THE

INVASION OF THE CRIMEA
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INVASION OF THE CRIMEA

ITS ORIGIN, AND AN ACCOUNT OF ITS PROGRESS
DOWN TO THE DEATH OF LORD RAGLAN

BY

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MCMII
'Guarantee,' 'august master,' 'good faith,' 'his Majesty's well-known magnanimity'—'the Pruth,' 'the Danube,' 'the Balkan;' 'Bulgaria, high-road to Constantinople,'—the air once more is so charged with the language of Czarinas and Czars, and the names of their neighbours' landmarks, that—judging only from the unstudied sounds—one might fancy the strange fitful drama which I long ago traced in these pages to be now again acting before us.

And indeed, though along with sharp contrasts, there is many a point of real likeness between the story of 1853 and the one we now see going on. Amongst the foremost of the causes which help to bring about this recurrence, there must be reckoned that crusading spirit of the north which, though stirring the heart of the millions much more deeply than the mind of their rulers, is nevertheless very steadfast.
The Russians are a warm-hearted, enthusiastic people, with an element of poetry in them, which derives perhaps, from the memory of subjection undergone in old times, and the days of the Tartar yoke; for, if Shelley speaks truly—

'Most wretched men
Are cradled into poetry by wrong,
They learn in sorrow what they teach in song.'

With but little in their own condition of life that can well provoke envy, the peasants love to believe that there are others more ill-fated than themselves, to whom they owe pity and help,—love to think that the conscript they see torn away from his village is going—going off in close custody—to be the liberator of syn-orthodox brethren oppressed by Mahometan tyrants; and being curiously prone to 'fraternity,' they can be honestly, and beyond measure vehement in favour of an idealised cause which demands their active sympathy. That the voice of the nation when eagerly expressing these feelings is commonly genuine and spontaneous, there seems no reason to doubt. Far from having been inspired by the rulers, an outburst of the fraternising enthusiasm, which tends towards State quarrels and war, is often unwelcome at first in the precincts of the Government offices; but it brings, nevertheless, a new force which Policy may afterwards guide, and pervert to worldly uses.

This volume shows how a war—in the midst of what seemed trading times—owed its origin to a
gentle, poetic impulsion—to love, fond, worshiping love of the Holy Shrines in Palestine; and now, as it happens, sheer chance—for indeed I sought no such knowledge—makes me able to say that it is sentiment—romantic, wild sentiment—which has once more been throwing the spark. When Servia in the month of July invaded her Suzerain's dominions, the new leverage of Russian Democracy had already so acted upon Opinion, that the Czar, although not at that time under anything like hard compulsion, was still so far moved as to be induced to let some of his people go out and take part in the rising—a rising against the Government of a State with which he professed to be at peace; but this armed emigration at first was upon a small scale, and the Servian cause stood in peril of suffering a not distant collapse, when the incident I am going to mention began to exert its strange sway over the course of events.

The young Colonel Nicholai Kireeff was a noble, whose birth and possessions connected him with the districts affected by Moscow's fiery aspirations; and being by nature a man of an enthusiastic disposition, with a romantic example before him in the life of his father, he had accustomed himself to the idea of self-sacrifice. Upon the outbreak of Prince Milan's insurrection, he went off to Servia with the design of acting simply under the banner of the Red Cross, and had already entered upon his humane task, when he found himself called upon by General Tchernaieff to accept the command of what we may call a brigade
—a force of some five thousand infantry, consisting of volunteers and militiamen, supported, it seems, by five guns; and before long, he not only had to take his brigade into action, but to use it as the means of assailing an entrenched position at Rokowitz. Young Kiréeff very well understood that the irregular force entrusted to him was far from being one that could be commanded in the hour of battle by taking a look with a field-glass and uttering a few words to an aide-de-camp; so he determined to carry forward his men by the simple and primitive expedient of personally advancing in front of them. He was a man of great stature, with extraordinary beauty of features; and, whether owing to the midsummer heat, or from any wild, martyr-like, or dare-devil impulse, he chose, as he had done from the first, to be clothed altogether in white. Whilst advancing in front of his troops against the Turkish battery he was struck—first by a shot passing through his left arm, then presently by another one which struck him in the neck, and then again by yet another one which shattered his right hand and forced him to drop his sword; but, despite all these wounds, he was still continuing his resolute advance, when a fourth shot passed through his lungs, and brought him, at length, to the ground, yet did not prevent him from uttering—although with great effort—the cry of 'Forward! Forward!' A fifth shot, however, fired low, passed through the fallen chief's heart and quenched his gallant spirit. The brigade he had commanded fell
back, and his body—vainly asked for soon afterwards by General Tchernaieff—remained in the hands of the Turks.

These are the bare facts upon which a huge superstructure was speedily raised. It may be that the grandeur of the young colonel’s form and stature, and the sight of the blood, showing vividly on his white attire, added something extraneous and weird to the sentiment which might well be inspired by witnessing his personal heroism; and few people, understanding ‘Young Muscovy,’ will be slow to believe that designing men, enchanted with the bright opportunity, took good care to seize and use it by putting in motion all the democratic and ecclesiastical machinery they had at their command. But, be that as it may, the actual result was that accounts of the incident—accounts growing every day more and more marvellous—flew so swiftly from city to city, from village to village, that before seven days had passed, the smouldering fire of Russian enthusiasm leapt up into a dangerous flame. Under countless green domes, big and small, priests fiercely chanting the ‘Requiem’ for a young hero’s soul, and setting forth the glory of dying in defence of ‘syn-orthodox’ brethren, drew warlike responses from men who—whilst still in cathedral or church—cried aloud that they, too, would go where the young Kiréeff had gone; and so many of them hastened to keep their word, that before long a flood of volunteers from many parts of Russia was pouring fast into
Belgrade. To sustain the once kindled enthusiasm apt means were taken. The simple photograph, representing the young Kiréeff’s noble features, soon expanded to large-sized portraits; and Fable then springing forward in the path of Truth, but transcending it with the swiftness of our modern appliances, there was constituted, in a strangely short time, one of those stirring legends which used to be the growth of long years—a legend half-warlike, half-superstitions, which exalted its really tall hero to the dimensions of a giant, and showed him piling up hecatombs by a mighty slaughter of Turks.*

The mine—the charged mine of enthusiasm upon which this kindling spark fell—was the same in many respects that we saw giving warlike impulsion to the Russia of 1853; but to the enthusiasm of a sensitive Church for the cause of its syn-orthodox brethren—to the passion of a northern and predatory State for conquest in sunny climes—to that kind of religious fervour which mainly yearned after masses under the dome of St Sophia—to that longing for a guardian-angelship which, however fraternal ostensibly, might perhaps carry with it the priceless key

* The able correspondents of our English newspapers lately acting in Servia took care to mention the exploit and death of Colonel Kiréeff with more or less of detail, and the information they furnished is for the most part consistent with the scrutinised accounts on which I found the above narrative; but it was only, of course, from the interior of Russia that a knowledge of the effect there produced by the incident could be directly obtained. The corps in which the Colonel formerly served was that of the Cavalry of the Guards, but he had quitted the army long before the beginning of this year.
of the Straits, there now was added the wrath—the just wrath at the thought of Bulgaria—which Russia shared with our people; whilst moreover, this time, there blazed up the fierce hatred of race against race, incited by Pansclavonic agitation, and withal the eager, joyous desire of a newly usurping democracy to use the monarch's prerogative of determining between peace or war.

It may be that by greater firmness the Czar could have withstood the whole weight of this national impulse, and that even with the firmness he had, he perhaps might have resisted the pressure if Fortune had smiled on his efforts; but this was not destined to be. Having endeavoured to let the enthusiasm of his people waste itself by acquiescing in their desire to volunteer for Servia, he soon came to learn that the men he had thus suffered to join in insurrection against the Sultan were so strongly supported by the sympathy of their brethren at home, that he not only could not disown them, but was brought into the curious predicament of having to watch over their safety, as though they were troops in his service; so that when the Turks overthrew them on the heights of Djunis, he found himself in the hapless condition of one who—without having gone to war—has somehow lost a battle. He was taken, it seems, by surprise, and whether losing or not his composure, he at all events astonished his own able ambassador at Constantinople by ordering him to send in an ultimatum without the assent of the other Powers; and proceed-
ing then almost immediately to separate himself (contingently) from the rest of Europe, began preparing for war.

Thus the phantom of the young Kiréeff with the blood on his snowy-white clothing, gave an impulse which was scarce less romantic and proved even perhaps more powerful than the sentiment for the Holy Shrines; but the very words I have used to establish the parallel disclose one broad, palpable difference between the Russia of 1853 and the Russia we now have before us. There, within recent years, whether destined to be lasting or not, there has occurred a displacement of political force, involving apparently nothing less than the decomposition of the ancient Czardom, the dispersion of what was once the Czar's power of choosing between peace and war amongst turbulent, warlike committees, the submission of Alexander II. to the Pansclavistic fraternity, and the consequent accession of Russia to the cause of a half-hearted Democracy, which, though patient of despotic power at home, is nevertheless so careful in its attention to the business of others as to be industriously aggressive abroad, asserting and exercising the 'sacred right of insurrection' in a foreign state ostensibly treated as 'friendly; ' nay, able, moreover, when beaten, to turn back upon the once puissant monarch at home, and compel him with all the public resources to come and fight out its battle. Between such a condition of things and the Czardom as it stood in 1853, the contrast of course seems abrupt. People
find in this volume the mighty autocrat Nicholas wielding absolutely in his own almost worshipped person the whole strength of his vast dominions; and then turning from the book to their newspapers, they learn that the Russian Emperor of this day is supposed to love peace and order—supposed to love honour and the observance of good faith between nation and nation, yet apparently loves all this in vain, because his power falls short, and the cattle are now driving the herdsman.* Yet even whilst still in the act of observing the immense change thus wrought, one can discern after all a close likeness between the volitional forces which acted upon the Russia of 1853 and those which govern her now. These pages abundantly show that, although the strong will of Nicholas (if only he could definitively know it) was absolute law in all Russia, his own mind was the theatre of a breathless strife, being rudely drawn to and fro by the conflicting desires which alternately had the mastery over him; and that yet, in every one of his varying—nay, opposite—moods, he was thoroughly, thoroughly Russian, being sometimes indeed a Russian statesman, sometimes a Russian fanatic, sometimes a Russian encroacher with a wild

* A very able and interesting account of the political Russia of the present day was given to the world on the 26th of last October, by Prince W. Mestchersky. The Prince assures his readers that Russia is now a Democracy with 'liberty, equality, and fraternity' all complete; but it is loyal, he says, and religious, and not therefore deserving to be confounded with the Democracy of the French Revolution. He plainly agrees that it is a Democracy not applying its energies to Home politics, but attending—on grounds of fraternity—to foreign affairs.
shallow, gypsy-like cunning, but always, always Russian, and always therefore impersonating some more or less weighty component of Russian opinion. Thus the conflict then distracting one man was an epitome of what we now see extended over Russia at large: for, exactly as the present Emperor Alexander made head for some time with noble courage and dignity against the perturbing forces arrayed against him by the Panslavononic societies, and all the other well-whetted instruments of an aggressive democracy, so also in the brain of the Czar Nicholas—until at last he succumbed to his more violent impulses, and descended to meet his fate—there went on an analogous conflict between his own clashing desires—between impulsions that would make him on one day a prudent, austere, righteous monarch; on the next, a half-fanatic, half-covetous aggressor in arms for the glory of his Church, and intent to win some of the land dividing him from the gates of Constantinople.

'Young Muscovy' flatters herself that the power she has wrested from her monarch will remain in her 'prentice hands; but one hardly knows how to believe that a Democracy which shrinks from Home politics can have any very strong roots, and indeed it seems likely that, as soon as there comes back a period of either real peace, or real war, the Czar will regain his ascendant; for in a period of European tranquillity (unless, indeed, they take heart, and begin to look after their own liberties instead of watching over their neighbours') the agitators of the Panslavononic
fraternity will have no field of action before them; and on the other hand, if a campaign shall have once been begun in great earnest, there is some danger of their being invited to express the enthusiasm they feel by the eloquence of their money contributions, but in other respects to stand down, and retire from public life. For the moment, however, 'young Mus-‘covy' has a real, though precarious existence, and must not be left out of account in negotiating with the Czar's representative.

I have striven to make it plain that the impulse which has been stirring the Russian people was for the most part a genuine, honest enthusiasm; but already we know that this zeal, though expressing itself at first in mere personal, volunteered enterprises, was glad, when defeated, to look back to St Peters burg and invoke the aid of the State. In obedience to that appeal, weighty armies are now fast assembling on the frontiers of the Turkish dominions, and it would be rash to make sure that, however disinterested originally, a State making these huge exertions will long remain purely angelic. The young Kiréeff could die for a shadowy, perhaps half-formed idea, but in the camp of 200,000 men, and in the Cabinet which has brought them together, coarser objects, if deemed within reach, must needs be tempting the choice.

A. W. K.

December 20, 1876.
ADVERTISEMENT TO THE SIXTH EDITION.

So long as this History was a subject of active controversy, I kept its language unchanged, throwing always into separate, though appended, 'notes,' those corrections and additions which I thought fit to make upon the issue of each new edition; but the safeguard thus adopted and maintained during a period of nearly fourteen years can at last be dispensed with, and accordingly the text of the narrative has been now for the first time revised.

The 14th chapter, however, concerns the actions and the character of a sovereign who, although at the height of his power when I published my words in 1863, was destined to meet dire reverses, and is now no more. Under these conditions, I have judged it right to let the chapter reappear without the change of one word.

A. W. K.

December 20, 1876.
THE SOURCES OF THE NARRATIVE.

Before I had determined to write any account of the war, there were grounds from which many inferred that a task of this kind would be mine; and I may say that, from the hour of their landing on the enemy's coast, close down to the present time, men, acting under this conviction, have been giving me a good deal of their knowledge.

In 1856 Lady Raglan placed in my hands the whole mass of the papers which Lord Raglan had with him at the time of his death. Having done this, she made it her request that I would cause to be published a letter which her husband addressed to her a few days before his death.* All else she left to me. Time passed, and no history founded upon these papers was given to the world. Time still passed away; and it chanced to me to hear that people who longed for the dispersion of what they believed to be falsehoods, were striving to impart to Lady Raglan the not unnatural

* I need hardly say that this letter will appear in its proper place.
impatience which all this delay had provoked. But
with a singleness of purpose and a strength of will
which remind one of the great soldier who was her
father's brother, she answered that, the papers having
once been placed under my control, she would not
disturb me with expressions of impatience, nor suffer
any one else to do so with her assent. I cannot be too
grateful to her for her generous and resolute trustful-
ness. If these volumes are late the whole blame rests
with me. If they are reaching the light too soon the
fault is still mine.

Knowing Lord Raglan's habits of business, knowing
his tendency to connect all public transactions with
the labours of the desk, and finding in no part of the
correspondence the least semblance of anything like a
chasm, I am led to believe that, of almost everything
concerning the business of the war which was known
to Lord Raglan himself, there lies in the papers before
me a clear and faithful record.

In this mass of papers there are, not only all the
Military Reports which were from time to time ad-
dressed to the Commander of the English army by
the generals and other officers serving under him (in-
cluding their holograph narratives of the part they
had been taking in the battles), but also Lord Raglan's
official and private correspondence with sovereigns
and their ambassadors; with ministers, generals, and
admirals; with the French, with the Turks, with the
Sardinians; with public men, and official function-
aries of all sorts and conditions; with adventurers;
with men propounding wild schemes; with dear and faithful friends.* Circumstances had previously made me acquainted with a good deal of the more important information thus laid before me; but there is a completeness in this body of authentic records which enables me to tread with more confidence than would have been right or possible if I had had a less perfect survey of the knowledge which belonged to Headquarters. And so methodical was Lord Raglan, and so well was he served by Colonel Steele, his military secretary, that all this mass of authentic matter lies ranged in perfect order. The strategic plans of the much-contriving Emperor—still carrying the odour of the havannahs which aid the ingenuity of the Tuileries—are ranged with all due care, and can be got at in a few moments; but, not less carefully ranged, and equally easy to find, is the rival scheme of the enthusiastic nosologist who advised that the Russians should be destroyed by the action of malaria, and the elaborate proposal of the English general who submitted a plan for taking Sebastopol with bows and arrows. Here and there, the neatness of the arranging hand is in strange contrast with the fiery contents of the papers arranged; for, along with reports and returns, and things precise, the most hurried scrawl of the commander who writes to his chief under stress of

*I have never looked at it since 1856, but it struck me then, that the letter which Mr Sidney Herbert addressed to Lord Raglan in the winter of the first campaign was the very ideal of what, in such circumstances, might be written by an English statesman who dearly loved his friend, but who loved his country yet more.
deep emotion, lies flat, and hushed, and docketed. It would seem as though no paper addressed to the English Headquarters was ever destroyed or mislaid.

With respect to my right to make public any of the papers entrusted to me, I have this, and this only, to say: circumstances have enabled me to know who ought to be consulted before any State Paper or private letter hitherto kept secret is sent abroad into the world; and, having this knowledge, I have done what I judge to be right.

The papers entrusted to me by Lady Raglan contain a part only of the knowledge which, without any energy on my part, I was destined to have cast upon me; for when it became known that the papers of the English Headquarters were in my hands, and that I was really engaged in the task which rumour had prematurely assigned to me, information of the highest value was poured in upon me from many quarters. Nor was this all. Great as was the quantity of information thus actually imparted to me, I found that the information which lay at my command was yet more abundant; for I do not recollect that to any one man in this country I have ever expressed any wish for the information which he might be able to give me, without receiving at once what I believe to be a full and honest disclosure of all he could tell on the subject. This facility embarrassed me; for I never could find that there was any limit to my power of getting at what was known in this country. I rarely asked a question without eliciting something
which added, more or less, to my labour, and tended to cause delay.

And now I have that to state which will not surprise my own countrymen, but which still, in the eyes of the foreigner, will seem to be passing strange. For some years, our statesmen, our admirals, and our generals, have known that the whole correspondence of the English Headquarters was in my hands; and very many of them have from time to time conversed and corresponded with me on the business of the war. Yet I declare I do not remember that any one of these public men has ever said to me that there was anything which, for the honour of our arms, or for the credit of the nation, it would be well to keep concealed. Every man has taken it for granted that what is best for the repute of England is, the truth.

I have received a most courteous, clear, and abundant answer to every inquiry which I have ventured to address to any French commander; and, indeed, the willingness to communicate with me from that quarter was so strong, that an officer of great experience, and highly gifted with all the qualities which make an accomplished soldier, was despatched to this country with instructions to impart ample statements to me respecting some of the operations of the French army. I seize upon this occasion of acknowledging the advantage I derived from the admirably lucid statements which were furnished to me by this highly-instructed officer; and I know that those friends of mine to whom I had the honour of presenting him,
will join with me in expressing the gratification which
we all derived from his society.

I thought it right to apprise the authorities of the
French War Department, that, if they desired it, the
journals of their divisions, and any other unpublished
papers in their War Office, which they might be
pleased to show, would be looked over by a gifted
friend of mine, now a member of the House of Com-
mons, who had kindly offered to undertake this task
for me. The French authorities did not avail them-
selves of my offer; but any obscurity which might
otherwise have resulted from this concealment has
been effectually dispersed by the information I after-
wards obtained from Russian sources.

Of all the materials on which I found my account
of the battle of the Alma, hardly any have been more
valuable to me than the narratives of the three Divi-
sional Generals who there held command under Prince
Mentschikoff. The gifted young Russian officer who
obtained for me these deeply interesting narratives,
and who kindly translated them from their Russian
originals, has not only conferred upon me an import-
ant favour, but has also done that which will uplift the
repute of the far-famed Russian infantry, by helping
to show to Europe the true character of the conflict
which it sustained on the banks of the Alma.

My knowledge respecting the battles of Balaclava
and Inkerman, and the subsequent fights before Sebas-
topol, is still incomplete; and I shall welcome any
information respecting these conflicts which men may
be pleased to entrust to me.* From the Russians, especially, I hope that I may receive communications of this kind. Their defence of Sebastopol ranges high in the annals of warfare; and I imagine that the more the truth is known, the more it will redound to the honour of the Russian arms.

I do not in general appeal for proof to my personal observation, but I have departed from this abstinence in two or three instances where it seemed to me that I might prevent a waste of controversial energy by saying at once that the thing told had been seen or heard by myself.

With regard to the portion of the work which is founded upon unpublished documents and private information, I had intended at one time—not to give the documents nor the names of my informants, nor the words they have written or spoken, but—to indicate the nature of the statements on which I rely; as, for instance, to say in notes at the foot of a page, 'The 'Raglan Papers,' 'Letter from an officer engaged,' 'Oral statement made to me by one who was present,' and the like. But, upon reflection, I judged that I could not venture to do this. When a published authority is referred to, any want of correspondence between the assertion and the proof can be detected by a reader who takes the trouble to ascend to the originals; but I do not like to assert that a document

* This sentence was published in 1863, and long before the appearance of my 4th and 5th volumes. It is only to information touching the period between 'Inkerman' and the close of June 1855, that the above invitation would now apply.
or a personal narrative withheld (for the present) from this wholesome scrutiny is the designated yet hidden foundation of a statement which I make freely, in my own way, and in my own language. So, although when I found my statements upon a Parliamentary Paper or a published book, I commonly give my authority; yet so far as concerns that part of the work which is based upon unpublished writings or private information—and this applies to an important part of the first, and to nearly the whole of the second volume—I in general make no reference to the grounds on which I rely. Hereafter it may be otherwise; but, for the present, this portion of the book must rest upon what, after all, is the chief basis of our historical knowledge—must rest upon the statement of one who had good means of knowing the truth. In the meanwhile, I shall keep and leave ready the clue by which, in some later time, and without further aid from me, my statements may be traced to their sources.

For a period of now several years my knowledge of what I undertake to narrate has been growing more and more complete. Far from gathering assurance at the sight of the progress thus made, I am rather led to infer that approaches which continued so long might continue perhaps still longer; and it is not without a kind of reluctance that I pass from the tranquil state of one who is absorbing the truth, to that of one making it public. But the time has now come.

A. W. K.

1st January 1863.
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ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853

BETWEEN

THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN.

CHAPTER I.

When this century had half run its course, and even during some few months afterwards, the peninsula which divides the Euxine from the Sea of Azoff was an almost forgotten land, lying out of the chief paths of merchants and travellers, and far away from all the capital cities of Christendom. Rarely went thither any one from Paris, or Vienna, or Berlin: to reach it from London was a harder task than to cross the Atlantic; and a man of office receiving in this distant province his orders despatched from St Petersburg, was the servant of masters who governed him from a distance of a thousand miles.

Along the course of the little rivers which seamed the ground, there were villages and narrow belts of tilled land, with gardens, and fruitful
vineyards; but for the most part this neglected Crim Tartary was a wilderness of steppe or of mountain-range much clothed towards the west with tall stiff grasses, and the stems of a fragrant herb like southernwood. The bulk of the people were of Tartar descent, but no longer what they had been in the days when nations trembled at the coming of the Golden Horde; and although they yet held to the Moslem faith, their religion had lost its warlike fire. Blessed with a dispensation from military service, and far away from the accustomed battle-fields of Europe and Asia, they lived in quiet, knowing little of war except what tradition could faintly carry down from old times in low monotonous chants. In their husbandry they were more governed by the habits of their ancestors than by the nature of the land which had once fed the people of Athens, for they neglected tillage and clung to pastoral life. Watching flocks and herds, they used to remain on the knolls very still for long hours together; and when they moved, they strode over the hills in their slow-flowing robes with something of the forlorn majesty of peasants descended from warriors. They wished for no change, and they excused their content in their simple way by saying that for three generations their race had lived happy under the Czars.*

* The villagers of Eskel (on the Katcha) declared this to me on the 23d of September 1854, and the date gives value to the acknowledgment, for these villagers had been witnessing the confusion and seeming ruin of the Czar’s army.
But afterwards, and for reasons unknown to the shepherds, the chief Powers of the earth began to break in upon these peaceful scenes. France, England, and Turkey were the invaders, and these at a later day were reinforced by Sardinia. With the whole might which she could put forth in a province far removed from her military centre, Russia stood her ground. The strife lasted a year and a half, and for twelve months it raged.

And with this invasion there came something more than what men saw upon the battle-fields of the contending armies. In one of the Allied States, the people being free of speech and having power over the judgment of their rulers, were able to take upon themselves a great share of the business of the war. It was in vain that the whole breadth of Europe divided this people from the field of strife. By means unknown before, they gained fitful and vivid glimpses of the battle and the siege, of the sufferings of the camp and bivouac, and the last dismal scenes of the hospital tent; and being thus armed from day to day with fresh knowledge, and feeling conscious of a warlike strength exceeding by a thousandfold the strength expressed by the mere numbers of their army, they thronged in, and made their voice heard, and became partakers of the counsels of State. The scene of the conflict was mainly their choice. They enforced the invasion. They watched it hour by hour. Through good and evil days they sustained it, and when by the yielding of their adversary the strife was brought to an end, they
seemed to pine for more fighting. Yet they had witnessed checkered scenes. They counted their army on the mainland. They watched it over the sea. They saw it land. They followed its march. They saw it in action. They tasted of the joy of victory. Then came the time when they had to bear to see their army dying upon a bleak hill from cold and want. In their anguish this people strove to know their general. They had seen him in the hour of battle, and their hearts had bounded with pride. They saw him now commanding a small force of wan, feeble, dying men, yet holding a strong enemy at bay, and comporting himself as though he were the chief of a strong, besieging army. They hardly knew at the time that for forty days the fate of two armies and the lasting fame and relative strength of great nations were hanging upon the quality of one man's mind. Tormented with grief and anger for the cruel sufferings of their countrymen, they turned upon the Chief with questioning looks, and seeing him always holding his ground and always composed, they strove to break in upon the mystery of his calm. But there, their power fell short. Except by withstanding the enemy, he made them no sign; and when he was reinforced and clothed once more with power, he still seemed the same to them. At length they saw him die. Thenceforth they had to look upon the void which was left by his death. They grew more patient. They did not become less resolute. What they hoped and what they feared in all these trials, what they
thought, what they felt, what they saw, what they heard, nay, even what they were planning against the enemy, they uttered aloud in the face of the world; and thence it happened that one of the chief features of the struggle was the demeanour of a free and impetuous people in time of war.

Again, the invasion of the Crimea so tried the strength, so measured the enduring power of the nations engaged, that, when the conflict was over, their relative stations in Europe were changed, and they had to be classed afresh.

Moreover, the strife yielded lessons in war and policy which are now of great worth.

But this war was deadly. "The grave of the hundred thousand" which Russia keeps holy on the Severnaya contains, after all, but a fraction of the soldiers, sailors, workmen, and peasants whom she alone brought to the sacrifice;* and if the aggregate of her losses were discovered and added to those of France, England, Turkey, and Sardinia, there would be seen to have resulted altogether an appalling destruction of life. The war consumed treasure unsparingly, but also swallowed up in huge quantities that yet more precious rural

* "The grave of the hundred thousand" on the north side of Sebastopol contains a less number of dead than its poetic appellation imports—contains, I believe, 80,000—but it is not there that the bulk of the victims repose. They died on the lines of march. The losses sustained by Russia were mainly occasioned by the effort of marching great distances in the interior of her vast territories. The Czar did not merely press on his people by forcing the march of soldiers, but by wringing from a hapless peasantry the means of moving his Divisions with their war encumbrances over immense tracts of country.
wealth to which human beings unnumbered were trusting for life or welfare; and again, it so shattered the framework of the European system, that thenceforth for many a year the safety of nations became more than ever dependent upon their armed strength. Upon the whole, there is ground for saying that the causes of a havoc which went to such proportions should be traced and remembered.

For thirty-five years there had been peace between the great Powers of Europe. The outbreaks of 1848 had been put down. The wars which they kindled had been kept within bounds, and had soon been brought to an end. Kings, emperors, and statesmen declared their love of peace. But always whilst they spoke, they went on levying men. Russia, Germany, and France were laden with standing armies.

This was one root of danger. There was another. Between a sovereign who governs for himself, and one who reigns through a council of statesmen, there are points of difference which make it more likely that war will result from the will of the one man than from the blended judgments of several chosen advisers. In these days the exigencies of an army are vast and devouring. Also, modern society, growing more and more vulnerable by reason of the very beauty and complexity of its arrangements, is made to tremble by the mere rumour of an appeal to arms; and, upon the whole, the evils inflicted by war are so cruel, and the benefit which a Power may hope to derive
from a scheme of aggression is commonly so obscure, so remote, and so uncertain, that when the world is in a state of equilibrium and repose, it is generally very hard to see how it can be really for the interest of any one State to go and do a wrong clearly tending to provoke a rupture. Here, then, there is something like a security for the maintaining of peace. But the security rests upon the supposition that a State will faithfully pursue its own welfare, and therefore it ceases to hold good in a country where the government happens to be in such hands that the interests of the nation at large fail to coincide with the interests of its ruler. This history will not dissemble—it will broadly lay open—the truth that a people no less than a prince may be under the sway of a warlike passion, and may wring obedience to its fierce command from the gentlest ministers of state; but upon the whole, the interests, the passions, and foibles which lead to war are more likely to be found in one man than in the band of public servants which is called a ministry. A ministry, indeed, will share in any sentiments of just national anger, and may even entertain a great scheme of state ambition, but it can scarcely be under the sway of fanaticism, or vanity, or petulance, or bodily fear; for though any one member of the Government may have some of these defects, the dangers they might well enough cause, if he alone were the ruler, are likely to be neutralised in council. Then, again, a man rightly called a minister of state is not a mere favourite of his sovereign, but the actual trans-
actor of public business. He is in close intercourse with those labourers of high worth and ability who in all great States compose the permanent staff of the public office; and in this way, even though he be newly come to affairs, he is brought into acquaintance with the great traditions of the State, and comes to know and feel what the interests of his country are. Above all, a ministry really charged with affairs will be free from the personal and family motives which deflect the state policy of a prince who is his own minister, and will refuse to merge the interests of their country in the mere hopes and fears of one man.

On the other hand, a monarch governing for himself, and without responsible ministers, must always be under a set of motives which are laid upon him by his personal station as well as by his care for the people. Such a prince is either a hereditary sovereign or he is a man who has won the crown with his own hand. In the first case, the contingency of his turning out to be a man really qualified for the actual governance of an empire is almost, though not quite, excluded by the bare law of chances; and, on the other hand, it may be expected that the prince who has made his own way to the throne will not be wanting in such qualities of mind as fit a man for business of state. In some respects, perhaps, he will be abler than a council. He will be more daring, more resolute, more secret; but these are qualities conducive to war, and not to peace. Moreover, a prince who has won for himself a sovereignty
claimed by others will almost always be under the pressure of motives very foreign to the real interests of the State. He knows that by many he is regarded as a mere usurper, and that his home enemies are carefully seeking the moment when they may depose him, and throw him into prison, and ill-use him, and take his life. He commands great armies, and has a crowd of hired courtiers at his side; but he knows that if his skill and his fortune should both chance to fail him in the same hour, he would become a prisoner or a corpse. He hears, from behind, the stealthy foot of the assassin; and before him he sees the dismal gates of a jail, and the slow, hateful forms of death by the hand of the law. Of course he must and he will use all the powers of the State as a defence against these dangers, and if it chance to seem likely—as in such circumstances it often does—that war may give him safety or respite, then to war he will surely go; and although he knows that this rough expedient is one which must be hurtful to the State, he will hardly be kept back by such a thought, for, being, as it were, a drowning man who sees a plank within his reach, he is forced by the law of nature to clutch it; and his country is then drawn into war, not because her interests require it, nor even because her interests are mistaken by her ruler, but because she has suffered herself to fall into the hands of a prince whose road to welfare is distinct from her own.*

* No verbal or other change has been made in the above paragraph since the day when it was first published in 1863.
The change suddenly undergone by France in the winter of 1851 must be shown by-and-by, and its effect upon the peace of Europe will be found to correspond but too closely with what we have last been saying; but the period now spoken of is one some months anterior to the night of the 2d December, and it was not yet possible in France, any more than in England, that a war should be all at once undertaken by the Executive Government without the approval of Parliament and of the nation at large. Still, the President Louis Napoleon could even then do acts which tended to breed up causes of quarrel between European States; and we shall see him exerting his power.

The power of All the Russias was centred in the Emperor, and it chanced that the qualities of Nicholas were of such a kind as to enable him to give a literal truth to the theory that he, and he alone, was the State.

In Austria the disasters of 1848 had broken the custom of government, and placed a kind of dictatorship in the hands of the youthful Emperor. And although before the summer of 1853 the traditions of the State had regained a great deal of their force, still for a time the recovery was not so plainly evidenced as to compel an unwilling man to see it; and the notion that the great empire of the Danube had merged in the mere wishes of Francis Joseph lingered always in the mind of the Czar, and drew him on into danger.

Even in Prussia, though the country seemed to
enjoy a constitutional form of government, the policy of the State was always liable to be de-
ranged by the tremulous hand of the King; and the anticipation of finding weakness in this
quarter was one of the causes which led the Czar to defy the judgment of Europe.

In the Ottoman dominions Abdul Medjid was accustomed to leave the administration of foreign
affairs to responsible ministers; and it will be seen that this wholesome method of reigning gave
the Turkish Government a great advantage over the diplomacy of other Continental States.

Speaking loosely, observers might say that the conduct of public business in England was a task
entrusted to ministers enjoying the confidence of Parliament; but the rule, if rule we may call it,
was subject to one huge exception, and besides, to several qualifying conditions which clogged the
authority wielded by some of our State Departments.* Amongst the Departments thus sub-
jected to Royal interference the Foreign Office was one; and there, besides maintaining a right
to see important despatches, the Crown was accustomed to insist that it must have an oppor-
tunity of either consenting or refusing consent to every resolve of great moment. The Crown, it is
true, understood that, unless at the cost of having to change the Administration, and to change it
under perilous conditions, no refusal to adopt a

* The 'huge exception' was of course the Horse Guards. Those habitually subjected to Royal interference were the Foreign Office and the Department of Woods and Works.
measure definitively approved by the Cabinet could be persistently maintained; but supposing
the Royal objections to be sound or even plausible, there was always of course a probability that they
might be supported by some of our public men; and upon the whole it may be said that, even al-
though exerted no further, the power of the Crown to enforce a deliberate reconsideration of every
great question arising was of itself a weighty pre-
rogative. This prerogative through the Prince
Consort was diligently asserted and exercised
during those very years—the first years of this
half-century—which were pregnant with the
question of peace or war for Europe, and it would
seem that the conditions were exactly those under
which princely warnings, if wise and well suited
to English methods of action, might have been
advantageously addressed to a 'drifting' minis-
try. The Consort seems to have imagined that
his ceaseless endeavours to understand, to check
and control the torrent of public business which
rushed in those days through the Foreign Office,
were labours of no small moment;* and it there-
fore may be fairly conjectured that a renewed sur-
vey of his political life will show him perceiving
each error of the Government, protesting against

* No one, I think, can read Mr Theodore Martin's work
without seeing that the Prince had that impression on his
mind. With respect to what I have called the 'torrent' of
business passing through the Foreign Office, I may cite the
statement made in Mr Martin's second volume—i.e., that in
1848 the number of despatches there arriving or thence sent
out was about 28,000.
every false step, and, in short, bringing down to the superintendence of our foreign affairs some of that all-enlightening wisdom which he and his friend Baron Stockmar were accustomed to ascribe to each other; but no disclosures to that effect have been hitherto made; * and accordingly, in the pages which follow, I shall have to show our ministers from time to time straying aside from what was the right, prudent course without yet being able to say that any one of those deviations was pointed out at the time by the Crown or the Royal Consort.

On the other hand, I decline to maintain that the interference of the Prince in our foreign affairs brought England into the war. Many reasoners, it is true, have believed that the hostility of the Crown to Lord Palmerston in the middle part of this century forged links in the chain of causation which brought about the quarrel with Russia; but discarding on the whole that conclusion, because overstrained and far-fetched, I have no ground left me for saying that the interposition of the Sovereign or the Prince in foreign affairs, either helped to bring on the war, or contributed any means for averting it.† Whether

* The Prince's memorandum of the 21st of October had no practical significance. It was more than four months too late.
† The Prince, as we know, was honestly desirous for the maintenance of an honourable peace, and combining that fact with the circumstances stated in the text, it becomes clear that the question of his Royal Highness's aptitude for the supervision of our foreign affairs must depend upon disclosures not hitherto made—upon disclosures showing what steps he took when each of the ministerial 'deviations' was in progress.
England went right or went wrong in the course we shall have to trace, she was guided at each step by ministers whom the House of Commons approved.

It was believed that the Emperor Nicholas numbered almost a million of men under arms; and of these a main part were brave, steady, obedient soldiers. Gathering from time to time great bodies of troops upon his western frontier, he caused the minds of men in the neighbouring States to be weighed down with a sense of his strength. Moreover, he was served by a diplomacy of the busy sort, always labouring to make the world hear of Russia and to acknowledge her might; and being united by family ties with some of the reigning Houses of Germany, he was able to have it believed that his favour might be of use to the courtiers and even sometimes to the statesmen of Central Europe. Down to the giving of trinkets and ribbons, he was not forgetful. His power was great; and when the troubles of 1848 broke out, the broad foundation of his authority was more than ever manifested; for, surrounded by sixty millions of subjects whose loyalty was hardly short of worship, he seemed to stand free and aloof from the panic which was overturning the thrones of the Western Continent, and to look down upon the

Feeling this, I shall aid Mr Theodore Martin in his endeavour to sustain the political reputation of H.R.H. by specially calling attention in foot-notes to the several periods of crisis when a little good, opportune warning might have had an unspeakable value.
terrors of his fellow-sovereigns, not deigning to yield his cold patronage to the cause of law and order. In the West, he said, and even in Central Europe, the storm might rage as it liked, but he warned and commanded that the waves should not so much as cast their spray upon the frontiers of 'Holy Russia';* and when Hungary rose, he ordered his columns to pass the border, and forced the insurgent army to lay down its arms. Then, proudly abstaining from conditions and recompense, he yielded up the kingdom to his Ally. That day Russia seemed to touch the pinnacle of her greatness; for men were forced to acknowledge that her power was vast, and that it was wielded in a spirit of austere virtue, ranging high above common ambition.

But towards the South, Russia was the neighbour of Turkey. The descendants of the Ottoman invaders still remained quartered in Roumelia and the adjoining provinces. They were a race living apart from the Christians who mainly peopled the land; for the original scheme of the Moslem invasions still kept its mark upon the country. When the Ottoman warriors were conquering a province, they used to follow the injunction of the Prophet, and call upon such of the nations as rejected the Koran to choose between 'the tribute' and the sword; but the destiny implied by the first branch of the alternative was very different from that of a people whose country is conquered by European invaders. Instead of being made

* See the Manifesto issued by the Czar in 1848
subject to all the laws of their conquerors, the people of the Christian Churches were suffered to live apart, governing themselves in their own way, furnishing no recruits to the army, and having few legal relations with the State, except as payers of tribute.

In cities, the people of the Christian Churches and of the Synagogue generally had their respective districts, apart from the Moslem quarter. They were not safe from lawless acts of tyranny; and there were usages which reminded them that they were a conquered people; but they were never interfered with, as the citizens of European States are, for the mere sake of method or uniformity. They were free in the exercise of their religion; and most of the customs under which they lived were so completely their own, and so many of the laws which they obeyed were laws administered by themselves, that they might almost be said to form tributary republics in the midst of a military empire. Indeed, this distinct existence was so fully recognised as a result of Mahometan conquest that the Turkish Government was accustomed to give the title of a 'Nation' to the members of any Christian Church or Synagogue established within the Ottoman realm.

The subjects, or 'Rayahs,' as they are called, thus held under Mussulman sway, numbered perhaps fifteen millions; and although the Mussulmans of the whole Empire might be computed at twenty-one millions, the great bulk of these were scattered over remote provinces in Asia and
Africa. There were hardly more than two million Turks in Europe. These dominant Ottomans were in an earlier stage of civilisation than most of the Christian States; and it had happened that their Government, in straining to overtake and imitate the more cultivated nations, had broken down much of the strength which belongs to a warlike and simple people. Besides, amongst the Turks who clustered around the seat of government, a large proportion were men so spoilt by their contact with the metropolis of the Lower Empire, that, whilst the State suffered from the ignorance and simplicity of the governing race, it was suffering also in an opposite way under the evils which are bred by corruption.

Yet, notwithstanding the canker of Byzantine vice, and although they knew that they were liable to be baffled by the methods of high organisation and ingenious contrivance now brought to bear upon the structure of armies, the Ottoman people still upheld the warlike spirit which belongs to their race and to their faith. It is true that Russia, seizing a moment when the Sultan was without an ally,* and almost without an

* The accustomed policy of England had first been deranged by a sentiment in favour of Greece—a sentiment culminating at Navarino—and was afterwards in no small measure governed by the personal feelings and strong wayward convictions of a Minister. He who became the head of the Government in 1828 was the foremost man then living in the world, and it could not but be that his vast ascendancy would curtail the power and alleviate the responsibility of every other member of the Cabinet. The Czar's Declaration of War was in April 1828, and at that time Lord Dudley and Ward was the Foreign
army,* had invaded Bulgaria in 1828, and, passing the Balkan in the following year, had brought the campaign to an issue which seemed like a triumph. Yet men versed in the affairs of Eastern Europe always knew that the treaty of Adrianople had not been won by the real strength of the invaders, but rather by a daring stratagem in the nature of a surprise, and by a skilful feat in diplomacy. Experience showed that the Turks could generally hold their ground with obstinacy, when the conditions of a fight were of such a kind that a man's bravery could make up for the want of preparation and discipline. In truth they were a devoted soldiery, and fired with so high a spirit that, when brought into the right frame of mind, they could look upon the thought of death in action with a steadfast, lusty joy. They were temperate, enduring, and obedient to a degree unknown in other armies. They brought their wants within a very narrow compass; and, without much visible effort of commissariat skill or of transport power, they were generally found to be provided with bread and cartridges, and even with means of shelter. Their arms were always bright. Their faith tended to make them improvident; but a wise Secretary, Lord Aberdeen not succeeding to the office until the 30th of May. It was not till the 8th of June that the Russians were over the Danube, and they were in the middle of July when, issuing from the desolate peninsula of the Dobrudja, they first touched the frontiers of what is commonly understood to be the province of "Bulgaria."

* The Sultan had destroyed the Janissaries, and was beginning the formation of an army upon the European plan.
instinct taught them that if there was one thing which ought not to be left to fate or to the precepts of a deceased prophet, it was the Artillery. Their guns were well served. The Empire was wanting in the classes from which a large body of good officers and of able statesmen could be taken, and therefore, with all their bravery, the Turks were liable to be brought to the verge of ruin by panic in the field, or by panic in the Divan; but where the men are of so warlike a quality as the Turks, the want of able officers can be remedied to an almost incredible degree by the presence of a foreigner; and, indeed, the Osmanlee is so strangely cheered and supported by the mere sight of an Englishman, that aid rendered upon the spur of the moment by five or six of our countrymen has more than once changed despair into victory, and governed the course of events. Help of that sort, whatever our Government might do, was not again likely to be wanting to the Turks in a defensive war. Moreover, the vast and desolate tracts of country which lie between the Pruth and the Bosphorus cannot easily be crossed by an army requiring large supplies, especially if it should be deprived of the sea communication. It is true that neither the warlike qualities of the Ottoman people nor the physical difficulties of the invasion were well understood in Europe, and it was commonly believed that Turkey, if left unsupported, would lie completely at the mercy of the Czar. This, however, was an error. Except in the possible event of their being overwhelmed by
some panic, the Turks were not liable to be speedily crushed by an army forcing the line of the Danube and advancing through the passes of the Balkan.

But also, the conquest of European Turkey was obstructed by the very splendour of the prize. To have the dominion of the summer kiosks, and the steep shady gardens looking down on the straits between Europe and Asia, is to have a command which carries with it nothing less than an Empire: and since the strength of every nation is relative, and is liable to be turned to nought by the aggrandisement of another Power, it was plain that no one among the nations of Europe could be seen going in quest of dominion on the Bosphorus without awakening alarm and resistance on the part of the other great Powers. Certainly the Turks trusted much in Heaven; but being also highly skilled in so much of the diplomatic art as was needed for them in this temporal world, they knew how to keep alive the watchfulness of every Power which was resolved to exclude its rivals from the shores of the Bosphorus. Moreover, those descendants of the Ottoman conquerors still remained gifted with the almost inscrutable qualities which enable a chosen race to hold dominion over a people more numerous and more clever than their masters. There were a few English statesmen and several English travellers who had come to understand this; but the generality of men in the Christian countries found it hard to make out that a people could be wise without
being keenly intelligent, and could see little strength in a civilisation much earlier and more rude than their own.

So in the common judgment of the world it had long seemed natural that, as a result of the decay which was thought to have come upon the Ottoman Empire, its European provinces should revert to Christendom. By many the conquest of them was thought to be an easy task: for the Turks were few and simple, and in peace-time very listless and improvident; and the bulk of the people held under their sway in Europe were Christians, who bore hatred against their Ottoman masters. And to Russia these same provinces seemed to be of a worth beyond all kind of measurement, for they lay towards the warm South, and, commanding the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, gave access to and fro between the Euxine and the Mediterranean. The Power which seemed to be abounding in might was divided from the land of temptation by a mere stream of water. No treaty stood in the way.* Was there in the polity of Europe any principle, custom, or law which could shelter the weak from the strong, and forbid the lord of eight hundred thousand soldiers from crossing the Pruth or the Danube?

* The preambles of the Treaties of 1840 and 1841 recognised the expediency of maintaining the Sultan's dominion, but there was nothing in the articles of either of those treaties which engaged the contracting parties to defend the empire from foreign invasion.
CHAPTER II.

The supreme Law or Usage which forms the safeguard of Europe is not in a state so perfect and symmetrical that the elucidation of it will bring any ease or comfort to a mind accustomed to crave for well-defined rules of conduct. It is a rough and wild-grown system, and its observance can only be enforced by opinion, and by the belief that it truly coincides with the interests of every Power which is called upon to obey it; but practically, it has been made to achieve a fair portion of that security which sanguine men might hope to see resulting from the adoption of an international code. Perhaps under a system ideally formed for the safety of nations and for the peace of the world, a wrong done to one State would be instantly treated as a wrong done to all. But in the actual state of the world there is no such bond between nations. It is true that the law of nations does not stint the right of executing justice, and that any power may either remonstrate against a wrong done to another State great or small, or may endeavour, if so it chooses, to prevent or redress the wrong by force of arms;
but the duties of States in this respect are very far from being coextensive with their rights. In Europe, all States except the five great Powers are exempt from the duty of watching over the general safety;* and even a State which is one of the five great Powers is not practically under an obligation to sustain the cause of justice unless its perception of the wrong is reinforced by a sense of its own interests. Moreover, no State, unless it be combating for its very life, can be expected to engage in a war without a fair prospect of success. But when the three circumstances are present—when a wrong is being done against any State great or small, when that wrong in its present or ulterior consequences happens to be injurious to one of the five great Powers, and, finally, when the great Power so injured is competent to wage war with fair hopes—then Europe is accustomed to expect that the great Power which is sustaining the hurt will be enlivened by the smart of the wound, and for its own sake, as well as for the public weal, will be ready to come forward in arms, or to labour for the formation of such leagues as may be needed for upholding the cause of justice. If a Power fails in this duty to itself and to Europe, it suddenly becomes lowered in the opinion of mankind; and happily there is no historic lesson more true than that which teaches all rulers that a moral degradation of this sort is speedily followed by disasters of such a kind as to be capable of

* The above was published before, in 1863, Italy had acceded to the "five."
being expressed in arithmetic, and of being in that way made clear to even the narrowest understanding. The principle on which the safeguard rests will not be acknowledged by all, but those who will disown it can be designated beforehand. There are many who cannot make out how society can justly be harsh upon a man for being tame under insult or injury; and the same class of moralists will encounter a like difficulty in their endeavour to understand the cogency and the worth of this Usage.

Perhaps the limit to which the Usage is subject may be best shown by first giving an example of circumstances in which it fails to take practical effect. When the Republic of Cracow was abolished by an arrangement concerted between Russia and Austria, a clear wrong was done, and France and England protested against it; but it could hardly be said that their interests were grievously affected by the change, and therefore it was not the opinion of Europe that the Western Powers had been guilty of a great dereliction of duty because on this account they declined to go to war.

But as an example of circumstances in which tame acquiescence would be clearly a breach of the great Usage and a defection from the cause of nations, one may cite the conduct of Prussia in 1805; for when the First Napoleon suddenly came to a rupture with Austria, and broke up from his camp at Boulogne and poured his armies into Germany, advancing upon Ulm and finally upon
Vienna itself, all men saw that it was not only for the interest of Europe at large, but also for the interest of Prussia herself, that she should come forward to prevent the catastrophe. She hung back and stood still whilst Austria succumbed; but acting thus, Prussia incurred the ill opinion of Europe; and the ruin which follows degradation did not at all lag, for in the very next year Bonaparte was issuing his decrees from Berlin, and the Prussians were yielding up their provinces and their strong places to France, and handing over their stores of gold and silver, and of food and clothing, to cruel French intendants, and French soldiery were quartered upon them at their hearths. A brave and warlike people had been brought down into this abyss because their rulers had shrunk from taking up arms in obedience to the great Usage; and Europe set it down and remembered that Prussia's dereliction of duty in 1805 was followed by shame and ruin in the autumn of 1806.

But if the wars of 1805 and 1806 supplied a signal instance of this kind of defection and of its speedy chastisement, they also furnished examples of loyal obedience to the great Usage. From the rupture of the peace of Amiens to the summer of 1805, Bonaparte was at peace with the Continent and at war with this country. During that interval of more than two years he bent his whole energy, and devoted the vast resources at his command, to the one object of invading and crushing England. It was against the interest of Europe that England should be ruined, but more
especially it was for the interest of Austria that this disaster should be averted, because the great empire of the Danube is so situate that its interests are more closely identical with the interests of England than with those of any other Power. Moreover, the indignation of Austria was whetted by seeing Bonaparte crowning himself at Milan and seizing Genoa. Therefore when Pitt turned to the Court of Vienna, he did not turn in vain. Supported by Russia and Sweden, Austria came forward in arms, and though she was for the time broken down by the disaster of Ulm, and the defeat of the Russian army at Austerlitz, her old ally was safe: nothing more was heard in those days of the invasion of England; and the islanders, relieved from the duty of mere literal self-defence, were set free to enter upon a larger scheme of action.* Thenceforth they defended England by toiling for the deliverance of Europe. The coalition of 1805 was shattered, but already it had helped to secure the precious life of the nation which was destined to be the first to carry war into the territory of the disturber. Again, in the same year it was perilous to Central Europe that Bonaparte should be having dominion in Germany; but also it was against the interest of Russia that this should be, and the de-

* Of course it was the destruction of the French and Spanish fleets at Trafalgar which prevented Bonaparte from resuming the idea of invading England, but that which caused him to abandon the enterprise which he had been planning for two years was the coalition. He broke up from the camp at Boulogne several weeks before the battle of Trafalgar.
fection of Prussia threw upon the Czar the burthen of having to be foremost in the defence of Austria. Therefore, in 1805, the Emperor Alexander came forward with his army to the rescue, and in the following year he refused to stand idle when Prussia was the victim, and again moved forward his armies; and although he was worsted at Austerlitz in striving to defend Austria, and although, after heroic struggles in defence of Prussia, he at last was vanquished at Friedland and was obliged to make peace, still his faithful and valorous efforts gained him so much of the respect of Europe, and even of his victorious adversary, that, beaten as he was, he was able to go to Tilsit and to negotiate with the great Conqueror of the day upon a footing which resembled equality.

It has fallen to the lot of England also to have some share of the honour which Europe bestows upon resolute defenders of right; for when Bonaparte wished to make himself master of Spain and Portugal, it was the interest of England to prevent this result if she could, and to endeavour to thwart and humble the French Emperor in the midst of his triumphs: but it was also for the interest of Europe that England should be able to do this. Nay, so crushing had been the disasters suffered by the Continental States, that the glorious duty of standing foremost and alone in defence of the liberties of mankind was cast for a time upon England. The task might well seem a hard one, for all that the islanders could do was to send out in ships scanty bodies of troops, in order that the
men, when they landed, might encounter the armies of the hitherto victorious Emperor. But England did not shrink from the undertaking. For more than six years she carried on the struggle, and during some three years of that time she stood alone against Napoleon, for he had put down all the other nations which had sought to resist him, and during that evil time it seemed that the vanquished people of the Continent had no hope left except when they were telling one another in whispers that England remained mistress of the seas, and in the Peninsula was still fighting hard. Times grew better, and although Bonaparte still held the language of a great potentate, he had so mismanaged the resources of the heroic and warlike country which he ruled, that an English army with its Portuguese auxiliaries was able to invade and hold its territory; and whilst he still pretended to the Germans that he was a proud and powerful sovereign, Wellington unmasked the whole imposture of the 'French Empire' by establishing his army and his foxhounds in the south of France, and quietly hunting the country in the livery of the Salisbury Hunt.* The effort had begun when Sir Arthur Wellesley landed upon the coast of Portugal in the year 1808, and it ended in 1814. In the spring of that last year, men

* Larpent's 'Private Journal at Head-Quarters,' 2d edition, vol. ii. p. 105. Wellington established himself in France in November 1813. He sent back into the Peninsula his whole Spanish army because it plundered. The invasion of France by the Continental Powers took place in the beginning of the following year.
of several nations were gathered together at the English headquarters in Toulouse; and it was put into the heart of a man whose name is unknown but who spoke in the French tongue, to confer the loftiest title that ever was truthfully given to man. In a moment his words were seized as though they were words from on High, and the whole assembly with one voice saluted Wellington 'the Liberator of Europe.'* The loyal soldier shrank from the sound of a title not taken exact from the Gazette,† but the voice which had spoken was nothing less than the voice of grateful nations. If the fame of England had grown to this proportion, it was because she had faithfully obeyed the great Usage, and had come to be the main prop of the rights of others by firmly defending her own.

The obligation imposed upon a great State by this Usage is not a heavy yoke, for after all it does no more than impel a Sovereign, by fresh motives and by larger sanctions, to be watchful in the protection of his own interests. It quickens his sense of honour. It warns him that if he tamely stands witnessing a wrong which it is his interest and his duty to redress, he will not escape with the reckoning which awaits him in his own dishonoured country, but that he will also be held guilty of a great European defection, and that his delinquency will be punished by the reproach of nations, by their scorn and mistrust, and at last,

† Mr Larpent (who was present) says that Wellington 'bowed confused,' and abruptly put an end to the scene.
perhaps, by their desertion of him in his hour of trial. But, on the other hand, the Usage assures a Prince that if he will but be firm in coming forward to redress a public wrong which chances to be collaterally hurtful to his own State, his cause will be singularly ennobled and strengthened by the acknowledgment of the principle that, although he is fighting for his own people, he is fighting also for every nation in the world which is interested in putting down the wrong-doer.

Of course neither this nor any other human law or usage can have any real worth except in proportion to the respect and obedience with which it is regarded; but since the Usage exacts nothing from any State except what is really for its own good as well as for the general weal, it is very much obeyed, and is always respected in Europe. Indeed, a virtual compliance with the Usage is much more general than it might seem to be at first sight, for the known or foreseen determination of a great State to resist the perpetration of a wrong is constantly tending with great force to the maintenance of peace, and peace being much less remarkable than war, the very success with which the principle works prevents it from being conspicuous. And, certainly, when the Usage is faithfully obeyed, it commonly proves a strong safeguard; for, the interests of the various nations of Europe being much intertwined, a wrong done to any lesser State is likely to be in some way hurtful or dishonouring to one or other of the great Powers; and if the great Power which is
thus aggrieved takes fire, as it ought to do, and determines to resist or avenge the aggression, it is generally able to embroil other States; and the result is that the Prince who is the wrong-doer finds himself involved in a war which—having a tendency to become greater and greater—can hardly be otherwise than formidable to him. It is the apprehension of this result which is the main safeguard of peace. Any prince who might be inclined to do a wrong to another State casts his eyes abroad to see the condition of the great Powers. If he observes that they are all in a sound state, and headed by firm, able rulers, who are equal, if need be, to the duty of taking up arms, he knows that his contemplated outrage would produce a war of which he cannot foresee the scope or limit, and, unless he be a madman or a desperado desiring war for war's sake, he will be inclined to hold back. On the other hand, if he sees that any great nation which ought to be foremost to resist him is in a state of exceptional weakness, or under the governance of unworthy or incapable rulers, or is distracted by some whim or sentiment interfering with her accustomed policy, then, perhaps, he allows himself to entertain a hope that she may not have the spirit or the wisdom to perform her duty. That is the hope, and it may be said in these days it is the one only hope, which would drive a sane prince to become the disturber of Europe. To frustrate this hope—in other words, to keep alive the dread of a just and avenging war—should be the care
of every statesman who would faithfully labour to preserve the peace of Europe. It is a poor use of time to urge a king or an emperor to restrain his ambition and his covetousness, for these are passions eternal, always to be looked for, and always to be combated. For such a prince the only good bridle is the fear of war. Of course it is right enough to appeal to this wholesome fear under the courteous title of 'deference to opinion,' though in truth it is not for the ambitious disturber, but rather for those Princes who are showing signs of weakness and failing spirit, that the discipline of opinion is really needed. Happily this discipline is not often wanting, for the feelings of nations in regard to the toleration of a wrong coincide with the general weal; and if men cannot always shame a prince from being guilty of an ignominious defection, they at least take care that the fruit of his delinquency shall be bitter. Europe is severe and slow of forgiveness towards any great Power which, by shrinking from the defence of its own rights, has suffered a harm to be done to another State.

It will be seen by-and-by that, in defiance of the opinion of Europe, and without any colour of right, a great Power invaded the territory of a weaker neighbour; but any one who keeps in mind the principle of the great Usage will have the means of seeing what resources Europe had for repressing this act of violence, and will hold a clue for finding out the quarter to which men had a right to look for the commencement of resistance.
The Power most exposed to harm from Russian encroachments upon European Turkey was Austria; for it was plain that, if her great neighbour of the North were to extend his empire in the direction of Moldavia, Wallachia, and Servia, and so come winding round her South-Eastern frontier, she would be brought into grievous danger; and her motives for watchfulness in this quarter were quickened by a knowledge of the disturbing elements which existed in the border provinces, where the people were drawn towards Russia by the ties of religion and race, and even of language. If the prospect of the Czar's carrying his dominion to the shores of the Bosphorus was galling and offensive to the other Powers of Europe, the evil which such a change was calculated to bring upon Austria seemed hardly short of ruin. Moreover Austria, in her character as a representative of German interests, was charged to see that the Lower Danube, ordained by Nature to be the main outlet for the products of Central Europe, should not hopelessly fall under the control of the Northern Power. Thus upon Austria, before all other Powers, there attached the care of guarding against encroachments on the European provinces of the Sultan; and the cogency of this duty towards herself, towards Germany, and towards Europe, Austria had always acknowledged. When Turkey was invaded in 1828, Prince Metternich was the one statesman in Europe who strove to form a league for the defence of the Sultan; * and

* See Note No. 1. in the Appendix.
it will be seen that, although the events of 1849 had tended to embarrass the free action of the Emperor Francis Joseph, the last war against the Sultan disclosed no change in Austrian policy.

