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PLATO'S REPUBLIC

THE GREEK TEXT

EDITED, WITH NOTES AND ESSAYS

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NOTES ON THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO

BOOK I.

ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑ] The second title, περὶ δικαίων, found in Par. A and other MSS., is probably a later addition. The plural form, πολιτείων, also occurs.

The scene is laid in the house of Cephalus at the Peiraeus, and the whole discourse is supposed to be repeated by Socrates the day after it actually took place. To the Republic as to the Charmides, Lysis, Parmenides, and in a less degree to the Protagoras, Euthydemus, Symposium and Phaedo, Plato has given the form of a narrated dialogue. By this device he is enabled to combine description with dramatic effect.

The unfinished trilogy of the Timaeus, Critias, and Hermocrates professes to be a continuation of the Republic (cp. Tim. ad init.), but may have been added long afterwards (cp. the parallel relation of the Sophist and Statesman to the Theaetetus, which last would seem, from a comparison of the style, to have been written at an earlier time). The Republic contains no hint of the more comprehensive scheme. In the Timaeus Socrates is represented as having on the previous day set forth the principles of his ideal commonwealth to a select company, consisting of Timaeus, Critias, Hermocrates, and a fourth person, whose name is not mentioned.

ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ] Socrates is the principal speaker, the chief interlocutors being Glaucon and Adeimantus, the sons of Ariston and Perictione, and brothers of Plato, who, like a painter, introduces the names and portraits of his family in several of his
dialogues (himself and Adeimantus in the Apology; Charmides and Critias in the Charmides; Critias in the Timaeus and Critias; Adeimantus, Glaucon, and Antiphon in the Parmenides). There are present also Thrasymachus, the sophist, who is 'charmed' into silence at the end of the First Book (cp. ii. 358 b), Cephalus and his eldest son Polemarchus, who soon vanish from the scene, Lysias (the orator) and Euthydemus, also sons of Cephalus, Niceratus the son of Nicias (cp. the Laches), Charmantides and Cleitophon. The last five, if we except a few words from Cleitophon (i. 340 a, b), are mute auditors. The circumstances of the opening scene are quickly lost sight of. Polemarchus once again appears, v. 449 b. Thrasymachus interposes once in v. 450, and is made the subject of a good-humoured remark in vi. 498 c.

Critics have discussed at length not only the date at which the Republic was written, which can only be approximately guessed at, but the date which the author intended to be represented in it. The year assumed by Boeckh¹ for the imaginary scene is 411 or 410 B.C. Most of the characters in the Republic and also in the Timaeus and Critias agree with this date. Socrates himself was then about fifty-seven or fifty-eight years old, Lysias had just returned from Thurii to Athens in 411; the calamities of the year of the thirty had not yet fallen upon his house; Prodicus and possibly also Protagoras, both of whom are referred to as living persons in x. 600 c, may have been still alive (the date of Protagoras' death is quite uncertain: Prodicus is spoken of as a living person in the Apology). Hermocrates, if, as is probable, the Syracusan general of that name is intended in the Timaeus, may well have been at Athens at the time, after his banishment, and on his way to Pharnabazus. The minor discrepancy respecting the death of Cephalus, which is said by the pseudo-Plutarch (Vit. Or. iii. 3) to have occurred before the settlement of Lysias at Thurii (B.C. 443), is not worth noticing. Even if we accept this last statement on such authority,—and it is more or less contradicted by Lysias,—there is no reason to suppose that Plato would have cared about accuracy in such a minute detail. He is careless of such dramatic proprieties. His dialogues, like the plays of Shake- speare, are works of fiction, which have only a certain degree of historical truth. Many anachronisms occur in them, e.g. Ismenias the Theban, who did not become famous until some time after

¹ De tempore quo Plato Rempublicam peroratam finxerit, dissertationes III: Kleine Schriften, iv. 437 sqq.
Socrates’ death, is mentioned by him in the Republic (i. 336 A) among great potentates; in the Menexenus, Aspasia, the mistress of Pericles, continues her survey of Greek history down to the peace of Antalcidas, b.c. 387; in the Symposium (193 a), Aristophanes, at the banquet of Agathon, which is supposed to have taken place in 416 b.c., uses an illustration taken from the dismemberment of Arcadia, or rather of Mantinea, by the Lacedaemonians (b.c. 385). It is doubtful whether Parmenides and Socrates can ever have met, as they are said to have done in the Theaetetus (183 e), Sophist (217 c), and Parmenides (127 b); and certainly the meeting is not to be taken as historical on the authority of Plato. These examples are enough to show that Plato is not to be appealed to as an authority for the dates of his dramatis personae, any more than Shakespeare or Sir Walter Scott. It is not known at what date the worship of Bendis was introduced in Attica, though it appears to be referred to in an inscription found at Salamis (Foucart, Associations religieuses, p. 209), but for the reason just stated this point is likewise unimportant.

To defend uncertain, or try to reconcile inconsistent, statements in a work of imagination is out of place and alien to the true spirit of criticism.

Socrates and Glaucon are about to return from the Peiraeus after a festival, when they are detained by Polemarchus. He takes them home with him, and Socrates enters into conversation with Cephalus, the aged father of the household.

C. Age is in itself a time of peace. The sorrows of old men are to be attributed to their own faults and tempers.

S. The world will say that you are happy in old age because you are rich.

C. Neither a bad rich man can be happy in age, nor a good poor man.

S. What is the chief advantage of riches?

C. Not to have deceived any one in word or deed, and to have paid one’s debts to gods and men.

S. But is justice simply to speak the truth and pay your debts, or are there exceptions to this rule?

C. Yes, there are.

‘And yet,’ interrupts Polemarchus, ‘the definition which has been given has the authority of Simonides.’

Cephalus retires to look after the sacrifices.
The old anecdote that the words with which the Republic opens were found after Plato’s death with various transpositions in his tablets—which is narrated by Diogenes Laertius (fl. 200? A. D.) and Panaetius (185?–110? B.C.)—Diog. Laer. iii. 25. 37 Euphorion ὤ καὶ Παναίτιος εἰρήκασι πολλάκις ἑστραμμένην εὐρήσατα τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς πολιτείας—and by Dionysius of Halicarnassus (fl. circa 30 B.C.) de comp. verb. v. p. 209 (Reiske) τὴν δὲ ἐλευθερασίαν αὐτοῦ (sc. τοῦ Πλάτωνος) λέγουσιν εὐρέθηναι, ποικίλως μετακειμένη τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς Πολιτείας ἔχουσαν τὴν, κατέβην χθές εἰς Πειραιὰ μετὰ Πλαύκωνος τοῦ Ἀρίστωνος,—may be true, but is more likely to have been invented.

τῇ θεῷ] Bendis, as is proved by the words of Thrasymachus, i. 354 Α ταῦτα δὴ σοι, ὁ Σωκράτης, εἰστιάσασθαι ἐν τοῖς Βένδιδείοις. The prominent part which the Thracians take in the procession seems to show that she is a Thracian goddess: Proclus (Theolog. 353) and others identify her with Artemis. Cp. Schol. in Rep. ἐπεὶ καὶ Βένδις παρ’ αὐτοῖς (sc. τοῖς Ὁραξίῳ) ἢ Ἀρτέμις καλεῖται. It is not a little curious that the Platonic Socrates should care to be present at the inauguration of one of those ‘strange divinities’ who seem to have clustered about the Peiraeus in the fourth century, B.C. and even earlier (Foucart, op. cit. p. 57). See especially Laws x. 910 c.

καὶ ἢ τῶν ἑπιχωρίων] καὶ anticipates the mention of the Thracians, who are equal if not superior to the natives of Peiraeus. The second καὶ and a ὤ corresponding to μέν, which might have been expected, pass into οὐ μέντοι ἢττον . . . ἡν = οὐχ ἢττον ῥε . . . καὶ ἡν.

B θεωρήσαντες] ‘Having seen the spectacle,’ corresponding to ἀμα τὴν ἑορτὴν βουλήμενος θεάσασθαι.

κατεδών οὖν πόρρωθεν ἡμᾶς οἴκαδε ὁρμημένους Πολέμαρχος ὁ Κεφάλου ἐκέλευσε δραμόντα τῶν παῖδα περιμεναί κελεύσαι] ‘Thereupon Polemarchus, the son of Cephalus, catching sight of us from afar, after we had set out on our way home, bade (ἐκέλευς) his servant run and bid us (κελεύσαι) wait for him.’

ὀditos, ἐφι, ἄπιθεν προσέρχεται]. ‘There he is coming up behind.’ Ὄδος is ‘deictic.’

ἀλλὰ περιμένετε . . . ἀλλὰ περιμενοῦμεν] ‘But, pray you, wait.’ ‘But we intend to wait’: cp. infra 328 B ἀλλὰ μεῖνητε. This expostulatory use of ἀλλά implies resistance and opposition, which is to be overcome in the mind of another. The second ἀλλά deprecates the assumption implied in the first, that they do not intend to wait.
As if from the procession,' i.e. it was natural to suppose they had been there. From the direction in which they were coming, Socrates infers that they had been at the spectacle, but does not know it.

A similar playful threat occurs in the Philebus 16 A ἀρ', ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐχ ὁμών τὸ πλῆθος, ὅτι νέοι πάντες ἔσμεν; καὶ οὐ φοβεῖ μὴ σοι μετὰ Φιλήβου ξυνεπιθώμεθα; in the Phaedrus, 236 C ἔσμεν δὲ μάνω μὲν ἐν ἔρημίᾳ, ἰσχυρότεροι δὲ ἐγὼ καὶ νεώτεροι: in the Charmides, 176 C ὀς βιασμένου, ἑφη, ἐπειδήπερ οδε γε ἐπιτάττει. Cp. also Symposium 213 c, where Socrates claims the protection of Agathon against the apprehended violence of Alcibiades. Plato frequently repeats not only the same thought, but even small dramatic traits and terms of expression.

ὁδόκων, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ἐτι ἐν λείπεται] εὐλείπεται is the reading of ΑΠΜ and other MSS. 'Is there not still left out the supposition of our persuading you?' For the use of the passive cp. Philebus 18 D τὸ δ' αὐτὸ μοι τοῦ λόγου νῦν τε καὶ σμικρῶν ἐμπροσθεν εὐλείπεται. See Goodwin, M. and T. 490, 2. 'The marginal reading of ἐν λείπεται, 'Is there not still one alternative which remains?' is perhaps better and more emphatic and has been adopted in our text; but the other reading may still be defended. The emendation may be due to the fact that εἴτε is otiose; it does not introduce a second omission. 'There is a combination of two ideas: 'Is there not still the supposition?'' and 'Have you not omitted the supposition?' Both = 'Have you not omitted the supposition which still remains?'

ὁς τοῖνυ μὴ ἀκουσμένων] The genitive absolute is placed in a dependent relation to the main verb διανοεῖσθε by the addition of ὁς: cp. vii. 523 c ὡς ἐγγίθεν... ὥρμενοι λέγοντος μοι διανοοῦ: Xen. Cyr. viii. 4. 27. Goodwin, M. and T. 864, 918. 'The expression of the antecedent in οὕτω adds a peremptory emphasis like 'even' in Shakespeare. See Schmidt's Shakespeare Lexicon, s.v. 'even,' § 8. 'You may even be assured we won't listen.'

ἀρά γε... οὖν ἵστη ὅτι λαμπᾶς ἠσται] 'Are you really not aware that——?' Adeimantus is surprised at the ignorance of the torch-race which Socrates' early departure betrays.

For the torch-race see the article λαμπαδηδρομία in Smith's Dictionary of Antiquities. There is a difficulty in reconciling the form of the race described in Pausanias (Attica c. xxx. 2 ἐν Ἀκαδημίᾳ δὲ ἐστι Προμηθέως βωμός καὶ θέουσαν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ πρὸς τὴν πόλιν ἔχοντες καιομένας λαμπάς: τὸ δὲ ἀγώνισμα ὦμοι τῷ δρόμῳ
Republic

328 A

phiλάξι τήν δάδα ἂτι καυμένην ἐστίν ἀποσβεσθείσης δέ, οὐδὲν ἂτι τῆς νίκης τῷ πρῶτῳ, δευτέρῳ δὲ ἀντ' αὐτοῦ μέτεστιν εἰ δὲ μηδέ τοιτή καίωτο, ὁ τρίτος ἐστὶν ὁ κρατῶν εἰ δὲ καὶ πάσων ἀποσβεσθείσης, οὐδεὶς ἐστιν, ὅτι καταλείπεται ἡ νίκη), which is between single competitors who run the whole course and where there is no passing on of the torch, with the favourite use of the image in such passages as Laws vi. 776 B γεννώντα τε καὶ ἐκφέρωντο παιδας, καθάπερ λαμπάδα τῶν βίων παραδιδόν- τας ἀλλοις ἐξ ἄλλων: Lucretius ii. 79 'Et quasi cursores vitae lampada tradunt': Persius vi. 61 'Cur me in decursu lampada poscis? ' Compare also Aesch. Agam. 312, 313 λαμπαδηφόρων νόμοι, ἀλλος παρ' ἄλλοι διαδοχοί πληρομενει, and the application of the image in Herod. viii. 98 to the Persian ἀγγαροι or royal post-runners. All these latter passages seem to imply a line of runners, each of whom carries the torch a certain distance and then hands it on to a successor. The form of the race which Plato has in mind in this passage was probably of this kind, the contest being between several competing lines running side by side.

διαδώσουσιν ἀλλῆλοις ἀμιλλώμενοι τοῖς ἵπποις;] The relation between ἀμιλλώμενοι and διαδώσουσιν is not to be pressed: all that is necessarily implied is that the competitors were on horseback, and that they passed the torch from one to the other: not that the transmission took place while the riders were at full speed.

ἐξαναστησόμεθα γάρ] Γάρ does not merely refer to ἐξον θέασασθαι, but introduces reasons for the mention of the παννυχίς. ['I mention the night-festival,] for we will rise after supper,' &c. The supper, torch-race and night-festival are entirely forgotten in the sequel.

B eἰς τοῦ Πολεμάρχου] Cephalus, the rich Syracusan, had settled in Attica at the invitation of Pericles (Lys., c. Eratosth. § 4, p. 120) about 440 B.C. He was joined there by his three sons, Polemar- chus, Lysias and Euthydemus, who are mentioned here, and are spoken of by their aged father as young men (328 B). Polemar- chus, however, is represented as head of the household, although Cephalus, whom Plato has probably kept alive for the purpose of the dialogue, still acts as the family priest. And Lysias, who was born in 458 B.C., would at the imaginary date of the dialogue (if that is B.C. 411) be forty-seven years old. In the Phaedrus (257 B) Socrates suggests that Lysias should cease to busy himself with the composition of paradoxical orations, and, like his brother Polemarthus, turn to philosophy. Polemarthus was put to death by the order of the Thirty Tyrants in 404 B.C. Of Euthydemus,
who must not be confounded with the Sophist of that name, nothing more is known.

καὶ δὴ καὶ] calls particular attention to the stranger Thrasy-
machus, a sophist or rhetorician who came to Athens about the
year 430 B.c.: facetiously described by Plato in the Phaedrus
(267 c) as a sort of rhetorical Titan (τῶν Χαλκηδονίου σθένος). ‘He
was a great master of the pathetic—would put people into a rage
and out again.’ ‘No one better at inventing or answering
calumnies’ 1. In the Rhetoric of Aristotle (ii. 23) the same
character appears: ‘Herodicus was wont to say of Thrasymachus
that he was ever Thrasymachus (bold in battle), as Conon said of
Thrasylalus that he was truly Thrasylalus (bold in council) 2. He
is spoken of with more respect by other writers (Cic. de Orat.
iii. 323).

Cleitophon may be inferred to be a disciple of Thrasymachus
from the part which he takes in the skirmish with Polemarchus
infra, 340 A). In the Cleitophon Cleitophon charges Socrates
with exhorting people to virtue, but with not telling them what it
is; and for this reason he resorts to Thrasymachus and other
sophists. The dialogue recalls in many passages the First Book
of the Republic: it is probably spurious and may have been
suggested by the passage just cited.

dia χρόνου γὰρ καὶ ἑωράκη αὐτὸν] ‘For indeed it was a long
since I had seen him.’ Kαι adds emphasis to the sentence
and refers to μᾶλα πρεσβίτες μοι ἔδοξεν κ.τ.λ. (not ‘It was long
since I had actually seen him’). The connexion of the sen-
tences is: ‘He appeared to me very aged. And no wonder,
for . . . ’

οὐ δὲ θαμίζεις] Compare II. xviii, 385:

τίπτε, Θέτι ταύπεπλε, ἰκαίεις ἡμέτερον δώ
αιδοίη τε φίλη τε; πάρος γε μὲν οὐ τι θαμίζεις.

1 Phaedrus 267 C, ὥ τῶν γε μὴν οἰκτρογόνων ἐπὶ γῆρας καὶ πενίαν ἐλκομένων
λόγων κεκρατηκέναι τέχνη μοι φαίνεται τοῦ τῶν Χαλκηδονίου σθένος· ὁργίας τ' αὐ
πολλοῦ ἄμα δεινὸς ἄνιψ τῆς γένους, καὶ πάλιν ὑφρυμένως ἑρμόθιν πηλεῖν ὡς ἱρὴ
διαβάλλει τε καὶ ἀπολύσαι διαβολᾶς ὑθεδῆ κραίστως. ib. 269 D ὃσον
β' αὐτοῦ (sc. βηρωκῆς) τέχνη, οὔχ ἦ λοφίας τε καὶ ῥασάμαχος πορεύεται,
dοκεῖ μοι φαίνεσθαι ἢ μέθοδος.

2 Aristot. Rhet. ii. 23, 29 καὶ ὡς Κώνων ῥασάμθυλον ῥασάμθυλον ἐκάλει, καὶ
Ἡρόδηκος ῥασάμαχον "αἱ ῥασάμαχοι ἐλ." 3

3 'Quid de Prodico Chio, quid de Thrasymacho Chalcedonio, de Protagora
Abderita loquar? quorum unusquisque plurimum temporibus illis, etiam de
natura rerum, et disseruit et scripsit.'
The latter words have suggested the emendation oβει in this passage. But this is unnecessary, and less expressive. The δε in οτ δε may be explained as adversative to the idea contained in ἡσαπάζετο: i.e. 'You are welcome, Socrates, but you do not come often enough.'

χρην μεντοι] The imperfect here, as in ην, ἐδει, ημεν immediately following, is quite general, but there is a shade of difference between it and χρη ἱνα. χρην, 'you ought to do what you have not been doing': χρη simply, 'you ought to do what you can do.'

οὔδεν ἂν σε ἐδει] Goodwin, M. and T. 423, points out that in such cases 'the leading verb takes ἂν when the chief force falls on the necessity, propriety, or possibility of the act rather than on the act itself.'—'There would be no need (as there now is) of your coming hither.'

D ἡμείς] The familiar use of the plural for the singular.

νῦν δε σε χρη πυκνότερον δεύρο ἑναι] 'But as things are (i.e. seeing that I am an old man) you should come here oftener.' In the Laches (181 c) the old man Lysimachus addresses Socrates in a similar strain: χρην μεν οὖν καὶ πρώτερον γε φοιτάν αυτῶν παρ' ἡμᾶς καὶ οἰκείους ἡγεῖσθαι, ὡσπερ τὸ δίκαιον. νῦν δ' οὖν ἀπὸ τῆς ἡμέρας, ἐπειδὴ ἀνιγνωρίσαμεν ἀλλήλους, μή ἄλλος ποιεῖ, ἀλλὰ σύνασθι τε καὶ γνώριζε καὶ ἡμᾶς καὶ τούσδε τούς νεώτερους, ὡπως ἄν διασώζητε καὶ ἡμείς τὴν ἡμετέραν φιλίαν, κ.τ.λ., in which as in the speech of Cephalus there is an imitation of the garrulity of old age.

tοίοδε τε τοῖς νεώτεροις] Cephalus thus speaks of his sons, although they are men of middle age. Some early interpreters and Bocckh make τοίοδε τε τοῖς νεώτεροις refer only to Glaucon and Adeimantus, the Athenian youths, and Serranus renders 'et hos adolescentes tecum adducas velim.' This notion, which was probably strengthened by the v. r. νεώτεροις, is really inadmissible.

καὶ μην ... χαίρω γε] 'Believe me, Cephalus, that I have a real pleasure in talking to very old men:' γε is omitted in A and other MSS.

καὶ δή καὶ σοι ἢδεως ἂν πυθοίμην] καὶ δή καὶ, as often, introduces a special instance: 'I take a pleasure in conversing with all old men ... and of you in particular I should like to ask.'

tούτο ... ἔξαγγελλείς] The vague phrase ὁ τί σοι φαίνεται τούτο is made clearer by the explanatory clause πυθοίμην ... ἔξαγ-
Notes : Book I.

γέλλεις. τοῦτο refers to ὄδον . . . ποιά τίς ἐστιν, κ.τ.λ., 'the nature of the path of life in old age;' but the meaning is defined by the addition of ἑσπερὶ . . . πώς τι, which gives the reason for asking Cephalus to give his own experience in the matter. τοῦ βίου is a partitive genitive depending on χαλεπὸν, 'a harsh part of life.' χαλεπὸν sc. ἐστι: this is preferable to making it an accusative governed by ἔστεγόλλεις, which might seem natural but for φαίνεται preceding. As in Iliad xxiv. 486:

μνήσαι πατρὸς σείω, θεωίς ἐπεικελ' Ἀχιλλεῦ,

τηλίκου ὥσπερ ἔγών ὁδῷ ἐπί γῆραος οὐδῷ,

and Odyssey xv. 246:

οὐδ' ἱκετο γῆραος οὐδόν,

life is compared to a house, of which Cephalus is standing on the threshold—i.e. old age—preparatory to leaving it: (or old age or even death may be a house which he is entering). The meaning of the metaphor has been generalized by familiar use. It occurs also in Herodotus iii. 14, 12 ἐς πτωχήμην ἀπίται ἐπὶ γῆραος οὐδῷ.

διασώζοντες τὴν παλαιὰν παροιμίαν] 'Keeping up the old adage,'—ἡλικὴ ἡλικα τέρπει.

ἐνπόντες] is the resumption of συνερχόμεθα. The present in both cases has a general meaning, not 'are coming' but 'come together.' Cp. vi. 493 c ἡ οὖν τι τοῦτο δοκεῖ διαφέρειν ὁ τὴν τῶν πολλῶν καὶ παντοδαπῶν ἐνπόντων ὄργῃ καὶ ἤδων κατανεοφείνῳ σοφίαν ἠγάμενοι; ἐνπόντες, the correction of Ast and Buttman, is unnecessary.

ἀναμιμησκόμενοι] 'calling to mind,' 'reminding one another.' The word more commonly governs the genitive: περὶ here gives indefiniteness.

καὶ ἄλλα ἀτα ἃ τῶν τοιοῦτων ἔχεται] 'and other things connected therewith.' For this idiomatic use of ἔχεται cp. Theaet. 145 A ὅσα παιδείας ἔχεται.

τότε μὲν εὖ ἐντε] The participle is in the imperfect tense.

ἐπὶ τοῦτῳ δὴ τὸ γῆρας ὑμνοῦσιν ὅσαν κακῶν σφίσιν αἵτιον] 'and from this they take occasion' (τοῦτῳ referring to προσπηλακίσεις τοῦ γῆρως) 'to bewail old age as bringing upon them innumerable evils.' ὑμνεῖν is used in a depreciatory sense, as viii. 549 D οἷα φιλοῦσιν οἱ γυναῖκες περὶ τῶν τοιοῦτων ὑμνεῖν.
Plato: Republic.

Republic

I.

329

B

ἔνεκα γε γήρως] is resumptive of τοῦτο: 'if old age were the cause, as an old man I am sure that I should have felt the same.'

Cp. 337 D ἀλλ’ ἔνεκα ἀρχηγίαν λέγε ('if money is the question').

καὶ ἄλλοις, καὶ δὴ καὶ Σοφοκλεῖ] The first καὶ prepares the way for the particular example of Sophocles.

C

ἐτὶ οὖσ᾿ τε εἰ... συγγίγνεθαῖ] Hirschig, approved by Cobet, would delete these words. But they are required by the cry of shame, εὐφήμει, which follows.

ἀποφυγόν] This passage is imitated by Cicero, De Senectute c. 14 'Quum ex eo quidam iam affecto aetate quareret, utereturne rebus Venereis, "Dii meliora, (inquit,) libenter vero (μείναι) istinc tanquam a domino agresti ac furioso profugi."' Cp. the description of Sophocles in Aristophanes, Ran. 82 ὁ δ’ εὐκολος μὲν ἐνθάδ’, εὐκολος δ’ ἐκεί, which expresses the same character.

παντάπασι γὰρ... ἐπειδὰν αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι παῦσωνται κατατείνουσαι καὶ χαλάσωσι... ἀπηλλάχθαι] It is best to omit γὰρ after ἐπειδὰν with Par. A: the clause ἐπειδὰν αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι... χαλάσωσι being taken as an explanation of ἐν τῷ γῆρᾳ. This involves an asyndeton of παντάπασι, which introduces an emphatic resumption of the first clause of the sentence παντάπασι... ἐλευθερία. The asyndeton at δεσποτῶν κ.τ.λ. is the common asyndeton which is allowed in an explanatory statement. We note the absolute use of κατατείνουσαι and χαλάσωσι: the word κατατείνουσαι has the same general sense with συνεινό, συντάνως, and other compounds of τείνω.

D

ἔστι] 'it is the case.' Arist. Ath. Pol. ch. 55 (Kenyon: Col. 28) ἔστι δὲ ψηφιζέσθαι, 'and the case is one of voting.'

τῷ τοιοῦτῳ] sc. τῷ μὴ κοσμίῳ καὶ εὐκόλῳ, κ.τ.λ.

ἔμμβαινει] These words are also imitated by Cicero, De Senect. cc. 2, 3, and the story of Themistocles and the Seriphian is repeated. Cicero, like Virgil (who πάντας ἄνθρωπος έκέκαστο κλεπτοσύνη), freely appropriates the turns of expression, as well as the subject matter, of his Greek master. But while the Latin poem is moulded by Virgil into a true work of Roman genius, the Latin dialogue is an inertistic imitation of the Greek model, being neither Greek in character nor Roman: a monologue rather than a dialogue, in which the grace of conversation, as well as much of the subtlety of philosophical thought, is lost.

ἐκίνουν] 'tried to draw him out.' Cp. Lysis 223 A ἐν νῷ
Notes: Book I.

11

eίχον ἄλλον ἢδη τινά τῶν πρεσβυτέρων κινεῖν: Xen. Mem. iv. 2. 2

Republic I.

329

to tou Thēμιστοκλέους] For a different version of the story, in which Timodemus of Belbina in the Saronic gulf (now the Island of St. George) called also the Aphidnean, takes the place of the Seriphian, see Herod. viii. 25.

εὖ ἔχει] ‘is in point.’ The abruptness of the expression is softened by the repetition of it with ὁ αὐτός λόγος (330 Α), in the corresponding clause, where also the words τοῖς πλούσιοις are parallel with τῷ Σεριφίῳ in the preceding part of the sentence.

δὲν κεκτήσαι] Socrates returns to the fact on which the conversation turns, supra 329 ε γεῖ τὸ πολλὴν οὐσίαν κεκτήσαι.

ποῖς ἐπεκτησάμην] ‘Acquired, do you say?’ This use of ποῖος is not necessarily derisive or ironical, as in Gorg. 490 c ποιῶν ἴματοι; but only implies a humorous feeling of contrast between the suggestion and the fact. Cephalus may be supposed to speak with a gentle smile, remembering that his additions had been but small to the diminished fortune which he had received. Cp. infra ἐγὼ δὲ ἢγαπῶ, κ.τ.λ.

tουτοῦ] ‘to my sons here’—an emendation of Bekker for τούτους, the reading of the MSS. The ‘Ionic’ dative plural form in σι(ν) is rare in the Republic and occurs mostly in passages which have a poetical tinge, i. 345 ε, iii. 388 δ, 389 β, viii. 560 ε, 564 c.

диπλῇ ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι ἄσπαξονται αὔτα] The dative or adverbial termination in διπλῇ probably here expresses the manner and not the measure of excess: ‘in a two-fold way’ as compared with, rather than ‘double as much as.’ It is taken up in ταύτῃ and in κατὰ τὴν χρείαν, ἵπτερ οἱ ἄλλοι. The MS. emendation καὶ οفاعلτᾳ τῆν χρείαν is clearly erroneous and makes havoc of the sense. With διπλῇ ἢ cp. vii. 539 δ ἡπτὶ διπλάσια ἢ τότε.

χαλεποὶ . . . ξυγγενέσθαι] For the construction cp. Phaedr. 275 ν χαλεποὶ ξυγνείαι.

καταγελόμενοι] The participle is imperfect = οἱ καταγελώντο.

καὶ αὐτός . . . ἣδικηκεν] The sentence becomes anacoluthic at καθόρα, which would naturally have been καθόρων: cp. vi. 495 ν ὅπῃ ἐφείμενα πολλοί, κ.τ.λ. where a main verb similarly takes the place of a participle. The resumptive ὅν, however this may be, make the irregularity less striking. Cp. Tim. 28 τὸ δὴ πᾶς οὐχίσκοις ἢ κόσμος ἢ καὶ ἄλλο ὅ τι ποτὲ ὄνομαζόμενος . . . σκεπτέον δ' οὖν περὶ αὐτοῦ πρῶτον.

D

E
Plato: Republic.

Republic

I.

τῶ δὲ ... γνωριμόφος] ‘but if a man is conscious of no injustice, hope is ever present to cheer him (ἡδεία), and to be his kindly nurse in age.’ The order of the words is not ἔλπις ἡδεία καὶ ἀγαθή, but ἡδεία πάρεστι καὶ πάρεστιν ἀγαθή γνωριμόφος.

A

άλλα γε ἐν ἀνθέν ἐνός οὐκ ἔλαχιστον ... εἰναι]. ἐν ἀνθέν ἐνός, an adverbial idiom, like ἐν πρός ἐν Laws i. 6.47 b. The emphasis is on οὐκ ἔλαχιστον. ‘But, comparing one thing with another, I should not reckon wealth as least useful for this object.’ In οὐκ ἔλαχιστον ... χρησιμότατον there seems to be a confusion of two constructions: οὐχ ἢκιστα χρήσιμον and χρησιμότατον. Stobaeus gives ἀλλ' ἐν γε.

B

tοῦτο δ' αὐτό ... λάβῃ] ‘but as to this very thing, justice I mean, shall we say thus simply (as you imply), that it is truthfulness, and the restoration of what a man receives from another?’ τοῦτο δ' αὐτό refers to εἰς τοῦτο, which itself goes back to τὸ γὰρ μηδὲ ἄκοντα ... ἀπείρᾳ δεδωτὰ. The train of thought is as follows: ‘You imply that a man may depart from life with a clear conscience if he has only told the truth and paid his debts, and that justice consists in this. But is it simply this—no more and no less? Are there not circumstances—e.g. if the man to whom we are speaking or to whom we are in debt is mad, in which to tell a lie or refuse to return a loan would be right; to speak the truth and return the loan wrong?’

For the indirect and natural way in which the subject of the dialogue is introduced, compare the Charmides; and for the familiar Socratic manner of commencing the argument with an external and superficial definition which is afterwards set aside or deepened by criticism and the consideration of instances, see the opening passages of the Charmides, Laches, Meno, Theaetetus.

Casuistry has a place in ancient as well as in modern thought, in Greek philosophy as well as in the theology of the Schoolmen and the Jesuits. It is not essentially the product of civilization or the consequence of deep pondering over moral problems. Amongst barbarous nations we already notice a tendency to casuistical distinctions: the letter, not the spirit of a contract, is observed by them; if the word of promise can be kept to the ear, the real or natural meaning of it is of no account (Thucyd. iii. 34). Early morality is legal and external, easily giving opportunity for such evasions; it is a morality of compulsion, not of willing obedience: the attitude of the savage towards a duty or obligation is to avoid fulfilling it so far as he can. In civilized
societies too a strong tendency to casuistry sets in when there is an abrupt transition from the old to the new, when the younger generation becomes dissatisfied with it and dares to criticize traditional morality and belief. It is this tendency which asserts itself in the transitional stage of Greek philosophy. Serious doubts arise when it is discovered that the old rule, which formerly claimed unquestioning obedience on all occasions, is found in the eye of reason and an enlightened conscience to admit of an exception. The course of such a revolution is well represented in the criticism and development of Cephalus' definition: but Plato artistically avoids the indignities which often arose out of such conflicts of the old and new by first requiring the retirement of Cephalus.

That simple rules, 'Thou shalt not lie,' 'Thou shalt not steal,' are modified by circumstances, was apparent enough to the contemporaries of Socrates. Aristotle, in the Nicomachean Ethics, is fond of turning aside into these by-paths of morals, which seem however to have rather an intellectual than a practical interest for him. Casuistical inquiry was carried still further in later writers, for example, in Panaetius, from whom Cicero partly borrowed his treatise 'De Officiis'; and the tendency was strengthened in later times by the parallel growth of law cases. Ancient casuistry is fresher than modern, and nearer to the first thoughts of mankind about right and wrong, growing up not so much out of the conflict of established principles, as in the effort to establish, widen, or purify them,—becoming in the hands of Socrates and Plato a sort of dialectic which undermines the maxims and aphorisms of the older times and prepares the way for higher and more universal conceptions of morality.

ἀπλῶς οὕτως] (1) 'thus absolutely:' οὕτως, i.e. 'as your words imply'; ἀπλῶς, 'absolutely,' i.e. making no allowance for circumstances. Cp. Laws i. 633 D ἄνθρωπον ἀληθείαν ἐστι, φέρε, τί θώμεν; πότερον ἀπλῶς οὕτως (as implied in what precedes) εἶναι πρὸς φόβους καὶ λύπας διαμάχην μόνον, ἢ καὶ πρὸς πόθους τε καὶ ἡδονῶς καὶ τινας δεινας θωπείας κολακιάς; infra iii. 386 B λοιπὸν ἀπλῶς οὕτως τὰ ἐν Ἀιθου, referring to the opinion of the terrors of the other world which has been just alluded to. Or, (2) 'just absolutely,' οὕτως being used idiomatically as in ῥαδίως οὕτω (ii. 377 B, 378 A) without any special reference.

ὁ ἀποδιδοὺς] 'The restorer in the case mentioned '; hence the article, which is omitted with ἐδέλων in what follows (οὐδ' αὐτ...
14  Plato: Republic.

Republic  λέγων, 'any more than if he were willing to tell the whole truth to a person in this condition.' The subject of ἀποδίδωσι and ἔθσιον is one and the same person: 'neither the restorer... nor the same person if he wished.'

D ὁτις ἐστὶ δικαίοσύνης] 'The definition or determining principle of justice:' ὁτις is here used as in Aristotle but in a less technical sense. Like other Aristotelian terms in Plato it retains several other meanings. The logical sense of 'term' or 'proposition' which appears occasionally in Aristotle is as yet unknown.

πάντα μὲν οὖν] 'Nay, but it is.' Μὲν οὖν is a corrective of the preceding sentence.

καὶ μέντοι... καὶ] like καὶ δὴ καὶ implies a sort of meditative transition, μέντοι calling attention to a new feature in the case. 'Well, said Cephalus (since you take up the argument), I hand it over to you.' The intervention of Polemarchus appears to Cephalus a fit opportunity for retiring: so he takes advantage of it to bequeath the argument to him. The second καὶ indicates that as Polemarchus has put in a word, the natural consequence of the interruption is that Cephalus should resign the argument.

Polemarchus, who 'inherits' the argument, is now called upon to defend the thesis of Simonides.

S. What does the divine poet mean by 'debt' in his definition of justice? Not simply that which has been lent; e.g. to the madman?

P. Certainly not; for if the madman were our friend, we should be doing him harm; whereas Simonides thinks that harm should be done to enemies, as is fitting (προσήκει), not to friends.

S. So Simonides meant by 'debt' 'what is fitting' (τὸ προσήκει). And Justice is the art of benefiting friends and harming enemies. But when does it benefit us, as piloting benefits us when we are at sea?

P. When we make war.

S. Then Justice is of no use in time of peace?

P. In partnerships.

S. Partnerships in what?

P. In money transactions.

S. Not in buying and selling: in buying or selling a horse a horse-dealer will be a better partner than a just man.

P. No, but in keeping money safe.
S. That is, while it is not put to any use? Justice, then, is only useful when the money is useless. But he who is strong in guarding is strong in attacking, as we see in medicine and in war, and so the just man, who is a good guardian of money, must also be an accomplished thief,—but always for the benefit of friends and harm of enemies.

Polemarchus, in desperation, repeats his definition—Justice benefits friends and harms enemies. Socrates proceeds to ask: Who are our friends? those who seem good to us, or those who are good?

P. Those whom we think good.

S. Then, if they seem and are not, the just will do good to bad men, and harm the good, who to him seem bad.

Polemarchus cries out against this conclusion and in order to avoid it, proposes to emend the definition. ‘A friend must not only seem, but also be a good man.’

S. Then Justice now means doing good to our friends who are good and harm to our enemies who are bad. But stay! Will the just do harm to any man? When harm is done to any creature, that creature loses something of his proper virtue. If harm therefore is done to any man, he loses something of justice. Our theory would make the just man the author of injustice, which is contrary to reason. That cannot have been the meaning of the wise Simonides, but must have been suggested by Periander, or Perdiccas, or Xerxes, or some other rich and seeming-powerful man. (Cp. Gorg. 466.)

The first book of the Republic is a preface to the rest; Socrates pulls out the stuff which is hereafter to be spun and woven. The analogy of the arts is introduced, but fails to give any clear conception of the virtues.

ο Πολέμαρχος τῶν γε σῶν κληρονόμος;] ‘Is not Polemarchus your heir?’ That is, ‘since the argument is yours’ (γε adding emphasis to σῶν), ‘does not Polemarchus inherit it?’

The character of Cephalus is distinguished by gentleness and goodness. There may also be traced in him the mannerism and garrulity of age: the love of anecdote and quotation, the matured experience of ‘the evening of life.’ Cicero (Ep. ad Att. iv. 16), who acknowledges himself to be what he truly is, an imitator of Plato in very minute particulars, remarks as follows on the retirement of Cephalus: ‘Quum in iis libris quos laudavi
Plato: Republic.

Republic

331 D

desideras personam Scaevolae, non eum temere demovi, sed feci idem quod in Πολυτις Deus ille noster Plato. Quum in Piraeanum Socrates venisset ad Cephalum locupletem et festivum senem, quoad primus ille sermo haberetur, adest in disputando senex; deinde quum ipse quoque commodissime locutus esset, ad rem divinam dicit se velle discedere, neque postea revertitur. Credo Platonem vix putasse satis consonum fore, si hominem id aetatis in tam longo sermone diutius retinuisset.' So in the Laches (189 b, c) the old man Lysimachus apologizes for the shortness of his memory: he 'cannot recollect the questions he would ask, or the answers to them.' Accordingly he subsides into a listener, who, though unable to take a part in the argument, is ready to act on the conclusions obtained. It may be noted also that the simpler conception of life and duty, the poetical and proverbial expression of it is better suited to the aged than to those who were deeply versed in the Sophistical and dialectical method of a later generation.

Sophistic cynicism, superficiality, and vehemence of assertion prove to be no match for the dialect of Socrates. Many questions are raised, 'of which we have a taste only and not a full meal,'—among them the question whether the just or unjust man is the happier, which in the sequel (iv. 445 a) 'becomes ridiculous.' The second book proceeds to ask in a more earnest strain, 'What is justice stripped of its externals?' Socrates then considers justice in the State, to help him to find justice in the individual. The justice thus found exists somehow in the relations of society (ii. 372 a).

λέγε δή, . . . ἐγώ δὲ ἀγνώ

[Observe the pretended awe for the authority of Simonides; the 'accustomed irony of Socrates' in professing his own ignorance, and assuming the knowledge of his companion. Simonides' definition, however, is not set aside, though certain explanations of it are, cp. esp. 335 ε.

ἀλλὰ μὲντοι; . . . τοῦτο μὲντοι] 'Αλλά opposes the words which follow to, μέντοι regards them as a limitation of, Socrates' rejection of Cephalus' definition. The second μέντοι limits the limitation introduced by the first. 'But (as opposed to what I have said) I said, it is true that it is not easy to disbelieve Simonides—for he was a wise and inspired man: still what he means by this . . . I fail to see.' It is true that the criticism of Cephalus' definition must be modified, if that definition has the authority of Simonides; but before we can appeal to his authority we must first understand his meaning. For τοῦτο δ' τι λέγει, 'what he means by this,' cp. Symp. 178 δ λέγω δὲ δή τι τοῦτο;
Notes: Book I.

σοφός] With a light touch of irony, as in Theaet. 151 B πολλοῖς μὲν δή ἑξεδωκὰ Προδίκῳ, πολλοῖς δὲ ἄλλοις σοφοῖς τε καὶ ἀπεπεσοῖς ἀνθρώπι.

μή σωφρόνου] i.e., ‘when not in his right mind.’ The adverb refers to the condition of the agent, not to the mode of action. It is probably used to avoid the awkward conjunction of two participles: μη σωφρονοῦντι ἀπαιτοῦντι.

ἀπαιτοῖ] i.e. ‘at a time when you might suppose him to demand it.’ Cp. Goodwin, M. and T. 555. He explains the optative as due to the fact that ἀποδοτέον=δέαν ἰν ἀποδίδον (resuming the previously expressed condition εἰ μὲνεις ἀπαιτοῖ). Cp. also ib. 521, for the forms of indefinite sentences.

ἡ τὸ τοιοῦτον] ‘Than this sort of thing’—i.e. than the making restoration to a man who is out of his mind.

ἀλλο μὲντοι . . . κακὸν δὲ μηδὲν] ‘Something different, certainly, said he; for he thinks that the debt which friends owe to friends is a benefit, and no injury whatever.’ Μέντοι as elsewhere in answers is used in confirmation of a previous suggestion: cp. v. 469 ε Ἐατέων ἀρα τάς νεκροσυλλᾶσ . . . ; Ἐατέων μὲντοι, ἐφί, νὴ Δία. Phaedo 73 d ἀλλα παν μυρία τουρν ἰν εἰη, Μυρία μέντοι νῃ Δία.

μανθάνω, ἣν δ’ ἐγώ] A similar argument occurs in the Memorabilia of Xenophon (iv. 2. 16, 17) where Socrates says that deception may be just towards enemies, and in some cases even towards friends; e.g., a general may fairly deceive dispirited troops by falsely telling them of the approach of allies; or, again, you may steal a sword from a melancholy friend who is about to destroy himself.

ἐάνπερ] Emphatic; ‘that is to say, if.’ The defining περ limits the assumption to the case in point. Cp. Theaet. 166 c ἐάνπερ ἀνομίοισι γένηται.

ἡνίξατο ἄρα . . . ἀφειλόμενον] Compare similar expressions in Charm. 162 Χ ἡνίττετο ἄρα, ὅς ἐοίκεν, ὅπερ ἄρτι ἐγώ ἐλεγον, ὁ λέγων τὸ τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττειν σωφροσύνην εἰναι: and Theaet. 152 c τοῦτο ἡμῖν μὲν ἡνίξατο τῷ πολλῷ συρφετὸ.

ἀνόμασεν, ‘he called,’ is slightly opposed to διενοεῖτο, ‘he meant.’

ἀλλὰ τί οἴει; . . . Σιμωνίδη] This is the reading which gives the best sense and which is found in nearly every MS. Like τί δή, τί μην in some of their uses, τί οἴει; = τί οἴει ἄλλο; ‘But what else do you suppose him to have done?’ Cp. Gorg. 480 B τί γὰρ δή φάσειν; sc. ἄλλο. There is a touch of humour in making Polemar- chus agree so heartily in the views suggested by Socrates, as if they had always been familiar to him. The same confidence is shown vol. iii.
in his previous answers, into which he is led by the arguments of Socrates. The Zurich edition of 1881, adopting Madvig's punctuation, reads 'Εφη with a capital letter, making ἀλλὰ τί οἴει; a part of the previous sentence. But the use of 'Εφη in the sense of ξυνέφη is doubtful; and the use of ἀλλὰ in continuing the previous sentence is very abrupt.

Another expedient is to cancel ἐφη and the stops, and place a dash after καλεῖται: ἀλλὰ τί οἴει, ὡ πρὸς Δίωσ, ἣν δ' ἐγώ (ἡν δ' ἐγώ being repeated, cp. infra 348 ν ἐφη . . . ἢ δ' ὅς). This receives some support from τί ἄν οἴει below, but no change is really necessary.

ὡ πρὸς Δίωσ[ ] Socrates now fairly warms to the argument; he exults in the train of thought which occurs to him; he begins enthusiastically with a frequently recurring formula (v. 459 λ, Lysis 214 ε, &c.—'By Heaven, I said'—to construct the Sorites which follows.—'To invite Socrates to an argument is like inviting horsemen to a plain' (Theaet. 183 d).

D ἣ οὖν δὴ τίσι τί, κ.τ.λ.] 'And what then will that be which the art called Justice gives, and to whom?'

εἰ μὲν . . . εἰρήμενοις] δεῖ, sc. (1) ἡμῖς, 'If we are to be consistent with what we said before': or (2) τὸ νῦν λεγόμενον, 'If this case is to go along with the rest.'

E τί δὲ ὁ δίκαιος;] sc. δικαίος εστὶ ποιεῖν, gathered from δικαστάτως . . . εὖ ποιεῖν above. An elliptical form of expression, in which we must supply some word to be gathered from the context: cp. infra 341 c τί δὲ κυβερνήτης; κ.τ.λ., and Gorgias 502 λ τί δὲ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ Μῆλης; κ.τ.λ.

ἐν τῷ προσπολεμεῖν] 'In going to war with others.' Thucyd. viii. 96. 5 ἐν τούτῳ μόνῳ Λακεδαιμόνιοι Ἀθηναῖοι πάντων δὴ ἔμφυτον προσπολεμήσαι ἐγένοτα. The repetition of ἐν τῷ with ἕμμαχεῖν,

though not necessary to the sense, is retained as having the greater MS. authority.

χρῆσιμον ἄρα] ἄρα, 'Then I am to understand.' Socrates carries on the argument a little further by extracting the answer from the respondent in a more general or abstract form. An explanation or new mode of statement, especially in dialogue, often takes the form of an inference.

τί δὲ δὴ;] marks the resumption of the main subject.

333 A ἐμβόλαια . . . κοινωνήματα] 'By contracts do you mean partnerships?' The more general word is substituted for the sake of extending the analogy.
peptwv] peptoi are 'draughts,' which were played in various ways. According to one mode of playing the game, you blocked up your antagonist so that he was unable to move. This process of 'shutting up' is used as an illustration of Socrates' method of arguing in vi. 487 B, c ὥσπερ ἑπὸ τῶν πεπτείνων δεινῶν οἱ μὴ τελευτῶντες ὑποκλείονται, k.t.l.

ἀλλ' εἰς πλίνθων] The new illustration is suggested by the word θέσις.

ὡσπερ ὁ κιθαριστικὸς τοῦ δικαίου] Plato in his lively manner passes unexpectedly from one illustration to another.

eἰς κρουμάτων] sc. κοινωνίαν: 'as a partner in playing the harp.'

ὁταν . . . σῶν εἰναι] 'When you want to deposit it and have it kept safely': σῶν εἰναι sc. το ἄργυρον: the subject is changed, as below—ὁταν μὴ δεῖν δέχῃ αὐτῷ χρήσθαι ἀλλὰ κείσθαι (sc. αὐτὸ).

καὶ κοινὴ καὶ ἴδια is a transition from the word κοινωνία: 'whether the guardians of it are partners or not.'

Socrates' 'incessant talk of cobblers, physicians, curriers, and cooks' (Gorg. 491 A) has left an impress on many passages in Plato. Both his political and his moral ideal are influenced by the analogy of the arts. But he repeatedly shows his sense of the inadequacy of the comparison of the 'art of living' to any particular art. And in the Statesman, 297 E, where the examples of the pilot, the physician, and the weaver are once more elaborately employed, he dwells expressly on the imperfect and provisional nature of the argument from example: ibid. 277 c.

οὐκ ἄν οὖν] Par. A reads οὐκ ἄν omitting ἄν, but οὐκ ἄν οὐν was clearly written in the margin, until a wormhole interfered with the ν of ἄν. The '?' in the critical note may therefore be cancelled.

εἰτε πυκτικὴ is added to vary the notion of μάχη from ὀπλιτική above, which has suggested the new topic; and also to introduce φυλάξασθαι, 'to parry a blow.'

καὶ λαθεῖν . . . ἐμποιήσαι;] The Zurich edition (1887) reads ἐμποιήσας, the conjecture of Schneider; but the emphasis falls on the wrong word, for the principal point is not that he who can guard against disease can be secret in producing it, but that he can produce it at all: that he does it secretly is merely a way in which Plato prepares for κλέψαι and φώρ δεινός in the following lines. It is better to retain the reading of the MSS., placing the comma after φυλάξασθαι, although the construction λαθεῖν ἐμποιήσαι

Notes: Book 1.

Republic

1. 333 B

2. C

3. D

4. E

5. C 2
Plato: Republic.

Republic

I.

333 E

=λάθρα ἐμποίησαι (‘best skilled to implant it by stealth’) is not free from suspicion. The second infinitive (sc. ὑπερ ἀπατ.) may be excused by the emphasis and by the position of διευκόλυτος. Early editors, following the MSS., put the comma after λαθείν. But λαθείν νόσον, ‘to elude a disease,’ is hardly defensible; and in leading up to the parallelism of φυλάξ with κλέψαι and with φῶρ in what follows, it is essential that φυλάξασθαι and λαθείν should be in separate clauses. Other emendations are (1) καὶ μὴ παθεῖν in q β’: but these MSS. are of questionable authority: (2) the omission of καὶ λαθείν—suggested by Muretus; in support of which it might be urged that the ‘accretion’ may have been due to a gloss on φυλάξασθαι having been μὴ παθεῖν. [L. C.]

To this it is right to add the following note by Professor Jowett:—

There is no MS. authority worth speaking of for any variation of the text in this passage. The principal emendation is that of Schneider, ἐμποίησαι for ἐμποίησαι, but to this it may be objected that the proper opposition is between φυλάξασθαι and ἐμποίησαι, not between φυλάξασθαι and λαθείν. The suggestion of Muretus that καὶ λαθείν should be omitted, as well as the MS. correction καὶ μὴ παθεῖν (q β’), is hardly worthy of notice. It is better to retain the old punctuation which places the comma after λαθείν and not after φυλάξασθαι. The chief reason why the passage has given trouble to interpreters is the impression that λαθείν can only be used with a personal object, and that therefore λαθείν νόσον, ‘to dodge a disease,’ is not good Greek. To this it may be replied that such personification involves a less flaw of language than the false opposition of φυλάξασθαι and λαθείν.

334 A

κλέψαι] ‘To steal an enemy’s plans and proceedings.’ Κλέψαι = ‘by stealth’ (1) ‘to get possession of,’ or (2) ‘to obtain advantage over.’

ὡς γοῦν . . . σημαίνει] ‘That is certainly what the argument implies.’ The qualification with γοῦν indicates Polemarchus’ reluctance to admit the conclusion, although he cannot rebut the argument.

ἀναπέφανται] expressing an unexpected result, as infra, 350 c: Sophist. 233 c διαφωτικῷ ἀρα . . . ὥ σοφιστῆς . . . ἔχων ἀναπέφανται.

B

κατά σὲ . . . Σιμωκίθην] Compare Theaet. 160 d, where there is a similar ironical use of the poets: κατὰ μὲν ὁμηρον καὶ Ἡράκλειτον καὶ πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον φέλον . . . . . κατὰ δὲ Θεαίτην. For the humour
of attributing to the respondent what Socrates has drawn out of him, compare also Gorg. 470 b, 503 c; Theaet. 163 a; Euthyd. 290.e.

ἐπ᾽ ὧφελίᾳ . . . . ἐχθρῶν] ‘For the good, however, of friends, and the harm of enemies.’ There is a humorous pretence of fairness in adding this limitation, which is also the link of connexion with what follows.

οὐκέτι . . . ἔλεγον] Cp. the passage in Meno 80 a, b, in which the influence of Socrates on his adversary is compared to that of the torpedo (νάρκη τῇ βαλαντίᾳ): ἀληθῶς γὰρ ἔγγει καὶ τὴν ψυχήν καὶ τὸ στόμα ναρκῶ: and Euthyphro 15 b, where Socrates himself is compared to Daedalus, as he makes the arguments of his adversary ‘walk away’: Alcibiades I. 127 δ, which has perhaps been imitated from this passage: ἀλλὰ μὰ τοὺς θεούς, ὃ Σώκρατες, οὔδ′ αὐτὸς οὔδ᾽ ὅ τι λέγω, κ.τ.λ.


καὶ ἐχθροῦς ὦσαυτῶς] Sc. τοὺς δοκοῦντας εἶναι πονηροῖς, ἥ τοὺς ὄντας, κἂν μὴ δοκῶσι.

tούτοις . . . φίλοι] ‘These then have the good for their enemies and the bad for their friends.’ τούτοις, ἵκε τοῖς περὶ ταύτα ἁμαρτάνοντων.

ἀλλ᾽ ἡμῶς δίκαιον] ἡμῶς—i. e. notwithstanding their mistake, the principle which has been laid down is to be applied, and the result in this case is that the evil are to be benefited and the good harmed.

μηδαμῶς] Polemarchus, moved not by shame, like Gorgias or Polus (Gorg. 482 c, &c.), or Thrasymachus (infra 352 b), but by honest indignation, entreats Socrates to alter the course of the argument. ‘Do not let us have that conclusion, Socrates.’ Cp. infra 335 λ κελεύεις, κ.τ.λ. For the ellipse of οὕτω βούμεν, or some similar expression, cp. Gorg. 497 θ ἡμᾶς, ὃ καλλίκλεις : Euthyd. 294 c.

δοσὶ διημαρτήκασι τῶν ἀνθρώπων] ‘That is to say, those of mankind who are in error.’ These words are added to explain πολλοίς, and refer to ἀρ ὁμαρτάνουσιν (supra, c). For the compound verb (dia = diverging from the aim) cp. Theaet. 178 λ ἡ ὄνω καὶ τυχάναι δεί, ἡ πολλά καὶ διαμαρτάνει ἐκάστη;

πονηροὶ γὰρ αὐτοῖς εἰσίν] ‘For they have bad ones.’

tὸν δοκοῦντα τε . . . καὶ τὸν ὄντα] The article, though repeated
for the sake of emphasis both with ὅτα and δοκοῦντα, refers to the same person. It may be expressed: ‘He is our friend, who not only seems, but who also is a good man.’

η αὐτῇ δέουσι [‘The same mode of statement’: cp. μεταδόθησα supra: viz., ‘our enemy is he who not only seems, but is so.’

κελεύεις . . . ἔλεγομεν] ‘You would have us add to our idea of justice more than we included in our first statement.’ The particle ἦ depends on the notion of a difference or comparison which is contained in προσεβίαι. Cp. Phaedr. 228 δ οἷς ἔφη διαφέρειν τὰ τοῦ ἐρώτος ἦ τὰ τοῦ μῆ: Gorg. 481 c ἀλλὰ τις ἥμων ἴδιῶν τι ἐπασχε πάθος ἦ οἱ ἄλλοι. In what follows the words νῦν πρὸς τούτῳ ὑδὲ λέγειν are in apposition with προσεβίαι and explanatory,—hence the asyndeton. λέγειν is governed by κελεύεις. By the terms of the argument the words ἄγαθον ὅτα, κακῶν ὅτα are added, not in limitation, but in definition of φίλον and ἐχθρόν: ‘our friend who is good,’ ‘our enemy, who is bad.’

That it is not right to harm even the evil is proved as follows:—When animals are harmed, they are made worse in that quality which is characteristic of them. That quality in man is justice: therefore, when man is harmed, he is rendered more unjust: whence follows the absurdity that justice is the cause of injustice. The argument is verbal, but hints at the truth more fully stated in ii. 379 c ff. (οὐδὲ ἀρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, . . . οἱ δὲ ὀνύναντο κολαζόμεναι).

μή οὔτω φάμεν] ‘Shall we be told that we must not say in like manner . . .’’ Cp. 337 β μή ἑποκρίνωμαι δὲν προείπες μηδέν;

ἀλλὰ τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ δή] δὴ emphasizes the real subject of inquiry; of which the previous cases are only illustrations. ‘And by justice then can the just make men unjust?’ So in οὐδὲ δή τοῦ ἄγαθον (infra, δ).

tούτῳ δὲ δὴ νοεῖ αὐτῷ] ‘And this moreover means for him.’ Cp. Euthyd. 287 β ὅ τι μοι νοοῖ τὸ ρῆμα;

σοφῶν . . . μακαρίων] Both σοφῶν and μακαρίων are here ironical. μακάριος originally means ‘blessed,’ and is sometimes applied to the dead: also, as here, to persons who have any cleverness or excellence—‘blest with understanding.’ Cp. Meno 71 b καυδελῶν σοι δοκεῖν μακάριος τις εἶναι, ἄρετήν γοῦν εἴτε διδακτόν εἴτε ὦτῳ τρόπῳ παραγίγνεται εἰδέναι.
Notes: Book I.

τὰς ὀφθαλμίας αὐτοῦ ἐτύληκαν τῷ Ἡρώδῃς], 'for my part, anyway (οὖν) I am ready to share in the battle;'—said in answer to the previous words of Socrates—'you and I will make war together.' The reading τὰς ὀφθαλμίας αὐτοῦ ἐτύληκαν is better than the emphatic ἐγὼ γεύσομαι. After Socrates has declared that both are ready to take up arms, there would be no meaning in Polemarchus' asseveration—'I at all events am ready to do so,' as though there were a doubt of Socrates.

τὸ ῥῆμα ἐπὶ τὸ φάσμα is in apposition with τὸ ῥῆμα: 'the saying which affirms that it is just to do good to friends and harm to enemies.'

Ἰσμηνίου τοῦ Θηβαίου] Cp. Meno 90 A, where Ismenias is said to have made himself a fortune in some sudden or irregular manner.—He was put to death by the Lacedaemonians in B.C. 382 after the seizure of the Cadmeia, on the ground that he had taken bribes from Persia.

μέγα οἰομένου δύνασθαι] 'who imagined that he had great power,' but had it not really, because Plato is not prepared to admit, as he here intimates by the word οἰομένου, that any man is really great or powerful who 'cannot do what he will.' (Gorg. 466 ff.)

οὐδὲ τούτο] Through the windings of dialectic we arrive at last in view of the Christian precept,—'Recompense to no man evil for evil.' After every caution and reservation something more is needed than the text of the old poet, which is only on a level with the old Hebrew saying, 'Thou shalt love thy neighbour and hate thine enemy.'

Yet the definition of Simonides is really a very good one, nor can any objection be raised to the explanation of ὀφθαλμοῦνας προσώπου. Socrates is unfair to it, in his attempt to elevate into a universal principle, that which is only a maxim or rule of conduct.

**Notes: Book I.**

"Thrasymachus breaks in with an impatient cry—'Instead of asking questions and criticizing answers, why not at once give your definition of the just? But don't treat us to such stale rubbish as 'the fitting' or 'the expedient.'"

Socrates deprecates the anger of the great Sophist and assures him that his own and his host's error is involuntary. They are only too ready to learn, if he will teach them.

"Thrasymachus laughs sardonically at 'the accustomed irony' of Socrates,—who now alleges the further difficulty that the most obvious answers have been forbidden him. He ends by prevailing..."
on Thrasymachus (who is really eager to speak) to give his own definition, that justice is the interest of the Stronger. In States, for example, the government, whether despotic, democratic or oligarchical, makes all its laws with a view to its own maintenance and security. And it is just for the subject to obey the laws. 'But do governments never make mistakes in the laws which they pass?'

T. 'Yes, sometimes.'

S. 'Then it is sometimes just for the subject to do what is inexpedient for the ruler.'

Polemarchus sees the point at once. But Cleitophon takes up the cudgels to defend his master's thesis. By 'what is expedient for the Stronger,' he says that Thrasy machus meant what the Stronger thought expedient for himself.

διαλευκομένων . . . μεταξύ 'In the midst of our discussion:' μεταξύ is to be taken with the participle: cp. Apol. 40 B, where Socrates says of the δαμόνιον σημείον—πολλαχοῦ δη με ἐπίση χε λέγοντα μεταξύ.

ὁρμα . . . διεκκυλύετο 'had been attempting;' 'had been repeatedly prevented,' — the iterative force of the imperfect.

ἄντιλαμβάνεσθαι] meaning originally 'to seize,' 'grasp'; has two secondary senses in Plato, (1) 'to lay hold of with the view of objecting':—so Soph. 239 ν ἄντιλαμβανόμενον ἤμων: infra, vi. 497 θ φόβῳ δὲ νὸι ψείς ἄντιλαμβανόμενον δεδηλώκατε μακρὰν . . . καὶ χαλεπῆν ἀυτοῦ τὴν ἀπόδειξιν; (2) 'to get possession of': so Parm. 130 ε, where Parmenides says of Socrates—οἵπω σοι ἄντιλαμβάνεσθαι καὶ ἐλέγχειν. 'To get hold of,' i.e. 'to interpose in,' is the meaning here. Cp. Gorg. 506 λ χρῆ ἄντιλαμβάνεσθαι καὶ ἐλέγχειν.

The sketch of Thrasy machus may be compared with that of Polus in the Gorgias, or of Dionysodorus and Euthydemus in the dialogue which bears the name of the latter: or with the vanity of Hippias and Prodicus in the Protagoras. The greater masters of the Sophistic art, such as Gorgias and Protagoras, have a higher character attributed to them; they preserve a stately equanimity, and are treated with a certain degree of respect by Socrates.

ὁς δὲ διεπαινάμεθα . . . εἶπον 'when we had ceased, and I had thus spoken.' The two clauses refer to the same moment. The last words of Socrates coincided with the break in the discussion. The emendation of Cobet—ὁς δη ἐπαινάμεθα,—which appears to arise from a supposed difficulty in explaining διεπαινάμεθα, is
needless. Cp. Symp. 191 c ἵνα... διαπάνωτο καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἔργα τρέπωντο. The compound signifies 'intermission.'

συστρέψας] i.e. 'gathering himself up,' i.e. for a spring. Cp. the Homeric ἐλη τε χανῶν (II. xx. 168), of the angry lion. ἦκεν is rather to be taken as the aorist of ἔμη than as the imperfect of ἤκω. Cp. Herod. ix. 49, § 2 ἐπὶκε τὴν ἵππων ἐπὶ τοὺς Ἑλλήνας. ἔαυτόν is easily supplied from what precedes: 'He gathered himself together and sprang upon us as if to tear us in pieces.' Cobet's conjecture (Varr. Lect. ed. sec. p. 526), διασπασόμενος for διαρ-πασόμενος, is quite unnecessary. Cp. II. xvi. 355 αἴσα διαρπάζουσαι (sc. οἱ λύκοι τὰς ἄρνας).

διεπτοήθημεν] 'We were panic-stricken,' a metaphor taken from the scaring of birds. Cp. Od. xviii. 340 διεπτούρει γυναῖκας, i.e. 'he scattered them in terror,' whereupon βάν δ' ἤμεναι διὰ δώμα.

εἰς τὸ μέσον φθεγξάμενος] 'He called out to the whole company.' Cp. Laws ii. 664 c τὰ τοιαῦτα εἰς τὸ μέσον ἄσομενος: Herod. vi. 130 ἐλεξε ἐς μέσον τάδε.

ὑποκατακλινόμενοι] The verb is used by Plutarch (1) of a wrestler allowing himself to be beaten, (2) of one who in a banquet takes the lower place. The latter seems to give the more natural metaphor here. See Liddell and Scott, s.v. The word here, taken in the sense of 'giving way to,' or 'giving place to,' may have a suggestion of either or both associations.

οὐκ ἀποδέξομαι, ἦν] 'I will not tolerate this sort of nonsense.' As elsewhere (infra, vii. 525 ὁ οὐδαμὴ ἀποδεξάμενον, ἦν τις, κ.τ.λ.), the object of the verb is resolved into a hypothetical or relative clause.

καὶ ἐγὼ... γενέσθαι] Cp. Theocritus xiv. 22 ὁ φθεγξί; λίκων εἰδεῖ; ἐπαίξε τις: Virg. Ecl. ix. 53 'Vox quoque Moerim | Iam fugit ipsa; lupi Moerim videre priores.' It is suggested, rather than expressed, that Thrasymachus is a wolf.

ei γάρ] ei γάρ τι, the reading of Ven. Π, is perhaps better suited to the irony of the passage; cp. Gorg. 488 ο ἐγὼ γάρ ei τι μὴ ὥρθως πράττω κατὰ τῶν βίων τῶν ἔμαυτον, εἴ ἔσθι τοῦτο ὅτι οὐχ ἐκὼν ἐξαμαρτάω, ἀλλ' ἀμιθὶ τῇ ἐμῇ.

μὴ γάρ δὴ... δυνάμεθα] 'If we were looking for a piece of gold, we should not, if we could help, allow ourselves to give place to one another and spoil our chance of finding it. Do not then imagine that in looking for justice, a thing more precious than many pieces of gold, we are weakly yielding to one another, and
not doing our utmost to bring the hidden thing to light; believe me, friend, that we are doing our best; but the fact is that we cannot.'

After οὐ δυνάμεθα some such word as 'find' or 'bring it to light' has to be supplied from φανύναι αὐτό.

For this mode of expression, in which an antithetical compound sentence is treated as a simple one, and is contained within a single negative or interrogative, cp. ii. 374 B: Phaedo 68 λ, β.

οἶνο γε σο'] 'Believe it, friend, we are.' The reading of ξ, and of the old editions—οἶνο γε ἐστίν, is feeble and without authority. The text may be said to have the support of the great majority of MSS., being the least possible correction of them. οἶνο must be connected with σπουδάζεσθαι τι μιλήσατα (not with οὐ σπουδάζεσθαι). Cp. the use of οἰςθαί γε χρῆ in a very similar sentence (Phaedo 68 b), where it is in the same way disconnected from the negative—οὐκ ἄσμενος εἶναι αὐτός; οἰςθαί γε χρῆ (sc. ἄσμενον ἑναν αὐτῶν): also Crit. 53 ν οὐκ οὐ οὐχ ἄσχημον φανείσθαι τὸ τοῦ Σωκράτους πρώγμα; οἰςθαί γε χρῆ. Another reading, but of small authority, is μη οἶνο σῦ.

tῶν δεινῶν'] cp. infra τὸ ἀνδρὸς οὐ φαίλον: δεινὸς has several transitions of meaning from the literal one of 'terrible' to 'strange,' 'admirable,' 'wonderful,' 'wise'; and so of pretended wisdom—'awful.' A favourite meaning of δεινός, always with a slight reproach, is that of 'one who is too much for another.'

χαλεπαίνεσθαι'] 'Than to be the victims of your anger.' To form passives of verbs governing the dative, like φθονεῖ, πιστεῦε, &c., was a growing tendency in the Greek of this period. See Essay on Platonic Syntax in vol. ii. p. 180, β.

σαρδάνων] probably from σαίρειν, 'to grin.' The word occurs already in Homer (Od. xx. 302).

eἰρωνεία'] cp. Symp. 216 ε ἤγεται δὲ πᾶντα ταῦτα τὰ κτήματα οὐδενὸς ἄξια, καὶ ἦμας οὐδὲν εῖναι, λέγουν μὲν οὖ, εἰρωνεύμενος τε καὶ παῖζων πάντα τῶν βιῶν πρὸς τοὺς ἀνδρόπους διατελεῖ: and Theaet. 150 ο ἄγνωσι εἰμὶ σοφίας, καὶ ὅπερ ἤδη πολλοὶ μοι ὀνείδησαν, ὡς τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους ἐρωτῶ, αὐτῶς δὲ οὐδὲν ἀποκρύνομαι περὶ οὐδενὸς διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἔχειν σοφίν, ἄληθες ὀνείδιζον. For the meaning of the word cp. Ar. Eth. N. ii. 7, 12 ἡ δ' ἐπὶ τὸ ἔλατον (προσποίησις) εἰρωνεία καὶ εἰρων: and Theophr. Charact. ἡ μὲν οὖν εἰρωνεία δάξειν ἀν εἶναι . . . προσποίησις ἐπὶ τὸ χείρων πράξεων καὶ λόγων. The word gains a new association from the application of it to Socrates, who not only pretended ignorance with the view of gaining an advantage in argument, but sincerely believed it to be the natural condition of man.
Notes: Book I.

δὴλον ... πωθανομένω] 'To a questioner who puts the question in this form, I believe you clearly saw that no one would answer.' The words δὴλον οἷμαι σοι ἢν resume εἴ ὁν ὑδάθα, the previous sentence being repeated in οὕτω. For the enclitic after οἷμαι in parenthesis cp. Theaet. 147 Λ ἢ οἰεῖ τίς τί συνήπῃ τινος ὄνομα, ὁ μὴ οἴδε τι ἐστειν;

 mũi . . . ὤν] 'Not even if the answer to the question (sc. τὸ ἐρωτώμενον) happens to be one of these?' Others would render, 'Not if one of these chances to be the truth?' Such an emphatic or predicative use of ὤν with τυγχάνει is doubtful, whereas the omission of a nominative, which is easily gathered from the rest of the sentence, is in the manner of Plato.

ὦς δῆ οἷμων τοῦτο ἐκείνῳ] 'Just as if the two cases were alike.' For this use of ὥς δῆ cp. Aesch. Agam. 1633 ὥς δῆ σῦ μοι τύραννος Ἀργεῖον ἐσσι: Soph. O. C. 809 ὥς δῆ σῦ βραχέα, παίτα δ' ἐν καρφί λέγεις.

οὐδέν γε ... ἐγώ] 'There is nothing to prevent it.' This is said in the same spirit as οἷκ ἂν θαυμάσαμι, a few lines below (cp. Charm. 164 λ καὶ οὐδέν γε σε άς κωλύει ἀληθῆ λέγειν).

ἡμεῖς] is ironical. Socrates provokingly says: 'A man can't help thinking as he does, though you and I join in forbidding him.'

ἀλλο τι οὖν, . . . ποιήσεις;] ἀλλο τι is used by Plato chiefly in two ways: (1) ἀλλο τι ἢ—'Is it not the case that . . . ?'—where the ellipsis of ἄστι or γένεται is lost sight of in the familiarity of the phrase; cp. Phaedo 70 c ἀλλο τι ἢ εἶν ἂν αἱ ψυχαὶ ἡμῶν ἐκεῖ; Theaet. 154 ε ἀλλο τι ἢ ἡ ἡμέα, ὥς πάνω πολλὴν σχολὴν ἐγνοτες, πάλιν ἐπανασκεψάμεθα . . . ; 'Shall we not,' &c.: (2) ἢ is dropped and ἀλλο τι like οἰεῖ, δοκεῖ, βούλει, and the like words, is taken adverbially: cp. Gorg. 495 c ἀλλο τι οὖν . . . δύο ταύτα ἔλεγες; 'You spoke of them as two, did you not?' and infra i. 342 ὃ ἀλλο τι οὖν . . . οὐδὲ ἦπτως οὐδείς τοῦ τῷ ἦπτως ἐγνωρόν σκοπεί . . . ; 'Then said I, neither does any physician consider what is for the interest of the physician: is not that true?' See Riddell's Digest, § 22. In the present passage Thrasymachus says: 'And that is what you are going to do, is it not?' i.e. 'I am to presume then that this is your intention,'—as if the absurdity were too glaring to be further expressed. Instead of saying sharply 'Do you mean to tell me . . . ?' he says with assumed calmness 'I am to understand then that you intend . . . ?'
Plato. Republic.

ηδος . . . ἀργύριον] This is a jest at the expense of the sophists, which Socrates is always either repeating or insinuating, as infra, 345 A. He has not had the good fortune ‘to hear the fifty drachma course of Prodicus’ (Cratyl. 384 b). He is informed by Callias, ‘who has spent more than all the rest of the world upon the Sophists,’ that a complete course of education may be had of Evenus at a cost of five minae (Apol. 20 A): Hermogenes, the younger brother of Callias, who is poor, must get these expensive lessons at second hand (Cratyl. 391 c). And the trains of disciples who follow them in dutiful order (Protag. 315 b), and are ready almost to carry them about on their heads (infra x. 660 d), are constantly ridiculed. The gains of Protagoras (Meno 91 b), which are greater than those of Pheidias or ten other sculptors, are ironically assumed as a proof of the truth of his doctrines. Compare also the mention of Socrates’ own circumstances in Apol. 23 B εν πενία μνήμη εἰμι.

E tis]. See above note on δῆλον οἴμαι σου supra B.

ἐπείτα . . . εἰή] εἰή, though apparently redundant, is found in all the MSS. ἀπειρημένον αὐτῷ εἰή is written as if not a participle μη εἰδὼς but εἰ μη εἰδείη had preceded.

οὐ φαύλου] ‘who is not to be disregarded.’ Ironicè: see above ύπὸ ὑμῶν τῶν δεινῶν (337 A) and note.

προσεποιεῖτο . . . ἀποκρινόμενον] ‘He pretended to contend for my being respondent.’ φιλωνεικος, ‘loving contention’: hence φιλωνεικεῖν, ‘to show a contentious spirit,’ ‘to be contentious.’ But like other words in Greek, it passes readily from the state to the act, and the feeling of the etymology is lost through frequent use. Cp. Protag. 360 E φιλωνεικεῖν μοι δοκεῖ τὸ ἐμὲ εἶναι τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον: Phil. 14 B οὖ δῆπον πρὸς γε αὐτὸ τοῦτο φιλωνεικοῖμεν. The Venetian MS. T. has φιλωνικείν. C. F. Hermann and Cobet would restore φιλωνικος, φιλωνικέω, φιλωνικία in Plato throughout, relying on Plato’s own remarks connecting the word with νίκη (ix. 581 a, 586 c), in which he is followed by Aristotle (Rhet. ii. 12, 6). But Plato’s fanciful etymology is no sufficient ground for judging of the orthography of a word.

C άκουε δῆ]. The sham compliment which precedes is too much for Thrasymachus, who immediately begins like a crier (oyes! oyes!) to proclaim his idea of justice. For the definition cp. Laws iv. 714 c αὕτε γὰρ πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον αὕτε πρὸς ἀρετήν οἶλην βλέπειν
Notes: Book I.

The participle with the article is used as a noun; hence τοῦ κρείττονος, not τῷ κρείττον. The new philosophy is first of all damaged by a broad joke from Socrates. If Polydamas the Pan­cratiast, who is our superior, finds the expediency of eating beef, does not expediency, and therefore justice, require that we, who are his inferiors, should eat beef too? Thrasymachus replies angrily and pompously, endeavouring to re-invest the subject with the dignity that has been lost. A similar jest occurs in the Charmides (161, 162), where justice, having been defined, as in iv. 443, to be τὸ τὰ ἐαυτὸν πράττειν, the question is raised whether this means ‘making one’s own coat.’ Cp. also Gorg. 490 c, where a similar question is provocingly asked—whether, as the wisest is to have most, the wise physician is to have most food.

The future here appears to be used as a stronger present: a sense of predetermination being expressed in it: ‘But you won’t.’ Cp. Charm. 166 τὰ ἔχεις οὐν μοι . . . δεῖξαι; ἀλλ’ οὐχ ἔχεις: Prot. 354 οὐχ ἔχεις.

καὶ τοῦτο . . . τί ποτε λέγεις;] ‘And with what meaning do you say this?’ καὶ indicates surprise, as in καὶ πῶς;

ei Πουλυδάμας ἡμῶν κρείττων] Polydamas is mentioned by many ancient writers as a Pancratiast of great strength and stature, who was at one time in the pay of Darius Ochus, and, amongst other wonderful feats, slew lions, and fought unarmed with armed men.

βδελυρός . . . λόγον] ‘That is abominable of you, Socrates: you understand me in the sense in which you can do my argument most mischief.’ κακοφρείν implies malice.

tίθεται . . . ἢ ἄρχη] ‘The government in each case makes the laws.’ The articles τοῦς and ἢ are correlative—τίθεται ἢ ἄρχη τοῦς νόμους. This removes Schneider’s objection to ἢ. The interchange of the generic present and gnomic aorist (τίθεται . . . ἐμεναι . . . ἀπέδρηαν . . . κολαζόμενω) is noticeable. Par. A reads ἐκάστη—a manifest error. The thesis of Thrasymachus has a verbal and superficial truth. There are governments everywhere who have power in their hands and make laws for their own interest, and
obedience to government is right. The abstract notion of law is the same amid every variety of law and custom, and authority in the ruler is the correlative of justice in the subject. The statement is a paradox which partly gains force from the appearance of honesty in confessing what other men are trying to conceal. Cp. Callicles in the Gorgias 483 ff.

An opinion equivalent to this is cited by Aristotle, Pol. i. 3, 4 τοῖς μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ ἐπιστήμη τέ τις εἶναι ἡ διεστοιεία . . . τοῖς δὲ παρὰ φύσιν τὸ διεσπόζειν. Nor are modern parallels wanting. When Hobbes says that power is the source of right, this is really the enunciation of a principle which is carried out only in his own 'kingdom of darkness.' He seems to have confused the duty of obedience to authority in the abstract with the duty of obedience to a particular authority. That authority always exists and always claims obedience may be readily allowed: the dispute is whether the authority does or does not reside in a certain person. 'Mankind are rightly jealous of their principles being reduced to the level of their practice.' It must be allowed that the theory of the Sophist is realized in fact whenever power is preferred to justice, or conventionality perverts truth. But the elevation of this distortion of life and nature into a philosophical theory is deservedly hated.

αὐτὸθι] Sc. ἐν τῷ σῷ ἀποκρίσει. δὴ is emphatic and ironical: 'it is true.'

οὖπο ... μηγάλη] Socrates, ignoring the irony of σμυκρᾶ, says gravely: 'It is not yet clear, even whether it is a great one,' i.e. 'it may be a great one for anything we yet know.'

ταῦτ' ἔσται, κ.τ.λ. 'That is what I am going to do'—implying that the grumbling exhortation of Thrasymachus was rather unnecessary. The special use of μέντοι in interrogations with ὦ may be compared with the use of δῆπον in claiming the recollection or agreement of the person addressed. But μέντοι further implies a transition of thought, or the renewal of an old thought, cp. infra vii. 521 D οὨκ ἄθηπᾶς μέντοι πολέμου ἐφαρμ.τοῦτοις ἀνιγκαῖον εἶναι νέοις ὡστάς; and 346 A οὐχὶ ἐκάστην μέντοι φαμέν ἐκάστοτε τῶν τεχνῶν τοῦτο ἐτέραν εἶναι, κ.τ.λ.

Justice is the expediency of the superior, but the superior may err, and then inexpediency becomes justice. This 'reductio ad absurdum,' which Polemarchus receives with triumph, is rejected by Cleitophon, who argues that the word 'expedient' is to be taken as 'expedient in the thought or mind of the ruler.' The idea which
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the ruler has of his interest, however inexpedient in fact, always remains the idea which the ruler has of his interest. Polemarchus truly retorts that this is an after-thought: Socrates, however, does not object to the change, but Thrasymachus prefers a different mode of shifting his ground. He argues not that the expedient is what seems to the ruler to be expedient, but that the ruler when he err is not to be called a ruler.

τοὺς δὲ τινῶς] For the qualifying use of the indefinite after the article, cp. Phileb. 13 c τὸς δὲ τίνας ἐτέρας αὐτῶν κακὰς: Herod. i. 114 τὸν δὲ καὶ τίνα αὐτῶν ὅθενλει σώματε ἔσται.

τὶ λέγεις αὐ; ἐφή] The reading of Stephanus τὶ λέγεις; omitting αὐ, is adopted by Schneider and inferred by him from Bekker's silence to rest on the authority of Par. A, where, however, αὐ is read, but is marked as doubtful (aυ). For the text, which gives more point to αὐ in the reply, cp. Aristoph. Nub. 1174 τοῦτο τοῖς ἄρχοντοι ἀτεχνῶς ἐπαθεῖ, το τὶ λέγεις αὐ; The question of Thrasymachus is rudely expressive of indignation and surprise. Socrates returns with a stroke of the hammer: 'I am saying what you say yourself.' There is the same form of the 'retort courteous,' infra in οἴμαι and οἴοι—'I think so,' said he. 'Then,' said I, 'you must further think,' &c. Compare a similar repetition in iv. 430 c ἀποδέχομαι τοῖς τὸν ἥμρειαν εἶναι. Καί γὰρ ἀποδέχοιν, ἤν δ' ἐγὼ, πολιτικῆν γε, καὶ ὁμιλῶ ἀποδέξει.


ἀρὰ τότε . . . ἀποδέχώμεθα] The whole argument may be briefly summed up as follows: 'Justice is the interest of the superior.' 'But what if the superior is mistaken about his interest?' 'But,' says Cleitophon, 'he cannot mistake about what he thinks to be his interest; and that was what Thrasymachus meant.' 'But that,' retorts Polemarchus, 'was not the assertion actually made by Thrasymachus.' 'Never mind,' says Socrates; 'we will take this instead of the other.' Cleitophon tries to evade the 'reductio ad absurdum' of Thrasymachus' argument by substituting after the manner of the Sophists appearance for reality. Justice thus becomes not the stronger's interest, but what appears to the stronger to be his interest. This, however, is not what Thrasymachus actually said (338 c, E).

οὐκ ἄναγκαιοι . . . λέγεις:] 'Must it not then follow that, in that
case, it is just to do the very opposite of what you say?’ According to Madvig’s punctuation, which is here followed, αὐτό (emphatic) is joined to τοῦναντίον. (Madvig also, unnecessarily, reads συμβαίνει.) The older punctuation was συμβαίνειν αὐτὸ ὀὕτωσι, δικαιον εἶναι, κ.τ.λ.,—αὐτὸ unemphatic and referring to the case put in the first part of the sentence; the antecedent, as in Polit. 263 a μήποτε παρ’ ἐμοὶ δόξης αὐτὸ ἐναργῶς διωρισμένον ἀκήκοιναι, having inexact reference to what precedes. [L. C.]

*οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον . . . λέγεις:] ‘Is it not necessary for the matter to turn out thus, that it is just to do the opposite of what you say?’ αὐτό, ‘the matter,’ has a vague antecedent in what precedes: cp. Polit. 263 a μήποτε παρ’ ἐμοὶ δόξης αὐτὸ ἐναργῶς διωρισμένον ἀκήκοιναι. ὀὕτωσι is explained in the clause which follows. It is better to explain the passage thus,—placing the comma after ὀὕτωσι, than with Madvig (who unnecessarily reads συμβαίνει) to delete the comma connecting αὐτό with τοῦναντίον and making ὀὕτωσι mean ‘in that case.’ ‘Must it not then follow that, in that case, it is just to do the very opposite of what you say?’ [B. J.]

τὸ γὰρ τὰ κελευόμενα, κ.τ.λ.] The first γὰρ introduces a justification, ‘You are right,’ says Cleitophon, and in that ‘Thrasymachus was consistent, since he defined justice to be obedience to the command of the ruler.’ The second γὰρ with καὶ admits Cleitophon’s assertion so far, but proceeds seriously to justify the argument by adding what had been suppressed. ‘Yes, I was right: for he also defined justice to be the interest of the stronger. And these two general principles are rendered inconsistent by his admission that the ruler sometimes makes a mistake about his own interest.’

ἀλλ’, ἐφι . . . ἐτίθετο] ‘But, said Cleitophon, he meant by the expediency of the superior, what the superior in his view thought expedient for him; this, he said, was to be done by the subject, and this he maintained to be justice.’ The asyndeton is relieved by an emphasis on τοῦτο. For the optative see Goodwin M. and T. 694, 700.

tοῦτο ποιητέον εἶναι τῷ ἕττον] ἐλεγεν has to be repeated with these words. Cleitophon’s dialectic recalls the passage with Polemarchus, supra, 334 c ff. Thrasymachus passes by the interposition of Cleitophon and defends himself from another point of view. He maintains not that what the superior thinks for his interest is just, but that the superior, qua superior, can never err.
Socrates is ready to argue the question on the new ground proposed by Cleitophon. But Thrasymachus takes a different line. 'The ruler makes no mistake qua ruler; when he gives commands which are inexpedient for him, he loses his title to be called the ruler or stronger.'

S. Very well;—We will speak of the ruler in the strictest sense of the term. Turning to the analogy of the arts we note that the physician qua physician is a healer only; and he takes fees not as physician, but as money-maker. The pilot, qua pilot, considers not his own safety but that of the passengers in his ship. The art which rules each function is self-sufficing and perfect and in need of nothing, while that whereto it ministers has need of many things. In other words, a true form of government does not regard its own interest, but the interest of that which is governed by it. And in all cases, the ruler, who is truly such, rules not for himself but for his subjects.

Thrasyymachus raises a new objection: 'The superior is not the superior when he errs.' We say indeed that 'the ruler has erred,' as in the case of other arts we say that 'the physician, the calculator, has erred.' But this is an incorrectness of language; for in erring 'the physician is no longer physician,' 'the ruler is no longer ruler.' Yet the possibility of error in the ruler had been admitted by Thrasyymachus in 339 c without this restriction. The question which is here introduced—viz. how far words are to be restricted to their good senses—is one which has occasioned considerable perplexity in the infancy of philosophy. Are εἰδουλία, προαιρέσις, τέχνη, φρόνησις, σοφία, and the other names of habits which occur in the Ethics of Aristotle, to be taken only in their better signification?—e.g. εἰδουλία, as implying a good end, προαιρέσις, as the deliberate choice always of good, σοφία and φρόνησις as concerned with truth only? How far, again, is the meaning of such terms to be extended by analogy? The answer seems to be that the use of language is determined by custom and association, and aims only at such a degree of precision as is necessary for the attainment of perspicuity. Words are not necessarily ambiguous because they are taken in good, bad, or neutral senses, if the sense in which they are taken is clearly indicated by the context.

The Sophist in Plato is apt to develop his argument into a speech—he 'goes running on in a long harangue, like brazen pots.
which, when they are struck, continue to sound unless some one
puts his hand upon them’ (Protag. 329 A). So Protagoras, in the
dialogue which bears his name, objects to the short ‘cut and
thrust’ method of Socrates, and prefers a stately display: and in
the Gorgias, Socrates himself, when he can get no more answers
out of his adversaries, is obliged to make ‘one man do the work of
two,’ and embody a series of questions and answers in a single
long speech.

\[\text{συκοφάντης . . . ἐξαμαρτάνει} \] ‘You are a sharper, Socrates, in
argument.’

For the argumentative use of \(\text{αὐτίκα} \) cp. Protag. 359 E αὐτίκα
eis τὸν πόλεμον οἱ μὲν ἔθελουσιν ἔννα, οἱ δὲ οὐκ ἔθελουσιν. The most
general meaning of the word is ‘immediately’—‘to begin with’;
when used as it is here, it may be conveniently translated ‘for
example.’

λογιστικὸν] λογιστικὸς is used in Plato in both senses, (1) of
calculating and (2) of reasoning. The latter sense, however, is
chiefly confined to the neuter. For the first sense cp. vii. 526 B οἶτε
φύσει λογιστικὸς εἰς πάντα τὰ μαθήματα . . . ὀξεῖ φύσει: for the second,
iv. 439 D τὸ μὲν . . . λογιστικὸν προσαγωρεύοντες. Cp. the converse
transition of meaning in the use of the word μαθήματα.

\[\text{λέγομεν τῷ ῥήματι} \] ‘The expression which we use is.’ Plato
is fond of contrasting the expression with the thought: cp. Theaet.
166 D τὸν δὲ λόγον ἀν μὴ τῷ ῥήματι μου διώκε: Gorg. 450 D οἶχ ὅτι
τῷ ῥήματι οὔτω εἶπε: ῥῆμα, in the sense of ‘expression,’ is opposed
to ὄνομα, ‘a single word.’ Cp. Cratyl. 399 A, B, where \(\Delta \)ι \(\phiιλός,
which is a \(\rhoῆμα,\) when contracted into \(\Delta \)ιφίλος becomes an ὄνομα.

tō \(\deltḁ, \) οἴμαι] ‘Whereas in fact, as I conceive.’ Cp. Laws i.
630 D τὸ δὲ πῶς χρῆν ἡμᾶς λέγειν; ‘but how in fact ought we to say?’
tō \(\deltḁ\) is often thus used in Plato, and may be explained either as an
accusative, ‘as to this,’ or as a nominative, ‘the fact is.’

\[\text{τοιούτον . . . ἀποκρίνεσθαι} \] ‘Understand, then, that my answer
to you just now was of this nature.’

\[\text{εἶν} \] Like ‘So’ in German, and ‘Well!’ or ‘Good!’ in
English, implies assent with every degree of expression, grave or
ironical—in this passage making rather light of the attack of
Thrasymachus: ‘Very well, Thrasymachus; you think me unfair?’
Elsewhere \(\epsilonἰν\) simply expresses agreement with a former proposition
for the sake of getting on to a new one: cp. infra 349 D, Protag. 312 E \(\epsilonἰν\) ο \(\deltḁ \) δὴ σοφιστῆς περὶ τίνος δεινὸν ποιεῖ λέγειν;
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οὐδὲ γ’ ᾧν ἐπίχειρήσαμι] Sc. βιώσασθαι τῷ λόγῳ. The boisterousness of Thrasymachus is contrasted with the provoking quietness of Socrates. Cp. infra 345 B ἤ εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν φέρων ἵνα τὸν λόγον; where the rejoinder is μᾶ Δία, . . . μὴ σὺ γε.

τοιούτον] ‘Any similar misunderstanding.’

δὲ νῦν] δὲ νῦν—(ὁ written over an erasure) is the reading of Par. A. Cp. δὲ ἀρτε ἑλεγες infra c : either δ or δὲ is quite admissible, but the masculine is more lively.

οὐδὲν ὃν καὶ ταύτα] (1) ‘Though here again you are nobody,’ i. e. ‘with as little effect as ever.’ Thrasymachus has been prophesying that Socrates will try to cheat, but without success: Socrates replies that he is not such a madman as to try and cheat Thrasymachus. The latter rejoins that he has made the attempt, though in this case, as on former occasions, unsuccessfully; or (2) [B. J.] ‘Although you made a fool of yourself at this too,’ i. e. at cheating Thrasymachus, as you would also have done at shaving a lion if you had attempted it. For οὐδὲν ὃν cp. viii. 556 D ἀνδρεὶς ἵματεροί εἰσιν οὐδὲν (according to one reading), and for the idiomatic καὶ ταύτα, Charm. 154 ε πάνυ καλός καὶ ἀγαθός ἐστι καὶ ταύτα.

Thrasymachus now argues that justice is the interest of the ruler regarded in his capacity of ruler, and therefore as unerring. Socrates accepts the position, and retorts that the ruler in his capacity of ruler has no concern with his own interests. To prove this, an appeal is made to the favourite analogy of the arts. The physician in his capacity of physician is not a taker of money, but a healer of the sick: the pilot is not to be thought of as a sailor, but as having a function of his own. And every man who has an art and function has in one sense an interest; but that interest is only the perfection of his art, and the art when perfect has no further need or interest.

οὐδὲν . . . ὑπολογιστέον] ‘This must not be taken into the account:’ i. e. as interfering with our conception of him. Cp. Laws iii. 702 C ὑπὲρν ὑπολογιζομένου τὸ ξενικὸν αὐτῶν.

ἀρ’ οὖν . . . τελέαν εἶναι.] There is a slight play upon the word ἐνοφέρων, which is here used not of the artist but of the art. ‘But has any of the arts an interest other than its own perfection?’ In other words they are complete in themselves and self-contained. There is no reason to stumble at the words, or with MSS. ἐν δ᾽ and some modern editors to alter the text by the insertion after ἄλλο of.
E  ἄσπερ, ἠφην ἠγώ] Thrasymachus does not understand the meaning of this self-sufficiency of art. Socrates therefore adds an illustration. ‘The body is not self-sufficing, because it requires the assistance of medicine: but the art of medicine (or any other art) is self-sufficing, because needing nothing external.’

νῦν] adds a slight emphasis which is sufficiently expressed in English by ‘has been’: but the word seems otiose, and may perhaps be a corruption of ἡμῶν.

ἐπὶ τοῦτο] ‘For this purpose,’ referring to the whole clause, viz. ἐπὶ τοῦτο ὅποσ τοῦτο (sc. τὸ σώματι) ἐκπορίζῃ τὰ ἐμφάνειται. Cp. supra D ἐπὶ τοῦτο πέφυκεν, κ.τ.λ.

A  ἐσθ’ ὅ τι προσδείται τινὸς ἀρετῆς] ‘Does art at all require any excellence?’ Socrates maintains a purely ideal conception of art or knowledge, because Thrasymachus had insisted on a purely ideal conception of the ruler. Thrasymachus might indeed have replied that this ideal of art is a mere fiction, or that the arts and sciences are dependent on one another. But such an answer, though familiar to modern thought, would have been strange to early Greek philosophy, perhaps even to Socrates, who has a clearer idea of art in the abstract than of the circumstances by which the arts are conditioned, or of their relation to one another.

σκεψομένης τε καὶ ἐκποριζούσης] Here as elsewhere the present and future are combined. Cp. x. 604 A μαχισθαί τε καὶ ἀντιτείνειν.

ὅτι ἐκάστη τεχνή] Whether the reading of Par. A, οἵ, ἀεί, is the result of dittographia, or the omission of ἀεί in the other MSS. is due to the resemblance of ΔΕΙ-ΑΕΙ, is uncertain.

καὶ τοῦτ ἐστὶν ἀπεραντον] The argument from infinity is a reductio ad absurdum characteristic of Greek speculation. How could art and knowledge, like the good, be other than finite? Unless they were a law to themselves, what limit was there to them? So Plato argues in the dialogue which bears the name of Parmenides (132 E ff, 133 A), that behind an idea and the particulars corresponding to it there may arise another idea and again another idea of that idea and its particulars, and so on to infinity. Aristotle, in his criticism of Plato’s Ideas (Met. i. 9. 3), repeats the same objection in a particular form, which he calls the argument of the
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τρίτος ἀνθρώπος: i.e. behind the idea of humanity and individual men there arises another idea inclusive of both, and so on to infinity.

τὸ ἄμφερον σκοπεῖν] is a further explanation of ἐπὶ τὴν αὐτῆς πονηρίαν, 'for its own defect, to consider what is expedient.'

αὐτὴ ἐν ἀβλαβῆς... ὀρθῇ ὀὔσα, κ.τ.λ.] 'And it is itself whole and unimpaired while it remains true—that is, so long as each art in its entirety is exactly what it is.' The latter words are an expansion or explanation of ὀρθῇ ὀὔσα.

οὖτως, ἐφη, φαίνεται] Cp. infra c φαίνεται, ἐφη, οὖτως. φαίνεται is expressive of a careless indifference, 'so it seems'—which develops into reluctance (infra συνεχόμενον... μᾶλα μόγις), as Thrasymachus becomes more alive to the impending consequences.

ἀλλὰ μὴν... τέχναι] 'But the arts have rule in their several spheres.' The missing link is now supplied, and Thrasymachus begins to be aware that he is caught in the toils of his adversary. For if the arts have no interest of their own, and yet are rulers or superiors, then in this case the ruler or superior does not seek his own interest. This idea that the only ruler is the scientific ruler, that government is an art, frequently recurs in Plato, and is the foundation of the famous notion of the 'philosopher-King.' Cp. viii. 552 b; Theaet. 170 a, b; Polit. 303 b.

τῷ ἄρχομενῷ] like ἐκεῖνῷ τῷ τέχνῃ ἐστίν above, is neuter, including both things and persons: there is therefore no occasion to change the reading from ἐκεῖνον to ἐκεῖνῳ against the authority of the best MSS. Cp. infra 345 d ἐφ' ὃ τέτακται... ἐκεῖνῳ τῷ ἄρχομενῳ τε καὶ θεραπευομένῳ: 346 d ἐκεῖνον ἐφ' ὃ τέτακται.

φ' ἀν αὐτὸς δημιουργη] 'And that (i.e. the person or thing) for which he himself executes the work.' For the dative after δημιουργεῖν cp. Laws viii. 846 e.

The impatience of Thrasymachus bursts forth again: 'As if the shepherd cared for the sheep and not for his own wages or profit!' Justice is in reality another's good, that is to say the advantage of the ruler. The just man everywhere reaps harm and loss. But the unjust man who has power,—he is the happy man; above all when his power is supreme. For injustice, if practised on a sufficient scale, is stronger than justice, and much more worthy of a free and aspiring nature.

ἐπειδὴ οὖν, κ.τ.λ.] Thrasymachus, foreseeing the inevitable
conclusion, makes a bold diversion. He is indignant at the paradox of Socrates, that the ruler seeks only the interest of his subjects, and places the opposite point of view in the strongest light. 'Even a child might know that the idealism of Socrates is the very reverse of the truth.' This he expresses in a coarse Aristophanic manner. Cp. the part taken by Callicles in the Gorgias; see especially 449 b, 511 a, 521 c, where several retorts courteous are given. For τί and ὅτι cp. Hipp. Maj. 290 c καὶ ἐγὼ τί μᾶλεστα; ἕθσω. ὅτι, ἐρεῖ, τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς οὐ χρυσοὺς ἐποίησεν. τοι adds a slight emphasis: 'because, to say the truth.' Cp. supra 330 b οὖ τοι ἐνεκα ἤρόμεν.

αὕτη] 'as far as she is concerned.' Cp. Lys. 208 ν ἔκεινη σε εἴ τι ποιεῖν δὲ τί ἄν βουλή, ἦν αὕτη μακάριος ἵν: Soph. 229 ε ὅταν αὐτός ἐξαιρετάνωσεν.

οὐδὲ πρόβατα οὐδὲ ποιμένα] 'You do not know either sheep or shepherd,' i.e. you do not know which is which. For this disjunctive form of expression cp. x. 605 b οὐτε τὰ μείζω οὔτε τὰ ἐλάττω διαγλιφῶσκοιτι.

ὅτι δὴ τί μᾶλεστα;] 'Because of what?' i.e. what is that which makes you say it? a verbal notion—γίνεσαι has to be supplied. The second ὅτι is a repetition of the first. Cp. Charm. 161 c ὅτι δὴ τί γε; ἐφη. "Ὅτι κ.τ.λ. ὅτι . . . τί is a combination of a causal with an interrogative construction; or ὅτι which would properly introduce a causal sentence is converted into an interrogative by τί. There is no doubt about the meaning: the difficulty is to explain the syntactical relation. In an idiom the syntax may be lost or cannot certainly be traced. Compare ἡνα τί (sc. γενηταί): Apol. 26 c ἡνα τί ταῦτα λέγεις;

ὅτι οἰει, κ.τ.λ.] The state of Thrasymachus' temper is worthy of attention. His imagined superiority is not greater than the real interval between himself and Socrates. He may be compared to an angry child struggling in the hands of a giant, who for a moment lets him go. Immediately his spirits begin to rally, and his impudence revives, only to entitle him to a more thorough castigation. The instinct of self-defence leads him to avoid the short interrogatory method of Socrates; he makes an oration, and after having had the pleasure of hearing himself speak, is about to retreat with dignity. But Socrates, with the help of the rest of the company, practises a method of detaining him which is quite as effectual as physical force. He is at first reluctant to be cross-
examined, but afterwards in the skilful hands of the master, he shows real good-humour, and takes some interest in the subject of inquiry.

διανοεῖοθαί πρός] Cp. Laws. i. 626 δ αὐτῷ δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸν πότερον ὡς πολεμίω πρὸς πολέμιον διανοητέον; 628 δ ὡσαύτως . . . πρὸς πόλεως εὐδαιμονίαν . . . διανοεῖοθαί. Faesi, Badham, and Cobet would read διακείσθαι, a change not required by the sense and which has no authority.

οὖτω πόρρω εἰ] ‘You are so far out of the way.’ Cp. Lys. 212 οὖτω πόρρω εἰμὶ τοῦ κτήματος: Theaet. 151 c πόρρω δῶτε τού εἴδενα.


οἱ δ’ ἀρχόμενοι] Either ‘and the subjects—;’ or ‘and they, as subjects—.’ For the latter cp. ii. 380 B οἱ δὲ ἀνίκαιτο κολαζόμενοι: Protag. 315 B οὐς ἀγεί . . . κηλῶν τῇ φωνῇ . . . οἱ δὲ κατὰ τὴν φωνὴν ἔπονται κεκηλημένοι.

ὁ μὲν δίκαιος ἀπὸ τῶν ἰσων] ‘the just man contributes a larger sum out of an equal fortune, the unjust a smaller.’

ἀπέχθεσθαι] appears to be used (as the accent implies) for the present passive. Cp. ἀφελεῖσθαι supra.

λέγω . . . πλεονεκτεῖν] ὅπερ, not ὅπερ, which is found in some inferior MSS., is the true reading; the antecedent is inferred from 343 B τοὺς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀρχοντας . . . ἀρχοντας.

ἡ τὸ δίκαιον] sc. εἶναι.

τὴν τελεωτάτην ἀδικίαν] cp. Euripides’ description of tyranny (Phoen. 549) as ἀδικίαν εὐδαίμονα, and the preceding speech of Eteocles concluding with the lines:

εἴπερ γὰρ ἀδικεῖν χρή, τυραννίδος πέρι κάλλιστον ἀδικεῖν, τόλλα δ’ εὔσεβεῖν χρεών.

ἔστι δὲ τούτο τυραννίς] Villainy on a large scale is no longer villainy, just as successful treason is no longer treason. The picture of the tyrant, which is faintly given here, is further developed in the next book, and finally worked up in Books viii and ix.

οἱ . . . τῶν τοιούτων κακουργημάτων] ‘For robbers of temples, man-stealers, burglars, swindlers, and thieves are the names which
are given to those who do wrong in the particular branches of this class of crimes.' The genitive depends on κατὰ μέρη (which is a resumption of ἐφ’ ἐκάστῳ μέρει). The class implied is the class which comprises the various forms of robbery, τοιοῦτον referring back to τάλλοστρα . . . δημόσια. For this use of τοιοῦτος cp. iv. 430 B τὴν δὲ τοιαύτην δύναμιν καὶ σωτηρίαν: Crat. 405 B ἀπολύουν τῶν τοιοῦτων κακῶν.

επειδὰν δὲ τις] The interchange of singular and plural varies the style. So above—ὅταν τις ἀδικήσας μὴ λάθῃ. And elsewhere—vi. 498 C ὅταν δὲ λήγῃ μὲν ἡ ῥώμη, πολιτικῶν δὲ καὶ στρατεύων ἕκτος γίγνηται, τότε ἢδη ἀφέτους νέμεσθαι.

344 D—348 A Socrates entreats Thrasymachus to stay and answer the momentous question. 'What way of life is best?' He will thereby confer an immense benefit on the whole company. Only let him be consistent and not shift his ground. If the physician is to be regarded as a healer of the sick, not as a receiver of fees, the shepherd is not to be described as a glutton, or a money-maker, but simply as a feeder of sheep. 'In so far as he is a shepherd, he tends his flock not for his own advantage, but for their good. All art is exercised for the good of its object—else why does the artist ask for pay? Every art has its proper function, beyond which it has no interest or requirement. And the earning of payment is the function of a separate art (μυσθωτίκη) which is only accidentally associated with the other arts, such as medicine, shepherding, or the government of men. Hence the true rulers will not take office without reward, unless they are threatened with the penalty of being ruled by their inferiors. The last is the only motive by which a good man can be induced to govern.

344 D ὥσπερ βαλανεὺς ἡμῶν καταντλήσας . . . τὸν λόγον] Compare the imitation of the expression by Lucian (Encom. Dem. § 16)—ἡ πού γε, ἐφ’ν, διανογε καταχεῖν μον τῶν ὥσπερ βαλανεὺς καταντλήσας τῶν λοιπῶν λόγων; ἄθροον—'in a mass'—expresses the flood of words which the Sophist pours out upon them.

ἡ ομικρὸν . . . ζῷῃ] For the form of the sentence compare Laches 185 A ἡ περὶ σμικροῦ οἴσεθε νυνι κυνωνεῖν καὶ σῦ καὶ Λυσίαχος, ἄλλ’ οὐ περὶ τούτου τοῦ κτήματος, δὲ τῶν ὑμετέρων μέγιστον δὲ τυγχάνει; For the sentiment cp. Gorg. 500 c, where Socrates in like manner pleads with Callicles that he should be serious in speaking of a subject so important as the end of human life.

E διαγόμενος] sc. τὸν βιον. The middle voice marks the personal
interest which each man has in his own way of life. ‘How his life may be passed by each one of us to the greatest advantage.’

ἐγὼ γὰρ ... ἔχειν] [There is no use in my remaining:] ‘for I am of a different opinion about the matter’ (i.e. about the nature and profitableness of justice). This is the most satisfactory way of taking the passage.

Some editors place a mark of interrogation after ἔχειν. Thrasymachus would then be understood to say, in answer to the question ἡ σμικρῶν . . . ζῷη; ‘Do I think anything else?’ i.e. about the importance of the question. But this is wanting in point. Schneider gives to the sentence a slightly different turn by placing a full stop after ἔχειν, and supposes the words to be ironical: ‘Just as if I think otherwise!’ But the irony is not sufficiently marked.

ζωικας, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, . . . κηδεσθαί] ζωικας sc. οὐσθαί τωτί ἄλλως ἔχειν. ‘So you seem; or rather you seem not to care a bit about us.’ Socrates affects to understand Thrasymachus to mean that he thinks differently about the importance of the question.

οὕτω κακῶς σοι κείσται] ‘It will not be a bad investment.’ For the use of κείσται in the sense of ‘being invested or laid up’ so as to yield a return of profit or interest, cp. Soph. O. C. 1518 ά σοι | γύρως ἄλπτα τῆθε κείσται πίλει, and above 333 ε ἄλλα κείσθαι which is the explanation of παρακαταβέσθαι καί σῶν εἴναι, i.e. ‘to be left on deposit.’

The Sophist is presented in a ludicrous point of view. He has been clamouring for a fee (337 δ), and now the fee is offered to him as a bribe to prevent his running away.

ἐγὼ γὰρ ... πείθομαι] ‘For my part (τό γ’ ἐμόν) I tell you that I am not convinced.’

ἔστω μὲν ἄδικος] ‘Let a man be unjust,’—not ‘Let her (sc. injustice) be as unjust as she will,’ which is poor and tautological.

ὁμως . . . κερδαλεότερον] ‘Still this does not convince me, for one, that injustice is more profitable than justice.’ ού ρείθει: sc. this supposed impunity of injustice. The nominative to ρείθει is gathered from the previous sentence. ‘Grant that the unjust man may be unpunished, still this does not convince me,’ &c.

The slight difficulty of this accounts for the reading of Ficinus (mihi suades).
Republic

I.

345

B

ἡ εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν . . . μὴ σὺ γε] (Cp. vii. 518 c.) 'Must I take and put the argument bodily into your soul?' 'By Heaven,' I said, 'don't.' The impatience of Thrasymachus is met by Socrates with a cry of horror. 'God forbid!—not that, whatever you do.' The coarseness of the Sophistic method of imparting knowledge is compared to forcing food down another person's throat.

C

ἐτε γὰρ . . . φυλάξει] Socrates, as his manner is, resuming,—returning on the old track (ἀναλάβων, ἰχνὸς μετελθῶν), says to Thrasymachus: You see that 'having at first defined the physician as the true physician (341 c, 342 A) you did not think fit afterwards (343 b) to retain the same accuracy in speaking of the shepherd.' For φυλάττειν, 'to keep in mind,' cp. Theaet. 182 c τοῦτο μόνον φυλάττωμεν.

ποιμαίνειν] Par. A has πιαίνειν here in the text, which agrees with μέλλοντα ἐστιάσεσθαι πρὸς τὴν εὐωχίαν infra, and with παχύνειν supra 343 b. But the same MS. has ποιμαίνειν in the margin by the first or second hand,—which is clearly right and necessary to the sense.

D


ἐπεὶ . . . ποιμενικῇ εἰναι] 'Since it has sufficiently provided what concerns itself with a view to its being perfect, so long as it lacks nothing of being the art of shepherding.' The subject of ἐκ-πεπόρισται (Perf. Mid.) is ἡ ποιμενικὴ, as is shown by the nominative βελτίστη.

E

ἐν τε πολιτικῇ καὶ ἰδιωτικῇ ἀρχῇ] 'In a public as in a private exercise of power': that is to say:—'And this applies not only to the shepherd and the physician, but also to the statesman.'

σὺ δὲ τοὺς ἀρχοντας . . . ἀλλ' εὖ οἶδα] The words τοὺς ἀληθῶς ἀρχοντας recall Thrasymachus' own assumption (343 b) that the term is used in the strictest sense. The fact that the artist will not work without pay, shows that as far as his art is concerned he studies not his own interest but the interest of his subject-matter. This is also the case with the true ruler: he too, for the same reason, will not rule without being rewarded.

οὐκ] sc. οἴομαι.

τὰς ἀλλὰς ἀρχὰς] There is a slight inaccuracy in the expression,
which arises out of the somewhat forced analogy supposed to exist between the art of government and the other 'arts' or 'offices.'

Cp. 342 c ἄρχοντι γε αἱ τέχναι, and infra 346 e.

αὐτοίσιν] The rare Ionic form is here adopted for emphasis and euphony. The other passages where it occurs in the Republic are iii. 388 d, 389 b; viii. 560 e, 564 c.

ἐπεὶ τοσόνδε εἶπέ] In assigning to each art a separate power or function, Socrates is preparing to distinguish the other arts from the art of pay.

ἀλλά] deprecates the imputation of perversity conveyed in Socrates' last words:—'But I admit that to be the difference.'

ὠσπερ ὑπέθου] 'as you proposed.' Cp. supra 341 b.

ἔστω, ἕφη] Thrasymachus becomes more reserved in his replies, as he begins to see the inevitable consequence. 'Let us suppose so.' Cp. Gorg. 504, 505.

ἢντινα ἢ ὥφελονται] 'Whatever benefit all craftsmen have in common manifestly arises from their additional use (προσχρώμενοι) in common of some one and the same thing'—(τινὶ τῷ αὐτῷ)—since the arts are peculiar and the benefit common. προσχρώμενοι, i.e. using in addition to their peculiar arts. ἀπ' ἐκείνου, 'from that' and not from their own art.

οὐ φαίνεται] 'Apparently not.' οὐ φαίνεται, like φαίνεται (cp. note on 342 c) has various shades of meaning which can only be determined by the context. As with οὐ φημι, οὐκ ἵνα, the negative is attracted to the main verb: οὐ φαίνεται = φαίνεται οὐκ (ἄφελείσθαι).

ἄρ' οὖν ... οἷμαι ἐγώγε] 'Does the art then confer no benefit,' when the artist works for nothing? 'I should think it does.'
The point of Socrates is to show that the good which the art does is separable from the good of the artist. Now the artist is not benefited unless he is paid, but his art confers a benefit all the same.

καὶ ἐπιτάττει] The arts have already been spoken of in several places as exercising command: supra 342 c, e; 345 e.

dιὰ δὴ ταῦτα . . . ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀρχομένῳ] ‘For which reason,’ i.e. because the ruler considers the interest not of himself but of his subjects. ταῦτα refers to the preceding, sentence. The clause which follows, διὶ ὁ μὲλλων, κ.τ.λ., is a resumption and further explanation of it, and is itself again resumed in ὦν δὴ ἐνεκα.

κατὰ τὴν τέχνην ἐπιτάττων] Thrasymachus is again and again reminded, and in every form of speech (cp. οἱ ἀληθῶς ἀρχοντες: 346 b ἐντερ βουλή ἀκριβῶς διορίζειν, and δὲ δὲι ἀκριβῶς σκοπείσθαι, κ.τ.λ.), that at his own suggestion (346 e) they are speaking of the ruler qua ruler.

μεθὸν δὲιν ὑπάρχειν] δεῖν, sc. ἐλέγομεν, the construction being continued from the previous sentence; and this is assisted by the interposition of ως ἐοικε. Cp. Phileb. 20 θάδε γε μήν, ὥς οἶμαι, περὶ αὐτοῦ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι λέγειν: Soph. 263 δ παυτάπασιν, ὥς ἐοικεν, ἡ τοιαύτη σύνθεσις . . . γίνεσθαι λόγος ψευδής.

ὀθεὶν κινδυνεύει . . . αὐχρόν νενομίσθαι] ‘And this would seem to be the reason why the willingness to hold office, without waiting to be compelled, has been thought discreditable.’ ‘Nos autem versamur non in republica Platonis, sed in faece Romuli.’ Compare the fable of Jotham (Judges ix. 8–15).

ἐὰν μὴ αὐτὸς ἐθέλῃ] referring to the indefinite τίνα which is the subject of ἀρχεθαί. For αὐτός referring to an indefinite word cp. Gorgias 520 c.

εἰπεί κινδυνεύει . . . τῷ τῷ ἀρχομένῳ] Compare the derisive words of St. Paul (1 Cor. vi. 4): ‘If then ye have judgements of things pertaining to this life, set them to judge who are least esteemed in the church’: and of Christ (Matth. xx. 26, 27), in which there is a similar irony arising out of their intense contrast to the spirit of this world: ‘Whosoever will be chief among you, let him be your servant.’

πᾶς . . . ὁ γιγνώσκων] ‘every man of understanding.’

ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν δὴ καὶ εἰσαύθεις σκεπόμεθα] Socrates, as elsewhere, availing himself of the facilities of conversation, breaks off
(Protag. 347 b, 357 b, 361 e, &c.), and defers a topic which is liable to become tedious. Instead of arguing out the question whether justice is the interest of the ruler, he takes up the subsequent statement of Thrasymachus, viz., that the unjust life is better than the just.

ποτέρως] This reading, which has the support of the best MSS., is preferred to Ast’s conjecture πότερον.

πότερον] πότερον ὡς, the reading of A II, admits of explanation, the ὡς being used pleonastically, as in ὡς ἀληθῶς, ὡς ἐτέρως (Phaedr. 276 c, Soph. 221 c). But it may also be due to a variation of reading between πότερον and ποτέρως.

Ἠκουσα, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ] Plato thus prepares the way for the part to be taken by Glaucon in Book ii.

ἐξευρεῖν] sc. ὑπ’ ἂν πείθωμεν, to be supplied from πείθωμεν.

ἂν μὲν τοίνυν . . . ἐσομέθα] With ἀντικατατείναντες, ‘replying to each other in set speeches,’ compare Protag. 329 λ ὁλιγῶν κατατείνουσι τοῦ λόγου. For ἀριθμεῖν δεήσει compare Cratyl. 437 D τί ὄν τοῦτο, ὃ Κριτίλε, ὁσπερ ψῆφους διαρθησομέθα τὰ ὄνοματα, καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ἐστιν ἡ ὁρθοτης; where Socrates, in a similar manner, repudiates the arithmetical method of determining the principles of language; also Gorgias 471 E, where Socrates refuses to permit the element of numbers to influence his judgement, and Theact. 171 A, where the method of ‘counting noses’ is ironically retorted on Protagoras.

ὡς . . . λέγομεν] ὡς (sc. ἀγαθὰ) ἐκάτεροι ἐν ἐκατέρῳ ἐν τῷ δίκαιον εἶναι καὶ ἐν τῷ ἁδικον εἶναι) λέγομεν.

ἀνομολογούμενοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους] ‘by the method of mutual admissions.’

ὑποτέρως, κ.τ.λ.] gentler and less direct than ποτέρως. ‘Would you tell me which of the two ways you prefer?’ Cp. Euthyd. 271 b ὑπότερον καὶ ἐρωτάς, ὃ Κριτίων;

οὔτως, ἕφη] ‘As you propose,’ referring to the words ἂν δὲ ὁσπερ . . . βῆτορες ἐσομέθα.

‘Perfect injustice,’ says Thrasymachus, ‘is more profitable than perfect justice.’ ‘Then will Thrasymachus maintain that the unjust are wise and good?’ ‘Undoubtedly, if only they have supreme power. In that case injustice is not only wise and good, but noble and strong.’ And now Thrasymachus has told Socrates his whole mind, and they can argue on a satisfactory basis.
Socrates begins by putting Thrasymachus to the question:

'Well:—but will the just man try to gain advantage over the just? or aim at more than what is just?' 'If he did, he would not be the diverting creature that he is.' 'Or would he claim to take advantage of the unjust?' 'He might claim to do so, but he would not be able.' But the unjust claims to take advantage both of his like and of his opposite, the just. Analogy shows this to be inconsistent with goodness and wisdom. No true musician aims at overstraining the lyre,—no artist seeks 'to do better than well.' And so the just man is like the good and wise artist, the unjust man like the bad artist. Now things which are alike have similar qualities, and therefore the just man is wise and good. To all this Thrasymachus is reluctantly forced to assent.

έξ ἄρχης] 'Beginning at the beginning,' as in Theaet. 179 e μᾶλλον σκέπτεσαι καὶ εξ ἄρχης, ὡσπερ αὐτοὶ ὑποστίνονται.

eîkós γ', ἐϕη... ἦ δ' ὅσ] 'That's a charming notion and a likely, seeing that I affirm injustice to be profitable and justice not.' 'Then what do you say?' 'The opposite,' said he. For ἡδιστε, as we might say in English, 'you funny man,' which expresses the affected amusement of Thrasymachus at being supposed to entertain such an opinion, see above 337 δ ἡδὲς γὰρ εἶ: vii. 527 δ ἡδὲς εἶ... δὲ ἐικὼς δεδιώτι τοὺς παλλαίοις: also Gorgias 491 e ὡς ἡδὺς εἶ τοὺς ἡλιθίους λέγεις τοὺς σῶφρονας. ἀλλά τι μὴν in this and similar places is equivalent to ἀλλὰ τί μὴν ἄλλο: as below 349 δ ἀλλὰ τί μελλεῖ; for ἀλλὰ τί μελλεῖ ἄλλο; and ἀλλὰ τί οἶει; for ἀλλὰ τί οἴει ἄλλο; supra 332 c and elsewhere. Cp. also Symposium. 206 ε ἐστι γὰρ, ὡς Ἀκρατεῖς, ἐϕη, οὐ τοῦ κολαθ ὁ ἐρως, ὡς οὐ οἴει. ἀλλὰ τί μην; Ἡδὲ γεννήσεως καὶ τοῦ τόκου ἐν τῷ καλῷ.

ἡ τὴν δικαιοσύνην... γενναίαν εὐθέλειαν] Thrasymachus is at first unwilling to hazard the assertion that injustice is virtue and justice vice. He says that justice is simplicity, injustice discretion. The statement is at length extracted from him that injustice is to be classed with wisdom and virtue, justice with their opposites. This proposition, which has been craftily drawn out of him, is the step in the argument which leads to his destruction. ἡ marks the astonishment of Socrates: 'And you mean to say?' Cp. infra iii. 396 ἦ μὴ μισήσαστα;—πάνι γενναίαν εὐθέλειαν: 'sublme simplicity.' For the ironical use of γενναίος cp. infra ii. 372 ὁ μάχας γενναίας, v. 454 λ ἡ γενναία... ἡ δύναμις τῆς ἀντιλογικῆς τέχνης: viii. 544 c ἡ γενναία ὁ τυρανὸς: Soph. 231 ἦ γένει γενναία σοφιστική: and for εὐθέλεια iii. 400 ε σὺ ἡ ἄνοιξιν ὑποκεριζόμενοι καλοῦμεν ὡς εὐθέλειαν.
kakō̱̱θeiaν] a paronomasia: kakaō̱̱θeia is not the opposite of  

ei̱̊θeia in the sense in which Thrasymachus uses it. But Socrates 
snatches at the etymological meaning of eι̱̊θeia to make a point 
against Thrasymachus.

συ δὲ … λέγειν] to transfer these words to Socrates, as is done 
on the authority of Par. A in the Zurich edition of 1887, interferes 
with the flow of the passage. The occurrence of ἂ δε after ἐφη, 
though uncommon, is sufficiently accounted for by supposing 
a pause after ποιεισθαι. Cp. Xen. Oecon. c. xvii. 8 πάνυ μὲν οὖν, 
ἐφη ἃν δε γε καί, ἐφη, κ.τ.λ. and infra 351 A νῦν δὲ γ', ἐφην. The dis-
tinction of persons in Par. A, however, is clear.

λυσιτελεῖ … ἐλεγον] ‘Even this sort of thing is advantageous, 
if undetected, but not worth mention: the real profit (ἄλλα sc. 
ἐντίν ἄξια λόγον) is in what I was just now speaking of,’ that is, in 
τελεία ἀδικία. νῦν δὴ refers chiefly to 344 B, c.

ἐθαύμασα] Aorist of the immediate past.

tοῦτο … στερεώτερον] (1) ‘This new position is firmer,’— 
‘now you are on more substantial ground’: or perhaps (2) ‘this 
is harder to make an impression upon,’ i.e. to deal with satisfactorily 
in argument. Par. A here reads ράσων for ράδιον, as ράδιον for ράν 
in ii. 370 a.

ἄληθέστατα … μαντεύει] ‘That guess of yours is wonderfully 
near the truth.’

ἄλλα τὸδε μοι πειρᾶ, κ.τ.λ.] A singular argument follows the 
admission that the unjust desires universal excess. The admission, 
which is rather unmeaning, seems to have arisen out of the desire 
of Thrasymachus to attribute to him every possible preeminence. 
In the argument the grasping nature of the unjust is contrasted 
with the moderation of the just, whose desires reach no higher than 
justice, and this, as Thrasymachus says, is the reason why he is 
such an amusing creature. The aim of the one is affirmed to be 
excess in all cases, the aim of the other, excess over deficiency, and 
attainment of the right measure. Immediately Socrates appeals to 
the analogy of the arts. No true artist desires excess in all cases, 
and the true artist is wise and good; therefore the just, not the 
unjust, is wise and good. But the conclusion thus arrived at con-
tradicts the hasty assertion of Thrasymachus, that injustice is to be 
classed with wisdom and goodness, justice with their opposites. 
Compare the French proverb, ‘Le mieux est l’ennemi du bien,’
'When workmen strive to do better than well, They do confound their skill in covetousness.'

Also Lear i. 4. 369 'Striving to better, oft we mar what's well':

'Relieved to think when workmen strive to do better than well, They do confound their skill in covetousness.'

Cp. also Gorgias 508 λ συ δε πλεονεξίαν οιει δειν ύσκειν γεωμετρίας γιναι ύμελαιοι: and the Kantian conception of freedom as obedience to law. The two kinds of measure in the Politicus (283), viz. (1) the comparative measure of more and less; and (2) the reference to a standard, belong to the same line of thought. Summed up in a word or two, the argument is that justice, if it be like the arts, aims not at excess, but at law and measure.

οδηγοὶς . . . εὐθῆς] 'Far otherwise, else he would not have been the amusing and simple-minded individual that he is.' ἀστεῖος, 'townbred,' as opposed to 'living far off in the fields.' Hence it acquires the meaning of 'witty,' 'clever,' which easily passes into that of 'amusing,' 'charming,' 'the cause of wit in others.' Cp. Lysis 204 ἀστείον γε, ἡ δ' ἰδε, ὅτι ἐρυθρᾶς. 'It's charming to see you blush.'

οὐδὲ τὴς δικαιας] sc. πράξεως, which is found in one MS.

εἰ . . . μή] Although εἰ is interrogative, μή and not οὐ is used, because Socrates asks whether this, in the opinion of Thrasyamachus, is probable. The use of ἦν in the preceding sentences has given a hypothetical turn to the expression. Cp. Goodwin, M. and T. 667, 5.

C τοῦ δε ἄδικου] Sc. ἄξιοι πλέον ἐχειν. 'But he does claim to have more than the unjust.' The context shows that this only applies where the unjust errs on the side of deficiency. For the use of δε, when a negative has preceded in the first clause, compare i. 354 λ ἄθλιον γε εἶναι οὐ λυσίτελει, εὐδαίμονα δε: iv. 422 τ ομιν δε: and for the use of πλεονεκτεῖν in this passage cp. Laws iii. 691 λ πλεονεκτεῖν τῶν τεθέντων νόμων.

τι δε δῆ . . . πράξεως] 'What of the unjust? Does not he claim as his due more than the just man, more than the just action?'

Ἀδε δῆ . . . τοῦ ἀνομοίου] 'Let us put the matter thus: the just does not desire more that his like, but more than his unlike;
but the unjust desires more than both his like and unlike.’ With this statement Thrasydamus is remarkably well satisfied. Cm. Philebus 27 e, where Philebus is similarly entrapped: ἴδον καὶ λύσῃ . . . τὼν τὸ μᾶλλον τε καὶ ἵπτων δεχομένων ἔστον; Φι. Ναί, τῶν τὸ μᾶλλον, ὦ Ἐκκρατες’ οὐ γὰρ ἀν ἴδον πᾶν ἄγαθον ἢ, εἰ μὴ ἀπειρον ἐτύγχανεν πεφυκός καὶ πλήθει καὶ τῷ μᾶλλον.

[Kern added: The reading δὴ, which is found in Ven. Π, but not in Par. Α, is more emphatic and expressive than δὲ, which however has the authority of Α Μ Ρ. δὴ marks the transition from a dramatic to a descriptive passage and may be translated: ‘Now Thrasydamus assented to all this,’ δὲ, according to the English idiom, is better omitted, and the words may be translated simply: ‘Thrasydamus assented,’ &c. The latter reading has been retained by Hermann and Baiter.]

Notes: Book I.

Republic I.

349 C

D

E

B

C

VOL. III.

E
**Republic**

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**tote kai**] is probably a mock heroic form of expression (like the imitation of Homer in Protag. 315 δ καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ Τάνταλον γε εἰσείδον): cp. esp. II. v. 394 τότε καὶ μω ἀνήκουσαν λάβειν ἀλγος. καὶ adds emphasis to τότε εἰδον: 'Ay, and then I saw.' The unusual order has led to the erroneous punctuation of Par. A, which places the point after τότε.

**Θρασύμαχος ἐρυθρώντα]** Compare Protag. 312 λ, where the youthful Hippocrates is seen by the light of the opening dawn to have a blush upon his face, as he professes his intention of becoming a disciple of the Sophist.

350 D–352 B  

**The comparative strength of justice and injustice is tested by an independent argument. Suppose a city to have triumphed in complete injustice, and to have subjugated many other cities. Can this triumph be secured without the help of justice? Can a city or an army or a band of robbers do any unjust thing in common, if they do not keep faith with one another? And what is true of large bodies of men is true also of two or three. If they are absolutely unjust, they will quarrel and fight and hate each other and be paralysed in action. And it is true also of the individual. If he is completely penetrated by injustice, he will be divided against himself and cannot stand. And he is the enemy of just men, and also of the Gods whose justice even Thrasymachus will not venture to deny. Complete injustice, therefore, is complete powerlessness.**

350 D  

**ἐφαμέν]** Cp. supra 344 c. Socrates, with an apparent graciousness, but really with the object of drawing Thrasymachus into a fresh contradiction, reasserts a proposition formerly maintained by Thrasymachus (supra 344 c). Thrasymachus, who has learnt from experience to be cautious of Socrates, is in reply surly and reserved. For the plural, including the speaker as well as the respondent, cp. Theaet. 210 b ἡ ὡς ἐτε κυνόμεν . . . ὃ φίλε;  

οὐδὲ ὁ νῦν λέγεις ἀρέσκει . . . δημηγορεῖν ἂν μὲ φαίησ] 'I am not contented with your last conclusion any more than with the former ones, and I could answer you: but if I did, I well know that you would say I was haranguing.'

E  

**μηδαμῶς . . . παρὰ γε τὴν σαυτοῦ δόξαν]** Cp. Gorgias 500 b καὶ πρὸς φιλίου, ὃ Καλλίκλεις, μὴτε αὐτὸς οὐκ δεῖν πρὸς ἐμὲ παῖζειν, μηδὲ ὁ τε ἄν τύχης παρὰ τὰ δοκοῦντα ἀποκρίνου.  

τούτο . . . ὑπὲρ ἀρτι] Cp. supra δ ἐφαμέν . . . μεμνησαι;
Notes: Book I.

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καὶ ἡ ἀκαίριαν] Cp. Politicus 281 D ποιητῶν ὁ λέγομεν,
ἐν' ἐφεξῆς ἢμῖν ὁ λόγος ἦν.

νῦν δὲ γ', ἐφην] Par. A reads ἐφη. But ἐφην is obviously the right reading; ν has been dropped from the compendium ἐφη-.

ἀλλ' οὔ τι οὕτως ἀπλῶς . . . σκέψαισθαι] 'I do not wish to consider the argument in this simple and abstract manner' (i.e. that injustice is folly and therefore weakness), but to show, by the example of states and individuals, how it actually works.

πόλιν φαίνῃς ἃν . . . δουλωσαμένην] 'You would not deny that a state may be unjust and may be unjustly attempting to enslave, or may have utterly enslaved other states, while already holding many in subjection under her.' Three stages are supposed:—(1) states attacked with a view to subjection; (2) states utterly subdued in recent struggles (καταβεβουλωσθαι); (3) states held in subjection (πολλὰς . . . ἔχειν δουλωσαμένην). As elsewhere, the complexity of the thing imagined makes the language harsh.

εἰ μὲν . . . ἀδικίας] 'If the case is as you were saying, and justice is wisdom, then, with justice; but if as I was saying, with injustice.' The MS. authority is strongly in favour of ἔχειν, the other reading, ἦσι, being an obvious correction which is meant to remedy the anacoluthon. The repetition of εἰ before ἡ δικαιοσύνη (a conjecture of Baiter's) is unnecessary, and also objectionable on the ground of the hiatus. The irregular construction may be defended by other passages of Plato, in which one of two clauses is an explanation of the other. Cp. Theaet. 203 E Ἐχέτω δή, ὅτι νῦν φαμέν, μία ἱδέα . . . ἐξ ἐκάστων τῶν συναρμοτιῶν στοιχείων γεγονομένη ἡ συλλαβή, where the reading has been questioned equally without reason.

μετὰ δικαιοσύνης] sc. τὴν δύναμιν ταύτην ἀνάγχε τῆς ἐχειν.

πάνω ἀγαμαι] Cp. a similar mode of practising on Meletus in the Apology 27 c ὡς ὄνησας, ὅτι μόνις ἀπεκρίνω ὑπὸ τούτῳ ἀναγκαζόμενος. See also Gorgias 449 c, d.


σοι γάρ, ἐφη, χαρίζωμαι] Thrasymachus wishes to intimate that the defeat which he sustains is to be attributed to his own good nature. The imperative moods which follow, ἔστω, ἔχετω, ἔστωσαν, imply that he is ready to admit anything which Socrates likes: 'let
us say so,' 'agreed,' 'if you will,' 'we won't quarrel about that.' And he is encouraged in his self-conceit by Socrates' words—Εδ γε σοι ποιών, δ ἀριστε, &c., of which he fails to see the irony. Callicles in the Gorgias (516 b) in the same temper says—Πώς γε, ἵνα σοι χαρίσωμαι. This is an ingenious device by which Plato is enabled to carry on the argument to the end, without requiring his adversary to undergo a process of sudden conversion.

This formula used interrogatively expects an affirmative answer. 'Surely that is so?'

ἐν ἑλευθέροις τε καὶ δοῦλοις] 'alike in freemen and in slaves.'

For the conflict with self cp. Laws i. 626 δ αὐτῷ δὲ πρὸς αὐτῶν πάτερον ὡς πολεμὰ πρὸς πολέμιον διανοητέων, ἥ πῶς ἢ τι λέγομεν; also viii. 560; Soph. 223 b.

ὅ θαυμάσει] marks the intense interest of Socrates as the conclusion he has been preparing rises in full proportions before his mind (ἀναπεραται supra 350 c).

μῶν μή like other interrogative particles, used with some uncertainty of meaning, which has to be defined by the context; for instance, in this passage, it seems to require a negative answer, but in Phaedo 84 c it merely suggests a doubt (τὰ λεχθέντα μῶν μή δοκεῖ ἐνδεώς λελέχθαι; πολλὰς γὰρ δὴ ἢ τι ἔχει ὑποψίας). It is a pleonastic expression which intensifies the interrogation. Either μῶν or μή might be omitted without any perceptible difference, except a slight weakening of the sense. μῶν, having lost its etymological sense of μῆ ὁν, allows the μή to be repeated.

αὐτῷ] sc. πόλις, γένος οἱ στρατόπεδοι.

καὶ τῷ ἐναντίῳ παντὶ καὶ τῷ δικαίῳ] 'with all that opposes, and therefore (inclusive) with the just.'

καὶ θεοὶς ἄρα] θεοὶς ἔχθρος was a common form of abuse (and therefore a term to be deprecated beyond others). See Soph. Phil. 1031 πῶς, ὁ θεοὶς ἔχθιστε, κ.τ.λ.: Demosth. de Cor. p. 241 Bekk., § 46 νῦν κόλακες καὶ θεοὶς ἔχθροι καὶ τάλλα ἐ προσήκει πάντι ἀκούσων.

Compare with this whole passage the description of the tyrannical man in Book ix. (577 ff).

Εὐωχοῦ τοῦ λόγου . . . ἀπέχθωμαι] Socrates takes up the word εὐωχοῦ with ἐστίασις, which is again echoed by Thrasymachus at the end of the book, 354 a ταῦτα δὴ σοι . . . ἐστιασθὼ ἐν τοῖς Βενδίδεοις.

Thrasymachus is seeking to cover his defeat by casting upon his
adversaries the reproach of intolerance. ‘I shall make enemies here if I oppose you.’ Compare the discomfiture of Gorgias and Polus through their fear of incurring odium: Gorgias 487 A, B τῷ δὲ χείον τώδε, Γοργίας τε καὶ Πόλυος, σοφῶ μὲν καὶ φίλω ἐστῶν ἐμῶ, ἐνδεικτέρῳ δὲ παρρησίας καὶ αἰσχυντηρείῳ μᾶλλον τοῦ διένοτος.

Once more, are just men happier than the unjust, as well as wiser, better and stronger?

Every creature has a work or function. And everything does its own work best, when it has its proper excellence. For example, the eye sees best when it is possessed of perfect vision, which is the opposite of blindness. Now life is the function of the soul, and justice (as we have seen) is the virtue or excellence of the soul. Therefore the soul lives best when it has justice. And to live well is to be happy.

Justice, then, is more profitable than injustice, if to be happy is profitable.

ὅτι μὲν γὰρ . . . τὸ πρῶτον ἑτίθεσον] After a somewhat long digression (ὥς γὰρ ἄν . . . πρῶτεν ἄδυνατον) the sentence is resumed in the words—ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ὁτι οὕτως ἔχει μανθάνω. The first part, as far as λέγομεν, is governed by ὅτι, and ταῦτα ὡς παντάπανοι ἀδιεχόμενος λέγομεν proceeds as if οὕς φαίμεν had been ὅταν φῶμεν τινα. ἀλλ' οὖχ . . . ἑτίθεσον which is opposed to οὕτως ἔχειν, repeats and emphasizes the antithesis. There is also a slight inexactness either of expression or of citation here, which is worth noticing as a point of style. The phrases ὡς σὺ τὸ πρῶτον ἑτίθησον and ὅπερ τὸ ὑστέρον προοιμίζεισα σκέψασθαι do not strictly agree. τὸ πρῶτον refers vaguely to the past discussion and suggests Socrates' subsequent criticism of the theory: 'which you maintained at first, but which I have since shown to be false.' The theory in question is that injustice is stronger than justice; and this, like the assertion next discussed—that injustice is happier than justice, is one aspect of Thrasy-machus' second contention—that injustice is generally superior to justice. τὸ ὑστέρον therefore contains a more exact reference than τὸ πρῶτον, alluding, not indefinitely to the past discussion, but to a definite point in it—the 'second contention,' as opposed to the first, that justice is the interest of the stronger (see above, 347 d, e). There is a slight inaccuracy in substituting a particular form of superiority—superior happiness—for superiority in general; and the introduction of τὸ ὑστέρον obscures the fact that the second
contention of Thrasy machus involves superior strength quite as much as superior happiness.

The various reading οὐδὲ (M), though inferior in manuscript authority, is not to be disregarded.

The omission of ἄν in the following sentence, μαχαίρα . . . ἀποτέμου, where however it is inserted in some MSS. of inferior note, may be defended on similar grounds.

Schneider defended the manuscript reading ἄν φαμέν by comparing Laws iv. 712 ε ἤγου δὲ οὕτω νῦν ἐξοίφησεν ἄν ἐρωτήθης ὁντος, ὥσπερ εἰπόν, οὐκ ἔχω διορισμάμενος εἰπεῖν τὶς τούτων ἐστὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν, and infra x. 610 ἄ ὀρθότατα ἄν, ἐφη, λέγεις (so MSS.). But the latter passage is easily corrected,—see note in loco,—and in the former ἔχω εἰπεῖν ᾧ ἐπίσωμι. There is no sufficient ground for refusing to admit so slight an alteration as the addition of an iota here any more than in vi. 494 B ἐν *πασίν . . . ἐν ἀπασίν, where Schneider vainly defends the manuscript reading ἐν πάσῳ.

dropped out between ai and am.

'Did we speak of any function of ears?' The imperfect refers to what has preceded, 352 E τί δὲ; ἀκούσας ἀλλὰ ἡ ὄσιν; οὐδαμῶς, as in Cratylus 410 C τί οὖν ἡμῖν ἦν τὸ μετὰ γνώσιν, referring to 408 D, and Soph. 263 C ὡς τῶν ἀδικημῶν ἦν λόγον ὡσαὶ μηδενῶς εἰσαι λόγον. ἦν = 'was admitted by us.'

Cp. Gorg. 468 B, 499 E, where the notion of an end appears in a still more rudimentary form. The conception of an ἔργον and an ἄρετή πρῶς τὸ ἔργον is derived from the analogy of art, the province of which has not yet been thoroughly distinguished from the sphere of nature and of morals. The conception exercised a great influence on Logic and Ethics in the ancient world, leading to the ἄγαθων of Aristotle, the opposition of means and ends, and the division of moral and intellectual virtue. Modern philosophy has moulded Ethics into another form. The favourite notion of a τάγαθων or 'summum bonum,' of which the conception of an ἔργον is the germ, has been replaced by modes of speech such as duty, law, the will of a superior being, or resolved into the more concrete abstractions of utility and pleasure.

'Well then,' is used with various degrees of force for 'hold,' 'stay,' passing also into a mere invitation to attend or con-
sider. Cp. Laws i. 639 d ἐὰν δὴ τῶν πολλῶν κοινωνίων ξυμπότας καὶ ξυμπότια διέμεν ἄν μιαν τινά ξυμποτίαν εἶναι;

ἀρ' ἄν ... καλῶς ἀπεργάσαμεν] Heindorf conj. ἀπεργάσαμεν, perhaps with reason. The use of the plural verb with the neuter plural nominative has been explained as a remnant of Epic usage, as a personification, or as due to the substitution in thought of a masculine plural substantive for a neuter plural having the same meaning, or to some other natural association. Cp. Thucyd. iv. 88 τὰ τέλη (the magistrates): ... αὐτῶν ἐξέπεμψαν.

The construction in any of these cases follows the sense rather than the grammatical form. A doubt however is thrown on the passage by various readings, ἀπεργάσαμεν, ἀπεργάζομαι, ἀπεργάζομαι, and by the use of ὅτα with the singular ἀπεργάσαται in the next sentence. The reading of the MSS. has however been retained in the text; because Greek usage is not absolutely uniform in requiring the neuter plural to be joined to a verb singular.

ἡτίς ... ἐρωτῶ] ‘Say rather, whatever their virtue is, for I have not come to that question yet.’ He means that he would rather affirm a general proposition (εἰ τῇ ὅικείᾳ μὲν ἄρετῇ ... εὔ ἐργάσεται τὰ ἐργαζόμενα), and not anticipate the particular. Every step is to follow regularly in the dialectical process.

τίθεμεν ... λόγον;] ‘Do we include all other things under the same statement?’

tο ... ἄρχειν, κ.τ.λ.] Cp. Phaedo 94 b. The pronoun αὐτά resumes τὸ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ... πάντα.

ἐκεῖνης] The gender follows ψυχῆ, and not ὅτα ἄλλῳ.

ἐφοδαίμονα δέ] Cp. supra 349 c, d τοῦ δὲ ἐδίκου, and note.

Thrasymachus is silenced, but Socrates is not satisfied. For he feels that he has passed on too quickly to consider certain attributes of justice, before he has defined what justice is.

ἄλλ' ὀσπερ οἱ λίχων, κ.τ.λ.] This is imitated by Polybius, B. P. iii. 57, 7 εἰ δὲ τινες πάντως ἐπιξητούσι κατὰ τόπον καὶ κατὰ μέρος τῶν τοιούτων ἀκούσων, ἵσως ἄφηνον παραπλῆσιν τι πάσχοντες τοῖς λίχων τῶν δειπνητῶν, καὶ γὰρ ἔκεινα, πάντων ἵσωσιν μένοι τῶν παρακειμένων, οὔτε κατὰ τὸ παρόν οὐθένως ἄθρεψεν ἀπολαύσει τῶν βρωμίτων, οὔτ' εἰσὶ τὸ μέλλων ὅψαλμων εὖ αὐτῶν τὴν ἀνάδοσιν καὶ τροφὴν κομίζονται. The passage is a good example of the manner in which later writers amplified the ideas of Plato. See also Julian, Orat. ii. p. 69 c and Themist., Orat. xviii. p. 220 b.
A similar image occurs in the Sophist 251 B ὀδευ γε, ὀιμαί, τοῖς τε νέοις καὶ τῶν γερόντων τοῖς ὑψμαθέων βοῶν παρεσκευάκαμεν: and in the Lysis 211 C, δ' ἵνα ἤμείσ, ἔθη δ' Κτήσιππος, αὐτῷ μόνῳ ἐστιάζον, ἡμῖν δὲ οὐ μεταβιβάσαν τῶν λόγων; Compare also the opening words of the Timaeus.

πρίν δ' τὸ πρώτον, κ.τ.λ.] Plato is loose in recapitulating here. The question—'What is justice?' was immediately followed by the question which Thrasymachus raised, whether justice or injustice was the more expedient, and the question whether justice is wisdom or folly was subordinate to this. But in glancing backwards from the conclusion that the just man has the better life, Socrates recalls the argument about the wise and good (349), as if it had arisen independently. The order (1, 2, 3) is not that in which the questions were raised by Thrasymachus, but that in which they were discussed. Such slight inconsistencies are very natural to the freedom of discourse. See above, 352 B.

C ὥστε μοι...εὐδαιμών] Socrates ends the discussion with the truly Socratic thought, that the result of a long inquiry is ignorance. The First Book of the Republic, and the first half of the Second Book, though here and there (335 A–E, 352 A) containing true and deep thoughts, are in general destructive only. The controversy with the Sophists which has been carried on in the Protagoras, Meno, Gorgias, and other dialogues, is now concluded, or takes another direction (cp. Sophist and Politicus). In the Republic, as elsewhere in Plato, they are the representatives of the popular morality in a better or worse form; their theory accords with the practice of the world, which is the great Sophist (vi. 492 A): this is contrasted by Socrates with the deeper truths and higher aspirations of philosophy. The thought that he who is ignorant of the nature of anything cannot know its qualities or attributes is very characteristic of Plato, and is the germ of a distinction which has exercised a lasting influence on philosophy. Compare Laches 190 A, Β εἰ γὰρ μὴ δ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο εἰδεῖμεν δ' ἵνα ποτ' ἔστω ὑψε ἢ δ' ἵνα ἔστω ἄκοιη, σχολή ἀν σύμβουλοι γε ὑξειά λόγου γενοίμεθα καὶ ἱστροὶ ἢ περὶ ὑπαιλαμὼν ἢ περὶ ὀτίων, ὄτι χράσουν ἄκοιη ἢ ὑψε κάλλεστ' ἣν κτήσιατο τίς: Protag. 361 C: Meno 71 B συμπέφυμαι τοῖς πολίταις τούτων τοῦ πράγματος, καὶ ἔμαντόν καταμεμφόμαι ὡς οὐκ εἶδως περὶ ἄρετής το παράπαν τ' δὲ μὴ οἶδα τί ἐστι, πῶς ἄν ὅποιον γέ τι εἰδέην;
BOOK II.

Glauc"on is determined to continue the argument. The theory which Thrasymachus has ineffectually maintained is one which passes current in various forms, and although it has no practical influence on ingenuous youths, yet their minds are confused by incessantly hearing it preached on every side.

τὸ δ’ ἢν ἄρα, ὡς ἑοίκε, προοιμίων] As a parallel of style we may compare Laws iv. 722 ὅ νόμοις ἃ ἑρτὶ μοι δοκοῦμεν λέγειν ἄρχεσθαι, τὰ δ’ ἐμπροσθεν ἢν πάντα ἥμιν προοιμία νόμων. τὸ ἤν ἐν τὸ δὲ ῥεσumes ταύτα εἰπὸν: ‘What I had said, I thought was the end, but it turned out to be (ἄρα) only the beginning.’

ὁ γάρ Γλαύκων . . . πρὸς ἀπαντά] Another example of this ‘intrepidity of talk’ in Glauc"on occurs in Xen. Mem. iii. 6, where he is described as dragged from the Bema, and with difficulty persuaded by Socrates that at twenty years of age he does not possess the qualifications of a statesman. In viii. 548 ὁ he is compared to the representative of timocracy for his φιλωνεκία. Glauc"on is also the ‘juvenis qui gaudet canibus avibusque’ (v. 459 λ), who breeds animals and birds; and the man of pleasure who is acquainted with the mysteries of love (v. 474 δ). He is an interlocutor in the introduction to the Parmenides and Symposium. For ἀνδρειότατος cp. Polit. 263 δ, where the young Socrates is called ὁ πᾶντων ἀνδρειότατος after a similar exhibition of boldness: also Theaet. 204 χ ἄνδρικῶς γε, ὁ θεαίτητε, μάχει.

ἀέτε before ἀνδρειότατος is closely connected with καὶ δὴ καί, which, as frequently, introduces an instance illustrating the general statement. The Greek expresses by a co-ordinate clause what in English would be introduced by a relative: ‘For Glauc"on, who is always,’ &c.

τὴν ἀπόρρησιν] ‘Renunciation of the argument’ (cp. supra i. 350 δ, E, 354 λ). Cp. the use of ἀπειπεῖν, Phaedo 85 c: ἀπαγορεύειν, infra 368 c, viii. 568 c: Theaet. 200 ὁ: ἀπερεῖν, ibid. See also Phileb. 111 ι φιλήθως γὰρ ἥμιν ὁ καλὸς ἀπείρηκεν.

παντὶ τρόπῳ] ‘in every way,’ cp. infra 368 c ὁ τε ὅ πλιν Γλαύκων καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἐδέοντο παντὶ τρόπῳ βοηθῆσαι—i.e. ‘to do all that he could to assist.’ The expression is passing into an adverb, and may be compared with πάντως, παντίσι, πανταχῇ, πᾶσῃ μηχανῇ, πᾶσῃ τέχνῃ.
ou toinun ... (p) an' autow] With the threefold division of goods which is given in the text may be compared the Aristotelian distinction (Eth. Nic. i. 6, 9) of goods which are pursued for their own sake, and goods which are means to other goods; also the statement (Eth. Nic. i. 7, 5) that the highest good (eideia) is the end of other goods, and not pursued for the sake of anything else: which implies a slightly different point of view from that of Plato in this passage. Yet afterwards (vi. 508) a higher good which gives reality even to virtue and knowledge and reaches beyond them, is also admitted. In the Philebus (65, 66) Good is measured by three tests—beauty, symmetry and truth,—and arranged in five degrees or stages: (1) measure; (2) symmetry; (3) reason and wisdom; (4) science, art, and true opinion; (5) unmixed pleasures.

ou toinun ... o boulei] Socrates in his refutation of Thrasy-machus has been led to dwell on the superior profitableness of Justice. He seems to acknowledge himself that this is an unsatisfactory way of treating the subject. For (i. 354 c) he cannot know whether the just man is happy until he knows what justice is, any more than in the Meno (100 b) he can tell how virtue is acquired until he knows the nature of virtue. The question which Socrates had left unexamined is raised again by Glaucou, who, proceeding from another point of view, asks 'What is Justice stripped of its externals?'

kai mu'den ... givnetai] The reading of the text is that of the best MSS. kai mu'den has been altered by Stephanus and some of the later editors into kai mus, and givnetai into givnetai, on slight external authority, from an objection to the use of mu'den in an independent clause. But the indefinite force of the relative (otai) is continued, and therefore the use of mu'den is justified: dia taoutas is added because the subject is changed and the Greek idiom does not allow of the repetition of the relative (di' osas). dia taoutas giv-

netai = at' paioin. Cp. i. 337 e apeiremion autou ein, which is used as though ei me eidein or os me eidein had preceded.—Glaucou's eager logic separates in idea what cannot be separated in fact. He forgets that harmless pleasures may be loved both for their own sake and for their effects.

Eta xairien vexota] (1) vexota, sc. autais, or (2) 'to go on rejoicing,' L. and S. s. v. vexo B iv. 2.
Corresponding to the mixed or contrasted pleasures of the Philebus (44 ff.).

The practice of healing and other modes of money-making, the practice of medicine being included under money-making. The thought of ἵπτρεύεσθαι has suggested ἴπτρευς, and hence this is given as the most obvious example of χρηματισμός. This is better than (2) understanding the words to mean—healing and also money-making, according to the well-known idiom. Cf. infra 371 A τῶν ἄλλων δημιουργῶν and τῶν ἄλλων δικόνων. Gorgias 473 C πολιτῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξέων.

the reflexive pronoun here does not refer to the subject of the verb.

‘There is, I said, certainly this third class also. But what then?’

This fairest intermediate class may be compared with the ‘mixed’ or concrete essence of the Philebus. See especially Phileb. 26 c οὖν μεθ' ὑμεῖας κάλλος καὶ ἰσχύς, καὶ εὖ ψυχαῖς αὐτὰ πάμπολλα ἔτερα καὶ πάγκαλα: ibid. 27 ο νικώντα μὲν ἐθεμέν ποι τῶν μικτῶν βίων ἡδονῆς τε καὶ φρονήσεως.

sc. εἶναι.

The omission of these words in Par. A may be due to the likeness of terminations (ψέγεσθαι, επαινεῖται). See Essay on Text, p. 103. The statement of the other side of an alternative where one only is in point is frequent in Plato.

‘But I, you see, am a slow sort of person.’

A shortened or elliptical form of expression —‘and then we shall see whether or no you and I agree.’ εὖν gives a softened and colloquial turn to the hypothesis. Cp. Theaet. 156 c ἄδρει, εὖν πως ἀποτελεσθῇ, ib. 192 E: Xen. Cyr. ii. 4, 16 ἀκοῦε τοίην . . . ἀν τί σοι δῷξα λίγειν.

In order to elicit from Socrates a convincing argument in favour of absolute Justice, Glaucon restates the Sophistic theory in a more abstract and more developed form.

‘And so I will do my utmost to declare the praises of the unrighteous life.’ For κατατείχω cp. 367 B ὦς δύσαι μᾶλιστα κατατείχας λέγω. So διατείνειν, συντείνειν, εἰστείνειν, ἑντονος.
occur in a metaphorical sense, implying a high degree of effort or tension: v. 474 Α θεῖν διασταταμένους: vii. 536 κ μᾶλλον ἐνειμάμενος εἰτὼν: Soph. 239 B ὁ τι μᾶλστα δύνασαι συνειναὶ πειράσθη.

eἰ σοι βουλομένῳ & λέγω] The suppressed word is probably ἐστίν, or possibly λέγω, echoed from the relative clause.

οἶδον τε] sc. ἐστίν. This reading, though not of much authority, seems probable, the reading of Ven. II, τί οἶδον τε being perhaps an emendation of τί δὲν τε, the reading of Par. Α ΜΕ, &c., which is also possible, notwithstanding the harshness of the construction (‘being what, and whence, it arises’), and has far higher manuscript authority. τί οἶνται γῆ is derived from τί οἶδον τε. [τί οἴνε may be a corruption of τί ἐστί, L. &C.] The nature of Justice is distinguished from its origin, although in the following argument the two are discussed together. Cp. infra 359 B αὖτη τε καὶ τοαιτη, καὶ εἴ δὲν πέφυκε τοιαῦτα.

In the nature of things to do wrong is a great good, but to suffer wrong is a still greater evil. Whence those who have not power to escape the evil and secure the good make an agreement with their fellows, by which they try to get rid of both. This is the origin of law and right, and the neutrality so brought about is Justice.

τεφυκέναι . . . (359 B) ὡς ὁ λόγος] Cp. the words of Thrasy-machus in i. 344 C οὐ γὰρ τὸ ποιεῖν . . . τὴν ἀδικίαν. The same theory is otherwise stated in the Gorgias, where the favourite opposition of νόμος and φύσις also occurs: see especially Gorg. 483 B ἀλλ᾽, οἶμαι, οἱ τιθέμενοι τοὺς νόμους οἱ ἀδελφεῖς ἀνθρωποί εἰσι καὶ οἱ πολλοί, κ.τ.λ. (Callicles is the speaker), 'The makers of laws are the many and the weak; so that legislation and praise and blame have all a view to them and to their interest. They terrify the mightier sort of men who are able to get the better of them, in order that they may not get the better of them; and they say that to take advantage of others is base and unjust and that injustice is the attempt to take advantage. Their reason is, as I believe, that being inferior they are well pleased to share alike.'

δοκεῖ] Ast conj. δοκεῖν, in keeping with the oratio obliqua which precedes and follows. But the number of consecutive infinitives, which is supposed to have led the copyist to try his hand at emendation, may rather be said to account for the return to the indicative here, although the infinitive construction is resumed immediately afterwards.
Notes: Book II. 61

ξυνθήκες αὐτῶν] (1) ‘Agreements with one another’—αὐτῶν for ἄλληλων as elsewhere: Laws x. 889 e ὅπη ἐκατον ἑαυτοῖς συν\\wмолόγησαν νομοθετούμενοι. Or (2), reading αὐτῶν: ‘And this they say is the beginning of the imposition of laws and covenants among them.’ αὐτῶν is best; the objective genitive is equivalent to πρὸς αὐτοὺς, sc. ἄλληλους. So in Thucyd. i. 140 τὸ Μεγαρίων ψήφισμα = τὸ πρὸς Μεγαρίας ψήφισθεν: infra iii. 391 c ὑπερηφανίαν θεῶν, i.e. πρὸς θεοὺς.


ἀρρωστία τοῦ ἀδικεῖν] ‘through want of confidence in their power to do wrong.’

If men had power to be unjust with impunity they would agree to no such compact. This is illustrated by the legend of Gyges’ ring, which changed him from an innocent shepherd into a guilty usurper, simply by enabling him to become invisible. Let the just man and the unjust each have such a power, and they will both act alike.

εἰ τοιόντες . . . ἄξει] The clause δόντες ἔξουσίαν . . . ἐπακολουθήσαμεν is an explanation of τοιόντες.

δ Πάσα . . . πέφυκεν] ὁ, sc. πλεονεκρα, as elsewhere in Plato, the neuter referring to the feminine. Theaet. 146 E γυνώσκει ἐπιστῆμὴν αὐτὸ δ τί ποτ’ ἐστίν: infra x. 612 B, where αὐτὸ δικαιοσύνην (or αὐτὸ-δικαίωσιν) is the reading of most MSS.: Laws ii. 653 B τί ποτε λέγομεν ἡμῖν εἶναι τὴν ὀρθὴν παιδείαν. τούτου γὰρ, κ.τ.λ.

νόμῳ δὲ βίας] Cp. the words of Hippias in Protag. 337 D ὁ δὲ νόμος, τίραννος ἄν τῶν ἄνθρωπον, πολλὰ παρὰ τὴν φύσιν βιάζεται. For the adverbial βία with the other dative cp. viii. 552 E οὗ ἐπιμελεῖα βία κατέχουσιν αἱ ἀρχαί. The active verbal use of τιμῆν, as in the words which follow, is rare.

τοιάδε . . . φασι . . . γενέσθαι] τοιάδε is grammatically connected with οἶνα for one another: the construction is hardly interrupted by the addition of εἰ αὐτοῖς γένοιτο, which adds liveliness to the expression. ‘The liberty of which I speak would be realized by their obtaining such a power as this,’ &c. The repetition of δύναμιν after ἔξουσίαν is occasioned by the additional words. This is the earliest mention, according to Mr. A. Lang, of the invisible-making ring.

τῷ [Γύγου] . . . προγόνῳ] It is Gyges himself, not the ancestor of Gyges, of whom Herodotus tells nearly the same story (without
the marvel), and Gyges himself, who is intended by Plato, as appears from x. 612 B εἶν τ' ἐξη τῶν Γύγων δακτύλιον, εἶν τε μή. Hence there is reason to suspect a miswriting of the text. Stallbaum reads, on slender manuscript authority, τῷ Γύγη, and, without authority, encloses τοῦ Λυδοῦ προγάνῳ in brackets. But as Gyges was not the ancestor of Lydus, who is the eponym of the race, it is difficult to see how these words can have found their way into the text even as a gloss. A more satisfactory alteration would be the substitution of Κροίσου for Γύγου—τῷ Κροίσου τοῦ Λυδοῦ προγάνῳ γενέσθαι, of which Γύγη may have been the explanation in the margin; or the original reading may have been Γύγῃ τῷ Κροίσου, κ.τ.λ.


δημβροῦ δὲ, κ.τ.λ.] Translated by Cicero, de Off. iii. 9 cum terra discisset magnis quibusdam imbris, in illum hiatum descendit aequumque equum, ut ferunt fabulae, animadvertil, cuinis in lateribus fores essent, &c.

ἀλλα τε δὴ [ά] μυθολογοῦσι] ἀ μυθολογοῖσι is the reading of the greater number of MSS., but not of Par. A. If ἀ is omitted, μυθολογοῖσι is a repetition of φασί, 'they tell,' resumed by 'they say in the tale.'

τοῦτον δὲ ἄλλο μὲν [ἐχειν] οὐδὲν] The insertion of ἐχειν has not the authority of Par. A, but appears to be required in order to avoid a harsh ellipsis. Ξ omitting ἐχειν reads δακτυλίον φέρειν.

ἐν ἐξαγγέλλον] The present is the true reading (not ἐξαγγέλλων with some MSS., a second aorist which is rarely, if ever, found; or the future ἐξαγγελλόν, which is ungrammatical). The tense expresses the general habit of making the report and is suggested by εἰωθότος. It is further confirmed by κατὰ μήνα.

τὴν σφενδόνην] the collet of the ring, in which the stone was placed as in a sling. καὶ διαλέγεσθαι changes the subject: 'he became invisible to the company, and they began to speak of him as though he were not there.'

καὶ αὐτῷ οὖν ἔμβαθειν] 'and he found this to be the case,' referring partly to εἰ ταύτην ἔχοι τὴν δύναμιν: also to the words which follow, στρέφοντι μὲν εἰσώ, κ.τ.λ., which are a further explanation of ταύτην τὴν δύναμιν.
Notes: Book II.

either ὅς ὁδειεν] The optatives may be accounted for by assimilation (Goodwin, M. and T. 558, cp. 531). But Glaucion speaks throughout as putting the case for another who is the objector. See the Essay on Syntax, vol. ii. p. 175.

οὐτοὶ δὲ δρῶν . . . ἀμφότεροι] For a similar piece of sophistry at an earlier stage compare Hdt. iii. 72. 6, 7 τοῦ γὰρ αὐτοῦ γλιθάμεθα, οἳ τε ψευδόμενοι καὶ οἱ τῇ ἀληθήγ ἀπαράστατοι, οἳ μὲν γε ψεύδονται τότε, ἐπεάν τι μελλωσί τοῖς ψεύδεσι πείσαντες κερδήσασθαι. οἳ δ’ ἀληθίζονται, ἵνα τῇ ἀληθήγ ἐπιστάσασθαι κέρδος, καὶ τε μᾶλλον σφιχοὶ ἐπιτάχθησαν. A more refined form of the same doubt occurs in Aristotle, Eth. Nic. v. 9, 9 ἕτερον γὰρ ἀγαθόν, εἰ ἐτυχεῖν, πλεονεκτεῖ, οὗν δόξης ἡ τοῦ ἀπλῶς καλοῦ.

ὡς οὖκ ἀγαθοῦ ἴδια ὄντος] gives the reason of ἀναγκαζόμενος: ‘under compulsion, because justice is not a good to him individually’; τοῦτο refers to ἐπὶ ταῖτῶν ὅσον and is further explained in the clause ἐπεὶ διὸν γ’ ἄν . . . ἀδικεῖν.

ὅ περὶ τοῦ τοιούτου λόγου λέγων] Either (1) ‘he who makes this argument his theme’; or (2) in the Homeric sense of περί, like ἀμνοῦμενος περὶ πάρτης, ‘who argues in defence of this thesis.’ Cp. infra 362 π ἰκανῶς εἰρήθαι περὶ τοῦ λόγου.

tοιαύτης ἐξουσίας ἐπιλαβόμενος] ‘Having got such an opportunity into his hands,’ a more graphic expression for ἐξουσίας λαβών. Cp. προφυσίως ἑπιλαβέσθαι in Hdt. iii. 36. 5; vi. 13. 3; 49. 3.

Which is the happier, the just life or the unjust?

Before we can answer this question, we must view them as they are in their perfection, the one entirely just, the other entirely unjust. The unjust man, seeming just, shall receive the rewards of justice in addition to the gains of injustice: the just man, seeming unjust, shall sacrifice his own advantage and also suffer the penalties of injustice.

τὴν δὲ κρίσιν αὑτὴν] ‘But the decision itself,’ or ‘the actual decision.’ The judgement, as of supreme importance, is distinguished from the preliminary description.

περὶ] Either περὶ or περί: on such a point the authority of MSS. is of no value. It is best to read περὶ and make the genitive antecedent to ὃν depend on κρίσιν. ‘The decision, in the case of the persons in question, as regards their life.’ The accusative κρίσιν is first placed out of construction, and then resumed as a cognate accusative with κρίσιν.

τὸς οὗν δὴ ἡ διάστασις;] For the sudden question compare infra 376 Τὸς οὗν ἡ παθεία ἦν
Ideas of justice and injustice cannot really be isolated from their consequences. (Compare the attempt which is made in Phileb. 20 ε to divide pleasure and knowledge: μήτε ἐν τῷ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐνέστω φρονήσει, μήτε ἐν τῷ τῆς φρονήσεως ἡδονή.) Truths which have any meaning or interest for man cannot be wholly withdrawn from the conditions of human life. Aristotle remarks on the absurdity of such paradoxes, Eth. Nic. vii. 13, 3 οί δὲ τῶν τροχιζομένων καὶ τῶν δυστυχίων μεγάλαις περιπέτευσται εὐδοϊμονα φάσκουσε εἰναι, ἐὰν ἢ ἀγαθός, ἢ ἐκότις ἢ ἀκοτις οὐδὲν λέγουσιν. And Socrates brings his hearers back to a more natural point of view when he requires that the meaning of justice should be sought for not in the individual, but in some relation of men to one another (infra 372 A).

The construction of the sentence is noticeable. First οἶνος, κ.τ.λ. is added in explanation of ὅσπερ οἱ δεινοὶ δημιουργοί, then the whole clause, ὅσπερ...ποιεῖτο, is resumed in οἷνος.

τὴν τελεωτάτην ἀδικίαν] Glaucon again recalls the phraseology of Thrasymachus, i. 344 λ.

τῶν λόγων] 'In our description.' So infra δ ἐπεξελθεῖν τῶν λόγων. Cp. infra 363 c εἰς "Αἰδών γὰρ ἀγαγώντες τῶν λόγων, said of Musaeus and his son taking their heroes down to the world below in their descriptions: 369 λ εἰ γεγυμένην πόλιν θεασάμεθα λόγῳ: C τῶν λόγων εἴ ἀρχής ποιώμεν πόλιν—'let us create the state': vii. 534 δ ὦς τῶν λόγων τρέφεις...εἰ ποτὲ ἐργῳ τρέφοις. So Tim. 27 A ἀνθρώπους τῶν λόγων γεγυμένων might be translated 'the men whom we have created.' The word ἵστῳμεν suggests the image, ὅσπερ ἀνθρώπον, &c., in what follows, infra p.

οὐ δοκεῖν] Aesch., S. c. Th. 592 (said of Amphiarasus)

οὐ γὰρ δοκεῖν ἄριστος, ἀλλ' εὐνούει, 
βαθεῖα ἀλοκα δια φρενός καρποῦμενος, 
εἴ ὃς τὰ κεδύνα βλαστάνει βουλευματα.

ἀδῆλον οὖν...τοιοῦτος εἰ] ἀδῆλον, sc. ἄν εἰ: 'In that case it would be uncertain whether he were such (i. e. just) for justice' sake, or for the sake of the gifts and rewards.' εἰ is the true reading, not ἄν εἰ, which has slight manuscript authority (Vind. E, Flor. x). The optative accords with the conditional nature of the case in an imagined future. See note on ὃς δόξειν 360 B supra.

Notes: Book II.

τῶν ἀπ᾽ αὐτῆς] ἀπό is not found in any of the MSS., which all read ὑπό. It is adopted from citations of the passage in Eusebius and Theodoret, and is better adapted to the context. The confusion of ὑπό and ἀπό is frequent in MSS. For ὑπό here, however, cp. Theaet. 200 ε ἐὰν ἀποῦ (sc. τοῦ δοξάζειν ἀληθῆ) γιγνώμενα.

ἀλλὰ ἵπτω] The reading of the best MSS. ἵπτω is a late form, which has probably crept in by mistake. Better ἵπτω (cp. vii. 534 c διαπερεύεται). The η of ἵπτω in Par. A appears to have been made from i. ἵπτω is probably a conjectural emendation for ἵπτω.

βαβαί] is an exclamation of wonder, parallel in form to πόται, παπαί. ‘Wonderful, said I, dear Glauc. In what a spirited manner you polish up your two heroes for the decision, as if each were a statue.’ Cp. the reversal of the two portraits in the true state, in which the King and the Tyrant (ix. 577) and the just and the unjust (x. 613) receive their final reward.

ἐκκαυθήσεται] (A Π), and not ἐκκαυθήσεται (γ) or ἐκκαυθήσεται (Μ), is the reading of the best MSS., and is confirmed by a further reference to this passage in x. 613 ε καὶ ἄγροικα ἐφησθυ σφ ενω ἀληθῆ λέγων,—ἐπί στρεβλώσονται καὶ ἐκκαυθήσονται. The Gorgias contains a germ of the second book of the Republic; we find there (473 c) the parallel words, εἰν ἄδικων ἀνθρώποι ληφθῆ τυραννίδι ἐπι-βουλεύων, καὶ ληφθεὶς στρεβλώσαι καὶ ἐκτίμησε καὶ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἐκκάηται, which also confirms the reading in this passage. The corruption in Μ is due to the later pronunciation of αυ.

Using a bold inversion, Glauc. says that the life of the unjust is more real than that of the just. For the reality of justice, when without the appearance of justice, is annihilated by suffering. But the hypocrisy of the unjust man is a part of his business, which is unmistakably real. The discourse of Adeimantus which follows is a further development of this paradox: cp. 362 ε ὡς ᾧ σαφέστερον ὃ μου δοκεῖ βουλέσθαι Γλαυκῶν. Adeimantus however represents the worldly or prudential, rather than the sophistical point of view.

ἀπα] ‘As may be inferred from this.’

ἀληθείας ἐχόμενον] ‘which has to do with truth,’ a favourite Platonic usage of ἐχομαι, e.g. Theaet. 145 λ ὅσα παιδείας ἐχεται: ἀληθεία was a favourite word, not only with Plato and Socrates, but with the Sophists, meaning with them, not reality, but appearance, which they asserted to be reality. Cp. Theaet. 167 λ, c and the title of the book of Protagoras (ἡ Ἀλήθεια—Theaet. 161 c); also Sophist 246 β τὴν λεγομένην ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν ἀλήθειαν.

Vol. III.
Glaucus resumes the quota-

tion, which he applies to the unjust man. In what follows the
‘counsels’ and their results are confused.

The words δοκοῦντει δικαίον εἶναι are
governed by βλαστάνει, with the subject of which ἀρχέιν agrees. The accusative takes the place of the dative in κερδάβαιντα, and with the words εἰς ἀγώνας τοιῶν ὕστα the construction reverts to φήσον (supra λ). For the former change cp. iv. 422 ὃ ὄνδ' εἰ ἐξεῖν . . . ὑποφεύγοντι τόν πρότερον ἰδι προσφέρομεν ἀναστρέφοντα κρούειν . . ;

 taxable

τοὺς τε φίλους εὕς ποιεῖν . . . βλάπτειν] A link of re-

miniscence connecting this with the previous discussion: supra i. 334 β.

This also contains an allusion to what precedes, supra i. 331 β, where Cephalus gave his simple defi-

nition.

For the redundant com-

parative compare Laws vi. 781 α λαθροδέτερον μᾶλλον and the redundant superlative in i. 331 β οὐκ ἐλάχιστον . . . χρησιμώτατον.

Well then, let brother help brother, as the proverb says.’ The proverb is a natural one and appears to be remembered in the lines of Homer:—

Iliad xxi. 308:

Od. xvi. 97:

τὸ λεγόμενον, as elsewhere, is an accusative in apposition to the sentence. For the optative παρεῖν, expressive of a wish or gentle command, see Monro’s Homeric Grammar, § 299 b.

οὐ] sc. λόγον, which, as elsewhere, are personified.
Glaucan had endeavoured to isolate justice and injustice from their consequences: ‘let the just suffer and the unjust be rewarded.’ ‘But what are justice and injustice in their nature?’ Adeimantus would wish also to make them independent of the opinion of men, who maintain, not that the just will suffer, but (1) that he will be rewarded (τοὺς ἐναρτίους λόγους) in this world and also in another (these are the sort of motives that they inculcate): (2) that injustice is only condemned by opinion and custom, and may be readily expiated. Here then is another reason for having a clear account of the nature of justice and injustice.

Adeimantus, whose character is contrasted with that of Glaucan throughout, as the more solid and practical is opposed to the eager and impulsive nature,—(two contraries, which, as Plato remarks in vi. 503 c, are seldom to be found in the same person)—now urges on Socrates a different set of considerations. Glaucan has shown how the opponents of justice declare that seeming is better than reality, and that the praise of justice arises from the fear of injustice. According to Adeimantus, the world is always repeating that virtue is honourable, but toilsome and difficult, vice easy and profitable although disreputable. The young are told to pursue justice, not for its own sake, but for the sake of reputation and reward, and to avoid injustice only from the fear of punishment. Poets and prose-writers alike tell of temporal prosperity attending on justice here, and sensual delights awaiting the just hereafter, and in speaking of the penalties of injustice they bury souls in mud or make them carry water in a sieve; their imagination reaches no further (cp. Theæt. 177 A).

λέγουσί] resumes λόγους supra.

αὐτὸ δικαιοσύνην] For this apposition of neuter and feminine, which has led some of the copyists to write αὐτὸ δικαιοσύνην in one word on the supposed analogy of αὐτομαχάων, cp. infra v. 472 c ἐξητοίμαν αὐτὸ τε δικαιοσύνην οἶν ἔστι, καὶ ἄνδρα τὸν τελέως δίκαιον: also x. 612 Β.

γέγνηται] not γέγραψαι, is the true reading. The singular has a collective force which is assisted by the neuter ὀσαπερ. Cp. infra v. 463 Α ἔστι . . . ἄρχοντες τε καὶ δῆμος: Euthyd. 302 Α ἔστι . . . καὶ βωμοὶ καὶ ἱερά, κ.τ.λ.

τῷ ἁδίκῳ] is read in x q v and is probably right, though perhaps only a manuscript conjecture:—τῷ δικαίῳ, which is the reading of
most MSS., including ΑΙΜ, may have arisen out of a logical confusion. Madvig would delete the words, which are omitted in one MS. (Par. K). It is hardly conceivable that Plato should have written δικαίω = δοκούσι δικαίω.

έπι πλέον \ldots ε αφαί σθεούς διδόναι] 'Now these make still more of reputation; for扔ing in the good opinion of Heaven, they have numberless benefits to relate, which the Gods, as they say, confer on the pious.' That is to say, they add the favour of Heaven to the good opinion of men.

ώσπερ . . . (c) παρέχην ἰχθυς] The first quotation is from Hesiod, Opera et Dies, 230:--

τοῖσι φέρει μὲν γαϊν πολὺν βιών, οὕρεσι δὲ δρῖς

άρη μὲν τε φέρει βαλάνους, μέση δὲ, κτλ.

as in the text. There is no reason to suppose any variation in this passage in the text of Hesiod. Plato has adapted the words to suit the construction of his own sentence. The second passage is quoted from the Odyssey, ix. 109-113, where ὁστε τεν is the beginning of the verse, τεν depending on κλέος in the previous line, and ή is correlative to another ή, which would have followed if the sentence had been completed.

Μουσαίος δὲ . . . τοῖς δικαιοῖς] 'And the blessings which Musaeus and his son (Ευμολπος? cp. Suidas s.v.) represent the Gods as giving to the just are still more glorious.' In the lively language of Plato the poet is the maker of what he relates; he takes his heroes down into the world below, and lays them on couches, and puts them into a state of intoxication, while others extend the heavenly rewards yet further to their descendants (δ μακροτέρους ἀποτείνουσι μισθοὺς παρὰ θεῶν). μακροτέρους is to be taken with ἀποτείνουσι. The jingle in συμπόσιον τῶν ὁσίων is perhaps intentional: cp. Symp. 185 ε Παυσανίου δὲ πανσαμένου, διδάσκουσι γὰρ μὲ ἴπτα λέγειν οὐσασι οἱ σοφοί.

εἰς πηλῶν τίνα . . . ἀναγκάζουσι φέρειν] Phaedo 69 ε κυνωνεύσαι καὶ οἱ τὰς τελετὰς ἡμῶν οὕτας καταστήσαντες οὐ φαινόντες εἰσιν, ὡλα τῷ ὄντι πάλαι αἰνῶτεσθαι, ὦτ ὄν ἀμύατος καὶ ἀτέλεστος εἰς "Αἰδοὺ αἱκηταί, ἐν βορφάρῳ κείσεται, κτλ.: Gorg. 493 B ὧς τῶν ἐν "Αἰδοὺ . . . οὕτι άθλιώτατοι ἄν εἰςοι ἀμύητοι, καὶ φαροῖες εἰς τὸν τετρημένον πίθον ὄφω ἐτέρψ τοιοῦτο τετρημένῃ κοσκίνῳ.

αλλα δὲ οὐκ ἔχουσιν] sc. λέγειν. Plato has in his mind the only real punishment of injustice, which such reasoners cannot see. Cp.
Further, Will "oi/8(ls KCU If 364.
May And persuasion, us security the or
TROIF(<T(i will from
Theaet. 176 D ύψωσας γὰρ ζημίαν ἄδικας, τὸ δὲ ἤκιστα ἄγνωσεν. οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἢν δοκοῦσι, πληγάι τε καὶ δάναοι, δὲν ἐνίοτε πάσχουσιν οὖνδὲν ἄδικοΰν-
tes, ἀλλὰ ἢν ἄδικονταν ἐκφυγεῖν, viz. that by their wicked acts they
become like the pattern of evil.

ἐκατέρων] i. e. τῶν δικαίων καὶ τῶν ἄδικων.

Again, they tell us that the way of virtue, though honourable, is
grievous and toilsome, whereas vice is easy and pleasant, although
disreputable. And while dwelling on the rewards of virtue, they
speak also in the same breath of the prosperity of the wicked, and of
the misfortunes of the just, attributing both to the action of the Gods.
There are prophets, too, and mendicant priests, who profess to have
the means of reconciling the Gods to sinners, and these declarations
of theirs are confirmed by poets, who represent the Gods as not
inexorable.

What conclusion will a youth of lively parts gather from all
this? Will he not avoid the hard road which leads to possible
disaster and follow the smooth pathway of appearances, holding up
to the world a show of virtue, while in secret he pursues his own
interest? If a doubt is suggested whether he can elude exposure, he
is ready with an answer. Is there not rhetoric, the science of
persuasion, and the power of combination into clubs for mutual
security? May we not hope even to circumvent the Gods? And
perhaps there are no Gods. But if there are, those who have told
us of them tell us also that they may be propitiated by sacrifice.
Then let us share our gains with them. You speak of the punish-
ments of the world below. But are there not mighty deities who
will give us absolution?

πρὸς δὲ τούτοις... καὶ ὑπὸ ποιητῶν] ‘Further, Socrates, con-
sider yet another way of speaking about justice and injustice to
which utterance is given, not only by the poets, but also in prose
writing.’ Cp. infra 366 E αὐτὸ δ’ ἐκάτερον... οἶδεις πώςοτε οὐτ’ ἐν
ποιήσεις οὐτ’ ἐν ἱδίαις λόγοις ἐπεξήλθον ἰκανῶς τῷ λόγῳ. ἴδια is opposed to
ὑπὸ ποιητῶν in the same way that ἴδιωτης is opposed to a skilled

ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλῆθος] ‘in general.’ Cp. Phaedr. 275 B ἀγνώσασθε ὡς
ἐπὶ τὸ πλῆθος διήνε.

καὶ ποιημένος πλουσίους... ἔχοντας] ‘wicked men who are rich
or have any power besides riches.’ ἀλλας, sc. ἡ πλουτοῦν, understood
from πλουσίους.
Republic

364

A

B

Republic

II.

eὐχερῶς] ‘lightly,’ is a word of blame here and in vii. 535 ε

ἀλλ’ εὐχερῶς ὁπερ θηρίον θειον ἐν ἁμαθία μολύνηται.

tοῦτων δὲ . . . ἑναντίαν μοῖραν] Compare infra 379 D, where the

Homerian sentiment of the two vessels of Zeus, the one full of good,

the other of evil destinies, is condemned; also the words of Psalm

xxxvii. 35 ‘I have seen the wicked in great power, and spreading

himself like a green bay tree,’ which are in like manner followed

by a justification of the ways of God to man.

θαυμασιώτατοι λέγονται] θαυμασιώτατοι is the predicate of λέγονται,

in which the notion of λόγοι is repeated. ‘The tales which are told

about the Gods and Virtue are the most wonderful of all.’ The

following words show the connexion implied in τε καί. ‘How the

Gods are disposed towards virtue.’

ἀγάρται] ‘begging priests.’ Cp. infra 381 D "Ἡραν ἡλιοωμένην

ὡς θέριναν ἀγειροουσαν.

C

βλάψει] ‘A man shall hurt,’ sc. πείδουσιν ὡς ὀ ἐθέλων βλάψει.

The passage may be taken in two different ways according as the

prophet or the person who consults him is supposed to be the

subject of ἀκείσθαι supra. In the latter case there is no difficulty

in supplying the subject of βλάψει. The regularity of construction

is interrupted by the sudden introduction of the direct form of

speech, which adds vividness to the passage. And the main thread

of the sentence is taken up again in ἐπαγωγαίς . . . ὑπρετεῖν.

If the prophets are the subject throughout, the reading βλάψει

is more convenient though still not necessary. But the man

who has recourse to the prophet or priest is clearly the nominative

to ἐθέλη, and is referred to in τοῦ supra. Cp. 365 Α μὴ

θύσαντας. βλάψει is found in almost all the MSS. and is a reading

which the scribes were unlikely to invent. βλάψαι is an emendation

of Muretus.

ὁι μὲν . . . διδόντες] ‘Those of them (i.e. of the persons

mentioned in 364 Α) who offer facilities for vice’ (calling Hesiod to

witness that, &c.). The conjecture of Muretus, approved by

Cobet, ὁι μὲν . . . ᾧδόντες, ‘Some of them singing about the facility

of vice’ was needlessly adopted in Baiter’s edition of 1881. For

διδόντες = διδοσθαί λέγοντες cp. supra 363 C, D διδάσας, ‘represent as

being given,’ kataλεύλαντες, κατορύθτουσιν.

D

λείη μὲν ὀδός] The reading in the text of Hesiod (Opera et Dies,

286) is ὀλίγη, not λείη, which is found here and in Laws iv. 718 ε,
where the quotation occurs again, and three other lines are added, the two last of which are quoted also in Prot. 340 ν:—

αδάνατοι, μακρός δὲ καὶ ὄρθιος οἶμος ἡ αὐτήν,
καὶ τριχύς τὸ πρῶτον ἐπὶν δ' εἰς ἄκρον ἴκναι,
ῥηθῆ ἡ ἐπίστα πέλει, χαλεπῷ περ ἐσύσα.

The substitution of λεῖα for ὀλίγη in Plato and also in Xenophon (Mem. ii. 1, 20) and Plutarch (Mor. 77 ν) is supposed to have been intended to avoid tautology of the two ideas, ὀλίγη ὀδός and μάλα ἐγγύθη ναίει, but such a tautology is frequent in Epic poetry: ὀλίγη, of which μάλα δ' ἐγγύθη ναίει is an explanation, is probably the true reading, and is opposed to μακρός following.

στρεπτοὶ δὲ τε καὶ θεὸι αὐτοῖς] The MSS. point to an early variety of reading between λισσοῖ, and στρεπτοὶ which is the reading of the original passage, II. ix. 497. The word λισσός does not occur elsewhere, though ἅλλιστος is found in Empedocles (frag. 50), and τρίλλιστος in Homer (Iliad viii. 488).

βιβλίων δὲ ὅμαδον παρέχοντοι Μουσαίου καὶ Ὄρφεως] For the 'host' of books cp. Eurip. Hippol. 953:—

Ὅρφεια τ' ἀνακτ' ἔχων
βιβλεῖον, πολλῶν γραμμάτων τιμῶν κατοικός,

also Alcestis, 967:—

Ὀρφείας εἰς σανίσιν, τάς
'Ὅρφεῖα κατέγραψεν
γιρυα'

and for the general thought in what follows, Soph. Fragm. 719

Dindorf (753 Nauck):—

ὡς τρισύλλβω
κεῖνοι βρατῶν, οἵ ταῦτα δερχθέντες τελή
μάλωσον ἐς "Λιδόν" τοῖσδε γὰρ μῶνοι ἕκει
ζῆν ἐστι, τοῖς δ' ἄλλους πάντα' ἕκει κακί.

Homer, Hymn to Demeter, 480–482:—

ὁλβιός, ὦς τἀδ' ὀπωσὶν ἐπιχθονίων ἀνθρώπων
ὁς δ' ἀτελὴς ἱερῶν, ὄσ ῥ' ἐμιροσ, ὥσπος ὧμοίην
αἰσιν ἔχει, φθίμενοι περ, ὑπὸ ξόφω εὐφρέντι.

Suidas has given a list of twenty-one Orphic works, which he attributes to various authors; one class of them being called τελεται and ascribed to Onomacritus. This and other passages (Phaedo
 Plato: Republic.

69 c; Orat. 402 b; Phileb. 66 c) show that a body of writings, older probably than any Orphica which have come down to us, existed under the name of Orpheus in the age of Plato.

καὶ παϊδίας ἣδονῶν] ‘and sportive delights.’ The pleonasm gives a scornful emphasis.

teleτάς] Compare Laws x. 908, 909, where the enemies of religion are divided into two classes: (1) open unbelievers, who may be honest and good men; and (2) insidious priests and magicians, who practise upon the souls of the living and dead: 908 D γίγνοσται δὲ εξ αὐτῶν (sc. μάιντεων) ἐστιν ὅτε καὶ τύρανναι καὶ δημη-

γάρι καὶ στρατηγοὶ, καὶ τελετοῖς δὲ ἰδίαις ἐπιθετούλευκότες σοφιστῶν τε ἐπικαλομένων μιχαῖ: 909 B ὅσοι δὲ ἄν... καταφρονοῦστες δὲ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ψυχαγωγῶσι μὲν πολλοῖς τῶν ζώντων, τοὺς δὲ τεθεωτας φάσκον-

τες ψυχαγωγεῖν καὶ θεοὺς ὑπισχυόμενοι πείθειν, κ.τ.λ. Both the open unbeliever and the religious impostor are to be punished, the former with a view to reformation, the latter more severely: both capitally, if they persist after a five years’ imprisonment.

ταῦτα... λεγόμενα] The accusativus pendens receives a con-

struction from ἄκουσθα, as the sentence proceeds.

 образом] τιμὴ is here used in the active verbal sense—‘re-

gard’—cp. supra 359 C ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ ἰσον τιμῆν.


ἀπερ ἐπιπτόμενοι συλλογίσαθαι] The words suggest the image of a wandering bee, gathering honey from each flower in passing. Cp. Ion 534 B ἐκ Μουσῶν κήπων τινῶν καὶ ναπῶν δρεπόμενοι τὰ μελη ἡμῶν φέροντι, ἀπερ αἱ μελιται.

λέγοι γὰρ ἄν... λέγεται] φασίν, like λέγεται, at the end of the sentence, is a resumption of τὰ μὲν... λεγόμενα, which is out of construction or rather in suspense. For the anacoluthon cp. Polit. 295 θ τὸ τοιοῦτον... ξυμβαίνον... γέλως ἢν ἢ μέγιστος γέφυρατ τῶν τοιοῦτων νουμοθηκμάτων:

πότερον δικὰ τείχος ὑψιον, κ.τ.λ.] The same passage is cited by Cicero ad Attic. xiii. 38, 41; Maxim. Tyr. xviii. init.; Atticus Platonic. apud Euseb. Praep. Ev. xv. 798 D; and Dionys. Halic. de Comp. verb. c. 21. From these sources Bergk gives the fragment thus:—Πότερον δικὰ τείχος ὑψιον | ἡ σκολιαῖς ἀπάταις ἀναβαίνει | ἐπι-

χθόνιοι γένοις ἀνδρῶν, | δίξα μου νόσο στρέκειαν επείν. Bergk observes
that ἡθοπέτειον βίος and κύριον εὐδαιμονίας in what follows have also a poetical ring.

ἐὰν καὶ μὴ δοκῶ] ‘If at the same time I have the opposite reputation.’ This, and not ἐὰν μὴ καὶ δοκῶ, is the reading of a majority of MSS., and is more idiomatic.

ἀδίκω δέ] sc. ἐστί.

τὸ δοκεῖν . . . καὶ τὰν ἀλάθειαν βιάτα] The words of Simonides, quoted by the Scholiast on Eur. Or. 782.

καὶ κύριον εὐδαιμονίας] sc. ἐστί.

πράδυνα μὲν καὶ σχῆμα] ‘As a vestibule and exterior.’ πράθυρον, κ.τ.λ., are accusatives in apposition to σκιαγραφίαιν . . . περιγραπτέον, and the whole sentence is explanatory of ἐπὶ τούτῳ δὴ τρεπτέον ὅλως and therefore in asyndeton.—σκιαγραφία in its simple meaning is painting in light and shade. In Plato the word is metaphorically used to imply illusion or unreality of any kind: cp. ix. 583 b ὁδὲ παναλθηθὲς ἐστὶν ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ἠδονή . . . ἄλλ’ ἄσκιαγραφημένην: Phaedo 69 b μὴ σκιαγράφα τις ἢ τοιαύτη ἀρέτη, κ.τ.λ. ἀλώπεκα, ‘the fox,’ is a more lively reading and better suited to the epithets κερδαλέαν and ποικίλην, ‘cunning and versatile,’ which are quoted from Archilochus, than ἀλωπεκὴν, the fox’s skin, which is quoted in the Lexicon of Timaeus. The fox—as the emblem of cunning—is to be trailed behind. Cp. Themist. Orat. xxii. 279 λ ἀνθρωπία σιμερὰ καὶ ἀνελεύθερα τὰς ἀλώπεκας ὀπισθεν ἐφελκύμενα: and Solon, Fr. 10. 7 ἀλώπεκας ἵππεις βαινεῖ.

οὗ ρᾶδιον ἀεὶ λαυθάνειν κακὸν δύτα] For the failure of the wicked in later life cp. x. 613 b οἱ μὲν δεινοὶ τε καὶ ἀδικοὶ δρῶσιν ὅπερ οἱ δρομῆς, ὃσιον ἂν δέοισιν εὐ ἀπὸ τῶν κάτω, ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν ἄνω μὴ.

ταύτη τίτων, ὡς . . . φέρει] ταύτη, ‘in this path’ (i.e. the path of dissimulation and appearance) ‘we must proceed, following in the track of the argument.’

ἐπὶ γὰρ τὸ λαυθάνει] ‘For’ (as to what you say of the difficulty of escaping detection) ‘with a view of escaping it,’ &c.—referring to the previous words οὗ ρᾶδιον ἀεὶ λαυθάνειν κακὸν δύτα.

ἐξ ὧν] ‘So drawing from these resources.’ The antecedent to ὧν is the whole sentence from ἐννομοστίας to διδόντες. The clubs supply force; the rhetors give the means of persuasion.

οὐδ’ ἡμῖν μελητεύον τοῦ λαυθάνει] καὶ ἡμῖν μελητεύον is the reading of
Plato: Republic.

Republic

II.

365 D

ΑΠΜ. But a wrong sense is thus given to the clause καὶ ἡμῖν μελητέων τοῦ λαοῦδϋνευ: 'We must take care to conceal our crimes.' Various ways of removing the difficulty have been suggested. (1) Stallbaum, in his later edition (1858), reads τί καὶ ἡμῖν...: and this is supported by slight manuscript authority (Flor. x); but the new interrogative beginning is too abrupt after ὁδκοῦν. (2) For μελητέων the Zurich editions substitute ἀμελητέων, the conj. of Baiter. But the meaning is not 'We ought not to attend to concealment,' but 'we need not attend to concealment.' The difficulty in the passage is clearly the omission of the negative, which is a very common kind of corruption. It may be supplied either by reading with θ ὁδκυθε' instead of καὶ (as in the text), or with a still smaller alteration, adopted by Schneider, of inserting ὁδκυθε before μελητέον—καὶ ἡμῖν ὁδκοῦν μελητέον: or by throwing back the accent on ὁδκοῦν (stic), a suggestion of Hermann's, who thus obtains the required negative. But in that case the force of ὁδκοῦν cannot be supposed to extend equally to both members of the sentence, which are distributed by μὲν and δὲ; in the second clause εἶ δὲ, κ.τ.λ., it must be assumed that the negative is forgotten and the construction changed.

E

eὐχωλαῖς ἡγανῆι] The reading ἡγανῆι here, as well as in 364 D, where some MSS. also read εὐχωλῆς, may possibly be a correction of ἡγανῆι taken from the ordinary text of Homer.

eἶ δ' οὖν] 'Now if we are to believe.' The alternative consequence which follows from the supposition 'if we believe neither' is too obvious to be expressed.

ἀπὸ τῶν ἀδικημάτων] 'From the results of wrong-doing.' For the sense compare Shakespeare, Hamlet iii. 3. 59 'And oft 'tis seen the wicked prize itself Buys out the law: but 'tis not so above.'

366 A

dικαιοὶ...ἀξίμιοι...μὲν, κ.τ.λ.] The various reading μόνον, which is found in ΗΜ and several other MSS. but not in Par. A, after the first ἀξίμιοι, helps somewhat clumsily to point the sense: 'If we are just, all that we gain is;' &c. μὲν, the conjecture of Muretus, gives a possible account of both the manuscript readings.

ἀδικοὶ δὲ] sc. ὄντες.

λισσόμενοι...ἀμαρτάνοντες] The line of Homer already quoted — 364 E λισσόμενοι, ὅτε κεῖν τις ὑπερβηθη καὶ ἀμάρτη— is ingeniously turned so as to suggest the notion of sinning and praying at once.
Notes: Book II.

ἡ παῖδες παιδών] Cp. supra 363 d. Republic II. 75

αὐ μέγα δύναται] These words happen to be omitted in Par. A, showing that the best MSS. not unfrequently err. It is quite unnecessary with Hermann to spoil the effect of a very spirited passage by the introduction of a very tame emendation — ἀλλ’ ὠφελῆσον αὐτοῖς μὴ τελετά χαὶ αὐτ ὁσιοὶ θεῖοι—in order to vindicate the accidental omission of αὖ μέγα δύναται in Par. A. B

αὐ μέγιστα πόλεις] Meaning Athens, where the Eleusinian mysteries had become part of the state religion.

καὶ οἱ θεῶν παῖδες ποιηταὶ] Either (1) 'and the poets, who are the children of the Gods': sc. ὄντες, absorbed in γενόμενοι, 'and have become their interpreters' : or (2) 'the children of the Gods who have become poets and the interpreters of the Gods.' The authority of states is contrasted with the genius of individuals. Cp. infra τῶν πολλῶν τε καὶ άκρων.

tίς μηχανή] This phrase from the more precise — 'What contrivance is there?' has passed into the more general sense— 'What possibility is there?' Cp. Phaedo 72 δ τίς μηχανή μὴ υπχί πάντα καταναλωθήναι; 'How can it be but that all things would be consumed?'

ὁς δῆ τοι... (p) αὐτὸ δρᾶν] For a like humanity of feeling cp. v. 476 E ἑπικρατώμενοι ὅτι οὐχ ὑμαίνει: vi. 492 A foll., 499 E; Phaedr. 268 E; Laws x. 888, 903. The conviction that vice is at any rate in some degree involuntary leads men to regard it in a more tolerant spirit. C

πλὴν εἰ τις θεία φώσι] Cp. again vi. 492 E οὔτε γὰρ γίγνεται οὔτε γέγονεν οὔδε οὖν μὴ γένηται ἄλλοιον ἢδος πρὸς ἀρετὴν παρὰ τὴν τούτων παιδείαν πεπαιδευμένον,—ἀνθρώπειον, ὡ ἐταίρε' θείον μέντοι κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν ἐξαιρώμεν λόγον. See also the question raised in the Meno and in Aristot. Eth. Nic. i. 9, whether virtue is not a divine gift.

ψέγει] supply ἐκαστος from οὐδείς, as in Symp. 192 E τοῦτα ἀκούσας... οὔδ' ἂν εἰς ἐξαρανθείη... ἀλλ' ἀτεχνός οὐκ' ἂν ἀκηκοέναι. D

ὡς δὲ, δῆλον] 'And that this is so, is plain.' Cp. Dem. c. Tim. 730, 25 ὡς δὲ, εγὼ φράσω.

tῶν τοιοῦτων] sc. τῶν ψευδών τὴν ἀδικίαν.
For these unworthy thoughts the friends of justice must be held responsible, if they continue to dwell mainly on the consequences of virtue and do not rather employ their eloquence to show that justice is in its own nature the highest good and injustice the greatest evil. Let Socrates apply himself to the task of showing this.

And all this arises from one thing, which was the beginning of our whole argument with you. My brother here and I were impelled to say to you, &c. eiteiv is an explanation of λόγος and receives a subject from τύδε καὶ ἐμοὶ—ὁστε τύδε καὶ ἐμε eiteiv. For the expression cp. Hdt. vi. 86, 16 τοῦ δὲ εἰνέκα δ λόγος ὁδὲ, ὃ 'Αθηναίοι, ἅρμηθη λέγεσθαι ἐς ὑμεῖς, εἰρήσεται.

What surprises me in all of you who praise justice is that...’ The mode of address, ὃ διαμάσιε, identifies Socrates with the ordinary panegyrists of justice, with whom Adeimantus is expostulating. Cp. Phaedr. 260 ν τί ποτ', ὃ διαμάσιοι, ληρεῖτε;

Plato is referring to well-known tales and maxims, which the poets and logographers had put into the mouths of ancient heroes, such as the choice of Heracles, or the advice of Erechtheus to his son in Euripides (Fragm. 364, II. 11-17):

The poet is a professional person. Cp. id. supra 363 ε, Phaedrus 258 ν.

After ἐκαστος some MSS. (Π γ) introduce ἀριστος, which Bekker approved. The weight of authority seems to be against it.


The word has an associa-
tion of vulgarity or bad taste: infra vii. 528 ἐς φορτικῶς ἐπαινοῦντι: Theaet. 183 ε ἡ φορτικῶς ἀκοῦσαι τάναντι:—lest we consider the subject in an unworthy manner.'

σου ἐπιθυμῶν ἀκοῦσαι τάναντι] is emphatic: 'it is because I wish to hear from you the opposite side, that I speak with so much earnestness, for I may as well be open with you.'

ὁς δύναμαι μάλλιστα] Cp. supra 358 d, where Glaucon says—διὸ κατατείνας ἐρῶ, κ.τ.λ.

εἰ γὰρ . . ψέγειν ἄλλα τὸ δοκεῖν] 'For unless you subtract from both of them their true reputation, and unless you add on the false one (μὴ is to be repeated with προοθήκεις), we shall say that you do not praise justice, but the appearance of justice, nor blame the being unjust, but the seeming to be.'

While the essences of justice and injustice remain the same, their consequences are supposed to be interchanged. The second ἄλλα τὸ δοκεῖν is omitted in the text of Α, but has been added in the margin by the second hand.

tὸ μὲν δίκαιον ἀλλότριον ἀγαθόν, κ.τ.λ.] Cp. i. 343 c.

tὸ δὲ ἀδικὸν αὐτῷ μέν, κ.τ.λ.] The unjust is expedient to a man's self, as above i. 344 c τὸ δ' ἀδικὸν ἐαυτῷ λυσιτελοῦν τε καὶ ἕςμφιμον.

ἐπειδὴ οὖν ὣμολογησας . . μᾶλλον αὐτὰ αὐτῶν] See above 357 b foll. Plato is fond of 'looping up' the argument by allusions to what has preceded. At the beginning of the Book, justice was placed in the second or 'fairest' class of goods, that is to say, goods desirable in themselves and for their consequences. Adeimantus in the words—πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον αὐτὰ αὐτῶν—has slightly altered this statement of Socrates, making justice belong to that class of goods which are desired much more for their own sakes than for their results.

We may observe τε followed by δέ as ὅτε by οἴδε when a clause is emphasized, as below vi. 499 b ὅτε πῶλε ὅτε πολιτεία οἴδε γ' ἂνῃ.


γόνιμα] 'genuine,' 'real.' Cp. γόνιμον ποιητήν in Aristophanes (Ran. 96).
Plato: Republic.

Republic II.

The MSS. vary between ἀνασχοίμην, ἀποδεχοίμην, and ἀνασχοίμην, the reading of Ξ, which has also the authority of the Scholiast and is represented in the version of Ficinus. The construction of the genitive with ἀνέχομαι occurs again in viii. 564 δ καὶ όνικ ἀνίχνεται τοῦ ἄλλα λέγοντος, Protag. 323 λ εἰκότως ἀπαντῶν ἄνδρος ἀνέχομαι.

εἰ μὴ σὺ κελεύεις] κελεύεις is the reading of Par. A (with the iota over an erasure) and should perhaps be preferred to κελεύεις.

E ἐάν τε λαυθαύρη, κ.τ.λ.] These words are repeated almost verbatim in two other places, iv. 427 b, ix. 580 c,—where Socrates claims to have fulfilled the present demand. See note on 367 c ἐπειδὴ οὖν ὠμολόγησας, κ.τ.λ.

Socrates is greatly struck by the divine instinct which has kept in the paths of virtue two young men who are able to plead so eloquently for the opposite of virtue.—He is discouraged at not having satisfied them, but in the sacred cause of Justice he may not falter. He suggests an expedient by which the discussion may be facilitated. Justice is an attribute of States as well as of individuals, and in the state it must surely be present on a larger scale. Justice in the state may be compared to a writing in large letters, and in the individual to a writing in small letters. Having failed in our attempt to decipher the small characters, let us now begin with the larger, and afterwards return to the smaller letters.

καὶ ἐγὼ ... εἰπον] For the form of the sentence cp. Protag. 335 E ἀδίκως ἐν γωγεῖ σου τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ἀγαμαι, ἀδίκω καὶ νῦν ἑπαυνω καὶ φιλω.

368 A ἐκεῖνον τοῦ ἄνδρος] Not Thrasymachus, as Stallbaum ridiculously supposes (quoting in proof of his opinion Phileb. 36 ν, where Protarchus, who supports the doctrines of Philebus, is jestingly addressed as ὧν ταῖς τῶν ἄνδρος), but Ariston, whose name immediately follows, and is connected with the phrase by the repetition of the word παιδε. What the passage of the Philebus really proves is that this was a familiar mode of address amongst
intimate friends. As in other passages (Theaet. 207 νοιτά: Sophist 263 ἐνοίτα), the demonstrative waits for the correlative word, which is supplied by the verse. The ‘pronominal phrase’ ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀνδρός, ‘of that man,’ prepares for the quotation from the Elegiac Poem and avoids the repetition of the name of Ariston.

περὶ τὴν Μεγαροῦ μάχην] The battle of Megara here referred to may be one of those mentioned by Diodorus (xiii. 65, 72) as having taken place in 409 or 405. As the Athenians were constantly at war with the Megarians, it may also be some minor engagement which is unrecorded. It certainly could not have been the battle in 424, because Plato, who was the eldest of the family, was only born in 430 or 428. We may be certain of so much:—(1) that Glaucon and Adeimantus were Plato’s brothers; (2) that they did distinguish themselves at a battle of Megara; (3) that this battle was not the famous one in 424. Cp. Böckh 439, 440.

eὖ δοκεῖ ἔχειν] ‘seems to be very appropriate.’ Cp. i. 329 ε.

dοκείτε δὴ μοι . . . ἥπιστουν ἄν όμιν] ‘I do believe that you are really not convinced; and I gather this from your general character, for if I judged by your words only, I should not trust you.’

ἐκ τοῦ ἄλλου] ἄλλος here, as frequently in Plato, and occasionally in other writers, is used adverbially; not ‘I judge from the rest of your character,’ but ‘I judge from something else [than your speech] which is your character.’ Cp. supra 357 c. The anti-
thesis is further pointed by αὐτοῦς in αὐτοῖς τοὺς λόγους.

ὁ τι χρήσωμαι] used absolutely, as in Protag. 321 c ἡπόρει ὁ τι χρήσατο: Gorg. 465 ε ἐν . . . σοῦ ἀποκριμασίων μη ἔχω ὁ τι χρήσωμαι.

μη βοηθεῖν] sc. τῇ δικαίωσίνη.

ἐπειδὴ οὖν, κ.τ.λ.] For οὖ δείνοι cp. Theaet. 154 ν δοκοῦν εἰ μὲν δείνοι καὶ σοφοὶ ἐγὼ τε καὶ σοῦ ὣμεν, κ.τ.λ., and, for the favourite illustration from letters, Polit. 277 ε foll., where the argument is from the simpler to the more complex, as here from the greater to the smaller. οἰαντερ ἄν εἰ may be compared with the elliptical formula ὁσπερ ἄν εἰ. The sentence is complicated. It would naturally have run thus: ‘We should make such an enquiry as near-sighted people would make, if they were bidden to read small letters at a distance, and some one discovered that the same letters existed elsewhere larger and on a larger ground. It would be thought a gain to read the larger letters first, and then proceed to
the lesser.' These two sentences are compressed into one, the apodosis of the first (ἐποίησατό τις), or some such words, being omitted, and ἔρμαιον ἀν ἐφανή, strictly an epexegesis of it, taking its place. For a similar accusative out of construction, cp. especially iv. 434 D (where this passage is referred to) νῦν θ’ ἐκτελέσωμεν τὴν σκέψιν ἢν φάθημεν, κ.τ.λ. Compare the use of ὅσπερ εἰ with a sentence following: e.g. Theaet. 197 c ἄλλ’ ὅσπερ εἰ τις . . . τρέφει, and elsewhere.

οὗτος [sc. πρῶτον ἀναγνώστας.

eἰ τα αὐτὰ ὀντα τυχχάνει] ‘To discover if they are really the same.’ See the transition from the state to the individual, which is made with a reference to this passage in iv. 434 D.

tί τοιοῦτον . . . καθορᾶς] ‘What do you see like this in the inquiry respecting justice?’ i.e. how is the inquiry facilitated by the simile of the large and small letters?

ἰσως τοινυ . . . ἐνείη] There is a touch of Socratic irony here.

τὴν τοῦ μεἰξονος . . . ἐπισκοπούντες] ‘Looking for the likeness of the greater in the form of the less.’

γενομένου αὐτοῦ] ‘When we have done as we propose.’ Sc. τοῦ γίγνεσθαι τὴν πόλιν λόγῳ.

δοκεῖ οὖν χρήναι, κ.τ.λ.] The apparent backwardness of Socrates has the effect of stimulating his hearers. The crowning instance of this is in v. 472 λ.

The state is the offspring of mutual need. No individual can supply a tithe of his own wants. Each therefore invites the co-operation of others, and the resulting association constitutes the state.

Primary wants are those of food, shelter, raiment and shoes, and these are supplied by the husbandman, the builder, the weaver and the cobbler.

Their labours must be divided, and each must produce enough of his commodity, and that of the right quality, to supply the rest.

This division of labour is approved upon the following grounds:—

1. Natural aptitudes differ. 2. A man who has one calling only is more likely to excel in it. 3. Work must be done at the right time, and therefore there should be no risk of the workmen being otherwise engaged. A market must also be provided; and a medium of exchange.

And the principle must be carried further. The manufacture of
tools and implements must be committed to the carpenter and smith, and there must be a class of herdsmen and shepherds to rear the animals required for husbandry and for use in building, and for the supply of wool and leather to the weaver and the shoemaker.

Our city is growing in size and can hardly be self-supporting. This deficiency leads to importation, and this to the creation of a mercantile class, and then, as imports necessitate exports, there is an increase of the number of persons in the city who are engaged in production. There must also be ships and sailors, and as exchange within the city grows more complex, barter becomes purchase, a currency is established, and a class of retail merchants is created. Lastly, the bulk of the commodities now carried to and fro necessitates a class of hired porters, who complete our simple state.

γίγνεται τοίνυν ... πόλεις] The real origin of society is beyond the horizon of human history. We reconstruct the fabric on some modern basis of contract, divine right, division of labour, mutual necessity, or obligation, which is ascribed by us to the earliest ages. But the society which we put together is only that which we have previously taken to pieces. We mistake the scientific exposition of a subject for its historical growth and development. The principles which we suppose to have been known and recognized by all mankind from the beginning, are really working in them, but unconsciously. They grew like children according to certain laws, but they did not understand these laws.

ἡ τίν’ οἶει ... πόλιν οἰκίζειν] ‘Or to what other origin would you attribute the foundation of the state?’ (Literally, ‘What other beginning, think you, founds the state?’) Necessity is the πρῶτος οἰκιστής. For the liveliness of the expression, cp. infra c ποιήσει δὲ αὐτήν ... ἡ ἡμετέρα χρεία.

οὖτω δὴ ἄρα ... ἐθήμεθα πόλιν ὄνομα] The plural is the main subject: this is subdivided by παραλαμβάνων, which is attracted by ἄλλος into the singular: cp. ἤμων ἐκκατοστός in the last sentence.

ἄλλος ἄλλον ... ἔπ’ ἄλλου χρείᾳ] ‘One taking to himself one person for one purpose, another taking another for a different purpose, and yet another for another purpose still.’ The complex expression reflects the mutual interlacing of various needs.

μεταδίδωσι δὴ ... ἀμειβον εἶναι] ‘And so one gives to another
or receives from another, because he believes it to be better for him' (to do so).

‘Well then, said I, let us in idea create a city from the beginning; although our need will be the real creator.'

preparing for σκυτοτόμος infra.

Aristotle, misunderstanding the imaginative and artistic treatment of the subject, which he takes as matter of fact, makes a superficial criticism on this passage in Pol. iv. 4, § 12, which is as follows: 'Socrates says that a state is made up of four sorts of people who are absolutely necessary; these are a weaver, a husbandman, a shoemaker, and a builder; afterwards, finding that they are not enough, he adds a smith, and again a herdsman, to look after the necessary animals; then a merchant, and then a retail trader. All these together form the complement of the first state, as if a state were established merely to supply the necessaries of life, rather than for the sake of the good, or stood equally in need of shoemakers and husbandmen.' Stallbaum (note on 369 B) says: 'Aristoteles causam (die Veranlassung) et finem (den Zweck) non distinxit, licet alibi discrimen eorum non neglexerit.' It is quite true that Plato is not here speaking of the final cause of the state, but of the immediate cause of its origin. It is Aristotle who substitutes one for the other and thereby introduces confusion.

′To provide all this.' Socrates playfully exaggerates the wants of his primitive state. Cp. the serious use in vii. 535 C τοσαύτην μάθησιν.

sc. ἔσται, implied in the previous verb.

This word, like 'cobbler' among ourselves, appears to have had ludicrous associations. Cp. infra 374 B; v. 466 B κατὰ τῶν τῶν σκυτοτόμων... βίων.

′thereto,' i.e. to those already mentioned.

Either (1) neuter, or better (2) masculine: 'another of those who minister to the body.'

Either 'the barest idea of a state,' or 'a state which provides for the barest necessities.' Probably a slight play is intended on both senses of the word ἄναγκαιος. There appears to be a similar double meaning in vii. 527 A λέγουσι μὲν ποιεῖ γελοίως τε καὶ ἄναγκαιος, 'they speak very ludicrously and
meagrely,' i.e. with a view to mere necessities; but not without an allusion to geometrical necessity. Also in ix. 574 B ἐνεκα . . . οὐκ ἄναγκαιας ἑταίρας . . . τὴν . . . ἄναγκαιαν μνήμα. The geometrical meaning is also played upon in v. 458 D οὐ γεωμετρικάς γε, . . . ἀλλ' ἑρωτικάς ἄναγκαις.

άμελήσαντα] sc. τῶν ἄλλων.

τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττειν] Compare Charm. 161 E, where this simple notion of doing one's own business, which has been suggested as a definition of σωφροσύνη, is humorously set aside: δοκεῖ ἄν σοι πόλις εὖ οἰκεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τούτων τοῦ νόμου τοῦ κελεύσοντος τὰ ἑαυτοῦ ἰμάτιον ἐκατον ὕφαινει καὶ πλέων, καὶ ὑποθήματα σκυτοτομεῖν, καὶ λήκυθον καὶ στελεγγίδα καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα κατὰ τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων, τῶν μὲν ἄλλοτρίων μὴ ἀπετεθαι, τὰ δὲ ἑαυτοῦ ἐκατον ἐργαίζεσθαι τε καὶ πράττειν; Οὐκ ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἦ δ' ὡς.

ἀλλ' ἵνως . . . ῥᾶν ή' κείνως] 'But surely, Socrates, the former way (οὔτω, sc. by operation) is easier than the second way' (ἐκείνως, by isolation). ῥᾶδιων, which is the reading of Par. Α and of the great majority of MSS., is supported by Meno 94 E ῥάδιων ἐστι κακός πνεύμα ἀνθρώπους ἡ εὖ. The manuscript emendation, ῥᾶν, may be right (see v. rr. on i. 348 E), but is not absolutely necessary. The confusion, if so be, arises from ditliographia and the similarity of Α to Δ (ῥαίων, ῥαιων, ραδιων). οὔτω refers to the more familiar of the two alternatives, which is nearer in the speaker's mind.

ἐννοῶ γὰρ . . . εἰπόντος σοῦ] 'It comes into my mind now you speak.' Socrates has been leading Adeimantus to this result, which he now characteristically pretends to gather from him. The genitive absolute indicates the occasion rather than the cause: cp. infra 383 Α οὔτως, ἐγὼ, ἐμοιγε καὶ αὐτῷ φαίνεται σοῦ λέγοντος.

φύτεα.] This word has the chief emphasis, and is resumed in φύσιν. The first point is that all have not the same natural aptitudes.

πράξειν] The reading πράξει (Μ 1) is not impossible.

ὁταν μιαν εἰς] sc. ἑργαίζεται.

οὐ γὰρ, οἴμαι . . . ἐν παρέργου μέρει] 'For the business, I conceive, will not wait for the leisure of the doer of the business, but the doer must keep at the work, making it his first object.' For the metaphorical application of θελεῖν to things without life, cp. infra iv. 436 B ταῦτα τάναντα ποιεῖν ἢ πᾶσχειν . . . οὐκ ἐθελήσει. So Hdt. i. 74 συμβάσεις ἵσχυραί οὐκ ἐθέλονσι συμμένειν.
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Section 2

The order is inverted, πλείω referring to καιρών, κάλλιον to δύνας, μίαν eis, βάρον to φύσιν, in what precedes.

"And so," &c.

E

That the husbandmen may have oxen to plough with, and builders, as well as husbandmen, the use of cattle for draught. ἔχοιεν is used in a double sense and construction— ἔχοιεν ('possess') βοῦς and ἔχοιεν ('be able') χρήσθαι: ἔχοιεν follows the mood of προσθείμεν: 'if we were to give them shepherds and other herdsmen that the husbandmen might have oxen for the plough.' Every possible use of the animals is enumerated except that of eating them. This is reserved for the luxurious state. Cp. infra 373 c δέΠητε δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων βουκημάτων παμπαλλόων, eis tis αὐτὰ ἔδειται. [ὑποβγύλεως, which should have been accusative after ἔχοιεν, is attracted into construction with χρήσθαι.—L. C.]

αὐτὴν τὴν πόλιν] 'To place the city itself' (not to speak further of the things contained in the city) 'where no imports are required, is well-nigh impossible.' αὐτὴν opposes the state to the previously mentioned individuals who are included in it. Cp. especially Thuc. ii. 60. § 4 ὡς τὸ τόπον ὅπως μὲν τὰς ἱδιὰς ζῷων ἦν αὐτῆς, ἔδει ἐκατός τὰς ἐκείνης ἀδύνατος, πῶς οὐ χρὴ πάντας ἄμφοιν αὐτῇ;

κενὸς ἀν ἤ] eἰ is found in all the manuscripts with the exception of q β'. But the meaning of the words κενὸς ἀν eἰ is poor and feeble, and the asyndeton at κενὸς ἀπείωπι indefensible. The reading κενὸς ἀν ἤ, though probably a manuscript conjecture, is most likely to be the true one. 'But if the minister come empty-handed, and bring nothing which the other people want, whoever they may be from whom they obtain the supply of their needs, he will depart empty-handed.' The position of κενὸς before ἀν ἤ is emphatic, and prepares for the repetition of the word.

Section 3

Dei δῆ] 'And, therefore, what they produce at home must be not only enough for themselves, but also enough and of the right kind to accommodate (subaud. ikανα ἐστιν those of whom (i.e. of whose commodities) they stand in need.' The slight difficulty of explaining the last words of this sentence has probably led to the insertion of
Either (1) τὸν may be taken as masculine: in this case the construction is peculiar and different from τὸν ἐκείνον δεόται in the preceding sentence: 'Those of whom they stand in need': i.e. of whose commodities they stand in need; or (2), placing a comma after ἐκείνοις, the clause τὸν ἐκείνοις may be taken as epexegetic—οίκια καὶ ὀπα ἐκείνοις, sc. ἰκανά, 'but in quality and measure suited to them (viz. those of whom they buy, παρ' τὸν κομίζοντα)—whatever the things are which they require.' The former interpretation (1) is the more probable.

tὸν ἀλλων διακόνων] 'And we shall also want the ministerial class of whom we spoke before, who will have to import and export the various products.' ἀλλων is adverbial. The article recalls the previous mention of them in 370 ε. It is implied, but not expressed, that this class also must be increased.

ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ πόλει] 'In the city itself.' The pronoun here distinguishes the internal from the external commerce of the city.

ἀγορᾶ . . . ἐκ τούτου] 'The next step will be to have a market-place, and a money-token for purposes of exchange.'

τὴν διακονίαν . . . ταύτην] 'this service'—of selling, as infra κ. τὴν τιμὴν ταύτην. The antecedent has to be collected from the previous words ἐν ἀγορᾷ καθήσαται.

αὐτῇ . . . τῇ πόλει] 'This want, then (i.e. of ministers of exchange), calls retail-traders into existence in the state.'

τοὺς δὲ πλάνητας ἐπὶ τῶς πόλεις] He recalls the ἐμποροί mentioned in 371 λ in order to distinguish them from the κάπηλοι.

τὴν τιμὴν ταύτην μισθὸν καλοῦντες] 'Who, selling the use of their strength, because they call the pay thereby obtained hire are called hirelings.' ταύτην refers to πωλοῦντες: cp. Theaet. 168 β ἄντι φιλοσοφὸφων μισθοῦντας τοῦτο τὸ πράγμα (=φιλοσοφίαν) and supra τὴν διακονίαν . . . ταύτην.

Plato is not a bad political economist; he saw the advantage of a division of labour (cp. Laws viii. 846 d, e) in saving the time and improving the skill of the labourers, and the accordance of such a division with the natural differences of mankind. The distinctions of manufacturers and dealers, and of soldiers and citizens, are based by him on the same principle, of which he also makes a fanciful
application in his objections to the drama (iii. 395 A, B 'One man cannot in his life play many parts'). He further saw the necessity of foreign trade or 'territorial division of labour,' in speaking of which Plato almost uses the formula of modern economical writers.

πλήρωμα...μισθωτοί] 'Then hirelings also go to make up a state.'

Where in the state are Justice and Injustice and at what point in the growth of the state do they come in? Adeimantus thinks that Justice somehow springs out of the mutual intercourse of the different classes with each other. Socrates then proceeds to describe the way of living in the primitive state.

But the rudeness of this Arcadian simplicity is distasteful to Glaucon, who, as a man of pleasure, demands that their citizens should have the comforts of civilized life.

And Socrates does not object. For the contrast between Justice and Injustice is likely to be more apparent when luxury has set in.

The first consequence is a further enlargement of the city by the addition of classes devoted to the supply of artificial wants; animals will be reared for food; more servants too, amongst others the class of swine-herds, as well as cooks and confectioners, will be required. The sphere of medicine also will be greatly extended.

Here used in the sense of 'intercourse' or 'dealings with one another.' Cp. Aristot. Rhet. i. 15, 22.

The main verb θρέψονται is forgotten in the accumulation of participles: and when the sentence is resumed with greater emphasis in the words μᾶζας, κ.τ.λ., a word more suitable to the context (εὖωχήσονται) takes its place. Hence an asyndeton.

The article refers to σῖτον supra.

τὰ μέν] sc. τὰ ἀλευρα.


μᾶζας γενναίας] 'Noble bannocks,' see note on i. 348 c.

ἐπὶ στιβάδων ἐστρωμένων μίλακι τε καὶ μυρρίναις] 'On pallets spread of yew and myrtle boughs.'

τοῦ οἴνου] the article referring to σῖτον τε ποιοῦντες καὶ οἶνον.
Notes: Book II.

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οὐχ ὑπὲρ τὴν οὐσίαν ποιούμενοι τοὺς παιδας] cp. iv. 421 E—423 C, where the question of population recurs.

eὐλαβούμενοι ... πόλεμοι] cp. infra 373 n, where war is seen to be occasioned by the excess of population over territory.

ἀνευ ὅψου ... ἐστιωμένους ἐστιωμένους conveys a sarcastic allusion to εὑρισκόμεθα. 'You call it feasting when they have nothing but dry bread!'

καὶ βολβοῦς καὶ λάχανα ... ἐφησονται] 'And they will boil truffles and cabbages—such vegetables for boiling as, you know, are to be had in the country.' Xen. Cyr. i. 2, § 8 asserts that cress (κάρδαμον) was the only ὅψον allowed to the Persian youth when under training.

Socrates assumes a charming unconsciousness of Glaucon's meaning when he asks for ὅψον, and, like Grumio, 'feeds him with the name of meat.'

μετρίως ὑποπίνοντες] 'Drinking moderately the while,' ἵπποι implies that the wine was an accompaniment of the 'dessert.' Cp. Anacreon f. 63 (quoted by I., and S. s. v.) καλὸς ὑποπίνοντες ἐν ὑμνοις.

εἰ δὲ ὕων πόλιν, κ.τ.λ.] This picture of paradisiacal simplicity and vegetable diet has no attractions for Glaucon, who abruptly exclaims: 'And if, Socrates, you were establishing a commonwealth of pigs, how else would you be feeding the beasts?' (χορτάζειν is used properly of animals). 'But what ought I to do, Glaucon? said I. Let them have the usages of civilized life: people who are to be comfortable should lie on sofas and dine off tables, and have dainties and dessert after the modern fashion.' In this easy, humorous style Plato makes the transition from the first simple notion of a state to the more complex. With ἀλλὰ πῶς χρή and ἀπερ νομίζεται, some general words like ποίειν and διδόναι have to be supplied from ἔχορταζες.

ἐπὶ τε κλίνὼν κατακεῖσθαι] in apposition with ἀπερ νομίζεται. κλίνη, 'a couch,' is opposed to στίχις, 'a pallet,' supra b.

ὅψα] sc. ἔξειν, absorbed in ἔχουσι.

σκοτοῦντες γὰρ ... ἐμφύωνται] Socrates ironically dissembles his real meaning, which is that without taking into account the evils attributable to luxury, and amongst other evils war, any real inquiry into the origin and growth of justice and injustice would be
impossible. Plato does not seek for justice in the simple state, because his idea of it and his anxiety to elaborate a parallel between the virtues of the individual and the state requires a more complex and highly organized form of society. There must be three classes in the state (as there are three parts of the soul)—each having its appropriate virtue of temperance, wisdom, courage,—before there can be justice, which is the harmonious blending of three virtues or cooperation of the three classes in the state. These three virtues and classes have no sufficient raison d’être in the city of pigs.

ἡ μὲν οὐν . . . ὑγιὴς τις] The word ὑγίης, which is softened by ὄσπερ, prepares the way for the stronger metaphor of φλεγμαίνουσαν πάλιν, which follows. Cp. Laws iii. 691 ε φύσις τις . . . κατιδούσα ὑμῶν τὴν ἀρχὴν φλεγμαίνουσαν ἔτι.

εἰ δ’ αὖ βούλεσθε . . . θεωρήσωμεν] The subjunctive in phrases of this kind was originally interrogative, but the exact relation of the words was forgotten in the course of time. Goodwin, M. and T. §§ 287, 288.

tαύτα γὰρ δὴ τισιν] Socrates thus playfully alludes to the displeasure which Glauccon expresses at the simple state.

κλίναι, κ.τ.λ.] κλίναι are to supersede the yew and myrtle boughs, τράπεζαι to take the place of the clean leaves.

ἐταῖραι] are introduced παρὰ προσδοκίαν among cakes and ointments, as below ἐτι δὲ καὶ συβωτῶν προσδεησόμεθα, in contrast with the more refined ministers of luxury. A link of association is supplied by the mention of the rich perfumes and other sensual delights. A similar juxtaposition occurs in the Theaetetus, 175 ἐ μνη δ’ ὄφον ἡδίναι ἣ βῶσις λόγους. So infra iii. 404 δ ψέγεις ἀρα καὶ Κορωβίαν κόρην φίλην εἶναι, where the Κορωβία κόρη is mentioned along with the luxuries of the table.

καὶ ὅφα δὴ] the particle δὴ calls attention to the special demand of Glauccon for ὄφον in 372 c, which Socrates now satisfies.

ἐκαστα τούτων παντοδαπά] The asyndeton adds to the effect, as in iv. 434 λ πάντα τάλλα μεταλλαττόμενα.

καὶ δὴ καὶ . . . θετέων] The antecedent to ἀ is repeated with a limitation in τὰ ἀναγκαῖα. ‘In providing what we first spoke of (shelter and covering) we must no longer ordain mere necessaries, as houses, garments, shoes, but set-a-going the arts of decoration.’

καὶ τὴν ποικιλίαν] These words are omitted in Par. A and
Notes : Book II.

several other MSS., but their presence in II shows the reading to be an early one, and as decoration is required for houses in the luxurious state, so embroidery is required for clothing.

μείζονα τε αὐτῷ] The correlative sentence is deferred; it is probably to be found in καὶ ἡ χώρα ποιν, κ.τ.λ. (infra n).

οῖκος . . . καὶ πλήθους] ‘It is to be increased in bulk and number.’ The words have a depreciatory tone, and are suggestive of a huge unwieldy multitude.

οἷον . . . μιμηταί] (1) It is not certain whether in this passage θηρευταί simply means ‘hunters,’ who may be supposed to supply the wants of the luxurious citizens, or whether it includes the association of ‘hunters of men,’ ‘birds of prey,’ who live by their wits at the expense of others (observe the addition of πάντες suggesting a multifarious class). The love of fanciful language in Plato, and also the tendency to fanciful comparisons and generalizations, which is apt to prevail in the infancy of dialectic (see especially the Sophist and Politicus, in both of which θηρευτική and μιμητική occur together, as θηρευταί and μιμηται in this passage,—Soph. 265 Α, Polit. 299 Β), makes it likely that this mischievous second intention of the word has not been forgotten by Plato. So the Sophist is termed νεών καὶ πλουσίων ἐμμοσθόν θηρευτής (Soph. 231 ν), and the art of the Sophist (Euthyd. 290 Β), θηρευτική . . . τέχνη ἀνθρώπων: in Laws vii. 823 Β, the term θῆρα is extended to men as well as to beasts and birds, so as to include thieves, pirates, &c.,—as also in the Sophist and Politicus, where the θῆρα τῶν ἡμέρων has many subdivisions, including piracy, kidnapping, law, rhetoric, and sophistry (Soph. 222 Β foll.)—and στρατηγική is included under θηρευτική (Polit. 299 Β στρατηγικής καὶ ξυμπάσης ἁστικοσῶν θηρευτικῆς καὶ γραφικῆς ἡ ξυμπάσης μέρος ὀπίου τῶν μιμητικῆς). Cp. also Xen. Mem. ii. 6. 29. (2) On the other hand, although the metaphorical use of θηρευτής is common, it may seem that the word could hardly be applied in this way without some preparation or explanation.

οὶ περὶ τὰ σχῆματα τε καὶ χρώματα] Simply ‘forms and colours,’ a general expression, including probably sculptors, painters, architects, as well as inferior decorative artists—not dancers, who are referred to under the next head (χορευταί).

ποιηταί] The poets are allowed to enter with other μιμηται, but most of them in Book iii are afterwards driven out. And by this
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reform of μονακίν' Socrates professes to have done something to purge the fevered commonwealth: cp. infra iii. 399 ε καὶ νὴ τῶν κινῶν, εἶπον, λελήθαμέν γε διακαθηροῦσαν πόλεων ἢν ἀρτι τρυφῶν ἐφαμεν πόλεων. The purgation is made more complete in Book x. ἡμιψεδοί, ὑποκριταί, χορευταί, ἐργολάβοι are the ministers of the poets.

παιδαγωγὸν] Fathers will no longer look after their sons themselves. Mothers will not suckle their own children. All sorts of persons will be required to minister to the extravagances of fashion and the luxuries of the table.

ἐτι δὲ καὶ συμβωτῶν] This is humorously added. Swine are fed only for eating; they were not wanted in a state that dispensed with animal food.

tούτο ἢ τούτου]. The vagueness of the reference renders the transition easy to 'the other animals,' as if swine, and not their keepers, had been mentioned at first. In what follows the emphasis is on παμπόλλων. The other animals (that were included in the former state) will be needed in far greater numbers than before, i.e. not only enough for ploughing, draught, &c. (supra 370 ε), but also for the table.

ιατρῶν ἐν χρείαις] The plural in χρείαις is occasioned by ιατρῶν.

A further consequence of luxury is that we shall be no longer content with the boundaries of our original territory, nor our neighbours with theirs: each will covet a portion of the other's land. And so we shall go to war:—which to states is the source of so many evils. For self-protection we must now have a soldier-class, which, like the other classes, will devote itself exclusively to its own pursuits.

In appointing the guardians, we must first of all select suitable natures. But what natures are suitable? The example of the watch-dog may instruct us here. For he, too, is a guardian. And we observe that courage and gentleness are united in him. Is such a combination possible in man? The difficulty seems at first sight insuperable; yet our illustration of the watch-dog shows a way out of it; for dogs are fierce to strangers, but gentle to those whom they know. May we not then infer that the love of knowledge in a spirited nature is the combination for which we are seeking.

Δφώσων αὐτοῦς] It is this prevalence of the lower nature (σῖδηροῦν, χρηματιστικῶν) which occasions the degeneracy of the state in Book
viii. (pp. 547, 550 ff.). Cp. also the downfall of Atlantis in the Critias (120 d ff.).

| Πολεμήσωμεν . . . ὅταν γίγνηται | Without enlarging on the precise effects of war, Socrates is content to argue that war arises from the same cause (i.e. luxury), as most of the other evils of mankind.

| εἴ ὅν | Either (1) referring to πολέμου (plural to singular, whence two MSS. read εἴ οὗ), or (2) = εἴ ἵκειοι γεγομένου δοῦ. For ὅταν γίγνηται, which is equivalent to ἐκάστοτε, cp. Euthyphr. 7 ν ἑκάρθροι ἀλλήλοις γεγομένα, ὅταν γεγομένα.

| ὅλω στρατοπέδῳ | follows the construction of σμίκρῳ which is a dative of measure or excess.

| ὑπέρ ὅν νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν | perhaps with an ironical reference to τίθησκομιστρίαι κοινρίεσ, &c.

| αὐτοί οὖχ ἰκανοὶ | ‘Are they not enough to take care of themselves without adding to them?’ The answer is: ‘Not enough; for if we are to carry out our principle of a division of labour, the soldier’s must be a separate calling.’

Plato separates the profession of the soldier on much the same grounds as standing armies would be defended in our own day. Yet, as he himself allows afterwards, the soldier may also be a philosopher, nor is the utmost military training inconsistent with other employments in modern times. Large standing armies may be required by the exceptional circumstances of politics, and are not necessarily attended by political dangers. Yet the division between the calling of the citizen and the soldier is probably injurious to both, as tending to separate elements of character which should rather be united—in Plato’s language, as dividing courage from gentleness, and also as superseding a patriotic by a merely professional feeling.

| αλλ’ ἄρα | applies, not only to the first, but also to the second member of the sentence (τὰ δὲ δὴ . . . εὖ ἀπεργασθέντα), which latter is the emphatic part of it: ‘But are we to infer then that while we make one rule for the cobbler and for the husbandman with a view to their attaining a special excellence, the attainment of special excellence in the military art is not of the greatest importance?’

| ἐφ’ ὃ ἐμελλε . . . ἐργαζόμενος | (1) ‘With a view to which keeping himself free from all other pursuits’—or better (2) ‘attending
to which, 'in which,' i.e. 'leaving other things and doing this.'

\[\textit{ef} \textit{w} \text{ belongs either (1) to } \textit{σχολήν ἄγων}, \text{ or (2) to the whole sentence, being resumed emphatically in } \textit{διὰ βίου αὐτὸ ἐργαζόμενος}.—\textit{μελλεῖ}, \text{i.e. 'if he was to do his work well,' as supra 372 \textit{δ} \textit{τοὺς μέλλοντας μὴ ταλαπωρεῖσθαι}.\]

\[\textit{ἡ οὗτω ῥᾴδιον} \ldots (ν) \textit{ἰκανή παρασχομένῳ} \]

For the complex form of sentence, where two clauses, which cannot be true together, are included in one interrogation or negation, cp. especially supra i. 336 \textit{εἰ μὴ γὰρ δὴ οἶνῳ, εἰ μὲν χρυσίων εἰςτούμεν} \ldots \textit{δικαιοσύνην δὲ ξημοῦσας, κ.τ.λ.}, and note. The implied disjunctive argument, If war is to be left to citizen soldiers it is either less important or easier than other pursuits, is characteristic of Plato, as also is the introduction of fresh examples, \textit{πεττεία καὶ κυβεία}, when those already adduced were sufficient.

\[\textit{οὗτο τοῦτο} \text{ sc. } \textit{πεττείαν ἡ κυβείαν}, \text{ understood from } \textit{πεττευτικὸς ἡ κυβευτικὸς}.\]

\[\textit{λαβὼν} \ldots \textit{ληφθέν} \]

The momentary tense is significant: 'the instant he takes it' or 'it is taken in hand.'

\[\textit{ὀπλῶν τε καὶ ὄργάνων} \]

The addition of \textit{ὄργάνων} points the analogy. The weapons of the warrior are his tools.

\[\textit{πολλοῦ γὰρ ἄν}, \text{ κ.τ.λ.} \text{ sc. } \textit{εἰ οὗτῳ ταύτα ἵν.}\]

\[\textit{τῶν ἄλλων} \]

To be joined with \textit{σχολής}: 'Leisure from other pursuits,' sc. \textit{ἐπιτηθευμάτων}. \text{ Cp. supra 370 \textit{c σχολήν τῶν ἄλλων ἄγων}, 374 \textit{b}.\]

\[\textit{ἤπ' οὖν} \ldots \textit{ἐπιτηθεύμα} \]

'Will he not also require a natural aptitude for the particular occupation?' \textit{ἐπιτηθεύμα} (cp. \textit{ἐπιτηθεῖς, ἐπιτηθεῦω}) has a wide range of meaning,—what a man practises, makes an object or profession: hence also the customs and institutions of a state.

\[\textit{ἡμέτερον μέντοι} \]\n
\textit{μέντοι} gives a deliberative assent to the new and somewhat disturbing suggestion.

\[\textit{ὅσον γὰρ ἑώς δύναμις παρείκη} \]

'as far as our power allows.'\text{ Theaet. 150 \textit{δ ὀπισθερ ἑὼς θεὸς παρείκη}; more often impersonal—Sympos. 187 \textit{ε} \textit{καθ' ὅσον παρείκη, φυλακτέων}.\]

\[\textit{οἶει} \ldots \textit{διαμάχεσθαι} \]

Compare with what follows the conclusion of the Politicus 306—311, where courage and gentleness are to be
Notes: Book II.

interwoven in a state. Also infra iv. 441 e: vi. 503 b, c: Laws vi. 773.

εἰς φυλακὴν] is to be taken closely with διαφέρειν. αἰσθανόμενον
is masculine: ‘When he has the game in view,’ αἰσθησις has a special use in hunting, cp. Xen. Cyn. 3. 5.

ὅς ἀμαχὸν τε καὶ ἀνίκητον θυμός] Cp. the saying of Heracleitus
(fr. cv Bywater) θυμῷ μάχεσθαι χαλεπῶν: ὃ τι γὰρ ἂν χρηίζῃ γίνεσθαι,
ψυχῆς ἀνέται,

ταῦτα δὲ ἀδυνάτοις ἐσοικε] ‘Now this seems an impossible
requirement’—viz. that a nature should be found, having both
these opposite qualities. For a similar affectation of despair on
the part of Socrates cp. Theaet. 203 D προγιγνώσκειν τὰ στοιχεῖα ἀπάσα ἀνάγκη τῷ μέλλοντι ποτε γνῶσεσθαι συλλαβῆν, καὶ οὕτως ἡμῶν ὁ καλὸς ἀλόγος ἀποδεδρακὼς οἰχήσεται.

δικαίως . . . ἄπελειφθημεν] ‘My friend, said I, we deserve to be
in a puzzle, for we have lost sight of our own illustration.’ Theaet. 189 c δικαίως ἄν καλόττο γνεῦν δοξάζων. So δικαίως vi. 504 A μὴ γὰρ μνημονεύων . . . τὰ λοιπὰ ἄν εἴην δίκαιος μὴ ἀκόνειν.

οὐκ ἐνενόησαμεν . . . ταῦτα] The greatest characters are those in
which opposite qualities, instead of extinguishing one another, exist
side by side, and are developed by the occasions which require
them. Besides the strength or goodness, the range or play of a
character has also to be considered. ἄρα, ‘then,’ as this example
shows.

οἴσθα γάρ ποι . . . τούναντίον] τῶν γενναίων κυνῶν has a double
construction: (1) after οἴσθα, as a poetical genitive, which may be
defended by such passages as Laws i. 646 D τῆς περὶ τῶν οἰνῶν ἄρα
dιατριβῆς ὑπαύτως διανοητέαν. (2) The use of the genitive is further
supported by the resumption of κυνῶν in αὐτῶν, which is governed
by ἥβος. Cp. infra iv. 439 B τοῦ ταξιτόου οὔ καλῶς ἐχει λέγειν, ὅτι αὐτοῦ,
κ.τ.λ.

οἴδα μέντοι] ‘Certainly.’ μέντοι marks Glaucon’s assent to the
new point to which attention is called.

καὶ τοῦτο, ἃν δὲ ἐγὼ . . . προσπεπονθῶς] Compare the fragment of
Heracleitus (cxdv Bywater) κύνες καὶ βαύζουσι δὲν ἄν μὴ γινώσκωσι.
This double character of friendliness to acquaintances and savageness
to strangers—τὸ φιλήτειον μὲν εἰς τῶν γνωρίμων, πρὸς δὲ τοῖς
ἀγνωταῖς ἄγριους—is attributed by Aristotle to θυμός, which he makes
the principle of friendship, instancing in support of his statement the fact that we are more liable to be excited against friends when we are slighted by them than against enemies (Pol. vii. 7, § 5). δὴ after οὐδὲν is well supported by manuscript authority, although Par. A has δὲ, and the particle is omitted by Stobaeus. δὴ is more forcible than δὲ. 'He has manifestly received no injury from one whom he has never seen.'

οὖ πάνυ . . . προσέχον τῶν νοῶν] 'I never before gave any attention to the point.' οὖ πάνυ, 'not at all' or 'certainly not,' the absoluteness of the negative being used to intensify the statement, as also in οὗ πάντως, with which the expression may be compared.

ἀλλὰ μὴν . . . φιλόσοφον] 'But surely this instinct of canine nature is charming, and quite like a philosopher.' κομψὸς is one of the facetious words in Plato. Compare the following: viii. 558 Α ἡ πραθής εὐίων τῶν δικασθείσων οὐ κομψῇ; 'charming,' as in this passage: iii. 405 Β τοὺς κομψοὺς Ἀσκληπιάδας, 'clever sons of Aesculapius:' v. 460 Α κλήρου κομψοὶ, 'clever,' 'cunningly devised lots': vi. 489 Α ὁ τοῦτο κομψευσάμενος ἐψεύσατο, 'the ingenious inventor of this told a fib:' Phaedr. 230 Β πάντως δὲ κομψάτατον τὸ τῆς πόας, 'most charming of all is the grass.' In all these passages there is an idea (1) of fineness or subtlety: (2) of amusement.

πὴ δὴ; . . . καὶ τὸ ἀλλὸτριον] Socrates works the illustration with ironical gravity. 'Your dog,' as he would say, 'is a philosopher; for he loves those whom he knows, and what is the love of knowledge but philosophy?'

For the use of πῆ and ἦ— Interesting in what way? In this way'—cp. vi. 510 Β σκάπει δῆ αὖ καὶ τῆν τοῦ νοητοῦ τομῆν ἢ τμητέον. Πῆ; 'Ἡ τὸ μὲν αὐτοῦ τοῖς τότε τμηθείσιν ὡς εἰκόσι χρωμένη ψυχῆς ζητεῖν ἀναγκάζεται ἐξ ὑποθέσεων: Theaet. 172 Β, where ἦ in like manner introduces a sentence: πῆ δῆ; ἦ τοῖς μὲν . . . ἀεὶ πάρεστι σχολῆ, κ.τ.λ.

οὐκοῦν . . . δεῖν εἶναι] 'And may we not say confidently of man also that he who is to be gentle to his friends and acquaintances must by nature be a lover of wisdom and knowledge?' The following sentence shows that φύσει is construed with φιλόσοφον and not with πρᾶος.

οὖτος μὲν . . . οὗτοι] The abrupt change of number is again noticeable. Cp. supra 373 Ε.
Notes: Book II.

αὐτό] The antecedent is to be gathered from παιδευθήσονται. 

σκοποῦσι] = εἰν σκοπώμεν.

ίνα μὴ ... διεξίωμεν] For the use of ἵκανος see Gorg. 512c ἵκανος γὰρ αὐτῷ ὁ λόγος: and for συχνός, implying tediousness, cp. Theaet. 185e μᾶλα συχνὸν λόγον: Soph. 217e ἐκτίναγα ἀπομυκόνιν λόγον συχνῶν κατ' ἑμαυτόν: Phil. 23b βασαί ... συχνόν μὲν λόγον τοῦ λοιποῦ. 'For we do not want to be tedious, and we do not want to leave unsaid what is required for completeness;' i.e. 'For we want enough, and not too much.' Cp. x. 601c μὴ τοῖνυ ἡμίσεως αὐτῷ καταλίπωμεν ῥήθειν, ἢδ' ἵκανος ἰδομέν. ἵκανον λόγον, like πλήρωμα supra 371e, is a collective word used partitively. This clause is omitted in the text of Par. A, but has been added in the margin by an early hand.

καὶ ὁ τοῦ Γλαύκωνος ἀδελφός] Glaucon, who was provoked by 'the city of pigs,' has been the interlocutor in the lively discussion of the luxurious commonwealth and of the nature of the guardians. Adeimantus now interposes on the question of method and continues the serious discussion about education, till on the question of music Glaucon is again too much interested to keep silence.

How are these select natures to be reared?

In youth they are to be educated, according to the dictates of long experience, in gymnastic and the liberal arts (μονωσία).

The liberal arts come first, beginning in the nursery with fables, in which truth is to be conveyed through fiction.

Considering the extreme importance of early impressions it is right to legislate even for these first beginnings of education.

The rules to be laid down may be exemplified by considering those great fables which the poets have embodied.

Their account of Gods and heroes is apt to insinuate wrong notions, which are injurious to the young and tender mind. Our poets must not tell of wrong done by Gods, nor of wars in heaven. Such tales are false and of bad example. Nor can they be defended as allegorical, for the child cannot distinguish allegory from fact.

God must be represented as He really is: (1) good, and (2) true.

τίς οὖν ἡ παιδεία:] Education in modern as well as in ancient times hangs to the past: the study of the poets who were committed to memory by the Athenian youth in the age of Plato (Protag. 325e foll.): 'And when the boy has learned his letters, and
is beginning to understand what is written, as before he understood only what was spoken, they put into his hands the works of great poets, which he reads sitting on a bench at school; in these are contained many admonitions, and many tales, and praises and encomia of famous men, which he is required to learn by heart, in order that he may imitate or emulate them and desire to become like them,—Laws vii. 810 foll.) may be compared with the study of the classics in our own day.


"... η μὲν ἐπὶ σώματι γυμναστική"] This, the commonplace point of view (ποι), is stated here, but corrected afterwards (iii. 411 E).

μουσικής δ’ εἰπὼν ... ἢ οὖ;] ‘In speaking thus, do you include literature under music, or not?’ The genitive depends on λόγους. For εἰπὼν without an object (sc. οὗτος or μουσικήν) cp. supra 370 λ εἰπόντος σοι.

The manuscript authority is divided between εἰπὼν and εἴπαν: the latter reading would mean, ‘And do you include literature,’ I said, ‘under music?’ εἰπὼν is to be preferred as having better authority.

παιδευτέον δ’ ... ψευδέον] Truth of feeling rather than of fact or reasoning is the form of truth which the mind is most willing to receive during the first years of life. The child has to go through a stage which is not unlike that of the infancy of mankind, and is only partially corrected by the experience of older persons. That the pupil may have as little as possible to unlearn (παρήσομεν ... τούς παιδίας καὶ λαμβάνειν ... ἐνννήσας δόξας ἐκείναις, ἀς, ἐπειδὰν τελεωθώσων, ἡμεν οἰησόμεθα δειν ἀντούς; infrá 377 B: cp. also iii. 411 E, Laws ii. 653 B), whether in religion or in anything else, considering especially the shortness of life, is what Plato would have termed a ‘point of first-rate importance’ in education. Compare again Laws vii. 792 λ ἔστι δὲ ὁ χρόνος οὕτως τριῶν οὐκ ἐλάττων ἐτῶν, μόριον οὐ σμικρὸν του βίου διαμεγέν χείρων ἡ μη χείρων. Nor has the power of the love of truth, regarded only as an instrument of enlarging and deepening the faculties, ever been sufficiently considered either in ancient or in modern education. For the falsehood of the poets cp. the familiar quotation from Hesiod—Theog. 27 ἢ μεν ψεύδα πολλὰ λέγειν ἐτύμοισιν ὁμοία. Also Pindar, Olymp. i. 28 foll.:
Notes: Book II.

ἡ θαύματα πολλά, καὶ ποὺ τι καὶ βρατῶν φάτιν ὑπὲρ τὸν ἁλαθὴν λόγον

dedaiadamēnοι ψεύδον ποικίλοις ἐξωπατώντε μιθοί.

and Arist. Met. i. 2, 13 kata tēn paroimian polla psuedontai anidoi.

toutō de poū . . . ἀληθῆ] ‘These, I conceive, speaking generally, are fictions, but they contain some elements of truth.’ Mythology, taken as a whole, is false, but may contain elements of historical or moral truth.

touṭo ἥ ἐλεγον . . . γυμναστικῆς] ‘That was my meaning in saying that (1) they (the young), or (2) that we (the teachers) must take in hand music before gymnastics.’

ἀπτέον] (1) sc. τοὺς νέους (infra νέος καὶ ἄπαλφο). Cp. infra iii. 389 B τὸ γε τοιούτων λατρειών δοτέων, ἰδιώταις δὲ οὐχ ἀπτέον. Or (2) sc. τοὺς παιδεουσίν ἡμῖν.

πλάττεται] sc. ὁ τρεφόμενος. The word occurs presently in a different connexion (μύθοις πλασθέντας): but cp. infra c πλάττειν τὰς ψυχὰς αὐτῶν.

ἐνδυέται τύπος] ‘A deep impression is made.’ For ἐνδύσεσθαι in the sense of ‘penetrate,’ ‘sink in,’ cp. Laws i. 642 B εὐνοια ἐκ νέων εὐθὺς ἐνδυέται ἐκαστὸν: also Theaet. 169 B οὕτω τις ἔρως δεινὸς ἐνδίδυκε τῆς περί ταύτα γυμνασίας: infra iii. 401 D μάλιστα καταδίεται εἰς τὸ ἐντὸς τῆς ψυχῆς ὁ τε μυθὸς καὶ ἀρμονία. For the sense compare Timaeus 26 B ὡς ἥ του, τὸ λεγόμενον, τὰ παιδῶν μαθήματα θαυμαστῶν ἔχει τι μιμείον: Theaet. 194 C τὰ σημεία . . . ἱκανὸς τοῦ βάθους ἔχοντα πολυχρώμα . . . γίγνεται.

Compare the saying—ἀρχὴ ἡμαυν παντός—or, as Plato, altering the well-known line of Hesiod, says in the Laws vi. 753 E ἀρχὴ . . . πλέον ἡ τὴν ἡμαυν παντός: an adaptation which is repeated by Aristotle, Eth. Nic. i. 7, § 23. See also infra iii. 401 E τὰ μὲν καλὰ ἑπανοὶ, . . . τὰ δ' αἰσχρὰ ψέοι τ' ἀν ὄρθως καὶ μειοὶ ἐτὶ νέος ὢν, πρὶν λόγων δυνάστει ἐσαι λαβείν, ὑλικῶς δὲ τοῦ λόγου ἀσπίζοιτ' ἀν αὐτῶν γνωρίζων δ' οἰκειότητα μάλιστα ὁ οὕτω τραφείς; and Laws ii. 653 B.

βαδίως οὕτω] (1) ‘Thus lightly,’ i.e. as we should be doing if we went no further; like ἄπλος οὕτως i. 331 C and elsewhere, and νῦν οὕτω: or, rather (2) ‘lightly, as is now commonly done’ (with the customary indifference). Cp. infra iii. 403 E ἡ τῶν ἀσκητῶν ἐξε; viii. 544 C ἡ Ἐρμηνεία . . . αὐτή, sc. πολιτεία. The same difficulty arises infra 378 A.
of μὲν ἃν καλὸν ... ἀποκριτέων] καλὸν, sc. μῦθον, understood from μυθοποιοῖς, in the same way as infra iii. 399 D τί δὲ; αἰλοσποιοῦς ἢ αἰληταῖς παραδεξεί εἰς τίν πῦλιν; ἢ οὐ τοῦτο (sc. αἰλός, understood from αἰλοσποιοῖς) πολυχρωμοῦτατον; this 'word understood' is added in the text of Ven. II.

καὶ πλάττειν . . . ταῖς χερόιν] A good commentary on these words is afforded by Plutarch, De Educatione Puerorum, ed. Reiske, 3. 26 ὀσπερ γὰρ τὰ μὲν ἥν τοῦ σῶματος εὐθὺς ἀπὸ γενέσεως πλάττειν τῶν τέκνων ἀναγκαῖον ἐστιν, ένα ταῖτα ἄρθα καὶ ἀστραβὴ φύσις, τῶν αὐτῶν τρόπων εἰς ἀρχής τὰ τῶν τέκνων ἂθη μυθίζειν προσκείει. A similar use of πλάττειν with reference to the adult body occurs in Plut., De Sanitate, ed. Reiske, 4. 93, where the editor vainly conjectures τῷ αὐτῶν τύπων εἶναι] sc. τῶν μειζόνων καὶ ἐλαττόνων μῦθων, which is easily supplied either from the previous or the following clause.

καὶ ταύτων δύνασθαι] 'And should have the same effect,' i. e. embody the same principles.

καὶ λέγουσιν] This is said either (1) of Homer and Hesiod, whose poems still live and are recited, or (2) of contemporary poets, who are included in οἱ ἄλλοι ποιηταί. Probably the latter.

ὀσπερ, ἢν δ’ ἔγω . . . μέμφεσθαί] i. e. τὸ ψεύδεσθαι περὶ θεῶν. Plato means (1) that any falsehood about the Gods is blameworthy, but (2), above all, when it has an immoral tendency.

ἄλλως τε καὶ . . . ψεύδηται] 'Especially when the fiction is bad as well as false.' The meaning of μὴ καλῶς may be illustrated by the repetition of the expression (οὐ καλῶς) in describing what Socrates terms the 'immoral fable of Uranus and Cronus.'

καὶ γὰρ . . . χαλεποί] 'Why yes, he said, these stories are certainly indefensible.'

οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀληθῆ] i. e. 'for they are false, as well as bad.'

eἰ γε δεῖ ἡμῖν, κ.τ.λ.] 'if we are to have them think.' ἡμῖν, here
as elsewhere, is the dative of the person interested. See on i. 343 λ ὅ γε αὐτῇ, κ.τ.λ.

πολλοῦ δεὶ . . . καὶ ποικιλτέων] ‘Far be it from us to tell them of the wars of the giants and (1) make them the subject of decorative work,’ or (2) ‘embroider them on garments.’ To the same stories Euthynphro appeals in justification of his own conduct in bringing an action against his father. See Euthynphr. 6 b, c καὶ πόλεμον ἀρι ἤγει αὐτὶ εὖ εἶναι τῷ ὅστι ἐν τοῖς θεοῖς πρὸς ἄλλοις, καὶ ἔχθρας ἐν δεινίς καὶ μάχαις καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα πολλά, οἷα λέγεται τῷ ὕπο τῶν ποιητῶν, καὶ ὕπο τῶν ἀγαθῶν γραφεῖν τὰ τῇ ἄλλα ἵπταν καταπεποίηται, καὶ δὴ καὶ τοῖς μεγίστοις Παναθηναίοις ὁ πίπλος μεστός τῶν τοιούτων ποικιλμάτων ἀνάγεται εἰς τὴν άκρόπολιν: and the previous passage, 5 e, in which Euthynphro defends his impiety by the example of Zeus binding his father.

The sentence is an emphatic repetition of what has preceded: the emphasis justifies the asyndeton. πολλοῦ δεὶ has passed into an adverb = ἡκιστα.

τοιαῦτα λεκτέα . . . λογοποιεῖν] ‘Such, rather, must be the stories told to them in earliest childhood by old men and old women alike, and as they grow up, we must compel the poets also to compose for them in a similar spirit’ (cp. infra 380 b, c). This punctuation, with a comma after γρασί, was first adopted in Baiter's edition of 1881. Previous editors, including K. F. Hermann, made the pause at πρεαμπτέως γιγνομένως. The passage, when so punctuated, was variously understood: (1) ‘by old men and old women, and all elderly persons’ (Davis and Vaughan): (2) ‘this is what old men and old women should begin by telling children, and the same when they grow up’ (Jowett's Plato, first edition). These ways are unsatisfactory, although the change from πρὸς τὰ παιδία to the dative in (2) may be defended by examples (Soph. 248 λ). The omission of λεκτέα in Par. A may be accidental, or the insertion of the word in other MSS., although necessary, may be only conjectural.

uiédos] is proved by the antithesis of πατρός to be the true reading; the old correction Διότ (Ξ ι), which is mentioned by Suidas and Photius, appears to have arisen from a reference to another story, which is told in Iliad xv. 18 ff. The legend of the golden throne containing hidden chains, which was presented by Hephaestus to his mother out of revenge for her rejection of him at his birth, is given by Pausanias i. 20. 3. It is to this legend that Plato refers.
Plato: Republic.

Republic

11. 

378 D

ἐν ὑπονοίαις πεποιημένας] ‘Composed with a hidden meaning.’

Cp. ἐν φαρμάκων εἰςει (iii. 389 b) and similar expressions. ὑπονοίαι was looked upon as an old-fashioned word in Plutarch’s day. Cp. Plut. de aud. Poet. ii. 19 E ταῖς πάλαι μὲν ὑπονοίαις ἀλληγορίαις δὲ νῦν λεγομέναι.

E

πρὸς ἀρετήν] ‘In regard to fitness for producing virtue.’ Cp. Phaedo 69 a ἣ ὀρθή πρὸς ἀρετήν ἀλλαγή, and see Riddell’s Digest, p. 128.

ἐξεῖ γάρ ... φαϊμεν] ‘Yes, said he, there is reason in that; but suppose a person were to ask us with regard to this what these noblest kinds of fiction (sc. τὰ κάλλιστα μεμυθολογημένα πρὸς ἀρετήν) are and what the tales in which they are found, what answer should we give?’ The first παύτα refers vaguely to what precedes, the second more precisely to κάλλιστα μεμυθολογημένα πρὸς ἀρετήν.

Compare Laws vii. 811, where the question is asked, what literary pattern the guardian of the law shall use in the education of youth, and is answered (not without a certain degree of egotism) that Plato’s own book of the Laws affords the best pattern.

379 A

αὐτὸ δὴ τοῦτο] in apposition with the sentence. ‘But as to this very point—the forms of theology, what shall they be?’

οἶος ... τραγῳδία] ‘God should ever be rendered to us as he in truth is, whether the form of verse which the poet chooses for the description of him be Epic, Lyric, or Tragic.’

ἐὰν τε ἐν μέλεσιν] though omitted in Par. A, is found in Eusebius (p. 376) and is probably genuine. The insertion seems to be required by the sense, and agrees with the divisions of poetry, infra iii. 392–394.

379 B–380 C

1. God is good. He can never be the author of evil. He is not the cause of all things, but only of the good.

How many poems will be cancelled by this simple rule!

If human calamities are referred to God, it must be added that they were inflicted for the good of those on whom they fell.

οὐκ ἄρα ... ἀγαθῶν] Cp. x. 617 E αἰτία ἐλοιμένου ἐδοκοῦν ἀναίτιος: Tim. 42 D διατηρομεθήσας ... ταύτα, ἵνα τῆς ἐπίτευξιν ἐπὶ κακίας ἐκάστων ἀναίτιος. Some of the inferences in the preceding Sorites are verbal only. The unnecessary multiplication of the steps is a characteristic feature of the Platonic dialectic.
Such pessimism seems more in harmony with the spirit of the Timaeus or the Laws than of the Republic. Cp. however infra v. 473 d. It is a strain of reflection always apt to recur in Greek literature: Iliad xvii. 446: Hdt. vii. 46, 3.

ταύτην τὴν ἄμαρτιαν] sc. the error of making God the author of evil, as is further explained in what follows.

κηρῶν] 'lots,' not Κηρῶν, 'fates.' Cp. Iliad xxiii. 210:—

ἐν δ’ ἐτίθη δύο κήρε ταυτελεγός θεατόνο.

The lines are not found in our text of Homer exactly as they are quoted; the passage referred to is Iliad xxiv. 527-532:—

δοιοι γὰρ τε πίθοι κατακείμεναι ἐν Δίος οὐδεὶς,
δόρων, οἷα δίδωσι, κακῶν, ἔτερος δὲ εἰὼν
ὁ μὲν κ’ ἀμμίξας δῶῃ Ζεὺς τερπικέρανυς,
ἀλλοτε μὲν τε κακῷ ὡ γε κύρεται, ἀλλοτε δ’ ἐσθλῷ:
ὁ δὲ κε τῶν λυγρῶν δῶῃ, λωβητῶν ἔθηκε,
καὶ ἐκακὴ βοῦβρωστις ἐπὶ χθόνα δαίων ἀλώει.

The quotations from Homer in Plato often show slight variations—which are sometimes intentional departures (see infra iii. 388 a) from the old manuscript text which has come down to us. The changes, however, are far from being sufficient to justify Wolf's assumption of the unsettled state of the Homeric text before the times of the Alexandrian Grammarians.

ὡς ταμίας] ὡς follows λέγωντος, in the same construction as ὡς δοιοὶ πίθοι supra. The words which follow are not found in Homer; they probably arise out of a confusion of the preceding quotation with Iliad iv. 84:—

Ζεὺς, ὅστ’ ἀνθρώπων ταμίας πολέμου τίτυκται.

ην] cognate accusative.

θεῶν ἔριν ... καὶ Δίος] (1) The strife and combat in the θεομαχία in Iliad xx takes place after an assembly of the Gods, convened by Zeus, whose command is carried to them by Themis,—in Plato's view a most inappropriate person for such a message. κρίσις is here 'dispute,' 'altercation,' from κρίνειθαι. (2) Others suppose an allusion to the judgement of Paris, and the contention which led to it: θεῶν is then from θεία. This explanation, however, rests on a con-
pectual emendation of Proclus' abstract of the Cypria (viz. Θέμυτος for Οἴτιδος—Heyne). See W. R. Hardie in the Classical Review, vol. iv. p. 182. And the strife of the goddesses is only the first of a chain of incidents leading to the events which the Cypria spoke of as planned between Zeus and Themis (or Thetis).

ἄλλ' ἐὰν τις, κ.τ.λ.] τὰ τῆς Νιόβης πάθη is used in two senses: (1) 'the sufferings of Niobe,' which is the object of ποιή, 'if any one shall make a poem on this theme:' (2) as the description of the play, which is the antecedent to ois. Plato is quoting from the Niobe of Aeschylus.

αὐτοῖς] probably refers to the poets, the singular being exchanged for the plural, as ποιήτῳ in the next sentence is followed by λέγουν. θεὸς in this passage is used in a generic sense, and ὁ θεὸς is relative to the θεὸς which has preceded. But the abstract term is already tending to pass into a proper name—a philological transition which in some degree assisted and also veiled the change in the Greek mind from many gods to one. Cp infra 381 c θεῷ . . . ἐκαστοσ αὐτῶν, and note: x. 597 b, c. For the sentiment cp. Butler's Analogy, part I. c. ii On the government of God by rewards and punishments. 'Perhaps there may be some impossibilities in the nature of things, which we are unacquainted with (i.e. which prevent God from making men's happiness independent of their actions). Or less happiness, it may be, would upon the whole be produced by such a method of conduct, than is by the present.' Again c. vii 'Though the actual permission of evil may be beneficial (οἱ δὲ ὑνίαντο κολαφῶμενοι) . . . yet notwithstanding it might have been much better for the world if this very evil had never been done.' The difficulty which Plato and Butler thus attempt to solve is, perhaps, reduced to the smallest proportions by regarding the whole of human existence as a course of education in which evil is ever lessening in the advance towards a higher good.

The amount of evil, rather than the permission of evil, seems to be the real difficulty. For what is called the permission of evil is only another way of describing the mixed nature of man. And no one can seriously complain that he does not belong to another order of beings, or that, having the power of doing right, he was not made incapable of doing wrong. And even in reference to the amount of evil there is no limit to the power which a man has of improving his own state and that of his fellow-creatures.

See on Book i. 352. In a solitary passage of the Laws (x. 897),
which is imitated in the Epinomis (988 ε) Plato seems to explain the origin of evil as in the Zoroastrian system, by supposing a power of evil as well as of good. No trace of this double principle of good and evil is to be found in Plato except in these two passages.


ἐπεί... διαμαχητέων] sc. ἦμιν: cp. ξύμφορα ἦμιν infra.

ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ πόλει] is added with solemnity; it does not imply that he might do so in another country.

μυθολογούντα] agrees with the subject of λέγειν, although νεώτερον is probably suggested by μὴν πινὰ ἀκούειν which is inserted διὰ μέσου. Cp. for the general meaning supra 378 c.


αὐτὸς μὲν τοῖν... μὴ πάντων] ‘This then will be one of our laws and patterns relating to Theology, which will have to be observed in speaking and writing,—that God is not the author of all things, but of good only.’ That morality in the highest and purest sense must be at the foundation of religion and especially of our conception of the nature of God, is a truth the repetition of which is rendered necessary by the corruption of the human intellect in Christian as well as in heathen times.

2. God is true. He changes not, nor does he deceive.

(a). He is not changed by another, for that other would be stronger than he; nor by himself, for that which is perfect can only change for the worse.

(b). He never deceives mankind. He is capable, neither of true falsehood, nor of falsehood in word;—neither of false-thinking (which all beings hate), nor of false-speaking, which men sometimes find necessary, when they want to elude an enemy, to humour an insane friend, or when they do not know the truth about ancient times, to make mythology as much like truth as they can. But God knows all things and is all powerful, and no madman is the friend of God. In this particular, as in the former, Homer and Aeschylus have committed grievous errors.

τί δὲ δῆ, κ.τ.λ.] The connexion of these paragraphs is as follows:
Plato: Republic.

Republic

II.

380 D

(1) God is good; (2) God is true, and this (a) in himself (i.e. unchangeable either from without or from within), and (β) in relation to us—i.e. he cannot lie or appear other than he is.

αὐτὸν γεγομένον] sc. ἄλλοιον τὴν ἰδέαν, i.e. ‘actually in his own person becoming different,’ as opposed to ‘merely appearing to become so.’ The predicate is to be gathered from what precedes (φαντάζεσθαι . . . ἰδέαις), and any ambiguity which might have been felt is cleared up by the addition of the words καὶ ἀλλὰτοντα τὸ αὐτοῦ εἶδος, κ.τ.λ. God is described, first as really taking some other form; in the second part of the sentence (τότε δὲ . . . δοκεῖν) the metamorphosis is only an illusion.

ἡ ἀπλοῦν τε εἶναι . . . τῆς εἰαυτοῦ ἰδέας ἐκβαίνειν;] ‘Or is he of a simple nature, and least of all going out of his own proper form?’ What is this form? The true answer to this question can only be gathered from the context, viz. that God is good, and God is true. The highest idea of beauty is described in the Symposium (211) as ‘that final cause of all our toils, which in the first place is everlasting, not growing or decaying, or waxing and waning; secondly, not fair in one point of view and foul in another, or at one time and in one relation, or at one place fair, at another time or in another relation or at another place foul, as if fair to some or foul to others, or in the likeness of a face or hands or any other part of the bodily frame, or in any form of speech or knowledge, or existing in any other being, as for example, in an animal, or in heaven, or in earth, or in any other place; but beauty only, simple, absolute, separate, and everlasting, which without diminution and without increase or any change, is imparted to the ever-growing and perishing beauties of all other things.’ Cp. also infra vi. 508 e, in which is described what Plato there terms the idea of good: this is that nature ‘which imparts truth to the known and the power of knowing to the knower, which is the author of science and truth, and yet surpasses them in beauty, and which is not only the author of knowledge, but of being and essence,—which is to the intellectual world what the sun is to the visible.’ See also Tim. 29 e.

Ε ὅποι μὲν ἄλλου] μὲν takes up one of the two cases which are supposed in the previous sentence. The second case is omitted, or rather deferred to infra 381 β ἄλλοιρ ἄρα αὐτός αὐτόν, κ.τ.λ.

σῶμα . . . καὶ πάν φυτῶν] φυτῶν, in the most general sense, would
be inclusive of the human body. Cp. vi. 491 ον παντὸς . . . φυτοῦ, εἴτε ἐγγείων, εἴτε τῶν ζῴων.

οὗ τίν] This is the reading of Par. A and several other MSS. Bekker read with Stephanus and some of the old editions αὐτῆν οὗ τίν. Aldus and Eusebius give αὐτῆν. One MS. (usband) has αὐτὴν. If αὐτῆν is read it must mean ‘the soul herself’ as opposed to the body mentioned in the previous sentence.

καὶ μὴν ποὺ . . . ἀλλοιούσαι] For the meaning of σκεῦος compare Soph. 219 λ τὸ τε αὐτῷ περί τὸ ξύνθετον καὶ πλαστόν, ὁ δὴ σκεῦος ὁμοίακαμεν. The words καὶ ἀμφιέσματα are omitted in Par. A.

ὁ θεὸς γε] ὁ θεὸς τε, Par. A, may perhaps be right.

ἐκὼν αὐτῶν, κ.τ.λ.] These words contain a fresh application of the Socratic principle of the involuntariness of Evil.

ἐκαστὸς αὐτῶν] sc. τῶν θεῶν, referring to θεῷ. See note on 380 A.

μὲνει . . . μορφῇ] Cp. the impressive language of the Timaeus, 42 ε καὶ ὁ μὲν δὴ ἀπαντᾷ ταύτα διατάξας ἐμεν ἐν τῷ έαυτῷ κατὰ τρόπον ἤδει.

θεοὶ ζείνοισιν, κ.τ.λ.] Odyssey xvii. 485, 486. Plato has somewhat unfairly omitted the following line, which expresses a higher feeling, and is therefore unsuited to his purpose:—

ἀνθρώπων ὑθριν τε καὶ εἰνομήν ἐφορώσετε.

In Soph. 216 c he alludes to the whole passage, and applies it to the philosophers, whom Socrates compares to unknown mysterious visitants, καθορώσετε ὑφόθεν τῶν τῶν κάτω βίων.

Θέτιδος] Thetis, according to Sophocles (Troilus fr. 556 Nauck; cp. Schol. in Pindar, Nem. iii. 60) and other writers, took various forms in order to escape from her nuptials with Peleus.

μηδ’ ἐν τραγῳδίαις . . . βιοδόροις] ‘Nor let any one, either in tragedy or in other poetry, introduce Herë disguised, in the form of a priestess, collecting alms for the life-giving sons of the Argive river Inachus.’ For the significance of ἀγείρουσαν see the noun ἀγγέρτης with the feminine ἀγγέρτης and the compound μητραγγέρτης, ‘a begging priest of Cybele.’

'Ινάχου, κ.τ.λ.] It is uncertain from what poet this quotation is taken. The children of Inachus are the other rivers of Argolis on whose waters the fruitfulness of the plain depended.
Plato: Republic.

Republic

II.

381 E

λέγουσαι τοὺς μύθους κακῶς] 'not telling their stories as they ought to be told.' Cp. οὐ καλὸς supra 377 E.

Such charges may be illustrated by the tales which are alluded to in the Laws, ii. 672, of Dionysus losing his reason through the devices of his step-mother Herè, and revenging himself by infusing madness into the rest of the world. Plato with a feeling like that of Herodotus is afraid to repeat the story (ἐγὼ δὲ τὸ μὲν τοιαύτα τοῖς ἀσφαλεῖς ἡγομένοις εἶναι λέγειν περὶ θεῶν ἀφύμα λέγειν): he appears, however, in the spirit of Pindar, to explain the madness innocently, as meaning the excess of youthful life.

ινδιαλλόμενοι] The poetic word recalls the spirit of the mythology.

ἄλλ' ἄρα] 'But are we to suppose then . . . ?' ἄρα (as above 381 B) expresses doubt or wonder about the alternative which remains. The emphasis is on the latter part of the sentence ἕμιν δὲ ποιοῦσι, κ.τ.λ.

382 A

ἐθέλοι ἂν] 'Can we imagine that God would lie or be willing to lie?' ἐθέλω here, as in 375 α, is nearly equivalent to μέλλω. 'Is God likely to do so?' 'Is it in His nature?'

ἡ ἑργὰς φαντασμα προτείνων] 'Or in act, by putting forth a false appearance.'

tὸ γε ὡς ἄληθως ψεύδοι] Plato is fond of this and similar oxymora. Cp. Theaet. 189 C οὐκ ἂν, οἱμα, σοὶ δοκῶ τοῦ ἄληθως ψεύδους ἀντιλαβέσθαι: Soph. 263 D: Phil. 23 ν' ἂν τὸ ἀδινατον εἶπον, λυπεῖν ἡδονῆν;

τῷ κυριωτάτῳ . . . έαυτῶν] For this as an expression for the soul, cp. Phaedo 94 B–E.

ἐκεῖ] sc. εὖ τῷ κυριωτάτῳ.

αὐτῷ] sc. τὸ ψεύδος.

B

ἐγὼ δὲ λέγω] Here, as often in antithesis, the pronoun, although not emphatic, partakes of the emphasis which belongs to the whole clause. 'What I really mean is this.'

ψεύδεσθαι τε καὶ ἐψεύδεσθαι] 'To be and remain deceived.' ἐψεύδεσθαι is added to explain or correct ψεύδεσθαι, 'the lie in the soul' being a thing infixed or permanent, and the whole phrase answers to ἐχειν τε καὶ κεκτηθελοῦν in the following clause. Cp. supra i. 351 B δουλοῦσθαι . . . καὶ καταδεδουλωσθαι.


Notes : Book II.

ἔν τῷ τοιούτῳ] in such a case; when the lie is in the soul and about real being. Cp. Laws v. 731 c τῶν γὰρ μεγίστων κακῶν αὐθείς οὐδαμοῦ οὐδὲν ἐκὼν κεκτήτο ἄν ποτε: πολὺ δὲ ήκίστα ἐν τοῖς τῶν ἐαυτοῦ τιμωτίτων. Cp. for ἐπιταύδα (ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ) vi. 505 D ἀλλὰ τὰ ὁντα ζητοῦμε, τὴν δὴ δίδαξεν ἐπιταύδα ἥδη πᾶς ἀτιμίζει.

ἀλλὰ μὴν ... ἀκρατον ψεῦδος] The lie in the soul is unconscious falsehood respecting the highest matters. To regard God as false or immoral, or, according to Plato, as deluding men with appearances, or to deny the existence of God would be a lie of this hateful sort, which may be compared with Aristotle's ἁγνοΐα καθίσμων (Eth. Nic. iii. 1, § 15), and is a contradiction of the essential nature of the soul, which, according to Plato, lives on truth, Soph. 228 c ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡμι ἡμιν γε ἢσμεν ἄκουσαι πάσαν πᾶν ἁγνοούσαν. Plato considers this unconscious falsehood to be much more disastrous spiritually than the mere conscious or verbal falsehood.

ἔψευσμένου] is masculine, referring to a person (as supra ἐψεύσθαι) 'on the part of him who is in error'; and the genitive depends on the whole phrase, ἢ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἁγνοία, resumed with ἢ.

tῶν καλουμένων φίλων] is a suspended genitive which finally gains construction from ἀποτροπῆς ἔνεκα. The emendation οἱ ἢν for ὅταν is unnecessary; ὅταν is correlative to τότε. This is perhaps said with a glance at the discussion in Book i, as to who are our friends (i. 334: cp. supra 362 B, c).

dιὰ τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι ὅπῃ τὰλθῆς ἔχει, κ.τ.λ.] Compare Timaeus 40 D ἀδύνατον ὅνων θιῶν παιῶν ἀποιστεῖν, καὶ περ ἦνε τε εἰκότων καὶ ἀναγκαῖον ἀποδείξεων λέγοντων, σκ. περὶ δαιμόνων γενέσεως. This notion of the functions of mythology may be illustrated from the Politicus, Timaeus, Critias, and Laws (Book iii), in which Plato gives the imaginary history of a 'world before the flood.'

κατὰ τὸ δὴ ... ἐν ψεύδωτο:] Then on which of these grounds is lying useful to God? Will he lie in imitating the truth, because he is ignorant of the events of other days?

ποιητῆς ... οὐκ ἐνι] 'Then in God there is nothing of a lying poet.' For the personification of a quality compare Phaedo 77 Ε ἀλλ' ἐσορ ἐν τε καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν πάις, ὅστις τὰ τοιαύτα φοβεῖται: also Phil. 39 A, B, where the faculty of memory is personified as a scribe, ὅ ... παρ' ἡμῖν γραμματεύς, and imagination as a painter, and some
ludicrous lines of Diphilus, quoted by Harpocration, s. v. δευσο-


‘But shall we suppose him to speak falsely, for fear of his enemies?’—Λυς is to be supplied from αφομιών άν ψεύδοιτο above. Cp. supra i. 352 άκοίσαι, and note.

ο θεός ἀπλοῦν καὶ ἀληθές] The neuter is continued from the preceding sentence.

οὔτε κατὰ φαντασίας] These words are omitted in Par. A, probably from the repetition of οὔτε.

ςυγχωρεῖς . . . έαυτούς] ‘You agree then that here is a second principle, according to which the Gods are not enchanters who transform themselves?’ ΤΟΥΤΟ refers to what has preceded, and is further explained by ώς μήτε, κ.τ.λ.

παράγειν] The construction is changed from ώς . . . οὗτοις, probably in consequence of the clause τφ μεταβάλλειν, κ.τ.λ., coming between.

οὔδε Αισχύλου] sc. τούτο ἑπαινεσύμεθα. έας is changed from ἐμίς to suit the former part of the sentence, and the less usual form is chosen to preserve the rhythm of the verse.

ϵύμπαντα τ' εἰπὼν, κ.τ.λ.] (1) ‘And in saying all, he raised a note of triumph over the blessedness of my lot.’ Τῦχας is governed by παίων ἑπευφήμησεν in one phrase. Or (2) joining εἰπὼν . . . τῦχας, ‘Having spoken of my lot as in all things blest of heaven.’

δέν τις τοιαύτα λέγει] This sentence begins with a resumption from δέν τις φη, κ.τ.λ. supra: hence the asyndeton.

χαλεπανούμεν] ‘We will frown,’ says Socrates, speaking with the imaginary authority of the ruler and lawgiver.

οὔδε τούς διδασκάλους εάσομεν . . . εί μέλλουσιν, κ.τ.λ.] There is a confusion or combination of two constructions. ‘We will not, because’ and ‘we must not, if.’ For this condensation see Riddell’s Digest, § 256: and cp. Thucyd. i. 40, 2 δοῦτν μη τοῖς δεξαμένως, ει σωφρονοῦσιν, πόλεμον ἀντι εἰρήνης ποιήσει.
BOOK III.

Besides their false representations of the Divine nature, the poets and mythologers are guilty of other falsehoods, which must likewise be forbidden in the interests of morality. The tales about the world below are such as cannot fail to inspire cowardice in all that hear them. But our guardians must be brave and have no fear of death. And our poets must tell the truth concerning Death, and rob him of imaginary terrors.

They will therefore be forbidden to represent their heroes as lamenting for the death of friends, since to die is not an evil, and the hero is sufficient for himself, and the loss of money and friends does not affect him greatly. Achilles must not mourn inordinately for Patroclus, nor Priam for Hector;—still less the chief of the Gods for his son Sarpedon.

Not only excessive grief, but excessive laughter must be discouraged. For every extreme brings on a reaction to the opposite extreme. The ‘inextinguishable laughter’ of the Gods must be erased from Homer.

Then our guardians must be taught veracity in their youth. For even ‘the lie in word’ has been reserved as a medicine for exceptional cases. And such a remedy must be solely entrusted to the physician, that is, to the ruler. No other in the state may ever dissemble what he knows.

In some things we may praise Homer—as where Diomed enforces obedience, or the good discipline of the Achaeans is described. But not the passage in which Achilles reviles his chief, nor where Odysseus rejoices over the banquet. For temperance, orderliness, and chastity are to be enforced, and such fortitude and self-control as Odysseus shows when he ‘strikes upon his breast and chides his heart.’

Liberality is another virtue to be fostered by us. Our poets must not sing that gifts prevail with kings, or tell how Achilles took a ransom for the body of Hector.

Nor must we listen to those passages in which the same hero is represented on the other hand as proud and impious. To hear of one so born and so brought up as being possessed with the opposite vices of meanness and insolence cannot but be ruinous to the morals of the young. The preceding rules, then, must restrict the choice of subjects in mythologizing about Gods and Heroes and the world unseen.
toiaut'datta] viz. that God is good and true.

This is added in allusion to the stories of Zeus and Cronos, and of quarrelling among the Gods. The words form a transition to the human virtues and duties which follow. The effect of such stories on the conduct of children towards their parents is again referred to in Laws x. 886 c ff.

(1) governed by ἔπαιτατεῖν: (2) repeated with λέγειν: cp. ii. 360 ὁ ἐπὶ τοῦ τοιοῦτον λόγου λέγων.

The construction is again changed at λέγοντας, which refers back to λοιδορεῖν: 'since, in reviling the world below, they do not say what is either true or expedient.' In some MSS. (Ven. ζ p. m., Vind. E, &c.) ὄν is inserted after λέγοντας which implies a suppressed condition: not 'since what they say is not true,' but (sc. εἰ λοιδοραίειν), 'since if they did so they would not speak truly.' Compare ii. 380 c ὡς οὕτε δεύτερον λέγομεν, εἰ λέγωτο.

These words are omitted in Par. Α and may possibly have been inserted by some scribe from recollection of Homer.

(1) the words of Achilles on awaking from the dream in which the ghost of Patroclus appears to him.

And the verse about Tiresias:—'To him alone [after death did the goddess Persephone grant] to have under-
standing, but other souls flit as shadows’ (Odysse. x. 495). The feminine ταῖ is due to the attraction of σκιαῖ;—the verse is quoted also in the Meno (100 λ) ὅτι οἷος πέσων τῶν ἐν “Αδόν, αἶ δὲ σκιαὶ ἀδάσσοναι. Plato seems to presuppose the construction and context to be in the memory of his hearers. Though he sometimes quotes inaccurately, both he and they must have been intimately familiar with the Iliad and Odyssey.

ψυχή δ’ ἐκ βεθέων] III. vi. 856. On the form ἀνδροτήτα see Monro and Leaf in loco.

ψυχή δὲ κατὰ χθονός] III. xxiii. 100.

ὦς δ’ οτε... ἡσαν] Odysse. xxiv. 6–9, ‘As bats in hollow of a mysterious cave, whenever any of them falls off out of the string from the rock, fly squeaking and cling to one another, so did they move together with gibbering cry.’

τρίζω is here used of a shrill treble sound—the squeak of a bat. The thin treble cry of the bat (inaudible to some persons) has been the recognized similitude in many lands for the voice of a ghost.

διαγράφωμεν] διαγράφειν is here to ‘cancel’ or ‘strike out,’ as elsewhere (vi. 500 ἓ) to ‘describe’ or ‘draw a plan of.’

ἀκουστέον] sc. ὃν, in construction with ὦς supra.

τὰ περὶ ταύτα... φοβερά] The order is τὰ δεινά τε καὶ φοβερά ὄνοματα πάντα τὰ περὶ ταύτα: ‘We must cast aside all the terrible and dreadful names which are used in describing this subject, Cocytus, Styx,’ &c.

ἀποβλητέα] though plural, takes the accusative after it, like ἀκουστέον supra.

καὶ ἄλλα... ὄνομαζόμενα] i.e. τῶλλα ὄνοματα τούτων τοῦ τόπου ὄντα, ἃ, κ.τ.λ.

ἐπίτειν δη ποιεῖ, κ.τ.λ.] ‘At the mention of which names a shudder passes through the soul of him that hears them.’

The words ὦς οἶον τε are probably genuine, though resting on slender manuscript authority, which is chiefly that of q. The reading which is found in almost all the MSS. is ὦς οἰείας, i.e. ‘as the poet thinks’ or ‘imagines, he produces a fine effect; whereas we fear that this effect of terror will spoil the courage of our soldiers.’ This is forced; and the emendation of ὅσα ἔτη, which is supposed to be an allusion to annual recitations of the rhapsodists, is worse.
Another conjectural reading is ὡς ἔτεια, ‘believing them to be true.’ The reading οίκται may have easily sprung out of οἰκών ὑπ’ through οἴκων: compare the converse confusion, i. 336 E οἰκὼν γε σῦ, ὃ φίλε, where for οἰκὼν γε σῦ Ven. Ξ reads οἰκὼν γε ἔστιν. The meaning of ὡς οἰκών ὑπ’ may be supported by the frequent recurrence of ὡς οἰκών ὑπ’ μιλίστα, μέγιστα, elsewhere in Plato. Protag. 349 E ὠλον που καλῶν ὡς οἰκόν τε μιλίστα.

καὶ ἰσως . . . ἄλλο τι] (1) ‘And this sort of thing (sc. ὅσα ἄλλα, κ.τ.λ.) may be well enough for some other object,’ i.e. to excite interest, or to teach not courage but something else. Cp. supra B οἷς ὡς ὑπ’ ποιμαίνα, κ.τ.λ.: infra 390 λ ἐὰν δὲ τίνα ἄλλην ἥδων ἐπάμεστα, θυμαστῶν οἴδεν. (2) Or does Plato mean—‘this effect of fear may be well enough for another purpose,’ viz., to discourage vice (cp. the judgement of the dead in x. sub fin.)? Cp. infra 394 δ where, under a similar vague expression, a very important matter seems to be concealed, viz. the expulsion of Homer.

θερμότεροι] ‘Too heated,’ i.e. ‘nervous,’ or ‘excitable,’ not cool enough. θερμότεροι suggests μαλακώτεροι, ‘softer,’ the ordinary effect of heat being to soften. Plato is fond of the conjunction of θερμός, and similar words with μαλακός. The effect of heat on wax is probably present to his mind. Cp. infra 411 B; Cratyl. 432 B; Laws ii. 671 B τόις ψυχαῖς τῶν πιμότων διαπύρως γεγυμένας μαλακωτέρας γέγυμεθαί: or 666 B μαλακώτερον ἐκ σκληροτέρου τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἥδος, καθάπερ εἰς ποὺ σίδηρον ἐντεθείτα, γεγυμένον.

Ast conjectured ἄθυμότεροι, and this reading was subsequently found by Bekker in MS. v (Angelicus).

καὶ τοὺς ὀδυρμοὺς . . . ἀνδρῶν:] ‘And shall we also get rid of the weepings and wailings of famous men?’ The genitive ἐλλογίμων ἀνδρῶν is the subject, not the object, of οἴκτους; otherwise the argument from Ἀλλὰ μήν . . . καταλάβη infra would be irrelevant. Cp. infra E τοὺς θρήνους τῶν ὑμαστῶν ἀνδρῶν: also 390 ο: Soph. O. C. 1636 ὁ δ’ ὃς ἄνηρ γενναίος, οὐκ οἴκτου μέτα, κ.τ.λ.

διαφερόντως . . . προσδεῖται] ‘He is distinguished above his fellows by standing least of all in need of another.’

ἠκιστά ἄρ’ . . . καταλάβῃ] ‘And therefore will be least likely to lament, but will bear with the greatest equanimity any misfortune of this sort which may befal him.’ The infinitive is dependent on λέγομεν (supra d), to which the construction returns.

ἄλλοι] ἔπει πλευράς . . . ἄλος ἀτρυγήτοιο] Iliad xxiv. 10–12,
slightly altered. Plato has dropped the metre (in the words τότε ... ἀναστάντα) to save the construction. It is probable that he has further altered διεύθυνα (II. xxiv. 12) into πλούζωντα, which does not occur in Homer, for the same reason, and also to increase the mock-heroic effect: the word ἀπρυγήτως does not occur in Homer, but is added to round off the line. πλούζωντα is found in Hesiod (Op. et Dies 632), and seems to be introduced here in a humorous sense ('sailing along'), in order to throw ridicule on the description. Cp. vii. 529 c κάν εἶ ἀπίσταν νέων ἐν γῇ. Heyne's conjecture, προϊόντα, a word not found, but formed on the analogy of ὑφίοντα, 'taking a morning walk,' is ingenious, cp. the words οἰδὲ μὲν Ἡώς | φαινομένη λήθεσιν, which follow in the text of Homer; but no change is necessary.

έκείνος] sc. ὁ Ὄμηρος.

κυλινδόμενον] The unmetrical κυλινδόμενον is read in ΜΞ, where the copyists have probably substituted the later prose form κυλινδεῖν for κυλινδέω, which is the only form in Homer. The same may or may not be true of ἰμφοτέρασι (ἵμφοτερίσι παρ. A).

ὄμοι ἐγώ, κ.τ.λ.] The words of Thetis in Iliad xviii. 54.

ἀνομοίοις] = 'in a manner unlike him,' recalls ii. 379 ὁ οἰος τυχάνι τὸ θεὸς ὄν, ἀεὶ δῆπον ἀποθολόν.

ὁ πόποι ... δαμήναι] Il. xxii. 168, 169; xvi. 433, 434.

ἀναξίως] sc. τῶν θεῶν.

εἰ καὶ ἐπίοι οὐτῶ} 'Should it even come into his mind.' Compare Phaedr. 264 Β τὸ ἐπίοι, 'what came into his head': infra viii. 563 οὐκέκοιν λαξάχιλον, ἐφη, ἐρωμέν ὁ τι νῦν ἡλθ᾽ ἐπὶ στάμα; Eurip. Med. 1051, 1052 ἀλλὰ τῆς ἐμῆς κάκης, | τὸ καὶ προέσθαι μαλακάκοις λόγοις φρενί. The very inclination to such words and actions is to be rebuked and suppressed. So in the Theaet. 173 Ω σπουδαί δε, κ.τ.λ. ... οἴδε ἵνα πράττειν προσίσταται αὐτοῖς.

ἄλλῳ καλλίων] 'Another and a fairer one:' sc. λόγῳ. For the term καλὸς applied to an argument cp. i. 334 Β, where Polemarchus says—οὗτος ἐκείνον καλλίων φαίνεται: Theaet. 203 Β, 209 Ε.

ὅταν τις ἐφὶ ἱσχυρῷ γέλωτα] 'when a man gives way to violent laughter.' Cp. Tim. 59 Β (Bekker's reading) τοῖστι δή (sc. τῇ ἡδουῇ) καὶ τὰ νῦν ἑφέστε (ἀφέστε, Par. A), and Protagoras 338 Α οὐριὰ ἑφέστα, 'running before the wind.'

The same thought occurs in viii. 563 Ε τὸ ἄγαν τι ποιεῖν μεγάλην

Notes: Book III.
Plato: Republic.

Republic III. 388 E

πολὺ δὲ ἦττον, ἐὰν θεοὺς] The particle δὲ after τε (in oúτε) is emphatic: 'but surely much less so if they are Gods.'

οὐκ ἀποδεκτέον ... οὐ γὰρ οὖν δὴ ἀποδεκτέον] 'On your views we must not admit them.' 'On my views, if you like to call them mine: that we must not admit them is certain.' For a similar piece of railiery compare v. 475 A ἐι βούλει, ἥν, ἤν ἐμοῦ λέγειν ... συγχαρώ τοῦ λόγου χάριν.