Over the councils of Prussia at this time the Court of St. Petersburg had a dangerous ascendancy; but by his actual station as a leading member of the Confederation, and by his hopes of attaining to a still higher authority in Germany, the King was forced into accord with Austria upon all questions which touched the freedom of the Lower Danube, and it was certain that he would do all that he safely could to discourage schemes for the disturbance of the Ottoman Empire. Still he lived in awe of the Emperor Nicholas, and it was hard to say beforehand what course he would take if he should be called upon to choose between defection and war.

Among the very foremost of the great Powers stood France; and she was well entitled, if her rulers should so think fit, to use her strength against any potentate threatening to alter the great territorial arrangements of Europe; and especially it was her right to withstand any changes which she might regard as menacing to her power in the Mediterranean. But French statesmen have generally thought that, as the Mediterranean after all is only a part of the ocean, a new maritime Power in the Levant might be rather a convenient ally against England than a dangerous rival to France; and, upon the whole, it was difficult to make out, either from the nature
of things or from the general course of her policy, that France had any deep interest in the integrity of the Sultan's dominions. At all events, her interest was not of so cogent a sort as to oblige her to stand more forward than any of the other great Powers, or to bear, in any greater proportion than they might do, the charge of keeping the Ottoman Empire untouched. Indeed, it was hard at that time to infer from the past acts of France that she had any settled policy upon the Eastern Question. She had clung with some steadiness to the idea of establishing French influence in Syria; and from time to time during the last half-century she had been inclined to entangle herself in Egypt; but upon the question whether the elements constituting the Ottoman Empire should be kept together, she had generally seemed to be undecided; for, although she took part in the conservative arrangements of 1841, her conduct in the previous year, and at several other times of crisis, had disclosed no great reluctance on her part to see the empire dismembered. Upon the supposition, however, that she intended to pursue the policy which she afterwards avowed, and to concur in the endeavour to maintain the Sultan's dominions, her duty towards herself and to Europe required that she should herself refrain from disturbing the quiet of the East, and that, in the event of any wrongful aggression by Russia upon the dominions of the Sultan, she should loyally range herself with such of the four great Powers as might be willing to check the encroachment
by their authority, or, in last resort, by force of arms; but it was not at all incumbent upon France to place herself in the van; and it was not consistent with the welfare of her people that she should take upon herself a share of the European burthen disproportionate to her interest in the state of Eastern Europe. Nor was there at this time any reason to imagine that the country could be brought into strife, or engaged in warlike enterprises, without sufficient cause; for the institutions of France had not then shrivelled up into a system which subordinated the vast interests of the State to the mere safety and welfare of its ruler. The legislative power and the control of the supplies were in the hands of an Assembly freely elected; and both in the Chamber and in print men enjoyed the right of free speech. Also the executive power rested lawfully in the hands of ministers responsible to Parliament; and therefore, although the President, as will be seen, could do acts leading to mischief and danger, he could not bring France to a rupture with a foreign State unless war were really demanded by the interests or by the honour, or at least by the passions, of the country. And the people being peacefully inclined, and the interests and the honour of the country being carefully respected by all foreign States, France was not at that time a source of disturbance to Europe.

Next to Austria, England was of all the great Powers the one most accustomed to insist upon the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire. It
might be a complex task to prove that the rule of the English in Hindostan is connected with the stability of the Sultan's dominions in a far-distant region of the world; but whether the theory of this curious inter-dependence be sound or merely fanciful, it is certain that the conquest of the shores of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles by one of the great Continental Powers would straiten the range of England's authority in the world, and, even if it did not do her harm of a positive kind, would relatively lessen her strength. The effect, too, of Russia's becoming a Mediterranean Power could not be so clearly foreseen and computed as not to be a fitting subject of care to English statesmen. The people at large were not accustomed to turn their minds in this direction; but the 'Eastern Question,' as it was called, had become consecrated by its descent through a great lineage of Statesmen; and the traditions of the Foreign Office were reinforced by English travellers: for these men, going to Eastern countries in early life, and becoming charmed with their glimpse of the grand, simple, violent world that they had read of in their Bibles, used soon to grow interested in the diplomatic strife always going on at Constantinople; and then coming home, they brought back with their chibouques and their scymitars a zeal for the cause of Turkey which did not fail to find utterance in Parliament. In process of time the accumulated counsels of these travellers, coming in aid of diplomats and statesmen, put straight the deflec-
tion which had been caused by romantic sympathy with the Greek insurgents; and it may be said that after the year 1833 the Eastern policy of England was brought back into its ancient channel.

Abroad, no one doubted that the maintenance of the Sultan's authority at Constantinople was of high concern to England; and indeed the bearing of the Eastern question upon English interests seemed even more clear and obvious to foreigners than to the bulk of our countrymen at home. At this time Lord John Russell was the Prime Minister; and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs was Lord Palmerston. It is true that during the last Russian invasion of Turkey in 1828, Lord Palmerston, then out of office, had taken part with Russia; but from the period of the Treaty of Unkia Skelessi in 1833 he had not swerved from the traditions of the Foreign Office; and, upon the whole, there was no fair ground for believing that under his counsels, and under the sanction of our then Prime Minister, the acquiescent policy of 1829 would again be followed by England.* It is true that strange doctrines were afloat; but after 1833 the Government had not forgotten that England was one of the great Powers of Europe, and had never confessed, by any un-

* Lord Aberdeen was Foreign Secretary in 1829; but considering the vast authority of the then Prime Minister (Wellington), it would perhaps be more just to ascribe the 'acquiescent' policy of that period to the great Duke himself than to any other minister. And the policy, although for the time 'acquiescent,' was not unwatchful.
pardonable inaction, that this height and standing in the world gave their country mere rank and celebrity without corresponding duties. Upon the whole, there was not at this time any sound reason for doubting that England would pursue her accustomed policy with due resolution. Thus Europe was in repose; for, in general, when the world believes that England will be firm, there is peace; it is the hope of her proving weak or irresolute which tends to breed war.

Of the lesser States of Europe there were some which, in the event of a war, might lean towards Russia, and more which would lean against her; and the divided opinion of the minor Courts of Germany might be reckoned upon by the Czar as tending to hamper the action of the leading States; but, upon the whole, the interests of the lesser Powers of Europe, and the means of action at their command, were not of such a kind as to exert much weight in retarding or accelerating Russian schemes of encroachment upon Turkey.

This was the quiet aspect of Europe in relation to the Eastern question, when an ancient quarrel between the monks of the Greek and the Latin Churches in Palestine began to extend to laymen and politicians, and even at last to endanger the peace of the world.
CHAPTER III.

The mystery of holy shrines lies deep in human nature. For, however the more spiritual minds may be able to rise and soar, the common man during his mortal career is tethered to the globe that is his appointed dwelling-place; and the more his affections are pure and holy, the more they seem to blend with the outward and visible world. Poets, bringing the gifts of mind to bear upon human feelings, have surrounded the image of love with myriads of their dazzling fancies; but it has been said that in every country, when a peasant speaks of his deep love, he always says the same thing. He always utters the dear name, and then only says that he 'worships the ground she treads.' It seems that where she who holds the spell of his life once touched the earth—where the hills and the wooded glen and the pebbly banks of the stream have in them the enchanting quality that they were seen by him and by her when they were together—there always his memory will cling; and it is in vain that space intervenes, for imagination, transcendent and strong of
flight, can waft him from lands far away till he lights upon the very path by the river's bank which was blessed by her gracious step. Nay, distance will inflame his fancy; for if he be cut off from the sacred ground by the breadth of the ocean, or by vast, endless, desolate tracts, he comes to know that deep in his bosom there lies a secret desire to journey and journey far, that he may touch with fond lips some mere ledge of rock where once he saw her foot resting. It seems that the impulse does not spring from any designed culture of sentiment, but from an honest earthly passion vouchsafed to the unlettered and the simple-hearted, and giving them strength to pass the mystic border which lies between love and worship. For men strongly moved by the Christian faith it was natural to yearn after the scenes of the Gospel narrative. In old times this feeling had strength to impel the chivalry of Europe to undertake the conquest of a barren and distant land; and although in later days the aggregate faith of the nations grew chill, and Christendom no longer claimed with the sword, still there were always many who were willing to brave toil and danger for the sake of attaining to the actual and visible Sion. These venturesome men came to be called Pelerins or Pilgrims. At first, as it would seem, they were impelled by deep feeling acting upon bold and resolute natures. Holding close to the faith that the Son of God, being also in mystic sense the great God Himself, had for our sakes and for our salvation become a babe, growing
up to be an anxious and suffering man, and submitting to be cruelly tortured and killed by the hands of His own creatures, they longed to touch and to kiss the spots which were believed to be the silent witnesses of His life upon earth, and of His cross and passion. And since also these men were of the Churches which sanctioned the adoration of the Virgin, they were taught, alike by their conception of duty and by nature's low whispering voice, to touch and to kiss the holy ground where Mary, pure and young, was ordained to become the link between God and the race of fallen man. And because the rocky land abounded in recesses and caves yielding shelter against sun and rain, it was possible for the Churches to declare, and very easy for trustful men to believe, that a hollow in a rock at Bethlehem was the Manger which held the infant Redeemer, and that a Grotto at Nazareth was the very home of the blessed Virgin.

Priests fastened upon this sentiment, and although in its beginning their design was not sordid, they found themselves driven by the course of events to convert the alluring mystery of the Holy Places into a source of revenue. The Mahometan invaders had become by conquest the lords of the ground; but since their own creed laid great stress upon the virtue of pilgrimage to holy shrines, they willingly entered into the feeling of the Christians who came to kneel in Palestine. Moreover, they respected the self-denial of monks; and it was found that, even in turbulent
times, a convent in Palestine surrounded by a good wall, and headed by a clever Superior, could generally hold its own. It was to establishments of this kind that the pilgrim looked for aid and hospitality, and in order to keep them up, the priests imagined the plan of causing the votary to pay according to his means at every shrine which he embraced. Upon the understanding that he fulfilled that condition he was led to believe that he won for himself unspeakable privileges in the world to come; and thenceforth a pilgrimage to the holy shrines ceased to be an expression of enthusiastic sentiment, and became a common act of devotion.

But since it happened that, because of the manner in which the toll was levied, every one of the Holy Places was a distinct source of revenue, the prerogative of the Turks as owners of the ground was necessarily brought into play, and it rested with them to determine which of the rival Churches should have the control and usufruct of every holy shrine. Here, then, was a subject of lasting strife. So long as the Ottoman Empire was in its full strength, the authorities at Constantinople were governed in their decision by the common appliances of intrigue, and most chiefly, no doubt, by gold; but when the power of the Sultans so waned as to make it needful for them to contract engagements with Christian sovereigns, the monks of one or other of the Churches found means to get their suit upheld by foreign intervention. In 1740, France obtained from the Sultan a grant which
had the force of a treaty, and its Articles, or 'Capitulations,' as they were sometimes called, purported to confirm and enlarge all the then existing privileges of the Latin Church in Palestine. But this success was not closely pursued, for in the course of the succeeding hundred years, the Greeks, keenly supported by Russia, obtained from the Turkish Government several firmans which granted them advantages in derogation of the treaty with France; and until the middle of this century France-acquiesced.

In the contest now about to be raised between France and Russia, it would be wrong to suppose that, so far as concerned strength of motive and sincerity of purpose, there was any approach to an equality between the contending Governments. In the Greek Church the rite of pilgrimage is held to be of such deep import, that if a family can command the means of journeying to Palestine, even from the far-distant provinces of Russia, they can scarcely remain in the sensation of being truly devout without undertaking the holy enterprise; and to this end the fruits of parsimony and labour, enduring through all the best years of manhood, are joyfully devoted. The compassing of vast distances with the narrow means at the command of a peasant is not achieved without suffering so great as to destroy many lives. This danger does not deter the brave pious people of the North. As the reward of their sacrifices, their priests, speaking boldly in the name of Heaven, promise them ineffable blessings. The advantages held
out are not understood to be dependent upon the volition and motive of the pilgrim, for they hold good, as baptism does, for children of tender years. Of course every man who thus came from afar to the Church of the Holy Sepulchre was the representative of many more who would do the like if they could. When the Emperor of Russia sought to gain or to keep for his Church the holy shrines of Palestine, he spoke on behalf of fifty millions of brave, pious, devoted subjects, of whom thousands for the sake of the cause would joyfully risk their lives. From the serf in his hut even up to the Great Czar himself, the faith professed was the faith really glowing in the heart, and violently swaying the will. It was the part of wise statesmen to treat with much deference an honest and pious desire which was rooted thus deep in the bosom of the Russian people.

On the other hand, the Latin Church seems not to have inculcated pilgrimage so earnestly as its Eastern rival. Whilst the Greek pilgrim-ships poured out upon the landing-place of Jaffa the multitudes of those who had survived the misery and the trials of the journey, the closest likeness of a pilgrim which the Latin Church could supply was often a mere French tourist, with a journal and a theory, and a plan of writing a book. It is true that the French Foreign Office had from time to time followed up those claims to protect the Latin Church in the East which had arisen in the times when the mistresses of 'the most Christian kings' were pious; but it was
understood that by the course of her studies in the eighteenth century, France had obtained a tight control over her religious feelings. Whenever she put forward a claim in her character as 'the eldest daughter of the Church,' men treated her demand as political, and dealt with it accordingly; but as to the religious pretension on which it was based, Europe always met that with a smile. Yet it will presently be seen that a claim which tried the gravity of diplomatists might be used as a puissant engine of mischief.

There was repose in the empire of the Sultan, and even the rival Churches of Jerusalem were suffering each other to rest, when the French President, in cold blood, and under no new motive for action, took up the forgotten cause of the Latin Church of Jerusalem, and began to apply it as a wedge for sundering the peace of the world.

The French Ambassador at Constantinople was instructed to demand that the grants to the Latin Church which were contained in the treaty of 1740 should be strictly executed;* and, since the firmans granted during the last century to the Greek Church were inconsistent with the capitulations of 1740, and had long been in actual operation, the effect of this demand on the part of the French President was to force the Sultan to disturb the existing state of repose, to annul the privileges which (with the acquiescence of France) the Greek Church had long been enjoying, to drive

* June 1850. 'Eastern Papers,' part i. p. 2.—Note to 4th Edition.
into frenzy the priesthood of the Greek Church, and to rouse to indignation the Sovereign of the great military empire of the North, with all those millions of pious and devoted men who, so far as regarded this question, were heart and soul with their Czar. 'The Ambassador of France,' said our Foreign Secretary, * 'was the first to disturb the status quo in which the matter rested. Not that the disputes of the Latin and Greek Churches were not very active, but that without some political action on the part of France, those quarrels would never have troubled the relations of friendly Powers. If report is to be believed, the French Ambassador was the first to speak of having recourse to force, and to threaten the intervention of a French fleet to enforce the demands of his country. We should deeply regret any dispute that might lead to conflict between two of the great Powers of Europe; but when we reflect that the quarrel is for exclusive privileges in a spot near which the heavenly host proclaimed peace on earth and goodwill towards men—when we see rival Churches contending for mastery in the very place where Christ died for mankind—the thought of such a spectacle is melancholy indeed. . . . Both parties ought to refrain from putting armies and fleets in motion for the purpose of making the tomb of Christ a cause of quarrel among Christians.'

Still, in a narrow and technical point of view, the claim of France might be upheld, because it was based upon a treaty between France and the Porte which could not be legally abrogated without the consent of the French Government; and the concessions to the Greek Church, though obtained at the instance of Russia, had not been put into the form of treaty engagements, and could always be revoked at the pleasure of the Sultan. Accordingly M. de Lavalette continued to press for the strict fulfilment of the treaty; and being guided, as it would seem, by violent instructions, and being also zealous and unskilled, he soon carried his urgency to the extremity of using offensive threats, and began to speak of what should be done by the French fleet. The Russian Envoy, better versed in affairs, used wiser but hardly less cogent words, requiring that the firmans should remain in force; and since no ingenuity could reconcile the engagements of the treaty with the grants contained in the firmans, the Porte, though having no interest of its own in the question, was tortured and alarmed by the contending negotiators. It seemed almost impossible to satisfy France without affronting the Emperor Nicholas.

The French, however, did not persist in claiming up to the very letter of the treaty of 1740, whilst on the other hand there were some of the powers of exclusion granted by the firmans which the Greeks could be persuaded to forego; and thus the subject remaining in dispute was nar-
rowed down until it seemed almost too slender for the apprehension of laymen.

Stated in bare terms, the question was whether, for the purpose of passing through the building into their Grotto, the Latin monks should have the key of the chief door of the Church of Bethlehem, and also one of the keys of each of the two doors of the sacred Manger,* and whether they should be at liberty to place in the sanctuary of the Nativity a silver star adorned with the arms of France. The Latins also claimed a privilege of worshipping once a-year at the shrine of the blessed Mary in the Church of Gethsemane, and they went on to assert their right to have a cupboard and a lamp in the tomb of the Virgin; but in this last pretension they were not well supported by France; † and, virtually, it was their claim to have a key of the great door of the Church of Bethlehem, instead of being put off with a key of the lesser door, which long remained insoluble, and had to be decided by the advance of armies ‡ and the threatening movement of fleets.

Diplomacy, somewhat startled at the nature of the question committed to its charge, but repressing the coarse emotion of surprise, 'ventured,' as it said, 'to inquire whether in this case a key meant an instrument for opening a door, only not to be employed in closing that door against Christians of other sects, or whether it was sim-

* 'Eastern Papers,' part, i. p. 84. † Ibid. p. 48.
‡ See Count Nesselrode's Despatches, ibid. p. 61.
CHAP. III.

"ply a key—an emblem;"* but Diplomacy answered that the key was really a key—a key for opening a door; and its evil quality was—not that it kept the Greeks out, but that it let the Latins come in.

M. de Lavalette's demand was so urgently, so violently pressed, that the Porte at length gave way, and acknowledged the validity of the Latin claims in a formal note:† but the paper had not been signed more than a few days when the Russian Minister, making hot remonstrance, caused the Porte to issue a firman,‡ ratifying all the existing privileges of the Greeks, and virtually revoking the acknowledgment just given to the Latins. Thereupon, as was natural, the French Government became indignant, and to escape its anger the Porte promised to evade the public reading of the firman at Jerusalem;§ but the Russian Minister not relaxing his zeal, the Turkish Government secretly promised him that the Pasha of Jerusalem should be instructed to try to avoid giving up the key to the Latin monks.

Then again, under further pressure by France, the Porte engaged to evade this last evasion, and at length the duty of affecting to carry out the conflicting engagements thus made by the Porte was entrusted to Afif Bey. This calm Mahometan went to Jerusalem, and strove to temporise as well

* See Count Nesselrode's Despatches, ibid. p. 79.
† Note of the 9th February 1852.
‡ The firman of the mi-fevrier 1852.
§ Col. Rose to Lord Malmesbury. 'Eastern Papers,' part i. p. 46.
as he could betwixt the angry Churches. His great difficulty was to avert the rage which the Greeks would be likely to feel when they came to know that the firman was not to be read; and the nature of his little stratagem showed that, although he was a benighted Moslem, he had some insight into the great ruling principle of ecclesiastical questions. His plan was to inflict a bitter disappointment upon the Latins in the presence of the Greek priesthood, for he imagined that in their delight at witnessing the mortification of their rivals, the Greeks might be made to overlook the great question of the public reading of the firman. So, as soon as the ceremonial visits had been exchanged, Afif Bey, with a suite of the local Effendis, met the three Patriarchs, Greek, Latin, and Armenian, in the Church of the Resurrection, just in front of the Holy Sepulchre itself, and under the great dome, and there he ‘made an oration upon the desire of His Majesty the Sultan to gratify all classes of his subjects;’ and when M. Basily and the Greek Patriarch and the Russian Archimandrite were becoming impatient for the public reading of the firman which was to give to their Church the whole of the Christian sanctuaries of Jerusalem, the Bey invited all the disputants to meet him in the Church of the Virgin near Gethsemane. There he read an order of the Sultan for permitting the Latins to celebrate a mass once a-year; but then, to the great joy of the Greeks, and to the horror of their rivals, he went on to read words commanding that the altar
and its ornaments should remain undisturbed. 'No sooner,' says the official account, 'were these words uttered, than the Latins, who had come to receive their triumph over the Orientals, broke out into loud exclamations of the impossibility of celebrating mass upon a schismatic slab of marble, with a covering of silk and gold instead of plain linen, among schismatic vases, and before a crucifix which has the feet separated instead of one nailed over the other.' Under cover of the storm thus raised, Asf Bey perhaps thought for a moment that he had secured his escape, and for a while he seems to have actually disentangled himself from the Churches, and to have succeeded in gaining his quarters.

But when the delight of witnessing the discomfiture of the Latins had in some degree subsided, the Greeks perceived that, after all, the main promise had been evaded. The firman had not been read. M. Basily, the Russian Consul-General, called on Asf Bey, and required that the reading of the firman should take place. At first the Bey affected not to know what firman was meant, but afterwards he said he had no copy of it; and at length, being then at the end of his stratagems, he acknowledged that he had no instructions to read it. Thereupon M. Basily sent off Prince Gagarin to Jaffa to convey these tidings to Constantinople in any Arab vessel that could be found; and then, hurrying to the Pasha of Jerusalem, he demanded to have a special council assembled, with himself and the Greek Patriarch...
in attendance, in order that Russia and the Orthodox Church might know once for all whether the firman had been sent or not; but when the meeting was gathered, Hafiz Pasha only 'made a smooth speech on the well-known benevolence of His Majesty towards all classes of his subjects, and that was all that could be said.'

So the Greeks, though they had been soothed for a moment by the discomfiture of their Latin adversaries in the Church of the Virgin, could not any longer fail to see that their rivals were in the ascendant; and it soon turned out that the promise to evade the delivery of the keys was not to be faithfully kept.

The pressure of France was applied with increasing force, and it produced its effect. In the month of December 1852, the silver star was brought with much pomp from the coast. Some of the Moslem Effendis went down to Jaffa to escort it, and others rode out a good way on the road that they might bring it into Jerusalem with triumph; and on Wednesday the 22d of the same month, the Latin Patriarch, with joy and with a great ceremony, replaced the glittering star in the sanctuary of Bethlehem; and at the same time the key of the great door of the church, together with the keys of the sacred manger, was handed over to the Latins.

* Consul Finn to Earl of Malmesbury, Oct. 27, 1852. 'Correspondence,' part i. p. 44.
† Consul Finn to Earl of Malmesbury, Dec. 28, 1852; but see Mr Pisani's note, p. 106.
For the Czar and for the devout people of All the Russia it was hard to bear this blow. 'To the indignation,' Count Nesselrode writes, 'of the whole people following the Greek ritual, the key of the Church of Bethlehem has been made over to the Latins, so as publicly to demonstrate their religious supremacy in the East. The mischief then is done, M. le Baron, and there is no longer any question of preventing it. It is now necessary to remedy it. The immunities of the Orthodox religion which have been injured, the promise which the Sultan had solemnly given to the Emperor, and which has been violated, call for an act of reparation. It is to obtain this that we must labour. If we took for our example the imperious and violent proceedings which have brought France to this result—if, like her, we were indifferent to the dignity of the Porte, to the consequences which an heroic remedy may have on a constitution already so shattered as that of the Ottoman Empire—our course would be already marked out for us, and we should not have long to reflect upon it. Menace and a resort to force would be our immediate means. The cannon has been called the last argument of kings, the French Government has made it its first. It is the argument with which, at the outset, it declared its intention to commence its proceedings at Tripoli as well as at Constantinople. Notwithstanding our legitimate causes of complaint, and at the risk of waiting some time longer for
redress, we shall take a less summary course. It may happen that France, perceiving any hesitation on the part of the Porte, may again have recourse to menace, and press upon it so as to prevent it from listening to our just demands. The Emperor has therefore considered it necessary to adopt in the outset some precautionary measures in order to support our negotiations, to neutralise the effect of M. Lavalette’s threats, and to guard himself in any contingency which may occur against a Government accustomed to act by surprises."

Nor were these empty words. The same authentic page† which tells of this triumph of Church over Church goes on to show how the Czar was preparing for vengeance. ‘Orders,’ says Sir Hamilton Seymour, ‘have been despatched to the 5th corps d’armée to advance to the frontiers of the Danubian provinces without waiting for their reserves; and the 4th corps, under the command of General Count Dannenberg, and now stationed in Volhynia, will be ordered to hold itself in readiness to march if necessary. General Luder’s corps d’armée, accordingly, being now 48,000 strong, will receive a reinforcement of 24,000 men soon after its arrival at its destination; and supposing the 4th corps to follow, the whole force will amount at least, according to official returns, to 144,000 men.’

* Count Nesselrode to Baron Brunnow, 14th January 1853. Ibid. p. 61.
† P. 56, ‘Eastern Papers,’ part i.
Is it true that for this cause great armies were gathering, and that for the sake of the key and the silver star the peace of the nations was brought into danger? Had the world grown young once more?

The strife of the Churches was no fable, but after all, though near and distinct, it was only the lesser truth. A crowd of monks with base foreheads stood quarrelling for a key at the sunny gates of a church in Palestine, but beyond and above, towering high in the misty North, men saw the ambition of the Czars.
CHAPTER IV.

Men dwelling amidst the snows of Russia are driven by very nature to grow covetous when they hear of the happier lands where all the year round there are roses and long sunny days. And since this people have a seabord and ports on the Euxine, they are forced by an everlasting policy to desire the command of the straits which lead through the heart of an empire into the midst of that world of which men kindle thoughts when they speak of the Ægean and of Greece, and the Ionian shores, and of Palestine and Egypt, and of Italy, and of France, and of Spain and the land of the Moors, and of the Atlantic beyond, and the path of ships on the ocean. Gifted with the knowledge and the skill which are means of excellence in the diplomatic art, and excluded by their institutions from taking any but an official part in the home Government, the Russian nobles had long been accustomed to bend their minds to foreign policy; and the State, favouring this inclination, used to multiply the labours of its diplomatic service. Almost every gifted and accom-
plished Russian who might be travelling in foreign countries used to receive instructions of some kind from his Government, and was enabled to believe that, either by collecting information or in some still more important way, he was performing a duty towards the State. Men thus entrusted became eager partakers of a policy rather more enterprising than the policy avowed by their Government, and the result was that the natural ambition of the country was always being nurtured and subserved by a great Aristocracy.

But, moreover, the ambition of the Statesmen and the Nobles was reinforced by the pious desire of the humbler classes. Some fifty millions of men in Russia held one creed; and they held it, too, with the earnestness of which Western Europe used to have experience in earlier times. In her wars Russia had always been engaged against nations which were not of her faith; and twice at least in the very agony of her national life, and when all other hope was gone, she had been rescued by the warlike zeal of her priesthood. By these causes love of country and devotion to the Church had become so closely welded into one engrossing sentiment, that good Muscovites could not sever the one idea from the other;* and although they were by nature a kind and good-humoured race of men, they were fierce in the matter of their religion. They had heard of

* I owe my perception of the causes which rendered the Russian Church so intensely national to Arthur Stanley's most interesting work upon the Greek Church.
infidels who had torn down the crosses from the Churches of Christ, and possessed themselves of the great city, the capital of the Orthodox Church; and, as far as they could judge, it would be a work of piety, with the permission of the Czar their father, to slaughter and extirpate the Turks. But this was not all. They knew that in the Turkish dominions there were ten or fourteen millions of men holding exactly the same faith as themselves, who were kept down in thraldom by the Moslems, and they had heard tales of the sufferings of these their brethren which seemed to call for vengeance. The very indulgence with which the Turks had allowed these Christians to have a distinct corporate existence in the Empire gave weight to their prayers; for, instead of being only a disorganised multitude of sufferers, they seemed to be, as it were, a suppliant nation, ever kneeling before the great Czar, and imploring him to deliver them from their captivity. It was not possible for the Russian people to conceive any enterprise more worthy of their nation and their Church than to raise high the banner of the Cross, drive the infidel Turks out of Europe, and cause the broad provinces in which their Christian brethren lived and suffered to be blended with 'Holy Russia.' It is true that the Muscovite peasants were not an enterprising race of men, and it might be hard perhaps to find a villager who, if he could have his choice, would rather be a soldier of the Cross than remain at home in his hut; but the people knew that, whether there
were peace or whether there were war, the exigency of their Czar's military system would always go on consuming their youth; and since this engine of a vast standing army was destined to be kept up and to be fed with their flesh and blood, they desired in their simple hearts that it should be used for a purpose which they believed to be holy and righteous. To a cause having all these sanctions the voice of prophecy could not be wanting. Seers foretold the destruction of the Turks by the men of the yellow hair.

Yet, vast as it was in its aggregate force, the heart's desire of a whole nation would have been vague and dim of sight if it had not some famed city for its goal, or some outward and visible figure or sign to which the multitude could point as the symbol of its great intent. The people were not without their goal nor without their symbol, for the city whither they tended was the imperial city of Constantine, once mistress of the world, and the Cross that the Emperor had seen in the heavens was still the sign in which the Church said they must conquer. For such as were the politic few there was the Golden Horn, with its command of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, and all its fair promise of wealth and empire. In the horizon of the pious multitude there rose the dome of St Sophia. Ambition was sanctified by Religion. The most pious might righteously desire that the devotion of their militant Church should be aided by the wisdom of the serpent, and the most worldly-minded states-
man could look with approval upon the scheme of a lucrative crusade. The Emperor Alexander the First, when he declared that for the time he was trying to withstand the ambition of his people, acknowledged that he was 'the only Russian ' who resisted the views of his subjects upon 'Turkey.' *

The Czar was the head of the Church. It was not without raising scruples in the minds of the pious that his predecessors had been able to attain ecclesiastical authority; but this shadow of doubt upon the title of the lay Pontiff made it all the more needful for him to take care that his zeal should be above reproach. It is true that the great body of the Muscovite people were simple and docile, not partaking in cares of Government, and that, even among the most powerful Nobles, there were none who would be unwilling to leave the choice of time and of measures to the chief of the State;† but still the religious mind of the vast empire would have been dangerously shocked if the priests had been forced to know that the Czar failed to share the pious desire of his people; and the minds of men accustomed to bend their thoughts to the aggrandisement of the nation would be overclouded and chilled if they saw that the Emperor was growing forgetful of their favourite cause.

But the prospect of what would follow upon

* Quoted by Sir H. Seymour, 'Eastern Papers,' part v. p. 11.
† This now, in 1876, under the Emperor Alexander, can no longer be said.
the realisation of this scheme of ambition was dim. The sovereignty of European Turkey could scarcely be added to the possessions of the Czar without tending to dislocate the system of his empire; for plainly it would be difficult to sway the vast Northern territories of All the Russians by orders sent from the Bosporus, and yet, by force of its mere place in the world, Constantinople seemed destined to be the capital of a great State. Therefore, in the event of its falling into the hands of the Romanoffs, it may be thought more likely that the imperial city would draw dominion to itself, and so become the metropolis of some new assemblage of territories, than that it would sink into the condition of a provincial seaport. The statesmen of St Petersburg have always understood the deep import of the change which the throne of Constantine would bring with it; and it may be imagined that considerations founded on this aspect of the enticing conquest have mingled with those suggested by the physical difficulties of invasion, the obstinate valour of the Turks, and the hostility of the great Powers of Europe. Still, the prize was so unspeakably alluring to an aristocracy fired with national ambition, and to a people glowing with piety, that apparently it was necessary for the Czar to seem as though he were always doing something for furthering a scheme of conquest thus endeared to the nation. He was liable to be deemed a failing champion of the faith when he was not labouring to restore the insulted Cross to the Church of
Constantine; he was chilling the healthy zeal of his ablest servants if he lived idle days making no approach to the Bosphorus.

Upon the whole, it resulted from the various motives tending to govern the policy of the State that the ambition of the Russian emperors in the direction of Constantinople was generally alive and watchful, and sometimes active, but was always irresolute. The first Napoleon said, in the early years of this century,* that the Czars were always threatening Constantinople and never taking it; and what he said then had already been true for a long time, and his words continued to be a true description of the Russian policy for half a century afterwards. Evidently it answered the purpose of the Czars to have it thought amongst their own people that they were steadily advancing towards the conquest, but they always suffered their reasons for delay to prevail. They had two minds upon the question. They were willing, but they were also unwilling, and this clashing of motives caused them to falter. At home they naturally tried to make their ambition apparent—abroad, as might be expected, they were more careful to display the inclinations forced upon them by prudence; but it would seem that this double face was not simply a deceptive contrivance, but resulted from imperfect volition. The project against Constantinople was a scheme of conquest continually to be delayed, but never discarded; and happen what

* 'La Russie a trop menacé Constantinople sans le prendre.'
might, it was never to be endured that the prospect of Russia's attaining some day to the Bosporus should be shut out by the ambition of any other Power.

Of course it followed that a great State ambition of this watchful but irresolute kind would be stimulated to an increased activity by the disappearance of any of the chief obstacles lying in the way of the enterprise; and especially this would be the case whenever the course of affairs seemed to be unfavourable to an alliance against Russia between the other great Powers of Europe.

The Emperor Nicholas held an absolute sway over his Empire, and his power was not moderated by the salutary resistance of ministers who had strength enough to decline to take part in acts which they disapproved. The old restraints which used sometimes to fetter the power of the Russian monarchs had fallen away, and nothing had yet come in their stead. Holding the boundless authority of an Oriental Potentate, the Czar was armed besides with all the power which is supplied by high organisation and the clever appliances of modern times. What he chose to do he actually did. He might be sitting alone and reading a despatch, and if it happened that its contents made him angry, he could touch a bell and kindle a war without hearing counsel from any living man. In the room where he laboured he could hear overhead the clicking of machinery, and he liked the sound of the restless magnets, for
they were giving instant effect to his will in regions far away. He was of a stern, unrelenting nature. He displayed, when he came to be tried, a sameness of ideas and of language and a want of resource which indicated poverty of intellect; but this dearth within was masked by the brilliancy of the qualities which adorned the surface; and he was so capable of business, and had such a vast activity, that he was able to arrogate to himself an immense share of the actual governance of his subjects. Indeed, by striving to extend his management beyond the proper compass of a single mind he disturbed the march of business, and so far superseded the responsibility of his servants that he ended by lessening to a perilous extent the number of gifted men who in former times had taken part in the counsels of the State. Still, this widely-ranging activity kept alive the awe with which his subjects watched to see where next he would strike; and made the nation feel that, along with his vast stature and his commanding presence, he carried the actual power of the State. He had been merciless towards the Polish nation; but whilst this sternness made him an object of hatred to millions of discomfited men, and to other millions of men who felt for them in their sorrows, it tended, perhaps, at the time to increase his ascendancy, by making him an object of dread, and it trebled the delight of being with him in his gentle mood. When he was friendly, or chose to seem so, there was a glow and frankness in his manner which had an irresistible
charm. He had discarded in some measure his predecessor's system of governing Russia through the aid of foreigners, and took a pride in his own people, and understood their worth. In the great empire of the North religion is closely blended with the national sentiment, and in this composite shape it had a strong hold upon the Czar. It did not much govern him in his daily life, and his way of joining in the service of the Church seemed to disclose something like impatience and disdain, but no one doubted that faith was deeply rooted in his mind. He had the air of a man raised above the level of common worshippers, who imagined that he was appointed to serve the cause of his Church by great imperial achievements, and not by humble feats of morality and devotion. It will be seen but too plainly that the Emperor Nicholas could be guilty of saying one thing and doing another; and it may be supposed, therefore, that at once and in plain terms he ought to be charged with duplicity; yet there are circumstances which make one falter in coming to such a conclusion. He had reigned, and had personally governed, for some seven-and-twenty years; and although during that period he had done much to raise bitter hatred, the most sagacious statesmen in Europe placed faith in his personal honour. It is certain that he had the love of truth. When he sought to speak of what he deemed fair and honourable, he travelled into our language for the word which spoke his meaning, and claimed to have the same standard of upright-
ness as an English 'gentleman.'* It is known also that his ideal of human grandeur was the character of the Duke of Wellington. No man could have made that choice without having truth in him.

It would seem, however, that beneath the virtues which for more than a quarter of a century had enabled the Czar to stand before Europe as a man of honour and truth, there lurked a set of opposite qualities; and that when he reached the period of life which has often been found a trying one to men of the Romanoff family, a deterioration began to take place which shook the ascendant of his better nature. After the beginning of 1853 there were strange alternations in his conduct. At one time he seemed to be so frank and straightforward that the most wary statesman could not and would not believe him to be intending deceit. Then, and even within a few hours, he would steal off and be false. But the vice which he disclosed in those weak intervals was not the profound deceit of statecraft, but rather the odd purposeless cunning of a gypsy or a savage, who shows by some sudden and harmless sign of his wild blood that, even after years of conformity to European ways, he has not been completely reclaimed. For the present, however, the Emperor Nicholas must be looked upon not merely as he was, but as he

* Sometimes when declaring his reliance upon the honour of our public men he would with great energy extend his open hand, and vow that with our people he never wanted more than what—in somewhat composite language—he called the 'parole de gentleman.'
seemed to be; and what he seemed to be in the beginning of 1853 was a firm, righteous man, too brave and too proud to be capable of descending to falsehood.

Nicholas had a violent will; but of course when he underwent the change which robbed him of his singleness of mind, his resolves, notwithstanding their native force, could not fail to lose their momentum. He was a man too military to be warlike; and was not only without the qualities for wielding an army in the field, but was mistaken also as to the way in which the best soldiers are made. Russia, under his sway, was so oppressively drilled that much of the fire and spirit of enterprise which are needed for war was crushed out by military training. No man, however, could toil with more zeal than he did in that branch of industry which seeks to give uniformity and mechanic action to bodies of men. He was an unwearied inspector of troops. He kept close at hand great numbers of small wooden images clothed in various uniforms, and one of the rooms in his favourite palace was filled with these military dolls.

The Emperor Nicholas had not been long upon the throne, when he showed that he was a partaker of the ambition of his people; for in 1828 he had begun an invasion of Turkey, and was present with his army in some of the labours of the campaign; but his experience was of a painful kind. The mechanical organisation in which he delighted broke down under stress of real war
carried on upon an extended line of operations. In the country of the Danube his soldiery perished fast from sickness and want; and although he had so well chosen his time that the Sultan was without an ally, and (having but lately put to death his own army) was in an ill condition for war, still he encountered so much of obstinate and troublesome resistance from the Turks, and was so ill able to cope with it, that at the instance, as is said, of his own Generals, he retired from the scene of conflict, and went back to St Petersburg with the galling knowledge that he was without the gifts which make an able commander in the field. He could not but see, too, that the military reputation of Russia was brought into great peril; and, although in the following year he was rescued from the dangerous straits into which he had run, by the brilliant audacity of Diebitsch, by the skill of his diplomacy, and above all by indulgent fortune, still he was so chastened by the anxiety of the time, and by the narrowness of his escape from a great humiliation, that he ceased to entertain any hope or intention of dismembering Turkey, except in the event of there occurring a chain of circumstances which should enable him to act with the concurrence of other great Powers.

But the Emperor knew that the pride of his people would be deeply wounded if any great changes should take place in the Ottoman Empire without bringing gain to Russia and accelerating her march to Constantinople; and therefore he believed that, until he was prepared to take a
part in dismembering the Empire, it was his interest to preserve it intact. For more than twenty years his actions as well as his declared intentions were in accordance with this view; and it would be wrong to believe that the policy thus shown forth to the world was only a mask. Just as the love of killing game generates a sincere wish to preserve it, so the very fact that the Czar looked upon Turkey as eventual booty, made him anxious to protect it from every other kind of danger. In 1833 the Emperor Nicholas saved the Sultan and his dynasty from destruction; and although he accompanied this measure with an act offensive to the other maritime Powers,* his conduct towards Turkey was loyal. In 1840 he again acted faithfully towards the Sultan, and joined with England and the two chief Powers of Germany in preventing the disruption of the Ottoman Empire.

In 1844 the Czar came to England, and anxiously strove to find out whether there were any of our foremost statesmen who had grown weary of a conservative policy in Turkey. He talked confidentially with the Duke of Wellington and Lord Aberdeen, and also, no doubt, with Sir Robert Peel; but evidently meeting with no encouragement, he covered his retreat by giving in his adhesion to England's accustomed policy, and to do this with the better effect, he left in our Foreign Office a solemn declaration not only of his own policy, but likewise, strange to say, of the policy of Austria;

* The Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi.
and all this he blended in a somewhat curious manner with words which might be read as importing that his views had obtained the sanction of the English Government. It would seem that our Government agreed, as they naturally would, to that part of the Czar's memorandum which was applicable to the existing state of things, and which, in fact, echoed the known opinion of England; and they also assented to the obvious proposition that the event of a breaking-up of the Ottoman Empire would make it important for the great Powers to come to an understanding amongst themselves; but it must be certain that the Duke of Wellington, Sir Robert Peel, and Lord Aberdeen refrained, as it is the custom of our statesmen to do, from all hypothetical engagements. 'Russia and England,' said this memorandum, 'are mutually penetrated with the conviction that it is for their common interest that the Ottoman Porte should maintain itself in the state of independence and of territorial possession which at present constitutes that Empire. Being agreed on this principle, Russia and England have an equal interest in uniting their efforts in order to keep up the existence of the Ottoman Empire, and to avert all the dangers which can place in jeopardy its safety. With this object, the essential point is to suffer the Porte to live in repose, without needlessly disturbing it by diplomatic bickerings, and without interfering, without absolute necessity, in its internal affairs.' Then, after showing that the tendency of the Turkish
Government to evade treaties and ill-use its Christian subjects ought to be checked rather by the combined and friendly remonstrance of all the Powers than by the separate action of one, the memorandum proceeded: 'If all the great Powers frankly adopt this line of conduct, they will have a well-founded expectation of preserving the existence of Turkey. However, they must not conceal from themselves how many elements of dissolution that Empire contains within itself. Unforeseen circumstances may hasten its fall. . . . In the uncertainty which hovers over the future, a single fundamental idea seems to admit of a really practical application: it is, that the danger which may result from a catastrophe in Turkey will be much diminished if, in the event of its occurring, Russia and England have come to an understanding as to the course to be taken by them in common. That understanding will be the more beneficial, inasmuch as it will have the full assent of Austria. Between her and Russia there exists already an entire accord.'

Upon the whole, it would seem that from the peace of Adrianople down to the beginning of 1853 the state of the Czar's mind upon the Eastern Question was this:—He was always ready to come forward as an eager and almost ferocious defender of his Church, and he deemed this motive to be one of such cogency that views resting on mere policy and prudence were always in danger of being overborne by it; but in the absence of events tending to bring this fiery principle into
action, he was really unwilling to face the troubles which would arise from the dismemberment of Turkey, unless he could know beforehand that England would act with him. If he could have obtained any anterior assurance to that effect, he would have tried perhaps to accelerate the disruption of the Sultan's Empire; but as England always declined to found any engagements upon the hypothesis of a catastrophe which she wished to prevent, the Emperor had probably accustomed himself to believe that Providence did not design to allot to him the momentous labour of governing the fall of the Ottoman Empire. He therefore chose the other alternative, and not only spoke but really did much for the preservation of an Empire which he was not yet ready to destroy. Still, whenever any subject of irritation occurred, the attractive force of the opposite policy was more or less felt; for it is not every man who, having to choose between two lines of action, can resolve to hold to the one and frankly discard the other. In general, the principle governing such a conflict is found to be analogous to the law which determines the composition of mechanic forces, and the mental struggle does not result in a clear adoption of either of the alternatives, but in a mean betwixt the two. It was thus with the Emperor Nicholas whenever it happened that he was irritated by questions connected with the action of the Turkish Government. At such times his conduct, swayed in one direction by the notion of dismembering the Empire, and in the other
direction by the policy of maintaining it, resulted in an endeavour to establish what the English Ambassador called 'a predominant influence over the counsels of the Porte, tending in the interest of absolute power to exclude all other influences, and to secure the means, if not of hastening the downfall of the Empire, at least of obstructing its improvement, and settling its future destinies to the profit of Russia, whenever a propitious juncture should arrive.'

* 'Eastern Papers,' part i. p. 237.
CHAPTER V.

It happened that at a time* when the Emperor of Russia was wrought to anger by the triumph of the Latin over the Greek Church, there were troubles in one of the provinces bordering upon the Austrian territory, and Omar Pasha, at the head of a Turkish force, was operating against the Christians in Montenegro. The continuance of this strife on her frontier was no doubt alarming and vexatious to Austria; but with the Emperor Nicholas the tidings of a conflict going on between a Moslem soldiery and a Christian people of the Greek faith could not fail to kindle his religious zeal, and cause him to thirst for vengeance against the enemies of his Church. Of course the existence of this feeling on the part of the Czar was well understood at Vienna, and it was probably in order to anticipate his wishes, and to remove his motives for interference, that the Austrian Cabinet determined to address a peremptory summons to the Porte, calling upon the Sul-

* The winter of 1852-3.
tan to withdraw his forces immediately from Montenegro. The Czar secretly but studiously represented that upon this and every other matter touching his policy in Turkey he was in close accord with Austria.* This, however, the Austrian Government denies. Truthful men declare that the Czar was not even informed beforehand of the demand which Austria had resolved to press upon the Porte. It is certain, however, that the Czar determined to act as though he were in close concert with Austria. Count Leiningen was to be the bearer of the Austrian summons; and simultaneously with the Count's departure from Vienna, the Emperor Nicholas resolved to despatch to the Porte an Ambassador Extraordinary, who was to declare that a refusal to withdraw Omar Pasha's forces from Montenegro would be regarded by the Czar as a ground of war between him and the Sultan; and the Ambassador was also to be charged with the duty of obtaining redress for the change which had been made in the allotment of the Holy Sites to the contending Churches. It may seem strange that the Czar should propose to found a declaration of war upon a grievance which was put forward by the Cabinet of Vienna, and not by himself; but he was always eager to stand forward as the protector of Christians of his own Church who had taken up arms against their Moslem rulers; and when, as now, his conservative policy was disturbed by

* 'Eastern Papers,' part v., in several places.
anger and religious zeal, his ulterior views upon the Eastern Question became too vague, and also, no doubt, too alarming, to admit of their being made the subject of a treaty engagement with Austria.

Apparently, then, the plan of the Emperor Nicholas was this:—he would make the rejection of Count Leiningen's demand a ground of war against the Porte, and then, acting under the blended motives furnished by the assigned cause of war and by his own separate grievance, he would avenge the wrong done to his Church by forcing the Sultan to submit to a foreign protectorate over all his provinces lying north of the Balkan. This, however, was only one view of the contemplated war. It might be applicable, if the occupation of the tributary provinces should evoke no element of trouble except the sheer resistance of the enemy; but the Czar, who did not well understand the Turkish Empire, was firmly convinced at this time that the approach of war would be followed by a rising of the Sultan's Christian subjects. On the other hand, he feared, and with better reason, that if the angry Moslems should deem the Sultan remiss or faint-hearted in the defence of his territory, they might rise against their Government and fall upon the Christian rayahs, whom they would regard as the abettors of the invasion. He could not fail to perceive that in the progress of the contemplated operations he might be forced by
events to give a vast extension to his views against the Sultan; and that, even against his will, and without being prepared for the crisis, he might find himself called upon to deal with the ruins of the Ottoman Empire in the midst of confusion and massacre.
CHAPTER VI.

Now, therefore, it became needful for the Emperor Nicholas to endeavour to divine the temper in which the other great Powers of Europe would be inclined to regard his intended pressure upon the Sultan, and the eventual catastrophe which, even if he should wish it, he might soon be unable to avert. It was of deep moment to him to know what help or acquiescence he might reckon upon, and what hostility he might have to encounter, if he should be called upon to take part in regulating the collapse of the Turkish Empire, and controlling the arrangements which were to follow.

He looked around. The policy of one of the great States of Europe was bent out of its true course, and in others there were signs of weak purpose. The power most deeply interested in preventing the dismemberment of European Turkey had already determined to press upon the Sultan an unjust and offensive demand; and although the statesmen of Vienna might have resolved in their own minds to stop short at some prescribed stage of the contemplated hostilities, it
was plain that Austria, when once engaged in war against the Sultan, would lose the standing-ground of a Power which undertakes to resist change, and would become so entangled by the mere progress of events, that it might be difficult for her to extricate herself and revert to a conservative policy. Indeed, the Emperor Nicholas might fairly expect that Austria, having committed the original mistake of disturbing the peace, would afterwards strive to cling to his friendship in the hope of being able to moderate his course of action, and avert or mitigate the downfall of the Turkish Empire.

With respect to Prussia, the Emperor Nicholas was free from anxiety. As long as the measures against the Sultan were carried on in alliance with Austria, the States of Germany had little ground for fearing that the interest which they had in the freedom of the Lower Danube would be forgotten; and, this object being secured, or regarded as secure, Prussia had less interest in the fate of the Ottoman Empire than any of the other great Powers. There being, therefore, no reason of State obliging him to take a contrary course, it was to be expected that the King of Prussia would continue to live under the ascendancy which his Imperial brother-in-law had long been accustomed to maintain.

France, having great military and naval forces, and a Mediterranean seaboard, was well entitled to frame for herself any honest system of policy which she might deem to be the best guide for her conduct in Eastern affairs; but her power to have
and assert any policy really her own could no longer be said to exist; for, by this time, as we shall by-and-by see more particularly, she had fallen under the mere control of the Second Bonaparte; and in order to divine what France would do, it was necessary to make out what scheme of action her ruler would deem to be most conducive to his comfort and safety. Even the supposition that he would copy the First Napoleon gave no sufficing clue for saying what his Eastern policy ought to be, or what it was, or what it was likely to be in any future week. France, as wielded by a Bonaparte, had been known to the Sultan sometimes as a friendly Power, sometimes as a Power pretending to be friendly to him, but secretly bargaining with Russia for the dismemberment of his empire;* sometimes as a mere predatory State seizing his provinces in time of peace and without the pretence of a quarrel,† and sometimes even as a rival Mahometan Power—for it is known that the First Bonaparte did not scruple to call himself in Egypt a true Mussulman;‡ and although he now and then claimed to be 'the eldest son of the Catholic Church,' he first introduced himself in the Levant as a soldier of a nation which had 'renounced the Messiah.'

Upon the whole, there seemed to be no reason why the new French Emperor should be unwilling

* At Tilsit.
† e.g., Bonaparte's predatory invasion of Egypt in time of peace.
‡ A falsified copy of the manifesto was sent to France. The one really issued represented Bonaparte as a Mahometan.

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to join with Russia in trying to bring about the dismemberment of the Turkish Empire, and to arrange the distribution of the spoil; for the great extension which France had given of late to her navy, rendered views of this kind less chimerical than they were at the time of the secret Articles of Tilsit.* But, on the other hand, it was the French Government which had provoked the religious excitement under which Nicholas was labouring; and, although it is believed that when his troubles increased upon him, the Czar afterwards made overtures to France, it would seem that in the beginning of 1853 he was too angry and too scornful towards the French Emperor to be able to harbour the thought of making him his ally. Of the danger lest France should suddenly adopt a conservative policy, and undertake to resist his arrangements in the East of Europe, the Emperor Nicholas made light, for he had resolved at this time not to place himself in conflict with England; and the operations of any Western Power in Turkey being dependent upon sea-communications, he did not think it to be within the wide compass of possible events that France, single-handed and without the alliance of her maritime neighbour, would or could obstruct him in the Levant. 'He cared,' he said, 'very

* There is ground, I understand, for believing, though I do not myself know the fact, that Louis Napoleon made early overtures to the Czar for what one may call a predatory alliance, and that the rebuff then inflicted upon him by Nicholas preceded his determination to seek a close alliance with England.
little what line the French might think proper to take in Eastern affairs; and he had apprised the Sultan that if his assistance were required for resisting the menaces of the French, it was entirely at the service of the Sultan."* 'When we (Russia and England) are agreed, I am quite without anxiety as to the West of Europe: it is immaterial what the others may think or do.'† There remained, then, only England, and upon the whole it had come to this: that the Emperor Nicholas would feel able to meet the emergency occasioned by the downfall of the Sultan, and might perhaps be inclined to do a little towards bringing about the catastrophe, if beforehand he could come to an understanding with the English Government as to the way in which Europe should deal with the fragments of the Turkish Empire. But he had learned, as he said, that an alliance with England must depend upon the feeling of the country at large, ‡ and this he strove hard to understand.

England had long been an enigma to the political students of the Continent, but after the summer of 1851 they began to imagine that they really at last understood her. They thought that she was falling from her place among nations; and indeed there were signs which might well lead a shallow observer to fancy that her ancient spirit was failing her. An army is but the limb of a nation, and it is no more given to a people to

* 'Eastern Papers,' part v. p. 10.  
† Ibid., p. 1.  
‡ Ibid., part iii.
combine the possession of military strength with an unmeasured devotion to the arts of peace, than it is for a man to be feeble and helpless in the general condition of his body, and yet to have at his command a strong right arm for the convenience of self-defence. The strength of the right arm is as the strength of the man: the prowess of an army is as the valour and warlike spirit of the nation which gives it her flesh and blood. England, having suffered herself to grow forgetful of this truth, seemed, in the eyes of foreigners, to be declining. It was not the reduction of the military and establishments which was the really evil sign: for—to say nothing of ancient times—the Swiss in Europe, and some of the States of the North American continent, have shown the world that a people which almost dispenses with a standing army may yet be among the most resolute and warlike of nations; but there was in England a general decrying of arms. Well-meaning men harangued and lectured in this spirit. What they sincerely desired was a continuance of peace; but instead of taking the thought and acquiring the knowledge which might have qualified them to warn their fellow-countrymen against steps tending to a needless war, they squandered their indignation upon the deceased authors of former wars, and used language of such preposterous breadth that what they said was as applicable to one war as to another. At length they generated a sect called the 'Peace Party,' which denounced war in strong indiscriminate terms.
Moreover, at this time extravagant veneration was avowed for mechanical contrivances, and the very words which grateful nations had wrought from out of their hearts in praise of tried chiefs and heroes were plundered, as it were, from the warlike professions, and given to those who for their own gain could make the best goods. It was no longer enough to say that an honest tradesman was a valuable member of society, or that a man who contrived a good machine was ingenious. More was expected from those who had the utterance of the public feeling; and it was announced that 'glory' and 'honour'—nay, to prevent all mistake, 'true honour' and 'true glory'—were due to him who could produce the best articles of trade. At length, in the summer of 1851, it was made to appear to foreigners that this singular faith had demanded and obtained an outward sign of its acceptance, and a solemn recognition by Church and State. The foreigners were mistaken. The truth is that the English, in their exuberant strength and their carelessness about the strict import of words, are accustomed to indulge a certain extravagance in their demonstrations of public feeling; and this is the more bewildering to foreign minds because it goes along with practical moderation and wisdom. What the English really meant was to give people an opportunity of seeing the new inventions and comparing all kinds of patterns, but, above all, to have a new kind of show, and bring about an immense gathering of people. Perhaps,
too, in the secret hearts of many, who were weary of tame life, there lurked a hope of animating tumults. This was all the English really meant. But the political philosophers of the Continent were resolved to impute to the islanders a more profound intent. They saw in the festival a solemn renouncing of all such dominion as rests upon force. England, they thought, was closing her great career by a whimsical act of abdication; and it must be acknowledged that there was enough to confound men accustomed to lay stress upon symbols. For the glory of mechanic Arts, and in token of their conquest over nature, a cathedral of glass climbed high over the stately elms of Knightsbridge, enclosing them, as it were, in a casket the work of men's hands, and it was not thought wrong nor impious to give the work the sanction of a religious ceremony. It was by the Archbishop of Canterbury that the money-changers were brought back into the temple. Few protested. One man, indeed, abounding in Scripture, and inflamed with the sight of the glass Babel ascending to the skies, stood up and denounced the work, and foretold 'wars' and 'judg-
ments.'* But he was a prophet speaking to the wrong generation, and no one heeded him. Indeed, it seemed likely that the soundness of his mind would be questioned; and if he went on to foretell that within three years England would be engaged in a bloody war springing out of a dispute about a key and a silver star, he was probably

* This I witnessed.
adjudged to be mad, for the whole country at the
time felt sure of its peaceful temper. Certainly
it was a hard task for the sagacity of a foreigner
to pierce through these outward signs, and see
that, notwithstanding them all, the old familiar
'Eastern Question' might be so used as to make
it rekindle the warlike ardour of England. Even
for Englishmen, until long after the beginning of
1853, it was difficult to foresee how the country
would be willing to act in regard to the defence
of Turkey; and the representatives of foreign
Powers accredited to St James's might be excused
if they assured their Courts that England was
depth in pursuits which would hinder her from all
due assertion of her will as a great European Power.

Thus foreigners came to believe that the Eng-
lish nature was changed, and that for the future
the country would always be tame in Europe;
and it chanced that, in the beginning of the year
1853, they were strengthened in their faith by
observing the structure of the Ministry then
recently formed; for Lord Palmerston, whose
name had become associated with the idea of a
resolute and watchful policy, was banished to the
Home Office, and the Prime Minister was Lord
Aberdeen, the same statesman who had held the
seals of the Foreign Office in former years, when
Austria was vainly entreating England to join
with her in defending the Sultan. The Emperor
Nicholas heard the tidings of Lord Aberdeen's
elevation to the premiership with a delight which
he did not suppress. Yet this very event, as will
be seen, was a main link in the chain of causes which was destined to draw the Czar into war, and bring him in misery to the grave.

But if there was a phantasy in vogue which seemed likely to make England acquiesce in transactions adverse to her accustomed policy in the East, there were other counsels afloat which, although they were based on very different views, seemed to tend in the same direction, for some of our countrymen were beginning to perceive that the restoration of a Bonapartist Empire in France would bring back with it the traditions and the predatory schemes of the First Napoleon. These advisers were unwilling that the elements of the great alliance, which, thirty-eight years before, had delivered Europe from its thraldom, should now be cast asunder for the mere sake of giving a better effect to the policy which the Foreign Office was accustomed to follow upon the Eastern Question. And in truth this same Eastern policy, though held by almost all responsible statesmen, was not so universally received in England as to go altogether unchallenged. The notion of England's standing still and suffering the Turks to be driven from Europe was not deemed so preposterous as to be unworthy of being put forward by men commanding great means of persuasion; and before the new year was far advanced, the Emperor Nicholas had means of knowing that the old English policy of averting the dismemberment of Turkey would be gravely questioned, and brought in an effective way to the test of printed discus-
sion.* Upon the whole, therefore, it seemed to the Czar that now, if ever, England might be willing to acquiesce in his encroachments upon Turkey, and even perhaps to abet him in schemes for the actual dismemberment of the Empire.

The Minister who represented the Queen at the Russian Court was Sir Hamilton Seymour. It is said that before there was a prospect of his being accredited at St Petersburg, he had conceived a high admiration of the qualities of the Emperor Nicholas, and that this circumstance, becoming known to the Czar, tended at first to make the English Minister more than commonly welcome at the Imperial Court. Sir Hamilton was not so constituted as to be liable to the kind of awe which other diplomatists too often felt in the majestic presence of the Emperor; but his despatches show that he was much interested, and, so to speak, amused by the conversation of a prince who wielded with his own very hand the power of All the Russias. Moreover, Sir Hamilton had the quickness and the presence of mind which enable a man to seize the true bearing and import of a sentence just uttered, and to meet it at the instant with the few and appropriate words which convey the needful answer, and provoke a still further disclosure.

On the night of the 9th of January 1853, the English Minister was at a party gathered in the palace of the Grand Duchess Helen, when the

* See the 'articles' in that direction which the 'Times' published in the early months of 1853.
Emperor Nicholas approached him, and drew him into conversation.

'You know my feelings,' the Emperor said, 'with regard to England. What I have told you before I say again: it was intended that the two countries should be upon terms of close amity; and I feel sure that this will continue to be the case. ... I repeat that it is very essential that the two Governments—that is, that the English Government and I, and I and the English Government—should be on the best terms; and the necessity was never greater than at present. I beg you to convey these words to Lord John Russell. When we are agreed, I am quite without anxiety as to the West of Europe; it is immaterial what the others may think or do. As to Turkey, that is another question; that country is in a critical state, and may give us all a great deal of trouble. And now I will take my leave of you.'

The Emperor then shook hands with Sir Hamilton Seymour, and believed that he had closed the conversation; but the skilled diplomatist saw and grasped his opportunity; and whilst his hand was still held by the Emperor, Sir Hamilton Seymour said, 'Sir, with your gracious permission, I would desire to take a great liberty.' Certainly,' His Majesty replied; 'what is it? let me hear.' Sir Hamilton said, 'I should be particularly glad that your Majesty should add a few words which may tend to calm the anxiety with respect to the affairs of Turkey which passing events are so calculated to excite on the part of Her
'Majesty's Government. Perhaps you will be pleased to charge me with some additional assurances of this kind.'

The Emperor's words and manner, although still very kind, showed that he had no intention of speaking to Sir Hamilton of the demonstration which he was about to make in the South. He said, however, at first with a little hesitation, but, as he proceeded, in an open and unhesitating manner: 'The affairs of Turkey are in a very disorganised condition; the country itself seems to be falling to pieces: the fall will be a great misfortune, and it is very important that England and Russia should come to a perfectly good understanding upon these affairs, and that neither should take any decisive step of which the other is not apprised.' The Envoy answered that this was certainly his view of the way in which Turkish questions should be treated; but the Emperor then said, as if proceeding with his remark, 'Stay we have on our hands a sick man—a very sick man; it will be, I tell you frankly, a great misfortune if one of these days he should slip away from us, especially before all necessary arrangements were made. But, however, this is not the time to speak to you on that matter.'

On the 22d of January another interview took place between the Emperor and the English Envoy. 'I found His Majesty,' writes Sir Hamilton Seymour, 'alone; he received me with great kindness, saying that I had appeared desirous to speak to him upon Eastern affairs; that on his
side there was no indisposition to do so, but that he must begin at a remote period. You know, His Majesty said, the dreams and plans in which the Empress Catherine was in the habit of indulging; these were handed down to our time; but while I inherited immense territorial possessions, I did not inherit those visions—those intentions, if you like to call them so. On the contrary, my country is so vast, so happily circumstanced in every way, that it would be unreasonable in me to desire more territory or more power than I possess; on the contrary, I am the first to tell you that our great, perhaps our only danger is that which would arise from an extension given to an Empire already too large.

Close to us lies Turkey, and in our present condition nothing better for our interests can be desired. The times have gone by when we had anything to fear from the fanatical spirit or the military enterprise of the Turks; and yet the country is strong enough, or has hitherto been strong enough, to preserve its independence, and to insure respectful treatment from other countries.

Well, in that Empire there are several millions of Christians whose interests I am called upon to watch over, while the right of doing so is secured to me by treaty. I may truly say that I make a moderate and sparing use of my right, and I will freely confess that it is one which is attended with obligations occasionally very inconvenient; but I cannot recede from the discharge of a dis-
tinct duty. Our religion as established in this country, came to us from the East, and there are feelings as well as obligations which never must be lost sight of.

Now Turkey, in the condition which I have described, has by degrees fallen into such a state of decrepitude that, as I told you the other night, eager as we all are for the prolonged existence of the man (and that I am as desirous as you can be for the continuance of his life, I beg you to believe), he may suddenly die upon our hands: we cannot resuscitate what is dead. If the Turkish Empire falls, it falls to rise no more; and I put it to you, therefore, whether it is not better to be provided beforehand for a contingency, than to incur the chaos, confusion, and the certainty of an European war, all of which must attend the catastrophe if it should occur unexpectedly, and before some ulterior system has been sketched. This is the point to which I am desirous you should call the attention of your Government.

Sir Hamilton Seymour adverted to the objection which the English Government habitually felt to the plan of taking engagements upon possible eventualities, and said that disinclination might be expected in England to the idea of disposing, by anticipation, of the succession of an old friend and ally. 'The rule is a good one,' the Emperor replied—'good at all times, especially in times of uncertainty and change like the present; still it is of the greatest importance that we should understand one another, and not allow events to
take us by surprise. Now I desire to speak to you as a friend and as a "gentleman:" if England and I arrive at an understanding in this matter, as regards the rest it matters little to me; it is indifferent to me what others do or think. Frankly, then, I tell you plainly that if England thinks of establishing herself one of these days at Constantinople, I will not allow it. I do not attribute this intention to you, but it is better on these occasions to speak plainly. For my part, I am equally disposed to take the engagement not to establish myself there—as proprietor that is to say, for as occupier I do not say: it might happen that circumstances, if no previous provision were made, if everything should be left to chance, might place me in the position of occupying Constantinople.'

On the 20th of February the Emperor came up to Sir Hamilton Seymour at a party given by the Grand Duchess Hereditary, and in the most gracious manner took him apart, saying he desired to speak to him. 'If your Government,' said the Emperor, 'has been led to believe that Turkey retains any elements of existence, your Government must have received incorrect information. 'I repeat to you that the sick man is dying, and we can never allow such an event to take us by surprise. We must come to some understanding.'

Then Sir Hamilton Seymour felt himself able to infer that the Czar had settled in his own mind that the hour for bringing about the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire must be at hand.
The next day the Emperor again sent for Sir Hamilton Seymour, and after combating the determination of the English Government to persist in regarding Turkey as a Power which might, and which probably would, remain as she was, he at length spoke out his long-reserved words of temptation. He thought, he said, that in the event of the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, it might be less difficult to arrive at a satisfactory territorial arrangement than was commonly believed, and then he proceeded: 'The Principalities are, in fact, an independent State under my protection: this might so continue. Servia might receive the same form of government. So again with Bulgaria: there seems to be no reason why this province should not form an independent State. As to Egypt, I quite understand the importance to England of that territory. I can then only say, that if, in the event of a distribution of the Ottoman succession upon the fall of the Empire, you should take possession of Egypt, I shall have no objection to offer. I would say the same thing of Candia: that island might suit you, and I do not know why it should not become an English possession.'

'As I did not wish,' writes Sir Hamilton Seymour, 'that the Emperor should imagine that an English public servant was caught by this sort of overture, I simply answered that I had always understood that the English views upon Egypt did not go beyond the point of securing a safe and ready communication between British India
and the mother country. Well, said the Emperor, induce your Government to write again upon these subjects—to write more fully, and to do so without hesitation. I have confidence in the English Government. It is not an engagement, a convention, which I ask of them; it is a free interchange of ideas, and, in case of need, the word of a "gentleman;" that is enough between us."

In answer to these overtures, the Government of the Queen disclaimed all notion of aiming at the possession of either Constantinople or any other of the Sultan's possessions, and accepted the assurances to the like effect which were given by the Czar. It combated the opinion that the extinction of the Ottoman Empire was near at hand, and deprecated the discussions based on that supposition as tending directly to produce the very result against which they were meant to provide. Finally, our Government, with abundance of courtesy, but in terms very stringent and clear, peremptorily refused to enter into any kind of secret engagement with Russia for the settlement of the Eastern Question.

These communications of January and February 1853 were carried on between the Emperor of Russia and the English Government upon the understanding that they were to be held strictly secret; and for more than a year this concealment was maintained. It will be for a later page to show the ground on which the engagement for

* "Eastern Papers," part v.
secrecy was broken, and the effect which the disclosure wrought upon the opinion of Europe, and upon the feelings of the people in England.

The Czar was baffled by the failure of his somewhat shallow plan for playing the tempter with the English Government; and an event which occurred at the same time still further conduced to the abandonment of his half-formed designs against the Sultan.

When Nicholas came to the singular resolution of declaring war against the Sultan in the event of his rejecting Austria's demand respecting Montenegro, he imagined, perhaps, that his counsels were kept strictly secret; but it seems probable that a knowledge or suspicion of the truth may have reached the Turkish Government, and helped to govern its decision. What we know is, that the demand made by Austria was carried by Count Leiningen to Constantinople, and that, having been put forward in terms offensively peremptory, it was suddenly acceded to by the sagacious advisers of the Sultan.

This last contingency seems to have been unforeseen by the Emperor Nicholas. At first, the tidings kindled in his mind strong feelings of joy, for he looked upon the deliverance of Montenegro as a triumph of his Church over the Moslem. But he soon perceived that this sudden attainment of the object to be sought would disconcert his plans. He found himself all at once deprived of the basis on which his scheme of action had rested; and except in respect of the question of the key and...
the silver star, there was nothing that he had to charge against the Sultan. On the other hand, he had failed in his endeavour to win over England to his views. He therefore relapsed into the use of the conservative language which he had been accustomed to apply to the treatment of the Eastern Question; professed his willingness to labour with England to prolong the existence of the Turkish Empire; and even went so far as to join with our Government in declaring that the way to achieve this result was to abstain 'from harassing the Porte by imperious demands, put forward in a manner humiliating to its independence and its dignity.'* He abandoned the intention of going to war, and even deprived himself of the means of taking such a step with effect; for immediately upon hearing the result of Count Leiningen's mission, he stopped the purchase of horses required for enabling him to take the field.

* 'Eastern Papers,' part v. p. 25.
CHAPTER VII.

But when a man’s mind has once been thrown forward towards action, it gains so great a momentum that the ceasing of the motive which first disturbed his repose does not instantly bring him to a stand. The Czar had found himself suddenly deprived of his ground of war against the Porte by the embarrassing success of Count Leiningen’s mission, and in the same week he was robbed of his last hope of the alliance which he most desired by the failure of his overtures to England. He gave up the idea of going to war, and policy commanded that for a while he should rest; but already he had so acted that rest was pain to him. He could not but be tortured with the thought that the sputive words which he had uttered to Sir Hamilton Seymour on the 21st of February were known to the Queen of England and to several of her foremost statesmen. Moreover, in a thousand forms, the bitter fruits of the delivery of the key and the star of Bethlehem, and the tidings of the triumph which the Latins had gained over his Church, and of the agony which
this discomfiture had inflicted upon pious zealots, were coming home upon him, and from time to time in a fitful way were tormenting him, and then giving him a little rest, and then once more rekindling his fury. So he began to turn this way and that, in order that by turmoil he might smother the past, win back the self-respect which he had lost, and gain some counter-victory for his Church. He had already gathered heavy bodies of troops in the south of his empire; he had a powerful fleet in the Euxine; the Bosphorus was nigh. The Turks, trusting mainly to heavenly power, were ill prepared. No French or English fleets were in the Levant. Above all, that shady garden at Therapia, commanding the entrance of the Euxine, and seeming to be the fit dwelling-place for a statesman who watched against invasion from the North, was no longer paced by the English Ambassador. The great Eltchi was away. Many thought it was possible for the Czar to seize the imperial city, and treat with the anger of Europe from the Seraglio Point.

But Nicholas, though he was capable of venturing a little way into wrong paths, and was often blinded to the difference between right and wrong by a sense of religious duty, was far from being a lawless prince. His conscience, warped by Faith, would easily reconcile him to an act of violence against a Mahometan Power; but he never questioned that the fate of Turkey was a matter of concern to other Christian States as well as to his own; and he did not at this time intend to take
any steps which England would regard as an outrage. The plan which he resorted to as a means of giving vent to his anger, and satisfying that tendency to action which had been engendered by his preparations against the Sultan, was to go on with the scheme of sending an Extraordinary Embassy to Constantinople, to make up for the sudden loss of the Montenegro grievance by laying an increased stress upon the question of the Holy Places, and to force the Sultan to settle the dispute upon terms which, without wounding the Latins more than could be helped, should still do justice to the Greek Church. Any attempt at resistance which the Porte might make, by alleging the counter-pressure of France, was to be met by at once engaging that the Emperor of Russia with all his forces should defend the Sultan's territory against every attack by a Western Power; and well knowing that protective aid of such a kind was a burthen and not a gift, the Emperor seems to have directed that this alliance should be not merely offered, but pressed.

But the secret purpose of the mission was to make the past defaults of the Turkish Government in regard to the Holy Places of Palestine a ground for extorting a treaty engagement by which the Greek Church throughout all Turkey would be brought under the protection of Russia. It seemed to the Czar that his half-completed preparations for war would give to his demands exactly that kind of support which their offensive character required; for the position of the troops...
gathered in Bessarabia, and the activity of the last few months in Sebastopol, would not fail to make the Turks see that force was at hand. The armaments in readiness were more than enough for the occupation of the Danubian Principalities; and as soon as they should become swollen by the unfailing aid of rumours, they might easily grow to be thought a sufficing force for some great enterprise against Constantinople.

For some time, the Emperor Nicholas hesitated in the choice of the person to whom this extraordinary mission should be entrusted. He hesitated between Count Orloff and Prince Mentschikoff. He did not hesitate because he was doubting which of the two men would be the fittest instrument of his policy, but rather because he had not determined what his policy should be. Count Orloff was a wise and moderate man, much associated with the Czar, and accustomed to speak to him with becoming freedom. To make choice of this trusty friend was to avoid any such outrage as would lead to the isolation of Russia. To choose Prince Mentschikoff was to choose a man whose feelings and prejudices might cause him to embitter the Czar's dispute with the Porte, and who, to say the least, could have no pretension to moderate the zeal of his master. It was for this very reason, perhaps, that he was preferred. In an evil hour Nicholas brought his doubts to an end, and made choice of Prince Mentschikoff.

Mentschikoff was a Prince of the sort which Court almanacs describe as 'Serene.' He was a
General, a High Admiral, the Governor of a great province, and, in short, so far as concerns official and titular rank was one of the chief of the Czar's subjects; but Russia has not disclosed the grounds on which it was thought fit to entrust to him—first the peace, and then the military renown of his country; for when Russians are asked about the qualities of mind which caused a man to be chosen for a momentous embassy, and for the command of an army defending his country from invasion, they only say that the Prince was famous for the strange and quaint sallies of his wit. However, he was of the school of those who desired to govern the affairs of the State upon principles violently Russian, and without the aid and counsel of foreigners. It was understood that he held the Turks in contempt; and it was said also that he entertained a strong dislike of the English. He had not been schooled in diplomacy, but he was to be entrusted with the power of using a threatening tone, and was to be supported by a fleet held in readiness, and by bodies of troops impending upon the Turkish frontiers. The Emperor Nicholas seems to have thought that harsh words and a display of force might be made to supply want of skill.

Great latitude was given to Prince Mentschikoff in regard to the means by which he was to attain the objects of his mission; but it is certain that the general tenor of his instructions contravened with singular exactness the honourable and generous language in which the Emperor Nicholas
loved to mark out the duty of the great Powers of Europe towards Turkey. In the last Secret Memorandum solemnly placed in the hands of our Envoy at St Petersburg as a record of the Emperor's determination, Nicholas, as we have seen, had laid it down that it was the duty of great Powers not to 'harass the Porte by imperious demands put forward in a manner humiliating to its independence and dignity;' and yet these very words, which so well point out what the Czar said ought not to be done, are a close description of that which he ordered his Ambassador to do.

The approach of Prince Mentschikoff to Constantinople was heralded by the arrival of Staff officers, who were charged to prepare the way, and cause men to feel the import of the coming embassy. For many days rumour was busy. When for some time men's minds had been kept on the rack, it became known that the expected vessel of war was nearing the gates of the Bosphorus; and at length, surrounded with pomp, and supported by the silent menace of fleets equipped, and battalions marching on the Danube, Prince Mentschikoff entered the palace of the Russian Embassy. The next day another war-steamer came down, bringing the Vice-Admiral Korniloff, the commander of the Black Sea fleet, and the Chief of the Staff of the land forces under General Rudiger, with several other officers. All this war-like following went to show that the Ambassador had the control of the military and naval forces which were hovering upon the Turkish Empire.
There, moreover, came tidings that General Dannenberg, then commanding the cavalry of the 5th corps d'armée, had pushed his advance-guard close up to the frontiers of Moldavia; that funds had been transmitted to merchants in Moldavia and Wallachia for the purchase of rations; and finally, that the fleet at Sebastopol was getting ready to sail at the shortest notice.

In the midst of the alarm engendered by these demonstrations, Prince Mentschikoff began the duties of his mission; and he so acted as to make men see that he was charged to coerce, and not to persuade. With his whole Embassy he went to the Grand Vizier's apartment at the Porte, but refused to obey the custom which imperatively required that he should wait upon Fuad Effendi, the Minister for Foreign Affairs. With him, as it was understood, the Ambassador declined to hold intercourse. Fuad Effendi, the immediate object of the affront, was the ablest member of the Government. He instantly resigned his office. The Sultan accepted his resignation. There was a panic. It was understood that Prince Mentschikoff was going to demand terms deeply humiliating and injurious to the Sultan, and that a refusal to give way would be followed by an instant attack. The Grand Vizier believed that the mission, far from being of a conciliatory character, as pretended, was meant, on the contrary, 'to win some important right from Turkey, which would destroy her independence,' and that the Czar's object was 'to trample under foot the rights of the Porte and
'the independence of the Sovereign.'* In short, the Divan was so taken by surprise, and so overwhelmed by alarm, as to be in danger of going to ruin by the path of concession for the sake of averting a sudden blow. But there remained one hope—the English fleet was at Malta; and the Grand Vizier went to Colonel Rose, who was then in charge of our affairs at the Porte, and entreated that he would request our Admiral at Malta to come up to Vourla, in order to give the Turkish Government the support of an approaching fleet. Colonel Rose, being a firm, able man, with strength to bear a sudden load of responsibility, was not afraid to go beyond the range of common duty. He consented to do as he was asked; and although he was disavowed by the Government at home, and although his appeal to the English Admiral was rejected, it is not the less certain that his mere consent to call up the fleet allayed the panic which was endangering at that moment the very life of the Ottoman Empire. Happily there was not a complete perfect communication by telegraph between London and Constantinople; and long before the disavowal reached the Bosphorus the Turkish statesmen had recovered their usual calm. On the other hand, the Russian Government was much soothed by the intelligence that the English Cabinet had declined to approve Colonel Rose's request to the Admiral; and it might be said with truth that both the Act of the Queen's Representative and the disavowal of it by

* 'Eastern Papers,' part i. p. 88.
his Government at home were of advantage to the public service.*

It would seem that in the middle of the month of March the anger of the Emperor Nicholas had grown cool. He had always felt the difficulty of basing a war upon the question of the Holy Places alone, and the language of his Government at this time was moderate and pacific.† But unhappily there were distinct centres of action in Paris, in London, in St Petersburg, and in Constantinople, and it was constantly happening that when the fire seemed to be got down in three out of the four capitals, it would spring up with fresh strength in the fourth. Thus, at a moment when the panic of the Divan had entirely ceased, and when the Court of St Petersburg, already inclining towards moderation, was about to be further pacified by the welcome tidings which informed it of the disavowal of Colonel Rose by the Home Government, the Emperor of the French suddenly determined to send a naval force into the Levant, and notwithstanding the opposition of our Government, the French fleet was ordered to Salamis. This was done without sound reason, for the panic which had induced Colonel Rose to appeal to the English Admiral at Malta had long ago ceased. The step gave deep umbrage to Russia.

* Colonel Rose was the officer who afterwards became illustrious for his career of victory in India, but at that later time he was known to his grateful country as Sir Hugh Rose. He is now Lord Strathnairn.

† Lord Cowley’s account of Count Nesselrode’s Despatch of the 15th March. ‘Eastern Papers,’ part i. p. 96.
When the Emperor Nicholas learned that the advance of the French fleet had been disapproved by England, his anger was followed by gladness, and the relations between the Governments of St Petersburg and London then seemed to be upon so friendly a footing as to exclude the fear of a disagreement. Count Nesselrode assured Sir Hamilton Seymour that Russia was alleging no grievance against the Turkish Government except in regard to the question of the Holy Places; and even this one remaining subject of complaint he began to treat as a slighter matter than it had hitherto appeared to be. It is hard to have to believe that all this good-humour of the Court of St Petersburg was simulated; and yet the assurances of Count Nesselrode distinctly went to exclude the belief that Russia could ever do that which she was actually doing. Yielding, it would seem, to an instinct of wild cunning, the Czar failed to understand that the chance of carrying a point at Constantinople by a diplomatic surprise could never be of such worth as to deserve to be set against his old reputation for truthfulness. If he thought at all, he would see that the difference between what he was saying and what he was doing would be laid bare in three weeks. Yet he gave way to the strange impulse which forced him to go and try to steal a trophy for his Church. He concealed from the French as well as from our Government all knowledge of his intention to endeavour to extort from the Sultan an engagement giving to Russia the protectorate
of the Greek Church in Turkey. The Cabinets of the Western Powers were suffered to gather the first tidings of this scheme from their Constantinople despatches, and the trust which the English Government had hitherto placed in the honour and good faith of the Emperor Nicholas was suddenly and for ever destroyed.

Meanwhile Prince Mentschikoff brought forward the claims of the Greek Church in regard to the Holy Places, but he seemed disposed to be moderate in his demands respecting the shrines, if the Turkish Government should show any willingness to give way to him in regard to the other and more important object which he was to endeavour to compass. Striving to take advantage of the alarm created by his Embassy, he proposed to wring from the Porte a treaty engagement, conceding to the Emperor of Russia a protectorate over the Greek Church in Turkey. At first he spoke darkly, intimating that he had some great demand to press upon the Sultan, but not yet choosing to say what the demand might be. Then he began to say to the Turkish Ministers that if they would appease the anger of the Czar, and deliver their State from danger, it would be well for them at once to turn away from France and England, trust themselves wholly to the generosity of the Emperor of Russia, and begin by giving a solemn assurance that they would withhold from the representatives of the Western Powers all knowledge of the negotiation which they were required to undertake. 'We are aware,'
said the Grand Vizier, 'that the object of his
(Prince Mentschikoff's) mission is to make a
secret treaty of alliance with us. He has not
demanded it officially, but he has told some
persons in his confidence, who (he knows) are in
communication with us, that we do wrong to
rely on the English and French Governments,
for experience should at length have proved to
us that we have lost much and gained nothing
by following their policy and advice. By this
language he seeks to gain their support, and to
insure their concurrence in the work of the
secret treaty which he is seeking to conclude.
His policy is most confused. At one time he
would attract us to Russia by mildness, spreading
abroad a report that the intentions of his Govern-
ment are pacific. At another time he seeks to
gain us over by pointing out the disadvantages
and inutility of our reliance upon England and
France, and how wrong we are in following the
advice of those two Powers, to whom we ought
not to be attached, especially if we consider that
the nature of their Constitution differs from that
of ours, which, on the contrary, resembles that
of Russia and Austria. Prince Mentschikoff
had a conference with Rifaat Pasha two days
ago. He told him that before communicating
to the Sublime Porte the nature of his mission
and the demands of his Government, and before
giving any explanation, he required from Rifaat
Pasha the formal promise of the Porte, that it
would not communicate to the representative
either of England or of France anything whatever as to what he demanded or proposed; that it was his wish that it should be treated with the greatest secrecy, otherwise he would not enter upon the subject.**

The Grand Vizier declared that the Turkish Government had at once refused to withhold from the Western Powers a knowledge of the impending negotiation, but it seems likely that some alarmed member of the Turkish Government may have been led to give the required promise of secrecy, for before the end of March Prince Mentschikoff vouchsafed to disclose the offers and the demands of his Sovereign. He verbally expressed the Emperor's wish to enter into a secret treaty with Turkey, putting a fleet and 400,000 men at her disposal if she ever needed aid against any Western Power. As 'the equivalent for this proffered aid,' said the Grand Vizier, 'Russia further secretly demanded an addition to the treaty of Kainardji, whereby the Greek Church should be placed entirely under Russian protection without reference to Turkey. Prince Mentschikoff had stated that the greatest secrecy must be maintained relative to this proposition; and that, should Turkey allow it to be made known to England, he and his mission would instantly quit Constantinople.'†

This kind of pressure upon the Turkish Government was perhaps well fitted for the days of alarm which immediately followed Prince Mentschikoff had stated that the greatest secrecy must be maintained relative to this proposition; and that, should Turkey allow it to be made known to England, he and his mission would instantly quit Constantinople.'†

* 'Eastern Papers,' part i. p. 111. † Ibid. p. 112.
schikoff's arrival at Constantinople; but an extortion attempted at the end of March was divided by a very safe interval from the 6th of the month when Colonel Rose, by requesting the English Admiral to come into the Levant, had been able to stop the panic. Rifaat Pasha, the Minister who had succeeded to Fuad Effendi in the Department of Foreign Affairs, was firm. 'I am not 'a child,' said he in his message to Colonel Rose; 'I am an old Minister, very well acquainted with 'the treaties which unite the Sublime Porte with 'the friendly Powers; and I understand, God be 'praised! too well the importance of our good re-
'lations with England and France, the full weight 'of the obligation to maintain treaties, the whole 'extent of the evil which would result to my 'Government if it departs from or infringes them, 'to hesitate a single instant to inform their respec-
'tive representatives of every demand or proposal 'which Russia might be desirous of enforcing 'upon us, and which might not be in accordance 'with the rights recorded in those treaties.' *

Finding himself thus encountered, and being unskilled in negotiation, Prince Mentschikoff had already begun to draw to himself the support of an army. The English Vice-Consul at Galatz reported that preparations had been made in Bessarabia for the passage of 120,000 men, and that battalions were marching to the south from all directions. Though the time of mere panic was past, there was 'anxiety and alarm' in the Divan.†

* 'Eastern Papers,' part i. p. 114, † Ibid. p. 124.
But Prince Mentschikoff was destined soon to learn that there was a power in the world which could exert more governance over Turkish statesmen than the march of the Czar's battalions. Before the week was past he had to undergo the sensation of encountering a formidable mind.
CHAPTER VIII.

When a great country is induced, by virtue or by policy, to refrain from using her physical strength against a Sovereign of a weaker State, she often solaces herself for this painful effort of moderation by showing her neighbour the error of his ways and giving him constant advice; and if it happen that two or more great Powers are thus engaged in tendering their rival counsels to the same State, they will be prone to struggle with one another for the ascendancy, and to do this with a zeal scarcely intelligible to men who have never seen that kind of strife. The prize contended for is commonly known by the name of 'influence;' and although this moral sovereignty over foreign States may be a privilege of small intrinsic worth, the Princes and Statesmen who have once begun combating for the prize, and even the merchants and the travellers who have happened to be on the spot, and to witness with any attention the animating incidents of the conflict, have generally had their zeal kindled. Now the Ottoman polity is of such a nature as
almost to court this kind of interference. The practice of suffering the Christian Churches to live and thrive separate and apart without being subjected to any attempt at amalgamation, has given to these communities so many of the privileges of distinct national existence that they long to make their independence still more complete, and to do this, not by attempting to lay their timid hands upon the government, but rather by becoming more and more separate, and at last dropping off from the Empire. Therefore, instead of harbouring schemes for rising in arms against the Sultan, they have accustomed themselves to seek to form ties of a political and religious kind with foreign States, and to appeal to them for protection against their Ottoman rulers. Here, then, of course, a gaping cleft was open to receive the wedge which diplomatists call a 'Protectorate.' Russia claimed a moral right to protect the ten or fourteen millions of Turkish subjects who constituted the Greek Church, and she availed herself of some loose words which had crept into the old treaty of Kainardji as a ground for maintaining that this moral claim was converted into a distinct right by treaty engagement. Austria, armed with treaties, was empowered to protect the Roman Catholic worship, but France had always been accustomed to busy herself in watching over that portion of the Latin Church which was connected with Palestine and Syria. It is true that the Armenian, the Coptic, and the Black Churches were without any recognised foreign
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patron, and flourished quite as well as their protected brethren; but the numbers composing these Churches were scanty in comparison with the worshippers following the Greek ritual; and it may be said that the bulk of the Christian population of Turkey had contracted the habit of looking abroad for support.

Again, the Turkish Government was always so sensible of the distinctness of the 'nations' held under its sway, and of the hardship of keeping Christians under the close subjection of the Moslem system, that even in the times when the Sultans were in the pride of their strength they generously allowed humble foreigners, though living in Turkey, to have the protection of their country's flag, and to enjoy immunities which (except in the case of Sovereigns and their embassies) the Governments of Christian countries have never been accustomed to give to any of their foreign guests. These privileges had been granted to the principal States of Europe by treaty engagements which went by the name of 'capitulations;' and they were so extensive that, except in regard to one or two specified descriptions of crime and outrage, a foreigner in Turkey who was a native of any of the States to whom these capitulations had been granted, was exempt from the laws of the country in which he dwelt. And these privileges were not even confined to foreigners, for Ambassadors at the Porte claimed and exercised a right of withdrawing a Turkish subject from the laws of his country by taking him into their ser-
vice, or even by a mere written grant of protection; and the streets of Pera and Galata were filled with Orientals of various races who had contrived to be turned into 'Russians,' or 'Frenchmen,' or 'Englishmen.' Thus it resulted that not only the great communities forming Churches or 'nations,' but also a great number of individuals, often clever, stirring, and unscrupulous men, were always labouring to attract the interference of some great Power, furnishing it with ready grounds of dispute, and stimulating its desire for preponderance. But there was a broad difference between the protectorate of Russia and that of the other States of Europe; for whilst the Roman Catholic States could only reckon a few hundred thousand of clients, and whilst the Protestant subjects of the Porte were too few to form a body in the State, the number of Greek Christians who looked to Russia for protection amounted to from ten to fourteen millions. This fact gave great strength and substance to the pretensions of Russia, but, on the other hand, it made her interference in a high degree dangerous; for it was clear that if the guardianship of so vast a number of the Rayahs or Turkish subjects were to be suffered to lapse into the hands of a foreign Sovereign, the empire of the Sultans would pass away. All the great Powers of Europe were accustomed to press upon the Sultan the duty of conferring upon his people, and especially upon his Christian subjects, the blessing of good and equal government; but Russia urged these demands with the not unnuat-
ural desire to prepare for herself a firm standing-ground in the midst of her neighbour's territory; whilst Austria and England, being interested in averting the dismemberment of the Sultan's dominions, gave their counsel with a real view to make the Sultan do what they deemed to be for his own good.

For ascendancy on this the favourite arena of diplomacy two men had long contended. They were altogether unequal in station, and yet were not ill matched. The first of the combatants was the Emperor Nicholas; the other was Sir Stratford Canning. This kinsman of Mr Canning the Minister had been bred from early life to the career of diplomacy, and whilst he was so young that he could still perhaps think in smooth Eton Alcăics more easily than in the diction of 'High Contracting Parties,' it was given him to negotiate a treaty which helped to bring ruin upon the enemy of his country.* How to negotiate with a perfected skill never degenerating into craft, how to form such a scheme of policy that his country might be brought to adopt it without swerving, and how to pursue this always, promoting it steadily abroad, and gradually forcing the Home Government to go all lengths in its support, this he knew; and he was, moreover, so gifted by nature, that whether men studied his despatches, or whether they

* The Treaty of Bucharest in 1812. By enabling the Czar to withdraw from the South the forces commanded by Tchitchagoff, this treaty did much to convert the discomfiture of Napoleon's 'Grand Army' into absolute ruin.
listened to his spoken words, or whether they were only bystanders caught and fascinated by the grace of his presence, they could scarcely help thinking that if the English nation was to be maintained in peace or drawn into war by the will of a single mortal, there was no man who looked so worthy to fix its destiny as Sir Stratford Canning. He had faults which made him an imperfect Christian, for his temper was fierce, and his assertion of self was so closely involved in his conflicts that he followed up his opinions with his feelings, and with the whole strength of his imperious nature. But his fierce temper, being always under control when purposes of State so required, was far from being an infirmity, and was rather a weapon of exceeding sharpness, for it was so wielded by him as to have more tendency to cause dread and surrender than to generate resistance. Then, too, every judgment which he pronounced was enfolded in words so complete as to exclude the idea that it could ever be varied, and to convey, therefore, the idea of duration. As though yielding to fate itself, the Turkish mind used to bend and fall down before him.

But the counsels which Sir Stratford Canning had been accustomed to tender to the Sultan's Ministers, however wholesome they might be, were often very irksome to hear, and very difficult to adopt. Indeed it might be questioned whether his Turkish policy could be made to consist with the principle on which the Ottoman system was based. He sought to make the Ottoman rule
seem tolerable to Christendom by getting rid of the differences which separated the Christian subjects of the Porte from their Mahometan fellow-subjects, and placing the tributaries on a footing with their masters. But the theory of Mahometan government rests upon the maintenance of a clear separation from the unbelievers; and to propose to a Mussulman of any piety that the Commander of the Faithful should obliterate the distinction between Mahometans and Christians, would be proposing to obliterate the distinction between virtue and vice. The notion would seem to be not merely wrong and wicked, but a contradiction in terms. A virtuous Osmanlee would feel that, if he were to consent to this levelling of the barriers between good and evil, he would lose the whole merit and comfort of being a Turk. Perhaps the opposite policy—namely, that of widening the separation of the Christians, and giving them (under a tenure less precarious than the present one) the character of tributary municipalities—would be more consonant with the scheme of a Mussulman Empire, and therefore more susceptible of complete execution. But whether the reforms thus counselled were possible or not, it was hard to resist the imperious Ambassador to his face. If what he directed was inconsistent with the nature of things, then possibly the nature of things would be changed by the decree of Heaven, for there was no hope that the great Eltchi would relax his will. In the meantime, however, and by the blessing of God, the actual
execution of the Ambassador's painful mandates might perhaps be suffered to encounter a little delay. So thought, so temporised, the wise tranquil statesmen at the Porte.

Of course, this kind of ascendency was often very galling to the Sultan's advisers. They knew that the English Ambassador was counselling them for the good of their country; but they felt that he humbled them by making his dictation too plainly apparent, and they were often very conscious that the motive which made them succumb to him was dread. Yet, if the Ambassador was unrelenting and even harsh in the exercise of his dominion over the Turks, he was faithful to guard them against enemies from abroad. He chastened them himself, but he was dangerous to any other man who came seeking to hurt his children.

Now it happened that this was exactly the kind of ascendency over the Turks for which the Emperor Nicholas had long been craving. Some men imagine that the Emperor's designs in regard to Turkey were steadily governed by sheer desire for his neighbour's land; and they are not without specious materials for forming such an opinion: but perhaps a full knowledge of the truth would justify the belief that, from the Peace of Adrianople in 1829 down to the time of his death, the Czar would have preferred the ascendency which Sir Stratford Canning enjoyed at Constantinople to any scheme of conquest. And, what is more, if Nicholas had succeeded in gaining this ascendency, he would have been inclined to use it as a
means of enforcing counsels somewhat similar to those which were pressed upon the Sultan by the English Ambassador; for though his first care would have been always for his own Church, it would have suited his pride and his policy to extend his protection to all the Christian subjects of the Porte. But just as similarity of doctrine often embitters the differences between contending sects, so the very resemblance between his and Sir Stratford Canning's views with regard to the Christian subjects of the Porte made it the more intolerable to him to see that he, the powerful neighbour of Turkey, who was able to hover over her frontiers and her shores with great armies and fleets, could never make an effort to force his counsels on the Porte without finding himself baffled or forestalled by the stronger mind.

Even in his very early life it had been the fate of Sir Stratford Canning to have to resist and thwart the Russian Government; and during a great part of the years of his embassy at Constantinople he had been more or less in a posture of resistance to the Emperor Nicholas. Moreover, the feeling with which the Emperor carried on this long-standing conflict was quickened by personal animosity, and by a knowledge that diplomacy was watching the strife with interest and amusement; for he had once gone the length of declining to receive Sir Stratford Canning as the English Ambassador at St Petersburg, and had thus marked him out before Europe as his recognised antagonist. The struggle had lasted for a long
time, and with varying success; for many a Turkish ministry owed its frail existence and its untimely end to the chances of the combat going on between the Czar and the English Ambassador. The Turks could not help knowing that the counsels of the Ambassador were for their own good, and they had reason to surmise that the advice of the Emperor might spring from opposite motives; but there are times when the smooth speech and the wily promises of a political foe are more welcome than the painful lectures of an honest friend; and again, though it was hard to bear up with mere words against the personal ascendant of the Ambassador, the Emperor had the power of throwing the sword into the scale at any moment. The strife, therefore, had not been altogether unequal; but, upon the whole, Sir Stratford Canning had kept the upper hand, and the Czar had been forced to endure the agony of being what his representative called 'secondary,' so long as Sir Stratford Canning was in the palace of the English Embassy.

For some eight or nine months Sir Stratford Canning had been absent from Constantinople; but now, at a time when Europe had fastened its eyes upon the Czar, and was watching to see how the Ambassador of All the Russias would impose his master's will upon Turkey, the Emperor Nicholas was obliged to hear that his eternal foe, travelling by the ominous route of Paris and Vienna, was slowly returning to his Embassy at the Porte.
It was on the 25th of February 1853 that Sir Stratford Canning, now Lord Stratford de Redcliffe,* was instructed to return to his former post. The measure was not without significance. Read by foreigners, it imported that England clung to her ancient policy, and was proceeding to maintain it; and although the instructions addressed to Lord Stratford disclosed no knowledge of the spirit in which Prince Mentschikoff was about to conduct his Embassy, or of the kind of proposals which he was about to press upon the Porte, they indicated that the Cabinet was alarmed for the fate of Turkey.

The despatch which supplied Lord Stratford with his instructions, announced to him that, in the then critical period of the fate of the Ottoman Empire, he was to return to his Embassy at Constantinople for a special purpose. Then, after recording once more the fact that the duty of maintaining the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire was a principle solemnly declared and acknowledged by all the great Powers of Europe, the despatch informed Lord Stratford that it was his mission to counsel prudence to the Porte, and forbearance to those Powers who were urging compliance with their demands. In Paris he was to remind the French Government that the interests of France and England in the East were identical, and was to explain the fatal embarrassment to which the Sultan might be exposed.

* Sir Stratford Canning was created Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe in 1852.
if unduly pressed by France upon a question of such vital importance to the Power from which Turkey had most to apprehend. At Vienna he was to give and elicit fresh declarations of the conservative views entertained by the two Governments. Then, proceeding to Constantinople, the Ambassador was to inform the Sultan that his Embassy was to be regarded as a mark of Her Majesty's friendly feelings towards His Highness, but also as indicating the opinion which Her Majesty entertained of the gravity of the circumstances in which there was reason to fear the Ottoman Empire was placed. In regard to any part which he might be able to take in conducting to a settlement of the question of the Holy Places, the discretion of the Ambassador was left unfettered. The Ambassador was directed to warn the Porte that the Ottoman Empire was in a position of peculiar danger. The accumulated grievances of foreign nations,' continued Lord Clarendon, 'which the Porte is unable or unwilling to redress, the maladministration of its own affairs, and the increasing weakness of executive power in Turkey, have caused the allies of the Porte latterly to assume a tone alike novel and alarming, and which, if persevered in, may lead to a general revolt among the Christian subjects of the Porte, and prove fatal to the independence and integrity of the Empire—a catastrophe that would be deeply deplored by Her Majesty's Government, but which it is their duty to represent to the Porte is considered probable and
impending by some of the great European Powers.

'Your Excellency will explain to the Sultan that
'it is with the object of pointing out these dangers,
'and with the hope of averting them, that Her
'Majesty's Government have now directed you to
'proceed to Constantinople. You will endeavour
'to convince the Sultan and his Ministers that
'the crisis is one which requires the utmost
'prudence on their part, and confidence in the
'sincerity and soundness of the advice they will
'receive from you, to resolve it favourably for their
'future peace and independence.' Then (and
probably at the suggestion of Lord Stratford him-
self) the Ambassador was to press upon the Porte
the adoption of the reforms which his intimate
knowledge of the affairs of Turkey enabled him to
recommend; and next, plainly disclosing the effect
already produced upon the mind of the Govern-
ment by the challenge to which our accustomed
policy in the East had just been subjected by the
press, the despatch went on:—'Nor will you dis-
guise from the Sultan and his Ministers that
'perseverance in his present course must end in
'alienating the sympathies of the British nation,
'and making it impossible for Her Majesty's
'Government to shelter them from the impending
'danger, or to overlook the exigencies of Christen-
dom, exposed to the natural consequences of
'their unwise policy and reckless maladminis-
'tration.' Finally, the Ambassador was told that,
in the event of imminent danger to the existence
of the Turkish Government, he was to despatch
a messenger at once to Malta, requesting the Admiral to hold himself in readiness; but Lord Stratford was not to direct him to approach the Dardanelles without positive instructions from the Government at home.

Thus, so far as concerned the power of turning for aid to physical force, the Ambassador went out poorly armed; but he was destined to have an opportunity of showing that a slender authority in the hands of a skilled diplomatist may be more formidable than the absolute control of great armaments entrusted to a less able statesman. Lord Stratford was licensed to do no more than send a message to an Admiral, advising him to be ready to go to sea; and, slight as this power was, he never exhausted it; yet, as will be seen, he so wielded the instruction which entrusted it to him as to be able to establish a great calm in the Divan at a moment when Prince Mentschikoff was violently pressing upon its fears, with a fleet awaiting his orders, and an army of 140,000 men.
CHAPTER IX.

On the morning of the 5th of April 1853, the Sultan and all his Ministers learned that a vessel of war was coming up the Propontis, and they knew who it was that was on board. Long before noon the voyage and the turmoil of the reception were over, and, except that a corvette under the English flag lay at anchor in the Golden Horn, there was no seeming change in the outward world.* Yet all was changed. Lord Stratford de Redcliffe had entered once more the palace of the English Embassy. The event spread a sense of safety, but also a sense of awe.† It seemed to bring with it confusion to the enemies of Turkey, but austere reproof for past errors at home, and punishment where punishment was due, and

* The corvette which brought the great Eltchi was the Fury, commanded by Captain Tatham.

† Since the original publication of this work, Captain Tatham has been so good as to communicate with me, and to confirm in decisive terms my above account of the awe inspired by Lord Stratford's return as 'most accurate.' The Captain was present at the first audience, and he assures me that the spectacle afforded by the manner and bearing of the great Ambassador and the evident awe of the Sultan is one he will 'never forget.'
an enforcement of hard toils and painful sacrifices of many kinds, and a long farewell to repose. It was the angry return of a king whose realm had been suffered to fall into danger. Before a day was over, the Grand Vizier and the Reis Effendi had begun to speak, and to tell a part of what they knew to the English Ambassador. They did not yet venture to tell all. Things which they had told to Colonel Rose they did not yet dare to tell to the great Eltchi. They did not, perhaps, mean to conceal from him, but they shrank from the terror of seeing his anger when he came to know of Prince Mentschikoff's demands for a Protectorate of the Greek Church. If they were to confess that they had borne to hear such a proposal, the Eltchi might think that they had dared to listen to it. Lord Stratford, observing their fear, imagined that it was Prince Mentschikoff who had disturbed their equanimity. 'This combination,' said he, 'of alarm, seeking for advice, and of reluctance to entrust me frankly with the whole case, is attributable to the threatening language of Prince Mentschikoff, and to the character of his proposals.' But 'his view of the cause of this tendency towards suppression is displaced by observing the frankness of the disclosures which the Turkish Ministers had long before made to Colonel Rose:* the truth is that Lord Stratford was unconscious of exercising the ascendancy which he did, and, imagining that men gave way to him because he

* 'Eastern Papers,' part i. p. 107 et seq.
was in the right, he never came to understand the awe which he inspired. However, by degrees the Turkish Ministers went so far as to tell him that 'since the arrival of Prince Mentschikoff, the language held by the Russian Embassy to them had been a mixture of angry complaints and friendly assurances, accompanied with positive requisitions as to the Holy Places in Palestine, indications of some ulterior views, and a general tone of insistence bordering at times on intimidation.'* They declared that as to what the ulterior views were, 'there was still some uncertainty in the language of Prince Mentschikoff. In the beginning he had sounded the sentiments of the Porte as to a defensive alliance with Russia, but, receiving no encouragement, had desisted from the overture. His intentions were now rather directed to a remodelling of the Greek Patriarchate of Constantinople to a more clear and comprehensive definition of Russian right under treaty to protect the Greek and Armenian subjects of the Porte in religious matters, and to the conclusion of a formal agreement comprising those points.' Then eager to place themselves under Lord Stratford's guidance, but still shrinking from a disclosure of the whole truth, the Turkish Ministers entreated the Ambassador to tell them how to meet the demands which, although they only spoke of them hypothetically, had been already made by Prince Mentschikoff.

Lord Stratford instantly saw that he must

* 'Eastern Papers,' part i. p. 125.
cause the question of the Holy Places to be kept clear of all the other subjects of discussion which Prince Mentschikoff might be intending to raise, for it was plain that the vacillation of the Porte in regard to the sanctuaries (though it had sprung from a desire to avoid giving offence to either of two great Powers) had given Russia fair grounds of complaint on that subject; but the Czar had nothing else to complain of, and it was clear, therefore, that if the one grievance which really existed could be settled, every hostile step which Russia might afterwards take would place her more and more in the wrong. 'Endeavour,' said Lord Stratford, in charging the Turkish Ministers, 'to keep the affair of the Holy Places separate from the ulterior proposals (whatever they may be) of Russia. The course which you appear to have taken under the former head was probably the best, and I am glad to find that there is a fair prospect of its success. Whenever Prince Mentschikoff comes forward with further propositions, you are at perfect liberty to decline entering into negotiation without a full statement of their nature, extent, and reasons. Should they be found on examination to carry with them that degree of influence over the Christian subjects of the Porte in favour of a foreign Power which might eventually prove dangerous or seriously inconvenient to the exercise of the Sultan's legitimate authority, His Majesty's Ministers cannot be doing wrong in declining them.'

* 'Eastern Papers,' part i. p. 125.
But then, added the Ambassador—and his words portended some counsels hard to follow—this will not prevent the removal by direct sovereign authority of any existing abuse."

Gradually the Turkish Ministers told more, and on the 9th of April Lord Stratford knew that Russia was demanding a treaty engagement, giving her the protectorate of the Greek Church in Turkey; and being now in communication with Prince Mentschikoff, he succeeded, as he believed, in penetrating the real object which Russia had in view. 'That object,' he said, 'was to reinstate the Russian influence in Turkey on an exclusive basis, and in a commanding and stringent form.' In other words, Prince Mentschikoff, with horse and foot and artillery and the whole Sebastopol fleet at his back, was come to depose the man whom they called in St Petersburg 'the English Sultan.' On the other hand, Lord Stratford was not willing to be deposed. The struggle began.

The severance of the question of the Holy Places from the ulterior demands of the Czar was not an object to be pursued for the sake of order and convenience only. On the contrary, it bade fair to govern the result of the diplomatic conflict; for the Montenegro question having disappeared, and Russia having committed herself to the avowal that she had no complaints against the Sultan except in regard to the Holy Places, a settlement of that solitary grievance would leave the ulterior demands so baseless that any attempt to enforce

* 'Eastern Papers,' part i. p. 125.
them by arms would be a naked outrage upon the opinion of Europe. If Prince Mentschikoff had been a man accustomed to negotiate, he would have taken care to preserve the question of the Holy Places, and keep it blended with the ulterior demand until he saw his way to a successful issue; for he was in the position of having to found two demands upon one grievance, and it was clear, therefore, that he would be stranded if he allowed his one grievance to be disposed of without having good reason for knowing that his further demand would be granted; but he was vain and confident, and perhaps his sagacity was blunted by the thought that he was able to threaten an appeal to force. Moreover, Prince Mentschikoff was in the hands of a practised adversary.

Lord Stratford, knowing the full import of the decision towards which he was leading his opponent, did not fail to deal with him tenderly; and for several days the Prince had the satisfaction of imagining that the imperious and overbearing Englishman of whom they were always talking at St Petersburg was become very gentle in his presence. The two Ambassadors, without being yet in negotiation, began to talk with one another of the matters which were bringing the peace of the world into danger. They spoke of the Holy Places. Far from seeming to be hard or scornful in regard to that matter, Lord Stratford was full of deference to a cause which, whether it were founded on error or on truth, was still the honest
heart's desire of fifty millions of pious men. He showed by his language that if by chance he should be called upon to use his good offices in this matter, or to mediate between Russia and France, he would form his judgment with gravity and with care. Where he could do so with justice, he admitted the fairness of the Russian claims.

Prince Mentschikoff's tone became 'considerably softened.'* Then the Ambassadors ventured upon the subject still more pregnant with danger, for Lord Stratford now disclosed his knowledge of Prince Mentschikoff's 'ulterior propositions relative to the protectorate of the 'whole Greek Church and the priesthood in 'Turkey, and his conviction that they would 'meet with serious opposition from the Porte, 'and be regarded with little favour by Powers 'even the most friendly to Russia.'† Prince Mentschikoff tried to 'attenuate the extent and 'effect'‡ of his demands; and, on the other hand, Lord Stratford 'drew a clear line of distinc- 'tion between the confirmation of special 'points already stipulated by treaty, and an ex- 'ension of influence having the virtual force of 'a protectorate, to be exercised exclusively by a 'single foreign Power, over the most important 'and numerous class of the Sultan's tributary 'subjects;'‡ but by a common consent the two Ambassadors 'avoided entering into a discussion

* 'Eastern Papers,' part i. p. 134.
† Ibid. p. 151.
‡ Ibid. p. 139.
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which might have proved irritating upon this 'question.' * Prince Mentschikoff, however, committed the diplomatic error of intimating 'that, notwithstanding the great importance attached 'to it by his Government, there was no danger 'of any hostile aggression as the result of its 'failure, but at most an estrangement between 'the two Courts, and perhaps, though it was not so 'said, an interruption of diplomatic relations.' *

That in these circumstances, and until he had succeeded in separating the question of the Holy Places, it was right for the English Ambassador to deal very temperately with the ulterior demands of the Czar, no diplomatist would doubt; and Lord Stratford acknowledges† that he carefully refrained from discussing the subject in a way tending to irritate, but the Russians imagine that he did more than abstain. They say that, having been supplied with a copy of Prince Mentschikoff's draft of the convention embodying his demands in respect to the Greek Church and Clergy, Lord Stratford struck out as inadmissible the clauses relating to the Greek Patriarch's tenure of office, and sending back the draft with that and with no other alteration, induced the Turkish Ministers (and through them induced the Russian Embassy) to suppose that he entertained no objection to the proposed convention except that which he had indicated by his erasure; and that Prince Mentschikoff, being in this belief, and being prepared to give way upon

* 'Eastern Papers,' part i. p. 139.  
† Ibid. p. 134.
the question of the Greek Patriarch, had a right to expect Lord Stratford's acquiescence in that dangerous part of the Czar's demand which sought to establish a Protectorate over the Greek Church in Turkey. Nothing is more likely than that, in the process of endeavouring to penetrate Lord Stratford's intentions through the medium of the Turkish Ministers, Prince Mentschikoff may have received a wrong impression, and it is very likely that Lord Stratford in reading the draft may have at once struck out clauses which he regarded as totally inadmissible, reserving for separate discussion and for oral explanation the consideration of an ambiguous clause which, dangerous as it was, might easily be so altered as to become entirely harmless; but it is certain that there was never a moment in which Lord Stratford was willing or even would have endured that any Protectorate over the Greek Church in Turkey should be ceded to Russia;* and no one versed in the spirit of English diplomacy, or having a just conception of Lord Stratford's nature, will be able to accept the belief that the Queen's Ambassador intended to overreach his antagonist by any misleading contrivance.

But whatever may have been the clue which led him into the wrong path, Prince Mentschikoff failed to see the danger in which he would place the success of his negotiation if he consented to let the question of the Holy Places be treated separ-

* See Lord Stratford's Despatches, 'Eastern Papers,' part i. p. 127 et seq. to 151.
ately; and the angry despatches which now came in from St Petersburg* did not tend to divert him from his error. On the contrary, they tended to place him in hostility with France more distinctly than before; and since the question of the Holy Places was the one in which France and Russia were face to face, the Czar's Ambassador was not perhaps unwilling to enter upon a course which would place him for the time in distinct antagonism with France, and with France alone. He agreed to allow the question of the Holy Places to be treated first and apart from his other demands.

It must be acknowledged that, so far as concerned the question of the Holy Places, the demands made by Russia were moderate. Notwithstanding all the heat of his sectarian zeal, the Emperor Nicholas had seen that to endeavour to enforce a withdrawal of the privileges which had been granted with public solemnity to the Latin Church would be to outrage Catholic Europe; and it may be believed, too, that his religious feeling made him unwilling to exclude the people of other creeds from those Holy Sites which, according to the teaching of his own Church, it was good for Christians to embrace. But if the demands of the Russian Emperor in regard to the Holy Places were fair and moderate, he was resolved to be peremptory in enforcing them. And it seemed to him that in this matter he could not fail to have the ascendant, for his forces were near

* 13th April.
at hand. Also he had good right to suppose that
France would be isolated, for it was not to be
believed that England or any other Power would
take a part or even acknowledge the slightest inter-
est in a question between two sorts of monks.

On the other hand, the violent language of M.
de Lavalette, his threats, the persistence of the
French Government, and the advance of the
Toulon fleet to the Bay of Salamis,—all these
signs seemed to exclude the expectation that the
French Government would easily give way. Here
was an error. Zealous himself, the Russian Amb-
bassador imagined a zeal in the Government and
the Church to which he was opposing himself,
and fancied that he saw in the French Ambas-
sador’s ‘resistance a proof of the encroaching
’spirit of that Church which proclaims itself
‘universal, and looked for its real cause in the
‘unceasing desire of the same Church to extend
‘the sphere of its action.’* He failed to see that
his French antagonist might suddenly smile and
throw off the cause of the Latin Church, and so
rob the Czar of the signal triumph on which he
was reckoning, by the process of mere concession.

But whilst, to the common judgment of men who
watched this haughty Embassy, it seemed that
the Czar, in all the pride of strength and firm
purpose, was descending on his prey, he was ful-
filling the utmost hope of the patient enemy in the
West, who had long pursued him with a stealthy
joy, and was now keenly marking him down.

* ‘Eastern Papers,’ part i. p. 139.
CHAPTER X.

Meantime the course of events affecting the question of the Holy Places had shifted the grounds of dispute; for the solemn act performed at Bethlehem in the foregoing December had converted the claims of the Latins into established privileges; and the Emperor Nicholas, notwithstanding his religious excitement, had still enough wisdom to see that, although he might have been able to prevent this result by a violent use of his power at an earlier period, he could not now undo what was done. Without outraging Catholic Europe, and even, it may be believed, his own sense of religious propriety, he could not now wrench the key of the Bethlehem Church from the hands of the Latin monks, nor tear down the silver star from the Holy Stable of the Nativity. Therefore all that Prince Mentschikoff demanded in regard to the key and the star was a declaration by the Turkish Government that the delivery of the key implied no ownership over the principal altar of the Church; that no change should be made in the system of the religious ceremonies or
the hours of service; that the guardianship of the
Great Gate should always be entrusted to a Greek
priest; and, finally, that the silver star should be
deemed to be a gift coming from the mere gener-
osity of the Sultan, and conferring no sort of new
rights.* In regard to the shrine of the Blessed
Virgin at Gethsemane, Prince Mentschikoff re-
quised that the Greeks should have precedence at
her tomb. He also insisted that the gardens of
the Church of Bethlehem should remain in the
joint guardianship of the Greeks and the Latins;
and in demanding that some buildings which over-
looked the terraces of the Church of the Holy
Sepulchre should be pulled down, he required that
the site of these buildings should never become
the property of any 'nation,' but be walled off and
kept apart as neutral ground. This last demand
is curious. The Russian Government felt that
even at Jerusalem it would be well to set apart
one small shred of ground, and keep it free from
the strife of the Churches.

But the last of Prince Mentschikoff's demands
in regard to the Holy Places was the one most
hard to solve. It has been said that in comparing
the ways of men in the East with the ways of
men in the West, there are found many subjects
on which their views are not merely different but
opposite. One of these is the business of repair-
ing churches. Whilst the English Churchmen
were contending that they ought not to be laden
with the whole burthen of keeping their sacred

* 'Eastern Papers,' part i. p. 129.
buildings in repair, the Christians in Palestine were willing to set the world in flames for the sake of maintaining their rival claims to the honour of repairing churches. The cupola of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre at Jerusalem was out of order. The Greeks, supported by Russia, claimed the right to repair it. The Latins denied their right. The dispute raged. Then, as usual, the wise and decorous Turk stepped in between the combatants, and said he would repair the Church himself. This did not content the Greeks, and Prince Mentschikoff now demanded that the ancient rights of the Greeks to repair the great Cupola and Church at Jerusalem should be recognised and confirmed; and although he did not reject the Sultan's offer to supply the means for the repairs, he insisted that the work should be under the control of the Greek Patriarch of Jerusalem.*

Some of these demands were resisted by France; and although M. de Lavalette had been long since recalled, M. de la Cour, who succeeded him, seemed inclined to be somewhat persistent, especially in regard to the question of the Cupola and the question of precedence at the Tomb of the Blessed Virgin.