B. ἀλλὰ μὴν, κ.τ.λ.] How far does Plato sanction falsehood? Only in the governors, who are allowed to use the 'lie remedial' in the management of their subjects; the subject is not allowed to have the privilege of lying in return. The higher sense of the inexpediency and immorality of all falsehood seems to be wanting here, as above in ii. 382 c. Yet falsehood is denied to the Gods, and only admitted as a necessary imperfection among men. Possibly some thread of irony is here interwoven (see especially εἰπέρ τισιν ἄλλοις). Plato seeing that falsehood plays a great part in the government of the world, is willing to sanction it for certain purposes: so for example in the marriage lots (v. 459 d), and in the noble lie—Φωικικῶν τε—about the origin of classes in society (infra 414 c).

eἰ γὰρ ὀρθῶς ἐλέγομεν ἄρτι] sc. at the end of Book ii. 382.


ἰδιώταις δὲ οὐχ ἀπτέον] sc. τοῦ τοιούτου.

τοὺς ἀρχουσι δὴ ... ἦ πολιτῶν ἔνεκα] The disjunctive form of sentence is occasioned by the negative implied in εἰπέρ τισιν ἄλλοις. 'None but the ruler is to do so, either for warlike or peaceful purposes.' For the meaning of πολεμίων ἔνεκα, cp. ii. 382 c τὸ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ψεῦδος ... χρήσιμον ... πρὸς τε τοὺς πολεμίους, κ.τ.λ.

C. πρῶς γε δὴ τούς τοιούτους ἀρχοντας] 'To our rulers, being what they are.' Plato does not acknowledge the same obligation towards unskilled rulers such as the demagogue or tyrant. Here, as supra i. 346 ε Plato without distinctly anticipating the great
revolution of making philosopher-kings already hints at a better sort of government than any at present existing among mankind.

In Par. A τοιούτους is written only in the margin, but by the first hand. It is omitted in Stobaeus and in v. It may therefore possibly be a repetition of τοιούτου.

λέγοντι] agrees with ἵδιωτη supra, the construction being slightly changed from λέγειν.

ἀν ἄρ' ἄλλον . . . ἐν τῇ πόλει] ‘If then a ruler catches any one besides himself lying in the state.’ ἂρχων is understood from τοῖς ἂρχονται,—ἀρχοντας supra.

τῶν οί . . . τέκτων δούρων] Od. xvii. 383, 384.

ἐάν γε . . . ἔργα τελήται] ‘Yes, said he, that is, if our theory is carried out.’ ‘If over and above the word there should ever be the fact’ (ἐργον τέλος). For the use of ἐπί cp. Odys. xvii. 308 εἰ δή καὶ ταχὺς ἐσκε βίεν ἐπὶ εἰδει τῷς.

Plato has opposite ways of enlivening his language. The first creation of the state is confessedly theoretical (ii. 369 Α, c), but it soon appears that ‘we are the legislators or oekists’ (ii. 379 Α, v. 458 c), ‘and do what we describe; or rather not we, but necessity is the founder of the state’ (ii. 369 c). Then again we are reminded that this is a mere argument or similitude, and the fact quite another thing, which is to be added over and above (ἐπί λόγῳ), as in this passage. Elsewhere the two modes of speech alternate with one another.

ὡς πλήθει] ‘for a body of men,’ such as the army of guardians whom we are training. The qualifying phrase is probably added to prepare for the definition of σωφροσύνη in the individual in Book iv. For a similar qualifying addition, cp. iv. 430 c πολιτικῆς γε. (The phrase is so understood by Van Heusde, Spec. Crit. in Plat. p. 52 and by Matthiae, Greek Grammar, § 388.)

tέττα . . . μόδω] II. iv. 412.

tά τούτων ἔχωμεν] either (1) ‘other lines which are of the same order with these,’ as expressing a similar feeling, or (2) ‘which go along with these.’ Plato, who is quoting from memory, supposes that all which he quotes occurs in the same passage.

ἰσαν . . . Ἀχαιοὶ,—σιγὴ δειδιότες σημάντορας] The first line is found in Iliad iii. 8: the second in Iliad iv. 431. It is improbable that we have a trace here of a Pre-Alexandrian Homer, nor is there
any reason for supposing that the second verse is interpolated in the text. Some Homeric illustration of obedience to chiefs is needed, and Plato has taken the liberty of bringing together two half-lines out of different passages, perhaps by a slip of memory, perhaps not intending that they should be connected. Cp. supra 388 b.

οινοβαρεσ... ἑλάφοιο] Il. i. 225.

καὶ τὰ τούτων ἑξῆς] ἑξῆς is variously construed with a genitive or dative (infra vii. 528 A τὸ ἑξῆς... τῇ γεωμετρίᾳ).

νεανιεύματα] 'impertinences.' So the verb, Phaedr. 235 A ἐφαίνετο δὴ μοι νεανιεύσεται ἑνδεικνύμενος: Gorg. 482 c: and the adjective νεανίκος, Gorg. 508 D τὸ νεανίκον δὴ τοῦτο τοῦ σοῦ λόγου. νεανιεύματα is the form in Par. A. In other MSS. there are traces of νεανικεύματα. Xenophon, Cyr. i. 2. 15, appears to have used νεανισκεύεσθαι.—Pollux, 2. 20; see Stephanus' Thesaurus, ed. Dindorf.

ei δὲ τινα ἀλλην ἤδονην] 'If however, apart from this, it gives any pleasure,'—ἀλλην being 'adverbial.'

παραπλεῖαι ὠς τράπεζαι, κ.τ.λ.] altered from Odys. ix. 8 παρὰ δὲ πλῆθωσι τράπεζαι. Plato has somewhat unfairly left out the minstrel, who, in the same setting, is placed foremost among the delights of the banquet.

λιμῷ δ' οἴκτιστον... ἐπιστεῖν] Odys. xii. 342.

ἡ Δία... ἐπιλανθανόμενον] 'Or to hear that Zeus, while the other Gods and mankind were sleeping, lightly forgot all that he had planned while he alone was awake.' The construction is ἀκούειν Δίᾳ ὡς ἐπιλανθανόμενον = ὡς Ζεὺς ἐπιλανθάνετο (cp. ii. 383 A ὡς... γόρτας ὄντας). The nominatives, μόνος ἐγγηγορώς, agree with the subject of ἐπιλανθάνομεν, the relative being transposed as supra ii. 363 A τοὺς ἀσίοις ἄφαρτοι τοὺς θεοὺς διδώναι. καθευδόντων... ἄ ἐπιλανθανόμενον is a paraphrase of Iliad ii. 1, 2 ff.

Ἄλλοι μὲν ὅμως θεοὶ τε καὶ ἄνερες ἢποκοροῦσαντεὶ τιθον παντόξιον. Δίᾳ δ' οὐκ ἑξῄ νήδυμος ὑπνοὺς· κ.τ.λ.

And the chief allusion is to Iliad xiv. 294–351. The words φίλον ῥήψας τοιχας, which occur in the poet's narrative (l. c. l. 296), are inaccurately ascribed by Plato to Zeus in person.

τὸ δωμάτιον] The diminutive is comically substituted for theθῶλομος of Iliad xiv. 338, and is perhaps meant to burlesque the αἰθέρα Δῶς δωμάτιων which Aristophanes (Ranae 100) ascribes to Euripides.
Notes: Book III.

τοιαύτα] ‘for something else of the same kind,’ ‘for the same sort of thing.’ These words are euphemistic and contemptuous. Plato does not care to give the second tale in full: Odys. viii. 266 foll. The sentence passes out of the interrogative form. οὖθε, sc. εἰπήδειτον ἠστιν ἁκοίνεσ.

ἀλλ' εἰ πού τινες ... ἀκουστέον] ‘But any extreme deeds of endurance which are either performed by famous men or told concerning them, our youth should see (represented at the theatre) and hear.’ λέγονται, sc. peri ἐκλογίμων ἄνδρῶν: ὑπό, κ.τ.λ., is in construction only with πράττονται. Πρὸς ἀπαντα cp. Thuc. iii. 82, 4 τὸ πρὸς ἀπαν εὐνεῖν.

τοὺς ἄνδρα] is used pronominally,—‘the men before us,’ ‘our pupils.’ Compare infra 391 c τοὺς ἡμετέρους. This familiar way of speaking adds a touch of reality to the conversation. Cp. Theaet. 144 ν, where Socrates says in reply to Theodorus’ description of his pupil—γεννικὸν λέγει τὸν ἄνδρα.

δώρα ... βασιλῆα] This verse is said by Suidas (i. p. 623) to be taken from Hesiod.

Φοίνικα, κ.τ.λ.] Il. ix. 432, 515 sqq.

ἡς μήνιος] The Epic word recalls the theme of the Iliad.

παρὰ τοῦ Ἀγαμέμνονος δώρα λαβεῖν] Il. xix. 278. Plato does injustice to the character of Achilles, who is indifferent to the gifts. It is a misconception of the Homeric idea to charge him with ἀνελευθερία or φιλοχρηματία, as infra 391 c. See especially Il. xix. 147, 148 Δώρα μὲν, ἀλ' κ' εἴδελησα, παρασχ'ειν, ὡς ἐπιεικές, | εἰτ' ἐκ' εἰμεν, πάρα σοί.

δ' Ἐμηρον] Compare x. 595 B κατ' ἰδια γέ τίς με καὶ ἀϊδὼς ἐκ παιδὸς ἐχουσα περί 'Ομήρου ἀποκωλύει λέγειν.

ἐβλαψάς μ' ἐκάεργῃ ... παρεῖ] Il. xxii. 15, 20.

καὶ ως πρὸς τὸν ποταμόν ... ἀπειθῶς εἰξε] Il. xxi. 130 ff.

καὶ αὖ ... οὗ πειστέον] Il. xxiii. 151. ‘Or that he said “Let me offer to Patroclus,” who was a lifeless corpse, “to take with him the locks,” which had been consecrated to the other river Spercheius, or that he did so, we should not believe.’ ὡς is to be repeated with ἐφη. The accusative, τὰς ... τρίχας, is in a loose construction, which becomes more precise when the phrase is resumed in κύμην. The genitive τοῦ ... Σπερχειοῦ is to be taken closely with ἱερᾶς in the usual construction.
Plato: Republic.

Republic

III.

391 B


tάς τῶν ξωρηθέντων σφαγῶς εἰς τὴν πυρὰν] II. xxiii. 175, 176.
The plurals έλξείς and σφαγῶς refer to a succession of distinct acts.
The body of Hector was dragged day after day, and twelve human victims, not one only, had been offered on the funeral pyre.

C

θεών τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων] For the genitive of the object after ὑπερηφανίαν cp. supra ii. 359 άνθρώπων (sic), and note.

μῆ τοῖνω . . . ἀρπαγάς] 'Then let us equally refuse to believe, or allow to be repeated the tale of Theseus, son of Poseidon, and Pirithous, son of Zeus, going forth to perpetrate such horrid acts of rape.' Pirithous aided Theseus in carrying off Helen, and Theseus joined Pirithous in his attempt to steal Persephone away from Pluto (Isocrates, Ἐκλειπτε ἐγκλώμων, 20–22). The plural ἀρπαγάς includes both actions. δεινάς marks not the danger of the descent to Hades, but the heinousness of the offence. ἀρμησάν is read in Par. A after all, and not ἄρμησαν, as stated by all the Editors from Bekker downwards. This determines the balance in favour of the plural verb. οὐτός is to be joined with δεινάς. Cp. Symp. 192 c οὐτός εἰπ μεγάλης σπουδῆς.

D

μηδὲ τιν' ἄλλον] ἄλλον is clearly preferable to ἄλλον, although ἄλλον (sic) is the reading of Par. A.

ὡς οἱ θεοὶ κακά γεννῶσι] 'That the Gods are progenitors of evil.' The doers of evil cannot be sons of God. Else evil would proceed from God. Cp. ii. 379 c.

E

ὡς ἀρα] ἀρα, 'then'—if these stories are true.

οἱ θεῶν ἀγχίσσοροι, κ.τ.λ.] These lines are taken, like the quotation in ii. 380 ά, from the Niobe of Aeschylus. The lines are also quoted by Strabo (xii. 870), as they occur here, with the exception that οἷς εν ἵδαε ρ πάγῳ is read for ὅν κατ' ἱδαίον πάγον. The reason of the resolution (καὶ οὐ πω), which occurs in all the MSS. but not in Strabo, may be either that Socrates is putting together lines from different places, as at pp. 386, 387, or that the copyists supposed him to have done so.

Aeschylus seems to imagine a sort of heavenly Ida, like Olympus in Homer, where the demigods sacrifice to their father in the sky.
Notes: Book III.

It is the mountain whose top reaches to Heaven in the imagination of the poet. Cp. the similar consecration of Mount Oeta in Soph. Trach. 1191.

What principles are to regulate the representation of human things? The point is reserved until after the decision of the main question, concerning the nature of Justice, and whether it is profitable or not to him who has it,—and this whether it be known or unknown to Gods and men.

[ἡμίν] before ἤν δ' ἐγὼ is omitted in Par. Α, probably owing to ἤν following.

λοιπὸν εἴδος λόγων πέρι] ‘What department still remains that has to do with the subjects of discourse?’ The reading λόγων πέρι is confirmed by τὰ μὲν δὴ λόγων πέρι infra c, and by the expression εἴδος νόμων πέρι, infra iv. 427 Α. The periphrasis is nearly equivalent to a simple genitive. The reading of Ξ, which was also the reading of the text before Bekker, is περιοριζόμενοι, a word the existence of which could not be allowed on the authority of this passage only, even if the other reading had not the authority of ΗΜ. The scribe who wrote περιοριζόμενοι οἷς as in Α must have understood the relative clause to mean ‘what is to be told to whom.’ For the meaning of λόγοι cp. supra ii. 376 Ε μουσικῆς δ' εἴπὼν τίθης λόγους, ἦ οὖ; where the subject was first started.

ὡς ἄρα] ‘to infer from what we admitted,’ ‘according to our view,’ viz. in Book ii.

Plato remembers that the poets (as Adeimantus pointed out, ii. 364 Α) err equally in their ideas about men, as about the Gods. But how can we determine the truth about human virtue till we define justice? This is an ironical or fanciful excuse for varying the order of the subject. Cp. iv. 430 Ε.

ἀλλότριον μὲν ἀγαθόν, κ.τ.λ.] i. 343 c, ii. 367 c.

ἄ πάλαι * ἕτοιμον] ‘which we have been seeking all this while.’ The manuscript reading is ἕτοιμον, ‘which we were seeking for long ago’; sc. in the inquiry about justice, before we began to construct the state. But the conjectural reading ἕτοιμον, which is confirmed by the version of Ficinus, is more probable. Cp. iv. 420 c καταδύσεις δὲ κρίνατ ἀν ὃ πάλαι ἕτοιμον. For the use of such a pronominal phrase in recapitulating, to avoid tautology, cp. Phileb. 50 c τὰ νῦν πολλάκες λεγόμενα.
Republic  
III.  
392 C–397 E

120  Plato: Republic.

So much is said with regard to the substance of the new literature. Next, as to the form. Shall it be (1) narrative, or (2) dramatic, or (3) a mixture of both?

The speeches in Homer are dramatic, but they are linked together with bits of narration. Tragic poetry is dramatic throughout. Homer, again, would be entirely narrative, if the speeches were reported indirectly. And this is the mode actually adopted in the Dithyramb.

The purely dramatic form is to be excluded from our state. For we have long since decided that simplicity is to be our rule; and the imitation of various characters is fatal to simplicity. Our youth may be allowed to impersonate the virtuous and good, but nothing that is vicious or mean, nor a female in any condition, nor a slave; still less, as happens in comedy, a drunkard or a coward. They must indeed know such characters from without, but never for a moment must they be identified with them. Nor may they mimic menial arts, of which they are to know nothing, nor unmeaning noises, such as the neighing of horses or the sound of thunder.

In narrating the fortunes of some hero, if they are carried away into impersonating him when he is about some noble deed, well and good. Or if they scornfully throw in a dramatic touch in characterizing some bad man, there is no great harm, provided that such points in their discourse are few and momentary. But the main tenour of the recital will be pure narration, and the manner of the recitation in the pitch and cadence of the voice will be simple and uniform.

διήγησις οὖσα] The participle is attracted to the noun instead of agreeing with πάντα supra.

ἀρ’ οὖν . . . περαινοοιν[ There are three kinds of poetry:—(1) the simple narrative, of which the dithyramb is given as an example (394 c): (2) the opposite kind, which has only action and no narrative, as is the case in tragedy and comedy: (3) the union of the two, as in Epic poetry, which, if you leave the speeches only, becomes a drama, or if you omit the speeches or report them in oratio obliqua, takes the form of simple narration.

Compare Aristotle’s Poetics, c. iii. § 2 καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ μιμεῖσθαι ἐστὶν ὅτι μὲν ἀπαγγέλλοντα ἢ ἔτερον τι γεγραμμένον, ὥσπερ Ὁμήρος νοεῖ, ἢ ὅσ τοὺς αὐτῶς καὶ μὴ μεταβάλλοντα, ἡ πάντας ὡς πράττονται καὶ ἐν- ἐργοῦντας τοὺς μιμομένους.—λέξις, as a separate element, is overlooked in Gorg. 502 c φέρε δή, εἰ τες περιέλοιτο τῆς ποιήσεως πάσης τό
Notes: Book III. 121

Republic III. 392 D

περαίνουσιν] 'proceed.' For this absolute use cp. Laws iv. 715 ε ὃ μὲν δὴ θεὸς . . . εἰδεία περαίνει ('fulfils his course').

ἀπολαβὼν μέρος τι] 'breaking off a part,' i.e. making use of an example. Cp. Gorg. 495 ἐ περὶ δότων βούλει τῶν σώματος ἀπολαβὼν σκόπει, and Theaet. 182 οὐ μανθάνεις ἀδρόνον λεγόμενον, κατὰ μέρη οὖν ἄκον. . .

οὐκ ἐτύχανε] The imperfect as in οὐκ ἔπειθε.

καὶ ἐλίσσετο . . . λαύν] ll. i. 15, 16.

tῶν ἐν ἠθάκη καὶ ὅλη Ὀδυσσεία παθημάτων] 'the things which happened at Ithaca and in the Odyssey generally,' i.e. not only in Ithaca, but at Sparta, Phaeacia, and elsewhere. Observe that ἐν is not again repeated, but is implied in a somewhat different meaning with Ὀδυσσεία.

οὐκοῦν διήγησις . . . τῶν ῥήσεων] Epic poetry is narrative throughout; but the simple narrative, i.e. the descriptive part is to be distinguished from narrative through imitation, i.e. the speeches: ἀπλή διήγησις ἀνευ μιμήσεως, from διήγησις διὰ μιμήσεως.

ὡ ἁν τις ὁμοιοί] sc. ἑαυτῶν, to be supplied from ὁμοιοῦν ἑαυτῶν at the beginning of the sentence.

ἴνα δὲ μὴ εἰπης, ὑπὶ οὐκ αὐ μανθάνεις] 'But that you may not say 'Once more I do not understand you.' ' The order of the words appears to be euphonic. Cp. Theaet. 161 λ ὃς οὐκ αὐτοὶ εἰς ταῦτα ἐρῶ ταῦτα.

αὐτοῦσ] emphatic—'themselves,' opposed to τὴν θυγατέρα οἶ.

λύσαι] depends on the general notion of urging implied in εὑχέτο.

μῆ . . . οὐκ ἑπαρκέσοι] This is the oratio obliqua of μῆ . . . οὐκ ἑπαρκέσει, Plato's prose version of μῆ . . . οὐ χραισμη in Homer. The future indicative after a verb of fearing is rare, but occurs in Aesch., Soph., and Xen. See Goodwin, M. and T., § 367. Cp. v. 451 λ μῆ σφαλεὶς . . . κεῖσομαι, and for the optative Euthyphro,
The future indicative after μή in a final clause, although rare, is not unknown (Ar. Eccl. 495 εἰκόν ... μή βραδύνειν ... μή καί τις ὁφεται), so that, as Goodwin remarks, M. and T., § 132, there is no objection to μή ... ἐπαρκέσωι being so taken here. In places of this kind the notions of purpose ('lest') and fearing ('for fear that') are nearly coincident.

ἄπιέναι δ' ἐκέλευε ... οἴκαδε ἔλθοι] 'He told him to be off, and not to provoke him, if he wished to get home safely.' Plato omits the accusative case after ἐπέστη (ἀλλ' ἦν, μή μ' ἐρέθιζεν), which has been unnecessarily restored by Valckenaer (μή ἦ) without manuscript authority.

This is prose for ἀπάνυθε κιόν II. i. 35.

τάς τε ἐπωνυμίας ... ναῶν οἰκοδομήσεως] II. i. 37-9:—

which last seems to have been understood by Plato, not of crowning shrines of the God with garlands, but of roofing them (ἐν ναῶν οἰκοδομήσεως), as Eustathius explains the word ἐρεψα by ὁράφωσα, which is probably the true meaning. 'ἐρεψα seems to indicate the most primitive form of temple—a mere roof to protect the image of a God standing in a grove.' Leaf's note on II. i. 39. Cp. Paus. x. 5, § 9.

tά καί δάκρυα] ἄι is an archaism or Homericism, into the use of which Plato is probably led by his subject. Cp. supra ii. 383 B τάς εἰς εἰπαίδος, and note. There is a similar use of a poetical form in the Phaedrus, where Socrates 'plays' at dithyrambs: 237 A ξύμ. μοι λάβεσθε τοῦ μύθου.

ταύτης αὖ ἐναντία] sc. διήγησις, i. e. ἦ διὰ μμήσεως.

καὶ τούτο ... τοιοῦτον] 'That again I understand; and I perceive that your remark applies to tragedy.'

ὁρθότατα ... οὖχ οἶός τ' ἦ] 'You perfectly catch my meaning, and now I think I make you see what before I could not.'

ἐμπροσθεν ... (c) τότε] supra 392 D καὶ τούτο (the first statement about διήγησις) ... ἐτι δεόμαι σαφέστερον μαθεῖν.
Notes: Book III.

The respondent gets full credit for his contribution. The reference to this definition is repeated infra 395 a.

If I make you understand.' The dative μοι, which is the reading of the MSS., has been altered into μον by Heindorf. This is unnecessary, although εἰ μοι μανθάνεις occurs in Phileb. 51 c. Compare Laws i. 644 c καὶ μοι δὲ εἰκώνος ἀποδέξασθε.

tο πρὸ τούτου] 392 c.

That was just what I meant.' τούτο αὐτὸ refers to what follows, ὅτι χρεία . . . μυμεῖσθαι, as well as to the words ὡς δὲ λεκτέον in what precedes.

οὕτε μυμεῖσθαι] sc. εἰσομεν.

And there may be more than this in question,—an anticipation of the condemnation of epic poetry in Book x.

πολλών ἐφαπτόμενον] 'attempting many things, he will altogether fail to be eminent in any (που).' ὡστε depends on some positive idea, which is gathered from ἀποστυγχάνω: 'he will not succeed (οὐ τυγχάνω αὐτῷ) in any so as to be eminent.' Cp. Protag. 314 b, where ἐτι νέοι ὡστε = οὕτω ἕλκιαν ἔχωμεν, ὡστε.

Yet Socrates at the end of the Symposium (223 b) maintains that comedy and tragedy belong to the same artist: τὸ μὲντοι κεφάλαιον, ἐφη, προσαναγκάζειν τὸν Σωκράτη ὁμολογεῖν αὐτὸς τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀνδρὸς εἶναι κωμῳδίαν καὶ τραγῳδίαν ἐπίστασθαι ποιεῖν, καὶ τὸν τέχνη τραγῳδιστικῶν ὡς το κωμῳδιστικῶς εἶναι.

For a judgement on tragedy compare Gorg. 502 b τι δὲ δὴ ἡ σεμνὴ αὐτή καὶ θαυμαστὴ ἡ τῆς τραγῳδίας ποίησις, ἐφ’ ὧν ἐσπούδακε; where he proceeds to say: 'Is the vocation of tragedy to please the spectators only? Or does she refuse to speak of pleasant vices and proclaim only what is wholesome but unpleasant? We must say Yes to the former; and if so, all the pretensions of tragedy will not hinder our classing her creations under the head of flattery.' The same test is applied to other kinds of poetry.

Plato's enmity to the drama seems to rest on grounds which are partly fanciful and partly real. The mimetic sympathetic power of the actor is unfavourable to strength and unity of purpose: the genius of imitation is certainly akin to weakness. But a man will not be induced to become a murderer by acting the
Plato: Republic.

Republic

part of a murderer; nor is the inference sound that the same individual cannot act many parts because he cannot succeed in many serious pursuits. The evil of the drama does not consist in the imitation of evil any more than of good, but in the effect of continued emotion and excitement on the character of the actor and spectators.

part of a murderer; nor is the inference sound that the same individual cannot act many parts because he cannot succeed in many serious pursuits. The evil of the drama does not consist in the imitation of evil any more than of good, but in the effect of continued emotion and excitement on the character of the actor and spectators.

And you know that the same actors do not perform in tragedy and comedy. Cp. τραγῳδοῖς νικάν, and similar expressions.

πάντα δὲ ταύτα μιμήματα] i.e. the rhapsode and the tragic or comic actor are 'imitators,' as well as the poets whose works they produce; or, in modern language, there is a sense in which the actor, too, 'creates' his part. Plato, however, fails to realize that true art is not mere imitation, but the embodiment of an ideal; although he comes near the expression of this truth in 401 B (infra).

wäste ἀδύνατος εἶναι ... ἄφομοιώματα] (1) If ἦ is unemphatic, 'And becomes unable to imitate many things well or to do the things themselves well, if they are many'; (2) or taking ἦ emphatically—'Or else' (if able to imitate) 'is not able to do the things themselves.' For the latter (which resumes σχολὴ ἀρα ἐπιτηδεύει, κ.τ.λ.) Cp. vi. 503 ἦ τὸν ἀδύνατον ἀποκριτέον: vii. 525 τῆς οὐσίας ἀπείρων εἶναι γενέσεως ἐξωθάντη, ἦ μιθέοτε λογιστικὸ γενέσθαι.


ἰνα μὴ ... ἀπολαύσωσιν] 'Lest by imitation they should become imbued with the reality of that which they imitate.' Cp. infra 401 B, C ἵνα μὴ ἐν κακίας εἰκόσι τρεφόμενοι ... ἐν τῇ ἐξουσίᾳ λανθάνων κακῶν μέγα ἐν τῇ αὐτῶν ψυχῇ.

εἰν ἐκ νέων διατελέσωσιν] 'If, beginning in youth, they continue far into life.'

eἰς ἐθῆ τε καὶ φύσιν καθίστανται] 'Acquire the fixedness of habit and nature.'
Reviling' (1) 'a man,' opposed to πρὸς θεοὺς following, or (2) 'her husband.'

καὶ ἀνεθάνατοι [καὶ δεήσωμεν] καὶ adds to the emphasis: 'We shall be far indeed from that.'

μεθύοντας ἦ καὶ νήφοντας] These words qualify the preceding participles. 'Abusing and reviling one another whether drunk or sober.'

ἀμαρτάνουσιν εἰς αὐτοὺς τε καὶ εἰς ἄλλους] 'Sin against others and against themselves,' i.e. degrading themselves as well as injuring others.

γνωστέων μὲν γάρ, κ.τ.λ.] Κρ. infra 409 ε ἀρετὴ δὲ φύσεως παιδευμένης χρώμω ἀμα αὐτῆς τε καὶ ποιημίας ἐπιστῆμην λήψεται.

κελεύοντας τούτοις] sc. τοῖς ἐλαύνουσιν: 'giving the time to the rowers,' i.e. doing the work of the κελευτῆς on board ship.

οὐδεὶς προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν τούτων οὖδεν] supra ii. 374 D, E.

ἡ μιμήσονται] ἢ, which is emphasized by its position in the sentence, asks the question with a tone of indignation. Κρ. v. 469 C τὶ δὲ; σκολιέειν . . . τοὺς τελευτήσαντας πλῆρ ύπλων, ἐπεδάν νικήσουσιν, ἢ καλῶς ἔχει;

ἀπείρηται αὐτοῖς, κ.τ.λ.] supra A.

εἰ . . . μανθάνω ἄ σολο λέγεις] Socrates again ascribes his own reflections to the respondent.

οὔ ἄν ἔχοιτο] 'In which he will persist.' Κρ. Soph. 264 E

ἐξῆμενοι τὴς τοῦ σοφιστοῦ κοινωνίας: Θυκ. i. 140 τῆς μὲν γνώμης . . . τῆς αὐτῆς ἔχομαι,

ὁ μὲν μοι . . . μέτριος ἀνήρ] ὁ is the definite article before μέτριος ἀνήρ. The words which intervene give an additional emphasis to μέτριος.

σπουδῇ] 'in earnest,' is opposed to παιδίως χάριν.

οὐκ ἐθελήσειν] like ἐθελήσειν supra, dependent on δοκεῖ.

αὐτῶν εἰκότειν τε καὶ ἐνιστάναι, κ.τ.λ.] 'To mould and adapt himself to the baser shapes,' like the clay of the statuary which would be said εἰνισταθαι τῷ τίπῳ, 'to settle into the shape of the mould.' But in Tim. 50 D ἐν ὧν ἔκτυπούμενον ἐνιστάται, the same word is used conversely of the form being impressed on the matter.
Plato: Republic.

Republic
III.
E

καὶ ἔσται... τῆς μυθησεως] 'And his style will partake of both kinds, of imitation and also of narrative' (τῆς ἀλλης διηγησεως: see on ii. 357 c: it may be remembered however that διηγησις alone, when not distinguished by the epithet ἀπλῆ, may include the imitative, as well as other kinds, as in the beginning of this passage, supra 392 d): 'only there will be a few grains of the former in a long recital.' Bekker alters the text into σμικρὸν δὲ τι μέρος μυθησεως εἰν πολλῷ λόγῳ τῆς διηγησεως, for which there is some faint manuscript authority; but the alteration is unnecessary; the text is neater and gives an equally good sense.

397 A ὃςῳ ἐν φαυλότερος ἡ... διηγησεται] It seems necessary to adopt Madvig's emendation here. Of the two manuscript readings, that of g, although probably conjectural, is the more plausible: 'The more vulgar he is, the more constantly will he employ imitation.' The reading of Par. A, &c., πῶντα τε μᾶλλον διηγησεται, could only mean: 'the more ready he will be to tell about anything and everything'—laying a strong emphasis on πῶντα, and implying that there are some things which a good man will not even narrate. If Plato had meant this, he would have said it more clearly. And the form of the sentence (τε... καὶ οὐδὲν... ὡστε, κ.τ.λ.) is much better adapted to bring out the additional point—that not only does the bad man always prefer imitation, but there is nothing which he is ashamed to imitate. The expression πῶντα διηγησεται is also too obviously out of keeping with the concluding words, σμικρὸν τι διηγησεως ἐχομεν. [The avoidance of a mere awkwardness does not justify an emendation which has no real manuscript authority. B. J.]

τροχιλίων] 'pulleys.' Perhaps, as Ast suggested, τροχιλίων should be read, τροχιλία, not τροχιλίων, being the usual form.

397 B σχῆμασιν] 'gestures': cp. Soph. 267 λ ὅταν... τὸ σῶν σχῆμα τῆς τῶν ἐαυτοῦ χρώμενος σώματι προσόμοιον ἡ φωνὴς φωνῆς φαίνεσθαι σοι, μήμησις τούτῳ τῆς φανταστικῆς μᾶλστα κέκληται σοι. The word is differently used supra ii. 373 B.

ὅλιγου πρὸς τὴν αὐτήν... καὶ ἐν μιᾷ ἄρμονίᾳ] (1) πρὸς τὴν αὐτήν, sc. λέξων ('ferme ad eandem orationis formam,' Fic.). 'The result is that he speaks nearly in the same style and with a uniform cadence.' [(2) ὅλιγου πρὸς τὴν αὐτήν, sc. χορδήν. πρὸς λέξων τοῦ ἀλγείων is hardly a natural expression, and the question here is not that of the style itself, but of the cadence and tone adapted to it. The cadence is uniform and approaches monotone. Cp. πρόσχορδος
Notes: Book III.

(Laws vii. 812 d) and the ellipsis of χορδή with μετάθη, ἐπάθη, μέσῃ (infra iv. 443 d): also Lucian, de Salt., c. 80 ἀλογα κινούμενοι καὶ μνῆμοι, ὡς φασίν, πρὸς τὴν χορδὴν. The narrative style, as it has less alteration of meaning or feeling (συμμετρεῖ γὰρ αἱ μεταβολαί), has fewer and slighter variations of tone than the dramatic.—As there is no authority, however, for this elliptical phrase, this interpretation, though suited to the context, is only conjectural. L. C.] For the use of ὀρθῶς compare 403 ὧν ὡρίζεται, χρωματικῶν αὐτῆς ἐραιστή τε καὶ παιδικῶς ὀρθῶς ἐρώστε τε καὶ ἐρωμένοις. The words τῷ ὀρθῶς λέγοντι ('when one recites properly') are balanced by εἰ μελεί τὸ οἰκεῖος λέγεισθαί (infra c), i.e. 'when the enunciation is appropriate to the style.' It is clear that ἀρμονία here is not used in the strictly musical sense, but is applied to the changes of pitch and tone which occur in speaking and reciting. Cp. Ar. Rhet. iii. 1, where Aristotle says that the three elements of utterance are μέγεθος, ἀρμονία καὶ μυθός, and identifies ἀρμονία with τόνος.

τι δὲ τοῦ ἐπερου ἔδοσ; . . . τῶν μεταβολῶν ἐξείν;] 'But what about the character of the other style? Will it not require the opposite? Will it not require all harmonies and all rhythms, if it is to be appropriately expressed, because it has every variety of change?' The μεταβολαί here referred to are changes in the style.

ἀρ' οὖν, κ.τ.λ. The words λόγος, λέξις, ἀρμονία, μυθός, βίος, may be distinguished as follows:—

λόγος, the subject, which is true or false, moral or immoral.

λέξις, the style, which is dramatic or narrative, or a composition of the two.

ἀρμονία is a musical term: it was applied (a) to the Enharmonic genus (this is the only sense it has in Aristoxenus), (β) to the modes, which according to some differed in the arrangement of the intervals, according to others in pitch. The word really means 'scale,' as defined in Laws ii. 664 Ε ἐπομεν ... ως ... τῇ δὴ τῆς κινησεως ταξις μυθος ὄνομα εἶν, τῇ δὲ ἀν τῆς φωνής, τοῦ τε ὄνομα ἀμα καὶ παρέος συγκεκαλυμένων, ἀρμονία ὄνομα προσαγορεύοιτο: (γ) Plato also applies the term in a still wider sense, as in the preceding sentence, to cadence or variation of tone in speaking and recitation—infra 398 ὑ τοῦ μη ἄδομένον λόγον.

μυθός is a term which applies equally to the music and to the
words: the division of time in metre (e.g. Paenonic, Dactylic, Trochaic, proceeding respectively in a ratio of $\frac{3}{2}$, $\frac{2}{3}$, $\frac{4}{3}$) and the corresponding accentuation of the music.

βασις is the movement considered as a system of times or quantities, $\frac{3}{2}$, $\frac{2}{3}$, $\frac{4}{3}$. In 400 A τρι' ἄττα ἔστιν εἴδη εξ διν αἱ βάσεις πλέονται Plato implies that the term βάσις applies to the whole of each of the three systems of which the Paeon, Dactyl, or Trochee is the characteristic element.

εξ ἀμφοτέρων ττιν ἔγγεραννύντες] ττιν σ. τύπω: i.e. ἦ ττιν εξ ἀμφοτέρων, ἔγγεραννύντες ττι εἴδος εξ ἀμφοτέρων. Εὔγερκεραμένον would have been more natural. But the preference for the active is characteristic of Greek.

πασὶ τε καὶ παιδαγωγοὶ, κ.τ.λ.] καὶ παιδαγωγοὶ is humorously added. He knows that his regulations will be unpopular, not with the children only, but with their attendants, who are 'children of a larger growth.' Cp. Gorg. 502 D (speaking of tragedy)—νῦν ἄρα ἡμεῖς εἰρήκαμεν ῥητορικὴν τινα πρὸς δήμον τουμόντων, οὐν παιδῶν τε ὅμω καὶ γυναικῶν καὶ ἄνδρῶν, καὶ δούλων καὶ εὐελθέρων. The expression recurs in Laws iii. 700 c with reference to the earlier custom of the theatre:


The genial versatile poet shall be sent into honourable exile: his severe didactic brother shall be alone retained.

αὐτὸς τε καὶ τὰ ποιήματα, κ.τ.λ.] (1) 'himself, and wanting to show his poems.' Cp. iv. 427 D αὐτὸς τε καὶ τῶν ἄδελφων παρακαλεῖ, and Phaedr. 253 b μποροῦμεν αὐτοὶ τε καὶ τὰ παιδικὰ πείδοντες: or perhaps (2), 'himself and his poems which he wishes to display'; τὰ ποιήματα being taken first as nominative to ἀφίκοιτο and then also as accusative after ἐπιδείξασθαι.

The words that follow are an ironical glorification of the dramatic poet: He is a holy and marvellous being—a delightful creature (cp. Ion 534 B κοίψον γὰρ χρῆμα ποιητῆς ἐστι καὶ πτηνῶν καὶ ἱερῶν). But as the like of him is not allowed among us, let us fall down before him and crown him with wool, and anoint his head with myrrh,—and show him the way out.

A similar, though more serious strain is addressed to the tragic poets in the Laws, vii. 817 A.D., where they are told that they will
not be allowed to perform their plays until they have been submitted to the censorship of the magistrates, and this severity is humorously attributed by Plato to professional jealousy. The law-giver who is a tragic poet in that 'his whole state is an imitation of the best and noblest life' cannot be expected to allow his rival and antagonist 'to erect his stage in the agora and introduce the fair voices of actors, speaking above his own,—very often in contradiction.' Cp. also Phileb. 50 b τῇ τοῦ βιοῦ ξυμπόση ταγωδία καὶ κωμῳδία.

ἐρίῳ στέφανες] (1) 'Crowning him with wool': or (2) 'providing him with a woollen fillet' (στέμμα), which he is to carry on a wand in token of the sacredness of his person.

κατ' ἀφρᾶσι] ii. 379 A ff.

εἰ εἶ ἡμῶν εἴη] 'If we really had the power.' For a similar reference to the possibility of the Republic being realized in fact cp. supra 389 D ἐὰν γε . . . εἰ ἐγε λόγῳ ἑργα τελήσω, and note.

So much for the subjects and the style of spoken discourse. And with regard to the song the principles will be the same.

The difference lies in the addition of tune and metre. As we have forbidden our poets to use lamentation, we shall forbid our musical composers to employ pathetic melodies, or any kind of music which tends to relax the moral fibre. No 'soft Lydian airs' for us, nor the 'linked sweetness' of Ionian strains! But only the manly Dorian and the martial Phrygian mood. Or, to speak more exactly, we must have one sort of music which expresses warlike resolution and patient fortitude, and one which breathes the serene temper of philosophic aspiration and wise counsel and calm rejoicing in the triumph of good.

For this we shall need no elaborate instrument, least of all the infinitely variable tones of the flute—nothing but the lyre and simple reed. We renounce Marsyas and hold to Apollo.

The passage which follows has been fully discussed by Westphal, Griechische Harmonik, ed. 1886, c. 5, §§ 25-31, pp. 187-240.

περὶ ὅθης τρόπου καὶ μελῶν] 'About the character of songs and the tunes.'
Plato: Republic.

Republic

398 C

Jecture at present (though I have a suspicion) what sort of things we ought to say.' Cp. Soph. 233 E λέγω τοίνυν ο' καὶ εμὲ τῶν πάντων:

infra vii. 529 A παντὶ ... δῆλον ... ἵνως, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, παντὶ δῆλον πλῆν ἐμοί.

D λόγου ... ρυθμοῦ] See note on supra 397 C.

καὶ ὦσαυτώς] I.e. ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ λέξει, viz. τῇ ἁπλῇ διηγήσει.

καὶ μήν, κ.τ.λ.] This general truth has been admitted above, 397 B εὰν τις ἀποδιδῷ πρέπονσαν ἀρμονίαν καὶ ρυθμὸν τῇ λέξει, although this is there said of speaking and recitation only.

E μεζολυδιστὶ] 'That famous mode which Sappho invented, and which Aristoxenus declares to be perfectly adapted to tragedy' (Westphal, Griechische Harmonik, ed. 1886, p. 198). The authority for this is Plutarch, De Mus., c. 16 καὶ ὁ μεζολυδιστὸς δὲ παθητική τις ἐστι, τραγῳδίας ἀρμοζοντα. 'Ἀρισταξένους δὲ φησὶ Σαπφῶν πρῶτην εὑρονθαι τὴν μεζολυδιστὶ, παρ' ἦς τοὺς τραγῳδοποιοὺς μαθὼν λαβόντας γοῦν αὐτοῖς συνειδῷ τῇ δοξατί, ἐπὶ μὲν τὸ μεγαλοπρεπὲς καὶ ἄξιωματικόν ἀποδίδωσιν, ἢ δὲ τὸ παθητικόν, μέμικται δὲ δεῖ τοῦτον τραγῳδίαν. But Plutarch, in the same passage, attributes to Aristoxenus other statements at variance with this.

ἄς δὲ ἐπιεικεῖς εἶναι] Cp. supra 387 E καὶ ὀδὴν ταύτας σπουδαίας. The suggestion that some women are to aim high is one of the preparations for the surprise in Book v.

αἴτινες χαλαραί καλούνται] 'The sort of melodies called lax.' The indefinite relative suits with Plato's affected ignorance (cp. infra 400 c), and the antecedent is in apposition to ἱαστὶ and λυδιστὶ taken together. The 'relaxed harmonies' include Ionian as well as a species of Lydian (ὑπολυδιστὶ), but there appears to be no distinction among Ionian melodies; although Westphal (§28, p. 200), assumes it. χαλαρὰ is probably a technical term of music, implying a lower pitch, and opposed to σύντονον, but is used by Plato with an ethical association, for which cp. ix. 590 B τρυφῆ δὲ καὶ μαλαθιαία οὐκ ἐπὶ τῇ αὐτοῦ τοῦτου (τοῦ δυμοῦ) χαλάσει τε καὶ ἀνέσει ψέγεται. Aristotle, Pol. viii. 5, § 22 says: 'Some of the modes make men sad and grave, like the so-called Mixolydian, others enfeeble the mind, like the relaxed harmonies, others again produce a moderate and settled temper, which appears to be the peculiar effect of the Dorian;—the Phrygian inspires enthusiasm.' Aristotle's word for 'relaxed' is ἄνεμωνα, and in this he is followed by Aristoxenus and later writers. It is generally assumed that χαλαρὰ in Plato means
the same thing. Aristotle in Pol. viii. 7, § 14, censures Plato for rejecting the ‘relaxed’ harmonies: he would keep them because less difficult for aged persons to sing.

\[ \text{ϕρυγικόν} \] Why should Plato choose the Phrygian mode to suit the ‘modest stillness and sobriety’ becoming men in peace? Aristotle’s criticism of this passage in Pol. viii. 7, §§ 9–11, seems only natural: ‘The Socrates of the Republic is wrong in retaining only the Phrygian mode along with the Dorian, and the more so because he rejects the flute; for the Phrygian is to the modes what the flute is to musical instruments—both of them are exciting and emotional. Poetry proves this, for Bacchic frenzy, and all similar emotions are most suitably expressed by the flute, and are better set to the Phrygian than to any other harmony. The dithyramb, for example, is acknowledged to be Phrygian.’ Either Phrygian melodies had other than orgiastic uses. or Plato is proceeding on some abstract ground, as that the Phrygian was in the mean between excess and defect in pitch.

\[ \text{ἐν πάσι τούτοις} \] is a resumption of \( \text{ἐν πολεμικῷ προμένει} \) and what follows: ‘In all these cases repelling the attacks of fortune with a firm front.’

\[ \text{ἐαυτόν ἐπέχουσα} \] ‘giving his attention to.’ Cp. Laws xi. 926 b \( \text{ἐπὶ μείζονι γράμμῃ τὴν διάνωσιν ἐπέχου} \). After \( \text{δεομένου} \) the construction is changed and the accusatives \( \text{ἐπέχουσα . . . πράξαντα} \), \( \text{k.t.l.} \), are governed directly by \( \text{μιμήσαι} \). The correction \( \text{ὑπέχουσα} \), ‘resigning’ or ‘submitting himself,’ which is found in a single manuscript \( \text{Π} \), is unnecessary.

\[ \text{ταύτας δύο ἄρμονίας, κ.τ.λ.} \] Cp. Laws vii. 814 E, where it is said of dancing to \( \text{δὴ σπουδαῖον [ἐναι κίνησιν] τὴν μὲν κατὰ πολέμου καὶ ἑν βιαίοις ἐμπλακέσθως πώνος σωμάτων μὲν καλῶς, ψυχῆς δὲ ἀνδρικῆς, τὴν δ' ἐν ἐπιραγμασίᾳ τε οὕσης ψυχῆς σώφρονος ἐν ἡδαινίᾳ τε ἐμμέτροις εἰρημείην ἀν τις λέγων κατὰ φύσιν τὴν τοιαύτην ἄρχησιν λέγοι.} \)

\[ \text{δυστυχοῦντων . . . ἀνδρείων} \] The genitives depend on \( \text{φθογγοῦσι}. \) The second \( \text{ἄρμονίας}, \) here bracketed, should probably be omitted.

\[ \text{οὐκ ἄρα . . . φαίνεται} \] ‘Then we shall certainly not want in our songs and tunes a multitude of strings or notes, or an instrument which has all the harmonies.’ ‘Clearly not.’

The Panharmonic instruments were those which were adapted for the performance of all the modes and musical genera; in other words, which admitted the greatest possible variety in the intervals and arrangement of the scale.
Plato: Republic.

Republic

399 C

**τριγώνων ἀρα καὶ πηκτίδων, κ.τ.λ.**] 'Then we shall not maintain
the artificers of lyres with three corners and composite scales, nor
of any of the many-stringed curiously harmonized instruments.'
'Manifestly not.' Cp. Arist. Pol. viii. 6, §§ 12, 13, who says that
these and other elaborate instruments were gradually disused, as
men learned to distinguish what conduced to virtue. The πηκτίς,
like the μάγαδις, was of Lydian origin (Herod. i. 17), and was
played with the fingers without a plectrum. See Susemihl's note on
Arist., l. c.

D

τί δέ; . . . μύημα;) ] 'Next, will you admit makers and players
of flutes into the state? Has not this' (τοῦτο, sc. αιλῶς understood
from αιληθῆς and αιλλοποιοῖς) 'more strings than all of them? And
are not panharmonic instruments themselves an imitation of the
flute?'

Plato says playfully that the flute, which has no strings, is 'the
most many-stringed of instruments': that is to say, the flute has those
qualities in the greatest degree which he has just been denouncing
in stringed instruments. According to Proclus, in Alcib. p. 197,
each aperture of the flute gave three or more sounds: this variety
was obtained by the use of shifts and slides. It was natural that
the panharmonic principle should be first applied to an instrument
of which the notes could be easily modified. (Paus. ix. 12, § 5.)

In the Laws iii. 700 D, Plato describes the degenerate musicians
as κεραννύτες δε θρύμνος τε ἕνας καὶ πυθώνας διθωράμβους, καὶ αἴλωδιας δὴ
taĩς κιβαρθοῦναι μιμούμενοι. Cp. Pind. Ol. vii. 21 παμφώνουσι τ’ ἐν
ἐντευκῶν αἰλῶν: Isthm. iv. 35 ἐν αἰλῶν τε παμφώνοις ὀμολαίοι.

κιθάρα.] The Dorian mood includes the 'Ὑποδωρατί (otherwise
called the Aeolian), of which Arist. Probl. xix. 48, § 1, says that
it is κιβαρθοῦκοτάτη τῶν ἀρμονιῶν.

E

νῇ τόν κύνα] may be regarded as a jest παρὰ προσδοκιάν (cp.
Phaedr. 236 ε ὄμυμι . . . τὴν πλάταν ταυτη). It occurs in
a lengthened form, which perhaps explains the allusion, in the
Gorgias 482 B μὰ τόν κύνα, τὸν Ἀἰγυπτίων θεόν—'By the Dog, the God
of Egypt.' It is observable that another oath of the same kind,
μὰ τόν χῆνα (which is likewise attributed to the followers of Socrates
see Schol. on Ar. Birds 521), refers to an Egyptian deity.

399 E–

400 E

By thus simplifying music we have purged our luxurious state.
And we must also simplify rhythm and metre. Not to enter into
technicalities of dactylic, spondaic, iambic, trochaic metre, and the
merits of the corresponding rhythms, we observe once for all that the rhythm must be noble and appropriate to the style, as the style is to the subject, and all must harmonize with the mental character which we desire to create.


tα λοιπὰ καθαρωμεν [‘Let us finish the purgation.’ In other words—‘Let us do with the metres what we have done with the modes.’]

μη ποικιλως ... βασεις [‘not to aim at having complex rhythms or varied systems of metre.’]

ἀλλα μα Δι?, ἐφη, κ.τ.λ.] [‘But in good faith I cannot tell. That there are three kinds of feet out of which metrical systems of feet are formed, as in sounds there are four notes whence spring all the modes,—so much I have observed and can say: but of what sort of life they are severally the expressions, I am unable to affirm.’

(1) The elements of metrical systems are simple, like the elements of musical systems:—since all systems of metre are based on three proportions of time, \( \frac{3}{2} \), \( \frac{2}{3} \), \( \frac{4}{3} \), and all the musical genera and modes, are produced by different intervals, or a different order of intervals, in the four sounds of the tetrachord. This is the simplest explanation of the words, εν τοις φθόγγοις τέτταρα, sc. εἴδη. Cp. Theact. 206 A ἐν δὲ κεκαλαμτο τελέως μεμαθηκέναι μᾶν ἀλλο τι ἤν ἄ τ τῶν φθόγγων ἐκάστω ἔδνασθιν ἐπικολοουθεῖν, ποίες χρισθεὶς εἴη, ἀ δὴ στοιχεία πᾶς ἃν ὁμολογηθεῖσα μουσικάς λέγεσθαι; (2) Westphal, who interprets the words εν τοις φθόγγοις τέτταρα as = εἴδη ἄρμονιων τέτταρα (εἴδη corresponding to the γένη of later writers), is compelled to assume that Plato here includes the Locrian mode, to which he has nowhere alluded: *Griechische Harmonik* (1886), § 31, p. 234. (3) Mr. Monro believes that τὰ ἐν τοῖς φθόγγοις τέτταρα are the Pythagorean ratios \( \frac{3}{2}, \frac{2}{3}, \frac{4}{3} \).

cαι μετὰ Δάμωνος] It is Damon in the Laches who is supposed to have imparted to Nicias his ideas about education (Laches 180 c, d: 200 λ). Compare p. 200, where Laches ironically says to him: πάντων δὲ μεγάλην ἀληθεία εἰχον ὁς τῷ παρὰ τοῦ Δάμωνος σοφία αὐτήν (sc. ἀνδρείαν) ἀνευρήσεις. Damon is said by Plutarch, de Mus. 16, to have invented ‘the relaxed Lydian mode’ (see above). καὶ, as in καὶ εἰσαφθέεις. We are not limited to our own wisdom in this, but may confer with Damon too.
The masculine accusatives in this sentence belong not to the rhythms as such, but only to the feet, which have been spoken of above as the εἴδη εὐξ ὧν αἱ βάσεις πλέονται. [B. J. questioned this, pointing to the words τοὺς ρυθμοὺς αὐτοὺς below as well as to ρυθμοὺς in the sentence itself. But can the words δάκτυλον, ἰαμβον, τροχαῖον be used for the corresponding rhythms (δακτυλικόν, &c.)? L. C.] The cretic (ἐνόπλιος) is composite (ἐπιθέτος), being made up of a trochee and a long syllable ~—~, in fact a dactyloaeus catalecticus. ἤρτος, which is elsewhere an epithet of the dactylic hexameter rhythm, seems here (sc. ποίος) to stand for the spondee, and the following words are an obscure way of saying that the spondee is equivalent to the dactyl, which is only a resolved spondee: 'a dactylic and also an heroic foot, which he somehow arranged so that arsis and thesis were equal, and long syllables and short were inter-changeable.' By expressing himself in this awkward way, Socrates parades his affected ignorance of the subject. His use of the terms ἄρσις, κάτω, however, is quite accurate. See Westphal’s Metrik (1885), pp. 103, 104, and Aristoxenus, § 16, p. 20. (The inversion of the terms ἄρσις and βέσις need not detain us here.)

ἐνόπλιον τε τυα, κ.τ.λ.] That ἐνόπλιος is the Cretic we learn amid some variety of statement from the Scholiast on Arist. Nubes 651: οἱ δὲ ἐνόπλιον, τῶν ἀμφίμακρων, ὄς καὶ Κρητικὸς καλεῖται. The view in question is confirmed by this passage in which the mention of the Cretic or Paean in illustrating the three kinds of metres (τρία ὄπτα εἴδη) could hardly have been omitted. Plato takes no account of epitrite and Ionic metres. He probably discarded them as too composite and irregular. For Damon cp. Isocrates περὶ ἀντιδιάσεως 251 where he is described as one of the wisest of the citizens and the teacher of Pericles.

καὶ τούτων . . . ἔναμφοτερὸν τι] 'And in respect of some of these he appeared to praise and blame the movement of the foot quite as much as the rhythms themselves;—or perhaps the combined effect of both.' The meaning of τὰς ἄγγιας τοῦ ποδὸς is the comparative speed or slowness of singing or reciting (tempo). The foot has clearly different effects in different times.

This agrees with the definition of Aristides, quoted by Westphal, Metrik (1885), p. 336: 'Ἀγγιῆ δὲ ἐστὶ ῥυθμικὴ χρόνων τόχοις ἡ βραδυτῆς, οἷν ὅταν τῶν λόγων σφυμεῖνας οὗ τὰ ἁθείας ποιοῦνται πρὸς τὰς ἄρσεις.
Notes: Book III.

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διαφόρως ἵκαστον χρόνον τὰ μεγέθη προφερώμεθα. And it is confirmed by Aristoxenus, quoted by Porphyr. ad Ptolem. p. 255 (Westphal, op. cit. p. 78) εἶτερ εἰσὶν ἵκαστον τῶν ῥυθμῶν ἀγωγαὶ ἀπειροὶ, ἀπειροὶ ἔσταται καὶ οἱ πρῶτοι (sc. χρόνοι) . . . οὐ δὲ λήφθη τῶν ῥυθμῶν, ὁμοιον εἰσίν οἱ προχαίοι, ἐπὶ τῆς δὴ τιμος ἀγωγῆς τεθεῖσ εἰπέρων ἐκείνων πρῶτων ἕνα τε λύφεται εἰς αὐτῶν: i.e. the time depends on the metrical unit ω, and conversely the length of the metrical unit differs according to the time.

ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν, κ.τ.λ.] Is Plato serious or affected in his ignorance of music and metres? He probably knew all that was known of music and mathematics in his own day. The feigning of ignorance seems therefore to be an artistic excuse for touching lightly on a subject, of which the lengthened discussion would have been out of place.

ἡ οὗ οἰεῖ;] sc. σμικροῦ λόγου εἶναι.

ταῦτα γε λόγῳ ἀκολουθητέον = δεί ταῦτα ἀκολουθεῖν.

εὐλογία ἄρα . . . διάνοιαν] Subject, style, metre, music, make up a fourfold harmony which in modern times has become dislocated and discordant, the style not being perfectly expressive of the subject, nor even lyric poetry always intended for song, and the time of the music being generally divorced from the metre of the words. Whether such an ideal as Plato imagines can be attained may be doubtful, as music can rarely express ideas, and the principles of articulate and inarticulate sound are necessarily different.

This musical harmony Plato partly confuses with a well-balanced life, and partly regards as the great instrument of attaining moral harmony. He is right in supposing that simplicity is a first principle both of art and life. Compare the defence of the ordinary education in μουσική which he puts in the mouth of Protagoras—Protag. 326 B καὶ τοὺς ῥυθμοὺς τε καὶ τὰς ἀρμονίας ἀναγκαίον ὕστερον ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν παιδῶν, ἢν ἠμερώτετοι τε ὀσί, καὶ εὐρυμιστέροι καὶ εὐαρμοστότεροι γεγονόμενοι χρήσιμοι ὅσιν εἰς τὸ λέγειν τε καὶ πράττειν πᾶς γὰρ ὁ βιος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εὐρυκλίμας τε καὶ εὐαρμοστίας δεῖται.

τὸ αὐτῶν πράττειν] ‘To do their duty as guardians.’

αὐτῶν] sc. of the principles of rhythm and order implied in ταῦτα supra. For the expression cp. Phil. 56 λ μεστὴ μὲν πον μουσικῆς πρώτοιν, κ.τ.λ.
The rules which have been laid down for poetry and literature must now be extended to the other arts—building, painting, &c. For in these likewise there is the expression of mind and character. And when the true harmony and rhythm, inspired by nobleness of heart, is observed by all of them, our youth will be able to feast eye and ear on fair sights and sounds; they will dwell in a land of health where refreshing breezes blow and will gather good from all things.

But of all the arts music, taken in the larger sense, is the most potent for good or for evil. And he who has been rightly trained in this will take less harm from outward things and will grow into natural conformity with reason, so that rational ideas when they are presented to him in due time will be recognized by him and find their way into his soul—just as one who has learnt the alphabet will attain to the power of reading the most complex writing, and will recognize the faintest trace of the familiar characters, even when reflected in water.

The fairest of all sights is the incarnation of these principles—as when a fair soul finds habitation in a body as fair, or even not so fair. The liberal education of our youth will culminate in having such a friend, not as the object of passionate longings, but of affectionate and well-attempered intercourse.

In what relation does good taste stand to morals, or beauty to truth, or character to virtue, or strength to right, or in general, what is external to what is within us? About these and similar questions there is in Plato a degree of ambiguity arising partly out of the Greek nature and education, partly out of the imperfect modes of conception which prevailed in the beginning of philosophy. To us the difference between art and morality is almost as permanent and settled as the distinction of intellect and will, and hardly less important. The dexterity or skill of hand of the mechanic is at once seen to be perfectly distinct from his moral character: though of course the hand is only the executor of the mind. In the fine arts, as we call them, here again making a distinction unknown to the ancients in the time of Plato, there is more danger of confusion, because a moral, or rather, perhaps, a sentimental, element enters into them. That is to say, the poet, painter, &c., must, at the time of executing his work, feel the thought to which he gives expression. But this temporary sentiment is really distinguished from the permanent basis of his
character. Ancient philosophy was little concerned with criticisms on art, and failed to make this analysis. Aristotle does indeed discuss the question whether the good citizen may be also a good man: but he never asks the parallel question, whether the good poet or good artist must be also a good man. In Plato, art has a large share in early education, but seems in later life to be superseded by speculative intelligence, which becomes the centre of truth and goodness. The discussion of such questions realizes to us the difficulty of reproducing a mental world which is different from our own. Compare the speech of Pericles in Thucydides (ii. 39–41).

_ὅποδεν . . . προσβάλη_ ‘From whatever source some influence of fair works stirs the sense of sight or hearing.’ _πρὸς ὄψιν_ not exactly=_πρὸς ὁμοια_ but includes the notion of _πρὸς τὸ ὄριν_. Cf. Theaet. 152 E—157 Α.

_ἄμπερ αὕρα_ ‘like a breeze which wafts health from wholesome places.’ _αὕρα_, not _λύρα_, as in the critical note, is the reading of Par. Α.

_φέροντα_] For the neuter plural, referring to two words (_ρυθμός_ and _ἀρμονία_) which are not in the same gender, cp. Herod. iii. 57 ἦν τὸν ἂγορὴ καὶ τὸ πρωτανήνιον Παρίῳ λίθῳ ἄκεκχαινα.

_καὶ ὅτι αὕ . . . ὃ φθοῦ τραφεῖς_ Education may be truly regarded as a process in which instincts, feelings, impressions, words, rules, are gradually ennobled and lighted up by reasoning and reflection. The results of reasoning and reflection may again become instincts and feelings; no conscious effort of thought is required to recall the first principles of morality. But this practical intuition of morals which is gained by use must not be confounded with that narrower and feebler perception of right and wrong which is given in childhood; or with the simple abstractions of right and wrong which are gained by later reflection.

Plato is conscious of the importance of educating the sense of beauty in childhood. The standard of taste, as of manners and morals, may be indefinitely raised by the atmosphere of early life.

_ἐκεῖ_] sc. ἐν μονοικῆ: cp. infra 404 E ὀφθαλμίν ἐκεῖ μὲν ἀκολασίαν ἡ ποικιλία ἐνετείκεν.

_καὶ ὀρθῶς δὴ ἐχαίρων . . . καταδεχόμενος_ Baiter, in the Zurich edition of 1881, adopted this very plausible conjecture of Maur.
The image of letters, helped by the ambiguous use of the word στοιχεῖον, had a considerable influence on Plato’s mind. At the end of the Theaetetus (201) an attempt is made to explain knowledge as a combination of elements, στοιχεία, which, like the letters of a word, have a meaning only in combination; and the same image occurs in the Sophist, 252 E. Cp. Polit. 278 δ ταῦτα τούτο ἡμών ἡ ψυχή φύσει περὶ τὰ τῶν πάντων στοιχεῖα πεποιθεῖα, κ.τ.λ.: Phil. 17 Α : Tim. 48 B.

...Whenever the letters, though few, were detected by us.'

oratio obliqua, depending on the thought implied in ήτιμάζωμεν = ‘under the idea that we need not notice them.’ So below, πρὶν ... ἐχομεν is indirect in past time for πρὶν ἄν ... ἐχομεν.

The sentence from ὁσπερ ἄρα is an anacoluthon; the thought is interrupted by the eager assent of Glaucon to the illustrative statement (ἀληθῆ), and after being expanded with οὐκοῦν, κ.τ.λ., is resumed and completed in the words, ἂρ’ οὖν, ὅ λέγω, πρὸς θέων, οὗτος οὐδὲ μουσαίοι, κ.τ.λ. For a similar interruption of a comparison softened in the same way by a reference to what precedes, cp. Theaet. 197 c, δ ἀλλ’ ὁσπερ ἐι τίς, κ.τ.λ.

Plato remembers that the highest forms of virtue to be found in human life are but shadows of the ideas, reflected on a fleeting stream.

the letters themselves—opposed to their shadows.

C

The list of four ‘cardinal’ virtues is not here regarded as exhaustive. And in the present enumeration Justice is held in reserve.

Compare Parmen. 130 ε οὖσα σοι ἀντιλήψεις φιλοσοφία ὡς ἕτε ἀντιλήψεις καὶ ἐμὴ δόξαν, ὅτε οὐδὲν αὐτῶν ἀτιμάσις.


Notes: Book III.

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ءکوؤس] sc. τοῖς ἤθεσι.

tοῦ δὲ τα μάλλοτα... οὐκ ἄν ἔρωτ] 'The man who has the spirit of harmony will be enamoured, then, of those who have most of this character; but of one who is inharmonical he will not be enamoured.'

Compare Symp. 209 β τὰ ὁδικά σώματα τὰ καλὰ μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ αἰσχρά ἀπαίζεται ἢ τῶν κυών, καὶ εἰσὶ ἐντυχής ψυχή καλή καὶ γενναία καὶ εὐφρενί, πάνω δὴ ἀπαίζεται τὸ ξυναφώτερον: ibid. 210 β, c μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τὸ ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς κάλλος τιμώτερον ἡγήσασθαι τοῦ ἐν τῷ σώματι, ὡστε καὶ εἰν ἐπεικῆς ὅν τὴν ψυχήν τις καὶ εἰνα συμικρῶν ἄνθος ἔχω, ἐξαιρείν αυτῷ καὶ ἐρῶν καὶ κίδεσθαι, κ.τ.λ.

μανθάνω... καὶ συγχωρῶ] A similar allusion to Glaucòn's character occurs in v. 474 δ ἀλλαφ. εἰπον, ἔπρεπεν, ὢ Γλαίκων, λέγειν ἢ λέγειν. ἀνθρι ὅ ἐρατικῶ οὐ πρέπει ἀμμημονείν, κ.τ.λ. The σιμώτης of Theactetus is a case in point (Theaet. 185 ε).

γ ἐκφροσνα ποιεῖ] Cp. the description of the marvellous effects of pleasure in Phileb. 47 λ.

tῇ ἀλλῆ ἄρετή] sc. καὶ ἡδονή ὑπερβαλλούσῃ ἐστὶ τις κοινωνία;

tὰ δ' ἄλλα... υφέξοντα] 'But for the rest he should so associate with him for whom he may care as never to be found to pass beyond this limit; and if he does, he is to be censured for coarseness and bad taste:' i.e. if he goes beyond what is implied in the words φιλέων, ἐφειναι, ἄπεσθαι ἄσπερ νίοιο. σπονδάζοι—the optative (for ἀν σπονδάς), because the legislation applies to an imagined future, or as Riddell would say, Digest § 74 β, is intended to belong to all time. δόξει is not to be taken emphatically; not 'even appear to' but simply 'be thought to.' A fact is spoken of, not as unreal or uncertain, but with reference to the impression which it creates. Cp. Thuc. iii. 10, § 1 εἰ μὴ μετ' ἀρετῆς δοκούσῃ εἰς ἀλλήλους γένουσα: Soph. O. T. 402 εἰ δὲ μηδὲνα γέρουν | εἶναι.

ὑφέξοντα] is dependent on νομοθετήσεις, the construction changing from the infinitive to the participle. Cp. supra 389 σ λέγοντι.

Aristotle in the Politics (ii. 4, § 3) refers to this passage: ἀτόπον δὲ κοινόν... διαφέρειν καὶ τὸ τὴν συνουσίαν ἄφελεν δι' ἄλλῃ μὲν αἰτίαις μηδεμίᾳν, ὡς λιγὸν β' ἵσχυράς τῆς ἡδονῆς γνωριμίης; οὖτε δ' ὁ μὲν πατήρ ἢ νόος, οἴ δ' ἀδηλφοί ἀλλήλων, μηθὲν οἴσθαι διαφέρειν. There seems to be some misunderstanding here. Plato has said that love is not to go beyond the innocent sort of familiarity which
subsists between members of a family. This is only an illustration of what is to be permitted. But Aristotle seems either to assume that Plato allows of improper intimacy between near relations, or to think that he ought to have distinguished different cases on some other ground than the mere violence of the pleasure. As he is evidently referring to this place, he has probably been misled by a confused recollection of the words, ἀπεσθαὶ ὀςφερ ὁίος, or is drawing a strained inference by connecting this passage with the regulations in Bk. v.

Meanwhile their physical education will not have been neglected. We may observe that a good mind makes a good body, not a good body a good mind; and so if the mind be well trained, it will be enough for us to lay down general rules about gymnastics, leaving the more particular care of the body to the mind itself. The first rule will be that of temperance, and it must follow that our system of training must be different from that of the Hellenic athlete, which is both dangerous to health and inconsistent with mental activity. Our youth must be always on the alert, and their training must be suited to their warlike duties.

In gymnastics as in music simplicity will be the guiding principle. And in this we shall follow Homer, whose warriors ate no fish nor stewed meats, but simple roast, and that without sauce. Far be from our youth the luxury of Sicily and the lasciviousness of Corinth, or even the niceties of Athenian confectionery.

Living in this simple fashion they will have no need of the law-courts and the doctor's shop.

έμοι μὲν γάρ ὁικ. κ.τ.λ.] The excellence of the mind is not dependent on the body, but the excellence of the body on the mind. Plato does not mean to say that greatness of soul will give the strength of Milo, or that an effort of the will is able to raise men above their bodily condition. But the mind has the initiative; it trains the body when duly trained itself; beginning in youth and considered with reference to the whole of life, the power of reason is really very great, if not supreme, over health and strength. 'Every man is either a fool or a physician' in some degree: he is his own best watchman, and has the power of observing and controlling his bodily habit.

Plato also regards the subject from another point of view: the mind is prior to the body as ideas are prior to sensible objects. There is something doubtful and ambiguous in such a notion, but
there is also the crude form of a truth which in modern times has been greatly neglected. Compare the fragment of Democritus, Frag. Mor. 128 (Mullach): ἂνθρώπους ἄρμοδιων ψυχῆς μᾶλλον ἢ σώματος ποιεσθής λόγον. ψυχή μὲν γὰρ τελεστάτη σκῖρνος μοχθηρίν ὀρθοὶ, σκῖρνοι δὲ λέγεις ἂν τὸν ἀγαθών ὀφθᾷν εὔδεν τι ὁμοίων τίθησι. Also Charmides 156 E πάντα γὰρ ἐφί έκ τῆς ψυχῆς ὁμοιότατοι καὶ τὰ κακά καὶ τὰ ἀγαθὰ τῷ σώματι καὶ παντὶ τῷ ἄνθρωπῳ, καὶ ἐκείθεν ἐπιρρέων ὀφθήν ἐκ τῆς κεφαλῆς ἐπὶ τὰ ὀμματα ὑπὸ τὸν ἐκεῖνον καὶ πρῶτον καὶ μάλιστα θεραπεύειν. See also Laws x. 891 ff. for the priority of mind. That the object of Gymnastic is mental and not bodily training (εἰ μὴ εἰ πάρετρον) is a truth which is more fully brought out infra, 410 B, ff., 411 E.

μέθης ... ἀφεκτέον αὐτοῖς] supra 390 A, B: 395 E.

τί δὲ δὴ ... ἀγώνοις] ‘But next what shall we say of their food? For the men are in training for the greatest of contests.’ Compare Laws viii. 829 E, where the legislator is supposed to ask himself: φέρε, τίνα τοτε τρόφις τὴν πάλιν ὅλην παρασκεύαζος; ἄρ' οὖν ἀθλητὰς τῶν μεγίστων ἀγώνων, οἷς ἀνταγωνισται μνημόν ὑπάρχουσι; ἄρ' οὖν, κ.τ.λ.] Training is of use as the preliminary of any extraordinary bodily exertion, yet dangerous to health generally because inducing an artificial state, and increasing the muscular, while often impairing the constitutional powers.


οὐς γε ἡστηρ κόνας ... ὑγείειαν] Cp. ii. 375 Λ ὃδε τί ποιεῖ αὐτοῖς ἐκάτερον εἶναι πρὸς αἴσθησιν καὶ ἑλαφρῶν πρὸς τὸ ἀἰσθανόμενον διωκάθειν, καὶ λογίαν αὐτ. εἰσὶ δὲν ἐλόντα διαμισθέαται.

καὶ τῶν ἄλλων σίτων] ‘And of food also.’ ἄλλων adverbal.


ἀπλῆ που καὶ ἐπιεικῆς γυμναστικῆ, καὶ μάλιστα ἡ τῶν περὶ τῶν πόλεμον] The subject of the first part of this sentence is ἡ βελτίστη γυμναστική and the predicate of the second part μάλιστα ἀπλῆ καὶ ἐπιεικῆς. The verb in both cases—ἀν εἰ—that is supplied from the preceding words. The force of τις (ἀδελφῇ τις) must be continued with ἀπλῆ καὶ ἐπιεικῆς. The whole would be: ἡ βελτίστη γυμναστική ἀπλῆ που καὶ ἐπιεικῆς τις γυμναστικὴ ἃν εἰ, καὶ ἡ τῶν περὶ τῶν πόλεμον μάλιστα ἀπλῆ καὶ ἐπιεικῆς ἃν εἰ.

καὶ παρ’ Ὀμήρου ... μάθοι ἃν τις] ‘Even from Homer,’ whom in other cases we blame, ‘one may learn such simple matters as
Plato: Republic.

this. Cp. supra ii. 383 c: Crat. 391 c ἄλλ' εἰ μὴ αὖ σε ταῦτα ἀρέσκει, παρ' ὦμὴρον χρή μανθάνει καὶ παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων ποιητῶν.

404 B ἐν Ἐλλησπόντῳ] 'at the Hellespont.' The name is here given not to the straits merely, but to the country near them.

C καὶ ὄρθως γε ... ἀπέχονται] ὄρθως applies mainly to ἀπέχονται. 'They know it, and rightly abstain.'

D ψέγεις ἀρα ... εὐπαθείας] 'You would not have men keep a mistress, who mean to preserve their constitution?' 'Certainly not.' 'And you disapprove also of the delights, as they are termed, of Athenian confectionery?' For a similar association cp. ii. 373 Λ ἑταῖραι καὶ πέμματα. See also in the Laws, viii. 840 A, the account of Iccus of Tarentum and other athletes who διὰ τῶν Ὀλυμπιακῶν τε ἀγώνων καὶ τοὺς τε ἄλλους ... οὗτοι πώποτε γυναικὸς ἁγνυτο, κ.τ.λ.

δὴν γὰρ ... ἀπεικάζομεν] 'We should not be far from the truth in comparing generally this way of feeding and living to the composition of melody and song in the panharmonic style and in all the rhythms.'

παναρμάνιον here means 'panharmonic style,' the style in which all the modes were combined and there were frequent transitions from one to another: above, 399 c, it was used of the instrument adapted to this style.

E ἐκεί] ἐν τῇ μελοποιίᾳ καὶ φίδῃ.

405 A δικαστική] Cobet would read δικαστική as in 409 E: unnecessarily and against the MSS.

ὁταν δὴ ... σπουδάζωσιν] 'when even free-men concern themselves about such matters in great numbers and with much eagerness.' For καὶ ἐλεύθεροι cp. infra μη μονον τούς φαίλους, κ.τ.λ.

B [καὶ] ἀπορία οἰκείων] καὶ is found in all the MSS., and, though somewhat difficult, is defensible. There is a double evidence of the want of education: (1) that like a slave you receive a justice that is imposed on you from without, and (2) because you have none of your own. The last clause not only adds emphasis but gives a new point.

ἡ δοκεῖ σοι ... (c) ἐκεῖνος ἐτι αἰσχίνον] The difficulty of this sentence arises chiefly from its length, and from the ambiguous use of τούτου, τότε in the first clause. The mind has to be carried on
from πάντων μὲν οὖν, ἐφη, αἰσχίστων, τὸ οὖ, ἀλλὰ τοῖτ', ἐφη, ἵκειου ἐτὶ αἰσχίων. 'Is it not a most disgraceful thing to send out for justice because you have no supply at home'? (ἀπορία ὁικείων)?—such is the general meaning of the previous sentence. To which the answer is that 'nothing can be more disgraceful.' The argument proceeds: 'Do you think this importation of justice (τοῦτο) is more disgraceful than the further stage (τοῦτο) of the same evil, in which a man takes a pride in litigation?' &c. 'No,' is the reply, 'that is more disgraceful still.'

The reading λογιζόμενος, which is that of the majority of MSS. (but not of Par. A or the Scholiast), is feeble: it affords an instance of the substitution common in MSS. of a well-known word for a less known one. Another various reading—αὐ (or αὐ) λογιζόμενος (Vind. F. Flor. X. Aug. v) is an indirect testimony to the reading of the text, as it has probably arisen from a confusion of the two, αὐ λογιζόμενος becoming λογιζόμενος. For the imagery cp. Arist. Nub. 449, 450:—

μᾶσθης, ἐρων, γλυώσ, ἀλαζὼν,
κέντρων, μιαρός, στρόφις, ἄργαλεως, κ.τ.λ.

νυστάζουτος δικαστοῦ] 'of a nodding justice.' The epithet is intended to cast a slur upon the law-courts.

tὸ δὲ ιατρικῆς] The words φύσας τε καὶ κατάρρους correspond to ρευμάτων τε καὶ πνευμάτων in the words immediately preceding. For φύσα cp. especially Xen. Cyr. i. 2, 16 ἀισχρόν ... ἐτὶ καὶ νῦν ἑστὶ Πέρσαις ... τὸ φύσης μεστὸς φαίνεσθαι.

ἀλλὰ] is adversative to the negative idea contained in ὅ τι μὴ.

dιάταν οίκαν διήλθομεν] viz. in 403 D ff., although the errors in diet have been rather hinted at than described. But see especially 404 D.

How simple were the prescriptions of the sons of Asclepius, for the wounded heroes who had lived as Homer describes! Very different is the practice nowadays, since Herodicus, himself a valetudinarian, has taught men to prolong their sickly lives by regimen.

The common workman has no time to be ill. Neither has the
Plato: Republic.

rich man, if, as Phocylides says, he ought to practise virtue. For to this or any other serious pursuit valetudinarianism is a great obstacle.

And Pindar and the tragic poets offended against principle when they said that Asclepius, who was a son of Zeus, was bribed to bring a man back to life, who in the course of Nature ought to have died.

It is Machaon (the Asclepiad), not Eurypylus, who receives the potion at the hands of Hecamede (II. xi. 624). The name Eurypylus is repeated below, 408 λ. It is observable that the same circumstance is rightly narrated of Machaon in the Ion (538 c). The mistake is natural (as the wound of Eurypylus occurs only a few lines earlier II. xi. 575 ff.), and ought not to be adduced as a proof that the text of Homer was different in Plato's time.

which, as you know, are considered to be rather inflammatory.

That watches over the course of a disease,—as a tutor (παιδαγωγός) over a growing boy. Cp. infra παρακολουθεῖν... τῷ νοσήματι. The word παιδαγωγεῖν recurs in the same sense in Tim. 89 d, but the passage in which it is found has a very different spirit, for Plato has changed his mind:—διό παιδαγωγεῖν δεί διαιτάς πάντα τὰ τοιοῦτα, καθ’ ὅσων ἂν ἕ τῷ σχολή, ἀλλ’ οὐ φαρμακεύοντα κακῶν δύσκολον ἐρεβιστέον.

Little is known of Herodicus (ὁ Σηλυμβριανός, τὸ δὲ ἄρχαῖον Μεγαρέως Protag. 316 e). From Plato's account we infer that he substituted regimen for medicine; in so doing he was probably in advance of his age. Two other notices of him in Plato agree with this passage: (1) Protag. 316 e, where he is called, with some degree of depreciation, 'a first-rate Sophist'—but this we may observe to be only said of him in the same sense in which Plato speaks of the poets as Sophists: (2) there is a pleasant mention of him at the commencement of the Phaedrus, where he is supposed to recommend walks in the open air, as far as the walls of Megara and back again (Phaedr. 227 d). According to Aristotle, Rhet. i. 5, § 10, Herodicus himself expressed an opinion not far removed from Plato's here: πολλοί... ὑγιασόµενον ὀσπερ Ἦρωδικος λέγεται, οὐδὲις ἂν εὐδαµονίας τῆς ἤγειας διὰ τὸ πάντων ἀπέκεφαλος τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἤ τῶν πλείστων.
Notes: Book III.

νοσώδης γενόμενος] ‘having fallen into bad health.’ Cp. Plato’s own opinion that the physician should not be in robust health—

406 D, E.

dυσθάνατων ... ἄφικετο] ‘So struggling against death by his cleverness he reached old age.’ His sickly life, prolonged by care, was in fact a lingering and painful death. Cp. Tim. 7.5 B τοῖς περὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν γένεσιν δημιουργοῖς, ἰαλογιζομένοις πότερον πολυχρονωτέρον χείρον ἣ βραχυχρονωτέρον βέλτιων ἀπεργάσαντο γένος, ἦν νῦν δὲ τοῦ πλείανος βιῶν φαυλοτέρου δὲ τὸν ἑλάττων ἰμένονα δυτα παντὶ πάντως αἱρετέων.

καλὸν] For the ironical use of καλὸν cp. Theaet. 183 A καλὸν ἂν ἢμῖν συμβαίνον τὸ ἐπινάρθημα τῆς ἀποκρίσεως, κ.τ.λ.

οὐκ ἀγνοία, κ.τ.λ.] It is assumed that Asclepius, as Apollo’s son, must have had a Divine knowledge of the art of healing, and Plato implies that the innovation in question is not merely erroneous, but impious.

πᾶσι τοῖς εὐνομομένοις] is a dative of the persons interested: ‘for the behoof of any well-governed community.’

ὁ ἡμείς ... οὐκ οἰσθανόμενα] ‘This we observe in the case of the artisan, and ludicrously enough fail to make the application to people of the richer sort.’ The adverb γελοῖος has a predicative force (= γελοία δρώντες). Cp. supra i. 332 Α ὀπίστε τις μὴ σωφρόνως ἀπαίτει; Thuc. i. 21, § 1 ἀπίστους ἐπὶ τὸ μυθοῦ ἀκενικηκάτα. δοκούντων is used with a slight contempt.

μακράν] Some MSS. read μικράν, among them Par. A. But μακράν has sufficient manuscript authority and agrees better with the context, even if μικρὰ δίαστα were a natural expression for ‘low diet.’

εἶπεν ... ἀπηλλάγη] are gnomic aorists, used in general statements to give greater liveliness, as in the Homeric similes. ἐμβᾶς has an association of boldness, ‘embarking on his accustomed mode of life.’

ἡν τι αὐτῷ ἔργον ... ἐλυσιτελεί] The past tenses refer to the previous supposition, 406 c, d.

ἀβίωτον] recalls οὐκ ἐλυσιτελεὶς ζην.

οὐκοῦν δὴ λέγεται γε] sc. ὁ πλοῦσιος ἐχεῖν τοιοῦτον ἔργον προκείμενον.

μηδὲν, εἶπον ... (B) οὐδὲν ἐμποδίζει] ‘Let us not quarrel with him on this head’ (viz. at what time a man is to commence a life of vol. III.
virtue), 'our object is rather to inform ourselves whether the rich
are bound to practise virtue; he who fails to do so having no
true life; or whether valetudinarism is an impediment to
the application of the mind in carpentry and other arts,
but is no impediment to that which Phocylides enjoins.' The
disjunctive sentence, which is complicated by the expansion of the
second clause with _μέν_ and _δέ_, might be paraphrased as follows,
'if the rich man is allowed to be a valetudinarian, either he is not
supposed to have any duties, or his duties must be of a kind with
which the care of health does not interfere, as we found that it
interfered with the work of the artisan.'

Plato is urging that the rich man, so far from having time to be
an invalid, has the business of virtue always on hand, and that
valetudinarism is just as great a hindrance to the pursuit of this
as it is to the occupation of the artisan. For the complex sentence
(cp. supra ii. 374 c and note : infra c, d).

Two MSS., _g_ β', read τῷ . . . παρακελεύματι for τῷ . . . παρακελεύμα,
but the accusative, which is found in all the other MSS., is prefer-
Mem. i. 2, 4 ταύτην γὰρ τὴν ἑξων ὑγιείᾳ τῇ ἱκανώς εἶναι καὶ τὴν τῆς
ψυχῆς ἐπιμελειάν οὐκ ἐμποδίζειν ἐφ' : Aeschines 85, 35 ἐμποδίζειν τοῦς
τῆς πόλεως καίροὺς. 'But to the duty which Phocylides enjoins it
(valetudinarism) is no hindrance.' The datives, _τεκτονικὴ μὲν καὶ_
ταῖς ἀλλαίς τέχναις, depend in the first place on ἐμπόδιον, but also
on τῇ προσέξει τοῦ νοῦ, which is added in further explanation.

_ἐδραίως ἐν πόλει ἀρχάς_] opposed to _στρατεύας._

_τὸ δὲ δὴ μέγιστον_] τὸ μέγιστον is a 'Noun-Phrase in apposition'
(Riddell, Digest, § 13) to the notion of ἐμποδίζει, or δύσκλος (ἐστίν)
which is continued in thought. ἵν δὲ ἐγὼ is omitted here, as above
in 'Ὁ δὲ δὴ πλοῦσιος, κ.τ.λ._

_μελέτας πρὸς ἑαυτὸν_] i.e. ὅταν μελετᾷ τίς τι πρὸς ἑαυτὸν.

_κεφαλῆς . . . διατάσεις_] 'tensions' or 'fullnesses of the head,'
i.e. headaches. This reading has the authority of Galen and
Stephanus. Par. A and most other MSS. read _διαστάσεις, 'dis-
tractions'_—as we say, 'a splitting headache'—a violent use of the
word.

_ὅπη ταύτης_] ταύτη sc. ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ, including not only dialectic,
but the preparatory studies of Bk. vii. For the two adverbs cp.
Theaet. 194 ἐν πάντῃ ταύτη_ _ψευδεται ἡ διάνοια_ : and for the general
meaning Phaedo 66 _β_ μυρίας μὲν γὰρ ἡμῖν ἁχολίας παρέχει τὸ σῶμα
Notes: Book III.

... τί δέ, ἃν τινες νόσου προσπέσωσιν, εἰμποδίζουσιν ἡμῶν τὴν τοῦ ὄντος θήμαν ... ἀπε ... οὐδὲ φρονήσατε ἡμῶν ἐγγύνεται οὐδέποτε οὐδέν. When Plato wrote the Timaeus he looked more seriously on the disorders occasioned by over-much study (87 e ff.) ταῦτων δὴ διανοητέων ... αἰτῶσθαι ποιεῖ.

τοὺς μὲν φύσει ... τὰ δ’ εἰσῳ, κ.τ.λ.] For the double form of the sentence (the two members of which may be joined by ‘whereas’) cp. supra B τεκτονικὴ μὲν, κ.τ.λ.: iv. 445 A ἄλλ, ἡφι ... βιωτῶν ἢ ἱρο ἐπιτα. The accusative in both parts of the sentence (τοὺς μὲν ... ἔχοντας ... ἐχοντας) is a loose construction for which the dative τούτους is afterwards substituted.

τὰ δ’ εἰσῳ ... λυσιτελὴ] (1) τὰ δ’ εἰσῳ σώματα is accusative of reference. Both οὐκ ἐπιχειρεῖν and μη ὀιεθαί depend on φώμεν in spite of the difference of negative, μη in indirect discourse being often used where we should expect οὐ. See Goodwin, M. and T., § 685. ἀπαντλόιντα, sc. αὐτῶν; ἐπιχεύοντα, sc. εἰς αὐτά. ‘But as for bodies diseased to the core, shall we not say (φώμεν) that he (sc. Asclepius) would not have attempted by regimen, that is by gradual processes of evacuation and effusion, to make a man’s life long and evil, and to make men beget children probably as good for nothing as themselves,—he did not think that he ought to prescribe for any one who did not live in the accustomed round of life, under the idea that such an one was useless alike to himself and to the state.’ [B. J.]

(2) τὰ ... σώματα are in a pendent construction similar to τοὺς μὲν, κ.τ.λ. above. Of the infinitives, προστάτευν and ἐπιχειρεῖν are in the construction with καταδείξαι: ποιεῖν is governed by ἐπιχειρεῖν, and φυτεύειν apparently by ποιεῖν: μὴ ὀιεθαί, however, would seem to depend on καταδείξαι ἰτηρικῆν supra, i.e. ‘he taught his disciples so.’ This seems required to justify the change from οὐ to μη, which helps to point the correspondence between τὸν μὴ δυνάμενον ... ζην and what follows. [L. C.]

μὴ ὀιεθαί δεῖν θεραπεύειν] Cp. Laches 195 c ἢ οὐ πολλοῖς οἰεί εἰ ἐκ τῆς νόσου ἰμιὸν εἶναι μὴ ἀναστήναι ἢ ἀναστήναι; for the same thought.

πολιτικῶν, ἡφί, λέγεις ‘Ἀσκληπιόν’ ‘You make out Asclepius to have been a statesman.’ Some of the commentators defend Plato against the charge of cruelty. But it is not necessary to view this half-ironical passage in so serious a light. His main conclusion, that the art of medicine should be made simple, is justified by the uncertainty of the subject and confirmed by modern science.

I. 2
The reading of the inferior MSS. οἱ οἱ παῖδες αὐτοῦ δεικνύουσιν δὲν ὅτι τουιότοι μὲν ὣς ὦχὲ, κ.τ.λ. was due to a mistake as to the meaning of ὅτι. Sauppe would read δῆλοι ... καὶ οἱ παῖδες αὐτοῦ ὅτι τουιότοι, comparing Crito 44 D δῆλα τὰ παρώνα ... ὅτι, κ.τ.λ. But the text is right. ‘That is manifest,’ I said; ‘and because of his statecraft, do you not see that his sons at Troy not only showed themselves brave in war, but practised medicine in the way I have described.’

Plato is quoting from memory, as is shown by the substitution of ἀρα. εἰκονίζουσαν' is dual. Asclepius had two sons, Podaleirius and Machaon. The words in II. iv. 218 αἱρετικὰ εἰκονίζουσαν ἐπὶ ἄρα ἡπία φάρμακα εἰλῖδος | πᾶσα refer to Machaon only. Purves' rendering, ‘He squeezed out the blood and sprinkled,’ &c., is supported by the gloss in Suidas: εἰκονίζουσας, ἐκπειτείας, ἐκθλίψας. The notion seems to be that of pressing together the ἱψὶς of the wound.

Plato probably has in mind the verses of Tyrt. Eleg. iii. (12 in Bergk) 5, 6:—

οὐδ' εἰ Τιθωραίοι φυῆ χαριστέροι εἶν πλουτοί δὲ Μίδεω καὶ Κινύρεω μίλλων.

The latter line is quoted with slight variation in the Laws ii. 660 κ ἐὰν δὲ ἄρα πλουτῷ μὲν Κινύρα τε καὶ Μίδα μίλλον.

'From what you say, the sons of Asclepius must have been very clever’ (perhaps referring to 405 δ τοὺς κομψοὺς 'Ἀσκληπιάδας').

Pindar, Pyth. iii. 55:—

ἔτραπεν καὶ κείνων ἀγάμοι μισθὸ χρυσὸς ἐν χερσίν φανείς ἀνδρ' ἐκ θανάτου κομίσαι ἰδῇ ἀλωκότα, κ.τ.λ.


sc. the principle laid down in 391 δ—that no one can be at once a son of God and a bad man,—which is also alluded to in the words ἀπειθοῦντες γε ἡμῖν supra.

Assuredly I mean good physicians, but do you know whom I consider to be such?’ Socrates evades the point of Glaucon’s question, viz. how the physician can see enough of disease in the ‘healthy’ commonwealth. Cp. supra 399 ε, 405 ε ff.
Notes: Book III.

ἀν εἰπης] sc. εἶδειν ἂν. ‘I should, if you would tell me.’

ἀλλά πειράσομαι . . . ἢρου] (‘It is difficult,) but I will try, I said. Let me note, however, that in the same words you join two things which are dissimilar.’

iatroί, κ.τ.λ.] The most skilful doctors are those who combine experience of disease in their own persons as well as in those of others with the theoretical knowledge of their art. Plato is right in maintaining that the profession of a physician is one for which rude health is not in every respect a qualification. A delicate organization helps to give an intelligence of the bodily state of others.

αὕτα] sc. τὰ σώματα αὐτῶν.

γενομένην τε καὶ οὕσαν] ‘which has been and is.’ The peri-phraseis gives dignity to the expression. The phrase repeats κάμοιν καὶ εἰν . . . εἰναὶ ποτε καὶ γενέσθαι supra. It is implied that past evil leaves its trace in the soul.

δικαστής δὲ γε, κ.τ.λ.] The case of the judge is different: his knowledge of evil ought not to be derived from the conversation of early companions, or the experience of his own ‘wild oats.’ ‘The princely heart of innocence’ is the foundation of a sound judgement in questions of right and wrong. The knowledge of evil and of the world had better wait until a man is older, and be obtained, not by introspection, but by study and observation of others.

On the other hand, that there may be in the best of men a narrowness of virtue and ignorance of human nature, which degenerates rapidly into a moral fault is not to be denied. And the tendency to believe that all the world are rogues is almost as characteristic of good men as of bad. There may also be in good men as well as bad, even without experience, a natural insight into the wickedness of mankind: this is a reflection which Plato stops short of making.

παραδείγματα ὀμοιοπαθῆ τοῖς πονηροῖς] ‘Samples of experience shared in common with the wicked,’ i.e. παραδείγματα παθῶν ὀμοίων τοῖς τῶν πονηρῶν.

καὶ ἄγαθός γε . . . σὺ ἡρώτας] ‘Yes, and good too, which is what you were asking’—in the words above, 408 c ἄρ’ οὐκ ἄγαθον δεῖ εὔ τῇ πόλει κεκτῆσθαι λατρεῖς; κ.τ.λ. Socrates insists that the good judge must be a good man.
Republic III. 395 D

σοφός οίδαμενος είναι[)]  
Cp. supra 395 D οίδαμενος είναι.

σοφώτερος . . . αύτώ τε καὶ ἄλλοις] 'He is more apt to be held wise than foolish, both in the opinion of others and in his own.'

ἀρετή δὲ φύσεως, κ.τ.λ.] 'But virtue, in a nature which is educated by time, will attain to a knowledge of herself and of vice likewise.'

χρόνῳ reads better if taken with παραδευμένην than with λήφεται.  
In the latter case there is a want of point, as the fact has been already stated that the knowledge of evil is obtained by time, above 409 B ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ διανεσθαι οἷον πέφυκε κακόν. The principle that knowledge is of opposites is assumed.

395 E ἄλλ' οὖχ ὁ κακός] sc. the rogue described above in the words—ὁ δὲ δεινὸς ἐκεῖνος καὶ κακόσποτος, κ.τ.λ.

409 A αὐτοὶ ἀποκτενοῦσιν[)]  *ultrum occident.* αὐτοὶ refers to δικασταὶ and ἰατροὶ understood in δικαστικῆς and ἰατρικῆν, which are the antecedents to αὕτη: although strictly speaking only ἰατροὶ goes with ἑίσουσι and only δικασταὶ with ἀποκτενοῦσιν.

410 B ἀρ' οὖν . . . ἀνάγκη;[)] 'And may not our student of music by following the same track—(i.e. aiming at simplicity) in his pursuit of gymnastic, gain an immunity from doctors, except in extreme cases?'

Simple training in music corrects the evil tendencies of law; simple gymnastic minimizes medicine. For the meaning of αἰρεῖν, 'to win' or 'gain,' cp. supra ii. 358 E τοῖς μὴ δυναμένοις τὸ μὲν ἐκφεύγειν τὸ δὲ αἰρεῖν.

αὐτὰ μὴν . . . μεταχειρεῖται] The 'muscular' philosophy of Plato aims at steadying the nerves,—πρὸς τὸ θυμοειδὲς . . . ἐκεῖνο,—at courage and endurance rather than at strength.

οἱ καθιστάντες . . . παραδεύειν] i.e. those who institute an education in music and gymnastic.

For the optative which follows see Riddell's Digest, § 75. Either, (1) as is there suggested, 'the dependent verb is intended to belong to all time'—καθιστάσαν being a generic present, 'who at any time appoint' (cp. viii. 566 B ἐξωμισκοῦσον), or (2) the present tense may include a reference to the past as in Aristoph. Ran. 23:—

αὐτὸς βαδίζω καὶ πουῦ, τοῦτον δ' ἄχω,  
ἔως μὴ τολμησωρωίτο μηδ' ἄχως φέροι—

i.e. 'I have been walking and toiling all this while.' Goodwin,
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M. and T., § 323. The institutions of the legislator are present in their operation, but the grounds for them were considered in past time. So οἱ καθηστάτες ... παῦεῖν. 'Those who are the authors of the system of education which now prevails.'

αὐτὴν τὴν διάνοιαν] 'Even in their minds'—though you might not expect the mind to be affected by their bodily training.

ἔγυε, ἔφη] sc. ἐννοοῖ, from οὐκ ἐννοεῖς above.

τὸ ἥμερον ... φύσει] cp. ii. 375 Ἑ.

αὐτοῦ] sc. τῆς φιλοσοφῶν φύσεως: the neuter for the feminine, as elsewhere. That ἀνεθέλτος here means 'relaxed' rather than 'indulged' or 'set free' is proved not only by ἐπισταθεῖν supra, but by the use of ἀνείσα in iv. 442 A ὅ τε δὲ ἀνείσα παραμυθαμένη.

ἀμφοτέρα ... τούτω τῷ φύσει] τὴν τε θυμοειδῆ καὶ τὴν φιλοσοφῶν: cp. ii. 375 Ἑ.

δειλὴ καὶ ἁγροικὸς] The verbal parallelism is maintained without considering that the two vices are not necessarily combined. Cowardice arises from excess of music and deficiency of gymnastic—rudeness from deficiency of music and excess of gymnastic.

οὐκοῦν ὅταν ... ἐποίησεν] 'Accordingly, when a man allows music to play upon him and to pour over his soul through his ears, as through a funnel, those sweet and soft and melancholy strains of which we were just now speaking, and when his whole life is passed in warbling and under the glamour of song, at first whatsoever passion there is in him he tempers like iron, and makes useful instead of brittle and useless.'

For the use of παρέχειν with the infinitive cp. Charm. 176 ἥν ἐπάθειν παρέχεις Σωκράτει, and for the fanciful meaning of καταλείψων viii. 561 c μεθύων καὶ καταλούμενοι: Laws vii. 790 ἐ ἀτεχνῶν οἴνον καταλούσαι τῶν παιδίων: Eurip. H. F. 871 τάχα σ' ἐγώ μᾶλλον χαρεύσω καὶ καταλήψω φόβῳ.

ἀς νῦν δὴ ἡμεῖς ἐλέγομεν] referring to supra 398 ν, ἔ.

τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ... (β) μαλθακὸν αἰχμητή] 'At first he tempers what spirit he had in him, as steel is tempered, and makes it serviceable instead of stiff and useless. But when he perseveres to fascination-point, thenceforward he begins to waste his spirit away, till he have melted the spirit out of him, and as it were cut out the sinews from his soul, and made thereof a feeble warrior.' ἐμάλαξε, κηλῇ, τῆκει, λεῖβει,—sc. τὸ θυμοειδὲς: ποιήσῃ, sc. τὴν ψυχήν from τῆς ψυχῆς

Reply: III.

410 Ὁ

411 Λ
preceding. Also in what follows, \( \psi \chi \eta \nu \) is to be supplied with \( \dot{\alpha} \theta \mu \omicron \omicron \nu \) and \( \theta \mu \omicron \omicron \epsilon \delta \omicron \eta \). For \( \epsilon \pi \chi \omicron \nu \mu \omicron \nu \) \( \mu \nu \) \( \alpha \nu \eta \) of one who \textit{keeps on doing} anything \textit{unremittingly}, \textit{cp. Theaet. 165} \( \delta \) \( \eta \lambda \epsilon \gamma \chi \xi \nu \) \( \epsilon \nu \) \( \epsilon \pi \chi \omicron \nu \nu \) \( \kappa \alpha \) \( \omicron \nu \kappa \alpha \nu \). For the Homericism \( \mu \lambda \delta \alpha \kappa \omicron \nu \) \( \alpha \iota \chi \mu \eta \tau \eta \nu \) see \textit{II. xvii. 588}, where Menelaus is so called.

\[ \text{καὶ ἐὰν μὲν γε, κ.τ.λ.} \] 'And if he act upon a nature originally wanting in spirit, he quickly accomplishes this: but if upon a spirited nature, he makes the spirit in him weak, and therefore excitable, quickly flaming up on slight occasions and quickly extinguished.' The above interpretation (subaud. \( \psi \chi \eta \nu \)) affords a more natural construction than to supply \( \dot{\alpha} \theta \mu \omicron \omicron \nu \) and \( \theta \mu \omicron \omicron \epsilon \delta \omicron \eta \) could hardly agree. For \( \epsilon \nu \lambda \beta \eta = \) 'if he have taken in hand,' \textit{i.e.} to be submitted to the process in question, \textit{cp. Theaet. 159} \( \varsigma \) \( \sigma \tau \nu \) \( \ldots \) \( \lambda \beta \eta \) \( \gamma \nu \mu \iota \nu \tau \eta \) \( \Sigma \omega \kappa \rho \alpha \tau \tau \varepsilon \).
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on the mind (cp. I Tim. iv. 8 ὑπὸ σωματικὴ γνώμασι προς ἄλλον ἐστὶν ἀφέλιμος).

ei μὴ ei πάρεργον] The reading of the text, which is that of Ven. P, is partly confirmed by the first hand of Par. A, which reads ei μὴ ei παρεργον (sic). The omission of the second ei, or the substitution of ei in some MSS., are probably emendations, arising from the comparative singularity of the expression ei μὴ ei. But cp. ix. 581 D ei μὴ ei τι αὐτῶν ἀργύρων ποιεῖ: Gorg. 480 c ei μὴ ei τις ἵππολάβωι ἐπὶ τούναντιον.

tελέως μουσικῶτατον] Compare a fine passage in the Laches 188 D καὶ κομιδὴ μοι δοκεῖ μουσικός ὁ τοιοῦτος εἶναι, ἀρμονίαν καλλίτην ἠρμοσμένα, οὐ λύφαν οὐδὲ παλιάς ὀργανα, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι ξήν ἠρμοσμένος, and the definition of σωφροσύνη as a kind of harmony in iv. 430 E. Cp. also note on 400 D.

οὐκοῦν . . . σοῦξεσθαι:] ‘And in our city, if the form of government is to last, shall we not have need of some one to preside over it, who is of the character now described?’ τοῦ τοιοῦτου refers to the class which is definite, τινὸς to the individual who is undefined. It is obvious that this minister of education will be one of the chief magistrates, but this point is for the present left undetermined.

Our guardians have now been chosen, and the main lines of their training have been laid down. But which of them are to be placed in command? At present we must be contented with providing that the officers or rulers shall be of ripe age and appointed on the principle of merit. And by merit is to be understood a steady loyalty, which neither forgetfulness nor sophistry nor pain nor fear nor even pleasure is able to shake or undermine.

χορεῖας γὰρ . . . χαλεπὰ εὑρεῖν] As elsewhere, Plato avoids details: cp. his treatment of music (especially 399 λ, 400 β), and his unwillingness to legislate about the smaller proprieties of life (iv. 425).

tούτοις] sc. τῶς τύποις.


φρονίμους τε . . . δυνατοὺς] ‘both wise and efficient for this object.’ εἰς τοῦτο, sc. εἰς φιλακῆν πόλεως.

When he first selects his rulers Plato is contented that they should
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be wise, capable and patriotic: they are not supposed to be philosophers. In Books v-vii he places his requirements far higher. He refers to this passage in vi. 502 b, ε. παράλιπωτι . . .

τῆς τῶν ἀρχώτων κατάστασιν, κ.τ.λ., vii. 536 c.

D καὶ [ὅταν μάλιστα] The MSS. read ὅταν μάλιστα, but ὅτι μάλιστα ('as far as is conceivable') is read in the quotation of Stobaeus. Hermann cancels both words, and Baiter (1881) plausibly suggests that they are due to the eye of the scribe having wandered back to τοῦτόν γ' ἀν μάλιστα. It is not probable that ὅταν is ever followed by the optative mood: either read ὅτι μάλιστα with Stobaeus, or follow Hermann and Baiter in the omission of the words. ἐκεῖνο, not οἷς, is written because the relative is not repeated in Greek: cp. ii. 357 B αἱ ἡδοναί ὅταν ἀθάνατοι καὶ μηδὲν . . . διὰ ταύτας γίγνεται.

μή δὲ] i.e. μή εὖ δὲ πράττοντος ἐκεῖνον. The other reading, εἰ δὲ μή, is probably conjectural.

E φυλακικοὶ . . . τοῦ δόγματος] Plato is playing, as elsewhere, on the word φύλακες. They are guardians of the city, and guardians of the patriotic principle which is implanted in them by the laws.

φαίνεται μοι δύξα, κ.τ.λ.] Plato takes occasion, in the description of the true guardian, to remind us that ignorance is involuntary, because no one can be supposed voluntarily to part with a good; and knowledge is a good. Compare Arist. Eth. Nic. vii. 2: supra ii. 382 a.

413 B τραγικὸς . . . κινδυνεύω λέγειν] 'I seem, I said, to be speaking like a tragic poet,' i.e. obscurely: viii. 545 ε. φῶμεν αὐτὰς τραγικὰς, ὅσ πρὸς πάθος ἡμᾶς παίζουσας καὶ ἐρεισχθείσας. In the latter passage, however, there is an association of mock solemnity which is hardly present here. For κλέπτειν used in tragedy with a similar reference to memory cp. Soph. Ant. 681 εἰ μή τῷ χρόνῳ κεκλέμεθα.

νῦν γάρ ποιεῖ μαθάνεις] ['I say no more] for now, I suppose, you understand.'

C ὧπο φόβου τι δείσαντες] τι is a cognate accusative—not 'fearing something,' but 'having some fear.'

τοῦ παρ' αὐτῶς δόγματος] παρ' αὐτῶς is a little more emphatic than αὐτῶν—'which has been imparted to them.' Cp. Soph. O. T. 612 τὸν παρ' αὐτῷ βιόνον.

δ' αὖ . . . [αὐτῶς ποιεῖν] αὐτῶς is in the dative, because the interest of the state is also their own. 'That which they conceive
it best for their state that they should perform.' But the two words are better omitted.

τηρητέον] sc. ὑμῖν.

καὶ ἀγώνας αὐτοῖς θετέον] θετέω is used with immediate reference to ἀγώνας.

οὖκ οὐ, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, . . . χρησιμώτατος εἶν] This passage is referred to in vi. 503 ε, in the second education, where Socrates proceeds to speak of intellectual tests.

τρίτου εἴδους . . . ἀμιλλαν] 'A trial of a third sort, with regard to enchantments.' The genitive γοητείας adheres closely to ἀμιλλαν cp. ἁγὸν εἰφυῖον (Eur. Med. 402) and the like expressions.

Three dangers were mentioned above (A) in the words κλαπέντες ἡ γοητευθέσεις ἡ βαιαθέσεις, and three tests are proposed of the capacity of the youths to meet them. Tasks are to be set them with a view to ascertain if they are proof against the two great thieves, Forgetfulness and Persuasion. They are to be subjected to hard toils and wearisome labours in order to show whether they can hold out against the violence of pain. A third and more subtle trial will test their powers to withstand the assaults of pleasure and fear. In the preceding sentence εξαπατῶστο has no reference to ἀπατᾶ, but recalls κλαπέντας and μεταπειθέντας supra. The accidental use of the same word in different connexion is slightly confusing.

καὶ εἰς ἰδονὰς αὐτὸ ἐν τραβήξετέον] 'And again pass them into pleasures,' just as metal is passed through different processes of heating and cooling.

tάφων . . . λαγχάνοντα] 'having allotted to them the highest honours of sepulture and of the other memorials,' which the dead have, such as celebration on festival days, inscriptions on columns, sacrifices, and the ἀγραφὸς μνήμη spoken of by Pericles in Thucyd. ii. 43. λαγχάνοντα is made to agree with ἀρχοντά, the intervening clause τιμᾶς δοτέον . . . τελευτήσατι being neglected.

ἂν ἐν τύπῳ . . . εἰρῆσθαι] These words are inserted to prepare the way for Books v–vii.

ἀρ' οὖν ἂν ἄληθῶς . . . κακουργεῖν] φιλάκες is used in two different senses with πολεμίων and φιλίων: 'to keep guard against the foe without and to watch over friends within.' ὅπως is dependent on οἴ φιλάκωσιν implied in φιλάκας. The form φιλίος occurs here as elsewhere in Plato (Symp. 221 b) in connexion with πολέμιος,
Now is the time for the founders of the state to invent a myth respecting its origin. ‘Like the warriors of Cadmus, our citizens’—so the tale will run—have sprung in full armour from the bosom of the land, who is their mother, so that they are brethren all.

The rulers have Gold in their composition: the auxiliaries Silver, the artificers and husbandmen Brass and Iron. But, as they all spring from a common stock, these class-differences will not be absolutely hereditary. It will therefore be a task of the chief rulers to test the metal of the children of the citizens, and assign them to their proper classes, so that brass and iron may never take the place of gold and silver in the government of the state.

It is not clear whether γεγονός and γενόμενον ἂν refer to the acceptance of the story or to the occurrence of the facts mentioned in it. The ambiguity is perhaps intentional. Plato is half inclined for the moment ‘to credit his own lie.’ But cp. iv. 425 B οὕτε γὰρ παύ γέγραψεν, κ.τ.λ.

There is a similar hesitation on the part of Socrates in the Fifth Book, 450 D, 471 ff., where he is about to introduce his two great theses of communism and the philosopher-king. The fear is, of course, only pretended.
Notes: Book III.

ἐδόκουν ταύτα πάντα πάσχειν, κ.τ.λ.]

ἐδόκουν is emphatic, opposed to ἦσαν—'they only thought.' ταύτα πάντα is the object of πάσχειν and the subject of γλύγγυσθαι—'they imagined that they suffered all these things and that they happened to them.'

καὶ ἡ γῆ αὐτοὺς, κ.τ.λ.] καὶ helps to mark the correspondence of the clauses. They were being fashioned in the Earth, and when they were ready, even then the Earth sent them forth. ἀνέναι is rightly used of the offspring of the ground: cp. Soph. O. T. 270, 1405. For the creation of man in the bosom of the earth, compare Protag. 320 D τυποῦσιν αὐτὰ ἀυτῷ γῆς ἐνδον, κ.τ.λ. Plato has a special fondness for the fable of an earth-born race. Compare Symp. 190 B; Soph. 247 c, 248 b; Polit. 269 b; Tim. 23 e; Critias 109 c.


γῆ τε μητρί, φιλτάτη τροφών· ἦ γὰρ νέος ἔρποντας εἰμενεί πέδω, ἄπαντα παιδοκόουσα παιδείας ὄτιλον, εἴρεψατ' οἰκιστῆρας ἀσπιδηφόρους πιστούσ, ὅπως γένουσθε πρὸς χρόνος τόδε.

See also the description of Melanippus in the same play, 412–416: σπαρτῶν δ’ ἄπ’ ἀνδρῶν, ὄν 'Ἀρχις ἐφείσατο, ρίζωμ’ ἀνεῖται, κάρτα δ’ ἔστ’ ἐγχώριος, Μελάνιππον. ἔργον δ’ ἐν κύδιοις Ἀρχις κρηνεί: Δίκη δ’ ὀμαίμων κάρτα νυν προστελλεται εἴργειν τεκούσῃ μητρὶ πολέμων δόρυν.

οὐκ ἔτος . . . λέγειν] 'You had good reason to be ashamed of the lie which you were going to tell.'

ικανοὶ ἄρχειν . . . ἐπίκουροι] The distinction between the ἄρχειν or φύλακες proper and the ἐπίκουροι has an important place in the analysis of the virtues (Book iv) and the development of philosophy in the state (Books vi and vii).

ἀτε οὖν ἐγγυγενεῖς ὄντες πάντες] These words refer to the second member of the sentence, ἐστι δ’ ὄτε, κ.τ.λ., which has the chief emphasis. 'As you are all originally of one family,' specific differences will not always be maintained.

ὁ τι αὐτοῖς . . . παραμέμφεται] (1) 'What they (the rulers) find to
be mingled in the souls of the young." αὐτοῖς, sc. τοῖς ἄρχονται: cp. i. 343 A ὡς γε αὐτή, κ.τ.λ., or (2) [B. J.] 'which of these metals is mingled in their souls.'

σφέτερος] 'belonging to their own (the rulers') class,' according to the familiar use of σφέις.

ὑπόχαλκος] 'having a proportion of brass.'

κατελεήσουσθ] κατα- in composition here implies blame (as in κατυχαρίζωμαι), 'improperly pity them.'

τὴν...τιμῆ] τιμῆ has here rather the meaning of 'office or occupation' than of 'rank.' Cp. Phileb. 61 c εἰδ' ὡσις θεῶν τούτην τὴν τιμῆν εἶληξε τῆς συγκράσεως: Hdt. vii. 36 αὐτή ἡ ἄχρει τιμῆ.

ἐκ τοῦτων] sc. τῶν ἄρματωργῶν ἢ γεωργῶν. It is observable that in our own day the industrial class still tends to divide into these two sections—artisans and husbandmen.

τιμῆσαντες] 'Having estimated their values.'

δταν...φυλάξ] The readings in this passage vary considerably. The principal variations are as follows: σιδηρὸς φυλάξ Λ secunda manu and Μ; σιδῆρος φυλάξ Λ prima manu and Π; σιδηρὸς with the omission of φυλάξ Σ. Either ὁ σιδηρὸς ἢ ὁ χαλκὸς, omitting φυλάξ, or ὁ σιδηρὸς φυλάξ ἢ ὁ χαλκὸς give a good sense, the latter reading resting on the best authority.

ουδαμῶς] Plato means to intimate that almost any fable may be rendered credible by time. The new account of the origin of man is not more improbable than the old one was at first, or the old one more true than the new.

σχεδόν γὰρ τι μαθήων ὃ λέγεις] 'I think that I understand what you mean:' viz. the difficulty of persuading the present generation. The first rulers must be taken into our confidence. Cp. supra 414 c μάλιστα μὲν, κ.τ.λ.

Enough of the fiction, and now let the rulers lead them to their camping-ground. They will select a position commanding both friend and foe; and there they will build habitations for themselves, of a humble sort, such as are suitable for soldiers and will afford them no temptation to break the rules of their education. They will live together and call nothing absolutely their own; they will be fed on rations at the public expense, and share a common table. As for gold and silver, they will not tarnish the pure metal of Divine
origin which is within them, by having anything to do with the corrupted coinage which passes current amongst men.

Glauc. quite approves of this.

καὶ τὸῦτο ... ἀγάγη] 'And this will turn out as rumour directs it,' i.e. according to the success with which the fiction is rumoured abroad.

διάπλοσαντες] Here, as elsewhere, the distinction between the guardians and the lower classes appears to be lost sight of.

θύσαντες οἷς χρῆ] The particulars of religious service are left undetermined: see iv. 427 B.

ναῦ, ἢν δ' ἐγώ ... χρηματιστικάς] 'Yes, said I, lodgings for soldiers, not for traders.' Compare supra 397 E καὶ τῶν πολεμικῶν πολεμικοῖ καὶ οὐ χρηματιστήν πρὸς τῇ πολεμικῇ.

ποιμέσι] The shepherds here are the lawgivers and the rulers who are to succeed them. The dative with αἰσχιστον takes the place of the accusative before the infinitive τρέφειν. Cp. Soph. O. C. 1201, 1202 λιπαρῶν γὰρ οὐ καλῶν | δίκαια προσχυμήσουσιν.

ἐπιχειρήσαι ... κακουργεῖν] (1) is a confusion between ἐπιχειρήσαι κακουργεῖν τὰ πρόβατα and ἐπιχειρήσαι τοῖς προβάτοις. Cp. supra ii. 370 E χρῆσαι ὑποξυγίους and note; or (2) more simply 'so that they attack the sheep to do them harm': κακουργεῖν, epekegetic infinitive.

ἀφομοιωθῶςιν] As elsewhere, the asyndeton is allowed where the second clause is explanatory of the first. For a similar apposition compare Eurip. Heracl. 176:—

μηδ', ὀπερ γιλείτε δράν, πάθης σὺ τούτο, τοὺς ἀμείνονας παρῶν φίλους ἀλέσθαι, τοὺς κικίονας λάβης.

οὐκοίν ... εἰσίν :] 'Will they not, if they are really well educated, be provided with the best of safeguards?'

τὴν μεγίστην τῆς εὐλαβείας] With this phrase cp. τῆς γῆς ἡ ἀρίστη, τῶν πλείστων τοῦ βίου, τῆς πλείστην τῆς στρατιάς (Thuc. vii. 3). The adjective takes by attraction the gender of the noun following. The accusative is used adverbially after παρεσκευασμένοι: cp. Riddell’s Digest, § 7.

τοῦτο μὲν ... ἦτις ποτὲ ἐστιν] We cannot be confident that they have the right education, but we may be confident that they
Plato: Republic.

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ought to have. This touch of unlooked for modesty prepares for the higher education of Book vii.

416 C  

\( \text{καὶ ὁρθῶς γε} \) sc. ἐλέγομεν.

\( \text{πρὸς τοῖς, κ.τ.λ.} \) The perfect harmony of a society is an idea only, which can never be realized in practice. Yet class-differences, though unavoidable, are still an evil. The antagonism of different sections deducts from the total strength of the whole of a community. The differences of interest create jealousy and party-spirit; the exclusive opinions of a class, whether of the highest or lowest rank, are always more or less untrue, and require to be adjusted by those of other classes. The happiest condition of society seems to be that in which different ranks insensibly fade into one another, or in which the transition is easy from one to the other, and personal merit, as in the Republic of Plato, readily acquires the privileges and estimation of rank. And although the individual is always in danger of sinking into his own class or imitating the one above him, yet he may lay aside the impress of any class in the sense of a higher freedom. Compare Aristotle, Pol. ii. 5, § 26, who in his matter-of-fact way objects that the confinement of office to a single class will be a cause of faction in a warlike state, and adds—οτε δ' ἀναγκαίων αὐτῶν τοῖς αὐτῶν ἀρχοντάς, φανερῶν οὐ γὰρ ἢτε μὲν ἄλλοις ἢτε δὲ ἄλλοις μέμικται ταῖς ψυχαῖς ὁ παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ χρυσός, ἀλλ' ἐστὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς. 

But he does not seem to remember that Plato has already met this objection, in part at least, by allowing merit to rise in the social scale.

417 A  

\( \text{ύπο τὸν αὐτὸν ὁροφῶν ἵναι} \) The slight exaggeration and comic formality of the language keeps up the humour of the passage.

\( \text{ἐξ ἀργύρου ἡ χρυσοῦ} \) The inverted repetition has the effect of a sort of legal phraseology.

B  

\( \text{θέουτας . . . ἐγγύτατα ὀλέθρου} \) A metaphor from navigation.
Notes : Book IV.

πάνυ γε, ἢ δ' ὅς ὁ Γλαύκων] Glaucon, who began by protesting against the omission of the luxuries of life in the ἀνεγκαιοντάτη πάλις, has by the art of Socrates been insensibly brought round to deny his own position. Cp. supra ii. 372 c, v.

BOOK IV.

Adeimantus here points out the apparent incongruity of making the highest class in the state the poorest. They have the city in their power, and yet they are to get no enjoyment out of it. Socrates will not ask at present whether plain living is or is not consistent with true happiness; he would rather insist that the law-giver is bound to consider the welfare of the whole community, and not of a part only, however important. Now the welfare of the community depends on the single-minded devotion of the guardians to their proper work, and the possession of private property would be subversive of this.

Indeed one of the chief duties of the guardian will be to prevent excessive inequalities of fortune from arising at all in the city. For the city in which there is wealth and poverty is no longer one. Two nations are already struggling within her. And so long as our state avoids this evil condition and remains really one, she will have nothing to fear from her neighbours, although in bulk and outward semblance they may be many times more powerful than she is.

καὶ ὁ Ἀδείμαντος, κ.τ.λ.] Happiness is the result, not the aim, of our Utopia. We do not separate the advantage of our ruling citizens from the well-being of all. Their life is not exactly a life of enjoyment, yet in the end a happiness incomparably beyond the lot of other men will fall to their share: cp. x. 612, 613.

τί οὖν . . . ἀπολογησε] Cp. Phaedo 63 Β Δίκαια, ἔφη, λέγετε. οἴμαι γὰρ ὡς μένει λέγειν ὅτι χρή με πρὸς ταῦτα ἀπολογήσασθαι ὡσπερ ἐν δικαστηρίῳ. For δ' ἐαυτούς, 'by their own act,' compare i. 354 Α οὐ μέντοι καλῶς γε εἰσίταμαι, δ' ἐμαυτόν, ὅλ' οὗ διὰ σέ: and for the meaning, Gorgias 492 Β οίς ἔξω ἀπολαίειν τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ μηδενὸς ἐμποδῶν ὄντως, αὐτοὶ εἰσώτεις δεισιτήν ἐπαγάγαντο τῶν τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων νόμον τε καὶ λόγον καὶ φύσαν. There is a reference to this passage in ν. 465 Ε Μέμνησαι οὖν, ἢν δ' ἔγω, ὅτι ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν οὐκ οἶδα ὅτου λόγον ἠμῖν ἐπείπλησεν, ὅτι τοὺς φύλακας οὐκ εὐδαιμονας ποιεῖν, οἴς ἔξω πάντα ἔχειν τι ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτῶν οὐδὲν ἔχοιεν;

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μη...μηδὲν] μη is used not unfrequently in oratio obliqua, especially when as here the main sentence is conditional, εάν τις σε φη, κ.τ.λ.

νῦν δή] supra iii. 416 d.

ἀλλ’ ἀτεχνῶς...φρουροῦντες] ‘they simply appear, he would say, like mercenaries to be stationed in the city doing nothing but mounting guard.’ The infinitive is used after φαίνονται to avoid a confusion of participles. Badham would cancel μοσθωτοί, but Socrates in saying οὔδε μισθούν, κ.τ.λ., tacitly corrects the respondent.

φαίη ἂν] resumes εἰν τίς σε φη in an independent construction.

ναι, ἢν δ’ ἐγὼ,...ἀναλίσκουσι] Socrates at first, instead of answering, reinforces the objection. Cp. vi. 487 ε ἀκώς ἂν, ὅτι ἐρωμενοι φαίνονται τίληθι λέγειν. ἐπισίτιοι...λαμβάνοντες is a correction of ἄσπερ ἐπίκουροι μισθωτοί. ‘Yes, said I, and this for their food only, and not even receiving pay in addition.’

οἱ ἄλλοι] sc. ἐπίκουροι.

οἱ εὐδαίμονες δοκοῦντες εἶναι] δοκοῦντες with a slight contempt, as in iii. 406 C τῶν πλουσίων τε καὶ εὐδαίμονων δοκοῦντων εἶναι: cp. x. 612 A τῶν εὐδαίμονων λεγομένων ἑπταῖσεων.

When Adeimantus is exhausted Socrates carries on the charges against himself, and as a final stroke he adds—‘they will have no money to spend on courtesans, or other objects, which, as the world goes, make happiness.’

tί...ἀπολογησόμεθα] ‘What, then, shall be our defence, you ask?’ Socrates, in repeating the question from supra 419, would have Adeimantus make common cause with him.

tῶν αὐτῶν οἴμον, κ.τ.λ.] refers to the division of labour, as appears from the words ἑπιστάμεθα γάρ, κ.τ.λ. infra e.

ἐροῦμεν...οἶλῃ ἢ πόλις] Aristotle (Pol. ii. 5, § 27) has the following remarks on this passage: ‘Plato deprives the guardians of happiness, and says that the legislator ought to make the whole state happy. But the whole cannot be happy unless most, or all, or some of its parts enjoy happiness. In this respect happiness is not like the even principle in numbers, which may exist only in the whole, but in none of the parts; not so happiness. And if the guardians are not happy, who are? Surely not the artisans, or the common people.’ It seems incredible that any one who has read
the beginning of Book iv should have so utterly misunderstood it. Plato, it is true, deprives the guardians of happiness, but only in the vulgar sense of the word: he believes that they will attain true happiness to the full in the performance of their proper function. So too of the other classes in the state.

ερούμεν] The future implies: 'The spirit of our previous remarks will lead us to say.' Cp. iii. 392 άνευ ἡμᾶς ἐρείν, κ.τ.λ.

καὶ αὐ... ἀδικίαν] This was not clearly said at first, although the presence of evil was acknowledged as a condition of the search (ii. 368 E, 372 E), but is added in anticipation of the bad states (infra 445 c, viii, ix). Compare infra c αὐτίκα δὲ τῆν ἐνωνίαν.

ἀπολαβώντες] Compare iii. 392 ἰ ἀπολαβῶν μέρος τι πειράζομαι σου ἐν τούτω δηλόμαι: Gorg. 495 ε ὁν περὶ ὅτου βούλει τοῦ σώματος ἀπολαβῶν σκόπει.

τιθέντες] is altered in some manuscripts (Π Ξ q) into θέντες, apparently for the sake of symmetry with ἀπολαβώντες: but the present agrees better with the present πλάττομεν.

ὡσπερ οὖν... (π) τὸ ὅλον καλὸν ποιοῦμεν] Why should the eyes of a statue be coloured black? The colouring of Greek statues was conventional, the design being, not to imitate life, but to bring out form. Perhaps the blackness of the eye was also conventional, or refers only to the pupil. Compare the Hippias Major 290 β ὅτε, ἐρεῖ, τῆς ἀδίκίας τούς ὄφθαλμοι οὖ χρυσοῦς ἐποίησεν, οὐδὲ τὸ ἅλο πρόκειται, οὐδὲ τοὺς χόδας οὐδὲ τὰς χεῖρας, ἡσπερ χρυσοῦν γε δὴ ὧν κάλ-

λιστος ἐμελεὶ φαίνεσθαι, ἄλλο ἐλεφάντινον.

All true art proceeds in the artist's mind from the whole to the parts—from composition and proportion to ornament and detail. The power of the whole, however simple, is the highest excellence of art, as the weakness of the whole, however finished in detail, is the greatest fault. The Greeks, though not much given to art criticism, were quite sensible of this first principle of art. Compare Soph. 235, 236, where symmetry of form and harmony of colour are declared to be the first principles of 'image-making,' with the single exception that in large works a slight deviation is necessary from the true and symmetrical line in the upper part of a statue to make up for distance.

ἐπιστάμεθα] 'We know how to,' i.e. we could do so, if we chose.
Republic 420 E

This word may mean (1) 'from left to right,' cp. Homer, Odyssey. xxi. 141, 142:

\[ \text{δριναθ} \text{ ἐξεῖς ἐπιδέξεια πάντες ἑταῖροι,} \]
\[ \text{ἀρξάμενοι τοῦ χῶρου, ὅθεν τέ περ ὀνοχοεῖει,} \]

or (2) 'dexterously,' 'cleverly.' If the former sense is preferred, it must be taken with διαπίνοντας: if the latter, with κατακλίναντες: 'having cleverly stretched them by the fireside challenging each other to drink.' [Against the former view it may be urged that it introduces a particular which is too minute and adds nothing telling to the description. B. J.] The manuscripts do not agree here, some reading ἐπιδέξεια (Par. A), others ἐπὶ δεξιά (M): if the sense 'dexterously' is preferred ἐπιδέξεια alone can be read: if the sense 'from right to left,' either reading is possible.

κεραμεύειν] sc. ἐπιστάμεθα κελεύειν.

421 A

οὕτε ἄλλος οὐδεὶς ... ἔξ ὅν πόλις γίγνεται] (1) 'Neither will any one else have any of the characteristics which go to make up a city'—or (2) 'Neither will any of the persons who make up the city have any distinct character.' The antecedent to ἔξ ὅν may be either a plural σχήματα implied in σχήμα, or a masculine ἐκεῖνον dependent on ἄλλος οὐδείς.

νευρορράφοι] Plato, as his manner is, in recapitulation adds a new touch to the picture. The word is chosen as humbler even than σκυτοτόμος.

For other references to the lowest class of citizens in Book iv see infra D, E, 423 D, 425 C, D, 428 B, C, E, 431 C—432 A, 434 A, B; cp. also v. 456 B ἦ τοις σκυτοτόμοις, τῇ σκυτικῇ παιδευεῖτας.

φιλάκες δὲ ... τῶν καίρων ἔχουσιν] The subject of ἔχουσιν is φιλάκες, without the addition μη ... δοκοῦτες. For ἁρδην cp. Laws iii. 677 c ὥμεν δὴ τὰς ... πόλεις ... ἁρδην ἐν τῷ τότε χρόνῳ διαφθειρασθα; And for οἰκεῖν, used in a neuter sense, cp. viii. 543 A τῇ μελλούσῃ ἀκροὶ οἰκεῖν πόλει: also Thuc. ii. 37 διὰ τὸ μη ἐς ὀλίγους ἄλλ' ἐς πλείωνας οἰκεῖν.

εἰ μὲν οὖν ... (B) ἄλλο ἄν τι ἦ πόλιν λέγοι] 'Now if our way be to make guardians in the truest sense (ὡς ἄληθώς opposed to δοκοῦτες), who are the reverse of harmers of the state (cp. πᾶσαν ἁρδην πόλιν ἀπολλάωσι), but he who asserts the other view imagines (ποιεῖ understood from ποιοῦμεν, or λέγει from λέγων) a sort of ploughman, —a happy merry-maker, as we may fancy, at a high festival, not in a state,—he means something which is not a state.'
The sentence is a good deal involved, and is one of the few passages in the Republic which, like many in the Laws, seem to require the ‘curiae secundae’ of the author. The perplexity in some degree arises from the antithesis to the previous sentence, which occasions the awkward apposition of ἡκίστα ... πόλεως: also from the omission of the verb in the second clause (which is λέγει rather than ποιεῖ), and the tautology of πόλιν and ἐν πόλει. The difficulty is increased by the complex ‘paratactic’ structure. More simply expressed, the sense is as follows: ‘If the idea of a state requires the citizens to be guardians, he who converts them into rustic holiday-makers will mean something that is not a state.’ πόλιν (without the article) is used in the same general sense as πόλις in ii. 369 B. ἐκεῖνο refers to the objection of p. 419 as expanded in 420. Instead of finishing the sentence Socrates breaks off abruptly with a tone of impatience.

tοῦτο μὲν | sc. ὁ, τι πλείστη εὐθαμονία.

ἀναγκαστέον ποιεῖν | sc. ἦμεν, ‘you and I must compel.’ Socrates persists in treating Adeimantus’ imaginary objector as a real person who is certainly not Adeimantus. Cp. 420 A τι οὖν δὴ ἀπολογησόμεθα, φης;

καὶ οὖτω ... εὐθαμονίας] ἐστέον anticipates the infinitive μεταλμβάνειν εὐθαμονίας, which, however, is drawn into construction with ἀποδίδωσι.

ἀδελφόν] For this metaphorical use of ἀδελφός cp. Soph. 224 β ἀδελφῷ τινὶ τὴς πράξεως ὀνόματι: Crito 54 c, where the laws of the world above speak of the laws of the world below as οἱ ἡμέτεροι ἀδελφοί. Compare the use in Soph. Ant. 192 καὶ νῦν ἀδελφὰ τώνδε κηρύξος ἔχω. μετρίως is modestly substituted by Socrates for κολὸς in Adeimantus’ reply.

tοὺς ἄλλους αὐτὶ δημιουργοὺς] The φῦλακες have been called δημιουργοὶ in a secondary sense, supra c; Socrates now speaks of the artificers properly so called. That this, and not the adverbial use of ἄλλος is intended here, is shown by the use of αὐτὶ to point the antithesis.

ὡστε καὶ κακοὺς γίγνεσθαι] (1) ‘To the extent of rendering them worthless.’ Cp. for the meaning infra κακὸν χυτρεῖς γίγνεται, κ.τ.λ.: and for the expression Thuc. ii. 51, § 6 ὡστε καὶ κτείνειν, occurring in a negative sentence to which the interrogative (with ἦ) here corresponds; or (2) ‘So that they become bad workmen.’ καὶ is
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\[ \text{παρέχεσθαι} \] 'To supply from his own resources.' It is not necessary to depart from this, the common use of \( \text{παρέχεσθαι} \), though some here prefer the directly reflexive meaning, 'to provide for himself.'

E \[ \text{διδάξεται} \] (1) It is usually said that in Attic \( \text{διδάσκω} \) means 'to teach,' \( \text{διδάσκομαι} \) 'to get some one taught by another.' (2) Hence Dr. W. H. Thompson (\textit{Journal of Philology}, vol. xii. p. 184) and Cobet, \textit{Var. Lect.} 310, would read \( \text{διδάξει} \) here. (3) But it is doubtful whether this distinction can be strictly maintained. See Riddell's \textit{Digest}, § 87. (4) The middle seems to be used for the sake of variety without any difference of meaning from the active: 'others whom he may teach, he will teach to be inferior workmen.' [B. J.] (5) The rare use of the middle is justified by the personal relation subsisting between the \( \text{χντρε规章制度} \) and his sons or apprentices. The same observation applies to \( \text{διδαξάω} \) in Ar. Nub. 783 \( \text{oυκ άνω διδαξαίμην ο’ είτε} \), 'I won't have you any longer for my pupil.' [L. C.]

\[ \text{πλούτοσ τε, κ.τ.λ.} \] That riches are the bane of a state was a favourite notion with the ancient world; nearly the opposite view is current among thinkers on these subjects in modern times. How is this difference to be accounted for? (1) The first impressions of men about riches and poverty are derived from poetry rather than philosophy, and this has led to a sort of inconsistency in our ideas of them (\( \text{παλαιά μέν τις διαφορά φιλοσοφία τε καὶ ποιητική} \). (2) There is a real difference in the influence of wealth among the ancients and moderns. In the modern world, the possession of wealth is the cause and effect of industry and progress; accumulation implies distribution; and many moral qualities, justice, order, independence, energy, are the accompaniments of wealth. In the ancient world wealth was generally acquired by the labour of slaves, or by corruption and violence: in the early times of the Greek republics accumulation was really a disturbing agent in the relation of classes, and in the later days both of Greece and Rome implied an admixture with foreigners which sensibly impaired the force and intensity of the national character. (Compare the extreme opposition of rich and poor which Plato describes as prevailing in the last stage of oligarchy, \textit{Book viii.} 551-556.) (3) It may be conceded that modern writers have erred in making wealth and security the
sole business of government, and that political economy, after every allowance for difference of circumstances, has something to learn from ancient philosophy on this subject. (4) Declamations against luxury in modern times have sometimes arisen insensibly from the application of the language of ancient writers, as in other instances, to an altered state of society. The same remark may be applied to the language of the New Testament about poverty, which presents an ideal only, not immediately applicable to other times and circumstances.

πλοῦτος] The noun agrees with the subject of λήσει.

ὁς οἶνος τε ... παρεσκευασμένος] 'trained to perfection in the art of boxing,' ἐπὶ τοῦτο, i.e. ἐπὶ τὸ πυκτεύειν. For this use of παρεσκευάζω cp. especially Gorg. 448 ὁ καλῶς ... παρεσκευάζου εἰς λάγους.

οὐδ' εἰ ... πυγμεῖ] (1) 'Not, said I, if he were able to run away and then turn and strike at the one who first came up, and supposing he were to do this repeatedly (πολλάκις) in the heat of a suffocating sun?' πολλάκις, 'several times,' adds a point to the description. Or (2) according to the other meaning of the word, 'perhaps,' 'it may be,' adding an accidental particular (‘possibly in stifling heat’) which would be much in favour of a trained boxer.—The change of case ὑποφεύγωντι ... ἀναστρέφοντα is due to the affinity which the infinitive has for an active subject.

ἀμέλει ... θαυμαστόν] 'Certainly, said he, there would be nothing wonderful in that.' ἀμέλει implies a full admission.

εὐθαίμων εἰ ... ὅτι σει] 'I envy you your simplicity in fancying.'

The word εὐθαίμων has a similar ironical sense in other places:

v. 450 οὗ ῥάδιον, ὥ εὐθαίμον ... διελθεῖν—as here implying a simplicity in the previous question. So ὥ μακάριε Phaedr. 241 E, al.

ἀλλὰ τί μήν; ἔφη] 'But what would you have?' said he. τί μήν, sc. ἀλλα. Cp. i. 348 c and note.

μειζόνως, κ.τ.λ.] 'You must give a grander name to other cities.'

tο τῶν παιζόντων] may either mean, (1) 'as people jestingly say' (cp. ix. 573 το τῶν παιζόντων, ἔφη, τοῦτο σὺ καὶ ἐμοὶ ἐρείς: and Laws vi. 780 c) in allusion to some saying οὗ πολίς ἀλλὰ πόλεις (or πολεῖς, the Epic plural of πόλις—'not a city but a many'), the exact application of which has not been preserved to us: or (2) 'as in the game’ where there is more than one city, in reference to the
expression παίζων πόλεις which, according to Suidas and the Scholiast, had passed into a proverb. Cp. Dict. of Ant. vol. ii. p. 12. In this case there is an allusion to the game called πόλεις, for a description of which, see Pollux, iv. 98. It was a species of draughts, in which the pieces (κύκες) were ranged on opposite sides of the board (πόλεις), the game consisted in their taking one another.

δύο μέν ... πλουσίων] καὶ ὀτιοῦν ἦ, 'if it be anything at all': the καὶ is to be taken with ὀτιοῦν, according to a common use. For the meaning of ὀτιοῦν compare Polit. 308 c εἰ τίς ποι ὑπάλληλον ἐπιστήμων πράγμα ὀτιοῦν τῶν αὐτῆς ἔργων, καὶ εἰ τὸ φαινόμενον ... ἐνιστήσω: Apology 35 B τοὺς δοκοῦσι καὶ ὀτιοῦν εἶναι.


καὶ ἐως ἂν ... τῶν προπολεμοῦντων] 'And as long as your city is governed wisely in the order just now prescribed, it will be the greatest of states, I do not mean in distinction or estimation, but in fact, though it number only a thousand fighting men.' εὐδοκίμειν has been altered into δοκεῖν in one manuscript (Par. K), which is followed by some editors.

B δοκοῦσας δὲ ... τῆς τῆλυκαύτης] 'But many that appear even many times greater than one of such a size.'

The same rule must be applied to population and territory. In neither way must our city attain a size which is inconsistent with unity.

Another 'trifling' rule they have to keep is that already laid down about maintaining the purity of the several classes: that so each individual may do one work and be truly one.

But indeed all else is really trifling in comparison with the great principles of Education as we have laid them down. If this all-important point be observed, all else is sure to go on rightly. Above all, the regulations respecting musical harmonies must be most jealously watched and preserved. No other innovation creeps in so insidiously, or is so destructive in its consequences, as the alteration of taste in music.

The minor details of conduct, including rules of behaviour, are matters which men educated as our citizens have been may be left to discover for themselves. But how if the greater principles are
not observed? They will tinker away at these minor matters of legislation, like men who will not give up a life of debauchery, but wish to avert its consequences: instead of getting rid of the cause of disease, they will strive by petty legislation to minimise its evils. What is this but trying to cut off the head of Hydra?

οἴμαι μέν, κ.τ.λ.] The limit of the state was a natural idea to the Greeks, who had no experience of any organization which could give unity to a great empire. Aristotle (Pol. vii. cc. 4, 5) agrees with Plato respecting the necessity of having a limit to the state, which is to be large enough to contain the elements of political well-being, and small enough to have a form of constitution (πολιτεία) and enforcement of the laws, within sight of the government (ἐνόρωπτος), and within the hearing of the herald. Much of his reasoning on the subject, however, turns on the abstract principle of measure in men, animals, and works and instruments in general. He approaches most nearly to Plato in the passage where he says that the greatness of the city depends, not on the numbers of the citizens, but on fulfilling the end for which political society exists (c. 4, § 5).

μήτε μεγάλη δοκούσα] ‘Nor one that gives the idea of being large’ (since none is really so). The qualifying word δοκούσα is added with reference to the preceding argument. Cp. supra β δοκούσας (sc. εἴναι μεγάλας) δὲ πολλάς.

καὶ φαύλον γ’, ἐφὶ . . . προστάξομεν] ‘And surely,’ said he, ‘this is a light matter to impose upon them.’ ‘And this,’ said I, ‘a lighter still.’ Adeimantus says ironically ‘This, i.e. the preservation of the unity of the state, is a trivial matter,’ meaning that it is grave and difficult. Socrates with a deeper irony says, ‘And this (i. e. the assignment of the citizens to their several classes) is more trivial still.’ Then, throwing off irony, he adds in sober earnest, ‘All is light in comparison of the one great thing, i.e. education.’ Cp. the ironical uses of γενναίος, χαρίεις, καλός, εὐδαιμόν, &c.

τούτο δ’ ἐβούλετο . . . δεῖ κοιμῆσαι] ‘And this meant that in the case of the other citizens also (as well as of the guardians) we must put each individual man to that one particular work for which nature designed him.’

He means that the transposition of ranks in individual cases is in accordance with our old principle of the division of labour, and
that this is to be carried out in detail, not only as between the guardians and the rest of the citizens, but as applied to the industrial classes amongst themselves.

dallα eis γέγονεται, κ.τ.λ.] Cp. v. 462, where he insists that there must be unity in the state.

οὖτοι . . . ικανόν] The words μᾶλλον δ' αντί μεγάλον ικανόν are added with characteristic moderation, because adequacy is better even than greatness. In using the familiar (τὸ λεγόμενον) expression ἐν μέγα φυλάττειν (cp. Polit. 297 ά μέχριπερ ἂν ἐν μέγα φυλάττωσι), Socrates reflects that the whole spirit of his previous remarks is against aiming at bigness in anything. Compare the curious passage in i. 349. The construction is slightly altered: μέγα is at first merely attributive to ἐν, but ικανόν is added as if μέγα were a supplementary predicate. ‘So long as they observe one great thing, or rather, if they observe it, not to a great but to a sufficient extent.’

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γάμων καὶ παιδοποιίας] These genitives depend upon some word of more general meaning supplied from κτήσιν. ‘The matter of marriage,’ &c.


ἀρθότατα . . . γίνοντ' ἂν] Adeimantus is led on by the familiar γνώμη, κοινά τὰ φίλων, to assent easily to a proposition which he does not fully understand. Polemarchus calls his attention to this at the beginning of Book v, and brings into prominence the question which is here briefly indicated.

καὶ μὴν . . . αὔξανομέν] ‘The truth is, said I, that a state, if once started well, goes on with accumulating force like a wheel.’

The efforts of ancient philosophers were directed to the attainment of permanence; they sought to preserve the type, which the legislator had fixed, by education. Their want of historical experience prevented them from perceiving that the institutions of one age are not adapted to another, or that in politics, as in the action of organic bodies, true permanence is also a progress. Nor had they the modern feeling that education has higher objects than merely political ones, and is degraded by serving the purpose of a governing body.
Notes: Book IV.

[Erxei ai wsteper kyklas] The word aubanomenh is not to be pressed into the comparison. A hoop or wheel, when once started well, goes on smoothly. This is true also of the growth of the state.

tolauthj paiideias] tolaouthj, sc. chrjasthj.

antilambanomevai] Lit. ‘getting a firm hold of,’ i.e. being thoroughly imbued with it.


to μη nevterihein, k.t.l.] tou μη nevterihein, in agreement with tou tou anvekten, would have been the natural construction, but the proximity of autο, which refers to tou tou, in the epexegetical clause, determines the structure of the sentence against what would be its more grammatical and logical form. Strictly only the words to μη nevterihein . . . phulastein are epexegetical of autο: hence phoβoμενοι agreeing with the subject of phulastein would have been more correct than the accusative. But the nominative phoβoμενοι is attracted into agreement with the subject of the dependent clause to μη nevterihein . . . phulastein, sc. εφας. The notion of duty (αei implied in anvekten) is also influential in favour of the accusative being used in place of the nominative in agreement with the subject of the main verb as required by the common rule.

For the use of pollakis ( = ‘perhaps’) cp. ix. 584 ινα μη pollakis oινθης εν τω παρόμει αυτω τοιτο περικειαν. The quotation is from Homer, Od. i. 351, where, however, not επιφρονεων, but επικλειουον is read.

dei d’ oυτ’ επαινειν . . . oυτε υπολαμβανειν] ‘But this ought not to be praised or conceived to be the poet’s meaning,’ i.e. that he approves a new kind of song.

eidos γαρ . . . kivndunevonta] ‘For we must beware of a change to a new kind of music, as endangering the whole.’ For the use of metaβαλλων=to take in exchange, cp. Theaet. 181 C οταν τι χώραν εκ χώρας metaβαλλη: or perhaps the adjective kaioun is used proleptically. metaβαλλον would then mean ‘to change,’ ‘to alter,’ not ‘to take in exchange.’ For εν in this connexion cp. Laches 187 B μη οικ εν τω Καρι ουίν ο κινδυνος κινδυνεύοται, αλλ’ εν τοις νυσι, κ.τ.λ.

oudamou . . . peidomevai] Compare Laws vii. 800 B parα τα δημοσια μελη τε και ιερα κα την των νεων ευμπασαν χορειαν μηδεις μαλλον ι παρ’, αντειναιν αλλον των νομων φθεγγισθω, μηδ’ εν ορχησει κινεσθω. The
same fanciful importance is attributed to music in the saying, 'Let me make the ballads of a people, I care not who makes their laws.' For Damon, cp. iii. 400 B and note. Modern Damons have been equally ready to prognosticate the ruin that would follow from trifling changes in education.