It seems probable, however, that although M. de la Cour may have been sufficiently supplied with instructions touching the immediate question in hand, he had not perceived so clearly as his English colleague the dawn of the new French policy. From the communications of his own

* 'Eastern Papers,' part i. p. 129.
Government before he crossed the Channel, from his sojourn at Paris, and from the tenor of the despatches from England, Lord Stratford had gathered means of inferring that France no longer intended to keep herself apart from England by persisting in her pressure upon the Sultan; and, supposing that she had made up her mind to enter upon this new policy, Lord Stratford might well entertain a hope that the question whether a Greek priest should be allowed to control the repair of a Cupola at Jerusalem, or whether the doorkeeper of a Church should be a Greek or a Latin, would not be fought with undue obstinacy by the quick-witted countrymen of Voltaire. He spoke with M. de la Cour, and found that he was prepared for concession, if matters could be so arranged as to satisfy what Lord Stratford, in his haughty and almost zoological way, liked to call 'French feelings of honour.' *

By means of his communications with the Turks, the English Ambassador easily ascertained the points on which Prince Mentschikoff might be expected to be inexorable. These were:—the repair of the Cupola, the question of precedence at the Tomb of the Virgin, and the question about the Greek doorkeeper in the Church of Bethlehem. Furnished with this clue, Lord Stratford saw M. de la Cour, and dissuaded him from committing himself to a determined resistance on any of these three questions. He also gave his French colleague to understand that, in his opinion, the

* 'Eastern Papers,' part i. p. 13f.
Greek pretension upon these three points stood on strong ground, and urged him to bear in mind the great European interests at stake, the declared moderation of the French Government, and the triumph already achieved by France in regard to the key and the silver star. And then Lord Stratford gave M. de la Cour a pleasing glimpse of the discomfiture into which their Russian colleague would be thrown if only the question of the Holy Places could be settled.* The French Ambassador soon began to enter into the spirit of these counsels.

On the other hand, Prince Mentschikoff was also willing to dispose of this question of the Holy Places; for he had now seen enough to be aware that he would not encounter sufficient resistance upon this matter to give him either a signal triumph or a tenable ground of rupture, and the angry despatches which he was receiving from St Petersburg made him impatient to press forward his ulterior demand. The two contending negotiators being thus disposed, it was soon found that the hindrances which prevented their coming to terms were very slender. But it often happens that the stress which a common man lays upon any subject of dispute is proportioned to the energy which he has spent in dealing with it, rather than to the real magnitude of the question itself; and when Prince Mentschikoff and M. de la Cour seemed to be approaching to a settlement, they allowed their minds to become once again so

* 'Eastern Papers,' part i. p. 155.
much heated by the strenuous discussions of small matters that the difficulty of settling the question of the Holy Places threatened to increase. The French and Russian Ambassadors insisted on their respective pretensions, while the Porte inclined but hesitated to assume the responsibility of deciding between them.'* Then, at last, the hour was ripe for the intervention of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe. 'I thought,' said he, 'it was time for me to adopt a more prominent part in reconciling the adverse parties.'

He was more than equal to the task. Being by nature so grave and stately as to be able to refrain from a smile without effort and even without design, he prevented the vain and presumptuous Russian from seeing the minuteness and inanity of the things which he was gaining by his violent attempt at diplomacy. For the Greek Patriarch to be authorised to watch the mending of a dilapidated roof—for the Greek votaries to have the first hour of the day at a tomb—and, finally, for the doorkeeper of a church to be always a Greek, though without any right of keeping out his opponents—these things might be trifles, but awarded to All the Russias through the stately mediation of the English Ambassador, they seemed to gain in size and majesty; and for the moment, perhaps, the sensations of the Prince were nearly the same as though he were receiving the surrender of a province or the engagements of a great alliance. On the other hand, Lord Strat-

* 'Eastern Papers,' part i. p. 157.
ford was unfailing in his deference to the motives of action which he had classed under the head of 'French feelings of honour;' and if M. de la Cour was set on fire by the thought that at the Tomb of the Virgin, or anywhere else, the Greek priests were to perform their daily worship before the hour appointed for the services of the Church which looked to France for support, Lord Stratford was there to explain, in his grand quiet way, that the priority proposed to be given to the Greeks was a priority resulting from the habit of early prayer which obtained in Oriental Churches, and not from their claim to have precedence over the species of monk which was protected by Frenchmen. At length he addressed the two Ambassadors; he solemnly expressed his hope that they would come to an adjustment. His words brought calm. In obedience, as it were, to the order of Nature, the lesser minds gave way to the greater, and the contention between the Churches for the shrines of Palestine was closed. The manner in which the Sultan should guarantee this apportionment of the shrines was still left open, but in all other respects, the question of the Holy Places was settled.*

According to the terms of the arrangement thus effected, the key of the Church of Bethlehem and the silver star placed in the Grotto of the Nativity were to remain where they were, but were to confer no new right on the Latins; and the doorkeeper of the Church was to be a Greek priest as

* April 22, 1853. 'Eastern Papers,' part i. p. 157.
before, but was to have no right to obstruct other nations in their right to enter the building. The question of precedence at the Tomb of the Blessed Virgin was ingeniously eluded by the device before spoken of; for the priority given to the Greeks was treated as though it resulted from a convenient arrangement of hours rather than from any intent to grant precedence; and it was accordingly arranged that the Greeks should worship in the Church every morning immediately after sunrise, and then the Armenians, and then the Latins, each nation having an hour and a half for the purpose. Perhaps it was in order to hinder the out-going worshippers from coming into conflict with those who were about to begin their devotions that the gentle Armenians were thus interposed between the two angry Churches. The gardens of the Convent of Bethlehem were to remain as before, under the joint care of the Greeks and Latins. With regard to the Cupola of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, it was arranged that it should be repaired by the Sultan in such a way as not to alter its form; and if, in the course of the building, any deviation from this engagement should appear to be threatened, the Greek Patriarch of Jerusalem was to be authorised to remonstrate, with a view to guard against innovation. The buildings overlooking the terraces of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre were to have their windows walled up, but were not to be demolished, and therefore no effect could be given to the Russian plan of setting apart a neutral ground
to be kept free from the dominion of both the contending Churches. All these arrangements were to be embodied in firmans addressed by the Sultan to the Turkish authorities at Jerusalem.*

Thus, after having tasked the patience of European diplomacy for a period of nearly three years, the business of apportioning the holy shrines of Palestine between the Churches of the East and of the West was brought at last to a close. The question was perhaps growing ripe for settlement when Lord Stratford reached Constantinople; but whether it was so or not, he closed it in seventeen days. For the part which he had taken in helping to achieve this result he received the thanks of the Turkish Government and of the Russian and French Ambassadors. The Divan might well be grateful to him, and he deserved, too, the thanks of his French colleague; for, having more insight into the new policy of the French Government than M. de la Cour, he was able to place him in the path which turned out to be the right one. But when Lord Stratford received the thanks of Prince Mentschikoff, he felt perhaps that the gravity which had served him well in these transactions was a gift which was still of some use.

* 'Eastern Papers,' part i. p. 248. The question of the Holy Places was finally settled on the 22d of April.
CHAPTER XI.

Whilst the question of the Holy Places was approaching its solution, Prince Mentschikoff went on with his demand for the protectorate of the Greek Church in Turkey; but the character of his mission was fitfully changed from time to time by the tenor of his instructions from home. On the 12th of April, the peaceful views which had prevailed at St Petersburg some weeks before were still governing the Russian Embassy at Constantinople; and Lord Stratford was able to report that the altered tone and demeanour of Prince Mentschikoff corresponded with the conciliatory assurances which Count Nesselrode had been giving in the previous month to Sir Hamilton Seymour. But on the following day all was changed. Fresh despatches came in from St Petersburg. They breathed anger and violent impatience, and of this anger and of this impatience the causes were visible. It was the measure adopted in Paris, several weeks before, which had rekindled the dying embers of the quarrel at St Petersburg, and the torch was now brought to Constantinople.
It has been seen that, without reason, and without communication with the English Ministers* (though it professed to be acting in unison with them), the French Government had ordered the Toulon fleet to approach the scene of controversy by advancing to Salamis; and it was whilst the indignation roused by this movement was still fresh in the mind of the Emperor Nicholas that the despatches had been framed. Moreover, at the time of sending of the despatches, the Czar knew that by the day they reached the shores of the Bosphorus, the man of whom he never could think with temper or calmness would already be at Constantinople, and he of course understood that, in the way of diplomatic strife, his Lord High Admiral the Serene Prince Governor of Finland was unfit for an encounter with Lord Stratford. He seems, therefore, to have determined to extricate his Ambassador from the unequal conflict by putting an end to what there was of a diplomatic character in the mission, and urging him into a course of sheer violence, which would supersede the finer labours of negotiation.

From the change which the despatches wrought in Prince Mentschikoff’s course of action, from the steps which he afterwards took, and from the known bent and temper of the Czar’s mind, it may be inferred that the instructions now received by the Russian Ambassador were somewhat to this effect:—*The French fleet has been ordered to Salamis. The Emperor is justly indignant.

* 'Eastern Papers,' part i. p. 98.
You must bring your mission to a close forthwith. Be peremptory both with the French and the Turks. If the French Ambassador is obstinate enough upon the question of the Holy Places to give you a tenable ground on which you can stand out, then hasten at once to a rupture upon that business without further discussion about our ulterior demands. But if the French Ambassador throws no sufficing difficulties in the way of the settlement of the question of the Holy Places, then press your demand for the protectorate of the Greek Church. Press it peremptorily. In carrying out these instructions, you have full discretion so far as concerns all forms and details, but in regard to time the Emperor grants you no latitude. You must force your mission to a close. By the time you receive this despatch Stratford Canning will be at Constantinople. He has ever thwarted His Majesty the Emperor. The inscrutable will of Providence has bestowed upon him great gifts of mind which he has used for no other purpose than to baffle and humiliate the Emperor, and keep down the Orthodox Church. In negotiation, or in contest for influence over the Turks, he would overcome you and crush you, but his instructions do not authorise him to be more than a mere peaceful negotiator. You, on the contrary, are supported by force. He can only persuade; you can threaten. Strike terror. Make the Divan feel the weight of our preparations in Bessarabia and at Sebastopol. Dannenberg's horsemen are
close upon the Pruth. When the Emperor re-
members the position of the 4th and the 5th
 corps d'armée, and the forwardness of his naval
preparations, he conceives he has a right to ex-
pect that you should instantly be able to take
the ascendant over a man who, with all his
hellish ability, is after all nothing more than the
representative of a country absorbed in the pur-
suit of gain. The Emperor cannot and will not
endure that his Representative, supported by the
forces of the Empire, should remain secondary
to the English Ambassador. Again the Emperor
commands me to say you must strike terror.
Use a fierce insulting tone. If the Turks remain
calm, it will be because Stratford Canning sup-
ports them. Therefore demand private audiences
of the Sultan, and press upon his fears. If your
last demands, whatever they may be, are reject-
ed, quit Constantinople immediately with your
whole suit, and carry away with you the whole
staff of our Legation.'

On the day after receiving his despatches, Prince
Mentschikoff had a long interview with Rifaat
Pasha, and strove to wrench from him the assent
of the Turkish Government to the terms already
submitted to the Porte as the project for a secret
treaty. And although it happened that in the
course of the negotiations on this subject Russia
submitted to accept many changes in the form or
the wording of the engagement which she required,
it may be said with accuracy that, from the first
to the last, she always required the Porte to give
her an instrument which should have the force of a treaty engagement, and confer upon her the right to insist that the Greek Church and Clergy in Turkey should continue in the enjoyment of all their existing privileges. It was clear, therefore, that if the Sultan should be induced to set his seal to any instrument of this kind, he would be chargeable with a breach of treaty engagements whenever a Greek bishop could satisfy a Russian Emperor that there was some privilege formerly enjoyed by him or his Church which had been varied or withdrawn. It was plain that for the Sultan to yield thus much would be to make the Czar a partaker of his sovereignty. This seemed clear to men of all nations except the Russians themselves; but especially it seemed clear to those who happened to know something of the structure of the Ottoman Empire. The indolence or the wise instinct of the Mussulman rulers had given to the Christian 'nations' living within the Sultan's dominions many of the blessings which we cherish under the name of 'self-government;' and since the Greek Christians had exercised these privileges by deputing their bishops and their priests to administer the authority conceded to the 'nation,' it followed that the spiritual dominion of the priesthood had become blended with a great share of temporal power. So many of the duties of prefects, of magistrates, of assessors, of collectors, and of police were discharged by bishops, priests, and deacons, that a protectorate of these ecclesiastics might be so used by a powerful for-
eign Prince, as to carry with it a virtual sovereignty over ten or fourteen millions of laymen.

All this had been seen by Lord Stratford and by the Turkish Ministers; and when Prince Menschikoff pressed the treaty upon Rifaat Pasha he was startled, as it would seem, by the calmness and the full knowledge which he encountered. 'The treaty,' said Rifaat Pasha, 'would be giving to Russia an exclusive protectorate over the whole Greek population, their clergy, and their Churches.'*

The Prince, it would seem, now began to know that he had to do with the English Ambassador, for he made the alteration before adverted to in the draft of his treaty, and on the 20th of April read it in its amended shape to Lord Stratford, and assured him that it was only an explanatory guarantee of existing treaties, giving to the co-religionists of Russia what Austria already possessed with regard to hers. Lord Stratford on that day had approached to within forty-eight hours of the settlement of the question of the Holy Places, which he deemed it so vital to achieve; and it may be easily imagined that, in the remarks which he might make upon hearing the draft read, he would abstain with great care from irritating discussion, and would not utter a word more than was necessary for the purpose of fairly indicating that his postponement of discussion on the subject of the ulterior demands was not to be mistaken for acquiescence; but all that for that pur-

* 'Eastern Papers,' part i. p. 153.
Pose was needed he fairly said, for he observed to Prince Mentschikoff 'that the Sultan's promise to protect his Christian subjects in the free exercise of their religion differed extremely from a right conferred on any foreign Power to enforce that protection, and also that the same degree of interference might be dangerous to the Porte, when exercised by so powerful an empire as Russia on behalf of ten millions of Greeks, and innocent in the case of Austria, whose influence, derivable from religious sympathy, was confined to a small number of Catholics, including her own subjects.'* These remarks were surely not ambiguous; but it seems probable that Prince Mentschikoff, misled by his previous impression as to what Lord Stratford really objected to, may have imagined that the proposed convention in its altered form would not be violently disapproved by the English Ambassador. At all events, he seems to have instructed his Government to that effect.

On the 19th of April the Russian Ambassador addressed his remonstrances and his demands to the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs in the form of a diplomatic Note. In the first sentence of this singular document Prince Mentschikoff tells the Minister for Foreign Affairs that he must have 'seen the duplicity of his predecessor.' In the next he tells him he must be 'convinced of the extent to which the respect due to the Emperor had been disregarded, and how great was his magnanimity in offering to the Porte the

* 'Eastern Papers,' part i. p. 156.
'means of escaping from the embarrassments occasioned to it by the bad faith of its Ministers;' and then, after more objurgation in the same strain, and after dealing in a peremptory way with the question of the Holy Places, the Note goes on to declare that 'in consequence of the hostile tendencies manifested for some years past in whatever related to Russia, she required in behalf of the religious communities of the 'Orthodox Church an explanatory and positive 'act of guarantee.' Then the Note requested that the Ottoman Cabinet would 'be pleased in its 'wisdom to weigh the serious nature of the offence 'which it had committed, and compare it with 'the moderation of the demands made for repar- 'ation and guarantee, which a consideration of 'legitimate defence might have put forward at 'greater length and in more peremptory terms.' Finally the Note stated that 'the reply of the 'Minister for Foreign Affairs would indicate to the 'Ambassador the ulterior duties which he would 'have to discharge;' and intimated that those duties would be 'consistent with the dignity of 'the Government which he represented, and of 'the religion professed by his Sovereign.'*

It might have been politic for Prince Mentschikoff to send such a note as this in the midst of the panic which followed his landing in the early days of March, but it was vain to send it now. The Turks had returned to their old allegiance. They could take their rest, for they knew that

* 'Eastern Papers,' part i. p. 158.
Lord Stratford watched. Him they feared, him they trusted, him they obeyed. It was in vain now that the Prince sought to crush the will of the Sultan and of his Ministers. Whether he threatened, or whether he tried to cajole; whether he sent his dragoman with angry messages to the Porte, or whether he went thither in person; whether he urged the members of the Government in private interviews, or whether he obtained audience of the Sultan, he always encountered the same firmness, the same courteous deference, and, above all, that same terrible moderation which, day by day and hour by hour, was putting him more and more in the wrong. The voice which spoke to him might be the voice of the Grand Vizier, or the voice of the Reis Effendi, or the voice of the Sultan himself; but the mind which he was really encountering was always the mind of one man.

Far from quailing under the threatening tone of the Note, the Turkish Government now determined to enter into no convention with Russia, and to reject Prince Mentschikoff's proposals respecting the protection of the Greek Church in Turkey. The Grand Vizier and the Reis Effendi calmly consulted Lord Stratford as to the manner in which they should give effect to the decision of the Cabinet, and Lord Stratford, now placed at ease by the settlement of the question of the Holy Places, contentedly prepared to encounter the next expected moves of Prince Mentschikoff.*

* 24th April. 'Eastern Papers,' part i. p. 160. The settlement of the question of the Holy Places was on the 22d.
In strife for ascendancy like that which was now going on between the Czar and Lord Stratford, the pain of undergoing defeat is of such a kind that the pangs of the sufferer accumulate; and far from being assuaged by time, they are every day less easy to bear than they were the day before. By the pomp and the declared significance of Prince Mentschikoff's mission, the Emperor Nicholas had drawn upon himself the eyes of Europe, and the presence of the religious ingredient had brought him under the gaze of many millions of his own subjects who were not commonly observers of the business of the State. And he who, in transactions thus watched by men, was preparing for him cruel discomfiture—he who kept him on the rack, and regulated his torments with cold unrelenting precision—was the old familiar enemy whom he had once refused to receive as the English Ambassador at St Petersburg. People who knew the springs of action in the Russian capital used to say at that time that the whole 'Eastern Question,' as it was called, lay enclosed in one name—lay enclosed in the name of Lord Stratford. They acknowledged that the Emperor Nicholas could not bear the stress of our Ambassador's authority with the Porte.

And, in truth, the Czar's power of endurance was drawing to a close. He wavered and wavered again and again. He was versed in business of State, and it would seem that when his mind was turned to things temporal he truly meant to be politic and just. But in his more religious mo-
ments he was furious. Even for Nicholas the Czar it was all but impossible to endure the Ambassador's political ascendancy; but the bare thought of Lord Stratford's protecting Christianity in Turkey was more than could be borne by Nicholas the Pontiff. Men not jesting approached him with stories that the Ambassador had determined to bring over the Sultan to the Church of England. His brain was not strong enough to be safe against rumours like that. He almost came to feel that the Englishman, who seemed to be endowed with strange powers of compulsion always used for the support of Moslem dominion and for curbing the Orthodox Russo-Greek Church, was a being in his nature Satanic, and that resistance to him was as much a duty (and was a duty as thickly beset with practical difficulties) as resistance to the great enemy of mankind. Maddened at last by this singular kind of torment, the Czar broke loose from the restraints of policy, and was even so void of counsel that, having determined to do violence to the Sultan, he did not take the common care of giving to his action any semblance of consistency with public law.

The despatches framed under the orders of a monarch in this condition of mind reached Prince Mentschikoff in the beginning of May. Breathing fresh anger and enjoining haste, they fiercely drove him on. They urged him to an almost instantaneous rupture, without giving him a standing-ground for his quarrel. Yet at this time the condition of things was of such a kind that a good
cause, nay even a specious grievance, would have helped Prince Mentschikoff better than the advance of the 4th and 5th corps, or the patrolling of Dannenberg's cavalry.

In truth, what now befell the Russian Ambassador was this:—He found himself placed under the compulsion of violent instructions at a time when all ground for just resentment was wanting. He could obey his orders, and force on a rupture; but he could no longer do this upon grounds which Europe would regard as having a semblance of fairness. When he had despatched his Note of the 19th of April, the question of the Holy Places was still unsettled, and he was then able to blend that grievance with other matters, and make it serve as a basis for his ulterior demands; but now that that question was disposed of, his standing-ground failed him, for he alleged against the Sultan no infraction of a treaty, and the only grievance of which he had had to complain had been redressed on the 22d of April; and yet, passing straight from this smooth condition of things, he had to call upon the Sultan to sign a treaty which he disapproved, and to make his refusal to do so a ground for the immediate rupture of diplomatic relations.

The natural hope of a diplomatist placed in a stress of this sort would have lain in the chance that the Government upon which he was pressing might be guilty of some imprudence, and it may be inferred that the Note of the 19th had been framed with a view of provoking the Turkish
Ministers into a burst of anger. But every hope of this kind had been baffled. Turks were fanatical, Turks were fierce, Turks were quick to avenge, and, above all, Turks were liable to panic; but some spell had come upon the race. The spell had come upon the Sultan, it had come upon the Turkish Ministers, it had come upon the Great Council, it had come even upon the larger mass of the warlike people who bring their feelings to bear upon the policy of their Sultan. At every step of his negotiation Prince Mentschikoff encountered an adversary always courteous, always moderate, but cold, steadfast, wary, and seeming as though he looked to the day when perhaps he might wreak cruel vengeance. Who this was the Prince now knew; and he perhaps began to understand the nature of the torment inflicted upon his imperial Master by the bare utterance of the one hated name. Prince Mentschikoff found himself powerless as a negotiator, and it was clear that, unless he could descend to the rude expedient of an ultimatum or a threat, he was a man annulled. Indeed, without some act of violence he could hardly deliver himself from ridicule.

Therefore, on the 5th of May, Prince Mentschikoff forwarded to the Minister for Foreign Affairs the draft of a Sened or Convention, purporting to be made between the Sultan and the Emperor of Russia. This proposed Sened confirmed, with the force of a treaty engagement, the arrangements respecting the Holy Places which had been made
in favour of the Greek Church, and it also introduced and applied to the rival Churches a provision similar in its wording to that which often appears in commercial treaties, and goes by the name of 'the most favoured nation clause.' But the noxious feature of the Convention, was detected in the Article which purported to secure for ever to the Orthodox Church and its Clergy all the rights and immunities which they had already enjoyed, and those of which they were possessed from ancient times.* Here, under a new form, was the old endeavour to obtain for Russia a protectorate of the Greek Church in Turkey.

This draft of a Convention was annexed to a Note, in which Prince Mentschikoff pressed its immediate adoption, and urged the Sublime Porte, 'laying aside all hesitation and all mistrust, by 'which,' he declared, 'the dignity and the generous sentiments of his august Master would be aggrieved,'† to delay its decision no longer. In conclusion, Prince Mentschikoff suffered himself to request that the Minister for Foreign Affairs would be good enough to let him have his answer by the following Tuesday, and to add that he could not 'consider any longer delay in any other 'light than as a want of respect towards his 'Government, which would impose upon him the 'most painful duty.'†

Upon receiving this hostile communication, the Minister for Foreign Affairs appealed to Lord Stratford.

* 'Eastern Papers,' part i. p. 167.  † Ibid. p. 165.
Stratford for counsel. He advised the Turkish Government to be still deferential, still courteous, still willing to go to the very edge of what might be safely conceded, but to stand firm.

At this time Lord Stratford received a visit from Prince Mentschikoff, and ascertained from him that he did not mean to recede from his demands. The Prince declared that he had run out the whole line of his moderation, and could go no further, and that his Government would no longer submit to the state of inferiority in which he said Russia was held with reference to the co-religionists of the Emperor Nicholas.

A few days later Lord Stratford addressed a letter to Prince Mentschikoff, in which, with all the diplomatic courtesy of which he was master, he strove to convey to the Prince some idea of the way in which he was derogating from that justice and moderation towards foreign sovereigns which had hitherto marked the reign of the Emperor Nicholas. The answer of Prince Mentschikoff announced that it was impossible for him to agree in the views pressed upon him by Lord Stratford, and (after a little more of the wasteful verbiage in which Russia used to assert that her exaction was good and wholesome for Turkey) the Prince claimed a right to freedom of action. He said that he was not conscious of having failed in the loyal assurances given by his Government to the Cabinet of the Queen, declared that he had been perfectly sincere in his communications with Lord Stratford, and owned that he had expected a.
frank co-operation on his part. But when he had written these common things the truth broke out. 'The Emperor's legation,' said he, 'cannot stay ' at Constantinople under the circumstances in ' which it has been placed. It cannot submit ' to the secondary position to which it might be ' wished to reduce it.'*

Lord Stratford, it would seem, had now little hope of being able to bring about an accommodation, and henceforth his great object was to take care that the Porte should stand firm, but should so act that, in the opinion of England and of Europe, the Sultan should seem justified in exposing himself to the hazard of a rupture with Russia.

Late at night Lord Stratford saw the Grand Vizier at his country-house, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Seraskier were present. During the day there had been a little failing of heart, and when the Turkish Ministers were in the presence of M. de la Cour, they had seemed ' disposed to shrink from encountering the conse- ' quences of Prince Mentschikoff's retiring in dis- ' pleasure;'† but either they had dissembled their fears in the presence of the English Ambassador, or else, whilst Lord Stratford was in the same room with them, their fear of other Powers was suspended. They were unanimous in regarding the Convention as inadmissible. Lord Stratford's determination was that the demand of Prince Mentschikoff should be resisted; but that at the

* 'Eastern Papers,' part i. p. 217. † Ibid. p. 177.
same time there should be shown so much of courtesy and of forbearance, and so great a willingness to go to the utmost limit of safe concession, and to improve the condition of the Christian subjects of the Porte, that the Turks should appear before Europe in a character almost angelic. 'I advised them,' said he, 'to open a door for negotiation in the note to be prepared, and to withhold no concession compatible with the real welfare and independence of the Empire. I could not in conscience urge them to accept the Russian demands as now presented to them, but I reminded them of the guarantee required by Prince Mentschikoff, and strongly recommended that, if the guarantee he required was inadmissible, a substitute for it should be found in a frank and comprehensive exercise of the Sultan's authority in the promulgation of a firman, securing both the spiritual and temporal privileges of all the Porte's tributary subjects, and, by way of further security, communicated officially to the five great Powers of Christendom.'* To all these counsels the Turkish Ministers listened with assenting mind.

But it was now late in the night, and the Ambassador rose. Perhaps the hour and the Ambassador's movement to depart cast a shadow of anxiety upon the minds of the Turkish Ministers. Perhaps the ripple of the waters (for the conference was in a house on the edge of the Bosphorus) called to mind the thought of the English

* 'Eastern Papers,' part i. 177.
flag. At all events, the Grand Vizier, in that moment of weakness, suffered himself to cast a thought after the arm of the flesh, and to ask whether the Porte might expect the eventual approach of the English squadron in the Mediterranean. Lord Stratford rebuked him. 'I replied,' said he, 'that I considered the position in its present stage to be one of a moral character, and consequently that its difficulties or hazards, whatever they might be, should be rather met by acts of a similar description than by demonstrations calculated to increase alarm and provoke resentment.'

It was a new and a strange task for this Grand Vizier of a warlike Tartar nation to be called upon to defend a threatened empire by 'acts of a moral character;' but after all his reliance was upon the man. It might be hard for him to understand how the mere advantage of being in the right could be used against the Sebastopol fleet, or the army that was hovering upon the Pruth; but if he looked upon the close, angry, resolute lips of the Ambassador, and the grand overhanging of his brow, he saw that which more than all else in the world takes hold of the Oriental mind, for he saw strength held in reserve. And this faith was of such a kind, that, far from being weakened, it would gather new force from Lord Stratford's refusal to speak of material help. The Turkish Ministry determined to reject Prince Mentschikoff's proposals, and to do this in the way advised by the English Ambassador. All this
while Lord Stratford was unconscious of exercising any ascendancy over his fellow-creatures, and it seemed to him that the Turks were determining this momentous question by means of their unbiased judgments.*

Prince Mentschikoff was soon made aware of the refusal with which his demand was to be met, and, finding that all his communications with the Turkish Ministers gave him nothing but the faithful echo of the counsels addressed to them by Lord Stratford, he seems to have imagined the plan of overstepping the Turkish Ministers, and endeavouring to wring an assent to his demands from the Sultan himself. It seems probable that Lord Stratford had been apprised of this intention, and was willing to defeat it, for on the 9th he sought a private audience of the Sultan: he sought it, of course, through the legitimate channel. The Minister for Foreign Affairs went with Lord Stratford to the Sultan's apartment, and then withdrew. The Ambassador spoke gravely to the Sultan of the danger with which his Empire was threatened, and then of the grounds for confidence. He was happy, he said, to find that His Majesty's servants, both Ministers and Council, were not less inclined to gratify the Russian Ambassador with all that could be safely conceded to him, than determined to withhold their consent from every requisition calculated to inflict a serious injury on the independence and dignity of their Sovereign. 'I had waited,' said Lord Stratford,

* 'Eastern Papers,' part i. p. 213.
to know their own unbiased impressions respecting the kind of guarantee demanded by
Prince Mentschikoff, and I could not do otherwise than approve the decision which they appear to have adopted with unanimity. My own impression is, that if your Majesty should sanction that decision, the Ambassador will probably break off his relations with the Porte and go away, together perhaps with his whole embassy: nor is it quite impossible even that a temporary occupation, however unjust, of the Danubian Principalities by Russia may take place; but I feel certain that neither a declaration of war, nor any other act of open hostility, is to be apprehended for the present, as the Emperor Nicholas cannot resort to such extremities on account of the pending differences without contradicting his most solemn assurances, and exposing himself to the indignant censure of all Europe. I conceive that, under such circumstances, the true position to be maintained by the Porte is one of moral resistance to such demands as are really inadmissible on just and essential grounds, and that the principle should even be applied under protest to the occupation of the Principalities, not in weakness or despair, but in reliance on a good cause, and on the sympathy of friendly and independent Governments. A firm adherence to this line of conduct as long as it is possible to maintain it with honour will, in my judgment, offer the best chances of ultimate success with the least
'practicable degree of provocation, and prevent disturbance of commercial interests. This language,' writes Lord Stratford, 'appeared to interest the Sultan deeply, and also to coincide with His Majesty's existing opinions. He said that he was well aware of the dangers to which I had alluded; that he was perfectly prepared, in the exercise of his own free will, to confirm and to render effective the protection promised to all classes of his tributary subjects in matters of religious worship, including the immunities and privileges granted to their respective clergy. He showed me the last communications in writing which had passed between his Ministers and the Russian Embassy; he thanked me for having helped to bring the question of the Holy Places to an arrangement; he professed his reliance on the friendly support of Great Britain.'

But now Lord Stratford apprised the Sultan that he had a communication to make to him which he had hitherto withheld from his Ministers, reserving it for the private ear of His Majesty. The pale Sultan listened.

Then the Ambassador announced that, in the event of imminent danger, he was instructed to request the Commander of Her Majesty's forces in the Mediterranean to hold his squadron in readiness.*

This order was of itself a slight thing, and it conferred but a narrow and stinted authority; but, imparted to the Sultan in private audience

* 'Eastern Papers,' part i. p. 213.
by Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, it came with more weight than the promise of armed support from the lips of a common Statesman. Long withheld from the Turkish Ministers, and now disclosed to them through their Sovereign, it confirmed them in the faith that whatever a man might know of the great Eltchi's power, there was always more to be known. And when a man once comes to be thus thought of by Orientals, he is more their master than one who seeks to overpower their minds by making coarse pretences of strength.

On the 10th the Secretary for Foreign Affairs sent his answer to Prince Mentschikoff's demand. The letter was full of courtesy and deference towards Russia: it declared it to be the firm intention of the Porte to maintain unimpaired the rights of all the tributary subjects of the Empire, and it expressed a willingness to negotiate with Russia concerning a church and an hospital at Jerusalem, and also as to the privileges which should be conceded to Russian subjects, monks and pilgrims; but the Note objected to entertain that portion of the Russian demands which went to give Russia a protectorate of the Greek Church in Turkey.*

On the following day Prince Mentschikoff sent an angry reply to this Note, declining to accept it as an answer to his demand. He stated that he was instructed to negotiate for an engagement guaranteeing the privileges of the Greek Church as a mark of respect to the religious convictions

* May 10. 'Eastern Papers,' part i. p. 196.
of the Emperor; and if the principles which formed the basis of this proposed mark of respect were to be rejected, and if the Porte, by a systematic opposition, was to persist in closing the very approaches to an intimate and direct understanding, then the Prince declared with pain that he must consider his mission at an end, must break off relations with the Cabinet of the Sultan, and throw upon the responsibility of his Ministers all the consequences which might ensue. The Prince ended his Note by requiring that it should be answered within three days.*

On the second day after sending this Note, Prince Mentschikoff was to have an interview with the Grand Vizier at half-past one o'clock; but before that hour came the Prince took a step which had the effect of breaking up the Ministry. Without the concurrence, and apparently without the previous knowledge, of the Ministers, he found means to obtain a private audience of the Sultan at ten o'clock in the morning. The Sultan did wrongly when he submitted to receive a foreign Ambassador without the advice or knowledge of his Ministers, and the Grand Vizier had the spirit to resent the course thus taken by his Sovereign; for upon being sent for by the Sultan immediately after the audience, he requested permission to stay at home, and at the same time gave up his seals of office. The new Ministry, however, was formed of men who, as members of the Great Council, had declared opinions adverse to the extreme de-

* May 11. 'Eastern Papers,' part i. p. 197.
mands of Russia.* Reshid Pasha became the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; and this was not an appointment which disclosed any intention on the part of the Sultan to disengage himself from the counsels of the English Ambassador.

If the Sultan had erred in granting an audience without the assent of his Ministers, he had carried his weakness no further. It soon transpired that Prince Mentschikoff had failed to wring from the Sultan any dangerous words. It seems that when the Prince came to press his demands upon the imperial ear, he found the monarch reposing in the calmness of mind which had been given him by the English Ambassador five days before, and in a few moments he had the mortification of hearing that for all answer to his demands he was referred to the Minister of State.† In the judgment of Prince Mentschikoff, to be thus answered was to be remitted back to Lord Stratford. It was hard to bear.

Prince Mentschikoff began his intercourse with the new Foreign Secretary by insisting upon an immediate reply to his Note of the 11th of May. Reshid Pasha asked for the delay of a few days, on the ground of the change of Ministry. This reasonable demand was met at first by a refusal, but afterwards by a Note which seems to have been rendered incoherent by the difficulty in which Prince Mentschikoff was placed; for, on the one hand, a request for a delay of a few days,

* 'Eastern Papers,' part i. p. 194.  † Ibid. p. 195
founded upon a change of Ministry, was a request too fair to be refused with decency; and on the other hand, the violent orders which had just come in from St Petersburg enjoined the Prince to close the unequal strife with Lord Stratford, and to enforce instant compliance, or at once break off and depart. The Note began by announcing that Reshid Pasha's communication imposed upon the Russian Ambassador the duty of breaking off from the then present time his official relations with the Sublime Porte; but it added that the Ambassador would suspend the last demand, which was to determine the attitude which Russia would thenceforth assume towards Turkey. The Note further declared that a continuance of hesitation on the part of the Ottoman Government would be regarded as an indication of reserve and distrust offensive to the Russian Government, and that the departure of the Russian Ambassador, and also of the Imperial Legation, would be the inevitable and immediate consequence.

By the voices of forty-two against three, the Great Council of the Porte determined to adhere to the decision already taken; and on the 18th, Reshid Pasha called upon Prince Mentschikoff, and orally imparted to him the extreme length to which the Turkish Government was willing to go in the way of concession. The honour of the Porte required, he said, that the exclusively spiritual privileges granted under the Sultan's predecessors, and confirmed by His Majesty, should
remain in full force; and he declared that the equitable system pursued by the Porte towards its subjects demanded that the Greek Clergy should be on as good a footing as other Christian subjects of the Sultan. He added that a firman was to issue proclaiming this determination on the part of the Sultan. In regard to the shrine at Jerusalem, Reshid Pasha was willing to engage that there should be no change without communicating with the Russian and French Governments. Reshid Pasha also consented that a church and hospital for the Russians should be built at Jerusalem; and in regard to all these last matters connected with the Holy Land, the Porte, he said, was willing to solemnise its promise by a formal convention. These overtures were made in exact accordance with a Paper of advice which Lord Stratford had placed in the hands of Reshid Pasha five days before.* Virtually Reshid Pasha offered Prince Mentschikoff everything which Russia had demanded except the protectorate of the Greek Church in Turkey.† That he refused.

Instantly, and without waiting for the written statement of the proposals orally conveyed to him by Reshid Pasha, Prince Mentschikoff determined to break off the negotiation. On the same day he addressed to the Porte an official Note, which purported to be truly his last. In this he declared that, by rejecting with distrust the wishes of the Emperor in favour of the Orthodox Greco-Russian

* 'Eastern Papers,' part i. p. 196.
† Ibid. p. 205, and see p. 252.
religion, the Sublime Porte had failed in what was due to an august and ancient ally. The refusal, he said, was a fresh injury. He declared his mission at an end; and after asserting that the Imperial Court could not, without prejudice to its dignity and without exposing itself to fresh insults, continue to maintain a mission at Constantinople, he announced that he should not only quit Constantinople himself, but should take with him the whole Staff of the Imperial Legation, except the Director of the Commercial Department. The Prince added, that the refusal of a guarantee for the Orthodox Greco-Russian religion obliged the Imperial Government to seek in its own power that security which the Porte declined to give by way of treaty engagement; and he added that any infringement of the existing state of the Eastern Church would be regarded as an act of hostility to Russia.*

Prince Mentschikoff's departure did not immediately follow the despatch of this Note, and on the morning of the 19th Lord Stratford took a step of great moment to the tranquillity of Europe, for it laid the seed of a wholesome policy which, until it was ruined, as will be seen hereafter, by the evil designs of some, and by the weakness of other men, promised fair to enforce justice and to maintain truth without bringing upon the world the calamity of a war. Instead of putting himself in communication with one only of the other great Powers, and so preparing a road to hostili

* May 18. 'Eastern Papers,' p. 206.
ties, the English Ambassador assembled the representatives of Austria, France, and Prussia. It then appeared that there was no essential difference of opinion between the representatives of the four great Powers. None of them questioned the soundness of the Porte's views in resisting the extreme demands of Russia; all acknowledged the spirit of conciliation displayed by the Sultan's Ministers; all were agreed in desiring to prevent the rupture; all desired that the Emperor Nicholas should be enabled to recede without discredit from the wrong path which he had taken, and were willing to cover his retreat by every device which was consistent with the honour and welfare of other States. This union of opinion, followed close by concerted action, was surely a right example of the way in which it was becoming for Europe to regard an approach to injustice by one of the great Powers. It was arranged that the Austrian Envoy should call upon Prince Mentschikoff, should apprise him of the sorrow with which the representatives of the four Powers contemplated the rupture of his relations with the Porte; should express the lively gratification which a friendly solution, if that were still possible, would afford them; and, finally, should ascertain whether the Prince would receive through a private channel the Porte's intended Note, and give it a calm consideration.* This appeal from the representatives of the four great Powers produced no effect on the mind of Prince Mentschikoff,† and Lord

* 'Eastern Papers,' part i. p. 205.
† Ibid. p. 219.
Stratford scarcely expected that it would do so; but it commenced, or rather it marked and strengthened, that expression of grave disapproval on the part of the four Powers, which was the true and the safe corrective of an outrage threatened by one.

After his official relations with the Porte had come to a close, Prince Mentschikoff received and rejected the Turkish Note,* which embodied the concessions already described to him orally by Reshid Pasha; but on the evening of the 20th of May the Prince determined to make a concession in point of form, and to be content to have the engagement which he was demanding from the Porte in the form of a diplomatic Note, instead of a Treaty or Convention. In furtherance of this view, though his official capacity had ceased, he caused to be delivered to Reshid Pasha the draft of a Note to be given by the Porte. This draft purported to involve the Porte in engagements exactly the same as those which it had refused to contract, and to give to Russia (by means of a Note instead of a Convention) the protectorate of the Greek Church in Turkey.† Reshid Pasha immediately sent the Note to Lord Statford for communication to the three other representatives of the four Powers, with a request that they would give an opinion as to the most

* This Note, being the last offer made by the Turkish Government to Prince Mentschikoff, is printed in the Appendix.
† 'Eastern Papers,' part i. p. 220. As this Draft was Prince Mentschikoff's real ultimatum, it is printed in the Appendix.
advisable mode of proceeding. Early the next morning, Lord Stratford ascertained that, in the opinion of Reshid Pasha, the altered form of the Russian demands left them as objectionable as ever.* The Russians imagined that Reshid Pasha was willing to give way to them, and that he even entreated Lord Stratford to let him yield, but that the English Ambassador was inexorable. There was no truth in this notion.† Lord Stratford's counsels had cut so deep into the mind of the Turkish Minister that he was well able to follow them without wanting guidance from hour to hour. The English Ambassador assembled the representatives of the three Powers, and found that they unanimously agreed with him 'in adopting an 'opinion essentially identical with that of the 'Turkish Ministers.' ‡ They all signed a memorandum declaring that 'upon a question which so 'closely touched the freedom of action and the 'sovereignty of His Majesty the Sultan, His High- 'ness Reshid Pasha was the best judge of the 'course which it was fitting to take, and that they 'did not consider themselves authorised to pro- 'nounce an opinion.' §

Prince Mentschikoff had caused it to be under-stood that this his last demand was only to be accepted by being accepted in full. It was re-

* 'Eastern Papers,' part i. pp. 219, 220.
† It is clearly disproved. Ibid. pp. 336-8.
‡ Ibid. p. 220.
§ Ibid. p. 222.
intended to issue and proclaim a guarantee for the exercise of the spiritual rights possessed by the Greek Church in Turkey. It was hard for Russia to endure the resistance which she had encountered, but it was more difficult still to hear, with any semblance of calmness, that the Porte, of its own free will, was doing a main part of that which the Emperor Nicholas had urged it to do. This was not tolerable. To Russian ears the least utterance about 'the free will of the Porte' instantly conveyed the idea that all was to be ordered and governed at the will and pleasure of the English Ambassador. The thought that the protectorate of the Greek Church was not only refused to the Czar, but was now passing quietly into the hands of Lord Stratford, was so maddening, that Prince Mentschikoff, forgetting or transcending the fact that he had formally announced the rupture of his relations with the Porte, now suffered himself to address a solemn Note to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, in which (basing himself upon a theory that the mention of the spiritual might be deemed to derogate from the temporal rights of the Church) he announced that any act having the effect which this theory attributed to the proposed guarantee, would be regarded as 'hostile to Russia and her religion.'

Having despatched these last words of threat, he at length went on board and departed. On the same day the arms of Russia were taken down from the palace of the Imperial Embassy.

* 'Eastern Papers,' part i. p. 253.
Thus ended the ill-omened mission of Prince Mentschikoff. It had lasted eleven weeks. In that compass of time the Emperor Nicholas destroyed the whole repute which he had earned by wielding the power of Russia for more than a quarter of a century with justice and moderation towards foreign States.* But, moreover, in these same fatal days the Emperor Nicholas did much to bring his good faith into question. The tenor of his previous life makes it right to insist that any imputation upon his personal honour shall be tested with scrupulous care; but it is hard to escape the conviction that, during several weeks in the spring of the year, he was giving to the English Government a series of assurances which misrepresented the instructions given by him to Prince Mentschikoff during that same period. Thus, almost at the very hour when Count Nesselrode was assuring Sir Hamilton Seymour that 'the adjustment of the difficulties respecting the 'Holy Places would settle all matters in dispute 'between Russia and the Porte,' † Prince Mentschikoff was striving to wring from the Porte a secret treaty, depriving the Sultan of his control over the Patriarchate of Constantinople, and ceding to Russia a virtual protectorate of the Greek Church in Turkey, and was enjoining the Turkish Ministers to keep this negotiation concealed from

* Computed from the Peace of Adrianople in 1829. The reign of Nicholas commenced in 1825.

† 'Eastern Papers,' part i. p. 102. The slight qualification with which Count Nesselrode accompanied the assurance, tended to strengthen it by giving it greater precision.
the 'ill-disposed powers,' for so he called England and France;* and again, in the very week in which the Czar was joining with the English Government in a form more than usually solemn in denouncing the practice of 'harassing the Porte ' by overbearing demands, put forward in a manner humiliating to its independence and its 'dignity,' † he was shaping the angry despatch which caused Prince Mentschikoff to insult the Porte by his peremptory Note of the 5th of May.

But notwithstanding all this variance between what the Czar said and what he did, it must be acknowledged that it would be hard to explain his words and his course of action by imputing to him a vulgar and rational duplicity; for it was plain that the secrecy at which he aimed would be terminated by the success of the negotiation; and supposing him to have been in possession of his reason, and to have been acting on grounds temporal, he could not have imagined that, for the sake of extorting a new promise from the Sultan, and giving a little more semblance of legality to pretensions which he already maintained to be valid, it was politic for him to forfeit that reputation for honour, which was a main element of his greatness and his strength. The dreams of territorial aggrandisement which he imparted to Sir Hamilton Seymour in January and February had

* 'Eastern Papers,' part i. p. 108.
† Memorandum by the Emperor Nicholas confidentially delivered to Sir Hamilton Seymour, and dated the 15th April 1853. Ibid. part v. p. 25.
all dissolved before the middle of March, and it is vain to say that after that time his actions were governed by any rational plan of conquest. Policy required that for encroachments against Turkey he should choose a time when Europe, engaged in some other strife, might be likely to acquiesce; far from doing this, the Czar chose a time when the four Powers had nothing else to do than to watch and restrain the aggression of Russia. Again, policy required that pressure upon the Sultan of a hostile kind should be justified by narratives of the cruel treatment of the Christians by their Turkish masters; yet if any such causes existed for the anger of Christendom, the Emperor Nicholas never took the pains to make them known to Europe. From first to last his loose charges against the Turks for maltreatment of their Christian subjects were not only left without proof, but were even unsupported by anything like statements of fact.

Still the Czar was not labouring under any general derangement of mind. The truth seems to be that zeal for his Church had made greater inroads upon his moral and intellectual nature than was commonly known, and that when he was under the stress of religious or rather of ecclesiastic feelings he ceased to be politic, and even perhaps ceased to be honest. It was at such times that there came upon him that tendency to act in a spirit of barbaric cunning which was really inconsistent with the general tenor of his life. But if it happened that whilst his mind was
already under one of these spiritual visitations, it was further inflamed by any tidings which roused his old antagonism to Sir Stratford Canning, then instantly it was wrought into such a state that one must be content to mark its fitful and violent impact upon human affairs without undertaking to deduce the result from any symmetrical scheme of action.

But, whatever the cause, the fall was great. The polity of the Russian State was of such a kind that, when the character of its monarch stood high he exalted the empire, and when he descended, he drew the empire along with him. In the beginning of March the Emperor Nicholas almost oppressed the continent of Europe with the weight of his vast power, conjoined with moderation and a spirit of austere justice towards foreign States. Before the end of May he stood before the world shorn bare of all this moral strength, and having nothing left to him except what might be reckoned and set down upon paper by an inspector of troops or a surveyor of ships. In less than three months the station of Russia amongst the Powers of Europe underwent a great change.

The English Ambassador remained upon the field of the conflict. Between the time of his return to Constantinople and the departure of Prince Mentschikoff there had passed forty-five days. In this period Lord Stratford had brought to a settlement the question of the Holy Places, had baffled all the efforts of the Emperor Nicholas to work an inroad upon the sovereign rights of
the Sultan, and had enforced upon the Turks a firmness so indomitable, and a moderation so unwearied, that from the hour of his arrival at Constantinople they resisted every claim which was fraught with real danger— but always resisted with courtesy—and yielded to every demand, however unjust in principle, if it seemed that they could yield with honour and with safety. Knowing that, if he left room for doubt whether Russia or the Porte were in the right, the controversy would run a danger of being decided in favour of the stronger, he provided, with a keen foresight, and at the cost of having to put a hard restraint upon his anger, and even upon his sense of justice, that the concessions offered by the Turks should reach beyond their just liability; nay, should reach so far beyond it as to leave a broad margin between, and make it difficult even for any one who inclined towards the strong to deny that Russia was committing an outrage upon a weaker State, and was therefore offending against Europe. In truth, he placed the Moslem before the world in an attitude of Christian forbearance sustained by unfailing courage; and in proportion as men loved justice and were led by the gentle precepts of the Gospel, they inclined to the Mahometan Prince, who seemed to represent their principles, and began to think how best they could help him to make a stand against the ferocious Christianity of the Czar. In England especially this sentiment was kindled, and already it was beginning to gain a hold over the policy of the State. Less than
three months before, the dismemberment of the Turkish Empire had been thought a fair subject to bring into question, and now the firmness and the strange moderation with which the Turks stood, resisting the demands of their assailant, was drawing the English people, day by day, into a steadfast alliance with the Sultan.

But if Lord Stratford had succeeded in gaining over to his cause the general opinion of Europe, or rather in adapting the policy of the Divan to what he knew would be approved by the people of the West, he did not neglect to use such means as he had for moving the Governments of the four Powers; and the concerted action to which he had succeeded in bringing them on the 21st of May was a beginning of the peaceful coercion with which it was fitting that Europe should withstand the encroachments of a wrong-doer. But this was not all that was effected by the diplomatic transactions of the spring. It cannot be concealed that, without the solemnity of a treaty—nay, without the knowledge of Parliament, and perhaps without the knowledge of her Prime Minister—England, in the course of a few weeks, had slid into all the responsibility of a defensive alliance with the Sultan against the Emperor of Russia. It may seem strange that this could be; but the truth is, that the general scope of a lengthened official correspondence is not to be gathered by merely learning at intervals the import of each despatch. Taken singly, almost every despatch composed by a skilled diplomatist
will be likely to seem wise and moderate, and deserving of a complete approval; but if a statesman goes on approving and approving one by one a long series of papers of this sort, without rousing himself to the effort of taking a broader view of the transactions which he has separately examined, he may find himself entangled in a course of action which he never intended to adopt. Perhaps this view tends to explain the reasons which caused a Minister whose love of peace was passionate and almost fanatical to become gradually and imperceptibly responsible for a policy leading towards war.* Lord Aberdeen did not formally renounce his neutral policy of 1828, and he did not at this time advise the Queen to conclude any treaty for the defence of Turkey, nor ask the judgment of Parliament upon the expediency of taking such a course; but day after day, and week after week, the Cabinet-boxes came and went, and came and

* This may also explain how it was that, so far as is known, the ceaseless efforts of the Prince Consort to exert an influence upon our foreign policy were without advantageous results. He never, as he complained with great naïveté, could find any question 'intact'; and if he had been an English statesman accustomed to apprehend the way in which an English policy grows up to maturity, he would not have dreamed of being able to do so. In order that the suggestions of a Palace adviser should have effect upon the swift course of business in our Foreign Office, it was, of course, indispensable that they should be opportune; and that condition apparently the Prince Consort did not fulfil. His Memorandum of the 21st of October 1853, if submitted to Ministers at all, should have been submitted to them at the latest on the 31st of the previous May, and before the messenger started who carried the despatch of that date.
went again, and every day he passed his anxious and inevitable hour and a half at the Foreign Office; and at length it became apparent that the Government of which he was the chief had so acted that it could not with honour* recede from the duty of defending the home provinces of the Sultan against an unprovoked attack by Russia. The advice of a strong Power is highly valued, but it is valued for reasons which should make men chary of giving it. It is not commonly valued for the sake of its mere wisdom, but partly because it is more or less a disclosure of policy, and still more because it tends to draw the advising State into a line of action corresponding with its counsels. England, by the voice of her Ambassador (approved from time to time by the Home Government†), had been advising a weak Power to resist a strong one. Counsels of such a kind could not but have a grave import.

The French Emperor had been more careful to keep himself free from engagements with the Porte; but he had long ago resolved to seize the welcome occasion of acting in concert with England. And England now became bound. Within three days from Prince Mentschikoff's departure France and England were beginning to concert resistance to Russia;‡ on the 26th of May the

* 'Even if the Governments of France and England were not in honour bound to protect the Sultan,' &c. — Lord Clarendon to Lord Cowley. 'Eastern Papers,' part ii. p. 321.
† 'Eastern Papers,' part i. p. 183.
‡ 24th May. Ibid. p. 182.
Sultan's refusal of the Russian ultimatum was warmly applauded by the English Government, and before the end of the month the Foreign Secretary instructed the English Ambassador that it was 'indispensable to take measures for the protection of the Sultan, and to aid His Highness in repelling any attack that might be made upon his territory;' and that 'the use of force was to be resorted to as a last and unavoidable resource for the protection of Turkey against an unprovoked attack, and in defence of her independence, which England,' as Lord Clarendon declared, 'was bound to maintain.'*

Lord Clarendon at the same time addressed a despatch to St Petersburg, setting forth with painful clearness the difference between the words and the acts of the Czar, and indignantly requiring to know what was the object which Russia had 'in view, and in what manner, and to what extent, the dominions of the Sultan and the tranquillity of Europe were threatened.'†

It was not by any one decisive act or promise, but by the tenor of expressions scattered through a long series of Despatches, and by words used from time to time in conversations, that England had taken upon herself the burthen of defending the Sultan against the Czar. Parliament was sitting when this momentous engagement was being contracted, and it may be thought that there was room for questioning whether England in concert with France alone, and without first

* 'Eastern Papers,' part i. p. 197. † Ibid. p. 200.
doing her utmost to obtain the concurrence of the other powers, should good-humouredly take upon herself a duty which was rather European than English, and which tended to involve her in war. There were eloquent members of the Legislature who would have been willing to deprecate such a policy, and to moderate and confine its action; but apparently they did not understand how England was becoming entangled until about nine months afterwards, and, either from want of knowledge or want of promptitude, they lost the occasion for aiding the Crown with their counsels. Indeed, from first to last, the backwardness of the English Parliament in seizing upon the changeful phases of the diplomatic strife was one of the main causes of the impending evil, and this was only one of the occasions on which it failed in the duty of opportune utterance. When the Despatch of the 31st of May was once on the road to Constantinople, England stood bound, and all that might be afterwards said about it would be criticism rather than counsel.*

So ended one phase of the ancient strife between the Emperor Nicholas and Lord Stratford de Redcliffe. Prince Mentschikoff, landing at Odessa, hastened to despatch to his master the best account he could give of the causes of his discomfiture, and of the evil skill of that Anti-christ, in stately English form, whom Heaven was

* For the purpose indicated ante, p. 14, I invite Mr Theodore Martin's attention to this period—viz., the month of May 1853, and in particular to the despatch of the 31st.
permitting for a while to triumph over the Czar and his Church.

Lord Stratford reaped the fruit of his toil and of the long-endured pain of encountering violence with moderation. All his acts were approved by the Government, and, so far as they were known and understood, by the bulk of his countrymen at home. And now when he paced the shady gardens, where often he had put upon his anger a difficult restraint, he could look with calm joy to the headland where the Straits opened out into the Euxine, for he knew that the Governments of the Western Powers, supporting his every word, and even overstepping his more sober policy, were coming forward to stand between Russia and her prey. The fleet at Malta was to be moved when and whither he chose; and, even to the length of war, the Admiral was ordered to obey any requisitions made to him by the Ambassador.* A few days later the Governments of Paris and London, fearing the consequence of delay, ordered the fleets to move up at once to the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles.† The power to choose between peace and war went from out of the Courts of Paris and London, and passed to Constantinople. Lord Stratford was worthy of this trust; for being firm, and supplied with full knowledge, and having power by his own mere ascendancy to enforce moderation upon the Turks, and to forbid panic, and even to keep down tumult, he was able to be very chary in the display of force, and to be more

frugal than the Government at home in using or engaging the power of the English Queen. He remained on the ground. Still, as before, he kept down the home dangers which threatened the Ottoman State. Still, as before, he obliged the Turks to deserve the goodwill of Europe; but now, besides, with the arm of the flesh, and no longer with the mere fencing of words, he was there to defend their capital from the gathered rage of the Czar. In truth, at this time he bore much of the weight of empire. Entrusted with the chief prerogative of kings, and living all his time at Therapia, close over the gates of the Bosphorus, he seemed to stand guard against the North, and to answer for the safety of his charge.
CHAPTER XII.

The mere sensation of being at strife with the English Ambassador at Constantinople, had kindled in the bosom of the Emperor Nicholas a rage so fierce as to drive him beyond the bounds of policy; but when he came to know the details of the struggle, and to see how, at every step, his Ambassador had been encountered—and, finally, when he heard (for that was the maddening thought) that, by counsels always obeyed, Lord Stratford was calmly exercising a protectorate of all the Churches in Turkey, including the very Church of him the Czar, him the Father, him the Pontiff of Eastern Christendom—he was wrought into such a condition of mind that his fury broke away from the restraint of even the very pride which begot it. Pride counselled the calm use of force, an order to the Admiral at Sebastopol, the silent march of battalions. But the Czar had so lost the control of his anger, that everywhere, and to all who would look upon the sight, he showed the wounds inflicted upon him by his hated adversary. 'He addressed,' said Lord Clarendon,
to the different Courts of Europe, unmeasured complaints of Lord Stratford. To him, and to him alone, he attributed the failure of Prince Mentschikoff's mission. * 'An incurable mistrust, a vehement activity,' said Count Nesselrode, † 'had characterised the whole of Lord Stratford's conduct during the latter part of the negotiation.'

Even in formal despatches the Czar caused his Minister to speak as though there were absolutely no government at Constantinople except the mere will of Lord Stratford. 'The English Ambassador,' Count Nesselrode said, 'persisted in refusing us any kind of guarantee;' ‡ and then the Count went on to picture the Turkish Ministers as prostrate before the English Ambassador, and vainly entreat ing him to let them yield to Russia. 'Reshid Pasha,' said he, 'struck with the dangers which the departure of our Legation might entail upon the Porte, earnestly conjured the British Ambassador not to oppose the acceptance of the Note drawn up by Prince Mentschikoff; but Lord Redcliffe prevented its acceptance by declaring that the Note was equivalent to a treaty, and was inadmissible.' † This last story, it has been seen, was the work of mere fiction; ‡ but in the Czar Nicholas, as well as in Prince Mentschikoff, there were remains of the Oriental nature which made him ready to believe in the boundless power of a mortal, and he seems

* 'Eastern Papers,' part i. p. 268. † Ibid. p. 243.
‡ This is proved very clearly. Ibid. p. 336 et seq.
to have received without question the fables with which the Eastern mind was portraying the severe, the implacable Eltchi. It was vain to show a monarch, thus wrought to anger, that the difference between him and the terrible Ambassador lay simply in the fact that the one was in the wrong and the other in the right. The thought of this only made the discomfiture more bitter. In the eyes of the Czar, Lord Stratford's way of keeping himself eternally in the right and eternally moderate was the mere contrivance, the mere inverted Jesuitism, of a man resolved to do good in order that evil might come—resolved to be forbearing and just for the sake of doing a harm to the Church. It was plain that, to assuage the torment which the Czar was enduring, the remedy was action: yet, strange to say, this disturber of Europe, who seemed to pass his life in preparing soldiery, was not at all ready for a war even against the Sultan alone. His preparations had been stopped in the beginning of March, and the movements which his troops had been making in Bessarabia were movements in the nature of threats. He wished to do some signal act of violence without plunging into war.