Certainly, said he, this musical lawlessness easily creeps in unobserved. The use of the negative is idiomatic, as in οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐργάζεται, k.t.l. 'And it really does no harm, except that,' &c. The use of the negative is idiomatically, as in οὐδὲν γ' . . . εἰ μὴ ἄγαθά γε Protag. 310 B.—'The only harm it does is this: it gradually ruins everything—that is all.'

The influence of the amusements of children upon their character is dwelt upon at length in the Laws vii. 797, 798.

Music does for them the opposite of what she did in the former case. She follows them into every part of life and makes them grow. ή 'κείνος, sc. ή τοίς τῇ παρανόμῳ μουσικῇ χρησαμένους ἐποίει.

Like 'jacere' in Latin.

Either (1) 'when to sit down, and when to give place'; or (rather L. C.) (2), as κατακλίσεις the verb has an active meaning, the substantive may be taken actively, of 'making another sit down,' or 'assisting elders to a seat.' This appears to be the right way of explaining the word in Arist. Eth. Nic. ix. 2, § 9 παντὶ δὲ τῷ πρεσβύτερῳ τιμήν καθ' ἥλικιάν [sc. ἀποδοτόν], ὑπαναστάσει καὶ κατακλίσει, when it is similarly combined with ὑπανιστάσεις. For the sense compare Hdt. ii. 80 συμφέρονται δὲ καὶ τόδε ἄλλο Αἰγύπτιοι 'Ελλήνων μούνοις λακεδαιμονίας. οἱ νεώτεροι αὐτῶν τοίς πρεσβύτεροις συνυγχάνοντες εἰκονιζόν τῆς ὥδου καὶ ἐκτράπωνται καὶ ἐπιούσι εξ ἐδρῆς ὑπανιστάται.

'For express and written enactments on such points are ineffectual and could never endure.'
Cp. Polit. 294 B αἱ γὰρ ἀναμοιῶτητες τῶν τε ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῶν πράξεων καὶ τὸ μηδέποτε μηδὲν, ὥς ἐποὺ εἰπεῖν, ἥσυχαν ἅγειν τῶν ἀνθρώπων οὐδὲν ἐστὶν ἀπολογήτων ἐν οὐδὲν περὶ ἀπάντων καὶ ἐπὶ πάντα τῶν χρόνων ἀποφύγεσθαι τέχνην οὐδὲ ἤμνησθαι. And for an attempt to meet the difficulty by 'exhortation' see Laws vii. 793, Soph. 2.30 A. For γίγνεται = 'take effect,' cp. supra iii. 414 C.

It is difficult in legislation to attain a mean between too great generality and too much detail. Particulars are endless and cannot all be included; yet the attempt to limit legislation to general principles gives rise to an undergrowth of precedents and legal maxims, which has no plan and is apt to become a wilderness. The good of one man is limited by the good of all; and the greatest freedom of the greatest number is attained by rules which fall very far short of universality. It might seem as if the legislator, having power, could easily mould the laws of a nation according to his will. But human nature is a stubborn thing—not a sheet of blank paper on which we can inscribe anything at will. Neither in England, nor in India, nor in any other country, can legislation be much in advance of public opinion. The laws of nations always stand in a near relation to their customs and history. Considering the influence of habit and idea and the growth of interests, the danger even in democracies is not of good institutions being too susceptible of change, but of bad ones becoming ineradicable. In social and commercial matters the difficulty of modern times is not how to preserve laws, but how to alter them, because great interests have grown up under their protection.

καὶ τελευτῶν . . . ἢ καὶ τοῦναντίων] 'And in the end it (i.e. the start which education gives him) terminates in some one complete and grand result either good or the reverse.' αὐτὸν, sc. τὸ ὑπερ ἐν τὶς ὀρμήσῃ ἐκ τῆς παιδείας. νεανικών, 'youthful: in the prime or pride of youth,' and so 'vehement.' The word is used in this sense by Hippocrates and the medical writers.

οὐκ ἄν ἔτι] 'I would not go on and try to legislate in these matters.'

[τάδε] τὰ ἤγοραῖα] τάδε is omitted in Par. A. Though not necessary to the sense, it is idiomatic: 'Those familiar regulations.' Cp. supra iii. 403 E τῶνδε τῶν ἄσκησιν.

δικών λήξεως] 'obtaining by lot the turn for bringing on a suit:' the last step in the ἀνάκρισις, i.e. the examination before the Archon of the parties to a suit prior to its being sent into the public courts.
The reading λίξεως (m q κ) is clearly right, though Par. A and Ven. ΠΣ agree in λίξεις. Throughout this and the following passage Plato has Athenian legislation in his mind. In the Laws the legislator makes minute provisions on many of the points here left to his successors to determine.

tελῶν...η πράξεις η θέσεις] 'Rules for collection or assessment.'

υπὸ άκολασίας] These words are added to explain οὐκ ἔθελοντας.

καὶ δεῖ ἐλπίζοντες] The participle is resumed from ἰατρευόμενοι.

tί δὲ; ἦν οὕτως, κ.τ.λ.] 'Well, said I, is not this charming in them?' &c. The irony in the word χαρίειν is seriously taken up in the next sentence: 'Not at all charming, he said: for there is no charm in going into a rage with a man who gives you good advice.'

For the uses of the word χαρίειν first ironically and then seriously cp. the similar use of φαύλον supra 423 c, d. For the change from plural to singular (αὐτῶν...μεθύων) cp. infra c ἀποθανούμενοι ὥς ἄν and note.

The epigrammatic sentence of Tacitus, 'corruptissima civitate plurimae leges,' may be quoted as a Roman parallel of this passage of the Republic. The thought of both goes rather beyond the truth. For the complexity of law does not mainly arise from depravity of morals, or the ingenuity of legislators, or the love of novelty, but (1) from the complexity of the relations and dealings of mankind: (2) from the remnants of old laws and usages surviving side by side with new ones. Law, which must appeal to a written word, superseding the discretion of individuals, can never be perfectly simple. A popular system of law is impossible in a civilized country. Yet, on the other hand, the habit of mind which has been acquired in making necessary distinctions may go on to make unnecessary ones. The subtlety of law should fall short of the subtlety of the ordinary circumstances of mankind, instead of exceeding them. Compare the Politicus, 294 foll., in which the fixed character of law amid the variety of circumstances, and the necessity for this owing to the imperfection of human nature, are unfavourably contrasted with the living supervision of the perfect ruler.

ἀποθανούμενοι] agrees in number with πολίταις: in what follows, δέ ἄν, κ.τ.λ., is substituted for οἵ ἄν τούτο δρῶσι. A few manuscripts (ΞΘΚ) have ἀποθανούμενοι, corrected in Ξ to ἀποθανούμενον, which is the reading of q B.
Notes: Book IV.

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... τῷ σοφῷ τὰ μεγάλα] ‘Wise in great matters.’

... τῶν πολεμῶν supplied from πολεμος supra.

πῶς λέγεις; κ.τ.λ.] Socrates aggravates the satire by an ironical answer: ‘What do you mean? Have you no mercy on the men? Do you think that one who does not know how to measure, when a number of others who are equally ignorant say that he is four cubits high, can help believing about himself what they say?’ With a sort of half seriousness this impossibility is admitted in the words which follow.

... τούτο γε] The manuscripts vary between οὐκ ἂν and οὐκ ἂ. For the first we might compare supra 422 οὐκ ἂν ἢ σοι, ἐφη, ἢ μα γε, where, however, there is ἂν also in the preceding sentence. In this passage οὐκ ἂν might possibly mean οὐκ ἂν οἶν τε ἐγγὺς μη τούτῳ ἰγινεσθαι. But οὐκ ἂ which has the support of ἌΠΙΜ is more in point (sc. οἴομαι). ‘Though I do not admire the men who are so deceived, yet on the other hand I do not think that they could help believing in such a case.’ The form of expression is not uncommon: cp. Ion 541 οὐκ ἂν ἢ μοι δοκεῖ τοῦτο; Soph. El. 1034 οὐδ’ ἂν τοσοῦτον ἔχοντο ἐχθαῖρω σ’ ἐγώ.

μὴ τοίνυν χαλέπαινε] ‘Don’t be angry, then.’ Look at them not under a serious but under a comic aspect. Cp. Phaedr. 269 β οὐ χρή χαλαπαίνειν, ἀλλὰ συγγεγρόωσκεν, εἰ τινὲς μὴ ἐπιστάμενοι διαλεγέσθαι αὐτοῦ αἰσθητώτα εἰς ἠνθοῦν ἀρίστας, τί ποτ’ ἐστι ῥητορική. Χαριστάτωτα recalls χαρίν supra λ.

νομοθετοῦντες τε ... ἑπαυνορθοῦντες ... οἰόμενον] (1) The first two participles may be dependent on the third: ‘believing that by such legislation and reforms as we have just mentioned they will put an end to frauds in contracts.’ Or (2) taken more simply the words may mean ‘legislating and reforming as we have just described in the belief that they will put an end,’ &c. Cp. supra 425 ε.

τὸ τοιοῦτον εἰδος νόμων πέρι] νόμων πέρι is an explanation of τοιοῦτον, which refers to legislation in matters of detail. Cp. vii. 539 C τὸ ὀλὸν φιλοσοφίας πέρι.

τὰ δὲ δυτι] δυτι is repeated pleonastically.
It only now remains to legislate concerning Religion. Here again we shall insist on a single principle, that religious worship shall be national. All questions concerning it shall be referred to Apollo the God at Delphi, who is the hereditary authority on this subject for all Hellenes.

Plato here, as in the Laws (vi. 759 c), is unwilling to depart from the traditional ceremonial of Greece. For a discussion of religion in the higher sense cp. the tenth book of the Laws.

'Likewise the graves of the dead, and the ministrations which are necessary to propitiate the inhabitants of the under-world.' The manuscripts, with the exception of Ven. Ξ, omit τε after τέλευταντων. The insertion is unnecessary, asyndeton being not uncommon in enumerations. Cp. iii. 399 C βίανος, ἱκούσιον, κ.τ.λ.

sc. ἔγγυτή: 'our ancestral interpreter.' There is slight manuscript authority (Par. Κ, Ven. Π, m q) for the reading πατρώφω, which would mean 'the father of our race,' Apollo being reputed the father of Ion (cp. Euthyd. 302 ν) and worshipped under this title at Athens. The reading of the text, however, is favoured by the sense as well as by the manuscripts. For Plato is not speaking in the person of an Ionian, but of a Greek who will have no other teacher of religion than the god of his ancestors. And the Apollo of whom he is thinking is not Απόλλων πατρώφος, but 'the God who sits in the centre of the earth, and is the interpreter of religion to all mankind.'

Plato's profession of reverence for the gods of Hellas is repeatedly expressed in a manner which makes it impossible to doubt his seriousness. The only passage which appears ironical is Tim. 40 D–41 Α. He probably felt (1) that religion was indispensable, and (2) that a new religion could not be established in a day. (Cp. Laws x. 909 εἰρά καὶ θεοὺς οὗ βάσιν ἱδρύεσθαι, μεγάλης δὲ διανοίας τῶν ὄρθως δρῶν τῷ τοιοῦτον.)

The foundation of our state would seem to be complete, but we still need a strong light to discern in it the nature and essential value of Justice.

Assuming, however, that the new city has the four cardinal virtues, if we can find three of them—wisdom, courage, and temperance—the remaining virtue will be the one which we seek.
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αὐτὸς τε καὶ τὸν ἰδελφὸν παρακάλει] Cp. iii. 398 A αὐτὸς τε καὶ τὰ ποιῆματα βουλόμενος ἐπάθειασθαι, and note: Phaedr. 253 B αὐτοὶ τε καὶ τὰ παιδικὰ πεῖθοντε: Xen. Anab. iii. 1, § 44: Thuc. viii. 55 ὁ Πεδάρτος αὐτὸς τε καὶ τὸ περὶ αὐτῶν ἐπικουρικῶν ἐχων. This passage is peculiar in that the verb is in the imperative mood and not a participle.

καὶ πότεροι . . . καὶ ἄνθρώπους] Compare the closing words of Adeimantus' speech, ii. 367 E εἶν τε λαυβίνη, κ.τ.λ., and note.

ὡς οὖχ ὁσίον σοι ὅν] Another allusion to the words of Socrates in the passage just cited, ii. 368 B δίδωκα γὰρ μὴ οὐδ' ὁσίον ἃ παραγενομένον δικαιοσύνη κακιγορουμένη ἀπαγορεύειν.

μὴ οὖ] οὖ is added in good manuscripts, and is in accordance with the usual idiom after such negative expressions as ὅδικον, ἀλογον, οὐκ ὁσίον. Compare, both for the meaning and the form of the sentence, Laws x. 891 A διὰ ταύτα λόγον υδαμῇ ἔχει οὐδὲ ὁσίον ἐμιλεῖ εἰναι φαίνεται τὸ μὴ οὖ βοηθεῖν τούτοις τοῖς λόγοις πάντα ἄνδρα κατὰ δύναμιν. In what follows the popular classification of the virtues which, although first explicitly recognized by Plato, was latent in the common consciousness of Hellas, is assumed as the basis of inquiry.

οὐκοῦν . . . εὑρημένον] The use of this half-logical half-mathematical 'method of residues' marks the infancy of philosophy. Cp. Lys. 216 E. If we were sure that the subject of our inquiry was one of four terms, and could eliminate the other three, then, as Plato says, the remaining term would be the one for which we are seeking. Another condition must be remembered, viz. that the four terms have each a precise meaning. Otherwise the form will be illusory, and the disjunctive syllogism in which the error is expressed will only help the illusion. But no logical term has the precision of a mathematical quantity. For example, in the discussion which follows, the third term σωφροσύνη is not easily separated from the fourth, which seems also to comprehend the two previous ones. The formula of residues is true when applied to abstract quantity or to the laws of nature. But the further application of this or of any other abstract form to morals or metaphysics is interfered with by the imperfection, or rather by the nature of language, and the indefiniteness of the subject.

ὁσπέρ τοῖνυν, κ.τ.λ.] For the form of sentence (ὁσπέρ with deferred apodosis) Cp. iii. 402 A, B, and note. Plato intended to make ἀλλον

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Wisdom is obviously present, but is possessed by one class only, and that the smallest, which gives this character to the whole. For statecraft is supreme wisdom, and this is vested in the rulers alone. Courage or fortitude also has her seat in one class principally, that is to say, in those guardians who are not rulers but defenders and preservers of the peace of the state. On their holding fast the patriotic principle with which they have been imbued, and thus having the courage of citizens, depends the security of the whole commonwealth.

Temperance is the mutual concord of the different classes rather than the proper excellence of one. In individuals this is spoken of as self-control, which means the obedience of the lower nature to the higher. And in our community it is the willing obedience of the industrial classes, which are lower and have a lower order of desires, to the two higher classes, which gives to the whole state the character of temperate.

Politics science is similarly distinguished from the arts in the Euthydemus (291), and, with curious elaboration, in the Politicus, 258-268 and elsewhere.

It has been doubted whether bouleuomén, which is the reading of all the manuscripts, should not be altered into bouleuomén. But bouleuomén, sc. ἡ πόλις τάτη τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ, resumes διὰ . . . ἐπιστήμῃ. Cp. infra ἡ . . . bouleúntai and note.
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For the omission of διά compare Phaedo 64 D, where, however, as in this passage, the preposition is easily supplied: φαίνεται σοι φιλοσόφου ἀνδρίν εἰναι εἰσονδακέναι περὶ τὰς ἴδιους καλουμένας τὰς τοιάσθε; . . . τί δέ; τὰς τῶν ἀφροδισίων; see Riddell’s Digest, § 190.

ἡ . . . βουλεύεται] ἡ is Hermann’s correction of ἡ, which was formerly read. It is confirmed by Matv, and is supported by έαυτής, immediately below, which, though it proves not to be the reading of Par. A, is on the whole most probable. The accent on ἡ in Par. A is written over an erasure. It is the city, not the science, that is εὐβουλος, and is therefore rightly said βουλεύεσθαι : cp. supra βουλευομένη, and note.

ὁμιλοῖ] The MSS., with one exception (Flor. n) omit ἂν. The optative without ἂν in a relative clause expresses remote or ideal possibility, in a case that is perfectly general: ‘what might be or may be conceived to be the best policy, internal or external.’ Compare Phaedrus 239 b ἀποβλέπων εἰς τὸν ἔραστήν, οἷος ὄν τῷ μὲν ἴδιστος, έαυτῷ δὲ βλασφέωτατος εἶη [ἂν εἰη solus Φ].

οὗς νῦν δή . . . ἄνωμαζομεν] iii. 414 b. The reading τελέως was erroneously attributed in Bekker’s collation to Par. A, which reads τελέος with all the other MSS. except Ven. Ε. τελέος has therefore been restored in the text.


οὐκοῦν . . . γίγνεται γένος] Cp. Polit. 292 ε—293 A, where Plato remarks that in a city of a thousand men there would not be 100 or even fifty good draught-players. How much smaller then would be the number of kings (i.e. scientific rulers)! The fewness of the wise is an often-recurring thought in Plato: cp. Theaet. 186 c, Polit. 297 C ἀλλὰ περὶ σμικρὸν τι καὶ ὀλίγου καὶ τὸ ἐν ἐστι γιγνεόν τὴν μίαν εἰκόνιν πολιτείαν τὴν ὅρθην.

οὔ γάρ . . . ἡ τοιαν αὐτὴν εἰναι ἡ τοιαν] ‘For I do not imagine, said I, that the courage or the cowardice of the other citizens will have the power of giving such a city this or that character.’ Infra 437 E τοῦ δὲ τοίου ἡ τοιοῦ τὰ προσγεγραμμένα.

καὶ ἄνδρεία ἄρα, κ.τ.λ.] καὶ (‘too’ ) marks the correspondence between the courage and wisdom, both of which are virtues of a portion of the city and not of the whole.
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οὐ πάνυ . . . ἔμαθον] ‘I do not quite understand.’ The other meaning, ‘not at all,’ is unsuitable here. It would be absurd for Glaucon to say that he does not at all understand the meaning of Socrates about courage.

σωτηρίαν . . . λέγω τινά] Socrates still answers enigmatically, as in Gorg. 463 b, where he defines rhetoric to Polus as πολιτικὴς μορίου εἴδωλον.

διὰ παντὸς δὲ ἔλεγον αὐτὴν σωτηρίαν] ‘and in speaking of courage as a never-failing preservation, I meant that a man preserves this principle when he is tried,’ &c. διασωζομαι is in the middle voice and has a general subject (τοι, τὸν ἀνθρώπον). αὐτήν, sc. τὴν δόξαν. Hermann would cancel the words αὐτήν σωτηρίαν. Another reading is τῷ ἐν τε λύπαι, κ.τ.λ., ‘by reason of,’ &c. For the right opinion concerning things terrible and not compare iii. 386 λ, 387 β ὦς δεὶ ἐλευθέρους εἶναι, δουλεῖαν βασιλέως μᾶλλον πεφωβημένους. See also Laches 190 ff., where the treatment of the subject is tentative, not dogmatic.

D ἐκ τοσοῦτων χρωμάτων] ‘Out of so many.’ The number of existing colours out of which the choice is made helps to show the amount of care that is required. The colour ἀλουργὸν is described by Plato, Tim. 68 c, as ἐπιθρῶν δὲ δὴ μέλαιν λευκῷ τε κρατεῖν.

E καὶ δὲ μὲν ἄν . . . βαφέν] ‘And whatever is dyed in this manner, that which is dyed becomes of a fast colour.’

δευσοποιῶν] ‘fast-dyed.’ Cp. some ludicrous lines of Diphilus quoted by Harpocratio,

ταύτα γὰρ ἡμῖν δευσοποιά παντελῶς
tὰ σπάργαν ἀποδίδαχεν,

where as here δευσοποιῶν is used not of the colour, but of the coloured material.

ἄνθος] i.e. the perfect brightness of the colour, which is like the bloom of a flower.

ἐὰν τε καὶ ταύτα] ταύτα, sc. τὰ λευκά. The choice of the wool answers to the selection of the guardians, the preparation of the wool to their education and training, and the dyeing of the wool to the imposition of the laws.

τοιοῦτον τοίνυν, κ.τ.λ.] The words ἐξελεγόμεθα . . . ἑπαίδευμεν recall ἐκλέγομαι . . . προπαρασκευάζουσιν supra.
Notes: Book IV.

μηδὲν οἶου ἄλλο μηχανάς, κ.τ.λ.] is a restatement of τοιοῦτον... ἥμας. Hence the asyndeton.

ἐκπλήναι] the optative is the right reading, to be construed with ἵνα μή. The form is less common than ἐκπλένει, but occurs elsewhere in Attic Greek. Par. A reads ἐκπλήναι, the infinitive, an obvious mistake, for ἰμματα, as ἱδονή shows, is in the nominative case.

χαλεστραίου] 'pearl-ash' is said by the Scholiast to be derived from Chalastra, a town or lake in Macedonia (Hdt. vii. 123).

τήν δὴ τοιαύτην δύναμιν καὶ σωτηρίαν] Cp. supra 429 B δύναμιν τοιαύτην, ἥ διὰ παντὸς ἄσωτει.

ἀλλ' οὐδέν ... λέγω] sc. ἄλλα. 'But I do not say anything else,' 'I agree.' As here, so in Laches (196 d, e) Socrates refuses to admit that the brutes possess courage.

καὶ γὰρ ἀποδέχου ... ἀποδέξει] 'Why, yes, said I, accept it, but as the courage of a citizen, and you will be right.'

Plato is speaking of courage only as the virtue of citizens, not as based upon philosophical principle. Compare x. 619 c, where the unfortunate choice is made by one ἐν τεταγμένη πολιτεία ἐν τῷ προτέρῳ βίω βεβαιωκότα, ἐθεὶ ἄνευ φιλοσοφίας ἀρμὴς μετεξελθότα: also Phaedo 68 d, where the courage of the philosopher is contrasted with the courage of ordinary men, which is only a fear of greater evils. There is nowhere in the Republic a discussion such as appears to be intimated in the words αἰθῆς δὲ περὶ αὐτοῦ (sc. τῆς ἀνθρείας)... ἐτὶ κάλλιον δίμεν, but cp. vi. 486 A, B οὐκοῦν καὶ δίκαιον οὐ δεινὸν τι ἀγνήσται δ τοιοῦτος; Compare Aristotle (Eth. Nic. iii. 7, 8), where he distinguishes true courage, which is for the sake of τὸ καλὸν, from the spurious forms of courage, and speaks of political courage as making the nearest approach to the true.

πῶς οὖν ἄν ... περὶ σωφροσύνης] 'How then can we discover justice, that we may trouble ourselves no more about temperance?' i.e. that we may be relieved from further discussion. πῶς ἄν expresses a wish, which Socrates affects to believe to be that of his hearers. εἰπερ expresses 'I do not want justice to appear first, at least, if that is to prevent us from proceeding to examine temperance.' For this mode of creating variety by playing with the order of the subject, compare the correction of the order of the sciences, vii. 528 A, B, and the similar artifice in Sympos. 185 c. d.
In the Charmides 160 ff., where σωφροσύνη is treated tentatively, as courage in the Laches, it is described (1) as ἡσυχία—but energy is excellence: (2) as αἰδώς—but Homer says αἰδώς οὐκ ἤγαθή: (3) as τὸ τὰ ἔαντον πράττειν—but if every one makes his own coat, this is inconsistent with a division of labour: (4) as γυνώσκειν ἔαντον—but that would make σωφροσύνη an ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστήμης, and this is contrary to the analogy of other sciences and arts.

In accepting the recognized four virtues (supra 427 E) Plato has prepared for the threefold division of the soul into rational, irascible, concupiscent. To the rational and irascible elements correspond the first two virtues σοφία and ἀνδρεία. σωφροσύνη is not the virtue of a single part of the soul, but consists in the subjection of the lower elements to the higher. The remaining virtue δικαιοσύνη, which is the condition of all the rest, is the fulfilment by each part of its own proper function.

In Gorg. 507 a, b, Protag. 331 a, the virtue of ἀσιώτης is also mentioned.

οὐτε οἶδα] sc. πῶς ἀν τὴν δικαιοσύνην εὑρομεν.

Ε. ἀλλὰ μέντοι . . . εἰ μὴ ἀδικῶ] ‘But that, said I, I do desire, or I am in the wrong.’ There seems to be a slight ellipse: the full sense would be, ‘I do desire, as I must, unless, &c.’ The phrase occurs elsewhere, e. g. x. 608 ὃ σὺ δὲ τοῦτ ἔχεις λέγειν; Εἰ μὴ ἀδικῶ γ’, ἐφην: and Charm. 156 λ καὶ τοῦνμά μον σὺ ἄκριβοις; Εἰ μὴ ἀδικῶ γε, ἐφη.

ὡς γε ἐντεῦθεν ἢδειν] ‘Looking from where I stand,’ i.e. to judge from our present point of view. This graphic touch recalls the image of the search, supra 427 E, and prepares for the still more lively one of the hunt for justice, infra 432 b: cp. also 445 e δεύρο . . . ἕνα καὶ ἔδης, κ.τ.λ.

ὡς φασι, κρεῖττῳ δὴ . . . λέγεται] The reading is doubtful. That in the text is confirmed by the margin of Par. A, and by Ma. also, according to Schneider, by two chief MSS. of Stobaeus. Schneider adopted this reading, but placed a full-stop at φασι, supposing in the latter part of the sentence the passive λέγεται to have taken the place of λέγονται, and comparing, amongst other passages, Apol. 21 c διασκοπῶν οὐν τοῦτον . . . καὶ διαλεγόμενον αὐτῷ, ἐδοξέ μοι οὕτως ὁ ἄνὴρ δοκεῖν μὲν εἶναι σοφὸς . . . εἶναι δ’ οὖν. The reading of A Π Ζ, &c., κρεῖττῳ δὴ αὐτοῦ φαίνονται οὐκ ἄδι’ ἕντων τρόπον καὶ ἄλλα ἀττα τοιαῦτα ὄσπερ ἵνα αὐτής λέγεται, can only be construed by
supplying λέγοντες from λέγεται, cp. supra 421 b ὁ δὲ ἐκεῖνο λέγειν, κ.τ.λ. One MS., q, reads φαίνεται . . . καλοῦντες, which Bekker adopted.

οὐκοῦν . . . (431 Λ) προσαγορεύεται] In the Laws, i. 627 c, the same figure is applied to a family or state: cp. also 626 E ἔπειδή γὰρ εἰς ἐκατός ἡμῶν ὁ μὲν κρεῖττων αὐτοῦ, ὁ δὲ ἦττων ἐστι; and Gorg. 491 ν ἐνα ἐκατόν λέγει αὐτῶν ἑαυτῷ ἄρχοντα.

καὶ ὅταν μὲν . . . τὸ κρεῖττω αὐτοῦ] φύσει is to be joined with βέλτιον, 'that which is by nature better.' τὸ κρεῖττω αὐτοῦ = ὁ λόγος supra, is the subject of λέγειν, which depends on φαίνεται and not on βούλεσθαι.

ἐπαινεὶ γοῦν] 'it is certainly a term of praise.' Cp. Crat. 419 Λ ὄπερ δὴ ἐπαίνει, and the use of νοεῖ with a neuter subject: i. 335 E τοῦτο δὲ δὴ νοεὶ αὐτῷ: also supra 423 D τοῦτο δὲ ἐβούλετο δηλοῦν. The more general subject (sc. ὁ λόγος) is continued with ψέγειν, καλεῖν infra.

καὶ γὰρ ἐοικεν] (That is evidently the meaning) 'for it seems a natural way of speaking.'

οὗ] 'Seeing that a thing, the better part of which rules over the worse.' ὁδ is governed by τὸ ἀμείνον τοῦ χείρονος.

*παύς] This correction of the manuscript reading πᾶς is necessary here, and in vi. 494 B.

τῶν ἐλευθέρων λεγομένων] 'Those who are called freemen.' In this expression, as in τῶν εὐθυμόνων δοκοῦντων (iii. 406 c) and the like, Plato implies that the philosopher alone is really free and happy.

τὰς δὲ γε ἀπλᾶς] The accusative is unusual after ἐπιτεύξει, and therefore these words are best regarded as an anacoluthon, apparently occasioned by the parallel of the previous sentence, τὰς γε πολλὰς . . . εὖροι. It may be rendered in English, 'But as to the simple and moderate pleasures, you will find them,' &c. αἱ δὴ, κ.τ.λ., 'which of course follow reason,' i. e. as being ἀπλαῖ and μέτριαι.

ὅταν οὕτως ἔχωσιν] sc. ὅταν ἡ αὐτὴ δόξα ἡ τῶν τε ἄρχουσι καὶ ἀρχομένως περὶ τοῦ οἰστίας δει ἄρξειν.

ὅτι οὐχ ὁσπερ . . . (Λ) ὅτῳς τῶν τοιοῦτων] 'Because courage and wisdom reside each in a portion of the state, which the one makes wise and the other valiant, but that is not the way with temperance (οὐχ οὕτω πολεῖ αὐτὴ is a resumption of οὐχ ὁσπερ . . .

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παρέχετο) which literally extends through all the notes of the scale, and produces a supreme harmony of the weakest, the strongest and the intermediate class, whether in wisdom or in force, or, if you will, in number, wealth and the like." δὲ ὀλήσ (άρπας) and διὰ πασῶν (χορδῶν) are musical terms, carrying out the notion of ἄρμονία supra. The application of the figure is pointed with ἀτεχνώς, 'literally through the whole,' i.e. the whole state as the whole lyre. A somewhat similar notion of the harmony of the various elements in a state occurs in Thuc. vi. 18 (the speech of Alcibiades) ὅμων δὲ τὸ τε φαῦλον καὶ τὸ μέσον καὶ τὸ πάντων ἀκριβεῖς ἀν ἔνενθαθέν μᾶλλον ἀν ἰδχύνειν.

ταύτων] A cognate accusative emphasizing ἔνθαθονται: 'agreeing in unison.'

εἰ μὲν βούλει, κ.τ.λ.] This may be expressed in the following tabular scheme:—

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<th>σφρονίσει,</th>
<th>ἒνσυ,</th>
<th>πλῆθος, &amp;c.</th>
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<td>ἰσχυρότατοι</td>
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<td>soldiers</td>
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<td>ἰσθενεύστατοι</td>
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ὡς γε οὕτωσι δόξαι] 'So far as for us to have formed the opinion we have expressed.' Each step in a Platonic argument is regarded as provisional, depending on the present consent of the interlocutors, who are free to modify their conclusions afterwards, should they see cause.

We are on the track of Justice but have not yet found her. Ah! we have been looking too far off. Here she lies, quite near to us,—the ground of the other virtues, the very life of the machine! Why is there harmony amongst the classes in the state? Why are the soldiers brave, the rulers wise? Simply because each is doing his own proper work, not interfering with his neighbour. That each should have his own and keep within his sphere is the popular notion of Justice. And by adhering to our first principle of the division of labour, we have secured that each of the three orders or classes shall perform its function well, and that our whole state shall be just, and escape from injustice which arises out of the interference of the three classes with one another.

οὖκοιν, ὥ Γλαυκῶν ... ἄδηλος γένηται] 'So now then, Glaucon, like huntsmen we should encircle the cover, taking heed that
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justice do not slip away and vanish out of sight.' For the metaphor compare Laches 194 b ὄλκοιν, ὁ φίλε, τῶν ἁγαθῶν κυηγέτου μεταθέν χρή καὶ μὴ ἀνέναι; Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. Βούλει οὖν καὶ Νεκίαν τόνδε παρακαλῶμεν ἐπὶ το κυηγόσιον...; Justice is more general and abstract and has more of the nature of universal law, whereas temperance, courage and wisdom are particular applications of this law: it is the general idea underlying the other three; the virtue of the whole as contrasted with the virtues of the parts: it may also be viewed as the result of all the rest. The simplicity of this is the real difficulty in understanding the nature of Justice: we are looking into the distance for that which is tumbling out at our feet. Justice is neither more nor less than 'our old friend' the division of labour applied not merely to the artisan class but to all the classes in the state (cp. the anticipation of this, ii. 372 a ἐν αὐτῶν τούτων χρείᾳ τινὶ τῇ πρὸς ἀλλήλους). Further, justice is the foundation or condition of the three other virtues, the quality which makes them possible (ὥ πᾶσιν ἐκείνοις τὴν δύναμιν παρέσχεν ὡστε ἐγγενείσθαι 433 b). It is obvious (1) that the relation between the three first and fourth is at variance with the method of elimination or residues by which Plato has proceeded: the fourth is not separable from the other three, they are particularized forms of it: (2) that the four virtues, especially justice, do not hold the same place in the state as in the individual, because it is only in certain respects and to a very limited degree that the state and individual admit of comparison.

The four 'cardinal virtues' of Plato appear meagre when compared with the greater fulness and minuteness of the psychology of Aristotle. Aristotle seems to include other types of virtue, e.g. that of magnificence, which belong to particular characters and circumstances and are not parts of the common ideal of human nature. Yet this virtue as well as the kindred ἀλευθερίωτης, although not entering into Plato's system, are mentioned by him along with σωφροσύνη and ἀνδρεία, iii. 402 c.

The definition of justice in this passage is one of the definitions of temperance in the Charmides (162 λ). So far is Plato from using language with the technical strictness of Aristotle. In general an ethical conception appears to lie at the foundation of temperance, a political one at the foundation of justice.

The ironical self-depreciation of Socrates and the humility of Glaucen are worthy of observation.

έαν πως...έδης] For the form of expression cp. infra 434 a and Theaet. 156 c ἄλλ' ἄρμει, ἔαν πως ἀποτελεσθῇ.
The omission of ὁς is singular.

Comparing a similar turn in the Sophist, 239 b, c δ τι μίαντα δύνασαι συντεινὸς πενιάθητι . . . Πολλὴ μὲν ἂν με καὶ ἄτοπος ἵνα προθυμία τῆς ἐπίχειρήσεως, εἰ . . . ἐπίχειρησίν, and Cratyl. 398 E πάθεν, ὁ ἕνα, ἵνα; οὐδὲ εἰ τι ὀνόμα ἄν εἰγν εἰρέσαι, οὐ συντείνω διὰ τὸ ἡγεῖσθαι σε μᾶλλον εἰρήσειν ἡ ἰμαντῶ. Also infra v. 474 A, B.

εστὶ γοὺς σκοτεινὸς] Compare the hunt for the Sophist in the 'dark cave' of negation, Soph. 254 A διὰ τὸ σκοτεινὸν τοῦ τόπου καταυαχθαι χαλεπῶς.

καὶ ἐγὼ κατιδὼν . . . εἶπον] 'Here I got view, and cried Hurrah! hurrah!'

ἡμεν καταγελαστότατοι . . . ἀπεσκοποῦμεν] The words from ἀσπερ are added in explanation. Hence the asyndeton.

ἀκουε, εἰ τι ἄρα λέγω] 'Listen and see whether there is anything in what I say.' Cp. infra 433 E εἰ οὖν δάξει.

τοῦτο ἐστὶν . . . ἡ δικαιοσύνη] 'This, or rather some form of this, is justice.' For the use of ἡτοι compare iii. 400 c τῶς ἀγωγίς τοῦ ποθὸν αὐτῶν οὐχ ἥττων ψέψειν . . . ἡ τοῦε μοῦος αὐτῶς, ἡτοι ἐμμε- φότερόν τι. This (i.e. each doing his own proper work) as he says below, when done in a certain way or manner, may be suspected to be (καὶ νωκεῖν εἴναι) justice.

τοῦτο τι εἴδος] It is the division of labour applied, not to the several industries, but to the three classes in the state and the three parts of the soul in the individual. The same thing is meant by τρόπων τινα supra 432 E and infra b. See 434 A.

τὸ ὑπόλοιπον . . . οὖν ἐσκέμμεθα] 'That which is the remainder of those we have considered;' i.e. which remains now that we have considered the other three. So τὸ ὑπολειφθὲν ἐκεῖνῳ infra. Cp. note on 432 b.

παρέχειν] depends immediately on δοκεῖ.

ἀλλὰ μέντοι . . . (δ) καὶ οὐκ ἐπολυπραγμόνει] The resumption ἡ τοῦτο, κ.τ.λ., helps to emphasize the alternative which is immediately in question. τοῦτο is explained by ὅτι τὸ αὐτὸ, κ.τ.λ.

ἐπάμελλον . . . δύναμις] 'Then competing with wisdom, temperance, and courage in the promotion of political virtue we find
this power, that each individual in the state is doing his own work.' The genitive is descriptive or explanatory, 'the power that consists in this, that each individual in the state does his own work.'

The rule observed by courts of law in the administration of justice, that each shall have his own, is adduced in confirmation of the definition. Cp. infra 442 E.

"Look now: perhaps you will agree with me. Suppose a carpenter to undertake the work of a cobbler, or a cobbler of a carpenter—either exchanging implements or duties, or the same person to be attempting to do both—any change you please but one, do you imagine that such changes will be any great harm to the state?"

πάντα τάλλα μεταλλαττόμενα] are followed in ἂν by τά γε τοιαίτα, which gives a true explanation, but is unnecessary as a correction of the passage. The words are in apposition with τέκτων . . . ὢν σκυτοτόμος, πάντα summing up, and τάλλα, as elsewhere in Plato, referring to what follows:—'anything but what I am about to speak of.' Compare Laws vii. 798 η τά μέν οὔν ἀλλα ἐλάπτω μετα-βαλλόμενα κακὰ διεξεργάζοντ' ἂν, ὅσα περὶ σχῆματα πάσχει τὸ τοιοῦτον ὧν ἰοῦν τὰ τῶν ἢδων ἐπαίνου τε καὶ ψόγου πέμπει πυκνά μεταπίπτει, πάντων, οἷομαι, μέγιστά τε καὶ πλείστης εἰλαθεῖσας δεόμενα ἄν εἴη. For the form of expression in summing up compare Polit. 299 η περὶ ἀπαντα ταύτη ὡσ πραττόμενα τί ποτ' ἂν φανεῖν, κ.τ.λ. ὢν μεταλαμβανόντες and ἢ καὶ . . . πράττειν are opposed, ἢ τιμάς introducing a subordinate distinction between implements and industries.

eἰς τὸ τοῦ πολεμικοῦ εἴδος] εἴδος here = 'mode of life or action,' i. e. 'function' rather than 'class.'

οὗτοι] The pronoun emphatically sums up the three classes in opposition to the minor sub-divisions of the industrial class enumerated in supra A.

ὥ τριῶν ἀρα . . . (c) μάλιστα κακουργία] τριῶν γενῶν, sc. guardians, soldiers, traders.

τῆς ἐαυτοῦ πόλεως] is added with the same solemn feeling as ἐν τῇ ἄυτον πόλει, supra ii. 380 B.

μηδέν . . . παγίως αὐτὸ λέγωμεν] 'We will not as yet say this quite positively.' For παγίως compare v. 479 κ οὔτε 'εἰναι οὔτε μὴ 'εἰναι οὐδέν αὐτῶν δυνάτων παγίως νοήσαι: and Theaet. 157 ι ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ποιῶν εἶναι τί καὶ τὸ πάσχον αὐτὶ ἐπὶ ἐνδε νοήσαι, ἄν φασίν, ὅκ εἶναι παγίως.
Compare the description of the argument from example in Polit. 278 A-C "Ἀρ' οὖν οὐχ ὧδε ῥάστον καὶ κάλλιστον ἐπάγειν αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τὰ μίπσο γεγονωσκόμενα; Πῶς; 'Ἀνάγειν πρῶτον ἐπ' ἐκείνω ἐν ὑς ταύτα ταῦτα ὀρθῶς ἐδόξαζον, αναγίγοντας δὲ τιθεῖνα παρὰ τὰ μίπσο γεγονωσκόμενα, καὶ παραβάλλοντας ἐνδεικνύειν τὴν αὐτὴν ὁμοίωτητα καὶ φύσιν ἐν ἀμφιτέραις οὕσαν ταῖς συμπλοκαῖς, μέχριστε ἂν πᾶσι τοῖς ἀγροσμείσις τὰ δοξαζόμενα ἀληθῶς παρατηθέμενα δεικθῇ, δεικθέντα δὲ, παραδείγμαθ' οὕτω γεγονόμενα, ποιήσῃ τῶν στοιχείων πάσων ἔκαστον ἐν πάσι τοῖς συλλαβαῖς, τὸ μὲν ἐτέρων ὡς τῶν ἄλλων ἐτέρων ὧν, τὸ δὲ ταυτόν ὡς ταυτὸν ἀεὶ κατὰ ταῦτα ἑαυτῷ προσασχημενεθαι. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. Οὐκοῦν ταύτῳ μὲν ἰκανῶς συνελήφθασιν, ὃτι παραδείγματος γ' ἐστὶ τότε γένεσις, ὅπωσιν ὧν ταυτόν, ἐν ἑτέρῳ διεσπασμένῳ δοξαζόμενον ὀρθῶς καὶ συναχθὲν, περὶ ἑκάστου ὡς συνιμφαίνει ἀληθῆ δόξαν ἀποτελῆ; Φαίηται.

κἂν μὲν ὁμολογηται] sc. ταύτῳ καὶ ἐν ἑνὶ ἐκάστῳ δικαιομήνῃ ἐινι. οὖν δὲ τι ἄλλο . . . ἐμφαίνειται] sc. ὧν τὸ δίκαιον. So also supra ἐφάνη: sc. ὧν.
Notes: Book IV.

βεβαιώσαμεθ' ἄν, κ.τ.λ.] 'We will fix in our souls,' i.e. we will not only form a clear conception of justice, but will adopt it as our rule of life. There is here an anticipation of the tone assumed at the end of Book ix.

καθ' ὁδὸν] In this expression, as in πρὸς τρόπον, &c., the notion of rightness is included in the noun. 'Your proposal is a right one.'

Let us turn now from the large letters to the small,—from the state to the individual,—and see whether this account of justice and of the other virtues is equally applicable in both cases.

The same words of praise and blame are applied to communities and to individuals. Whence we conclude that the same moral attributes belong equally to both.

But if this be so, and our account of the virtues is right, the soul must have three parts corresponding to the three classes in the state. (We must be content for the present with crude methods of psychological inquiry, only bearing in mind that there is a longer and more certain way.)

The imperfect apprehension of logical distinction in the Socratic age of Greek philosophy is seen in the following discussion, which may be summarized as follows: 'Quantitative difference leaves a quality unchanged. The difference between the state and the individual is only a difference of quantity: therefore the quality of justice in the state and the individual is the same.' It is hardly necessary to point out in our own day that the spheres of law or politics and of morality are only partially co-extensive; or in the language of ancient philosophy, that justice in the state is not the same with justice in the individual. The criticism with which Aristotle commences the Politics, on the erroneous conception of the state as a large family, appears trite to us; in his own age such a criticism afforded a valuable landmark against error. It seems to be directed against Plato.

ἀρ' οὖν . . . ὁμοιόν;] 'Is a nature which is called by the same name, whether it exists in a larger or smaller form, unlike or like in that respect in which it is called by the same name?' In other words, does quantity make any difference to quality? The translation in the English version is not strictly accurate: not two things, but two different forms of the same thing are spoken of.

πάθη τε καὶ ἔξεις] 'affections and qualities.'
435 C
eis fauliou ye . . . xalbeta ta kalda] The irony of Socrates in the use of the term fauliou is taken up seriously in what follows. Cp. supra 423 C fauliou ... fauloteron: 426 A tote auton ou xaria ev ...; which is seriously answered by the words ou pain xarien. xalbeta ta kalda is a maxim which later on is put into Socrates’ mouth, infra vi. 497 D. For empeptwakamev, ‘we have tumbled into,’ cp. the image in v. 453 D av te tie eis kolymbetaivn mikran empesin in te eis to megaston pelagous mesou, k.t.l.

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καὶ τῶν ἐνα ἄρα . . . (c) τῇ πόλει ἡ έκείνοις, sc. τοῖς ἐν τῇ πόλει εἰδειν, αξιούσθει is passive.

D ek tououwv mebdwv, k.t.l.] Plato seems to intimate some ‘dialectic of the future,’ of which he has himself laid the foundation in the Sixth and Seventh Books, where he distinguishes the kinds of knowledge and the faculties corresponding to them: in the present discussion, which does not aim at philosophical accuracy, he will argue from the common use of language. The nature of such a dialectic can only be conjectured: probably Plato would have desired to proceed by some method of ideas in the investigation of the soul: e.g. ‘what idea is that which contains or knows other ideas?’ He might have gone on to speculate on the identity of the ‘Ego’ and the universal. Cp. Theaet. 184 D deioun yap pou ... ei pollai tines en hmin, oswter en doureiais ipsis, aiosthesin egkathnetai, alla mj eis matha idiai, eite psyxh eite o ti dei kalen, panta tauta xyntheie. In Book x. 611 B he hints that the soul is really one and not many.

In similar enigmatic language he appears in the Charmides (169 A) to describe dialectic: megalou de tinos, de filo, andros de, otheis tou to kata panton ikanous didymietai, poteron oidein tov onetwv twv autoiv dinamiv autov pros evnto pefuvn exevn ... h ta mhn, ta de ov. So Phaedrus, 246 A peri de tie ideias autyes (sc. tie psyxh) dide leketon, otei mhn esti, pantet pantos deiws einai kai makrais dihykseis, dei de iouke, anbropineis te kai elaptovos. An application of the words alla ... ayousa, in a sense of which Socrates would doubtless have recognized the truth, may also be made to modern inductive philosophy.

oiaivn wv . . . xromwthva] So far as the expression is concerned, Plato might be referring generally to the methods in use in his own day: cp. vii. 516 A twv nyn legeomenvn allhous: but that he is referring rather to the methods which he has employed in the previous discussion, is shown by the words twv ye proeirhmenvn te kai prosekem-menvn aevos, and also by the reference to this place in vi. 504 B.
Notes: Book IV.

It is clear that if a state has moral attributes, these can only come from the individuals of whom the state is composed. But what is not so clear is whether the three activities which we have identified with our three classes, are functions of three faculties or of one indivisible nature. In other words, is the distinction which we draw between thought, passion and desire, a real distinction?

The soul is one. Is it also many? Let us make sure. We see a top revolve and yet stand still. But that implies that it has an axis and a circumference. For nothing can have opposite activities (or passivities) at the same time with the same part of itself and in the same respect.

Now assest and dissent, desire and repugnance, are opposites.

And thirst is desire of drink,—of that simply, without qualification,—unless the thirst is qualified. One may be thirsty, however, and yet not drink, because reason is opposed to the desire. This proves that reason excludes desire. It remains to distinguish anger from desire and reason. Some may be inclined to identify the two impulsive principles. But the case of Leontius is a refutation of them. For when he was led by a low craving to look at the dead bodies of criminals in the place of execution, a higher impulse struggled with his desire and he was angry with himself. Indeed anger commonly takes part with reason (just as our soldiers support the rulers), wherever injustice is perceived. Yet anger is clearly to be distinguished from reason. For children are irrationally angry,—so are lions and wolves,—and when Odysseus rebuked his spirit, it was the reason in him which checked his passion.

ἀρ' οὖν ἡμῖν, κ.τ.λ. The courageous temper (τὸ θυμοειδὲς) in the state is said to be derived from the individuals who compose the state. Cp. infra viii. 544 D, Ε όσθ' οὖν . . . πίπτε ἄν ἐλευ. But
Socrates again leaves out of sight the fact that the collective courage of a state or an army is in some degree different from the courage of individuals. And yet the conception of the state as an ideal unity different from the individuals who compose it belongs rather to ancient than to modern thought. See Thuc. ii. 60 πολίων πλείων ἔμπασαν ὅρθωμεν ὑφελεῖν τοὺς ἰδιώτας ἢ καθ' ἕκαστον τῶν πολιτῶν εὑραγόιται, αὕριον δὲ σφαλλομένην.

γελοῖον γὰρ ... ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν] ‘For example, in the case of a people who have the character of being passionate, to imagine that this quality does not originate in the individuals, who compose the state, would be ridiculous.’ For the use of αἰτία compare Laws i. 624 θεῖως ... εἰλήφη τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς τῶν νόμων διαθέσεως; and elsewhere αἰτίαν ἔχειν. οὔ δέ: the relative refers to a masculine understood from πόλεσιν, rather than immediately to ἰδιωτῶν.

tὸν ἄνω τόπον] This can hardly mean ‘the Highland country,’ as L. and S. interpret: rather the parts of Europe which are remote from Hellas and the Aegean Sea.

Φώνικας ... Ἀἰγυπτόν] In Laws v. 747 c he passes a similar censure on the Phoenicians and Egyptians, whose institutions are charged with causing πανουργία instead of σοφία, though he is uncertain whether this is to be attributed to the hand of the legislator, to adverse fortune, or to climate. For Thrace and Scythia cp. Arist. Pol. vii. 7, § 2 τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ψυχροῖς τόποις ἐθνὲς καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν Εὐρώπην θυμοῦ μὲν ἐστὶ πλήρη, διανοιάς δὲ ἐνδεχόστερα καὶ τέχνης, κ.τ.λ., which he goes on to contrast with the intellectual and indolent character of the Asiatics, and the union of intellect and passion in the Greek.

The fallacy about the sameness of the state and the individual easily escapes notice. A question of psychology receives more attention, and is imagined to involve a real difficulty:—Does the soul act as a whole or in three parts? Before this question can be resolved, the meaning of sameness and difference has to be ascertained. (1) Opposition in the same relation is to be distinguished from opposition in different relations; in the first case the two members of the opposition are necessarily exclusive or contradictory—they cannot co-exist; but not so in the second. (2) If one of the terms which are correlative (e.g. drink or thirst) is simple, the other should be simple: if one is compound the other must be compound.
Notes: Book IV.

τόδε δὲ ... ἄλλο ἄλλω] 'But this is a real difficulty. Is there one principle here by which we perform our several actions, or three whereby our actions are severally performed?'

τῷ αὐτῷ τοῦτῳ] finds an imperfect antecedent in what precedes: 'this faculty' of which we spoke as δυμοκίνεις, φιλομαθῆς, φιλοχρήματος. τοῦτων ἐκαίστα, the correction of q, would refer to the several actions of the mind.

δὴλον ὅτι ... ὀὐκ ἐθελήσει ἄμα] 'It is clear that the same thing will not do or suffer opposites at the same time, in the same part and in the same relation.'

Can two contradictories be true? Not in the statement of particular facts, when the terms are accurately used and the same relation is preserved. A wheel or top which moves upon a fixed axis or centre may be said to move and not to move, i.e. it may move at its circumference, while its axis (conceived as a vertical straight line) remains still. But the wheel or top cannot move and not move around its axis at the same time: it is ridiculous to maintain that 'the earth goes round the sun in the same sense and at the same time that the sun goes round the earth.' Where in any subject of theological or metaphysical speculation, such as necessity and free-will, or the divisibility of matter, contradictories are said to be equally true, the reason is that neither expression is more than half the truth, and both together are only approximations to the truth. Plato is perhaps arguing with the Heracliteans in this passage. If so, he has got beyond their point of view and reached the region of common sense. Cp. Symp. 187 A, B: Soph. 242 Ε διαφερόμενον γὰρ ὑπὶ ξυμφέρεται, φασίν αἱ συντονώτεραι τῶν μονώτων, κ.τ.λ.

οὗ ταῦτων ἥν] The imperfect of εἰμί is nowhere used simply for the present, but either (1) with some reference to the past as in ix. 580 ὅ τὸ μὲν, φαμέν, ἥν, referring to the discussion at iv. 439 ὅ: or (2), as in this passage, supra 428 A, and x. 609 B, implying an assertion of existence confirmed by inquiry and therefore prior to it,—'was all along.' Compare the expression τὸ τί ἥν εἶμαι, in which the past tense refers to the essence as prior to our conception of it.

οὐκοῦν ... περιφέρονται] 'And suppose such an objector were still further to display his wit by subtly arguing that tops at any...
rate, when they spin round with their pegs fixed on the same spot, stand and are moved in their entirety at the same time.

These are apparent exceptions to Plato's law of contradiction which have to be cleared away before we are in a condition to determine whether the parts of the soul are really opposed. There would be no distinction of ὑπὸς and ἐνθύμια unless the actions which flow from the one principle excluded those which flow from the other.

ὅς οὖ κατὰ ταῦτα . . . φερομένων] τὰ τοιαῦτα is to be taken as cognate accusative with the participles. 'Since things which act in this way are not at such moments in motion and at rest with the same parts of themselves,'

πάθοι . . . ποιήσεις] The words εἴη η καὶ to which Stallbaum objects as unmeaning, and which he supposes to have crept in from the termination of ποιήσεις, have the authority of the best MSS. They are more likely to have been omitted than inserted. Nor is there any objection to them on the ground of want of sense. Because the categories of ποιεῖν and πάσχειν are correlatives there is no reason why εἴναι should not be interposed between them, the three together answering to active, intransitive, passive.

ἐνα μη ἀναγκαξάμεθα . . . μηκύνειν] 'that we may not be compelled to be tedious by going right through all such objections, and satisfying ourselves that they are untrue.'

ὑποθέμενοι . . . ἔσεσθαι] He means to say that he will not guard every possible case: if any assumption on which the argument turns is found to be erroneous, the consequences which follow shall be withdrawn. Cp. supra 434 ο μηδεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πο πάνν παγίος αὐτὸ λέγωμεν.

προσάγεσθαι] 'to draw to oneself,' i. e. to accept.

ἀπωθεῖσθαι] 'to reject.'

τῶν ἐναντιῶν *ἀν ἄλληλοις] The insertion of ἄν seems necessary, and it may easily have dropped out between -ων and ἄλ-

ἔτει ποιημάτων . . . παθημάτων] 'Activities or passivities as the case may be.'

οὐδὲν γὰρ ταῦτα διώσει] i. e. this relation of opposition is equally possible between activities and passivities.
Notes: Book IV.

εἰς τὸ ἀπωθεῖν . . . θῆσομεν] Compare Soph. 235 λ εἰς γόητα . . .

θετέων (sc. αὐτῶν) τινά.

ἀρ' οὖν, καθ' ὅσον, κ.τ.λ.] He means to say that if one of two
relative terms is qualified the other must also be qualified: e. g.
simple thirst is relative to simple drink, but great thirst implies
much drink, hot thirst cold drink, and so on.

η οὖ] The false reading πον seems originally to have had a
place in Par. λ (η οὖ: πον mg). Hermann's inversion of ψυχροῦ
and θερμοῦ for the sake of symmetry makes nonsense of the passage;
see infra 438 ε καὶ οὖ τε λέγω, ἡς, ὅσον ἄν ἦ, τοιαῦτα καὶ ἐστιν.

tου δὲ τοιου . . . τὰ προσγινώμενα] 'But the accessories of the
desire are relative to this or that quality in the object of desire.'

μήτοι τις, κ.τ.λ.] The objection ends with the words χρηστοῦ
σίτου. It is restated in a different and more general form by
Socrates in the following sentence (πάντες γάρ . . . αἱ ἄλλαι οὐτω).
Plato leaves the objection for a time (until 439 λ), and proceeds to
show more clearly how the qualification of one term of a relation
inevitably involves the qualification of the other. Then returning
to the case of thirst in 439 λ he states that thirst simple is neither
of much nor of little, neither of good nor of bad drink, but simply
of drink. He does not fully criticize the objection. Had he done
so, he would probably have gone on to contest the fact that 'all
desire is of good.' Obviously the desire of the drunkard is not of
drink that is good for him—or to explain that the statement could
only be accepted as true if 'desire' is used in an ideal sense and
therefore implying the qualification of it by the word 'good.'

ἰσως γάρ ἄν, κ.τ.λ.] γάρ means, 'You are right to call attention
to this, for,' &c.

τοιαῦτα οἰα εἶναι του] For the technical use of the genitive to
express relation, cp. Thcaet. 160 λ Ἀνάγκη δὲ γε ἐμέ τε τινὸς γίγ-
νεσθαι, κ.τ.λ.

οὐκ ἐμαθεῖς, κ.τ.λ.] The example of comparatives is next taken,
to which the same principle applies. 'Greater' is relative to
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‘smaller,’ ‘heavier’ to ‘lighter,’ ‘more’ to ‘fewer.’ But if one of the terms in these several pairs is qualified, the other must also be qualified. Thus ‘much greater’ is relative to ‘much smaller,’ ‘much heavier’ to ‘much lighter,’ ‘many more’ to ‘many fewer.’

A similar transition is made in the Charmides, from the relation between sense and knowledge, and the objects of sense and knowledge, to comparative terms: 168 B καὶ γὰρ τὸ μεῖζὸν φαμέν τοιαύτην τινὰ ἔχειν δύναμιν, ὡστε τινὸς εἶναι μεῖζον; c οὐκόν καὶ εἴ τι διπλάσιον ἐστι τῶν τε ἄλλων διπλάσιων καὶ ἑαυτοῦ, ἡμίσεως δήπον ὄντος ἑαυτοῦ τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων διπλάσιων ἄν εἴη: ibid. πλεῖον δὲ αὐτοῦ ὃν οὐ καὶ ἔλαττον ἔσται, καὶ βαρύτερον δὲν, κοντφύτερον, καὶ πρεσβύτερον δὲν νεώτερον, καὶ τὰλλα πάντα ὀσμύτων;

C τὰ διπλάσια πρὸς τὰ ἡμίσεια] The same rule applies to these terms as to ‘greater’ and ‘smaller,’ ‘more’ and ‘fewer,’ a ‘larger double’ is relative to a ‘larger half.’ The double of 6 (=12) is a larger double than the double of 4 (=8): and the larger half (6) is relative to the larger double (12): the smaller half (4) to the smaller double (8).

ti δὲ τὰ περὶ τὰς ἐπιστήμας; κ.τ.λ.] So with regard to sciences: the object of science is knowledge, but the object of a particular science is a particular kind of knowledge. With ti δὲ, σοὶ δοκεῖ may be supplied.

ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος] sc. τούτων ἐστὶ.


αὐτα] ‘themselves,’ i.e. without their accidents. The simple correlatives are simply of each other, the qualified correlatives are of the qualified.

αὐτῶν μόνων] sc. δὲν ἐστίν.

E καὶ οὔ τι λέγω, κ.τ.λ.] The qualities of the two terms of a relation, though correlative, are not necessarily identical, e.g. as we have seen above, hot thirst is of cold drink; or to take the case of knowledge and its objects: there is a sub-division of things which are objects of knowledge into healthy things; and there is a subdivision of knowledge corresponding to these healthy things; but because the objects are healthy it does not follow that the knowledge which is concerned with them, although distinguished from other kinds of knowledge, is healthy too. As these objects are
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distinguished from other objects by the possession of a particular quality (i.e. health), so the knowledge which is relative to them is distinguished from other kinds of knowledge by possessing a peculiar quality (i.e. having to do with health).

τὸ δὲ δὴ δίψοι ... (439 a) πώματος γε] 'Will you not say that thirst, said I, is in this class, the class of relations, as far as its essence is concerned. Thirst is, I imagine,— Yes, said he, thirst is of drink.' Two questions are asked; before the second is completed Glaucon breaks in with a reply to the first (ἐγώγε): and in πώματος γε he completes and answers the second. The order of words in the first question is οὖθες εἰ τὸ δίψοι εἰναι τούτων τῶν τινώς (sc. ὅπως) and in adding τούτω ὅπερ ἐστίν, sc. εἰναι, τούτων is neglected. For a brachylogy similar to that in τῶν τινώς cp. Phil. 16 ν τῶν ἐν ἐκείνων.

The bearing of this passage on the argument appears to be as follows. The object of Socrates is to establish a difference between θυμὸς, ἐπιθυμία and λόγος, and to show that these are primary elements of the soul. In order to meet the possible objection—that these are not distinct elements, as is shown by such phrases as a 'reasonable' or a 'passionate desire,' or 'a reasonable anger,' he insists that 'desire' or 'anger' are in themselves simple, and that they become qualified by the addition of something apart from them and different from them.

οὐ γὰρ δὴ ... πράττοι] 'For surely as we maintain, the same thing cannot do opposite things with the same part of itself in reference to the same thing at the same time.' αὐ is to be supplied from the previous sentence: cp. for parallels i. 352 ε, ii. 382 ε, and notes.

tοῦ τοξότου] cp. supra 428 a and note.

πότερον, κ.τ.λ.] A man may be thirsty and not choose to drink: but this is because there is present in him another principle (usually reason) besides thirst, which masters his thirst.

τὰ τοιαῦτα] i.e. the indulgence of appetite generally.

διὰν ἐγγίγνῃται] Plato never loses an opportunity of saying that 'all men have not' right reason. Cp. Theaet. 186 c τὰ δὲ περὶ τούτων ἀναλογίσματα πρὸς τε οὐσίαν καὶ ὕφελειαν μόχις καὶ ἐν χρόνω διὰ πολλῶν πραγμάτων καὶ παθεῖαν παραγίγνεται οἰς ἀν καὶ παραγίγνεται.

diá... νοσημάτων] 'through the incidence of morbid conditions.'
From the rule that the same principle when rightly defined cannot have two contradictory effects is inferred that the desire to drink and the power to abstain from drinking proceed from different elements in the soul.

The perfect signifies a perpetual or constantly recurring state, 'is in a continual flutter.' Cp. vii. 521 ετευτυκαί.

The opposition of desire and reason is admitted. Are desire and anger equally opposed? At first sight the impression is that they are nearly related.

'To one or other of these.' The indefinite πότερος (L. and S. s.v.) occurs several times in Plato. It is hardly found in other Greek writers of the classical period.

An anecdote is introduced to prove that a similar opposition may exist between anger and desire as between reason and desire. The interpretation of ποτὲ ἀκούσας τι πιστεύω τούτω is difficult; the best explanation of the words as they stand is as follows: 'I once heard a story in which I put faith,' and which implies that anger is not akin to desire. [Possibly, however, a negative οὐ has been dropped before πιστεύω. 'I once heard a tale which makes me doubt that suggestion of yours.' L. C.]

I.e. the outer wall on the north running from Athens to the Peiraeus. The middle wall (τὸ διὰ μέσου τείχος), which was parallel to the north wall, is mentioned in the Gorgias (455 ε): it also extended from Athens to Peiraeus, and was so called because it lay between the north wall and another wall which ran to Phalerum. Thus a fortified open space communicating between Athens and the Peiraeus, and not merely a wall, was still preserved as a means of communication between Athens and the Peiraeus, even if the north wall were captured.

The story is that Leontius, son of Aglaion, going up from the Peiraeus underneath the north wall on the out-
side observing dead bodies lying by the executioner' [or 'at the executioner's,' L. C.], &c. There is no reason to read δημείῳ for δημιοί. The spot is sufficiently described as outside the north wall on the road from Peiraeus to Athens, being also the spot where the executioner would naturally be found.

ιδοὺ ύμῖν . . . ὡς κακοδαίμονες] 'There's for you, wretches!'

οὗτος μέντοι . . . ὁ λόγος] 'This tale, however.' μέντοι contrasts the inference suggested by Leontius' words with Glaucon's first impression.

οὐκοῦν καὶ ἄλλοθι . . . (b) τοῦ τοιοῦτοῦ] 'The subject is at first the man himself, but changes to τὸν θυμὸν' as the sentence proceeds. Cp. supra 4.11 b.

αὐτῶν κοινωνήσαντα] sc. τὸν θυμὸν.

αἱροῦντος λογού μὴ δεῖν ἀντιπράττειν] 'When reason decides that she is not to be opposed.' The omission of ἵσυν (sc. τῷ λόγῳ) after ἀντιπράττειν is sufficiently supported by instances (L. and S., s.v. ἀντιπράσσω 2). The reading of the principal MSS. has therefore been retained, and may be construed as above. There is no distinct subject of ἀντιπράττειν, with which either θυμόν or ἐπιθυμίαν or τὸν ἀνθρωπὸν, or all together may be supplied. The other reading, ἄν τι πράττειν, accepted by Bekker, is obviously an emendation, which gives a poor sense. Stallbaum places a comma after δεῖν, and construes as follows:—'But that the spirit, making common cause with the desires when reason insists that its making common cause is wrong (μὴ δεῖν, sc. κοινωνήσαι), should oppose reason,' &c.,—a method of taking the words which is harsher than the other.

The sentence is an anacoluthon, the structure of κοινωνήσαντα being broken by τοῦ τοιοῦτοῦ αἰσθέσθαι, which is substituted for ἴδεῖν.

ὅταν ἀδικεῖσθαι τις ἡγηταὶ . . . (b) πραῦνθη] The subject of ζεῖ, κ.τ.λ., is ὁ θυμός from the previous sentence, as appears from ὅσπερ κῶν ὧπο νομέως. But the θυμός is closely identified with the person in whom it forms the active principle. Hence πάρ' αὐτῷ, 'with the man's self.'

διὰ *τοῦ πεινῆν, κ.τ.λ.] Cp. infra 4.42 c διὰ τὲ λυπῶν καὶ ἤδων: vi. 494 d διὰ τοσοῦτον κακῶν. The reading is conjectural. The manuscript reading διὰ τὸ can only be defended in one of two ways. Either (1) connecting διὰ τὸ . . . πάσχειν directly with οὖληγε τῶν γενναίων = 'he does not on that account desist from noble efforts,'
the words καὶ νικά καὶ being introduced διὰ μίσου: or (2) [B. J.] 'and because it (sc. passion) endures hunger and cold and other such sufferings patiently,' &c. (πεινην ὑπομένων being equivalent to ὑπομενεὶν πεινῶν). The words καὶ νικά καὶ οὖ λῆγει, κ.τ.λ., present considerable difficulty, and involve a contradiction if νικά and οὖ λῆγει are supposed to refer to the same struggle, because they put together conjunctively (καὶ ... καὶ) what should be joined disjunctively (ἡ ... ἡ). The difficulty is somewhat obviated if νικά and οὖ λῆγει, κ.τ.λ., are taken to refer to different struggles,—the former to the struggle between θυμός and ἐπιθυμία within the injured man himself, as exemplified in his endurance of hunger and cold in the attempt to satisfy his anger, the latter to the struggle in which the injured man strives to avenge himself on his injurer.

καίτοι γ'] 'And indeed'—a common use in Homer, rare in Attic.

ἀλλ' *ἡ ... ἐνθυμεῖ:] 'But do you bear this also in mind, I wonder?' *ἡ, the conjecture of Ast, is more expressive than εἰ, the manuscript reading. Εἰ in Hellenistic Greek (Matt. xii. 10), as in Homer (Od. i. 158) is used with directly interrogative force. But this only helps to account for the corruption.

'E̓ oμεθα] refers to the suggestion hesitatingly put forward by GlaucOn, supra 439 E Ἰσως, ἕφη, (τὸ τοῦ θυμοῦ ἀν εἰ ὀμοφυνές) . . . τῷ ἐπιθυμητικῷ. Socrates, as in other passages, courteously assumes a share of the responsibility of a suggestion which has proved erroneous.

τίθεσθαι τὰ ὀπλα πρὸς τοῦ λογιστικοῦ] 'Arrays itself on the side of the rational part.'

φύσει, ἕκαν μή ... διαφθαρή] These words seem to imply an admission that the statement in 440 B goes beyond the actual fact, and represents what Plato regards as the normal condition. It is only in the uncorrupted soul that passion always obeys reason. It may, in perverted natures, become subject to the many-headed monster, i.e. the desires, cp. ix. 590 B, where the depravation of θυμός is described, especially in the words κολακεία δὲ καὶ ἀνελευθερία οὐχ ὅταν τις τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο, τὸ θυμοειδὲς, ὑπὸ τῷ ὄχλῳ δέδωκε θρησκία τινὴ καὶ ἔνεκα χρημάτων καὶ τῆς ἐκείνου ἀπληστίας προσπηλακιζόμενον ἐθιζή ἐκ νέου ἀντὶ λέοντος πίθηκον γίγνεσθαι;

ἄνάγκη, ἕφη, τρίτον] sc. τοῦτο εἶναι.
That passion or spirit is the ally of reason against appetite has been already shown. But is there any difference between passion and reason? Yes, for passion exists in children who have not attained to reason, and in irrational animals. A further proof of their opposition is given by Homer, who makes the reasoning principle rebuke senseless wrath.

Since, then, it is proved that the state and the individual are alike resolvable into three elements, it may be assumed that wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice are severally referable to corresponding parts and relations in either. Justice in the individual as in the state exists when reason, passion, and desire perform severally their proper functions. And this end is secured by the united influence of music and gymnastic applied to the two higher elements, which together will rule and keep guard over the third. Courage in the individual as in the state is the virtue of the spirited element, and consists in tenacity of patriotic resolve; temperance is the harmony between higher and lower; wisdom is the supremacy of the rational element. The 'small letters' are now as legible as the large. And our theory will stand the test of common instances. For the actions of the just man, as we have defined him, are in accordance with popular notions of justice. Our presentiment that justice would be found in the interaction of the various classes of the community has been more than confirmed. But the principle of the division of labour which we then asserted was but a shadow of the deeper truth, that there are these three elements in the soul of man, whose right and consentaneous working constitutes him just. Such is justice, then, in states and individuals.

Compare Parmen. 137 A ἔνως χρὴ τηλικόνδε οὖν διανεύσαι τοιούτων τε καὶ τοιούτων πλήθος λόγων.

like μετρίως, is an expression of moderation, which is not, however, to be taken very strictly—'we are fairly agreed.'

Socrates determines that we reason with one part of the soul, and desire with another, and are angry with another. This is an important beginning in the science of psychology. For though
a thinker of the Megarian school may argue that the soul is without parts (and Plato himself hints as much—Book x. p. 611), the thing intended is nevertheless true, that there are different and opposite effects which may be ascribed in a figure to parts of the soul. The division does not interfere with the higher unity in which they meet. A limb is dead when cut off from the source of life; a faculty is unmeaning which is independent of the mind and of other faculties. But the body or mind which had no limbs or faculties would be incapable of being made the subject of inquiry or of description.

Psychology seems to rest (1) on language, which expresses in a crude and general manner, subject to the conditions of language, the collective reflections of the human mind about itself; the common use of terms which has come down from former ages is partially modified (α) by the efforts of great thinkers, who stamp words anew, and (β) by the experience of mankind, which insensibly changes their meaning: names which have originally referred to material objects insensibly pass into the sphere of mind: (2) on consciousness, which suggests rather than proves, and the facts or results of which are generally lost in the attempt to define them: (3) on external observation (α) of the physical antecedents of mental states or habits, which, however, fall very far short of the whole secret of the mind: (β) of outward acts either seen by the eye or verified by the independent testimony of several observers,—and admitting sometimes of being tabulated in the form of statistics: these form the principal scientific ground of psychological inquiry: (4) on history, which traces the continuity of the human mind in all ages and countries, though with many breaks and chasms: which shows the impossibility of explaining mental phenomena within the limits of the individual: which helps to separate the abstract from the concrete, the ideas of the understanding or reason from the colours of mythology or imagination: which subjects the mental world to our use by showing us our place in the whole. There is no science in which we are more likely to be imposed upon by words: in none is greater care required that the parts should not be separated from the whole; in none is more left to the subtlety of individual apprehension. The greatest use of such a science is not to supply positive information about the mind or the faculties of the mind, but to quicken the habit of observation of ourselves and others.
Notes: Book IV.

For this idiomatic pleonasm cp. Soph. Trach. 263, 264, Philoct. 1370, 1371 διπλὴν μὲν... διπλὴν δὲ, κ.τ.λ.

ἀμφότερα] The individual and the state.

τῷ τὸ ἐαυτοῦ... γενῶν] The order is τῷ ἐκαστὸν τριῶν ὄντων ἐν ἀντί γενῶν πρῶτοι τῷ ἐαυτοῦ.

τὸ μὲν] sc. τὸ λογιστικὸν, τὸ δὲ, sc. τὸ θυμοειδὲς.

ἡμερούσα ἁρμονία τε καὶ ῥυθμός] Cp. iii. 401 D, 412 A.

καὶ τούτῳ... *προστάτησετον] The MSS. give προστάτησετον, which would mean,—'And so music and gymnastic' (the subject is supplied from μουσικῆς καὶ γυμναστικῆς κράσις above), 'will place these two' (reason and anger), 'which have been thus nurtured and have learned their parts and been educated, in authority over the concupiscient element.' There is a harshness in this change from the singular to the dual with a dual object, and in the further change of subject in τηρήσετον to which the subject appears to be τὸ λογιστικὸν καὶ τὸ θυμοειδὲς. To avoid this Bekker has, without manuscript authority, altered προστάτησετον into προστάτησετον,—'these two' (reason and anger) 'will preside,' &c. But the correction is not absolutely necessary, and therefore; like all emendations which are not absolutely necessary, should not be admitted into the text. [B. J.]

δ Τηρήσετον... (v) ἀνατρέψῃ] 'Over this part of the soul they (reason and passion) will keep guard, lest waxing great with fullness of bodily pleasures, as they are termed, and no longer confined to her own sphere, the concupiscient soul should attempt to enslave and rule those who are not her natural born subjects, and overturn the common life of all.' For the use of οὐκ αὖ, referring to τὰ αὐτῶν μαθών (supra), cp. iii. 393 n, and note: vi. 499 D τῶν δὲ πολλῶν, ἤν δ᾽ εὖ, ὅτι οὐκ ἄδε, ἐρείς; Bekker reads γενῶν for γένει with δ᾽, these MSS. also give προσήκεν for προσήκον with Stobaeus—probably the right reading.


πάντων] sc. τῶν μερῶν, which, in Plato's figurative language, are spoken of as a community: cp. infra ἐκάστῳ τε καὶ ΔΛΦ τῷ κοινῷ σφών αὐτῶν τριῶν ὄντων.

σοφῶν δὲ γε ἐκείνῳ τῷ σμικρῷ μέρει, τῷ δ᾽ ἥρχε τ᾽ ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ ταῦτα παρῆγγελλεν] The reference in the first words, ἐκείνῳ τῷ σμικρῷ...
taùta parèγγελλειν] referring to τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου παραγγελθέν supra, and both containing a reference to supra 429 c, where the instruction is given not by reason to the individual, but by the lawgiver to the state. The imperfect refers to the time of education.

ἐχον ὄν κάκεινο, κ.τ.λ.] ‘that again too having in itself a knowledge, the knowledge of what is advantageous to each and to the whole community which is composed of them, being three in number.’ Reason has in itself a knowledge (i.e. of the expedient for each and all), as it was implied in the previous sentence that θυμός had received a knowledge (i.e. of what is or is not fearful).

D τὸ τε ἀρχον καὶ τῷ ἀρχομένῳ] the one ruling principle of reason, and the two subject ones of passion and desire.

στασιάζωσιν αὐτῷ] sc. τῷ ἀρχομένῳ τῷ ἀρχοντι.

ὥς πολλάκις λέγομεν] Cp. ii. 368 a for a similar ‘pronominal’ phrase.

τὶ οὖν; . . . ἐφάντ;] ‘Is justice in any way more dim to our eyes, so as to appear other than she appeared in the state?’ Justice, as now seen in the individual, has the same form under which she appeared in the state, and the outlines are as sharp in every way. In ii. 368 c the form of justice in the individual was said to require a keen vision. And a visual image, if seen more dimly in one position than in another, might be said ἀπαμβλύνεσθαι. As elsewhere, the attribute of perception is transferred to the thing perceived.

E ὅδε γὰρ . . . προσφέροντες] ‘Because if there be any doubt lingering in our minds we may thoroughly convince ourselves in this way;—by applying to it (i.e. to justice as we define it) the test of common-place notions.’ αὐτῷ refers to δικαιοσύνη, as elsewhere, a neuter taking up a feminine. προσφέρειν is used as in Phileb. 23 a τὴν ἀκριβοτάτην αὐτῇ προσφέροντα βάσανον. Plato uses common opinion, not without disdain, as a confirmation of his philosophical definition. The common notions about justice, which when adduced by Polus and Cephalus are rejected as superficial and external, are now used ‘as witnesses’ to the soundness of the deeper conception. Cp. supra 433 e, where the definition of
justice in the state is illustrated by the legal notion of justice, viz.  

τελευν ἄρα . . . τὸ ἐνύπνιον . . . δ ἐφαμὲν ὑποπετεύσαι]  ‘Our dream, then, is fulfilled, I mean the suspicion which we expressed.’  

The antecedent to δ is in apposition to τὸ ἐνύπνιον, and δ is a cognate accusative, governed by ὑποπετεύσαι. In what follows, the reference is to supra 432 D κινδυνεύομεν τι ἔχειν ἢνος, and 433 A δ γὰρ ἐκ ἀρχῆς ἐθεμέθα . . . ὅτε τὴν πύλην κατωκιζομεν. That again refers back to ii. 370 ff. And an anticipation of the dream occurs at ib. 371 E, 372 A ποῦ οὖν ἐντούτοις ἔν αὐτῇ εἶν ἢ τε δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἢ ἀδικία; . . . ἐν αὐτῶν τοίχων χρείας τινί. There is also some reference to supra 432 D. It follows that ἀρχόμενοι in the present passage is in the imperfect tense, and ἐμπεβηκέναι pluperfect: ‘how that in the very commencement of our foundation of the state we had lighted (it would seem) upon a certain beginning and impress of justice.’  

ἀρχόμενοι τῆς πόλεως οἰκίζειν] lit. ‘making a beginning of the city to found it.’ So v. 450 B μετροι . . . τοιούτων λόγων ἀκοῦειν.  

κινδυνεύομεν] In recalling the language of supra 432 D κινδυνεύομεν τι ἔχειν ἢνος, Plato retains the direct form, although κινδυνεύομεν would have been more regular.  

τὸ δὲ γε ἦν ἄρα . . . δὲ δ καὶ ὡφελεί, εἰδωλόν τι τῆς δικαιοσύνης] ‘And this (the division of labour) was really a sort of shadow of justice. Hence the advantage of it,’ i.e. because it partakes of the nature of justice. τὸ refers to ἀρχήν τε καὶ τύπον τινὰ τῆς δικαιοσύνης and is further explained by τὸ τὸν μέν, κ.τ.λ.  

τὸ δὲ γε ἀληθὲς] ‘Whereas in reality.’ The words oppose what, after inquiry, has been found out to be the case, to what at one time they suspected to be the case. The construction of this sentence is as follows: τοιοῦτο is first explained in the clause ἀλλ’ οὐ περὶ τὴν ἐξο πράξει τινὰ ἐν αὐτῶν καὶ τὰ ἐκατόν, and what follows (μὴ ἔσαστα . . . περὶ τὰ τὸ ἑαυτὸν ἑμιδόλαια) is again an explanation of the second part of this explanatory clause (περὶ τὴν ἑκατόν ἀληθῶς περὶ ἑκατόν καὶ τὰ ἑκατόν). οὔτω δὴ πράττειν resumes the participial clauses from μὴ ἔσαστα . . . σώφρονα καὶ ἡμιοσιμέον. Plato passes from explanation to a more general characterization of justice in the words ἐν πᾶσι τοιούτις ἡγούμενοι, κ.τ.λ.  

τοιοῦτο μὲν τι] ‘Something of this kind’: i.e. a sort of doing one’s own business.
'but not concerned with the performance of any external action of his own, but with internal actions which are in very truth concerned with himself and are his own.'

The omission of the article τῶν is supplemented by the addition of τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γένη below.

Having in very truth arranged his proper home business well. For what is more ὀικεῖον than a man's soul, and what arrangements more perfect than what is here described?

'and having harmonized the three elements, just as if they were three notes of a scale of a higher, middle and lower string.' The scale contemplated seems to be the octave: νεάτης, ὑπάτης, μέσης, sc. χορδῆς. The Greek 'highest' note (ὑπάτης) corresponds to our 'lowest,' the 'lowest' (νεάτης) to our 'highest.'

The words εἰ ἄλλα ἄττα μεταξύ (suggested by the intermediate notes of the lyre) are observable, as seeming to imply that Plato did not wish his threefold division of the soul to be taken as strictly exhaustive.

The distinction between ἐπιστήμη and δόξα is here assumed.

Injustice is the strife of the three elements with one another, the insurrection of a part against the whole, the rebellion of the lower nature against that which has natural authority.

Having determined so much we have no difficulty in distinguishing what actions are just and what are unjust. And we perceive that virtue is health and vice disease in the soul.

Let us ask once more, Is it expedient to be just or unjust, apart from opinion, human or divine? It is no longer possible to ask the question seriously. For if incurable bodily disease makes life not worth living, how utterly unprofitable must it be, if the soul which is the principle of life is diseased? However, we must complete our survey, and describe the forms of unrighteousness. They are innumerable, but four may be selected as sufficiently distinct for our examination. These four severally correspond to four forms of
political constitution. The just life, which is the fifth, answers to Kingship or Aristocracy.

οὐκὸν στάσιν τινά, κ.τ.λ.] Evil, unrighteousness, injustice are regarded by Plato here and in other passages (e.g. Soph. 228 a) as a sort of distraction or dissolution. They can only exist to a certain degree, because they would be destructive to that in which they are contained. As he says in i. 352 b, there is no such thing as perfect injustice, for that would be suicidal: enough justice must remain to keep injustice together.

No single aspect includes all the forms of evil, which varies infinitely with the characters and circumstances of mankind. (i) Evil may be represented as weakness: the higher nature, though not absolutely extinct, habitually and without resistance giving way to the lower: ἄκρασία, δείλια. Or (ii) as mere negation or privation of good: the diverse, transient, irrational principle, which has been imagined to stand in the same relation to God that physical impurity does to ourselves. (iii) Evil may be conceived as strength; the merely animal passing into a diabolical nature, the reason giving a malignant intensity to the passions, doing and suffering without end in this world and another,—τὸν δ’ ἐχοντα καὶ μιᾶν ζωτικῶν παρέχονταν (x. 610 e: cp. vi. 491 B). (iv) Evil may be summed up under the two commonest forms of evil: (a) untruth—ψευδός: (β) sensuality—ἀκαλασία. (γ) Evil, according to some theological writers, is the preference of self to God or other men. Lastly (vi) evil is strife, or εἰσιν ἑαυτοῖς μεροὺς τίνος τῷ δλῳ τῆς ψυχῆς, as in this passage; or, as in the Epistles of St. Paul, the consciousness of sin. To Plato evil appears more under the aspect of deformity and untruth than to modern writers, and less under that of sensuality; also more as political and social, and less as spiritual and moral. Yet in the picture of the tyrant and the tyrannical man in the Republic (Book ix), and in the discussion of the Gorgias respecting the chastisement of evil, the effect of evil in the individual is also strongly felt and expressed.'

οὐκοῦν...τῷ τοῦ ἀρχικοῦ γένους ὄντι] ‘Must not it (i.e. injustice) on the other hand be a kind of quarrel between these three, a meddlesomeness and interference and rising up of a part of the soul against the whole in order that it may rule over her when it has no right, but is of such a nature as to be properly the slave to that which is of the royal race.’

The majority of MSS., including Par. A, read τοιοῦτον...δον-
πλάτων, τοῦ δ' αὖ δουλεύειν ἀρχικοῦ γένους ὄντι (ὄντος Μ: ὄντε q). Vind. 
ε ἔχει τὸν δ' αὖ μὴ δουλεύειν, ἀρχικοῦ γένους ὄντι. Τούτῳ λέγεται. 

Τῷ τοῦ ἀρχικοῦ γένους ὄντι, Κ. Τ. Λ. λέγεται. ἡ λέξις τοῦ ἀρχικοῦ γένους ὄντι, 

άλλα ὁπερεῖ ὁ προσθηκόν (κ. ο. αὐτῷ ἀρχεῖν). ἐν τῷ τοῦ ἀρχικοῦ γένους ὄντι, 

τὸ δὲ νόσον παρὰ φύσιν, κ.τ.λ. ] sc. τὸ δὲ νόσον ποιεῖν ἐστὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ 

σώματι παρὰ φύσιν καθιστᾶν ἄρχειν τε καὶ ἀρχῆσθαι ἄλλο ὑπ' ἄλλου. 

Justice is the health of the soul, is beauty, is harmony, is fitness, 

is division of labour, is nature, is happiness: of all which injustice 

is the contrary. Already at this stage of the argument our old 

question about their comparative expediency has become ridicu-

lous,' and can no longer be seriously entertained. 

τῆς δὲ αὐτοῦ τοῦτο . . . ἀρετῆν κτήσεται] 'And when the very 

principle of our life is thrown into confusion and is going to 

pieces, shall we be told that it is worth a man’s while to live, 

whatever course he choose to follow, unless he finds some means of escaping 

from vice and injustice, and of acquiring justice and virtue?' δὲ 

marks the transition from the trivial to the more important case. 

The general drift of the sentence is, that nothing can make life 

bearable to the unjust, except the prospect of escape from injustice. 

For a similar mode of expressing an 'a fortiori' argument cp. 

i. 336 εὶ μὴ γὰρ δὴ οἶον . . . φανερὰ αὐτῷ καὶ σημεῖον. οὐ, not μὴ, is 

used because the clause depends on δοκεῖ and not on the conditional 

particle εἰ, which introduces the whole sentence. The negative 

belonging to the direct form is retained in the indirect. The fresh 

protasis, εάν τε λανθάνῃ, is added in the development of the thought 

independently of the preceding participial clause, so that the sen-
tence has a twofold protasis, or in other words, εἴναις, κ.τ.λ., modifies the apodosis.

*ἀποκμητέον*] This is Bekker’s conjecture for ἀποκμητέον, the MS. reading. The change is very slight, and is justified by the general exactness of the replies in the Platonic dialogue. It is obvious that Glaucon is intended to emphasize (with characteristic ardour) what Socrates has just said. He is much less likely to have used a different expression than the copyists are to have written the commoner for the rarer word. And the form ἀποκμητέον, though not occurring elsewhere, is perfectly legitimate.

ἀ γε δὴ καὶ ἀξία θέασ] Plato will not assert that his division is exhaustive. Cp. viii. 544 D ἡ των ἄλλην ἔχεις ἰδέαν πολιτείας, ἦτις καὶ ἐν ἐκείνῃ διαφανεῖ τινὰ κείμεν; Similarly in Theaet. 156 B it is said that modes of sensation are infinite, though only a few of them have distinct names.

ὡσπερ ἀπὸ σκοπεῖα] The course of the argument which had once kept Socrates and his companions watching a thicket, has now taken them up to a mountain top, from which they have a wide and clear survey of human things,—of the one form of virtue and the countless forms of vice. The graphic use of δεύρο has prepared for this.

ἐγγενομένου . . . ἀριστοκρατία] Cp. Polit. 297 C peri σμικρῶν τι καὶ ὀλίγων καὶ τὸ ἐν ἐκείνῃ διαφανεί τινὰ κείμεν; D

οὕτε γὰρ ἀν πλείουσ ὦτε εἰς ἐγγενόμενοι] ‘For the accident of there being one, or more than one of them will not lead them to disturb any fundamental law of the state so long as they observe the nurture and education which we have described.’

τῶν ἀξίων λόγου νόμων τῆς πόλεως] For the partitive genitive= ‘any of them,’ cp. Gorgias 514 A δημοσίᾳ πράξαντες τῶν πολιτικῶν πραγμάτων.

BOOK V.

At this point Socrates is interrupted by a whispered conversation between Adeimantus and Polemarchus, who has not failed to notice the application of the proverb ‘Friends have all things in common’ to the question of marriage (iv. 423 ε). He and Adeimantus are agreed that Socrates must be challenged to explain himself on a matter of such paramount importance as the relation of the sexes.
Socrates admits that the subject is one on which it would be calamitous to miss the truth, but for that very reason he is reluctant to speak. In the end, however, he yields to their request.

perί ἰδιωτῶν ψυχῆς τρόπου κατασκευήν] perί κατασκευήν τρόπον ψυχῆς ἰδιωτῶν is the order of the words. Each form of constitution has a form of the individual life corresponding to it.

ἐν τέταρτη, κ.τ.λ.] The subject of the four perverted forms of the state is resumed again in Book viii.

σμικρὸν γὰρ ἀπωτέρω τοῦ Ἀδειμαντοῦ καθήστο] That is, Polemar-chus sat a little further away from Socrates than Adeimantus did. He is supposed to draw the latter away from Socrates and to whisper in his ear. This explains how a conversation could be carried on of which Socrates heard only the last words.

λαβόμενος ... παρὰ τὸν ὦμον] ‘having taken hold of him (αὐτοῦ) by his garment, high up, close to the shoulder.’

tί μάλιστα, ἐφη ... ἡμῖν δοκεῖς, ἐφη] tί μάλιστα is taken in two senses: in the first case as meaning ‘what in particular?’ and in the second case ‘why in particular?’ This play of words cannot be maintained in English.

ἐτι ἐγὼ εἶπον] is the reading of all the MSS. but Ven. Σ, in which ὅτι ε. c. is found. (A trace of the same reading appears in M, which reads ὅτι, according to Signor Rostagno. Schneider asserts that ἐτι is the reading of q, notwithstanding the silence of Bekker.) The alteration to ὅτι ... τί (‘because of what?’) is no improvement in the meaning: and where this combination occurs, as in i. 343 A ὅτι δὴ τί μάλιστα; ἡν δ’ ἐγώ. ὅτι οἶει, κ.τ.λ.: Charm. 161 c ὅτι δὴ τί γε; ἐφη. ὅτι οὐ δίπον, ἡν δ’ ἐγώ, ἢ τὰ ρήματα ἐφθέγξατο, ταύτῃ καὶ ἐνόει: ὅτι is resumed in the reply and the words are not separated, as they are here, by ἐγὼ εἶπον. For the use of ἔτι with an aorist, cp. vi. 508 C Πῶς; ἐφη’ ἔτι διελθέ μοι: Prot. 310 C ἔτι μὲν ἐνεχείρησα.


καὶ λήσειν οἰηθήναι ... κοινὰ τὰ φίλων ἔσται] ‘And you seem to have thought (δοκεῖς ... οἰηθήναι) that you would escape detection in throwing out the slight remark that forsooth in the
matter of women and children everybody must know that friends will have all things in common.' The passage referred to is iv. 423 e ταῦτα μαθεῖς διαφωνεῖαι, καὶ ἄλλα γε ὅσα νῦν ἡμεῖς παραλείπομεν, τὴν τε τῶν γυναικῶν κτῆσιν καὶ γύμων καὶ παιδείας, ὅτι δὲ ταῦτα κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν πάντα τὰ μάλιστα κοινά τὰ φίλων ποιεῖσθαι.

οἴεις] sc. εἰπον to be supplied from εἰπόν supra.

τὸ ὁρθός τούτο . . . λόγου δεῖται, τίς ὁ τρόπος τῆς κοινωνίας] 'but your word "rightly," like the rest, requires explanation, as to the manner of the community.' ταλλα, the other particulars of legislation which have not been lightly passed over but fully explained.

γενομένους] sc. τοὺς παῖδας understood from παιδοποιήσονται.

ὅλην ταύτην ἡν λέγεις κοινωνίαν] 'and [speak about] the whole subject of the community of women and children which you mean.' Some verb governing the accusative must be supplied with ὅλην in place of μνησθήσονθαι, or the construction goes back to μὴ οὖν παρῆς.

μέγα γάρ τι οἴμοθεα φέρειν καὶ ὁλον, κ.τ.λ.] 'For we think that whether it takes place rightly or not rightly will make a great, nay all the difference to the state.' Cp. Phaedo 79 ε ὅλο καὶ παντι : Laws xii. 944 ε διαφέρει δὲ ὁλον που καὶ τὸ πᾶν.

φέρειν . . . γινόμενον] sc. το τῆς περὶ ταῦτα κοινωνίας.

ἐπειδῆ . . . πολιτείας] 'But now as you are taking in hand another form of government.' For ἐπιλαμβάνομεν in this sense cp. Soph. 217 β λόγων ἐπελάβου παραπλησίων, κ.τ.λ.

ἀμέλει] 'Never mind!'—'without more ado,' setting aside a remark or question either as unimportant or not requiring further discussion. Cp. iv. 422 c and note 'Ἀμέλει, ἐφη, οἴδειν ἢν γένοιτο βασιλεύς: and vii. 539 ε Ἀμέλει, εἰπον, πέντε βές.

ἐπιλαβόμεναι μοι] 'In laying hands upon me.' The word is repeated in a different sense, for which cp. especially Prot. 329 λ μακρὰν ἥχει καὶ ἀποτείνει, εἰν μὴ ἐπιλάβηται τει, 'unless someone lays hold of it.'

ὅσπερ εξ ἀρχῆς] 'As if we were just beginning,' cp. i. 348 β.

ὡς τότε ἐρρήθη] iv. 423 ε.

ἄ . . . παρακαλοῦντες] Either (1) 'and in now calling in this fresh argument,' or (2) 'and in now urging me to this.' In the latter case the antecedent is to be gathered from the general sense
of the preceding words (sc. ταῦτα πύλων διελθέων) and ἄ is cognate accusative.

For the image cp. Cratylus 401 ε ἐνενόηκα τι σμῆνος σωφίας.

τί δέ; ἦ δὲ ὅσον ἄκουσομένους] χρυσαχοίν, literally, 'to smelt ore for gold.' The word had also acquired the sense of 'to go on a fool's errand,' 'to be imposed upon,' the origin of which Suidas and Harpocration explain in the following manner: A report was once spread abroad at Athens that there was on Hymettus a great quantity of gold dust guarded by warrior ants. The Athenians went armed out to seize the treasure but were worsted and returned home without accomplishing their purpose. Cp. the parallel expression in English—'to seek for the philosopher's stone.'

μετρίων δέ γ'] In book vi. (498 d) such discussions are not merely limited to this life, but are supposed to be continued in another, when the soul is reborn to the world: πείρας γὰρ αὐτῶν ἀνήρ-σομεν, ἐῳ ἄν ἦ πείσομεν και τοῦτον καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ἦ προφύργον τι παύσω-μεν εἰς ἐκείνου τοῦ βίου, ὅταν αὐτὶς γενόμενοι τοῖς ταύτασις ἐντύξωσαι λόγως: Theact. 173 c; Polit. 283. ἄκοουεῖν is an epexegetic infinitive.

ἀλλὰ ... ἡ] 'but never mind us,' i.e. never mind inflicting on us a discourse of immoderate length, referring to μετρίων γε.

ἡ δὲ ἐπιπονωτάτη δοκεῖ εἶναι] 'Which is generally thought to be the most troublesome part of education.' ἐπιπονωτάτη, sc. τῆς τροφῆς. Plato dwells on the importance of the very earliest training in Laws vii. 792 a. See especially the words ἐστὶ δὲ ὁ χρύνος ὄντος τριῶν οὐκ ἔλθετον ἐτῶν (i.e. the three first years of life), μόριον οὐ σμικρῶν τοῦ βίου διαγαγεῖν χείρον ἢ μὴ χείρον.

πειρῶ* δὴ] The choice lies between this correction of πειρῶ ὄν, the reading of Par. A, and πειρῶ ὄν, the reading of ΠΜ. Cp. iv. 431 b; Symp. 221 e.

οὐ δὲ διὸν ... ἀπιστήσεται] καὶ ταύτη refers to ὃς ἄριστ' ἔν εἰ ἑαυτα. For εὐδαιμον in the sense of 'blissfully ignorant,' cp. iv. 422 e εὐδαιμον εἰ, ἤν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι οὔκε, κ.τ.λ. and note.

Great preparations are made for the introduction of the new social system. First, Socrates is disposed to pass over the entire subject. After he has been detected in this little trick he will only proceed at the earnest request of the company, who are willing to take upon themselves the entire responsibility. He anticipates all
the ridicule which the common sense of mankind has agreed to heap on the attempt to overthrow the first and simplest of human institutions. At each fall of the wave the sound of laughter is resounding in our ears, until the greatest wave swallows up all, and the Republic, which was originally a Dorian state, reappears as a kingdom of philosophy.

μη ευχη δοκη ειναι ο λογοσ | Cp. infra 456 c ουκ ομη αδηνατι γε ουδε ευχαις δομοι ενομοθετομεν.

εμοι] not εμαυτο, because the object is to be distinguished from the subject of belief. The repetition of the same word adds point. Cp. Soph. O. T. 379 Κρεων δε σοι πημεν ουδεν, αλλα αυτος συ σοι.


περι των μεγιστων τε και φιλων] 'About matters dear to us, and of the highest importance' (such as family life).

ασφαλες και θαρραλεον] 'A thing safe and giving confidence,' i.e. a thing which may be done with safety and confidence. The epithet θαρραλεος, commonly used of a person who possesses confidence, is here applied to a thing which inspires confidence in the doer. Cp. Prot. 359 c: Soph. Philoct. 106: Pind. Nem. vii. 50.

ου τι γελωτα δοφλειν is an explanatory infinitive after φοβερον τε και σφαλερον—'not at all as to incurring ridicule.' The phrase γελωτα δοφλειν recurs in vi. 506 D αλλα όπως μη ουκ οις τ' έσομαι, προθυμομενοι δε ανεχμονω γελωτα δοφλησω.

κεισομαι] 'I shall be overthrown.' Cp. Euthyd. 303 ά οσπερ πληγεις υπο του λογου εκειμην αφωνος: Al. Nub. 126 αλλ' οδη εγω μενοι πεσων γε κεισομαι. The future indicative follows μη by a slight anacoluthon arising from the common tendency to revert to the more direct form of expression.

προσκυνω δε ... ου μελλω λεγειν] 'And I bow to Adrasteia touching what I am about to say.' The involuntary homicide prays Adrasteia to bear witness that he could not help his act, and Socrates is in a like evil case. Cp. Aesch. Prom. 936 οι προσκυνούντες την Αδραστειαν σοφοι. The slightly archaic form απατων (cp. λυμεων) adds to the mock solemnity here and infra B.

ελπιζω γαρ ... νομιμων περι] 'For I do indeed believe that to be an involuntary homicide is a less crime than to be a deceiver about the beautiful, the good, and the just, in the matter of laws.'
Schneider joins the words καλὸν τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ δικαίων with νομίμων, but is inclined to cancel δικαίων. Several MSS., with Ven. Ξ, read δικαίων καὶ νομίμων πέρι.

ὅστε εὖ με παραμυθεῖ] (1) 'So that you console me well.' This at first sight appears to be a contradiction of the words καλὸς εἰχέν ἢ παραμυθία, at 45ο e. The apparent difficulty has led the scribe of γ to insert ὅχι after ἰο. Socrates had rejected the consolation when first offered, and now, without much point, he is supposed to repeat his refusal. The reading of the text, in which the other MSS. agree, gives also a better sense. Socrates ironically accepts the consolation which he had previously rejected. The ironical emphasis is more pointed than the simple negative would have been. Cp. the ironical use of καλὸν in iii. 4ο6 β καλὸν ὑπα τὸ γέρας, κ.τ.λ. 'You are indeed happy in your attempt to console me!' This is better than (2) making the words equivalent to εὖ ποιεῖς ὅτι με παραμυθεῖ ('You do well in endeavouring to console me') which loses the reference to the point of Glaucon's remark, οὔτε ἀπιστοι οὔτε δύναι οἱ ἰκονοσύμμεναι.

ἄλλ', ὁ Σώκρατες, ἐφή... εἰτερ ἐκεί, καθάδε] The first ἄλλα is adversative to the remark of Socrates about the risk which he is running; the second ἄλλα is a repetition of the first with the addition of a request. Both are resumed in the third ἄλλα, which implies that Socrates adopts Glaucon's point of view in opposition, to his own.

ἀφίμεν... καθαρὸν εἶναι] 'We acquit you both as guiltless of our blood, so to say, and as not our deceiver.'

ἄλλα μέντοι, κ.τ.λ.] 'Well, it is true that in that case, said I, the man who is acquitted is clear as the law says, and if in that case' (i.e. in the case of the homicide) 'it is likely that he will be so in this' (i.e. the case of involuntary deception).

δράμα] 'business,' or 'part.' Cp. Theaet. 15ο α τοῦ μὲν τοίνυν τῶν μαίων τασοῦτων, ἑλπτο τῷ ἑμοῦ δράματος.

Our guardians have been compared to watch-dogs. Now in training these, we make no difference between male and female, except that we do not expect the female to be quite equal to the male in strength.

In applying this general principle we must be prepared for ridicule, especially when we insist that the women, like the men,
must strip for gymnastic exercises. But we may remember that when this custom was first introduced among the men, the wits of that day had their opportunity, and no doubt made use of it. Yet experience and common sense have proved too much for them.

 ioûsin] sc. ἡμῖν. For the idiomatic dative cp. infra 452 c πορευ-τέων ... δειθείσοι, κ.τ.λ.

 ακολουθῶμεν ... ἀποδιδόντες] ‘Let us follow out that hint in the matter of the birth and training which we assign to our women, making it similar (to that of the watch-dogs) and then consider whether we deem it suitable or not.’ The subject of πρέπει is τῷ τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τροφῆν παραπλησίαν ἀποδιδόναι gathered from the previous words.

 εἰ ἡμῖν πρέπει] ‘If we find it suitable.’ Cp. especially infra 462 λ ἀπα ... εἰς μὲν τὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἵππος ἡμῖν ἄρμόστει.

 ἀπερ ἀν ... φυλάττωσι] ἀπερ is cognate accusative: ‘In those duties of guardianship which are performed by the males.’

 κοινῇ, ἐφη, πάντα] sc. υἱόμεθα δεῖν αὐτὰς πράττεν.

 ως ἀσθενευτέρας] The subject, ταῖς θηλείαις τῶν φυλάκων κυνῶν, is sufficiently indicated by the previous sentence.

 παρὰ τὸ έθος] sc. πραττόμενα, which is absorbed in λεγόμενα.

 εἰ πράξεται ἡ λέγεται] Cp. iii. 389 D Ἐάν γε, ἡ δὲ ὤς, ἐπί γε λόγῳ ἵππα τελῆται, where see note.

 οὐ μόνον τὰς νέας, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡδη τὰς πρεσβύτερας] Said with a slight hyperbaton (which adds emphasis) for τὰς ἡδη πρεσβύτερας.

 ξυσι] sc. οἴντες.

 οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, κ.τ.λ.] The uncompromising tone of this passage may be contrasted with the greater respect for public opinion which is shown in Laws viii. 834 D ἔθελεια δὲ περὶ τοῦτων νόμων μὲν καὶ ἐπιτάξεων οὐκ ἂξια βαλέσθαι τῆς κοινωνίας’ εάν δὲ εὗ αὐτῶν τῶν ἔμπροσθεν παθημάτων εἰς έθος ἱοῦντος ἡ φύσις εὐδέχηται, κ.τ.λ.

 περὶ τὴν τῶν ὅπλων σχέσιν] ‘as to their bearing of heavy arms.’

 πορευτέον, κ.τ.λ.] Plato’s theory of female education, though at variance with modern ideas, has points which are worthy of attention. (1) He considers the subject independently of existing practice, and with reference to the difference of sex only. He implies (2) that
bodily health and strength, and the training which gives them, are equally necessary for both sexes. (3) Also that men and women have the same interests and duties, and are capable of the same occupations in a greater degree than the customs of society allow. (4) That false delicacy is not a good foundation either for manners or morals. The error of Plato seems to arise from not considering the other differences to which the difference of sex gives rise in mind and feeling. He has forgotten that ‘women’s best education is the training of their children.’ He has lost sight also of the fact that education is relative to character, and the character of women is necessarily formed by the universal opinion of mankind. The merit of seeking to give them position in an age in which they were comparatively degraded must certainly be conceded to him. Modern philosophy would ascribe to them equal powers of different qualities:

‘For woman is not undeveloped man,
But diverse.’

Plato has made a considerable step in advance of the ancient world by assigning to them unequal powers of the same quality: as the poet elsewhere sings:

‘Woman is the lesser man.’

tο τραχύ τοῦ νόμου] For an analogous phrase cp. viii. 568 c πρὸς τὸ ἄνωτες τῶν πολιτειῶν.

dεηθεισὶ τε τουτων] sc. ἡμῖν.

οὐ πολὺς χρόνος ἔξ ὦ, κ.τ.λ.] Cp. Hdt. i. 10: Thuc. i. 6, § 5.

πάντα ταύτα and πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα refer partly to the ludicrous image called up supra ὅταν ἰσοφιλή, κ.τ.λ.

καὶ τὸ ἐν τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς . . . ἐνεδείξατο, κ.τ.λ.] ‘Then the ludicrous effect to the outward eye vanished before the arguments which showed what was best, and this (i.e. the disappearance of ridicule) showed that he is a fool who thinks anything else ridiculous,’ &c. The first καὶ is intensive, marking the correspondence between men’s experience and the change in their opinions. This was an instance of the folly of ridicule not grounded in reason.

μάταιος δὲ γελοίον, κ.τ.λ.] Ridicule is not ‘the test of truth’ or goodness, but the test of strength, the detector of some flaw or inconsistency or pretension or deviation from custom in
character or action. 'Man is a laughing animal,' and reason uses
this power no less than that of speech as the expression of herself,
finding in the pleasure of laughter a ready opening at which wisdom
or wit may enter in. But the alliance, though capable of a serious
purpose, is partly fanciful and humorous, and cannot always be
constrained, as Plato seems to imply, for the sake of some political
or moral end. Ridicule has more influence on manners than on
morals;—is more concerned with the outward surface of life and
society than with the inner nature of man, having a free touch and
passing lightly from one topic to another. Ridicule is the enemy
of superstition and sentimental feeling; and the employment of
such an instrument on serious subjects is not always to be depre-
cated as hurtful; there is nothing of which hypocrisy is so much
afraid, nothing which better sifts the weaknesses of human nature.
Successful ridicule (1) depends on a certain force of character or
ready tact in the person who makes another ridiculous: (2) it
requires either an object of attack which is sensitive to ridicule, or
(3) public opinion which supports the assailant. A rude justice is
the result, in which perhaps a certain degree of injustice may be
concealed by the excellence of the jest. On the other hand, the
greatest minds, one of whose proper works is to help and free
others from scorn, are perhaps incapable of using the weapon of
ridicule as they are also incapable of being made ridiculous.

καὶ καλοῦ αὖ σπουδάζει] is the reading of the majority of the
MSS., which yields a tolerable sense—'and who again aims
seriously at any standard of nobility which he sets up for himself,
except the good.' Schneider reads ἂ σπουδάζει, omitting καὶ καλοῦ.
Others make πρὸς . . . σκοπῶν depend on στηθαμενος, 'having
set himself to some other aim.' (Jebb on Soph. Ant. 299.)

But the first aorist middle of ἵστημι, unlike ἵστασθαι, requires an
object. This may be supplied in one of two ways, (1) supposing
the expression to be metaphorical, sc. τὸ τάξιν: cp. the absolute
use of ἐπιστήμην, sc. τὸ ἄρμι; or (2) as above, σπουδάζει πρὸς . . .
σκοπῶν, στηθαμενος (οὐτῶν), 'with any other aim which he propo-
ses to himself.' The word ἵστημι is used of setting up a mark, although
θέμενος would be more usual. Cp. Hom. Od. xix. 573, 574:

τοὺς πελέκεας, τοὺς κεῖνοι εἰνὶ μεγαρμοσίν ἑοίσιν
ἱστασχ’ ἵστησι, δρυόχων ὡς, δώδεκα πάντας.

The conjectural omission of πρὸς (W. H. Thompson on Gorg. 474 D)
The only question of any real moment is whether the female sex in man is capable of sharing in the duties which we assign to them. For our first principle is that our citizens, all and each, shall do the work which is suited to their several natures. A controversialist will say that men and women differ, and therefore that the pursuits assigned to them must differ. But in the spirit of controversy such a one omits to ask whether the difference of nature has anything to do with the particular work in question. One cobbler may have a shock of hair and yet another who is bald is not disqualified from cobbling. Now the difference of sex is limited to the function of procreation, and this lies quite apart from government and war. In point of fact women can do all that men do, though as a rule they cannot do it so well, and men can do all that women do (even to weaving and the baking of cakes), and as a rule, when they do it, they do it better. And there are the same differences amongst women as amongst men. One has a taste for medicine, another for music. And we may presume that some of them, though not all, have capabilities for war and government. These ought to be selected as companions and helpmates for the highest class of men, and to share in the same occupations. In giving them also the same education in music and gymnastic we have been legislating according to nature.

This is contrary to present custom: but is it possible? Is it the best course? We have shown that it is possible. And if the men whom we have chosen and educated are better than the other men, will not the chosen women, similarly educated, be better than other women? And is it not best to provide for the existence of the best possible men and women in a community? Our women, then, shall not shrink from physical exercises nor from war, although we shall assign to them the lighter duties in both pursuits, because of the comparative weakness of their natures. Our standard of excellence and grace, in this and all respects, shall not be Custom, but the highest Utility.

Φύσις ἡ ἄνδροπινή ἡ θηλεία Ἰ. Female human nature.' The words ἡ ἄνδροπινή, to which Cobet objected, keep up the analogy between man and the other animals which runs through the passage. Cp. supra 451 D, E.

καὶ τούτῳ δὴ...ποτέρων ἐστίν;' And to which of the two
classes (the class of things they can or cannot share with the men) is this duty of warfare to be assigned?'

'iva μὴ ἐρημα ... πολιορκήται'] 'That the other side may not be besieged without having defenders.' Cp. Soph. 246 ν: Theaet. 164 ε.

tῆς κατοικίσεως] sc. τῆς πώλεως, for which πόλιν is substituted by attraction. Cp. iv. 443 c and note. The reference is to ii. 369 Α ff.

ὁ θαυμάσιον] 'O rare, O admirable sir,' as elsewhere, marks the wondering eagerness of Socrates at the new turn in the argument.

σοῦ δεήσομαι τε καὶ δέομαι] 'I shall have to ask you, as I now do.' For the future cp. Theaet. 164 ε καθιερώσωμεν ... αὐτῷ βοηθείω.

καὶ τὸν ... ἐμμηνέυσαι] Socrates has explained the views of an imaginary critic of the argument (supra Α ἴνα μὴ ἐρημα, κ.τ.λ.). He is now asked to explain 'our own' meaning, which is not yet clear. For the word compare Soph. 246 Ε Κίλενε ὅτι τοὺς βελτίως γεγονότας ἀποκρίνασθαι σοι, καὶ τὸ λεχθὲν παρ' αὐτῶν ἀφερμήνευ.

οὔ μὰ τὸν Δία ... ἐδικεῖν] 'I don't wonder at your hesitation, for by Zeus it is no easy task,' &c. 'The strong negation is put forward as a reason for the fear which Socrates expresses in the previous sentence:—'No indeed, that does not look easy' (which is a reason for hesitation). 'Why, no; but the truth is that whether a man tumbles into a swimming-bath or into a mighty ocean, he swims all the same.' The real order is, οὔ γάρ εὐκόλω ἐδικεῖν, οὔ μὰ τὸν Δία. But the eagerness of the speaker brings the oath to the front. Cp. Parm. 131 Ε οὔ μὰ τὸν Δία, φίλαι, οὔ μοι δοκεῖ εὐκόλων εἶναι τὸ τουλίτων οὖδαμός διορίσασθαι. οὔκ εὐκόλῳ = χαλεπῷ. Cp. i. 348 Ε.

ἀν τέ τις ... νεὶ οὐδὲν ἤττον] is perhaps the first suggestion of the image of the wave which is distinctly mentioned infra 457 Β ff. The word διανεύκαμεν ιv. 441 c. has prepared the way for it. A similar figure occurs in the Laches, 194 c 'Ἰδι δή, ὧ Νικία, ἀνδράσι φίλους χειμαραμένους ἐν λόγῳ καὶ ἀποροῦσι βοηθήσουν. Cp. Eurip. HIPP. 469, 470 έἰ δὲ τὴν τύχην | πεισοῦσ' ὅσην σὺ πῶς ἀν ἐκνεώσαι δοκεῖς;

ἀπορον] lit. 'hard to come by': cp. ii. 378 Α ἄλλα τι μέγα καὶ ἀπορον δῆμα, 'some unprocurable victim.' σωτηρίαν is the subject of some more general word than ὑπολαβεῖν, e.g. φανῆαι.
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Republic

453 E [omoloyomez] The imperfect tense seems preferable, as the reference to the former argument is so pointed here, although omoloyomez, the reading of Par. A, is also possible. The present might convey a general statement. Cp. supra b omoloyevete... 'Omoloyepegam.

tas de allass fetus The aforesaid different natures. tas de allass is to be explained with reference to alla phusin in the preceding line. The verbal ambiguity is obviated by the clearness of the context. So in Soph. O. T. 845 tois pollois is not 'the many,' or 'the greater number,' but 'the plurality of persons which the previous description implied.'

h genvaia... (454 a) prods allhlos xromenoi That is to say, People make oppositions of words, because they do not understand the differences of things. Our argument hinged upon the opposition of 'some' and 'other'; but we never considered in what sense each of these terms applied to the difference of sex. There are various species of difference — eidoi ths allhows eos (454 c) each appertaining to some particular quality or capacity (pros ti teionta), e.g. height, strength, &c.; and because people differ as participating in some particular species of difference, we must not conclude that they differ in toto, depriving 'different' as applied to them of all real significance.

Compare Soph. 218 c dei de de elai pantos perip to pragma automo mallon dia logon h tovoma monoan omyomolygismai xoris logon: Theaet. 164 c antiloyikos elikamen pros tas twn onomaton omoloyis omyomolygismai kai toioiwt twn per genwmenoi tologon agapain, kai ou fiskoutes agwonstai allla philoteou einais laithanomenai taipita ekineis tois dievios andreisi pou oystes: Polit. 285 A, B: Soph. 259 D to de taipon eteron apofainen ambo ge phe kai to thetros taipon kai to mega smeron kai to omous anomous, kai chairein ou toin tainstia dei profevonta en tois logois, ouvies tois eilegos, aotous alloi inos apti te tov andon tinous efapostomein chemos neugevhs ov.


[piato autto to onoma diwkeiv] Either (1) as in the translation 'pursuing a merely verbal opposition,' or (2) (as suggested by Mr. J. Solomon) 'assailing,' or 'holding in chase, what is a mere verbal contradiction.' For the latter cp. Theaet. 166 D tov de logon avu mju tov rhythmati mou diwke.

B to mnu thn autnu phusin] mnu is the reading of Ven. Z and the old
editions, and is probably right. 'We might valiantly and contentiously insist upon the verbal truth that the nature which is not the same (i.e. the female nature) ought not to have the same pursuits (i.e. as the male nature), but we never considered at all what was the nature of the sameness and difference which we were then distinguishing and whereto it was related.' The reading of the other MSS, ΑΠΠ &c. ὁ τὸν αὐτὴν, κ.τ.λ., can only mean, 'the nature which was in fact the same we argued in our contentious manner to be incapable of the same pursuits.' But the words ὁ τὸ ... τυχάνειν are simply a restatement of the objection in 453 B, c that men and women having different natures should have different pursuits, while the assertion that men and women share the same human nature would be out of place. And the opposition of μὴ τὴν αὐτὴν, οὐ τῶν αὐτῶν, is more like Plato than the conjectural reading τὴν ἄλλην (Balter).

ἐπεσκεψάμεθα δὲ ... (c) μὴ τοὺς ἐτέρους] We spoke of the same and other, but we did not define the meaning or object of the difference. Bald and hairy men are different; but no conclusion can be drawn from this that because the bald man is a cobbler the hairy man is not to be a cobbler. Plato is well aware of the value of a ludicrous illustration. Cp. infra 474 E: vi. 495 E: Theaet. 149 α.

μὴ ἑαν κομῆτας] sc. σκυτοτομεῖν.

τὴν αὐτὴν καὶ τὴν ἐτέραν] ο αὐτὸς and ὁ ἐτερος are here generalized. Cp. Theaet. 190 c.

ιατρικὸν μὲν καὶ ιατρικὸν τὴν ψυχὴν δότα] This reading has weak manuscript authority (q β), but is probably right, the older MSS. having been misled by the apparent dittographia. Par. λ has ιατρικὸν μὲν καὶ ιατρικὴν τὴν ψυχὴν δότα: others (Vat. θ) give ιατρικὸν μὲν καὶ ιατρικὴν τὴν ψυχὴν ἔχοντα by a further corruption. K. F. Hermann approved of ιατρικὸν μὲν καὶ ιατρικὴν τὴν ψυχὴν δότα, 'a man and woman gifted with medical talent' (cp. infra 455 E), but Plato could not be guilty of the clumsiness of assuming at the very beginning incidentally the general proposition which he has to prove, viz. the aptitude of women for all pursuits. Others have proposed ιατρὶον μὲν καὶ ιατρικὸν τὴν ψυχὴν δότα, which is adopted by Bekker, and may be supported by comparing Xen. Mem. iii. 1, 4 ὁ μαθησόν ἑαυτῷ καὶ μὴ ἱατρεύῃ ὁμοιο _ιατρὸς ἐστιν_: Polit. 259 α ἐὰν τῶν δημοσιονότων ιατρῶν ἰκανός ἐσμένειεῖν ἰδιωτεύων αὐτῶς, κ.τ.λ. But
the slight alteration ἰατρῶν is unnecessary, and it is better not to depart further from the MSS. than is absolutely required. Schneider obtained nearly the same meaning by reading as in the text and joining τῷ ψυχῶν with the second ἰατρικῶν exclusively. But the repetition simply emphasizes identity in order to prepare for the contrast between identity and difference. ‘If two men have each the soul of a physician, we meant to say for example that they have the same nature’ (however different they may be in other respects); ‘if one have the soul of a physician, and the other have the soul of a carpenter, we meant to say that they have different natures’ (however else they may resemble one another). The singular ὁντα is accounted for by attraction to the nearest word.

πρὸς τέχνην τινά] ‘in regard of fitness for some art.’ Riddell, Digest, § 128.

ὅς πρὸς δ ἡμεῖς λέγομεν, κ.τ.λ.] ‘that a woman differs from a man with reference to the point of which we are speaking,’ i.e. common training and participation in the same duties. Cp. Theaet. 177 δ τούτο δὲ που σκόμμι ἀν εἴη πρὸς δ λέγομεν.

455 ὁπερ σῷ ὀλίγον πρότερον ἐλεγε] supra 453 c ὅς μὲν ἐξαίφνης, ἐφη, οὐ πάνυ ῥάδιον.

καὶ τῷ μὲν ... (c) τῷ δὲ ἐναντιοῖτο;] Strength of body is needed for strength of mind. ‘Cp. vi. 498 b ὑγίων τε σωμάτων, ἐν ὃ βλαστάνει τε καὶ ἀνθρώπιν, εἴ μᾶλα ἑπιμελείσθαι, ὑπηρεσίας φιλοσοφία κτωμένους: Protag. 326 b ἐτί τοῖς πρὸς τούτοις εἰς παιδοτρίζου πέμπουσιν, ἵνα τὰ σώματα βελτίων ἔξοντες ὑπηρετώσι τῇ διανοίᾳ χρηστῇ οὐσῃ.

οἷς ... ὧρίζου] For the dative cp. ii. 376 b συνέσει τε καὶ ἀγνοίᾳ ὀμικρόων τὸ τε ὀικεῖον καὶ τὸ ἀλλάτριον. ‘The imperfect tense alludes to what was implied in the objection, ‘you meant to define,’ supra 453 b.

ἐν οἷς δὴ τι δοκεῖ ... εἶναι] Cp. Symp. 219 c καῖπερ ἐκεῖνο γε ὁμοῦ τι εἶναι.

κρατεῖται] κρατεῖσθαι is passive, and as in a few other instances (with the meaning of ἠττᾶσθαι) takes the genitive (πολλῶν ἄνδρῶν) without the preposition (e.g. κρατεῖσθαι ἡδονῶν Aeschin. de Fals. Leg. § 152).

Compare Cratyl. 392 c πότερον οὖν αἱ γυναῖκες ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι φρον-μότεραι σοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι ἣ οἱ ἄνδρες, ὃς τὸ δῶλον εἶπεῖν γένος;
Notes: Book V.

"But natural aptitudes are equally diffused in both." 

For the generic use of ξών cp. Theaet. 157 ε ἄρα αὐτοῖσιν ἀνθρωπόν τε τίδεναι καὶ λίθον καὶ ἐκαστὸν ξών τε καὶ ἐίδος.

ἐπι πᾶσι δὲ, κ.τ.λ.] Cp. supra 451 ε πλὴν ὑπὸ ἀνθενεστέρως χρώμεθα, τοῖς δὲ ὑπὸ ἵσχυστέρως.

ἀλλ' ἔστι γὰρ] It has been agreed that women must have some occupation. 'But then (ἀλλὰ γὰρ) as we shall say, women's capabilities differ, just as men's do, and their occupations therefore must be similarly distributed.'

καὶ γυνῇ] sc. ἡ μὲν ἰατρική, ἡ δ' οὖ.

γυμναστική δ' ἄρα οὖ ... (456 λ) ἔγωγε] 'But is not one woman a lover of gymnastics and of war, another unwarlike and no lover of gymnastics?' 'I should think so.'

The reading γυμναστική δ' ἄρα οὖ, οὔδε is adopted by Schneider and Hermann and the Zurich editors, and is supported by the preponderance of MS. authority. The form of question is not the ordinary use of οὖ expecting an affirmative answer, but rather an ironical negation with an interrogative tone. Cp. infra 468 B (where however the humour is more apparent): 'Ἀλλὰ τάδ', αὕτω, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, οὐκέτι σοι δοκεῖ. Τοῦ ποιοῦ; Τὸ φιλήσαι τε καὶ φιληθῆναι ὑπὸ ἐκάστου. The other readings, καὶ γυμναστική, ἡ δ' ἄρα οὖ' and that of η, which Bekker adopted, καὶ γυμναστική ἄρα καὶ πολεμική, look like clumsy attempts at emendation.

ἀθυμοσ] 'Passionless.' For this use of the word cp. iii. 411 B, Laws x. 888 λ.

ἡ οὖ τοιαύτη] sc. φιλόσοφον καὶ θυμοειδῆ. The instances from μονοτική onwards have led the way to this.

ἐπείπερ εἰσιν ἰκαναί καὶ ἐξυγγενεῖς] 'Seeing that they are qualified and of a kindred nature,' i.e. one which is at once φιλόσοφος and θυμοειδῆς. In the Politicus and Laws, on the other hand, the aim of the legislator is rather to unite in marriage opposite natures that they may supplement each other.—Polit. 309, 310: Laws vi. 773 ff.

ἥκομεν ἄρα ... ἀποδιδόναι] 'And so we are come round to what we were before saying, and allow that there is nothing
Plato: Republic.

unnatural in assigning the pursuit of music and gymnastic to the
wives of the guardians.' Cp. Laws ii. 659 C Δοκεῖ μου τρίτον ἡ
tέταρτον ὁ λόγος εἰς ταῦταν περιφερόμενοι ἢκεν : Gorg. 521 E ὁ αὐτὸς
dὲ μοι ἢκει λόγος, ὀπερ πρός Πώλου ἐλέγαν : ibid. 517 C οὐδὲν πανάμεθα
εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ ἂει περιφερόμενοι.

C εὐχαίσ ὄμοια] Cp. supra 450 D μὴ εὐχὴ δοκῇ εἰναὶ ὁ λόγος.

ἡ ἐπίσκεψις] supra 452 E.

ὅτι δὲ δὴ βέλτιστα, κ.τ.λ. ] The possibility of our proposals has
received an elaborate proof. Men and women have been shown to
have a common nature and therefore it is natural to assign to them
a common education and common pursuits. Whether our proposals
are desirable remains to be considered.

Aristotle (Pol. i. 13, § 9), perhaps referring to Meno 71 E, will not
hear of the ascription of the same qualities to men and women:
οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ σωφροσύνη γυναικὸς καὶ ἀνδρὸς, οὐδὲ ἀνδρία καὶ δικαιοσύνη,
kαθάπερ ἄτετο Σωκράτης, ἀλλ’ ἡ μὲν ἀρχικὴ ἀνδρία, ἡ δὲ ὑπηρετική.

οὐκ ἄλλη μὲν . . . (D) παραλαβοῦσα ; ] ' Then surely with a view to a
woman’s becoming fitted to be a guardian, there will not be one
education which will make men and another which will make
women guardians, especially when it has received the same nature
to work upon. ’ The whole sentence is negatived, and the para-
tactic expansion breaks from the construction with πρός. ποιήσει,
sc. φυλακικοῖς.

D ἐν οὖν τῇ πόλει . . . τῇ σκυτικῇ παιδευθένται ; ] This is the most
distinct allusion which is made in any part of the Republic to the
education or want of education of the lowest class in the state.
Cp. however viii. 547 C, where the condition of the ordinary citizens
is alluded to in general terms, and iv. 421 E, where apprenticeship
is incidentally referred to. The lower classes have no real place
in the Republic ; they fade away into the distance.

τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν . . . ἀριστοι ] i.e. (1) ‘better than the other
citizens,’ as they are better than the cobbler’s, or (2) ‘than the
citizens besides themselves.’ [B. J.]

457 καὶ οὖκ ἄλλα πρακτέων] Their devotion to public duty forbids
their absorption in the nursery. This remark contains a hint of
the next-coming ‘wave.’

Aτελῆ τοῦ γελοίου σοφίας δρέπων καρπῶν] σοφίας is the genitive
after καρπὸν, which is governed by δρέπων, 'the man who laughs at
naked women, plucks from his laughter an unripe fruit of wisdom,' i.e. foolishness, 'not knowing at what he is laughing.' According to Stobaeus (ed. Gaisford, Tit. 304), the quotation is from Pindar, who applies the words ἀτελὴ σοφίας καρπὸν δρέπων to the physiologists, the addition τοῦ γελοίου is Plato's own. See also Phaedr. 260 c, D ποίων των οἱ . . . τὴν ῥητορικὴν καρπὸν δώ εἴσεπρε θερίζεων; Jests about the gymnastics of the Spartan women such as Plato describes are found in the Lysistrata of Aristophanes (80–83).

καλλιστα γάρ δὴ τούτο καὶ λέγεται καὶ λελέξεται i.e. 'this which is commonly said will ever be the noblest saying: "That the useful is noble and the hurtful is base."' See especially Theaet. 172 a, b, 177 d, e. The sentiment recurs infra 458 ε ἔεν δ' ἂν ἵποι οἱ ὕφελμωται. The future-perfect expresses permanence and absoluteness in future time.

We have escaped one wave of the sea of ridicule which was ready to swallow us up alive. But the next is still more formidable. For on the community of education and employment there follows the community of marriage. And here also the scepticism to be encountered is two-fold:—(1) Is the change possible, and (2) is it for the best? Socrates is confident upon the latter point, and proposes to take it first, leaving what is more doubtful and difficult to be disposed of afterwards. Let us build our 'Castle in the air,' and then consider whether we may hope one day to find a place fit for it on the solid ground.

The women shall be first selected, then educated, and, lastly, have their duties assigned to them. Then—having their work, their quarters, and their meals in common—the two sexes cannot but be drawn together, by a more than mathematical necessity. Now order is inseparable from our first principle: licentiousness, in a city of the blessed, is a thing not to be permitted: and so the question rises, What order is to be observed about marriage-rites? Once more we may appeal to the analogy of the lower animals. In breeding hawk or hound, Glaucon is careful in the matter of selection, pairing the best-bred individuals with the best, while both are in their prime. And the same conditions ought to be applied to the breeding of other animals and of men amongst them, if the quality of the race is to be preserved. Here, then, is a point in which the wisdom of our rulers will be put to the test. For they must have recourse to the 'medicine' of deception, so that, without apparent constraint,
the highest privileges in the way of marriage may be reserved for the noblest. There must be festivals and hymeneal songs proclaiming how the brave deserve the fair. And exceptional advantages in affairs of this kind must be provided for those who distinguish themselves in war. There will be lotteries cunningly devised, which, unknown to the people, will effect our purpose. And there will be magistrates, male and female, appointed to take care of the children who are born of these marriages. The perfect offspring of noble parents they will carry to the common nurseries and place them under appropriate care. But the children of inferior parents, and accidental misbirths, will be carried off by them none shall know whither,—never to reappear. The mothers shall be allowed to suckle their own and one another's children (not knowing the difference), as much as is desirable for their health. But there will be wet nurses who will relieve them of any duties that might break their rest.

It remains to define the age for marriage. In women this lasts from twenty to forty, and in men from about twenty-five to fifty-five. Beyond these limits either way none shall be permitted to bring forth children for the state. Nor shall any one within the prescribed age cohabit without permission of the magistrates. But a general dispensation shall be given to those who are past the age, provided that they abstain from incestuous intercourse and provided also that if a child is born, it shall be understood that no one shall be responsible for rearing it.

Now under these new laws what connexions are incestuous? Children are not to know their real parents. But all who are born from seven to nine months after each marriage festival will be brothers and sisters to each other, and sons and daughters to all who were married at that festival. These will be the prohibited degrees.

ἀλλὰ πτ... όμολογεῖσθαι] 'But that the argument somehow comes to an agreement with itself.' For the reciprocal middle voice, cp. Phaedr. 265δ τὸ αὐτὸ αὐτῷ όμολογούμενον: Tim. 29c: Laws v. 746c.

The image of the wave, the way for which has been already prepared (453δ), is one of those continuous images in Plato which also form links in the arrangement of the subject.

μείζον πρὸς ἀπιστίαν] 'more formidable, as more provocative of incredulity.'
Notes: Book V.

The aorist is sometimes used without ἂν in confident prediction. Cp. Protag. 316 c τοῦτο δὲ οὔταί οἱ μάλιστα γενέσθαι, εἰ σοὶ συγγένειο: Goodwin, M. and T., § 127. But the similarity of ἂν, ἀμ, may easily have led to the loss of the particle here.


λόγων σύστασιν] ‘A combination’ (or ‘coalition’) ‘of arguments’: i.e. λόγον λόγῳ συνυπόταμουν. Socrates had hoped to escape from one of his enemies, he now finds that he has to meet both of them. Cp. Eurip. Androm. 1088 εἰσ δὲ συστάσεις | κύκλους τ' ἐχώρει λαὸς οἰκήτωρ δεῖν: Dem. κατ' Στεφάνου Α, 1122, 1. 5 τάς αὐτῶν συστασεῖς κυριωτέρας τῶν νόμων ἄξιον εἶναι.

ἐκ γε τοῦ ἑτέρου] The language is still coloured by the image of the ‘sea of arguments.’

λοιπῶν δὲ δὴ ... περὶ τοῦ δυνατοῦ καὶ μῆ] sc. διαλέγομαι, or λόγον διδόναι, which is supplied in the next sentence (cp. infra).

ἐσάνω με ἐορτάσαι] ‘suffer me to keep holiday.’

καὶ γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοι ποὺ, κ.τ.λ.] καὶ in καὶ γὰρ anticipates καὶ in ἦδη οὐκ καὶ αὐτός, κ.τ.λ., to which it is correlative.

γενομένου] sc. ἐκείνου ὁ βαῦλονται. Cp. ii. 369 Ἀ. Θυκόων γενομένου αὐτῷ ἐκπεπεταστερου ἢδειν ὁ ἐτόμων;

καὶ ὑπερθέν] καὶ implies ‘there will be an opportunity of doing so hereafter as well as now.’ Cp. iii. 400 ἔβαλα μετὰ Δίμωνος and note: Soph. 254 ὥπερ μὲν τοῦτον καὶ τάχα ἐπισκεφτόμεθα σαφέστερον. [καὶ simply: ‘and.’ B. J.]

γιγνόμενα] ‘When they do take place.’ Cp. supra γενομένου.

τά δὲ καὶ μιμομένους] sc. τοὺς νόμους, i.e. ‘following their spirit.’ Cp. Polit. 300 ff., where the actual rulers are advised to ‘imitate,’ i.e. act in the spirit of, the ideal ruler.

σὺ μὲν τοῖνυν, κ.τ.λ.] αὐτοῖς depends on παραδώσεις, sc. τοῖς ἀρχηγοῖι καὶ τοῖς ἐπικούροις.

ὅμως δὲ ἀναμεμειγμένων ... ἔξονται] The subject of ἀναμεμειγμένων is also the subject of ἔξονται. ἔξονται is passive in sense.

οὗ γεωμετρικάις γε ... ἀνάγκαις] The dative ἀνάγκαις is to be
construed with ἀναγκαῖα, ‘necessary in virtue of’: cp. Soph. 257 ὁ
tais μεγίστας ἀνάγκαις ἀδύνατων. For the play on ἄναγκη, cp. vii.
527 λ., ix. 581 ε.

ἀλλὰ μετὰ δὴ ταύτα, ὡς Γλαῦκων, κ.τ.λ.] Is Plato serious in his
scheme of communism? Modern readers would like to explain
this part of the ideal commonwealth in a figure only (ἐν ἱππονίᾳ);
they might imagine themselves not far off a kingdom of heaven,
‘in which they neither marry, nor are given in marriage.’ But the
particularity of the details forbids this: we seem rather to be
entering on a ‘new moral world.’ It may be urged on behalf of
Plato: (1) that he himself acknowledges the community of women
and children to be ‘the second of the three great waves’ or para-
doxes: (2) that in the Laws the theory is not put into practice,
though regarded as affording the true and absolutely perfect rule
of the state, Laws v. 739 ὃ μὲν δὴ τοιαῦτη πόλις, ἐκτὸς ποὺ θεὶ ἡ
παιδες θεὼν αὐτὴν οἰκοῦσι πλείους ἐνός, ὧτω διαζώντως εὐφραίνομενοι
κατοικοῦσιν: (3) that the Greek sentiment about the relations of the
sexes is unlike that of modern times: (4) that the family is not
destroyed but merged in the state; public interests are supposed
to take the place of private ones: (5) the equalization of the sexes
was a great thought in that age and country, not entirely realized
by any modern nation: (6) the communism of Plato has other
aims than the indulgence of the passions; licentiousness is to be
deemed ‘an unholy thing’: (7) although the physical consider-
ations to which Plato draws our attention can hardly be dwelt
upon, neither can they be safely overlooked: (8) lastly, there is
a speculative interest in considering social institutions with a
reference to first principles which lie beyond the range of
custom and experience.

ἀρ’ οὖκ εἰσὶ τινες καὶ γίγνονται ἄριστοι;] ‘Are there not some
who are and who prove themselves to be the best?’ The same
creatures form the subject of both verbs.

ἐκ τῶν ἄριστων] sc. γεννᾶν.

γεννᾶται] sc. (1) τὸ γεννάμενον, or (2) τὸ γένος infra.

τί δὲ ἵππων οἶει] ἵππων may be taken as a genitive of reference
(with peri omitted), as in Hom. Od. xi. 174 εἰπὲ δὲ μου πατρός τε καὶ
υἱός, ὅν κατέλειτον: Soph. O. C. 354, 355 μαντεῖ αἴγουσα πάντα, . . . ἄ
tούδ’ ἐχρήσαθη σῶματος: this is eased by assimilation to the genitives in
the previous sentence (ἄρνιθων ... κυνών). Cp. Phaedo 78 ο Τι δὲ τῶν πολλῶν καλῶν . . . άρα κατὰ ταύτα ἔχει . . .

ότι ἄναγκη αὐτοῖς, κ.τ.λ.] For deception as a political medicine, cp. ii. 382 c. The order is ἡγούμεθα ἐξαρκεῖν ἱατρῶν εἶναι καὶ φαυλόπερον.

μὴ δεομένοις μὲν . . . ἐθελόντων ὑπακούειν] ἐθελόντων (1) sc. τῶν σομάτων (the genitive absolute is changed in one MS., r, to the dative ἐθελούσων), ‘when the constitution is amenable to diet’: cp. ii. 370 b and note; or (2) the subject of ἐθελόντων is personal: ‘when the patients are willing to submit to regimen’ [B. J.].

ἀνδρειοτέρον] ‘more courageous’: the task of prescribing medicine is more difficult than of prescribing a diet, and therefore requires more courage in the physician.


εἰ μέλλει . . . ἀκρότατον εἶναι] ‘If the flock is to be of the highest quality’: as above σφόδρα ἄκρων.

ποίμνων . . . ἀγέλη] The words are meant to recall the analogy of the lower animals (cp. Polit. 261).

tοῖς ἡμετέροις ποιηταῖς] For the sort of poetry and poets to be received in our state cp. iii. 398 Α, Β.

tοῖς γεγομένοις γάμοις] ‘The unions which result’ from brides and bridegrooms being brought together. The expression prepares for the restriction following.

τὸ δὲ πλῆθος, κ.τ.λ.] ‘But the number of the marriages we shall place under the control of the magistrates.’ For πλῆθος of a limited number or quantity, cp. Gorg. 451 c πῶς ἔχει πλῆθος (τό τε ἁρμιον καὶ το περιττόν): Phaedr. 279 c τὸ . . . χρυσοῦ πλῆθος εἰη μοι ὅς, κ.τ.λ.

On the question of population, cp. viii. 546 Α, Β, Β. We may observe that these two passages have an apparent likeness but are not really similar in their drift. In the first, Plato supposes
a limitation to be placed upon population by the rulers to avoid excess and defect of numbers: in the second, he fears the deterioration and confusion of classes which may arise by ignorance in the rulers of the so-called number of the state or cycle of human births.

Aristotle and Plato are agreed, the latter both in the Laws and the Republic, in limiting the state by unity, μέχρις ὅτι ἂν ἑδήλη εἶναι μία. No definite number is given in the Republic: in the Laws it is said that the number is to be regulated by the size of neighbouring states. The number finally fixed upon is 5040, which Plato praises in respect of convenience, because it was capable of such numerous subdivisions. At this number, in a passage which it is hardly possible to explain, Aristotle carps. It would require, he says, a territory as great as Babylonia to support such a vast population in idleness, to say nothing of their attendants.

πρὸς πολέμους ... ἀποσκοποῦντες] Cp. ii. 372 c εὐλαβήμενου πενιὰν ἢ πόλεμον (but in the present passage the notion is rather that of making allowance for losses sustained through war or pestilence): and for μήτε ... γίγνηται cp. iv. 423 c ὃτις μήτε συμκρᾶ ἢ πώλεσ ἐσται μήτε μεγάλη δοκοῦσα.

κλῆροι δὴ τινες ... τοὺς ἀρχοντας] 'Then, I suppose, we must contrive some ingenious kind of lot, that the less worthy person, on each occasion of uniting them, may lay the blame on chance, and not on the ruler.'

For σύνερξις, cp. Tim. 18 D εἰς τὴν τῶν γάμων σύνερξιν, where Plato, referring to this passage, repeats the expression, and infra 461 B μὴ ἐνέρξαντος ἀρχοντας. Cp. also the Homeric use of συνέργω in Od. ix. 425-427 Ἀρσένες δὲς ἦσαν ... | Τοῖς ἀκέων συνέργων ἐνστρεφέσσας λύγωσιν. Plato thinks that the principles which are observed in breeding animals should also be observed in breeding human beings. Hence he applies the terminology of the former to the latter. Σύνερξις, properly used of the penning of animals, is here applied to the union of men and women. Cp. the use of the words ἐγέλη and ποίμνων supra 459 E, and of σηκός infra c.

tὸν φαύλον ἐκείνον] The reference is to supra 459 D τοῖς δὲ φαιλοτάτους ταῖς φαιλοτάταις τούναντιον.

Ε ἵνα καὶ ... σπείρωται] 'That there may be moreover a colourable excuse for such fathers having as many children as possible.
Notes: Book V.

καὶ ἄμα]  'and at the same time,' i.e. while we honour bravery we also reap an advantage.

eἴτε ἀμφότερα] For this adverbial accusative cp. Laches 187 α ἡ δώραις ἡ χάριν ἡ ἀμφότερα.

κοιναὶ . . . καὶ ἄρχαι, κ.τ.λ.]  'Offices also' (as well as education and the general duties of guardians, supra 456 ff.) 'are I suppose to be common to both women and men.' The inference on p. 456 supra only extended to the duties of guardians generally. The further consequence that the rulers will be taken from both sexes is here assumed by the way. Plato seems, however, to betray a certain consciousness that the office immediately in question might be specially suitable for women. Cp. Laws vi. 784, vii. 794, where it is actually entrusted to women.

eἰς τῶν σηκὼν] Cp. Homer, Od. ix. 219, 220, where the lambs and kids await their mothers in the pens: στείνοντο δὲ σηκολ | ΄Αριὼν ἦδ' ἐμίφων.

τὰ δὲ τῶν χειρόνων . . . κατακρύψουσιν ὡς πρέπει] Cp. infra 461 C ὡς οὐκ οὔσης τροφῆς τῶ τοιούτῳ. Is Plato a maintainer of infanticide? It must be admitted that the words in which he touches on this subject are not perfectly clear. First let us consider the passage supra 459 D δεῖ . . . τοὺς ἁρίστους ταῖς ἁρίσταις συγγένεσθαι ὡς πλειστάκις, τοὺς δὲ φαυλοτάτους ταῖς φαυλοτάταις τοινιντίοι, καὶ τῶν μὲν τὰ ἐκμαν τρίφειν, τῶν δὲ μῆ, εἰ μελλεῖ τὸ ποιμνὸν δι᾽ τι ἁρίστατον εἶναι, 'The best of either sex should be united with the best as often, and the inferior with the inferior, as seldom as possible; and they should rear the offspring of the one sort of union, but not of the other, if the flock is to be maintained in first-rate condition.' Here Plato is speaking of keeping up the breed of the guardians in perfection: but it does not necessarily follow that the weaklings or imperfect individuals must be put out of the way to accomplish this: he could have obtained his object by degradation of them to an inferior class. Nevertheless the words τῶν δὲ μῆ (sc. τρίφειν) have an ominous sound, unaccompanied as they are by any explanation of what is to become of them. Still more ominous are the words in the present passage τὰ δὲ τῶν χειρόνων, καὶ ἕαν τι τῶν ἑτέρων ἀνάπηρον γίγνεται, ἐν ἀπορρήτῳ τε καὶ ἀδήλῳ κατακρύψουσιν ὡς πρέπει, 'But the offspring of inferior parents, or of the better, when they chance to be deformed, will be put away in some mysterious un-
known place, as they should be.' These words are meant to suggest something different from rearing the children in a pen or asylum, which Plato does not like or think it good taste more distinctly to describe. It is further stated in 461 c that the children born of irregular unions between parents who have passed the prescribed limit of age, if abortion has not been already practised, shall not be reared, μάλιστα μὲν μὴ ' εἰς φῶς ἐκφέρειν κύμα μὴ ' εὗ, εὖν γένηται, εὖν δὲ τι βαίνεται, οὕτω τιθέναι, ὡς ἄυκ οὔσης τροφῆς τῷ τοιαύτῳ. It may be remarked that whatever doubt may be entertained respecting the meaning of the word τρέφειν in the first of these passages, there can be no doubt as to the sense which is to be assigned to τροφῆς in the last.

All three passages occur within two pages of each other: there is therefore a strong presumption that they must be explained in the same way. It may also be fairly argued that they must be taken in the worst sense that they will bear, because Plato would naturally wish to cast a veil over an unpleasant subject. Nor can the milder view be defended by Timaeus 19 A τὰ δὲ τῶν κακῶν εἰς τὴν ἀλλήν λάβρα διαδοτέων πόλιν: for it is not necessary that Plato should be perfectly consistent: he may have altered his mind or may have forgotten.