The disposition of the Russian forces on the banks of the Pruth had long been breeding rumours that the Emperor Nicholas meditated an occupation of the Principalities called Wallachia and Moldavia. These provinces formed a part of the Ottoman dominions in Europe; but they were held by the Sultan under arrangements...
which modified their subjection to the Porte and gave them the character of tributary States. Each of them was governed by a prince called a Hospodar, who received his investiture at Constantinople; but the Sultan was precluded by treaty from almost all interference with the internal government of the provinces, and was even debarred the right of sending any soldiery into their territories. Russia, on the other hand, had acquired over these provinces a species of protectorate; and, in the event of their being disturbed by internal anarchy, she had power to aid in repressing the disorder by military occupation. This contingency had not occurred in either of the provinces; but the anomalous form of their political existence caused the Emperor Nicholas to imagine that, by occupying them with a military force, and professing to hold them as a pledge, he could find for himself a middle course betwixt peace and war; and the thought was welcome to him, because, being angry and irresolute, he had been painfully driven to and fro, and was glad to compound with his passion.

On the 31st of May Count Nesselrode addressed a letter to Reshid Pasha, urging the Porte to accept without variation the draft of the Note submitted to it by Prince Mentschikoff, and announcing that, if the Porte should fail to do this within a period of eight days, the Russian army, after a few weeks, would cross the frontier, in order to obtain 'by force, but without war,' that which the Porte should decline to give up of its own accord.
It was afterwards explained that this plan of resorting to violence without war was to be carried into effect by occupying the Danubian Principalities, and holding them as a security for the Sultan's compliance.

But, in the second week of June, the Despatch which brought to the Sultan a virtual alliance with England was already at Constantinople, and the English fleet was coming up from Malta to the mouth of the Dardanelles under orders to obey the word of the English Ambassador. Before the moment came for despatching an answer to Count Nesselrode's summons, both the French and the English fleets were at anchor close outside the Straits, in waters called Besica Bay. Thus supported, the Porte at once refused to give Russia the Note demanded; but, under Lord Stratford's counsel, it did this in terms of deferential courtesy, and in a way which left open a door to future negotiation.

In all the capitals of the five great Powers, as well as at Constantinople, great efforts were made to bring about an accommodation, and it is certain that at intervals, if not continually, the Emperor Nicholas sought the means of retreating without ridicule from the ground on which his violence had placed him. It might seem that this was a condition of things in which diplomacy ought to have been able to act with effect; but it is hard for any one acquainted with the Despatches to say that the Statesmen entrusted with the duty of labouring for this end were wanting in energy
or-in skill. It was the Czar's ancient hatred of Sir Stratford Canning which defied the healing art. What Nicholas wanted was to be able to force upon the Porte some measure which was keenly disapproved by Lord Stratford; and if it could have been shown that the English Ambassador had led the Turks into an untenable ground, there would have been an opportunity of giving the Czar this gratification: but Lord Stratford's moderation had been so firmly maintained, his sight had been always so clear and just, and his advice had gone so close to the edge of what could safely be conceded by the Turks, that (without doing a gross wrong to the Sultan) it was hardly possible to contrive any way of giving the Czar a semblance of triumph over the English Ambassador.

From this time and thenceforth down to the final rupture between Russia and the Western Powers, there was a cause of evil at work which was every day tending to draw the Czar on into danger. Austria, Prussia, and France were unfitly represented at St Petersburg. In order to understand the nature of this evil, it must be remembered that in the reign of Nicholas the society of the Russian capital was what in the last century used to go by the name of a 'Court.' It was a mere group of men and women gathered always around one centre, bending always their eyes on one man, and striving to divine his will. Moreover, the worshippers were always watching to see who was in favour and who was in disgrace;
and whoever was seen to be in favour with the Czar was brought into favour with all; and whoever was believed to have incurred the Czar's displeasure, was immediately forced to perceive that he had become displeasing to the rest of his fellow-creatures. Strange to say, the members of the diplomatic body were not exempt from these vicissitudes: if a foreign envoy felt obliged to offer resistance to the imperial will, his life was made cold and gloomy to him; and, on the other hand, he was sure to be well caressed if he chose to cringe to the Czar. At a critical time, and in the presence of a 'society' which thus called upon even a stranger to fall down, and join in Czar-worship, it was of great moment that foreign States should be represented at St Petersburg by men of high spirit, by men with some strength of will, and, above all, completely acquainted with the real purposes and desires of their respective governments; but, unfortunately for the peace of Europe, these conditions were wanting, for M. Castelbajac, representing France, and Colonel Rochow, representing Prussia, were both of them a good deal too courtier-like for the exigency of a time which required that their demeanour at the Court of the raging Nicholas should be grave at the least, if not stern; and although it is true that Count Mensdorf, the representative of Austria, was an honest soldier too high-couraged to be capable of shrinking from what he understood to be his duty, he was not a man so well versed in the task of a diplomatist as to have a large
conception of its implied obligations; and besides, it would seem, he had not been kept well imbued with the policy which his Government was pursuing.* Thus it happened that at a time when four of the Great Powers were all apparently labouring to restrain the Czar by the course they took at Constantinople, no less than in their own capitals, there were three of them which failed to maintain a corresponding front at St Petersburg.

Sir Hamilton Seymour alone held language corresponding with the disapproval which the acts of the Czar were exciting in Central Europe, as well as in France and England. He alone represented at St Petersburg the judgment of the four Powers. From the moment when the occupation of the Principalities was first threatened, he always treated it as an act perilous to the tranquillity of Europe, and always declined to give any measure of the extent to which it was likely to affect the relations between Russia and England. In using this wholesome language he was left without support from any of his colleagues.

Of course, in a literal way, the representatives of Austria, Prussia, and France obeyed their

* It was long the custom of Austria to leave her Ambassadors ill furnished with knowledge of material facts, and sometimes also in darkness respecting the policy of the Government. Perhaps the interference of the Sovereign in the business of the Foreign Office at Vienna was the cause of this apparent neglect. If a Minister could not send an important despatch without taking the pleasure of the Emperor, the correspondence of the Department would be only too likely to fall into a defective, slovenly state.
orders, and remonstrated when they were directed to do so; but the Czar was so prone to believe what he wished to be true, that diplomatists who were forced to make painful communications to his Government could easily do a great deal to blunt the edge of their instructions. So, although in the real Europe Nicholas had become isolated, yet in Europe, as represented at St Petersburg, the true order of things was reversed. There, it was Sir Hamilton Seymour who stood alone. More than this, it was believed at St Petersburg that the delinquency of M. Castelbajac often went beyond mere inaction, and that when the Czar was pained and discouraged by the reserve or the warning language of the Queen’s representative, he used to turn for solace to the complaisant Frenchman standing always in readiness to assure him that Sir Hamilton Seymour’s grave tone was the sheer whim of an obstinate Englishman.

The Emperor Nicholas had laid down for himself a rule which was always to guide his conduct upon the Eastern Question; and it seems to be certain that at this time, even in his most angry moments, he intended to cling to his resolve. What he had determined was, that no temptation should draw him into hostile conflict with England. He did not know that already he was breaking away from England, and rapidly going adrift. Persisting in the belief that the opposition which he had been encountering at Constantinople was the work of the English Ambassador, and of him alone, or at worst of the Foreign Office, he
refused to accept the conviction that he was falling out with the English people, or even with the English Government. It was, in vain that Lord Clarendon, in words as clear as day, disclosed the anger and the growing determination of the Cabinet. It was in vain that, by grave words and by pregnant reserve, Sir Hamilton Seymour strove to warn the Czar of the danger which he was bringing upon his relations with England. The Czar imagined that he knew better. 'My dear Sir Hamilton,' Count Nesselrode seemed to say, 'you have lived away from your country so long, that, forgive me, you do not know its condition and temper. We do. We have studied it. Your Foreign Office speaks as if we did not know that England has her weak point. My dear Sir Hamilton, we have mastered the whole subject of the "School of Manchester." Certainly it cost us some trouble, but we have now made out the difference between a "Meeting" on a Sunday morning, and a "Meeting" on a Monday night. Nothing escapes us. We comprehend the Society of Friends. Pardon me, Sir Hamilton, for saying so, but your country is notoriously engaged in commerce. With that we shall not interfere.'

In truth, the Czar's theory was, that the foreign policy of the English Government was dictated by the people, and that the people loved money, and for the sake of money loved peace. In other words, he thought that the English nation had undergone what historians term 'corruption.' As far as he could make out, the vast expanse of
men and women which presented itself to his imagination under the name of 'the people' was the same sort of thing as the crowd which went to hear a fierce speech against princes, and statesmen, and parliaments, and armies, and navies, and taxes. He also thought that the cheers which this crowd uttered at the end of sentences denouncing war, were proof of a settled determination to prevent any Government from ever again breaking the peace without stringent reasons. A deeper knowledge would have taught him that what the crowd applauded was not the mere doctrine, but the pure racy strenuous English, and the animating ferocity of the speaker: for, in speeches of this kind, praises of peace were always blended with rough attacks upon public men; and therefore, to a shallow observer, the hearers might seem to be lifting up their voices for peace and goodwill among men, when in reality they were only acknowledging the pleasantness of the sensation which is produced by hearing good invective. A prince of the Russian Emperor's breed might have known that, even if it be given in praise or in joy, the 'hurrah' of a northern people has in it a sound of conflict. What it negatives and forbids is peace and rest. His battalions were destined to hear it some day, to know its import, and to blend it long afterwards with recollections of mist and slaughter, and the breaking strength of Russia. But to the mind of the Czar at this time, the cheering which greeted the thin phantom of the 'Peace Party' imported
a determination of the English people to abdicate their place in Europe; and in proportion as this belief fixed its hold upon his mind, the tranquillity of the world was brought into danger.

Another unhappy circumstance tended to keep the Czar in his fatal error. Lord Aberdeen was the Prime Minister. He was a pure and upright statesman, and it can be said that the more closely he was known the more he was honoured; for his friends always saw in him higher qualities than he was able to disclose to the general world by writing, or by speech, or by action. It was his lot to do much towards bringing upon his country a great calamity. He drew down war by suffering himself to have an undue horror of it. With good and truly peaceful intentions, he was every day breaking down one of the surest of the safeguards which protected the peace of Europe. This he did by the dangerous language which he suffered himself to hold almost down to the time of Baron Brunnow's departure from London. If judges were to declare their horror of justice, and make it appear that they would be likely to shrink from the duty of passing sentence on one of their erring fellow-creatures, they would invite the world to pillage and murder; but they would be committing a fault less grave than that of which Lord Aberdeen was guilty. He was chief of the Government, entrusted with the forces of the State. To be chary of the use of means so puissant for good and for evil is one of the most solemn charges that can be cast upon man; but for a ruler to
give out that the sword of the State will be in his hands a thing loathed and cast aside, is to be guilty of a dereliction of duty fraught with instant danger. To all who would listen, Lord Aberdeen used to say that he abhorred the very thought of war; and that he was sure it would not and could not occur. He caused men to believe that, except for weighty and solemn cause, no war would be undertaken with his concurrence. Relying on a Prime Minister's words, the Emperor Nicholas felt certain that Lord Aberdeen would not carry England into a war for the sake of a difference between the wording of a Note demanded by Prince Mentschikoff and the wording of a Note proposed by the Turks. It is true that Baron Brunnow had the sagacity to understand that imprudent and timid language, though coming from the lips of a Prime Minister, would not necessarily be binding upon the high-spirited people of England; and he, no doubt, warned his master accordingly, even at the time when he was conveying to him Lord Aberdeen's words of peace;* but it was so delightful to the Czar to remain under the impression produced by the language of the English Prime Minister, and, moreover, this language was so closely in harmony with the apparent feelings of the active little crowd which he had mistaken for 'the English people,' that he could not or would not forego his illusion.

It is believed that the errors of Lord Aberdeen did not end here. In a conversation between

* The Baron informed me that this was the case.
Lord Clarendon and Baron Brunnow, our Foreign Secretary, they say, spoke a plain, firm sentence, disclosing the dangers which the occupation of the Principalities would bring upon the relations between Russia and England. The wholesome words were flying to St Petersburg. They would have destroyed the Czar's illusion, and they therefore bade fair to preserve the peace of Europe; but when Lord Aberdeen came to know what had been uttered, he insisted, they say, and insisted with effect, that Baron Brunnow should be requested to consider Lord Clarendon's words as unspoken. Of course, after a fatal revocation like this, it would be hard indeed to convince the Czar that his encroachment was provoking the grave resistance of England.

The Emperor Nicholas was alone, in his accustomed writing-room in the Palace of Czarskoe Selo, when he came to the resolve which followed upon the discomfiture of Prince Mentschikoff. He took no counsel. He rang a bell. Presently an officer of his Staff stood before him. To him he gave his orders for the occupation of the Principalities. Afterwards he told Count Orloff what he had done. Count Orloff became grave, and said, 'This is war.' The Czar was surprised to hear that the Count took so gloomy a view. He was sure that no country would stir against him without the concurrence of England, and he was certain that, because of her Peace Party, her traders, and her Prime Minister, it was impossible for England to move.
It was thus that by rashness and want of moderation men truly attached to the cause of peace were encouraging the wrong-doer, and rapidly bringing upon Europe the calamity which they most abhorred.

On the 2d July the Emperor Nicholas caused his forces to pass the Pruth, and laid hold of the two Principalities. On the following day a manifesto was read in the churches of All the Russias.*

'It is known,' said the Czar, 'to all our faithful subjects that the defence of the Orthodox religion was from time immemorial the vow of our glorious forefathers. From the time that it pleased Providence to entrust to us our hereditary throne, the defence of these holy obligations inseparable from it was the constant object of our solicitude and care; and these, based on the glorious treaty of Kainardji, confirmed by other solemn treaties, were ever directed to ensure the inviolability of the Orthodox Church. But to our great grief, recently, in despite of our efforts to defend the inviolability of the rights and privileges of our Orthodox Church, various arbitrary acts of the Porte have infringed these rights, and threaten at last the complete overthrow of the long-perpetuated order so dear to Orthodoxy.

Having exhausted all persuasion, we have found it needful to advance our armies into the Danubian Principalities, in order to show the Ottoman Porte to what its obstinacy may lead. But even now we have not the intention to commence

* 'Eastern Papers,' part i. p. 357.
war. By the occupation of the Principalities we desire to have such a security as will ensure us the restoration of our rights. It is not conquest that we seek; Russia needs it not; we seek satisfaction for a just right so clearly infringed. We are ready even now to arrest the movement of our armies, if the Ottoman Porte will bind itself solemnly to observe the inviolability of the Orthodox Church. But if blindness and obstinacy decide for the contrary, then, calling God to our aid, we shall leave the decision of the struggle to Him, and, in full confidence in His omnipotent right hand, we shall march forward for the Orthodox Church.*

By declaring that his military occupation of these provinces was not an act of war, the Emperor Nicholas did not escape from any part of the responsibility naturally attaching to the invasion of a neighbour's territory; and yet, by making this announcement, he committed the error of enabling the Porte to choose its own time for the final rupture. The Sultan was advised by Lord Stratford, and afterwards by the Home Governments of the Western Powers, that although he was entitled, if he chose, to look upon the seizure of the tributary provinces as a clear invasion of his territory, he was not obliged to treat it as an act which placed him at war, and that for the moment it was wise for him to hold back. Upon this counsel the Sultan acted; and in truth the latitude which it gave him was high-

* 'Eastern Papers,' part i. p. 323.
ly convenient, because he was ill-prepared for an immediate encounter. Therefore, without yet going to a rupture, the Turkish Government exerted itself to make ready for war. In States religiously constituted, the preparation for war is begun by preaching it; and now in Europe, in Asia, and in Africa, wherever there were Turkish dominions, the Moslems were called to arms by a truculent course of sermons. In the churches of Russia there was a like appeal to the piety of the multitude. Of course the members of the two disputing Governments were much under the influence of temporal motives; but by the people of both Empires the war now believed to be impending was regarded as a war for Religion.
CHAPTER XIII.

The Czar had no sooner uttered his threat to occupy the Principalities, than he found himself met by the unanimous disapproval of the other great Powers of Europe. Nor was this a barren expression of opinion. From the time of the accomplishment of Count Leiningen's mission, Austria had never ceased to declare her adhesion to her accustomed policy; and the moment that she saw herself endangered by the Czar's determination to send troops into Wallachia and Moldavia, she became, as it was her interest and her duty to be, a resolute opponent of Russia. And her resistance was of more value than that of any other Power, because she was so placed in reference to the Principalities that, at any moment and without any very hard effort, she could make her will the law. Of course the Czar might resent the interference of Austria and declare war against her; but in such a case he would necessarily place the scene of hostilities upon another part of her frontier. It was not possible for him with common prudence to wind round
the frontier of the Austrian Empire, and attempt to keep troops in Wallachia, if he were liable to attack from Transylvania and the Banat.

Clearly, then, it rested with Austria to prevent or redress the threatened outrage. Her resolution was never doubtful. Before the end of May Count Buol represented at St Petersburg the danger of the proceedings adopted by Prince Mentschikoff;* and on the 17th of June he declared that he considered himself as 'entirely united' with England in her policy towards the Turkish Empire, that he regarded 'the maintenance of its independence and integrity as of the most essential importance to the best interests of Austria,' and that he would employ all the 'means in his power to effect that object.' He promised that he would take no engagement with Russia not to oppose her 'with arms;' and he added that 'should he be called upon to carry out an armed intervention on the frontiers, it would be in support of the authority and independence of the Sultan.'†

The opinion of Prussia was scarcely less decided. On the 30th of May Lord Bloomfield was able to report that the impression made upon the Government of Berlin by the last reports from Turkey was 'most unfavourable to the Russian Government;' and Baron Manteuffel declared that Prince Mentschikoff had gone far beyond everything that the Prussian Government had been given to expect, and he could hardly believe but

* 'Eastern Papers,' part i. p. 224. † Ibid. p. 291.
that the Prince would be disavowed.* Three days later the Prussian Government conveyed this impression to the Court of St Petersburg;† and on the 7th Lord Clarendon expressed his satisfaction at the views taken and the course of the policy indicated both by the Court of Berlin and the Court of Vienna.‡

This was the effect produced by the threat contained in Count Nesselrode's summons; but when the invasion of the Principalities took place, and came to be known in Europe, it quickly appeared that the uneasiness excited by the actual occurrence of the event was more than proportioned to that which sprang from the mere expectation of it. In Austria the uneasiness of the Government was so great that it dissolved the close relations of friendship lately subsisting between the Courts of Petersburg and Vienna; and within three days from the time when Russia crossed the Pruth, Count Buol, abandoning the notion of 'acting singly,' which had been entertained some days before,§ began to lay the foundations of a league well fitted to repress the Czar's encroachment without plunging Europe in war.

'The entry of the Russian troops into the Principalities,' wrote Lord Westmoreland to the English Secretary of State, 'is looked upon with the greatest possible regret: and I am requested by Count Buol to state this to your Lordship, as also to announce to you his intention immediate-

'ly to convey this feeling to the Russian Cabinet, together with the expression of the disappointment he has felt at the sudden adoption of this measure while there still existed the hope of an arrangement at Constantinople. Count Buol expressed his entire satisfaction with the language your Lordship had held to Count Colloredo, agreeing as he does with the policy you recommend, and with the necessity which would arise, in case the invasion of the Principalities took place, of concerting measures among the Powers parties to the treaties of 1841, with the view of obtaining from the Russian Cabinet the most distinct declarations as to the objects of that movement, and the term which would be fixed for its duration.'*

On the other hand, the Governments of France and England, with less cause for anxiety about countries so remote as the provinces of the Lower Danube, were angrily impatient of the Czar's intrusion.

Prussia, hitherto supposed to be hardly capable of differing with the Emperor Nicholas, did not fear to express her disapproval in decisive terms; and the Cabinet of Berlin instructed the King's Envoy at Constantinople to 'unite cordially' with the representatives of Austria, France, and England. †

In short, the attitude of Europe towards the Russian Emperor was exactly that which a lover of peace and of order might desire to witness;

* Eastern Papers,' part i. p. 356. † Ibid. p. 355
for the wrong-doer was left without an ally in the world, and was resisted by the four great Powers, with the assent of the other States of Europe. It was plain, moreover, that this resistance would not evaporate in mere remonstrance or protest; for if Austria was the country most endangered by the seizure of the Principalities, she was also the power which could most easily extirpate the evil, because, whenever she chose, she could fall upon the flank and rear of the Russian invaders by issuing through the passes of the Eastern Carpathian range, or the frontier which touched the Banat. Moreover, France and England, by bringing their fleets into the Levant, by causing them to approach the Dardanelles, by passing the Straits, by anchoring in the Golden Horn, by ascending the Bosphorus, by cruising in the Euxine, and, finally, by interdicting the Russian flag from its waters, could always inflict a graduated torture upon the Czar, and (even without going to the extremity of war) could make it impossible that the indignation of Europe should remain unheeded.

The concord of the States opposing the Czar's encroachment was already so well perfected that, on the very day* when the Russian advance-guard crossed the Pruth, the representatives of the four Powers assembled in Conference, determined to address to Russia a collective Note pressing the Czar to put his claims against Turkey in conformity with the sovereign rights of

* 2d July 1853
the Sultan. Here was the very principle for which France and England had been contending; and it was obvious that if this concerted action of the four Powers should last, it would ensure peace: for, in the first place, any resistance to their united will would be hopeless; and, on the other hand, a Prince whose spirit rebelled against the idea of yielding to States which he looked upon as adversaries, might gracefully give way to the award of assembled Europe. In short, the four Powers could coerce without making war; and the business of a statesman who sought to maintain the peace and good order of Europe was to keep them united, taking care that no mere shades of difference should part them, and that nothing short of a violent and irreconcilable change on the part of one or more of the Powers should dissolve a confederacy which promised to ensure the continuance of peace and a speedy enforcement of justice.

How came it to happen that in the midst of all this harmony there supervened a policy which discarded the principle of a peaceful coercion applied by the whole of the remonstrant Powers, and raised up in its stead a threatening alliance which was powerful enough to wage a bloody and successful war, but was without that more wholesome measure of strength which can enforce justice without inflicting humiliation, and without resort to arms? How came it to happen that within six days from the date of the collective Note, and without the intervening occurrence of
any new event, the concert of the four Powers was suddenly superseded and paralysed by the announcement of a separate understanding between two of them?

It was not for reasons of State that by one of the high contracting parties this evil course was designed; and in order to see how it came to be possible that the vast interests of Europe should be set aside in favour of mere personal objects, it will presently be necessary to contract the field of vision, and, going back to the winter of 1851, to glance at the operations of a small knot of middle-aged men who were pushing their fortunes in Paris.
CHAPTER XIV.*

1.

In the beginning of the winter of 1851 France was still a republic; but the Constitution of 1848 had struck no root. There was a feeling that the country had been surprised and coerced into the act of declaring itself a republic, and that a monarchical system of government was the only one adapted for France. The sense of instability which sprang from this belief was connected with an agonising dread of insurrections like those which, forty months before, had filled the streets of Paris with scenes of bloodshed. Moreover, to those who watched and feared, it seemed that the shadow on the dial was moving on with a terrible steadiness to the hour when a return to anarchy was, as it were, pre-ordained by law; for the constitution required that a new president should be chosen in the spring of the following year, and the French, being by nature of a keen and anxious

* Not a word of this chapter has been changed since the day of its original publication in January 1863, when the French Emperor was at the height of his power.
temperament, cannot endure that lasting pressure upon the nerves which is inflicted by a long-impending danger. Their impulse under such trials is to rush forward, or to run back, and what they are least inclined to do is to stand still and be calm, or make a steady move to the front.

In general, France thought it best that, notwithstanding the Rule of the Constitution, which stood in the way, the then President should be quietly re-elected; and a large majority of the Assembly, faithfully representing this opinion, had come to a vote which sought to give it effect; but their desire was baffled by an unwise provision of the Republican Charter, which had laid it down that no constitutional change should take place without the sanction of three-fourths of the Assembly. By this clumsy bar the action of the state system was hampered, and many whose minds generally inclined them to respect legality were forced to acknowledge that the Constitution wanted a wrench. Still, the republic had long been free from serious outbreak. The law was obeyed; and indeed the determination to maintain order at all sacrifices was so strong that, even upon somewhat slight foundation, the President had been entrusted with power to place under martial law any districts in which disturbances seemed likely to occur. The struggles which went on in the Chamber, though they were unsightly in the eyes of military men and of those who love the decisiveness and consistency of despotism, were rather signs of healthy political action than of danger to
the State. It is not true, as was afterwards pretended, that the Executive was wickedly or perversely thwarted either by the votes of the Assembly, or by the speeches of its members; still less is it true that the representative body was engaged in hatching plots against the President; and although the army, remembering the humiliations of 1848, was in ill-humour with the people, and was willing upon any fit occasion to act against them, there was no general officer of any repute who would consent to fire a shot without what French Commanders deemed to be the one lawful warrant for action—an order from the Minister of War.

II.

But the President of the republic was Prince Charles Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, the statutory heir of the first French Emperor.* The election which made him the chief of the State had been conducted with perfect fairness; and since it happened that in former years he had twice engaged in enterprises which aimed at the throne of France, he had good right to infer that the millions of citizens who elected him into the presidency were willing to use his ambition as a means of restoring to France a monarchical form of government.

But if he had been open in disclosing the ambition which was almost cast upon him by the

* *i.e., by the Senatus-Consulte of 1804.*
circumstances of his birth, he had been as successful as the first Brutus in passing for a man of a poor intellect. Both in France and in England, at that time, men in general imagined him to be dull. When he talked, the flow of his ideas was sluggish: his features were opaque; and after years of dreary studies, the writings evolved by his thoughtful, long-pondering mind had not shed much light on the world. Even the strange ventures in which he had engaged had failed to win towards him the interest which commonly attaches to enterprise. People in London who were fond of having gatherings of celebrated characters never used to present him to their friends as a serious pretender to a throne, but rather as though he were a balloon-man, who had twice had a fall from the skies, and was still in some measure alive. Yet the more men knew him in England, the more they liked him. He entered into English pursuits, and rode fairly to hounds. He was friendly, social, good-humoured, and willing enough to talk freely about his views upon the throne of France. The sayings he uttered about his 'destiny' were addressed (apparently as a matter of policy) to casual acquaintance; but to his intimate friends he used the language of a calculating and practical aspirant to Empire.

The opinion which men had formed of his ability in the period of exile was not much altered by his return to France: for in the Assembly his apparent want of mental power caused the world to regard him as harmless, and in the chair of the
President he commonly seemed to be torpid. But there were always a few who believed in his capacity; and observant men had latterly remarked that from time to time there appeared a State Paper understood to be the work of the President, which teemed with thought, and which showed that the writer, standing solitary and apart from the gregarious nation of which he was the chief, was able to contemplate it as something external to himself. His long, endless study of the mind of the First Napoleon had caused him to adopt and imitate the Emperor's habit of looking down upon the French people, and treating the mighty nation as a substance to be studied and controlled by a foreign brain. Indeed, during the periods of his imprisonment and of his exile, the relations between him and the France of his studies were very like the relations between an anatomist and a corpse. He lectured upon it; he dissected its fibres; he explained its functions; he showed how beautifully Nature, in her infinite wisdom, had adapted it to the service of the Bonapartes; and how, without the fostering care of those same Bonapartes, the creature was doomed to degenerate, and to perish out of the world.

If his intellect was of a poorer quality than men supposed it to be at the time of the Anglo-French alliance, it was much above the low gauge which people used to assign to it in the earlier period which began in 1836 and ended at the close of 1851. That which had so long veiled his cleverness from the knowledge of mankind, was
the repulsive nature of the science at which he laboured. Many men before him had suffered themselves to bring craft into politics; many more, toiling in humbler grades, had applied their cunning skill to the conflicts which engage courts of law; but no living man perhaps, except Prince Louis Bonaparte, had passed the hours of a studious youth, and the prime of a thoughtful manhood, in contriving how to apply stratagem to the science of jurisprudence. It was not, perhaps, from natural baseness that his mind took this bent. The inclination to sit and sit planning for the attainment of some object of desire—this, indeed, was in his nature; but the inclination to labour at the task of making law an engine of deceit—this did not come perforce with his blood. Yet it came with his parentage. It is true, he might have determined to reject the indication given him by the accident of his birth, and to remain a private citizen; but when once he resolved to become a pretender to the imperial throne, he of course had to try and see how it was possible—how it was possible in the midst of this century—that the coarse Bonaparte yoke of 1804 could be made to sit kindly upon the neck of France; and France being a European nation, and the yoke being in substance a yoke such as Tartars make for Chinese, it followed that the accommodating of the one to the other was only to be effected by guile.

Therefore, by the sheer exigencies of his inheritance rather than by inborn wickedness, Prince Louis was driven to be a contriver; and
to expect him to be loyal to France without giving up his pretensions altogether, would be as inconsistent as to say that the heir of the first Perkin might undertake to revive the fleeting glories of the house of Warbeck, and yet refrain from imposture.

For years, the Prince pursued his strange calling, and by the time his studies were over, he had become highly skilled. Long before the moment had come for bringing his crooked science into use, he had learnt how to frame a Constitution which should seem to enact one thing and really enact another. He knew how to put the word 'jury' in laws which robbed men of their freedom; he could set the snare which he called 'universal suffrage;' he knew how to strangle a nation in the night-time with a thing he called a 'Plebiscite.'

The lawyer-like ingenuity which had thus been evoked for purposes of jurisprudence could, of course, be applied to the composition of State Papers and to political writings of all kinds; and the older Prince Louis grew, the more this odd accomplishment of his was used to subserve his infirmities. It was his nature to remain long in suspense, not merely between similar, but even between opposite plans of action. This weakness grew upon him with his years; and, his conscience being used to stand neuter in these mental conflicts, he never could end his doubt by seeing that one course was honest and the other not; so, in order to be able to linger safely in his suspense, he had to be always making resting-places upon
which for a time he might be able to stand undecided. Just as the indolent man becomes clever in framing excuses for his delays, so Prince Louis, because he was so often hesitating between the right and the left, became highly skilled in contriving—not merely ambiguous phrases, but—ambiguous schemes of action.

Partly from habits acquired in the secret societies of the Italian Carbonari, partly from long years passed in prison, and partly, too, as he once said, from his intercourse with the calm, self-possessed men of the English turf, he had derived the power of keeping long silence; but he was not by nature a reserved nor a secret man. Towards foreigners, and especially towards the English, he was generally frank. He was reserved and wary with the French, but this was upon the principle which makes a sportsman reserved and wary with deer and partridges and trout. No doubt, he was capable of dissembling, and continuing to dissemble through long periods of time; but it would seem that his faculty of keeping his intentions secret was very much aided by the fact that his judgment was often in real suspense, and that he had therefore no secret to tell. His love of masks and disguises sprang more, perhaps, from the odd vanity and the theatric mania which will be presently spoken of, than from a base love of deceit; for it is certain that the mystery in which he loved to wrap himself up was often contrived with a view to a melodramatic surprise.

It is believed that men do him wrong who speak
of him as void of all idea of truth. He understood truth, and in conversation he habitually preferred it to falsehood; but his truthfulness (though not perhaps contrived for such an end) sometimes became a means of deception; because, after generating confidence, it would suddenly break down under the pressure of a strong motive. He could maintain friendly relations with a man, and speak frankly and truthfully to him for seven years, and then suddenly deceive him. Of course men finding themselves ensnared by what had appeared to be honesty in his character, were naturally inclined to believe that every semblance of a good quality was a mask; but it is more consistent with the principles of human nature to believe that a truthfulness continuing for seven years was a genuine remnant of virtue, than that it was a mere preparation for falsehood. His doubting and undecided nature was a help to concealment; for men got so wearied by following the oscillations of his mind that their suspicions in time went to rest; and then, perhaps, when he saw that they were quite tired of predicting that he would do a thing, he gently stole out and did it.

He had boldness of the kind which is produced by reflection rather than that which is the result of temperament. In order to cope with the extraordinary perils into which he now and then thrust himself, and to cope with them decorously, there was wanted a fiery quality which nature had refused to the great bulk of mankind as well as to him. But it was only in emergencies of a
really trying sort, and involving instant physical danger, that his boldness fell short. He had all the courage which would have enabled him in a private station of life to pass through the common trials of the world with honour unquestioned; but he had besides, now and then, a factitious kind of audacity produced by long dreamy meditation; and when he had wrought himself into this state, he was apt to expose his firmness to trials beyond his strength. The truth is, that his imagination had so great a sway over him as to make him love the idea of enterprises, but it had not strength enough to give him a foreknowledge of what his sensations would be in the hour of trial. So he was most venturesome in his schemes for action; and yet, when at last he stood face to face with the very danger which he had long been courting, he was liable to be scared by it, as though it were something new and strange.

He loved to contrive and brood over plots, and he had a great skill in making the preparatory arrangements for bringing his schemes to ripeness; but his labours in this direction had a tendency to bring him into scenes for which by nature he was ill-fitted, because, like most of the common herd of men, he was unable to command the presence of mind and the flush of animal spirits which are needed for the critical moments of a daring adventure. In short he was a thoughtful literary man, deliberately tasking himself to venture into a desperate path, and going
great lengths in that direction; but liable to find himself balked in the moment of trial by the sudden and chilling return of his good sense.

He was not by nature bloodthirsty nor cruel, and besides that in small matters he had kind and generous instincts, he was really so willing to act fairly until the motive for foul play was strong, that for months and months together he was able to live amongst English sporting men without incurring disgrace; and if he was not so constituted nor so disciplined as to be able to refrain from any object of eager desire merely upon the theory that what he sought to do was wicked, there is ground for inferring that his perception of the difference between right and wrong had been dimmed (as it naturally would be) by the habit of seeking an ideal of manly worth in a personage like the First Bonaparte. It would seem that (as a study, or out of curiosity, if not with a notion of being guided by it) he must have accustomed himself to hear sometimes what conscience had to say; for it is certain that, with a pen in his hand and with sufficient time for preparation, he could imitate very neatly the scrupulous language of a man of honour.*

What he always longed for was to be able to seize and draw upon himself the wondering atten-

* See inter alia his address to the Electors, 29th Nov. 1848; his speech, read after taking the oath, 20th Dec. 1848; speech at Ham, 22d July 1849; ditto, at Tours, 1st Aug. 1849; message to the Chambers, 3d Dec. 1849; ditto, 12th Nov. 1850. It will be seen (see post) that, according to my view, these declarations may have been composed at a time when he was...
tion of mankind; and the accident of his birth having marked out for him the throne of the First Napoleon as an object upon which he might fasten a hope, his craving for conspicuousness, though it had its true root in vanity, soon came to resemble ambition; but the mental isolation in which he was kept by the nature of his aims and his studies, the seeming poverty of his intellect, his blank wooden looks, and above all, perhaps, the supposed remoteness of his chances of success—these sources of discouragement, contrasting with the grandeur of the object at which he aimed, caused his pretension to be looked upon as something merely comic and odd. Linked with this his passionate desire to attain to a height from which he might see the world gazing up at him, there was a strong and almost eccentric fondness for the artifices by which the framer of a melodrama, the stage-manager, and the stage-hero, combined to produce their effects; and so, by the blended force of a passion and a fancy, he was impelled to be contriving scenic effects and surprises in which he himself was always to be the hero. This bent was so strong and dominant as to be not a mere taste for theatric arrangements, but rather what men call a propensity. Standing alone, it would have done no more, perhaps, than govern the character of his amusements; but since his birth really shrinking from treason; but if, as others suppose, they were intended to hoodwink the country, it must be owned that they counterfeited the sentiments of an honest man with extraordinary skill.
had made him a pretender to the throne of France, his desire to imitate and reproduce the Empire supplied a point of contact between his theatric mania and what one may call his rational ambition; and the result was, that so long as he was in exile, he was always filled with a desire to mimic Napoleon's return from Elba, and to do this in his own person and upon the stage of the actual world.

In some of its features his attempt at Strasburg in 1836 was a graver business than is commonly supposed. At that time he was twenty-eight years old. He had gained over Vaudrey, the officer commanding a regiment of artillery which formed part of the garrison. Early in the morning of Sunday the 30th of October the movement began. By declaring that a revolution had broken out in Paris, and that the King had been deposed, Vaudrey persuaded his gunners to recognise the Prince as Napoleon II. Vaudrey then caused detachments to march to the houses of the Prefect and of General Voirol, the General commanding the garrison, and made them both prisoners, placing sentries at their doors. All this he achieved without alarming any of the other regiments.

Supposing that there really existed among the troops a deep attachment to the name and family of Bonaparte, little more seemed needed for winning over the whole garrison than that the heir of the great Emperor should have the personal qualities requisite for the success of the enterprise. Prince Louis was brought into the presence of the
captive General, and tried to gain him over, but was repulsed. Afterwards the Prince, surrounded with men personating an Imperial Staff, was conducted to the barrack of the 46th Regiment; and the men, taken entirely by surprise, were told that the person now introduced to them was their Emperor. What they saw was a young man with the bearing and countenance of a weaver—a weaver oppressed by long hours of monotonous indoor work, which makes the body stoop and keeps the eyes downcast; but all the while—and yet it was broad daylight—this young man, from hat to boot, was standing dressed up in the historic costume of the man of Austerlitz and Marengo. It seems that this painful exhibition began to undo the success which Vaudrey had achieved; but strange things had happened in Paris before; and the soldiery could not with certainty know that the young man might not be what they were told he was—Napoleon II., the new-made Emperor of the French. Their perplexity gave the Prince an opportunity of trying whether the sentiment for the Bonapartes were really existing or not, and if it were, whether he was the man to kindle it.

But by-and-by Talandier, the Colonel of the regiment, having been at length apprised of what was going on, came into the yard. He instantly ordered the gates to be closed, and then—fierce, angry, and scornful—went straight up to the spot where the proposed Emperor and his 'Imperial Staff' were standing. Of course this apparition
—the apparition of the indignant Colonel whose barrack had been invaded—was exactly what was to be expected, exactly what was to be combated; but yet, as though it were something monstrous and undreamt of, it came upon the Prince with a crushing power. To him, a literary man, standing in a barrack-yard in the dress of the great conqueror, an angry Colonel, with authentic warrant to command, was something real, and therefore, it seems, dreadful. In a moment Prince Louis succumbed to him. Some thought that, after what had been done that morning, the Prince owed it to the unfortunate Vaudrey (whom he had seduced into the plot) to take care not to let the enterprise collapse without testing his fortune to the utmost by a strenuous, not to say desperate resistance; but this view did not prevail. One of the ornaments which the Prince wore was a sword; yet, without striking a blow, he suffered himself to be publicly stripped of his grand cordon of the Legion of Honour and all his other decorations.* According to one account, the angry Colonel inflicted this dishonour with his own hands, and not only pulled the grand cordon from the Prince's bosom, but tore off his epaulettes, and trampled both epaulettes and grand cordon under foot. When he had been thus stripped the Prince

* Despatch of General Voirol, 'Moniteur,' 2d Nov. After stating the arrival of Lt.-Col. Talandier in the barrack-yard, the despatch says, 'Dans une minute L. N. Bonaparte et les misérables qui avaient pris parti pour lui ont été arrêtés, et les décorations dont ils étaient revêtus ont été arrachées par les soldats du 46me.'
was locked up. The decorated followers, who had been impersonating the Imperial Staff, underwent the same fate as their chief. Before judging the Prince for his conduct during these moments, it would be fair to assume that the Colonel having once been suffered to enter the yard, and to exert the ascendancy of his superior firmness, the danger of attempting resistance to him would have been great—would have been greater than any which the common herd of men are at all inclined to encounter. Besides, the mere fact that the Prince had wilfully brought himself into such a predicament shows that, although it might fail him in very trying moments, he had extraordinary daring of a particular kind. It would be unjust to say flatly that a man so willing as he was to make approaches to dangers was timid; it would be fairer to say that his characteristic was a faltering boldness. He could not alter his nature, and his nature was to be venturesome beforehand, but to be so violently awakened and shocked by the actual contact of danger as to be left without the spirit, and seemingly without the wish or the motives, for going on any farther with the part of a desperado. The truth is, that the sources of his boldness were his vanity and his theatric bent; and these passions, though they had power to bring him to the verge of danger, were not robust enough to hold good against man's natural shrinking from the risk of being killed—being killed within the next minute. Conscious that in point of hat and coat and boots he was
the same as the Emperor Napoleon, he imagined that the great revoir of 1815 between the men and the man of a hundred fights could be acted over again between modern French troops and himself; but it is plain that this belief had resulted from the undue mastery which he had allowed for a time to his ruling propensity, and not from any actual overthrow of the reason; for, when checked, he did not, like a madman or a dare-devil, try to carry his venture through; nor did he even, indeed, hold on long enough to try, and try fairly, whether the Bonapartist sentiment to which he wished to appeal were really existent or not: on the contrary, the moment he encountered the shock of the real world he stopped dead; and becoming suddenly quiet, harmless, and obedient, surrendered himself (as he always has done) to the first firm man who touched him. The change was like that seeming miracle which is wrought when a hysterical girl, who seems to be carried headlong by strange hallucinations, and to be clothed with the terrible power of madness, is suddenly cured and silenced by a rebuke and a sharp angry threat. Accepting a small sum of money * from the Sovereign whom he had been trying to dethrone, Prince Louis was shipped off to America by the good-natured King of the French.

But if he was wanting in the quality which enables a man to go well through with a venture, his ruling propensity had strength enough to make him try the same thing over and over again.

* £600.
His want of the personal qualifications for enterprises of this sort being now known in the French Army, and, ridicule having fastened upon his name, he could not afterwards seduce into his schemes any officers of higher rank than a lieutenant. Yet he did not desist. Before long he was planning another 'return from Elba,' but this time with new dresses and decorations. So long as he was preparing counterfeit flags and counterfeit generals and counterfeit soldiers,* and teaching a forlorn London bird to play the part of an omen and guide the destiny of France, he was perfectly at home in that kind of statesmanship; and the framing of the plebiscites and proclamations, which formed a large part of his cargo, was a business of which he was master; but if his arrangements should take effect then what he had to look for was, that at an early hour on a summer morning he would find himself in a barrack-yard at Boulogne surrounded by a band of armed followers, and supported by one of the officers of the garrison whom he had previously gained over; but also having to do with a number of soldiery, of whom some would be for him and some inclining against him, and others confused and perplexed. Now, this was exactly what happened to him: his arrangements had been so skilful, and fortune had so far lured him on, that whither he meant to

* The dresses were made to counterfeit the uniform of the 42d, one of the regiments quartered at Boulogne; and buttons having on them the number of the regiment were forged for the purpose at Birmingham.
go, there he was at last, standing in the very circumstances which he had brought about with long design aforethought. But then his nature failed him. Becoming agitated, and losing his presence of mind,* he could not govern the result of the struggle by the resources of his intellect; and being also without the fire and the joyfulness which come to warlike men in moments of crisis and of danger, he was ill qualified to kindle the hearts of the bewildered soldiery. So, when at last a firm, angry officer † forced his way into the barrack-yard, he conquered the Prince almost instantly by the strength of a more resolute nature, and turned him out into the street with all his fifty armed followers, with his flag and his eagle,‡ and his counterfeit headquarters Staff, as though he were dealing with a mere troop of strolling players.§ Yet only a few weeks afterwards this same Prince Louis Napoleon was able to show, by his demeanour before the Chamber of Peers, that where the occasion gave him leisure for thought, and for the exercise of mental control, he knew how to comport himself with dignity, and with a generous care for the safety and welfare of his followers.

* This is his own explanation of his state given before the Chamber of Peers. The flutter he was in caused him, as he explained, to let his pistol go off without intending it, and to hit a soldier who was not taking part against him.—‘Moniteur’ for 1340, p. 2031-2034.
† Captain Col-Puygellier.
‡ The eagle here spoken of is the wooden one.
§ ‘Moniteur,’ ubi ante.
It was natural that a man thus constituted should be much inclined to linger in the early stages of a plot; but since it chanced that by his birth and by his ambition Prince Louis Napoleon was put forward before the world as a pretender to the throne of France, he had always had around him a few keen adventurers who were willing to partake his fortunes; and if there were times when his personal wishes would have inclined him to choose repose or indefinite delay, he was too considerate in his feelings towards his little knot of followers to be capable of forgetting their needs.

In 1851, motives of this kind, joined with feelings of disappointment and of personal humiliation, were driving the President forward. He had always wished to bring about a change in the Constitution, but originally he had hoped to be able to do this with the aid and approval of some at least of the statesmen and eminent generals of the country; and the fact of his desiring such concurrence in his plans seems to show that he did not at first intend to trample upon France by subjecting her to a sheer Asiatic despotism, but rather to found such a monarchy as might have the support of men of station and character. But besides that few people believed him to be so able a man as he really was, there attached to him at this period a good deal of ridicule. So, although there were numbers in France who would have
been heartily glad to see the Republic crushed by some able dictator, there were hardly any public men who believed that in the President of the Republic they would find the man they wanted. Therefore his overtures to the gentlemen of France were always rejected. Every statesman to whom he applied refused to entertain his proposals. Every general whom he urged always said that for whatever he did he must have 'an order from the Minister of War.'

The President being thus rebuffed, his plan of changing the form of government with the assent of some of the leading statesmen and generals of the country degenerated into schemes of a very different kind; and at length he fell into the hands of persons of the quality of Persigny, Morny, and Fleury. With these men he plotted; and, strangely enough, it happened that the character and the pressing wants of his associates gave strength and purpose to designs which, without this stimulus, might have long remained mere dreams. The President was easy and generous in the use of money, and he gave his followers all he could; but the checks created by the constitution of the Republic were so effective, that beyond the narrow limit allowed by law he was without any command of the State resources. In their inveterate love of strong government, the Republicans had placed within reach of the Chief of the State ample means for overthrowing their whole structure, and yet they allowed him to remain subject to the same kind of anxiety, and to be driven to
the same kind of expedients, as an embarrassed tradesman. This was the President's actual plight; and if he looked to the future as designed for him by the Constitution, he could see nothing but the prospect of having to step down on a day already fixed, and descend from a conspicuous station into poverty and darkness. He would have been content, perhaps, to get what he needed by fair means. In the beginning of the year he had tried hard to induce the Chambers to increase the funds placed at his disposal. He failed. From that moment it was to be expected that, even if he himself should still wish to keep his hands from the purse of France, his associates, becoming more and more impatient, and more and more practical in their views, would soon press their chief into action.

The President had been a promoter of the law of the 31st of May restricting the franchise, but he now became the champion of universal suffrage. To minds versed in politics this change might have sufficed to disclose the nature of the schemes upon which the Chief of the State was brooding; but from first to last, words tending to allay suspicion had been used with great industry and skill. From the moment of his coming before the public in February 1848, the Prince laid hold of almost every occasion he could find for vowing again and again that he harboured no schemes against the Constitution. The speech which he addressed to the Assembly in 1850* may be taken as one instance out of numbers of these solemn

* 13th November.
and volunteered declarations. * 'He considered,' he said, 'as great criminals, those who by personal ambition compromised the small amount of stability secured by the Constitution; . . .

'that if the Constitution contained defects and dangers, the Assembly was competent to expose them to the eyes of the country; but that he alone, bound by his oath, restrained himself within the strict limits traced by that act.' He declared that 'the first duty of authorities was to inspire the people with respect for the law by never deviating from it themselves; and that his anxiety was not, he assured the Assembly to know who would govern France in 1852, but to employ the time at his disposal, so that the transition, whatever it might be, should be effected without agitation or disturbance; for,' said he, 'the noblest object, and the most worthy of an exalted mind, is not to seek when in power how to perpetuate it, but to labour inseparably to fortify, for the benefit of all, those principles of authority and morality which defy the passions of mankind and the instability of laws.'

It was thus that, in language well contrived for winning belief, he repudiated as wicked and preposterous the notion of his being the man who would or could act against the Constitution; and, supposing that when he voluntarily made these declarations he had resolved to do what he afterwards did, he would have been guilty of deceit more than commonly black; but perhaps

* See an enumeration of a few of these given ante.
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an appreciation of the room which he had in his mind for double and conflicting views, and a knowledge of his hesitating nature, and of the pressing wants of the associates by whom he was surrounded, may justify the more friendly view of those who imagine that, when he made all these solemn declarations, he was really shrinking from treason. Certainly, his words were just such as may have pictured the real thoughts of a goaded man at times when he had determined to make a stand against hungry and resolute followers who were keenly driving him forward.

It was natural that, in looking at the operation which changed the Republic into an Empire, the attention of the observer should be concentrated upon the person, who, already the Chief of the State, was about to attain to the throne; and there seems to be no doubt that what may be called the literary part of the transaction was performed by the President in person. He was the lawyer of the confederacy. He no doubt wrote the Proclamations, the Plebiscites, and the Constitutions, and all suchlike things; but it seems that the propelling power which brought the plot to bear was mainly supplied by Count de Morny, and by a resolute Major named Fleury.

M. Morny was a man of great daring, and gifted with more than common powers of fascina-
tion. He had been a member of the Chamber of Deputies in the time of the monarchy; but he was rather known to the world as a speculator
than as a politician. He was a buyer and seller of those fractional and volatile interests in trading adventures which go by the name of 'shares;' and since it has chanced that the nature of some of his transactions has been brought to light by the public tribunals, it is probable that the kind of repute in which he is held may be owing in part to those disclosures.* He knew how to found a 'company,' and he now undertook to establish institutions which were destined to be more lucrative to him than any of his former adventures. M. Morny was a practical man. If Prince Louis Napoleon was going to be content with a visionary life, thinking fondly of the hour when grateful France would come of her own accord and salute him Emperor, M. Morny was not the sort of person who would consent to stand loitering with him in the hungry land of dreams.

It seems, however, that the man who was the most able to make the President act, to drive him deep into his own plot, and fiercely carry him through it, was Major Fleury. Fleury was young, but his life had been checkered. He was the son of a Paris tradesman, from whom at an early age he had inherited a pleasant sum of money. He plunged into the enjoyments of Paris with so much ardour that that phase of his career was soon cut short; but whilst his father's friends were no

* The trials here referred to are the action for libel against M. Cabrol, Tribunal of the Seine, January 21 and June 30, 1853; and the suit instituted by the shareholders of the 'Constitutionnel' against Veron, Mirès, and Morny.
doubt lamenting ten times a-day that the boy had 'eaten his fortune,' young Fleury was at the foot of a ladder which was destined to give him a control over the fate of a mighty nation. He enlisted in the army as a common soldier; but the officers of his corps were so well pleased with the young man, and so admired the high spirit with which he met his change of fortune, that their goodwill soon caused him to be raised from the ranks. It was perhaps his knowledge about horses which first caused him to be attached to the Staff of the President.

From his temperament and his experience of life it resulted that Fleury cared a great deal for money, or the things which money can buy, and was not at all disposed to stand still and go without it. He was daring and resolute, and his daring was of the kind which holds good in the moment of danger. If Prince Louis Bonaparte was bold and ingenious in designing, Fleury was the man to execute. The one was skilful in preparing the mine and laying the train; the other was the man standing by with a lighted match, and determined to touch the fuse. The support of such a comrade as Fleury in the barrack-yard at Strasburg or at Boulogne might have brought many lives into danger, but it would have prevented the enterprise from coming to a ridiculous end. In truth, the nature of the one man was the complement of the nature of the other; and between them they had a set of qualities so puissant for dealing a sudden blow, that, working together,
and with all the appliances of the Executive Government at their command, they were a pair who might well be able to make a strange dream come true. It would seem that from the moment when Fleury became a partaker of momentous secrets, the President ceased to be free. At all events, he would have found it costly to attempt to stand still.

The language held by the generals who declared that they would act under the authority of the Minister of War, and not without it, suggested the contrivance which was resorted to. Fleury determined to find a military man capable of command, capable of secrecy, and capable of a great venture. The person chosen was to be properly sounded, and, if he seemed willing, was to be admitted into the plot. He was then to be made Minister of War, in order that through him the whole of the land-forces should be at the disposal of the plotters. Fleury went to Algeria to find the instrument required; and he so well performed his task that he hit upon a general officer who was christened, it seems, Jacques Arnaud Le Roy,* but was known at this time as Achille St Arnaud. Of some of the adventures of this person it will be right to speak hereafter. There was nothing in his past life, nor in his then plight, which made it at all dangerous for Fleury to ap-

* Giving in a formal way its list of the new Ministry of the 27th of October, the 'Annuaire,' an authority favourable to the Elysée, has these words: 'A la guerre, Jacques Arnaud le Roy de St Arnaud,' p. 352.—Note to 4th Edition, 1863.
proach him with the words of a suborner. He readily entered into the plot. From the moment that Prince Louis Bonaparte and his associates had entrusted their secret to the man of Fleury's selection, it was perhaps hardly possible for them to flinch; for the exigencies of St Arnaud, formerly Le Roy, were not likely to be on so modest a scale as to consist with the financial arrangements of a Republic governed by law; and the discontent of a person of his quality, with a secret like that in his charge, would plainly bring the rest of the brethren into danger. He was made Minister of War. This was on the 27th of October.

At the same time M. Maupas, or De Maupas, was brought into the Ministry. In the previous July this person had been Prefect of the Department of the Upper Garonne. Of him, his friends say that he had property, and that he had never been used to obtain money dishonestly. His zeal had led him to desire that thirty-two persons, including three members of the Council-General, should be seized and thrown into prison, on a charge of conspiring against the Government. The legal authorities of the department refused to suffer this, because they said there was no ground for the charge. Then this Maupas, or De Maupas, proposed that the want of all ground for accusing the men should be supplied by a stratagem, and with that view he deliberately offered to arrange that incriminating papers and arms and grenades should be secretly placed in the houses
of the men whom he wanted to have accused. Naturally, the legal authorities of the department were horror-struck by the proposal, and they denounced the Prefect to the Keeper of the Seals. Maupas was ordered to Paris.* From the indignant and scornful presence of M. Faucher he came away sobbing, and people who knew the truth supposed him to be for ever disgraced and ruined; but he went and told his sorrows to the President. The President of course instantly saw that the man could be suborned. He admitted him into the plot, and on the 27th of October appointed him Prefect of Police.

Persigny, properly Fialin, was in the plot. He was descended, on one side, of an ancient family, and, disliking his father's name, he seems to have called himself for many years after the name of his maternal grandfather.† He began life as a non-commissioned officer. As he himself said,‡ his instinct was 'to serve'; and at first, he served the Legitimists, but chance brought him into contact with Louis Bonaparte, and he very soon became the attached friend of the Prince, and his partner in all his plans and adventures. If Morny was merely taking up the Bonaparte cause as one

* See the 'Bulletin Français', p. 98 et seq. This publication appeared under auspices which make it a safe authority. It is to be regretted that its statements extend to only a portion of the events connected with the 2d of December.

† This, I think, was the account which he gave upon his trial in 1840. He was tried by the description of Fialin dit Persigny.

‡ Before the Chamber of Peers, 1840.
of many other money speculations, Persigny could truly say that he had made it for years his profession, and had even tried as well as he could to raise it to the dignity of a real political principle. But the part entrusted to Persigny on this occasion, though possibly an important one, was not of a conspicuous sort. It is said that, the firmness of the Prince Louis Bonaparte being distrusted by his comrades, Persigny, who was of a sanguine, hopeful nature, was to remain constantly at the Elysée in order to receive the tidings which would be coming in during the period of danger, and prevent them from reaching the President in such a way as to shake him and cause despondency. At all events, it would seem that the hand of Persigny was not the hand employed to execute the measures of the Elysée; and to this circumstance he owes it that he will not always have to stand in the same sentences with Morny, and Fleury, and Maupas, and St Arnaud, formerly Le Roy.

It was necessary to take measures for paralysing the National Guard; but the force was under the command of General Perrot, a man whose honesty could not be tampered with. To dismiss him suddenly would be to excite suspicion. The following expedient was adopted: The President appointed as Chief of the Staff of the National Guard a person named Vieyra. The past life and the then repute of this person were of such a kind, that General Perrot, it seems, conceived himself insulted by the nomination, and instantly resigned.
That was what the brethren of the Elysée wanted. On Sunday the 30th, General Lawæstine was appointed to the command. He was a man who had fought in the great wars, but, now in his grey hairs, he was not too proud to accept the part designed for him. His function was—not to lead the force of which he took the command, but—to prevent it from acting. It was unnecessary to admit either Lawæstine or Vieyra to a complete knowledge of the plot, because all that they were to do was to frustrate the assembly of the National Guard by withholding all orders and preventing the drums from beating to arms.

Of course the engine on which the brethren of the Elysée rested their main hopes was the army; and it was known that the remembrance of humiliating conflicts in the streets of Paris had long been embittering the temper in which the troops regarded the people of the capital. Moreover, it happened that at this time the Legislative Assembly had been agitated by a discussion which inflamed the troops with fresh anger against civilians in general, but more especially against the Parisians, against the representatives of the people, and against statesmen and politicians of all kinds. A portion of the Chambers, foreseeing that the army might be used against the freedom of the Legislative Body, had desired that the Assembly should avail itself of a provision in the Constitution which empowered it, not only to have an armed force for its protection, but to have that force under the order of its own nominee. This
CHAP. XIV.

Its indignation at M. Baze's proposal.

was a scheme which shocked the mind of the army. In France, of late years, the Minister of War had always been a soldier, and an order from him (though it was in reality the order of a member of the civil Government) was habitually regarded by military men as the order of a general having supreme command. A proposal to change this system by giving to the Assembly a direct control over a portion of the land-forces could be easily represented to the soldiery as a plan for withdrawing the French army from the control of its generals and placing it under the command of men whom the soldiers called 'lawyers.' Seen in this light, the project so exasperated the feelings of the troops, that if it had been carried, they would probably have been stirred up at once to effect by force a violent change of the Constitution. The measure was rejected; but anger is not always appeased by the removal of the kindling motive; and the soreness created by the mere agitation of the question had been so well kept up by the means employed for the purpose, that the garrison of Paris now came to look upon the people with a well-defined feeling of spite.

Care had been taken to bring into Paris and its neighbourhood the regiments most likely to serve the purpose of the Elysée, and to give the command to generals who might be expected to act without scruples. The forces in Paris and its neighbourhood were under the orders of General Magnan. At the time of Louis Napoleon's descent
upon the coast near Boulogne, Magnan had had the misfortune to be singled out by the Prince as a person to whom it was fitting to offer a bribe of £4000. He had also had the misfortune to be detected in continuing his intercourse with the officer who had thought it safe to come with a proposal like that into the presence of a French general. Magnan did not conceal his willingness to go all lengths, and the brethren, it appears, wished to bring him completely into the plot;* but his panegyrist (not seeing, perhaps, the full import of his disclosure) causes it to be known that the General, though ready to act against Paris and against the Assembly, declined to risk his safety by avowedly joining in the plot. 'He expressly requested,' says Granier de Cassagnac, 'not to be apprised until the moment for taking 'the necessary dispositions and mounting on 'horseback.'† In other words, though he was willing to use the forces under his command in destroying the Constitution, and in effecting such slaughter as might be needed for the purpose, he refused to dispense with the screen afforded by an order from the Minister of War. In the event of the enterprise failing he would be able to say, 'I refused to participate in any plot. The duty 'of a soldier is obedience. Here is the order 'which I received from General St Arnaud. I

* This is inferred from what follows.
CHAP. XIV.

Meeting of twenty generals at Magnan's house.

‘did no more than obey my commanding officer.’

On the 27th of November, however, this Magnan assembled twenty generals whom he had under his command, and gave them to understand that they might soon be called upon to act against Paris and against the Constitution.* They promised a zealous and thoroughgoing obedience; and although every one of them, from Magnan downwards, was to have the pleasing shelter of an order from his superior officer, they all seemed to have imagined that their determination was of the sort which mankind call heroic; for their panegyrist relates with pride that when Magnan and his twenty generals were entering into this league and covenant against the people of Paris, they solemnly embraced one another.†

From time to time the common soldiery were gratified with presents of food and wine, as well as with an abundance of flattering words; and their exasperation against the civilians was so well kept alive, that men used to African warfare were brought into the humour for calling the Parisians ‘Bedouins.’ There was massacre in the

* Granier de Cassagnac, p. 392. There, the 26th is the day of the month which the historian mentions, but he gives Thursday (which fell on the 27th) as the day of the week when the meeting took place.—Note to 4th Edition, 1863.

† ‘All the generals embraced each other, and from that moment it might be said with certainty that France was going to come out of the abyss.’—Ibid. p. 392. The names of the twenty-one generals will be found ibid. p. 393.—Note to 4th Edition, 1863.
very sound. The army of Paris was in the temper required.

It was necessary for the plotters to have the concurrence of M. St Georges, the Director of the State printing-office. M. St Georges was suborned. Then all was ready.

IV.

On the Monday night between the 1st and the 2d of December the President had his usual assembly at the Elysée. Ministers who were loyally ignorant of what was going on were mingled with those who were in the plot. Vieyra was present. He was spoken to by the President, and he undertook that the National Guard should not beat to arms that night. He went away, and it is said that he fulfilled his humble task by causing the drums to be mutilated. At the usual hour the assembly began to disperse, and by eleven o'clock there were only three guests who remained. These were Morny (who had previously taken care to show himself at one of the theatres), Maupas, and St Arnaud, formerly Le Roy. There was, besides, an orderly officer of the President, called Colonel Beville, who was initiated in the secret. Persigny, it seems, was not present. Morny, Maupas, and St Arnaud went with the President into his cabinet; Colonel Beville followed them.* Mocquard, the private secretary of the President, was

in the secret, but it does not appear that he was in the room at this time. Fleury too, it seems, was away; he was probably on an errand which tended to put an end to the hesitation of his more elderly comrades, and drive them to make the venture. They were to strike the blow that night. They deliberated, but in the absence of Fleury their council was incomplete, because at the very moment when perhaps their doubts and fears were inclining them still to hold back, Fleury, impetuous and resolute, might be taking a step which must needs push them forward. By-and-by they were apprised that an order which had been given for the movement of a battalion of gendarmerie had duly taken effect without exciting remark. It is probable that the execution of this delicate movement was the very business which Fleury had gone to witness with his own eyes, and that it was he who brought the intelligence of its complete success to the Elysée. Perhaps also he showed that, after the step which had just been taken, it would be dangerous to stop short; for the plotters now passed into action. The President entrusted a packet of manuscripts to Colonel Beville, and despatched him to the State printing-office.

It was in the streets which surround this building that the battalion of gendarmerie had been collected. When Paris was hushed in sleep, the battalion came quietly out, and folded round the State printing-office. From that moment until their work was done the printers were all close
captives, for no one of them was suffered to go out. For some time they were kept waiting. At length Colonel Beville came from the Elysée with his packet of manuscripts. These papers were the proclamations required for the early morning, and M. St Georges, the Director, gave orders to put them into type. It is said that there was something like resistance; but in the end, if not at first, the printers obeyed. Each compositor stood whilst he worked between two policemen, and the manuscript being cut into many pieces, no one could make out the sense of what he was printing.* By these proclamations the President asserted that the Assembly was a hotbed of plots; declared it dissolved; pronounced for universal suffrage; proposed a new constitution; vowed anew that his duty was to maintain the Republic;† and placed Paris and the twelve surrounding departments under martial law.‡ In one of the proclamations he appealed to the army, and strove to whet its enmity against civilians by reminding it of the defeats inflicted upon the troops in 1830 and 1848.§

The President wrote letters dismissing the mem-

* Mauduit, 'Révolution Militaire,' p. 92.
† 'My duty is to baffle their perfidious projects, to maintain the Republic, and to save the country,' &c. 'Annuaire,' App. p. 60.—Note to 4th Edition, 1863.
‡ Ibid.
§ The proclamation to the army contained this passage: 'In 1830, as in 1848, they treated you as conquered men. After having spurned your heroic disinterestedness, they disdained to consult your sympathies and your wishes, and yet you are the élite of the nation. To-day, in this solemn moment, I desire that the army may make its voice heard.'—Granier de
bers of the Government who were not in the plot; but he did not cause these letters to be delivered until the following morning. He also signed a paper appointing Morny to the Home Office.

The night was advancing. Some important steps had been taken, but still, though highly dangerous, it was not absolutely impossible for the plotters to stop short. They could tear up the letters which purported to dismiss the Ministers; and although they could not hope to prevent the disclosures which the printers would make as soon as they were released from captivity, it was not too late to keep back the words, and even the general tenor, of the Proclamations. But the next steps were of such a kind as to be irrevocable.

It is said that at this part of the night the spirit of some of the brethren was cast down, and that there was one of them who shrank from farther action; but Fleury, they say, got into a room alone with the man who wanted to hang back, and then, locking the door and drawing a pistol, stood and threatened his agitated friend with instant death if he still refused to go on.*

Cassagnac, vol. ii. p. 404. A copy of the proclamation will also be found in the 'Annuaire' for 1851. This last publication (which must be distinguished from the 'Annuaire des Deux Mondes') gives an account of the events of December, written in a spirit favourable to the Elysée; but the Appendix contains a full collection of official documents.—Note to 4th Edition, 1863.

* I have thought it right to introduce this account under a form indicating that it is based on mere rumour, but I entertain no doubt that the incident has been declared to be true by one of the two persons who stood face to face in that room.
What is certain is, that, whether in hope or whether in fear, the plotters went on with their midnight task. The order from the Minister of War was probably signed by half-past two in the morning, for at three it was in the hands of Magnan.*

At the same hour Maupas (assigning for pretext the expected arrival of foreign refugees) caused a number of Commissaries to be summoned in all haste to the Prefecture of Police. At half-past three in the morning these men were in attendance; Maupas received each of them separately, and gave to each distinct instructions. It was then that for the first time the main secret of the confederates passed into the hands of a number of subordinate agents. During some hours of that night every one of those humble Commissaries had the destinies of France in his hands; for he might either obey the Minister, and so place his country in the power of the Elysée; or he might obey the law, denounce the plot, and bring its contrivers to trial. Maupas gave orders for the seizure at the same minute of the foremost Generals of France, and several of her leading Statesmen.† Parties of the police, each under the orders of a Commissary, were to be at the doors of the persons to be arrested some time beforehand, but the seizures were not to take place until a quarter past six.

At six o'clock a brigade of infantry, under

Forey, occupied the Quai d'Orsay; another brigade, under Dulac, occupied the garden of the Tuileries; another brigade, under Cotte, occupied the Place de la Concorde; and another brigade of infantry under Canrobert, with a whole division of cavalry under Korte, and another brigade of cavalry under Reybell, was posted in the neighbourhood of the Elysée. It would seem that the main objects aimed at by those who thus placed the troops were—not at this moment to overawe the whole of Paris, but—rather to support the operations of Maupas, and to provide for the safety of the brethren at the Elysée by keeping them close under the shield of the army as long as they remained in Paris, and, if such a step should become necessary, by securing and covering their flight.

Almost at the same time Maupas's orders were carefully obeyed; for at the appointed minute, and whilst it was still dark, the designated houses were entered. The most famous generals of France were seized. General Changarnier, General Bedeau, General Lamoricière, General Cavagnac, and General Leflô were taken from their beds, and carried away through the sleeping city and thrown into prison. In the same minute the like was done with some of the chief members and officers of the Assembly, and, amongst others, with Thiers, Miot, Baze, Colonel Charras, Roger du Nord, and several of the democratic leaders.

† Ibid. p. 401.
Some men, believed to be the chiefs of secret societies, were also seized.* The general object of these night-arrests was that, when morning broke, the army should be without generals inclined to observe the law, that the Assembly should be without the machinery for convoking it, and that all the political parties in the State should be paralysed by the disappearance of their chiefs. The number of men thus seized in the dark was seventy-eight. Eighteen of these were members of the Assembly.†

Whilst it was still dark, Morny, escorted by a body of infantry, took possession of the Home Office, and prepared to touch the springs of that wondrous machinery by which a clerk can dictate to a nation. Already he began to tell forty thousand communes of the enthusiasm with which the sleeping city had received the announcement of measures not hitherto disclosed.‡

V.

When the light of the morning dawned, people saw the Proclamations on the walls, and slowly came to hear that numbers of the foremost men of France had been seized in the night-time, and that every General to whom the friends of law and order could look for help was lying in one or

* Granier de Cassagnac, vol. ii. p. 401. † Ibid.
‡ "The Assembly," he wrote, "has been dissolved amid the applause of the whole population of Paris." Circular to the Prefects.—Note to 4th Edition, 1863.
other of the prisons. The newspapers, to which a man might run in order to know, and know truly, what others thought and intended, were all seized and stopped.*

The gates of the Assembly were closed and guarded, but the Deputies, who began to flock thither, found means to enter by passing through one of the official residences which formed part of the building.† They had assembled in the Chamber in large numbers, and some of them having caught Dupin, their reluctant President, were forcing him to come and take the chair, when a body of infantry burst in and drove them out, striking some of them with the butt-ends of their muskets.‡ Almost at the same time a number of Deputies who had gathered about the side-entrance of the Assembly were roughly handled and dispersed by a body of light infantry. Twelve Deputies were seized by the soldiers and carried off prisoners.§

In the course of the morning the President, accompanied by his uncle, Jerome Bonaparte, and Count Flahault,|| and attended by many general officers and a numerous staff, rode through some

* ‘Annuaire,’ p. 344.
† La Vérité, ‘Recueil d’Actes Officiels,’ p. 4.
‡ The names of nine of these are given in the ‘Recueil,’ p. 64; and besides these, the seizure of M.M. Daru and De Blois is stated. Ibid. pp. 6, 7.—Note to 4th Edition, 1863.
§ La Vérité, ‘Recueil d’Actes Officiels,’ p. 4.
|| I imagine that, before the night of the 1st of December, Count Flahault had some knowledge of what was going to be done.
of the streets of Paris.* It would seem that his
theatric bent had led Prince Louis to expect from
this ride a kind of triumph, upon which his
fortunes would hinge; and certainly the unpopu-
laritv of the Assembly, and the suddenness and
perfection of the blow which he had struck in the
night, gave him fair grounds for his hope; but
he was hardly aware of the light in which his
personal pretensions were regarded by the keen
laughing people of Paris. The moment when
they would cease to use laughter against him was
very near, but it had not yet come. Moreover,
he did not bring himself to incur the risk which
was necessary for obtaining an acclaim of the
people, for he clung to the streets and the quays
which were close under the dominion of the
troops. Upon the whole, the reception he met
with seems to have been neither friendly nor
violently hostile, but chilling, and in a quiet way
scornful.

It seems that after meeting this check his
spirit suffered collapse. Once again, though not
so hopelessly as at Strasburg and Boulogne, he had
encountered the shock of the real world. And
again, as before, the shock felled him. Nor was it
strange that he should be abashed and despond-
ing: obeying his old propensity, he had prepared
and appointed for the Austerlitz day a great
scenic greeting between himself on the one hand,

* Fleury rode in front of the cortège, waving his sword and
trying to get the people in the streets to cheer.—Note to 4th
and on the other a mighty nation. When, leaving the room where all this had been contrived and rehearsed, he came out into the free air, and rode through street after street, it became every minute more certain that Paris was too busy, too grave, too scornful, to think of hailing him Emperor; nay, strange to say, the people, being fastidious or careless, or imperfectly aware of what had been done, refused to give him even that wondering attention which seemed to be insured to him by the transactions of the foregoing night; and yet, there they were—the proffered Cæsar and his long-prepared group of Captains—sitting published on the backs of real horses, with appropriate swords and dresses. Perhaps what a man in this plight might the most hate would be the sun—the cold December sun. Prince Louis rode home, and went in out of sight.

Thenceforth, for the most part, he remained close shut up in the Elysée. There, in an inner room, still decked in red trousers, but with his back to the daylight, they say he sat bent over a fireplace for hours and hours together, resting his elbows on his knees, and burying his face in his hands.

What is better known is, that in general, during this period of danger, tidings were not suffered to go to him straight. It seems that, either in obedience to his own dismal instinct, or else because his associates had determined to prevent him from ruining them by his gloom, he was kept sheltered from immediate contact with alarm.
ing messengers. It was thought more wholesome for him to hear what Persigny or the resolute Fleury might think it safe to tell him, than to see with his own eyes an aide-de-camp fresh come from St Arnaud or Magnan, or a commissary full fraught with the sensations which were shaking the health of Maupas.

Driven from their Chamber, the Deputies assembled at the Mayorality of the 10th arrondissement.* There, upon the motion of the illustrious Berryer, they resolved that the act of Louis Bonaparte was a forfeiture of the Presidency, and they directed the judges of the Supreme Court to meet and proceed to the judgment of the President and his accomplices.† These resolutions had just been voted, when a battalion of the Chasseurs de Vincennes entered the courtyard of the Mayoralty, and began to ascend the stairs. One of the Vice-Presidents of the Assembly‡ went out and summoned the soldiers to stop, and leave the Chamber free. The officer appealed to felt the hatefulness or the danger of the duty entrusted to him, and, declaring that he was only an in-

* 'Recueil d'Actes Officiels,' p. 60. In that and in pp. 61-3, the names of the 220 deputies are given.—Note to 4th Edition, 1863.

† Ibid. pp. 37, 45. The report of the proceedings of the Assembly is from the shorthand-writer's notes. See ibid. p. 35.—Note to 4th Edition, 1863.

‡ Namely, M. Vitet. Through all those last moments of the struggle between law and force, M. Vitet's demeanour was admirable for its firmness and dignity. Of this I am assured by one of the most eminent of the many statesmen who were there present.—Note to 4th Edition, 1863.
Presently afterwards several battalions of the line under the command of General Forey came up and surrounded the Mayoralty. The Chasseurs de Vincennes were ordered to load. By-and-by two Commissaries of Police came to the door, and, announcing that they had orders to clear the hall, entreated the Assembly to yield. The Assembly refused. A third Commissary came, using more imperative language, but he also seems to have shrunk back when he was made to see the lawlessness of the act which he was attempting.† At length an aide-de-camp of General Magnan came with a written order directing the officer in command of the battalion to clear the hall, to do this if necessary by force, and to carry off to the prison of Mazas any Deputies offering resistance.‡ By his way of framing this order, Magnan showed how he crouched under his favourite shelter, for in it he declared that he acted 'in consequence of the orders of the Minister of War.' § The number of Deputies present at

* La Vérité, 'Recueil d'Actes Officiels,' p. 52.
† Ibid. pp. 53-6.
‡ It was in the second of the two written orders produced that the prison of Mazas was designated. It is given ibid. p. 57.—Note to 4th Edition, 1863.
§ The order rendered into English was in these words:—
'Commandant! In consequence of the orders of the Minister of War, cause to be immediately occupied the Mayoralty of the 10th arrondissement, and cause to be arrested, if necessary, such of the representatives as shall not instantly obey the
this moment was two hundred and twenty. The whole Assembly declared that they resisted, and would yield to nothing short of force. In the absence of Dupin, M. Benoist d'Azy had been presiding over the Assembly, and both he and one of the Vice-Presidents were now collared by officers of police and led out.† The whole Assembly followed, and, enfolded between files of soldiery, was marched through the streets. General Forey rode by the side of the column.‡ The captive Assembly passed through the Rue de Grenelle, the Rue St Guillaume, the Rue Neuve de l'Université, the Rue de Beaune, and finally into the Quai d'Orsay.§ The spectacle of France thus marched prisoner through the streets seems to have pained the people who saw it, but the pain was that of men who, witnessing by chance some disagreeable outrage, feel sorry that some one else does not prevent it, and then pass on. The members of the Assembly, trusting too much to mere law and right, had neglected or failed to provide that there should be a great concourse of people in the neighbourhood of the hall where they met. Those who saw this ending of free institutions were casual bystanders, and were gathered, it seems, in no great numbers. There

† Ibid. p. 60. M. Benoist d'Azy was one of the Vice-Presidents, and the other Vice-President collared by the soldiery was M. Vitet. —Note to 4th Edition.
‡ Ibid. p. 11.
§ Ibid. p. 60.
was no storm of indignation. In an evil hour the Republicans had made it a law that the representatives of the people should be paid for their services. This provision, as was natural, had brought the Assembly into discredit, for it destroyed the ennobling sentiment with which a free people is accustomed to regard its Parliament. The Paris workman, brave and warlike, but shrewd and somewhat envious, compared the amount of his day's earning with the wages of the Deputies, and it did not seem to him that the right cause to stand up for was the cause of men who were hired to be patriots at the rate of twenty-five francs a-day. Still, by his mere taste, and his high sense of the difference between what is becoming and what is ignoble, he was inclined to feel hurt by the sight of what he witnessed. In this doubtful temper the Paris workman stood watching, and saw his country slide down from out of the rank of free States. The gates of the D'Orsay barrack were opened, and the Assembly was marched into the court. Then the gates closed upon them.*

It was now only two o'clock in the afternoon;† but darkness was wanted to hide the thing which was next to be done, and the members of the Assembly were kept prisoners all the day in the barrack. At half-past four, three Deputies who had been absent came to the barrack and caused

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* La Vérité, 'Recueil d'Actes Officiels,' p. 60.
† Ibid. p. 12; but the procès-verbal makes it rather later—viz., twenty minutes past three o'clock. Ibid. p. 60.—Note to 4th Edition, 1863.
themselves to be made prisoners with the two hundred and twenty already there; and at half-past eight in the evening the twelve Deputies who had been seized by the troops at the house of the Assembly were brought to the barrack, so that the number of Deputies there imprisoned was now raised to two hundred and thirty-five.*

At a quarter before ten o'clock at night a large number of the windowless vans which are used for the transport of felons were brought into the court of the barrack, and into these the two hundred and thirty-five members of the Assembly were thrust.† They were carried off,—some to the Fort of Mount Valerian, some to the fortress of Vincennes, and some to the prison of Mazas. Before the dawn of the 3d of December all the eminent members of the Assembly, and all the foremost generals of France, were lying in prison; for now (besides General Changarnier, and General Bedeau, General Lamoricière, General Cavaignac, and General Leflò, and besides Thiers, and Colonel Charras, and Roger du Nord, and Miot, and Baze, and the others who had been seized the night before, and were still held fast in the jails) there were in prison two hundred and thirty-five of the

* According to the 'Recueil' the number was 232.—La Vérité, 'Recueil d'Actes Officiels,' p. 64. The difference is occasioned by including, or not including, M. Daru, and M. de Blois, and one other.—Note to 4th Edition, 1863.

† Not all in one batch, but in three. The last batch was so large a one, that the prison-vans had to be reinforced by some omnibuses; and some few of the Deputies were left behind for a time in the barrack. Ibid. p. 15.—Note to 4th Edition, 1863.
representatives of the people, including, amongst others of wide renown, Berryer, Odillon Barrot, Barthélémy St Hilaire, Gustave de Beaumont, Benoist d'Azy, * the Duc de Broglie, Adminal Cecile, Chambolle, De Corcelles, Dufaure, Duvergier de Hauranne, De Falloux, General Lauriston, Oscar Lafayette, Lanjuinais, Lasteyrie, the Duc de Luines, the Duc de Montebello, General Radoult-Lafosse, General Oudinot, De Remusat, and the wise and gifted De Tocqueville. Amongst the men imprisoned there were twelve statesmen who had been Cabinet Ministers, and nine of these had been chosen by the President himself.†

These were the sort of men who were within the walls of the prisons. Those who threw them into prison were Prince Louis Bonaparte, Morny, Maupas, and St Arnaud formerly Le Roy, all acting with the advice and consent of Fialin de Persigny, and under the propulsion of Fleury. It is true that the army was aiding; but it has been seen that Magnan, who commanded it, had taken care to screen himself under the orders of the Minister of War; and in the event of his being brought to trial he would, no doubt, labour to show that in doing as he did, and in effecting

* One of the Vice-Presidents of the Assembly. Amongst the Deputies thrown into prison there was also M. Vitet, another of the Vice-Presidents.—Note to 4th Edition, 1863.

† The facts mentioned in the above paragraph are not, I believe, controverted in any important point. A full account of what passed will be found in the well-known letter of M. de Tocqueville (now printed in the collection of his letters), and in the ‘Recueil’ above quoted, pp. 13, 14, 60 et seq.—Note to 4th Edition, 1863.
the midnight seizure and imprisonment of his country's greatest commanders, he was an instrument, and not a contriver.

By the laws of the Republic, the duty of taking cognisance of offences against the Constitution was cast upon the Supreme Court. The Court was sitting, when an armed force entered the hall, and the judges were driven from the bench,* but not until they had made a judicial order for the impeachment of the President. Before the judges were thrust down they adjourned the Court to a day 'to be named hereafter,' and they had the spirit to order a notice of the impeachment to be served upon the President at the Elysée.† If the process-server encountered Colonel Fleury at the Elysée, he would soon find that Fleury was not the man who would suffer his gloomy master to be depressed by the sight of a man with an ugly summons from a Court of Law.

VI.

The ancient courage of the Parisians had accustomed them to the thought of encountering wrong by an armed resistance; but there were many causes which rendered it unwise for them at that moment to appeal to force. The events of 1848,

* The 'Annuaire' says triumphantly that two Commissaries of Police 'interrupted this fresh attempt at legal resistance, p. 373.—Note to 4th Edition, 1863.
† It seems that in his mission to the Elysée the process-server was accompanied by the President of the Court. Ibid. 'Bulletin Français,' p. 27.—Note to 4th Edition, 1863.
and the doctrines of the sect called Socialists, had filled men's minds with terror. People who had known what it was to be for months and months together in actual fear for their lives and for their goods, were brought down into a condition of mind which made them willing to side with any executive government however lawless, against any kind of insurrection however righteous. Moreover, the feeling of contempt with which the President had been regarded by many was not immediately changed by the events of the 2d of December. It was effectually changed, as will be seen, by the carnage of the 4th; but before the afternoon of that day, the very extravagance of the outrage which had been perpetrated so reminded men of the invasion of Strasburg and the grotesque descent upon Boulogne, that, during the fifty-four hours which followed upon the dawn of the 2d, the indignation of the public was weakened by its sense of the ridiculous. The contemptuous cry of 'Soulouque!' indicated that Paris was comparing Louis Napoleon to the negro Emperor who had travestied the achievements of the First Bonaparte; and there were many to whom it seemed that his mimicry of the 18th Brumaire belonged to exactly the same class of enterprises as his mimicry of the return from Elba. Plainly the difference was, that this time, instead of having only a few dresses and counterfeit flags, he commanded the resources of the most powerful executive government in the world; but still there was a somewhat widespread belief that the
President was tumbling as fast as was necessary, and would soon be defeated and punished. Besides, by the contrivance already described, the plotters had paralysed the National Guard. Moreover, it would seem that the great body of the working men did not conceive themselves to be hurt by what had been done. Universal suffrage, and the immediate privilege of choosing a dictator for France, were offerings well fitted to win over many honest though credulous labourers, and the baser sort, whose vice is envy, were gratified by what had been done; for they loved to see the kind of inversion which was implied in the fact that men like Lamoricière, and Bedeau, and Cavaignac, like De Luines, like De Tocqueville, and the Duc de Broglie, could be shut up in a jail or thrown into a felon's van by persons like Morny, and Maupas, and St Arnaud formerly Le Roy. Thus there was no sufficing material for the immediate formation of insurgent forces in Paris. The rich and the middle classes were indignant, but they had a horror of insurrection; and the poor had less dread of insurrection, but then they were not indignant. It is known, moreover, that for the moment there was no fighting power in Paris. Paris has generally abounded in warlike and daring men, who love fighting for fighting's sake; but, for the time, this portion of the French community had been crushed by the result of the great street-battle of June 1848, and the seizures and banishments which followed the defeat of the insurgents. The men of the barri-
The Committee of Resistance.

Cades had been stripped of their arms, deprived of their leaders, and so thinned in numbers as to be unequal to any serious conflict, and their helplessness was completed by the sudden disappearance of the street captains and the chiefs of secret societies, who had been seized in the night between the 1st and 2d of December.

Still there was a remnant of the old insurrectionary forces, which was willing to try the experiment of throwing up a few barricades, and there was, besides, a small number of men who were impelled in the same direction by motives of a different and almost opposite kind. These last were men too brave, too proud, too faithful in their love of right and freedom, to be capable of acquiescing for even a week in the transactions of the December night. The foremost of these was the illustrious Victor Hugo. He and some of the other members of the Assembly who had escaped seizure, formed themselves into a Committee of Resistance, with a view to assert by arms the supremacy of the law. This step they took on the 2d of December.

Several members of the Assembly went into the Faubourg St Antoine, and strove to raise the people. These Deputies were Schœlcher, Bandin, Aubry, Duval, Chaix, Malardier, and De Flotte, and they were vigorously supported by Cournet, whose residence became their headquarters, and by Xavier Durrieu, Kesler, Ruin, Lemaitre, Wabripon, Le Jeune, and other men connected with the democratic press. More, it would seem, by
their personal energy than by the aid of the people, these men threw up a slight barricade at the corner of the Rue St Marguerite. Against this there marched a battalion of the 19th Regiment; and then there occurred a scene which may make one smile for a moment, and may then almost force one to admire the touching pedantry of brave men, who imagined that, without policy or warlike means, they could be strong with the mere strength of the law. Laying aside their firearms, and throwing across their shoulders scarfs which marked them as Representatives of the People, the Deputies ranged themselves in front of the barricade, and one of them, Charles Baudin, held ready in his hand the book of the Constitution. When the head of the column was within a few yards of the barricade, it was halted. For some moments there was silence. Law and Force had met. On the one side was the Code democratic, which France had declared to be perpetual; on the other a battalion of the line. Charles Baudin, pointing to his book, began to show what he held to be the clear duty of the battalion; but the whole basis of his argument was an assumption that the law ought to be obeyed; and it seems that the officer in command refused to concede what logicians call the 'major premiss,' for, instead of accepting its necessary consequence, he gave an impatient sign. Suddenly the muskets of the front-rank men came down, came up, came level; and in another instant their fire pelted straight into the group of the scarfed Deputies.
Baudin fell dead, his head being shattered by more than one ball. One other was killed by the volley; several more were wounded. The book of the Constitution had fallen to the ground, and the defenders of the law recurred to their firearms. They shot the officer who had caused the death of their comrade and questioned their major premiss. There was a fight of the Homeric sort for the body of Charles Baudin. The battalion won it. Four soldiers carried it off.* Plainly this attempted insurrection in the Faubourg St Antoine was without the support of the multitude. It died out.

The Committee of Resistance now caused barricades to be thrown up in that mass of streets between the Hôtel de Ville and the Boulevard, which is the accustomed centre of an insurrection in Paris; but they were not strong enough to occupy the houses, and therefore the troops passed through the streets without danger, and easily took every barricade which they encountered. When the troops retired, the barricades again sprang up, but only to be again taken. This state of things continued during part of the 3d of December; but afterwards the efforts of the troops were relaxed, and, during the night and the whole forenoon of the next day, the formation of barricades in the centre of Paris was allowed to go on without encountering serious interruption.†

* Xavier Durrieu, pp. 23, 24.
† Magnan's Despatch, given in the 'Moniteur.'
VII.

At two o'clock in the afternoon of the 4th, the condition of Paris was this:—The mass of streets which lies between the Boulevard and the neighbourhood of the Hôtel de Ville was barricaded, and held without combating by the insurgents; but the rest of the city was free from grave disturbance. The army was impending. It was nearly forty-eight thousand strong,* and comprised a force of all arms, including cavalry, infantry, artillery, engineers, and gendarmes. Large bodies of infantry were so posted that brigades advancing from all the quarters of the compass could simultaneously converge upon the barricaded district. Besides that, by the means already shown, the troops had been wrought into a feeling of hatred against the people of Paris, they had clearly been made to understand that they were to allow no consideration for bystanders to interfere with their fire, that they were to give no quarter, and that they were to put to death not only the combatants whom they might see in arms against them, but those also who, without having been seen in the act, might nevertheless be deemed to have taken part against them. When it is remembered that the duty—the judicial duty—of bringing people within this last category was cast upon raging soldiers, it will be clear that the army

of Paris was brought into the streets with instructions well fitted to bring about the events which marked the afternoon of the 4th of December.* For reasons which then remained unknown, the troops were abstaining from action, and there was a good distance between the heads of the columns and the outposts of the insurgents.

It is plain that, either because of his own hesitation, or because of the hesitation of the President or M. St Arnaud, the General in command of the army was hanging back;† and in truth, though the mere physical task which he had to perform was a slight one, Magnan could not but see that, politically, he had got into danger. The mechanical arrangements of the night of the 2d of December had met with a success which was wondrously complete; but in other respects the enterprise of the Elysian brethren seemed to be failing, for no one of mark and character had come forward to abet the President. There were many lovers of order and tran-

* My knowledge as to what the troops were made to understand is derived from a source highly favourable to the Elysée.
† Magnan, in his Despatch, accounts for his delay in words which tend to justify the conclusion of those who believe that the opportunity of inflicting slaughter on the people of Paris was deliberately sought for and prepared; but I am not inclined to believe that for such an object a French General would throw away the first seven hours of a short December day, and therefore, so far as concerns his motives, I reject Magnan’s statement. I consider that the disclosures made before the Chamber of Peers, in 1840, give me a right to use my own judgment in determining the weight which is due to this person’s assertions.
quillity who wished the President to succeed in overthrowing the Constitution, or giving it the needful wrench; but they had assumed that he would not engage in any enterprise of this sort without the support of some, at least, of the statesmen who were the known champions of the cause of order. Those whose views had lain in this direction were shocked out of their hopes when, on the 2d of December, they came to find that all the honoured defenders of the cause of order had been thrown into prison, and that the persons who were sheltering the President by their concurrence and their moral sanction were Morny and Maupas or De Maupas, and St Arnaud formerly Le Roy. The list of the Ministry, which was published on the following day, contained no name held in honour; and the plotters of the Elysée, terrified, as it seems, at the state of isolation in which they were placed, resorted to a curious stratagem. They formed what they called a 'Consultative Commission,' and promulgated a decree which purported to appoint as members of the body, not only most of the plotters themselves, and others whose services they could command, but also some eighty other men who were eminent for their character and station.* In so far as it represented these eighty men to be members of the Commission, the decree was a counterfeit. One after another, the men with the honoured names repudiated the notion that they had consented to go and 'consult' with Louis Bonaparte, and

* 'Annuaire,' Appendix, pp. 63-65.
Morny, and Fleury, and Maupas, and St Arnaud formerly Le Roy.* The Elysée derived great advantage from this stratagem, because for many precious hours, and even days, it kept the country from knowing what was the number and what was the quality of the persons who were really abetting the President; but Magnan of course knew the truth, and when he found, on the morning of the 4th of December, that even the complete success of all the arrangements of the foregoing Tuesday had not been hitherto puissant enough to bring to the Elysée the support of men of weight and character, he had grounds for the alarm which seems to have been the cause of his inaction.

For, regarded in connection with the state of isolation in which the plotters still remained, the insurrection, feeble as it was, became a source of grave danger to the General in command of the troops. It would have been no new thing to have to act against insurgents in vindication of the law, and under the orders of what had been com-

* Several of their letters to this effect appeared from time to time in the English journals; but M. Léon Faucher (who had been a few weeks before a member of the Cabinet) addressed his indignant protest straight to the President:—

'**Monsieur le President,—It is with a painful surprise** that I see my name figuring amongst those of the members of a Consultative Commission which you have just been instituting. I did not think I had given you any right to offer me this insult [de me faire cette injure]. The services I have rendered to you in the belief that they were services rendered to the country, entitled me perhaps to expect from you a very different treatment. At all events my character deserved more respect.' "Recueil," p. 24.—Note to 4th Edition, 1863.
monly called a 'Government;' but this time the law was on the side of the insurgents, and the knot of men who had got the control of the offices of the State were not so circumstanced in point of repute as to be able to make up for the want of legal authority by the weight of their personal character. Therefore it was natural for Magnan, notwithstanding his cherished order from the Minister of War, to think a good deal of what might happen to him, if perchance, at the very moment when he was taking upon his hands the blood of the Parisians, the plot of which he was the instrument should after all break down for want of support from men known and honoured as statesmen.

But at length perhaps it was effectually explained to Magnan that he must stand or fall with those to whom he was now committed, and that, although he thought to keep himself under the shelter of the 'order of the Minister of War,' the testimony of any one out of the twenty Generals who met him on the 27th of November would suffice to bring him into nearly the same plight as any of the avowed plotters. A judicious application of this kind of torture would make it unnecessary for Colonel Fleury to show even the hilt of his pistol. At all events, Magnan now at last consented to act against the insurrection. He had thrown away the whole of the morning and the better part of the afternoon, and this on a short December day; but at two o'clock the troops were ordered to advance, and by three all
the heads of columns which were converging upon the insurrection from different points were almost close to the several barricades upon which they had marched.

VIII.

The advanced post of the insurgents, at its north-western extremity, was covered by a small barricade, which crossed the Boulevard at a point close to the Gymnase Theatre. Some twenty men, with weapons and a drum taken in part from the 'property room' of the theatre, were behind this rampart; and a small flag, which the insurgents had chanced to find, was planted on the top of the barricade.*

Facing this little barricade, at a distance of about a hundred and fifty yards, was the head of the vast column of troops which now occupied the whole of the western Boulevard, and a couple of field-pieces stood pointed towards the barricade. In the neutral space between the barricade and the head of the column the shops and almost all the windows were closed, but numbers of spectators, including many women, crowded the foot-pavement. These gazers were obviously incurring the risk of receiving stray shots. But westward of the point occupied by the head of the column the state of

* The great barricade in this district was the one which crossed the Boulevard diagonally, near the Porte St Denis. It is not noticed in the text, because the object here is, not to describe in detail the preparations of the insurgents, but merely to show the state of the Boulevard at the point where their advanced post faced the troops.
the Boulevards was different. From that point home to the Madeleine the whole carriage-way was occupied by troops; the infantry was drawn up in subdivisions at quarter distance. Along this part of the gay and glittering Boulevard the windows, the balconies, and the foot-pavements were crowded with men and women who were gazing at the military display. These gazers had no reason for supposing that they incurred any danger, for they could see no one with whom the army would have to contend. It is true that notices had been placed upon the walls, recommending people not to encumber the streets, and warning them that they would be liable to be dispersed by the troops without being summoned; but of course those who had chanced to see this announcement naturally imagined that it was a menace addressed to riotous crowds which might be pressing upon the troops in a hostile way. Not one man could have read it as a sentence of sudden death against peaceful spectators.

At three o'clock one of the field-pieces ranged in front of the column was fired at the little barricade near the Gymnase. The shot went high over the mark. The troops at the head of the column sent a few musket-shots in the direction of the barricade, and there was a slight attempt at reply, but no one on either side was wounded; and the engagement, if so it could be called, was so languid and harmless that even the gazers who stood on the foot-pavement, between the troops and the barricade, were not deterred from remain-
ing where they were; and with regard to the spectators farther west, there was nothing that tended to cause them alarm, for they could see no one who was in antagonism with the troops. So along the whole Boulevard, from the Madeleine to near the Rue du Sentier, the foot-pavements, the windows, and the balconies still remained crowded with men and women and children, and from near the Rue du Sentier to the little barricade at the Gymnase, spectators still lined the foot-pavement; but in that last part of the Boulevard the windows were closed.*

According to some, a shot was fired from a window or a house-top near the Rue du Sentier. This is denied by others, and one witness declares that the first shot came from a soldier near the centre of one of the battalions, who fired straight up into the air; but what followed was this: the troops at the head of the column faced about to the south and opened fire. Some of the soldiery fired point-blank into the mass of spectators who stood gazing upon them from the foot-pavement, and the rest of the troops fired up at the gay crowded windows and balconies.† The officers in general did not order the firing, but seemingly they were agitated in the same way as the men of the rank and file, for such of them as could be seen from a balcony at the corner of the Rue Mont-

* What I say as to the state of the Boulevard at this time is taken from many concurrent authorities, but Captain Jesse’s statement (see post) is the most clear and satisfactory so far as concerns what he saw.
† Captain Jesse, ubi post.
martre appeared to acquiesce in all that the soldiery did.*

The impulse which had thus come upon the soldiery near the head of the column was a motive akin to panic, for it was carried by swift contagion from man to man till it ran westward from the Boulevard Bonne Nouvelle into the Boulevard Poissonière, and gained the Boulevard Montmartre, and ran swiftly through its whole length, and entered the Boulevard des Italiens. Thus by a movement in the nature of that which tacticians describe as 'conversion,' a column of some sixteen thousand men facing eastward towards St Denis was suddenly formed, as it were, into an order of battle fronting southward, and busily firing into the crowd which lined the foot-pavement, and upon the men, women, and children who stood at the balconies and windows on that side of the Boulevard.t What made the fire at the houses the more deadly was that, even after it had begun at the eastern part of the Boulevard Montmartre, people standing at the balconies and windows further west could not see or believe that the troops were really firing in at the windows with ball-cartridge, and they remained in the front rooms, and even continued standing at the windows, until a volley came crashing in. At one of the windows there stood a young Russian noble with his sister at his side. Suddenly they received the fire of the soldiery, and both of them were wounded with musket-shots.

* Captain Jesse, ubi post.  
† Ibid.
An English surgeon, who had been gazing from another window in the same house, had the fortune to stand unscathed; and when he began to give his care to the wounded brother and sister, he was so touched, he says, by their forgetfulness of self, and the love they seemed to bear the one for the other, that more than ever before in all his life he prized his power of warding off death.

Of the people on the foot-pavement who were not struck down at first, some rushed and strove to find a shelter, or even a half-shelter, at any spot within reach. Others tried to crawl away on their hands and knees; for they hoped that perhaps the balls might fly over them. The impulse to shoot people had been sudden, but was not momentary. The soldiers loaded and reloaded with a strange industry, and made haste to kill and kill, as though their lives depended upon the quantity of the slaughter they could get through in some given period of time.

When there was no longer a crowd to fire into, the soldiers would aim carefully at any single fugitive who was trying to effect his escape; and if a man tried to save himself by coming close up to the troops and asking for mercy, the soldiers would force or persuade the suppliant to keep off and hasten away, and then, if they could, they killed him running. This slaughter of unarmed men and women was continued for a quarter of an hour or twenty minutes. It chanced that amongst the persons standing at the balconies near the corner of the Rue Montmartre there was
an English officer; and because of the position in which he stood, the professional knowledge which guided his observation, the composure with which he was able to see and to describe, and the more than common responsibility which attaches upon a military narrator, it is probable that his testimony will be always appealed to by historians who shall seek to give a truthful account of the founding of the Second French Empire.

At the moment when the firing began, this officer was looking upon the military display with his wife at his side, and was so placed that if he looked eastward he would carry his eye along the Boulevard for a distance of about 800 yards, and see as far as the head of the column; and if he looked westward he could see to the point where the Boulevard Montmartre runs into the Boulevard des Italiens. This is what he writes: 'I went to the balcony at which my wife was standing, and remained there watching the troops. The whole Boulevard, as far as the eye could reach, was crowded with them,—principally infantry in subdivisions at quarter distance, and here and there a batch of twelve-pounders and howitzers, some of which occupied the rising ground of the Boulevard Poissonière. The officers were smoking their cigars. The windows were crowded with people, principally women, tradesmen, servants, and children, or, like ourselves, the occupants of apartments. Suddenly, as I was intently looking with my glass at the troops in the distance eastward, a few musket-shots were fired
'at the head of the column, which consisted of about 3000 men. In a few moments it spread; and, after hanging a little, came down the Boulevard in a waving sheet of flame. So regular, however, was the fire that at first I thought it was a *feu de joie* for some barricade taken in advance, or to signal their position to some other division; and it was not till it came within fifty yards of me that I recognised the sharp ringing report of ball-cartridge; but even then I could scarcely believe the evidence of my ears, for, as to my eyes, I could not discover any enemy to fire at; and I continued looking at the men until the company below me were actually raising their firelocks, and one vagabond sharper than the rest—a mere lad without whisker or moustache—had covered me. In an instant I dashed my wife, who had just stepped back, against the pier between the windows, when a shot struck the ceiling immediately over our heads, and covered us with dust and broken plaster. In a second after, I placed her upon the floor; and in another, a volley came against the whole front of the house, the balcony, and windows; one shot broke the mirror over the chimney-piece, another the shade of the clock; every pane of glass but one was smashed; the curtains and window-frames cut; the room, in short, was riddled. The iron balcony, though rather low, was a great protection; still fireballs entered the room, and in the pause for reloading I drew my wife to the door, and took refuge in
the back-rooms of the house. The rattle of musketry was incessant for more than a quarter of an hour after this; and in a very few minutes the guns were unlimbered and pointed at the "Magasin" of M. Sallandrouze, five houses on our right. What the object or meaning of all this might be was a perfect enigma to every individual in the house, French or foreigners. Some thought the troops had turned round and joined the Reds; others suggested that they must have been fired upon somewhere, though they certainly had not from our house or any other on the Boulevard Montmartre, or we must have seen it from the balcony. . . . This wanton fusilade must have been the result of a panic, lest the windows should have been lined with concealed enemies, and they wanted to secure their skins by the first fire, or else it was a sanguinary impulse. . . . The men, as I have already stated, fired volley upon volley for more than a quarter of an hour without any return; they shot down many of the unhappy individuals who remained on the Boulevard and could not obtain an entrance into any house; some persons were killed close to our door.* The like of what was calmly seen by this English officer, † was seen with frenzied horror by thousands of French men and women.

* Letter from Captain Jesse, first printed in the 'Times,' 13th December 1851, and given also in the 'Annual Register.'

† Another English officer, who was in that part of the Boulevards which is at the corner of the Rue de Grammont, writes to me thus:— 'Having been in Paris during the coup d'état, and
If the officers in general abstained from ordering the slaughter, Colonel Rochefort did not follow their example. He was an officer in the Lancers, and he had already done execution with his horsemen amongst the chairs and the idlers in the neighbourhood of Tortoni's; but afterwards imagining a shot to have been fired from a part of the Boulevard occupied by infantry, he put himself at the head of a detachment, which made a charge upon the crowd; and the military historian of these events relates with triumph that about thirty corpses, almost all of them in the clothes of gentlemen, were the trophies of this exploit.*

Along a distance of a thousand yards, going eastward from the Rue Richelieu, the dead bodies were strewed upon the foot-pavement of the Boulevard, but in several spots they lay in heaps. Some of the people mortally struck would be able to stagger blindly for a pace or two until they were tripped up by a corpse, and this, perhaps, is why a large proportion of the bodies lay heaped one on the other. Before one shop-front they

* having been a spectator and nearly a victim when the French troops fired against harmless people on the Boulevards, and having been standing, until forced to leave it, on the balcony of my club at the corner of the Rue de Grammont—which club was struck thirty-seven times, six balls entering the drawing-room—I can vouch for the correctness of your description of it." Letter dated 9th March 1863.—Note to 4th Edition, 1863.

* This was in the Boulevard Poissonière. Manduit, pp. 217, 218. Manduit speaks of these thirty killed as armed men, but it is well proved that there were no armed men in the Boulevard Poissonière, and I have therefore no difficulty in rejecting that part of his statement.
counted thirty-three corpses. By the peaceful little nook or court which is called the Cité Bergère they counted thirty-seven. The slayers were many thousands of armed soldiery: the slain were of a number that never will be reckoned; but amongst all these slayers and all these slain there was not one combatant. There was no fight, no riot, no fray, no quarrel, no dispute.* What happened was a slaughter of unarmed men, and women, and children. Where they lay, the dead bore witness. Corpses lying apart struck deeper into people's memory than the dead who were lying in heaps. Some were haunted with the look of an old man with silver hair, whose only weapon was the umbrella which lay at his side. Some shuddered because of seeing the gay idler of the Boulevard sitting dead against the wall of a house, and scarce parted from the cigar which lay on the ground near his hand. Some carried in their minds the sight of a printer's boy leaning back against a shop-front, because, though the lad was killed, the proof-sheets which he was carrying had remained in his hands, and were red with his blood, and were fluttering in the wind.† The military historian of these achieve-

* I speak here of the Boulevard from the Rue du Sentier to the western extremity of the Boulevard Montmartre.
† For accounts of the state of the Boulevard after the massacre, see the written statements of eyewitnesses supplied to Victor Hugo, and printed in his narrative. It will be seen that I do not adopt M. Victor Hugo's conclusions; but there is no reason for questioning the authenticity or the truth of the statements which he has collected.
ments permitted himself to speak with a kind of joy of the number of women who suffered. After accusing the gentler sex of the crime of sheltering men from the fire of the troops, the Colonel writes it down that 'many an Amazon of the Boulevard has paid dearly for her imprudent collusion with that new sort of barricade;' and then he goes on to express a hope that women will profit by the example and derive from it 'a lesson for the future.'

One woman who fell and died claspimg her child, was suffered to keep her hold in death as in life, for the child too was killed. Words which long had been used for making figures of speech, recovered their ancient use, being wanted again in the world for the picturing of things real and physical. Musket-shots do not shed much blood in proportion to the slaughter which they work; but still in so many places the foot-pavement was wet and red, that, except by care, no one could pass along it without gathering blood. Round each of the trees in the Boulevards a little space of earth is left unpaved in order to give room for the expansion of the trunk. The blood, collecting in pools upon the asphalt, drained down at last into these hollows, and there becoming coagulated, it remained for more than a day, and was observed by many. 'Their 'blood,' says the English officer before quoted,—'their blood lay in the hollows round the trees the next morning when we passed at twelve 'o'clock.' 'The Boulevards and the adjacent

* Mauduit, p. 278.
streets,' he goes on to say, 'were at some points a perfect shambles.' Incredible as it may seem, artillery was brought to bear upon some of the houses in the Boulevard. On its north side the houses were so battered that the foot-pavement beneath them was laden with plaster and such ruins as field-guns can bring down.

The soldiers broke into many houses and hunted the inmates from floor to floor, and caught them at last and slaughtered them. These things, no doubt, they did under a notion that shots had been fired from the house which they entered; but it is certain that in almost all these instances, if not in every one of them, the impression was false. One or two soldiers would be seen rushing furiously at some particular door, and this sight leading their comrades to imagine that a shot had been fired from the windows above, was enough to bring into the accused house a whole band of slaughterers. The Sallandrouze carpet warehouse was thus entered. Fourteen helpless people shrank for safety behind some piles of carpets. The soldiers killed them crouching.

IX.

Whilst these things were being done upon the Boulevard, four brigades were converging upon the streets where resistance, though of a rash and feeble kind, had been really attempted. One after another the barricades were battered by artillery, and then carried without a serious struggle; but
deliberation, that many of the poor fellows put to death were allowed to dispose of their little treasures before they died. Thus, one man, when told that he must die, entreated the officer in command to be allowed to send to his mother the fifteen francs which he carried in his pocket. The officer, consenting, took down the address of the man's mother, received from him the fifteen francs, and then killed him. Many times over the like of this was done.

Great numbers of prisoners were brought into the Prefecture of Police, but it appears to have been thought inconvenient to allow the sound of the discharge of musketry to be heard coming from the precincts of the building. For that reason, as it would seem, another mode of quieting men was adopted. It is hard to have to believe such things, but according to the statement of a former member of the Legislative Assembly, who declares that he saw them with his own eyes, each of the prisoners destined to undergo this fate was driven, with his hands tied behind him, into one of the courts of the Prefecture, and then one of Maupas's police-officers came and knocked him on the head with a loaded club, and felled him—felled him in the way that is used by a man when he has to slaughter a bullock.*

* M. Xavier Durrieu, formerly a member—not of the 'Legislative,' as stated in the text, but—of the Constituent Assembly, is one of those who states that he was an eyewitness of these deeds, having seen them from the window of his cell. He says, 'Souvent quand la porte était refermée les sergents do
XI.

Troops are sometimes obliged to kill insurgents in actual fight, and unarmed people standing in the line of fire often share the fate of the combatants; what that is the whole world understands. But also an officer has sometimes caused people to be put to death, not because they were fighting against him, nor even because they were hindering the actual operations of the troops, but because he has imagined that under some probable change of circumstance their continued presence might become a source of inconvenience or danger, and he has therefore thought it right to have them shot down by way of precaution; but generally such an act as this has been preceded by the most earnest entreaties to disperse, and by repeated warnings. This may be called a precautionary slaughter of bystanders, who are foolhardy or perverse, or wilfully obstructive to the troops. Again, it has happened that a slaughter of this last-mentioned sort has occurred, but without having been preceded by any such request or warning as would give the people time

'ville se jetaient comme des tigres sur les prisonniers attachés 'les mains derrière le dos. Ils les assommaient à coup de 'casse-tête. Ils les laissaient râlant sur la pierre où plusieurs 'd'entre eux ont expiré. . . . Il en est ainsi ni plus ni 'moins: nous l'avons vu des fenêtres de nos cellules qui s'ouvraient sur la cour.'—Le Coup d'État, par Xavier Durrieu, ancien Représentant du Peuple, pp. 39, 40.—Note to 4th Edi-
tion. 1863.
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to disperse. This is a wilful and malignant slaughter of bystanders; but still it is a slaughter of bystanders whose presence might become inconvenient to the troops, and therefore, perhaps, it is not simply wanton. Again, it has happened (as we have but too well seen) that soldiers not engaged in combat, and exposed to no real danger, have suddenly fired into the midst of crowds of men and women who neither opposed nor obstructed them. This is 'wanton massacre.' Again, it has sometimes happened, even in modern times, that when men defeated in fight have thrown down their arms and surrendered themselves, asking for mercy, the soldiery to whom they appealed have refused their prayers, and have instantly killed them. This is called 'giving no quarter.' Again, it has happened that defeated combatants, having thrown down their arms and surrendered at discretion, and not having been immediately killed, have succeeded in constituting themselves the prisoners of the vanquishing soldiery, but presently afterwards (as, for instance, within the time needed for taking the pleasure of an officer on horseback at only a few yards' distance) they have been put to death. This is called 'killing prisoners.' Again, defeated combatants, who have succeeded in constituting themselves prisoners, have been allowed to remain alive for a considerable time, and have afterwards been put to death by their captors, with circumstances indicating deliberation. This is called 'killing prisoners in cold blood.' Again, soldiers
after a fight in a city have rushed into houses where they believed that there were people who helped or favoured their adversaries, and, yielding to their fury, have put to death men and women whom they had never seen in combat against them. This is massacre of non-combatants, but it is massacre committed by men still hot from the fight. Again, it has happened that soldiery, seizing unarmed people whom they believed to be favourers of their adversaries, have nevertheless checked their fury, and, instead of killing them, have made them prisoners; but afterwards upon the arrival of orders from men more cruel than the angry soldiery, these people have been put to death. This is called an 'execution of non-combatants in cold blood.'

Here, then, are acts of slaughter of no less than nine kinds, and of nine kinds so distinct that they do not merely differ in their accidents, but are divided, the one from the other, by strong moral gradations. It is certain that deeds ranging under all these nine categories were done in Paris on the 4th of December 1851, and it is not less certain that, although they were not all of them specifically ordered, they were, every one of them, caused by the brethren of the Elysée. Moreover, it must be remembered that this slaughtering of prisoners was the slaughtering of men against whom it was only to be charged that they were in arms—not to violate, but—to defend the laws of their country.

But there is yet another use to which, if it were
not for the honest pride of its officers and men, it would be possible for an army to be put. In the course of an insurrection in such a city as Paris, numbers of prisoners might be seized either by the immense police force which would probably be hard at its work, or by troops who might shrink from the hatefulness of refusing quarter to men without arms in their hands; and the prisoners thus taken, being consigned to the ordinary jails, would be in the custody of the civil power. The Government, regretting that many of the prisoners should have been taken alive, might perhaps desire to put them to death, but might be of opinion that it would be impolitic to kill them by the hand of the civil power. In this strait, if it were not for the obstacle likely to be interposed by the honour and just pride of a war-like profession, platoons of foot-soldiers might be used—not to defend—not to attack—not to fight, but to relieve the civilians from one of the duties which they are accustomed to deem most vile, by performing for them the office of the executioner; and these platoons might even be ordered to help the Government to hide the deed by doing their work in the dead hours of the night.

Is it true that, with the sanction of the Home Office and of the Prefecture of Police, and under the orders of Prince Louis Bonaparte, St Arnaud, Magnan, Morny, and Maupas, a midnight work of this last kind was done by the army of Paris?

To men not living in the French capital, it
seems that there is a want of complete certainty about the fate of a great many out of those throngs of prisoners who were brought into the jails and other places of detention on the 4th and 5th of December. The people of Paris think otherwise. They seem to have no doubt. The grounds of their belief are partly of this sort:—A family, anxious to know what had become of one of their relatives who was missing, appealed for help to a man in so high a station of life that they deemed him powerful enough to be able to question official personages, and his is the testimony which records what passed. In order, if possible, to find a clue to the fate of the lost man, he made the acquaintance of one of the functionaries who held the office of a 'Judge-Substitute.' The moment the subject of inquiry was touched, the 'Judge-Substitute' began to boil with anger at the mere thought of what he had witnessed, but it seems that his indignation was not altogether unconnected with offended pride, and the agony of having had his jurisdiction invaded. He said that he had been ordered to go to some of the jails and examine the prisoners, with a view to determine whether they should be detained or set free; and that, whilst he was engaged in this duty, a party of non-commissioned officers and soldiers came into the room and rudely announced that they themselves had orders to dispose of those prisoners whose fingers were black. Then without regard to the protesting of the 'Judge-Substitute,'
they examined the hands of the prisoners whom he had before him, adjudged that the fingers of many of them were black, and at once carried off all those whom they so condemned, with a view (as the 'Judge-Substitute' understood) to shoot them, or have them shot. That they were so shot the 'Judge-Substitute' was certain, but it is plain that he had no personal knowledge of what was done to the prisoners after they were carried off by the soldiers. Again, during the night of the 4th and the night of the 5th, people listening in one of the undisturbed quarters of Paris would suddenly hear the volley of a single platoon—a sound not heard, they say, at such hours either before or since. The sound of this occasional platoon-firing was heard coming chiefly, it seems, from the Champ de Mars, but also from other spots, and, in particular, from the gardens of the Luxembourg, and from the esplanade of the Invalides. People listening within hearing of this last spot declared, they say, that the sound of the platoon-fire was followed by shrieks and moans; and that once, in the midst of the other cries, they caught some piteous words, close followed by a scream, and sounding as though they were the words of a lad imperfectly shot and dying hard.

Partly upon grounds of this sort, but more perhaps by the teaching of universal fame, Paris came to believe—and, rightly or wrongly, Paris still believes—that during the night of the 4th, and again during the night of the 5th, prisoners
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN.

were shot in batches and thrown into pits.* On the other hand, the adherents of the French Emperor deny that the troops did duty as executioners. Therefore the value of an Imperialist denial, with all such weight as may be thought to belong to it, is set against the imperfect proof on which Paris founds her belief; but men must remember why it is that any obscurity can hang upon a question like this. The question whether, on the night of a given Thursday and a given Friday, whole batches of men living in Paris were taken out and shot by platoons in such places as the Champ de Mars or the Luxembourg gardens—this is a question which, from its very nature, could not have remained in doubt for forty-eight hours, unless Paris at the time had lost her freedom of speech and her freedom of printing; and even now, after a lapse of years, if freedom were restored to France, the question would be quickly and righteously determined. Now it happens that those who took away from Paris her freedom of speech and her freedom of printing are the very persons of whom it is said that during two December nights they caused their fellow-countrymen to be shot by platoons and in batches. So it comes to

* I now have the name of a man—a man widely known, and forming part of Louis Napoleon's military entourage—who entered the Union Club of Paris in a state of joyous excitement, saying with exultation that he had just been 'assisting' at the shooting of 165 insurgents in the Champ de Mars. It is right to say that some time afterwards, when the fashion of thus boasting had a little declined, the man said he might have 'un peu exagéré.'—Note to 5th Edition.
this, that those who are charged have made away with the means by which the truth might be best established. In this stress, Justice is not so dull and helpless as to submit to be baffled. Wisely deviating in such a case from her common path, she listens for a moment to incomplete testimony against the concealer, and then, by requiring that he who hid away the truth shall restore it to light, or abide the consequence of his default, she shifts the duty of giving strict proof from the accuser to the accused. Because Prince Louis and his associates closed up the accustomed approaches to truth, therefore it is cast upon them either to remain under the charge which Paris brings against them, or else to labour and show, as best they may, that they did not cause batches of French citizens to be shot by platoons of infantry in the night of the 4th and the night of the 5th of December.*

* I find that what I, in my caution, thus speak of as a 'question,' has been recorded as a proved fact by a gentleman who was in Paris at the time of the coup d'état, who was gifted more than most men with the power of seeking for truth in an impartial spirit, and who enjoyed great opportunities of informing himself concerning the events which had been passing in the French capital. His narrative asserts, in plain unqualified terms, that 'hundreds' were 'put to death in the courtyards of the barracks, or in the subterraneous passages of the 'Tuileries.' Still, the writer did not see the prisoners shot with his own eyes, and I persist in my inclination to treat it as a 'question,' whether these alleged executions did or did not take place in the nights of the 4th and 5th of December.—Note to 4th Edition.
XII.

The whole number of people killed by the troops during the forty hours which followed upon the commencement of the massacre in the Boulevards, will never be known. The burying of the bodies was done for the most part at night. In searching for a proximate notion of the extent of the carnage, it is not safe to rely even upon the acknowledgments of the officers engaged in the work, for during some time they were under an impression that it was favourable to a man's advancement to be supposed to be much steeped in what was done. The colonel of one of the regiments engaged in this slaughter spoke whilst the business was fresh in his mind. It would be unsafe to accept his statement as accurate or even as substantially true; but as it is certain that the man had taken part in the transactions of which he spoke, and that he really wished to gain credence for the words which he uttered, his testimony has a kind of value as representing (to say the least of it) his idea of what could be put forward as a credible statement by one who had the means of knowing the truth. What he declared was that his regiment alone had killed two thousand four hundred men. Supposing that his statement was anything like an approach to the truth, and that his corps was at all rivalled by others, a very high number would be
wanted for recording the whole quantity of the slaughter.*

In the army which did these things, the whole number of killed was twenty-five.†

XIII.