The Greek feeling is sufficiently expressed in a well-known passage of Aristotle (Pol. vii. 16, § 15): 'As to the exposure and rearing of children, let there be a law that no deformed child shall live, but where there are too many (for in our state population has a limit), when couples have children in excess, and the state of feeling is averse to the exposure of offspring, let abortion be procured before sense and life have begun; what may or may not be lawfully done in these cases depends on the question of life and sensation.' The occurrence of such a passage in Aristotle is a strong reason for believing that similar passages have a similar meaning in Plato. It shows that they are not in any degree at variance with Greek feeling.

On the whole we must conclude that the only reason for denying Plato to be a maintainer of infanticide is the wish to acquit him of allowing a practice so repugnant to modern Christian notions.

There are similar questions in antiquity; e.g. whether human sacrifices were practised by the Greeks and Romans, about which there is the same doubt, due to the same reticence or ambiguity, and which should probably be answered in the same way.
Notes: Book V.

τὰ εἴκοσι ἔτη] ‘a period of twenty years.’ The article, which is added according to Greek idiom with the word of number, defines the time in reference to the rest of life.

tὰ ποιά αὐτῶν;] sc. τῶν ἐτῶν. ‘Which years of life do you mean?’ i.e. within what limits do you define the twenty or thirty years?

γυναικὴ μὲν . . . πεντεκαὶπεντηκονταέτος] ‘For a woman, said I, the proper time (μέτριος χρόνος) is to begin at twenty years of age and to continue to bear children to the state until forty; for a man the proper time is to begin when he has passed “the swiftest prime of running,”’ i.e. when his powers of running are at their highest, ‘and to beget children to the state until fifty-five.’ The words τὴν δευτάτην δρόμου ἀκμήν have also been referred to the course of life. But it is difficult to make δρόμος refer to the race of life where there is nothing in the context to suggest this metaphorical application of the phrase. In Laws (vi. 785) a man must marry, if at all, between thirty and thirty-five, a woman between sixteen and twenty.

tῶν εἰς τὸ κοινὸν γεννήσεων] This qualification is added to leave room for the licence given infra c.

ἀν λάθη] sc. φύς. Cp. infra c ἕων δὲ τῷ βιάσηται. It is assumed that, if such a birth came to the knowledge of the rulers, the child would be at once destroyed.


ἀνέγγυον] ‘unwarranted.’

καὶ ταύτα γ’ ἡδη . . . προθυμεῖσθαι] ταύτα γε, sc. ἀφῆσομεν. ‘Before granting this permission, however, we must instruct them to use all diligence,’ &c.

ἐὰν γένηται] sc. κύμα, not παιδίον.

βιάσηται] sc. εἰς τὸ φῶς.

οὗτος τιθέναι] sc. τὸ γεννημένον, ‘to dispose of it on the clear understanding that such an offspring is not to be reared.’

πῶς διαγνώσονται . . . οὔδαμῶς] sc. διαγνώσονται. ‘How will they distinguish their fathers and daughters and the other relatives of each other whom you mentioned?’ (1) ‘Not at all,’ i.e. they
Plato: Republic.

will not know their own fathers and daughters, &c. in the literal sense. Or (2), as sometimes elsewhere, the negation with ἀλλὰ is only a stronger way of saying 'simply as follows.' Cp. iv. 424 D and note: also infra 472 B ἀλλὰ τί τούτῳ γ᾽; ἐφη. Ὁδὲν ἀλλ᾽ εἶν, κ.τ.λ. [L. C.]

Plato's 'table of prohibited degrees' appears to be the following. Brothers and sisters (except in the reserved case of a 'dispensation' from the Oracle), parents and children, grandparents and grandchildren. These terms are all relative to the common marriage of the hymeneal festival. Brothers and sisters are those born from seven to ten months afterwards; they cannot marry those who took part in the festival, who are all their parents, any more than one another; nor any one who took part in the festivals from seven to ten months before the birth of their parents.

There is no difficulty in this passage if we bear in mind that Plato uses the words parents and children, brothers and sisters in a new sense which he consistently observes. Some of the results of his arrangements he hardly saw or does not care to notice. The infrequency of the opportunity of nuptial intercourse is singular: but this is not unreasonable if it is considered that the nuptial scheme has absolutely no other object but the procreation of children: also the circumstance is to be remarked that those who were united in any hymeneal festival would rarely be born in the same year owing to the difference in the marriageable age prescribed for men and women.

μετ' ἐκείνην δεκάτῳ μηνὶ καὶ ἐβδομῳ δῇ] 'After an interval of ten or indeed of seven months': an inexact way of saying, 'From seven to ten months after.' δῇ draws attention to the more exceptional case.

καὶ οὖτω δῇ τὰ τούτων ἐκυονα] 'Their offspring defined in the same way.' Cp. Theact. 156 c τὰ δὲ γεννώμενα οὖτω δὖ.

ἐὰν ὁ κλήρος ταύτη εὐμπάπτῃ] It is not forgotten that the lottery has been cunningly devised by the rulers: supra 460 λ.

The great merit of the new arrangement is that it secures the unity of feeling in the state: so that if one member suffer, the whole body shall suffer with it, and the gladness of one shall be the gladness of all.

In other states one family sorrows, another rejoices at the same
Notes: Book V.

event; the rulers, though fellow-citizens, are masters, the people slaves, and even the ruling class are bound together by no tie but that of office. Whereas in our community the people regard the rulers as their protectors and are regarded by them in turn as bread-winners, and the rulers will be all one family, not only in name, but in reality.

This new institution is in keeping with the community of property which was previously ordained. And both together, by securing unanimity, will render quarrels and crimes of violence impossible in our state. Nor shall we have poor men flattering the rich, nor fathers of families harassed by petty cares, but the life of our guardians will be more enviable than that of Olympian victors. So little need we fear the objection that in forbidding them to have property we have made them less happy than the other citizens. Should any of them be moved by a low ambition and seek to appropriate the state to himself, he will learn to his cost how truly Hesiod said, 'Half is better than the whole.'

واجبأثا... واللогоي بعسسؤبأثا ولللوو is literally 'to obtain confirmation from the argument,' which, as elsewhere, is personified. Cp. Gorg. 489 A μὴ φθόνει μοι ἀποκρίνασθαι τούτο, Καλλίκλεις, ἢ, εάν μοι ἀμοιλογήσῃς, βεβαιώσωμαι ἡδη παρὰ σοῦ, ἄτε ἰκανοὶ ἄνδρος διαγρώναι ἀμοιλογηκότος.

In what follows Plato appears to confuse the absolute unity of the state with the harmony or balance of the various elements which are contained in the state. He has no idea of a unity of opposites or differences—τὸ ἀντίκειται συμφέρων. May we not imagine some Athenian statesman or man of the world saying: 'O Socrates, did you ever see one individual who was by nature the same as another? and is not a state made up of differences of character as well as of different employments? And if you could destroy these differences by education, would you not reduce men to a powerless unity in which their best qualities are lost?' Such has certainly been the fate of religious orders, who, in a spirit not unlike that of Plato's Republic, have attempted to extinguish individual character or genius in a common interest. Cp. Arist. Pol. ii. 2, § 3 ou μόνον δ' ἐκ πλείωνοι ἄνθρωποι ἐστίν ἡ πόλις, ἀλλά καὶ εἴποι διαφερόντων. Cp. also ibid. c. 2, § 2; c. 5, §§ 13-17. This truth begins to find acknowledgement in Plato's regulations concerning marriage in the Politicus and Laws (Polit. 309, 310: Laws vi. 773).
"Republic."

Of the mutual understanding or agreement, implied in the words 'as if', the impression of the good is the explanation of the words 'as if' supra 451 D. For 'as if' supra 451 D cf. 'as if' and note. The redundancy of 'as if' after 'as if' is occasioned by the antithesis of 'as if'.

This is that barren unity which Aristotle condemns (Pol. ii. cc. 3, 4: also c. 5, § 14 ὥσπερ κἂν εἰ τις τὸν συμφωνίαν ποιήσειν ὁμοφωνίαν ἥ τὸν ρυθμὸν βάσιν μίαν). To to refers to τὸ τε ἐμὸν καὶ τὸ ὀκὺ ἐμὸν in the previous sentence.

The illustration then proceeds until Glaucus gives his assent and returns to the original question of Socrates (τοῦτο δ' ἐρωτᾶσ). For the expression 'κατὰ τὸ σῶμα' supra 584 C. 'κατὰ τὸ σῶμα' τοῦ σώματος 'ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τείνουσαι ... ἕδοναι': Theaet. 186 c ὅσα διὰ τοῦ σώματος παθήματα 'ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τείνειν': Phil. 34 c, n: Tim. 64. The redundancy of ἄη after 'πᾶσα is occasioned by the antithesis of μέρους.

As a neuter cp. iv. 421 a καὶ αὖ τοῦ 'οίκειν καὶ 'ευδαιμονεῖν μόνον τῶν καρῶν 'ἐξουσιν: viii. 543 a τῇ μελλούσῃ ἄκρως 'οίκειν πόλει.

For the familiar idiom cp. Theaet. 145 c ὅρα ... 'επιδεικνύσθαι, ἐμοὶ δὲ 'σκοπεῖσθαι.

'The things agreed to.' Cp. ii. 362 b 'βουλεύματα and note.

For the use of the singular verb with a plural substantive, cp. ii. 363 a ἡμα ... 'γίγνεται ... ἄρχαι τε καὶ γάμοι, k.t.l. and note.

'Sc. προπαγορεύεων.'

A 'with regard to the rulers.' The genitive is at first vague, as supra 459 b 'Τί δὲ ἐπ'οιεὶ ...; and is then brought into government with 'εἰ τις.
τὸν μὲν ὦκεῖον... (c) ὦχ ἔαυτοῦ;] ‘The friend he thinks and speaks of as belonging to him; the stranger as not belonging to him.’

πότερον αὐτῶι... κατὰ τὰ ὄνοματα πράττειν;] ‘Will you merely assign to them by law the name of friends?’ It is hardly necessary to observe that ὑποθέτειν has two constructions in the successive clauses: (1) with τὰ ὄνοματα: (2) with πράττειν.

περὶ τε τοὺς πατέρας] The correlative phrase (καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἔννομείς) is deferred through the expansion of the sentence, and the lost thread is resumed in the words καὶ περὶ πατέρων... καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔννομων, in construction with ὑμνήσουσιν.

αὐταί σοι ἣ ἄλλαι φήμαι... (ε) φθέγγουστο] This resumption only regards the latter part of the preceding sentence (ἡ μήτε πρὸς θεῶν... ἡ τάυτα), in which not the law itself, but the sanction of the law is spoken of.

ὑμνήσουσιν] is used intransitively like ὦκεῖον in the expression ἡ ἀριστα πολιτευμένη πόλις ὦκεῖ (supra 462 B).

ἐφαμεν] supra 462 b, c.

κοινῇ] sc. γιγνόμενη.

οὐκοῦν μάλιστα... ἔξουσιν;] As Aristotle truly remarks (Pol. ii. 1), ‘mine and thine,’ as well as ‘father and mother,’ have received a new meaning; Plato seems to forget that the legislator cannot create by new use of names the feeling of family relationship where no such relationship exists. The sweetness of the ‘wine,’ which is the affection of a family, has been dissolved in water (Ar. Pol. ii. 4, 7, 8).

πρὸς τῇ ἄλλῃ καταστάσει] ‘besides the general arrangement of the state,’ i.e. the other arrangements not including the community of wives and children. Cp. supra 463 A, B.

σῶματι... ὡς ἔχει] The slight harshness of adding πρὸς μέρος αὐτοῦ to σῶματι (cp. infra 466 D παρὰ φύσιν τὴν τοῦ θῆλεος πρὸς τὸ ἄρρητον) is softened by the further addition of ὡς ἔχει λύπης, κ.τ.λ.

τοῖς πρόσθεν γε] The reference is to iii. 415 e ff.

κοινῇ πάντας ἀνάλοικοιν] This was implied in the institution of συσσίτια, which were a κοινῇ ἀνάλοιας τῆς διδομένης τροφῆς (iii. 416 e).
The mention of offences against the person is suggested by the exception of πλὴν τὸ σῶμα in the preceding sentences. (Cp. the classification of criminal offences in the Laws, Book ix, especially pp. 879, 880.)

καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ βιαίων γε, κ.τ.λ.] The mention of offences against the person is suggested by the exception of πλὴν τὸ σῶμα in the preceding sentences. (Cp. the classification of criminal offences in the Laws, Book ix, especially pp. 879, 880.)

καὶ γυναικὰ τε καὶ παῖδας ἔτέρους] sc. ὄνομαζοντας 'ἔμοις.' ‘Calling a different wife and different children his own.’

καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ βιαίων γε, κ.τ.λ.] The mention of offences against the person is suggested by the exception of πλὴν τὸ σῶμα in the preceding sentences. (Cp. the classification of criminal offences in the Laws, Book ix, especially pp. 879, 880.)

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καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ βιαίων γε, κ.τ.λ.] The mention of offences against the person is suggested by the exception of πλὴν τὸ σῶμα in the preceding sentences. (Cp. the classification of criminal offences in the Laws, Book ix, especially pp. 879, 880.)
Madvig's simple change of τὸ to τοῦ seems justifiable. Cp. iv. 440 C.

ἐµβάινει γὰρ οὕτως] 'That is clearly the result' (viz. of our institutions—ἐκ τῶν νῦνον infra).

tοῦτων μὴν ... διχοστατήσῃ] Plato, as Aristotle remarks (Pol. ii. 5, 18 ff.), seems hardly to think of the lower orders of the state. The question which is raised in the Politics has no answer: 'Did he mean the communism of the higher orders to extend to the lower?' There is certainly no proof that he did.


κολακείας τε πλουσίων πένητες] (1) 'Flatteries of the rich, in the case of the poor': κολακείας, like ἀπορίας and ἀλγηθόνας, is the accusative after λέγειν, while πένητες is in apposition (part with whole) with the nominative of ἀπηλλαγμένοι ἄν eἰεν: the full expression is κολακείας τε πλουσίων ἄν πένητες ἀπηλλαγμένοι ἄν eἰεν. Or (2) κολακείας gen. sing, in the same case with ὅν.

tαιμεύειν παραδὸντες] Cp. iii. 416 ὅλησθαν καὶ ταιμεύων μηδὲν εἶναι: viii. 550 τὸ ταιμεύων ... ἐκεῖνο ἐκάστω χρυσίον πληροφεύμενον ἀπάλλυσι τὴν τοιαύτην πολιτείαν.

ἀπαλλάξονται] Cobet's conjecture, ἀπηλλάξουσα (future perfect), though in strict accordance with ἀπηλλαγμένοι ἄν eἰεν supra, is quite needless, and the form does not occur elsewhere.

γέρα δέχονται ... μετέχουσιν] Plato seems at first to have intended to end the sentence at τελευτήσαντες, but by an after-thought expands the word into an independent clause. Cp. Phaedr. 258 C ἰδίθεν δέηεται αὐτὸς τε αὐτῶν ἔτι ζων, καὶ οἱ ἔπειτα γεγονόμενα ταῦτα ταῦτα περὶ αὐτῶν νομίζουσι.


ποιοῖμεν ... σκεψούμεθα ... ποιοῖμεν] The optative has sufficient manuscript authority, and is therefore preferred, although the readings of A, ποιοῖμεν (bis), σκεψούμεθα, are not impossible.

εἰ ποιο παραπέπτοι] 'If so be that the topic should fall in our way.' Cp. viii. 561 B.

μὴ πὴ κατὰ ... τὸν τῶν γεωργῶν;) 'Can it from any point of view be regarded as on a level with that of the husbandman,' &c. Cp. Gorg. 512 B μὴ σοι δοκεῖ κατὰ τὸν δικανικὸν εἶναι;
Plato : Republic.

Republic 

ἔκειν] iv. 420 D. 

μενεῖ . . . βίω] either (1) 'he will continue in, or remain true to, this life.' 

C 

Cp. vi. 496 B πάνωμικρὸν . . . κατὰ φύσιν μεῖναι ἐπ' αὐτῷ: or (2) taking μενεῖ in a more general and absolute sense, 'he will remain where he is (i.e. he will be content) when such a life is offered to him.' (ἐπί = on condition of.)

συγχωρεῖς] here is followed by two constructions: first by the accusative of the noun (κοινωνίαν), then by the infinitive (δεῖν, πράξειν). 'You agree to the community . . ., viz. that the women should (δεῖν) . . . and that if they do so they will do (πράξειν) what is best . . . .

D 

Τῇ πεφύκατον . . . κοινωνεῖν] These words are added in limitation and further explanation of παρὰ φύσιν.

466 D– 471 C

Here Glaucon would have reminded Socrates of the question which had been left to the last,—whether such a revolution of established custom is possible. Socrates anticipates him by subtly interposing a point of detail, which still detains them for some time. What are to be the laws and usages of war? The women will go campaigning with the men, and they will take their children with them (except those of tender age), mounted on swift and well-trained horses, under proper guidance and protection, to see the battle and to perform such services as they are fitted for. Thus, while their safety is provided for, they will learn their future occupation, and their presence will heighten the valour of their parents.

As to military discipline, the appropriate punishment for cowardice in action will be the degradation of the offender to the rank of an artisan, and if he is taken prisoner, we may make a present of him to the enemy. As rewards for eminent service in the field, there will be crowns, ovations and favours from the young and beautiful (as before said), not to mention feasts for which we have the example in Homer. Those who die bravely for their country shall be declared to be of the golden (or royal) race, and shall have divine honours paid to them, as the God at Delphi shall direct. And a similar tribute shall be assigned to those who die at home after doing eminent service.

But how will our soldiers treat their enemies? They will distinguish between Hellenes and barbarians. No Hellenic city shall be enslaved; no Hellene held in bondage. And it shall be forbidden
to despoil the dead, both on grounds of humanity and discipline. Hellenic armour (unless by Divine command) shall not be hung as a trophy in the temples of Greek Gods. Nor shall Hellenic territory be ravaged, or Hellenic villages burnt. For the quarrel of Hellene with Hellene is not war, but sedition, an untoward variance between kinsmen; and it should be kept within strict bounds, not suffered to degenerate into unnatural violence. Nor should men act as if such contention were irreconcilable. In warring with barbarians, which alone is truly war, the usages heretofore practised by the Hellenes in fighting amongst themselves are quite barbarous enough.

οὐκοῦν, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ... (Ε) πολεμήσουσιν] 'The only question that remains, is as to the possibility of the scheme.' 'That is what I was going to suggest.' 'We need not speak about war, for it is obvious what will be the manner of their wars.'

ἐφθης ... ὑπολήψεσθαι] 'You have forestalled an interruption which I was meditating.' ὑπολήψεσθαι has the meaning of interrupting, taking up a conversation, cp. Prot. 318 λ ὑπολαβὼν ...

peri μεν γὰρ τῶν ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ, κ.τ.λ.] γὰρ introduces the reason why the possibility of the scheme is the only remaining topic (κοινων supra). The real motive of the digression is an artistic one. The great peripeteia, the on-rushing of the 'third wave,' is made more impressive by being delayed.

ὁτι κοινη ... (467 λ) καὶ μητέρας] The words διακονεῖν, κ.τ.λ., follow the general notion of what is fitting. They may be construed with ἀξοῦσι, but the change is occasioned by δείησει intervening. For ἀδροί cp. Hdt. iv. 180 ἐπείαν δὲ γυναῖκι τὸ παιδίον ἄδρον γένηται.


ἀναλαβεῖν] here as often in later writers is intransitive in meaning = 'to recover.'

καὶ οὐκ ἄξιον κινδύνου] (1) οὐκ ἄξιον is co-ordinate with σμικρόν. 'Do you think the difference unimportant and not worth some risk?' Or (2) the words οὐκ ἄξιον κινδύνου are parenthetical and are to be joined with θεωρεῖν, neglecting ἡ μὴ. [B. J.]

Notes: Book V. 241

Republic V. 466 D–471 C

E 466 D

B 467

C

R
Republic: Republic

467 C  τούτο μὲν ἄρα υπάρκτεν] 'This then we must begin with.' υπάρχειν, 'to begin with,' being used with the accusative as well as the genitive, is legitimately formed into a passive verbal with τούτο in the accusative. προσμήχανάσθαι depends on the general notion of duty implied in υπάρκτεν.

D  εὐλαβήσονται] sc. ἀγειν.

468 A  πῶς ἐκτένον σοι τοὺς στρατιώτας] πῶς ἐκτένον = πῶς ἐχειν δεῖ; σοι is an ethic dative: 'How should you have your soldiers disposed to one another and to their enemies?'

B  δεξιωθήναι] δεξιοθένθαι often means 'to extend the right hand towards a person in token of admiration.' See especially Soph. El. 975, 976: Xen. Hellen. v. 1, 3 οὕδεις ἐκείνον τῶν στρατιωτῶν ὅσον οὐκ ἔδεξιόσαςτο καὶ ὃ μὲν ἐστεφάνωστεν, κ.τ.λ.
Notes: Book V.

καὶ μὴ δεῖν ἐξείναι] καὶ, which is omitted in some MSS., including Λ, may indicate the addition of a further clause to the law. 'Be it furthermore enacted,' &c. Cp. iii. 417 Α and note.

ἄρεσις τῶν τιοιοτῶν] Either (1) 'there will be more frequent selections of such men' (τιοιοτῶν referring to ἄγαθον ὄντι) 'than of others by the rulers to take part in the marriage festivals,' cp. supra 460 Α, Β; or (2) 'success in winning such prizes.'

ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ καθ' Ὀμηρόν . . . (β) τὴν ἵσχυν αὐξήσει] II. vii. 321, 322

νῦν τοὺς δ' Ἀιντά διηκέκέσσι γέμαιρεν

ἡμῶς Ἀτρείδης, εὐφυκρεῖων Ἀγαμέμνων.

As in iii. 408 Β and elsewhere, Socrates takes a humorous delight in supporting his opinions by the authority of Homer.

ὡς ταύτην οἶκείαν οὖσαν τιμήν] 'implying that this was a proper way of honouring.'

ταύτα γε] 'in this,' although we refuse to follow him in other things (ii. 383 Α, &c.).

νῦν δὴ] supra Β, Β.

καὶ κρέασιν ... δεπάσας] II. viii. 162: xii 311. This may seem a curious form of training and hardly consistent with iii. 390 Α, Β, &c.; but compare Laws i. 649. Plato cannot be held up as an advocate of total abstinence, but rather of moderation in the use of wine.

τοῦ χρυσοῦ γένους] iii. 415 Α–C.

ἄλλ' οὖ πεισάμεθα Ἡσιοδώ] The lines which follow are altered from Hesiod, Op. et Dies, 121 ff.:

τοῖς μὲν δαίμονεσ εἰσίν Δίους μεγάλου διὰ βουλίας,

ἐσθλοί, ἐπικράτειοι, φιλακεῖς θυντῶν ἄνθρωπων.

They occur also in Crat. 398 Α, where it is inferred that Hesiod meant by δαίμονες the wise and good. Ib. Β ὃς ἢν ἄγαθον ἢ δαίμονον εἴναι, καὶ ζώντα καὶ τελευτήσαντα καὶ ὀρθῶς δαίμονα καλεῖσθαι.

τοῦ τιοιοτοῦ] τοῦ χρυσοῦ. Cp. iv. 424 Α.

πῶς χρῆ . . . τιθέναι] 'how to order the sepulture of heroic and divine persons ': τιθέναι used absolutely for ἐσ ταφὰς τιθέναι (cp. τὰς θήκας ἱνθά B).

τι δὲ; πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους, κ.τ.λ.] Plato would make a distinction
between Greek meeting Greek and the wars of Greeks with barbarians, not unlike that which has been observed in modern times between the wars of civilized nations with one another and with Orientals or savages.

What are to be the usages of war is a question which has not received a complete solution. This is due to the comparative infrequency of wars and the variety of their circumstances. The precedents are few and there are no courts to sanction or register them. Still some shadow or reflection of law seems to watch over a state of man which in one sense is the negation of law. As in other cases in which the law of nations fails, the law of nature tends to appear. 1. In ancient times there was a faith that 'God would defend the right'; and in our own day justice has not so entirely vanished from the world, but that some plea or appearance of right also gives might. 2. As there must be a degree of justice in the commencement, there must also be some regard to the common rights of humanity in the conduct of a war: (a) so much truth and sincerity in the dealings of the two adversaries as may enable them to fight collectively; an army would cease to be an army which had no word of honour with their opponents; (b) so much humanity as is consistent with the object of war; everyone would agree that a destruction of life or property, say of an unfortified town or of helpless persons, which had no military result, was barbarous and inhuman; (c) but the question when the destruction of life and property is justified by the military result is always a matter of opinion; (d) the first thoughts of mankind regard war as a great evil, which is to be humanized as far as possible; their second thoughts lead them to doubt the 'greatest humanity principle,' as likely to multiply and protract the evil: on the other hand, cruelty or severity, which may perhaps tend to shorten wars, tends also to deprive them of their chivalry, and to demoralize those who are engaged in them; (e) neutral nations insist that the two belligerents shall not be allowed so to injure one another, as permanently to injure the world: also that they shall settle their quarrel within as narrow limits and with as little injury to others as possible. 3. An element of feeling and courtesy happily enters into the usages of war; the friendly relation of individuals is not wholly absorbed in the collective antagonism; the condition of prisoners is ameliorated, and the communications between the two parties are couched in friendly language, and are not interpreted by legal technicalities.
4. No Christian or civilized nation would willingly overstep the limits of custom. The soldier may be trained to give the most fatal wound; the engineer may invent deadly machines: but the suggestion of any new kind of death by poisoning and suffocation is revolting to the military as well as to the common feeling. With a like inconsistency, the Greek, who slew his prisoners, nevertheless restored the bodies of the slain. 5. Speculative politicians have sometimes imagined that war, which has been in some degree regulated, might be further conventionalized into a duel between armies and fleets. But the elements of war are never so completely under our control, or the situation so equal, as to admit of such a convention. International law, whether about neutral ships or goods, rights of blockade, privateering, can only be altered by common consent; and the alterations commonly affect the relative positions of different nations in the event of war. 6. That one usage of war should be maintained towards Greeks, one towards barbarians—one towards Europeans, another towards Indians or New Zealanders, may be palliated by necessity or previous wrong, but cannot be defended in theory. 'A great nation's little wars' are commonly the least creditable part of her history.

Δοκεῖ δίκαιον . . . τούτο ἐθέλειν] ἄλλη sc. πῶλει (ἄλφω Σ). For the form of sentence cp. Theaet. 154 ά ἔχεις τούτο ἰσχυρῶς, ἥ πολὺ μᾶλλον, κ.τ.λ. For the influence of this feeling on actual Greek usages of war cp. Xen. Hellen. i. 6, § 14 κελεύων τῶν συμμάχων ἀποδοθῇ καὶ τοὺς Μῆθυμμαίοις οὐκ ἔφη (ἄπολλος ἑπεῖτα) ἐπεὶ τοῖς οὐδὲνα ἐλλήνων εἰς τὸ ἐκεῖνον δυνατόν ἄνδραποδισθῆναι.

καὶ τούτο ἐθέλειν] sc. τοὺς Ἐλλήνας. Our state is a Greek state (cp. 470 E) and will therefore habitually spare their own kinsmen.

τὴν ὑπὸ τῶν βαρβάρων δουλεύαν] 'Their enslavement by the barbarians.'

ἄλφω καὶ παντὶ] 'altogether,' ganz und gar. The expression is varied in different places, τῷ ἄλφω καὶ παντὶ (Rep. vii. 527 c): τῷ παντὶ καὶ ἄλφω (Laws v. 734 E).

μηδὲ . . . ἔμφοβολεύειν;] 'Is it just that they should not even possess a Greek as a slave and that they should advise the other Hellenes not to do so either?' The sentence is divided by μήτε . . . τε, the latter particle introducing a variation of μήτε τοὺς ἄλλους. The infinitives depend on the general notion of δοκεῖ δίκαιον, understood from the previous question.
Xenophon tells us (Hell. ii. 4, § 19) that Thrasybulus and his friends, after their victory over the thirty tyrants, τὰ μὲν ὅπλα ἔλαβαιν, τοὺς δὲ χιτῶνας οὐδενὸς τῶν πολιτῶν ἐπεκλεψαν.

For the use of ἔχω cp. Thuc. ii. 41 οὕτε τῷ πολεμίῳ ἐπελθοῦσι οἰνακίτησιν ἐξεῖ.

τοῦ βαλόντος] ‘of him who hit them,’ is the reading of Par. A. Other MSS. have βιβλωντος, ‘of the thrower’ in general, or ‘of him who is throwing at them.’ This passage is quoted by Aristotle, Rhet. iii. 4, § 3, as a specimen of an εἰκὼν: καὶ τὸ ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ τῇ Πλάτωνος, δι’ οἷ οὐ τοὺς τεθνεότας σκυλεύσαντες εἶδαν καὶ τοὺς κυνιδίως, τοὺς λέβως διάκειται τῶν βιβλωντῶν οὐχ ἀπόμενα.

εἰκόνων . . . τὰς τῶν ἀναίρεσεων διακλωνεῖς] ‘We must let alone spoliation of the dead, or prevention of the removal of corpses.’ See Thuc. iv. 97–101 (the affair of Delium).

εἰκόνων μεντοι] μέντοι here implies strong assent to a proposition which alters what had previously been thought.

 Plato thus avoids clashing directly with religious tradition. He will not lay down the law too rigidly, but allows an appeal against himself to the oracle of Delphi (iv. 427 b, c). See Paus. x. 10, § 3.

γῆς τε τιμῆσεως] For the omission of περὶ cp. supra 459 b τί δὲ ἵππων οὐεί . . . ; vii. 515 b τί δὲ τῶν παραφρομένων; οὐ ταύτων τούτω; and Gorg. 500 b. The correction τιμῆσεως, formerly adopted by the Zurich editors (‘assessment of the territory’?), is not in keeping with the corresponding clause, and is unsupported by manuscript authority. What is expressed in γῆν τέμνειν, which is forbidden, is clearly more than the removal of the year’s produce, which he allows (infra b), and would include the cutting down of fruit-trees, the destruction of farm buildings and the like.

τί σοι δράσουσιν] For σοι cp. supra 468 A πῶς ἔκτενον σοι τοὺς στρατιώτας;

The article τὰ, which is added after ταύτα in some MSS. (M Ε), throws a stronger emphasis on the verb, but makes no real difference in the sense: ‘It appears to me that wars and sedition, as they are two in name, are two in reality.’

δύνα ἐπὶ δυοῖν . . . τῇ τοῦ ἀλλοτρίου πόλεμος] ‘being applied to
differences arising in two things. And the two things I speak of are what is domestic or kindred and what is alien or foreign. Accordingly sedition is the name for the enmity of what is domestic: war, for the enmity of what is alien. The quarrel or enmity of what is domestic and kindred = the quarrel of one state with itself: the quarrel or enmity of what is alien and foreign = the quarrel of two states with one another. For καὶ εὐθυμία ἐπὶ τινι cp. Parmen. 147 ν, Soph. 218 c: and for the use of the passive, Eurip. Hec. 1271 τῆς ὁμοια δ' ὁνομα σῷ κεκλησται. The particle οὖν (ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν), which is omitted in a few MSS., is probably genuine. It is hardly worth while, therefore, to discuss whether the asyndeton which is occasioned by the omission of οὖν is justified by examples. The genitives are possessive or descriptive: 'where the relation is that of kindred,' 'where it is that of aliens.' For the definition of στάσις cp. Soph. 228 Λ τὴν τοῦ φύσει έγγενούς ἐκ τινος διαφθορᾶς διαφοράν.

καὶ οὖν ἐν γε ... ἀπο τρόπου λέγεις] 'That is a very just mode of speaking.' ἀπο in the sense of 'away from' is accented by the grammarians as a paroxytone, a distinction however which is often neglected in the MSS.

ὁρα δὴ καὶ εἰ τόδε ... λέγω] καὶ belongs in sense to τόδε.

"Ελληνας μὲν ἀρα ... τὴν ἕχθραν ταύτην κλητέον] A slight variation in the order of the text occurs here: instead of πολεμείν μαχομένους τε ... εἶναι, some MSS. (including Λ mg.) read μαχομένους πολεμείν τε in order to give τε its proper position after the main verb. But τε may follow πολεμείν μαχομένους as a single word.

ξυγκωρὼ οὖτω νομίζειν] 'I agree to hold this language.'

ἐν τῇ νῦν ὁμολογομένη στάσει] 'In what people now agree in calling sedition,' i.e. in sedition as ordinarily understood, as opposed to the new meaning which Socrates has given to it, viz. the war of Greeks with Greeks. For the use of νῦν in such a connexion cp. ii. 372 Ε ὧσα ἀπερ καὶ οἱ νῦν ἔχουσι: vii. 529 Λ ὡς μὲν νῦν αὐτὸν μεταχειρίζονται οἱ εἰς φιλοσοφιαν ἀνάγοντες.

ὡς ἀληθήνωθης τε, κ.τ.λ.] ὡς is substituted for ὅτι at the beginning of the sentence. It is to be taken with ἀληθήνωθης in the sense of 'how.' 'How wicked does the strife appear! and neither of the two parties seem lovers of their country.' Cp. vi. 496 c.

τὴν τροφὸν τε καὶ μητέρα κείρειν] See note on iii. 414 E.
μέτριον εἶναι] The force of δοκεῖ is continued from above.

ως διαλλαγησομένων] For the construction of διανοεῖσθαι ως cp. i. 327 c ως . . . μη ἀκουσμένων . . . διανοεῖσθε: vii. 523 c ως ἐγγύθεν τοίνυν ὄρωμένους λέγοντος μου διανοοῦ.

αὐτή ἢ δίαινα ἐκεῖνης] αὐτή refers to the words immediately preceding, τοὺς καρποὺς ἀφαρείσθαι . . . πολεμησόντων: ἐκεῖνης το ἐὰν ἐκάτεροι, κ.τ.λ.

ἡν σὺ πῶλιν οἰκίζεις] σὺ is emphatic. The new city shares the nationality of Glaucon, who is playfully called the founder of it.

ἀλλ᾿ οὗ . . . ὑπάρχειν οἵ ἀλλοι ἑρῶν;] For οὔδε in interrogations cp. supra 455 οὐδέ πολεμικὴ;

σωφρονοῦσιν] For the significance of this term cp. Χερ. Ηηλ. iii. 2, § 23 ἔθοσε τοὺς ἐφόρους καὶ τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ σωφρονίσας αὐτοὺς (sc. τοὺς Ἡλείους), and the context there.

ὑπὸ τῶν ἀναιτίων ἀλγούσιτων] The innocent, who are in the majority (cp. ὡς φιλοὶ τῶν πολλῶν), compel the minority (cp. ἄλγους ἀεὶ ἐξερήσεις, κ.τ.λ.), for whose guilt they are made to smart, to submit.

πρὸς δὲ τοὺς βαρβάρους, ως . . . πρὸς ἄλληλους] ‘And they should deal with barbarians as the Greeks now deal with one another.’ The irony is transparent.

In the previous clause the ingenuity of the transcriber of q has unnecessarily altered ἐνιαυτίος into Ἕλληνας. That Greeks only are intended is clear from the context.

θώμεν, ἐφη . . . καὶ τὰ πρόσθεν] The infinitive ἐκεῖν is governed by θώμεν, which is used in two constructions: ‘We will lay down this law, and we will assume that this and the former enactments are excellent.’ For the infinitive after τίθημι cp. i. 331 Α ἔγωγε τίθημι τὴν τῶν χρημάτων κτύσιν πλείστον ἄξιον εἶναι.

Glaucan grows impatient of the digression and Socrates can no longer elude the advance of the ‘third and greatest wave.’ The new institution involves innumerable benefits, but is it possible? Can this ideal ever become real?

Socrates first pleads that such a demand goes beyond the aim proposed (ii. 368), which is to find the nature of Justice in the abstract. If we have made that discovery, our success will not be
Notes: Book V.

The point to be chiefly dwelt on is put forward, leaving the construction in suspense, and the words καὶ ἄ σὐ παραλεῖπεις ἐγὼ λέγω supply the apodosis: 'For as to the advantages of this form of government, if possible, to the state in which it might be possible, I add particulars not mentioned by you.' For a similar turn of expression cp. iv. 420 λ ναὶ, ἢν ἰ ἐγὼ, καὶ ταῦτα γε ἐπισίτιοι . . . κατηγορημένα, and for παρωσάμενον cp. Soph. Trach. 358 ὑν νῦν παρώσας οὕτως ἐμπαλίν λέγει.

As in vii. 528 f., 537 d, the lively imagination of Glaucon seizes on the incidental results and circumstances of the institution which is in question. γιγνώσκοντες is to be taken closely with what follows, 'acknowledging each other as brothers,' &c. Compare supra 461 c.

στραγγευόμενω] instead of the unmeaning στρατευόμενω, is the ingenious emendation of Orelli; and is also found as a correction in the Viennese MS. F: 'You have no mercy on my hesitation.' The metaphor in the word στραγγεύομαι is taken from the falling of drops of water extracted by pressure: cp. στρείγομαι, and for the use of the word Aristoph. Nubes 131 τι ταῦτ' ἔχων στραγγεύομαι; Acharn. 126 κάπεστι ἐγὼ δὴν ἐνθαδό στραγγεύομαι; This reading is confirmed by the resumption of the same idea in ὀξυσὶ τε καὶ ἐδεδοκῇ infra. στρατευόμενω may have been suggested to a scribe by the association of καταδρομὴν ἐποιήσω: or possibly by the notion which Stallbaum seems to entertain that warfare is the subject in hand.
The same metaphor occurs in the Euthydemus infra 293 A σώσας ἣμισ... ἐκ τῆς τρικυμίας τοῦ λόγου. It is continued in 473 C επ' αὐτῷ δῆ... εἰμὶ δ' τῷ μεγίστῳ προσεικάζομεν κύματι.

This is the reading of MS. The reading of Par. A, Ven. ii. λέγειν λόγου τε, might be preferred as the durior lectio, but on no other ground. It is probably an accidental mis-writing. The reading of the text is also supported by 9 corr., the first hand having written λέγειν λέγειν according to Schneider, who examined the MS. after Bekker.

As a preparation for the third and last wave, which is still impending, Socrates returns to the main object of the work, which, as he again reminds us, is the search after justice and injustice, first in the state, and secondly in the individual. The ideal of justice is not the less ideal because incapable of realization, any more than the perfection of human beauty in a picture is less perfect because there is no ideal man like the man in the picture. Therefore Socrates regards the task required of him, to prove the possibility of his state in fact, as a work of supererogation, the failure of which in no way interferes with the truth of his speculations, and in which only a contingent and imperfect success is to be expected. The spirit of this passage may be compared with vi. 501 ff., where the relation of the ideal to the actual is again in question. In both these passages Plato talks of painters as copyists of the Idea. In Book x he speaks of them along with poets as mere copyists of the copy. The former view comes nearer to the modern notion of art as the idealization of nature than the ordinary Greek conception of μιμητική.

"Only that if." Cp. supra 461 D οὐδ' εἶναι and note.

Plato here implies that it is the nature of the actual to fall short of the ideal, and of the concrete to fall short of the abstract.
Notes: Book V.

ovōs] 'The latter,' answering the last question.

ei γένοιτο] These words may be explained to mean 'whether he could be produced'; but they are then inconsistent with οὐ τοῦτον ἕνεκα infra D. Madvig would obviate the difficulty by omitting καί. But the tautology of ei γένοιτο . . . γενόμενος is then very weak, and it is better to cancel ei γένοιτο as a gloss on γενόμενος. Another expedient is to read ἐν (ἰν;?) γένοιτο with Bekker. τελέως is omitted in Ven. π. [There is no inconsistency between ei γένοιτο . . . γενόμενος and ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦτον ἕνεκα infra D: to inquire whether perfect justice or a perfectly just man are possible is a different thing from trying to demonstrate their possibility. B. J.]

τὴν ἑκείνης μοίραν ὁμοιοτάτην ἐξειν] τὴν ἑκείνης, the reading of Par. λ and most MSS., 'The lot that is most like justice,' is not ungrammatical, but extremely improbable, as answering to ἑκείνηις . . . ὁμοιοτάτος preceding. It is much more likely that ἑκείνης is due to itacism or to an echo of the phrase μηδὲν δεῖν αὐτῆς ἑκείνης διαφέρειν in what precedes.

ἐν' ἀποδείξωμεν] is the explanation of τοῦτον ἕνεκα: cp. infra τοῦτον ἕνεκα, ἐὰν μὴ ἐξωμεν.

τά αὐτά διομολόγησαι] Socrates in 472 d had extracted from Glaucon the admission that an artist who cannot demonstrate the possibility of the existence of a man so beautiful as he has painted is not to be considered inferior for that reason. Here, before he attempts to show the possibility of his communistic scheme, he asks Glaucon to make the same admission, in a different, it is true, and more universal form: 'That action can never come up to description.'

ἡ φύσιν ἔξει, κ.τ.λ.] 'All experience is against this, but that is no reason for doubting the truth of it,' says Euler (quoted by Coleridge) of the properties of the arch. He means that the mathematical ideal of the arch is imperfectly realized in matter. The relation of mathematics to physics is a good because a definite type of the relation of the abstract to the concrete. The ideal of the state is much farther removed from actual fact; or in Plato's words, 'action falls short of conception or expression, though some may deem otherwise.' What is true or perfect is one thing: what is possible, another. And great evils may arise from an attempt to enforce political ideals on a state of the world unsuited to them,—
the 'respublica Platonis' or 'the primitive church,' 'in faece Romuli' or 'the dregs of the Gothic empire.'

For the expression φύσιν ἔχει cp. vi. 489 B ἐὰν γὰρ ἔχει φύσιν κυβερνήτην γνωτόν δείσθαι ἄρχεσθαι.

καὶ εἰ μὴ τῷ δοκεῖ[,] i.e. though it may seem an inversion of the recognized opposition between λόγος and ἔργον. ἀλλὰ σὺ is an appeal from common opinion to the judgement of Glaucon.

καὶ τῷ ἔργῳ δεῖν] δεῖν is pleonastic, expanding ἀνάγκαζε.

φάναι[,] is the common use of the infinitive for the second person of the imperative (like φάσκειν in poetry). Cp. vi. 508 B τοῦτον τοῖς ... φάναι με λέγεω, and 509 B καὶ τοῖς γεγυμνακομένοις τοῖς μὴ μοῦν τὸ γεγυμνακομένος φάναι, κ.τ.λ.

The change required is nothing short of this. Either kings and rulers must be philosophers or philosophers kings. Until that is effected, there can be no happiness for individual or state.

This is a hard saying, and to escape from the consequences of having uttered it we must distinguish whom we mean by 'philosophers.'

ἐπὶ αὐτῷ δὴ ... κατακλύσεων] For ἐπὶ αὐτῷ ... εἰμί cp. infra 476 B ἐπὶ αὐτῷ τὸ καλὸν ... εἶναι. The pronoun is used as in Soph. O. T. 1169 πῶς αὐτῷ γ' εἰμὶ τῷ δεινῷ λέγεω. The metaphor of the laughing wave is perhaps the most audacious in Plato; the wave which has been following us throughout the book, since our first plunge, supra 453 B, is at last turned into a roaring sea of ridicule.

εἰρήσεται δ' οὖν] 'But the word shall be spoken, come what may.'

ἐὰν μὴ ... (E) διεληλύθαμεν] (Cp. Laws iv. 710, 711, where a wise and virtuous despotism is affirmed to be the best basis of legislation: εἰ τύραννος γένοιτο ... νέος, σώφρων, εὐμαθῆς, μνήμων, ἀνδρείας, μεγαλοπρεπῆς).

In this celebrated sentence Plato expresses the real unity of
practical and speculative life. Everywhere they seem to diverge—in politics, in religion, in the characters of men; but the principle which unites them lies deeper than the divergences. One is subject to the idols of the tribe, the other, of the den; the one is of this world, the other not of this world: the one is strong within a limited range, the other has a feeble intelligence of all things. The philosopher, in the description of the Theaetetus (173 ff.), may hardly recognize the existence of his fellow-creatures: the lawyer or politician in the companion picture (ib. 175) often knows only a narrow and debased section of human nature, and is as much out of his element in extraordinary circumstances as the philosopher is in common life. And there are false ways in which the two elements may be reconciled—in the doctrinaire (Euthyd. 305), in the pseudo-philanthropist, in the political idealist, or in any premature and superficial attempts to rest society on a liberal and philosophical basis. There is a real reconcilement of them when the king is also a seer, or the statesman in the highest sense is a philosopher, equal to the immediate present, rising also into the more distant future. The words of the text may also be regarded as a sort of Greek prophecy of a millennium: ‘I heard a voice crying, The kingdoms of the world are become the kingdoms of wisdom and truth.’

The passage is the keystone of the Republic. In other writings of Plato the speculative is divorced from the practical: in the Republic there is an attempt to unite them. The philosopher is no longer an isolated being who lives in contemplation; he descends from his ‘mountain heights’ to dwell among his own people, and in ‘his father’s house,’ ‘if there is such a home upon the earth’ (ix. 592 b).

οί βασιλῆς . . . λεγόμενοι] It is implied that the actual rulers of the world are not true kings.

καὶ τοῦτο εἰς ταύτων συμπέσῃ] ‘And unless these two, political power and philosophy, meet together in the same.’ Two things are here spoken of which coalesce in one. In the form of the sentence their coalition is anticipated. Cp. iv. 435 a and note.

eἰς τὸ δυνατὸν] ‘so far as is possible,’ in the nature of things. Such touches of moderation (in accordance with supra 472 ff.) occur in the most ideal passages of Plato. Cp. especially Symp. 212 a καὶ εἴτερ τῷ ἄλλῳ ἄνθρωπῳ, ἄθανάτῳ κάκεινος; Phaedr. 253 a καθ’ ὃσον δυνατὸν θεῶν ἀνθρώπων μετασχίνω.
It may be asked whether there has ever been a period in which this dream of the Republic has received a fulfilment: in the course of ages, as Plato pathetically asks, may there not have been a king who was also a philosopher? Some would add a further condition, not only that the king should be a philosopher, but that he should rule over a people fitted to receive his institutions. The names of the philosophical Roman emperors naturally occur to us; as has been truly said, one of the greatest blessings to the world would have been the adoption of Christianity by Marcus Antoninus instead of by Constantine. Still nearer approaches to a philosopher-king may be found in the legislators and princes of the East: Zoroaster, Sakya Muni, in the Mahometan emperor Akbar Khan, in our own Alfred the Great or the Mexican Montezuma.

Nor have there been wanting in our own day one or two who have shown a remarkable union of philosophical genius with military and political insight. Compare the ideal of the Puritans and the French Protestants.

χαλεπῶν γὰρ ἰδεῖν] 'It is given to few to perceive.' Cp. Phaedo 62 b 0... λόγος... μέγας τε τίς μοι φαίνεται καὶ οὗ ῥάδιος διδεῖν. χαλεπῶν is used of an excellence rarely attained: cp. Theact. 144 α ὡς ἄλλῳ χαλεπῶν.

καὶ δὴ, Ὡ Σάκρατες, κ. τ. λ.] We are reminded of the manner in which the upholders of paradoxical or revolutionary ideas are threatened with popular hostility in Aristophanes, e. g. Birds 310 ff., Wasps 400 ff., and Acharnians 280 ff.

The famous words are introduced with great circumstance and preparation. The expectation has been raised by the image of the wave; at last the time has arrived for the revelation of the overwhelming truth. The real solemnity of the revelation is instantly broken by the ludicrous outburst which follows. Socrates admits all the consequences which are urged, and gravely charges them upon his companion. The companion promises to help with good wishes and encouragement, which are all that he has to offer; and Socrates, having such a champion to support him, takes heart, and, still relieving the discourse by ludicrous imagery, proceeds to the description of philosophy.

διαδήλων] 'distinguished,' i. e. from those whom we do not mean.
The philosopher loves wisdom in its entirety. His desires are fixed on universal truth: not as seen in the concrete, but as known in the abstract. For between knowledge and ignorance there is an intermediate faculty of sense or opinion (διανοία), and between being and nonentity there is an intermediate region of 'contingent-matter.' Note, as being corresponds to knowledge, and not-being to ignorance, so the contingent, which now is and now is not, must be the object of the blinking, twilight faculty of opinion. That is the sphere of sense and ordinary thinking, and has no share in philosophy.

οὐ γὰρ πάνυ γε| 'Not perfectly.' Cp. iv. 439 c and note.

δάκρους:] Compare the image in the Symposium of those who are 'bitten' with philosophy 218 A τὴν καρδίαν... πληγεῖς τι καὶ διηθεῖς ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ λόγων: Eurip. Hippol. 1301-1303 τὴν γὰρ ἐλαύνεις θεών ἐπ᾽ ἑμῖν ὑπελείψας ἡδονή | διηθείσα κύριοι παιδός ἡμᾶς ἡδονή αἰέναν. So with comic exaggeration, ἀρδάπτει τόθος in Aristoph. Ran. 66. κύϊος is the common word.

ἡ οὖχ οὖτω ποιεῖτε;] 'Is not this your way?' Cp. ii. 365 A τί οἰόμεθα... ψυχὴς ποιεῖν; and note.

ὁ μὲν, ὦτι σιμός, κ.τ.λ.| A parallel to the thought is furnished by Hor. Sat. book I. iii. 38 'Illuc praeventam amatorem quod amicac | Turpia decipiant cæcum vitia... Strabonen | Appellat Paetum pater.' Lucret. iv. 1160-1164 'Nigra melichrus est, immunda et fetida acosmos, | Caesia Palladium, nervosa et lignea dorcas | Parvula pumilio, chariton mia, tolul merum sal, | Magna atque immanis cataplexis plenaque honoris.' In Charmides 154 B ἀτεχνῶς γὰρ λευκή σάββη εἰμὶ πρὸς τῶν καλῶν, Socrates ironically represents himself as thus universally susceptible. Cp. Herrick, 'What I fancy, I approve, | No dislike there is in love.' For the colour of μελίχλωρος cp. Theocritus x. 26

βομβύκα (silkworm) χαρίσσα, Σῶμαν καλέοντι τυ πάντες, | ἵσχαν, ἀλωοκαττὸν ἐγὼ δὲ μόνος μελίχλωρον:

and for the expression πᾶσας φωνὰς ἀφίετε, Laws x. 890 ᾽αλλὰ πᾶσαν, τὸ λεγόμενον, φωνὴν ἵέπτα... ἐπίκουρον γέγενον.

The meaning is that the lover, by the excuses he makes for the defects of his favourites, proves that his love is not partial, but universal: in this he is the figure of the lover of knowledge. The idea of a 'whole' in this passage is less abstract than elsewhere in Plato, e.g. Theaet. 173 f, where philosophy is again the love of
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the whole, πᾶσαν πάντη φύσιν ἐρευνομένη τῶν ἀντων ἑκάστοι δλού. This is intentional, however, and prepares for the correction of Glauccon's view, infra 475 d, e.

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A

εἰ βούλει . . . τού λόγου χάριν] 'If you wish to say, taking me as your example, that lovers act thus, I agree, for the argument's sake.' For this use of επί cp. x. 597 B επὶ αὐτῶν τούτων ζητήσαμεν τῶν μιμητὴν τούτων, and Charm. 155 D ὅσ εἰπεν ἐπὶ καλοῦ λέγων πιαδός, κ.τ.λ.

καὶ μὴν φιλοτήμους γε] 'And further you see that lovers of honour,' &c., cp. τοὺς φιλοίνους supra. The article appears to be omitted for the sake of variety; the difference of meaning is hardly distinguishable in English.

trerrierχουσι] 'If they cannot be στρατηγοί, they are glad to be in command of the third of a tribe.' See Photius, p. 288: Pollux viii. 109.

C
tὸν . . . εὐχερῶς ἔθελοντα, κ.τ.λ.] The real lover of knowledge has a taste for every kind of knowledge.

E

ἀλλ' ὀμοίως μὲν φιλοσόφοις] Aristotle says more seriously that the love of knowledge is apparent even in the delights of sensible perception: Metaph. i. 1 Πάντες ἀνθρώποι τοῦ εἰδέναι ὤργονται φύσει. Σημεῖον δ' ἢ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἁγάπης· καὶ γὰρ χαρίς τῆς χρείας ἁγαπῶνται δ' αὐτάς, καὶ μᾶλλα τῶν ἄλλων ἡ διὰ τῶν ὁμάτων . . . Αὐτὶν δ' ὅτι μᾶλλον τοιαὶ γνωρίζειν τι ήμᾶς αὐτὶ τῶν αἰσθήσεων καὶ πολλὰς δηλοὶ διαφοράς. For the use of μὲν cp. Theaet. 201 B οὐδαμῶς ἔγογγον αἶμα, ἀλλὰ πεῖσαι μὲν.

οὐδαμῶς . . . τὸ τοιόοδε] (1) Socrates appeals to Glauccon's confession of discipleship, supra 474 A, B. Cp. vi. 504 E, 505 A: Phaedo 100 B, c. This agrees better with the context and with the tone of the passage than to suppose (2) that Socrates is continuing the raillery with which he attacked Glauccon, supra 474 D, E, 'A man of pleasure like you will readily perceive that beauty and ugliness are not the same.'

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A

τῇ δὲ τῶν πράξεων . . . καὶ ἄλληλων κοινωνίᾳ] Plato here supposes, first of all, an admixture of the ideas with human actions, and with sensible objects; secondly, with one another. For the intercommunion of ideas, cp. Soph. 250 ff. It may also be illustrated from infra 478 E, where τὸ δυσαστὸν is shown to be τὸ ἄμφοτέρων μετέχον, τοῦ εἶναι τε καὶ μὴ εἶναι: there is therefore no
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257. reason for suspecting or emending the word ἀλλὰδὼν. Cp. also Polit. 278 η ηθοντιβέμενα δ’ εἰς τὰς τῶν πραγμάτων μακρὰς καὶ μὴ μασίοις συλλαβάς, κ.τ.λ.


ηγούμενος τε τι αὐτῷ καλὸν] For ἴγικοσθαί (= νομίζειν) with a simple accusative and without εἴτε cp. Laws x. 899 ά ὅτι μὲν ἴγιεὶ θεοὺς, κ.τ.λ.: Soph. 222 β εἴτε ... ἀνθρώπων ... μηδεμίαν ἴγιεὶ θήραν.

καὶ τὰ ἐκείνου μετέχουσα] The language of μεθέξις is here used, although the ideal of justice has just before (472 c) been spoken of as παράδειγμα. The two notions, which are figures, are not here, as in Arist. Met. i. 6, §§ 3 and 4, opposed.

ἐπικρυπτόμενοι ὅτι οὐχ ὑγιαίνει] ‘Drawing a veil over the fact that he is not in his right mind.’ Cp. Phaedr. 268 ε οὐκ ἁγίας εἴποι Ἰν, Ἄ μοιχὴν, μελαγχαλαί, ἀλλ’ ἀτα μυστικοὶ ὄν πραιτεροῖ, ὅτι, Ἄ ἀριστε, κ.τ.λ. for a similar humanity of feeling.

ἀλλ’ ἦμιν εἰπὲ τόδε] The sentence returns to the direct form, addressing the imaginary respondent.

ἐκανός οὖν ... πάντη ἄγνωστον] Being, according to Plato in this passage, is the absolute object of knowledge; not-being, of ignorance; and the intermediate which partakes of both, matter of opinion. This last, as here expressed, is probably the earliest conception of contingent matter. That Plato should not have perceived that degrees of certainty are in the subject only, and have no corresponding object, considering the great difficulty which the ancient world experienced in disengaging subject and object, is not perhaps surprising: the wonder is rather that such a figment as a ‘contingent or probable matter’ should have survived in the traditions of modern logic. The other two conceptions of being and not-being also present a different aspect to the ancient philosopher and to the student of modern metaphysics. Being, according to Plato, is true existence, the essence of things human and divine, the correlative of absolute knowledge, almost the Supreme Being. To the modern metaphysician, on the other hand, being, as Hegel says, is a word only, the poorest and most void of all abstractions, which only by negation or combination with not-being attains to positive or definite meaning. The necessity of passing from being to the determinations of being or to

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A
actual phenomena was never seen distinctly in the Platonic philosophy (although approximately realized in the Sophist, Politicus, and Philebus). Not-being has in Plato, at least in the present passage, a positive or substantial existence, and is not perceived to be abstract or negative only.

\[\text{\textit{icaros} ... \textit{kvn e:i pteonaxhi skopoimve}]\]

The supposition refers to the negative notion implied in \textit{icaros}. 'We could not be more assured of this, even if we were to look at it in several more points of view.' For the implied admission that an important truth may be proved in more ways than one cp. x. 611 b: Theaet. 206 c \textit{all}a \textit{de} tou\textsuperscript{t}ou \textit{m}en \textit{eti} \textit{kvn} \textit{all}la \textit{phanei}n \textit{ap}udei\zeta\i tis.

\[\text{\textit{to\u03b1 \textit{e}l\textit{i}k\textit{r}i\textit{v}os \textit{ontos}}}\] 'the pure light of being'; cp. Phaedo 67 b \textit{gno\textit{s}om\textit{eb}a de \textit{h}om\textit{on} \textit{avt}o\textit{\v}s \textit{p}un \textit{to} \textit{e}l\textit{i}k\textit{r}i\textit{v}e\textit{s}.

\[\text{\textit{ouko}u\textit{v} \textit{ep}e\textit{\i} \textit{epi} \textit{men}, k.t.l.}\]

Most of the MSS. omit \textit{de} after \textit{metaxu}. Two of them (\textit{g} \textit{b}) complete the sentence by adding \textit{ei} after \textit{ouko\u03b1}. Hermann and Baiter further amend \textit{e\i} by \textit{ep}e\textit{i}, for the omission of which the alliteration may afford a reason. This is adopted in the text. The true reading is uncertain. A further step is being taken in the argument: 'Since knowledge corresponded (\textit{\eta}v) to being, and ignorance to not-being, for this intermediate must we not look for a corresponding intermediate between ignorance and knowledge, if such there be?'

\[\text{\textit{kat\a} \textit{t}en \textit{d}unav\textit{m}en \textit{ekat\v{e}ra} \textit{t}en \textit{avt\v{h}is}]\]

For \textit{avt\v{h}i

\[\text{\textit{o}uk\textit{o}u\textit{v} \textit{epi}\textit{st}i\textit{m}i \textit{me\u03b1} \ldots \textit{diel\textit{e}v\textit{th}ai}]\]

The words \textit{gn\textit{ov}na\textit{i} \w\textit{vs} \textit{esti} \textit{to} \textit{\delt{a}v} are a resumption or exegesis of the words which precede. Socrates returns to the same question below (478 a), where he repeats it in nearly the same words—\textit{epi}\textit{st}i\textit{m}i \textit{me\u03b1} \g\textit{e} \textit{pou} \textit{epi} \textit{to} \textit{\delt{a}v} \textit{ovt\v{s}, k.t.l.} But first he will explain and illustrate by examples the meaning of the term 'faculties' or 'powers,' which he is employing. Compare the preliminary psychological discussion in iv. 435 ff.

\[\text{\textit{duvame\u03b1\v{s} \textit{d} e\textit{i} \textit{ek}e\textit{\nu} \ldots \textit{aper\textit{g}ai\textit{zo}m\textit{e}\u03b1\v{v} \textit{all}\textit{h}i}]\]

He means that faculties have no sensible qualities, but are known by their effects
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only. This is a first principle of psychology. Cp. Ion 537  
δαν ἡ μὲν ἐτέρων πραγμάτων ἦ ἐπιστήμη, ἡ δ' ἐτέρων, οὖν καί ὁ τίν μὲν ἄλλην, τίν δὲ ἄλλην τέχνην. And for the words οὕτω τινά χρώμα ὥρω ὀὕτε 
σχήμα, κ.τ.λ. cp. Soph. 247 c, d and Theaet. 155 ε (of the crude 
materialists) πρᾶξεις δὲ καί γενέσεις καί πάν τὸ ἀώρατον οὐκ ἀποδεχόμενον ὡς ἐν οὐνίας μέρει, whereas the disciples of Protagoras are said to 
uphold the existence of things (or processes) not visible.

ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτῷ τεταγμένην] Cp. i. 345 δ ἐφ' ὧν τέτακται: ib. 346 ά.

ἐπιστήμην πότερον . . . φίς εἶναι αὐτήν] The pronoun is unem-
phatic, being simply a resumption of the noun, which is placed at 
the beginning for the sake of emphasis.

εἰς τούτο . . . ἐρρωμενοστάτην] For the two-fold answer to one 
question in the same sentence cp. iv. 439 λ ἔγογγε, ἥ δ' ὧν. πώ-
ματος γε.

εἰς δύναμιν] Cp. Soph. 2.35 λ εἰς γόρτα . . . βετέων.

οὐσομεν] θήσομεν Μ corr. Θ Vind. D; and so Cobet. The use 
in the text is certainly singular. But φέρω is elsewhere used (with 
ἐπί) of referring a predicate to a subject (Soph. 237 c, Tim. 37 ε), 
or a thought to its object (infra 478 b).

πῶς γὰρ ἄν . . . τίθειν] Δόξα is the faculty of opinion and is also 
neither allied to sensible perception or sense. But what has opinion 
to do with perception? To us opinion is fallible and probable; 
sense is generally infallible. Opinion to us is for the most part 
concerned with the same matter as knowledge; sense with external 
objects only. The truth seems to be that here and in some other 
pages of Plato δόξα is a union or rather confusion of two opera-
tions of the mind which are really distinct. The origin of this 
confusion is to be sought for in the history of early Greek philo-
osophy which opposed sense and opinion alike to the certainty of 
pure intellect. Both are opposed to the universal and neither of 
them affords a standard of measurement. Ἀλήθειας and δόξα are 
however distinguished in Theaet. 187 ά, where it is suggested that 
knowledge may be the same with true opinion.

ἐπιστήμη μὲν γέ ποι ἐπὶ τῷ ὄντι] sc. πέφυκεν. Cp. supra 477 ά. 478 E

δόξα δὲ, φαμέν, δοξάζειν] sc. πέφυκεν.

ἡ ταύτων ὑπὲρ ἐπιστήμη γεγνώσκει] ἡ ταύτων sc. δόξα δοξάζει; 'Is 
it the nature of opinion to opine the same which knowledge 
knows?'

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478

B

ἐὰν οὖν τὸ μῆ ὑν δοξάζει] sc. ὁ δοξάζων: cp. i. 345 Α ἐστὶ μὲν ἀδικος, κ.τ.λ. So infra c οὔκ ἀρα ... δοξάζει. For the form of argument cp. Theaet. 188 ὁ δυνάτων δὲ ὅτροιν ὁ λέγετε, καὶ τις ἀνθρώπων τὸ μῆ ὑν δοξάζει; ... ὁ ἀρα εὖ γέ τι ὅρων ὁν τι ὅρα: Soph. 237 γ τὸ τί τοῦτο ὑμα ἑπτεν ὕπτεν λέγομεν ἑκάστοτε ... ἀνάγκη τὸν τί λέγομαι ἐν γέ τι λέγειν.

μὴ δι γε] (1) sc. τὸ μῆ δι, which is resumed as the subject of προσαγωγεύομεν from supra τὸ μῆ ὑν δοξάζει. To this μὴ δι γε is attached as a ground or reason. ‘Not-being, since non-existent, would not rightly be called one-thing, but, strictly, no-thing’ (μὴ δι γε i. q. εἰ μὴ εἰπ γε, Stallbaum).

[(2) It is better to take μὴ δι more simply for ‘what is not’ or (‘not-being’) the sense in which μὴ δι γε occurs just below.

B. J.]

C

ἀρ' οὖν ἐκτὸς τούτων ... ἀσαφεία] ‘Does opinion then lie in a region beyond these, surpassing either knowledge in clearness, or ignorance in dimness?’—But if not ‘without,’ the argument proceeds to show that opinion is within these limits.

σκοτωδέστερον ... φανότερον] Cpr. Soph. 254 ὁ μὲν ἀποθε- δράσκων εἰς τὴν τοῦ μῆ ὅτος σκοτεινότητα ... κατανοησαι χαλεπός ...

ὁ δὲ ... τῇ τοῦ ὅτος ... προσκείμενος ἰδεα, διὰ τὸ λαμπρὸν αὐ τῆς χώρας ὑπάρχων ἐνυπητής ὑπάρχει.

D

οὐκοῦν ἐφαμεν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν] supra 477 λ, β.

οὐν ἄμα ὑν τε καὶ μὴ δι] There is probably a confusion of the two constructions οὐν εἶναι and φανεροὶ δι.

E

ἀποκρινέσθω ὁ χρηστός ... (479 λ) φιλοθεάμων] ἐκεῖνος ὁ φιλοθεάμων is a resumption of ὁ χρηστός, referring to supra 475 δ—476 β, c. For the vague reference cp. supra 460 λ τῶν φαύλων ἐκεῖνων. Socrates proceeds to show that sensible objects are and are not what they are:—They have no fixed character of their own; they are different in different relations.

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Α

γηγεῖται ... νομίζει] supra 476 c, d.

καὶ τάλλα οὖτω] Some of these ‘other things’ are enumerated infra v.

B

τί δὲ; τὰ πολλὰ διπλάσια ... φαίνεται;] That is to say, although, in the abstract, a double and half differ, in the concrete they may coincide; e.g. two chairs are the half of four and the double of one.
The same view of the relativeness of sense occurs often elsewhere: e.g. Theaet. 152 δ ἐὰν ὡς μέγα προσαγορεύεται, καὶ σμικρὸν φαν-είται, καὶ ἐὰν βαρύ, κούφων, ξύμπαντά τε οὕτως: Phil. 1.4 καὶ βαρύν καὶ κούφων τὸν αὐτὸν: Phaedo 74 B ff., 102.

tοῖς ἐν ταῖς ἐστιάσεσιν, ἐφη... αἰνίγματι] (1) 'They are like the double-entendres at feasts, and like the children's riddle about the eunuch throwing at the bat.' ἐπαμφοτερίζουσιν is thus explained by Timaeus in his lexicon to Plato: cp. the active use of ἐξημφοτερίζειν in Euthyd. 300 D. [(2) But the verb occurs immediately below, ἐπαμφοτερίζειν sc. ἐοικεῖν, in the ordinary intransitive sense, and it is unlike Plato to repeat the same example in illustration—(Riddles at feasts and the children's riddle). The phrase τοῖς ἐν ταῖς ἐστιάσεσιν ἐπαμφοτερίζουσιν may contain an allusion to some incident of Greek festivity familiar to Plato's readers, but to us unknown. L. C.]

καὶ τῷ τῶν παιδῶν αἰνίγματι] The riddle referred to is given by the Scholiast:—

Ἀνώς τίς ἔστιν ὡς ἀνήρ τε κοῦκ ἀνήρ ὁμοθ θα κοῦκ ὁμοθ θα ἱδὼν τε κοῦκ ἱδὼν ἐπί ξύλου τε κοῦ ξύλου καθημένην λίθῳ τε κοῦ λίθῳ βύλου τε κοῦ βύλου:

i.e. a eunuch aimed at a bat which he saw imperfectly sitting upon a reed with a pumice-stone and missed him.

φ') 'wherewith,' viz. with a pumice-stone. This proves to be the reading of Par. A, and is therefore to be adopted without question in preference to ὡς.

ἐφ' οὖ] sc. καθημένην.


μεταξύ που κυλινδεῖται] 'range somewhere between.' The word κυλινδεῖσθαι has often a depreciatory association, as of 'knocking about, a prey to chance or circumstance,' &c. Cp. Phaedr. 275 τ., Phaedo 81 c, 82 ε.

πρωμολογήσαμεν δὲ γε... πλανητῶν ἁλισκόμενον] 'But we agreed beforehand, that anything of this kind which might come to light was to be described as the object of opinion, not of
knowledge, being the class which oscillates between and is apprehended by the intermediate faculty.

480 § η οὖ μημονεύομεν] supra 476 b, c: 479 α.

έκαστον το ὅν] ‘Each kind in its essential nature,’—i. e. αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν, δίκαιον, ἀγαθόν, . . . καὶ τὰλλα σκότω.

BOOK VI.

If the philosopher can lay hold of universal and unchanging truth, and those who cannot rise above opinion are not philosophers, to which of the two shall we commit the government of the state? In a word, ought the true guardian to be clear-sighted or blind? There can be but one answer to this question, unless the philosopher is deficient in some other way. But the philosophic nature contains all the elements of virtue. He who is to be trained in philosophy must be quick-witted and have a good memory; he must be a lover of all truth, a hater of falsehood, courageous, temperate, just, gentle, large-minded, gracious in his thoughts and ways. Not even Momus can have any fault to find with such a character.

διὰ μακροῦ . . . λόγου] λόγος, as elsewhere, is personified: cp. infra 503 Λ παρεξήγως καὶ παρακαλουστμένου τοῦ λόγου, πεφυσήμενον κατα τοῦ νῦν παρών. διεξελθόντος may be explained (1) as intransitive (cp. Soph. 237 β τῶν δὲ λόγων, ἡ βελτίστα διέξεισι: Sophocl. Oed. Col. 574 χω λόγος διέρχεται: Dem. 541, 22 πάντα δ' ἡ διεξέλθει τὰκ τῶν νόμων)—the participle being added afterwards to complete the expression—‘In the course of a long discussion which has come to its conclusion.’ Or (2) αὐνούς, sc. τοὺς φιλοσόφους, may be supplied as the object of διεξελθόντος—‘after a long argument which has discussed their nature.’ Cp. Laws v. 743 ε ἣν διεξερχόμεθα πολιτείαν.

μακροῦ] a slight exaggeration, as the argument about the true nature of philosophers does not extend to more than six pages, 474-480. But if such a matter-of-fact objection needs an answer, it may be replied that six pages seem a considerable space to devote to the definition of a single term: and the steps through which Glaucon has been led to the conclusion were elaborate and
minute. The reading of Ξ, διὰ μ. τ. δ. τοῦ λόγου, is due to a false interpretation, i.e. τοῦ λόγου διεξελβάντος διὰ μακρού τιμός. διεξελβάντες (x τ) is another manuscript conjecture. According to this reading the philosophers are supposed to run the gauntlet of the argument through which their nature is revealed.

οὗ ράδιον | sc. ἀναφανῆπαι αὐτοῖς.

οὗ φαίνεται | is, 'it appears to be not easy': not 'it does not appear easy.'

ἔμοιγ' οὖν | 'To me at least it appears that it might have been set forth in a still better manner, if we had had only to speak of this one point.' The subject of φαίνηαι is τὸ πράγμα rather than τοῖς φιλοσόφοις, as appears from τοῦτοι μόνοι following.

μέλλοντι | agreeing with τοῖς understood, not with ἔμοιγε supra: 'if one were not required': not 'if I were not required.'

οἰ δὲ μὴ | sc. οἱ δὲ μὴ τοῖς οἵς κατὰ ταύτα ὁμαίνωσ ἔχοντος δυνάμενοι ἐφιστεισθαι.

πλανώμενοι | 'Wandering up and down'—referring to the uncertainties of opinion: cp. v. 479 A ff., especially δ τὸ μεταξ' πλανωτών: also infra 485 B. For the word cp. especially Lysis 213 E οἷκ ἄν ποτε οὐτως ἐπιπλανώμεθα.

μετρίως | 'fairly,' 'duly,' 'fittingly.' Cp. x. 597 E τούτο ... ἔμοιγε δοκεὶ μετρίωτα' ἐν πρισματεὺσθαι, μυρητῆς.

καθιστάναι | sc. λέγοντες δεῖν.

τόδε δὲ ... τηρεῖν ὄπιον ὁ:] 'But can there be any question whether a blind or sharp-seeing watchman should guard a thing?'

—In Plato's language, he who is ignorant of the universal is blind, 'not seeing the sun': he has no mental image or 'pattern in the mount' (cp. ix. 592), no idea of true being or principle of order, to which he may refer objects of sense or the particulars of human action: he is still in the den, having his back turned toward the light (cp. vii ad init.).

ὡσπερ γραφῆς] Cp. infra 500 E οἱ τῷ θεῷ παραδείγματι χρώμενοι ζωγράφοι, 501 A, b, where Plato repeats and expands the image suggested here.

κάκεισερ] sc. εἰς τὸ ἀναθειστάτου. But the opposition of έκείσε—ἐνάθει implies that the truth is not here but yonder,—ἐν οἴραπό του ἀνακείσετεν (ix. 592 B: cp. also x. 610 B).
The regulation of minutiae was to be left to each generation of rulers, the great principles having been once for all laid down: cp. iii. 412 b, iv. 425, 426, 427 a: and Laws vi. 769, 770, 772, 779 d, vii. 816, viii. 846 e, xii. 956 e.

_τούτους_ sc. 'the blind leaders of the blind,' who have just been described.

_ἐκαστὸν τὸ δὲν_ i. e. who know the essential reality of each thing: who are capable, in modern language, of abstraction and generalization:—The power of abstraction seemed to Plato in his own age to constitute the great difference between one man's mental condition and another's (Phaedr. 265 e, Rep. vii. 534).

_εἰ γε τάλλα μὴ ἐλλείπουντο_ 'If they did not fall behind in other ways,'

_τοῦτω γὰρ αὐτῷ . . . ἄν προέχοιεν_ 'For this very thing in which they will have the superiority is about the most important point of all.' _σχέδον τι τῷ μεγίστῳ_: the emphasis is on _τῷ μεγίστῳ_, 'the greatest point of all' is the knowledge of ideas and universals. _τι_ which follows _σχέδον_ does not weaken its force but calls attention to it: as 'pretty' is employed in some uses of the phrase 'pretty nearly' in English.

_κακεῖνα καὶ ταῦτα_ 'The other qualities (= τάλλα supra e—i. e. experience and general excellence) and these (the special attributes of the philosopher). Both are comprised in _ταῦτα_ infra (ταῦτα ἔχειν οἱ αὐτοὶ).

The question how this combination of the practical and speculative may be attained, is answered by an inquiry into the nature of the philosopher. For the necessity of the philosopher's knowing also the particular, 'if he is to find his way home,' cp. Phileb. 62 b.

_δ γοῦν, κ.τ.λ._ v. 474 b. If with the best MSS. we read _δεῖ_, we must supply _τοῦτο ποιεῖν δεῖ_ from _πρῶτον δεῖν καταμαθεῖν_ to complete the sentence. Or if this explanation is deemed unsatisfactory we must adopt the reading _δε_ of the inferior MSS.

_δ ἂν αὐτοῖς δηλοῖ . . . καὶ φθοράς_ The genitive _οὕσιας_ is partitive and follows _δηλοῖ_: cp. iv. 445 ἐ σοφεῖ _ἐγκατάλειπεν καθήσειν ἂν τῶν ἄξιων λόγου νόμων τῆς πόλεως. _ἐκεῖνης_ refers to the discussion in v. 475 ἐ foll.
The words are found in Themistius, Orat. xxi. 250, with some verbal differences: τούτα μὲν δὴ ὁμολογείοντω τίς φιλοσοφόφοι φύσεως πέρι, ὃν μαθήματος δέοι οὐτόι παντώς ἄλλ' ὃ ἂν ἐκεῖνην δηλοῖ τὴν υἱότητα τὴν ἀεὶ οὖσαν καὶ μὴ πιλανωμένην ύπὸ φθοράς καὶ γενέσεως. The agreement is not sufficiently exact to justify the substitution of οὖσαν for οὖνας in the text; Themistius appears to have simplified the construction.

πάσης αὐτῆς] sc. τῆς οὖσας, governed by ἐρώσιν.

οὔτε τιμωτέρου οὔτε ἀτιμωτέρου μέρους] Cp. Soph. 227 λ, Parmen. 130 ε, for this favourite thought.

ὦσπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν . . . διήλθομεν] v. 474 c ff. ἐκόντας εἶναι] 'so far as their being willing is concerned.' ἐκῶν εἶναι is a parenthetic phrase—generally used in negative sentences—in which the word ἐκῶν gains force from the addition of εἶναι.


ἀλλὰ μην . . . ἀπωχητευμένον] For ἀπωχητευμένον in strict accuracy ἀπωχητευμέναι might be expected. But the attraction which confuses the simile and the thing compared is common in Greek (e. g. Soph. Trach. 33), and occurs elsewhere in Plato: cp. iii. 401 c, ὃς ὅποις Ἀν δικαίως οἱ πρῶτοι οἱ προσβάλλοντες, ὦσπερ ἀβραμ φέροντας ἀπὸ χρηστῶν τῶν ἔλεγχων, καὶ . . . ἀγούσα. ἐκεῖσε refers to εἰς ἐν τι.

τὰς δὲ διὰ τοῦ σώματος] τὰς is an accusative of reference—'in respect of': or περὶ may be supplied from the previous clause. The former is the more natural way of taking the words. The image of the stream is continued in ἐρρυῆκασιν and ἐκλείποιεν.

It is common to draw a line between talent and character: the powers of a man are distinguished from his interests and affections. Such lines of demarcation are convenient, but they are also partly misleading. For the love of knowledge is knowledge: moral qualities interpenetrate with mental: how much a man feels is quite as important as how much he thinks, or rather he must feel what he thinks. There is no surer criterion of progress in education than an interest in study: nor anything more fatal to intellectual excellence than envy and meanness.

ὁ γε τοιοῦτος] 'such an one, at any rate'—i. e. one who takes no delight in the pleasures of the body—'must be temperate.'
265  *Plato: Republic.*

Republic  

μετὰ πολλῆς δαπάνης σπουδάζεται]  ‘For the reasons why wealth is eagerly pursued with lavish expenditure.’  For the use of μετὰ cp. viii. 560 d μετρίότητα ... ὑπερορίζοντη μετὰ πωλῶν καὶ ἀνωφελῶν ἐπιθυμίων: ix. 575 c οἱ τῶν τύραννων γενώσιμοι μετὰ δήμου ἄνωτοι.  And, for the reasons why wealth is eagerly pursued with lavish expenditure.

485  

E  

tοῦ ὄλου καὶ παντοῦ]  Compare Theaet. 173 e, where the soul of the philosopher is described as πᾶσαν πάντη φύσιν ἐρευνώμεν τῶν ἀντων ἐκάστου ὄλου, εἰς τῶν ἔγγος οὐδέν αὐτὴν συγκαθείσα.

486  

A  

τοῦ ὄλου καὶ παντοῦ]  Compare Theaet. 173 e, where the soul of the philosopher is described as πᾶσαν πάντη φύσιν ἐρευνώμεν τῶν ἀντων ἐκάστου ὄλου, εἰς τῶν ἔγγος οὐδέν αὐτὴν συγκαθείσα.

η ὅνω ὑπάρχει διανοία ... οἴνον τε οἴει τούτῳ κ.τ.λ.]  The common transition from the mind or soul to the person.  Cp. x. 620 d.  

Ast and Stallbaum, following a quotation of the passage in Marcus Aurelius (vii. § 35), read φ ... διανοίας for η ... διανοία, but this is unnecessary.

B  

μηδ' ἀλαζών]  This refers to the love of truth, supra 485 c.

ζηθ' ὄπη ἄν δυσεὐμβολος ... γένοιτο]  For δυσεὐμβολος with δυσκοινωνίτος following, compare the juxtaposition of ξυμβελλεὶν and κανωνεῖν in ii. 362 b.

καὶ τοῦτο δῆ ... καὶ ἀγρία]  Cp. Theaet. 144 d.  The qualities here enumerated are nearly the same that are found to be actually embodied in the ‘wise’ Theaetetus.  The words εἰ ... ἀγρία are the explanation of τοῦτο, the whole question being suggested by the words of the previous sentence, δυσεὐμβολος ἦ ἄδικος.

C  

ἐδμαθής ἡ δυσμαθής]  sc. εἰ ἄρια.  The construction is to be supplied from the previous sentence.

λήθης ὅν πλέως]  Cp. Theaet. 144 b νοσθροὶ ... πρῶς τὰς μαθήσεις καὶ λήθης γέμοντες.

D  

ἄλλα μημονικήν ... δεῖν εἶναι]  A seeming combination of two constructions, μημονικήν αὐτὴν δεῖ εἶναι and μημονικήν αὐτὴν ζητῶμεν εἶναι.  Cp. infra 503 b ὃν γὰρ διήλθομεν φύσιν δεῖν ὑπάρχει αὐτοῖς.

ἐλκείν]  Cp. viii. 568 c εἰς τερανιδᾶς ... ἐλκουσὶ τὰς πολιτείας.  The word conveys an idea of distortion and perversion.


ην ἐπὶ ... (ε) εὐάγγελον παρέξει]  ‘which its own nature will make easy to lead towards the idea of each form of being.’
Notes: Book VI.

μὴ πὴ δοκούμεν σοι, κ.τ.λ.] πὴ = 'at any point.' The dative τῇ...ψυχῇ depends chiefly on ἀναγκαία.

ὁλος τε καὶ ἐγγενής] The latter word implies a reference to 485 C η ἄνω οἰκειότερον σοφία τι άληθείας ἄν εὑροις;

αλλ', ἦν δ' ἐγώ...τὴν πόλιν ἐπιτρέποις] Compare the virtues of the philosopher-tyrant in Laws iv. 709, where despotism is thought to afford the most favourable opportunity for organizing a state: εἰ τύραννοι γένατο, φής, νέος, σώφρων, εἰμαθῆς, μνήμων, ἀνδρείας, μεγαλοπρεπῆς.

teleiotheis...παideia te καὶ ἠλικία] is introductory to the discussion about the education and age of the rulers, from 502 onwards.

The conclusion appears inevitable that the philosophic nature, 487 B-E when matured by time and training, ought to be entrusted with the supreme power. But Adeimantus meets all these theoretical assumptions by an appeal to facts. Experience shows that those who continue in the pursuit of philosophy after their first youth turn out to be either strange creatures, not to say rascals, or at all events, even when they are thoroughly respectable, their philosophy makes them useless. Socrates admits the force of the objection, yet maintains his paradox. To explain his position he has recourse to an allegory.


παραγόμενοι...μέγα τὸ σφάλμα...ἀναφαίνεσθαι] i.e. μεγάλως σφάλλεσθαι καὶ τοῖς πρῶτον ὁμολογημένοις ἐναντίον. The subject is changed from the persons to that which they experience: 'the overthrow which is revealed is great and contradictory of their first impressions.' At σφεῖς, κ.τ.λ., the original construction is resumed.

Compare the description of the Elenchus in the Sophist, 230 B διερωτώσων δὲν ἂν ὄφται τίς τι πέρι λέγειν λέγων μηδεν' εἰθ' ἂτε πλανο-

τούν τις δάβας μαθίων ἐξετάζουσι, καὶ συνάγωντες δὴ τοῖς λόγοις εἰς ταύτων τιθέασι παρ' ἄλληλαις, τιθέντες δὲ ἐπιθετούσοις αὐτὰς αὐτάς ἀμα περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν πρὸς τὰ αὐτὰ κατὰ ταύτα ἐναντίον. And for the effect of Socrates on his hearers see the image of the torpedo in Meno 80.

ὑπὸ τῶν πεττεύειν δεινῶν] The game of draughts here spoken
Republic
VI.
487
B
D

τοῦ πεπαδεύθαι ἔνεκα] Cp. infra 497 ε (where ἄπτεσθαι occurs in the same idiomatic sense).

πάνυ ἀλλοκότους . . . παμπονήρους] ‘very strange beings, not to say utter rogues.’

τοὺς δ’ ἐπιεἰκεστάτους . . . ἀχρήστους ταῖς πόλεσι γιγνομένους]
See the description of the philosopher in the Theaetetus, who has not a word to say for himself in the courts or the assembly (173 c, d): or the view of Callicles in the Gorgias, 485 a φιλοσοφίας μέν, ἄσων παιδείας χάρων, καλῶν μετέχειν, καὶ οὐκ ἀσχρόν μετρακίῳ ὅτι φιλοσοφεῖν. The man of the world admires philosophy in youth: such interests, at that time of life, are indications of a free and generous spirit: but if a person has not ‘passed his metaphysics’ when he is old, why, he should go to school again and be beaten. The feeling which Plato here expresses is a feeling of modern quite as much as of ancient times. The study of metaphysics is regarded as at once dangerous and puerile. They have been thought to belong only to a particular stage of life: ‘poetry for boys,’ ‘metaphysics for young men,’ ‘facts for those who are of full age.’ The true conception of metaphysics is the combination of the parts of knowledge by an effort of the mind into an ideal whole. They are always extending their domain, as the prospect is opening of new fields of science and of the past history of man. The narrower view is lost in a wider one: the previous elements of knowledge, whether in the world or in the individual, are taken up into the mind, and adjusted in new proportions. Also the knowledge of facts would be narrow and partial unless the imagination enabled us to allow for the unknown part of man and nature, raising us above our own particular study or aspect of things to the other elements of truth and knowledge. On the other hand it may be argued that metaphysics may easily outrun facts, and interfere with our capacity of observing and acquiring them.

E

ἀκούοις ἄν . . . λέγειν] The popular opinion of philosophy has been seriously urged against Socrates. Instead of the expected refutation, ‘Quite true’ is the only reply.

ἔρωτάς . . . δι’ εἰκόνων λέγειν] ‘You ask a question, I said,
requiring to be answered through a similitude.' And you, methinks, are not accustomed to speak through similitudes.'

The last words are of course ironical: Socrates carries on the irony in what follows (ἐν ἐν τοῖς μαλλοὶ ἑδης, κ.τ.λ.).

ἐν μαλλοὶ] 'that (having this contempt for my similitudes) you may see still better what a poor hand I am at them.' For γλύσχρως cp. Crat. 414 c, where Hermogenes, speaking of one of the etymologies offered by Socrates, says: καὶ μᾶλα γε γλύσχρως, ὥς Σώκρατες. He who would judge of Socrates' powers in inventing similitudes may, after reading this passage, compare ix. 588 c, d.

There is a ship of which the captain is a simple-minded giant, short-sighted, dull of hearing, and but slightly skilled in navigation. The crew are always contending among themselves for the possession of the helm, but have never learnt, and even deny the possibility of learning, the art of steering. He only is the skilled navigator who is a partisan of theirs. If they cannot succeed by persuasion, they resort to force, throwing their rivals overboard and dragging the captain. Thus beginning they proceed to make free with the stores, and their voyage is such as might be expected of men like them. What chance of a hearing has the skilled pilot among such as they are? They only call him prater, star-gazer, and good-for-nothing. This image sufficiently indicates the position of those philosophers whom Adeimantus has acknowledged to be honest men. They are useless, because their states, as at present governed, make no use of them.

At a later date Plato returns to the comparison of the ruler to the steersman as a familiar image: Polit. 297 E Εἰς δὴ τὰς εἰκόνας ἑπαναλαμβάνει πάλιν, αἰς ἀναγκαίοις ἀπεικαζέιν ἢ καὶ τῶν βασιλικῶν ἀρχοντῶν.

Ποιας; Τὸν γενναίον κυβερνήτην καὶ τὸν ἐφέρων πολλῶν ἄνταξιον ἀτριών. κατίδομεν γὰρ δὴ τῇ σχήμα ἐν τούτω τινί αὐτοῖς πλασάμεναι.

αὐτό] sc. τὸ πάθος τῶν ἑπισκευαστῶν.

οἶν . . . γράφουσι] οἶν may be taken either as an adverb, 'just as'; or as an adjective governed by γράφουσι—'to form by combining from many sources an idea of it like what' &c. The former is right.

νόησον . . . (β) ἐτέρα τοιαύτα τοιούτου, i. e. the kind of thing which I have now before my mind.

ναῦκληρον] The asyndeton, as usual, in an explanatory clause.


Plato: Republic.

488 B

βραχύ τι] is cogn. accus. 'having but a narrow range of vision,'—and ἐτέρα τοιαῦτα is in the same construction,—'and whose intelligence in nautical matters is much on the same level.'

περὶ τῆς κυβερνήσεως] 'quarrelling about the steering, each thinking that he ought to steer.'

μὴτε μαθόντα, κ.τ.λ.] 'This recalls Socrates' well-known accusation against the statesmen of Greece, that there are among them no teachers of political virtue. Cp. Protag. 319 D τούτως οίδεις τοίτο ἐπισκέπτει δόσαπερ τοῖς πρώτοις, οτι υἱδαμώθεν μαθών, οἴδε ὅντες διδασκαλοῦν οἶδενός αὐτῷ, ἔσείτα συμβελεύειν ἐπιξείρει τῇ χύρῳ, ὅτι οὐχ ἤγονται διδάκτων εἶναι. Cp. also Xen. Mem. iii. 6.

πρὸς δὲ τούτοις . . . κατατέμενεν] Yet Plato himself seems to maintain this paradox in the Protagoras and Meno. In those dialogues the postulate that there must be a science of politics was ironically held in reserve, while the hollowness of the actual politicians was disclosed. But Plato is now ready to assert, not only that there is such a science, but that he has the key of it.

C

περικεχύσθαι . . . τῆς νεώς ἄρχειν . . . πλείν] These infinitives, which follow νόησον at the beginning of the sentence, avoid the confusion which would otherwise be occasioned by the multiplication of participles. In πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, κ.τ.λ., a return is made to the participial construction.

εὐμποδίσαντας is metaphorical: 'having enchanted the noble captain,' i.e. rendered him incapable, 'by some narcotic drug, or by drink or some other means.' Cp. Gorg. 482 E ἐκ ταύτης γὰρ αὐτῇ τῆς ὀρμολογίας αὐτῶς ἐπὶ σοῦ συμποδίσαει ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐπεστομίσθη: Theaet. 165 E ἡλεγχεῖν ἄν . . . οὐκ ἂν εἰμι πρὶν . . . εὐμποδίσθης ἐπί αὕτου.

πλείν ὡς τὸ εἰκός τοὺς τοιούτους] 'make just such a voyage as might be expected of men like them.' Cp. Polit. 302 A πολλοὶ μὴν ἐνιστε καὶ καθόπερ πλοιὰ καταδύμεναι διὸλυμοῦνται διὸ διολώσασι καὶ ἐτι διολούνται διὰ τὴν τῶν κυβερνητῶν καὶ καυτῶν μοχθηρίαν τῶν περὶ τὰ μέγατα μεγάτην ἄροναι εἰληφότων, κ.τ.λ.; Laws x. 906 D.

D

ὅπως δὲ κυβερνήσει . . . (Ε) καὶ τὴν κυβερνητικὴν] (1) 'But to get the helm into one's hand, with or without consent, is an art and study which they imagine to be irreconcileable with the acquisition of the science of navigation.' The mutinous sailors think that the struggle to get the helm into one's power, which, in their opinion, is the all-important thing, leaves no time for the study of navigation, and so
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they neglect it. Transferring the image into the language of politics we have—ὁποῖος δὲ ἄρξει (τις) κ.τ.λ., μὴτε τέχνην τούτον... ὅπως... κυβερνήσει... ἕν τε μῆς is a resumption of ὅπως ἄρξησθαι ἡ πείθωτες ἡ βιαζόμενα τῶν ναύκληρων, and τὴν κυβερνητικὴν refers to the science of the true pilot, τῶ... ἀληθινὸν κυβερνήτων πρα. τοῦτον takes up ὅπως, κ.τ.λ. Socrates reiterates his main point, that power, not knowledge, is the object of the actual politicians. (2) According to Ast and others the true pilot is the subject of κυβερνήσει, and this part of the sentence gives the impression which the behaviour of the true pilot makes on the world in general. The phrase ἕν τε τινες βουλῶνται ἕν τε μῆς is supposed to contrast the scientific pilot, who keeps the ship in her course, without consulting the passengers, with the conduct of the sailors in the allegory, whose one thought is to cajole or intoxicate the captain (i.e. to flatter and humour the people) so that they may get the helm into their power. The sense then would be: ‘imagining that to know how to steer, whether he has the leave of those on board or no,—as, in their opinion, the true pilot does,—is an art and study quite incompatible with the business of a steersman’—as they conceive of it. They consider that the arbitrary rule as it appears to them of the true pilot is inconsistent with steering, as they understand it (i.e. as the art of cajoling the captain). They think it is no part of pilotage to know how to manage the helm (no part of politics to know how to govern). This explanation appears plausible on comparinginfra 489 B où γὰρ ἔχει φόσον κυβερνητῆς παντῶν δεισθαι... ύφ' αὐτοῦ: and Polit. 293 Λ εἰάν τε ἐκώτων εἰάν τε ἐκώτων ἀρχαῖον... νομισμάτων... κατὰ τέχνην... ἄρχουσαν. But the exactness of the parallel in the immediate context between ὅπως ἄρξησθαι and ὅπως κυβερνήσει, and between πείθωτες ἡ βιαζόμεναι and εἰάν τε τινες βουλῶνται εἰάν τε μῆς, is decisive in favour of the first (1) interpretation. And the true king in the Republic is imagined as the ruler of a willing people: infra 502 B πῶλαν ἔχον πείθομεν, 499 B καί τῇ πῶλει *κατηκὼς γενέσθαι.

οἴσμενοι | The MSS. vary between ἐπισῶντες, οἴσμενοι, and ἐπισῶντας. oἰσμένος. That the copyists should have changed the accusative into the nominative is unlikely; the analogy of ψίχοντας was almost certain to lead some of them to change the nominative into the accusative. The transition to the nominative may be occasioned by

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E
the neighbourhood of ἀρξαντων, and in so long a sentence the original construction is apt to be lost sight of.

489 A ταῖς πόλεσι . . . τὴν διάθεσιν ἔοικεν] ‘resembles cities in their attitude towards true philosophers.’

The ‘parable’ hardly needs an interpretation. The ship is the state: the star-gazing pilot is the philosopher: the noble captain, ‘not very quick in his perceptions,’ the people honest and stupid: the mutineers, the sophists and adventurers by whom the noble captain is ‘drugged and disabled,’—who make their last appearance in the Politicus (291).

Aristotle refers to this passage in Rhet. iii. 43 as an example of an εἰκών—ἡ εἰς τῶν δήμων ὅτι ὁμοίως ναυκλήρω, ἵσχυρο μὲν, ἐπικοκάφος δὲ. The passage should be compared with Politicus 298, 299, where it is supposed that if certain rules were prescribed by the state about navigation and the true κυβερνήτης, who steered from knowledge of the stars and winds, were to transgress them, he would be liable to be called μετεωρολόγος, ἀδισκόχης τις σοφιστής.

ékéinon] supra 487 D.

ὅτι . . . οὔ τιμῶνται] Socrates softens the language of Adeimantus.

καὶ ὅτι . . . λέγεις, κ.τ.λ.] ὅτι depends on διδασκε and is parallel with ὅτι in the previous sentence. The MSS. are divided between λέγεις and λέγειν (for Par. D, which reads λέγει, has no independent value): the greater weight of authority is in favour of λέγεις. ‘And that you are not wrong in saying that the best of the votaries of philosophy are of no use to the world:—for their uselessness, however, bid him blame those who make no use of them and not the good philosophers themselves.’

In using the second person (λέγεις), Socrates attributes to Adeimantus what he had only represented to be the opinion of others, though with an evident inclination to assent (cp. infra δὲ ὅσος δὴ σὺ φῆς . . . ἀληθῆ σε λέγειν). The other reading, λέγειν, could only be explained, if at all, as a harsh confusion of two constructions—διδασκε λέγειν and διδασκε ὅτι λέγεις.

οὐ γὰρ ἔχει φύσιν] φύσιν ἔχει, ‘it is natural,’ like λόγον ἔχει, ‘it is reasonable.’ The phrase occurs in Herodotus, ii. 45.

ἀλλʼ ὁ τούτο κομψευσάμενος . . . πέφυκεν, κ.τ.λ.] The saying is attributed by Aristotle to Simonides: Rhet. ii. 16 τοῦσ σοφοὺς γὰρ ἔφη ὕρων ἐπὶ ταῖς τῶν πλουσίων δύραις διατριβάντας. Cp. for the general
sentiment, Theaet. 170 a, b καὶ ἐν γε τοῖς μεγάστοις κινδύνοις, ὅταν ἐν στρατεύματι ἡ νόσος ἐν τούλαθτι χειμάζωσαι, ὡσπερ πρὸς θεοὺς ἔχειν τούς ἐν ἐκάστοις ἁρχοντας, σωτῆρας σφῶν προσδοκῶσαι, οὐκ ἄλλο τῷ διαφέροντας ἢ τῷ εἴδειν. καὶ πάντα που μεστά ταύτραπα πληθοῦσαν διδασκάλοις τε καὶ ἁρχοντας ἐμνητοί τε, κ.τ.λ.

δεισάδα] (1) is governed by some word (such as πρόειρων) suggested by ἀναγκαίον εἶναι preceding. Or (2) ἀναγκαίον εἶναι is neglected, and the infinitive continued directly with πέφυκεν.

μετεωρόλεσχας] ‘Meteorologizers’ combines the μετεωροσκόπων τε καὶ ἀδολέσχην of supra 488 e.

ἐκ τοῦ τοίνυν . . . ἐπιτηδευόντων] ‘As a result of this and (1) in these circumstances’—or (2) ‘among men like these’—‘the noblest pursuit can hardly be held in esteem by those who have opposite pursuits.’

ἐν τούτοις may be either masculine or neuter (infra 494 c ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις: Symp. 220 b: Phaedo 101 c), but for the masculine cp. supra ὑπὸ τούτων. The words οἱ δὲ ἐπιεικέστατοι ἄρηστοι are added to recall both sides of the statement, although only one is in point.

τὰ τοιοῦτα] sc. τὰ τῆς φιλοσοφίας.

τὸν ἐγκαλοῦντα . . . ἀληθῆ σε λέγειν] Supra 487 d, e. As before in supra b Socrates chooses to identify Adimantus with the objectors whose opinions he quotes.

οὐκοῦν τῆς μὲν . . . ἄρηστιας, κ.τ.λ.] The reason why one class of philosophers are useless is that the world will not use them: the reason why another class are corrupted is that the finest natures are most susceptible of adverse influences.

τῆς δὲ τῶν πολλῶν ποιηρίας τὴν ἀνάγκην] ‘The cause which inevitably produces the wickedness of the greater number.’

The philosophic nature combines qualities that are rarely found in the same person. It is also exceptionally liable to corruption. Rare plants are more than others sensitive to surrounding influences. And the very graces which have been enumerated, above all when combined with gifts of fortune, become, through their perversion, sources of evil. The world is the great sophist that spoils the highly endowed youth, and moulds him with popular applause and clamour to mundane purposes. How can such an one, except through some divine providence, give ear to the teachings of philosophy? The professional, fee-earning sophist is like the attendant of a great beast,
whom he knows when to approach, and who indicates by grunts his likes and dislikes. He never distinguishes between what is inevitable and what is best. Hence, of those who are at their birth endowed with a philosophic nature, all save the few 'useless' ones (whom pride or sickness or some internal oracle have retained) desert philosophy for 'politics' and leave a vacant room, which is filled by those whom Adeimantus designates as nondescripts and rascals. The maiden of high estate, left poor and desolate, is married to a tinker just let out of prison. Meanwhile the child of light, who is faithful to his trust, sees the hopelessness of effort, and stands in shelter until the storm has passed, contented if he may preserve his own integrity.

ἄκοιωμεν δὴ...καγαθόν ἐσόμενον] ὅθεν is put for ὅδε by attraction with ἐκείθερ, which is to be construed with ἀναμνησθέντες.

αὐτῷ] is not the usual dative after ἥγεσθαι, but an ethical dative: sc. ἥγεσθο τοῦ χρόνον αὐτῷ—'was the leader of his band,' infra c.


ἡ ἀλαζόνι δυντι, κ.τ.λ.] For the use of η in the sense of 'or else' cp. v. 463 D ἡ μήτε πρὸς θεον μήτε πρὸς ἀνθρώπον αὐτῷ ἀμενων ἔσεσθαι.

οὐκοῦν...περὶ αὐτοῦ;) ‘Is not this one point, to say no more (οὔτω), very inconsistent with our present ideas about him?’ οὔτω is idiomatic, as in νῦν οὕτως, ἀπλῶς οὕτως.

παρὰ δόξαιν τοῖς νῦν δοκούμενοις] i.e. πρὸς τὰ νῦν δοκούμενα, the whole expression being an amplified equivalent of παρὰ τὰ νῦν δοκούμενα = παρὰ τῶς τῶν νῦν δόξας. τοῖς νῦν δοκούμενοις = 'received opinions,' is a noticeable phrase.

ἀπολογησόμεθα...ἀμιλλάσθαι)] 'We shall defend ourselves' (when accused of being paradoxical) 'by saying' (as we have said) 'that it was his nature to press onward towards true being.' The optative after the future indicative in an indirect sentence may be explained as implying a reference to some former expression of the thought quoted. See Goodwin, M. and T., §§ 159, 676.


Ἀλλ' ίοι...ἐδίνος, πρὶν δ' οὖ] In such glowing language does Plato describe what are termed by us mere abstractions, to which metaphysical enthusiasm has, nevertheless, given a permanent
place in the mind, and which in a secondary logical stage have been the regulators and instruments of human knowledge. In one point of view the language may be compared with that of Eastern Pantheism (μυγεις τω onium ὄντως), in another (ἐπὶ τοῖς ... πολλοῖς ἐκάστοις), with that of the Organon of Aristotle.

ο̣ προσήκε: ψυχής ἐφάπτεται τοῦ τοιοῦτον | i.e. τούτω τῷ ψυχής ο̣ τούτῳ, the suppressed antecedent, is a dative of the instrument, φ', the relative, a dative of reference with προσήκε: 'with that part of the soul to which it belongs.'

ζόη καὶ τρέφοντο | Cp. Phaedr. 248 B οὐ δ' ἐνεχ' ἢ πολλὴ ἀπονθή, τὸ ἀληθεῖς ὑδείν πεδίον οὐ ἔστιν, ἢ τε δὴ προσήκονσα ψυχῆς τῷ ἀρίστῳ νομὴ ἐκ τοῦ ἐκεί λειμώνος τυγχάνει οὖσα.

λήγου ὁδίνος | Cp. Thaet. 148 E ὁδίνεις γάρ, ὡς φίλε Θεαίτης: Symp. 206 Ε τῷ κυώντε ... πολλῇ ἢ πτοίησις γέρονε περὶ τὸ καλὸν εἰά τὸ μεγάλης ὁδίνος ἀπολείψ τῶν ἔχοντα.

τοῦτῳ τι μετέσται ... μισεῖν;] 'Will be have any part in loving falsehood, or, on the contrary, will he not hate it?'

αλλ' ύγιεῖς τε καὶ δίκαιον ἡθος | sc. φαινεῖν ἐν αἰτή (sc. ἀληθεία) Κ ἀκολουθήσαι.

καὶ δὴ τὸν ἄλλον ... ἀναγκάζοντα τάττειν;] 'Why should I again set in array from the very beginning the rest of the band of qualities which make up the philosophic nature, at each step compelling your assent?' ἀναγκάζοντα is taken up in ἐνέβη: 'Why force you again to admit what you have already admitted?'

ἀναγκάζοντα is the reading of the best MSS.: ἀναλαμβάνοντα (= 'recapitulating'), the reading of Stephanus and of Ven. Σ, is probably a correction: cp. infra ν τῷ τῶν ἅλθος φιλοσόφων φύσιν ... εξ ἀνάγκης ὁμοσαμένη.

For the favourite image of the chorus (continued from χορὸν κακῶν supra), cp. especially Euthydemus 279 c τὴν δὲ σοφίαν τοῖς χοροῦ τάξομεν; ἐν τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, ἢ τῶν λέγεις; Rep. viii. 560 E ἡβριν καὶ ἀναφίνων ... λαμπρὰς μετὰ πολλοῦ χοροῦ κατίγουσιν ἑστεφανωμένας: ix. 580 B έγογε ὡσπερ χοροῦς κρίνων, κ.τ.λ.: also Theact. 173 B-Β τούς δὲ τοῦ ἡμετέρου χοροῦ ... περὶ τῶν καρυφαίων.

καὶ σοῦ ἐπιλαμβόμενον | 'And when you interposed and said.' Cp. Symp. 214 B ἐὰν τί μὴ ἀληθεῖς λέγω, μεταξὺ ἐπιλαμβοῦ.

τῆς διαβολῆς | διαβολή is a malicious 'misrepresentation.' Cp. supra 489 D: infra 500 D διαβολὴ δ' ἐν πάσι πολλῇ.
Plato: Republic.

Republic VI. Σμικρόν δὲ τι . . . καλοῦσιν] 'A small number, whom, as you say, they call,' &c. The antecedent of οὗς is implied in the collective neuter σμικρόν τι = ὀλίγοι τινες.

καὶ εἰς τὸ ἐπιτήδευμα καθισταμένα αὐτῆς] 'and settling down to her pursuit.'

ἀνάξιον . . . ἑαυτῶν] 'of which they are themselves unworthy.' For this use of ἀνάξιος = 'too good for,' cp. Soph. Phil. 1009 ἀνάξιον μὲν σοῦ, κατάξιον δ' ἐμοὶ: i.e. 'of which you are unworthy and I am worthy.'

καὶ μεῖζον] For μεῖζον = 'too great' or 'high,' cp. Soph. 231 A ἡ μὲν μεῖζον αὐτῶις προσάπτωμεν γέρας.

καὶ ἐπὶ πάντας] sc. τεῦνουσαν: 'and extending to all who bear the name.' This phrase is added by an afterthought and is not strictly in construction.

B καὶ ὀλίγας] sc. τοιαύταις φύσεις.

ὁ μὲν πάντων . . . ἀποσπασμένας ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς τε καὶ φιλοσοφίας] 'In the first place what is strangest of all to hear, viz. that each of the qualities which we praised as belonging to the philosophic nature destroys the soul which possesses them and draws it away from philosophy.' These words are the answer to τίνες δή;—giving one of the ways in which these rare natures are corrupted. ὅν = ἐκείνων ἂν.

C τὰ λεγόμενα ἀγαθά] This is Plato's way of quoting a common opinion which is not acknowledged by philosophy. Cp. iv. 431 C τῶν ἑλευθέρων λεγομένων ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς τε καὶ φιλοσοφίαις.

λαβοῦ τοῖνυ . . . περὶ αὐτῶν] αὐτοῦ = 'the subject in hand': αὐτῶν = 'the philosophic natures;' last mentioned supra B in τοῖνυ δὴ τῶν ὀλίγων, κ.τ.λ.

κελεύεις] sc. λαβίσθαι αὐτοῦ.

D πάντως, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, . . . ἵμαμεν] 'Of every seed or growing thing, whether vegetable or animal, we know.' φυτῶν is here taken in its widest sense.

It is not, however, the stronger or better nature of which the remark in the text is psychologically true. The poetical and sensitive temperament is the one which suffers most from alien conditions. Weakness, especially when accompanied by intellectual gifts, may indeed, by the help of accidents, be matured into strength. And strength, which was wanting in the original
character, has been sometimes developed in a life-long struggle against the passions or against circumstances. But, in general, the finer qualities of mind, which are capable also of coming to the greatest good, are most injured by corrupting influences: the gentler nature, which meets with no response at school or in the world, is coated over with an impenetrable rind: the soil is receptive, and the imagination is frequently haunted by impressions of evil, when they have ceased to affect the will. Genius, in the spring of youth, is hardly ever aware of the deteriorating effects of the surrounding atmosphere or soil. Stronger, rougher characters are not in the same way the creatures of circumstances. But weakness has no limit of evil, when the barriers of education and of public opinion have been once passed. This is commonly the stuff out of which great criminals are made.

κάκιον ἀπαλλάττειν] Stallbaum reads κακίνων', with a slight variation of writing and of meaning, but see L. and S. s. v. ἀπαλλάττειν, a. ii.

νεανίκης] ‘vigorous,’ ‘high-spirited.’ Cp. infra 503 c νεανικὸν τε καὶ μεγαλοπρεπεῖς τὰς διανοίας, E.

ἀσθενὴς δὲ φύσιν, κ.τ.λ.] This clause depends on the general force of the words ἡ οἷει ... ἄλλ' οὔκ, which emphasize the second alternative mentioned:—‘Surely you must think that great crimes spring from a high-spirited (not from an inferior) nature, but that a weak nature,’ &c. For ἡ οἷει ... ἄλλ' οὔκ cp. i. 344 E. ἡ συμφρόν ὕπερείρειν πράγμα διαφιλοσοφών, ἄλλ' οὔ βίου διαγωγήν; αἰτίαν here is the adjective.

οὔκ, ἄλλα ... οὕτως] οὔκ. sc. εἰ φιλίθης: οὕτως, sc. εἰ νεανίκης.

ἡ τοινυν έθεμεν] sc. εἰνι.

ἡ καὶ σὺ ἤγει ... (B) ἀνδράς καὶ γυναικάς;] ‘Or do you, like the many, really think that there are, in any degree worth speaking of, young men corrupted by Sophists, or Sophists in a private capacity who corrupt them?’ &c. Plato exhibits the Sophist in different lights,—here in a more favourable one. The point of this passage is to show that whether the Sophists are good or bad, their influence is unimportant compared with that of the great Sophist, public opinion, which they merely echo.

ἰδιωτικοῦς] ‘in a private capacity;’ is opposed to the sophistry
of the assembly or of public opinion. Cp. infra c παιδείαν ἰδιωτικήν : E ἰδιωτικοὺς λόγους.

megístous . . . σοφιστάς] Cp. Polit. 303 c, where Plato says of false statesmen — megístous δὲ ὄντας μυητὰς καὶ γόητας megístous γίνεσθαι τῶν σοφιστῶν σοφιστάς.

εὐγκαθεξόμενοι ἄδρόιοι οἱ πολλοὶ] ‘sitting down together assembled in great force.’ Hermann’s correction οἱ πολλοὶ adopted in the text is not quite certain. ἄδροι πολλοὶ seems to have been a not uncommon phrase: cp. Gorgias 490 B ἐὰν ἐν ταύτῳ ὀμνεῖ, ὀσπερ ὦν, πολλοὶ ἄδροι ἀνθρώπου: Xen. Anab. vii. 3, § 9 οὕτα κύρια πολλὰς ἄδρων. The subject of ψέγωσι is to be supplied from αὐτοὺς τῶς ταύτα λέγοντα supra.

ὑπερβαλλόντως ἐκάτερα] sc. ποιώτερος—‘doing either in excess’ (referring to ἐπαινῶσιν and ψέγωσι).

ἡ *ποιαν αὐτῷ . . . ἀνθέξειν] ποιαν ἄν MSS. (1) ἄν with future indicative and future infinitive is a well-authenticated construction, that is, in many cases it has the support of the best MSS.: the omission of it is unjustifiable when it has sufficient manuscript authority in its favour. Here it is read in all the MSS. The particle, without weakening it, gives an ironical force to the future: ‘will be likely to.’ Cp. x. 615 D Οὐχ ἡκεί, φάναι, οἶδα ἄν ἡκεὶ δείπνον. Cp. Goodwin, M. and T., §§ 197, 208. [B. J.]

(2) The repetition of the same syllable in ποιαν ἄν makes it easier to question the authority of the MSS. The ‘colloquial style’ of which Goodwin speaks in referring to x. 615 D, is not present here. [L. C.]

οὗτος] ὁ τοιοῦτος ψόγος ἡ ἐπαινος, under the image of a torrent suggested by κατὰ βοῦν and by κατακλυσθεῖσαν supra.

φήσειν . . . τοιοῦτον] φήσειν is dependent on οὐκ οἰεί to be gathered from ποιαν αὐτῷ παιδείαν ἰδιωτικὴν ἀνθέξειν (sc. οἰεί, supplied from τίνα οἰεί κορδίαν ἵσχει; ὡς οὐ . . . οἰχήσεσθαι which is equivalent to οὐκ οἰεί καὶ ἱπνοιαί παιδείαν ἰδιωτικὴν . . . οἰχήσεσθαι. Cp. note on 491 E ἄσθενη δὲ φύσιν, κ.τ.λ.

τὸ[ν] μὴ πειθόμενον] τὸν is the reading of Ven. Π Σ and a majority of the MSS. and seems more expressive here than τῷ (collective neuter), the reading of A M, for which cp. infra E ὁ τῷ περ. κ.τ.λ. τὸν μὴ πειθόμενον is Bekker’s reading.
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οὗ γὰρ . . . ἐξαιρώμεν λόγου] For ἐξαιρῶμεν λόγου cp. Symp. 176

c Σωκράτη δ’ ἐξαιρῶ λόγου.

‘That which is impossible with men is possible with God’ is one way in which Plato expresses the Socratic feeling that the ideal of philosophy is a divine reality, which is nowhere fully manifested. Cp. the θεῖος λόγος of the Phaedo (85 n), and the ‘epiphany’ of the philosopher in the Sophist (216 c): ii. 368 A: ix. 592 λ ἐὰν μὴ θεῖα τις εὐμμὴν τίχη. See also the words which have prepared for this, supra 492 λ ἐὰν μὴ τις αὐτῇ βοηθήσας θεῶν τίχη.

ἄλλοιον ἕθος . . . πεπαιδευμένον] (1) ‘A different type of character, which has been trained to virtue in opposition to the education which they (sc. οἱ πολλοὶ) supply.’ It is better to adopt this interpretation, giving to παρά its common signification, and taking πρὸς ἄρετήν with πεπαιδευμένον (cp. Protag. 342 ν Λακεδαιμόνιοι πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν καὶ λόγου ἁμίστα πεπαιδευται: Gorg. 471 ν), than (2), with Stallbaum, to take παρά in the unparalleled sense of ‘in accordance with,’ translating the whole passage: ‘a type of character differently disposed towards virtue, if it has been trained in accordance with the education which they supply.’ The participle, πεπαιδευμένον, according to the first interpretation, is equivalent to a relative clause, ὃ πεπαιδευται: according to the second, to a conditional, ἣν πεπαιδευμένον ἤ.

ἐκαστός . . . μὴ ἄλλα παιδεύειν] sc. δοξάτω σοι. For what follows cp. Phaedrus 260 c, ν, especially the words ἐδαχαί δὲ πλήθους μεμελετηκός, κ.τ.λ.

οὕς δὴ . . . ἡγοῦνται] ‘whom they regard as their professional rivals.’

οὕτω] the people, who are themselves the Sophist: cp. τούτων, supra 492 ε. The dislike of the Sophists on the part of men like Anytus (Meno, sub fin.) is humorously attributed to professional jealousy.

μεγάλου καὶ ἵσχυρον πρεφομένου] ‘a great and mighty beast which is fed by him,’—‘of which he is the keeper.’

ἐφ’ οἷς ἐκάστας] The reading of nearly all the MSS. is ἐκαστος, which cannot be explained satisfactorily. Corrections are ἐκάστος (Vind. E), ἐκάστος, ὃς ἐφ’ ἐκάστος (/calendar), and ἐκάστας (cf. van Prinsterer). ἐκάστας is preferred because it gives a slight increase of distinctness
to the meaning: 'upon what occasions he utters his different
cries.' Cp. Laws vii. 792 A οὐ μὲν γὰρ ἄν προσφερομένου στιγά, καλῶς
οὖντα προσφέρειν, οὐ δὲ ἄν κλαίῃ καὶ βοᾷ, οὐ καλῶς.

καὶ χρόνου τριβῆ] τριβῆ is opposed to ἐπιστήμη, Phaedr. 260 e

καὶ ἐπιθυμίων] Opinion and desire are hardly distinguishable in
the great beast.

όνομαξοὶ δὲ πάντα ταῦτα, κ.τ.λ.] 'should employ all these terms
(καλῶς, αἰσχρῶς, &c.) according to the opinions of the great beast.'

τάναγκαια δίκαια καλοί] His only principle of justice would
be the physical necessities and exigencies of the great beast's
nature.

οὐκ ἄτοπος ἂν . . . παιδευτῆς] ἂν is to be joined with εἰμαι.

εἰτ' ἐν γραφή[ν, κ.τ.λ.]] Cp. Polit. 297 e ff., where the absurdities of
actual politics are ridiculed by imagining the result of similar
proceedings in other sciences.

ὁτι μὲν γὰρ . . . ἐπαινῶσιν] The construction is incomplete:
δῆλον or some such word has to be supplied with ὅτι. Cp. v. 471
&c., ὡστε ὧτι γε, κ.τ.λ., and note: Soph. 248 ν τὸ δὲ ὡς τὸ γεγονότα
ἐπερ ἐστι ποιεῖν τι, τὸ γεγονότα κατανεῖν ἀναγκαῖον αὖ ἕγυμβαῖνει πάσχειν.

ἐπιδεικνύομενος] supra iii. 398 a.

πέρα τῶν ἀναγκαίων] is to be joined with κυρίους αὐτοῦ ποιῶν
τοὺς πολλούς: 'The man who makes the many his arbiters of taste,
except in so far as is necessary, will experience the fatal necessity
of doing whatever they approve.' The true artist will not fall
under the dominion of the many: but he must respect the opinion
of the world up to a certain point, if 'he is to get leave to live in
it.'

The aim of the Sophist, in Plato's view, is not to undermine
public opinion or morals, but to reproduce them. His wisdom is to
think like other men: cp. Shaks. 2 Henry IV. ii. 2, 62 'Never a man's
thought in the world keeps the roadway better than thine.' He is
the representative man, who utters the average mind,—in religion, in politics, in arts, in society. He gathers up in his words the power of the many, which he directs against the wisdom of the few. He systematizes received opinions, which are thus rendered capable of being taught (compare the Protagoras). And sometimes philosophy may enable him to invest a popular belief with the dignity of a great truth, or to embody in a general formula the maxims of a party or sect.

ἡ Διομήδεια λεγομένη ἀνάγκη] The proverb is said by the Scholiast to refer to the following story:—Διομήδης καὶ Ὄδυσσεῖς τὸ Πολεμικὸν κλέφαντες εἶ Ἰλίου νεκτῶς ἐπανήσαν ἐπὶ τὰς ναίς σελήνης ὑποθανατίσας, φιλοτιμοῦμενος δ᾽ Ὅδυσσεῖς αὐτῶν μῶνον δάκτιον γενίσαι τὴν πρᾶξιν, ἐπιχείρησε τῶν Διομήδεα μετὰ τοῦ Πολεμικοῦ προηγαμμένον ἀνέλειν. ὥδε κατὰ τὸ τῆς σελήνης φῶς τῆν καθ᾽ αὐτῶν θεωσάμενος τοῦ ἐπιφερομένου ξίφους σκιῶν, συνλαμβάνει τε τῶν Ὅδυσσεί, καὶ τὰς χεῖρας τοῦθε συνδεῖ, προϊένει τε κελέειν, καὶ τύπτων αὐτῶν πλιστεῖ τῷ ξίφει τὸ μετάφθευν ἐπὶ τοῦ Ἑλλήνας παραγίμετα. The Scholiast on Aristoph. Eccles. 1029 has a different explanation:—ὅτι Διομήδης οἱ θράξις πάνω ἐχον ἐγκατέρωσε, τοὺς παρόντας ξένους ἐβαλέτω αὐταῖς συνείμενος. Whatever the story may be to which the phrase refers, it is quite clear that the general meaning of it is ‘inevitable necessity.’

ταῦτα τοῖνυν . . . (494 Α) ὑπ᾿ αὐτῶν] The opposition of the few and the many is almost as great in the reading age of the nineteenth century as in the hearing age of Socrates and Plato. In politics, in society, in the realms of thought and imagination, there are two classes not marked in the vocabulary of party and found in all parties—the inferior minds and the superior: those who are under the influence of the hour, and those who have characters and principles. The difference is exaggerated when a single mind is at variance with the rest of the world. The great man who may be borne on the deeper tide of ages has, nevertheless, to struggle with the eddies and currents which react upon the surface. Yet the opposition is not so entire and absolute as Plato seems to assume. For different classes of minds, like different ranks in society, fade into one another: and also the simple elements of moral and religious truth afford a wide ground of common interest. No link from the highest to the lowest can be spared in the order of things. And through the progress of commerce and the arts, in the movements of history, by the gradual spread of education, the discoveries of great thinkers at length find a place in the world,
and the speculative ideas of one generation become the received opinions of the next.

**Republic**

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ταύτα τούνν... ἀναμνήσθητι] ‘Bearing all these things in mind, remember further that point which we mentioned before’—i.e. in 491 A, where it is said that the truly philosophic nature is rarely found among men.

αὐτό τί ἐκαστον] Cp. v. 479 ε.: supra 484 δ, 490 β.

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ἀνέξεται] sc. λεγόμενα.

φιλόσοφον μὲν ἄρα... πλήθος ἀδύνατον εἶναι] Cp. especially Polit. 292 ε. μῶν οὖν δοκεῖ πλῆθος γε ἐν πολεῖ ταύτην τὴν ἐπιστήμην δυνατόν εἶναι κτήσασθαι; Καὶ πῶς;

καὶ ὑπὸ τούτων δὴ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν] supra 493 λ.

ἐκ δὴ τούτων] ‘As a consequence of this,’—i.e. the fact of their being blamed by the people and by their flatterers. Cp. supra 489 c.

ὡμολόγηται] 485 λ, 487 c.

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οὐκοῦν εἴθες ἐν *παῖσιν... ἐν ἀπασίν] The MSS. have εἴθες ἐν πᾶσιν. But the conjecture ἐν παῖσιν is clearly right. For (1) it makes explicit the contrast to πρεσβύτερος infra: (2) the same correction (παισι for πασι) is required in iv. 431 c, where there can be no reasonable doubt: (3) it agrees better with εἴθες: cp. iii. 401 δ εἴθες ἐξ παιδών.

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ὑποκείσονται ἄρα] ‘Then they will lie at his feet.’ ὑποκείσθαι is here used like υποστίπτεσθαι (infra ix. 576 λ) or υποστρέψεων (iv. 426 c). Cp. Gorg. 510 c ταύτα ψέγων καὶ ἐπαιων ἐθελή ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ὑποκείσθαι τῷ ἄρχοντι.

τί οὖν οἴει... ποιήσεων] ‘How then do you suppose that he will behave?’ For ποιήσεων cp. supra ii. 365 λ and note: Thuc. v. 71 τὰ στρατόπεδα ποιεῖ μὲν καὶ ἀπαντά τοιτὸ.

ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις] ‘under such circumstances’: cp. supra 489 c ἐκ τε... τοιτῶν καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοῖς according to one interpretation.

Ὑγοῦμενον] The lives of Pausanias, Themistocles, Alcibiades (the latter especially in the words καὶ ἐπὶ εὔειδῆς καὶ μέγας), perhaps of Lysander, may have been in the writer’s mind. Cp. I Alcibiades 105, where Socrates charges the young Alcibiades with an ambition extending beyond Athens to Greece, beyond Greece to Asia and the world.
Notes: Book VI.

τὸ δὲ οὗ κτητόν] sc. ὁ νοῦς, as elsewhere the neuter referring to a masculine word.

diὰ τοσοῦτον κακῶν] ‘through’ (i.e. notwithstanding) ‘such manifold hindrance.’ For a somewhat similar use cp. Soph. Trach. 1131 τίρασ τοι διὰ κακῶν εἴδοσισια. Cp. also Keble, Christian Year, Whit-Sunday:

‘To other strains our Souls are set;
A giddy whirl of sin
Fills ear and brain and will not let
Heaven’s harmonies come in.’

diὰ τὸ . . . ἐξυγγενῆς τῶν λόγων] (1) ‘Because such reasoning is congenial to him’: or (2) ‘Because of that in him which is kindred to dialectic.’ Cp. iii. 402 άλθωνος δὲ τοῦ λόγου ἀσπάζοντι άν αυτῶν γνωρίζων δὲ οἰκείωτητα μίλιτα ὁ οὕτω τραφέις.

eἰς] ‘One person’: more than ‘one’ cannot be expected.

tοὺς ἡγουμένους ἀπολλύων] ‘who think that they are losing.’

οὐ πᾶν μὲν ἔργον . . . εἰς ἀγώνας καθιστάτας] With the participles we must supply οἰόμεθα καὶ ὁτιοῦν δράσεως αὐτοῦς from τί οἰόμεθα δράσεως . . .; immediately preceding. ‘Do we not suppose that they will do anything, performing any action and speaking any word . . .?’ The words καὶ (‘both’) ἰδιὰ . . . καθιστάτας are added in explanation of πράττοντας . . . περὶ τῶν πείθοντα.

ἐλέγομεν] 491 ff.

πλοῦτοι] The plural has the effect of scorn.

οὐ γὰρ] ‘Yes, I see that all this is true: for it was not a bad, but a true observation.’ κακῶς has to be understood from the beginning of the preceding sentence—οὐ κακῶς ἐλέγομεν.

ἀλγής καὶ ἀλλως γιγνομένης] ‘which even otherwise’ (i.e. setting aside the cause of destruction just mentioned) ‘is a rare growth.’

ὡς ἡμεῖς φαμέν] v. 476 B: supra 491 A, B.

καὶ ἐκ τοῦτων δὴ τῶν ἀνδρῶν . . . οὔτε ἰδιώτην οὔτε πόλιν δρά] Plato thinks that it is only great natures which do great evil. Yet it is almost a condition of men’s greatness that they should also in spite of themselves do some good.

The largeness and force and originality of a man’s character are
the qualities which give him power over his fellows. The narrow nature, which is incapable of attracting others and has no intelligence either of things or persons, is necessarily unable to act upon them.

καὶ οἱ τὰ μέγιστα] καὶ = 'also,' anticipating καὶ οἱ τὰγαθὰ. The latter clause introduces the reverse statement, though not immediately in point.

καὶ οἱ τἄγαθα, οἱ ἀν ταῦτῃ τύχωσι ρύεντες] 'and' [from these men, i.e. the philosophers, come those who do] 'the' [greatest] 'goods, being such of them as are drawn in this direction.' The element of chance is never wholly eliminated in Plato.

οἱς μᾶλλον προσήκει] sc. ἡ φιλοσοφία— to whom she is nearest of kin.' There is a reference to the Athenian law which compelled the nearest kinsman to marry an orphan maiden. Cp. Laws xi. 924.

τὴν δὲ, κ.τ.λ.] The bad philosophers are not the philosophic natures spoilt, but the unphilosophic pretenders to philosophy. δὲ answers both to μὲν (οὗτοι μὲν) and τε (αὗτοί τε).

δομως γὰρ δὴ ... (ἢ) τυγχάνουσιν] The sentence is really unfinished, the finite verb τυγχάνουσιν, substituted for the participle by attraction from λειωθηναι, giving it a fallacious appearance of completeness. The sense is completed figuratively in the words τοῦ δεσπότου τὴν θυγατέρα μελλοντος γαμεῖν, κ.τ.λ., of the next sentence, and literally in 496 Λ ὅτιν ἀυτῇ πλησιάζεται ὁμιλῶσι οὕτως κ.τ.λ. The personification which follows is suggested in the words ὁσπερ ὁρφαίνυ συγγενῶν (c), and continued by the help of οἱ ξυνώντες αὐτῇ (ibid.), until the idea is complete and philosophy is transformed into a gentle maiden who is compelled by poverty to marry a tinker and has offspring νόθα καὶ φαύλα. In the words τὶ δαί; ... ἀληθινῆς ἐχόμενον; the simile is blended with that which it is intended to illustrate.

δοκεῖς ... διαφέρειν αὑτοὺς ἢδεῖν] ἢδεῖν is epexegetic := 'to look at.' φαλακροῦ] is only added to make a more contemptible image, while ομικρῶν is in keeping with the diminutives ἀνθρωπίσκοι, τεχνίων, and νεωτί ... λελυμένου continues the figure οἱ ἐκ τῶν εἱργημῶν ... ἀποδιδράσκοντες. τοῦ δεσπότου is in construction with θυγατέρα.

προσήκοντα ἀκοῦσαι σοφίσματα] 'fit to be called sophisms.' Cp. Lysis 207 Λ οὗ τὸ καλὸς εἶναι μόνον ἤξιον ἀκοῦσαι, and see L. and S.,
Notes: Book VI.

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s. v. αἰκων, iii. 2. The use of this idiom here implies the familiar personification of λόγος, in the shape of the διανοηματα τε καὶ δόξας, which are the offspring of the unworthy marriage. προσήκοντα = αἰς προσήκει, —a 'personal' construction.

καὶ οὖθεν . . . εξόμενον; ] 'And nothing genuine or worthy of true wisdom or having to do with it.' There is no sufficient reason for cancelling ἀξιων, which may be either taken absolutely, or as governing the genitive as well as εξόμενον, which in this case is pleonastic, like φωτεῖς, ἔρως, μολῶν, &c. But the reading of Ven. II, ἀξιων ὑπειράνει, suggests the possibility of *ἀξιων.


καταληφθέν, 'detained by exile,' sc. from deserting philosophy.

βραχὺ δὲ ποῦ τι . . . ἑν' αὐθήν ἄν ἐλθοι] εὐφωνία gives the reason of δικαιώσ ἀπαθάςαν: its force may be rendered thus: —'rightly scorning it by reason of its own natural excellence.'

κατασχεῖν . . . (ἐ) κατέχει| sc. πρὸς τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ.

tὸ δαμόνιον σημεῖον] On this subject see Apology 31 D: Theaet. 151 A: Theages 128 E: Xen. Mem. i. 4. What we gather respecting this 'familiar' of Socrates is (1) that he had experienced these intimations from childhood (A1ol. 31): (2) they prohibited but never instigated a course of action; they would stop him when going out of his house or forbid him to proceed in the middle of a speech (ibid. b), or prevent his taking back truant pupils (Theaet. 151), or hinder his departure till he had expiated some trifling impiety (Phaedr. 242 b): (3) the δαμόνιον is always described by him in the neuter gender,—once in a doubtful dialogue as having a voice (Theages 128 E); also as a special monitor which is peculiar to himself, as in the text and Xen. Mem. i. 4. Xenophon is very anxious that we should believe his master's account of this strange experience; the simplicity of Socrates' own statement is a strong reason for doing so. It is not to be confounded with the general consciousness of a divine mission received by Socrates from the Oracle, or with special intimations such as that given by the dream in the Phaedo (60 E). There is nothing wonderful or mysterious beyond the fact itself: no intimations are given by the δαμόνιον of future events or divine truths. Nor can we easily set bounds to the latent forms of instinct which reason may assume,
or deny the possibility of mental phenomena, which are without parallel in ordinary experience.

η...τινὶ ἄλλῳ ἦ οὐδενὶ] A slight extension of a common idiom, for which cp. Apology 17 B ἦ τὶ ἦ οὐδενὶ.

tοῦτων δὲ τῶν ἀλήγων οἱ γενόμενοι] Cp. Thuc. iii. 56, § 7 ὅν ἡμεῖς γενόμενοι.

If a perfectly wise and just man were to appear, how would the world receive him? Would he make his voice heard in opposition to the opinions and practices of the day? Would any party range themselves on his side? Or would he be an outcast and an exile, "wandering about in sheepskins and goatskins?" Would he have been burnt at the Reformation, or would he be tolerated in our own day?

ἐπὶ τὴν τῷ δικαίῳ βοήθειαν] The manuscript authority is nearly divided between τῷ δικαίῳ (Par. A: Vind. f) and τῶν δικαίων (II M). The former was adopted by Schneider and is idiomatic: but τῶν δικαίων (the objective genitive) is not ungrammatical. Both readings have the same meaning: 'to the assistance of what is just.'

διὰ ὠσπερ εἰς θηρία . . . ἑλέως τε καὶ εὐμενής ἀπαλλάξεται] Cp. Gorg. 521, 522, where Socrates gives the reason why he takes no part in politics, viz. because he would have been long ago put to death.

eἰς πᾶσιν ἀγρίοις ἀντέχειν] ἀγρίοις is emphatic and a part of the predicate: = ἀγρίοις ὦ διὶ or ἀγριαίνουσι, 'singly to oppose the fury of them all.' The collocation of εἰς πᾶσιν aids the antithesis.

λογισμῷ λαβῶν] The change from the plural to the singular (ἰδόντες τὴν μανίαν . . . ταῦτα πάντα λογισμῷ λαβῶν) is due to the singular in the image (δισεπρ εἰς θηρία ἀνθρώπος ἐμπεσῶν).

τὴν ἀπαλλαγήν, κ.τ.λ.] 'He will take his departure from it with a fair hope, in peace and good-will.' αὐτοῦ, sc. τοῦ βιοῦ.

οὐδὲ γε . . . τὰ κοινὰ σῶσει] Shall a man acquiesce in the state of life, politics, education, which he finds around him, retiring 'behind a wall' in stormy times, or shall he 'take arms against a sea of troubles' and strive to set men right? That is a question which admits of a general answer so far as this: That he who from cowardice or self-interest or over-refinement or indolence or irresolution fails in resisting the prejudice or injustice or falsehood of his
Notes: Book VI.

age, is wanting in the fulfilment of the highest duty of a citizen and a man. Yet, in the ordinary state of society, the antagonism between the individual and the world, whether of politics or of public opinion, is not so great as is implied in the Platonic contrast. The spirit which replies to divine goodness with the words, 'We have a law and by our law he ought to die,' is, in Plato's language (supra 496 c), hardly worth mentioning, having only occurred once perhaps in the history of mankind. Most societies have better, as well as worse impulses; if they are not so good as the best individuals, of whom they are partly composed, neither are they so bad as the worst. Of their nobler impulses the philosopher may avail himself: he is the Master of those that think; his gentle qualities may readily be appreciated by all. Nor does he really stand alone: many intermediate minds are the conductors between himself and the multitude, with whom he may sometimes also make a direct alliance, like the King and the Commons in the Roman State, against the prejudices or interests of the few. His duty is to struggle rather than to win, in the faith, which is the meeting-point of philosophy and religion, that truth will finally prevail. His place is not in the congenial state which Plato offers him—this would only limit him; but in the world at large, in which he makes himself felt as a power.

Philosophy must continue thus degraded and defamed, until the true philosopher obtain a state and constitution suited to him. Thus, having a true environment, Philosophy will prove in action that she is alone divine. Such a perfect constitution has now been described in outline. But the education of the philosophic rulers has yet to be determined. And first, the method of their training in philosophy must be the opposite of that now in vogue. Instead of getting a smattering of dialectic in the brief interim between school and business, after which, as things now are, the student hardly meddles with philosophy again, they shall be content in youth with elementary mental discipline and attend seriously to the strengthening of the physical frame; until the age arrives when the mind approaches her maturity. Then they shall increase the gymnastics of the mind. And when declining strength exempts them from public services, they shall be permitted to devote themselves entirely to the pursuit which they love, and so prepare themselves for blessedness to come.

τὴν προσήκοουσαν αὐτὴ τίνα . . . λέγεις] For the form of expression cp. v. 475 ε τῶν δὲ ἀληθινῶς, ἐφη, τίνας λέγεις ;
Plato: Republic.

Republic

VI.

497 B

diō kai στρέφεσθαι ... κρατούμενον ἱέναι] 'And so it (i.e. the philosophic nature) is warped and changed, just as a foreign seed, sown in an alien soil, fades away (ἐξίτηλον) and tends to be subdued and pass (κρατούμενον ἱέναι) into the native stock.' For ἱέναι εἰς cp. Laws viii. 834 D paideumátov εἰς ἔθος ἰόντων.

The words which follow, οὔτω καὶ τοῦτο ... ἐκπίπτειν, are added as if ὁσπέρ ἔνικὸν στέρμα, κ.τ.λ., had been quite independent of diō kai στρέφεσθαι ... αὐτήν. The construction would have been more correct if the sentence had terminated at ἱέναι, or if kai had been inserted before ὁσπέρ ἔνικὸν στέρμα. As the sentence stands there is an asyndeton either before ὁσπέρ or οὔτω.


η[ν] 'was always,' even when rejected of men.

tὰ [μὲν ἄλλα, κ.τ.λ.] 'In other respects this one (sc. ἤν ἡμεῖς διεληλύθαμεν) is the best constitution': but there was one defect in it. We did indeed say at the time that the spirit of the legislator was to be preserved, but we did not show sufficiently how this was to be effected. τοῦτο δὲ αὐτό, 'this very point' (which is excluded and excepted by τὰ ἄλλα) was mentioned, but not adequately discussed.

ἐρρήθη μὲν ... (ν) ἄλλῳ ὀχὸν ἰκανὸς ... ἐδηλώθη] The construction is broken by the answer, ἐρρήθη γάρ, ἐφί: and ἄλλῳ ὀχὸν ἰκανὸς ... ἐδηλώθη takes the place of ὀχὸν ἰκανὸς δὲ ἐδηλώθη.

Socrates had said (ἐρρήθη: cp. iii. 412-414.4) that it was necessary to have an authority in the state that should preserve the spirit of the legislator. The question as to how this was to be effected had only been partly answered in Book iii (ὀχὸν ἰκανὸς ἐδηλώθη), owing to the objection of Adeimantus (φόβῳ ὃν ὡμεῖς, κ.τ.λ.) at the beginning of Book iv (419 ff.), and the more serious interruption at the beginning of ν (450 ff.), which led to the discussion of communism. Socrates now proceeds to complete (τὸ λοιπόν) his answer by stating how the study of philosophy is to be pursued.

D λόγον] 'idea,' 'conception,' 'reasoned notion.'

ὡν ὡμεῖς ἀντιλαμβανόμενοι] ὡν, sc. ἐκεῖνον ἄ (cognate accus.).

αὐτοῦ] 'of it,' i.e. of the question which we were discussing in Book iii.
ou "πάντων ράστων] πάντως MSS.—‘not by any means the easiest,’ Bekker’s correction, ou "πάντων ράστων, is unnecessary [B. J.]. But the change is slight and the phrase more idiomatic [I. C.].

καὶ τὸ λεγόμενον . . . χαλεπά] τῷ δότι is an addition of Socrates’, ‘we may indeed say in the words of the proverb.’

ἀλλ’ ὤμως . . . φανεροῦ γενομένου] ‘Still, he said, let us clear up this point, and so complete the demonstration.’

νῦν μὲν . . . (498 Α) περὶ τοὺς λόγους] ‘At present those who do engage in philosophy are mere striplings, just past their boyhood: they approach—that is, those of them who are most thought of as philosophers—the most difficult part of the subject; and I mean by the most difficult part, dialectic; in the interval before keeping house and going into business, and then betake themselves off.’ That is to say, the study of philosophy, as at present pursued, begins too early, at the wrong end, and ends too soon. The opposite advice is given by Callicles in the Gorgias (485).

(1) Only the extreme limit (οἰκονομίας καὶ χρηματισμοῦ) of the interval (τὸ μεταξό) is mentioned; the other is to be gathered from ἐκ παιδίων: ‘between boyhood and business.’ Or (2) we may take τὸ μεταξό . . . χρηματισμοῦ, with Stallbaum, as meaning ‘in the spare moments of housekeeping and business.’

οἱ φιλοσοφώτατοι ποιούμενοι] On comparing vii. 538 c τῶν ἄλλων ποιούμενων οἰκεῖων, it appears that ποιούμενοι is a qualifying word like δικούντες, &c., and is to be understood passively: ‘who are thought to be most accomplished in philosophy.’


δεὶ δὲ πῶς;] sc. πράττειν.

πάν τοῦναντίον] sc. δεὶ πράττειν.

ὑπηρεσίαν φιλοσοφία κτωμένους] In the Protagoras Plato represents this principle as recognized in the ordinary education of the Greek: Protag. 326 B ἐνα τὰ σώματα βελτίων ἐχοντες ὑπηρετῶσι τῇ διανοίᾳ χρηστῇ ὀδοι.

προϊόνσης δὲ τῆς ἡλικίας, ἐν ὑ] ‘as the period of life advances in which,’ Two notions are combined: ‘As the time of life goes forwards,’ and ‘as the particular age arrives.’

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600 δέ λέγω . . . μοιραν ἐπιστήμεν πρέπουσαν] 'But when the strength fails, and a man is past political and military duties, they should range at will and devote themselves to no other pursuit, except as a secondary matter, those, that is, who are to live happily and after death to crown the life they have lived with a fitting destiny in the world below.' The subject of γίγνεται is τις, for which the Indef. Plur. is substituted in ἄφετον, κ.τ.λ.

For a similar use of the term ἄφετον, applied to the sons of Pericles, who are left to get their political education where they can, cp. Protag. 320 λ αὐτοὶ περιώντες νέοιοται ὡσπερ ἄφετοι, ἐϊν ποιν αὐτόματοι περεύχοσι τῇ ἀρετῇ.

Adeimantus thinks that the zeal of Socrates will be met with equal zeal on the part of his opponents, beginning with Thrasymachus. 'Do not try to cause ill-feeling between Thrasymachus and me, who are now friends, although we were never enemies. For I shall never relax my efforts to do good to him and to all men, and my work may bear fruit in another life, if not in this.' He adds that it is no blame to ordinary men that they do not believe, since they have had sophistry palmed upon them for truth, and an artificial combination of words for the spontaneous unity of nature. Nor have they ever seen a perfect man ruling in a perfect state. Socrates therefore once more reiterates his main position, that there is no hope for mankind unless either the few who are now 'useless' should have supreme power, or the actual potentates should be inspired with a genuine love of true philosophy. Then, and not till then, the ideal state will come into being. And when the vulgar see the philosopher as he really is, they will be of another mind. The majority of men cannot be angry with one who loves them, or be jealous of one who is free from all jealousy and personality. For his mind dwells, not among the contentions of earth, but in the divine order. He will take the state in hand and make a 'tabula rasa,' whereon he will plan out the ideal of human society, looking at the abstract principles of virtue, and at the actual traces of it existing among men, framing out of both together the image of a divine humanity. He—or they, if there be more than one—is alone qualified for this work. Nor is it inconceivable that in the whole course of time one such may arise, and may legislate for a willing people, or that he may make his laws according to the spirit of our doctrines. In that case our ideal ('though hard and rare') will be actually realized.
Notes: Book VI.

See note on i. 336 B. The words οὐδὲ πρὸ τοῦ, k.t.l., are in keeping with the good humour which, after the storm, Socrates has contrived to restore at the end of Book i, and which remains unbroken at the beginning of Book v. For the use of διαβόλειν cp. Symp. 222 οὕτως ἐμὲ καὶ σε μὴ δέιξῃ διαβόλη.

For this notion of discourses taking place in another life cp. Apol. 41, Phaedo 68 a, b, in which Socrates anticipates his meeting with great souls in Hades. In the present passage, however, the reference is to a future life on earth after the interval of a thousand years. It is curious after this allusion to find Glaucon in x. 608 D expressing surprise when Socrates announces the immortality of the Soul.

This allusion to the 'spontaneous harmony' of the dialogue is partly a mode of praising his own work (cp. Shakespeare, Jul. Caes. iii. i, iii 'How many ages hence | Shall this our lofty scene be acted over | In states unborn and accents yet unknown!' and Laws vii. 811, where Plato eulogizes his own compositions with the freedom and garrulity of old age), and partly expresses his real conviction that the harmony of his dialogues (as of a living creature—Phaedr. 264 c) was not merely a work of art, but had a real correspondence with the truth of the ideas. Cp. Theaet. 200 e, Phil. 20 c.

The arguments are again personified.

This phrase occurs in Eurip. Hippol. 102 πρόσωπον αὐτῆς ἁγνὸς ὁν ἀσπαζομαί.

Cp. Psalm cxxxxviii. 6 'The proud he knoweth afar off.' The phrase occurs in Eurip. Hippol. 102 πρόσωπον αὐτῆς ἁγνὸς ὁν ἀσπαζομαί.

References:

498

499

A

B

C

D

E
kai deidotes omois] 'although with trembling,' kai as in kaiiper.