Of all men dwelling in cities the people of Paris are perhaps the most warlike. Less almost than any other Europeans are they accustomed to over-value the lives of themselves and their fellow-citizens. With them the joy of the fight has power to overcome fear and grief, and they had been used to great street-battles; but they had not been used of late to witness the slaughter of people unarmed and helpless. At the sight of what was done on that 4th of December the great city was struck down as though by a plague. A keen-eyed Englishman, who chanced to come upon some of the people retreating from these scenes of slaughter, declared that their countenances were of a strange livid hue which he had never before seen. This was because he had never before seen the faces of men coming straight from the witnessing of a massacre. They say that the shock of being within sight and hearing the shrieks broke down the nervous strength of many a brave though

* The number of regiments operating against Paris was between thirty and forty, and of these about twenty belonged to the divisions which were actively employed in the work.

† Including all officers and soldiers killed from the 3d to the 6th of December. The official return, 'Moniteur,' p. 3062.
tender man, and caused him to burst into sobs as though he were a little child.

Before the morning of the 5th the armed insurrection had ceased. From the first, it had been feeble. On the other hand, the moral resistance which was opposed to the acts of the President and his associates had been growing in strength: and when the massacre began on the afternoon of the 4th of December, the power of this moral resistance was in the highest degree formidable. Yet it came to pass that, by reason of the strange prostration of mind which was wrought by the massacre, the armed insurrection dragged down with it in its fall the whole policy of those who conceived that by the mere force of opinion and ridicule they would be enabled to send the plotters to Vincennes. The Cause of those who intended to rely upon this scheme of moral resistance was in no way mixed up with the attempts of the men of the barricades, but still it was a Cause which depended upon the high spirit of the people; and it had happened that this spirit—perplexed and baffled on the 2d of December by a stratagem and a night attack—was now crushed out by sheer horror.

For her beauty, for her grandeur, for her historic fame, for her warlike deeds, for her power to lead the will of a mighty nation, and to crown or discrown its monarchs, no city on earth is worthy to be the rival of Paris. Yet, because of the palsy that came upon her after the slaughter on the Boulevard, this Paris—this beauteous, heroic Paris
CHAP. XIV.
The queen of great renown, was delivered bound into the hands of Prince Louis Bonaparte, and Morny, and Maupas or De Maupas, and St Arnaud formerly Le Roy. And the benefit which Prince Louis derived from the massacre was not transitory. It is a maxim of French politics that, happen what may, a man seeking to be a ruler of France must not be ridiculous. From 1836 until 1848 Prince Louis had never ceased to be obscure except by bringing upon himself the laughter of the world; and his election into the chair of the Presidency had only served to bring upon him a more constant outpouring of the scorn and sarcasm which Paris knows how to bestow.* Even the suddenness and perfect success of the blow struck in the night between the 1st and the 2d of December had failed to make Paris think of him with gravity. But it was otherwise after three o'clock on the 4th of December; and it happened that the most strenuous adversaries of this oddly-fated Prince were those who, in one respect, best served his cause; for the more they strove to show that he, and he alone, of his own design and malice had planned and ordered the massacre,† the more completely they relieved him from the disqualification which had hitherto made it impossible for him to become the supreme ruler of

* A glance at the 'Charivari' for '49, '50, and the first eleven months of '51, would verify this statement. The stopping of the 'Charivari' was one of the very first exertions of absolute power which followed the night of the 2d of December.
† It will be seen (see post) that I question the truth of this charge against him.
France. Before the night closed in on the 4th of December, he was sheltered safe from ridicule by the ghastly heaps on the Boulevard.

XIV.

The fate of the provinces resembled the fate of the capital. Whilst it was still dark on the morning of the 2d, Morny, stealing into the Home Office, had entrusted his orders for instant and enthusiastic support to the zeal of every prefect, and had ordered that every mayor, every juge de paix, and every other public functionary who failed to give in his instant and written adhesion to the acts of the President should be dismissed.* In France the engine of State is so constructed as to give to the Home Office an almost irresistible power over the provinces, and the means which the Office had of coercing France were reinforced by an appeal to men's fears of anarchy, and their dread of the sect called 'Socialists.' Forty thousand communes were suddenly told that they must make swift choice between Socialism and anarchy and rapine on the one hand, and on the other a virtuous dictator and lawgiver, recom-

* 'You will immediately dismiss the juges de paix, the mayors, and the other functionaries, whose concurrence may not be assured, and appoint other men in their stead. To this end, you will call upon all the public functionaries to give you in writing their adhesion to the great measure which the Government has just adopted.' Morny's Circular to the Prefects. 'Annuaire,' Appendix, p. 67.—Note to 4th Edition, 1863.
mended and warranted by the authority of Mon-  
sieur de Morny. The gifted Montalembert him-  
self was so effectually caught in this springe that  
he publicly represented the dilemma as giving no  
choice except between Louis Bonaparte and 'the  
'ruin of France.' In the provinces, as in Paris,  
there were men whose love of right was stronger  
than their fears of the Executive Government, and  
stronger than their dread of the Socialists; but  
the Departments, being kept in utter darkness by  
the arrangements of the Home Office, were slower  
than Paris in finding out that the blow of the 2d  
of December had been struck by a small knot of  
associates without the concurrence of statesmen  
who were the friends of law and order; and it  
would seem that, although the proclamations  
were received at first with stupor and perplexity,  
they soon engendered a hope that the President  
(acting, as the country people imagined him to  
be, with the support of many eminent statesmen)  
might effect a wholesome change in the Constitu-  
tion, and restore to France some of the tranquill-  
ity and freedom which she had enjoyed under  
the Government of her last King. There were  
risings; but every Department which seemed  
likely to move was put under martial law. Then  
followed slaughter, banishment, imprisonment,  
sequestration; and all this at the mere pleasure  
of generals raging with a cruel hatred of the  
person, and glowing with the glow of that motive  
—so hateful because so sordid—which in central-  
ised States men call 'zeal.' Of these generals
there were some who, in their fury, went beyond all the bounds of what could be dictated by anything like policy, even though of the most ferocious kind. In the department of the Allier, for instance, it was decreed, not only that all who were 'known' to have taken up arms against the Government should be tried by Court-Martial, but that 'those whose Socialist opinions were notorious' should be transported by the mere order of the Administration, and have their property sequestered. The bare mental act of holding a given opinion was thus put into the category of black crimes; and either the prisoner was to have no trial at all, or else he was to be tried, as it were, by the hangman. This decree was issued by a man called General Eynard, and was at once adopted and promulgated by the Executive Government.*

XV.

The violence with which the brethren of the Elysée were raging, took its origin, no doubt, from their terror; but now that they were able to draw breath, another motive began to govern them, and to drive them along the same road: for by this time, they were able to give to their actions a colour which tended to bring them the support and goodwill of whole multitudes—whole multitudes distracted with fear of the democrats, and only longing for safety. For more than three years people had lived in dread of the 'Socialists;'

* 'Moniteur,' 28th Dec.
and though the sect, taken alone, was never so formidable as to justify the alarm of a firm man, still it was more or less allied with the fierce species of democrat which men called 'Red,' and, the institutions of the Republic being new and weak, it was right for the nation to stand on its guard against anarchy; though many have judged that the defenders of order, being upheld by the voice of the millions no less than by the forces of intellect and of property, might have kept their watch without fear. But whether the thing from which people ran flying was a danger or only a phantom, the terror it spread brought numbers down into a state which was hardly other than abject. Of course, people thus unmanned would look up piteously to the Executive Government as their natural protectors, and would be willing to offer their freedom in exchange for a little more safety. So now, if not before, the company of the Elysée saw the gain which would accrue to them if they could have it believed that their enterprise was a war against Socialism. After the subjugation of Paris, the scanty gatherings of people who took up arms against the Government were composed, no doubt, partly of Socialists, but partly also of men who had no motive for rising, except that they were of too high a spirit to be able to stand idle and see the law trampled down. But the brotherhood of the Elysée was master—sole master—of the power to speak in print; and by exaggerating the disturbances going on in some parts of France, as well
as by fastening upon all who stood up against them the name of the hated sect, they caused it to be believed by thousands, and perhaps by millions, that they were engaged in a valorous and desperate struggle against Socialism. In proportion as this pretence came to be believed, it brought hosts of people to the support of the Executive Government; and there is reason to believe that, even among those of the upper classes who seemed to be standing proudly aloof from the Elysée, there were many who secretly rejoiced to be delivered from their fear of the Democrats at the price of having to see France handled for a time by persons like Morny and Maupas.

The truth is, that in the success of this speculation of the Elysée many thought they saw how to escape from the vexations of democracy in a safe and indolent way. When an Arab decides that the burnous, which is his garment by day and by night, has become unduly populous, he lays it upon an ant-hill in order that the one kind of insect may be chased away by the other; and, as soon as this has been done, he easily brushes off the conquering genus with the stroke of a whip or a pipe-stick. In a lazy mood well-born men thought to do this with France; and the first part of the process was successful enough, for all the red sort were killed or crushed or hunted away; but when that was done it began to appear that those whose hungry energies had been made use of to do the work were altogether unwilling to be
brushed off. They clung. Even now, after the lapse of years, they cling and feed.*

XVI.

The army in the provinces closely imitated the ferocity of the army of Paris; but it was to be apprehended that soldiery, however fierce, might deal only with the surface of discontent, and not strike deep enough into the heart of the country. They might kill people in streets and roads and fields; they might even send their musket-balls through windows into the houses, and shoot whole batches of prisoners; but they could not so well search out the indignant friends of law and order in their inner homes. Therefore Morny sent into the provinces men of dire repute, and armed them with terrible powers. These persons were called Commissaries. In every spot so visited the people shuddered; for they knew by their experience of 1848 that a man thus set over them by the terrible Home Office might be a ruffian well known to the police for his crimes as well as for his services, and that from a potentate of that quality it might cost them dear to buy their safety.

There have been times when the all but dying spark of a nation’s life has been kept alive by the priests of her faith; and when this has happened, there has sprung up so deep a love between people and Church that the lapse of ages has not had

* Written in September 1861.
strength to put the two asunder.* In France, it is true, the Church no longer wielded the authority which had belonged to her of old; but besides that the virtues of her humble and labouring priesthood had gained for her more means of guiding men's minds than Europe was accustomed to believe, she was a cohering and organised body. Therefore, at a moment when the whole temporal powers of the State had been seized by a small knot of men slyly acting in concert, and when the Parliamentary and judicial authority which might restrain their violence had been all at once overthrown, the Church of France, surviving in the midst of ruined institutions, became suddenly invested with a great power to do good or to do evil. She might stand between the armed man and his victim; she might turn away wrath; she might make conditions for prostrate France. Or, taking a yet loftier stand, she might resolve to choose—and choose sternly—between right and wrong. She chose.

The priesthood of France were, upon the whole, a zealous, unworldly, devoted body of men; but already the Church which they served had been gained over to the President by the arrangements which led to the siege and occupation of Rome. Therefore, although the priests perceived that Maupas, coming privily in the night-time, had seized the generals and the statesmen of France, and had shut up the Parliament, and driven the

* See Arthur Stanley's admirable account of the relations between Russia and her Church.
judges from the judgment-seat, still it seemed to them that, because of Rome, they ought to side with Maupas. So far as concerned her political action in this time of trial, they suffered the Church of France to degenerate into a mere sub-department of the Home Office. In the rural districts, when the time for the Plebiscite came, they fastened tickets marked 'Yes' upon their people, and drove them in flocks to the poll.

XVII.

Every institution in the country being thus suborned or enslaved or shattered, the brethren of the Elysée resolved to follow up their victory over France. In the sense which will presently appear they resolved to disman her. It had resulted, from the political state of France during several years, that great numbers of the most stirring men in the country had belonged to clubs, which the law called 'secret societies.' A net thrown over this class would gather into its folds whole myriads of honest men; and indeed it has been computed that the number of persons then alive who at one time or other had belonged to some kind of 'secret society,' amounted to no less than two millions. If French citizens at some period of their lives had belonged to societies forbidden by statute, it was enough (and, after a lapse of time, much more than enough) that the penalties of the law which they had disobeyed should be enforced against
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Prince Louis Bonaparte and Morny, with the advice and consent of Maupas, issued a retro-operative decree, by which all these hundreds of thousands of Frenchmen were made liable to be instantly seized, and transported either to the penal settlements in Africa, or to the torrid swamps of Cayenne.* The decree was as comprehensive as a law would be in England if it enacted that every man who had ever attended a political meeting might be now suddenly transported; but it was a hundred times less merciful; for, in general, to be banished to Cayenne was to be put to a slow, cruel, horrible death. Morny and Maupas pressed and pressed the execution of this

* Decree of 8th December, inserted in the 'Moniteur' of the 9th. It is also in the 'Annuaire,' pp. 75, 76. The transportation was to be to a penal colony in Algeria or Cayenne, and was to be for a period of five years at the least, and ten years at the most (Articles 1 and 2). The order for transportation was to be an act of administration. In other words, everybody whom the police authorities chose to designate as having belonged to a secret society was made liable to be transported without trial. This decree was superscribed Liberty, Equality, Fraternity. I observe that, within forty-eight hours from the time when they thus got France down—viz., on the 10th of December—the brethren of the Elysée began their 'concessions' to railways and other companies. Thenceforth, as might be expected, 'concessions' went on at a merry rate. See whole lists of them in the Appendices to the 'Annuaire.' Those who know how vast have been the sums expended by our public companies in obtaining 'Private Acts of Parliament,' may form some idea of the importance of the patronage in this direction which the brethren got into their hands.—Note to 4th Edition, 1863.
almost incredible decree with a ferocity which must have sprung in the first instance from terror, and was afterwards kept alive for the sake of that hideous sort of popularity which was to be gained by calling men Socialists, and then fiercely hunting them down. None will ever know the number of men who at this period were either killed or imprisoned in France, or sent to die in Africa or Cayenne; but the panegyrist of Louis Bonaparte and his fellow-plotters acknowledges that the number of people who were seized and transported within the few weeks which followed the 2d of December, amounted to the enormous number of twenty-six thousand five hundred.*

France perhaps could have borne the loss of many tens of thousands of ordinary soldiers and workmen without being visibly weakened; but no nation in the world—no, not even France herself—is so abounding in the men who will dare something for honour and liberty, as to be able to bear to lose in one month between twenty and thirty thousand men, seized from out of her most stirring and most courageous citizens. It could not be but that what remained of France when she had thus been stricken should for years seem to languish and to be of a poor spirit. This is why I have chosen to say that France was dismanned.

But, besides the men killed and the men trans-

* Granier de Cassagnac, vol. ii. p. 433. To meet the cost of these wholesale transportingations, an extraordinary credit was opened on the 28th of January. It is only the title of the decree, and not the sum fixed, which is given in the 'Annuaire,' Appendix, p. 95.—Note to 4th Edition, 1863.
ported, there were some thousands of Frenchmen who were made to undergo sufferings too horrible to be here told. I speak of those who were enclosed in the casemates of the fortresses and huddled down between the decks of the Canada and the Duguesclin. These hapless beings were, for the most part, men attached to the cause of the Republic. It would seem that of the two thousand men whose sufferings are the most known, a great part were men whose lives had been engaged in literary pursuits; for amongst them there were authors of some repute, editors of newspapers, and political writers of many grades, besides lawyers, physicians, and others whose labours in the field of politics had been mainly labours of the intellectual sort. The tortments inflicted upon these men lasted from two to three months. It was not till the second week in March that a great many of them came out into the light and the pure air of heaven. Because of what they had suffered they were hideous and terrible to look upon. The hospitals received many. It is right that the works which testify of these things should be indicated as authorities on which the narrator founds his passing words.* But unless a man be under some special motive for learning the detailed truth, it would be well for him to close his eyes against those horrible pages; for if once he looks and reads, the recol-

* 'Le Coup d'Etat,' par Xavier Durrieu, ancien Representant du Peuple. 'Histoire de la Terreur Bonapartiste,' par Hippolyte Magen.
lecion of the things he reads of may haunt him and weigh upon his spirit till he longs and longs in vain to recover his ignorance of what, even in this his own time, has been done to living men.*

XVIII.

At length the time came for the operation of what was called the Plebiscite. The arrangements of the plotters had been of such a kind as to allow France no hope of escape from anarchy and utter chaos, except by submitting herself to the dictatorship of Louis Bonaparte; for although the President in his Proclamation had declared that if the country did not like his Presidency they might choose some other in his place, no such alternative

* I have not ventured to speak of the numbers of these hapless sufferers further than to use the phrase, 'the two thousand men whose sufferings are the best known;' but the highly qualified writer referred to in the foot-note, p. 298, conceived himself warranted in venturing upon the following words:—

'All that is known is, that about three thousand two hundred have since disappeared from Paris; they may have been killed in the Boulevards, and thrown into the large pits in which those who fell on that day were promiscuously interred; they may have been among the hundreds who were put to death in the courtyards of the barracks, or in the subterraneous passages of the Tuileries; they may be in the casemates of Fort Bicêtre, or in the bagnes of Rochefort, or they may be at sea on their way to Cayenne. . . . We have already stated that the number of persons undergoing or sentenced by these cruelties is believed to exceed ten thousand. A hundred thousand more are supposed to be in the vaults and casemates which the French dignify with the name of prisons, often piled, crammed, and wedged together so closely that they can scarcely change their positions.' 'Edinburgh Review,' vol. xcv. p. 319.—Note to 4th Edition.
was really offered. The choice given to the electors did not even purport to be anything but a choice between Louis Bonaparte and nothing. According to the wording of the Plebiscite, a vote given for any candidate other than Louis Bonaparte would have been null. An elector was only permitted to vote 'Yes,' or vote 'No;' and it seems plain that the prospect of anarchy involved in the negative vote would alone have operated as a sufficing menace. Therefore, even if the collection of the suffrages had been carried on with perfect fairness, the mere stress of the question proposed would have made it impossible that there should be a free election: the same central power which, nearly four years before, had compelled the terrified nation to pretend that it loved a republic, would have now forced the same helpless people to kneel, and say they chose for their one only lawgiver the man recommended to them by Monsieur de Morny.

Having the army and the whole executive power in their hands, and having preordained the question to be put to the people, the brethren of the Elysée, it would seem, might have safely allowed the proceeding to go to its sure conclusion without further coercing the vote; and if they had done thus, they would have given a colour to the assertion that the result of the Plebiscite was a national ratification of their act. But, remembering what they had done, and having blood on their hands, they did not venture upon a free election. What they did was this:
they placed thirty-two departments under martial law; and since they wanted nothing more than a sheet of paper and a pen and ink in order to place every other department in the same predicament, it can be said without straining a word, that potentially, or actually, the whole of France was under martial law.

Therefore men voted under the sword. But martial law is only one of the circumstances which constitute the difference between an honest election and a Plebiscite of the Bonaparte sort. Of course, for all effective action on the part of multitudes, some degree of concert is needful; and on the side of the plotters, using as they did the resistless engine of the executive government, the concert was perfect. To the adversaries of the Elysée all effective means of concerted action were forbidden by Morny and Maupas. Not only could they have no semblance of a public meeting, but they could not even venture upon the slightest approach to those lesser gatherings which are needed for men who want to act together. Of course, in these days, the chief engine for giving concerted and rational action to bodies of men is the Press. But, except for the uses of the Elysée, there was no Press. All journals hostile to the plot were silenced. Not a word could be printed which was unfavourable to Monsieur Morny’s candidate for the dictatorship. Even the printing and distributing of negative voting-tickets was made penal; and during the ceremony which was called an ‘election,’ several persons were actually
arrested, and charged with the offence of distributing negative voting-tickets, or persuading others to vote against the President. It was soon made clear that, so far as concerned his means of taking a real part in the election, every adversary of the Elysée was as helpless as a man deaf and dumb.

In one department it was decreed that any one spreading reports or suggesting fears tending to disquiet the people, should be instantly arrested and brought before a court-martial.* In another, every society, and indeed every kind of meeting, however few the persons composing it might be, was in terms prohibited; † and it was announced that any man disobeying the order would be deemed to be a member of a secret society within the meaning of the terrible decree of the 8th of December, and liable to transportation.‡ In the same department it was decreed, that every one hawking or distributing printed tickets, or even manuscripts, unless authorised by the mayor or the juge de paix, should be prosecuted; and the same prefect, in almost mad rage against freedom, proclaimed that any one who was caught in an endeavour to 'propagate an opinion' should be deemed guilty of exciting to civil war and instantly handed over to the judicial authority.§ In another department the sub-prefect announced

* Arrêté du Général d'Alphonse, Commandant l'état de siège dans le Département du Cher, Article 4.
† Arrêté du Préfet de la Haute Garonne, Articles 1, 2, 3.
‡ Ibid., Article 3.
§ Ibid., Article 4.
that any one who threw a doubt on the loyalty of the acts of the Government should be arrested.*

These are samples of the means which generals and prefects and sub-prefects adopted for insuring the result; but it is hardly to be believed that all this base zeal was really needed, because from the very first, the brethren of the Elysée had taken a step which, even if it had stood alone, would have been more than enough to coerce the vote. They fixed for the 20th and 21st of December the election to which civilians were invited; but long before this, the army had been ordered to vote (and to vote openly without ballot), within forty-eight hours from the receipt of a despatch of the 3d of December.† So all the land-forces of France had voted, as it were, by beat of drum, and the result of their voting had been made known to the whole country, long before the time fixed for the civilians to proceed to election. France, therefore, if she were to dare to vote against the President, would be placing herself in instant and open conflict with the declared will of her own army, and this at a time when, to the extent already stated, she was under martial law.

Surprised, perplexed, affrighted, and all un-

* Arrêté du Sous-préfet de Valenciennes.
† "Annuaire," Appendix, p. 67. M. St Arnaud's circular to the generals of Division ordered that the vote of the soldiers be taken within forty-eight hours, and also said, 'The President reckons on the support of the nation and of the army; and, so far as concerns your Division, on the energy of your attitude, the prompt and severe repression of the slightest attempt at disturbance.' Ibid.—Note to 4th Edition, 1863.
armed and helpless, France was called upon either to strive to levy a war of despair against the mighty engine of the French executive government, and the vast army which stood over her, or else to succumb at once to Louis Bonaparte and Morny and Maupas and Monsieur Le Roy St Arnaud. She succumbed. The brethren of the Elysée had asked the country to say 'Yes' or 'No:' should Louis Bonaparte alone build a new Constitution for the governance of the mighty nation? and when, in the way already told, they had obtained the 'Yes' from herds and flocks of men whom they ventured to number at nearly eight millions,* it was made known to Paris that the person who had long been the favourite subject of her jests was now become sole lawgiver for her and for France. In the making of such laws as he intended to give the country, Prince Louis was highly skilled, for he knew how to enfold the creation of a sheer Oriental autocracy in a nomenclature taken from the polity of Free European States. With the advice and consent of Morny, and no doubt with the full approval of all the rest of the plotters, he virtually made it the law that he should command, and that France should pay him tribute and obey.†

* 7,439,216, against 640,737 noes. 'Annuaire,' Appendix, p. 95.—Note to 4th Edition.
† The free way in which the purse of France was laid open by the success of the coup d'etat may be in some measure gathered from the long catalogue of decrees opening supplementary and extraordinary credits, which is given in the Appendix to the 'Annuaire,' pp. 95 et seq. As was mentioned in a
It has been seen that the success of the plot of the 2d of December resulted from the massacre which took place in the Boulevard on the following Thursday; and since this strange event became the foundation of a momentous change in the polity of France, and even in the destinies of Europe, it is right for men to know, if they can, how and why it came to pass. At three o'clock on the afternoon of the 4th of December, the ultimate success of the plot had seemed to become almost hopeless by reason of the isolation to which Prince Louis and his associates were reduced. But at that hour the massacre began, and before the bodies were cleared away, the brethren of the Elysée had Paris and France at their mercy. It was natural that wronged and angry men, seeing this cause and this effect, should be capable of believing that the massacre was wilfully planned as a means of achieving the result which it actually produced. Just as the Cambridge theologian maintained that he who looked upon a watch must needs believe in a watchmaker, so men who had seen the massacre were led to infer a demon. They saw that the massacre brought wealth and blessings to the Elysée, and they thought it a safe induction to say that the man

former note (ante, p. 311), the 'concessions' to railway and other companies began so early as the 10th of December. See the Appendix to the 'Annuaire.'—Note to 4th Edition, 1863.
who gathered the harvest as though it were his own must have sown the seed in due season. Yet, so far as one knows, this argument from design is not very well reinforced by external proof; and perhaps it is more consistent with the principles of human nature to believe that the slaughter of the Boulevard resulted from the mixed causes which are known to have been in operation, than from a cold design on the part of the President to have a quantity of peaceful men and women killed in order that the mere horror of the sight might crush the spirit of Paris. Without resorting to this dreadful solution, the causes of the massacre may be reached by fair conjecture.

The army, as we have seen, was burning with hatred of the civilians, and its ferocity had been carefully whetted by the President and by St Arnaud. This feeling, apart from other motives of action, would not have induced the brave soldiery of France to fire point-blank into crowds of defenceless men and women; but a passion more cogent than anger was working in the bosoms of the men at the Elysée and the Generals in command, and from them it descended to the troops.

According to its nature, and the circumstances in which it is placed, a creature struck by terror may either lie trembling in a state of abject prostration, or else may be convulsed with hysterical energy; and when terror seizes upon man or beast in this last way, it is the fiercest and most blind of all passions. The French unite the delicate,
nervous organisation of the south with much of
the energy of the north; and they are keenly
susceptible of the terror that makes a man kill
people, and the terror that makes him lie down
and beg. On that 4th of December, Paris was
visited with terror in either form. The army
raged and the people crouched; but army and
people alike were governed by terror. It is very
true that in the Boulevard there were no physical
dangers which could have struck the troops with
this truculent sort of panic; for even if it is
believed that two or three shots were fired from
a window or a house-top, an occurrence of that
kind, in a quarter which was plainly prepared for
sight-seeing and not for strife, was too trivial of
itself to be capable of disturbing prime troops.
But the President and his associates, though they
had succeeded in all their mechanical arrange-
ments, had failed to obtain the support of men of
character and eminence. For that reason they
were obviously in peril; and if Morny and Fleury
still remained in good heart, there is no reason
for doubting that on the 4th of December the
sensations of the President, of the two other
Bonapartes, of Maupas, of St Arnaud, and of
Magnan, corresponded with the alarming circum-
stances in which they were placed.

The state of the President seems to have been
very like what it had been in former times at
Strasburg and at Boulogne, and what it was years
afterwards at Magenta and Solferino. He did
not on any of these five occasions so give way
to fear as to prove that he had less self-control in moments of danger than the common run of peaceful citizens; but on all of them he showed that, though he had chosen to set himself heroic tasks, his temperament was ill-fitted for the hour of battle and for the crisis of an adventure. For, besides that (in common with the bulk of mankind) he was without resource and presence of mind when he imagined that danger was really quite close upon him, his complexion and the dismal looks he wore in times of trial were always against him. From some defect perhaps in the structure of the heart or the arterial system, his skin, when he was in a state of alarm, was liable to be suffused with a greenish hue. This discoloration might be a sign of high moral courage, because it would tend to show that the spirit was warring with the flesh; but still it does not indicate that condition of body and soul which belongs to a true king of men in the hour of danger, and enables him to give heart and impulsion to those around him. It is obvious, too, that an appearance of this sort would be damping to the ardour of the bystanders. Several incidents show that between the 2d and the 4th of December the President was irresolute and keenly alive to his danger. The long-pondered plan of election which he had promulgated on the 2d of December he withdrew the next day, in obedience to the supposed desire of the Parisian multitude. He took care to have always close to his side the immense force of cavalry, to which he looked as
the means of protecting his flight; and it seems that, during a great portion of the critical interval, the carriages and horses required for his escape were kept ready for instant use in the stable-yard of the Elysée. Moreover, it was at this time that he suffered himself to resort to the almost desperate resource of counterfeiting the names of men represented as belonging to the Consultative Commission. But perhaps his condition of mind may be best inferred from the posture in which history catches him whilst he nestled under the wing of the army.

When a peaceful citizen is in grievous peril, and depending for his life upon the whim of soldiers, his instinct is to take all his gold and go and offer it to the armed men, and tell them he loves and admires them. What, in such stress, the endangered citizen would be impelled by his nature to do, is exactly what Louis Bonaparte did. The transaction could not be concealed, and the imperial historian seems to have thought that, upon the whole, the best course was to give it an air of classic grandeur by describing the soldiers as the 'conquerors' of a rugged Greek word, and by calling a French coin an 'obolus.' 'There remained,' said he, 'to the President, out of all his personal fortune, out of all his patrimony, a sum of fifty thousand francs. He knew that in certain memorable circumstances the troops had faltered in the presence of insurrection, more from being famished than from being defeated; so he took all that remained to him,
even to his last crown-piece, and charged Colonel Fleury to go to the soldiers, conquerors of demagogy, and distribute to them, brigade by brigade, and man by man, this his last obolus.'

The President had said, in one of his addresses to the army of Paris, that he would not bid them advance, but would himself go the foremost and ask them to follow him. If it was becoming to address empty play-actor's words of that sort to real soldiers, it certainly was not the duty of the President to act upon them; for there could not well be any such engagement in the streets of Paris as would make it right for a literary man (though he was also the chief of the State) to go and affect to put himself at the head of an army inured to war; but still there was a contrast between what was said and what was done, which makes a man smile as he passes. The President had vowed he would lead the soldiers against the foe, and instead, he sent them all his money. There is no reason to suppose that the change of plan was at all displeasing to the troops; and this bribing of the armed men is only adverted to here as a means of getting at the real state of the President's mind, and thereby tracing up to its cause the massacre of the 4th of December.

Another clue, leading the same way, is to be found in the Decree by which the President enacted that combats with insurgents at home should count for the honour and profit of the troops in the same way as though they were

fought against a foreign enemy.* It is true that this decree was not issued until the massacre of the 4th was over, but of course the temper in which a man encounters danger is to be gathered in part from his demeanour immediately after the worst moment of trial; and when it is found that the chief of a proud and mighty nation was capable of putting his hand to a paper of this sort on the 5th of December, some idea may be formed of what his sensations were on the noon of the day before, when the agony of being in fear had not as yet been succeeded by the indecorous excitement of escape.

Whilst Prince Louis Bonaparte was hugging the knees of the soldiers, his uncle Jerome Bonaparte fell into so painful a condition as to be unable to maintain his self-control, and he suffered himself to publish a letter in which he not only disclosed his alarm, but even showed that he was preparing to separate himself from his nephew; for he made it appear (as he could do, perhaps, with strict truth) that although he had got into danger by showing himself in public with the President on the 2d of December, he was innocent of the plot, and a stranger to the counsels of the Elysée.† His son (now called Prince Napoleon)

* Decree of the 5th, inserted in the 'Moniteur' of the 7th December: 'Lorsq'une troupe organisée aura contribuée par des combats à rétablir l'ordre sur un point quelconque du territoire, ce service sera compté comme service de campagne.' Article 1, 'Annuaire,' Appendix, p. 70.—Note to 4th Edition.
† The letter will be found in the 'Annual Register.' It seems to have been sent at 10 o'clock at night on the 4th of December;
was really, they say, a strong disapprover of the President's acts, and it was natural that he should be most unwilling to be put to death or otherwise ill-treated upon the theory that he was the cousin and therefore the accomplice of Louis, for of that theory he wholly and utterly denied the truth. Any man, however firm, might well resolve that, happen what might to him, he would struggle hard to avoid being executed by mistake; and it seems unfair to cast blame on Prince Napoleon for trying to disconnect his personal destiny from that of the endangered men at the Elysée, whose counsels he had not shared. Still, the sense of being cast loose by the other Bonapartes, could not but be discouraging to Prince Louis, and to those who had thrown in their lot with him.

Maupas, or De Maupas, was a man of a fine, large, robust frame, and with florid healthy looks; but it sometimes happens that a spacious and strong-looking body of that sort is not so safe a tabernacle as it seems for man's troubled spirit. It is said that the bodily strength of Maupas collapsed in the hour of danger, and that, at a critical part of the time between the night of the 2d of December and the massacre of the 4th, he had the misfortune to fall ill.

but the writer evidently did not know that the insurrection at that time was so near its end as it really was, and his letter may therefore be taken as a fair indication of the state of his mind in the earlier part of the day. The advice and the mild remonstrance contained in the letter might have been given in private by a man who had not lost his calm, but the fact of allowing such a letter to be public discloses Jerome's motives.
Finally, it must be repeated that on that 4th of December the army of Paris was kept in a state of inaction during all the precious hours which elapsed between the earliest dawn of the morning and two o'clock in the afternoon.

These are signs that the brethren of the Elysée were aghast at what they had done, and aghast at what they had to do. And it is obvious that Magnan and the twenty Generals who had embraced one another on the 27th of November, were now more involved in the danger of the plot than at first they might have expected to be; for the isolation in which the President was left for want of men of character and station who would consent to come and stand round him, must have made all these Generals feel that even the sovereign warrant of 'an order from the Minister of 'War' was a covering which had become very thin.

Now by nature the French people are used to go in flocks; and in their army there is not that social difference between the officers and the common soldiers which is the best contrivance hitherto discovered for intercepting the spread of a panic or any other bewildering impulse. With their troops, any impulse, whether of daring or fear, will often dart like lightning from man to man, and quickly involve the whole mass. Generally, perhaps, a panic in an army ascends from the ranks. On this day, the panic, it seems, went downwards. For six hours the army had been kept waiting and waiting under arms within
a few hundred yards of the barricades which it was to attack. The order to advance did not come. Somewhere, there was hesitation, and the Generals could not but know that even a little hesitation at such a time was both a sign and a cause of danger; but when they saw it continuing through all the morning hours of a short December day, they could hardly have failed to apprehend that the plot of the Elysée was collapsing for want of support, and they could not but know that, if this dread were well founded, their fate was likely to be a hard one.

The temperament of Frenchmen is better fitted for the hour of combat than for the endurance of this sort of protracted tension; and the anxiety of men of their race, when they are much perturbed and kept in long suspense, will easily degenerate into that kind of alarm which is apt to become ferocious. This was the kind of stress to which the troops were put on that 4th of December; and in the case of Magnan and the Generals under him, the pangs of having to wait upon the brink of action for more than two-thirds of a day were sharpened by a sense of political danger; for they felt that if, after all, the scheme of the Elysée should fail, their meeting of the 27th might cause them to be brought to trial. Any one knowing what those twenty-one Generals had on their minds, and being also somewhat used to the French army, will almost be able to hear the grinding of the teeth and the rumbling of the curses which mark the armed
Frenchman when he rages because he is anxious. Even without the utterance of any words, the countenances of men thus disturbed would be swiftly read in a body of French troops; and though the soldiery and the inferior officers would not be able to make out very well what it was that was troubling the minds of the Generals, the sense of not knowing all would only make them the more susceptible of infection. On the other hand, it is certain that the instructions given to the troops prescribed the ruthless slaughtering of all who resisted or obstructed them; and although it is of course true that these directions would not compel or sanction the slaughter of peaceful crowds not at all obstructing the troops, still they would so act upon the minds of the soldiery that any passion which might chance to seize them would be likely to take a fierce shape.

Upon the whole, then, it would seem that the natural and well-grounded alarm which beset the President and some of his associates was turned to anxiety of the raging sort when it came upon the military commanders, and that from them it ran down, till at last it seized upon the troops with so maddening a power as to cause them to face round without word of command, and open fire upon a crowd of gazing men and women.

If this solution were accepted, it would destroy the theory which ascribes to Prince Louis Bonaparte the malign design of contriving a slaughter on the Boulevard as a means of striking terror,
and so crushing resistance; but it would still remain true that, although it was not specifically designed and ordered, the massacre was brought about by him, and by Morny, Maupas, and St Arnaud,—all acting with the concurrence and under the encouragement of Fleury and Persigny. By them the deeds of the 2d of December were contrived and done; by them, and in order to the support of those same deeds, the army was brought into the streets; by their industry the minds of the soldiery were whetted for the slaughter of the Parisians; and, finally, by their hesitation, or the hesitation of Magnan their instrument, the army, when it was almost face to face with the barricades, was still kept standing and expectant, until its Generals, catching and transmitting in an altered form the terror which had come upon them from the Elysée, brought the troops into that state of truculent panic which was the immediate cause of the slaughter. It must also be remembered that the doubt which I have tried to solve extends only to the cause which brought about the massacre of the peaceful crowds on the Boulevard; for it remains unquestioned that the killing of the prisoners taken in the barricaded quarter was the result of design, and was enforced by stringent orders. Moreover, the persons who had the blood upon their hands were the persons who got the booty. St Arnaud is no more; but Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, Morny, Fleury, Maupas, Magnan, and Persigny
—all these are yet alive, and in their possession the public treasures of France may still be abundantly found.*

XX.

It is known that the most practised gamesters grow weary sometimes of their long efforts to pry into the future which chance is preparing for them, and that in the midst of their anxiety and doubt they are now and then glad to accept guidance from the blind, confident guess of some one who is younger and less jaded than themselves; and when a hot-headed lad insists that he can govern fortune, when he 'calls the main,' as though it were a word of command, and shakes the dice-box with a lusty arm, the pale doubting elders will sometimes follow the lead of youth's high animal spirits; and if they do this and win, their hearts are warm to the lad whose fire and wilfulness compelled them to run the venture. Whether it be true, as is said, that in the hour of trial any of the brethren of the Elysée were urged forward by Colonel Fleury's threats, or whether, abstaining from actual violence, he was able to drive them on by the sheer ascendancy of a more ardent and resolute nature, it is certain that he well earned their gratitude, if by any means, gentle or rough, he forced them to keep their stake on the table. For they won. They won France. They used her hard; they took her

* I may be allowed to remind the reader that the above was published in 1863.—Note to 6th Edition.
freedom; they laid open her purse, and were rich with her wealth. They went and sat in the seats of Kings and Statesmen, and handled the mighty nation as they willed in the face of Europe. Those who hated freedom, and those also who bore ill-will towards the French people, made merry with what they saw.

XXI.

These are the things which Charles Louis Napoleon Bonaparte did. What he had sworn to do was set forth in the oath which he took on the 20th of December 1848. On that day he stood before the National Assembly, and, lifting his right arm towards heaven, thus swore:—'In the presence of God, and before the French people represented by the National Assembly, I swear to remain faithful to the democratic Republic one and indivisible, and to fulfil all the duties which the Constitution imposes upon me.' What he had pledged his honour to do was set forth in the promise, which of his own free will he addressed to the Assembly. Reading from a paper which he had prepared, he uttered these words:—'The votes of the nation, and the oath which I have just taken, command my future conduct. My duty is clear; I will fulfil it as a man of honour. I shall regard as enemies of the country all those who endeavour to change by illegal means that which all France has established.'
In Europe at that time there were many men and several millions of women, who truly believed that the landmarks which divided good from evil were in charge of priests, and that what Religion blessed must needs be right. Now on the thirtieth day computed from the night of the 2d of December, the rays of twelve thousand lamps pierced the thick wintry fog that clogged the morning air, and shed their difficult light through the nave of the historic pile which stands marking the lapse of ages and the strange checkered destiny of France. There waiting, there were the bishops, priests, and deacons of the Roman branch of the Church of Jesus Christ. These bishops, priests, and deacons stood thus expecting, because they claimed to be able to conduct the relations between man and his Creator; and the swearer of the oath of the 20th of December had deigned to apprise them that again, with their good leave, he was coming into 'the presence of God.' And he came. Where the kings of France had knelt, there was now the persistent manager of the company that had played at Strasburg and Boulogne, and with him it may well be believed, there were Morny rejoicing in his gains, and Magnan soaring high above sums of four thousand pounds, and Maupas no longer in danger, and St Arnaud formerly Le Roy, and Fialin, more often called 'Persigny,' and Fleury the propeller of all, more eager, perhaps, to go and be swift to spend his winnings, than to sit in a cathedral and think how the fire of his temperament had given
him a strange power over the fate of a nation. When the Church perceived that the swearer of the oath and all his associates were ready, she began her service. Having robes whereon all down the back there was embroidered the figure of a cross, and being, it would seem, without fear, the bishops and priests went up to the high altar, and scattered rich incense, and knelt and rose, and knelt and rose again. Then, in the hearing of thousands, there pealed through the aisles that hymn of praise which purports to waft into heaven the thanksgivings of a whole people for some new and signal mercy vouchsafed to them by Almighty God. It was because of what had been done to France within the last thirty days that the Hosannas arose in Notre Dame. Moreover, the priests lifted their voices, and cried aloud, chanting and saying to the Most High, 'Domine, salvum fac Ludovicum Napoleonem.'—O Lord! save Louis Napoleon.

What is good, and what is evil? and who is he that deserves the prayers of a nation? If any man, being scrupulous and devout, was moved by the events of December to ask these questions of his Church, he was answered that day in the Cathedral of Our Lady of Paris.

XXII.

In the next December, the form of the state system was accommodated to the reality, and the President of the Republic became what men call
CHAP. XIV.

a 'French Emperor.' The style that Prince Louis thought fit to take was this:—'Napoleon the 'Third, by the Grace of God, and by the will of 'the people, Emperor of the French.'

XXIII.

Of course, when any one thinks of the events of December 1851, the stress of his attention is apt to be brought to bear upon those who were actors, and upon those who, desiring to act, were only hindered from doing so by falling into the pits which the trappers had dug for them; but no one will fail to see that one of the main phenomena of the time was the wilful acquiescence of great numbers of men. It may seem strange that during a time of danger the sin of inaction should be found in a once free and always brave people. The cause of this was the hatred which men had of democracy. A sheer democracy, it would seem, is so unfriendly to personal liberty, and therefore so vexing or alarming, not only to its avowed political enemies, but to those also who in general are accustomed to stand aloof from public affairs, that it must needs close its frail existence as soon as there comes home a General renowned in arms who chooses to make himself King. This was always laid down as a guiding principle by those who professed to be able to draw lessons from history; but even they used to think that, until some sort of hero could be found, democratic institutions might last. France
showed mankind that the mere want of such a hero as will answer the purpose is a want which can be compensated by a little ingenuity. She taught the world that when a mighty nation is under a democracy, and is threatened with doctrines which challenge the ownership and enjoyment of property, any knot of men who can get trusted with a momentary hold of the engine of State (and somebody must be so trusted), may take one of their number who never made a campaign except with counterfeit soldiers, and never fired a shot except when he fired by mistake, and may make him a dictator, a lawgiver, and an absolute monarch, with the acquiescence, if not with the approval, of a vast proportion of the people. Moreover, France proved that the transition is not of necessity a slow one; and that, when the perils of a high centralisation and a great standing army are added to the perils of a sheer democracy, then freedom, although it be hedged round and guarded by all the contrivances which clever, thoughtful, and honest Republicans can devise, may be stolen and made away with in one dark winter night, as though it were a purse or a trinket.

XXIV.

Although France lost her freedom, it would be an error to imagine that upon the ruins of the commonwealth there was founded a monarchy like that, for instance, which governs the people of Russia. In empires of that kind the Sovereign...
commands the services of all his subjects. In France, for the most part, the gentlemen of the country resolved to stand aloof from the Government, and not only declined to vouchsafe their society to the new occupant of the Tuileries, but even looked cold upon any stray person of their own station who suffered himself to be tempted thither by money. They were determined to abide their time, and in the meanwhile to do nothing which would make it inconsistent for them, as soon as it suited their policy, to take an opportunity of laying cruel hands on the new Emperor and his associates. It was obvious that, because of the instinct which makes creatures cling to life, a monarch thus kept always standing on the very edge of a horrible fate, but still having for the time in his hands the engine of the State, would be driven by the very law of his being to make use of the forces of the nation as means of safety for himself and his comrades; and that to that one end, not only the operations of the Home Government, but even the foreign policy of the country, would be steadily aimed. And so it happened. After the 2d December in the year 1851, the foreign policy of France was used for a prop to prop the throne which Morny and his friends had built up.

Therefore, although I have dwelt awhile upon a singular passage in the domestic history of France, I have not digressed. The origin of the war with Russia could not be traced without showing what was the foreign policy of France at
the time when the mischief was done; and since it happened that the foreign policy of France was new to the world, and was governed in all things by the personal exigencies of those who wielded it, no one could receive a true impression of its aim and purpose without first gathering some idea of the events by which the destinies of Europe were connected with the hopes and fears of Prince Louis and Morny and Fleury, of Magnan and Persigny and Maupas and Monsieur Le Roy St Arnaud.
CHAPTER XV.

Almost instantly the change which was wrought by these French transactions began to act upon Europe. The associates of the Elysée well understood that if they had been able to trample upon France and her laws, their success had been made possible by the dread which the French people had of a return to tumult; and it was clear that, until they could do something more than merely head the police of the country, their new power would be hardly more stable than the passing terrors on which it rested. What they had to do was to distract France from thinking of her shame at home by sending her attention abroad. For their very lives' sake they had to make haste, and to pile up events which might stand between them and the past, and shelter them from the peril to which they were brought whenever men's thoughts were turned to the night of the 2d of December, and the Thursday, the day of blood. There could be no hesitating about this. Ambition had nothing to do with it. It was matter of life and death. If Prince Louis and Morny and
Fleury, if Maupas, St Arnaud, and Magnan were to continue quartered upon France instead of being thrown into prison and brought to trial, it was indispensable that Europe should be disturbed. Without delay the needful steps were taken.

It must have been within a week or two after the completion of the arrangements consequent on the night of the 2d of December, that the despatches went from Paris which caused M. de Lavalette to wring from the Porte the Note of the 9th of February,* and forced the Sultan into engagements unfair and offensive to Russia. The French President steadily continued this plan of driving the Porte into a quarrel with the Czar, until at length he succeeded in bringing about the event † which was followed by the advance of the Russian armies; but the moment the Czar was wrought up into a state of anger which sufficed to make him a disturber of Europe, Prince Louis, now Emperor of the French, sagaciously perceived that it might be possible for him to take violent means of appeasing the very troubles which he himself had just raised; and to do this by suddenly declaring for a conservative policy in Turkey, and offering to put himself in concert with one of the great settled States of Europe.

England, he knew, had always clung to a conservative policy in the East. France, he also knew, of late years, had generally done the re-

* 1852. See ante.
† The delivery of the key and the star to the Latin monks at Bethlehem in December 1852. See Count Nesselrode's despatch of the 14th of January 1853, ante, pp. 54, 55.
verse, but then France was utterly in his power; and it seemed to him that, by offering to thrust France into an English policy, he might purchase for himself an alliance with the Queen, and win for his new throne a sanction of more lasting worth than Morny's well-warranted return of his eight millions of approving Frenchmen. Above all, if he could be united with England, he might be able to enter upon that conspicuous action in Europe which was needful for his safety at home, and might do this without bringing upon himself any war of a dangerous kind.

Another motive of a narrower sort was urging him in the same direction. Hating freedom, hating the French people, and delighting in an incident which he looked upon as reducing the theory of Representative Government to the absurdum, Nicholas had approved and enjoyed the treatment inflicted upon France by throwing her into the felon's van and sending her to jail; but he had objected to the notion of the Second Napoleon being called 'the Third;'* and, in a spirit still

* It is said, I know not with what truth, that the style of the new Emperor was the result of a clerical error. In the course of its preparations for constituting the Empire, the Home Office wished the country to take up a word which should be intermediate between 'President' and 'Emperor;' so the minister determined to order that France should suddenly burst into a cry of 'Vive Napoleon!' and he wrote, they say, the following order, 'Que le mot d'ordre soit Vive 'Napoleon !!!' The clerk, they say, mistook the three notes of admiration for Roman numerals; and in a few hours the forty thousand communes of France had cried out so obediently for 'Napoleon III.,' that the Government was obliged to adopt the clerk's blunder.
more pedantic, he had refused to address the French sovereign in the accustomed form. He would call him his 'good friend,' but no earthly power should make him add the word 'brother.' The taunting society of Petersburg amused itself with the amputated phrase, and loved to call the ruler of France their 'good friend.' The new Emperor chafed at this, for his vanity was hurt; but he abided his time.

At length, nay so early as the 28th of January 1853, the French Emperor perceived that his measures had effectually roused the Czar's hostility to the Sultan, and he instantly proposed to England that the two Powers should act together in extinguishing the flames which he himself had just kindled, and should endeavour to come to a joint understanding, with a view to resist the ambition of Russia. Knowing beforehand what the policy of England was, he all at once adopted it, and proposed it to our Government in the very terms always used by English statesmen. He took, as it were, an 'old copy' of the first English Speech from the Throne which came to his hand, and, following its words, declared that the first object should be to 'preserve the integrity of the Ottoman Empire.'* From that moment until the summer of 1855, and perhaps even down to a still later period, he did not once swerve from the great scheme of forming and maintaining an offensive alliance with England against the Czar, and to that object he subordinated all other considera-

* 'Eastern Papers,' part i. p. 68.
tions. He had at that time the rare gift of being able to keep himself alive to the proportionate value of political objects. He knew how to give up the less for the sake of attaining and keeping the greater. Governed by this principle, he gradually began to draw closer and closer towards England; and when the angry Czar imagined that he was advancing in the cause of his Church against a resolute champion of the Latins, his wily adversary was smiling perhaps with Lord Cowley about the 'key' and the 'cupola,' and preparing to form an alliance on strictly temporal grounds.

It would have been well for Europe if the exigencies of the persons then wielding the destinies of France would have permitted the State to rest content with that honest share of duty which fell to the lot of each of the four Powers when the intended occupation of the Principalities was announced. Neither the interest nor the honour of France required that in the Eastern Question she should stand more forward than any other of the remonstrant States; but the personal interest of the new Emperor and his December friends did not at all coincide with the interest of France; for what he and his associates wanted, and what in truth they really needed, was to thrust France into a conflict which might be either diplomatic or warlike, but which was at all events to be of a conspicuous sort, tending to ward off the peril of home politics, and give to the fabric of the 2d of December something like station and celebrity in
Europe. In order to achieve this, it clearly would not suffice for France to be merely one of a conference of four great Powers quietly and temperamentally engaged in repressing the encroachment of the Czar. Her part in such a business could not possibly be so prominent nor so animating as to draw away the attention of the French from the persons who had got into their palaces and their offices of State. On the other hand, a close, separate, and significant alliance with England, and with England alone, to the exclusion of the rest of the four Powers, would not only bring about the conflict which was needed for the safety and comfort of the Tuileries, but would seem in the eyes of the mistaken world to give the sanction of the Queen's pure name to the acts of the December night and the Thursday the day of blood. The unspeakable value of this moral shelter to persons in the condition of the new French Monarch, and St Arnaud, Morny, and Maupas, can never be understood except by those who look back and remember how exalted the moral station of England was, in the period which elapsed between the 10th of April 1848 and the time when she suffered herself to become entangled in engagements with the French Emperor.

It would have been right enough that France and England, as the two great maritime Powers, should have come to an understanding with each other in regard to the disposition of their fleets; but even if they had been concerting for only that limited purpose, it would have been right that the
general tenor and object of their naval arrangements should have received the antecedent approval of the two other Powers with whom they were in cordial agreement. The English Government, however, not only consented to engage in naval movements which affected—nay, actually governed—the question of peace or war, but fell into the error of concerting these movements with France alone, and doing this not because of any difference which had arisen between the four Powers, but simply because France and England were provided with ships; so that in truth the Western Powers, merely because they were possessed of the implement which enabled them to put a pressure upon the Czar, resolved to act as though they were the only judges of the question whether the pressure should be applied or not; and this at a time when, as Lord Clarendon declared in Parliament, the four Powers were 'all acting cordially together.' Of course, this wanton segregation tended to supersede or dissolve the concord which bound the four Powers, and, as a sure consequence, to endanger yet more than ever the cause of peace. Some strange blindness prevented Lord Aberdeen from seeing the path he trod, or rather prevented him from seeing it with a clearness conducive to action. But what the French Emperor wanted was even more than this, and what he wanted was done. It is true that neither admiration nor moral disapproval of the conduct of princes ought to have any exceeding sway over our relations with foreign States; and
if we had had the misfortune to find that the Emperor of the French was the only potentate in Europe whose policy was in accord with our own, it might have been right that closer relations of alliance with France (however humiliating they might seem in the eyes of the moralist) should have followed our separation from the other States of Europe. But no such separation had occurred. What the French Emperor ventured to attempt, and what he actually succeeded in achieving, was to draw England into a distinct and separate alliance with himself, not at a time when she was isolated, but at a moment when she was in close accord with the rest of the four Powers.

Towards the close of the Parliamentary session of 1853, the determination on the part of Austria to rid the Principalities of their Russian invaders was growing in intensity. Prussia also was firm; and in principle the concord of the four Powers was so exact, that it extended, as was afterwards seen, not only to the terms on which the difference between Russia and Turkey should be settled, but to the ulterior arrangements which might be pressed upon Russia at the conclusion of the war which she was provoking. 'The four 'great Powers,' said Lord Aberdeen on the 12th of August, 'are now acting in concert.'* 'In 'all these transactions,' said Lord Clarendon,† 'Austria, England, Prussia, and France are all 'acting cordially together, in order to check de- 'signs which they consider inconsistent with the

* 129 Hansard, p. 1650.  † Ibid. p. 1423.
The nature of the understanding of Midsummer 1853 between France and England.

Yet it cannot be doubted that in the midst of this perfect concord of the four Powers, the English Government was induced to enter into a separate understanding with the Emperor of the French.* This was the fatal transaction which substituted a cruel war for the peaceful but irresistible pressure which was exerted by the four Powers. The purport of this arrangement still lurks in private notes, and in recollections of private interviews; but it can be seen that (for reasons never yet explained) France and England were engaging to move in advance of the other Powers. The four Powers, being all of one mind, were still to remain in concert so far as concerned the discussion and adjudication of the questions pending between Russia and Turkey; but France and England were to volunteer to enforce their judgment. The four Powers were to be judges, and two of them—namely, France and England—were to be the executioners. What made this arrangement the more preposterous was, that the outrage of which Europe complained was the occupation of two provinces which abutted upon the Austrian dominions. Of all the great Powers, Austria was the chief sufferer. Austria was upon the spot. Austria was the one Power which instantly and in a summary way could force the Czar to quit his hold; and yet the charge of

* Hansard, pp. 1424, 1768, 1826.
undertaking a duty which pressed upon her more than upon any other State in Europe, was voluntarily taken upon themselves by two States whose dominions were vastly distant from the scene of the evil deed. It was much as though the forces of the United States and of Brazil were to come across the Atlantic to defend Antwerp from the French, whilst the English looked on and thanked their enterprising friends for relieving them of their duty.

There was not, perhaps, more than one of the members of the English Cabinet who desired the formation of this singular alliance on grounds like those which moved the French Emperor; and it is believed that Lord Aberdeen and several other members of the Government were much governed by a shallow theory which had prevailed for some years amongst public men. The theory was, that close union between France and England was a security for the peace of Europe.

'Sure I am,' said one confident man who echoed the crude thought of many—'sure I am, that if the advisers of the Crown in this country act in cordial concert with the Government of the Emperor of the French, and if the forces of the two countries in the Mediterranean are to act in concert, then it will be almost impossible that any war can disturb the peace of Europe.' But of course, to men of more statesmanlike views, the main temptation was the prospect of seeing France dragged into the policy which England had always entertained upon the Eastern Question.
Perhaps it will be thought that the practice of hiding away momentous engagements between States in the folds of private notes may now and then justify an endeavour to infer the nature of an agreement secretly made between two Governments from the tenor of their subsequent actions, and from a knowledge of surrounding facts. If this licence were to be granted, and if also it were to be assumed that the English as well as the French Government was negotiating with open eyes, it might perhaps be laid down that the compact of Midsummer 1853 was virtually of this sort:—'The Emperor of the French shall set aside the old views of the French Foreign Office, and shall oblige France with all her forces to uphold the Eastern policy of England. In consideration of this sacrifice of French interests by the French Emperor, England promises to give her moral sanction (in the way hereinafter prescribed) to the arrangements of December 1851, and to take the following means for strengthening the throne and endeavouring to establish the dynasty of the Emperor of the French: 1st, England shall give up the system of peaceful coercion which is involved in the concerted action of the four Powers, and shall adopt, in lieu of it, a separate understanding with France, of such a kind as to place the two Powers conspicuously in advance of the others, and in a state of more immediate antagonism to Russia with a prospect of eventual war. 2d, Even before any treaty of alliance is agreed upon, the
Queen of England shall declare before all Europe that the Emperor of the French is united with Her Majesty in her endeavours to allay the troubles now threatening Europe with war; and it shall not be competent to the English Government to weaken the effect of this announcement by advising Her Majesty to include any other Sovereigns in the same statement. If Her Majesty should continue to be closely in accord with the rest of the four Powers, she may be advised to speak of them in general terms as her allies, but they are not to be named. 3d, If hostilities should become necessary, the two Governments will determine upon the measures to be adopted in common; and in that case also it is distinctly understood that the English Government will advise the Queen not to shrink from the gratification of receiving the Emperor of the French as her guest. It is, of course, to be understood (il va sans dire) that the reception of His Majesty at the English Court is to be in all respects the same as would be the reception of any other great Sovereign in alliance with the Queen. Whenever occasion requires it, the other actors in the operations of December 1851 shall be received and treated by the English authorities with the honours due to the trusted servants of a friendly Power, and without objections founded on the transactions of December, or any of the circumstances of their past lives. These are only imaginary words, but they show what the French Emperor was seeking to achieve.
and they represent but too faithfully what the English Government did.

Every State is entitled to regard a foreign nation as represented by its Government. The principle is a sound one; but it must be owned that by this alliance the theory was pushed to an ugly conclusion. What happened was the like of this:—There came to us five men heavily laden with treasure, but looking hurried and anxious. They wanted to speak to us. Upon inquiring who they were, and comparing their answers with our other means of knowing the truth, we found that two of them bore names resulting in the usual way from marriages and baptisms,* and that the other three had been going by names which they had chosen for the sake of euphony. They said that suddenly they had become so struck with the soundness of our old-fashioned opinions, that they asked nothing better than to be suffered to devote the immense resources which they could command to the attainment of the object which we had always desired. All they wanted, in return, was that, in pursuing our own object side by side with them, we would promise not to suffer ourselves to be clogged by our old scruples against breaches of the peace; that we would admit them to our intimacy, allowing ourselves to be much seen with them in public; and that, in order to make our favour the more signal, we would consent to turn aside a little from our old friends: that was all. With regard to the

* These two were Prince Louis Bonaparte and Maupas.
question of how they had come by their treasure, and all the vast resources they offered us, their story was that they had all these things with the express consent of the former owner. There was something about them which made us fear that, if we repulsed them, they would carry their treasures to the very man who, at that moment, was giving us trouble. In truth, it seemed that, either from us or from somebody else, they must and they would have shelter. Upon their hands there was a good deal of blood. We shrank a little, but we were tempted much. We yielded: we struck the bargain. What we did was not unlawful, for those with whom we treated had for the time a real hold upon the people in whose great name they professed to come; and by the custom of nations we were entitled to say that we would know nothing of any France except the France that was brought to us by these five persons to be disposed of for the purposes of our 'Eastern Question'; but when we had done this thing, we had no right to believe that to Europe at large, still less to the gentlemen of France, the fair name of England would seem as it seemed before.