499 B

oide g' anhp omois] 'No, nor can an individual become equally perfect,' sc. as he would in a kingdom of philosophers. See above

497 A oide ye, eipov, ta megesta, k.t.l.

periballon which is found in the best MSS., is probably correct: 'until necessity (1) encompasses them' (L. and S. s. v. periballon, ii) to take charge of the city and the city to obey them, or (2) 'constrains them' (lit. 'invests them with it'), the infinitives

taking the place of an accusative. The inferior reading, paraballon, must be taken intransitively, like paraballon in viii. 556 c aton paraballunos allhous ai te arxountes kai oi arxounes.

cai t' polei kathekou genvosthai] The MSS. have kathekou (kathekou II), which is harsh in grammar and irrelevant in meaning. kathekou, a correction of Schleiermacher's, involves the least possible change (from o1 to o), and makes the sentence smooth: 'Until either philosophers are invested with power, or kings, who have power, become philosophers.' Cp. v. 473 d ean m' ... i o1 filosofou basileousan ev taive poleatan i o1 basileis te vin legovmenou kai dynastia filosofofromi ourgiwos te kai ikanous for the same two alternatives. kathekou has been explained as attracted to the subject of boulontai from kathekous which Stallbaum conjectured: but apart from the grammar, the notion of the city entertaining the philosophers to govern her, goes beyond anything which has been suggested by Plato.

touton de potera ... echein logon] 'To suppose that either or both of these alternatives is impossible, I maintain to be quite unreasonable.' poterois is the indefinite, 'either of the two,' as in Theaet. 145 a ti 8', ei poteroi tivn psykhn epainoi prov arhetin, k.t.l., and elsewhere. This is one of Plato's subtleties of language which appear to be lost in later writers. The pronoun oideva is more emphatic than the simple negative ovm echein logon.

ei toinu ... (D) egkratih generatai] estosoi, sc. eismen. auth i Moosa, sc. filosofia, auth referring to akrois eis filosofian at the beginning of the sentence.

en tw apetew to paraleluthoti chronw] The fancy of ancient writers led them to speculate on the boundless past more than on the future. Herodotus has no difficulty in imagining that the Delta might have been accumulated in 10,000 years. Socrates in the Theaetetus (174 e) imagines infinite time, in which every man's
pedigree has contained princes, as well as peasants, many times over. In the Laws infinite time, in which a series of destructions is supposed to have occurred, is said to be the origin of states (iii. 677). Similar speculations occur in the Politicus and Timaeus. In this respect, as in several others, Greek thought seems to occupy an intermediate space between the dreamy infinity of the Oriental and the narrower notions of the West.

[Text continues with notes and translations]
more fanciful use of the metaphor occurs in Theaet. 184 A ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπεισκωμαξῶντων λόγων.

It may be often doubted whether the persecution of religious and philosophical teachers is to be laid to the door of their virtues or of their faults: in the nineteenth century and under ordinary circumstances, rather to the latter. No man is now persecuted for his goodness: there is far more danger that the rewards which he receives may injure the bloom of his disinterestedness. He is more likely to be persecuted for the love of truth, when the truth happens to be opposed to the prevailing sentiments of his age and country. Yet here, again, much will depend upon himself. The philosopher who has no kindness for the many and is too fastidious to sympathize with them, easily becomes the object of enmity to those who are unacquainted with him. This does not show that mankind deliberately prefer falsehood to truth, any more than evil to good.

[Names and authorities in the place of reasons and proofs, personalities instead of facts, in ancient as well as modern times, mark a superficial and unphilosophic character. So the μεγαλόψυχος in Aristotle is οὐκ ἀνθρωπολόγος (N. E. iv. 3, § 31). Yet those who are guilty of these faults are almost always unconscious of them.]

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πολύ γ'] sc. ήκιστα.

C ἀλλ' εἰς τεταγμένα ἄττα, κ.τ.λ.] In a similar spirit it is said in the Timaeus (47 A-c) that men should in their lives imitate the unchanging motions of the heavens. Compare also the philosopher in the Theaetetus 174 ff., and, for the loftiness of κατω βλέπειν, Sophist 216 καθορώντες ὑψάθεν τῶν τῶν κατω βίων.

ταῦτα μιμεῖσθαι τε...ἀφομοιουθαῖ] sc. δέ, elicited from οὔδε...

...σχολή, the positive from the negative.

ἀφομοιουθαῖ] sc. τούτωι.

D διαβολὴ 8 ἐν πάσι πολλῇ] ἐν πάσι may mean either (1) ‘among all men’: or (2) ‘in all things,’ i.e. attending every form of human life. ‘The philosopher attains to divinity as far as man can; but there is always detraction going on.’ The divine life is not complete until its excellence is acknowledged by mankind.

δημοτικῆς ἀρετῆς] Cp. iv. 430 c πολιτικῆν γε and note: Phaedo 82 B οἱ τὴν δημοτικήν τε καὶ πολιτικὴν ἀρετὴν ἐπιστηπδευκότες.
Notes: Book VI.

οὐ χαλεπανοῦσιν ... (501 Α) δὲ οὐ πάνυ βάδιον] 'They will not be angry if they understand. But tell me, what is their manner of drawing it?' 'I mean, I replied, they will take for their tablet a state and human nature, and will begin by making a clean surface, which is not at all an easy thing to do.'

The modern philosopher will rather say: ὁπερ οὐ πάνυ δυνατόν. Neither individuals nor states can wholly break with their antecedents. The power of habit or tradition, in institutions as well as characters branches back the former things.

ἀλλ' οὖν ... ἦ αὐτοὶ ποιησαί] 'However, you know that this is the point which will at once distinguish them from the others: they will have nothing to do with individual or state, and will draft no laws, until they have either (ἡ) received or (ἡ) themselves made a clear surface.' In other words they will begin with the abstraction of a state. A method of effecting such a 'clean sweep' is suggested at the end of Book vii, where all persons of ten years old and upwards are to be sent out of the city:

οὐκοῦν ... τῆς πολιτείας] 'Do you not suppose that the next step will be to make an outline of the form of the constitution?' For the meaning of ἐπιγράφειν cp. the opposition of ἐπιγραφή and τελεώται ἀπεργασία infra 504 π. In Protag. 326 π the word is used of the writing-master setting a copy.

ἀπεργαζόμενοι] 'In filling up the outline.'

τὸ φύσει δίκαιον ... τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἄνθρώποις] i.e. to natural justice and to that justice which exists among men. Cp. Phaedo 103 π οὔτε τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν οὔτε τὸ ἐν τῇ φύσε: ibid. 102 π. The absolute ideal or the ideal in nature, is opposed to the actual in man. The pronoun is resumed in ἀπ' ἐκείνου.

ἐμποιοίειν ... θεοείκελον] 'they would put into the picture what is manlike, mingling and mixing it from the modes of human action, forming their conception of it from that ideal, which Homer, when existing among men, called divine and godlike.' There is possibly an allusion to the secondary meaning of ἄνθρεικελον = a pigment of the colour of human flesh.

ἀπ' ἐκείνου τεκμαράμενοι, κ.τ.λ.] Does an artist paint from an ideal in the mind's eye, or from observation of nature and life? Is moral and political philosophy to be gathered deductively from ideas, or inductively from experience? The same answer may be
given to both questions: (1) that different minds work in different ways: one with eye and thought simultaneously, the other with a conception that always seems to outrun the power of execution. One fills up a previously existing outline, the other creates piece-meal: the ideal is first in one mind, the real in another. And one man is a philosopher from running about in life, another from reading and study. (2) The opposition of fact and idea, though often made and occasionally justified by the differences of human character or genius, is not, speaking generally, a true one; ideas and ideals are only more universal and distant facts, in which the particularity and confusedness of sense is lost.

Viz. v. 474 A Θείν διατεταμένους, k.t.l.

Referring once more to supra 485 ff.

The change from μὴ to οὐ shows that ἀμφισβητήσαται has been forgotten, some general notion such as λέγειν having taken its place; and in what follows φάσειν can only be explained by a recurrence to οὖς or some similar word implied in the preceding question, the infinitive being suggested by ἔσεσθαι preceding.

C oûς διατεταμένους ἐφ’ ἡμᾶς ἔφησθα ιέναι] Viz. v. 474 A Θείν διατεταμένους, k.t.l.

D ἢν ἡμεῖς διήλθομεν] Referring once more to supra 485 ff.

τί δέ; τὴν τοιαύτην ... ἀφωρίσαμεν ] The change from μὴ to οὐ shows that ἀμφισβητήσαται has been forgotten, some general notion such as λέγειν having taken its place; and in what follows φάσειν can only be explained by a recurrence to οὖς or some similar word implied in the preceding question, the infinitive being suggested by ἔσεσθαι preceding.

E ἢν μυθολογοῦμεν λόγῳ] Cp. once more iii. 389 D ἐὰν γε ... ἐπί γε λόγῳ ἐργα τελήται.

ἡττον] sc. ἀγριαίνωσιν.

βουλεῖ ... (502 Λ) ὀμολογήσωσιν] ‘Do you wish that we should say, not that they are less angry, but that they have become altogether gentle.’ So the unregenerate materialists in the Sophist are imagined to be better than they are, for the sake of the argument (Soph. 246 D, 247 E). Cp. also i. 354 ι. ὅπο σοῦ γε ... ὁ Ὀρασιμάχη, ἐπειδή μοι πρῶς ἔγενεν καὶ χαλεπαίνων ἐπαύσατο.

ἡττον φῶμεν] sc. ἀγριαίνειν.

A αἰσχυνθέντες] ‘from shame’ at our magnanimity in saying they are quite gentle.

τις] τις; which proves to be the reading of Par. A, agrees equally well with the answer οὕτω ἂν εἰς, but cp. ἔχει τις ... ἕσθ' ὅστις ... , infra.

ὡς μὲν γὰρ ... ἔγγυγκροῦμεν] Supra 491 ff., 499 D.

B γενόμενος] = εἰ γένοιτο, ‘were he to arise.’
άλλα δή... ἀδύνατον] Plato is arguing about the probability of his perfect state coming into being, and he assumes this to be possible if only one philosophic nature in the course of ages remains uncorrupted, and finds a city willing to obey him—that is the first step. The ruler lays down his laws and the people execute them—that is the second step. But why should not that which approves itself to us approve itself to him? Or, in other words, 'Why should not the laws which he lays down be the same with ours?'

We may now return to the education of the ruling class, which, as was said above, must be arranged with due regard to the age best fitted for each branch of study. And first, the tests which we now demand for them will be more severe than those previously required. Their patriotism must indeed be proof against all assaults, but they must also be unwearied in learning. Now this implies the combination, rarely found, of quickness with steadiness, of eagerness with persistence. If this higher nature is to be tested, the course of studies must not only include such provisional views of justice, temperance and other virtues, as have been given above: but the pupil must be taken round by what was then briefly indicated as the 'longer way.' In other words, he must not stop short of the highest of all studies, that of the idea of good,—a thing of which all men have a presentiment, but which none have grasped, yet without which all pursuits are vain. This the true guardian must not fail to know if our state is to be perfectly ordered. Yet for the present this supreme idea, transcending not pleasure only, but wisdom, knowledge, truth, and even Being, cannot be defined, but only shadowed forth. As the sun is the source not only of light and vision, but also of the generation and growth of visible things, so the Idea of Good is the supreme cause, not of truth and knowledge only, but of Being. The analogy may be carried further. As in the visible world there are shadows and (so-called) substances, so in the intelligible there is a lower sphere in which ideas are symbolized by sensible things, and a higher one, where the ideas are contemplated absolutely in subordination to the idea of good. Thus:

The visible world presided over by the sun has

a. Shadows perceived by (α)
   Conjecture:

b. Realities perceived by (β)
   Faith.

The intellectual world presided over by the Idea of Good has

c. Mathematical truth perceived by (γ). Scientific thought:

d. Ideal truth perceived by (δ) Reason.
Plato: Republic.

ouδέν . . . το σοφόν μοι ἐγένετο] 'I gained nothing by the trick.'

Cp. Symp. 214 A πρὸς μὲν Σοκράτη, δ' ἄνδρες, τὸ σοφοσμά μοι οὐδέν.
The allusion is to v. 449 c and the passage there referred to—iv. 423 E.

τὴν . . . δυσχέρειαν] 'the troublesomeness,' i.e. both the inherent difficulty of this, and the dislike which the statement of it was sure to occasion.

ἡ παντελῶς ἀληθῆς] The absolutely right arrangement being that the rulers must be philosophers. He proceeds to take up the subject at the point where in Book iii he had digressed. The φύλακες had been supposed to go through a novitiate, with a view of testing their temperance and courage: 413 E καὶ τὸν ἀεὶ ἐν τῇ παισί καὶ πενήνται καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώποι βασιλεύωμεν καὶ ἠκήρατον εἰδολίων καταστατέων ἄρχοντα τῆς πόλεως . . . τὸν δὲ μὴ τοιούτων ἀποκριτέων.

ἐλέγομεν] iii. 412 c ff.

tὸ δόγμα τούτο] as appears from iii. 412 E, is that which is implied in φιλοπόλιτας, viz. the determination ὅ μὲν ἀν τῇ πόλει ἡγεσίων ἐξαρχίσει, πάσῃ προθυμίᾳ ποιεῖν, ὅ ὅ τ᾽ ἂν μή, μὴ δὲν τρόπο πράξῃ ἂν ἐθέλεις.

ἡ τον ἀνικατοῦντα ἀποκριτέων] 'else, he who failed was to be rejected.'

παρακαλιμπτομένου] proves to be the reading of Α, as well as of Π M. The reading παρακαλιπτεσθαι appears in no manuscript.

ἡ γὰρ διήθομεν φύσιν δεῖν υπάρχειν αὐτοῖς] 'for the nature which we described as needing to be present in them.' διέρχομαι here takes the construction of λέγειν: ὡς δέον would be more regular than the infinitive δεῖν.

διεσπασμένη] διεσπασμένα was wrongly read by Cobet (Var. Lecti, ed. sec., p. 531, quoted by Baiter) in Par. A. It is really found only in a' τ, and was adopted by Stephanus from the Latin version of Ficinus. διεσπασμένη is now restored.

εὑμαθεῖς καὶ μυσμοί . . . ἐθέλεις ἢ] There are two ways of construing this passage:—(1) 'You know that people who have a quick apprehension and memory, shrewdness and acuteness, and such like qualities, are not wont to be at the same time of a generous and noble spirit, so as to be such as to wish (ὡς τιοῦτο εἰναι οἷον) to live an orderly life, quietly and steadily.' (2) 'People who have
a quick apprehension and memory, and shrewdness and acuteness, and other such qualities, as you know (and we must add the impetuous and noble), are not wont to be at the same time such as to wish to live orderly.'

The former interpretation (1) gives the more obvious and natural construction. But it is objected, not without a show of reason, that the combination of high-spirit with quickness of intellect does not necessarily produce quietness of conduct (μετὰ ἡσυχίας ... ἢν). To which it may be replied that νεαικόι, as well as μεγαλοπρεπεῖς, is here used in a good sense, implying, not youthful impetuosity, but a robust and high-toned character. For this use of νεαικός cp. supra 491. E ἢ οἰκὶ τὰ μεγάλα ἀδικήματα ... ἐκ φαιλῆς, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκ νεαικῆς φύσεως προφή διωλομένης γέγονεθα ... ; For the connexion of μεγαλοπρέπεια with σωφροσύνη and κοσμίωτης cp. supra 500 c, d.

τὰ βέβαια ... ἢθη] The εἰμιβρέστεροι of Theact. 144 b.

αὐτῷ] sc. τῷ παιδευομένῳ.

αὐτῷ] sc. ἢν διήλθομεν φύσι (supra b).

οἷς τότε ἐλέγομεν] iii. 413 c ff.

δυνατή] is the reading of the majority of MSS. It may be defended by supplying φύσις (or ἐκχή cp. vii. 535 b) from the general sense of the preceding passage.

οἱ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις] 'In other kinds of effort,' i.e. other than intellectual. Orelli's conjecture, ἄθλοις, is plausible but unnecessary. It is also noticeable that the word ἄθλοις is absent from most of Plato's dialogues, occurring only in the Timaeus and Laws.

διαστησάμενοι ἐνεβιβάζομεν] It is better (1) to take ἐνεβιβάζομεν transitively—'we gathered concerning justice, temperance, courage and wisdom, what their several natures were,' than (2) intransitively, as Timaeus does, 'we came to an agreement.' The meaning here approaches that of proof or inference which is common in Aristotle. L. and S. s. v. συμβιβάζω, iii.

μη γάρ ... ἀκούειν] 'Why, if I did not remember, I should deserve not to hear the rest.' μη μημονέων = εἰ μη μημονέωμι.

ἡ καὶ τὸ προρρηθὲν αὐτῶν] sc. μημονεῖς. αὐτῶν, sc. our discussion of the three parts of the soul.

ἐλέγομεν ποι ... προσάψαι] Cp. iv. 435 D μακροτέρα καὶ πλείων ὀδός ἢ ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἁγοῦσα. That is to say, the account of the ideas of
justice, temperance, courage, wisdom, which was given in Book iv, was inexact and popular. Their true nature would only be revealed by dialectical deduction in their relation with the good. For ἐπομένας with the genitive cp. Polit. 271 έ διά τῆς τουαύτης ἐστὶ κατα-

ἐπομένα έπόμενα.

ός μὲν δυνατὸν ήν] The use of the indicative here amongst so many optatives belongs to the idiomatic use of ήν in speaking of an ultimate fact.

άτελες γάρ οὐδὲν οὐδενὸς μέτρον] ‘Nothing imperfect is the measure of anything.’ The very notion of measure involves completeness or definite quantity. For another play on the word μέτρον cp. v. 450 δ μέτρον . . . τοιούτων λόγων ἄκουεν ὄλος ὁ βίος νοῦν ἔχουσιν. A somewhat different test is proposed in Polit. 286 δ, ἐ οὕτε γάρ πρὸς τήν ἡδονήν μήκος ἀμφότερος, κ.τ.λ., where it is said that discourses are not to be measured by the pleasure they give, nor by the ease or quickness with which they dispose of a subject, but as they tend to sharpen the dialectical powers.

δοκεῖ δ’ ἐνίοτε τῶν] Cp. ii. 372 ε, where τῶν conveys a similar innuendo.

καὶ μείζον, κ.τ.λ.] Not only is there a knowledge higher than virtue, but the virtues themselves should be exhibited in their most perfect form.

καὶ μάλα, ἐφι, ἅζιον τὸ διανόημα] ‘Your sentiment, said he, is a right noble one’: i.e. that the highest perfection is required on the highest subjects. καὶ μάλα is to be connected with ἅζιον: cp. i. 334 καὶ μάλα, ἐφι, οὕτω ἔμμηθαι. Cp. the αὐτό τάκριθεν of the Politicus (284 ν), which will require a standard of measure.

Yet in modern, as well as in ancient times, the highest subjects have been treated in the loosest manner. The reason is that they are partly matters of faith and feeling, as well as of reason: all have something to say upon them, and all are eager to hear about them. Not only philosophy, but theology, has often fallen into ignoble hands—οὐ προσήκον ἑπεισδεκακώκτας.

οὐ πάνυ] ‘Certainly not.’

πάντως] as elsewhere, has the force of a connecting particle; cp. Theaet. 143 λ πάντως ἔγγει καὶ ἀναπαύσασθαι δέομαι: Polit. 268 ε πάντως οὐ πολλὰ ἐκφεύγει τι παιδίας ἐτη. The sentence is not therefore to be regarded as an asyndeton.
Notes: Book VI.

η αὖ διανοεῖ ... ἀντιλαμβανόμενος] 'Or you again intend to interrupt and give trouble,' as Adeimantus had previously done by recurring to the subject of women and children (v. 450B ὄσον ἑστὶν λόγων ἐπειδήμετε, κ.τ.λ.).

eἰ δὲ μὴ ἴσομεν ... ἀνευ τοῦ ἁγαθοῦ] The double εἰ in the former part of the sentence helps to distinguish the indicative clause from the optative,—the former mood being correctly used to repeat a previous statement, the latter indicating the further supposition. For the same reason Bekker rightly changed κεκτήμεθα to κεκτήμεθα.

ἡ οἶει ... ἁγαθήν] Compare the passage (iv. 438A) in which drink or any desirable object is said to include the good. But are all the meanings of 'good' the same?—would have been the question of Aristotle (N. E. i. 6). Words seem to play the same part with the ἴδεα τοῦ ἁγαθοῦ as with the Eleatic ὅν or with the abstract θέος. Language readily provides an expression for the unity which the human mind is mainly seeking.

tοῖς δὲ κομψοτέροις] Cp. Aristotle's οἱ χαριντες (N. E. i. 4, § 2, &c.): also Theact. 156A.

καὶ ὅτι γε, ὡς φιλε, κ.τ.λ.] (a) Those who maintain that intelligence is the good, on being asked what they mean by intelligence, reply—'Intelligence of the good'—thus re-introducing the word and still begging the question 'What is the nature of the good?' (b) Those who maintain that pleasure is the good have to admit that there are bad as well as good pleasures, and therefore that bad and good are identical. In the first sentence Plato appears to be speaking of the Cynics, or perhaps of the Megarians: in the second of the Cyrenaics and of people in general. Cp. Phileb. 67 B οἱ πολλοὶ κρίνοντι τὰς ἥδεις εἰς τὸ ἐὰν ἡμῖν εὐ κρατήσως εἶναι. For the contradiction ἁγαθὰ καὶ κακὰ ταῦτα (infra ν), cp. Phil. 13 B, c: and, for ὡς ... ἐπιοινεύτων, Theact. 147 A. B οἱ υἱὸν ὑπερ纳斯 οὐκρίσεως, κ.τ.λ.

τὶ δὲ; τὸδε οὐ φανερὸν, κ.τ.λ.] However men may differ in their idea of the good, they all alike insist on having what they think the reality and will not put up with a sham.

The argument is in some degree like that of Anselm and Descartes, that the highest perfection involves existence. The reality of pleasure might be maintained on similar grounds. For nobody desires 'sham pleasure.' Plato in this passage (but cp.
Parm. 132 b, where he has begun to suspect that abstractions may be a creation of the mind) does not appear to be aware of the answer to this sort of argument—that good, like being, may be an abstraction only, though one of the three greatest or highest of our abstractions: 'verum, unum, bonum.' Compare Theaet. 172 A, where the real nature of the good or expedient is contrasted with the conventionality of law and justice.

The tautology in δοκούντα . . . δοκεῖν affords no valid objection to the reading.

E δ δὴ διώκει μὲν ἀπασα ψυχὴ, κ.τ.λ.] Cp. Aristot. N. E. i. 1, § 1 δίδ καλὸς ἀπεφύνατο τάγαθον, οὗ πῖντ' ἐφίτει.

εἴ τι ὀφελοῦ ἢν] sc. αὐτῶν.


πρότερον] (1) sc. τοῦ φύλακος. The guardians are φύλακες τῶν δικαίων καὶ καλῶν, sc. τῶν νομίμων. Cp. supra 504 c φύλακες πόλεως τε καὶ νόμων. Or (2) 'before he sees how they (justice and beauty) are good (ὅπη ποτε ἄγαθά ἔστιν).' [B. J.]

B ἀνάγκη . . . παρὰ ταῦτα] A slight discontent is betrayed in these words. Adeimantus, here, as elsewhere, is not easily satisfied: he wants to know Socrates' own opinion. Socrates before giving his answer, exclaims against the persistent vein of expostulation adopted by Adeimantus already in several passages: ii. 367 ν, v. 449 c, vi. 487 b. The impatience of Glaucon (infra d: cp. ii. 357 λ) comes to the aid of his elder brother.

οὕτος . . . ἀνήρ] οὗτος ἀνήρ expresses a sort of humorous indignation. The MSS. vary between καλὸς and καλῶς. If καλὸς is read, it must be taken ironically with οὕτος ἀνήρ: 'A fine gentleman like you.' For καλῶς (which is idiomatic) cp. Soph. Oed. Tyr. 1008 ὅ παῖ, καλῶς εἰ δήλος οὐκ εἰδὼς τι δρᾶσ: Oed. Col. 269 τοῦτ' ἐγὼ καλῶς ἑξούθα. The point is determined in favour of καλῶς by observing that the vernacular phrase οὕτος ἀνήρ (for which cp. especially Gorg. 467 b, 489 b, 505 c) does not elsewhere occur with the addition of an epithet. The text agrees with the first hand of Par. A.

A similar trait of character is attributed to Cebes in the Phaedo 63 A ἰδεῖ του, ἄφη, ὁ Κέβης λόγους τινὰς ἀνερέναι, καὶ οὗ πῖνει εὕθεως ἔθελεν πείδεσθαι ὃ τι ἄν τις εἶπη: and 77 λ καίτω καρπερώτατος ἀνθρώπων ἐστί (sc. ὁ Κέβης) πρὸς τὸ ἀπίστευν τοῖς λόγοις.
Notes: Book VI.

For the blindness of right opinion without knowledge cp. Theaet. 201 c.

As in the search after justice (iv. 432 b, c), the increasing dramatic life indicates the interest and importance of the discovery.

Glaucn seizes on the admission of Socrates (504 b), that an approximate method might be sometimes employed. Socrates replies that in the present case even the approximation may be unattainable.

'To reach what is now in my mind is too much for our present attempt.' We have set out in search of Justice (v. 472 b), and in the attempt to discover it we are called upon to define the Good. But that is only to be attained by metaphysical disquisitions for which the readers of the Republic are not yet expected to be sufficiently prepared. Cp. Theaet. 177 c, where Theodorus prefers moral discourses to dialectic. The present remark throws some light on the scope and aim of the Republic.

The untranslateable pun (tókos, 'offspring,' and tókos, 'interest'), for which the way has been prepared in the word ἀποτίσεις, is carried further in what follows: 'Take care that I do not unintentionally deceive you and render a false account of the offspring or interest.'

For the same figure cp. Polit. 267 λ καλῶς καὶ καθαπερῆ χρῶς ἀπεδωκάς μου τῶν λόγων, προσθέεις τήν ἐκτροπὴν ὅνων τόκων καὶ ἀναπληρώσως αὐτῶν: and for a different simile viii. 555 ε τοῦ πατρὸς ἐγγόνως τόκους πολλοπλασιοῦ κοιμώμεναι.

For the use of the aorist participle with γε = 'not until,' cp. Phaedr. 228 ν τήν μέντοι διάνοιαν . . . διέμι, ἀφράμυνος ἀπὸ τοῦ πρώτου. Δείεις γε πρῶτον, ὃ φιλότης, τί ἢ, μὲν τήν ὀριστερὰ ἔχεις ὑπὸ τῷ ἰματίῳ. The reference in εν τοῖς ἐμπροσθεῖν is to ν. 476 λ: cp. supra 493 ε.

This passage has been thought
Plato: Republic.

Republic VI.

507 B

inconsistent with v. 478, 9, where it was shown that the 'many beautiful,' &c. cannot be said either to be or not to be. But εἰναι is not here used in the sense of 'to have real existence,' but simply = 'to be.'

ἐκαστα οὐτως] οὐτως, sc. πολλά, 'many individuals of each class.'

καὶ αὐτὸ δὴ καλὸν ... προσαγορεύομεν ] 'And we say that there is a beauty in itself and a good in itself: and in the same way with reference to all the classes which we previously regarded as consisting of many individuals, reversing the process and placing the individuals under one idea corresponding to each of these classes, as forming a unity, we call each class by what it really is.'

C ἄρ' οὖν ... ἑδημιούργησεν] Cp. Heracleitus, fragm. 21 ὁφθαλμοὶ ὡτων μάρτυρες ἀκραβέστεροι.

ἔστιν οί τι ... (b) ἀκουσθῆσαι] The ancient physical philosopher did not observe that air was as necessary for the transmission of sound as light for the medium of vision.

D ἢ σύ τινα ἔχεις εἰπεῖν ;] sc. αἰσθησιν ἢτιν τοιαύτῃ τινος προσδεί.

παρουσίας δὲ χρώας ἐν αὐτοῖς] sc. ἐν τοῖς ὦρανοῖς from τοῦ ὦρατοῦ supra. The analysis of vision here is less minute than in the Theaetetus and Timaeus. Colour is imagined as being present in the objects, although neither colour nor vision can be realized without light. Cp. infra 508 c ὄν ἐν τὰς χρώας ... ἐπέχη ... νυκτερινὰ φέγγη.

Ε τίνος δὴ λέγεις] (1) sc. γένους παραγενομένου τῆς τε ὅψιν ὅραν τά τε χρώματα ὦρατα εἶναι. The genitive is used as if εἶναν μὴ παραγενηται had been ς δὲ μὴ παραγενομένων. (2) For the genitive cp. v. 459 B τι δὲ ἰσπων οἴει ; [B. J.].

ὁδομικρὰ ἄρα ἠδέα ... (508 A) τὸ φῶς] 'Then the sense of sight and the quality of visibility are joined together by a bond nobler by the measure of no small nature than the bond which unites other correlatives, if light be no ignoble thing.' 'Nay, said he, it is far from being ignoble.' ὁδομικρὰ ἠδέα is the dative of measure or comparison, and is said in the same way as μείζων τῆς πόλεως, ἀλλ' ἐλκ στρατοπέδῳ (ii. 373 ε). Cp. especially Hdt. vi. 106, § 3 πολυν λογικῷ ὃ Ἑλλάς γέγονεν ἀρηνστέρῃ. For the use of ἠδέα in this sense, cp. Phileb. 64 οὐκοῦν εἰ μὴ μὴ δυνάμεθα
Notes: Book VI.

Light is necessary to the correlation between the eye and visible things, and the preciousness of light is the measure of the superiority of that correlation to those existing between the other organs of sense and their several objects.

For the use of αιτιώματι in the sense of 'allege to be the cause' cp. x. 599 E; δε τίς αἰτιάται πόλις νομοθέτην ἂγαθὸν γεγονόντα καί σφάς ὀφεληκέναι;

οὐκοῦν καὶ τὴν δύναμιν . . . κέκτηται;' Is not the power which it (the eye) has, dispensed from the Sun and possessed by it as something derived from without?'

This may be appropriately termed Plato's 'solar myth.' Even at the present day, when the power which the sun's force exerts over all nature is so much more truly recognized than formerly, the influence which the idea of the sun continues to exercise over the mind and imagination is hardly less remarkable. The ordinary religious feeling about the sun was shared by Socrates: Apol. 26 c, Symp. 220 d.

For φάναι cp. v. 473 A φάναι ἡμᾶς ἕξεπνηκέναι ὡς δύνατά ταῦτα γένεσθαι ἄ φαν ἐπιτάττεις. ὃ τί περ, κ.τ.λ., is added in explanation of ἀνάλογον ἑαυτῷ.

ὁν τάγαθῳ . . . (c) τα ὑρώμενα 'whom the good begot to be its own counterpart, to be in the visible world in relation to sight and the things of sight what itself is in the intelligible world in relation to mind and the things of mind.' τούτον, emphatically resuming the preceding τούτον, is in the same construction with ὅν, while τούτο is the emphatic antecedent to ὃ τί περ. For the construction of λέγειν with all that follows it cp. 511 A, B.

ἀν . . . ἐπέχη] 'upon the colours of which the light of day falls.'

ἀλλὰ ἅν νυκτερινὰ φέγγα] sc. ἀλλ' ἐπ' ἐκεῖν ἃν ἄν τις χρῶς νυκτερινὰ φέγγα ἐπέχη.

καταλάμπῃ] The ἄν, which is not absolutely required in this and similar expressions, may be supplied from what has preceded, ἄν ἃν . . . ἐπέχη, and would be felt as superfluous after ὅταν.

ἐνοῦσα φαίνεται] sc. ἡ καθαρὰ ὑπερ.

οὕτω τοίνυν . . . νοῦν ἔχειν φαίνεται] 'In like manner (οὕτω) conceive too of the soul in this way (ὥδε): when she is fixed steadily on that on which truth and being shine, she knows and understands this and appears to have intelligence.'
The expression recalls v. 479 c.

'this, then, which imparts truth to the things that are known and gives to the knower the power of knowing, is what I would have you call the idea of good: and this you will deem to be the cause of knowledge and of truth so far as the latter is known: but fair as are both these, knowledge and truth, you will be right in thinking that it is something fairer than these.' μέν strictly belongs to αἰτίαν and is opposed to the following δέ: the idea of good 'is indeed (μέν) the cause of knowledge and truth, but (δέ) it is other and fairer than they.' The reading διανοοῦ instead of the formerly received διὰ τοῦ (Ven. Ε, &c.) has superior manuscript authority, including Par. λ, and gives a clear sense. The other is feeble and the expedient of cancelling the clause ως γιγνωσκομένης ... ἡγήσει indefensible.

The good is the sun, truth is light, the ideas are the objects of sight, and knowledge is vision. The strain of 'heavenly beauty' in which the mind is to be absorbed is in a region far away from modern thoughts. The intense reality of all beauty and all truth when seen according to the divine idea is perhaps as near an approach as we can make to the meaning of Plato. The want of personality in the ἀγαθῶν prevents our minds from resting in that which to Plato is the most real of thoughts, comprehending in one the idea of order and design, of a cause in nature and of intelligence in man, not without an association of goodness in the sense of benevolence and good-will. Cp. Tim. 29 ε.

Preparations for the ἀγαθῶν may be traced in the Symposium, 211 D, Ε τί δήτα, ἐφι, αἰώμεθα, εἰ τῷ γένοιτο αὐτῷ τὸ καλὸν ἰδεῖν ἐλεκρινές, καθαρόν, ἀμετον, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀνάπλεων σαρκῶν τε ἀνθρωπίνων καὶ χρωμάτων καὶ ἄλλης πολλῆς φλαμίας βυγγῆς, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τὸ θεῖον καλὸν δύναιτο μονοεἰδές κατιδεῖν; where the idea of ἀγαθῶν is not yet evolved out of the καλῶν: in the Phaedrus 250 D ψῆς γὰρ ἡμῖν ἐξιτάτη τὰς διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἔρχεται αἰσθήσεων, ἢ φρόνησις αὐχ ἀράται—δεινώς γὰρ ἂν παρείχεν ἔρωτας, εἰ τι τοιοῦτον ἐναντίς ἐφαργής εἶδολον παρείχετο εἰς ψῆν ἴων—καὶ τὰλλα ὅσα ἐραστᾶ, νῦν δὲ κάλλος μόνον τκοτὴν ἔσχε μορὴν, ὡς ἐκφανέστατον εἰμι καὶ ἔρασμωταν. And in the Philebus, which is probably later than the Republic, we find an attempt to give a further definition to the idea. The eternal nature or highest good is found to consist in measure, above the σύμμετρον and τέλον, which are second, and νοῦς and φρόνησις, which are third in the scale (Phil. 66 λ, β).
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Neuter plural rather than feminine singular.

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A

J Neuter plural rather than feminine singular.

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309

A

The state or nature of the good.'

αμήχανον κάλλος] sc. τοù ἄγαθοù.

φάναι] cp. supra 508 b.

οὐκ οὕσιας οὔτος... ὑπερέχοντος] Referring to the history of philosophy we may translate this:—'The idea of good reaches a step beyond the Eleatic being.'

"Ἀπόλλων... δαμονίας ὑπερβολῆς] 'Good heavens, what a marvellous superiority!' The way for this exclamation has been already prepared in the words αμήχανον κάλλος, supra. Glaucus speaks with a feeling of admiration and yet of incredulity. Cp. Euthyd. 303 λ Ἡράκλεις, ἔφη, κυλοῦ λόγον! and for the rejoinder of Socrates cp. Phaedr. 238 D οὐκέτι πόρρω δινεμίζων φιλεγγυμα... τούτων μέντοι σὲ αἰτίοις.

ei μή τι] sc. ἀλλο: 'at all events complete the simile of the sun.'

Cp. 501 E ἵνα, ei μή τι ἀλλο, ῥάγχυντινες ὁμολογήσωσιν: Meno 86 ε. ei μή τι οὖν, ἄλλα σμικρῶν γε μοι τῆς ἄρχης χάλασον.

ίνα μὴ οὕραυν... περὶ τὸ ὄνομα] In allusion to the fanciful derivation of οὕραυς from ὀρᾶν. Cp. Crat. 396 B οὐρανία, ὀρώσα τὰ ἄνω. The v. g. οὕραυν, though of inferior manuscript authority, may possibly be right.

ὁσπερ τοῖνυν γραμμῆν... τὸ μὲν ἔτερον τμῆμα εἰκόνες] Cp. Sophist 265 ε ff., where ποιητής is first divided κατὰ πλάτος into θεῖα and ἄνθρωπιν, and then sub-divided κατὰ μῆκος into shadows and realities. ἄνισα τμῆματα is the reading of Proclus, p. 431. 10; of the Pseudo-Plutarch, 1001; and of the great majority of MSS., including Par. A. The emendations ἵσα, ἄν' ἵσα, have been proposed: the variations εἰς ἵσα (v), perhaps equally an emendation, and ἄν, ἵσα (Vind. f, &c.), are also found in MSS. The reading ἄν' ἵσα is poor Greek, as well as poor sense; and the other correction, εἰς ἵσα, although not open to the first charge, equally enfeebles the meaning of ἄνα τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον:—'Divide the line equally and then sub-divide in the same proportion.' The text, as found in the best authorities, is probably genuine: the difficulty is to discover a reason for the inequality in the divisions. The whole line may be regarded as representing a progress upwards from the
infinite multiplicity of sense and the reflections of sense at the lower end, to the unity of good at the higher; the reflections of sense are more numerous than the objects of sense, as the mathematical figures and other phenomena of nature are more numerous than the ideas; and also downwards from the infinite value of the idea of good to the insignificance of sensible objects and their shadows (cp. infra 511). Still, although this explanation is in harmony with Plato's ideas and with the general context, as a matter of style further explanation is needed. Cp. however Theaet. 197 d, where in the same manner he describes the different kinds of knowledge under the image of birds, some in larger and smaller groups, others singly flying through all, without adding any explanation of the reason of this.

\[\text{tò μὲν ἐτέρον τῆμα} \] i.e. the lower segment.

\[\text{δόσα πυκνὰ τε καὶ λεία καὶ φανὰ διόνυστηκε} \] For διόνυστηκε of a compact solid, cp. Tim. 61 a, 83 a. And for an account of the phenomena of reflection, ibid. 46 a, b.

\[\text{ἡ καὶ ἑθελοὶ ἄν ... ἕ ὑμοιώθη} \] αὐτῷ, sc. τὸ ἀρώμενον, which has now been divided.

\[\text{ἡ τὸ μὲν αὐτοῦ ... τὴν μέθοδον ποιομένη} \] 'As thus:—There are two subdivisions of the intellectual sphere: a lower one, wherein the mind uses the objects given by the former segments as symbols; the inquiry can only be hypothetical, and instead of going upwards to a principle, works downward to a result. In the higher subdivision, the soul passes out of hypotheses and ascends to a first principle, which is above hypotheses, making no use of symbols, as in the former case, but proceeding by ideas alone.'

tois tote τημήθεισιν \[= \text{touis ἐμπροσθεν ἐιρημένοις τημάσιν}, \] referring to supra 509 d, e, 510 a. The reading of A and of the MSS. of Proclus, μυθηθέοις, though it may be due to the ingenuity of some early corrector, has the advantage of giving clearness to the logical connexion:—i.e. the visible realities, of which the eikones in the lower segment of the visible were imitations. These now become eikones in their turn. Cp. infra εἰς καὶ σκιάν, κ.τ.λ.: vii. 515 D ἔκεινα ἄν τὸτε τὰς σκιὰς εἴωρα. The testimony of Ven. II is not available here, two leaves of the MS. having been lost; but its congeners D, K agree with other MSS. in giving τημήθεισιν.

tò δ' αὐ ἐτέρον τό, κ.τ.λ.] The genuineness of tò after ἐτέρον is open
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to question. For no mention has occurred of the upper division leading to an ἀνεπόθετος. It may be answered that this is sufficiently implied in the preceding words, which describe the soul in the other division as εξ ὑποθέσεων οὐκ ἐπ’ ἀρχὴν πορευομένη. But the construction is also much simpler and more intelligible without the article, the only word to be supplied being ζητεῖ, which governs both τὸ ἔτερον and ἐκείνο. The conjecture ὅ for τὸ is ingenious but unnecessary.

Of the three manuscript readings, ὄσπερ ἐκείνο εἰκῶν (Α Μ), τῶν περὶ ἐκεῖνο εἰκῶν (DK Vind. F corr.), ὄν περὶ ἐκεῖνο εἰκῶν (Vind. f p. m.), the first, which is that of Par. Α is probably the true one: i.e. ὄντων εἰκῶν ὄσπερ χρωμένη ζητεῖ ἐκείνο.

ἀλλ’ αὐθις | sc. λεγόμενον μαθήσει.

τοῦτων | sc. what I am now about to say, as well as what has been said.

καὶ ἀλλα . . . καθ’ ἑκάστην μέθοδον | This is added, like καὶ τὰ τοιαύτα supra, καὶ τάλλα οὕτως infra, to show that διάνοια is not confined to Arithmetic and Geometry, but prevails also in the other sciences.

ποιησάμενοι ὑποθέσεις αὐτά | That is to say, they presuppose mathematical quantities and figures without any inquiry into the grounds of their suppositions, and end in the construction of their problem διάνοια—i.e. consistently, without any contradiction within the sphere of mathematics.

οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅτι, κ.τ.λ. | sc. οὐκοῖν καὶ τόδε οὕτα ὅτι.

καὶ τάλλα οὕτως | sc. πραγματεύονται.

α πλάττουσι | e.g. the sphere, pyramid, cube, and other solid figures.

ὡν καὶ σκιαί, κ.τ.λ. | These words allude to the fourth or lowest section. Plato means to say that the mathematicians use as images of abstract ideas those things of which shadows and reflections are the natural images, that is, the forms of superficial and solid geometry, such as the square, circle, sphere, pyramid, cube, &c., and the other objects of vision.

Cp. vii. 534 λ, where further inquiry into the relation of the subdivisions is declined. The lowest of the four segments consists of shadows and reflections of objects: and each of the three
lower is the reflection of the segment above it. The two main
divisions rest on the fundamental antithesis of Greek philosophy,
aistoria and noia: the first and third subdivisions appear to be
suggested by the Heraclitean and Pythagorean doctrines.

τότε τοινυν νοητόν, κ.τ.λ. The mind, beginning with number
and figure, in the longest trains of reasoning always remains within
the sphere of mathematics—a truth which was not perceived by the
Pythagoreans when they identified numbers with moral ideas, and
is forgotten by Plato in the next book where he supposes the
higher astronomy to consist only of mathematical problems.

eikos δε χρωμένων... τετιμημένων ‘using, however, as images
those very things of which there are reflections in the sphere below
them, and which, in relation to those reflections, are habitually
esteemed and honoured as real and clear.’

There are two respects in which διάνωσι or scientific reasoning is
inferior to true dialectic (νοησι):—

(1) In deducing its results from certain abstract assumptions.
Thus arithmetic assumes the notions of ‘odd’ and ‘even,’ geometry
those of the circle, square, &c., and of acute, right and obtuse
angles; solid geometry, the notions of the sphere, pyramid, cube,
octahedron, &c.: astronomy, certain relations of matter in motion:
harmony, certain proportionate vibrations, and the like. None of
these sciences ask the reason of their primary definitions, or can
prove them to be otherwise than arbitrary.

(2) The other point in which these sciences are inferior is that
their processes are not pure from matter. For although both their
assumptions and their deductions have for their object certain pure
abstractions, they are unable to study these apart from visible
things. Even the arithmetician has a difficulty in separating his
abstract unit from the units which he is engaged in counting, or
from the geometrical figures through which he studies the relations
of numbers. In the ἐπίπεδον σχῆμα, which stands visibly for 9, each
side is of a certain length. The geometrical cannot reason without
diagrams, much less can the astronomer without the outward
configuration of the heavens (τυ ἐν τῷ ὁφραφ ψοικίλματα vii. 529 c)
or some copy of this, or the harmonist without audible sounds.

The first of these defects is meant by ὑποθέσει δ’ ἀναγκαζόμενην
529 ὃ τῇ περὶ τὸν ὁφραφ ψοικίλια παραθέτωμαι χρυστέων τῆς πρὸς
ἐκεῖνα μαθήσεως ἐνέκα (sc. τῶν ἀληθινῶν ἐν σχῆματι φαρῶν).
Notes: Book VI.

But in speaking of sensible objects as the symbols or images through which science works, Plato remembers that what are images or shadows in relation to scientific conception, are the realities of common language and experience, and he recalls the distinction which he made at first between the shadow and the substance (supra 509 e), which were to one another as opinion or fancy to knowledge (τὰ μὲν ἐπερον τιμήμα εἰκόνες ... τὸ ... ἐπερον ... ὁ τούτο ἑικε ... διηρήσθαι ἡλιθεία τε καὶ μῆ, ὅς τὸ διαξιστὸν πρὸς τὸ γνώστων, οὕτω τὸ ὑμιοθεῖν πρὸς τὸ ὁ ὑμιοθεῖν).

The eikones of the present passage are taken from the same class, which in the former place (and in common life) hold the higher and more honourable position of Realities—τὸ ὁ ἡ εἰκὼν ὑμιοθείη, and are so esteemed in relation to the eikónes of that place (509 e), viz. the shadows and reflections which occupy the fourth or lowest grade. To avoid the confusion that might arise from this, he here resumes what he had hinted just before, supra 510 e ὅν καὶ σκιαὶ καὶ ἐν ἰδαιμ εἰκόνες ἐικῷ, and uses emphatic pronouns to make the distinction felt, αὐτοῖς, ἐκεῖνοι, πρὸς ἐκεῖνα. The things which science uses as her symbols are sensible objects, τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν κατὰ ἀπεικασθέντα, —αὐτοῖς, the things themselves, as distinguished from their shadows, &c.—of which the class below them are again the symbols or likenesses: and in relation to those likenesses (their shadows and reflections) those sensible objects (both are ἐκεῖνα because remote from the true objects of knowledge) have had awarded to them an honourable estimation for clearness and reality.

The words ἐκεῖνοι πρὸς ἐκεῖνα (SC. τοῖς ὁμοιώμοις πρὸς τὰς σκιὰς) are added in apposition to τοῖς . . . ἀπεικασθέσια, so as to show that the ‘distinctness’ (ἐνάργεια) here spoken of is entirely relative, within the lower world of sense: and αὐτοῖς is not used with the specially Platonic meaning, but simply to distinguish objects from their shadows. Cp. Soph. 266 c, and for ἀπεικασθέσια, Phaedr. 250 B ὁλίγον ἐπὶ τὰς εἰκόνας ἱόντες θεωτυμεν τὸ τῶν εἰκασθέντας γένος. The use of ἐκεῖνο here distinguishes the visible, which has been dismissed, from the intellectual, which is the immediate subject of thought.

For τετιμημένοις several MSS., including the first hand of Par. A, read τετιμημένοι, which may be variously regarded either as supported or suggested by τοῖς τότε τιμηθέσιν above. The word τετιμημένοι is not, however, in harmony with δεδοξασμένοις. The correction of Par. A is by the first or second hand, and both Ven. II and M are defective here.
In the highest of the four divisions we are concerned with ideas only. The spheres of Mathematics and Metaphysics, as they may be termed in modern phraseology, are alike limited, the one to hypotheses, the other to ideas.

Mathematical studies are regarded by Plato as affording the most distinct example of scientific method. Indeed, from the position which they occupy in the next book, it might appear that they are understood by him to constitute the whole of the division intermediate between πίστις and νόησις, the field that is occupied by διάνωσ. But from an incidental remark, vii. 517 D τῶν τοῦ δικαίου σκιῶν ἡ ἐγαλμάτων δὲ αἱ σκιαὶ, it is evident that he does not clearly distinguish between those hypotheses which are abstractions of sense and those which are abstractions of mind, between the hypothetical conception of a circle or a square, and that of Justice, so far as method is concerned. See also Μένος 86 ε ἡμ. ὀσπερ ὁι γεωμετρίαι, κ.τ.λ., where ethical reasoning is illustrated from mathematical. All science is imperfect so long as assumptions are taken for first principles, and symbols for realities. When the hypothesis is referred to a first principle, and the symbol explained by the thing signified, the science is complete (νοητῶν δυναμετὰ αρχὴς infra δ).

Of the attempt to rise upwards from ὑποθέσεις towards first principles, we have many examples in Plato: for instance in the Phaedo, where from the consideration of equality we rise to the conception of a perfect ideal, and in the Symposium, where Diotima leads Socrates upwards from the definition τόκος ἐν καλῷ to the contemplation of absolute Beauty. We may doubt if Plato himself would have asserted that in any part of his works he had realized the other aspect of his ideal method, that of descending by due steps from the Idea of Good to particular things. There is a sense in which his method is far more inductive than deductive. But, in the early part of the Timaeus, where from the notion of the Uncreated, the Eternal and the Good, he passes gradually to the necessary constitution of the Universe, there is an approximation to the intellectual movement which is here indicated.

It would be vain to formulate the precise relation in which Plato’s view of Mathematics in the Republic stands to the statement of Aristotle, Metaph. i. 6, § 4 ἐτε δὲ παρὰ τὰ αἰσθητά καὶ τὰ εἴδη τὰ μαθηματικὰ τῶν πραγμάτων εἶναι φυσι μεταξὺ, διαφέροντα τῶν μὲν αἰσθητῶν τῷ αἴδια καὶ ἀκίνητα εἶναι, τῶν δ’ εἴδων τῷ τὰ μὲν πολλὰ ἀττα ὄμοια εἶναι, τὸ δὲ εἴδος αὐτὸ ἐν ἕκαστον μόνον.
tás ὑποθέσεις] The assumptions here meant are clearly not those of Mathematics only, but of every subject which can be brought under definition.

οἷον ἐπιβάσεις τε καὶ ὄρμας] For a similar ladder by which we may ascend through the lower stages of beauty, ὅσπερ ἐπαναβαθμὸς χρώμεναι, to the contemplation of a divine perfection see Symp. 211 B, C.

tὸ ὑπὸ τῶν τεχνῶν καλουμένων] Meaning geometry and the sister arts, cp. supra b. That the term is not quite accurately used Plato himself seems to intimate in καλουμένων, and also in vii. 533 c, d especially the words ἀς ἐπιστήμασ μὲν πολλάκις προσείτομεν διὰ τὸ ἔδοξε, δέονται δὲ ὀνόματος ἄλλου, ἐναργεστέρου μὲν ἢ δόξης, ἀμυδρότερον δὲ ἢ ἐπιστήμης.


αὐτά] sc. τὰ ὑπὸ τούτων (τῶν τεχνῶν) θεωρημένων.

ὡς μεταξὺ τί . . . τὴν διάνοιαν οὖσαν] 'meaning to say that διάνοια is intermediate between opinion and reason.' Cp. the phrases διὰ μέσου, διὰ χρίνου, &c., for the meaning of διά. And for a reference to this place cp. vii. 533 d.

καὶ τάξον αὐτά . . . ἡγησάμενος μετέχειν] 'And arrange the terms in proportion, attributing to them such a degree of clearness as their objects have of truth.' For πίστιν cp. the use of the words πιστεύων and πίστις applied to right impression as distinct from knowledge in x. 601 e, and Tim. 29 c ὁ τί περ πρὸς γίνεσθαι οὖσία, τοῦτο πρὸς πίστιν ἀλήθεια. The word expresses the 'natural realism' of ordinary thought.
BOOK VII.

Now if the idea of good in relation to the other ideas be represented by the sun, who gives light and warmth and growth to the natural world, the condition of men without philosophy may be compared to that of persons in a subterranean cave, bound fast in a position where they can only see the shadows of manufactured images cast by the light of an artificial fire. Education in the higher sense might then be represented as the process of unbinding such prisoners and turning them round and making them look upwards and then dragging them from their cavernous habitation into the light of day.

The metaphor by which the sun represents the idea of Good as supreme over the intellectual world is now developed into an allegory, in which the shadows cast from images by the light of an artificial fire are contrasted with the true objects seen by the light of the sun.

To a condition which I may thus describe. For the use of πάθος cp. vi. 488 A οὗτω γὰρ χάλεψον τὸ πάθος τῶν ἑπιευκεστάτων.

The entrance extending all along the den, i.e. the cave is shallow in proportion to the width of its mouth. This helps verisimilitude, because a multitude of human beings can be thus imagined as similarly placed with respect to the ascent towards the opening. The light of heaven does not penetrate into the cavern, which is 'open to the light' only in the sense that it is possible to clamber out of it into the light.

The construction with ίδε is continued. The illusion of the shadows could not have been preserved if the prisoners had been able to turn their heads and see the fire and the images from which the shadows fell.
The way along which the figures are moving is raised and the light at a distance is raised still higher: otherwise the shadows of the figures and vessels could not have been visible to the prisoners in the den.

As exhibitors of puppets have a screen before the persons who exhibit them, over which they show the puppets. The image of puppets is a favourite one with Plato. In the Laws i. 645 B, vii. 804 B, he compares human life to a puppet-show. The difficulty in τῶν ἄνθρώπων, which seems at first sight needless, is best met by supposing the ἄνθρωποις to be not the actual exhibitor or puller of the strings but the master of the show. This agrees better with what follows—"Ὅποι τοίνυν, κ.τ.λ., than to suppose τῶν ἄνθρώπων to refer to the spectators.

These represent the natural and artificial objects (τὰ τε περὶ ἡμᾶς ζῶν καὶ πάν τὸ φυτεύον καὶ τὸ σκευαστῶν ζῶν γένος of vi. 510 A) which have their patterns in the upper world and in relation to them are mere toy-work (cp. x. 596, where Plato speaks of the ideal bed, the real bed, which is the copy of it, and the picture of the bed: also Tim. 28, 29, where the visible patterns are made in the likeness of the invisible and fashioned by the younger gods; ibid. 42 D, E): yet even of these only the shadows are perceptible by sense. The intention of this expression is best seen by comparing the following passages:—
Without wishing to press the allegory, it is natural to assume that a point of which so much is made has a distinct intention. Now in page 532 a it is stated that the man who in the allegory begins to see the real objects in the daylight represents the soul beginning dialectic, and that the scientific education preceding this was represented by the turning round to the εἴδωλα, the ascent, and the first glimpse of the reflections of the real objects in the light of day.

The stages in this preliminary process represent not different spheres but different degrees of scientific enlightenment. The meaning of εἴδωλα receives further illustration from the following passages:—

530 Α νομεῖν μέν, ὡς οἶχ᾽ τε καλλίστα τά τοιαύτα ἔργα συντῆσασθαι, οὕτω ἐξυπνάναι τῷ τοῖς οὐρανοῖς ὄντων τε καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ τῆς δὲ νυκτὸς πρὸς ἡμέραν ἐξυμετρῆσαι, ... οὐκ ἄστυπον ... ἵγγεσται τοῖς νομίζοντα γλυκείσατε τὰ τούτα ἀεὶ ὑπάρχοντες. ... σῶμα τε ἑχουστα καὶ ἀρώμενα, καὶ ζητεῖν παντὶ τρόπῳ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ αὐτῶν λαβεῖν;

533 δ' ἑννενίναι καὶ συμπεριγραφοὶ χρωμεῖν αἷς διάθημεν τέχναις· ἄς ἐπιστήμασι μὲν πολλάκις προσεῖπομεν διὰ τὸ ἔθος, δεόνται δὲ νόμοσις ἄλλοις, ἐναργεῖοντες μὲν ἡ δόξης, ἀμυνοστόρου δὲ ἡ ἐπιστήμης. διώκουσιν δὲ αὐτὴν ἐν γε τῷ πρόσθεν πον ἀριστάμεθα. See also ibid. b, c.

The εἴδωλα are (1) out of sight of the ἵδεα of good, (2) made and shown by somebody, (3) lighted by the fire which represents the sun. They are the figures of real outward objects: but as all outward objects can be comprehended under number and figure, Plato seems also to include in them the figures and numbers of arithmetic and geometry. He passes from the world as we see it to the world as conceived of by the mathematician, in which he expects to find the way up to the ἵδεα of good.

The notion of the σκευαστὰ εἴδωλα has been prepared for by the mention of the solid figures of geometers ἀ πλάτωνων (vi. 510 e) and the use of the word σκευαστά for inanimate objects (ib. 510 a).

515 λίθινα τε ... εἰργασμένα] The σκευαστά are wrought in various materials, as the visible world is compounded of the four elements.

οἶνον εἴκος] To be joined with what follows: ‘naturally, some of the carriers are speaking, others not.’ The first impression of these words is that they have no point, but we see below (515 b εἰ καὶ ἦχω, κ.τ.λ.) the reason why they are introduced. Plato has hitherto spoken of the sensible as the visible world. But he here also
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includes the world of hearing. This prepares for the science of harmonics infra 530 d ff.

\[\text{티 디 토ν 파라페로μένων} \] sc. \(\text{ου ταύτα ἴηει \ldots \ άπερ ὅμων;}\) ‘Do you not suppose that they would believe that they were naming those things that they saw actually before them?’ i.e. that the terms they used in their conversations applied to the shadows and not to the realities of which they are ignorant? \(\text{ταύτα} \) the reading of \(\Sigma \text{K,} \) the simple antecedent, is better than \(\text{ταύτα,} \) the reading of \(\text{Λ.} \) \(\text{Π} \) and \(\text{Μ} \) are wanting in this place. \(\text{Παράωντα} \) the reading of Flor. \(\text{x} \) is rather confusing as it might signify either the shadows or the realities. The pleonastic expression ‘those present things which they actually saw’ is emphatic and in the manner of Plato.

\[\text{παντάπασι \ldots σκιάς} \] \(\text{σκευαστά} \) are not ordinary artificial objects (as in vi. 510 \(\text{Λ καὶ το σκευαστόν ἕλον γίνοσ} \) but diminutive \text{images} of ordinary artificial objects, being the \(\text{σκιύ} \) which are carried along the wall. For the purpose of the present allegory the \(\text{ζφα} \) and \(\text{φυτέωτα} \) also are \(\text{σκευαστά}, \) ‘manufactured articles.’

\[\text{το ἀλήθες} \] \(\text{ἀλήθεια,} \) ‘reality,’ was the favourite term of Protagoras, who denied all truth beyond momentary impressions, Theaet. 162 \(\text{Α;} \) Soph. 246 \(\text{Β;} \) Crat. 391 \(\text{c.} \)

\begin{align*}
\text{The stages of the educational process may be roughly sketched in terms of the preceding allegory. The man is first loosed from his bonds and turned towards the light. Then by questions his attention is fixed upon the realities of which he has hitherto seen the shadows, and heard the echoes only:—then upon the central power which gives light to these. After this he is dragged up the rough and steep ascent into the daylight; where again he first sees the shadows, then real objects, then the heavenly luminaries, first the moon and stars by night, and last of all the sun by day. And when he has seen the sun, he will recognize the truth about him, that he is in a manner the cause of all things. He who has so far attained will not wish himself back in the den nor covet the honours there adjudged to those who make the best guesses about the shadows. And if he were restored to his old place while his eyes were still unaccustomed to the darkness, his fellow-prisoners would laugh him to scorn, and say that Philosophy was the ruin of a man.}
\end{align*}

\(\text{σκόπει δή, κ.τ.λ.] \) \(\text{join λύσιν τῶν δεισμῶν, ιασιν τῆς ἀφροσύνης.} \) The latter phrase refers to the state of ignorance described as the
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C e i φύσει τοιάδε ξυμβαίνοι αὐτοῖς Supposing that the following were the manner of it (their release and cure as it happened to them): 'in the course of nature.' For the conception of philosophy as the freeing of the soul from sense cp. Phaedo 83.

D τί ἄν οίει ... βλέποι This is the apodosis of the new sentence which begins with ὅποτε and is grammatically in apposition to that which precedes, although gradually developed into an independent statement. Cp. supra ii. 359 B εἰ τοιῶθε ποιήσαμεν, κ.τ.λ.

ϕλυαρίας] Cp. Phaedo 66 c εἴδωλων παντοδαιμών καὶ ϕλυαρίας ἐμπίπτλησιν ἡμάς πολλὴς. βλέποι is the reading of all the better MSS. which grammarians are disposed to correct into βλέπα in accordance with the more common usage. The optative may be due to the attraction of the preceding optative λέγοι.

καὶ δὴ ... δεικνύμενα;] Plato here seems to be thinking of the practice of Socrates, who by interrogation about the facts of experience in the light of common sense reduced men to perplexity.

E διὰ τραχείας τῆς ἀναβάσεως καὶ ἀνάντους] Cp. Theaet. 175 b ὡς ἡ γῆ τιμα αὐτῶς ... ἐλκύσῃ ἄνω, κ.τ.λ.

δύνασθαι ... ἀγανακτεῖν ... (516 A) δύνασθαι] These infinitives depend like the preceding (ἀπορεῖν, &c.) on οὐκ οίει (supra b).

516 A τῶν νῦν λεγομένων] 'Of the objects which are now (by men in general) called real.' Plato reminds us that he is speaking in a figure. Cp. infra 519 A, vi. 490 A.

tά τε ... εἴδωλα] He will see an image of the truth in words (Phaedo 100 A) before he rises to the contemplation of the highest ideas. The gradations that follow are not to be pressed beyond the general meaning; but there are degrees of glory in the heaven of ideas. Cp. note on vi. 511 A. One is tempted however to suppose that 'the moon and stars' may symbolize the ideas of Being, Truth, Sameness, Difference, &c., which although divine are of a lower order than the Good and are studied apart from it.

tῶν ἀνθρώπων] The knowledge of man is the starting-point, as in all Socratic philosophy.

B τελευταῖον δὴ ... οἶσ ἔστιν] The fulness of expression, the
antithesis and the thrice repeated pronoun give effect to the climax.

ὅτι αὐτὸς, κ.τ.λ.] Cp. vi. 509 B. ὁτός, the reading of Π, is equally good Greek, but αὐτὸς has a solemn emphasis.

οὐχί] 'He and his fellow-prisoners.'

τρόπον τυνά] Inasmuch as the σκευαστά were images of real objects, and the 'fire' was borrowed from the sun.

τῷ ὀξύτατῳ . . . (ν) ἢξειν] We may apply Plato's words to the vain shadow of a philosophy, whether ancient or modern, in which facts are divorced from principles, and about which there arises a mighty controversy having no basis or foundation of truth.

tὸ τοῦ Ὁμήρου] quoted in iii. 386 c.

σφόδρα] emphasizes the quotation,—'would indeed wish.'

*ἀν] before ἀνάπλαιως is not found in any MS. In this and many similar places it may be doubted whether ἄν was omitted by the author to avoid cacophony, or by the scribe as an apparent ditto-graphia.

ἐκ τοῦ ἡλίου;) 'out of the sun,' i.e. the sunshine. ἡλίος = 'sunlight' occurs also in Phaedo 116 Ε ἐτί ἡλίου εἶναι ἐπὶ τοῖς ὀρεσιν: infra 532 B: cp. also Soph. Phil. 17 ἡλίου διαλή πάρεστε εὐθάκησις.

τὰς δὲ δὴ σκιάς, κ.τ.λ.] Plato is never weary of contrasting in all the fanciful forms that his imagination suggests, the real and seeming; the life of the philosopher, martyr, king, 'who is not of this world,' and the life of the politician, lawyer, sophist (vi. 492 λ), who is the impersonation of the world. The contact of philosophy with common opinions and life affords one of those curious points of view in which appearance is opposed to true knowledge: either the philosopher is conceived to be made ridiculous by tumbling into wells, mocked at by Thracian women, mazed and puzzled in the justice-room, blinking at 'a world unrealized,' laughed at by mankind, but also laughing at them, or the ambitious Sophist is imagined, more truly ridiculous in his impotent attempts after first principles, dressing himself up in names and words, to be compared only to a bald little blacksmith's apprentice, who washes the dirt from his face, and marries his master's daughter, which is the Lady Philosophy. Cp. Theaet. 174 ff., Polit. 299.
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516 E

γνωματεύοντα [A ἀπαξ λεγόμενον in classical Greek, and therefore of uncertain meaning: either 'reasoning from signs' (γνώμα, 'a sign') or 'measuring the shadows' (γνώμα, 'a measuring rod'). It is used in the latter sense by Themistius, but the more general sense of 'forming a judgement of' is more in accordance with the context here. It is perhaps used with some degree of contempt, as contrasted with contemplation of the idea. γνωμονεύοντα is quoted by Timaeus in his lexicon to Plato: cp. the γνώμων of the sun-dial.

517 A

tῆς συνηθείας [is added to correct the vagueness of οὗτος: sc. τοῦ καταστῆμα τῷ ὀμματα.

ἀποκτινώναι ἄν; ] as though οἶκ οἱ ἔδει had preceded, which words really occur a long way off in supra 516 c.

517 B

In the foregoing allegory the cave is the phenomenal world, the fire is the power of the sun: the way upwards and the vision of the things above is the elevation of the soul into the intellectual region, whereof the idea of good is the crown or summit. This, once beheld, is known to be the cause of all that is admirable, both in the higher and in the lower sphere. And he who has risen to this contemplation will not be eager to take part in human affairs. And if compelled to do so he will stumble and be confused at first, like ὅς who comes suddenly out of the daylight into a darkened room.

517 B

τῆς γ' ἐμῆς ἔλπιδος [ἐλπίς, like ἐλπίζω, is used in the sense of 'surmise' or 'idea,' cp. v. 451 A ἐλπίζω γὰρ οὖν ('for I suspect') ἐλπιστικὸν ἀμάρτημα ἀκούσας τινός φονεύα γενέσθαι, Laws vii. 817 B ὃς ἢ ποι ἡμῶν ἐστιν ἐλπις ('as I suspect').

ἐπειδὴ . . . ἀκούειν] See vi. 506 δ ἡ πρὸς Διὸς . . . ἀποστῆσ.

ἐν τῷ γνωστῷ, κ.τ.λ. [is an explanation of οὗτος: ἑδέα is in apposition with the nominative to φαίνεται, which has to be supplied with ὅρασθαι and εἶναι: συλλογιστέα is singular feminine:—'My opinion is that in the world of knowledge the idea of good appears last of all and is with difficulty seen.'

C

οἱ ἑνταῦθα ἔλθοντες [Those who have attained to this.' Cp. Symp. 211 D ἑνταῦθα τοῦ βίου . . . εἰ πέρ ποι ἀλλοθι, βιωτόν ἀνθρώπῳ, θεωμένῳ αὐτῷ τὸ καλὸν.

D

eἰπερ αὖ . . . τοῦτ ἔχει] αὖ is to be taken closely with τοῦτο, the most emphatic word:—'in this particular as well as the rest.' The
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point in the allegory to which this corresponds is to be found in 516 D: 'he would rather be a hireling than live and think like his old companions in the den.'


ἄγαλμάτων] ἄγαλματα and σκιαί refer back to the Allegory, and if the meaning of them is asked may be represented as embodiments more or less imperfect of the idea of Justice. The ἄγαλματα may be conceived to be the enactments of Athenian Law; and σκιαί the sophistries of pleaders relating to them and the like. Similarly in iv. 443 c the principle of the division of labour is called εἶδολον τε τῆς δικαιοσύνης.

φανότερον . . . λαμπροτέρου] These words are neuter, not masculine with βίον supplied. For the omission of the article cp. Phaedo 89 B ἐπὶ πολὺ ἵψηλτέρου ἡ ἐγὼ.

ὑπὸ λαμπροτέρου μαρμαρυγῆς ἐμπέπλησται] 'is dazzled (μαρμαρυγῆς ἐμπέπλησται) by a more brilliant atmosphere.' Cp. supra 516 A αὐγῆς ἄν ἔχοντα τὰ ὀμάτα μεστὰ, κ.τ.λ.

καὶ οὕτω δή, κ.τ.λ. Cp. supra 516 c ἀναμμηνησκόμενον . . . τῶν τότε ἐξουσιωμοτῶν οὐκ ἄν οἶει αὐτῶν μὲν εὐδαιμονίζειν τῆς μεταβολῆς, τούς δὲ εἶλεν;

The returning captive is happy in having once seen the brighter day: the newly liberated one, on the other hand, is an object of pity to the inhabitants of the upper world, or if of laughter, there is more reason in this 'laughter of angels' than in the sounds which greet the other from the den. Cp. Soph. 254 A ὁ μὲν ὑποδιδράσκων εἰς τὴν τοῦ μὴ ὄντος σκοτεινότητα, τριζῇ προσπατῶμεν αὐτῆς, διὰ τὸ σκοτεινῶν τοῦ τύπου κατανοῆσαι χαλεπῶς . . . ὁ δὲ γε φιλόσοφος, τῇ τοῦ ὄντος ἀεὶ διὰ λογισμὸν προσκείμενος ἴδες, διὰ τὸ λαμπρὸν αὐτῆς χώρας ὀδηγῶς ἐπιτείχῃ ὑφήμη.

It follows that education consists not in putting knowledge into the mind, but in fixing the organ of knowledge on its proper object by turning the whole soul from darkness to light. The mind of a clever rogue sees keenly, but is forced into the service of evil. The same power, when redeemed from degradation, and directed aright, would see the truth as clearly as now it perceives the mean purposes to which it ministers. It follows, too, that government should be

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Entrusted neither to men who are without training in philosophy nor to those who have passed all their life in it. The one sort do not see the end of life, the others are unwilling to engage in politics.

\[\text{σφεῖσ] sc. \text{oι σοφοῦσαι}.\]

Plato, like other religious teachers, has his doctrine of conversion—the change of nature as a whole, the upward turning of the eye to the light, the vision of the idea of good. This conversion of the soul he ironically compares (infra 521 c) to the spinning round of an oyster-shell.

Whether knowledge is more truly conceived as 'brought to the pupil' or as 'drawn out of him' is a controversy which has always prevailed among philosophers and their disciples. On this turns the opposition between Socrates, as represented by Plato, and the Sophists. It is partly the same with the controversy respecting the absoluteness or relativity of knowledge. It finds a solution in a recognition both of the objective and subjective elements of truth, of facts brought from without and a mind prepared in its own nature and by the knowledge of previous facts to receive them. One of the many aspects of this relation is expressed in the Theaetetus (149 ff.), where Socrates professes that he has nothing to impart, but can only bring to light the thoughts of others.

\[\text{ταύτην τὴν ἑνοῦσαν... δύναμιν} \]
The accusative is governed by \text{περιακτέον} infra. The eye of the mind cannot turn to the light without the whole mind: it is as if the bodily eye could not turn and look round unless the body turned with it.

\[\text{τούτου... αὐτοῦ... διαμηχανήσασθαι} \]

\text{τούτου αὐτοῦ} is explained in \text{τῆς περιαγωγῆς}. The indirect interrogation \text{τίνα τρόπον} depends on some such notion as \text{ήτις σκέψεται} implied in \text{τέχνη}. The words \text{οὗ τοῦ ἐμποιήσαι... διαμηχανήσασθαι} like \text{τῆς περιαγωγῆς} are dependent on \text{τέχνη}.

\[\text{μεταστραφὸσεται} \]

\text{sc. \text{τὸ ὀργανόν ὁ καταραμέναι ἐκαστός}}.

\[\text{αὐτῷ} \]

\text{sc. \text{τῷ ὀργανῷ}}.

\[\text{αὐτῷ} \]

\text{sc. \text{τὸ ὀράν}}.

\[\text{τούτῳ διαμηχανήσασθαι} \]

\text{sc. ὅπως ὀρθῶς ἔσται τετραμένων καὶ βλέψει οἱ δεῖ.}

\[\text{αἱ μὲν τοῖνυν ἄλλα, κ.τ.λ.} \]

The theory of habit is transferred from the body to the mind: they are the lower not the higher gifts...
of the intellect ('memory, allied to sense,' attention, the link between the moral and intellectual qualities) rather than genius or originality, which are subject to the influence of habit. Yet these latter, though not acquired by habit, require to be trained and directed before any good use can be made of them.

 كالوُمرة] They are 'virtues of soul' only in a lower sense. See note on supra 516 a.

 παντὸς μάλλον] cp. infra 520 ε.

 θειοτέρου τινὸς . . . οὐδα] sc. ὄργανον ἀρετῆ: 'is the virtue of a more divine principle.'

 δριμό] 'Shrewdly.' The same word is applied to the narrow legal soul in the Theaetetus 175 δ τὸν σμικρὸν ἐκείνων τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ δριμὸν καὶ ἔικαικῶν: ib. 173 λ ἐντονοι καὶ δριμεῖς γίγνονται.

 ὡστε . . . ἔργαζόμενον] The infinitive ἔργαζομαι, which would naturally follow ὡστε, is 'attracted' into the participial construction (ὡς . . . ἔχων . . . ἡμαγκασμένον).

 τοῦτο μέντοι, κ.τ.λ.] τοῦτο is to be taken with τὸ τῆς τοιαύτης φύσεως, which is a periphrasis for ἡ τοιαύτη φύσις, the nature so constituted. The hypothetical clause εἰ ἐκ παιδὸς . . . μολυβδόδας, having been expanded with αἱ διὰ . . . ὑπον, is resumed and continued in the words ὡν εἰ . . . τάληθη, and the apodosis begins with καὶ ἐκείνα.

 τοιαύτης] sc. οὕτω δριμεῖς ὀρᾶν.

 τὰς τῆς γενέσεως ἐκγεγενεῖς] The reading of the older editions τὰ . . . ἐκγεγενῆ, is not indefensible; the gender of the relative (αἲ) being in that case assimilated to that with which the antecedent is compared.

 †περὶ κάτω] Madvig, followed by Cobet and Baiter, conjectures περὶκάτω. This could only mean 'upside down.' It is better to read simply κάτω with Hermann (cp. infra 529 b, ix. 586 a) or περὶ τὰ κάτω with some of the inferior MSS.

 μήτε . . . μήτε] The use of μή is occasioned by ἀνάγκη preceding.
Our duty then as founders of the state is first to educate the chosen natures in the highest of studies, and then to compel them to take part in the active conduct of affairs.

‘But will it not be a wrong to them,’ says Glaucon, ‘to drag them down from the realms of light into the darkness of the den?’

The answer is that in legislating (cp. iv. 419) we must consult the welfare not of a part but of the whole state. It is also to be observed that our philosophers do not spring up of themselves as in other cities, but are the product of our institutions. They owe a debt therefore to the state and its founders, which they are bound to pay. When their education has been completed, they must descend by turns into the cave and accustom their eyes to the darkness. For when once habituated, they will see and judge of the shadows infinitely better than those who have always been captives. An incidental advantage of the plan will be that our citizens, coming from a brighter life, and being rich inwardly (cp. iii sub fin.) will take office as a duty, and not for the sake of gain.

tον οἰκιστών] is explanatory of ἡμέτερον.
ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ] vi. 504 E ff.
ιδεῖν, κ.τ.λ.] In apposition to ἀφικέσθαι . . . μέγιστον and in construction with ἀναγκάσατε.

τό αὐτοῦ . . . καταμένειν] A parallel to this description may be traced in the unwillingness of Christian saints and hermits to leave their cells and take part in the business of life, seeming sometimes, as Plato says, to be ἐν μακίρων νῆσοις already.

εἰτε σπουδαιότεραι] sc. εἰσίν.
ἐπείτ', ἔφη, ἀδικήσομεν αὐτούς] An expression of surprise. ‘And are we then to do them an injustice?’

ἀμείνον] sc. ζήν.

ἐπελάθου . . . πάλιν] iv. 419 ff.

τούτο μηχανάται εγγενέσθαι] sc. ἦ νόμοι τήν εὐπραξίαν.

αὐτὸς ἐμποιῶν . . . τῆς πόλεως] αὐτὸς bis is emphatic: ‘the law itself creating such men in the state, not in order to leave them to their own devices, but that it might itself have the full use of them for the binding together of the state,’ or taking ἔυνδεσμον in the more common sense of the word, ‘so as to be the bond of the state.’
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ὅτι οὖν ἄδικήσομεν] ‘that we shall not be wrongdoing them after all.’ ἐ δὲ in οὖνδὲ = ‘in spite of what you say,’ referring to ἄδικήσομεν supra 519 d.

δίκην δ’ ἔχει . . . τροφεῖα] ‘now it seems fair that the wild plant which owes culture to nobody should not be eager to pay the price of its culture to anybody.’ The phrase δίκην ἔχει may be compared with φύσιν ἔχει, λόγον ἔχει.

ὑμᾶς δ’ ἥμεις] The sentence returns to the direct form.

ἐκεῖνω] sc. τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσι φιλοσόφων γεγομένων.

ἐκάστῳ] sc. ῥμῶν.

ξυνεβιζόμενοι γάρ, κ.τ.λ.] The strength and weakness of the politician in his limitation: he can see and act powerfully on the immediate present or future, but on that only. In times of revolution he is apt to be at fault: he is neither capable of spanning the movement, nor of confining himself to the necessities of the hour. It is only the greatest genius that can use the legal, political, or ecclesiastical maxims of an age and country, and yet be above them, knowing their true value;—who is at once φρόνιμος and σοφός: able to follow τεωρία and πολιτική.

tὰ εἰδώλα] This word is not always strictly used for the images from which the shadows are thrown, as in 532 B ἀπὸ τῶν σκιῶν ἐπὶ τὰ εἰδώλα, but also more generally as in 516 A of reflections in water, and, as in this place, to include σκιαί. We have risen to a point of view from which the σκευαστά and the σκιαί are included under one notion as εἰδώλα: cp. vi. 511 A.

From this part of the Republic Lord Bacon borrowed his figure of ‘idola specus’ and of the ‘idols’ generally.

σκιαμαχοῦντων . . . στασιαζόντων περὶ τοῦ ἀρχεῖν] These words refer to the disputes and ambitions of the prisoners in the den, and στασιαζόντων also reminds us of the quarrelling of the sailors about the helm (vi. 488 c).

ὁντος] sc. τοῦ ἀρχεῖν.

tὸ δὲ ποι ἀληθές, κ.τ.λ.] Cp. i. 342 D, 345 F. There is a slight change of construction from ἐν πόλει to ταύτην, κ.τ.λ.
Republic

77

520

D.

τὸν δὲ πολὺν χρόνον is added to avoid a one-sided statement: they have to toil, but still the greater part of their time is to be passed in the world above. For ἐν τῷ καθάρῳ cp. Theact. 177 ἐκείνος . . . ὁ τῶν κακῶν καθάρος τόπος.

E
eἰ μὲν βίον . . . (521 λ) ἀρέσει [That is, if you provide your future rulers with a life which is better than that of a ruler.

521

Λ


περιμάχητων γάρ, κ.τ.λ.] The subject, ὁ τοιοῦτος πάλεμος, is developed from περιμάχητων . . . τὸ ἀρχεῖν γιγνόμενον, which is left out of construction. Cp. Phaedo 69 β χωρίζομεν δὲ φρονίσεως . . . ἡ τοιαύτη ἀρετή.

B

φρονίσωται] sc. εἰσίν, absorbed in ἐξουσι following.

526

By what methods then shall such rulers be created and brought up out of darkness into the light of reason? 'Gymnastic' is clearly incapable of doing this; and so is even 'music' as hitherto defined, seeing that the harmony and rhythm which it imparts are not evolved from within, but impressed by habit from without. And the 'arts' we have already rejected (vi. 495 ν) as mechanical. The germ of something higher first appears in the perception of number. Arithmetic may help to educate the reason. For, every perception has this effect which brings with it the perception of an opposite. And not until sensation reports contrary attributes of the same object does the mind become aware of unity and diversity. This, however rudimentary, is an act of pure intelligence; and when aroused in us by the study of number, it becomes an instrument of essential value for the awakening of thought. Arithmetic therefore is the first step in the higher education. The incidental advantages of the study, especially for soldiers, are easily seen.

521

C

ἐξ "Αἰδοῦ . . . εἰς θεοῦ] e.g. Herakles, Polydeuces, &c. Cp. Phaedo 82 β, c, where the soul is said only by the love of knowledge to find her way into the company of the gods.

τοῦτο δὲ . . . φύσομεν εἰναι] 'this then would seem to be—not the turning over of an oyster-shell, but the conversion of a soul
The antithesis from night to day which is as night to the true ascent, which leads to the true being. The text, as thus interpreted, is not free from objection: the meaning of ὀδυσσαν drags, and ἐπάνωδον gives a feeble antithesis to ἡμέρας. It may however be argued that the addition of ὀδυσσαν is in harmony with the emphatic and pleonastic expressions in which Plato describes being (cp. infra 529 b); and that ἐπάνωδον arises out of the connexion of the passage. The sense is clear, though the style is perhaps a little at fault. The first thing to be done is to turn the soul round to philosophy, which is not the light itself, but the real and true way up to the light. The περιαγωγή (supra 518 b) or μεταστροφή precedes the ἐπάνωδος (infra 532 b). This is quite in the Socratic and Platonic spirit. For ὀδυσσαν some late copies have ἰναγής (γ), which appears to be a feeble correction. Ξ omits ὀδυσσαν. Iamblichus has preserved a reading, ὀδύσα ἐπάνωδος, which may possibly be right (‘being the way upward to the “true day” of being’), and which may be supposed to have been lost owing to the copyists not understanding that ἡμέραν was to be supplied with ἀληθινήν. But according to this reading the distinction between the ‘turning round’ and the ‘ascent’ is not strictly maintained. With reference to Cobet’s conjecture, εἰς ἀληθινήν τοῦ ὄστος ὀδυσίαν ἐπάνωδος, it may be questioned whether Plato would have used the expression ‘the existence of being,’ although the phrase ὀδυσίαν ὄστος ὀλίγε ὄστος occurs in Soph. 262 c in a different connexion.

For ὀστράκου cp. Phaedr. 241 b ὁ πρὶν ἔρασθα, ὀστράκου μεταπεισώστο, ἵτε τι φερή μεταβαλών. ὀστράκου περιστροφή is an allusion to the game ὀστρακίσμα, in which a potsherd white on one side and black on the other was twirled upon a line, and accordingly as the black or white turned up, one party fled and the other pursued. Such at least is the explanation of the game which may be gathered from these two passages, of which only that in the Phaedrus is referred to by Pollux, ix. 111.

τὸδε ὁ ἐννοῶ... νέους ὄντας;] ‘Now this occurs to me as I speak: were we not saying that they must in the days of their youth be trained warriors?’ Cp. iii. 403 ἐ ἀθληταῖ μὲν γὰρ οἱ ἀνδρεῖς τοῦ μεγίστου ἀγώνος: viii. 543 ὃ ὀστήρ ἐ ἀθλητᾶς τε πολέμου καὶ φίλακας.

ἀπεί ἄρα... ἐκείνῳ] ‘The study which we are searching for must have this in addition to the other;’ i.e. military use as well as a philosophical value. τοῦτο refers to what precedes, and is explained in what follows.
προσέχειν] The etymological use, for ἔχειν πρὸς, ‘to have in addition,’ is remarkable. Cp. Soph. O. T. 175 ἄλλων δ’ ἐν ἄλλῳ προσίδοι, κ.τ.λ. The singularity has probably led to the various readings προσέχος (τ), πῶς ἔχειν (γ), παρέχειν (Ξ).

δὴν τὸ πρότερον διήλθομεν] ii. 376 E ff. There is a sense in which philosophy is also μονακεφή, cp. vi. 499 D αὐτὴ ἡ Μοῦσα, Phaedo 61 Α ὡς φιλοσοφίας . . . οὕτως μεγάλες μονακεφής.

ἄλλα ἢν ἔκεινη γ’, ἔφη, κ.τ.λ.] For the repetition of ἔφη infra (τούτων ἀδελφά, ἔφη), cp. viii. 557 C, where ἢν δ’, ἐγώ is similarly repeated.

ἀντίστροφος τῆς γυμναστικῆς] This is said in the spirit of the preceding remark (518 D) that all the virtues except wisdom are not far removed from bodily habit.

ἄγαθόν] is to be taken with τοιούτων and not with μάθημα:—μάθημα δὲ πρὸς τοιούτων, κ.τ.λ., refers to supra 521 D μάθημα ψυχῆς ὁλκών . . . ἐπὶ τὸ δῶν, and οἴον οὐ νῦν ἔτητεις probably to μάθημα: cp. supra 521 E ὡς ἔτούμεν μάθημα. The v. r. ἢγον Π mg. deserves to be considered.

αἲ τε γὰρ τέχναι] The corresponding καί is superseded by the speech of Glaucon, καί μήν, κ.τ.λ.

ἐδοξαν] viz. supra vi. 495 D ὅπο δὲ τῶν τεχνῶν τε καὶ δημοφρήμων ἀσπερ τὰ σώματα λελώθηται, οὕτω καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς ἐνυγκελασμένους τε καὶ ἀποστερομένους διὰ τὰς βασινην τυχάνουσιν.


κοινόν] = ἐπὶ πάντα τεῖντις: cp. Theaet. 185 E αὐτή δὲ αὐτής ἡ ψυχή τὰ κοινὰ μοι φίλωσεν περὶ πάντων ἐπισκοπεῖν, where among τὰ κοινὰ is mentioned number (ἐν τε καὶ τὸν ἄλλον ἄριθμον).

διάνοια] διάνοια is perhaps here used according to the definition in vi. 511 C, D for mathematical reasoning.
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tò φαύλον τούτο] For this ironical use of φαύλος cp. iv. 423 c, 435 c.

παγγελοιον γούν ... ἀποφαίνει] The three extant tragedians all wrote plays on the subject of Palamedes. Agamemnon is addressed in an extant fragment of the Palamedes of Euripides (584 Nauck). Aeschylus also attributes the invention of number to Prometheus (P. V. 459).

ἀναριθμήτων ὄντων] sc. τῶν τῆς ἑπόν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων.

καὶ λογίζεσθαι τε] καὶ, which is supported by Par. A, and is certainly more likely to have been altered than retained, though maintained by some editors to be a corruption of ἢ (which gives a poor sense), is the right reading. ‘Shall we hesitate to set down as a study necessary to a warrior also an ability to reckon and count?’ For ἄλλο τι οὖν cp. note on i. 337 c.

καὶ ἄνθρωπος ἔσεσθαι] cp. Tim. 39 β ἦν ... μετάσχοι ... ἀρίθμοι τὰ ζώα, ὅσοι ἦν προσήκον, μάθονα παρὰ τῆς ταῦτας καὶ ὅμως περιποίησε. Also Phaedr. 249 b for difference between the souls of men and animals.

ὁν ἥτοιμον] supra 521 d.

χρήσαι δ’ οὐδεῖς αὐτῷ ὀρθῶς] οὖδεὶς, sc. καθευδεύει. Plato means that persons study arithmetic for convenience only, and not as a training of the mind. In modern education, mathematics, besides their more particular application as the expression of physics, would generally be regarded as having four uses: (1) they fix the attention; (2) they give accuracy; (3) they impart a perception of symmetry and order, and a power of construction; (4) they are also said to strengthen the rational powers generally. The last use must be admitted with reservation, considering that reasoning in general, whether in science or life, is for the most part concrete and not abstract. The highest of human faculties, the judgement, is little cultivated by mathematical studies. Plato seems to have valued mathematics as a general training of the mind (infra 526 c): not without an anticipation of the enormous power gained by it in the interpretation of nature.

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καὶ τούτο] sc. τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν.

523

Hora: The participial construction follows δείκνυμι as a verb implying perception.

B παρακαλοῦντα . . . εἰς ἐπίσκεψιν] i.e. calling in reason to examine the intimations of sense.

ἐκεῖνη] sc. τὴν νόησιν, emphatically opposed to τῆς αἰσθήσεως following.

οὐδὲν υγίες ποιούσης] ‘is behaving in an untrustworthy manner.’

C

Some sensations excite thought, others do not. Take the case of a finger: a finger as a finger does not give rise to contradictory impressions. But as possessed of qualities it does, e.g. a finger as far as visibility is concerned is at once both great and small; as far as the touch is concerned, at once hard and soft, thick and thin. This contradiction in the ‘mere sensation’ excites thought to separate the two elements given in sensation and to go on to consider what the elements are in themselves—i.e. what is the great and what is the small, &c.

D έν πάσι γὰρ . . . ἐπερέσθαι] ‘the ordinary mind is not driven to ask any question.’ έν πάσι . . . τούτοις, sc. τοῖς οὕτω φαινομένοις (ἔν πε
He goes on to show that another faculty is called in when contradictions arise which sense cannot explain.

The interrogation ἄρα gives a strong emphasis which is continued through the following clause.

ὡς ποιεῖ] 'behaves in the following way.'

ἡ ἐπὶ τῶ σκληρῶ τεταγμένη αἴσθησις], sc. ἡ ἀφή.

ἀὖ] 'In contradistinction to the former case in which the soul was not perplexed:' 523 c ff.

ἡ τοῦ κούφου καὶ ... βαρέος] What is here mentioned without a name in Plato seems to be the same which modern philosophers call the sense of resistance. For these antinomies of sense cp. v. 479 v, Theaet. 152 d, Phil. 14.

The apodosis comes in with οὐκοῦν . . . ἀὖ (c) which takes the place of δὲ, because of the development of the first clause which has intervened.

οὐκοῦν ἐὰν δῶ φαίνηται, κ.τ.λ.] The sense, while thought is latent, perceives a sort of chaos only, of great and small, afterwards the mind is awakened and distinguishes the great from the small.

διὰ δὲ τὴν τούτου σαφήνειαν . . . ἡ 'κείνη] 'But with a view to clearing up this chaos of sense' (τούτου, sc. τοῦ συγκεχυμένου) 'the thinking mind is compelled to reverse the process, and look at small and great as distinct and not confused.' For διὰ . . . σαφήνειαν cp. Polit. 262 c σαφήνειας ἐνεκα. τούναντίον is an adverbial accusative, i.e. τούναντιον, sc. ποιώντα. 'κείνη = ἡ ὄψιν.

The difficulty of this passage is to understand how the operation of sense is separated from that of the mind. The theory of vision may offer an illustration of Plato's meaning. Our first impression, as common language seems to imply, is that surrounding objects are seen by us in their true forms and at their proper distances by the sole use of the eye. Experiment shows that much which is apparently part of the act of sight is really an unconscious influence of the mind which habit has confused with the pure sensation, arising from the observation of shadow, colour, or the use of the two eyes in connexion with each other. The mere eye without the mind may be said in Plato's language to perceive οὗ διωρισμένα ἀλλὰ συγκεχυμένα.
The error of Plato is that he describes the act of vision as having two successive stages, one in which the sense, another in which the mind is active: we ourselves should regard these two processes as one and simultaneous in the concrete, although in thought we can analyze an act of vision into them. The world opening on the half-awakened eyes of a new-born child is perhaps the nearest image of Plato’s conception of the material of sense.

When the same objects suggest the idea of opposites, e.g. of great and small, the mind is ‘irritated’ into the consideration of the nature of great and small, of which the impressions have hitherto been confused.

This, although only an early correction in Par. A seems on the whole more probable than πότερον. Cp. infra 525 A, B: Theaet. 186 A.

The ‘one and many’ here spoken of seems still to be the Zenonian puzzle which is said in the Philebus (14 D) to have been superseded by the deeper oppositions amongst the ideas themselves.

There is a various reading περὶ αὐτό, sc. περὶ τὸ ἔν. 525 A τὸ αὐτό is retained, not as inherently more probable, but as the reading of the best MSS.

If this happens in the case of unity it must happen to all number, since number proceeds from unity. Cp. Parm. 144 A.

‘All number’ collectively. Cp. Theaet. 147 ε τὸν ἀριθμὸν πάντα διὰ διελάβομεν: Phaedo 104 ά δ ἡμῶν τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἀπας. For τοῦτο some MSS. have τὸν, others omit the word.

This may be illustrated from modern philosophy, which equally recognizes contradiction as a motive of thought. The being which is also not-being, that is to say, the privation or abstraction of individual or particular being: the one which is many: the same which is diverse: the motion which is and is not in the same place: the moment which is and is not in the same time: the continuous which is also discrete: the finite which is infinity: the beginning which begins not,—the negation which is only relation, together with the higher contradictions which arise in the sphere of theology or moral philosophy—
would have been regarded by Plato no less than by Kant and Hegel as highly suggestive difficulties to the student of dialectic. In the later stage of his philosophy, beginning with the Parmenides, he is increasingly disposed to dwell on such modes of thought.

\[\text{φιλοσόφως δὲ, κ.τ.λ.}] \ 'while the philosopher must study arithmetical because without emerging from the sea of generation and laying hold of true being he can never become an arithmetician.' The 'philosopher' = the philosophic student, he that would be a philosopher. Else there is some want of point in the termination of the sentence, because the study of arithmetic is a preliminary to philosophy and not the result of it. Davis and Vaughan render \[\text{λογιστικώς, 'skilful reasoner,' but this is pointless, and hardly possible when the word is used in two other passages within ten lines in the sense of calculation (515 \, \alpha, \, \epsilon). \] For \[\text{ἡ μηδέποτε . . . γενέσθαι} \] cp. iii. 401 \, \beta \, δὴ \, γὺ \, ποι' \, ἡμῖν \, ποιεῖν.

\[\text{γενέσεως ἔξαναδύντι}] \] Cp. Phaedr. 247 \, \d \, \text{where the soul has risen to the inner heaven 'in the revolution she beholds Justice and Temperance and Knowledge absolute not in the form of generation' (οἴχ ἡ γένεσις πρώσεστιν).}

\[\text{προσήκον δὴ τὸ μάθημα, κ.τ.λ.}] \ μάθημα (or \, αὐτό) is to be repeated in the accusative after \[\text{νομοθετήσας} \, \text{and} \, \piειθεὶν \, \epsilonτὶ \, \text{λογιστικὴν} \, \iotaναί.} \] Cp. supra 519 \, \d \, \text{идей τε τὸ ἀγαθὸν, κ.τ.λ.}

\[\text{ἐνεκά πολέμου τε . . . καὶ οὐσίαν}] \] By the insertion of \text{τε} after \[\text{ρατσῶνς} \, \text{from Par.} \, \lambda, \, \text{the awkward agglomeration of three genitive cases is avoided. The warlike use of arithmetic is admitted here; but when Glaucan follows up this line of argument afterwards, he is reproved by Socrates. This change of front is one of the expedients which Plato employs to keep attention alive.}

\[\text{ἐννοῶ ῥηθέντος}] \] Socrates professes to have discovered what has long been familiar to him: this also is one of the artifices by which he quickens the interest of his hearers. Cp. a similar form of expression in ii. 370 \, \alpha \, \text{ἐννοῶ γὰρ καὶ αὐτὸς εἰπόντος σοῦ.}

\[\text{ἀλλὰ μὴ τού καταθέειν}] \] Cp. supra c \, ὡς \, \epsilonμπόρους \, ἡ \, κατῆλους: \, i. 345 \, \c, \, \text{δ} \, \text{ὡσπερ χρηματιστὴν ἀλλ' οὐ ποιμένα.}

\[\text{οἰσθα γὰρ ποὺ . . . πολλαπλασιῶσιν}] \ 'If you go about to divide the unit they multiply it.' In teaching arithmetic, the unit was represented by a line — . If the pupil by a natural mistake assumed the magnitude of this line to be significant, and proposed to divide it, the teacher would show him that for arithmetical purposes
it was a matter of indifference whether the line was divided into four parts or multiplied by four, since a magnitude, however great or small, might equally be taken to represent the abstract unit. 'One,' so conceived, is without parts: if it is imagined as divided, every part is equal to the whole. The same distinction between the popular and scientific study of arithmetic is clearly stated in Phil. 56 E οἱ μὲν γὰρ ποὺ ... τις θῆσει.

Apposition of a part to the whole.—Plato is endeavouring to show the purely abstract and intellectual nature of the science of number. The proof of this is, that while bodies or objects of sense have parts, the unit is said by arithmetical theorists to be incapable of division: which shows that, if questioned, they would at once acknowledge that number of a purely intellectual or abstract sort is the subject of their operations.

ὅτι] by attraction for ἅ.

ὅρας οὖν ... (ἢ) τὴν ἀλήθειαν;) 'then do you see, my friend, I said, that this science may be fairly thought necessary to us, since we find that it necessitates the soul to use the pure intelligence for the attainment of pure truth?' A slight play of words seems to be intended, as infra 527 A and elsewhere, on ἀναγκαίον and προσαναγκαίον. ἡμῖν, 'for our purpose' (i.e. for us as lawgivers).

οἱ τε βραδεῖς ... ἐπιτιθῶσαν] Compare again Laws v. 747.

καὶ μὴν ... ὡς τοῦτο] 'And, indeed, you will not easily find anything that is more laborious to the student; nor will you find many that are equally so.' οὔδὲ πολλά, sc. ἃ τῶν οὖν οὕτω μέγαν παρέχεται. Hence in continuing the sentence, ἥ which should have followed μεῖσο is changed to ὡς.

Geometry, no less than arithmetic, is indispensable to the profession of arms, and if followed far enough, it may also serve as a stage in higher education. For, however this has been obscured by the employment of terms implying a practical application, its real purpose is to obtain abstract, universal, and it may even be said, eternal results. Moreover, experience shows that as arithmetic quickens so geometry clears the mind.

ὅσα δὴ ἄλλα] such as the hollow square (πλαίσιον). For the form of the sentence cp. Iach. 182 c προσθήκομεν δ' αὐτῷ οὐ σμικρὰν
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προσθήκην, ὅτι πάντα ἀνδρὶ ἐν πολέῳ καὶ παραδείγματον καὶ ἀνδρείωτερον ἀν ποιήσειν αὐτῶν αὐτοῦ δεκ ὀλίγῳ αὐτὴ ἐπιστήμη. And for the phrase γεωμετρικῶς καὶ μή ὅν cr. infra 527 c ήμεῖνος τε γεωμετρίας καὶ μή.

tὸ εὐδαιμονεστάτον τοῦ ὄντος] The blessedness of the soul that apprehends the good is attributed to the good itself. Phaedr. 250 c εὐδαιμονίᾳ φάσματα . . . ἐποπτεύουσι.

πάν τούναυτίου] is adverbial.

λέγομεν μὲν ποῦ . . . ἀναγκαῖας] ‘They talk in a very ridiculous and meagre fashion.’ ἀναγκαῖας = with merely practical needs in view. For this meaning cp. ii. 369 ν ἀναγκαιοτάτη πόλις: Tim. 69 ν: Thuc. v. 8 ὀπλισιν ἀναγκαίαν. There is however a facetious allusion to geometrical necessity, for which cp. v. 458 ν Τ ἑωμετ- τρικαὶ γε . . . ἄλλ' ἐρωτικὰς ἀνάγκας: they have only practical necessities in view, not the necessities of geometry.’

tετραγωνίζειν] = to construct a square equal to a given area. The use of the same word in Theaet. 148 λ is slightly different, viz. ‘to form when squared,’ said of the line which represents a square root.

παρατείνειν] (1) ‘to produce a straight line’ [or, (2) as in Meno 87 λ, to extend a plane figure, L. C.]

προστιθέναι] ‘to apply,’ viz. a plane figure to a line.

ὡς τοῦ ἄει ὄντος γνώσεως, κ.τ.λ.] The words βιομολογητέον and ἔνεκα are repeated from the previous sentences: τι is to be joined with χιλιομένου, ‘becoming this or that.’

ὁλκὸν ἀρα . . . ἔχωμεν] ὡ γενναίε, like ὡ θεμελίως, ὡ ἐδοτε expresses the feeling of the speaker about the noble thought which has just arisen in his mind.

πρὸς τὸ ἀνω . . . ἔχωμεν] ‘with a view to (πρὸς) our directing upwards what now wrongly we direct downwards.’

ἄ] sc. τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἁματα. Perhaps ᾧ should be read.

ἐν τῇ καλλιτόπλει σοι] ‘in your model state’: used as a term of endearment; cp. ii. 370 ν τοῦ πολιχνίου. αὐτοῦ, i.e. ‘geometry,’ for the incidental advantages of the science are not small.

Astronomy is approved by Glaucon as conveying information that is of use for generalship. Socrates rallies him on his zeal for useful knowledge, which, as he insinuates, is due to the fear of popular
opinion. He reminds him that the main purpose of education is to brighten the eye of reason. Now there is a much-neglected science which should on this account have been taken first. Geometry was understood to mean plane geometry. But the geometry of solids should come before astronomy which is the science of the motion of solids. Although yet in its infancy, the intermediate science may yet some day be developed. For, difficult as it is, if only encouraged, it would work its way through the fascination which it inallably exercises on superior minds.

Socrates seems to think that too much is being made of the military uses of the sciences. He himself first drew attention to the point in the case of arithmetic (521 d): but when Glaucon, following, as he imagines, the lead of Socrates, praises geometry for the same reason, he observes that even a little of it suffices for the commander, and lays stress upon its higher use in purifying the eye of the soul. Here where Glaucon again makes the same point, he laughs at his utilitarianism and fear of popular opinion. When astronomy again comes up for consideration (528 e), Glaucon, mindful of the remonstrance of Socrates, praises it for making the soul look upward: but Socrates objects to having his metaphor understood so literally: and insists that the truth to which the soul should look up is not visible to the eye but to the mind only.

εμοι' οὖν, ἐφη] 'whereas it is a high truth although believed by few, that,' &c. τὸ is the subject of ἐστιν and is explained by the clause introduced by ὅτι.

ἐκάστου ὀργανόν τι ψυχής] 'a faculty in the soul of every man.'

ἐκκαθαίρεται ... ἀναξιωπυρεῖται] 'is polished' (like a soiled mirror) 'and lighted up' (like a fading torch) cp. infra 533 D ἐν βορβάρῳ ... τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ὀμμα κατορφωρυγένον.

σκόπει οὖν ... (528 Λ) ἀνασθαι] i.e. 'will you argue with the philosophers or with the utilitarians, or will you carry on the argument independently and chiefly for your own satisfaction?' A similar turn of thought occurs in Protag. 33 I c οὕτω γὰρ δούμαι τὸ εἰ βούλει τοῦτο καὶ εἰ σοι δοκεῖ ἐλέγχεσθαι ἀλλ' ἐμὲ τε καὶ σέ. The argument is sometimes conceived of in Plato as a disputation between two persons, or again, as the mind talking to itself, or once more, as
independent of the mind and having a distinct power and reality of its own.

Cobet’s conjecture (η οἶδε πρὸς ἐπίρους) is neat and plausible, and preferable to Madvig’s (η εἶ πρὸς οὖν ἐπίρους), but is not really required. The double negative is merely emphatic.

ἀναγε... αὐτὸ καθ’ αὐτὸ λαβείν] ‘then take a step backward,’ I said: ‘for the truth is that we mistook the science which should follow next after geometry.’ ‘How was that?’ said he—(sc. πῶς λαβώντες νικ ὑπόθεσ εὐάξομεν;)—‘The error was in placing solids in motion before solids at rest.’ According to Plato’s own statement (528 Ν) the mention of solid geometry in its natural place was purposely omitted because of its backwardness: the omission may also be a trick of style intended to give variety and dramatic effect. If astronomy had not been mentioned twice, Socrates would not have had the two opportunities for laughing at Glaucon, first for his utilitarianism, secondly for his sentimentalism. Cp. iv. 430 Ν where it is proposed to pass on to Justice without considering Temperance: and Symp. 185 Ν where the order of the speakers Aristophanes and Eryximachus is transposed.

νῦν δὴ] These words in the sense of ‘just now,’ ‘a little while ago,’ are not divided by γάρ, but express a single notion: cp. καὶ δὴ.

ἡδῆ] is to be joined with ἐν περιφορᾷ ὅν.

τοῦτο] sc. τρίτη αἰτή.

μεγαλοφρονοῦμενοι] ‘in their great conceit of themselves:’ a word not found elsewhere except in the active voice, but not for that reason to be changed into μεγαλαυχούμενοι (Cobet). It is not surprising that Plato should have introduced the middle voice of a verb signifying a mental state. Compare the word φλαφρονείθαι, which occurs six times in the Laws and nowhere else in the genuine writings of Plato.

ἔπει καὶ νῦν... (p) φανήναι] The plan of the sentence seems to have changed in the process of construction. ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν ξητούντων may depend on some general idea of disadvantage, e. g. κολυμμένα understood from the previous clause. (Vögelin cuts the knot of the difficulty by cancelling δὲ: this suggests another interpretation, taking ὑπὸ τῶν ξητούντων with αὐξάνεται, ‘still by the efforts of their votaries they grow perforce,’ but this is also very improbable.) Plato means to say that these mathematicians were ignorant of

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the educational value of their own study. His own love of the regular solids may be remarked in the Timaeus (54, 55).

autà φανήναι] = ei φανείη.

σπευδών, κ.τ.λ.] Plato elsewhere alludes to the backwardness of such studies in Greece as compared with Egypt: a fact which the Athenian interlocutor in the Laws (vii. 819 d) says had struck him late in life (καὶ αὐτὸς ἀκοίσας ὁψὲ ποτὲ τὸ περὶ ταύτα ἡμῶν πάθος ἰδαύμασα); when he found that among the Egyptians mathematical problems were an amusement of childhood, the ignorance of the Greeks seemed to him absolutely 'swinish' (οἶκ ἀνθρώπων ἄλλῳ ἰθρῶν τινῶν ... θρεμμάτων).

γελοίως] 'In a way that is ridiculous;' and so 'miserable,' or 'contemptible'—a favourite application of the word in Plato: cp. especially iv. 429 ἐκπλῦτα καὶ γελοῖα.

Having corrected this omission, we proceed in order to Astronomy. Glaucon praises the contemplation of the starry heavens, not now as a useful, but as an elevating pursuit. Socrates replies, that the eye may look upwards, but that the mind looks down, if it is contented with mere observation and does not rise to universal truths. The sky is only a great moving diagram, and Astronomy, like Geometry, must leave poring over phenomena, and proceed to determine the general principles of solids in motion, if this science also is to help us onward and upward, as we advance from what is visible towards the intellectual and invisible. The astronomer must let the heavens alone and make use of problems (i.e. study abstract theorems).

έαν αὐτὴν πόλις μετίη] The expression is elliptical: sc. ἥμεν γὰρ ὑπάρξουσαν, ἕαν, κ.τ.λ. Cp. supra 522 ἐιπέρ ... μὴ ἤπιστατο.

ὁ γε νῦν δή μοι ... ἐπεπληγεῖς] 'acting on the principle of your rebuke': supra 527 d. There is great humour in the way in which Glaucon is driven from the utilitarian to the sentimental view of knowledge, only to receive a more severe rebuff from Socrates.

The antecedent to ὁ is an accusative ἐκεῖο in apposition to the following clause.

οἱ εἰς φιλοσοφιαν ἀνάγοντες] has been translated (1) 'who embark' or 'set sail on the sea of philosophy': a metaphorical use of ἀνάγειν which, although it receives some colour from Phaedr.
272 D oð' ἄνάγειν ἄνω μακρὰν περιβαλλομένους, seems to require more help from the surrounding imagery; or (2) 'who raise astronomy to the rank of a science.' For this use of ἄνάγειν cp. Tim. 19 λ τῶν ἀξίων πᾶλιν ἄναγεν δεῖν, 'the worthy are to be raised from a lower to a higher class.' It is also possible (3) that ἄνάγειν simply means 'to refer,' 'those who refer it' (sc. astronomy) 'to philosophy.'

Φιλοσοφία is here used in the popular sense of any higher kind of knowledge, as in Tim. 88 c μονικὴ καὶ πάση φιλοσοφία πρωτοχρώμενον.

οὐκ ἄγενως, κ.τ.λ.] This and what follows is of course ironical, as Glaucon very clearly sees (δικήν, ἐφη, ἔχω ἱνθα). Those who have conceived thus 'nobly' of the things above, are said in the Timaeus (91 d) to be destined hereafter to enter on another life in the form of birds.

νομίσαι ... ποιοῦν] For the participle instead of the infinitive after νομίζω, which here avoids a treble infinitive (νομίσαι ποιεῖν βλέπειν) cp. Xen. Anab. vi. 6, § 24 νομίζει ... ἁνθρώπων ἀποκτενών.

οὕτε μαθεῖν, κ.τ.λ.] As often in an illustration, the construction is resumed with an asyndeton.

νέων ἐν γῇ ἡ ἐν θαλάττῃ] For this piece of extravagance cp. iii. 388 λ πλωίζοντα and note. A similar, but more pointed, metaphorical use of ἔξ ὑπτιάς νέων occurs in Phaedr. 264 λ ἔξ ὑπτιάς ἀνάπαλεν διανέων ἐπιχειρεῖ τὸν λόγον. νέων is absent from some MSS. but is required by ἐν θαλάττῃ.

τῶν τοιοῦτων] sc. τῶν ὁρωμένων.

τῶν δὲ ἀληθινῶν] sc. φορῶν, as the following clauses show. That swiftness and slowness are themselves causes which move and contain all moving objects, is a mode of speaking due to a philosophy which attributes an excessive importance to abstract ideas. As afterwards in the Timaeus, though in a somewhat different manner, the world is doubled—the true swiftness and slowness convey the real heavenly bodies which are invisible, as the apparent velocities of the bodies that appear are the visible copies of them.

πάνι ... σχήμασι] Plato seems to mean that every mathematical figure is, or ought to be, exemplified in the revolution of the heavens.

οὐκοῦν, εἶπον, κ.τ.λ.] The works of creation are imperfect, like all other works of art. Let us imagine that some Daedalus had...
drawn mathematical figures: no one would measure these figures with the view of learning the true nature of proportion. Nor will any one gather the true nature of astronomy from measuring the proportions of days and weeks and months and years.

\[\text{ὅσπερ ἄν ... (ἐ) διαγράμμασιν}] \quad \text{sc. χρήσατο αὐτοῖς.}

\[\nuομεῖν μέν\] \quad \text{is a resumption of ταύτων πείσεσθαι, 'that is to say, he will think.'}

\[\sigmaυστῆσασθαι\] \quad \text{is of course active in meaning.}

\[\text{αὐτόν}\] \quad \text{sc. τῶν οἴρανόν.}

\[τὴν δὲ νυκτὸς ... πρὸς ἄλληλα\] \quad \text{The sentence is slightly altered in the process of construction, and the general meaning of these words is resumed in ταύτα infra. For παραλλάττειν cp. Tim. 22 c τὸ δ' ἀληθές ἐστι τῶν περὶ γῆν καὶ κατ' οἴραν χώτων παράλλαξε (deviation).}

\[\text{ξητεῖν}\] \quad \text{depends on νομίζοντα with the common ellipse of δεῖν.}

\[\text{προβλῆμασιν ἀρα ... μέτιμεν}\] \quad \text{‘Astronomy, then, like geometry, we shall pursue by the help of problems.’ It is obvious that pure mathematics do not give the slightest knowledge of physics. No abstract study of βάθους φορά would explain the motions of the heavenly bodies. But when a ground of fact has been obtained, mathematical science is the great lever of our knowledge of the universe.}

\begin{itemize}
  \item Though Plato was mistaken in identifying the science which treats of solids in motion with astronomy, he was probably before his age in the idea that a theory of matter in motion might form a separate branch of mathematics.
  \item The same desire to make physics a pure science resting on the ύγαθῶν appears in Phaedo 97 ν, ε, where Socrates describes himself as turning away dissatisfied from Anaxagoras, because he was unable to demonstrate the rational necessity of physics. A similar tendency is observable in the Timaeus, where Timaeus, although professing that the knowledge of physics which is attainable by man is only probable, nevertheless seeks to construct the elements out of a triangle. In Laws vii. 821, 822, there is a complaint of the empirical state of astronomy, which led men to ‘blasphemous’ notions of wandering stars and contrarious orbits. Plato seems to imply, perhaps drawn to this by a sound instinct,
that if there were a true science of astronomy, we should find nothing irregular in the motions of the stars.

πολλαπλάσιον . . . ἂν ὡς νῦν ἀστρονομεῖται] For ἂν after an implied comparison cp. i. 335 οὐ προσθείναι τῷ δικαίῳ ἂν ὡς τὸ πρῶτον ἑλέγομεν.

The theory of music (a Pythagorean subject which is not at once obvious to Glaucus) must also be raised not only above the wrangling disputes of practical musicians, but also above the limitations of Pythagorean theory, which is still based upon the "harmonies which are heard." Our pupils must rise to the universal contemplation of harmonic ratios in themselves.

ἀλλὰ γάρ τι, κ.τ.λ.] γάρ connects with τάλλα,—'but (seeing that there are other studies) have you any of the suitable studies to suggest?' For τῶν προσηκόντων cp. supra 521 d.

τὰ μὲν ὡς πάντα, κ.τ.λ.] Such professions of ignorance or imperfect knowledge are characteristic of Plato: cp. supra iii. 400 d, οὐ εἰς Δίμωνα ἀνωθενθάσθω. Plato is suggesting that many phenomena besides those of astronomy and harmony may be scientifically brought under φορά. All change might be described as a kind of motion. Cp. Theaet. 152 d, 156 c, d, where vision is described as the result of certain motions, and Laws x. 893, 894, where ten kinds of motion are enumerated; among them σύγκρισις and διάκρισις, ἀπέξ and φθίσις.

ὡς πρὸς ἀστρονομίαν . . . παγηνα] Cp. Tim. 47 b, c θεῶν ἡμῶν ἀνευρεῖν διὸμηςασθαι τε ὅψιν, ὅτα, τὰς ἐν υἱῷα κατατάσσει τοῖς νοοὶ περίκομοις χρησιμοθεία ἐπὶ τὰς περιφοράς τὰς τῆς παρ' ἡμῶν διανοήσεως, ἥγγειοις ἐκείναις οὕσας, ἀπαράτοις τεταρμείναις, ἐκμεθοντες δὲ καὶ λογισμῶν κατὰ φύσιν ὀρθότητος μετασχόντες, μεμοικοῦν τὸς τοῦ θεοῦ πάντως ἀπλανεὶς οὕςας, τὰς ἐν ἡμῶν πεπλανημένας καταστασιμοθεία.—The whole passage should be read.

ὡς οἷς τε Πυθαγόρεως φασι, κ.τ.λ.] Cp. iv. 424 c οἷς φησί τε Δίμων καὶ ἐγὼ πειθήμα: Symp. 186 c, see also Tim. 80 b for an analysis of 'harmony.'

ἐκείνων] viz. the Pythagoreans, who had given special attention to harmonics.

καὶ εἰ τι ἄλλο πρὸς τούτοις] This seems to imply that other applications of βίδους φορά are possible besides astronomy and harmonics. Cp. supra d τὰ μὲν οὖν πάντα, κ.τ.λ.
There were two parties in the musical world of Athens: one the scientific, which rested on the old Pythagorean doctrines and generally denied the appeal to sense into which however they were sometimes betrayed (they were headed in later times by Aristoxenus the pupil of Aristotle): the other, the empirical, who are referred to in the words which follow. Plato intimates in the words ἐκ ἣν αὐτῆς (531 a) that he appeals to the scientific and not to the empirical party. But he adds that even the former are not wholly right.

The subject is to be gathered from the context, viz. ἐκ περὶ τᾶς ἀρμονίας. Socrates means the Pythagoreans, but Glaucon understands him to speak of the empirics or ordinary musicians. This is corrected in what follows (infra b, c).

Plato gives a comic description of the empirical musicians experimenting either with voice, flute, or lyre. A tone and a quarter-tone are sounded successively, while the men lean forward to listen, whereupon some of them declare that they perceive no difference, while others say they recognize a distinct interval, and that this ought to be made the unit of harmony and employed as the basis of the scale: ἐν μέσῳ τινά ἡχών is a slightly inaccurate but idiomatic expression for μέσον τί τῶν ἡχών, 'a difference of tone.'

The introduction (in flute-playing) of a quarter-note (πυκνών) between the middle notes of the enharmonic scale, is recognized as a comparative novelty even by Plutarch (De Musica, c. xi), and was treated as an obscure point by Aristoxenus, who says of it, τελευταῖος αὐτῷ καὶ μάλιστα μετὰ πολλοῦ πόνου συνεβίβασε ἡ αἰσθησις. See Westphal's Harmonik, 2nd ed., p. 128. Aristoxenus (Elem. Harm. i. 24) defines πυκνώμας as τὸ ἐκ δύο διαστημάτων συνενζυκτός, ἀ συνετεβιβα τὸν διάστημα περιμεῖ τοῦ λειψομένου διαστήματος ἐν τῷ διὰ τετράφων. For example a δ b (c) when the two intervals a δ, δ b, are together less than the interval b d (c being omitted). ἡθιγογομένων (viz. τῶν χορδῶν). Ven. Ξ Vat. m read ἡθιγογομένων: 'others contending that the note is now identical.'
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The order of words as rendered in the translation is
(1) περὶ κατηγορίας ἐξαρθρώσεως, κ.τ.λ. The words πράγματα . . . ἀπεβλαύτας suggest other imagery derived from the law-courts. They have a controversy with the strings and torture them: they accuse them of refusing to speak or of speaking too much.' Socrates is contented with hinting at this grotesque conception. According to another way of taking the words (2) κατηγορίαι, κ.τ.λ., may be rendered 'concerning accusation of the strings and their denial of it and exaggeration,' the latter words describing the behaviour of the strings under trial. The musician enraged is imagined as scolding the strings: the strings as denying his accusations and blowing him.

For the weakness of empiricism in music cp. Phil. 56 Τὸ μέτρον ἐκάστης χορῆς τῷ στοχαζομένῳ φημιστῶνα.

ταῦταν γὰρ ποιοῦσι, κ.τ.λ. Plato as we may retort has fallen into the same error about harmony as about astronomy. For harmony no less than astronomy rests ultimately on a fact, which is that certain successions or combinations of sound are agreeable to the human ear. The simplicity of this fact, which is found to agree with certain ratios of number, has naturally led in either case to the substitution of numerical laws for the phenomena of which they are the expression.

οὐκ εἰς προβλήματα ἀνίασιν] 'They do not rise to problems,' i.e. to abstract questions which are independent of facts.

χρήσιμον . . . ἀχρηστὸν] καλοῦ is here added because music seems especially to suggest the identity of the beautiful and the good. ἄλλως, i.e. μὴ πρὸς τὴν καλοῦ τε καὶ ἁγαθοῦ ζητήσων. The subject of ἀχρηστὸν is τὸ περὶ ἄρμονίας.

Furthermore, the sciences thus purged from empiricism must be carried upwards to the stage where they are seen in mutual correlation. Then they may really become the prelude (they can never be more) of Dialectic, the study of pure abstractions by pure thought. By this alone the mind gets beyond 'hypotheses' and dispenses with them, although employing the arts or so-called sciences concerned with them, in the preliminary stage, which for want of a better word has been termed in the previous survey (vi. sub fin.) διάνοια. Nor is the dialectician perfect until he has realized a complete conception not only of Being but of the Good.
Republic

VII.

531

C

The affinity of astronomy and music is not at first sight obvious. To the Pythagoreans and Plato (see Tim. 47) the music of the spheres afforded a link of connexion between them, which to us appears fanciful. But Plato sees also a real connexion, inasmuch as he supposes them both to be based upon number and proportion, which he regards as the common element of all the preparatory sciences. When reduced to this mathematical form they are the prelude to the science of the Good.

For the application of this remark cp. infra 537 c.

The genitive is continued in τίνος by a sort of attraction.

πάντα ταύτα προοίμια ἐστιν] The figure of the προοίμιον and νόμος with a play on the word νόμος, is one of the leading features in the structure of the Laws. (Laws iii. 700 b, iv. 722 b.)

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A

εἴλεγομεν] supra 516 a ff.

οὖ̂ τοῖς καὶ διὰν ... τοῦ ὀρατοῦ] The reading of the MSS. is followed in the text. Various alterations have been suggested: (1) the insertion of ἄν (or εἰν) before ἄνευ; (2) ἐπιχειρῶν for ἐπιχειρῆ; (3) ὄρμαν for ὀρμᾶ; (4) κὰν μῆ for καὶ μῆ, with a comma after ὀρμᾶ (then supposed to be in the indicative mood). It is better to follow the MSS. without attempting to get over the asyndeton which is not without parallel in Plato—the clause ἄνευ ... ἀποστῆ being explanatory of οὖ̂ τοῖς ... ἐπιχειρῆ.
Notes: Book VII.

ء ἕστιν ἐκαστὸν] Until he reach the Good, he will still find himself among specific ἔδη. Ὑπ. vi. 484 ὰ and note.

ἐκεῖνος τὸτε] sc. ἦ τῇ τῆς ὄψεως δυνάμει χρώμενος supra ἀ: τότε like ἐλέγομεν refers to supra 516 ἂ ff.

ἡ δὲ γε . . . (c) ἀποσκλαξομένας] ‘But the release of the prisoners from their chains and the turning of them from the shadows towards the images and the light, and the ascent from the underground den into the day (supra 516 ἰ), and their vainly endeavouring when there to look on the animals and plants, and the light of the sun, whereas they can only look on the divinely made reflections and the shadows of real things (not shadows of images cast by the light of a fire, which is itself a shadow compared with the sun).’ In what follows the construction is changed and the nominatives are resumed in ταῦτῃ . . . τὴν δύναμιν. For the confusing double use of the demonstrative ὦτος cp. iii. 405 ὰ, ὶ.

The conjecture of Nægelsbach ἐπὶ ἀδύναμα βλέπειν (a reading found also in Iamblichus) is plausible and in keeping with the previous nominatives feminine. But on the other hand it may be said that ἀδύναμα βλέπειν (for τοῦ βλέπειν) is a questionable construction without a verb preceding; and that the infinitive βλέπειν follows the preceding verbal nouns as if ἡ ἐπάνοδος had been τὸ ἐπανελθέων αὐτοῖς, while the preposition ἐπὶ may be used as in Sophocles (El. 108, Ant. 759, O. C. 1554), in which passages the sense of condition appears to have passed into the manner. So here, ‘to look powerlessly,’ i.e. to be without power to see. In πρὸς δὲ, κ.τ.λ., the negative notion in ἐπὶ ἀδύναμα disappears.

θεῖα] This word has been needlessly suspected. In Soph. 266 ὰ, ὶ Plato speaks of a divine as well as a human μυθικῷ. The epithet here contrasts the reflections in water, &c., due to the light of the sun, with the shadows of the οἰκειοστία cast by the fire-light. The phantasmagoria in the den and the σκιαί of real objects are distinct, as in the passage which this resumes, 516 ἂ ff. For the position of θεῖα as a ‘dragging predicate’ cp. ix. 573 ἂ τῶν ἐν τάις τοιούταις συνονομέσις ἡδονών ἀνεμένων.

τῶν ὄντων] is emphatic = the visible realities which in the allegory correspond to the ideas.

δι’ ἑτέρου τοιούτου] τοιούτου refers to εἰδώλων.

ὡσπερ τότε] sc. ἦν ἐπαναγωγῇ: supra 516 ὰ ff.
It is difficult to accept, being difficult to understand: it is difficult not to accept it, because when understood, it appears self-evident.

The pronoun is emphatic. Cp. v. 473 c ἐπ’ αὐτῷ δῆ...εἰμὶ ὁ τῷ μεγάστῳ προσεικάζομεν κύματι.

One MS. (τ) has αἱ ὁδοὶ.

For the moderation of statement cp. Phaedo 114 c, ὁ τὸ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα διάσχυμασθαν οὕτως ἔχειν, ὡς ἐγὼ διελθύθα, οὐ πρέπει νοὺς ἔχοντι ἄνθρωπον, κ.τ.λ.

This reading is supported by the version of Ficinus and partially by the reading of Φ (ὁτι μὲν δῆ, κ.τ.λ.), ‘That in appearance (ἴδειν) it is something like this,’—is better authenticated but seems less in point.

The division of the arts into κολλωτική (πρὸς δόξας ἄνθρωπων καὶ ἐπιθυμίαις), ποιητική (πρὸς γενέσεις τε καὶ συνθέσεις) and ἐπιμελητική (πρὸς θεραπείαν) may remind us of similar divisions in the Gorgias (463 ff., 501, 502), Sophist (222 E, 265 ff.), and Politicus (261–275 F): γενέσεις, ἓ. ἑ. γεωργία: συνθέσεις, ἕ. ἑ. ἵσις, τεκτονική, &c. τετράφασαι ἑκατοκτόνως ἔσται.

The accusative, by attraction to ἀς, is also in construction with ὄρομεν. The plural, also partly due to attraction, has a depreciatory effect.

Mathematics are not a science in Plato’s sense of the term, because they do not inquire into the nature of their own conceptions. They start with certain assumptions: they have a scientific basis only when connected with the idea of good, which is at once the beginning and end of them, the final cause to which they all tend and the foundation on which they rest. Such a connexion is of course an illusion, the nature of which was not understood in the
begins of philosophy. The acknowledgement that the ‘reality’ of mathematics is not metaphysics but physics would have been an entire inversion of the Platonic order of ideas.

\[\phi \gamma \rho \\grave{a} \rho \chi \eta \ \mu \varepsilon \nu \delta \mu \eta \ \omega \delta \varepsilon, \ \kappa \tau \lambda.\text{] The nature of our ideas of number and figure may be summed up under a few heads:} (1) Mathematical, like other abstractions, have been gradually separated from the concrete: the process by which the abstract idea of \textit{one} is obtained is not different from that which gives the abstract idea of \textit{man}. (2) But in such abstractions the individual being perfectly vacant of any separate content is identical with the universal: hence they admit of endless construction, and every construction has absolute necessity and certainty. (3) They are affected like our other ideas by use and association: the incessant recurrence of them, the power of constructing them; also the verification of their truth in the concrete, as well as by algebra and trigonometry and the various processes of arithmetic,—greatly strengthen our conceptions of them. (4) The mode in which they have been gradually attained and developed by a series of inquirers from Pythagoras to Newton and Laplace, must be clearly separated (as in the case of all our ideas) from the accidental way in which they are acquired by the individual, (a) unconsciously through the medium of language, (b) as the result of education and study. In any other sense, the origin of our ideas of number and figure, as of all our other ideas, is only their history.

\[\omega \nu \kappa o\nu \ldots (b) \ \alpha \iota \varepsilon \ \delta \eta \lambda \theta \omicron \omicron \epsilon \nu \ \tau \epsilon \chi \nu \alpha \iota \text{] ‘then dialectic and dialectic alone pursues this method: doing away with hypotheses and going to the very first principle so as to have certainty; and gently drawing and leading upward the eye of the soul, which is actually buried in some barbarian bog’ (\textit{barbaraikos} is chosen partly for the sound), ‘using as handmaids in the work of conversion the arts which we have discussed.’

\[\alpha \nu \iota \rho \omicron \omega \omicron \alpha \text{] has been compared to the Hegelian \textit{aufheben} (‘the hypotheses which in the sphere of mathematics were absolute become relative to each other and to the Good’). But the analogy is hardly so close. \(\epsilon \iota \ \alpha \vartheta \tau \eta \nu \ \tau \iota \nu \ \alpha \rho \chi \eta \nu\) is governed chiefly by \textit{poreutai}, and \textit{anairooasa} means ‘taking out of the way.’ The hypotheses are done away with; that is, when seen in their relation to the good they cease to be hypotheses, cp. vi. 511 \textit{B} \textit{tas upoboleis}

\[\nu \omicron \omicron \mu \omicron \epsilon \nu \ \omicron \kappa \ \alpha \rho \chi \acute{a} \acute{s}, \ \alpha \lambda \lambda \eta \ \tau \circ \ o\nu \iota \ \upomega \theta \iota \acute{e} \acute{i} \epsilon \iota, \ \omicron \omicron \ \epsilon \pi \beta \acute{a} \acute{s} \iota \epsilon \ \tau \epsilon \ \omicron \ \omicron \omicron \acute{a} \acute{s}, \ \kappa \tau \lambda.\text{: and Symp. 211 C \textit{dysper epanabathmois xroymenov}. A simpler
conception of διάλεκτική as the 'science of sciences' occurs in Phil. 58 ά τήν γάρ περί τό δια τούτω καί τό κατά ταύτων ανεξαρτήτως.


εν γε τῷ πρόσθεν που] vi. 511 D.

άλλ' δ' αν μόνον . . . δ λέγει εν ψυχῇ] These words are omitted in Ven. Ε, and their genuineness has been doubted, partly on the ground, which is not very strong, that in Plato's language assent in the negative form (οuplicate) is not usually accompanied by any further elucidation. There is considerable variety in the readings: the weight of manuscript authority being in favour of that which is retained in the text. The various reading λέγων for εξω q need not be rejected on the ground of tautology. Cp. viii. 543 c τοῖς λόγοις ἐποίου λέγων. Another reading is ἂ λέγεις, 'what you mean to express'—this appears as a correction of Par. A. The words in the text are very possibly genuine and may be rendered—'we only require' (the verb is gathered from οuplicate ὁδοὺ μάτας ἀμφιβολίαι) 'an expression which may indicate with a clearness proportioned to the mental condition, that of which it speaks as existing in the mind.' For example, διάλεκτική may not be a very clear or definite expression, but the state of mind which it expresses is also far from clear. Of many suggested emendations that of Professor Bywater deserves most consideration, ἂλλ' δ' αν μόνον δηλοὶ τήν εξω, τῶν ἔχει σαφηνείας ἂ λέγεις εν ψυχῇ. For the whole expression cp. ix. 581 ά ὡστε τι ἡμίν αὐτοῖς δηλοῦν, ὅποτε τοῦτο τής ψυχῆς τό μέρος λέγομεν. It deserves notice that the whole sentence ἂλλ' δ' . . . ψυχῇ being omitted in Ε is accordingly absent from the editions of Aldus and Stephanus.

τήν δ' ἑφ' οἶς ταύτα, κ.τ.λ.] 'The exact proportion to each other of the things to which these terms apply, and the division of the spheres of opinion and reason severally.' The line (vi. 509 D, E) was proportionately divided. Plato seems to hint that the proportionate division of the line and of each of the subdivisions was not a mere arbitrary fancy.

πολλαπλασίων . . . ἡ] Cp. supra 530 c πολλαπλάσιον . . . ἡ ὡς νῦν ἀστρονομεῖται."

ὀσων] (1) sc. ὀσων λόγων οἱ παρελημνικαὶ λόγοι ἡμᾶς εὐπλησαν [B. J.], or (2) for τῶν ὀσων by a somewhat unusual attraction as if ἡ had not preceded.
Notes: Book VII.

Do KCU. C and running The in. oucrias j3ov\d. Those TfXfJTtu
questionings. That thing irrational pursuit. Theaet. 274, discipline,
which is being compared to jest. But it is the number of the tyrant in ix. 589 ff.
which is little more than an elaborate jest. For the idiom in
which the qualifying epithet is omitted with the thing compared
cp. Sojh. O. T. 922 and 923 ἐκπεπληγμένον... ὡς κυβερνήτην νεόω. Another
interpretation (2) is suggested by Theaet. 202 b, where the
elements of thought are said ἀλογα καὶ ἁγνωστα εἶναι, άσθητα δὲ—
being compared to letters, which have no significance until combined
in syllables. ‘Insignificant and meaningless, like mere lines.’
(3) The only other possible explanation is that of Ast, ‘incapable
of speech like mere lines or written characters.’ Cp. Phaedrus
274, where he dwells on the superiority of speech over writing.

Who are to be counted worthy of this training, and how shall it
be ordered? Those who are to be our rulers must be chosen young,
not as in our first selection (iii. 412). And besides the steadiness
and firmness which were then required, their intellectual quickness
and perseverance, and their love of truth, will have to be thoroughly
tested and approved. Philosophy will not then be disgraced, as she
is now. In early life intellectual training should be given through
amusements, but at twenty when compulsory gymnastic comes to an
end, our selected pupils must begin a ten years’ course of mental
discipline, in which the scattered elements of knowledge previously
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535 A–537 D

acquired must be combined in a whole according to their natural relationship to one another and to true being. Comprehensiveness is the great test of dialectical talent. At thirty a further selection should be made, and those finally sifted out by the help of dialectic for the select class may be promoted to still higher honours.

τούς τε γὰρ βεβαιοτάτους, κ.τ.λ.] vi. 503.

βλοσυροῦσ τὰ ἡθη] ‘Of a sturdy moral nature.’

ἀλλὰ καὶ . . . αὐτοῖς] ‘but also they must have the natural gifts which are suitable to this education’—i.e. the higher education of which he is now treating.

ποῖα . . . διαστέλλει;] ‘Which do you determine these to be?’ For the middle voice cp. Aristot. Pol. ii. 8, § 17 ἐπειδὴ πεποιήμεθα μνείαν, ἓτι μικρά περὶ αὐτοῦ διαστείλασθαι βέλτιον.

δριμοῦτητα . . . μαυθάνειν] μαυθάνειν, which takes the place of a subject of ὑπάρχειν answering to δριμοῦτητα, is attracted into construction with ἰδι.

οἰκειότερος . . . ὁ πόνος] ‘The toil more properly belongs to the mind, being confined to it and not shared by the body.’ For ἀποδειλίαν cp. vi. 504 λ.

καὶ μνήμονα . . . ξηπητέον] ‘Therefore the man whom we seek must also be endowed with memory; he must be a solid man who is a lover of all kinds of labour.’

ἀρρατόν] from α and ῥαϊ, a word said to have existed as a various reading for ἄρρητον in II. xiv. 56 ἀρρατῶν νηῶν τε καὶ αὐτῶν εἶλορ ἐσεθαι. The only other place where it is now found is Cratyl. 407 d, where it is said to mean σκληρῶν τε καὶ ἀμετάστροφον: compare the French word inébranlable.

τίνι τρόπῳ] sc. ἀλλάφ.

τά τε τοῦ σώματος, κ.τ.λ.] As in iii. 403 D, bodily exercise is subordinated to the training of the mind.

δ καὶ πρῶτερον εἶπον] vi. 495 Ε.

χωλός δὲ . . . φιλοπονίαν] ‘And he too is lame, whose love of labour, instead of this, has taken the opposite turn.’ See Tim. 87 c, d for a similar train of reflection.
Minds that hate falsehood in practice are often very impatient of scientific or historical truth. They may be unconscious of their defect: this unconsciousness, however, is no measure of the responsibility which attaches to them. Prejudice and stupidity cannot be altogether exempted from the guilt of the consequences which flow from them. The educated are apt to imagine that they are no more bound to inquire than the uneducated; and they sometimes think that their duty is rather to conceal than to express the result of their inquiries, when at variance with common belief. The truth is that the less the uneducated inquire, the more the educated are bound to inquire; and the stronger the impulse to concealment, the greater the duty to speak plainly. The sense of such a duty is not easily aroused when at variance with interest or custom, at the point where science and religion, virtue and truth, temporarily seem to diverge, or where the inquirer has to stand against the general opinion of mankind. Intellectual cowardice or common-place, or want of faith, are fatal to all true philosophy. He who has such a 'maimed soul' may perhaps escape without injury to himself: but, if a man of ability, he cannot fail to leave an evil mark on others, in our day especially, when more than in ancient times the world needs to be reminded that the love of truth is the first of intellectual virtues.
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B

γελοιον δ' ἐγώγε . . . παθεῖν] 'My present error is, if not disgraceful, yet ridiculous enough.' It is observable that although Plato maintains the verisimilitude of the fiction that he is an actual legislator by all sorts of minute touches, he sometimes for the sake of variety, as in the present passage, allows the illusion to be broken through: cp. iii. 389 ὁ ἐν γε, ἢ δ' ὃς, ἐπὶ γε λόγῳ ἐργα τελήσω; supra 534 ὁ ὁδὸς τοῦ λόγου τρέφεις . . . εἰ ποτε ἐργα τρέφοις: vi. 510 E.

C τοῖς αἰτίοις] For the strong feeling which these words convey cp. Phaedo 116 c ὅτι ἐμοὶ χαλέπαινες, γιγνώσκεις γὰρ τοὺς αἰτίους, ἀλλ' ἐκείνοις.

οὐ μὰ τὸν . . . ῥήτορι] Briefly the meaning is, G. 'You do not in my judgement, who am the listener;' S. 'But I do in my own, who am the speaker.'

Σύλων γὰρ οὔ πειστέον] Alluding to the famous line of Solon (Fragment 20, Bergk) γνῆσιος δ' αἰεὶ πολλὰ διδασκόμενος, quoted also in Lach. 189 λ. In the first 'selection of rulers or officers, older men were chosen, because no man is to enter on an office, till he has reached a certain age. But in providing for the future the rulers designate must be chosen young, because they have so much to learn.

D οὐκ ὡς ἐπάναγκες, κ.τ.λ.] 'Not making the plan of our instruction such that learning should be compulsory.'

E Χειρον οὐδέν] But see above vi. 495 D.

ψυχὴ δὲ . . . μάθημα] 'Knowledge which is acquired under compulsion obtains no hold on the mind.'—Why do we remember some things and not others?—memory is (1) most retentive and impressionable in childhood; (2) most suggestive and associative in later life; (3) generally strongest of words and events which are seen by the light of emotion or interest, or under new circumstances. The healthy memory is that of observation, which freely receives from the external world. The memory of study, when not merely verbal or mechanical, is proportioned to the degree of attention or interest which the mind is capable of giving. Memory seems also to flourish at the expense of the other faculties, and may receive by an exclusive training a monstrous and disproportioned growth. On the other hand, memory is greatly impaired and disturbed by excess of imagination, which tends to confuse the
Notes: Book VII.

recollection of the past; or of reflection which draws away the mind from the external world and is only willing to receive facts connected with theories or principles. Probably even intensity of feeling, while preserving some facts with a preternatural clearness and light tends to impair the ordinary operation of memory about facts in general: the concentration of the intellectual faculties is generally inconsistent with their diffusion. Many persons have observed that a growth of mind has compensated the loss of memory: in such cases the change may be regarded as a sort of adjustment of the intellectual faculties. The true art of remembering is also an art of forgetting: better to forget most things than to remember all. Lastly, memory appears to be allied to sense and to depend on health: the reason of the common decay of the faculty in old age is partly physical, partly due also to the fading interest in the surrounding world.

ἐν πάσι . . . ἐγκριτέον] ‘And whoever appears to be always most ready at all these things—labours, lessons, dangers, will have to be enrolled in a select number.’

οὔτος γάρ . . . πράξαι] ‘This time of life,’ viz. that devoted to compulsory gymnastic: cp. infra 539 E, where twice the time is estimated at five years as the mean between 4 and 6. The time meant is between 17 and 20.

ἀδύνατος τι ἄλλο πράξαι] ‘is one in which it is impossible to do anything else.’ The inability which is really inherent in the persons is transferred to the age.

τίς ἐκαστὸς, κ.τ.λ.] τίς = ποιῶσ τὶς: cp. viii. 558 C ᾧ ἔρει δή, ἤν ὤ ἐγώ, τίς ὁ τευτόν ἑδία: Thuc. iii. 12, § 1 τίς οὖν αὐτῇ ἡ φιλία ἐγέμνη ἡ ἐλευθερία πιστῆ: Soph. O. T. 151 τίς ποτε τίς πολυχρόνου, κ.τ.λ.: O. C. 775 τίς αὐτῇ τέρψει, ἄκοντας φιλεῖν;

μετὰ δὴ τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον, κ.τ.λ.] Education in the higher sense of the term is concerned not only with practical subjects of knowledge, but with the method or connexion of knowledge in general.

That science which adjusts other sciences in relation to each other, which begins where they end, and examines the conceptions
which they receive and use; which separates the progress or movement or history of human thought from the course of events; which regards the body in relation to the mind, and both in relation to God and the world, perceiving amid abstractions and imperfect points of view, the higher or united nature of all, is called by Plato dialectic, and may be accepted by ourselves as the description of metaphysic. But to Plato such a science is almost imaginary, extending only to the connexion of the mathematical sciences: among ourselves it is very imperfect; in idea a 'novum et antiquum organum' of all knowledge; in fact, scarcely advancing beyond discussions respecting the origin of human ideas, and the correlation of the sciences.

C

τά τε χύδην μαθήματα... γενόμενα] The imperfect construction of the article and noun with the adverb, for which cp. viii. 564 λ ἧ... ἦν ἕλευθερα: Laws i. 630 δ εἰς τοὺς πόρρω νουθέτος: Aesch. Ag. 165 τὸ μάται... ἄχθος, is supplemented by the participle.

tούτοις] sc. τοῖς ἐκ τῶν εἰκοσιετῶν προκριθέντων.

eἰς σύνοψιν... φύσεως] The genitives ἀλλήλων, καὶ τῆς... φύσεως, both depend on οἰκειότητος... τῶν μαθημάτων.


ὁ μὲν γὰρ συνοπτικὸς διαλεκτικός] Cp. especially Phaedr. 265 b, Soph. 253 b, Tim. 83 c τις ἄν δυνατός εἰς πολλὰ μὲν καὶ ἀνάμια βλέπων, ὥραν δὲ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐν γένος ἐνόν ἄξιον ἐπωνυμίας πάσι.

537 D–

Great caution has to be exercised in admitting young men to the study of dialectic. As things now are, dialectic is another word for eristic, which may be described as a sort of revolutionary scepticism. As a supposititious child, who after a time discovers that his supposed parents are not his real parents, ceases to honour them: so the young man ceases to honour the principles of justice and virtue in which he has been brought up, when he hears them refuted by the eristics. By postponing the study of dialectic to the age of thirty we have provided one security. But there is still need of caution.

537 D

οὐκ ἐννοεῖς, κ.τ.λ.] Compare the evil name of philosophy in vi. 495.
The first hand of Par. A agrees with Ven. II in reading ἐμπίπλανται, a corrector has changed this to ἐμπίπλανται, and ἐμπίπλανται is the reading of M. If ἐμπίπλανται were read, the subject would be τὸ διαλέγεσθαι, and αὐτοῖς in what follows would get its antecedent from the general context. But the expression τὸ διαλέγεσθαι παρανομία ἐμπίπλαται has a sound unlike Plato, who would speak of κακοῖς περὶ τὸ διαλέγεσθαι, but hardly of τὸ διαλέγεσθαι as ἐμπιπλάμενον κακίας.

ἐμπίπλανται gets a subject, οἱ διαλεκτικοί, from the preceding words, τὸ διαλέγεσθαι, and this subject is the antecedent to αὐτοῖς.

τὰ μεγάλα] 'in important matters.'

ἀπαρακαλύπτως] Cp. the democratic youth in viii. 560 c πάλιν τε εἰς ἑκείνους τοὺς λαυτοφύγους ἐλθὼν φανερῶς κατοικεῖ.

τῶν ἄλλων ποιουμένων οἰκείων] 'the rest of his reputed kindred.' This meaning of ποιουσθα (passive) is supported by vi. 498 A οἱ φιλοσοφώτατοι ποιουμένοι—(where see note), ix. 573 B δύοσ . . . ποιουμένας χρηστάς, 574 D δύοσ . . . τῶν δικαίων ποιουμένας. It is therefore unnecessary to take the word in the middle sense of 'adopting,' i.e. 'laying claim to him.'

ἐστὶν ποι . . . αὐτά] The contrast of knowledge and opinion, or of speculative truth and popular belief, is the source of a real difficulty in education. The maxims in which the young are brought up, and which have a kind of parental influence on them (ὡσπερ ὑπὸ γονεῖσι) are sometimes narrow or partially untrue or perhaps represent the traditions of a former generation. False or imperfect conceptions of the truth necessarily precede higher and more perfect ones. There is a time at which the young man grows out of them, and falls under the influence of other ideas or meets the tide of the world. With active minds the element of authority is always receding within narrower limits. But when 'the human spirits on a day' begin to ask what are the real foundations, τί τὸ καλῶν, δίκαιον, &c., there comes the danger that the youth in his iconoclasm, or destruction of shams, may lose his sense of reverence for the first principles of truth and right.

Emerson says, 'when the Gods come, the half-gods go': but the half-gods sometimes go first, and leave an empty room. The candles are out, and the sun has not yet risen.
Πλάτων: "Ο Κορίνθιος" προφητεύει ότι "τοιν κολακεύοντα" την "ημερήσια" ζωή που ήταν γνωστή στον αρχαιολόγο πριν από την επίκεισή του. Στις ημέρες πριν από την επίκειση του, η ζωή της επιτυχίας ήταν καθιστομένη από την ιδιωτική προσωπικότητα και τη σκέψη. Ο Πλάτων χρησιμοποιεί τη χρήση και την αντικατάσταση της "ημέρας" από την "επιτυχία" στατικά για τον ρολό της επιμέλειας ή της αποθήκευσης. 

To πάθος των επισκέπτων τους επιλεγεται ακόμη και τον λόγον. 'Όταν μια ζωή που είναι πληρής από την επιτυχία της ζωής, η επιμέλεια τους έχει να παραδείσουν μια καλή και επιτυχημένη με την επιτυχία που έχει επέλεγε. Ο Πλάτων χρησιμοποιεί την αντικατάσταση της επιτυχίας από την επιμέλεια για να επιδεικνύει την αντικατάσταση της ζωής που είναι καλή και επιτυχημένη με την επιμέλεια που έχει επέλεγε.
Notes: Book VII.

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it; and also the susceptibility in the disciple which is required for the reception of such a system,—are unfavourable to counsels of moderation. Such moderation, which may be only the ‘via media’ of expediency borrowing the language of philosophy, may also rest on a just appreciation of the many aspects and hindrances of human knowledge. The thought here is very similar to that put into the mouth of Protagoras in Theaet. 167 Ε ὅταν τις μὴ χωρίς μὲν ὃς ἀγωνιζόμενος τὰς διατριβὰς ποιήσαι, χωρὶς δὲ διαλεγόμενος, καὶ ἐν μὲν τῷ παῖς τε καὶ σφαλλὴ καθ’ ὅσον ἄν δύνησαι, ἐν δὲ τῷ διαλέγεσθαι σπουδάζῃ.


τούτου ἐπ’ εὐλαβεία] (1) i.e. ἐπὶ τῶ εἰλαβθίαθα τοῦτο. This seems better than (2) taking τούτου with προειρημένα (as in vi. 504 A τὸ προοριθῆθαι αὐτῶν) because there is nothing sufficiently definite between pp. 535 and 539 for τούτου to refer to.

καὶ μὴ ὃς νῦν, κ.τ.λ.] As often in comparisons, the illustration takes the place of the thing illustrated, hence the construction changes from ἐρχεσθαι to ἐρχεται. Cp. x. 610 D.

The first course of dialectic, beginning at thirty, is to last five years. And at thirty-five, the trained dialectician is to come down to practical life and for fifteen years to exercise command in war, and other subordinate offices of state. At fifty, if deemed worthy of promotion, he is to renew the study of dialectic, and at last proceed to the contemplation of the Form of Good. Having seen the Good, he is to take his turn at intervals in the labour of government, legislation and education, still spending the greater part of his time in contemplation, until he pass to the islands of the blest.

ἀρκεῖ δὴ, κ.τ.λ.] ἄντιστρόφως . . . γυμνασίοις is explanatory of μὴ δὲν ἄλλο πράττοντι, and ἐν διπλάσια ἡ τότε refers to 537 B.

ἐνα μηδ’ ἐμπειρία ὑπερώσι] Cp. vi. 484 D.

εἰ ἐμμενοῦσιν . . . (540 A) ἦ τι καὶ παρακινήσουσιν] Great intellect often exists without will, and is drawn hither and thither by the influence of circumstances; and sometimes may be apparently even increased by yielding to their influence. The power of mind which is shown at a particular moment is not always consistent with the self-command or patience which is necessary for continuous action. The bravery of the orator’s words (e.g. Demosthenes’) is no test of his ability as a commander, nor the speculative politics of the
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VII.

539 E

philosopher (e.g. Bentham’s) any evidence of capacity as a statesman. There is a narrower as well as a wider circle, of action as well as thought, which may be compared to the den, and which must not be confounded with the world of ideas, nor yet wholly cut off from them: into this the philosopher has to descend and apprentice himself to practical affairs. He who, is the ‘spectator of all time and of all existence’ has to reconcile immutable principles with the jealousies, fears, passions, prejudices of the hour: in his own character he must unite the utmost readiness and power of adaptation with the greatest inflexibility.

540 A

ἡ τι καὶ παρακινήσουσιν] ‘or whether they will give way at all,’ παρακινεῖν is here used intransitively: cp. the similar use of ἵπποινεῖν and other compounds of κινέω.

ἀνακλίναντας ... παρέχουν] ‘directing the light of the soul upward to look at that which gives light to all.’ The eye in the act of vision is here, as in Tim. 45, conceived of as emitting light.

540C–541B

Such women as are found capable, are to take office with the men. But these things will not come to pass until the philosopher-king, or kings, arrive upon the scene, and have removed all the inhabitants who are more than ten years old. He or they will then set to work to educate the remainder in the manner which we have described. Here ends the account of the perfect state. And the perfect individual is like unto it.

540 C


540 D

eὐχαὶς εἰρηκέναι] v. 450 D ὠκε ν τις αὐτῶν ἀποτελοῦ, μὴ εὐχη δεῖκῃ εἶναι ὁ λόγος: ib. 456 c, vi. 499 c.

540 E

ἀναγκαίωτατον] i.e. they will hold justice to be the highest necessity. In other words they will not allow any so-called political necessity (‘the tyrant’s plea’) to stand in the way of what they know to be right. Cp. vi. 493 c.
Notes: Book VIII.

διασκευασμένων μέν [when they shall have set to rights their own city.] The construction is continued from ὅταν, k.t.l., supra.

The philosopher-statesmen will save a generation by sending the grown-up inhabitants into the country and taking possession of their children to educate them in the new plan. With ἐκπέμψαντες ... θρέψαντες ὅταν must be again supplied. The poet Gray was led by a curious misapprehension to suspect ἔτη. This is undoubtedly a false reading, he says, for ἔτχρικτετέων or ἔκθρικτετέων, so that till some MSS. inform us better, we must remain in the dark as to the age when Plato would permit his statesmen to retire wholly from the world. This is extravagant enough, but Plato has hardly considered how the provision, which he here abruptly introduces, is to be reconciled with what precedes. For how are the children to be taught music and gymnastic when all their elders have been sent away? From what other state, πόρρω ποιου ἕτος ὅτι τῆς ἡμετέρας επώφεως (vi. 499 A), are the new teachers to be brought?

The dependent construction is continued from ἐνεχώρειτε ... εἰρηκέναι supra 540 n. The similarity of sound in εὐδαιμονησεῖν ὁνήσειν is probably intentional as in Παυσανίου δὲ πανσαμένου (Symp. 185 c).

BOOK VIII.

Having determined the great questions of state communism and of the philosopher-king, we return to the point from which we digressed (vi. 499 A) and proceed to describe the four principal false forms of political society. These are (1) the Cretan or Laconian (τυμαρχία), (2) oligarchy (a condition fraught with evils), (3) democracy, the reaction from this, and (4) the consummation of political evil, which is tyranny. Parallel to these are the corresponding perversions of individual character. The tyrant represents the ideal of evil, as the just man (vii. 541 b) embodies the ideal of good.

τῇ μελλοῦσῃ ἄκρως οἰκεῖν πόλει] ‘in the state which is to be perfectly administered’—opposed to the imperfect states which follow: οἰκεῖν, as elsewhere, is used intransitively: cp. iv. 421 A καὶ αὐτοῦ εὖ οἰκεῖν καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖν μόνοι τῶν καρδῶν ἐχοῦσιν.
The community referred to in these latter words includes the education and employment of women on the same lines with the men. The lowest class is here left out of sight.

'certainly I have not forgotten' (referring to ei μημονεύοις), 'that at all events we thought none of them ought to possess anything which other people possess.'

'let us recall the point at which we digressed, that we may return into the same pathway.' The accusative is cognate, sc. άδών.

The words from καὶ ταύτα refer to v. 449 Α Ἀγαθή μὲν τοίνυν τὴν τουμάτην πῶλαν τε καὶ πολιτείαν καὶ ὀρθὴν καλῶ, καὶ ἄνδρα τῶν τουμίτων. Socrates, having completed the first sketch of the state and of education at the end of Book iv, in order to supply an omission of which he is supposed to be guilty in the first part of Book v, begins the higher conception of both (καλλίω ἢτι, κ.τ.λ.), which is given by the addition of the philosopher-king at the end of Book v. The true idea of the philosopher-statesman is then separated from the false, and a second or higher education provided for him in books vi, vii.

Socrates now passes from the ideal commonwealth to various defective politics, which have a clear affinity to the ordinary Greek states: he afterwards returns to another ideal, not of this world, including a vision of a future life, which is faintly sketched in Book x.

The following lines of Wordsworth's Prelude describe a similar descent from the ideal to the actual:—

Ere long, the lonely mountains left, I moved,  
Begirt from day to day with temporal shapes  
Of vice and folly thrust upon my view,  
Objects of sport, and ridicule and scorn,
Manners and characters discriminate, And little bustling passions that eclipse, As well they might, the impersonated thought, The idea or abstraction of the kind.

\[\text{\textit{ἀλλ’ ὁν̄ δὴ}}\ \text{\textit{ἀλλά supplies the opposition to} μὲν (ἀγαθὴν μὲν τὴν τοιαύτην): ὁν̄ δὴ marks the emphatic resumption of the train of thought preceding the digression καὶ ταῦτα, \textit{k.t.l.}}: ‘but, however this may be, you said.’\]

\[\text{\textit{ὡν καὶ πέρι, k.t.l.}}\ \text{\textit{iv. 445 c.}}\]

\[\text{\textit{αὐτοῦς} \text{\textit{sc. τοὺς ταῖς πέντε πολιτεῖαις ὁμοίας ἀνδρὰς.}}\]

\[\text{καὶ ἐμοῦ ἐρωμένου, k.t.l.} \text{\textit{For the absolute use of ὑπέλαβε cp. Meno 74 c ei . . . μετὰ ταῦτα ὑπέλαβεν ὁ ἐρωτῶν. A summary of the previous discussion is ingeniously grafted upon the dialogue. Compare for a similar recapitulation the opening of the Timaeus.}}\]

\[\text{\textit{ὡσπερ πολαιστής, τὴν αὐτὴν λαβὴν πάρεχε} \text{\textit{‘like a wrestler, let me have the same grip of you,’ i.e. let me resume my position. For this favourite metaphor cp. Phil. 13 E τὰχ’ ἀνώτερες εἰς τὸς ὁμοίας (sc. λαβάς) ἵσως ἄν πως ἀλλῆλοις συγχωρήσαμεν: Phaedr. 236 b, Laws iii. 682 E.}}}\]

\[\text{\textit{οὐ χαλέτως . . . Λακωνικὴ αὐτή} \text{\textit{‘there will be no difficulty in answering your question: the forms of government of which I speak are those which also have distinct names, that which meets with general approbation, the well-known Cretan and Spartan constitution:’ cp. infra \textit{v 552} καὶ ἐν εἴδει διαφανεί τῳ κέιται; For the connexion of the Cretan and Lacedemonian forms of government see especially Arist. Pol. ii. 10.}}}\]

\[\text{\textit{ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν} \text{\textit{‘by most people.’}}}\]

\[\text{\textit{ἡ . . . Λακωνικὴ αὐτὴ} \text{\textit{i.e. the Spartan constitution with which we are so familiar. Cp. iii. 403 E ἡ τῶν ὡσκητῶν ἔξις.}}}\]

\[\text{καὶ δευτέρα, k.t.l.} \text{\textit{ἡ ὀλιγαρχία would naturally have followed ἐπαινουμένη, but the participle καλουμένη is added, and the expression is then accommodated to the participial phrase. In the words συχνῶν γέμουσα κακῶν πολιτεία there is a trace of the same personal bitterness which makes the picture of oligarchy, infra 552, so full of scathing satire.}}}\]

\[\text{ταῦτη διάφορος} \text{\textit{‘at variance with this last’—being familiarly}}\]
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Plato: Republic.

Republic

VIII.

known as the watchword of the opposite faction—not merely 'different from this,' which would be ταύτης διάφορος.

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καὶ ἡ γενναία δὴ τυραννίς, κ.τ.λ.] γενναία is ironical as in v. 453 ε ἡ γενναία . . . ἡ δύναμις τῆς ἀντιλογικῆς τέχνης.

The reading διαφεύγουσα for διαφέρουσα is found in Par. A and all the best MSS. (διαφέρουσα Ven. Ξ, Flor. x, Ang. v, Vind. e). Such a degree of unanimity in a singular reading might possibly justify a forced interpretation: 'and escaping' (or 'surviving') 'all these comes tyranny, the fourth and last disorder of a state.' This interpretation, however, clearly passes the limits of usage in language and is almost unmeaning, even though we take into account Plato's tendency to resolve words compounded with prepositions, and give them new senses (e.g. προσέχειν vili. 521 b).

It may be further remarked that διαφεύγειν always governs the accusative.

The reading διαφεύγουσα may have arisen from the desire in a copyist to avoid the tautology of διάφορος which immediately precedes and may have been thought to derive some confirmation from ix. 587 c φυγόν νόμον τε καὶ λόγον. It affords one of the few instances in the text of Plato, in which the requirements of the sense must prevail against the greater authority of the MSS.

1) ἦτις καὶ . . . κεῖται] Cp. supra A δὲ καὶ πέμπτε, κ.τ.λ., and note.

δυναστείαι . . . εἰσίν] 'for the family governments and sovereignties which are bought and sold and other constitutions like these are a sort of intermediates.' This sentence makes it clear that although Plato is idealizing he has an eye to historical facts. Aristotle does not mention the ὄντας βασιλείαι.

ἡ οἰεί, κ.τ.λ.] An allusion to Od. xix. 163 οὗ γὰρ ἀπὸ δρυός ἐσθι παλαιφάτου οὐδ' ἀπὸ πέτρης.

The same allusion occurs in Apol. 34 ο ἡμεῖς, δὲ ἀμαρτε, εἰσί μὲν ποὺ τινες καὶ οἰκείως καὶ γὰρ τούτο αὐτό τὸ τοῦ Ὄμηρου, οὐδ' ἐγὼ ἀπὸ δρυός οὐδ' ἀπὸ πέτρης πέφυκα. For the relation of the state to the individual cp. especially iv. 435 ε τὰ αὐτὰ ἐν ἐκάστῳ ἐνεστὶν ἡμῶν εἶδη τε καὶ ἡθη ἄπερ ἐν τῇ πόλει; οὗ γὰρ ποὺ ἀλλοθεν ἐκεῖσε ἄφικεν.

E

ai τῶν ἰδιωτῶν κατασκευαῖ] 'the formations of the individual character.'

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κατὰ τὴν . . . πολιτείαν] 'whose characters answer or correspond to' (lit. 'are ranked with') 'the Spartan constitution.'
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καὶ τῶν τυραννικῶν] The article is omitted with ὀλιγαρχικῶν and δημοκρατικῶν so as to reserve the emphasis for 'the tyrannical man.'

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προφανομένῳ] 'which is coming into view.' Cp. Charm. 173 λ ὅμως τό γε προφανόμενου ἄναγκαιον σκοπεῖν καὶ μὴ εἰκῇ παριέναι.

ἠσπερ ἡρξάμεθα, κ.τ.λ.] ii. 368 ε. πρῶτον ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι ζητήσωμεν, κ.τ.λ. The allusion here, as in other places, to what has preceded, is part of what may be called the composition of the work. The drawing together of the various threads is the beginning of the end.

καὶ νῦν οὕτω... κλητέον] (1) 'first we have to consider the "ambitious" constitution: I say "ambitious," because there is no other name of it in common use. Or shall we call it timocracy or timarchy?' or (2) 'first we have to consider the "ambitious" constitution: I say "ambitious," because there is no other name in use. We must call it either timocracy or timarchy.' According to the last way of taking the words, which appears to be the best, the clause ἡ τιμοκρατίαν, κ.τ.λ., is an asyndeton. Dr. W. H. Thompson ingeniously suggested λεγόμενον, ἀλλ' ἡ, κ.τ.λ.

The word timocracy, which in Plato and Xenophon means a government of which honour is the ruling principle, is used by Aristotle in the sense of ἡ ἀπὸ τιμημάτων πολιτεία (Eth. N. viii. 10, Pol. iv. 14; cp. Isocr. Antid. 259 ε): a government based on a property qualification, which existed in Athens even before the time of the Solonian constitution, as in Corinth after the fall of the Cypselidae. In Plato the constitution ἀπὸ τιμημάτων is the characteristic of oligarchy: infra 550 c.

The succession of states has but a slender resemblance to the actual fact: and the succession of individuals is still more shadowy; for in the first place, admitting the Spartan and Cretan type as a fair representative of timocracy, which is the first declension from the perfect form, there is no example of this or any similar state passing into an oligarchy of wealth, while the common form of oligarchy, resting on distinctions of birth, is unnoticed in the Republic. Again, the transition from democracy to tyranny is not the order of history, except perhaps in the single instance of Dionysius the elder and the Sicilian despots (the thirty tyrants are imposed by a foreign power, and are not the natural outgrowth of
the Athenian democracy, which had an end of another kind): tyranny, instead of being the end of democracy, is rather to be regarded as a stage in early Greek history which preceded democracy, and in which the vigour and ability of individuals asserted themselves with the help of the Demos against the rule of a class (the saying ἐκ προστατικῆς ῥῦχος φύεται is thus far justified); or in later times as a phase of violence which is to be attributed not to an excess of democracy (this was the last bulwark against such a state), but to the general disorder and unsettlement of Greece. In the case of Euphron of Sicyon, democracy preceded tyranny, but was itself brought on by the influence of Euphron (cp. Arist. Pol. v. 12, § 7, who makes similar criticisms).

None of the descriptions of Plato are to be verified by history: the pictures of the oligarch, democrat, tyrant, are all caricatures. The latter is such a portrait as the Greeks in later times loved to draw of Phalaris or Dionysius the elder, being a great exaggeration of the truth, in which quite as much as in the lives of medieval saints or mythic heroes, the conduct and actions of one were attributed to another in order to fill up the outline. There was nothing that the Greek was not willing to believe of them (Clearchus apud Athenaeum ix. 396). The tyrant was the negation of government and law, whose assassination was glorious, for he ruled only for the good of himself and not of his subjects. The ideal image of Plato was therefore not far removed from the vulgar thought of the ordinary Greek.

In the succession of individuals Plato is also following an order of ideas, and not an order of facts. Here and there a trait may be found of Alcibiades or Themistocles or perhaps of Critias. But the transition of one type of character to another is wholly imaginary. The error of identifying the individual and the state is seen most strikingly in the further assumption that the succession of states implies a corresponding succession of individuals.

πρὸς δὲ ταύτην] ‘In comparison with this.’

All change in states begins with a factious spirit arising within the governing class. But how should faction enter in amongst our philosophic rulers? It can only spring from some degeneracy, which must inevitably come sooner or later from some flaw in their arithmetic—since being human, they are not infallible—leading them to diverge, however slightly, from the true number which presides over
human generation. Some inauspicious births, consequent on such an error will gradually deteriorate the breed, until men come to power, who know not the muse, and neglect the liberal element in education. And those so educated, when they succeed in turn, will fail to eliminate aright the iron and brass from the pure silver and gold, whence disproportion following will lead to contention; the brass and iron pulling one way, towards acquisition, the gold and silver towards wisdom and virtue; until a compromise is reached, whereby private property is established, the industrial class depressed, and the guardians become an army of occupation.

"True without distinction" of all governments.

"When division arises within the governing power itself." Cp. Laws iii. 683 E διαπουλεία δὲ καταλύεται … ἢ καὶ τις ἀρχὴ πώποτε κατέλυθη μῶν ὕπο τῶν άλλων ἢ σφῶν αἰτῶν;


"Shall we after the manner of Homer pray to the Muses to tell us how faction first was fired? Shall we imagine them in tragic vein talking in mock earnest and lofty style, playing and jesting with us as with children."

"When their revolutions severally join their circumferences:" i.e. come round to the point where they began.

"i.e. the human race, opposed by the Muses to their own or the divine."

Cp. Phaed. 65 E μὴ τινά ἄλλην αἰσθησιν ἐφέλκων μηδεμίαν μετὰ τοῦ λογισμοῦ. To Plato philosophy is abstract: when alloyed with sense, as in all human endeavours, it is doomed
Plato: Republic.

The change now to be contemplated is the greatest possible—from the perfect to the imperfect; and the causes of the transition are occult. It is precisely at such a critical moment that the reader of Plato may expect the occurrence of a myth—in which, while the style is adorned, verisimilitude is made to compensate for the absence of exact knowledge (ii. 382 δ). And as the irruption of evil is supposed to spring from an error in the calculation of times and seasons, the myth is a mathematical one.

The danger of over-population is not here in question, as in iv. 423 B, v. 460 A; deterioration comes in with an alteration in the quality of the breed.

The list of interpreters who have tried to solve this famous riddle, which even in Cicero's time had become proverbial, is a very long one. Even of those who have contributed important hints, from Faber and Barocci in the fifteenth century to Gow and Adam in the nineteenth, it must suffice to name here, besides those just mentioned, K. F. Hermann, Schneider, Weber and Monro.

The last named critic, after a very full and clear discussion of the chief interpretations (Journal of Philology) appears to think, not that the key has been lost, but that there never was any one key, the passage being rather nothing else than a series of tentative guesses disguised in intentionally vague language. Professor Jowett, on the other hand, believed that Plato meant something which contemporary Greeks would understand, but he thought that the exact meaning was irrecoverable, and probably also unimportant. He was by no means confident of the soundness of the explanation which he finally adopted, and it need not be repeated here. See Translation of Dialogues, ed. III. vol. iii. pp. cxxx–cxxxv.

Mathematical definition in Plato's time was tentative and uncertain, and the significance of terms consequently unfixed. He himself uses δύναμις in different senses, and it is by no means clear that his use of παράτινες is consistent with the terminology of the geometrical writers. (See note on vii. 527 a.) All that will be attempted here will be first to give approximately the most probable force of each expression, and then with great diffidence, chiefly by way of illustration, to put forth one amongst many partial solutions.

One or two general remarks may be prefixed. (1) That the answer to the riddle is probably much simpler than the tragic
language of the Muses has led some commentators to expect. This may be inferred from the words ἐν ὑ πρώτῳ, as well as from the language of the opening sentence, in which it is indicated that the elaborate terminology is not to be taken too seriously. This has to be considered in the interpretation of such words as δυναστεύομεναι, αὐξόντων, φθινόντων, &c. (2) That as Plato intends to puzzle his reader, it is quite possible that even if the mathematical methods of his time were clearly known to us, their employment in the solution of this riddle might be misapplied. (3) That the whole tenour of the passage would lead one to expect the introduction of some arbitrary assumption at some point or other. The difficulty turns on minimizing this, and finding where it comes in. Whether, for example, in the phrase τρίς αὔξηθείς or in ἕκατον τοσαυτάκις?

λογισμῷ μετ' αἰσθήσεως] ‘Through reasoning accompanied with sensation.’ Notwithstanding their high training, they cannot absolutely attain to pure reason. The tincture of sense makes it impossible wholly to eliminate error.

θείῳ . . . γεννητῷ] For example the World of the Timaeus.

περίοδος] This is explained by the words ὅταν . . . συνάπτωσι: ‘the time in which it comes round.’

ἀριθμῷ . . . τελείῳ] The ‘perfect number’ which comprises the period in which a divine birth (i.e. the right moment for it) comes round, may or may not correspond to the definition ‘a number equal to the sum of its divisions.’ But Plato is probably thinking of some higher and more complex expression than any of the simpler terms of which this is true (6, 28, 496). This is implied in the expression βραχύβιος μὲν βραχυπόροις, ἐναντίοις δὲ ἐναντίας: cp. Tim. 39 e.

ἐν ὑ πρώτῳ] ‘In which first,’ i.e. in the series of numbers;—the simplest that is resolvable into elements of which the following statement is true.

αὔξησεις . . . ἀπέφηναν] Almost every word in this sentence has been disputed. It seems pretty clear that a series of four terms is meant,—having of course three intervals between them. That which has met with most favour is the continuous proportion 27: 36: 48: 64, or the converse of this. The difficulty is to make this harmonize with the remaining expressions.

αὔξησεις] Is it necessary that this should mean anything more than ‘increments’? Some would restrict the word to powers (αὔξη
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δευτέρα, τρίτη, &c.): others to multiples generally. Granting this last, may it not extend to multiples of unity?

δυνάμεναι τε καὶ δυναστευόμεναι] The latter word does not occur elsewhere, and the explanations of it given by Greek arithmeticians are inconsistent. If ἡ δυναμή (εἰδεῖα) is the side of a square, may not τὸ δυναστευόμενον (passive, sc. ἕπιεδον) be the square itself? Thus if 3 is ἡ δυναμή, 9 would be τὸ δυναστευόμενον. The series will then consist of root-numbers and their squares.

ὁμοίοιτων καὶ ἀνομοίοιτων] ‘Consisting of numbers that make similar and dissimilar figures.’ i.e. numbers odd and even. For the genitive with ὁμός cp. iv. 443 όμος τρεῖς ἀρμονίας . . . νέατης τε καὶ ὑπάτης καὶ μέσης—also the expression in what follows, infra c ἐκατὸν μὲν ἄριθμον, κ.τ.λ. This designation of the odd and even numbers turns upon a theorem to which Aristotle alludes in Phys. iii. 4 and which is in fact the geometrical expression for the formula \((a + b)^2 = a^2 + 2ab + b^2\).

Thus \(CG = a + b\), and \(CF = CG' = (a + b)^2\). \(CE\) is the square on \(a\). Then \(DE, EG\), are each severally equal to \(ab\), and \(EF = b^2\). Hence the square \(CF' = (a + b)^2 = a^2 + 2ab + b^2\). Take now the case in which \(b = 1\). Then \(CF' = (a + 1)^2 = a^2 + 2a + 1\). Now \(2a + 1 = \) the gnomon \(DFG\), and is clearly an odd number, which varies from 3 upwards according to the value of \(a\), so that any such number equals \(2a + 1\). Hence every odd number has the peculiar property that when added to the square of half-itself-minus-one (i.e. to \(a^2\)), it produces a square number:—

\[
egin{align*}
1 + 3 &= 4 \\
4 + 5 &= 9 \\
9 + 7 &= 16 \\
16 + 9 + 25, &\text{and so forth.}
\end{align*}
\]

The odd numbers are in this way ὁμοιοίτως, ‘producing similar figures,’ viz. squares; the even numbers (each = \(2a\)) are ἀνομοίοιτως, because when added to the same squares they produce oblongs, not squares, every such oblong being dissimilar from every other:

\[
\begin{align*}
\quad a^2 + 2a &= CE + DE + EG = CH. \\
1 + 2 &= 3 \\
4 + 4 &= 8 \\
9 + 6 &= 15 \\
16 + 8 &= 24 &\text{&c.}
\end{align*}
\]
Otherwise the words have been explained more generally, ὀμοιούντες = 'expressing similar figures,' e. g. 9 and 81; ἀνομοιοῦντες, 'expressing dissimilar figures': e. g. 3 and 9 or 27 and 81.

καὶ αὔξοντων καὶ φθινόντων] Either αὔξειν here must be intransitive or φθινω transitive, and there is no authority for either in classical Greek. As αὔξω is frequently intransitive in common Greek, such a meaning may possibly be admitted here. The terms are borrowed from the Pythagoreans, who may not have observed Attic purity. And in speaking of the numbers, to which so much of active force is attributed, the difference may have been hardly felt. Schneider tried to identify this distinction with that between ἐπερετείς ἀριθμοὶ ('numbers exceeded by their factors') and εὐθείας ('exceeding them') but there is no reason why it should not be understood more simply of a series of numbers alternately increasing and diminishing.

πάντα ... ἀπέφηναν] I.e. the process is completed without having recourse to any irrational quantity, such as 'the diameter of the square of five.' This is implied in βῆτα: προσήγορα conveys something more, viz. a common measure: in this case unity. I.e. no use is made of fractions.

At this point we pause to consider 'the number of the human period' which has been now described. The solution which has found most favour is 216, a number which has more, integral factors than any previous number. It is the cube of 6 and may be divided into 27, 64, 125, the cubes of 3, 4, 5, which are the sides of the Pythagorean triangle. Anatolius, Theolog. Arithm. p. 40, ed. Ast (quoted by Schneider), asserts that the successive births of Pythagoras were said by Androcyes, Eubulides, Aristoxenus and others to have taken place at intervals of 216 years. But the very complexity of the number, which is its chief recommendation, also makes it difficult to say which of the many ways of forming it was selected by Plato's fancy. He is not satisfied with describing it simply as 6³. In the Timaeus (35 b ff.) the soul of the world is formed by the interweaving of two numerical series starting severally from 2 and 3. Can it be that the four terms here intended are simply the combination of 2, 2² with 3, 3²? Taking these in the order 2, 4, 3, 9, they are both odd and even, they increase and diminish, for 2 < 4 > 3 < 9; and when multiplied together they make 216.
The wonderful properties of the mysterious number are not yet exhausted. By skilful manipulation there can be developed out of it a complex geometrical expression which, taken in connexion with the number itself, contains the secret of prosperous generation. The terms of this expression are clearly indicated in the sequel, but the method of obtaining it is, as in the former case, extremely obscure.

' The base whereof, in the proportion of four to three.' 

The phrase ἐπίτριτος πυθμήν, taken alone, could only mean the proportion of 4 to 3, as the lowest term of the series of ratios 4 : 3, 8 : 6, 12 : 9, 16 : 12, &c. See Nicomachus Gerasenus, Introd. Arithm. i. 19, who gives these examples of the ἐπίτριτον εἴδος τοῦ ἐπιμορφίου (Schneider). But then what becomes of 6? The expression as a whole seems to suggest some process of which the πυθμήν of the series in question is the foundation. Supposing the first term of the series to be 2, as proposed in the preceding note, and still following the analogy of the passage in the Timaeus, may not the words be understood to mean, 'the base of the series,—viz. 2,—being (1) quadrupled, and (2) tripled'—so obtaining the two numbers 8 and 6, for the operation which follows?

' In conjunction with the pentad,' i.e. the number 5 is also to be employed in the operation. The meaning of συζυγεῖς is quite general; for example, in the passage of Nicomachus just referred to, ὃ ἀπὸ τετράδος συνεχεῖς τετραπλάσιοι, συνεζυγεῖς τῶν ἀπὸ τριάδος τριπλασίους, ὀμοσταγεῖς ὀμοσταγέων, it means simply that the numbers are to be arranged in pairs. So far then the manner in which 5 enters into the combination is left vague. It is rendered more precise, however, by the addition of τρῖς αὐξηθεῖς, which is paraphrased by Aristotle, Pol. v. 12, § 8, in the words ὅταν ὁ τοῦ διαγράμματος ἀριθμὸς τοῦτον γένηται στερμός. But when we ask what is meant by ὁ δριθῶς τοῦ διαγράμματος τοῦτον, the only answer is ὁ τῶν (πρώσθεν εἰρημένων) ἐπίτριτος πυθμήν πεμπάδι συζυγεῖς. i.e. if we are right so far, some combination of the numbers 8 and 6 with the number 5.

Suppose, for the sake of argument, that having multiplied 8 and 6 severally by 5, producing 40 and 30, we multiply each of these
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products, first by 10 ($=2 \times 5$) and then by 25 ($=5^2$). The result is

$$40 \times 10 \times 25 = 10,000,$$
$$30 \times 10 \times 25 = 7,500.$$  

Each of these, as the product of three factors, is a 'solid' number. And if they are to be added together (but this is uncertain) 17500 is also $\sigma\tau\rho\varepsilon\sigma\delta\sigma$ ($25 \times 25 \times 28$).

By this, or some other process, the number produces 'two harmonies,' δύο ἀρμονίας παρέχεται.

By ἀρμονία here is meant a solid number, resolvable into factors which have a certain recognized relation to each other, e.g. 10,000 = $10 \times 25 \times 40$, reducible to the simple arithmetical progression, 2, 5, 8; and 7500 = $15 \times 20 \times 25$, reducible to 3, 4, 5, the sides of the Pythagorean triangle.

ἰσην ἰσάκις, ἕκατὸν τοσαυτάκις] 'A square consisting of 100 multiplied into itself,' i.e. 10,000 = 100². This explanation agrees best with the idiomatic use of τοσαύτος.

ἰσομήκῃ μὲν τῇ] 'Equal to the former in one dimension,' i.e. having a side = 100.

προμήκῃ δὲ] But oblong. Viz. 100 × 75 = 7500.

[Otherwise, supposing the plural ὁν supra to refer to the number 216 as including its factors—and so accounting for the plural—and taking πυθμὴν = 6, as the first term of the series 6, 36, 216, the ἐπίπτητος or $\frac{4}{3}$ of this is 8. Multiply this as before by 5, 10, and 25 the result is 10,000 which divides into the two harmonics 2500 and 7500. The former may be described as ἕκατὸν τοσαυτάκις, '100 taken so many times.'][

ἕκατὸν μὲν . . . τριάδος] 'Consisting of a hundred numbers formed (i.e. squared) upon rational diameters of the number 5, each wanting one (or if irrational then wanting two), and a hundred cubes of the number three.' In other words \{$(7^2 = 49) - 1 \} = 48 \times 100 = 4800$; or \{$(7.0204)^2 = 50) - 2 \} = 48 \times 100 = 4800$.

[The words ἕκατὸν μὲν ἀριθμῷ . . . τριάδος have generally been taken to be a more explicit account of the second harmony, as in the rendering just given. I.e. it is an oblong measuring 100 one way, and composed of two quantities, which are thus described. The sentence, so explained, has a natural rhythm. Mr. Gow on the other hand supposes this to be a repetition of the two previous
clauses in the reverse order: 2700 being the regular solid figure of which one side is 100; and the oblong being 100 times the square of the diameter of 5 minus 2. Mr. Adam follows up this suggestion by multiplying these two quantities together

\[(4800 \times 2700 = 12,960,000 = 60').\]

The διάμετρος ρητή πεμπάδος is the diameter of the square of 5 (= \(\sqrt{50}\)) neglecting the fraction: i.e. since \(\sqrt{50} = 7.0204\), and this is the διάμετρος ἀρρητος, the διάμετρος ρητή is 7.

εὔμπας δὲ οὗτος ἄριθμός γεωμετρικός, τοιούτου κύριος, ἀμεινόνων τε καὶ χειρόνων γενέσεων] What is to be done with the two harmonies when obtained? Plato leaves this quite uncertain: and it does not appear as if he intended anything further. The εὔμπας ἄριθμος γεωμετρικός is the number 216 with all that is involved in it, viz. the production of the two ‘harmonies’ in the way above described. The knowledge of all this on the part of the rulers is essential to the preservation of the breed in its perfection.

This diagram has been drawn upon the margin of Par. Α by an early hand. It seems to represent the Pythagorean triangle τρίς αὐξηθεῖς, i.e. simply raised to terms of 3 and 9. The ἐπίτριτος πυθμὴν πεμπάδι συζυγεῖς is understood to mean simply a combination of 3, 4, 5. But how the scholiast found in this a solution of the whole problem is not apparent. For the numbers 3, 4, 5; 9, 12, 15; 27, 36, 45, are as enigmatical as ever.

As to the symbolic significance of the number or numbers the Muses make no sign, and it is vain to cross-examine them. The following observations contain the more important amongst many suggestions which have been made.

(1) The word περιόδος is vague, and may cover anything from the minimum time of gestation (216 days—Adam) to such a cycle as that described in the Politicus, or the ‘great year’ of Tim. 39 ε. (2) The number 5 was sometimes regarded as the type of justice, sometimes of marriage ( = 3 + 2, the first male combined with the first female number): (3) duality enters into human generation as into all material things. (4) The proportion of 40 to 30 may be regarded as suitable for the marriageable ages of men and women (Gow). (5) The successive births of Pythagoras
are said to have taken place at intervals of 216 years (Schneider). (6) A grand cycle for the state might be rounded off with a century of human lives ranging between 100 and 75 years each \( \left( \frac{17500}{2} = 8750 \right) \). (7) The two harmonies have been supposed by some to signify mental and bodily excellence, by others virtue in the State and the individual, by others again perfection in man and woman.

\\[ \text{ν καταστήσονται} \] 'The men of the former age will appoint the best of them to be their successors.' So the middle voice may be rendered. The reading καταστήσονται, which has slight manuscript authority, may, however, be the true one, as in the next sentence καταστήσονται is used passively. Cp. note on iv. 442 λ.

\\[ \text{ἂμος δὲ . . . ἀμελεῖν} \] 'Nevertheless' [although the best available] 'when they in turn come into their fathers' power, they will in the first place begin to neglect us.'

\\[ \text{φύλακες ὄντες} \] 'although guardians.' This is an aggravation, for music was to be the first care of the guardians: cp. iv. 424 c to δὴ φυλακτήρων . . . ἐστινθά ποιοι οἰκοδομητέον τοῖς φύλαξιν, ἐν μουσικῆ. \\

\\[ \text{παρ' ἐλαττω . . . μουσικῆς} \] said in explanation of ἡμῶν ἀμελεῖν.

\\[ \text{δεύτερον δὲ τὰ γυμναστικῆς} \] the 'shadow' of a difficulty is found in these words. For the Spartan or Cretan constitution, which is the first stage in Plato's declining scale, was not negligent of gymnastic: cp. infra 547 ν γυμναστικῆς . . . ἐπιμελεῖσθαι. Hence the suspicion which gave rise to Madvig's emendation δεύτερα τε γυμναστικῆς. Cp. infra 548 c πρεσβυτέρως γυμναστικῆς μουσικῆς τετημηκίναι, and for δεύτερα Xen. Hellen. vii. 1, § 35 ἐτήσιο γε θεότερος μετὰ τὸν Πελαιοῦν. But the sense of the reading in the text although arrived at in a different way, is nearly the same. Socrates means to say that in the first place they neglect music: and in the second place, and therefore in a less degree, gymnastic. It is further observable that the first declension in the state is not from music to gymnastic, but from the philosophical to the military government, which no doubt retained gymnastic, but did not care for it in the spirit prescribed in Book iii. For the seeming want of point cp. v. 451 λ ὡς τε ἐν με παραμεθεί, and infra 547 κ ἀπλουστέρων. Plato from a love of parallelism or for the sake of completeness, often presents the other side of an antithesis, though not in point. Cp. infra 559 C ἀρ' οὖν . . . ἀληχαρχικάν, and ii. 358 λ ἀδικία δ' ἐπαινεῖται.
πρὸς τὸ δοκιμάζειν . . . (Ε) γένη] 'for the task of assaying the metal of your different races, which are the same as Hesiod's': (Op. et D. 109 ff.). To keep the race pure was a main function of the guardians. Socrates is alluding to the Phoenician tale at the end of Book iii. pp. 415, 416.

σιδήρου ἄργυρο] sc. γένους γένει. This is the reading of Par. A. Other MSS. have σιδήρου άργυρο (the metals). Cp. the similar doubt as to the reading of iii. 415 c.

tαύτης τοι γενεάς] Iliad vi. 211, xx. 241.

eἰλκέτην . . . ηγέτην] What has been described as a possibility of the future is now assumed to be a 'fait accompli.' Hence the imperfect. τὰς ψυχὰς . . . ηγέτην, in speaking of the gold and silver race is substituted for the harsher εἰλκέτην.

*τῶ δ' αὖ] The slight change from τὸ to τῶ, suggested by Schneider, is certainly an improvement, though, as he observes, not absolutely necessary.

κατανειμαμένους] sc. τῶν πολίτων. Madvig's conjecture, κατανειμαμένωι εξενώσασθαι, is extremely plausible, but the change to the nominative δουλωσάμενοι may be occasioned by the feeling that this last is not merely an enactment but an act of the rulers.

tόὺς δὲ . . . ἐπιμελεῖσθαι] The word φυλάκη is used ironically in the new sense of guarding against them instead of guarding them. Cp. iii. 414 β φύλακας παντελεῖς τῶν τε ἐξωθεν πολεμίων τῶν τε ἐντός φιλίων, and for φίλους τε καὶ τροφέας, v. 463 β τί δ' οὖτ᾿ τῶν δῆμων (προσαγορέων); Μισθοδότας τε καὶ τροφέας.

περιοίκοις τε καὶ οἰκέτας] are distinguished as subjects and household slaves, the former word conveying an obvious reference to Sparta.

The timocratic state will resemble our ideal aristocracy in debarring the ruling and fighting class from other occupations in devotion to military discipline and gymnastic, and in the practice of common meals. Its characteristics will be a certain jealousy of philosophers, a love of strategy, and a continual tendency to engage in war. On the other hand it will approach the oligarchic spirit in a fierce secret longing after gold and silver, and the illegal habit of keeping large private establishments.

Honour is the ruling passion, leading to ambitious quarrels which are aggravated by the prevalence of extravagance among men whose
Nolcs: Book VIII.

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such is the general outline.

virtue has been compulsory and is not inspired by rational conviction.

τής τοῦ πολέμου ἰγνώσιας | 'For military exercises' : cp. ii. 374 λ ή περὶ τῶν πολέμου ἰγνώσια.

τῷ δὲ γε φοβεῖσθαι, κ.τ.λ.] The construction at the beginning of the sentence is continued from τῷ μὲν τιμᾶν, κ.τ.λ., but resumed with a change to the accusative in τὰ πολλὰ τῶν τοιούτων.

Various attempts have been made to correct ἀπλουστέρους which is the reading of the MSS. on the ground of inconsistency with ἀπλοῦς preceding. But (1) inconsistent tautology is not a strong ground of objection to an expression in Plato: (2) the apparent tautology is also an antithesis though feebly expressed; 'the state has no philosophers who are sincere and thorough-going, and therefore falls back on the simpler nature of the soldier.' (3) The want of a word is often found in writing to lead to the inappropriate repetition of a preceding word. For ἀπλοῦς meaning straightforward cp. Xen. Hellen. vi. 1, § 6 κάκείων μὲντοι ἐποιεῖσας τὴν ἀπλότητα τῆς πόλεως ἀπῆλθε, said of Polydamas of Thessaly after his conference with the authorities at Sparta.

ἐπιθυμηταὶ δὲ γε, κ.τ.λ.] The words τὰ δὲ τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν (547 ν) are here taken up.

μέμικται γάρ, κ.τ.λ.] The description of Plato may be illustrated by the real declension of the Spartan state. There were divisions in Sparta between the partisans of the Ephors and Kings (φιλονεικίαι). According to Aristotle, no other state was equally corrupt (ἐπιθυμηταὶ χρημάτων): her greatest citizens, Pausanias, Astyochus, Lysander, were the reverse of simple and straightforward (οὐχ ἀπλοὶ καὶ ἀτενεῖς). The 'wild' love of money which existed in the Spartan character is the more remarkable, because unaccompanied by the enterprise which is necessary for the acquisition of wealth. The cruelty to slaves is also touched upon in the corresponding figure of the τιμοκρατικὸς νεανίας (infra 549 λ).

οὐκοῦν ... ἀπεργάσασθαι] It is observable that Plato implies that his succession of commonwealths is only a rough outline of a few of them, intended to show 'in large letters' the true portraits of the just and the unjust. Cp. supra 544 c, d and the similar suggestion of intermediates in the division of the soul in iv. 443 e καὶ εἴ ἄλλα ἀστά μεταξὺ τυχάνει δύνα. The attempt here declined by
548 E–549 B

‘The Timocratic individual,’ says Adeimantus, ‘must be about as quarrelsome as Glaucon.’ But he will be more obstinate and less inclined to liberal pursuits: although he likes listening to a song or speech. He is obedient to the rulers, but rough to slaves, while civil to his equals, and above all things, he is ambitious of honour in war, while athletics and hunting are his recreations. In youth he despises money, but in age he covets it, having no resources in himself.

αὐθαδέστερον . . . οὐδαμῶς] ‘He should be made of harder stuff, I said, and somewhat less cultivated, yet a lover of the muses and a good listener, though nothing of a speaker.’ In other words the timocrat is an unimpressionable man, with no original power, and yet poetry and oratory have a charm for him. ‘The Spartan will never extract a verse out of ‘his own pure brain,’ is not in the habit of making long speeches, but will listen to the oratory of Alcibiades when he visits Sparta, or to the recitations of Homer and Tyrtaeus. For the hit at Glaucon, compare the description of him in Xen. Mem. iii. 6, § 1 Γλαύκωνα δὲ τῶν Ἀριστών οὕτω επεχείρη εἰς ἐκχαίρειν, ἐπιθυμῶν προστατεύειν τῆς πόλεως, ουδέπω εἴκοσιν ἔτη γεγονός, οὐ τῶν ἄλλων οἰκείων τε καὶ φίλων οἰκείων ἰδίωτα παύσαι, ἐκκόμποι τε ἀπὸ τοῦ βήματος καὶ καταγγελαστὸν ὄντα, κ.τ.λ.

ὀποιαμοιούστερον] The features of the Spartan character are sufficiently apparent in this description. Compare the account at the commencement of the greater Hippias, 285 e, which Hippias gives of the willingness of the Spartans to hear him tell of the genealogies of gods and heroes, and their unwillingness to receive instruction in the sciences. Again, for what follows, compare the statement of the Laws, Book i, that the Spartan and Cretan institutions were exclusively designed for war; also Protag. 343, where Plato adds another trait to the Lacedemonian character, their making brevity the soul of their primitive philosophy.

καὶ δουλος μὲν τις, κ.τ.λ.] This is still part of the character of the Spartan. See the beautiful passage of the Laws (vi. 777 λ) in which the Athenian describes the behaviour of a just and noble person towards his slaves: he is not to be too familiar with them, he is to be more just to them than to his equals, herein showing that he loves justice for its own sake.
Notes: Book VIII.

āν appears in only two MSS. of slight authority. But most MSS. have τισαν which is probably a corruption of τισαν.

ἐστι ... πολιτείας] 'this type of character belongs to that form of government (timocracy).’ The genitive is the predicate.

οὐκοῦν ... καταφρονοί ἄν] 'and will not such an one while young be a despiser of riches?'

His origin may be thus conceived: a good man who avoids politics in an ill-conditioned state has a son who in boyhood hears his mother complain of ‘the slights which she has to endure through the submissiveness of her husband,’ and is told by the servants of the house that when grown up he must be a man indeed and reclaim what his father has let go. By and by he comes to know a little of the world as it is. Distracted by these diverse influences, while he admires his father’s virtues, he is tempted to covetousness and ambition. And in the end the love of honour becomes his ruling passion.

πη δη ... (v) γυναῖκιν] The sentence ὅταν, κ.τ.λ., is not in any exact construction: the most grammatical way of taking the words is after πη δη ... γίγνεται; sc. γίγνεται ὅταν (cp. πῶς followed by ὅταν infra 553 λ). But the imperfect construction is supplemented by the deferred apodosis at 550 λ τότε δη δ νίος.

The legend of the wife of Caius Licinius Stolo in Livy, vi. 34, is a similar tale of feminine jealousy. Plato is perhaps thinking of Laconizing youth at Athens.

ἐπεῖτα ὀρῶσης ... (v) υμνεῖν] αἰσθάνηται reverts to the construction with ὅταν, although having the same subject with the participle ὀρῶσης, which itself somewhat loosely follows ἀκούῃ. Mr. H. Richards proposes to cancel αἰσθάνηται.

ἰδία τε ἐν δικαστηρίωι καὶ δημοσίᾳ] ‘privately in law courts, and publicly’ (sc. in the assembly).

ἐαυτῷ μὲν τὸν νοῦν προσέχοντα] Cp. vi. 496 δ ἀγαπᾷ, εἰ πη αἰτίος καθαρῶς ... βιώσεται.

καὶ οἱ οἰκέται, κ.τ.λ.] The picture would not be complete without the old servant who is zealous for the honour of the family.

καὶ ἐξιὼν, κ.τ.λ.] ‘And when he goes abroad he hears and sees more of the same sort.’ The reading of Par. A is ἀκούῃ, but this is hardly defensible, even on the ground of a supposed construction.
with ὅταν repeated from supra c. The words are too far off, with οἴσθα ὀὖν, κ.τ.λ., intervening.

570 μὴ τὰ αὐτῶν] (sc. πρῶτον) has the force of τὰ μὴ αὐτῶν. The order of words gives emphasis to the negative.

παρὰ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων] These words are to be taken with ἐγγὺθεν, 'having a nearer view of his father's ways than of the ways of others,'—which may account for his father still retaining an influence over him.

ἐλκόμενος . . . (B) ἣλθε] The first ἐλκόμενος is resumed after the parentheses τοῦ μὲν . . . κεχρήθηκαί.

550 C- 551 B Oligarchy is a form of constitution based on the valuation of rateable property. It is a government in which the wealthy rule and in which the poor have no share. The change to this form from timarchy is occasioned by that secret hoard of which we spoke (supra 548 B), alluring them to spend on things forbidden. They vie with one another in accumulation, and in expenditure, until wealth becomes of more account than merit. The poor man is always rejected and the rich preferred, and at last a law is carried, either by intimidation or by force of arms, making money the qualification of citizenship.

550 C λέγωμεν . . . τεταγμένοι] The line is probably quoted from memory, and made up out of two lines in the Seven against Thebes, 451 λέγ' ἄλλον ἄλλας ἐν πολίως εἰληκότα and 570 ὀμολογῶν δὲ πρὸς πόλις τεταγμένος. The similarity of πολή and πόλει was nearer in sound than in spelling.

κατὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν] supra 545 B.

τὴν ἀπὸ τιμημάτων . . . πολιτείαν] 'A government resting on the valuation of property I term oligarchy.'

It is to be observed that Plato here absolutely opposes timocracy to oligarchy. But as a fact in the history of Greece, so far as we can judge from somewhat meagre indications, there were many kinds of both, the element of wealth combining in various degrees
with that of birth: the right of the strongest, that is, of the heavy
armed soldier or horseman, or of the well equipped pirate, or the
leader of pirates, largely entering into all of them.

ἐκεῖνο] supra 548 A.

tοὺς νόμους . . . ἀπειθοῦντες] 'they wrest the laws to this end,
disobeying the law,' i.e. they misinterpret the letter and violate
the spirit of the constitution.

ἡ οὖχ οὗτω . . . ἑπτοντε;] 'Is not this the sort of difference
between riches and virtue? When they are placed in either scale
of the balance, the one rises, as the other falls.' The text follows
Madvig's correction; the manuscript reading κεμένον ἐκατέρου may
however be explained by placing a comma after ἐκατέρου, 'the one
ever rising as the other falls, as if each were placed in a scale of
a balance.'

ἡ καὶ πρὸ τοῦτο, κ.τ.λ.] As in the revolution of the Four Hundred
at Athens: Thuc. viii. 66 ἀντελγετε οὐδεὶς έτε τῶν ἄλλων, δεδίως καὶ
ὁρῶν πολὺ τὸ ἐξουσιάζον.

Suppose a property qualification to be required of a pilot, what
would become of navigation? To guide the helm of the state is more
difficult and also more important than to steer the ship; the failure
in the practice of it will therefore be more disastrous. The oligarchical
city, moreover, is not one, but two at least, viz. the rich and the poor.
(Cp. iv. 422 E.) The government cannot go to war, for fear that
the multitude may desert in battle and leave the few, who are also
covetous, to support both the danger and the expense. Again, under
this constitution the same person may have diverse callings; he
may be warrior and trader in one. And, what is worst of all, he
may reduce himself to beggary. He never was a real ruler, and
now he is only a spendthrift and a drone in the hive. And of
these wingless drones, unlike the winged ones, there are some with
stings. In other words, wherever there are paupers there are also
rogues.

ἐφαμεν] supra 544 C.

πρῶτον μὲν . . . οἷος ἐστιν] The first error relates to the very
principle of the constitution (supra A ὁρὸν πολιτείας ὀλιγαρχίας
tαξάμενοι πλῆθος χρηματῶν): πρῶτον, συ. ἀμάρτημα ἐστίν: for the turn
of sentence cp. i. 331 c τούτο δ' αὐτά, τήν δικαιοσύνην, πότερα τήν
ἀλήθειαν αὐτό φησομεν εἶναι; and for the use of ὁρὸς, Laws i. 626 c
The meaning of ὁρός in Plato is more general and less abstract than the logical term 'definition,' which is its signification in later Greek. A similar change takes place in the meaning of several words (εἴδος, ἔδεα, συλλογισμός, υπόθεσις, ὀλη), which in Plato retain more or less their popular senses,—but in Aristotle have already passed into the technical language of the schools.

ἄδρει γάρ, κ.τ.λ.] The interruption of Adeimantus prevents Socrates from completing the sentence, and the apodosis, ὅποιον τι ἄν δοκεῖς συμβαίνειν or some such words, is wanting. The reply of Adeimantus, πονηράν . . . ναυτίλλεσθαι, is dependent on the omitted apodosis. The comparison of the ruler to the steersman was always with Socrates a favourite topic: i. 341 c, vi. 488 b; Polit. 297 e; Xen. Mem. i. 1, § 9. [Ast and H. Richards cj. εἰκός for ἦ δ' ὦς.]

σύκεύω . . . ἀρχής;] 'And is not this true about any government of anything?' Ast's emendation ἡστινός for ἥ τινος of the MSS., which is here adopted, gives the best meaning with the least alteration. The construction is elliptical, and put by attraction for ἀρχής, ἥ τις ἄν ἣ. For the use of ὦς τις, cp. Hipp. Maj. 282 δ ἡ ἄλλος δημοσιογύς ἄφι ἡστινός τέχνης.

tι δέ; . . . ἀλλήλοις] Cp. iv. 422 e, where Socrates strongly insists that other states are not one but many. There is a lively image of the change here described, which probably represents the condition of many Greek cities in the seventh and eighth centuries before Christ, in the poems of Theognis, who laments that the old oligarchical privileges have been superseded by an invasion of rich bad men. (Theogn. 1109 ff. ed. Bergk.)

ἀλλὰ μὴν, κ.τ.λ.] Bekker was right in saying that οὐδέ is omitted in Par. A. The MS. reads ἀλλὰ μὴν | τόδε but τό is written over an erasure and the word as at first written may have been οὐδέ (sic). A later hand has replaced οὐδέ in the right hand margin after ἀλλὰ μὴν, which comes at the end of the line. If οὐδέ were omitted, the sentence would receive an ironical turn (cp. iv. 426 λ), but this is scarcely suitable to the directness of the reply οὐ καλὸν.

τῶς] 'in all likelihood.' [H. Richards cj. ἵσχυρῶς.]

διὰ τὸ ἀναγκάζεσθαι, κ.τ.λ.] As at Lesbos in the Peloponnesian war:—Thuc. iii. 27; Arist. Pol. vi. 7.

διηγαρξικοὺς φαινόμενοι] For this play of words cp. infra 555 λ.
Notes: Book VIII.

πάλαι] ii. 374 B.  
γεωργούντας] like the αὐτοφυγαί of the Peloponnese; Thuc. i. 141, §§ 3–5.  
ἡ δοκεῖ ὁρθῶς ἔχειν ;] The position of the interrogative particle implies strong emphasis.  
eἰς δὲ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν ;] viz. the functions mentioned in the words μὴτε χρηματιστήν . . . μὴτε ὄπλιτην (supra λ).  
αὐτῆς] sc. τῆς πόλεως.  
oὐτῶς] 'The latter; he seemed to be a ruler but was only a spendthrift.'  
αὐτῶν] resumed in καὶ τὸν τοιοῦτον to accentuate the parallelism.  
ἐκ μὲν τῶν ἀκέπτρων] ἐκ points to the class from which they come without saying whether all become paupers or only some.  
πτωχοὶ . . . τελευτῶσιν] sc. εἰς τὸ πτωχοὶ εἶναι, like τυραννίδας . . . εἰς πτωχείας τελευτῶσας in x. 618 λ. The words have also been translated, though with less point and less meaning in the preposition: 'who die in old age paupers' (Schneider).  
πάντες, κ.τ.λ.] sc. γίγνονται implied in τελευτῶσιν.  
δὴν οὖν ἥμα, κ.τ.λ.] In modern language, Where there is pauperism, there is crime:—this is at least true of every oppressive and unequal state of civilized society.  
βαλλαντιατομοι] The form is doubtful (see I. and S. s. v. ἐλαλάντιοι), but is retained as given by the first hand of Par. Α.  
μὴ οὖν, κ.τ.λ.] 'May we suppose.' μὴ οὖν in this passage is equivalent to μῶν:—although the affirmative answer has already been implied in the previous argument, Socrates ironically proposes the question as one absolutely undetermined: so supra 552 Α ὅμω δὴ . . . εἰ τὸδε . . . παραδέχεται: Theaet. 145 Α ἥ καὶ ἀστρονομικός . . . ;  
ἐπιμελεία βία] The insertion of καὶ between these words is unnecessary: βία has passed into an adverb and lost the idea of a dative case. Cp. ii. 359 c νίμῳ δὲ βία παράγεται, κ.τ.λ., infra 554 c κατεχομένας βία ὑπὸ τῆς ἄλλης ἐπιμελείας.  
τοὺς δὲ καὶ πλεῖον] These words betray the same feeling which appeared in the first mention of oligarchy supra 544 c συνήν γίμονοι κακῶν πολεμεῖσι.  
ἀπειργάσθω] 'Let this form of government too be deemed
Let us now imagine the transition from the timocratic to the oligarchic man. The former has a son, who walks in his footsteps, until the father meets with some reverse in his ambitious career, and is either put to death or banished and his goods confiscated. The son, impoverished and disenchanted, flings away ambition, and by sparing habits and hard work scrapes a fortune together. Desire of wealth he elevates to the rank of king and lord, to whom the reasoning and aspiring elements are to be subservient. This revolution is as complete as it is swift.

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553 A

ἐκ τοῦ τιμοκρατικοῦ ἐκείνου] supra 548 d ff.

ἀπαν, κ.τ.λ. This clause is partly the answer to πῶς, sc. μεταβάλλει, partly the protasis of a sentence of which ἐπὶ κεφαλὴν ὥθει, κ.τ.λ., is the deferred apodosis. Cp. supra 549 c ἔν ὅ... γίνεται; ἀπαν, κ.τ.λ.

B

ἐμπεσόντα... ὑπὸ συκοφαντῶν] ‘then brought into court, being damaged by informers.’ It has been proposed to omit βλαπτόμενον, the insertion of which is attributed to some transcriber’s ignorance that ὑπὸ after ἐμπεσόν was good Greek. But the word is very expressive of the harm which informers might do to a man’s career (Lys. pro Polych. § 12 οὐ δίκαιος διὰ τοῦτο ἐστὶ βλαπτεσθαι): and the imperfect tense, which is one ground of the objection, is quite appropriate as describing a continuous state and not like ἐμπεσόντα, &c., a momentary act, i.e. ὑπὸ συκοφαντῶν ἐβλάπτετό τε καὶ ἐμπεσόν ἐις δικαστήριον ἀπέδανεν.

καὶ παθὼν] The son of course suffers in the exile of his father, or in the confiscation of his property.

δείσας] is to be taken closely with what follows: ‘He is alarmed and straightway thrusts ambition and passion head foremost from his bosom’s throne.’

C

tο θυμοειδεὶς ἐκείνῳ] supra 550 B.

τιάρας τε καὶ... ἀκινάκας] περιπετείντα or the like word which is required for τιάρας, κ.τ.λ., is altered to παραξωνύντα to suit ἀκινάκας. For the plural, which may be described as ‘magnific,’ cp. vi. 495 A.
Notes: Book VIII.

553 C

πλοῦτοι τε καὶ πᾶσα ἡ τουμένη παρασκευή, Symp. 218 A Φαίδρους, Ἀγάμερος, Ἐρυθρικός.

to δὲ γε. κ.τ.λ.] The change from οὐδὲν ἄλλο to μηδὲν ἄλλο is to be explained by the general notion of ἀναγκαῖος in the second clause being understood from οὐδὲν...εἰ in the first.

ἡ γοῦν...ὁμοιος ἀν εἰη] 'The change which produces him is from an individual who is similar to the state which produced oligarchy (viz. timocracy). 'Let us consider then whether he be like oligarchy.' The assumed parallelism of states and individuals is presumptive evidence of the likeness which is now to be verified. ἀν εἰη, sc. εἰ οὕτω μεταβάλλω.

In this conversion from ambition to avarice the individual follows the analogy of the state: he is a lover and getter of money, indulging only his necessary desires and keeping under restraint the extravagant ones: he is penurious, industrious, sordid, negligent of culture (he has deserted the muses for the blind god of wealth). Yet some of his passions are still strong within him because of his neglect of education: and being hungry and unsatisfied they are like the paupers and rogues in the city. In his ordinary dealings he represses them, because he is afraid of losing his character and his property: but when he has a safer opportunity of taking advantage, as when he is guardian of an orphan, he does not scruple to indulge them. The oligarchical man is thus divided against himself; and in the contest of ambition he proves a contemptible adversary, being niggardly of his means and distrusting his own nature, except that meagre portion of it which is absorbed in money-getting.

μὴ παρεχόμενος] 'not affording or allowing himself;' a special use of the middle voice. The negative is μὴ, not οὐ, because παρεχόμενος is part of a 'causal expression' (τῶ...εἰναι, κ.τ.λ.).

αὐχμηρός γέ τις...ὡν, κ.τ.λ.] This sentence is in effect a participial clause attached to the preceding participles—'and this because he is a shabby fellow,' &c. The idiom is the same as in εἴ γε σὺ ποιῶν and the like expressions. Cp. Aristoph. Nub. 893 λόγος—ἡπτῶν γ' ὡν.

οὐς δὴ, κ.τ.λ.] sc. θησαυροταιόν: for the plural referring to the singular cp. Thuc. vi. 12, 13 νεωτέρῳ...οὕς εὖώ, κ.τ.λ.

τυφλὸν ἄγεμόνα] sc. Plutus. Cp. the Plutus of Aristophanes, the
plot of which turns upon the restoration of the god of wealth to sight.

καὶ ἐπίμα μάλιστα] ἐπίμα is an ingenious and almost certain emendation of Schneider’s, which is confirmed by the expressions τιμώντες ἀγρίως ... χρυσῶν 548 λ, τιμᾶν μηδὲν ἄλλο ἡ πλοῦτον 553 δ, and χρῆματα ... μάλιστα ἐντιμα ... παρὰ τῷ τοιούτῳ just above. The principal MSS. vary between καὶ ἐπὶ μάλιστα εὖ, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ, τόδε δὲ σκόπει, which has the greater weight of authority, and καὶ ἐπὶ μία ἔτ, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ, τόδε δὲ σκόπει, either of which leaves the previous thought without assent or approval, and also has an unmeaning emphasis:—μάλιστα is at the end of a line in Par. A.

τόδε δὲ σκόπει] The quality in the individual which corresponds to oligarchy in the state is the love of money. The money-maker has a show of respectability, and his other passions are generally kept under by the main one of avarice. The truth is that he is one half beggar and the other half rogue; this however can only be discovered by watching him in secret places. If you would know his real character, see how he manages a trust, and whether he deals with other people’s money as he does with his own.

κατεχομένας ... ἐπιμελείας;] 'kept down perforce by his general habit of carefulness.' ἄλλος is 'adverbial' contrasting ἐπιμελείας with ἐπιθυμίας, κ.τ.λ.

ἐπιεικεῖ τινὶ ἐαυτοῦ βία κατέχει] (1) 'By some virtuous element in himself he forcibly restrains': βία as supra c, 552 ε (where see note on ἐπιμελεία βία), is to be taken separately as an adverb. For ἐπιεικεῖ τινὶ ἐαυτοῦ cp. infra 555 λ ἀλίγης τισὶν ἐαυτοῦ. [(2) 'By some virtuous restraint which he puts upon himself.' B. J.]

ἄλλος] sc. the non-avaricious passions—here opposed to 'respectable' prudent motives. For ἄλλος opposing things different in kind cp. iii. 396 ε. μυθήσως τε καὶ τῆς ἄλλης διηγήσεως.

εὑρήσεις] Par. A gives εὑρήσεις (sic)—ἐν by the diorthotes. Schneider observes that, as the text now stands, the dative is too far from the preposition. Perhaps ἐνευρήσεις should be read.

τοῦ κηφήνος ἐνυγγενεῖς] i.e. κηφηνώδεις:—'drone-like,' 'of the nature of the drone.'

οὐδὲ εἰς ἄλλα διπλοῦς τις] As the city was divided between
rich and poor, so the man is divided between meanness and respectability.

\[\text{διεννύητεκής ... τής ψυχής ἀληθῆς ἀρετή}\] ‘the true virtue which arises when the soul is at unity and in harmony.’ The expression is somewhat singular, but there is no sufficient reason for omitting the article.

\[\text{ή τινος νίκης, κ.τ.λ.}\] For the genitives after \[\text{ἀνταγωνιστής}\] cp. ii. 374 d, Laws viii. 834 b.

\[\text{κρήματά τε, κ.τ.λ.}\] τε connects the two parts of the sentence, of which the second, ending with \[\text{πλούτει}\], is loaded with participles: of these \[\text{δείδως}\] expresses the cause, and \[\text{πολεμῶν}\] the consequence, of \[\text{οὐκ ἑθέλων, κ.τ.λ.}\]

\[\text{ὀλιγαρχικός}\] ‘like the men in the oligarchy’: supra 551 e.

Democracy comes next, and is brought about by a natural reaction against the ruling spirit of oligarchy, which is covetousness. The extravagance of young men is not properly controlled, because it is profitable to those in power, who lend them money at high interest and when it is spent seize their estates. Thus the class of stinging drones is multiplied, while the ruling class grow fat and soft, neglecting all martial exercises. The hour for revolution ripens; and the oligarchical government is easily overthrown. Some of its members are proscribed, some banished; the rest are admitted to an equal share of the power, which is now in the hands of the people.

\[\text{ποίον τινα ἔχει}\] sc. \[\text{τρόπον}\], in a slightly different sense of the word, which occurs again immediately below. \[\text{τρόπος}\] in \[\text{τρόπον τινά τοιοῦτε}\] is again used in the first sense.

\[\text{οὐκόου ... γίγνεσθαι;}\] The words \[\text{δὲ ἀπληστικόν}\] are a partial explanation of \[\text{τρόπον τινά τοιοῦτε}\]. The pleonastic \[\text{δείν}\] resumes the notion of \[\text{προκειμένου}\].

\[\text{εἰργεῖν ... μὴ ἐξεῖναι}\] \[\text{ἐξεῖναι}\] is pleonastic.

\[\text{νόμῳ}\] Cp. supra 552 a.

\[\text{kάθηναι δή, κ.τ.λ.}\] ‘there they sit doing nothing in the city.’ \[\text{kάθηναι}\] implies that they are biding their time.

\[\text{oὔδε δοκούντες ... ὅραν}\] ‘Making as if they saw them not.’

See L. and S. s. v. \[\text{δοκεῖω}, i. 4.}\n
\[\text{vol. iii.}\]
For the imagery cp. vi. 507 A.

The singular is collective.

Two ways are suggested of correcting the evil: (1) a man may be prevented from doing what he likes with his own: (2) the protection of the law may be withdrawn from the creditor. The latter principle is laid down in Laws v. 742 c μηδὲ δανείζειν ἐπὶ τίκωρ, ὥσ ἐξὸν μὴ ἀποδώσαι τὸ παράπαν τῷ δανεισμένῳ μὴ τὸ κοῦν μήτε κεφάλαιον: viii. 849 e, xi. 915 d. It is also said to have been a law of Charondas (Stobaeus, Serm. 44, 21).

How far the law should interfere to protect the creditor, and whether no protection is not the best protection, is a question which may be regarded as still undecided. Although commerce can never be wholly without the pale of law, yet as time goes on, the interference or protection of the law seems to be confined within narrower limits, which may probably with advantage be still further restricted. So much in trade has been settled by the consent and common sense of traders. The law again is so powerless to enter into the minutiae of private transactions, where many interests combine against inquiry, as to suggest the thought that except in cases of direct fraud or theft, trade, like morality, is beyond the legal arm. Many contracts of the highest importance are matters of honour only. If legal protection were withdrawn from the creditor, the result would obviously be that no one but a man of established character could borrow money, for the borrower would be under no compulsion to pay except that of his own interest. It is equally obvious, that this would limit the operations of trade—whether advantageously or not, is a doubtful question.

εκείνη refers to the regulation which existed in the well constituted state, but was relaxed in the oligarchy (supra 552 A, 555 C), viz. that young men shall not be allowed to waste their fortunes.


ṁΙS] 'any one,' i.e. 'the legislator,' 'the state,' 'we.'

B νῦν δὲ γ', ἔφην ἐγώ, κ.τ.λ.] τὰ τοιαῦτα refers to the whole description from ἄτε, οἷμαι (555 c) onwards, οὕτω to the creation of the dangerous class among the poor (supra 555 D ff.).

οὖσας δὲ αὐτοὺς καὶ τοὺς αὐτῶι, κ.τ.λ.] I. c. on the other hand they leave their sons to grow up in idleness and luxury, while they themselves are absorbed in making money. The sentence is
expanded and becomes two sentences, the condition of the youth being first described; then in aúτος δὲ, κ.τ.λ., that of the older generation: cp. the structure of supra 552 c τοὺς δὲ πεῖζος τοῖτος, κ.τ.λ.

οὕτω δὴ παρεσκευασμένοι, κ.τ.λ.] In this sentence the verb καταφρονῶνται is dependent on ὅταν. (1) An appearance of confusion is caused by the nominative θεῶμενοι which seems to be connected with παραβάλλωσιν, but in reality is equivalent to ὅταν θεῶνται preceding καταφρονῶνται. Either παραβάλλοντες ... ἢ ... θεῶμενοι ... καταφρονῶνται or παραβάλλωσιν ... ἢ ... θεῶνται καὶ καταφρονῶνται would be the regular construction. Or (2) the words θεῶμενοι ... καταφρονῶνται οἱ πένητες may be regarded as an instance of the common apposition of whole and part.

ὅταν παραβάλλωσιν] ‘when they come along-side,’ probably a nautical metaphor: cp. Lysis 203 ε ὁ παραβάλλεις; For the sense cp. Phaedr. 239 c, d.

ἀλλοτρίας] ‘which he has no right to’: ‘which does not properly belong to him.’ He has grown great at other men’s expense. Cp. Gorg. 518 d, Laws vii. 797 f.

eἰσὶ παρ’ οὖδέν;] This is Baiter’s correction of εἰσὶ γὰρ οὖδέν which is the reading of the best MSS. εἰσὶν οὖδέν, the reading of the old editions, though giving a more forcible meaning (cp. infra 562 d), is of inferior authority.

eὖ οἶδα μὲν οὖν] μὲν οὖν corrects οἴει. ‘Do you ask if I think they will do so? Nay, I know it for a fact that they do so.’

ἐκείνῳ] sc. τῷ ποσῶδει σῶματι. κατὰ ταύτα ἐκείνῳ = νοσῶδως.

For the comparison of sedition to disease cp. Soph. 228 λέγων ὅτως καὶ στάσιν οὐ παίτων πενώμενος, κ.τ.λ.

καὶ ὡς τὸ πολὺ ... γίγνονται] This feature of democracy is recalled in the companion picture of the individual infra 561 b, ἀδιπερ λαχοῦση. γίγνονται is the reading of the best MSS.: the subjunctive is inexact, because any words dependent on ὅταν should describe a characteristic of the origin of democracy, not merely a characteristic of democracy. γίγνονται may be an error of the copyists caused by the preceding subjunctives.

ἡ κατάστασις δημοκρατίας] The article goes with both words taken together as a single expression.

diὰ φόβον] diὰ φόβον (Par. A p. m. Ven. π) is a natural error occasioned by the apparent parallelism of δι᾽ ὀπλῶν.
Freedom is now the word and every man arranges his life just as he pleases. The city is like an embroidered robe, in which all modes of life, all forms of government, are represented. There is no one constitution, but samples of all. To take office, to obey authority, to make war or peace when others do so, are matters left to individual caprice. Men publicly condemned to death or banishment go out and in with acclamation of their friends. No training or qualification is required for office as in our state, save only the profession of popular sympathies. It is a city of delightful ease, exempt from awe, worship, degree where all however unlike are 'equal' and 'unclassed, sceptreless, free, uncircumscribed.' — Delightful for the moment!

This is a reason for deferring the consideration of the democratic man, who appears infra 558 c.

'... may be expected to arrange' (not 'is able to' as in the translation).

As elsewhere in comparisons there is an asyndeton because the words are explanatory of the preceding clause.

The words τί μὴν; ἐφη (following φαίνοιτο), which Bekker retained from earlier editions, are almost, if not entirely, without manuscript authority. The sentence which takes their place in the Munich MS. τί—φαίνοιτο γὰρ ἦ δ’ ὅς, τοιαύτη τις—betrays the same uneasiness at the repetition of ἦ δ’ ἔγω. But this, like the frequent insertion of ἐφη λέγων in reported narrative, is a natural way of calling attention to a fresh point. Cp. vii. 522 a, where fifteenth century scribes have tried to get rid of the second ἐφη by the clumsy expedient of reading ἀδελφά ἐθη ἄντα ἔχουσα.

Aristophanes indulges in a similar flight of fancy in the Acharnians 180 ff. where he makes Dicaeopolis conclude a private treaty with the Lacedemonians.

There is a slight confusion arising out of the double negative, the words μὴδεν ἦττον, k.t.l., presupposing ἐξείνα, which is implied in μηδεμίαν ἀνάγκην supra. This slight difficulty may have led to the reading ἄρχεις, for which...
the first hand in Par. Λ and Ven. Π wrote ἀρχ ῥη. For ἐπὶ η cp. iii. 388 δ εἰ καὶ ἐπί οι αὐτῷ τοιοῦτον ἡ λέγειν ἡ ποιεῖν: Phaedr. 264 β τῷ ἐπί οἱ εἰρήσαται.

Ἰσωσ ... ἐν γε τούτῳ| ‘Perhaps so, for the moment’: i.e. not permanently.

τί δέ; ἡ πραβτίς ... οὖν κομψή] (i) ‘And is there not something exquisite in her clemency towards some who have been condemned?’ This involves a possibly allowable extension of the ‘objective’ use of the genitive: ένιών = πρός ένιον cp. ii. 359 Λ έλεον οἱ αὐτῶν. Laws iv. 717 Λ σκοπός μὲν οὖν ἡμῶν οἶτος οὖ δει στοχάζεσθαι βέλη δὲ αὐτοῦ (the darts which reach the mark) καὶ οὖν ἡ τοῖς βέλεσιν ἐφεσι, τὰ ποῖ ἃν λεγίμενα ἀφθονατα φέρουν’ ἄν; This was Bekker’s view. (2) The genitive ἀκαθόδεντων may be taken as of the subject, ‘the meekness of some of the condemned’: said ironically for their indifference or contempt of the laws:—Both explanations give a sufficiently good sense, but the latter is to be preferred. περινοστεὶ ὅσπερ ήρωι infra is in favour of this interpretation, and it is harsh to make ἡ πραβτίς without any qualification or hint from the context to mean ‘the gentleness of democracy’ or ‘her gentleness.’ Some propose to insert ἐπί, περὶ or κατά (Stephanus) before ἐνιών.

ἡ οὖν ἐν εἰδεῖς, k.t.l.|] The sentence is somewhat irregular, the genitive μενόντων ... ἐν μέσῳ being substituted for the accusative after εἰδεῖς, through attraction to ἀνθρώπων. ‘The construction is softened through an association from the ordinary construction of the genitive with αἰσθάνομαι.

The subject of περινοστεῖ is to be gathered from μενόντων, k.t.l., ‘The man marches about.’ Late MSS. insert ο καταψηφισθεῖς. There is perhaps an implied allusion to the νύσται, ‘He is welcomed wherever he goes like one of the heroes returning from the siege of Troy.’ [Madv. cj. καταψηφισθεῖτος: Schn. cj. οὐτοῦ μενόντων.]

ἡ δὲ συγγνώμη, k.t.l.|] The sentence breaks off and is completed by the answer of Adeimantus πάνυ γ’, ἐφη, γενναία, in which γενναία may agree with πᾶς (as in the translation) or rather with συγγνώμη, the force of the interrogative having been continued from a preceding sentence—‘and what say you of her forgiving spirit, &c.? Yes, said he, that is glorious.’ The relation of ὡσ μεγαλοπρεπός ... πλήθει to καταφρόνησις ... τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα may be expressed as follows: ‘her contempt for the things we spoke of ... how grandly trampling them under foot she cares not at all,’ &c.
Before examining the democratic man it is advisable to define the necessary desires, which were above (554 A) distinguished from the unnecessary ones. Necessary desires are those which (1) are conducive to life, (2) impossible to extinguish. The desire of food, for example, is necessary, while that of savoury meats is unnecessary. And the drone of whom we spoke is the slave of unnecessary desires, but the oligarch only of the necessary.

Our penurious oligarchical man might have (I suppose) a son, &c.

This is said in continuation of the preceding sentence, the participle ἄρχων agreeing with the subject of γένοιτ' ἄν. Socrates is proceeding to develop the genesis of the democratic man. A finite verb (e.g. ἐγένεσα τοῦ κυρίου μέλημα, cp. infra 559 D) would have followed, had not the apodosis been broken off or deferred in favour of the digression about the necessary desires. This is better (as is shown by δῆ) than to suppose the participle to be merely linked on to the preceding sentence as in 554 A αἴχυμπος γέ τις . . . ἄν.

Socrates here makes a psychological digression, for the first time introducing the distinction which afterwards became the favourite one with Aristotle and the Epicureans, of pleasures which are and are not natural and necessary. The digression may be compared with the one in iv. 436-438 in which Socrates treats of relation and opposition. He returns to the distinction of natural and necessary pleasures in the next book (ix. 572 c ff.).

καὶ πρὸς] πρὸς is taken adverbially, as often with γε, e.g. i. 328 A καὶ πρὸς γε πανευθανεῖς ποιήσουσιν, and sometimes without : as in Euthyd. 298 D καὶ πρὸς ἀπρ σο ἐπι πατήρ ἔστι καὶ κύων : Laws iv. 709 C.

αἱ ἑλισιν] Cp. vii. 529 A τὴν περὶ τὰ ἄνω μάθησιν λαμβάνειν παρὰ σαύρῳ, ἦ ἐστι: where ἦ = οἶα, as in this passage αἱ = οἰα.
Notes: Book VIII.

ἀρ’ οὖν οὖχ... (b) δὲν εἶη: ‘will not the desire of eating within the limits of health and strength, and of simple food and condiments be necessary?’ αὐτοῦ σίτου τε καὶ ὑψου is joined with ἡ, and completes the notion of τοῦ φαγεῖν, κ.τ.λ. αὐτοῦ is added to prepare for the antithesis ἡ πέρα τοῦτον, κ.τ.λ., infra. Cp. iv. 439 λ δίψας... αὐτὸ... αὐτοῦ πῶματος. The modern distinction between food and the pleasure of eating as the object of hunger, does not occur to Plato.

ἡ τε μὴ... δυνατή| ‘and because a man cannot suppress it while he lives.’ This reading of the Munich MS. q (not noticed by Bekker) is preferred to those of the chief MSS. on two grounds: (1) καὶ ἀμφότερα must refer to the twofold condition repeatedly mentioned in 558 b, e, 559 λ, and again implied in δυνατῇ δὲ κολα-ζομείη, κ.τ.λ., infra. This meaning cannot be got out of the reading ἡ τε παισαι ζωντα δυνατή: (2) παύσαι ζώντα, ‘to make one cease from living,’ would be a very strange expression for ἀποκτουνώναι. Just as βλαβερά, in what follows, is opposed to ὀφέλιμος here, so δυνατή... ἀπαλλάττεσθαι contains the opposite of the remaining clause ἡ τε μὴ... δυνατή.

For the idiomatic expression cp. vii. 537 b ἄνδυνατος τι ἄλλο πρᾶξαι, where, if the subject of πρᾶξαι had been expressed, it would have been in the accusative (τοὺς νίους). So ζώντα agrees with the subject of παύσαι here. Negation is expressed through μὴ rather than ὑν—which Coraes suggested—because the sentence states a condition. The complete expression would be ἀναγκαία (ἀν εἶη) ἡ μὴ (ἐστὶ) δυνατή (τω) παίσαι ζώντα. Professor W. W. Goodwin, who approves of this interpretation, quotes Xen. Anab. iv. 1. § 24 δυνατήν... ὑποζυγίον πορεύεσθαι δῆν. For the transition from the dative to the accusative with an infinitive cp. iv. 422 b οὐδ᾽ εἰ ἔξειῃ... ὑποφεύγοντα... ἀναστρέφοντα κρούειν. For the corruption of MSS. through dropping the negative, see Essay on Text, pp. 106–109. [L. C.]

τι δὲ... ἀπαλλάττεσθαι] ‘and the desire which goes beyond this, craving more elaborate dishes, of which, if controlled and trained in youth, most people may get rid’: καὶ ἄλλοις, κ.τ.λ., answers to καὶ αὐτοῦ σίτου in what precedes. ἀπαλλάττεσθαι is passive: cp. supra λ ἄσ... ἀπαλλάξειν ἂν.

χρηματιστικάς διὰ τό, κ.τ.λ. Plato seizes the word which comes nearest to his meaning, and justifies it by a false etymology not better than many in the Cratylus.
Now suppose the oligarchical individual to have a son, who after a miserly education, falls amongst the drones and tastes their honey. His useless desires are re-inflected, until in turn his prudential inclinations are strengthened with admonition. There is civil war within him, till the democratic faction is turned out, and he returns to regular ways. But his father has no gift in education, and the ill weeds grow apace; and there is again a faction within that holds secret correspondence with strange pleasures, with whose aid at last they rush up and seize the Acropolis of the Soul. It has been swept clean of its true defenders (reason and virtue) and lies open to the assaults of vicious sophistry. The youth returns to the companionship of the drones, and when good counsel (accredited or not) seeks audience, the gates are barred. Perverted reason discards the old-fashioned virtues, and all vices of insolence and excess are openly installed under fair titles as manliness and liberality and freedom. This downward course may be arrested as youth wears off, and then the man gives way to every impulse in its turn, now drinking, now abstaining; now toiling at athletics, then again doing nothing at all; first all for war, then all for business; living not one life but taking a turn at many—an existence truly delightful as many persons think.

τάλιν τοῖνυν, κ.τ.λ.] The analogy of the state and the individual, which in the previous stages was helped by real points of resemblance as well as by language, begins to fail more and more. For though the transition from the miserly father to the spendthrift son is natural enough and true to human life, the parallel transition from oligarchy to democracy is not substantiated by history and is fanciful and untrue. τάλιν marks the resumption from 558 δ after the digression.

ὡς νῦν δὴ ἑλέγομεν] supra 558 c. αἰθωσι θηροί, sc. the drones.

αἰθωσι] = 'fiery,' a poetical word, in keeping with the rhetorical and grandiloquent character of this part of the Republic.

μεταβολῆς . . . δημοκρατικῆν] There is no difference of reading in this passage, but the words are difficult: either (1) ὀλιγαρχικῆς
Notes: Book VIII.

(supply πολιτείας or καταστάσεως) is the genitive after μεταβολῆς, but the ellipse is harsh; or (2) διγαρπικῆς may be a corruption of διγαρπίας, which has led to the further corruption of δημοκρατίαν into δημοκρατικὴν. For the double genitive cp. vii. 525 c ῥεξθῶν τε μεταστροφῆς, κ.τ.λ. The addition of ἐ after μεταβολῆς would certainly make the sentence clearer.

ἐμμαχίας] used here, as in Thuc. vi. 73 ὅπως ἐμμαχία ... παραγένητα and elsewhere, in the concrete sense of 'an allied force.' So also ἐμμαχία below.

ἐξωθεν] viz. from the κηφῆνας with whom he associates. We may note that the quarrel is not between reason and desire, but between a thrifty parsimonious spirit and unsatisfied craving and discontent.

τῷ ἐτέρῳ τῶν παρ’ ἐκείνῳ] the self-indulgent desires, as opposed to the necessary ones.

τῷ ἐν ἑαυτῷ] The reflexive pronoun can hardly be right with ἐκείνῳ preceding. Perhaps the two words have changed places in the MSS. from τῶν παρ’ ἑαυτῷ ... τῷ ἐν ἐκείνῳ.

ἡ ποθεν παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς] 'it may be from his father': πόθεν expresses the uncertainty from what quarter the alliance will come.

ἀδικις δὲ ... ἐγένοντο] For a time the democracy is partially suppressed by assistance from without, and the house is again swept and garnished. But new passions gather and grow to a head, and possess themselves of the undefended citadel: 'seven other devils' in the shape of opinions and sophisms 'enter in and dwell there': and they hold the gates of the palace against all comers, and suffer no other power to make an alliance, nor even individuals to parley. The inter-penetration of metaphor and fact, and the subtle manner in which the particulars of the life of the state are woven into the life of the individual, add greatly to the beauty and expressiveness of the passage.

τῶν ἐκπεσουσών ... ἐγγυγενεῖς] 'Other desires, akin to those which were banished, growing up within him.'

δι’ ἀνεπιστημοσύνην τροφῆς πατρός] (1) 'because he, their father, does not know how to educate them.' The man is regarded as the parent of his desires (cp. infra 561 B ἐξ ἵσου τρέψων). But the imagery is forced, and not consistent. For his duty towards these
desires was not to educate but to exterminate them. Rather (2) because his father had no skill in education. The reference is to the ‘oligarchical’ father, who was said above (554 B, 559 D) to have given no attention to education, and to have brought up his son ἀπαντητῶν. [I. C.]

λάθρα ἄμυλλα, sc. ταῖς ἔμοι τῆς ἐπιθυμίας, implied in τὰς αὐτὰς ὁμιλίας which again refers to 559 ε.

φονεύτω τε καὶ φύλακες] φονεύτω is added to sustain the image of a garrison. Cp. infra 561 B τὸ φονεύτων.

καὶ πολύ γ', ἐφη] sc. ἀριστω.

τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον] sc. τὴν ἀκριόπολιν.

eἰς ἑκείνους τούς λαστοφάγους] who make him forget his home, like the mariners of Odysseus, Od. ix. 81 ff. The reference is to the κηφῶνες mentioned supra 559 D.

φανερῶς] ‘openly,’ no longer λάθρα supra B. Cp. vii. 536 c ἀπαρακλητῶσ. Before, he had hesitated and listened to both sides; now he has made up his mind, and will listen only to this one.

οὔτε πρέσβεις . . . εἰσδέχονται] ‘Nor do they receive the words of old men in a private capacity, which come as ambassadors.’ The λόγοι, not the persons, form the embassy. The image is complicated and in some danger of being confused by the subordinate contrast between the authority of the family and the influence of friends. The former is described as the action of a league coming publicly in aid; the latter as a commission or embassy. The word πρέσβεις, which is suggested by the association of πρεσβυτέρων, is not necessarily inconsistent with ἴδιωτῶν. See Dem. 1121. τ, quoted by L. and S. s. v. πρεσβυτής, ii. The image, as not unfrequently happens in Greek, is crossed with the thing signified. The advice of private friends is imagined as that of individual commissioners accompanying an army, much as in Xen. Hellen. ii. 4, § 36, the public embassy from the Peiraeus is accompanied by individuals, ἴδιωται, who are sent in a private capacity from a party in the city.

The emendation of Badham adopted by Cobet, δι' ἀτον, is unnecessary and feeble, and the personification of the ἀλαζόνες λόγου who have ὅτα, extravagant.

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who advise him on their own account,"—not as accredited on behalf of his friends (παρ' ὁικείων τις βοήθεια supra).

καὶ τὴν μὲν αἰδώ, κ.τ.λ.] For the inversion of ethical terms, cp. Thuc. iii. 83.

πείθοντες (sc. ὅσι ἄγρυκαι καὶ ἀνελειθερία ἐστίν) is added to complete the expression.

καθήραντες] is of course ironical (cp. infra 567 c), and, like τελουμένου, alludes to the mysteries.

κατεχομένου] has a twofold association: (1) 'who is occupied like a conquered city,' or (2) 'possessed' by them, cp. Ion 533 ένθεου δώτε καὶ κατεχόμενον.


ἀρ' οὖχ . . . ἀνεσίν] The accusative ἐλευθέρωσιν, κ.τ.λ., expresses the effect of the change: cp. iv. 424 c εἴδος γὰρ καίνην μουσίκης μεταβάλλειν. ἐκ τοῦ . . . πρεφομένου may be either neuter = 'from a life that is nourished,' or masculine 'from one who is nurtured,' cp. supra 558 διὰ ὑώς ὑπὸ τῷ πατρὶ τεθραμμένος ἐν τοῖς ἐκείνου ἡθεσιν.

ἐὰν εὐτυχῆς ἦ] Madvig conjectured ἐὰν εὐτυχῆση, partly with a view of harmonizing the tenses, and partly under the influence of a parallel passage ix. 578 c where Bekker reads ὁς ἂν . . . τυραννικὸς ἂν . . . δυστυχῆσῃ, κ.τ.λ. But (1) there is no objection to the dissimilarity of tenses, which constantly recurs: (2) the present tense gives a better meaning, 'if he be fortunate,' referring to his whole state and character: (3) there is no reason if Plato wrote δυστυχῆσῃ in one place, that he should have written εὐτυχῆση in another: (4) moreover δυστυχῆσῃ is itself an unnecessary emendation of δυστυχῆς ἦ, which in turn is a confirmation of εὐτυχῆς ἦ.

ἄλλα τι καὶ πρεσβύτερος. κ.τ.λ.] The words τι καί are opposed to μὴ πέρα ἐκβακχευθῇ and modify what follows μέρη τε . . . ἐνδόω: 'but as he grows older in some degree modifies his passions,' a meaning which is to be gathered from the remainder of the sentence.

tοῦ πολλοῦ θρούβου παρελθόντος] 'when the turmoil of passion has mostly passed by.'

tοῖς ἐπεισελθοῦσι] supra 559 E.

eἰς ἵσον δὴ τὶ καταστήσας. κ.τ.λ.] The passions of the democratic man rule by chance, as in a democracy the magistrates are elected
by lot. The freeman gives each of them their turn, and will not be
the slave of any: but unfortunately he is equally impartial between
good and evil. As he grows older, he learns to balance them with
one another. He is the Alcibiades or Mirabeau of history: the
rake who turns politician in common life—πρεσβέτερος γενόμενος, κ.τ.λ.

παραπεπτούση . . . λαχούση  ‘the chance passion, which as it
were obtains the lot.’

έως ἀν πληρωθῇ] sc. ἡ παραπεπτοσύνα ἤδονη. πληροῦν ἤδονήν is said
with a slight degree of inaccuracy for πληροῦν ἑπιθυμίαν.

αφόδρα γάρ] This and other strong affirmations indicate that
what Socrates asserts is corroborated by Adeimantus’ own
experience, cp. supra 556 ε. εὖ οἴδα, κ.τ.λ.

ώς εἰ φιλοσοφία]  ‘as if he were spending his time in philosophy’: οὐ
here = quasi.

παντάπασιν . . . ἀνδρός] ‘You have certainly described the life
of a man who is a lover of equality.’ The compound, meaning
‘equality before the law,’ is made to suggest indifferences as to this,
that, or the other rule of life.

καὶ παντοδαπόν τε καὶ . . . μεστόν] sc. βίον.

τὸν καλὸν τε καὶ ποικίλον] not the life but the man. The
article in the predicate (τὸν καλὸν τε καὶ ποικίλον) implies ‘the man
whom we are seeking.’ ‘And that the man of whom we are
speaking is the fair and spangled one whom we are seeking, just as
that city was.’

As wealth, the good of oligarchy, caused the reaction to democracy,
so liberty leads from democracy to tyranny. The first stage how-
ever in this progress is from democracy to anarchy. Unscrupulous
leaders, the evil cup-bearers, mix the draughts of liberty too strong,
until the city is drunken. Then fathers fear their sons, and sons
assume authority over their fathers. The citizen, the metic and the
foreigner are all as one. The young vie with the old; and the old
condescend to the young, lest they should be thought severe and
morose. The difference between men and women disappears, and at
last even the slaves assume the airs of free-men. Nay the very cattle
in the public roads will jostle wayfarers, as having equal rights.
The public mind becomes so restive as to be intolerant of the very
shadow of authority.
Notes: Book VIII.

'tis tropeos . . . ginetai;' i.e. tis tropeos esti tis geniseos autou;
'What is the nature of the process in the case of tyranny.'

σχεδυν δήλον] This is assumed as a corollary from the succession of states. That it comes from oligarchy is clear. The question is how does it come?

['What is the character of tyranny? For it is clear that it arises out of democracy.' 'It is clear.' 'And does not tyranny arise from democracy in much the same sort of way as democracy from oligarchy?'] Plato begins by speaking of the character of tyranny, just hinting that its origin is too well known to need discussion. But then, with a certain amount of inconsistency, he proceeds to treat the question at some length. B. J.]

τρόπων τινα των αυτών] 'In somewhat the same way.' τινα is added because the process is only to a certain extent the same.

δ προσθεντο, κ.τ.λ.] The construction of the sentence is interrupted by ἓ γαρ; and resumed in ἐπὶ πλουτοῦ τοίνυν ἀπληστία. πλουτοῦ being substituted for τοῦτον after the digression.

[ὑπερ]πλουτος] occurs elsewhere only as an adjective (supra 552 B, Aesch. Prom. 466). As a substantive it may be defended by the analogy of such words as ὑπέρθεος, ὑπερσοφιστής, ὑπερθεμιστοκλῆς, ὑπέρδουλος. [B. J.]

[But ὑπὲρ is probably a corruption of ποῦ, which occurs elsewhere in similar references: vi. 490 C, vii. 533 D, ix. 572 C, 582 D, 588 B. Other conjectural emendations are ὑπὲρ πλουτοῦ (Madvig), ὑπερ-πλουτεῖν. L. C.]

ἐν δημοκρατουμενη πόλει] sc. ὀν.

ἐχει τε κάλλιστον] sc. ἡ δημοκρατουμενή πόλει,—(1) 'is the fairest of its fair attributes.' Cp. Theaet. 171 A toû 'ἐχει κομψότατον. Or (2) 'it has this in the highest perfection,' i.e. better than any other state.


δπερ ἦν νῦν δὴ ἐρών] These words resume the thread that has been broken off by digressions. Socrates has reminded Adeimantus that wealth was the principle and excessive wealth the ruin of oligarchy, and that liberty was the principle of democracy. He
now returns to his main purpose, which was to prove that excessive liberty is the ruin of democracy and prepares for tyranny.

562 

τὴν ἀναρχίαν] No longer liberty, but anarchy.

563 καὶ σμικρὰ τοιάδει] σμικρὰ is used ironically as in i. 339 β σμικρά

γε ἵσως, ἔφη, προσθῆκη. Cp. iv. 423 c καὶ φαιλῶν γ', ἔφη, κ.τ.λ., and note.

B τὸ δὲ γε ... ἔσχατον, κ.τ.λ.] is an exclamation, softened by the epexegesis in ὅσον γίγνεται, κ.τ.λ. See above, 558 β ἦ δὲ συγγρώμη, κ.τ.λ., and note.

C οὐκοῦν κατ' Ἀισχύλον, κ.τ.λ.] From an unknown play of Aeschylus. Fr. 341 Nauck.

Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity are found to exist among men and women, slaves and freemen. The animals catch the infection.

This and some of the previous passages are translated by Cic. de Rep. i. chap. 43. He has not however been altogether able to 'carry the jest,’ which is propounded by him seriously and without the delicate preparation of Plato. ‘Ex quo fit ut etiam servi se liberi gerant: uxores eodem iure sint quo viri. Quia tanta libertate canes etiam et equi, aselli, denique liberi sint, sic incurrant, ut eis de via decedendum sit.' The most extravagant and comical ideas (ὁ τι νῦν ἡλθ' ἐπὶ στόμα;) often occur in the works of Plato. But the manner of saying them, which enhances the humour, does away with the feeling of bad taste and impropriety.

ἀτεχνῶς γάρ, κ.τ.λ.] ‘The proverb is amply verified, “like lady, like lap-dog.”’ The proverb of course refers to assimilation of character;—Master Shallow's men ‘by observing of him, do bear themselves like foolish justices; he, by conversing with them, is turned into a justice-like serving-man: their spirits are so married in conjunction with the participation of society, that they flock together in consent, like so many wild-geese’ (Shakespeare, 2 Henry IV, v. 1). But Plato applies it in a new sense with reference to assumed equality. The spaniel disputes the sofa with her mistress.

γίγνονται, κ.τ.λ.] ‘and there are horses and asses accustomed,’ &c. [B. J.]

[After γίγνονται some general notion such as ἐλείθερον has to be supplied. Or (2) deleting the commas and construing γίγνονται with what precedes, we may suppose some word of similar ending, e. g. σεμνύνονται, to have dropped out before τε δή, κ.τ.λ. L. C.]
You perceive how the accumulation of all these things renders sensitive the mind of the citizens. The subject of ποιεῖ is to be supplied from the genitive absolute. τὸ... κεφαλαίον is in apposition with the sentence. ‘As the upshot of all this when it has accumulated, how sensitive the soul of the citizens becomes’; cp. Theaet. 182 β ἄλλο εἴ μητρώων πρὸς ἄλληλα συγγενομένων τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ ἀποτικτοντα τὰ μὲν ποιὰ ὢντα γίνεσθαι, τὰ δὲ αἰσθανόμενα.

Dr. W. H. Thompson conjectured προσφέρῃ.

‘I know it only too well, he said.’ The alacrity of the response to the description of democracy here and supra 558 c implies personal experience.

‘sprightly.’ This epithet is specially applied to the exaggerated form of democracy in which liberty becomes license—supra 562 c ff.

The excess of liberty leads to the extreme of servitude, and the state passes from democracy through anarchy to tyranny. The immediate authors of the change are the class of idle spendthrifts whom we compared to drones. Of these there are two species, the stinging and the stingless: the former lead the way, the latter follow; while between them they have almost a monopoly of power. For the money-making class do but afford them pasturage, and the poor who have to work for their subsistence will not attend to politics unless they are paid. And the drones, taking money from the rich, will give the others just so much as may conduce to their own purposes. The rich, driven to self-defence, incur the suspicion of oligarchy, and power is thus given to the Protector of the people. For the populace have always some one favourite. Let the Protector once taste blood, and his destiny is fixed. By the law of self-preservation he must become a wolf, i.e. a tyrant. When the combination of his enemies becomes formidable, he asks for a body-guard which is readily granted him. When this takes place, then let the rich man fly. For the Protector will cast many down, and stand erect in the chariot of the state, a full-blown Tyrant.

tαύτων... τοῦτο] I. e. excess. Socrates raises expectation by drawing out the analogy in the disorders of the oligarchical and
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563 E
democratical state. To this the interlocutor, Adeimantus, gives several passive and uncertain answers. He does not see whither the generalities of Socrates are tending. Socrates refers to his half-expressed dissatisfaction in the words ἀλλ' οὐ τούτ', οἶμαι ... ἡρώτας infra 564 b. 'But this was not the point of your question': viz. supra 562 E πῶς ... τὸ τοιοῦτον λέγομεν;

καὶ τῷ ὄντι ... (564 Α) ἡκιστά] τῷ ὄντι marks the fresh exemplification of a familiar truth: cp. vi. 497 ν τὰ καλὰ τῷ ὄντι χαλεπά. So ὥς ἀληθῶς, ἀτεχνῶς.

564 Α
καὶ δή] is omitted in Par. Α and some other MSS. Though not necessary, the words are Platonic and idiomatic.

εἰς ἄγαν δουλείαν] Like σφάδρα φιλία Laws iii. 698 c.

εἰς οἶμαι, κ.τ.λ.] οἶμαι is inserted like a particle after the preposition.

564 B
dουλοῦται αὐτὴν] sc. τὴν δημοκρατίαν, or rather τὴν δημοκρατουμένην πόλιν.

ἀληθῆ, ἐφη, λέγεις] i.e. that was what I meant.

ἐκεῖνο ... ἀκέντροις] The pronoun refers to supra 552 c where the 'drones' are first mentioned.

ἐν πάσῃ πολιτείᾳ ἐγγιγνομένῳ] sc. ἐν ἣ ἐν ἐγγίγνησθον, 'wherever found.' After ταράττενον, τὴν πολιτείαν must be supplied from ἐν πάσῃ πολιτείᾳ, 'make confusion in every state where they arise.'

φλέγμα τε καὶ χολή] According to Aristotle, Prob. i. 29, χολή is hot and φλέγμα cold. The hot humour answers to the stinging, the cold to the stingless drones.

564 C
μελιτουργὸν] 'maker of honey;' is the reading of the first hand of Par. Α. The other reading μελιτουργόν, 'bee-master,' is the more common, if not the only form elsewhere, which may be regarded as a reason either for adopting or rejecting it. It is also more directly in point.

ἐκτετμήσεσθον] The rare fut. perf. is very expressive,—'that they be extirpated once for all.'

ὡδε τοῖνυν ... καὶ ἔχει] The object of λάβωμεν, sc. τὸ πράγμα, is easily supplied. There is a tendency in Plato to omit the case after verbs which describe dialectical or mental processes, e.g. ἀναλαβεῖν, διορίζοσθαι, ἀναγκάζειν.
Public offices with few exceptions are filled by this class of persons. What exceptions Plato had in his mind we can only guess. He may be referring to institutions like the Areopagus, or to individual statesmen like Pericles: cp. infra εχωρις τιων δλιγων.

προσίζουν βομβεί] ‘settles and keeps up a constant hum.’

There is no reason why this verb should not be used intransitively, but it is rather confusing to have it so with βλίσεις following in the active meaning, and Ruhnken (Tim. p. 63) was perhaps right in reading βλίττεται.

implies that the rich are now a separate class.

αύτουργοι] ‘who work with their hands;’ not, as the word elsewhere means, ‘tilling their own land.’ They are here opposed to the employers of labour.

και ἀπράγμονες] ‘and keep out of politics.’

έστι γαρ . . . μεταλαμβάν] θαμά belongs to the whole sentence, not to ποιεῖν alone:—‘are not often disposed to do so.’

One of the great problems of democracies has ever been how to make the mass of the people use their infinitesimal share of the government. The power which they have is so small that it is very partially exercised except in times of revolution and excitement. The Athenians solved the difficulty by giving the ecclesiasts ‘a little honey.’ Cp. Aristoph. Wasps 655-679, and Dem. Olynth. iii. 37, §§ 35, 36.

The history of Athens in the century after the Persian War, and especially of the oligarchical party,—hardly loyal in the time of Pericles and Ephialtes, and in the later years of the Peloponnesian War usurping the government, which they afterwards accepted from a foreign power in the name of the Thirty Tyrants, and the political reaction to which the remembrance of this tyranny as well as of the older one of Pisistratus gave rise, is the best commentary on this passage.

τὸ πλεῖστον αὐτοὶ ἐχεῖν] Cp. especially Thuc. iii. 38 and 42.

μεταλαμβάνει . . . οὖτως] ‘Why, yes, to that extent the people
Republic VIII.

565 C do share: i.e. they have what their leaders are willing to leave them.

565 D ἐἰσαγγελίαι] 'impeachments,' viz. against the oligarchs for arbitrary conduct, leading to reprisals on their part.

D ὁ γενόμενος, κ.τ.λ., which is an anacoluthon, is resumed in τούτῳ.

E έμφυλίου αἴματος] His fellow-citizen is regarded as his kinsman. For an account of the wide prevalence of similar beliefs and various conjectures respecting their origin, see McLennan's article 'Lycanthropy,' in Encycl. Brit., ed. ix.

E γλώττῃ . . . ἀνοσίω] The tongue and lips which make the slanderous accusation are vividly imagined as actually tasting blood.

566 A ὑποσημαίνη] For ὑποσημαίνεω = 'to indicate or intimate a line of action,' cp. Thuc. i. 82, § 3 ὁρῶντες ἡμῶν ἢδη τὴν τε παρασκευὴν καὶ τοὺς λόγους αὐτῆς ὑμῶν ὑποσημαίνοντας. εἴμαρται adds solemnity. It is a law of Destiny.

B διαβάλλοντες τῇ πόλει] 'by setting the citizens against him.' For the construction cp. Phaedo 67 ε διαβεβληται μὲν πανταχὺ τῷ σώματι.

B τὸ δὴ τυραννικὸν αἰτήμα, κ.τ.λ.] αἰτεῖν infra is the explanation of αἰτήμα.

B αὐτοῖς] sc. τῷ δήμῳ supplied from τὸν δήμον supra, marks ironically the personal interest which the people take in their Protector. The simplicity or stupidity of the people, who are compared in vi. 488 A, B to the deaf and short-sighted ship-master, is a favourite theme of Plato in the Republic.

C τῶν Κροίσῳ γενόμενον χρησμόν] Herod. i. 55.


What sort of happiness has the tyrant and the city which is under a tyranny? In his early days, the tyrant is all smiles and promises and humbleness, making gifts of lands to all and sundry, but especially to those who serve him. But there comes a time when he must stir up wars, that the people may require his leadership and that he may drain the resources of the powerful and also expose his private enemies to danger. War brings unpopularity, and some of those who helped him to his throne find fault with him. He must put these out of the way, and gradually he is compelled to 'purge the commonwealth' of all high-minded, brave, and able men, leaving only the dregs of the populace. At the same time, to secure his power, he must increase his body-guard with mercenaries and emancipated slaves. These are 'the wise companions whose intercourse,' as the tragic poet says, 'makes the tyrant wise.'—And it is because they say such things that we refuse to admit the tragedians into our state and bid them go elsewhere. They will breathe most freely, where the form of government is worst!—But we wander from the subject. Thus installed, the tyrant will, as long as he can, support his armies by robbery of temples and confiscation: and when that source fails, he will tax the people. If they resist, he will disarm and strike them, though he will be striking his own father.

βροτός] is a poetical word and is chosen to express abhorrence:—'such a creature.' The strain of irony mingles with contempt in such expressions as καλλιστος ἄνδρα, καλλίστη πολιτεία, τήν εὐδαμονίαν τοῦ ἄνδρος, κ.τ.λ., cp. supra 562 l, 563 e.

tαῖς μὲν πρώταις ἡμέραις, κ.τ.λ.] cp. Hotspur on Bolingbroke ('this king of smiles') in Shakespeare, 1 Henry IV, i. 3, 246.

διαν δὲ γε . . . καταλλαγῇ] ‘but when in his relations to enemies without he is reconciled to some and destroys others,' &c. The irregularity of the language is softened by the possible construction of πρὸς ἑκθροὺς with καταλλαγῇ, and the resumption of ἑκθροὺς in ἐκεῖνων. For ἡσυχία ἐκείνων cp. Herod. i. 45, § 4 ἐπεὶ τε ἡσυχίη τῶν ἑθρώπων ἐγέρετο περὶ τὸ σῶμα.
Plato: Republic.

Republic VIII.

567 A

οὐκοῦν ... ἐπιβουλεύσωσιν;] cp. Arist. Pol. v. i i, § 8.

ταῦτα δὴ ... (B) πολίταις;] ἐτομον, sc. ἑστὶν. ἐτομος is one of a class of words, ἄξιος, δήλος, &c., with which this ellipse is common. In the following sentence παρρησιάζεσθαι is governed by ἐτομῶν ἑστὶν, or by a more general notion to be gathered from ἀνάγκη and ἐτομον.

B


ὑπεξαίρειν] ‘to remove.’ Par. A reads ὑπεξαίρειν by a frequent confusion. For ὑπεξαίρειν in this sense = ‘to put out of the way,’ cp. especially Thuc. viii. 70, § 2 (of the Four Hundred) ἀνέδρας τέ τινις ἀπέκτειναν οὐ πολλοίς, οὐ ἔδουκαν ἑπιτήδεου εἰσαὶ ὑπεξαίρεθηναι.

C

ὡς ἐοίκε γάρ] sc. εἰναι. ἀνάγκη is the subject of ἐοίκε.

ἐιπερ ἄρξει] ‘if he is to be master.’

D

μετὰ φαινον τῶν πολλῶν] not ‘with the many bad’ (as in the translation) but ‘with companions most of whom are bad.’ Cp. ix. 579 ε ὑπὸ πάντων πολεμίων.

τὸν μισθὸν] ‘the necessary pay.’ It is assumed that he can get no service voluntarily.

E

τι δὲ;] The early editions read τοῖς δὲ, which is not indefensible though weakly supported by the MSS. ‘And when he has guardsmen on the spot, will he not prefer to employ them?’ Par. A and nearly all the other MSS. give τίς δὲ (‘but who would not wish to get them on the spot?’) This meaning is forced and inconsistent with the ἄρα which is weak even if changed to ἄρα. The most probable variant is that of the Munich MS. q which was preferred by Stallbaum, and is adopted in the text:—‘Well, but will he not choose to take retainers (δομεφόρους ποιήσασθαι) from the spot?’ According to any way of taking the passage some general notion such as λαβεῖν or ποιήσασθαι must be supplied with ἐθελήσειν from μεταπέμψεται in the previous sentence.

568 A

οἱ νέοι πολίται] viz. the foreign mercenaries. ἡνείσιν, sc. αὐτῷ.

πυκνῆς διανοίας ἐχάμενον] ‘characteristic of a shrewd wit.’ Cp. vi. 496 Λ φρονήσεως ... ἀληθινῆς ἐχάμενον.

B

ὡς ἄρα ... συνουσία] The line σοφοί τύραννοι τῶν σοφῶν συνουσία is variously ascribed by the scholiasts to an unknown play of
Euripides, and also to the Ajax Locrus of Sophocles. See Nauck, Frag. Soph. 13.

τούτοις] (1) may refer to οὗτοι οἱ ἐταίροι supra: ‘these’ (i.e. the associates Plato has mentioned) ‘are manifestly the wise men meant by Euripides:’ or (2) with a comma before ξύνεσθιν, ‘these are the wise,’ viz. the people with whom the tyrant consorts.

καὶ ὃς ἰσοθέον γ’, ἔφη ... ποιηταῖ] The line to which allusion is made is Eurip. Troad. 1169 γάμων τε καὶ τῆς ἰσοθέου τυραννίδος. See also Phoenissae 503–506.

tοιγάρτοι ... (c) κομψοὶ] The poets, who are ironically supposed to be of a gentle nature, as the law has been already passed, ‘do forgive us’ for expelling them. Hence the present (ξυγγιγνώ-σκουσιν) as well as the future παραβεβόμεθα.

Euripides is said to have visited the court of Archilaus king of Macedonia; Pindar and Simonides, perhaps Aeschylus also, were familiar at that of Hiero. Was Plato himself the friend and intimate of Dionysius? The manner in which the relation is here spoken of is at variance with such a supposition, for which the spurious epistles are not a sufficient warrant; and which may, perhaps, like the meeting of Solon and Croesus in Herodotus, be a moral sentiment rather than an historical fact. Whether Plato ‘was or was not a good citizen,’ no one was ever more intensely penetrated with the Greek feeling against tyrants.

καλὰς φωνὰς ... μισθωσάμενοι] viz. of those who are called the poets’ ὑπηρέτα, supra ii. 373 Β ῥαψῳδοί, ὑποκραταί, χορευταί:

ἐξεβηκέν] ‘In this we have been making a digression.’ The reference to Tragedy beginning at supra Λ οὐκ ἐτὸς was a digression.

τὰ τῶν ἀποδομένων] This cannot be right. Par. Α reads λ ἀποδομένων, the λ above the line being possibly by the first hand. The reading ἀπολομένων is also found in the Munich MS. q. Baiter reads καὶ τὰ τῶν ἀπολομένων, which has the merit of giving regularity to the syntax. But the deferred apodosis (for which cp. especially ix. 575 λ τῶν ἐχουσά τε and note) offers no real difficulty, and the suspended construction, to be resumed again after τί δ’ ἔστων, κ.τ.λ., is more suitable here than a passing reference to the proscription, which was a fail accompli at 567 c (cp. also supra Λ τῶν προτέρους ἑκείνου ἀπολέσας). Stephanus proposed τὰ τῶν ἀποδομένων. But
even the present tense ἀποδιδοσθαι hardly occurs with passive meaning. The reading ἀποδομένων is very possibly a corruption of πωλουμένων. 'First he will make use of what sacred treasures there are in the city,—so far as the proceeds of what is thus exposed for sale suffice, reducing the contribution which he exacts from the people.' [L. C.]

E ἐὰν δὲ] ἐὰν τε, the reading of Par. A, &c., is difficult to explain, and is not satisfactorily accounted for by Schneider, who supposes it to answer to a suppressed ἐὰν τε μή. It is better either to omit τε or to read ἐὰν δέ, as in the text, with two MSS.—Μ (the Cesena MS.) and ν (Angelicus). The latter alternative seems further to involve the omission of δέ in πῶς [δέ] λέγεις;—πῶς λέγεις; εἶπον ἐὰν δέ. The apodosis is supplied by the answer γνώσεται γε, κ.τ.λ. (infra).

A κατέστησεν] 'established,' sc. ὡς προστάτην τοῦ δῆμου.

ἀπὸ] ἵπο is the reading of the MSS., but is clearly wrong.

καὶ νῦν . . . ἐξελαύνων;] It may be doubted whether (1) καὶ νῦν κελεύει is dependent on δή, and the indirect form of καὶ νῦν κελεύω; or (2) the preceding construction has been forgotten and καὶ νῦν κελεύει is an independent clause. The former is more lively and every way more probable.

γνώσεται γε . . . ἐξελαύνει] for ἡμί cp. supra 565 c αὐξεῖν μέγαν.

B καί, τὸ λεγόμενον, κ.τ.λ.] 'And as the saying is, the people who would avoid enslavement to free-men, which is smoke, have fallen under the tyranny of slaves, which is fire.' For the proverbial phrase cp. Shakespeare, As You Like It, i. 2, 270 'Thus must I from the smoke into the smother; From tyrant Duke unto a tyrant brother.'

C δουλων δουλείαν μεταμπισχόμενος] i.e. they are enslaved by slaves (cp. supra 567 ε), which is the most galling form of slavery.
BOOK IX.

The tyrannical individual alone remains. To know how he arises out of the democratical man, and whether he lives happily or not, we must examine into the nature of the desires. There are some of them which are active only in sleep, but in our dreams are capable of any amount of lawlessness. Now the democratical man, as we found, deliberately gave play to every impulse in its turn, and we imagine him in later life to have a son, whom he has brought up on the same principle of indiscriminate indulgence. But the son is led away by the temptations to which his father had yielded only in part, and after various oscillations between counter-influences, at length a master-passion is planted in his breast.

λοιπός γὰρ οὖν οὖν adds emphasis which can hardly be expressed in English: 'why, yes, he said, he is indeed the only one remaining.'

τὸ τῶν ἐπιθυμίων, κ.τ.λ.] The thread is taken up from viii. 558 D ff. where the distinction between the necessary and unnecessary pleasures is first clearly drawn. The unchaining of the lower nature, which had been arrested at a certain point (viii. 561 A) is now to be followed to its consummation, and the working of the desires must therefore be more minutely described.

οὐκοῦν ... ἐτέρας παρὰ καλῷ;] 'Is not the inquiry still open to us?' — ἐν καλῷ as in Soph. Elect. 384 νῦν γὰρ ἐν καλῷ φρονεῖν.

αἱ κινδυνεύουσι ... παντὶ] 'which appear to be innate in every man.'

ἐνίων μὲν ἄνθρωποι] 'in some persons.' The genitive follows ἡδοναί καὶ ἐπιθυμίαι resumed from the beginning of the sentence, and is to be repeated with ἀπαλλάττεσθαι. The latter word is passive as in viii. 559 A, B.

τῶν δὲ] 'but in the case of others,' answering to ἐνίων μὲν.

λέγεις δὲ καὶ ... ταῦτας;] 'and further let me ask, which do you mean by these?' καὶ is expressive of the surprise and interest which arises about the new point. Cp. Soph. Ο. Τ. 1129 παίον ἄνδρα καὶ λέγεις; Herod. ix. 25, § 2.
Republic

Plato: Republic.

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 República

Plato: Republic.

 República

Republic

IX.

571

C

ἐκείνου] sc. τοῦ ἐπίθυμητου, to be gathered from what precedes, viz. τὸ τῶν ἐπίθυμων supra λ.

ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ] is the resumption of the previous sentence ὅταν ... ἡθῆ, which in turn is the explanation of the clause τάς . . . ἐγειρομένας.

μητρὶ τε γάρ, κ.τ.λ.] Cp. Soph. O. T. 981:

πολλοὶ γὰρ ήθη καὶ ἀνείρασιν βροτῶν μητρὶ ἔωσεν ἀδηλήσαν.

ἐπίχειρεῖν] From the irrational element of human nature we here pass insensibly to the person in whom it is active.

D

ὡς οἰεται] ‘in imagination.’

βρώματος τε ἀπέχεσθαι μηθενός] ‘to indulge in any sort of food.’ Plato is preparing for the mention of the tyrant, infra 574 E, who in x. 619 c is supposed to eat his own children. In the latter part of the sentence the negative form of expression οὐδὲν ὅκνει is lost sight of, and the general sense of τολμᾷ supra is continued.

ὁγιενῶς . . . αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ] αὐτοῦ is a genitive of relation, like καλῶς ἔχειν αὐτοῦ. The passage which follows is translated by Cicero, de Divin. i. 29.

εἰς σύννοιαν αὐτὸς αὐτῷ] ‘having come to reflect upon himself.’ σύννοια has the meaning of ‘reflexion,’ ‘deep thought’ (cp. Aesch. Prom. 437 σύννοια δὲ διάπτομαι κεῖρα).

E


572

A

ἄλλ' ἐς, κ.τ.λ.] sc. τὸ βίλτιστον. Par. A p. m. has ἀρέγεσθαι καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαι. Par. A corr. has ἀρέγεσθαι τοῦ καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαι: the remaining MSS. have ἀρέγεσθαι τοῦ αἰσθάνεσθαι. If the reading ἀρέγεσθαι τοῦ καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαι is sound, the meaning is ‘it leaves the soul free from pains and lusts to pure contemplation, and to aspire further (καὶ) to perceive something which it knows not.’ But the words καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαι should perhaps be struck out and the accent restored to τοῦ. The rational principle is imagined as feeling after that in sleep which it may hope to comprehend in waking. Cp. x. 611 ε ὀίων ἐφίεται ὁμιλίων.

καθεύδη] is a resumption of εἰς τὸν ὄπινον ἦ, which is again
repeated in ἀναπαύονται: 'and does not go to sleep in a state of angry excitement because of a quarrel against some one.'

τῆς τ' ἀληθείας . . . ἀπτεταί] These words are not to be taken generally, but with reference to the time of sleep. When he goes to rest with his passions calmed and his reason awakened he attains more truth than when he goes to rest in any other frame of mind.

tαῦτα μὲν . . . ἐστίν] 'In saying these things we have digressed further than we intended: but the point on which we wish to remark is this.'


The truth seems to be, as Aristotle implies, that dreams have little or nothing of a moral nature; they are not the passions let loose from the control of reason, but physical imaginations of good and evil in which the will is almost, if not entirely, absent. Dreams are 'decaying sense'; they are the recollections of our waking life fancifully combined by associations which have no law; and sometimes the animal desires, but hardly ever the malignant ones, find an expression in them.

καὶ πάνυ . . . εἶναι] 'Even in some of us who unquestionably seem to be virtuous men.' καὶ πάνυ is to be joined with δοκοῦσιν. μετρίοις, 'not in excess,' and therefore, according to Greek notions, 'good and virtuous.'

ἡ] 'He arose, did he not (ποῦ), through being trained from his youth upward under a miserly parent?' (supra viii. 559 δ).

παιδιᾶς τε καὶ καλλωπισμοῦ ἑνεκα] 'Disregarding the unnecessary, which have for their object only amusement or ornament.'

eἰς . . . τὸ ἐκεῖνων εἰδῶν] 'To their fashions.' εἰδῶν is the plan or mode of life adopted by the men. Cp. Thuc. viii. 56 τρέπεται ἐπὶ τούτῳ εἰδῶ. Ficinus gives mores (Ἦθος?): cp. vi. 497 8.
Plato: Republic.


572 D  οὔτε ἀνελεύθερον οὔτε παράνομον] i.e. in the mean between ἀλγαρχία and ἄρχαρχία,—οὔδεν μᾶλλον εἰς ἀναγκαίους ἔδειν μὴ ἀναγκαίους ἔδοντι ἀναλίπτειν (viii. 561 A), βλέπον ἰσορρομοικοῦ τῶν ἄθροισ (ib. ε).

θῆς τοίνυν . . . τίθει] The present tense is appropriately substituted for the aorist, because in what follows attention is drawn not merely to the fact of his education which is presupposed, but to his way of life which is represented as continuing.

E  ὄνομαξιμενὴν δὲ] 'which however is termed.' Cp. Herod. vii. 155, § 2 ὑπὸ . . . τῶν σφετέρων δούλων, καλεομένων δὲ Κελλυρίων.

ταῖς εἰν μέσῳ] Supra δ κατέστη εἰς μέσων.

tοὺς δὲ αὖ] sc. τοὺς διαφθείροντας, supra c.

τὰ ἠτούμα διανεμομένων] 'which divide his means among them.' Cp. viii. 552 B τῶν ἠτοίμων ἀναλωτῆς.

573 A  τῶν τοιούτων] 'of men like him,' in whom the lower nature is predominant.

573 A-C  The master passion, a great and winged drone, leads the swarm of other passions buzzing in his train. They feed and pamper him until his sting is grown, when he is surrounded with a body-guard of furious lusts, which kill or banish what remains in the man of prudential and conventional virtue. Has not Passion long been called the tyrant of the soul? Is not the drunken man a lord? And do not madmen fancy that they can rule over the Gods?

573 A  περὶ αὐτῶν . . . (v) ἐν αὐτῷ . . . παρ' αὐτοῦ] περὶ αὐτῶν, i.e. the monster winged drone. ἐν αὐτῷ, i.e. the man,—not ἐν αὐτῷ, 'in the drone,' for good opinions and desires could hardly be supposed to exist in him, and οὗτος ὁ προστάτης τῆς ψυχῆς must be the subject of λάβῃ: παρ' αὐτοῦ, i.e. the monster winged drone. The subject of καθηρῃ is the drone and the object is the man.

οὐν] The rare plural may imply variety of wines (Xen. An. iv. 4, 9), but is rather simply 'magnific.' ἀνειμένων is a 'dragging predicate' implying a relative clause (cp. vii. 532 c) 'the pleasures found in such society, which are dissolute.'

ὅπο μανίας] A crowd of mad thoughts and fancies supply the place of the tyrant's body-guard—viii. 566 B. The manner in
which the metaphor is harmonized and sustained by the ‘buzzing of the appetites,’ and the ‘sting of desire,’ which is implanted in the monster drone, is very characteristic of Plato, in whom such continuous metaphors are used not merely as images but as links of connexion. In the same manner, by the use of the word προστάτης 572 E, continued in the προστάτης τῆς ψυχῆς, the master passion is gradually developed into the demagogue or leader of the people.

ποιομένας χρηστάς] ‘regarded as good.’ ποιομένας is one of those disparaging additions which Plato often employs, and here refers to the respectable ideas and motives which hold the desires in check when philosophy is absent. See above in the description of the oligarchical man (viii. 554 E) εὐσκημονίστερος ἀν πολλῶν . . . εἰ, and in the progress of his son (viii. 560 A) αἴδοις τῶν ἐγγενομένων ἐν τῇ τοῦ νέου ψυχῆ. This use of the passive ποιεῖται, although not supported by parallels from other writers, appears to be sufficiently established by the passages quoted on vi. 498 A. Another meaning suggested here is ‘good opinions in process of formation.’ But this use is no better authenticated, and it is out of keeping with the rest of the description to suppose any genuine tendencies to virtue springing up afresh at this stage of the downward career.

καὶ μανίας] καί, although found in Par. A and several other MSS, is probably spurious.

καὶ μή . . . ἀρχεῖν] Cp. Soph. Aj. 116, where Ajax gives his orders to Athena. ὑποκινεῖν suggests mental disturbance or excite, παρακινεῖν rather alienation or derangement. There is no reason why ὑποκινεῖν should not also be used intransitively.

Plato, in introducing a new sense of τυραννικός, illustrates his meaning by metaphorical uses of the word in common parlance,—τὰ φορτικὰ . . . προσφέροντες (iv. 442 E).

ἀκριβῶς] τῷ ἀκριβεῖ λόγῳ: ‘in the true sense of the word.’

*ανήρ] This word is probably the subject and should be ἀνήρ, although the MSS., as usual in such cases, read ἀνή. The presence of the article is proved by the lengthening of the alpha in similar places of tragic dialogue.

The life of riot which ensues awakens clamorous wants, which are supplied through rapine, until he robs and beats his parents, whom
he makes subservient to the meanest object of his desires. Then he breaks into houses, and robs temples, while the newly enfranchised lusts, that were formerly chained down except in sleep, overpower his respectable 'democratic' prepossessions. The master-passion is now tyrant to the height, and leads the soul that is under his dominion into every excess of crime, being ministered to partly from without and partly from within.

τὸ τῶν ... ἐρεὶς] ‘As people say in jest, that is not my business to tell you, but yours to tell me.’ καὶ is idiomatic, giving a sly emphasis:—‘That is just what you have to tell me.’

παρ' αὐτοῖς] ‘Amongst them,’ viz. the man and his companions: cp. supra Λ τῶν τοιούτων, also infra 575 c. Such monstrosities ‘never come single.’

ἂν ἄν ἔρως] ἂν is governed by ἔρως. ‘Whatever things are objects of the tyrant Passion that lives within.’

παραβλαστάνουσιν] ‘spring up beside’ the master-passion. The image is that of young saplings shooting up at the side of a tree.

tῆς οὐσιάς παραπέσεις] ‘encroachments on his capital’:—he parts with some of his estate.

ὁταν δὲ ... βιασάμενον;] The passage is imitated by Longinus, de Sublim. xliv. 7, where a poetical image is converted into a rhetorical figure.

tοὺς δὲ] Still referring to the tyrannical man and his comrades who resemble him:—supra παρ' αὐτοῖς and note. The alternative of sing. and plur. prepares for infra 575 Λ καὶ ἄν μὲν ... ὀλίγου ... ὀσί, κ.τ.λ.

σφόδρα γ', ἐφή] sc. ἀνάγκη.

ἄναγκαιον ... φέρειν] ‘he must get money from each and every source’—carrying on the notion of violence contained in ἄφελέσθαι.

οὐ πάνυ ... τοιούτου] ‘I do not feel at all comfortable about the parents of such a gentleman as this.’

πρὸς Διὸς] here as elsewhere, like ὁ θαυμάσει supra, indicates the rising excitement of the speaker. There is a play on the word ἄναγκαιον in the two senses of necessitas and necessitudo,—‘who is bound to him by the closest ties.’ Cp. vii. 527 Λ ἄναγκαιος and note.
πληγαῖς τε δοῦναι, κ.τ.λ.] In these words Plato is preparing for the actual tyrant: cp. infra 575 D ἑαυτὸν δὲ μὴ ἐπιτρέπῃ, κ.τ.λ.

ἐπιλίπη] The reading is doubtful between ἐπιλίπη, ‘fail,’ and ἐπιλέπη, ‘begin to fail.’

νευκορῆσει] ‘He will clean out,’ i.e. plunder, ‘a temple’—
a playful litotes like ‘convey’ in Shakespeare. This point in the individual answers to viii. 568 d, e in the account of tyranny:—ἐὰν τε ἢερὰ χρῆματα ἑ, κ.τ.λ.

τὰς δίκαιας ποιουμένας] The reading δίκαιας was restored in place of δίκαιας by Bekker from Par. A; in which, however, it is a correction, though apparently by the first hand. The phrase is a repetition of supra 573 B ἑὰν τινι ἐν αὐτῷ δόξα ἡ ἐπιθυμίας λάθη ποιουμένας χρηστάς, where see the note. The reading of the other MSS., τὰς δίκας ποιουμένας, meaning, according to Stallbaum ‘which gave judgement about things good and evil,’ is equally doubtful in point of Greek and of sense. The ‘opinions’ are those imparted to him by his democratical father, who still respects, or fears, the law.

ἀι νεωστὶ . . . λελυμέναι] Cp. supra 571 B κολαζόμεναι, κ.τ.λ., infra 575 A τὸν δ’ ἐνδεικν. . . ἑλευθερωθένται. This point recalls viii. 567 E.

tυραννευθεὶς δὲ ὑπὸ Ἐρωτος] ‘But now that he is under the dominion of the great Passion.’—The subject is changed from ἀι νεωστὶ ἐκ δουλείας λελυμέναι under the influence of the preceding clause δὲ ἦν αὐτός, κ.τ.λ.

βρώματος] supra 571 B and note.

τὸν ἔχοντα τε αὐτῶν] The particle τε after ἔχοντα is probably genuine; but the construction is broken off and resumed in ἐὰν μὲν, κ.τ.λ. which follows, the immediate consequences being thus distinguished from the ulterior result. Plato readily passes from the individual to the state, and plays with language in the transition from one to the other.

αὐτῶν τε καὶ τῶν περὶ αὐτῶν] The reflexive pronouns refer to Ἐρως.

τῶν . . . θόρυβον] The rabble-rout in attendance on the master-passion. The racket and turmoil (viii. 561 B) are poetically substituted for the crowd which makes them.

ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν τρόπων καὶ ἑαυτοῦ] ‘By those same dispositions
Republic

575 A

Such is the tyrannical person in himself. What is he in relation to his city? When there are a few such men, and they are kept under, they go and serve some tyrant or become mercenaries, if there is war; otherwise they stay at home and do petty mischiefs, such as burglary and kidnapping, or find congenial occupation about the courts of law. But when they have multiplied, and become aware of their numerical strength, they pick out the man from among them who has the most tyrannical disposition and make him a tyrant. He is the most lustful, the most violent of them all; who, before 'his infant fortune comes to age,' is full of smiles and 'courtesies,' but when his end is gained, looks strangely on those that helped him to power. He never has a friend, nor gets a taste of freedom, but is ever faithless, ever unjust. We are now speaking of him as in a dream. But when the dream becomes reality, then is attained the very acme of human evil.

575 B

ἄλλον τυά... τύραννον] állos refers to τυραννικὸς ἀνήρ: they who have the making of tyrants in them, or who are all but tyrants, i.e. of τυραννικοῖ ἄνδρες, go and find another tyrant, in whose service they enlist.

ἐὰν... γένωνται] 'If such characters are bred when there is no war.' The antithesis is suggested by the casual phrase ἐὰν ποι

576 A

πόλεμος ἦν.

C

σμικρὰ... βάλλει] 'A small catalogue of evils,—(even) if there are only a few such men!' 'Why yes,' said I, 'for small is small in comparison with great; and all these things in the misery and mischief which they inflict upon a state don't come within a league of the tyrant, as the saying is.' Socrates' σμικρά,—'small in comparison with tyranny,' is ironically echoed by Adeimantus. The meaning, however, is taken up seriously in the next sentence. A similar play on the same word between the ironical and serious occurs elsewhere in Plato: cp. vi. 498 D Εἰς μικρὸν γ', ἔφη, χρόνον εὕρηκα. Εἰς οἴδεν μέν οὖν, ἔφη, ὡς γε πρὸς τὸν ἄπαντα. For the catalogue of 'small evils' cp. i. 344 B ff.
Notes: Book IX.

415

πλεῖστον ... τὺραννον] 'Most of the tyrannical nature.' Cp. ii. Republic IX. 382 D ποιητῆς ... ψευδής εἶν θεω οὐκ ἔν,—viii. 554 D τῶν τοῦ κηφήνως ἐννεάεις ... ἐπιθυμίας. The expression here keeps up the personification of "ερως, τύραννος ἐνδον οἰκῶν, supra 573 D.

tυραννικῶτατος] 'Most fit to be a tyrant.' Cp. Ἀθηναῖκος.

ἐὰν ... ὑπείκωσιν] For the suppressed apodosis cp. Protag. 325 D καὶ ἐὰν μὲν ἑκὼν πείθηται εἰ δὲ μὴ, κ.τ.λ.

μητρίδα] like the English 'mother-country' for the German 'fatherland.'

θρέψει] has a sarcastic force. 'That is his way of supporting her!'

tοιοθέτει] refers to what follows: 'they are always associating with their flatterers, cringing to those who have power to aid them, and neglecting their old friends.'—The plural again takes the place of the singular (τοῦ τοιοῦτον ἄνδρός).

πρῶτον μὲν ... ἀλλότριοι;} 'In the first place, in their intercourse with others, they associate with their own flatterers or ready tools; or, if they want anything from anybody, they are equally ready to fall down before them:—there is no attitude of friendship into which they will not throw themselves:—and when they have gained their end, they know them no more.' This also is a point in which tyrannical men resemble the tyrant (viii. 566 ε).

καὶ σφόδρα γε] sc. τοιοῦτοι γίνονται.

κεφαλαίωσόμεθα ... τοιοῦτος γ] 'Let us, then, sum up in a word the character of the worst. He is the man who in reality is such as we imagined him in our dream.'

The thought of ὑπαρ and διαρ may have been suggested by supra 571 c, d, but does not directly refer to the bad dreams there spoken of: the word διήλθομεν is inconsistent with this explanation:—not 'who is in reality the monster let loose in a dream,' but 'who is in fact the man whom we have described in words.' Plato's love of climax leads to this further step. And here, as in several other places, Socrates enlivens the thought by a transition from the imaginary to the real. Cp. iii. 389 D ἐὰν γε ... ἐπὶ γε λόγῳ ἔργα τεληται. At this point the mock-heroic style passes into seriousness. Socrates, as Chaerephon says of him in the Gorgias, is profoundly in earnest:—'Εμοὶ μὲν δοκεῖ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ὑπερφυῶς σπουδαίζειν.
And is the acme of evil the acme of wretchedness? Let us compare them, Glaucon,—the five cities and the five men. The men will be as the cities.—For example, as the city under a tyranny is the most wretched of all, so is the life that is under the tyranny of desire. Such at least is the judgement of those who are able to look within. City and man are both seen to be enslaved under the rule of the worst. Both are poor and hungry. Both are full of lamentation and mourning and woe. But there is one being who is yet more wretched than the tyrannical man, and that is the tyrannical man who becomes a tyrant.

\[\text{τοιούτος} \text{ ἄθλος,—sc. φανήσεται.}\]

\[\text{τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς... δοκεῖ} \text{ 'But the many have likewise opinions many.' These words follow closely on τῇ ἀληθείᾳ. Truth is one; error is manifold. He is miserable, though opinions differ. Plato thus signifies his contempt for common opinion. For the turn of expression cp. vi. 500 δ διαβολή δ', ἐν πάοι πολλή.}\]

\[\text{ἄνάγκη, κ.τ.λ.} \text{ 'that must certainly be as you say.' γοῦν implies 'whatever the many may think.'}\]

\[\text{ἄλλο τι... οὕτως;} \text{ 'And must not the tyrannical man be like the tyrannical city?' ὀμοιότητι is an explanation or illustration of κατά: cp. viii. 555 Λ ἀπιστοίμεν μή κατὰ τὴν ἀληθείαν πόλιν ὀμοιότητι... τετάχθαι;—'Must they not correspond in similitude?' The word in both places has been needlessly called in question. The dative is like ποιημα τε καὶ ὀμοιότητι supra 575 c. ὀμοιότητι would fit the context here. But Plato characteristically prepares for what follows by using a general expression and so affecting to keep the question open. Cp. infra 577 c τὴν ὀμοιότητα ἀναμμηνευ-σκόμενος.}\]

\[\text{τι οὖν ἄρετῇ, κ.τ.λ.} \text{ This reading, which is manifestly right, has been corrupted in all the MSS. to τι οὖν ἄρεα (or ἄρα) ἡ, and has only been preserved as a various reading by the diorthotes on the margin of Par. Α.}\]

\[\text{εὐδαιμονίας} \text{ For the use of the genitive cp. v. 470 Λ τί δέ; γῆς τε τίμεσως τῆς 'Ελληνικῆς καὶ οἰκίων ἐμπρήσεως. The same notion is resumed with greater distinctness infra 577 B πῶς ἔχει εὐδαιμονίας;}\]

\[\text{ἀλλ' ὡς χρή} \text{ sc. θεασάμενοι ὡς χρή, which is resumed in καταδύντες... καὶ ἔδοντες, 'having fairly looked at the whole city from within, we will then give our opinion.'} \]
ἀρ’ οὖν ... διορε';] 'And shall I be right in making the same challenge about the men, and in claiming to have as judge one whose mind can enter into the character of a man and look through him; not like a child who sees from the outside and is dazzled at the parade which the tyrannical nature assumes to those without;—but who has a clear insight?'

πρόστασις, like προστασία, πρόσχημα, here signifies 'outward show,' the externals of majesty. This meaning of the word, though not common, is defined by the clause which follows:—ἡν πρὸς τοὺς ἐξω σχηματιζομαι.

eι οὖν οἰοίμην . . . (B) ταύτα προκαλοῖο] The words eι οὖν, κ.τ.λ., are a resumption of the previous sentence: the apodosis to them is the answer;—'If I were to suppose, as I am saying'—'. . . That, he replied, would like the former be a very right challenge.'

καὶ ταύτα] refers to 576 E ὅρθως . . . προκαλεῖ.

τὸν δυνατὸν ἄν, κ.τ.λ.] 'Of the number of those who would be able to judge': ἃν is to be taken with δυνατὸν = δυναμένων.

What follows is the answer to the question which was raised in the first Book,—'Whether the life of the just or unjust man is the happier?' The inquiry, which had already become 'ridiculous' in Book iv (445 arendra), is once more resumed, and the answer to what was at first an unanswerable paradox appears in the most complete and triumphant form.

καθ' ἐκαστον] sc. πάθημα, anticipating τὰ παθήματα.

ἐν μέρει ἄθρων] sc. ἐκάτερον,—τὴν τε πόλιν καὶ τῶν ἄνδρα.

ὡς πόλιν εἶπεῖν] 'To speak of the city as a city' [i.e. not merely as a number of individuals]. Cp. infra E ὃς περὶ ἀλης εἰπείν ψυχής.

ἀνήρ] See above, note on 573 c.

συμπρόν δὲ καὶ τὸ μοχθηρότατον] The ruling passion is here spoken of as a small part of the soul. The object of this, which is hardly consistent with the foregoing description, is to render the parallel between state and individual as complete as possible.

πολύ γε] sc. ἡκιστα.

καὶ ἡ τυραινουμένη ὁρα . . . μεστὴ ἔσται] 'Then the soul which is under tyranny (I am speaking of the soul taken as a whole)
The harmony of affections and faculties is a far higher conception of the powers of human nature than the isolated strength of any one of them under the name of will or passion; which has the appearance and perhaps the consciousness of strength, and is really weakness.

The confusion of τε and γε in MSS. is so frequent, that there need be no hesitation in reading τὴν τε here, although it has less of manuscript support than τὴν γε.

οὐπω...μᾶλιστα] 'I do not think that our description has yet arrived at the extreme form of misery.' οὖτος = 'the man before us.' τοιοῦτος = ἄθλιος, sc. ὑπ'.

Plato is preparing a rhetorical surprise:—There is yet a worse than the worst.

Consider first the position of the tyrant. He may be compared to the master of a household of slaves, who should be set down with them in a desert place out of reach of aid from his fellows. Nay more, we must suppose him to be surrounded by neighbours who are determined to abolish slavery. He cannot go abroad, or see what is worth seeing anywhere, but, starved in spirit, must abide like a woman in some inner chamber, cowering and unsatisfied.

Now suppose the man in this position to have the tyrannical nature, such as we have described it. Must he not descend to be the slave of the meanest, the flatterer of the vilest,—becoming daily more avarice-bitten, more inquisitive, more envious, faithless and unjust? Godless and friendless, he is the entertainer and cherisher of all manner of evil,—unhappy and causing unhappiness.
Notes: Book IX.  

τεκμαίρομαι ... σκοπεῖν] 'I should infer from what has preceded that what you say is true.' 'Yes,' said I; 'however, these are not matters about which to have an opinion, but of which one should endeavour to gain a clear conception (1) by the help of such a process of reasoning as we now employ': or possibly (2) 'Where the argument is of such a nature.' For the latter (2) cp. infra 579 c τοῖς τοιούτοις κακοῖς and note. The turn of conversation here resembles vi. 504 D οἴχ ὑπογραφήν δεί ὦσπερ νῦν θεάσασθαι, ἀλλὰ τὴν τελεωτάτην ἀπεργασίαν μὴ παρέμεναι.

ὁσοι πλούσιοι] sc. ὄντες, which seems to be omitted in accordance with the idiomatic ellipse after ὁσοι.

dιαφέρει ... πλήθος] 'But the number of the persons over whom he (the tyrant) rules is a point of difference.' Cp. Xen. Mem. iii. 4, § 12 ἦ γὰρ τῶν ἰδίων ἐπιμέλεια πλήθει μόνον διαφέρει τῆς τῶν κοινῶν.

οἶσθ' οὖν ὅτι, κ.τ.λ.] Socrates, wanting to draw attention to a familiar fact, treats it as a new and original observation.—'Did you ever remark' &c.? Cp. ii. 376 Λ ἦ οὔπω τούτο ἐθαύμασας;

τί γὰρ ...; οὔδέν, εἴπον] 'Why should they fear them?' 'Oh, for no reason.' The negative in this and similar places merely waives the point immediately in hand before calling attention to something else, which remains to be said, cp. esp. iv. 424 D οὔδε γὰρ ἐργαζόμεθα καὶ note. The familiar phrase in Protag. 310 B —μὴ τι νέωτερον ἀγγέλλεις; οὔδέν γ', ἦ δ' ὅσ, εἰ μή ἄγαθε γε,—is an example of the same conversational idiom. [L. C.]

ἐν ποίῳ ... καὶ ὅποσῳ] The indirect form following on the direct is partly occasioned here by the neighbourhood of οίει. Some MSS. have πόσῳ,—but cp. Gorg. 500 A ἐκλέξασθαι ποία ἄγαθα τῶν ἰδιῶν ἐστι καὶ ὅποια κακί.

ἐν παντὶ] sc. φόβῳ. 'In absolute terror.' Cp. Soph. 250 ἐν πάσῃ συνεχήμεθα ἀπορίᾳ.

The single master who has many slaves is safe only because all the masters unite for mutual protection. But suppose the family and their slaves to be carried off into the wilderness: the case of the individual owner is desperate. Or, again, surround the unfortunate man with neighbours who make the possession of slaves a crime,—and there is a worse than what seemed to be the worst position. Both these misfortunes have befallen the tyrant:—he is in a solitude, and has nevertheless all mankind for his enemies.
When he has no need to do so: i.e. being actuated by no ordinary motive, but by fear. Cp. Plut. Tib. Gracc. c. 21 (quoted by Schneider) δείστασα περί τοῦ ἄνδρος ἡ βουλή ψηφίζεται μηδὲν δεομένη πέμπτει αὐτὸν ἐς 'Ἀσίαν.

By people who are all his enemies.' Cp. vi. 496 D εἰς πάνων ἄγριοις ἄντίχεις : viii. 567 D μετὰ φαύλων τῶν πολλῶν ὀλείν.

It is a characteristically Greek trait that the tyrannical nature has not only the lower desires in excess, but also unbounded curiosity, like Glaucon's φιλοθείμονες in v. 475 D.

A dative of circumstance, referring to the immediately preceding description of the tyrant's condition. Ast's conjecture εὖ τοῖς τ. κ. is not necessary. The tyrant's miseries are increased a hundred-fold when he is of the tyrannical nature. The extreme of wretchedness attending the combination of character and position is greater than the evil involved in either taken separately. Or (2) the dative may be explained as denoting the measure of excess—The description of the tyrannical tyrant began at 578 c: what followed was an illustration of his excess of misery over the tyrannical individual as such. The illustration is now applied. 'Do not such evils as these measure the excess of misery accruing to him whom you just now judged to be most wretched of all, when he is raised from a private station to despotical power?' πλείώ καρπούται, sc. κακι.

The opposition of the following clause logically requires μὴ ὡς, which recent editors have accordingly accepted from Stobaeus and Vat. Θ. But the order of words is idiomatic.

The conjunctive δοκῆ—see v. rr.—has the authority of all the MSS. but one. There are too many instances of εἰ, ἐτεί, &c., with the subjunctive to allow of confidence in rejecting it: e.g. Laws xii. 958 D εἰτε τις ἄρρην εἰτε τις δῆλος ῥ. [But? ὡς.]

And κἂν εἰ appears sometimes to be treated as = καὶ
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éin. In Arist. Eth. Nic. vii. 7, § 1 the MSS. have καί εἰ ῥέσως. See also Pol. ii. 1, 1 with the note of Mr. W. L. Newman in his Politics, vol. ii. p. 227.

κόλαξ τῶν ποιητῶν] cp. supra κόλαξ...θεραπόντων.

καὶ ἂ τὸ πρότερον εἰπομεν] supra 576 a, b, viii. 507.

The case is now ripe for judgement, and Glaucn formally assigns to the five individuals their places in the order of virtue and happiness and the contraries of these. The most royal nature is the best and happiest; the most 'tyrannical' is the worst and wretchedest, while (1) the oligarchical and (2) the democratical man come between.

ἰδι δὴ...τυραννικόν] 'Come now, said I, as the universal arbiter sets forth his sentence,' 'so do you also decide who in your opinion is the first, and who the second, and the remainder, being five in all, in order.'

The expression ὁ διὰ πάντων κριτής is obscure, and cannot be certainly explained. It has been compared to τῶν διὰ πάντων χορῶν or ἀγώνων, found in inscriptions:—Boeckh's C. I. G. vol. i. 425, 1586, 1719, 1720. The words may mean (1) the judge who decides the prizes of all the different kinds of contests; (2) or all the prizes, e.g. first, second, third, in the same contest; (3) the judge who gave the final decision in some musical pentathlon, such as appears to be referred to in the inscriptions. Cp. Herod. ii. 91, § 5 ἀγώνα γυμνικῶν τελεῖς διὰ πάσης ἀγώνισε ἔχοντα, and Laws ii. 658 a τί ἢν, εἰ ποτὲ τις οὕτως ἀπλῶς ἀγώνα θεία ὑπνωκοῦν, μηδὲν ἀφορίσας μητὴ γυμνικῶν μήτε μουσικῶν μήθει ἰπτικῶν, ἀλλὰ πάντας συνεισεχωροῦν τοὺς ἐν τῇ πάλαι προειπτα βεῖς νικητῆρα τῶν βουλόμενον ἵκες ἀγωνούμενόν ἴδους πέρι μόνον: ib. xii. 949 a καὶ κριτήν αὐτὸ ὕρων καὶ πάσης μουσικῆς. The separate contests may have had separate experts to judge of them—πέντε ὄντασ seems to convey an allusion to the pentathlon; and the words ὀσπέρ χοροῦς κρίνω in Glaucn's reply are in favour of this line of interpretation, for which see also Xen. Mem. iii. 4, § 3 ὀδύκις κεχορήγησε, πάσιν τοῖς χοροῖς νεώπορες. The image, however, is not consistent; for διὰ πάντων must have originally referred to all the kinds of performance, but is here applied to all the competitors.

πέντε ὄντασ] of course refers to all the individuals and not to τοὺς ἄλλους with which it is verbally combined.
Republic

580 C  καθάπερ ... εἰσῆλθον ... κρίνω] ‘I assign them their places in the order in which they came in.’

580 D-583 A The judgement of Glaucon,—or of the enlightened observer (supra 577 Λ) is confirmed by that of the philosopher, who has the best right to judge. For there are three pleasures, corresponding to the three parts of the soul,—the pleasure of learning, the pleasure of honour or victory, and the pleasure of gain. The philosopher knows them all, but the lover of honour or of gain is acquainted only with one. He has this threefold experience; and in him Reason which is the faculty of judging is far superior: therefore he will be the most competent to decide. And his decision is that the pleasure of knowing and learning is by far the most worth having, while he assigns the second place to the pleasures of ambition.

elder τε λανθάνων, κ.τ.λ.] ii. 366 E. This is one of the threads by which Plato connects the end of the Republic with the beginning.

580 D  ἐὰν τι δόξῃ] ‘If it at all approve itself,—τι adverbal.

δέξεται ... ἀπόδειξιν] τὸ λογιστικῶν, which is found before δέξεται in Par. Λ and most MSS., seems to have arisen from a gloss on τριχῆ, enumerating the three parts of the soul. This is confirmed by the reading of Par. Κ λογιστικῶν, ἐπιθυμητικῶν, θυμικῶν δέξεται. Κ although a derivative of Π has some readings coming from an independent source. τὸ in Par. Λ is marked with two dots as questionable. For the impersonal use of δέξεται, sc. τὸ πρᾶγμα, cp. the use of δείξει, Phil. 45 D τάχα ... αἰχ ἦττον δείξει, and the like expressions.

tὸ μὲν, φαμέν, ἢν] The past tense refers to the previous discussion in iv. 439 ff.

Ε  τοῦτῳ ἑπωνομάσαμεν] The dative is instrumental. ‘We employed this to name it with.’ This better corresponds with ἐν ... ὀνόματι supra than the various reading τοῦτο, which has very slight authority (Ang. v, Vat. m, Par. Κ corr.).

581 Α  μᾶλλον ἀν ... τῷ λόγῳ] ‘We should be most able to rest on a single comprehensive notion in speaking (τῷ λόγῳ).’
So as to convey a clear meaning to ourselves, in speaking of this part of the soul.'

The passionate element resolves itself into the love of power and honour.

\[ \text{τούτων} \] sc. τῶν τριῶν εἰδών. I. e. it cares less for gain than \( θυμὸς \) does, and less for power than \( ἐπιθυμία \). The word, though pleonastic, is in accordance with the fulness and precision of Plato's style. W. H. Thompson's \( πάντων \), on the other hand, is over-emphatic. The philosopher (infra 582 A) cares less for gain than for glory. [If rejected, the word must be attributed to an accidental doubling of \( τούτων \). L. C.]

\[ \text{kατὰ τρόπον \( \varepsilon \) καλοῖς} \] 'We should give the proper name.'

\[ \text{ανθρώπων \ldots \ τὰ πρῶτα} \] sc. \( γίνη \). 'Three kinds in chief (or primarily).' For the limitation cp. iv. 443 E καὶ \( εἰ \) \( ἄλλα \) \( οὕτα \) \( μεταξύ \) τυχαίων \( οὕτα \) and note.

\[ \text{ὑποκείμενον \( εν \) έκάστῳ τούτων} \] 'Corresponding severally to each of these'—i. e. in the order of classification. Cp. Protag. 349 β \( έκάστῳ τῶν \) \( οὐνομάτων \) τούτων \( οὕροκείται \) τοῖς \( ίδιοις \) \( οὐνία \) καί \( πράγμα \). \( οὕροκεί-\) μενον, not = subject-matter, but simply denoting correspondence as in Protag. 1. e.

\[ \text{τρεῖς τοιούτων} \] i. e. one of each kind.

\[ \text{τῶν βίων} \] Cp. Arist. Eth. Nic. i. 2.

\[ \text{δὲ \( χρηματιστικός \)} \] 'First the money-maker.' The second \( τε \) changes to \( δὲ \) as the sentence becomes adversative.

\[ \text{τῶν \( δὲ \) φιλόσοφον, \( ή\)ν \( δ' \) \( εγώ \), \( ποιόμεθα \), κ.τ.λ.} \] 'But may we suppose that the philosopher regards the other pleasures in regard to the pleasure of knowing the truth and in that pursuit abiding always, not so very far from the Heaven of pleasure, and that he calls the other pleasures necessary under the idea that if there were no necessity for them he would rather not have them.'

In this way of taking the passage the words \( \text{τῆς \( ήθοινής \) οὐ \( πάνυ \) \( πόρω \)} \) have a slight irony, intended to express that the philosopher has in knowledge the true pleasure. For \( \text{ποιόμεθα} \) Gräser and Hermann read \( η οἰώμεθα \), which diminishes the harshness of the
expression νομίζειν τάς ἄλλας ἡδονὰς πρὸς τὴν τοῦ εἰδέναι τάληθες ὄψιν ἔχει. With καλεῖν, ἄρ' οἰκονομεῖθα has to be supplied from τί οἰώμεθα, in which there is also considerable harshness. In the translation τί οἰώμεθα has been read not without hesitation, as it is difficult to account for the same error, however slight (π for τι) creeping into all the MSS. [B. J.]

τὸν δὲ φιλόσοφον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, "τί οἰώμεθα . . . (ε) εἰ μὴ ἀνάγκη ἤν;"

'And what, are we to suppose, is the philosopher’s estimate of other pleasures in comparison with that of knowing the truth as it is and being evermore engaged in such an intellectual pursuit? Must we not think that he accounts them far removed from true pleasure, and that he calls them necessary and nothing more, inasmuch as, apart from knowledge of the truth, he has no wants but what are absolutely necessary? ' τί οἰώμεθα is Gräser’s correction of ποιώμεθα, the manuscript reading, which may be strained to yield a possible meaning (—' may we suppose?') but is ill-suited to the immediate context, and to the reply—εὖ . . . δὲι εἰδέναι, which exactly fits οἰώμεθα, cp. i. 341 Α, Β; viii. 556 Α, Ε.

In what follows, Madvig’s conjecture τὴν . . . ἡδονῆν; for which see v. rr., is occasioned by the apparent baldness of τῆς ἡδονῆς in the present connexion. But his reading, πρὸς τὴν τοῦ εἰδέναι τάληθες ὄψιν ἔχει . . . ἡδονῆν, is ill-balanced, and the last phrase too abrupt. The word ἡδονῆς, which is marked with dots in Par. Α, is very possibly corrupt, however, and may have grown out of ἀληθεῖας through an interlinear gloss, τῆς ἀληθείας. It might, indeed, be said that in the philosopher’s view other pleasures, as compared with that of knowledge, were far from being pleasure at all. But the sudden introduction of this thought in a passage of such gravity is on the whole improbable. [L. C.]

οὐ πάνυ πόρρω] sc. δὲι οἰσθαν νομίζειν αὐτῶν. The force of οὐ is continued with καὶ καλεῖν, κ.τ.λ.

πολύ, ἐφη, διαφέρει] The philosopher is at a higher stage of experience than either of the two others: he has passed them, but they can never compete with him. In the world of the money-getter, where wealth is held in respect, something is known even of the pleasure of honour: but neither he nor the ambitious man can conceive of the pleasure which the philosopher finds in knowledge. Cp. 'He that is spiritual judgeth all things; Yet he himself is judged of none.'
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The best MSS., including Par. A, have ἀλλὰ τί μὴν.

καὶ μὴν . . . φιλοσόφου] ‘And he is the only one of them whose experience is accompanied by wisdom.—Certainly.—Further, the very instrument by which judgement is to be given is not the instrument of the covetous or ambitious man, but only of the philosopher.’

διὰ λόγων ποὺ ἔφαμεν, κ.τ.λ.] supra ά ἐμπειρίᾳ τε καὶ φρονήσει καὶ λόγῳ.

τοῦτοι] τοῦ φιλοσόφου.

ἐπειδή Σ’ ἐμπειρίᾳ, κ.τ.λ.] sc. κρῖνεται τα κρινόμενα.

καὶ εἰν φ . . . ἡδίστος] ‘And he amongst us, in whom this is the ruling principle, has the pleasantest life.’

For a similar judgement of lives cp. Phil. 65 ff.

ό κριτής] The argument which began at 582 A is now complete, and the philosopher,—not Glaucn or one of ourselves,—is admitted to be the judge.

αὐτοῦ] sc. τοῦ κριτοῦ.

To add a third and crowning demonstration:—The pleasure of the philosopher is alone real.

The satisfaction of desire and that of anger only appear pleasant through contrast with antecedent pain. Moreover the things of the body are less real than things of the mind; and therefore bodily pleasures, like the indulgence of appetite and anger, are more unreal than the pleasures of intellect. Most men are ignorant of this, and looking ever downwards prefer the shadow of delight. Whereas if the lower nature be subdued to the higher, even the lower pleasures partake somewhat of reality, because the whole life is standing in the light of truth.

ταῦτα . . . ἀκηκόειναι] The two victories already achieved are (1) the superior happiness of the just in Glaucn’s judgement, after
comparing the individuals with the states: (2) the judgement of the philosopher, accredited by his superior knowledge of true pleasure. The third and last is the proved unreality of other pleasures in comparison with those of philosophy. For the favourite allusion to Zeus Soter cp. Charm. 167 A, B πάλιν τοίνυν, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, τῷ τρίτῳ τῷ Σωτῆρι, ὡσπερ εἴ άμιχῆς ἐπιυκτοπώμεθα: Phil. 66 D ἐδυ δὴ τῷ τρίτῳ τῷ σωτῆρι, κ.τ.λ. The association of the phrase with the Olympian contests occurs only here.

ἐσκιαγραφημένη] σκιαγραφία is a painting in light and shade, which owes its effect to contrast and is therefore a very appropriate figure of pleasure,—here affirmed to be purely relative. In Phaedo 69 B it is applied to courage and temperance, which are likewise said to be unreal when separated from knowledge. Cp. x. 602 D ὢ δὴ ημῶν τῷ παθήματι τῆς φύσεως ἡ σκιαγραφία ἐπιθεμένη γοητείας οὐδ' ἀπολείπει:—also vii. 523 b, Theaet. 208 e.

ὡς ἐγὼ δοκῶ] Compare the part of the Philebus in which the relativeness of pleasure is discussed, especially 44 c, where the opinion of those who deny the existence of pleasure is quoted.

Plato uses a similar anonymous formula in Lys. 215 c, probably referring to the Heracliteans; also in Phaedo 62 b, speaking of the Pythagoreans; in Theaet. 201 d, of the Megarians (?); and of certain anonymous physicists (friends of Democritus?) in Phil. 20. He is probably here alluding to these persons, whoever they may have been,—who maintained a doctrine not unlike that in the text, viz. that pleasure is only an escape from pain. It is not likely, as Stallbaum supposes, that Plato would have used this ironical formula of a doctrine for which he had made himself responsible. And the greater precision and fulness with which the subject of pleasure is treated in the Philebus is one of the reasons for supposing the date of that dialogue to be later than that of the Republic. Both speak of a neutral condition between pleasure and pain; in both the metaphor of health and sickness occurs; both describe pleasure as an enchantment,—γοητεία. But in the Republic the object of Plato is only to convict ordinary pleasure of unreality; in the Philebus there is an elaborate attempt to analyse pleasures, and to distinguish true from false kinds:—the higher pleasures are not only the intellectual, but extend also to those which are derived from beauty of form, colour, sound, smell (here only incidentally mentioned), and are unalloyed with pain. Here, again, it is simply assumed that all pleasures are καύχοιται (583 e) and πληρώσεις
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(585 a, b):—in the Philebus, as in Aristotle's Ethics, the circumstance of some pleasures being γενέσεις and πληρώσεις is adduced as a ground for depreciating them. For the Platonic view of pleasure see introduction to Philebus, Eng. Trans. vol. iv. pp. 530 ff.

ωδ’ ... ἀμα] 'I will make the matter clear in the following way, carrying on the inquiry while you answer me.' ωδε points generally to what follows—the manner of which is further particularized by σοῦ ... ἀμα. For ζητῶν ἀμα cp. v. 450 e.

From the relativeness of pleasure and pain Plato deduces their illusory and unsatisfying nature. There are two extremes, pleasure and pain, and an intermediate state which may be described as the absence of either. But it may also be conceived as pain or pleasure. Health and rest are all the pleasures that a man desires in sickness; and the cessation of enjoyment may be assumed in like manner to be often a pain.

This is an argument characteristic of ancient philosophy, which in modern times has no value. Pleasure is relative and contrasted, admitting of degrees, and associated with certain bodily sensations; also of a fleeting and transient nature when compared with the eternal idea, or the absoluteness of knowledge. But pleasure only partakes in this of the condition of our bodily state; that which is relative or admits of degrees is not the less really existing. Even the power of receiving intellectual pleasure is almost as transient as the enjoyments of sense; the permanence of objects of knowledge must not be confounded with the continuance of our capacity to be pleased by them. This is casually admitted in Symp. 207 e. But it is more clearly seen by us than by Plato and Aristotle, who were confused in their perception of the imperfectly abstract ideas of the 'limit' and the 'relative'; and to whom that which was incapable of being defined seemed also to be incapable of any true existence.

ἀσ ... ἀρα] 'as they find.'

τοῦ τοιοῦτου] sc. τοῦ λυπηροῦ—the absence of pain. Cp. viii. 566 ε ὅταν ... ἡμεῖς έκείνων ... γένηται.

ἡ ἡμεία] sc. φαίνεται, resuming τούτω.

οὐδὲν ὑγίες] cp. vii. 523 b ὅσ τῆς αἰσθήσεως οὐδὲν ὑγίες ποιούσης, Soph. 232 λ ὅταν ἐπιστήμων τες πολλά ποίησαι ... το φαύνσαμα τούτο ... οὐκ ἐσθ' ὑγίες. And for γοητεία, Phil. 44 c αὐτὸ τοῦτο αὐτῆς τὸ ἐπαγγελγὸν γοητευμα οὐχ ἥδων εἶναι.
Plato: Republic.

Between this and ἂν δ' ἔγω the reading is uncertain.

See v. rr.

'Percliance': cp. iv. 424 c, &c.

Although pleasures and pains have both been mentioned. Cp. infra 586 c ἐντῶν and note.

Between this and ἂν δ', the reading is uncertain.

And are commonly called pleasures. For this frequent formula, in contrasting common opinion with philosophic truth, cp. iv. 431 c τῶν ἐλευθέρων λεγομένων.

'Is this not also true of the anticipations of pleasure and pain which precede them?' πρὸ μελλόντων instead of περὶ μελλόντων, and προηθήσεις instead of πρῶτηθήσεις, are required by the sense, and are the readings of Par. Α and other MSS. The form of the word προηθήσεις is singular, but is confirmed by the use of ἡσθήμα in the sense of pleasure in the fragments of Eupolis' Δῆμοι.

The Timaeus, p. 62 c ff., shows a clear advance beyond the crudity of this distinction which is parallel to the point of view in Phaedo 109. [L. C.]

As the man who has no true pleasure has, nevertheless, a true experience of pain.

'they firmly believe that they have reached the goal of satiety and pleasure, just as if they were looking at grey when contrasted with black in inexperience of white, and viewing pain in like manner contrasted with the absence of pain in their inexperience of pleasure, they are deceived.' So we may translate, omitting δὲ after ὁσπερ with all the best MSS. The antithesis to μὲν is to be gathered from the clause καὶ ... ἀπατώνται ( = ἀπατώνται δὲ). This is a possible but not a probable way of taking the passage. A much better sense is obtained by the insertion of δὲ after ὁσπερ, which is actually found in one MS. (Munich g), 'they firmly believe that they have reached the goal of
satiation and pleasure, but as a matter of fact they are deceived through viewing pain in contrast with the absence of pain in inexperience of pleasure, just as they would be deceived (sc. ἀπατώντο ἄφε) if they viewed (ἀποσκοπούντες = εἰ ἀποσκοποὺν) grey contrasted with black in inexperience of white.'

πρὸς τὸ ἀλυπών οὔτω λύπην] W. II. Thompson’s conjectural emendation, πρὸς λυπὴν οὔτω τὸ ἀλυπών, is certainly more logical, but the ‘chiasmus’ in the text is not impossible.


οὐκοῦν... ἵσχεν] ‘If this be so, he who takes food and he who gets hold of understanding’ (ἀχω a stronger form of ἱχω) ‘will both be filled.’

πότερα... (c) ἄρετής;] ‘Which classes of things are they which in your judgement have a greater share in true being?—those of which food and drink and condiments and all kinds of sustenance are examples, or the class which contains true opinion and knowledge and mind and in general all virtue?’ Observe the transition from plural to singular in passing from sense to knowledge.

καὶ ἄληθείας] The word is obelized because the abstract noun is oddly correlated to the adjectives preceding, where καὶ ἄληθείς might equally have been said.

τὸ τοῦ μηδέποτε ὀμοίου] The article here was added by Ast, as below (*τοῦ ἄει ὀμοίου) by Madvig. Though not absolutely required in either place, it might easily have been dropped by a抄写员.

εἰ δὲ ἄληθείας ἥττον, οὐ καὶ οὐσίας;] Plato wishes to show that the unchangeable partakes of essence, knowledge and truth in equal degrees: or rather that essence, knowledge and truth go together. First he asks whether it has either of these qualities in a greater degree than the others, and elicits the answer that it has not. Then with the same object in view, he proceeds to inquire whether, ‘if the unchangeable had less of truth, would it not also have less of essence?’ For the sake of his argument it would have been sufficient to obtain the admission that truth and essence go together: that the pleasures of the body, being less true, are also less real.

For somewhat similar inversions cp. infra 587 e, supra 582 B, c.
Plato: Republic.

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It is therefore unnecessary with Madvig to suppose a lacuna before ei.

585 D σῶμα δὲ αὐτὸ ... οὖτως;] sc. ἡ τοῦ ἠλθείας τε καὶ οὐσίας μετέχειν.

τῶν ἡ τοῦ ὄντων] sc. πληροφορεῖν.

τῶν φύσει προσηκόντων] 'with things naturally befitting,' i.e. things permissible for the body, things eternal for the mind.

E ἀπιστοτέρας] corresponds to ἡ τοῦ ... βεβαιῶς in the previous clause.

586 A μέχρι πάλιν ... μεταξύ] 'back again as far as the middle point'—but no farther upwards.

ταύτη] 'hereabout,' i.e. in the region below the middle. So τοῦτο in the next clause.

τὸ ἁλθῶς ἄνω] Cp. Phaedo 109, Phaedrus 247 c for the similar idea of an upper heaven into which the mind is elevated.

Κεκυφότες, κ.τ.λ.] Cp. vii. 519 λ τὰς τῆς γενέσεως δυναμεῖς ὑποπερ μολέβδινας, κ.τ.λ. Note χορταζόμενοι, a word usually applied to animals (ἐχώρταις ii. 372 d) and see Milton, Comus, sub init.

'Who knows not Circe,
The daughter of the Sun, whose charmed cup
Whoever tasted lost his upright shape
And downward fell into a grovelling swine?'

Εὔεκα ... πλεονεξίας] For the origin of war in luxury cp. ii. 373 e and Phaedo 66 c καὶ γὰρ πολέμους καὶ στάσεις καὶ μάχας συνέναι ἄλλο παρέχει ἢ τὸ σῶμα καὶ αἱ τούτων ἐπιθυμία.


ὀπλαῖς] probably with a glance at ὀπλαῖς.


παρελῶς ... χρησμωδεῖς βίον] 'Verily, Socrates, said Glauccon, you describe the life of the many like an oracle.'

ξυνείαι] sc. τούς τοιοῦτον.

ὑπὸ τῆς ... ἀποχραικυμέναι] 'Whose colour is gained by
The conclusion just arrived at may now receive a mathematical expression. The shadow, which is a surface, may be represented arithmetically as $3 \times 3 = 9$, the distance between king and oligarch being simply multiplied into that between oligarch and tyrant. But to fathom the depth of the declension, not $9$ but the cube of $9$ must serve to express the enormous interval. The square of $9$ is $81$, the cube is $729$, a number not unsuitable to human life, for it is a number connected with days and nights and months and years. And if in pleasure the tyrant differs from the king so widely, how great must be the king's superiority in other ways!
Socrates, having discussed the different kinds of pleasure and the different forms of government and character in relation to pleasure and pain, proceeds to sum up these differences in an arithmetical formula, or rather in two numbers, 9 and 729. These numbers are obtained in the following manner. The oligarch is in the third remove from true pleasure; the king has the pleasure of wisdom, the timocrat that of honour, the oligarch that of wealth, which is an unreal shadow. But the tyrant is in the third remove from the oligarch, and his pleasure is the shadow of the shadow of a shadow—and this a shadow thrice removed from reality. According to the simplest computation, his life is thrice three times less sweet or his pleasure less true than that of the king. His shadow of enjoyment is therefore represented by the superficial number 9. (For the superficial nature of the εἰδωλοῦν cp. x. 598 A, B.) But in order to gauge the depth of the tyrant’s misery, or conversely to estimate the solidity of the king’s happiness, it is necessary to cube the simple number 9. The number so obtained is 729.

ϕυγών νόμον τε καὶ λόγον] cp. supra A ἀ πλέιστον . . . λόγον ἀφιέστηκε.

δορυφόρος] ‘armed’ viz. with stings: supra 573 E, 575 A. They are the body-guard of the tyrant passion.

οὐδὲ] is to be joined with εἴπείν—‘not even to express it.’

ἀπὸ τοῦ ὀλυγαρχικοῦ τρίτος . . . τρίτῳ εἰδῶλῳ] Plato adopts the inclusive mode of reckoning (Oligarch 1, Democrat 2, Tyrant 3), and similarly from the oligarch to the king (Oligarch 1, Timarch 2, King 3). Then to obtain a value for the shadow of pleasure enjoyed by the tyrant, he multiplies together the numbers so obtained. But when he turns to consider the solidity of the king’s pleasure he is not contented with the square number, but taking this as ‘linear,’ i. e. as a simple number, he squares and cubes it (9, 81, 729).

Ϊν accordance with iv. 445 D, E.
Notes: Book IX.

ἐπίπεδον ... ἄν εἴη] 'The shadow of tyrannical pleasure, then, determined by the number of length will be a plain figure:' i.e. the number 9, which is the 'linear' expression of the interval, is also the expression of a surface, the square of 3.

tο εἴδωλον ... ἡδονής τυραννικής] 'The shadow, of which the tyrant's pleasure consists.'

κατὰ τὸν τοῦ μέκος ἀριθμὸν] sc. λογιζομένως.

κατὰ δὲ δύναμιν καὶ τρίτην αὐξήν] (1) 'But if we square and cube.' There is some doubt as to the exact process intended and even as to the precise meaning of δύναμις. The δύναμις of a number is properly its square,—τὸ ἐπίπεδον ὁ δύναμις (Theaet. 148 λ). Hence either 9 : 81 : 729, as above; or 3 × 9 × 27 = 729. But in the passage of the Theaetetus just cited, δύναμις is 'the square-root,' and even 'an irrational square-root'—showing that in Plato the technical usage is not fixed. Here it may possibly mean (2) 'any higher power,' e.g. the cube: 'if we raise the number,' i.e. 9, 'say to the third power.'

ὁσιν, κ.τ.λ.] sc. τὸ τύραννος τοῦ βασιλικοῦ.

μεταστρέφας] sc. τὸν λόγον. 'If you turn the argument the other way about': i.e. if you show not how far the tyrant is removed from the king in the untruth of his pleasure, but how far the king is removed from the tyrant in the truth of his pleasure.

tελειοθείση τῇ πολλαπλασιώσει] I.e. when 9 is raised to the third power; [or when 3, 9, 27 are multiplied together]. It should be remembered that Plato is only playing with numbers and must not be taken too seriously. The number 729 besides being convenient for the measurement of days and nights, also included many numerical compounds, and was the expression of many geometrical figures which gave a seeming authority to it. If it is worth while to raise the question, we can hardly say that Plato is in earnest: but we may perhaps say that he was fascinated by finding a numerical expression of what he conceived to be the truth. He did not trouble himself about minor details, any more than in the number which he assigns in the Laws for the population of his city.

ἀμήχανον ... τοῖν ἀνδροῖν] (1) 'You have brought to bear upon the two men' (viz. the king and the tyrant, although the tyrant is chiefly thought of) 'an overwhelming calculation of the difference.
between them; or (2) ‘you have brought down upon us a wonderful calculation of the difference between the two men.’ 

The image is that of a river coming down in flood and covering everything with debris. Cp. καταχώνυμι in Gorg. 512 B, Theaet. 177 B. In the former case (1) the genitive τοῦ ἄνδροι is governed by κατά in composition. [If the other reading, κατασκεϕώρικας (see v. rr.), were adopted, the genitives would follow διαφορότητος as in (2). But Plato is not likely to have used such a word as κατασκεϕόριν without more point than can be found in it here. L. C.]

τοῦ τε δίκαιου καὶ τοῦ ἀδίκου] In apposition to τοῦ ἄνδροι. The king is the ideal of justice, the tyrant of injustice.

ἀληθῆ] ‘The calculation is a true one and we may remark further,’ &c. The mathematical accuracy of the calculation is made an argument for the truth of its application.

ἡμεραι καὶ νύκτες] The year is supposed to consist of about 364½ days and 364½ nights. For the approximate number cp. Laws vi. 771 c δὲ πάσας τὰς διανομὰς ἔχει μέχρι τῶν δώδεκα ὀρθὰ μὰς ἀρχάμεναι πλὴν ἐνδεκάδος αὐτῆς ὄχι σημαράτατον λαμαί ἐπὶ βάτερα γὰρ ὑγιῆ γίγνεται δύον ἐστίων ἀπονεμηθέεσσαν—said of the number 5040.

καὶ μῆνες] 12 months in a year: 30 + ½ days in a month:—

12 × (30 + ½) = 364: 2 × 364½ = 729.

To such a pass has the theory of the profitableness of injustice come! Let us try to bring this home to our adversary’s imagination. ‘Three natures,’ we will say, ‘are enclosed within the single form of man:—one human, one leonine, and one a many-headed beast. And we are told that it is for the man’s interest to starve the human nature, and enslave it to the bestial! But the praise of Justice means that the man should set the human or divine element in charge over the other two, to prune the desires, and train the leonine element to help him in controlling them. That is the purpose for which laws are made and children held under authority, that licence may be kept in check, and the harmony of the soul preserved. And on this purpose every wise man will concentrate his efforts.’

ἲν δὲ ποι, κ.τ.λ.] Socrates, not without an air of triumph, returns to the source of the discussion, which is finally disposed of,—the old argument of Thrasymachus, who, however, is ne
longer attacked by name, as peace was concluded between them at the end of Book i, and Socrates would not allow this to be disturbed in vi. 498 c ἡ διὰ ὑδατῶν, κ.τ.λ. He is mentioned once more infra vi. 498 c, as peace was concluded between them at the end of Book iv, but having proceeded so far, it was thought best to complete the discussion by describing the forms of evil (iv. 445 c).

αὐτῷ] sc. τῷ ἐκεῖνῳ λέγοντι—supplied from below and from λεγόμενον supra—rather than τῷ ... ἀδίκῳ supra.

οία ἐλεγεν] 'What a preposterous statement he was guilty of,'

οἰαὶ μυθολογοῦται, κ.τ.λ.] Cp. Phaedr. 230 η ὑπίοια ... τυφῶνος πολυπλοκώτερον.

Milton’s description of Sin (P. L. ii. 650, 651) has some degree of similarity:—

'The one seemed woman to the waist, and fair:
But ended foul in many a scaly fold,' &c.

See also the image of the charioteer and the two steeds in Phaedr. 246.

ἡμέρων δὲ] If δὲ is retained, against Madvig’s τε, the fact that the many heads are some wild and some tame, is a fresh point in the description. δὲ is not correlative to μὲν.

δεινοὶ ... (D) πεπλάσθω] 'The work implies marvellous power in the modeller: still, inasmuch as language is more easily moulded than wax or similar substances, let us suppose the model to have been made.'

tοῦτω ... τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ] 'This human creature whom we have made,' referring to ἀνθρώπων immediately above, as distinguished from the man within.

διὶ οὐδὲν ... (589 A) ἄλληλα] It is hardly necessary to observe that (a) the multitudinous monster represents the desires: (b) the lion, anger; (c) the man within, reason. For the first cp. supra 580 ν, ε τὸ δὲ τρίτον διὰ πολυείδιαν ἐνὶ οὐκ ἔχομεν ἀνόματε προσεπεῖν ἴδιῳ αὐτοῖ.

tὰ περὶ τὸν λέοντα] This phrase prepares for the serpentine element, which is afterwards (590 B) brought in to represent the meaner forms of anger.

οθεν ... ἐγκρατέστατος] 'The genitive τοῦ ἀνθρώπου (i) may be
Plato: Republic.

Republic

IX.

governed by ἐγκρατεστάτος, or (2) may be taken partitive with ὁ εὐτὸς ἄνθρωπος.

589 ἐξόμημαχον ... λέοντος φύσιν] Cp. iv. 440 B ὄσπερ δυνῶν στασιάζων· τοῦ ἐξόμημαχου τῷ λόγῳ γναθμευόν τὸν θυμὸν τοῦ τοιούτου.

B πρὸς τε γὰρ ... ψέγει] 'For whether you consider pleasure, or reputation, or advantage, the eulogist of the righteous man speaks the truth; and he who attacks him has no sanity or knowledge in all his attacks;' υγιεῖς is governed by ψέγων λέγει, which is to be gathered from the main drift of the sentence.


ὑπὸ γὰρ ἐκῶν ἀμαρτάνει] Plato falls back on the Socratic notion of the involuntariness of error.

ἀ μακάριε ... (π) φύσεως] 'May we not say that things customarily esteemed fair and foul have come into existence for some such reason as this, that the fair are those which subdue to the man or rather those which subdue to the divine the wild beast element of the nature: that foul are those which enslave the gentle element to the savage.' The words τὰ μὲν καλά, κ.τ.λ., are an explanation of διὰ τὰ τοιαύτα, the participle taking the place of the prepositional phrase—ποιοῦντα = διὰ τὸ ποιεῖν: 'for this reason, the good being those,' &c. With τὰ μὲν καλὰ ... αἰσχρὰ δὲ we must supply φαιμέν ἄν εἶναι from ἄν φαιμέν γεγονέναι.—νόμιμα nearly = νομιζόμενα.

D λαμβάνων ... μοχθηροτάτῳ] This sentence is in apposition to τοιόντε.

E εἰς ἀγρίων ... ἄνθρωπον] sc. οἰκίαν.

550 ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ] sc. ἐν τῷ ἀκόλουθῳν.

A τὸ δεινὸν, τὸ μέγα, κ.τ.λ.] τὸ δεινὸν is used substantively, and τὸ μέγα ἐκεῖνο, κ.τ.λ., added epexegetically: 'the dangerous thing, viz. that great beast.' The reading of the old editions, without the comma after δεινὸν, is not so good.

B τὸ ... ὑπερβάλει] The serpent element has not hitherto been mentioned [but cp. supra 588 ε τὰ περὶ τῶν λέωντα, where something besides the lion is suggested. L. C.]. It is here added to account for the meaner forms of anger. The image grows under the artist's hand. So in the next sentence the lion when rabid with lust becomes a 'mad-headed ape.'
Notes: Book IX. 437

χαλάσει τε καὶ ἀνέσει] ἀνέσει is here 'relaxation,' not 'letting loose' as in ἀνεσέα supra λ. Since faculties are of opposites, θυμισ is the seat of cowardice as well as of courage.

ὁχλῶδει] At once 'multitudinous' and 'troublesome.'

ἐκεῖνω] τοῦ ὀχλώδους θηρίον.

θεραπεύειν] follows ὡστε: δύνηται is governed by ὅταν, the construction of the earlier part of the sentence being resumed. Cp. vi. 493 λ, β, 495 d, e, and, for the imagery, vi. 493.

ὁ τοιοῦτος] sc. ὁ βαίνωνος καὶ χειροτέχνης.

ὡσπερ Ὠρασύμαχος ὑπετο] i. 343 β, c.

καὶ ὄρθως γ', ἐφή] sc. φιμέν supra c.

βουλεταῖ] βουλεύεται is the reading of most MSS.; but βουλεταῖ is the more idiomatic and probably the true one. See v. rr.

καὶ ἡ τῶν... (591 λ) ἀφίέμεν] Cp. supra iii. 402 λ. This mention of the inward πολιτεία prepares for the highly wrought passage at the end of the book, infra 592 β. Cp. also v. 449 λ περὶ ἱδιοτῶν ψυχής τρόπων κατασκευῆν.

τῷ... τοιούτῳ] sc. βελτιστῷ.

πη δ' ἄδικοντα λανθάνειν... λυσιτελεῖν] sc. φήσομεν.

ἡ οὐχὶ ὁ μὲν... γίγνεται] Cp. Gorg. 509, where the noble paradox is maintained that the wicked are gainers by being punished.

τιμωτέραν ἔξιν λαμβάνει 'attains a nobler state.'

eἰς τοῦτο ἡμετέρας] viz. to assert the pre-eminence of the soul over the body.

ἀλλ' ἀεὶ... φαύνηται] 'But his aim will ever be that he may be found to preserve the harmony of the body for the sake of the harmony of the soul.' ἀλλ' ἀεἰ, sc. ζησεὶ πρὸς τοῦτο βλέπων. For the change from the future to the subjunctive after ὅπως cp. Timaeus 18 Ε ὅπως... ἐξιλληξόνται, καὶ μὴ τις... γίγνεται. [The addition of φαύνηται can only be accounted for by an attraction into the ὅπως clause occasioned by the occurrence of οὐχ ὅπως. The preference of the subjunctive to the future appears to be similarly caused by the neighbourhood of μελλη. But the sentence would certainly be more regular if φαύνηται were omitted. L.C.]
tē ἀληθεία μοῦσικός] Cp. iv. 443 d. But we have now risen to a still higher strain.

D 〈oukouν ... ἐμμφωνίαν;〉 sc. τῆς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἑνεκα ἐμμφωνίας ἀρμοττά-μενος ἔχον.

tοῦ πλῆθους] sc. τῶν χρημάτων. οὔκ with αὐξήσει.

E μὴ τι ... τῶν ἐκεῖ] ‘That none of his elements therein (ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ) give way.’ For παρακινεῖν, ‘to give,’ cp. vii. 540 A.

καὶ τιμᾶς γε] The accusative looks forward to φεῦξεται, but as the sentence is developed, the genitive τῶν μέν is required by μεθέξει καὶ γεύσεται.


‘M. If you shall cleave to my consent, when ’tis,
   It shall make honour for you.

B. So I lose none,
   In seeking to augment it, but still keep
   My bosom franchised and allegiance clear,
   I shall be counselled.’

The wise man, then, will not devote himself to politics, unless by some divine providence he has been born under the ideal constitution. But whether this be so or not, according to that ideal, and to no other, he will frame his life.

νη τῶν κόνα] Socrates excited by the misunderstanding of Glaucos, gives vent to his feelings in his favourite oath. ‘By the dog of Egypt, he certainly will in his own city, not however perhaps in his native land.’


ἔαυτὸν κατοικίζειν] sc. ἐκεῖ.

τὰ γὰρ ταύτις ... οὐδεμιᾶς] ‘He will live after the manner of that city, having naught to do with any other’: i.e. he will live in the spirit of philosophy and take no part in politics, unless in a perfect state.

Plato is not thinking of the constitution of the state on earth corresponding to the movements of the heavenly bodies (as in vi.
500 c, Tim. 47 c). The heaven which he describes is an ideal one, answering to the individual rather than to the state. His ‘Kingdom of Heaven’ is within; and in this passage is exhibited to us as a life rather than as a system of government. For παράδειγμα cp. especially Theact. 176 ε.

BOOK X.

The tenth book of the Republic has two parts, the first containing a final settlement of the question of poetry, the second treating of the Immortality of the soul, which is proved and also revealed, the myth being the crown and completion of the previous argument respecting Immortality, as the allegory of the cave in Book vii is a figure of the stages of the mind in the processes of knowledge as described in Book vi. A preparation was made for the renewal of the first of the two subjects (which could be only partially treated in iii. 391–398) by the casual allusion in viii. 568 A–D; and the way to the second of them has been indicated in scattered hints such as are furnished by the concluding words of the last book, and vi. 498 D εἰς ἵκεινων τὸν βίον, ἀραν αὖθις γενόμενοι τοῖς τοιχίωσι εὐτυχοῖς λόγοις: cp. also the words of Cephalus, i. 330 ε. Plato does not base this life upon another: the empire of virtue is sufficient. But he believes another life to be the natural continuation of this, as is sufficiently apparent from the language of the Phaedo, Crito, Apology, Phaedrus, Gorgias, Politicus. And as in the Gorgias the subject of Justice seems naturally to lead up to a final judgement, so the end of Book x is also the fitting conclusion of the whole dialogue.

The exclusion of poetry from our ideal state has been confirmed by our subsequent analysis, which shows how dangerous imitative art must be to those who have not fathomed its true nature. My love of Homer makes me unwilling to say this, yet it must be said.

For what is imitation?

There are many beds, but one ideal bed which the craftsman seeks to imitate. The painter represents a bed or anything in Heaven or Earth with equal ease, because he makes not the ideal nor even the actual bed but only a superficial likeness of the latter. Thus he is in the third remove from truth. As are in like manner the whole tribe of imitators and the poet among them.
Republic

595 A  

καὶ μὴν, κ.τ.λ.] In the third book Tragedy and Comedy were excluded from the state, but there was an intimation that possibly something more than this was intended: 394 δ ἵσως, ἣν 8' εὖν ἵσως δὲ καὶ πλείω ἐτοι τούτων: in other words, the fate of Homer was not finally determined. A hint was also given (392 c) that the nature of Justice must first be investigated, before the poets generally could be brought up for judgement. The attack on poetry is now repeated and receives a new direction. The poet is shown to be at a greater distance from truth than was originally supposed; he affects the feelings only, and not the reason. These new points of view are suggested by the divisions of the soul (iv. 435 ff.) and the doctrine of ideas: not so much however, by the higher view of the ἰδέα of Good. which appears in Book vi, as the lower view, which makes the ideas class-words, as at the end of Book v (cp. Meno, Phaedo, Cratylius): also by the distinction of higher and lower pleasures and desires in Book ix. περὶ αὐτῆς, sc. περὶ τῆς ἐν λόγως κειμένης τόλεως (ix. 592 Λ).

ϕυεῖομεν] The imperfect tense refers to the Aorist in the preceding sentence ἐν ἰ νῦν διήλθομεν οἰκίζοντες τόλει (at the end of Book ix).

λῶβη, κ.τ.λ.] Cp. Meno 91 c οὗτοί γε φανερά ἐστι λῶβη τε καὶ διαφθορὰ τῶν συγγενομένων.

καίτοι ... λέγειν] Cp. Soph. 217 ε αἰδὼς τίς μ᾽ ἔχει ... μὴ κατὰ σμικρὸν ... ποιεῖται: Arist. Eth. N. i. 6, § 1 καίτερ προσώπων τῆς τοιαύτης ζήτησεις γνωμένης διὰ τὸ φιλίως ἄνδρας εἰςαγαγεῖν τὰ εἴδη. δάξει δ᾽ ἄν ἵσως βελτίων εἶναι καὶ δεῖν ἐπὶ σωτηρία γε τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ τὰ οἰκεία ἀναρεῖν, ἀλλος τε καὶ φιλοσόφους ὁτας' ἀμφοῖν γὰρ δυτοῦ φιλίων ὄσιν προτιμὰν τὴν ἀληθείαν.

ἀποκωλύει] 'a feeling about Homer which has possessed me from a child makes me reluctant to speak.'

Εἴοικε μὲν γὰρ, κ.τ.λ.] So below, 598 δ, Homer is called τραγῳδίας ἤγεμον, 607 Λ πρώτον τῶν τραγῳδιστῶν, and Theaet. 152 Ε καὶ τῶν ποιητῶν οἱ ἄκροι τῆς ποιήσεως ἐκατέρας' κομῳδίας μὲν, 'Επίχαρμος, τραγῳδίας δὲ, Ὄμηρος. Cp. also Aristotle's Poetics, chap. 4 ὁ γὰρ Μαργίτης ἄνδρον ἔχει, διαπερ Ἡμίας καὶ ἡ Ὀδυσσεία πρὸς τὰς τραγῳδίας, οὗτοι καὶ οὗτος πρὸς τὰς κομῳδίας.

τῶν καλῶν, κ.τ.λ.] 'who have such charms.' The epithet is ironical. Cp. iii. 398 Λ προσκυνοῦμεν ἄν αὐτῶν ὡς ἱερὸν καὶ θαυμαστὸν καὶ ἱδὼν.
Notes: Book X.

δ λέγω] ‘as I say,’ referring to ἡπείων, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ, supra.

διάλω] Imitation in general, as distinguished from poetry, which is a species of imitation.

ἡ ποι... (596 α) πρότεροι εἶδον, κ.τ.λ.] ‘A likely thing then that I shall understand! There is no reason why you should not, for those who have the duller sight often see a thing quicker than those who have a keener one.’ Cp. iv. 432 c ἐὰν μοι ἐπομένω χρῆ... πάνυ μοι μετρῖος χρῆσε.

Socrates, instead of modestly declining the implied compliment of Glaucon, contrary to expectation adopts it with a kind of irony: at the same time leaving on the mind the impression, which cannot be effaced, of his own superiority. So in vii. 532 ε ὠκέρ... ὁ φίλε Γαλαύκων, οἵος τ' ἐστε ἀκολουθεῖν, Socrates, speaking as a master to the pupil, plainly acknowledges that Glaucon will not be able to follow him beyond a certain point.

οὐδ' ἂν προθυμηθήναι οἴός τε εἶν] ‘I could not muster courage.’

βούλειι οὖν... ἔπιφερομεν] ‘Shall we begin our inquiry at this point— with our accustomed method? For, as you know, our custom has been to assume some one single idea in the case of the many individuals to which we apply the same name.’ So in vi. 504 ε he speaks of the ἴδεα of good as a common subject of speculation with him, πάνως αὐτὸ οὐκ ἀληγάκις ἀκίνκους: v. 475 ε ff.: Phaedo 100 b. See also Phileb. 16 b.

εἶδος and ἴδεα are used in many places indifferently. Both have the meaning of form or ideal. But eίδος more than ἴδεα inclines to the notion of a logical universal, ἐν ἑπὶ πολλῶν.

τῶν πολλῶν] Here equivalent to τῶν πολλῶν ὄντων ἴκιστων: cp. vi. 490 Α, β τοῖς δοξουμένοις εἶναι πολλοῖς ἴκιστοις.

ἄλλ' ὥρα... (c) τάξα μᾶλλον φῆσεις] ‘But consider what name you give to the artificer whom I am about to mention. Who is that? One who is the maker of all things which are made by any and every craftsman. That must be a strange and marvellous man. Wait a little; there will be more reason for your saying so.’ For τάξα μᾶλλον φῆσεις cp. Cratyl. 410 ε Σ. πάρρῳ ἤδη, οἴμα, φαίνομαι σοφίας ἐλαιόνει. Ε. πάνμ μὲν οὖν. Σ. τάξα μᾶλλον φῆσεις:

πάνυ θαυμαστόν, κ.τ.λ.] Cp. Soph. 233, 234, where the ‘wizard’
of a sophist is described as the maker of all things in play and not in earnest, imposing on the young by imitations which deceive them, like paintings seen at a distance. The ‘wizard’ here is the μυστής (597 b), of which genus the painter and the poet are specific forms.

σοφιστήν] The word is here used in the vernacular sense for ‘the master of an art or mystery.’

In this passage Plato seems to return from the higher and more speculative theory of ideas which has been exhibited in the sixth and seventh books, to the cruder conception of the earlier dialogues. His aim, however, must be remembered: which is to represent the poet as being in the third remove from the truth. This could only be accomplished by separating the idea from the object, and the object from the shadow or reflection: cp. vi. 509 b. The same imagery is applied to the tyrant in ix. 587 c ff.

But is the poet or painter a mere imitator as Plato seems to imply? That is a question which he has himself answered in another passage, v. 472 D οἱ ὁ νὰν ὁ ὕπτων τὶ ἀγαθὸν ἑωράξαν ἢ γαρ ὀν ἡμαῖν παραδείγμα οἷον ἡμι ὄν ἐν ὁ ἐκλαίνων ἄνθρωπος καὶ πάντα εἰς τὸ γράμμα ἰκανόν ἀποδόσα μὴ ἔχῃ ἀποδείξα ὑμί καὶ δυνατῶν γενέσθαι τοιοῦτον ἀνδρά; No theory can be more erroneous than that which degrades art into mere imitation,—which seeks for beauty in the parts and not in the whole, in colour and ornament rather than in proportion and design, in outward objects and not in the inspiring or informing mind. The requirement of composition in a work of art is alone an evidence that mere imitation is not art.

ποιητής] ‘maker’: the word is used in the most general sense, [though with a glance at the poet, L. C.].

οὐ χαλεπὸς ... δημιουργοῦμενος] ‘not a difficult way, I said, but one which is soon compassed and by various methods.’ For δημιουργοῦμενος applied to the manner of the action and not to the thing, cp. Soph. 221 a τὸ τῆς ... πληγῆς ... ἀνασπώμενον.

tαχὺ μὲν, κ.τ.λ.] There is an asyndeton here, as is not uncommon in explanatory clauses.

εἰς δέον ἔρχει τῷ λόγῳ] ‘You bring welcome aid to the argument,’ i.e. you go to the point required: viz. to the distinction between φαινόμενα and δόρτα.

μέντοι," recalls a previous statement which tends to modify what
has just been said: the picture is unreal, but is not the bed itself unreal too?

Plato here uses the language of ‘crude realism.’ But the beginnings of logical technicality are discernible in the expressions ὅ ἐστιν, ὀπερ ἐστιν.

tελέως δὲ ... ἀληθῆ λέγειν] The idiomatic use of the verb κινδυνεύει makes a change in the usual construction, which would be eι τις φαίη ... οὐκ ἃν λέγωι. κινδυνεύει = ‘he would seem,’ i.e. may be presumed to be according to this theory. Cp. Theaet. 152 C ὀν γὰρ οὐσθάνειν ἐκαστος, τοιαύτα ἐκάστῳ καὶ κινδυνεύει εἶναι.

ὡς γ' ἃν δόξειε, κ.τ.λ.] sc. τοῖς διαλεκτικῆς ἐμπείροις.

καὶ τοῦτο] sc. τὸ τοῦ κλινογραφοῦ ἔργου. καὶ, the work of the maker of the actual bed,—as well as the painter’s imitation of it.

πρὸς ἀλήθειαν] ‘with respect to reality.’ Cp. infra 600 B γελαύσερας ἐτι πρὸς παιδείαν.

βούλει οὖν ... τις ποτ' ἐστίν;] ‘Suppose that we inquire into the nature of this imitator, basing our remarks upon this example.’

For the use of ἐπι with reference to an example, cp. v. 475 a εἰ βούλει, ἐφη, ἐπ' ἐμαύ λέγειν περὶ τῶν ἐρωτικῶν.

τὸν μιμητήν τοῦτον] ‘the imitator who is the subject of our inquiry.’ Cp. supra 595 e μίμησιν ὅλως ... ὅ τι ποτ' ἐστίν; infra e τὸν μὲν δὴ μιμητήν ὁμολογήσαμεν. It is now sufficiently evident that the wonderful artificer described on p. 596 is the μιμητής. The accusative τοῦτον is confirmed by Par. A and the majority of MSS. Nor is the inexactness of the antecedent a sufficient reason for reading τοῦτον, which has the greater fault of being weak. The use of αὕτα immediately below is similar to the use of τοῦτον in this passage.

μία μὲν ... (c) ὅ ἐστι κλίνη] Plato in the Sophist separates ποιητική into two parts, one divine, the other human (Soph. 265 c). In what follows ib. 266, 267, he further divides human art into creative and imitative.

ἐν τῇ φύσει] ‘in nature,’ i.e. in the true order of nature. Cp. Phaedo 103 b αὐτὸ τὸ ἐναντίον ἐαυτῷ ἐναντίον οὐκ ἃν ποτε γένοιτο, οὔτε τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν, οὔτε τὸ ἐν τῇ φύσει. In this passage Plato distinguishes the picture of the bed, the bed made by the carpenter, and the real bed which is ideal, essential, in the nature of things, in the
mind of God. It may be asked whether the third bed is the idea of a bed. We may reply that it is not distinguished from it, neither does Plato identify them. He uses many forms to express what in the popular language of philosophy is termed by us his doctrine of ideas. [The further relation of the ideal bed to the supra-mundane ιδέα is beyond the scope of this passage. L. C.]

οτι . . . οδχ αι δω] Compare a somewhat similar argument in the Sophist 243 d, e, in which the dualistic principles of some of the previous philosophers are reduced to 'being,' because existence is predicated of cold and hot. See also Parmenides 133 A, Tim. 31 A.

D 
βούλει οὖν . . . πεποιηκεν] 'Shall we then speak of him as the natural maker of this (i.e. the idea of the bed) or by some name of a similar kind? Yes, he replied; inasmuch as by the natural process of creation he has made this and all other things.'

φύσει] is the echo of φυτουργόν = 'by a natural process.'

αλλα τι . . . εἰναι;] 'but what of the bed will you call him?' 

κλίνη is governed by τί:—'if not the maker or artificer, what is his relation to the bed?' Cp. Symp. 204 D τί τῶν καλῶν ἐστὶν ὁ Ἠρως;

E 
τῶν τού τρίτου . . . γεννήματος] sc. δημουργών. Cp. Dante, Inferno xi. 105 Si che vostr' arte a Dio quasi è nipote: 'So that your art is as it were the grandchild of God.'

τούτ' ἄρα ἐσται καὶ ὁ τραγῳδιοποίος] 'The tragic poet then since he is an imitator will be like these (καί), i.e. the painter and carpenter, 'in the third remove from the king and the truth.'

God (supra n) is here represented as a king. The word is borrowed from the language of the ninth book in which the imperfect shadow of the king is δημοκράτικος, ὀλγαρχικός, as here of God the shadows are ζωγράφος, κλινοποίος, &c.

A 
αὕτο τὸ ἐν τῇ φύσει ἐκαστον] i.e. the several patterns of things as they exist in nature. Cp. again Phaedo 103 B.

B 
πεποιηται] Perfect middle = 'is wont to create her productions,'—the perfect being used like τετεύτακε of an habitual state. Cp. viii. 556 c τῶν ἄλλων ἡμεληκότας, καὶ εὖδει πλεῖον ἐπιμέλειαι πεποιημένους ὑμητῆς, κ.τ.λ. πρὸς τὸ ὅν follows πεποιηται, 'with a view to being.'
Notes: Book X. 445

μιμήσασθαι] sc. τὸ ὄν.

φαντάσματος . . . μύησις;] a resumption of the previous question πότερα . . . ὡς φαίνεται;

πόρρω . . . εἰδώλων[.] "πόρρω is a favourite Platonic expression: cp. ix. 581 e, Theaet. 151 c πόρρω ὅτες τοῦ εἰδέναι: Soph. 234 c ἐτὶ πόρρῳ τῶν πραγμάτων τῆς ἀλήθειας ἀφεστότας. εἰδώλων refers to supra φαντάσματος μύησις. ποῦ is the indefinite adverb of place, 'somewhere far off,' not = 'as I conceive'; cp. vi. 499 c, D πόρρῳ ποῦ ἕκτος ὅτε τῆς ἡμετέρας ἐπόψιως.

tοὺς ἄλλους δημιουργοὺς[.] 'or any other artist.' For the asyndeton cp. iv. 434 A πάντα τάλλα μεταλλαττόμενα.

τῷ δοκεῖν] sc. τὸ ἵκονγραφήμηνον.

ὑπολαμβάνειν δεῖ τῷ τοιούτῳ[.] 'We must understand by such a statement,' cp. ix. 578 c τῷ τοιούτῳ λόγῳ σκοπεῖν and note. The description of φαντάσματος in Soph. 238 d ff. recalls the present passage.

ἀνθρωπος[.] Possibly ἀνθρωπος: see note on ἀνήρ ix. 573 c.

Homer, who is deemed to be an authority on the arts and virtues, is in the third remove from truth. Else he would have left laws and institutions and distinguished pupils behind him, and in his life-time would not have had to beg his bread.

οὐκοῦν, κ.τ.λ.] In the Ion of Plato, the same argument is drawn out at length in answer to the Rhapsodist's assertion of Homer’s omniscience (Ion 538 ff.—Homer is not a physician or a charioteer, or a general or a pilot, and yet he writes of all these subjects).

Why should Plato who is himself 'the last of the poets,' and the most poetical of prose writers, be also the enemy of poetry? For reasons partly fanciful and partly real:—

1. He is conscious of a deeply-seated opposition between poetry and philosophy, between the imagination and understanding, between the feelings and reason, between opinion or fiction and truth, between mythology and morality. Poetry is concerned with sense and not with abstractions or ideas, which are to Plato the food of a higher imagination. 2. The poet is from his point of view a mere imitator, who can do everything because he does nothing well; and he encourages the weaker or sentimental side of

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C D

D

598 D–601 B
Plato: Republic.

the human character. 3. He has not forgotten the old quarrel between philosophy and poetry, which is of longer standing and perhaps even deeper than that between the philosopher and the Sophist, just as the difference between Socrates and Aristophanes might be said to strike deeper than that between Socrates and Protagoras or Gorgias. 4. The ironical distinctions which the poet is to receive indicate the sense of his genius and of the beauty of his works; this, however, is not to supersede the sense of truth. 5. Plato's mission is to realize the abstract, and poetry is a picture, not an abstraction. Modern philosophy, in seeking to realize the abstract in the concrete, adopts a different attitude towards poetry and art. 6. He is probably influenced by the decline of poetry in his own age; what he calls in Laws iii. 701 a 'theatrocracy' was taking possession of the field.

Yet after every allowance has been made, there remains some reason for surprise, (1) that he should not have acknowledged the moral greatness of Sophocles and Aeschylus, or (2) have noticed that he himself like the tragedians is an imitator, for that both have based the form of their writings on conversation.

599 A τριτά ἀπέξοντα] τριτά is adverbial, sc. διαστήματα, nearly equivalent to τρίς, 'three times.'

η τι καὶ λέγουσι] 'or whether there is after all some meaning in what they say.' καὶ has a deliberative force.

οἷς οὖν . . . (B) ἔξοντα;) For the use of ἄφειναι to express self-abandonment to a pursuit, cp. ii. 373 B ἐὰν καὶ ἐκεῖνοι ἄφων αὐτοῦς ἐπὶ χρημάτων κτίσιν ἀπειρόν (ἐπὶ τῇ, κ.τ.λ., is here to be construed with σπουδάζειν).

προστήσασθαι . . . βίου] 'To set in the forefront of his life.' Cp. viii. 565 C ἐν τινὰ άει δῆμος εἰσώθε . . . προωτασθαι εαυτοῦ.

B καλὰ . . . μνημεία] εαυτοῦ is to be joined with μνημεία.

ἡ ὄφελία] 'The benefit or usefulness' rather than 'the profit.'

τῶν μὲν τοῖνυν . . . (D) πυρθανομένοις] i.e. we will not ask whether Homer as a physician has effected any cures; a fairer question will be (δικαίων που) whether he is a general or a legislator, or an educator of mankind:—ἐρωτώντες is connected with τίνας ὑγείες, κ.τ.λ., not with ei ἱατρικός, κ.τ.λ., which merely expresses the supposition on which the question rests. Cp. the construction of infra δ ὁ φίλε ὁμηρε, κ.τ.λ.
Notes: Book X.

ὁ φίλε... δεύτερος] ἀρετῆς πέρι resumes what is implied in πολέμων... ἀνθρώπω. εἰδώλου δημιουργός is an explanation of τρίτος ἀπὸ τὴς ἀληθείας.

ὅν δὴ... ἀριστάμεθα] ὁν is the predicate: 'which we defined the imitator to be.' Cp. vi. 499 ε οὗς λέγεις τοὺς φιλοσόφους, ix. 576 b and note. The reference here is to supra 597 ε, 598 β, c.

σὲ δὲ τίς, κ.τ.λ.] Cp. Lach. 186 β ἢ εἶ τις ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἑαυτῷ διδάσκαλον μὲν οὐ φησι γεγονόντα, ἀλλ' οὖν ἔργα αὐτῶς αὐτοῦ ἔχει εἶπείν, καὶ ἐπιδείξατi τίνες Ἀθηναίων ἢ τῶν ἔτην, ἡ δούλοι ἡ ἀλεύθεροι, δὲ ἐκείνον ὁμολογούμενοι ἤγαθοι γεγόνασιν;

The words which follow after Σύλωνα, viz. σὲ... εἶπείν, are read in the MSS. and earlier editions without interpunctuation. This great improvement in the text was introduced by Bekker.

ἀλλ' οἷα δὴ... λέγονται] εἰς before τὰ ἔργα was omitted by the first hand in Par. Α. Whether the preposition is retained or rejected, the words τὰ ἔργα or εἰς τὰ ἔργα are to be connected with σοφοῦ.

ἐπὶ συνουσία] 'For companionship,' i.e. as a companion. ἐπὶ τούτῳ (v) refers to ἐπὶ συνουσία, 'on this ground.'

καὶ οἱ ὑποτέροι... ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις;] The form of sentence is an expansion of the common idiom αὐτὸς τε καὶ, for which see iv. 427 c.

In the confusion of early and later Pythagoreanism, the testimony of Plato to a Pythagorean way of life is not without importance.

οὕτ' αὖ, ἐφή, κ.τ.λ.] The meaning is that Homer could not have educated Creophylus, or judging by the examples of Pythagoras, Protagoras and others, that 'child of flesh' would never have left him to starve. There is no need of emendation, nor any difficulty in the text.

Κρεώφυλος] is mentioned in Strabo xiv. cc. 638, 639 as a Samian who entertained Homer and received from him the poem called Ὀιχαλίας ἄλωσις, which, according to an epigram of Callimachus, was really the writing of Creophylus himself. He is mentioned by Pausanias iv. 2, 2 as the author of the Heraclea in which he spoke of Oechalia, probably the same work. Socrates similarly argues in Gorg. 516 against the statesmanship of Pericles and others from the ingratitude of the people towards them.
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ἐπ' αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου] as infra d. ἐπ' ἐκείνου, 'in his own day.' Of this the words ὅτε ἔλθη, 'when he was alive,' are a further colloquial amplification. Plato seems to have supposed that the name Ἐρω-φιλος was derived from ἐρεύς and φιλή: 'of the stock of flesh.'

ἀλλ' ὀει ... ὀὔκ ἀρ' ἀν ... ἀλλὰ Πρωταγόρας μὲν ... (d) "Ομηρον δ' ἀρα . . . καὶ ὀὔχι, κ.τ.λ.] The first part of this sentence has a regular protasis (ἐἰ τῷ ὅτι ... δυνάμενος) and apodosis (οὔκ ἀρ' ἀν πολλοὺς . . . ὅπ' αὐτῶν): the second part has two subdivisions (1) Πρωταγόρας μὲν ἀρα . . . οἱ ἐταίροι: (2) "Ομηρον δ' ἀρα . . . μεταλάβοις. The connexion of the first and second part may be traced as follows: If Homer had been able to make men better, he would have been honoured: but as a matter of fact, while Protagoras was honoured (and therefore may be supposed to have done men good) Homer was not honoured (and therefore cannot be supposed to have done men good). For the interposition of ὀει near the beginning of the sentence cp. especially Meno 93 c ἀλλ', ὀει, οὔκ ἀν ἐξουληθῇ;

ἀρα . . . ἀρα . . . ἀρα] 'As we are expected to suppose.'


ἐπὶ ταύτῃ τῇ σοφίᾳ] has an ironical reference to ἐὰν μὴ . . . ἐπιστατήσων: i.e. a wisdom which has so high a claim.

*δυνάναι] The reading of a majority of MSS. is δυναί (Λ'ΙΙ &c.) or δυναί (Λ'). As such forms are anomalous, several emendations have been suggested,—δύναω which rests on slight manuscript authority (Flor. x &c.), and δύνασαι which is also found in a single MS. δυνάναι, however, which is not found in any MS. is more likely to have been the original of δυναί, and the tense agrees better with the other verbs in the sentence.

καὶ ὀὔχι, κ.τ.λ.] The force of the negative ὀὔχι, demanding an affirmative answer, is continued to the end of the sentence.

Ε αὐτοὶ ἀν επαναγώγουσι] 'They would have chosen to attend or follow him.' From the more precise sense of watching or following about like a tutor, the word seems to acquire here and in I Alc. 135 d οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ὁπως οὐ παιδαγογήσω σε, the more general meaning of following another, never leaving him out of sight. For the whole passage cp. Theag. 128 ε.

μιμητᾶς εἰδώλων] (1) 'forgers of semblances,' 'imitative makers
of shadows’—from μιμέσθαι εἶδωλον, ‘to make a shadowy imitation’
(εἶδωλον cognate accusative, cp. infra 602 B τοῦτο μιμήσεται) [L. C.];
(2) ‘they copy images of virtue’ [B. J. Trans.].

χρώματι ἀττα ἐκάστων τῶν τεχνῶν] ‘colours belonging to’
(taken from) ‘the several arts.’

τοῖς διόμασι καὶ ρήμασιν] The dative is either (1) governed by
ti in ἐπίχρωματιζειν, ‘he dips his language in the colours of the
arts’: or (2) instrumental, ‘he gives his work a superficial colouring
of the arts by the language he employs.’ The latter is the more
natural mode of expression.

ἐπεὶ γυμνωθέντα γε, κ.τ.λ.] Poetry, it is argued, becomes bare
and meagre if stripped of poetical diction and colouring. More
than half the grace and bloom of a poem necessarily flies off in
translation; the same ideas, when expressed in prose, are no
longer the same. But the poet might reply that philosophy also
would become unmeaning if deprived of a suitable vehicle of
expression, nor can language ever wholly lose a musical and
poetical element.

αὕτα ἐφ’ αὐτῶν λεγόμενα] I. e. when the matter or λόγος is
stripped of the form of poetry (λέξις, ἀρμονία, μυθός) and merely
spoken. Cp. iii. 392 B ff.

τεθέασαι γὰρ ποι] ‘For you have seen I suppose, what they
look like?’ We may paraphrase ‘you have seen the Logographer
turning poetry into prose.’

Not the imitator, nor even the maker of things is the true
authority, but he who uses them and directs them to their end. The
imitator consults neither use nor reality (of which he is ignorant)
but appearance only.

μὴ τοῖνυν . . . ἔσωμεν] ‘Do not let us leave the subject half
explained, but let us have a thorough understanding of it.’ Cp.
ii. 376 D ἢμεν μὴ ἔσωμεν ἵκεν ᾗγον λόγον, Phaedo 77 c φαίνεται γὰρ ὀστερ
ἡμισιαν ἀποδείχθαι αὐτῷ δει. ἡμίσιως, the genitive used adverbially
(corrected to ἡμίσιως in Par. A), is the reading of most MSS.:
ἐφ’ ἡμίσιως (q) seems to be a conjectural reading: ἡμίσιως, the
conjecture of Stephanus, is an adverb formed on the analogy
of ταχέως, παχίως, &c.

ἀρ’ οὖν ἐπατει, κ.τ.λ.] A favourite idea in Plato:—Cratyl. 390 D

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The correlation of singular and plural here arises from the collocation of particular and universal. The instrument (sing.) is good in some cases bad in others (plur.). [L. C.]

Some would read ἔξωγγελλει (biss). But see note on infra 604 λ ἄντιτεινειν.

ου ἄν υπηρετῶσιν] sc. αὐλοῖ. 'Which he finds serviceable:'—not merely 'which he makes use of.' Cp. Protag. 326 β ένα τά σώματα βελτίων χέννες υπηρετῶσι τῇ διανοίᾳ χρηστῇ οὐσί. The occurrence of υπηρετῶσιν and υπηρετήσει in successive lines, but in a different connexion, is worthy of remark.

πίστιν δρθήν] πίστις is here used in the sense of an opinion received from others—not with the technical meaning which was given to it in vi. 511. The genitive, governed by ποιητής, is resumed with κάλλους τε καὶ ποιηρίας.

ἐδα τό ... ἐπιτάττεσθαι] 'because of having orders given him.' For the passive cp. i. 337 λ χάλεσαιεσθαι.

χαρίεις ἄν εἰῆ ... ποιή] 'The imitator will be in a charming state of intelligence about his own inventions.' The asyndeton is used as elsewhere to express the persistent feeling with which Socrates (ἐπέξων καὶ οὕτως ωνεῖς) sends the argument home: cp. v. 462 έ ὀφα ἄν εἰῆ ... ἐπιεώναι. For the ironical use of χαρίεις and the reply cp. iv. 426 λ τὸδε αὐτῶν οὐ χαρίεν and the answer (β) οὐ πάνι χαρίεν.

ἀλλ’ οὐν δῆ ομίσ γε, κ.τ.λ.] The particles emphasize the absurdity of such a proceeding, considering the nature of imitation: 'nevertheless he will do it.'

τοῦτο μιμήσεται] τοῦτο is a cognate accusative: not 'that he will imitate' but 'such will be the mode of his imitation.'

καὶ ἐν ἐπεσί] Homer is still included among tragic poets: supra 595 c, infra 607 λ, Theaet. 153 λ.
Thus shallow and unreal itself, imitation works upon what is shallow and unreal in human nature, appealing as it does to the crude experience of sensation and not to the arts of measuring and weighing by which the illusions of sense are corrected. So painting deceives the eye, and poetry introduces similar confusion by her representation of complex and inconsistent emotions, appealing to the passions and not to reason.

πρὸς Δίός] The exclamation (cp. i. 332 c, ix. 574 b) is uttered in glad anticipation of a new argument, in which Plato having shown the unreality of dramatic performances, proceeds to consider them as injurious to the moral character: first, as illusive; secondly, as tending to imitate the feelings when excited and variable rather than when equable; thirdly, and more than all, as promoting the indulgence and expression of feelings which would otherwise be restrained. Before taking the new step he resumes what has preceded with μὲν (περὶ πρίτων μὲν τί, κ.τ.λ.). In the next sentence ἵστις is to be supplied with ἐξεν.

tοῦ ποιεῦ τινὸς περὶ λέγεις;] ‘what is the subject of your remark?’ The interrogative pronoun is not a repetition of ποιεῖν τί supra, but refers generally to the whole point in question, asking for an example or illustration of it.

πᾶσα τις ταραχή] ‘a kind of utter confusion’ = πάντως τις ταραχή: πᾶς is used intensively and not extensively: cp. Soph. 250 ν πᾶση συνεχώμεθα ἀπορία,—and for the use of τις, Gorg. 522 b αὕτη γερ τις βοθέων ἕαυτῷ πολλάκις ἡμῖν ὑμολόγηται κρατιστὴ εἶναι.


ἀρ’ οὖν οὗ τὸ μετρεῖν, κ.τ.λ.] The apparent variations of the senses are corrected by measure and number. This is the answer to the doctrine of the fallibility of our knowledge of sensible objects, whether suggested by Plato or by Berkeley. The variations are ascertainable or assignable to disturbing causes and afford no reason for doubting the general truthfulness of sense. For Plato’s conception of the art of measuring, cp. Protag. 356 ν, Philebus 55 ε.

τοῦτῳ δὲ πολλάκις, κ.τ.λ.] The dative would naturally have been followed by some such word as συμβαίνει, ‘it turns out,’ &c. For this the expression ταναντία φαίνεται is substituted. Or in other
words, the dative is in a loose construction with the whole sentence, like a genitive absolute, and is not to be taken with φαίνεται. It would not be in accordance with Plato's use of language, or with the context in what follows, to speak of the contradictions of sense as having anything to do with the rational element in the soul. For a similar change of construction, cp. viii. 566 ε πρὸς τοὺς ἐξω ἐχθροὺς, κ.τ.λ., Theact. 182 β ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων . . . τα δὲ αἰσθανόμενα.

οὐκοῦν ἐφαμεν . . . εἶναι;] He refers to iv. 436 ἦς—'with the same faculty to form opposite opinions at the same time.'

άλλα μὴν, κ.τ.λ.] Measure and number are among the leading ideas of the Platonic philosophy. There is a measure in words as in all other things (Polit. 285 λ) and the μέτρον and μέτρων in the Philebus are in the highest region of good.

ἐλεγον] supra 597 ε ff., 602 δ.

ἡ γραφικὴ . . . (β) ἀληθεῖ] The chief stress is on πόρρω, which has the first place in each clause and is repeated for the sake of emphasis.

ἐπ' οὐδενι, κ.τ.λ.] The purpose for which their friendship is cemented is utterly unsound and untrue.

φαύλη . . . μυμητική] Cp. vi. 496 λ ποι' ἄττα οὖν εἰκός γεννᾶν τοὺς τουτάτους; οὐ νόθα καί φαύλα;}

μὴ τι ἀλλο ἥ παρὰ ταῦτα;] μὴ τι ἀλλο ἥν, the conjecture of Ast, is certainly probable. The past tense would refer to iii. 399 λ, β, where the true scope of μυμητική was described. But the interrogative use of the subjunctive with μὴ expecting a negative answer, is a sufficiently well-ascertained Platonic construction—see Goodwin, M. and L., § 268. Cp. especially Parm. 163 δ τὸ δὲ γίγνεσθαι καὶ τὸ ἀπόλλυσθαι μὴ τι ἀλλο ἧ, κ.τ.λ., where, however, Bekker reads ἦν with Heindorf.


ἀναμμηνήσκομαι δὲ . . . ἦμων] Socrates apparently refers to two discussions, one in iii. 387, where the brave man is described as bearing sorrow with fortitude,—the other in iv. 439, where opposite tendencies are spoken of as working together in the soul.
Notes: Book X.

ἀνήρ . . . ἀπολέσας] The words ὧδὲ ἀπολέσας . . . ποιεῖται are an explanation of τοιοῦτον τούτης μετασχῶν.

tοτε] iii. 387 D, E.

οὐτω . . . ἄλθεσι] ‘Rather the latter, said he, if we are to speak truly.’ τό γε ἄλθεσι is an adverbial phrase = re vera. The reasonableness of this is noticeable. Plato sees that even the good man, who has his feelings most under control, cannot altogether overcome them.

tο δὲ . . . εἰπὲ] ‘But now tell me this about him.’ There is no need of altering τὸ δὲ to τὸ δὲ with Schneider and the inferior MSS. The neuter of the article is often used thus demonstratively in beginning a new sentence.

Socrates recalls the heads of the former discussion, to which he adds a new one, viz. the tendency of dramatic performances to relax the self-control which is natural in the presence of others.

μαχεῖσθαι τε καὶ ἀντιτείνειν] Cp. i. 342 A σκεψομένης τε καὶ ἐκπορής, supra 601 D ἐξαγγέλλει . . . καὶ ἐπιστάει:—ἀντιτείνειν, which is supported by the great majority of MSS., is probably genuine, notwithstanding the change of tense.

ἀ οὐκ ἄν δέξαιτο τινα ἰδεὶν δρῶντα] ‘Which he would not choose to see another doing.’ Cp. Soph. El. 1278 ἡ κάρτα κἂν ἄλλοις ἐνευμίην ἰδὼν. (Unless ἦ has dropped out—ἀ οὐκ ἄν δέξαιτο τινα ἦ ἰδεὶν δρῶντα.)

ἐναντίας . . . εἶναι] ‘But when a man is drawn in two opposite directions in reference to the same object, we say that he has necessarily two distinct principles.’

φαμέν may be understood parenthetically, and ἀναγκαίον as = ἀναγκαῖον ἐστὶν. But ἀναγκαίον is equally well explained by supplying εἶναι:—sc. φαμέν εἶναι ἀναγκαῖον δύο εἶναι εἰν αὐτῷ. Compare again the discussion in Book iv (436 ff.) in which the principle of contradiction is first stated.

The change of construction from δῆλου ὄντος to προβαίνον is caused by the transition to the impersonal verb. Cp. Euthyphr. 4 D ὥς ἀνδροφόνου καὶ οὐδὲν ὄν πράγμα. The accusative, when once adopted, is continued.

οὔτε τι . . . σπουδής] The spirit of these words resembles that of many passages in the Laws; e. g. vii. 803 B, C ἐστι δῆ τοίνυν τὰ
In the circumstances:—i.e. éν ταῖς ἡμιφοραῖς (supra).


For the image cp. Dem. Philipp. i. § 40 ἄσπερ οἱ βάρβαροι πυκτεύουσιν, οὕτω πολεμεῖν

τελείται καὶ γὰρ ἕκεινον ὁ πληγεὶς ἂν τὸς πληγῆς ἔχεται, κἂν ἐτέρωσε

παθήσῃ, ἐκείν’ εἰσίν αἱ χεῖρες: προβάλλεσθαι δ’ ἡ βλέπειν ἑναντίον οὐτ’

οὐδεν οὕτ’ ἐθελει.

The dative appears elsewhere in similar expressions (ix. 585 A, Polit. 264 A, Laws vii. 799 c) and therefore τῷ (q) is to be preferred to τό, the reading of the older MSS., which, however, is not impossible after γίγνεσθαι (‘to arrive at’).

As we are saying—supra b.

Cp. iv. 439 D πληρώσεων τινῶν καὶ ἱδονῶν ἐταῖρον (neuter): supra 603 b.

‘admits of.’ Cp. Thuc. ii. 41, § 3 ἀγανάκτησιν ἔχει.

the reading of Π q and a few other MSS., has been preferred by some editors on the supposition that μιμοῦμαι is not used passively. As other tenses of the verb are taken in a passive sense (Laws ii. 668 B τὸ μιμηθεῖν: Cratyl. 425 D γράφματι καὶ συλλογίᾳ τὰ πράγματα μεμιμημένα: supra 599 A μιμηθησόμενον) there is no sufficient reason for refusing such a sense to the present. But, as Schneider observes, μιμοῦμεν here may quite well be an accusative masculine,—‘nor is it easy to understand one who tries to imitate this.’ Ficinus (‘si imitemur’) perhaps read μιμοῦμεν.

The dative is dative of the occasion, while ἀνθρώπους depends on εὐπτετές καταμαθεῖν. ‘At a public gathering, and for men assembling,’ &c.

Trying...[2] οὐ negatives the whole sentence; hence καὶ, not οὐδὲ. It follows that τε, not γε, is right, and τε was probably at first written in Par. A, in which γε is a correction. (The mark + written over γ by the diorthotes, has been mistaken for τ.) For
πέπηγεν κρ. vii. 530 δός πρός ἀστρονομίαν ἐμματα πέπηγεν, δός πρός ἐναρμάνον φοράν δύτα παγίναι.

φαύλα ... πρός ἀλῆθειαν] Cp. supra 597 λ ἀμυνδρών τι ... πρὸς ἀλῆθειαν.

ἐτερον τοιούτον] sc. φαύλον, to which τούτο before ἤγειρει also refers.

ὡσπερ ἐν πόλει] ‘As in the case of a city;’ sc. the rational part is destroyed. The subject of comparison is resumed in ταύτων καὶ τῶν, κ.τ.λ., infra.

παραδιδῷ] sc. αὐτοῖς.

ταύτων] Accusative in apposition to κακὴν ... ἐμποιεῖν, bringing out the antecedent to ὡσπερ.

πολιτεῖαν] The thought is similar to that in ix. 592 b: cp. infra 608 b περί τῆς ἐν αὐτῷ πολιτείας δεδομένη.

οὔτε τὰ μείζων οὔτε τὰ ἐλάττω] Cp. i. 343 λ ὀϊδε πρῶξατα ὀϊδε παμένα and note.

ἀλλὰ τὰ αὐτὰ ... ἀφεστῶτα] There is great uncertainty about the text and construction of this passage. The reading εἴδωλονοιντα, which refers to the poet, rests on insufficient manuscript authority (q corr.). Nor is the change from the dative to the accusative necessary, as the ‘foolish part of the soul’ may very well be called ‘a maker of images.’ There is, however, good authority for ἀφεστῶτα; and it may be argued that if either the dative or the accusative is read in one clause, it should be read in both. But ἀφεστῶτα,—‘things remote from the truth,’ may quite well be in agreement with εἴδωλα. On the other hand, ἀφεστῶτα, the reading of Σ D corr., is also possible.—It may be argued further, on the one hand that εἴδωλοποιοῦντα agreeing with the subject of ἐμποιεῖν preserves better the balance of the sentence, on the other hand that it is too far removed from its context.

The crowning offence of poetry is her corrupting not only bad or indifferent persons, but even the good. Our feelings are stirred when Homer or one of the tragedians represents some pitiful hero weeping or smiting his breast. But in our own sorrows we are expected to play the manly part. And we cannot be right in praising others for a weakness which would disgrace ourselves. The same rule applies to the excess of laughter excited by comedy,
and still more to the awakening of lower feelings. Hymns in praise of God and god-like men are the only poems which we admit in our state.

The change from singular to plural marks the transition from the single speeches (ῥήσεως) of the characters in Epic poetry and tragedy to the combined song or plaint (κομμοῦ) of the chorus and the persons on the stage. The conjectural reading ἡ κλαίοντας for ἡ καὶ ἀδοντάς is unnecessary.

μὴ ἀξίοι εἶναι] μὴ, not ὦ, is used in putting the case.

οὐ μὰ . . . σκοποίησ] ναι here expresses dissent from the negative preceding. 'That does not appear reasonable.' 'Yes, but it will, if you look at it in this way.' εὐλογον is used in slightly different senses in the two clauses. 'It looks very inconsistent,' said Glaucon, 'thus to praise the tragic poet.—Rather, it is easily explained, if you look at it in this way.'

πεπεινηκὸς τοῦ δακρύσα] 'compelled to fast from tears:' i.e. which has been denied the satisfaction of weeping.

ἀνίησι . . . τούτου] 'relaxes its watch over this tearful part of our nature.' Cp. viii. 547 c φιλακης αὐτῶν and note.

Plato passes from the rational part of the soul to the man himself. ἄτε like ὦς is construed with the accusative neuter participle of an impersonal verb.

λογίζεσθαι . . . εἰς τὰ οἰκεία] Cp. iii. 395 c ἵνα μὴ ἐκ τῆς μυθησεως τοῦ εἶναι ἀπολιαύσωσιν.

ὄρι, ἀν αὐτός, κ.τ.λ.] The text has been variously emended. Schneider’s reading (ἄν for ἄν) has been adopted as involving the least change. Hermann’s correction of δὲ to δὴ is to some extent confirmed by the absence of μὲν after αὐτός. Supposing this accepted, the simplest change is to add ἅ before αὐτός and ἄν after αἰσχύνοιο:—ὅτι, ἄν & αὐτός αἰσχῦνοι ἄν, κ.τ.λ., 'that, if jests, which you would be ashamed to make, sound delightful to your ear.' It is possible, however, that we have here a carelessly written
sentence, in which the differing moods a ἄν ἀλήθευσον and a ἄν Republic X. 666 C

ἀδ] 'again,' as in the former case, supra λ.

ἐκεί] 'On those occasions,' i. e. in hearing poetry, cp. v. 451 b.

ἐν τοῖς οἰκείοις] In your private life and conversation (supra b).

καὶ περί ἀφροδισίων] ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος is to be supplied before δι.

Plato is an enemy to sentimentalism; all those influences which are represented to us by novels, plays, poems, are to be sternly repressed. He will not have the feelings excited by unreal sorrows, lest they should be unequal to the support of real ones. That the indulgence of the feelings even in virtuous or religious emotions may be carried to excess, is certainly true. Also, as Butler has remarked, passive impression is (or rather may be) in an inverse ratio to active habit. Still, one who cannot feel is almost as far removed from a rational being as one who cannot think: the sources of imagination and sympathy are dried up in him; and to quicken the feelings and imagination where they are deficient is quite as important a part of education as to moderate them where they are in excess.

Plato does not recognize that the indulgence of the feelings may also be a cultivation of them (μίμησις . . . περαιόνοσα δι' ἐλέον καὶ φόβου τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων κάθαρσιν). What would he have thought of a system which resolves the moral sentiments into sympathy? Much of the obscurity of this subject arises out of the strongly marked line of distinction which is drawn between reason and feeling, and from the neglect to observe that reason is often manifested in the form of feeling.

ἀξίος ἀναλαβόντι μανθάνειν] 'It is well worth while to take him up and learn him.' The reading ἀξίος has the authority of Par. A as well as of Π M, and is also more idiomatic than ἀξιον, which has been adopted by editors on the supposed authority of Par. A.

ὁσον] owing to the omission of its antecedent τοσοῦτον, is in the accusative case; hence ὁμοιοτροφοσμοιον by attraction to it becomes ὁμοιοσμους.

ἐγκώμια τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς] 'praises of the brave,' like Symp. 194 b ἐγκομίου τῷ ἔρωτι. The construction here follows that of the preceding words.

τοῦ κοιμη . . . λόγου] Either (1) 'the reason which by common
consent has always been held to be the highest,' or (2) 'that reason which from time to time appears best to the majority.' Cp. supra 604 b, c.

607 B—608 B  Such then is our defence for what may seem hard measure towards the poets who have charmed us. The truth is that there is an old quarrel between philosophy and poetry. But if the Muse, making her defence in turn, can prove that we are wrong, we are only too ready to listen to her. Yet until she or her friends can show that she is not only pleasant but useful to the state, we shall hear her under protest, using the foregoing argument as a counter-charm. For great is the issue at stake. And of the highest rewards of virtue we have not yet spoken.

607 B  ταύτα δή, ἕφην, κ.τ.λ.  The reasons for ἀπολελογίσθω, 'let this be our defence,' and ἀπολελογίσθω, 'let this be our final reckoning' or 'summing up,' are very nearly balanced. In favour of the latter may be urged (1) the agreement of the two best MSS. Par. A and Ven. II, (2) the old argument of the 'more difficult reading,' (3) the apparent anticipation of the defence of poetry in the word ἀπολελογίσθω, which may also have suggested the alteration to the mind of the copyist, (4) the tone of the preceding pages, which has not been that of apology but of accusation or judgement (supra 595 a, b, 604 d, e). On the other hand, ἀπολελογίσθω (1) has the consent of the remaining MSS., (2) is a more natural and appropriate expression; (3) towards Homer at least the attitude has been one of apology; (4) in the immediate context, the epexegesis  ὅτι εἰκότως ἀρα, κ.τ.λ., is more suitable to this idea, for which cp. also iv. 420 b, vi. 490 a; Phaedo 63, 69; (5) 'this is our defence;' let poetry make hers if she can,'—is not by any means an illogical sequence.

ὁ γὰρ λόγος ἡμᾶς ἡρει]  The expression ὁ λόγος αἱρεῖ is not infrequent in the sense, 'reason constrains us.' In the present passage ὁ λόγος may mean either (1) 'the argument,' as in Laws ii. 663 b ὡς καὶ νῦν αὐτὸ ἡρεῖ οἷον λόγος ἔχειν, or (2) 'reason' generally. The addition of ἡμᾶς which gives a touch of liveliness, is rather in favour of the former.

προσεῖπωμεν]  'let us say in addition,' cp. Soph. 250 b. The scribe of r, not understanding this, wrote αὐτήν instead of αὐτῆ.
καὶ γὰρ ἡ λακέρυζα, κ.τ.λ.] for the saying of 'the yelping hound barking at her lord' and 'one mighty in the vain talk of fools,' &c.

The first of these two quotations is said by Plato (Laws xii. 967 c, d) to be applied by certain poets to the disciples of Anaxagoras, who though nameless, are sufficiently indicated by their doctrine ὡς νοῦς εἶη ὁ διακεκσαμεμένες πάθῃ ὡςα 'καὶ αὐφανών,—which doctrine of theirs however they ruined, and themselves with it, by also making earth and stones the universal causes.

ὁ τῶν Δία σοφῶν ὄχλος κρατῶν] The best mode of construing this clause is to take Δία with κρατῶν, 'the crowd of philosophers overmastering Zeus.' Cp. Shakespeare, Hamlet, v. 1, 86–88 'A politician,... one that would circumvent God.'

The order of the words may be possibly explained by the circumstance of their being a quotation from some lyric poet. In Plato himself, however, there occur examples of somewhat violent or affected transpositions, as in Laws vii. 824 θήρευσις... ἦ τῶν διαλαμβάνων πάνων ἐξουσία. The Vulgate text before Bekker (still followed by some editors) had διασφόρων in one word on the authority of some inferior manuscripts (which read διασφόρων) according to the supposed analogy of διάστικμος,—itself a word of doubtful authority.

σημεία] sc. ἦστιν, which gives the required verb.

ἡ πρὸς ἡδονὴν ποιητικὴ] is opposed to the 'austere' poetry which is to be admitted: iii. 398 Α αὐτόι δὲ ἐν τῷ αὐστηροτέρῳ καὶ ἀνδεστιρῷ ποιητῇ χρώμεθα.

ἀπολογησομένη] The reading ἀπολογησομένη, which seems to have been that of A', is probably right. οὕτω, 'on this condition,' is explained by ἀπολογησομένη... μέτρῳ.

τῶν καλῶν πολιτειῶν] said ironically, like ἦ καλλιστη... πολιτεία in viii. 562 Α.

† αἰσθώμεθα] is a word of doubtful genuineness. And even if it be changed to αἰσθηλώμεθα, the expression is feeble. Ἀισθώμεθα and ἡσθήμεθα are not much better. Εἰσόμεθα, the reading of q, is probably conjectural. Madvig very ingeniously conjectured ἀσόμεθα, continuing the idea of ἐπάδωντες. But (1) the participial clause ἐκλαβουμένωι... ἔρωτα is hardly enough of a digression to justify the resumptive δ’ οὖν: (2) the expression ἀσόμεθα ὡς, κ.τ.λ., is not quite natural or idiomatic: (3) there is nothing in the words ὡς οὖν
One life is far too little to reward virtue, or to deserve the serious care of an immortal soul.—That the human soul is immortal is a strange thought to Glaucous. But Socrates undertakes to prove it.

Poetry is emphasized as being the immediate subject of the previous discussion.

That the doctrine of the immortality of the soul, which is asserted in the Crito, Phaedo, Phaedrus, and referred to in the Apology, Timaeus, Politicus, Laws,—and also in Rep. vi. 498 D, should be here spoken of as a new revelation of which Glaucus hears for the first time, is remarkable.

That which perishes can be destroyed only by its own proper evil. Now the soul has an evil proper to it, namely vice. But vice does not destroy the soul. It would lose all it terrifies if it did. For it would release the wicked man from evil. Instead of which it keeps him alive and wide awake. It follows that as the soul is capable of being destroyed by its own evil, the soul therefore must be imperishable and immortal.

The argument is as follows:—The soul has a proper evil, which is vice. Now if vice has no
destroying power over the soul, no merely external evil can have any.

κακόν τι] The best MSS. read κακῶν τε, which is possibly right.

τοῦτο μέντοι . . . ἀπολλών] 'An evil however whose destructive agency cannot cause its dissolution.'

οὐκ ἤν;] cp. iv. 436 B, C εἰσόμεθα οὕτι οὐ ταύτων ἤν ἄλλα πλεῖω:
and the note.

ἄλλα ὥσε ποιεῖ] 'But put the matter in this way.'

ὡσπερ . . . (ν) ἀφικνεῖται] The apodosis is deferred to make room for the question οὐχ οὖτως;
It is resumed in a new form in θι. δη, κ.τ.λ., infra.

καὶ & νῦν δὴ, κ.τ.λ.] καὶ must here mean 'and'—not 'also,' as in καὶ ψυχή infra D, because the comparison is not between the body and corn, iron (supra A), &c., but between all these and the soul.

ἐκείνῳ γε] 'The other (and more remote) alternative,' referring to supra A.

ὑπὸ τῆς . . . πονηρίας . . . ἐκείνων] 'by the evil which is proper to them alone,' i.e. in so far as it is an evil of food considered in itself. For example, mildew, the disease of corn, can destroy the ear of corn, but the mildewed ear of corn will not destroy the human body of itself, but only by introducing into it some disease of the body.

*ὁρθότατα] ὁρθότατ' ἄν is the reading of all the MSS. with two unimportant exceptions (ὁρθότατ' ἄν Vind. F, ὁρθότατ' ἄφ' Vind. E), but is probably corrupt. Either ὁρθότατα as in the text, or ὁρθότατά γ', should be read.

ἡ τοίνυν . . . (β) ἀνοσιωτέρα γίγνεται] Compare the first chapter of Butler's Analogy, Part i:—especially the curious observation, 'we have no way of determining by experience what is the certain bulk of the living being each man calls himself; and yet till it be determined that it is larger in bulk than the solid elementary particles of matter which there is no ground to think any natural power can dissolve, there is no sort of reason to think death to be the dissolution of it, of the living being, even though it should not be absolutely indiscrepible.' Here however Butler seems to imply that the soul may be a primary atom, and so indivisible. Plato argues that no disease
of the body nor division of the particles however minute can affect the soul.

For εἰ τις ὁ τι σμικρότατα we should perhaps read εἰ τις εἰς ὁ τι σμικρότατα: but cp. vi. 509 δ γραμμὴν δίχα τετμημένην . . . ἀνίσα τμήματα.

ὅμως τῷ λόγῳ τολμᾶν εἶναι] 'boldly closes' (1) 'with our argument,' or (2) 'with us in argument.' The latter may be supported by the absolute use of ὁμώς . . . χωρήσεται in Theaet. 165 ε, and for τῷ λόγῳ thus used cp. ii. 361 β τῶν δίκαιων παρ' αὐτῶν ἴστωμεν τῷ λόγῳ. But the first explanation is perhaps simpler and more natural.

μάλιστα . . . ἦττων] sc. λαμβάνωντας αὐτό.

ἀλλὰ μὴν, ὥσπερ νῦν . . . οὐ αἰδικοί] Cp. vii. 539 δ καὶ μὴ ὡς νῦν ὁ τυχῶν καὶ αὐθεντὴν προσήκου ἐξῆκε τὸ αὐτὸ—and the note there.


οὔτω πόρρω . . . εἶναι] 'So far is she removed from being deadly.' I. e. Injustice is far enough from being one of the things which cause death. Cp. Phaedo 107 c εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἤν ὁ θάνατος τοῦ παντὸς ἀπαλλαγή, ἐρμαον ἄν ἦν τοῖς κακίστως ἀποθανοῦσιν τοῦ τε σώματος ἀμι ἀπηλλάξθαι καὶ τῆς αὐτῶν κακίας μετὰ τῆς ψυχῆς. Yet at the end of Book i (351 ff.) Socrates uses an argument apparently inconsistent with this, which he applies both to the state and to the individual, viz. that evil is a principle of dissolution or annihilation, which subsists only through the latent presence of good.

For the figurative language cp. Polit. 284 Ε πάνθ' ὑπόσα εἰς τὸ μέσον ἀποκίσθη τῶν ἐνχάτων.

Now the number of souls, since they are immortal, must always be the same, neither less nor more; they cannot become less, because none of them can die: and they cannot increase, because they could only be increased if what is mortal became immortal, of which the result would be that all things would become immortal. Nor can their nature really be so complex as appears to us. The fact of immortality is proved. But the nature of the soul is beyond the limits of our knowledge. For she is plunged in the sea of mortality and encrusted with earth. Only the divine spark of philosophy within her gives an inkling of her pristine and true being:
Plato teaches that souls are eternal, and have a certain fixed number which is incapable of increase or diminution. Any process of change by which the mortal passes into the immortal must end after infinite ages in the immortality of all the mortal. That this is Plato's meaning, which is, however, obscurely expressed, appears from Phaedo 72 B, c εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἢ ἄνταποδιδοθῇ τὰ ἐτέρα τοῖς ἐτέροις γενόμενα, ὅπως ἐπεί κύκλῳ περιώματα, ἀλλ' εὐθείᾳ τις εἰς ἥ γένεσις ἐκ τοῦ ἐτέρου μόνον εἰς τὸ καταντικρύ, καὶ μὴ ἀνακάμπτει πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ ἐτέραν μὴ δὲ καμπὶ ἑως οὔτη, οὔτ' ὅτι πάντα τελευτῶντα τὰ αὐτὸ σχῆμα ἀν σχῶν: where an opposite turn is given to the same argument and it is urged that life must follow death as death follows life. One of the reasons given by Anselm in Cur Deus Homo, for the redemption of mankind, is 'the appointed number of the souls of the blessed.'

τῇ ἀληθεστάτῃ φύσει] 'in her truest nature,' as distinguished from that phenomenal nature of the soul which is known to us in experience, and has parts and opposing desires as in Book iv.

οὐ ράδιον, κ.τ.λ. (i) 'that can hardly be eternal, as we have now discovered the soul to be, which is compounded of many elements, and is not perfectly compounded.' The words σωθετῶν τε, κ.τ.λ., may be illustrated by ix. 588 ff. where the soul is said in a figure to be composed of a many-headed beast, a lion, and a man. Otherwise (2) the words ὡς νῦν . . . ψυχή may be taken closely with the clause immediately preceding and referred to the psychology of Books iv and ix. The position of the words in question is in favour of the latter explanation—'that can hardly be eternal which is imperfectly compounded of various elements, as in our present conversation the soul has appeared to be.'


καὶ οἱ άλλοι such as the reasonings in the Phaedo and Phaedrus.

ἀναγκάσειαν ἄν] 'would prove beyond doubt.'

εὐρήσει . . . διώφεται The subject of these verbs is to be gathered from the preceding sentence: viz, ὁ οὕτω διαθέωμενος.

δικαιοσύνας τε καὶ ἀδικίας The plural signifies the concrete realization of the abstract notion:—Justice and Injustice in their various forms.

tebeāmēba μέντοι . . . τῆν ἀρχαίαν φύσιν] The construction is
altered to suit the expansion of the simile: and there is a resumption of τεθεάμεθα ... αὐτό in infra n' οὐτω καὶ τῆν ψυχήν, κ.τ.λ.

With the following image cp. Phaedrus 250c καθαροί ὀστέοι καὶ ὀστήματα τούτων ὅ νῦν σῶμα περιφέροντες ὑνομάζομεν, ὀστρεύον τρόπον δεδεσμεύμενον.

These words in the relative clause resume ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς δρμῆς'] sc. τῆς τοῦ τῷ θείῳ ἐφέπευθαί.

'as the effects of what are called blissful banquets.' Cp. supra γῆν ἐστιωμένη.

We have found, as Glauccon and Adeimantus required, that apart from reputation and rewards, justice in her own nature is best for the soul in her own nature, even though a man could make himself invisible. Having answered this requirement, we may now, without offence, state the truth about the just man's reward. He does not escape the notice of the gods, and they love him and make him blessed. And though his justice may not soon appear to men, yet at the end of the race he wins the prize against those who started brilliantly with a splendid show. The unjust may elude detection for a while; but in their age they are exploded and despised; and suffer all those horrors which were formerly recounted as falling on the head of the just man who was misconstrued by mankind.

The passage which follows is one of the many reminiscences of earlier portions of the work which occur in later ones, and which form an exquisite thread of connexion amid apparent disorder. The old allusion to the ring of Gyges is heightened and enriched by the reference to Iliad v. 844, 845.

This very early piece of folk-lore is alluded to also in Hesiod. Scut. 227, Aristoph. Ach. 390, and in the legend of Perseus in Pherecydes. See Leaf's note on Iliad. l. c. He compares the Tarn-Kappe or Nebelkappe of northern mythology.

For the bearing of the words τὸν Γύγου δακτύλιον on the reading of ii. 359 c, see note in loco.

'we have cleared away in the argument the difficulties raised by Glauccon and Adeimantus.' To answer
accusations or clear away objections is a meaning constantly assigned to ἀπολύσθαι. On the other hand there is no certain instance of the use of the middle voice of this verb in the sense of ‘paying a debt.’ A various reading ἀπεδυσάμεθα is found in the Cesena MS. (M), in Ven. ζ, and in Stobaeus: this may be connected with the passage (ii. 361 C γυμνοσθόν δή πάντων πλὴν δικαιοσύνης, κ.τ.λ.) in which Glaucon and Adeimantus desire Socrates to ‘strip’ justice. The allusion, however, is too remote; the form is unusual in Attic prose, and the reading is not assisted by the immediate context.

έπηνέκαμεν] Par. A reads ἐπηνέκαμεν (sic) with a dot over the γ, suggesting ἐπηνέκαμεν, and Par. K reads ἐπηνέσαμεν. This recalls the words of Adeimantus (which may however have suggested this reading to the scribe) ii. 363 A οὐκ αὐτῷ δικαιοσύνην ἐπαινοῦντες, ἀλλὰ τὰς ἀπ’ αὑτῆς εὐδοκιμάσεις, ib. 367 D μασθοῦς δὲ καὶ δίδακας πάρες ἄλλως ἐπαινεῖν. But for ἐπιφέρειν, ‘to bring to bear,’ ‘apply’ (reading ἐπηνέκαμεν), cp. Soph. 251 A λέγομεν ἀνθρώπον δή ποιλ’ ἄτα ἐπωνομάζοντες, τά τε χρώματα ἐπιφέροντες αὐτῷ καί ... κακίας καί ἀρετῶν.—The word ἐπηνέκαμεν with the same variant ἐπηνέσαμεν occurs in Polit. 307 A.

ὑμεῖς γὰρ ἢγεῖσθε] ii. 361 A ff., 367 E.

ἡτεῖαθε, the reading of Par. A, which is supported by M (ἡτεῖαθε) is perhaps to be preferred to ἢγεῖσθε: it agrees better with ἔδωκα and δοτέναι, and with ἀπαιτῶ in the following sentence. Cp. infra δ, e. There is a slight pleonasm or anacoluthon in δοτέναι following ἡτεῖαθε, which however is not unpleonastic.

ταῦτα λανθάνειν] ‘That one should escape notice in this.’

tαῦτα, cognate accusative.

δοκεῖσθαι] For the passive cp. vi. 490 A τοίς ... δοκοῦμένοις.

εἰ μὴ τι ἀναγκαῖον, κ.τ.λ.] Cp. Butler, Analogy, Part. i. chap. 2 ‘Why the author of nature does not make his creatures happy without the instrumentality of their own actions, and prevent their bringing any sufferings upon themselves, is another matter. Perhaps there may be some impossibilities in the nature of things which we are unacquainted with.’

ἐκ προτέρας ἁμαιρίας] The effect of one life on another is again referred to infra 620 A κατὰ συνῆθειαν γὰρ τοῦ προτέρου βίου τὰ πολλὰ αφρίσθαι.

οὗ γὰρ δή, κ.τ.λ.] cp. vi. 500 C, D θείῳ δή καὶ κοσμίῳ ὃ γε φιλόσοφος vol. iii.
Plato: Republic.

Republic  
X.  
613  
A  

ὅμιλὼν κάσμιος τε καὶ θείος εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν ἀνθρώπῳ γίγνεται: Απολ. 41c  
καὶ ἐν τούτῳ διανοοῦσι ἄληθές, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀνθρώπος κακὸν οὐδὲν  
οὕτε ζώντε οὕτε τελευτᾶται, οὐδὲ ἀμελεῖτο ὑπὸ θεῶν τὰ τούτον πράγματα.  
Cp. also, for the ὁμοίωσις θεῶ Theaet. 176 b–e, Laws iv. 716 b, c.  

Socrates is about to show that righteousness has the rewards  
both of this life and of another. He may be said to have partly  
begged the question of this life by imagining the existence of true  
happiness in a perfect state. Yet, as he has himself implied at the  
end of Book ix, the good man has also the power of constructing  
a ‘Kingdom of God’ within him, even when the world is against  
him. Nor is he so antagonistic to his fellow-creatures in fact  
as he is supposed to be in idea. The world comes round to him  
at last: appearances as well as realities must be at length restored  
to him: virtue in the long run is also happiness and good  
repute.

B  
ἀρ' οὖχ ὄδε ἐξεῖ... (c) ἀποτρέχοντες] ‘Is not the actual truth as  
follows? Are not those clever unjust men in the position of runners  
who run well from the lower end of the course to the upper, but  
not from the upper to the lower? They lead off at a great pace,  
but in the end come to look foolish, slinking away with their ears  
down on their shoulders, and without a crown.’ The words ἀπὸ  
tῶν κάτω... ἀνω have been taken to mean ‘from the lower and  
upper parts of their body,’ i.e. their hips and shoulders; and  
Socrates is supposed to be describing those who have good legs  
and no chest. See Riddell’sDigest of Idioms, § 111: also Madvig  
quoted by Baiter in his preface. But it seems more natural to  
apply the ambiguous words ἄνω and κάτω to the upper and lower  
end of the race-course than to the parts of the human body. The  
‘upper end’ of the course is that farthest from the starting-place,  
and only a course up and down the stadium is contemplated. The  
second statement (τὸ μὲν πρῶτον, κ.τ.λ.) as in many similar passages  
is an expansion of the first. The race alluded to is of course the  
διαλός: cp. Aesch. Agam. 343, 344 δεὶ γάρ πρὸς οἴκους νοστίμου  
σωτηρίας | κάρφαι διαλόν θάτεραν κάλλιον πάλιν. The new interpretation  
in which Riddell and Madvig concur rather takes from the point of  
the comparison, but the use of ἀπὸ which it implies is idiomatic:  
cp. Xen. Rep. Lac. v. 9 ὁμοίως γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν σκελῶν καὶ ἀπὸ χειρῶν  
καὶ ἀπὸ τραχήλου γυμνάζονται.

C  
ἀπερ αὐτὸς ἔλεγε] ii. 361 n, E.—Another of the numerous links  
by which Plato connects the beginning with the end of his work.
γέροντες . . . προπλακίζονται] (1) 'As they grow old they are miserably insulted' (ἀθλεοι predicative), rather than (2) 'becoming wretched old men they are insulted.'

The words εἴτε ὑπερβάλσονται καὶ ἐκκαυθήσονται, though found in all MSS., are omitted by some editors and bracketed by others. There is no necessity for this. The addition of the word εἴτε, which improves the effect of them, sufficiently shows that they are not a gloss arising out of a reference to the words of Glaucon, ii. 361 e. They suggest the antecedent to ἄ, and may be sufficiently defended as a humorous epitome of the original to which Socrates briefly refers.

δ λέγω] supra c.

καὶ μᾶλ', ἐφη, κ.τ.λ.] καὶ μάλα (καὶ intensive) is to be taken closely with καλά τε καὶ βεβαιά. 'They are indeed most fair and well assured.'

Yet greater far are the rewards of the just and the punishments of the unjust in another life. This is shown by the report which Er the Pamphylian brought from the other world. He was left for dead amongst the slain, and twelve days afterwards came to life upon the funeral pyre. His tale was as follows:—"When his soul left the body, he proceeded with a great company to a place where there were two chasms in the earth, near together; and directly above them two chasms in the sky. Judges sat there in the midst, and after judgement, some souls ascended through the chasm on the right, while others descended into the chasm on the left. He himself on approaching the judgement seat, was told that he was to observe what took place, and carry the report of it back to living men. Then he beheld how from the chasm on the right hand were coming up souls parched and dusty, while from the chasm upon the left came down another troop clean and bright. All gladly rested in the meadow after their long journey of a thousand years.'

Plato ends the Republic with a myth: partly (1) because he is on the limits of human knowledge: imagination necessarily enters into any representation of another life: (2) also because he has the old garment of mythology still clinging to him: (3) that he may popularize moral truths by investing them with the charm of a religious tale: (4) since he is embodying in literature the Pythagorean and Orphic feelings of the age. Like religious
paintings, the myths of Plato have also some traditional elements which lend them verisimilitude and help to bring them into harmony with contemporary ideas. Plato is accepting the old forms and trying to breathe a moral and intellectual life into them. His myth consequently, instead of being a mere fiction or fairy tale, is supported by the strength of traditional belief. The attempts of Numenius, Proclus and others to connect this myth with those in Gorg., Phaed., Phaedr., Tim. so as to get a complete and consistent view of Plato's supra-mundane theories, only show the futility of such a method.

τὰ ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου ὅφειλόμενα ἀκούσαι] 'The debt of description which the argument owes to them.' Supra 612 c ἀ ἐδανείσασθε ἐν τῷ λόγῳ. The repetition of ἀκούσαι has been suspected by Stephanus and Stallbaum, but the word is not without meaning if it be taken in the sense of 'to have related concerning them.' Cp. supra vi. 496 λ, Lys. 207 οὗ τὸ καλὸς εἶναι μόνον ἀξίως ἀκούσαι. The debt which has been incurred in words has to be paid in words.

λέγοις ἄκη, κ.τ.λ. ] 'As one who delights in listening to few things more.'

ἀλλ' ἀλκίμου μὲν ἀνδρός] Socrates makes a pun on the name of Alcinous; as we might say, parodying the words: 'I will introduce you to a hero: not the well-known one of the Pilgrim's Progress; yet this too is a Great-heart.' Cp. Symp. 185 Παισιαῖον δὲ παυσιμένων. There is perhaps an allusion to the descent among the shades (Odyssey xi) which forms a part of the tale of Ulysses to Alcinous. The epithet is appropriate to one who fell in battle.

tοῦ 'Ἀρμενίου] not 'the Armenian' but 'the son of Armenius' as in the quotation of Clementinfra: his country is mentioned afterwards. Pamphylia is again referred to, infra 615 c.

Er, the son of Armenius, is declared by Clement of Alexandria (Stromat. v. 710, § 24) to be Zoroaster: ὁ δ' αὐτὸς (sc. Πλάτων) ἐν τῷ δεκάτῳ τῆς Πολιτείας Ἦρως τοῦ Ἀρμενίου τὸ γένος Παμφυλοῦ μέμνηται, ὅσ' ἐστὶ Ζωραϊστῆρας' αὐτὸς γοῦν ὁ Ζωραϊστῆρας γράφει: Τάδε ξυνέγραψε Ζωραϊστῆρας 'Ἀρμενίου τὸ γένος Πάμφυλος ἐν πολέμῳ τελευτήσας ὅσα ἐν "Ἀδῆ γενόμενος ἐδίπτυ παρὰ θεῶν.

δεκαταῖων ... δωδεκαταῖος] This gives two days for the homebringing and funeral preparations. The twelve days are not forgotten in the narrative. The sojourn of seven days is succeeded
by a journey of four days, and this by another journey of one day (616 B).

επειδή οὗ] The first hand in Par. A wrote επειδή οὗ with Ven. Ξ: an early corrector changed this to επειδή οὖν. The genitive goes with the noun: not 'when the soul left him,' but 'when his spirit went forth.' In what follows, the soul or spirit is spoken of as the man.

eἰς τόπον τινά δαίμόνιον] 'to a wonderful place.'


tῶν διεκασαμένων] is neuter: cp. infra σημεία πάντων ὧν ἔπραξαν.

dιακελεύοντο] Oblique for διακελεύομεθα: 'The judges or their apparitors said, "You must be the messenger, and we exhort you to look and listen."

'The souls that came from heaven, pure and bright, and those that rose out of the ground, dusty and soiled, met and rested in the meadow, friends greeting friends and telling of what they had seen in their respective journeys. The one told of delights beyond compare; the other with lamentation and weeping recounted all that they had suffered and seen others suffer. Each sin was punished ten times over, once in every hundred years; and the rewarding of good deeds was in the same proportion. Newly born infants, too, were there, but of them there is not much to be said. The punishments of impiety and parricide were greater than of other sins. I heard a Pamphylian ask, "Where is Ardaius the Great?" "Not here," was the reply,—"nor will he ever come. The mouth of the chasm refused him with a terrific roar, and he was thrown down and flayed and dragged away over spikes of flint to be cast into the abyss." The same happened to other tyrants.'

δόσα τε καὶ οία πάθωσεν] 'Of all the dreadful things they had experienced.'

χιλιετῇ] The form χιλιετῇ is supported by the Cesena MS., and by Par. ΔΚ which may be taken as representing Ven. Π, of which the concluding pages are wanting.
Republic: Plato: Republic.

τὸῦτο δ' εἶναι ... ἀνθρωπίνου] 'that is to say, once in every hundred years, this being reckoned as the measure of the life of man.' Plato often deals in round numbers. See ix. 588 ἀ προσ- ἕκοντα ... βίαις ἀμήθην. τοῦτο refers to δίκην δεδωκέναι ... δεκάκις.

καὶ οἶνος, κ.τ.λ. The sentence breaks off with an illustration and is continued as if οἶνος had preceded: καὶ, which is found in all the MSS. is genuine, and the phrase may be explained as a colloquialism:—'And, for example, if there were any,' &c.

πολλῶν] This is the reading of Ven. ξ, and may be a conjectural emendation of πολλοί, the reading of most MSS., which cannot be right. A corrector of Par. ν has changed πολλοί to πολλοῖς,—certainly an idiomatic reading. Schneider is hardly justified in saying of it 'propter pluralem θυατήρων ferri nequit.' Cp. Laws ix. 870 ν. The words ἡ πόλεις ... ἐμβεβληκότες explain θανάτων ... αἰτίοι.

κομισαντο ... κομιζοντο] The aorist refers to the fact, the present to the general rule.

tὸν δὲ εὕθες γενομένων ... πέρι] 'And of those (who died) as soon as they were born, or after living only a little while.' Since the dead alone are in question, the ellipse of ἀποθανόντων or ἀπογενομένων (conjectured by Cobet) can be endured, especially since it avoids the collision of two participles.—Plato also has a 'limbus infantum,' at which he hints.

eἰς δὲ θεοὺς ... διηγεῖτο] 'And of piety and impiety to Gods and parents and of the murder of kindred (reading αὐτόχειρος φόνον), the retributions which he narrated were yet greater.'

The reading of all the MSS. is αὐτόχειρας, as in the text, of which, however, no grammatical account can be given. The conjecture of Ast, αὐτόχειρος φόνον, is extremely probable. Αὐτόχειρ is used, as often in tragedy, to imply violence to kindred: cp. Laws ix. 872 ε ἐγγεγείνων αὐτόχειρας φόνων. The sentence thus includes all acts of impiety, as involving a higher degree of crime.

'Αρβαῖος ὁ μέγας] The tyrant of Books viii, ix, is still alive, and is having the reward of his crimes. The spirits amongst whom Er finds himself are his own countrymen. The questioner is obviously a Pamphylian, who, having passed his thousand years in Heaven, is still interested in the concerns of his native country. He asks of his friend who has come from Hell (cp. supra 614 ε δοσι γνώριμαι) not without a certain degree of dread, how it has fared with the
contemporary tyrant, of whose greatness he still retains the impression.

χιλιοστὸν ἔτος] Cp. supra A εἶναι ἀν τὴν πορείαν χιλιετη. Plato would not have us forget that a thousand years have passed since these spirits were in the body.

ἀποκτείνας] = ὁ ἀπεκτείνων, 'who in the course of his tyranny had slain.'

οὐδ᾿ ἂν ἦξει] ἂν combined with the future indicative throws a shade of irony into the meaning: 'nor is he likely to be coming here.' See Goodwin, M." and T." § 197.

ἐθεασάμεθα, κ.τ.λ.] These are not the words of Er, but of the spirit whom he overhears. The narrative which follows is a confirmation of the words 'he is not likely to come.' Er begins again to speak in his own person at infra 616 B καὶ τὰς μὲν δῆ.

τοῦτο] refers both to what precedes and follows: 'for this' viz, the fate of Ardiaeus 'was one of the terrible sights which we' i.e. the spirits in the world below 'witnessed.' The partitive genitive here forms part of the predication.

καὶ τάλλα πάντα πεπονθότες] 'and had suffered all that we told you.' These words, like τῶν δεινῶν θεαμάτων supra, refer to the conversation which the pilgrims from the lower world had held with the pilgrims from the upper respecting their experiences in the thousand years,—supra 614 E. τάλλα, 'the rest,' i.e. all except the spectacle now to be described.

ἡμᾶς δὲ καὶ . . . ἡμαρτηκότων] It was not the position of the tyrant that had merited judgement, but the character of his life. Cp. Gorg. 524 E ὁ Ῥαδάμανθις . . . θεᾶται ἐκάστου τὴν ψυχὴν, οὐκ εἰδὼς ὅτου ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ πολλάκις τοῦ μεγίστου βασιλέως ἐπιλαμβάνει, κ.τ.λ.

ἡ μὴ ἱκανῶς, κ.τ.λ.] Ardiaeus was incurable, but the attempt might be made prematurely by others whose term of punishment was only to be temporarily prolonged.

ἐνταῦθα δῆ, κ.τ.λ.] The ministers of vengeance are represented as they might be in Dante or by one of the early Italian painters. They are waiting (παρεστῶτες) for the well-known signal.

τὸν δὲ Ἀρδιαῖον . . . (616 A) ἄγοιντο] The transposition of ὅτι εἰς to εἰς ὧν in Par. A led Hermann to conjecture that τὸν Τάρταρον as well
as ταῦτα ὑπομένουν was an accretion. The latter words are probably a gloss: they are not found in A M. It is not possible, nor is it very important to determine accurately the reading of this passage: the general meaning is clear enough.

σφίσι] 'to him and to his fellows' viz. the souls just ascended from beneath.

tοῦτον . . . ἀναβαίνον] There is some confusion in the MSS. here. Par. K appears to read as in the text. Par. A omits τὸν φόβον: other MSS. retaining τὸν φόβον read ὑποκέχαστο τὸ στόμιον instead of μὴ γένοιτο . . . ἀναβαίνον. There can be little doubt that in these MSS. a gloss has taken the place of the true reading. But τὸν φόβον is probably genuine, although in the reading of Par. A it has been rejected as superfluous.

σιγήσαντος] sc. τοῦ στόμιον supra 615 E. The aorist points to the moment of passing the aperture. Observe too, the difference between ἀναβαίνον, 'tried to ascend,' and ἀναβηναι, 'ascended.'

καὶ αὖ τὰς ἐργεσίας] ἐργεσία seems to be used here for the rewards of merit, much as ἀρετή is used for 'reputation of virtue.'

'Now after seven days of rest in the meadow we set out upon our journey. And during the fourth day's journeying we saw far off a light, straight like a pillar, in colour like unto a rainbow. Another day of travel brought us to the light, and in the midst of it we saw the spindle of necessity depending from the fastenings of the sky. This spindle is the cause of all the celestial revolutions, and the ball or whorl of it is eight-fold, as there are eight concentric circles or orbits (fixed stars, Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, Venus, Mercury, Sun and Moon), endued with appropriate motions, and each having its peculiar Siren tone. The three Fates sit round and set their hands to the revolutions of the spindle as it turns on the knees of their mother Necessity, where she sits enthroned. And they sing, to the music of the spheres, Lachesis of the past, Clotho of the present, Atropos of the future.'

ἐκάστοις] 'each company;' i.e. all those who had arrived on the same day.

δεῖν] is general, referring to all the souls: ἀφικνεῖσθαι refers to Er and his company in particular.
Notes: Book X.

eddar ... φῶς εἴθος] ἀνωθεν is to be taken with τεταμένον.

'Whence they descried a line of light reaching from above.' It is worth observing as illustrating the difference between Greek and English on the subject of Tautology, that in this most finished passage Plato three times over uses the same word (τεταμένον) within ten lines. The phrase διὰ παιντό τεταμένον is applied in the Timaeus, p. 40, to the axis of the universe (πόλος).

μάλιστα τῇ ἱριδι προσφερή] That is, not in shape, but in colour. It has been remarked by Boeckh, following Numenius and others, that the idea of the luminous column was suggested by the Milky Way. But this is hardly consistent with the distinct statement that the light was straight and vertical, or with the rainbow colours.

tà ἀκρα αὐτοῦ τῶν δεσμῶν] 'the extremities of the chains of Heaven' or 'of the Light.' αὐτοῦ is ambiguous, and may refer either to οὐρανοῦ or φῶς,—more naturally to the former.

The Earth is imagined as an inner sphere, concentric with the outer sphere of the heaven, and connected with it by the column of light, in the midst of which are fastened the ends of the chains of Heaven. In the centre of the column and attached to the ends of these chains is the spindle which the Fates are turning upon the knees of Necessity. This together with the whorl which 'governs' it gives law to the movements of the heavenly bodies.

The Light is compared to the ὑπόξωμα of a trireme, which is variously explained as the undergirding rope (Acts xxvii. 17), or as a rope passing from stem to stern. See especially E. Warre in Journal of Hellenic Studies, v. 216 ('On the raft of Ulysses'): 'The hawser, called ὑπόξωμα, stretched from stem to stern, over crutches, kept up bow and stern and prevented “hogging.”' This is seen very clearly in the representation of an Egyptian ship given in Duemichen's Fleet of an Egyptian Queen. Possibly the difficulty about the ὑπόξωμα, Plat. Rep. Bk. x, finds its solution in this straight truss amidships. But the ὑπόξωματα in the case of triremes seem generally to have been applied outside, stretching from stem to stern on both sides of the vessel. These hawser, put on dry, would shrink when wet, and so tighten up the timbers of the lightly built vessel. The thought of Plato seems to be that the whole circle of the Universe was held fast by the column, which, like the rope that fastened a trireme from stem to stern, passed through the midst of it. The words, οἶον κίονα, show that the position of
the column was vertical from Er’s point of view. The lower hemisphere is not considered, because everything is viewed from the upper surface of the Earth. The form of expression, εἶναι γάρ, κ.τ.λ., shows that the figure of the ἵπποξώμα illustrates rather the function than the appearance of the pillar of light.

τὴν περιφοράν] ‘the revolving sphere,’—not merely ‘the revolution.’

Ἀνάγκης ἀπρακτον] The spindle of necessity is the pole or axis of the heaven and earth, which passes through the midst of the column of light.

τὴν . . . ἡλακάτην] Not here the distaff, but ‘the shaft’ of the spindle.

ἐκ τε τούτου καὶ ἄλλων γενών] Cp. the difference, in Tim. 41 d, between the Divine and Mundane elements of the Creation.

tὸ μὲν . . . ἐνθάδε] ‘In shape it (ἡ τοῦ σφαιρώδους φύσις) resembled that (ἡ sc. φύσις) of a common whorl.’

νοῆσαι δὲ δεῖ, κ.τ.λ.] The whorl is fastened round the spindle like the body of a teetotum on its shaft, and is formed of eight whorls fitting one into the other like a number of boxes, and showing on the upper side a continuous surface. It is doubtful whether this whorl is in the form of a cylinder or of part of a sphere. The circumstance that the upper surface only is said to be smooth is in favour of the latter supposition, which also agrees better with the image of the boxes fitting into one another. But on the other hand the shaft is driven home (διαμπερὴς ἠλλασα τοῖς ἑξάμετροις) through the eighth or innermost, and each whorl appears to be driven through and through the one immediately outside it,—although διαμπερὴς . . . ἀρμόττων may be understood to mean merely that they fitted each other in every part.

τὸν μὲν οὖν πρῶτον τε, κ.τ.λ.] The passage which follows is to be explained (ι) from the phenomena of the Heavens, as they
Notes: Book X.

475 present themselves to the eye, or as they were accounted for by the crude astronomy of Plato’s age: (2) from certain Pythagorean ratios or harmonies of number. The description of the heavenly bodies is still partly a work of fancy. This part of the Republic agrees with the Timaeus in general outline. (a) The order of the planets is the same in both: (b) there is an axis of the universe in both, which passes through the centre of the earth: (c) in both there is one motion of the whole, and a different motion of the seven inner circles. (d) In neither is there any distinct mention of a motion of the earth. The whole and the outermost circle are moving in one direction, the seven inner circles while partaking of this motion, εν τῷ διώ περιφερομένῳ, move also gently, ἥρείμα, in an opposite direction. This conception of a double movement seems intended to explain the difficulties of astronomy arising out of the apparent diurnal motion of the Heavens round the Earth and the distinct and apparently inconsistent movements of the Sun, Moon and Planets: cp. Tim. 38 ff. The outer whorl, which is spotted, represents the fixed stars (which, as in the Timaeus, have only the ‘motion of the same’); the seventh which is described as the brightest is the sun; the eighth shining with borrowed light, and having more of retrograde motion, is the moon; the second and fifth, which are of a yellower colour than the sun and moon, are Saturn and Mercury; the third and whitest of all is Jupiter; the next whitest or sixth is Venus; the fourth, which is reddish, is Mars. The whorl of the fixed stars is the widest; the others are enumerated according to their width; the breadth of the rims may be intended to signify the supposed distances of the orbits from each other; it may also rest merely on some notion of harmonical arrangement.

[It is difficult to reason about a description of the universe which is mythical and fanciful, and only has a faint basis in the astronomical notions of the ancients themselves. The following note on this subject has been contributed by Mr. W. A. Craigie, and deserves insertion here.

The order of Plato’s enumeration of the planets in

Rep. x. 616 ff.

Although the relative distance, brightness, &c. of the νυκτός, in this theory of the universe, correspond in the first instance to the real or supposed distance &c. of the planets denoted by these, there is a curious fact connected with Plato’s order of arranging them
that can hardly be accidental, and may account for his views regarding some of their properties. This is that each enumeration seems to be based on combinations which rest on the number 9. Thus to take first the 'breadth of the lips' of the φάντασμα, which gives Plato's view of the distance of each planet from the other, we have the following series, the 1st φάντασμα being the outermost and the 8th the innermost of the set.

A. No. of φάντασμα 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th
   Order of 'width' 1 8 7 3 6 2 5 4

By thus joining those φάντασμα whose united numbers produce a sum of 9, we have a symmetrical figure with its centre between the 4th and 5th.

This appears even more clearly in the next enumeration, that of the respective colours, for here it comes out in the otherwise arbitrary way in which Plato springs from one to another instead of taking them in the order of some scheme of colour. Thus the 4th, which is reddish, is inserted between the 3rd and 6th, which are both white. Writing down the numbers then in Plato's order, we get

B. 1 7 8 2 = 5 3 4 6

which gives another set divided in the centre of the 8 rings, where it is indeed coupled by the remark that the 2nd and 5th nearly resemble each other.

The respective speed of the rings gives them in their natural order from 8 to 1 which of course produces a similar result

C. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 | centre | 8 7 &c.

It may also be significant here that the three which move at the same rate (5, 6, 7) produce the sum of 18, or half that of the whole series.

Note.—Series A gives a still more elaborate figure if we invert the lines: thus

Order of width 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
No. of φάντασμα 1 6 4 8 7 5 3 2]
Notes: Book X.

τὴν ἑναντίαν τῷ ὀλυ ἴρμα περιφέρεσθαι] I. e. while they partake of the diurnal revolution, the sun, moon and planets alter their position in the sky from day to day,—the moon most rapidly, then the sun with Venus and Mercury, and so on. The peculiar apparent motions of Mercury and Venus are noticed in the Timaeus (p. 38 ν); but this point is too minute for Plato’s purpose here.

τρίτον δὲ τὸν τρίτον which is in all the MSS. except q, may possibly be defended: ‘the third in order of reverse motion was the fourth’—but the ambiguity of this expression and the probability that τὸν may have arisen out of πέμπτον, justify the rejection of the article.

σφίσι] To Er and the other souls, who are thus kept in mind.

ἐπανακυκλούμενον] ‘in the reverse or retrograde revolution,’ which it shares with the other six inner circles. This word is to be closely joined with φορᾷ ιέναi.

αὐτὸν] sc. τὸν ἀτρακτον.

ἐνα τόνον] is the reading of the best MSS. and of Proclus: ‘one sound and one note.’ Another reading, of inferior authority, is ἄνα τόνον.

Μοίρας, κ.τ.λ.] The touches of the Fates regulating the motions of the inner and outer Heaven are obscurely symbolical. ‘Lachesis, wise in past events, allots to each his life (she touches both motions); Clotho spins this in the present (touching the larger motion), Atropos (touching the inner circles) makes the destiny irreversible. Why does Clotho touch the outer circle? Is it because the present, as the moment of choice, alone from time to time lays hold upon eternity? Lachesis touches both alternately:—the past is unalterable but influences what is to come. Atropos, the future, not to be averted, is alone contingent, ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἔχειν.’ So we may attempt to interpret Plato’s symbolism.

ὡσαύτως] ‘In like manner,’ i. e. at intervals, referring to διαλειτουσαν χρόνον.

‘As soon as we came thither we were taken before Lachesis, from whose lap an Interpreter took lots, and samples of lives. After some warning words he threw the lots to each of us, but I was forbidden to take up mine. Then he laid out the samples and bade
the souls in order of their lots make choice of the lives which they desired to lead on earth.'—Socrates observes by the way that of the whole of human existence this is the most critical moment. And in order to make the choice aright, not merely the life of good habits, but philosophy is required.

The allotment of lives is assigned to Lachesis, ἀπὸ τοῦ λαχανίου.

‘Another period of belonging to the race of mortals.’ θανατηφόρου agrees with περίοδοι,—‘leading to death.’

‘Let him who draws the foremost lot, first choose a life.’ The order of words seems intended to produce the effect of tragedy.

‘Virtue is free to all’ or ‘is not the exclusive property of any.’ In such allegorical fashion does Plato assert the freedom of the human will in a previous existence, as determining the condition of this. Cp. Tim. 42 ν διδασκομενής δὲ πάντα αὐτώς ταῖτα, ὅνα τῆς ἐπείπτα εἰὴ κακίας ἐκάστων ἀνάίτως:—also Laws x. 904, in which God is described as, after consideration of their nature, placing living beings, in whom the connexion of soul and body, though not eternal, is morally speaking indissoluble, in a state of probation, and making their future character and dwelling-place depend upon virtue and vice, of which one or other is to be chosen in an instant.

The allegory is not to be too closely pressed: for while it is said below that the life chosen determines the character of the soul during that life, this is followed by the exhortation that a man should study philosophy, so that everywhere, as far as possible, both here and hereafter, he may choose the best life with reference to his individual character. Compare the parallel passage of the Phaedrus, pp. 248, 249, where in the first instance the law of transmigration is called θεομόδο 'Δραστείας, and then in what follows the individual choice is mentioned incidentally:—Phaedr. 249 B τῷ δὲ χιλιώστῳ (ἤτα) ἄμφοτεραι ἀμφικυνομέναι ἐπὶ κλήρωσιν τε καὶ αἵρεσιν τοῦ δευτέρου βίου, αἰρόμεναι δὴ ἄν ἐκέλην ἐκάστῃ.

‘Threw the lots so as to reach them all.’ πάντας, sc. σφάλης.

‘But him’ (viz. Er) ‘the minister did not permit to do so.’ ὁ ὦκ ἕαν, sc. τοῦ προφήτην.
Notes: Book X.

ψυχῆς δὲ τάξιν, κ.τ.λ.] ‘There was no definite character in the samples of their lives: because the character was given to the individual by the life which the soul had chosen.’ τάξιν = πῶς ἔχον τάξις. Cp. supra 617 ε ὑπεις δαίμονα ἑὐγενεῖο: infra 621 Β.

τὰ δὲ καὶ μεσοῦν τούτων] I.e. ‘some were in a mean state between health and sickness, riches and poverty.’ So infra 619 λ τῶν μέσου . . . τῶν τοιούτων βιων.

τίς αὐτῶν, κ.τ.λ.] depends immediately on ἐξευρεῖν. The idea of seeking out the truth is developed into that of finding the true teacher, which has been suggested by the word μαθητῆς.

τὰ νῦν δὴ ῥηθέντα] All the various circumstances of life included in the previous description (supra λ) of the βιων παραδείγματα.

μετὰ ποίας τινὸς ψυχῆς ἐξέως] The whole of a man’s present life is to be a preparation for his choice in the life to come. To this choice he is to bring with him a knowledge of the influence which circumstances exercise on character,—whether the circumstances in which nature places him, or in which he places himself. He must also know the nature of the soul, and how she may be made better or worse.

ἐάσει] Λ return from the participle to the finite verb. Ven. Ξ reads εἰν, Vat. Υ εἴωειν.

ἀδαμαντίνως] is a stronger word for βεβαιώς.

πλούτων] The plural is used with a certain grandiloquence to express the various degrees and kinds of wealth, cp. vi. 495 λ. For ἀνέκπληκτος cp. ix. 577 λ καὶ μὴ καθαύπερ παῖς ἐξευρεῖν ἀρῶν ἐκπληττεται ὑπὸ τῆς τῶν τυραννικῶν προστάσεως.

καὶ ἐν παντὶ τῷ ἐπείτα] This truth is anticipated in the remark (vi. 498 ὃ) half understood by Glaucón πεῖρας γὰρ οἶδεν ἀνήσομεν, κ.τ.λ.

Er proceeds with his narrative.—‘In bidding us choose, the Interpreter told us to use judgement; and if we did so, even the last comer need not despair. No sooner had he spoken than one of the souls came forward and chose the greatest tyranny; he was one of those who came from heaven, and had dwelt in a well-ordered city: but like others who were similarly overtaken, he had no philosophy. He lamented his choice when it was too late, but disregarding the word of the Interpreter, blamed everybody but
himself. This was a typical instance of sudden reversal of destiny, due to chance and inexperience. The spectacle of the election was at once pathetic, ludicrous, and wonderful. Most of the souls chose the opposite of their former lives. The soul of Orpheus took the nature of a swan, disdaining to be born of a woman, because women had been his murderers. Those of Ajax and Agamemnon, in resentment of their wrongs, preferred the lives of a lion and an eagle severally to the life of man. Atalanta chose the life of an athlete, Epeius that of a woman cunning in the arts. Thersites who came late, put on the likeness of an ape; and the soul of Odysseus which came last of all, weary of travel and ambition, rejecting every other, chose the quiet life of a private man.'

καὶ δὴ οὖν, κ.τ.λ.] ‘and according to the report of the messenger from the other world,’—viz, Er, supra 614 D,—‘these were the very words of the prophet: “Even the last comer, if he chooses with understanding and lives earnestly, is destined to have an eligible life and one which is anything but bad. Let not him who chooses first be careless, nor let the last despair.”’

We note the rhetorical art with which Plato first enunciates his ‘whole duty of man,’ and then confirms his precepts by recurring to the myth of Er.

eἰπόντος δὲ] sc. τού προφήτου ταῖτα.

ἐφή] sc. ο ’Ηρ.

eἰμαρμένην . . . βρώσεις, κ.τ.λ.] An apposition which may be compared with supra 616 D κύκλου . . . τὰ χείλη φαύνοντας.

tοῖς προφητείσιν] ‘to the former speech’; supra 617 E αἰτία ἐλομένου.

ἐν τεταγμένῃ πολιτείᾳ . . . (δ) ἄρετῆς μετειληφότα] Plato means to intimate that the life of mere habit is no safeguard of truth or virtue, under altered circumstances. Cp. Phaedo 81, 82, where those who have lived virtuously in a well-ordered community, though their condition is said to be comparatively blessed, are only permitted to attain some tolerable social state, whether of men or other political animals, such as ants or bees: their life is contrasted with that of the votaries of philosophy, who are meet to be the companions of Gods. See also vi. 506 c where he compares those who have right opinion without knowledge to blind men who manage to keep the straight path; also Meno 97.
Notes: Book X.

ὡς δὲ καὶ εἶπεῖν] ‘and as indeed one might say,’ a qualification of the seeming paradox that quite as many of the souls who made a bad choice came from Heaven as from underground. For καὶ, which marks the bearing of the new remark on what precedes, cp. Gorg. 520 B μῶνοι δ’ ἔγωγε καὶ ὄμην τοῖς δημηγόροις τε καὶ σοφισταῖς οὐκ ἕγχωρειν, κ.τ.λ.


διὸ δὴ . . . τοῦ πλῆθου] ‘and because of this’ (i.e. because of the experience of some and the inexperience of others) ‘and also because of the chances of the lot, many of the souls exchanged a good destiny for an evil, or an evil for a good.’ Innocence and happiness in his previous life are not sufficient to sustain a man in the choice for the future: a severer probation or discipline is required, which is that of philosophy. And, suppose a man to have had the discipline, even the journey from one life to the other is a heavenly pilgrimage: and the return hither, if he have only moderate fortune in his opportunity of choice, is not unblessed. But most men are under the dominion of habit, and few know how to profit by experience.

μῖσει τοῦ γυναικείου γένους, κ.τ.λ.] The dative is to be taken closely with οὐκ ἐθέλουσαν:—‘because of hatred of the sex who destroyed him, not choosing to be born of a woman.’

ὡσαύτως. εἰκοστὴν δὲ] This reading is confirmed by the quotation of Plutarch. The reader naturally asks what some of the copyists (who read εἰκός· τῆν, or who changed the reading into ὡςαύτως, ὡς τὸ εἰκός· τῆν) perhaps asked themselves: ‘Why should the soul of Ajax have been the twentieth?’ Plutarch, who also raises this question (Symp. Quaest. lix. 5), says that Ajax is the twentieth soul who appears in Homer (Od. xi) to Ulysses,—that is to say after excepting Elpenor, who is not worth counting. The real answer is that no answer is needed. Ajax is twentieth and Agamemnon twenty-first for the same reason that Atalanta is in the middle and Ulysses at the end of the series: that is to say, in order to heighten the effect of the narrative by the appearance of exactness, and to illustrate the working of the element of chance. The copyists may have been merely misled by the letters ὡς at the end of ὡσαύτως suggesting the familiar phrase ὡς εἰκός.

τῆν δ’ ἐπὶ τούτῳ] sc. λαχοῦσαν εἶναι ψυχήν.

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πόρρω δ’ ἐν ὑστάτοις ἰδείν] ‘and that he saw far away among
the last.’ πόρρω refers to the place assigned to Thersites by the
number of his lot. He is luckless as well as despicable. Odysseus,
on the other hand, is unfortunate but superior to misfortune.

καὶ ἀσμένην ἐλέσθαι] ‘and took up the lot with joy.’ ἐλέσθαι
is co-ordinate with εὑρεῖν . . . εἰπεῖν.

τὰ μὲν ἄδικα, κ.τ.λ.] Cp. Phaedo 82 A τοῦ δὲ γε ἄδικια τε καὶ
tυραννίδας καὶ ἀρπαγὰς προτετιμηκότας εἰς τὰ τῶν λίκων τε καὶ ἱερίκων
καὶ ἱκτίων γένη, κ.τ.λ. For δίκαια as an attribute of θηρία cp. vi.
496 D.

‘When all had chosen, they went each in order to Lachesis, and
received from her the Genius who was to be the guardian of their
lives. This Genius led them for confirmation beneath the hands of
Clotho and of Atropos successively. Then all passed under the
throne of Necessity; and when we had passed through the midst of
it we came into the arid plain of Oblivion, and encamped beside the
waters of Forgetfulness, whereof each soul was compelled to drink
a certain measure, but some drank to excess. I, however, was not
permitted to drink of it. But when, at midnight, it had thundered,
and the Earth had quaked, and the souls had shot upwards like
stars to their places of birth, I, without knowing how I returned to
the body, opened my eyes at dawn, and found myself lying on the
pyre.’

‘And so,’ adds Socrates, ‘this Vision of Judgement vanished not,
but was preserved for our instruction. By taking to heart its
lessons, we may secure true happiness here and hereafter.’

δὲν εἰλετο δαίμονα] Supra 617 E. δαίμων here = ‘the genius,’
or ‘guardian angel,’ or ‘the double’ of a man, as in Phaedo 107 C
ὁ ἐκάστου δαίμων, ὅσπερ ζωντα εἰλήξει: elsewhere one of the race of
demi-gods or sons of God who are supposed to have governed
and to govern mankind: cp. Polit. 271 D καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰ ζῶα κατὰ γένη
καὶ ἄγελας ὁν νομεῖς θεῖοι διελήξεσαν δαίμονες: Laws iv. 713 D τὰ τοῖν
dὴ καὶ ὁ θεὸς ἄρα καὶ φιλόνθρωπος ὅν τὸ γίνοις ὀμιλεῖν ἤμων ἐφίστη τὸ τῶν
dαίμονον. In the Timaeus, 90 A, the δαίμων of each one is spoken
of as the rational principle, κυρίωτατον τῆς ψυχῆς εἶδος, which God
had given them.

κυροῦντα] ‘Ratifying’ (participle of κυρόω), agreeing with
δαίμονα.
λαχών] is masculine instead of feminine: the person for the soul. The same gender is continued in ἐφαψάμενον and διεξέλθοντα, which are more naturally referred to the person than to the Genius, who, however, is the subject of κυρωῦντα, ἔγειν, ποιοῦντα.

ἀμεταστρεπτί] follows up ἀμετάστροφα. and helps to mark the solemn moment when, their destiny having been made irreversible, they pass singly beneath the throne of Necessity. The words ἐπείδη . . . διήλθον imply that they pass one by one. Each, when he has passed through, has to wait for the rest.

διεξέλθοντα] The subject has changed insensibly from δαίμονα with which the previous participles agree, to the spirit, or the man himself. Cp. οἱ ἄλλοι.

διὰ καύματος . . . δείνοι] They are passing through the midst of the pillar of light.

καὶ γὰρ . . . φύει] The plain of Oblivion is appropriately described as a barren wilderness, having nothing to remind us of this world.

σφᾶς] Er, in continuing his narrative, now includes himself in the company of souls. From 617 ε, ἐ δὲ οὐκ ἔσαι, he has been only a spectator.

οὐ τὸ υδρὸ . . . στέγειν] Another suggestive image of forgetfulness. These words metaphorically describe the failure of memory to retain the things which have happened to men in a former state of existence. No vessel, such as the human soul, can hold the stream of recollection after it has drunk of the water.

τοὺς δὲ φρονῆσει . . . μέτρου] The eagerness of the soul to forget past cares is the source of temptation here. The soul that drinks too deeply of forgetfulness is ‘defiled,’ infra c: cp. vii. 535 ε ἡ ἀν . . . ἀμαθία μολυνηταί. The wise seek to retain, if possible, some recollection of a former state of existence. For the forgetfulness of a former state cp. Phaedrus 250. This is the only allusion which occurs in the Republic to the doctrine of ἀνάμνησις, which, moreover, is rarely spoken of elsewhere—and chiefly in the earlier writings of Plato (Meno 81 ff., Phaedo 73-76, Phaedrus 250, 275).

ποῦντα . . . ἐπιλαυθάνεσθαι] The aorist denotes each several act of drinking: the continuous, or general tense, answering to ἔσαι, describes the uniform result.
The grammar reflects the strangeness of the situation, in which the disembodied spirit returns, and the man suddenly finds himself lying on the funeral pyre.

The MSS. are a good deal divided between the omission and insertion of ηδη. It may be explained as referring back to the beginning of the narrative (supra 614 b) where the dead are described as being taken up for burial on the tenth day, two days before Er's coming to life upon the pyre.

καὶ οὕτως, κ.τ.λ.] ‘And so’ (by Er's coming back to Earth) ‘the tale, Glaucon, was saved and has not perished, and may be our salvation, if we are obedient to it.’ οὕτως is the reading of Par. Α, the Cesena MS. (M), Ven. Ξ and several other MSS., οὕτως of Par. ν κ (the representatives of Ven. Π), the Munich MS. q, &c. Both readings seem to require the article before μιᾶς, which appears only in Par. Κ. The reason of its omission may be the familiarity of the proverbial phrase μιᾶς ἀπόλευτο. (Theaet. 164 b, Phil. 14 Α, Laws i. 645 b.)

πάντα . . . ἀνέχεσθαι] Supra 610 b.

πάντα δὲ ἀγαθά] After ἀγαθά some more general word like δέχεσθαι has to be understood from ἀνέχεσθαι.


ίνα καὶ ἣμῖν αὐτοῖς, κ.τ.λ.] Cp. i. 351 Ε–352 b.

D) ὠσπέρ . . . περιαγειρόμενοί] ‘Like the victors at the games, who go round to collect gifts.’

The words καὶ ἐιθάδε . . . πορεία, which are pleonastic, resume what has been said of the rewards of virtue both in this life and in the life to come (614 ε ff.); and the continuous tense in κομιζώμεθα corresponds to the long period over which the recompense is spread.

ἡν διελήλυθαμεν] ‘Which we have gone through,’ i.e. described; but with a playful suggestion of our having made the pilgrimage ourselves.
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