But whatever were the terms of the understanding between the two Governments, the result of it was that the English Cabinet, disregarding the policy which only six days before had united it in a concerted action with the Powers represented at the Conference, now announced, through the lips of Lord Palmerston,* 'that England and

* 8th July 1853, in the House of Commons.
'France were agreed, that they continued to 'follow the same policy, and that they had the 'most perfect confidence in each other.' These 'words were enough to show any one used to foreign affairs that England was advancing with France into an adventurous policy, and then (though even then they were dangerously late) Members of Parliament might have stood forward with some hope of being able to check their country in her smooth descent from peace to war. They lost the occasion; it did not recur.*

At the close of the session, the Queen's Speech announced to Europe 'that the Emperor of the 'French had united with Her Majesty in earnest 'endeavours to reconcile differences, the continua- 'nance of which might involve Europe in war; 'and she declared that, acting in concert with 'her Allies, and relying on the exertions of the 'Conference then assembled at Vienna, Her 'Majesty had good reason to hope that an hon- 'ourable arrangement would speedily be accom- 'plished.' †

It would seem, at first sight, that this language had been occasioned by some accidental displacement of words; and that it could not have been intended for the Queen of England to say that she

* For the purpose indicated ante, p. 14, I invite the attention of Mr Theodore Martin to this period. What were the 'minutes' written and what the steps taken by the Prince Consort at that cardinal time?

† 129 Hansard, p. 1826. Here again, when the policy of the Cabinet was to be indicated in so formal a document as the Queen's Speech, I invite the attention of Mr Theodore Martin.
was acting in concert with her Allies assembled at Vienna, and to declare, in another limb of the same sentence, that she was 'united' with one of them. Unhappily, the error was not an error of words. The Speech accurately described the strange policy which our Government had adopted; for it was strictly true that, in the midst of a perfect concord between the four great Powers, the English Cabinet had been drawn into a separate union with France, and into an union of such a kind as to require the distinguishing phrase which disclosed the new league to Europe.

This Speech from the Throne may be regarded as marking the point where the roads of policy branched off. By the one road, England, moving in company with the rest of the four Powers, might insure a peaceful represssion of the outrage which was disturbing Europe; by the other, she might also enforce the right, but, joined with the French Emperor, and parted from the rest of the four Powers, she would reach it by passing through war. The Cabinet of Lord Aberdeen desired peace, and not war; but seeing dimly, they took the adventurous path. They so little knew whither they were going that they made no preparation for war. *

* See Lord Aberdeen's evidence before the Sebastopol Committee.
CHAPTER XVI.

The difference between a servant and a Minister of State lies in this:—that the servant obeys the orders given him, without troubling himself concerning the question whether his master is right or wrong; whilst a Minister of State declines to be the instrument for giving effect to measures which he deems to be hurtful to his country. The Chancellor of the Russian Empire was sagacious and politic; and his experience in the business of the State, and in the councils of Europe, went back to the great days when Nesselrode and Hardenberg, and Metternich and Wellington, set their seals to the same charter. That the Czar was wrong in these transactions against Turkey no man in Europe knew better than Count Nesselrode; and at first he had the courage to speak to his master so frankly that Nicholas, when he had heard a remark which tended to wisdom and moderation, would cry out, 'That is what the 'Chancellor is perpetually telling me!' But unhappily for the Czar and for his empire, the Minister did not enjoy so commanding a station
as to be able to put restraint upon his Sovereign, nor even perhaps to offer him counsel in his angry mood. He could advise with Nicholas the Czar; but there were reasons which made his counsels unwelcome to a heated defender of the Greek faith. He was a member of the Church of England, and the maddening rumours of the day made out that into the jaws of this very Church of England Lord Stratford was dragging the Sultan and all his Moslem subjects. Then, too, Count Nesselrode was worldly; but, after all, the quality most certain to make him irksome to a Prince in a high state of religious or ecclesiastic excitement was his good sense. It was dangerous for a wise, able sinner like him to go near holy Nicholas the Pontiff, the Head of God’s Orthodox Church upon earth, when he was hearing the voices from Heaven, when he was raging against the enemies of the Faith, and struggling to enforce his will upon mankind by utterances of the hated name of Canning,* and interjections, and gnashing of teeth. Far from being able to make a stand against this consuming fury, Nesselrode did not even decline to be the instrument for disclosing to all the world his master’s condition of mind.

When the Czar knew that the fleets of the Western Powers were coming up into the Levant, and that the sword of England was now in the hands of Lord Stratford, he was thrown into so fierce a state, that his notions of what was true and what was not true—of what was plausible, and

* The Czar used to call Lord Stratford ‘Lord Canning.’
what was ascertainably false—of what was a cause, and what was an effect—of what happened first, and what happened last,—nay, almost, it would seem, his notions of what was the Bosphorus and what was the Hellespont,*—became as a heap of ruins. He was in the condition imagined by the Psalmist, when he prayed the Lord that his enemy might be 'confounded.' Count Nesselrode was forced to gather up his master's shivered thoughts, and, putting them as well as he could into the language of diplomacy, to address to all the Courts of Europe a wild remonstrance against the measures of the Western Powers. The approach of their fleets to an anchorage in the Ægean outside the Straits of the Dardanelles was treated in this despatch as though it were little less than a seizure of Constantinople; and it was represented that this was an act of violence which had entitled and compelled the Czar, in his own defence, to occupy the Principalities.† Lord Clarendon seized this weak pretence and easily laid it bare; for he showed that Nicholas, in his anger, was transposing events, and that the Czar's resolve to cross the Pruth was anterior to the occurrence which he now declared to have been the motive of his action. Then, in language worthy of England, our Foreign Secretary went on to vindicate her right to send her fleets whither she chose, so long as they were on the high seas, or on the coasts of a Sovereign legiti-

* See the sentence of the above text beginning 'The approach.'
† 'Eastern Papers,' part i. p. 342.
mately assenting to their presence. Nearly at the same time the writer of the French Foreign Office despatches pursued the Czar through Europe with his bright, cutting, pitiless logic.*

Of course, the vivacity of France and England tended to place Austria at her ease, and to make her more backward than she would otherwise have been in sending troops into the Banat; and, moreover, the separate action of the Western Powers was well calculated, as will be seen by-and-by, to undo the good which might be effected by the Conference of the four Powers at Vienna. The Conference, however, did not remit its labour. The mediating character which belonged to it in its original constitution was gradually changed, until at length it represented what was nothing less than a confederacy of the four Powers against Russia. It is true that it was a confederacy which sought to exhaust persuasion, and to use to the utmost the moral pressure of assembled Europe before it resorted to arms; and it is true also that it was willing to make the Czar’s retreat from his false moves as easy and as free from shame as the nature of his late errors would allow; but these were views held by the English Cabinet as well as by the Conference; and it is certain that, if our Government had seen clear, and had been free from separate engagements, it would have stood fast upon the ground occupied by the four Powers,

* These despatches bear the signature of M. Drouyn de Lhuys, but it was commonly believed at the time that they were written by a man on the permanent staff of the French Foreign Office.
and would have refused to be drawn into measures which were destined to be continually undoing the pacific work of the diplomatists assembled at Vienna.

But partnership with the midnight associates of the 2d of December was a heavy yoke. With all his heart and soul Lord Aberdeen desired the tranquillity of Europe; but he had suffered his Cabinet to enter into close friendly engagements with one to whom the tranquillity of Europe portended jail, and ill-usage, and death. The French Emperor had consented to engage France in an English policy; and he thought he had a right to insist that England should pay the price, and help to give him the means of such signal action in Europe as might drive away men's thoughts from the hour when the Parliament of France had been thrown into the felons' van.

The object at which the French Emperor was aiming stands clear enough to the sight; but at this time the scheme of action by which he sought to attain his ends was ambiguous. In general, men are prone to find out consistency in the acts of rulers, and to imagine that numberless acts, appearing to have different aspects, are the result of one steady design; but those who love truth better than symmetry will be able to believe that much of the conduct of the French Emperor was rather the effect of clashing purposes than of duplicity. There are philosophers who imagine that the human mind (corresponding in that respect with the brain) has a dual action, and that
the singleness of purpose observed in a decided man is the result of a close accord between the two engines of thought, and not of actual unity. Certainly it would appear that the Emperor Louis Napoleon, more than most other men, was accustomed to linger in doubt between two conflicting plans, and to delay his final adoption of the one, and his final rejection of the other, for as long a time as possible, in order to find out what might be best to be ultimately done by carrying on experiments for many months together with two rival schemes of action.

But whether this double method of action was the result of idiosyncrasy or of a profound policy, it was but too well fitted for the object of drawing England into a war. The aim of the French Emperor was to keep his understanding with England in full force, and yet to give the alliance a warlike direction. If he were to adopt a policy frankly warlike, he would repel Lord Aberdeen and endanger the alliance. If he were to be frankly pacific, there would be a danger of his restoring to Europe that tranquillity which could not fail to bring him and his December friends into jeopardy. In this strait he did not exactly take a middle course. By splitting his means of action he managed to take two courses at the same time. There are people who can write at the same time with both hands. Politically, Louis Napoleon had this accomplishment. With his left hand he seemed to strive after peace; with his right he tried to stir up a war. The lan-
The Bosphorus and the Dardanelles

gages of his diplomacy was pacific, and yet at the very same time he contrived that the naval forces of France and England should be used as the means of provoking a war. The part which he took in the negotiations going on at Vienna, and in the other capitals of the great Powers, was temperate, just, and moderate; and it is probable that the Despatches which indicated this spirit long continued to mislead Lord Aberdeen, and to keep him under the impression that an Anglo-French alliance was really an engine of peace; but it will be seen that, as soon as the French Emperor had drawn England into an understanding with him, he was enabled to engage her in a series of dangerous naval movements, which he contrived to keep going on simultaneously with the efforts of the negotiators, so as always to be defeating their labours.

In order to appreciate the exceeding force of the lever which was used for this purpose, a man ought to have in his mind the political geography of south-eastern Europe, and the configuration of the seas which flow with a ceaseless current into the waters of the Ægean.

The Euxine is connected with the Mediterranean by the Straits of the Bosphorus, the Sea of Marmora, and the Straits of the Dardanelles. The Bosphorus is a current of the sea, seventeen miles in length, and in some places hardly more than half a mile broad, but so deep, even home to the shores on either side, that a ship of war can almost, as it were, find shade under the gardens
of the European shore—can almost mix her spars with the cypresses which darken the coast of Asia. At its southern extremity the Bosphorus minglesthe waters of the great inlet or harbour which still often goes by the name of the Golden Horn; and at length, after passing between Constantinople and its beautiful suburb of Scutari, the straits open out into the land-locked basin now known as the sea of Marmora, which used to be called the Propontis. At the foot of this inland sea the water is again contracted into a deep channel, no more, in one place, than three-quarters of a mile in breadth, and is not set free till, after a course of some forty miles, it reaches the neighbourhood of the Troad, and spreads abroad into the Aegean. These last are the famous straits between Europe and Asia which used to be called the Hellespont, and are now the Dardanelles. The Bosphorus and the Dardanelles are both so narrow that, even in the early times of artillery, they could be commanded by guns on either side, and it followed that these waters had not the character of 'high seas.' And since the land upon either side belonged to the Ottoman Empire, the Sultans always claimed and always enjoyed a right to keep out foreign ships of war, from both the straits. Now on the Black Sea Russia had as much seabord as Turkey, and nevertheless, like every other Power, she was shut out from all right to send her armed navy into the Mediterranean through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. There being no other outlet, her
Black Sea fleet was pent up in an inland basin. Painful as this duress must needs be to a haughty State having a powerful fleet in the Euxine, it would seem that Russia has been more willing to submit to the restriction than to see the war-flag of other States in the Dardanelles or the Bosphorus. The presence of a force greater than her own, or even rivalling it, did not comport with the kind of ascendancy which she was always seeking to establish at Constantinople and on the seabord of the Euxine. Russia, therefore, had been a willing party to the treaty of 1841. By this treaty the five great Powers acknowledged the right of the Sultan to exclude armed navies from both the straits; and, on the other hand, the Sultan engaged that in time of peace he would always exercise this right of exclusion. Moreover, the five Powers promised that they would all respect this engagement by the Sultan. The result, therefore, was that, whether with or without the consent of the Sultan no foreign squadron, at a time when the Sultan was at peace, could lawfully appear in either of the straits.* But when the Emperor Nicholas forcibly occupied the Principalities, it was clear that this act was a just cause of war whenever the Sultan might think fit so to treat it; and there was fair ground for saying that, even before a declaration of war, the invasion of the Sultan's dominions was such a violation of the state of peace contemplated by the

* There were exceptions in favour of vessels having on board the Representatives of foreign States.
treaty, that the Sultan was morally released from his engagement, and might be justified in asking his allies to send their fleets up through the straits. On the other hand, the appearance of foreign navies in the Dardanelles was regarded as so destructive to Russian ascendancy, that the bare prospect of it used to fill Russian statesmen with dismay; and the Emperor Nicholas held the idea in such horror that the mere approach of the French and English fleets to the Levant wrought him, as we have seen, to a state of mind which was only too faithfully portrayed by his Chancellor's Circular.

It is plain, therefore, that the power of advising the Sultan to call up the French and English fleets was an engine of immense force in the hands of the Western Powers; but it is also certain that this was a power which would put a much harder stress upon Russia whilst it was kept suspended over her, than it was likely to do when it came to be physically used. To subject Nicholas to the fear of having to see foreign war-flags in the straits, was to apply a pressure well fitted for coercing him; but actually to exert the power was to break its spell, and to change the Czar's wholesome dread into a frenzy of anger hardly consistent with hopes of peace.

The French Emperor had no sooner engaged the English Government in a separate understanding, than he began to insist upon the necessity of using the naval power of France and England in the way which he proposed—a way bitterly offen-
sive to Russia. Having at length succeeded in forcing this measure upon England, he, after a while, pressed upon her another movement of the fleet still more hostile than the first, and again he succeeded in bringing the English Government to yield to him. Again, and still once again, he did the like, always in the end bringing England to adopt his hostile measures; and he never desisted from this course of action until, at last, it had effected a virtual rupture between the Czar and the Western Powers.

Not yet as part of this narrative, but by way of anticipation, and in order to gather into one page the grounds of the statement just made, the following instances are given of the way in which the English Government was, from time to time, driven to join with the French Emperor in making a quarrelsome use of the two fleets:—On the 13th of July 1853, the French Emperor, through his Minister of Foreign Affairs, declared to the English Government that if the occupation of the Principalities continued, the French fleet could not longer remain at Besica Bay. On the 19th of August he declared it to be absolutely necessary that the combined fleets should enter the Dardanelles, and he pressed the English Government to adopt a resolution to this effect. On the 21st of September he insisted that the English Government, at the same moment as the French, should immediately order up the combined squadrons to Constantinople. On the 15th of December he pressed the English Government to agree that the
Allied fleets should enter the Euxine, take possession of it, and interdict the passage of every Russian vessel. It will be seen that, with more or less reluctance and after more or less delay, these demands were always acceded to by England: and the course thus taken by the maritime Powers was fatal to the pending negotiations; for, besides that in the way already shown the Czar's wholesome fears were converted into bursts of rage, the Turks at the same time were deriving a dangerous encouragement from the sight of the French and English war-flags; and the result was, that the negotiators, with all their skill and all their patience, were never able to frame a Note in the exact words which would allay the anger of Nicholas, without encountering a steadfast resistance on the part of the Sultan.*

Some men will believe that a long series of acts, all having a tendency in the same direction, and ending at length in war, were deliberately planned by the French Emperor as a means of bringing about the result which they effected, and that the temperate and sometimes conciliatory negotiations which were carried on during the same period were a mask to the real intent. It is perhaps more likely to be true that the French Emperor was all this time hesitating, and keeping his judgment in suspense. What he needed, for his very life's sake, was to become so conspicuous, whether as a disturber or as a pacificator of other

* Here again, for the purpose indicated ante, p. 14, I invite the attention of Mr Theodore Martin.
nations, that Frenchmen might be brought to look at what he was doing to others instead of what he had done to them; and if he could have reached to this by seeming to take a great ascendant in the diplomacy of Europe, it is possible that, for a while at least, he might have been content to spare the world from graver troubles; but whether he acted from design or under the impulse of varying and conflicting wishes, it is certain that that command of naval power, which was an engine of excellent strength for enforcing the restoration of tranquillity, was so used by his orders and under his persuasion, as to become the means of provoking a war.
CHAPTER XVII.

Lord Stratford, it would seem, was unconscious of his power over the mind of Nicholas, and did not understand that it rested with him to determine whether the Czar should be politic or raging. He did not know that, as long as he was at Therapia, every deed, every word of the Divan was regarded as coming from the English Ambassador; and that the bare thought of the Greek Church in Turkey being under the protection of Canning, was the very one which would at any moment change the Czar from an able man of business to an almost irresponsible being. Taking the complaints of Russia according to their avowed meaning, the English Ambassador faithfully strove to remove every trace of the foundation on which they rested; and having caused the Porte to issue firmans perpetuating all the accustomed privileges of the Greek Church, he proposed that copies of these firmans should be sent to the Court of St Petersburg, together with a courteous Note from the Porte to Count Nesselrode, distinctly assuring the Chancellor that the
firmans confirmed the privileges of the Greek Church in perpetuity, and virtually, therefore, enga-
ging that the grants should never be revoked.* This was doing exactly what Russia ostensibly
required; but it was also doing exactly that which the Czar most abhorred, for to his mind it in-
dicated nothing less than that the Greek Church was passing under the gracious protection of Lord
Stratford. The polished courtesy of the Note imparting this concession only made it the more
hateful, by showing on its face whence it came. However, Lord Stratford obtained for his plan the
full approval of his French, Austrian, and Prussian colleagues, as well as of the Porte; and the Note,
signed by Reshid Pasha, and enclosing copies of the new firmans, was despatched to Vienna, with
a view to its being thence transmitted to St Petersburg. The packet which held these papers
contained the very ingredients which were best fitted for disturbing the reason of the Czar. It
happened, however, that at Vienna there were men who knew something of the psychological
part of the Eastern Question, and they took upon themselves to arrest the maddening Note in its
transit.

And now the representatives of the four Powers, conferring in the Austrian capital, succeeded in
framing a document which soon became known to Europe under the name of the 'Vienna Note.'
This paper, framed originally in Paris, was perfected and finally approved by all the four Powers

* 20th July 1853. 'Eastern Papers,' part ii. p. 15.
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conferring at Vienna. It was a draft of a Note understood to be brought forward by Austria in her mediating capacity, and proposed to be addressed by the Porte to the Russian Government. The parties to the Conference believed that the engagements purporting to be made by the Note on the part of the Sultan might satisfy the Czar without endangering the true interests of Turkey. Indeed, the Austrian Government, somewhat forgetting its duty as a faithful mediator, had used means of ascertaining that the Note would be acceptable to Russia,* but without taking a like step in favour of the other disputant. Copies of the Note thus framed were sent for approval to St Petersburg and to Constantinople, and the acceptance of the arrangement was pressed upon the Governments of the two disputing States with all the moral weight which the four great Powers could give to their unanimous award.

And here it ought to be marked that at this moment the French Emperor did nothing to thwart the restoration of tranquillity. He perhaps believed that if a Note which had originated in Paris were to become the basis of a settlement, he might found on this circumstance a claim to the glory of having pacified Europe, and in that wholesome way might achieve the sort of conspicuousness which he loved and needed. Perhaps he was only obeying that doubleness of mind which made him always

* ' Eastern Papers,' part ii. p. 27.
prone to do acts clashing one with another. But whatever may have been the cause which led him for a moment to intermit his policy, it is just to acknowledge that he seems to have been faithfully willing to give effect to the means of pacification which were proffered by the 'Vienna 'Note.' It soon became known that the Note was agreed to by the Emperor Nicholas. Men believed that all was settled. It was true that the courier who was expected to be the bearer of the assent of the Porte had not yet come in from Constantinople, but it was assumed that the representatives of the four Powers had taken the precaution of possessing themselves of the real views of the Turkish Government; and, besides, it was thought impossible that the Sultan should undertake to remain in antagonism to Russia, if the support which he had hitherto received from the four great Powers were to be transferred from him to the Czar.

Those who dwell far away from great cities can hardly, perhaps, believe that the touching signs of simplicity which they observe in rural life may be easily found now and then in the councils of assembled Europe. The Governments of all the four Powers, and their representatives assembled at Vienna, fondly imagined that they could settle the dispute and restore tranquillity to Europe without consulting Lord Stratford de Redcliffe. They framed and despatched the Note without learning what his opinion of it was, and it is probable that a knowledge of this singular
omission may have conduced to make the Czar accept the award of the mediating Powers, by tempting him with the delight of seeing Lord Stratford overruled. But, on the other hand, the one man who was judge of what ought or ought not to be conceded by the Turks was Lord Stratford; and it is plain that any statesmen who forgot him in their reckoning must have been imperfect in their notion of political dynamics. It would be wrong to suppose that a sound judgment by the four Powers would be liable to be overturned by Lord Stratford from any mere feeling of neglect. He was too proud, as well as too honest, to be capable of such a littleness. What was to be apprehended was, that until it was ratified by the English Ambassador at the Porte, the decision of a number of men in Vienna and Paris and London and Berlin might turn out to be really erroneous, or might seem to be so in the eyes of one who was profoundly versed in the subject; and no man had a right to make sure that, even at the instance of all Europe, this strong-willed Englishman would consent to use his vast personal ascendancy as a means of forcing upon the Turks a surrender which he held to be dangerous.

Early in August the Vienna Note reached Constantinople; and the Turkish Government soon detected in it not only a misrecital of history, but words of a dangerous sort, conveying or seeming to convey to Russia, under a new form, that very protectorate of the Greek Church in Turkey which had brought about the rupture of the negotiation
conducted by Prince Mentschikoff. The four Powers, however, had determined to press the acceptance of the arrangement upon the Porte; and on the 12th it became known at Constantinople that the Note had been accepted by the Emperor Nicholas. On the same day the English Ambassador received instructions from London, which informed him that the English Government 'adhered to the Vienna Note, and considered that it fully guarded the principle which had been contended for, and might therefore with perfect safety be signed by the Porte;' and Lord Clarendon went on to express a hope that the Ambassador would have 'found no difficulty in procuring the assent of the Turkish Government to a project which the allies of the Sultan unanimously concurred in recommending for his adoption.'

It cannot be doubted that Lord Stratford's opinion as to the effect of the Vienna Note was opposed to that of his Government,† but it was his duty to obey. He obeyed. He 'scrupulously abstained from expressing any private opinion of his on the Note whilst it was under consideration at the Porte,' and he conveyed to the Turkish Government the desire of Europe. 'I called the attention of Reshid Pasha,' said he, 'to the strong and earnest manner in which the Vienna Note was recommended to the acceptance of the Porte, not only by Her Majesty's Government, but also by the Cabinets of Austria,

* 'Eastern Papers,' part ii. p. 27. † Ibid. pp. 72, 82.
France, and Prussia. I reminded him of the intelligence which had been received from St Petersburg, purporting that the Emperor of Russia had signified his readiness to accept the same Note. I urged the importance of his engaging the Porte to come to a decision with the least possible delay. I repeatedly urged the importance of an immediate decision, and the danger of declining or only accepting with amendments, what the four friendly Powers so earnestly recommended, and what the Cabinet of St Peters burg had accepted in its actual state.

These were dutiful words. But it is not to be believed that, even if he strove to do so, Lord Stratford could hide his real thoughts from the Turkish Ministers. There was that in his very presence which disclosed his volition; for if the thin disciplined lips moved in obedience to constituted authorities, men who knew how to read the meaning of his brow, and the light which kindled beneath, would gather that the Ambassador's thought concerning the Home Governments of the five great Powers of Europe was little else than an angry 'quos ego!' The sagacious Turks would look more to these great signs than to the tenor of formal advice sent out from London, and if they saw that Lord Stratford was in his heart against the opinion of Europe, they would easily resolve to follow his known desire, and to disobey his mere words. The result

* 'Eastern Papers,' part ii. p. 69.
was that, without any signs of painful doubt, the Turkish Government determined to stand firm. They quietly introduced into the draft the modifications which they deemed to be necessary for extracting its dangerous quality, and resolved that, unless these changes were admitted, they would altogether reject the Note. They were supported by the unanimous decision of the Great Council.

It might seem that, with Lord Stratford and the Turkish Government on one side, and all the rest of Europe, including England herself, on the other, the preponderance would be soon determined; and Lord Clarendon remonstrated against the obstinacy of the Turks in terms which approached to a disapproval of all that had lately been done at Constantinople;* but Europe was in the wrong, and Lord Stratford and the Turks were in the right; and happily for the world, a strong man and a good cause make a formidable conjunction. Lord Stratford did not fail to show his Government that the objections of the Turks to the proposed Note were well founded; and Europe was compelled to remember that the Russian demand still had in it the original vice of wrongfully seeking to extort a treaty in time of peace.

On the 19th of August the Porte declined to accept the Vienna Note, without introducing into it the required alterations.† These alterations

* 'Eastern Papers,' part ii. p. 91.
† Ibid. p. 80. A copy of the 'Vienna Note,' and of the alterations insisted upon by the Turks, is given in the Appendix, in order to show the exact difference of words which brought about the final rupture between Russia and the Porte.
were rejected by Russia; and for a moment Europe was threatened with the mortification of seeing that the question of peace or war was to depend upon a mere verbal criticism—and a criticism, too, in which the English Government at first supposed that the Turks were wrong.* It happened, however, that in the course of the discussion, Count Nesselrode argued against the alterations proposed at Constantinople, in language which avowed that the meaning and intent of Russia coincided with that very interpretation which had been fastened upon the Note by the sagacity of the Turks; and the Governments of the four Powers being then obliged to acknowledge that they were wrong, and that Lord Stratford and the Turks were right, the question which brought about the final rupture between Russia and the Porte was virtually the same as that which had caused the departure of Prince Mentschikoff from Constantinople. What Russia still required, and what the Porte still refused to grant, was the Protectorate of the Greek Church in Turkey.† At length, with the advice of a Great Council attended by a hundred and seventy-two of the foremost men of the Empire, the Porte determined

* 'Eastern Papers,' part ii. p. 91.
† I am happily able to say that the letters which have recently passed between Sir Arthur Gordon and Lord Russell do not suggest to me any modification of the statements contained in this chapter; but the correspondence is, I think, so interesting, that I venture to add it (see Note iv.) in the Appendix. Sir Arthur Gordon was the son and deeply trusted private secretary of Lord Aberdeen, and probably knows more of what his father knew than any other living man.
upon war. A declaration was issued, which made the further continuance of peace dependent upon the evacuation of the Principalities; and the Russian General there commanding was summoned to withdraw his troops from the invaded provinces within fifteen days. He did not comply with the demand; and on the 23d of October 1853 the Sultan was placed in a state of war with the Emperor of Russia.*

But meanwhile the preachers of the Orthodox Church and the preachers of Islam had not been idle. In Russia, the piety and the spirit of the people had been forestalled by the consuming evil of a vast standing army, and crushed down by police and by drill. The Government had already taken so much by sheer compulsion, that the people, however brave and pious, had little more that it was willing to offer up in sacrifice. It was not thus in the Ottoman Empire. Through the vast and scattered dominions of the Sultan, the holy war had not been preached in vain. There, religion and love of country and warlike ardour were blent into one ennobling sentiment, which was strong enough, as was soon shown, to make men arise of their own free will and endure long toil and cruel hardships that they might attain to some battle-field or siege and there face death with joy. And under the counsels and ascend-

* There was an idea that Russia and Turkey passed into a state of war on the 4th of October, but, as above stated, the 23d was the day. See in the Appendix a note showing this—viz., Note v.
ancy of Lord Stratford this ardour was so well
guided that it was kept from breaking out in vain
tumult or outrage, and was brought to bear in all
its might upon the defence of the State. 'A
'spirit of self-devotion,' wrote the Ambassador,
'unaccompanied with fanatical demonstrations,
'and showing itself among the highest function-
'aries of the State, bids fair to give an extra-
'ordinary impulse to any military enterprise
'which may be undertaken against Russia by the
'Turkish Government. The corps of Ulema are
'preparing to advance a considerable sum in sup-
'port of the war. The Grand Vizier, the Minister
'for Foreign Affairs, and other leading members
'of the Administration, have resigned a large pro-
'portion of their horses for the service of the
'artillery. Reinforcements continue to be directed
'towards the Danube and the Georgian frontier.
'If hostilities commence, they will be prosecuted
'in a manner to leave, on one side or on the
'other, deep and durable traces of a truly national
'struggle.'*

But if the Turkish Empire was still the Caliph-
ate, and if religion still gave the watchword which
brought many races of men to crowd to the same
standard, yet the Porte, chastened by the adver-
sity of the latter century, and disciplined by the
English Ambassador, had become so wise and
politie that it governed the beating heart of the
nation, and suffered no fanatic words to go out
into Christendom. The duty of the Moslem, now

* 'Eastern Papers,' part ii. p. 167.
called to arms for his Faith, was preached with a fervour sufficing for all military purposes; but the Proclamation which announced that the Sultan was at war abstained from all fierce theology. Reiterating the poignant truths which placed the Porte in the right and the Czar in the wrong, it kept to that tone of moderation which had hitherto marked all the State Papers of the Turkish Government. But this very moderation seemed always to kindle fresh rage in the mind of the Emperor Nicholas, and to fetch out his religious zeal. The reason perhaps was, that in all wisdom and all moderation evinced by the Divan he persisted in seeing the evil hand of Lord Stratford. In his Proclamation he ascended to ecstatic heights:

"By the grace of God, We, Nicholas I., Emperor and Autocrat of All the Russias, make known: By our Manifesto of the 14th of June, we acquainted our well-beloved and faithful subjects with the motives which have compelled us to demand of the Ottoman Porte inviolable guarantees in favour of the sacred rights of the Orthodox Church. . . . Russia is challenged to the fight; nothing, therefore, further remains for her but, in confident reliance upon God, to have recourse to arms, in order to compel the Ottoman Government to respect treaties, and obtain from it reparation for the offences by which it has responded to our most moderate demands, and to our legitimate solicitude for the defence of the Orthodox faith in the East, which is equally professed by the Russian people. We
are firmly convinced that our faithful subjects will join the fervent prayers which we address to the Most High, that His hand may be pleased to bless our arms in the holy and just cause which has ever found ardent defenders in our pious ancestors. "In Thee, O Lord, have I trusted; let me not be confounded for ever!" *

* 'Eastern Papers,' part ii. p. 228.
APPENDIX.

NOTE I.

Respecting the Attitude of Austria towards Russia in 1828-9.

Prince Metternich's endeavour to form a league for this purpose has been questioned; and there can be no doubt that the Duke of Wellington, and with him Lord Aberdeen, thought poorly of all that Metternich could or would do; but the Russian Government—a Government served at that time with an extraordinary abundance of diplomatic skill and energy—acquired what it deemed to be a certainty on this subject. After suggesting the possibility of a triple alliance between Russia, Prussia, and France, Count Pozzo di Borgo, on the 28th of November 1828, writes thus to Count Nesselrode:

'Lorsque je trace de telles combinaisons, M. Le Comte, c'est avec le désir qu'elles ne puissent jamais devenir nécessaires : il a fallu la conduite inconcevable du Prince Metternich pour être forcé à chercher dans de si grands changemens les moyens de déjouer cette ligue générale qu'il travaille à former contre la Russie, et à contenir les coups directs qu'il voudrait lui porter.'—Portfolio, vol. i. p. 469.
For further proofs of the fact that Russia understood Austria to be bitterly hostile and to be endeavouring to form a league against her, see passages from the same despatch appearing in vol. i. of the Portfolio, at the following pages:—


The Duke of Wellington had evidently been urged by Metternich towards the adoption of strong measures, but profoundly distrust ing the courage of Metternich, he yielded but little attention to warlike counsels coming from that quarter. On the 7th of November the Duke thus wrote to Lord Aberdeen:—'In truth, Metternich is as much at a loss as we to know what to do. He was very angry with us for not seizing the apparent opportunity afforded by the blockade to declare against Russia, because that would have been a commencement of resistance which, at all events, would have saved the Turks, and would have enabled him to do what he calls "prendre une position;" that is to say, either to support us or to oppose us, or what is more probable, do nothing but talk. But, as I said before, he no more knows what to do under existing circumstances than we do.'

The Russian Government, though it knew, as it conceived, that Prince Metternich was in earnest, adroitly resolved to allow the Duke of Wellington and Lord Aberdeen to remain under the false impression (for so they regarded it) which the Duke's low estimate of Metternich had produced. After saying that he had communicated to Count Pozzo di Borgo Metternich's denial, M. de Tatischeff, the Russian ambassador at Vienna, thus writes to his Government on the 5th of February 1829:—

'J'ai reçu de notre ambassadeur à Paris par un courrier
Frangais des notions si détaillées et si positives sur la manière dont ce projet a été communiqué au Gouvernement Francais, que j’aurais pu en démontrer l’existence au Prince de Metternich lui-même, si conformément à la dépêche réservée de V. Ex. du 14 Janvier dernier, je n’avais cru plus opportune de ne pas prolonger à nos discussions sur un fait qui appartient désormais au domaine de l’histoire.

Then after stating an interview with Metternich, in which he caused him to see that his scheme had been discovered (Count Trautmandorff seems to have been the agent), and after saying that the Prince appeared much décontenancé at the position in which he was placed by being convicted, M. Tatischeff continues:

‘Je n’ai pas fait confidence à mes collègues du résultat de nos explications; et je n’ai contredit Lord Cowley lorsque ces jours-ci il m’a annoncé que Lord Aberdeen lui avait écrit une dépêche pour lui parler des intentions qu’on avait prêtées à l’Autriche comme denuée de tout fondement.’—Portfolio, vol. ii. p. 69 et seq.—Note to 5th Edition.
NOTE II.

PAPERS SHOWING THE DIFFERENCE WHICH LED TO THE RUPTURE OF PRINCE MENTSCHIKOFF'S NEGOTIATION.

Draft of Note proposed by Prince Mentschikoff to be addressed to him by the Porte.*

La Sublime Porte, après l'examen le plus attentif et le plus sérieux des demandes qui forment l'objet de la mission extraordinaire confiée à l'Ambassadeur de Russie, Prince Mentschikoff, et après avoir soumis le résultat de cet examen à Sa Majesté le Sultan, se fait un devoir empressé de notifier par la présente à son Altesse l'Ambassadeur la décision Impériale émanée à ce sujet par un Irade suprême en date du (date Musulmane et Chrétienne).

Sa Majesté voulant donner à son auguste allié et ami l'Empereur de Russie un nouveau témoignage de son amitié la plus sincère, et de son désir intime de consolider les anciennes relations de bon voisinage et de parfaite entente qui existent entre les deux États, plaçant en même temps une entière confiance dans les intentions constamment bienveillantes de Sa Majesté Impériale pour le maintien de l'intégrité et de l'indépendance de l'Empire Ottoman, a daigné apprécier et prendre en sérieuse considération les représentations franches et cordiales dont l'Ambassadeur de Russie s'est rendu l'organe en faveur du culte orthodoxe Greco-Russe professé par son auguste allié ainsi que par la majorité de leurs sujets respectifs.

Le Soussigné a reçu en conséquence l'ordre de donner par la présente note l'assurance la plus solennelle au Gouvernement de Russie, que représente auprès de Sa Majesté le Sultan son Altesse le Prince Mentschikoff, sur la

* This was the last demand made by the Prince.
sollictude invariable et les sentiments généreux et tolérants qui animent Sa Majesté le Sultan pour la sécurité et la prospérité dans ses états du clergé, des églises, et des établissements religieux du culte Chrétien d'Orient.

Afin de rendre ces assurances plus explicites, préciser d'une manière formelle les objets principaux de cette haute sollicitude, corroborer par des éclaircissements supplémentaires que nécessite la marche du temps, le sens des Articles qui dans les Traités antérieurs conclus entre les deux Puissances ont trait aux questions religieuses, et prévenir enfin à jamais toute nuance de malentendu et de désaccord à se sujet entre les deux Gouvernements, le Soussigné est autorisé par sa Majesté le Sultan à faire les déclarations suivantes :

1. Le culte Orthodoxe d'Orient, son clergé, ses églises, et ses possessions, ainsi que ses établissements religieux, jouiront dans l'avenir sans aucune atteinte, sous l'égide de Sa Majesté le Sultan, des privilèges et immunités qui leur sont assurés ab antiquo, ou qui leur ont été accordés à différentes reprises par la faveur Impérial, et dans un principe de haute équité participeront aux avantages accordés aux autres rites Chrétiens, ainsi qu'aux Légations Étrangères accréditées près la Sublime Porte par Convention ou disposition particulière.

2. Sa Majesté le Sultan ayant jugé nécessaire et équitable de corroborer et d'expliquer son firman souverain revêtu du hattihoumayoum le 15 de la lune de Rebiul-Akhir 1268 (10 Février 1852), par son firman souverain du et d'ordonner en sus par un autre firman en date du la réparation de la coupole du Temple du Saint Sépulcre, ces deux firmans seront textuellement exécutés et fidèlement observés, pour maintenir à jamais le status quo actuel des sanctuaires possédés par les Grecs exclusivement ou en commun avec d'autres cultes.

Il est entendu que cette promesse s'étend également au maintien de tous les droits et immunités dont jouissent ab
antiquo l'Eglise Orthodoxe et son clergé tant dans la ville de Jérusalem qu'au-déhors, sans aucun préjudice pour les autres communautés Chrétiennes.

3. Pour le cas où la Cour Impériale de Russie en ferait la demande, il sera assigné une localité convenable dans la ville de Jérusalem ou dans les environs pour la construction d'une église consacrée à la célébration du service divin par les ecclésiastiques Russes, et d'un hospice pour les pèlerins indigents ou malades, lesquelles fondations seront sous la surveillance spéciale du Consulat-Général de Russie en Syrie et en Palestine.

4. On donnera les firmans et les ordres nécessaires à qui de droit et aux Patriarches Grecs pour l'exécution de ces décisions souveraines, et on s'entendra ultérieurement sur la régularisation des points de détail qui n'auront pas trouvé place tant dans les firmans concernant les lieux saints de Jérusalem que dans la présente notification.

Le Soussigné, &c.

---

Reshid Pasha to Prince Mentschikoff.*

(Translation.)

The statement made by Prince Mentschikoff, in his written and verbal communications, concerning the doubts and want of confidence entertained by the Porte with regard to His Majesty the Emperor's good intentions, has been seen with great regret. His Majesty the Sultan has perfect faith and confidence in His Majesty the Emperor, and highly appreciates the great qualities and spirit of justice which animate his august ally and neighbour, and it is a great honour for me to proclaim that it has always been His Majesty the Sultan's desire to consolidate and

* This was the last offer made by the Porte to Prince Mentschikoff.
strengthen the friendly relations happily subsisting between the two countries.

With reference to the religious privileges of the Greek Churches and clergy, the honour of the Porte requires that the exclusively spiritual privileges granted under the Sultan's predecessors, and confirmed by his Majesty, should be now and henceforward preserved unimpaired and in force; and the equitable system pursued by the Porte towards its subjects demands that any spiritual privilege whatever granted henceforward to one class of Christian subjects should not be refused to the Greek clergy. It would be a cause of much regret that the fixed intentions of His Majesty the Sultan in this respect should be called into question.

Nevertheless, the Imperial firman now granted to the Greek Patriarchate, confirming the religious privileges, is considered to afford a new proof of his Imperial Majesty's benevolent sentiments in this respect, and the general promulgation thereof must afford every security, and remove for ever from His Imperial Majesty's mind all doubts for the future respecting the religion which he professes, and it is with pleasure that I perform the duty of making this declaration.

In order that there should be no alteration respecting the Shrines at Jerusalem, it is formally promised that, for security in the future thereon, the Sublime Porte will take no step concerning them without the knowledge of the French and Russian Governments. An official note has been addressed to the French Embassy also to this purpose.

The Sultan consents that a church and hospital should be built at Jerusalem (for the Russians); and the Porte is ready and disposed to conclude a Sened, both on this subject and concerning the special privileges of the Russian monks at that place.
NOTE III.

The 'Vienna Note,' with the Proposed Turkish Modifications, Showing the Points of the Difference, which was followed by War between Russia and Turkey.

Copy of the Vienna Proj et de Note, as modified by the Sublime Porte.

[The Turkish modifications are shown by printing in italics the words which the Porte rejected, and placing the words which it proposed to substitute in the foot-note.]

Sa Majesté le Sultan n'ayant rien de plus à cœur que de rétablir entre elle et Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie les relations de bon voisinage et de parfaite entente qui ont été malheureusement altérée par de récentes et pénibles complications, a pris soigneusement à tâcher de rechercher les moyens d'effacer les traces de ce différend.

Un iradé suprême en date du lui ayant fait connaître la décision Impériale, la Sublime Porte se félicite de pouvoir la communiquer à son Excellence M. le Comte de Nesselrode.

Si à toute époque les Empereurs de Russie ont témoignés leur active sollicitude pour le maintien des immunités et privilèges de l'Eglise Orthodoxe Grecque dans l'Empire Ottoman, les Sultans ne se sont jamais refusés à les consacrer* de nouveau par des actes solennels qui attestaient de leur ancienne et constante bienveillance à l'égard de leurs sujets Chrétiens.

* Le culte et l'Eglise Orthodoxe Grecque, les Sultans n'ont jamais cessé de veiller au maintien des immunités et privilèges qu'ils ont spontanément accordés à diverses reprises à ce culte et à cette Eglise dans l'Empire Ottoman, et de les consacrer.
Sa Majesté le Sultan Abdul-Medjid, aujourd'hui régnant, animé des mêmes dispositions et voulant donner à Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie un témoignage personnel de son amitié la plus sincère, n'a écouté que sa confiance infinie dans les qualités éminentes de son auguste ami et allié, et a daigné prendre en sérieuse considération les représentations dont son Altesse le Prince de Mentschikoff s'est rendu l'organe auprès de la Sublime Porte.

Le Soussigné a reçu en conséquence l'ordre de déclarer par la présente que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Sultan restera fidèle à la lettre et à l'esprit des stipulations des Traites de Kainardji et d'Andrinople, relatives à la protection du culte Chrétien,* et que Sa Majesté regarde comme étant de son honneur de faire observer à tout jamais, et de préserver de toute atteinte, soit présentement, soit dans l'avenir, la jouissance des privilèges spirituels qui ont été accordés par les augustes aieux de Sa Majesté à l'Eglise Orthodoxe de l'Orient, qui sont maintenus et confirmés par elle; et, en outre, à faire participer dans un esprit de haute équité le rit Grec aux avantages concédés aux autres rites Chrétiens par Convention ou disposition particulière.†

Au reste, comme le firman Impérial qui vient d'être donné au patriarcat et au clergé Grec, et qui contient les confirmations de leurs privilèges spirituels, devra être regardé comme une nouvelle preuve de ses nobles sentiments, et comme, en outre, la proclamation de ce firman, qui donne toute sécurité, devra faire disparaître toute crainte à l'égard du rit qui est la religion de Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie; je suis heureux d'être chargé du devoir de faire la présente notification.

* Aux stipulations du Traité de Kainardji confirmé par celui d'Andrinople, relatives à la protection par la Sublime Porte de la religion Chrétienne, et il est en outre chargé de faire connaître.
† Octroyés, ou qui seraient octroyés, aux autres communautés Chrétiennes, sujettes Ottomans.
NOTE IV.

Correspondence between Sir Arthur Gordon and Lord Russell.*

The Hon. Sir Arthur Gordon, K.C.M.G.,
to Earl Russell, K.G.

Ascot Wood, February 1875.

My dear Lord Russell,—Like every one else, I have read your late publication with interest and with pleasure. It contains, however, a statement which has caused me much surprise.

The statement to which I refer is one with reference to the conduct of the negotiations which preceded the Crimean war. It is to be found at page 271, and is as follows:—

'The Austrian Government had framed a Note of conciliation, which the Emperor of Russia had accepted as a settlement of all difficulties. I proposed to Lord Clarendon that the Turkish Government should be told that if they would accept this Note *totidem verbis* we could arrange a peace between Turkey and Russia; but that if Turkey altered the Note, we could befriend her no further. Lord Aberdeen, although he saw very clearly that by this means peace would be insured, declined to use his authority to enforce the condition. Had I been Prime Minister at the time, I should have insisted on the acceptance of the Austrian Note.'

What you might have done had you been Prime Minister in 1853 can be known, of course, by none except yourself; but I have no hesitation whatever in saying that your

* Reprinted by Macmillan & Co. (with permission) from the 'Times' of March 1, 1875.
present impression—that you then desired to press the Turks to accept the Vienna Note, and that Lord Aberdeen declined to adopt your advice to that effect—is not in accordance with my understanding of what actually took place. It is, I hope, unnecessary for me to add that of course it is the accuracy of your recollection only, and not the sincerity of the present impression upon your mind, which I venture to call in question.

I need hardly remind you that the Note prepared at Vienna, and which was held by all the Four Powers to be one which the Porte might safely sign, and the Emperor of Russia might honourably accept, was forwarded from Vienna simultaneously to St Petersburg and to Constantinople; that the Emperor Nicholas at once declared his willingness to accept it; but that the Porte refused to sign it unless certain modifications were previously introduced; and that the Emperor of Russia was recommended by the Four Powers to consent to the introduction of these modifications, but declined to accept any alteration made by the Turks in a document which had been originally prepared by all the great Powers of Europe, and already accepted by himself.

The question then arose whether the Porte should be pressed to sign the original Note, under a guarantee of the great Powers as to the interpretation to be given to it; and my recollection is very clear that both Lord Aberdeen and Lord Clarendon wished to adopt this course, but that it met with strenuous opposition from yourself, and that your objections were indeed so strong as to lead you to declare that, should the plan be persevered in, you would leave the Cabinet. In fact, I believed that a dissolution of the Government on this ground was only averted by the publication of the Emperor of Russia's reasons for refusing to accept the modifications of the Porte—reasons which, showing as they did that he understood the Note in the
same sense as the Turks, rendered it impossible to press further for its signature in a different sense from that in which it was read both by the Power by which it was to be sent and the Power by which it was to be received.

There are probably few persons now living who have a fuller knowledge or a clearer recollection than myself of all that passed during the long and complicated negotiations which preceded the Crimean war. My knowledge of all that passed, both abroad and at home, was ample; for not only was I in possession of the most unreserved confidence of my father (whose private secretary I then was), but both Sir James Graham and Lord Clarendon, as well as Mr. Gladstone, were in the habit of conversing with me with entire freedom on the course of public affairs. My recollection of that period is vivid and distinct. Though my subsequent life has not been inactive, nor I hope altogether a useless one, my acceptance of colonial employment has necessarily removed me from any part in transactions of similar magnitude; nor have I, like yourself and most of the other actors in those negotiations, been ever since engaged in great affairs, the increasing pressure of which, as well as the crowd of important events which have filled the last twenty years, must necessarily have more or less weakened the impressions of this bygone time in so far as concerns matters of detail.

But it is not upon the strength of my own recollection, however vivid, or on that of my knowledge, however complete I may believe it to be, that I should have ventured to question the accuracy of any statement made by you, were it not that the ample documentary evidence in my possession completely confirms the correctness of my impressions.

It is no doubt the case that in the first instance you, in common with the rest of the Cabinet, desired that the Vienna Note should be pressed upon the acceptance of the
Porte. But with respect to this there was no difference of opinion or of action. On the 29th of July Lord Aberdeen wrote to Lord Clarendon in the following terms:

'I take for granted that you agree with Lord John in not giving to Stratford any option as to the acceptance by Turkey of our conditions; and that you adopt his proposed declaration. I think it quite necessary that this should be clearly understood by Stratford and the Turks.'

Accordingly Lord Clarendon, on the 3d of August, informed Lord Stratford that the Turks 'must' sign the Note; and when, a fortnight later, under the apprehension that difficulties might be made at Constantinople, you wrote that you thought 'the positive orders given to Stratford must produce their effect; if not, they must be repeated and enforced,' Lord Aberdeen observed (August 20) that he 'adhered to every syllable' of your letter. So far the agreement was perfect; but when, a few days afterwards, it was known that the Turks (as it had been anticipated they would do) had suggested modifications in the Note, and it became a practical question whether the acceptance of it in the terms agreed to at Vienna should be insisted on, you expressed the utmost reluctance to adopt that course. On the 26th of August Lord Aberdeen wrote to inform you of the arrival of intelligence that the Turks desired to introduce alterations into the Note. He expresses a doubt whether the Emperor of Russia will consent to them, and says:

'It is just possible that he may yield, and perhaps it may be right to make the attempt. Should it fail, we are bound to make the Turks agree to the terms we have prescribed or to let them take their own course.'

In this sentiment, however, you did not concur, for you reply, writing from Roseneath, on the 30th:

'Hitherto we have shown great forbearance to Russia. It now becomes us to show a similar indulgence towards
Turkey when she becomes in her turn wilful and wrong-headed.'

On the 4th of September Lord Aberdeen recorded his conviction that 'should the Emperor reject the modifications, the Conference at Vienna must then endeavour to 'make such a joint proposition at Constantinople as will 'induce the Turks to accept the Note in its original form' —a clear indication of his own views and wishes.

On the 12th of September the news arrived that the Emperor Nicholas had refused to accept the Turkish modifications, and at a meeting between Lord Aberdeen, Lord Clarendon, and Lord Palmerston on the 15th, it was agreed to urge the Vienna Conference to recommend the Porte to sign the unmodified Austrian Note, the Powers giving to the Porte at the same time an assurance that it was understood by them in a similar sense to that which it would have more clearly borne had the modifications been inserted in its text.

The proposal was at once despatched by telegraph to Vienna. On hearing this you wrote from Roseneath, on the 19th, to Lord Aberdeen:—

'The only hope I have is that Turkey may instantly re- ject such a proposal; but even that will not wipe away 'the shame of having made it . . . It is unwise and 'unfair to propose again a Note which his [the Sultan's] 'Ministers have declared they can none of them sign. All 'this makes me very uneasy, and if the Austrians agree to 'Clarendon's terms, and forward them to Constantinople, 'I do not see how I can remain a member of your Govern 'ment.'

You expressed yourself in even stronger terms to Lord Clarendon; and in writing again, two or three days later, to Lord Aberdeen, in amplification of the preceding letter, you say:—

'I had in view the Note of Reschid Pasha, as published
in the "Times," in which he says, "Certains paragraphes " superflus et incompatibles avec le droit sacré du gouver-
" nement de sa Majesté le Sultan y ayant été introduits,
" la Sublime Porte," &c.; and again, "Pas un serviteur de
" l'auguste famille Imperiale Ottomane n'oserait ni ne serait
" capable de mettre par écrit des paroles qui tendraient," 
&c. I thought and think that if after these declarations
 made public in the face of Europe the Sultan's Minister
 had signed the Vienna Note, he would have signed a totally
 different document from the Note as presented to him;
 although the words were the same. I could not, there-
fore, approve of the step you took, though Palmerston
 may have approved, and even suggested it.'

Nevertheless, I believe, from the tenor of my father's correspondence with Sir James Graham, that even at the risk of breaking up the Government this plan would have been pursued, had it not been that, as I have before observed, and as is explained by Lord Aberdeen in a letter to you of the 22d of September:—

'When the Emperor gave his reasons for rejecting the modifications, we found that he interpreted the Note in a manner quite different from ourselves, and in a great degree justified the objections of the Turks. We could not, therefore, honestly continue to give an interpretation to the Note, and ask the Turks again to sign it, when we knew that the interpretation of the Emperor was entirely different. The project, in consequence of this, fell to the ground. . . . I am not at all certain if something of the sort might not hereafter be revived with advantage.'

Your rejoinder was: 'If the project of having the Note of Vienna signed by the Sultan's Ministers is ever revived, as you seem to think likely, I hope I shall hear of it before it is finally agreed to.'

The reference in your recent volume to an 'Austrian' Note and its acceptance by the Emperor of Russia (which
can only be said of the original Vienna Note) is precise and unmistakable; but I have carefully gone through all the records of the period to see whether any of the other projects of accommodation, at various times proposed, received from you any decided support. The only other Note which there was ever any question of urging upon the Porte's acceptance was one framed towards the middle of October, by the English and French Governments, and which it was believed would also be adopted at Vienna. This Note was very carefully written, and Lord Aberdeen was extremely anxious that it should be strongly pressed upon the Porte — proposing that the declaration of the Four Powers, to be made on its presentation, should conclude thus:—

'It [the Note] has been framed with an anxious regard for the interests of the Porte. The objections formerly urged against portions of the Vienna Note have been considered and effectually removed, and there is nothing which can in any degree affect the independence or dignity of the Sultan. The Four Powers trust that the Porte will duly appreciate their endeavours, and will adopt this Note as now proposed. Should this unfortunately not be the case, they feel it to be their duty to declare that they cannot permit themselves, in consequence of unfounded objections, or by the declaration of war which they have already condemned, to be drawn into the adoption of a policy inconsistent with the peace of Europe as well as with the true interests of Turkey itself. On the other hand, the conciliatory spirit evinced by an acceptance of the Note, as now proposed, could not fail to secure for the Porte, in case of necessity, a more decided support from the Four Powers.'

This addition Lord Clarendon pronounced to be 'necessary,' while Mr Gladstone wrote that he was 'one of those who, like Graham, think it indispensable.' The reason
why Lord Aberdeen did not, however, insist on its adoption is thus stated by him in writing to Mr. Gladstone (October 20):

'Reasonable as it was, I have not thought it prudent to adhere to it. I found that Palmerston and Lord John were both determined to resist it to the utmost extremity; and I had to consider how far I should be justified in creating a breach on such grounds; for the practical question at issue would have been, whether we should impose on the Turks the necessity of making no alteration whatever in a Note which was to be signed by them and delivered in their name. To those who did not know all that had passed, such a condition would have appeared harsh and unjust; and I felt that it could not properly be made the ground of such an irreconcilable difference in the Cabinet.'

Lord Clarendon wrote to you that the declaration was abandoned, and you replied, October 22: 'Your note has given me great satisfaction. I understand from it that a power of modification is to be left to Reschid Pasha.'

Both at the time, and ever after, until his death, Lord Aberdeen's impression certainly was that the views taken by you of the differences between the Porte and Russia made it impossible for you conscientiously to support him in his efforts for peace; and that had it been otherwise, war might have been avoided. I find that, just previously to its commencement (Feb. 28, 1854), he expressed this feeling to you in the following terms. After stating his entire concurrence with you on the Reform question, he says:

'I wish that I could feel as much at ease on the subject of the unhappy war in which we are about to be engaged. The abstract justice of the cause, although indisputable, is but a poor consolation for the inevitable calamities of all war, or for a decision which I am not without fear may
prove to have been impolitic and unwise. My conscience upbraids me the more, because, seeing, as I did from the first, all that was to be apprehended, it is possible that, by a little more energy and vigour, not, indeed, on the 'Danube, but in Downing Street, it might have been prevented.'

Your reply (March 3) was this:—

'The only course which would have prevented war would have been to have counselled acquiescence to the Turks. But that was a course to which . . . . . . . . , and I would not have consented; so that you would only have broken up your Government, if you had insisted upon it.'

There is certainly no hint here that war could have been avoided had a plan of accommodation recommended by yourself been adopted by Lord Aberdeen.

My letter is already a long one; but, as I am writing, I may as well remark upon another sentence in your recent publication which may, I think, be misapprehended, and which to ordinary readers may seem to bear a meaning which I am certain it was not your intention to convey.

Those who are not, like yourself, aware that Lord Aberdeen was at all times as eagerly anxious to quit office as any other man ever was to obtain it, may, I think, imagine that by your perfectly truthful statement that 'Lord Aberdeen told you that after being Prime Minister for a short time he meant to make way for you, but somehow the moment never came for executing his intentions,' it is intended to imply that Lord Aberdeen, once established in power, was reluctant to relinquish it, and slow to carry out the wish he had expressed.

You probably saw at the time the letter written by my father at the end of 1856 to the Duke of Bedford, in answer to some inquiries made by the Duke upon this subject; but it conveys so clear and complete a statement of
the case that I cannot, I think, do better than copy its principal sentences:—

'From my correspondence with Lord John and personal communication in 1852, he must have had no doubt of my reluctance to be at the head of the Government and of my desire to see him in that position instead of myself, as being in my opinion infinitely better qualified to take it. When I found, from the admitted state of public opinion at the time and the unwillingness of my own friends to listen to any such arrangement, that his appointment was impossible, I formed a resolution in my own mind that I would take an opportunity, in the event of my being placed at the head, of retiring in his favour whenever circumstances should permit, and as soon as I could do so without breaking up the Government; for this I did not think it would be fair either to the Queen or to my colleagues to do. I cannot recollect having specifically declared this intention to Lord John himself before the formation of the Government; but I think that I must have done so to others; and I have little doubt that from the first he must have looked to such a contingency. At all events I kept it constantly in view myself; and in the summer of 1853, when, by the acceptance of the Vienna Note, it appeared that the difference between Russia and Turkey was entirely settled, I thought the time had come when something might be attempted.

'At that time I had a conversation with Lord John in which I very clearly explained to him my views and intentions. On submitting the matter to my friends I found that Graham, although unwillingly, acquiesced, and I believe he informed Lord John himself to that effect. My other friends would not entertain the proposal; and I was compelled to delay any further proceeding, in the hope that during the Recess and before the next Session of Parliament I might by persuasion change their views.
The members of the Cabinet separated for the summer, and the time was not very favourable for personal communications. Most unfortunately, the Eastern negotiations were renewed; and, as they became more and more complicated, we found ourselves, before the meeting of Parliament, on the very eve of war. I recollect having an explanation with Lord John at the time, and telling him that it was impossible for me at such a moment to think of running away. In this opinion I thought he appeared entirely to acquiesce. After the war had fairly commenced I do not think that the subject was ever practically discussed between us.

You say that Lord John thinks he committed an error in leaving the Government in the way he did. It is certain that a different course might more probably have led to the result at which we both wished to arrive.

Had he supported us against Roebeck's motion, or enabled us in some mode to meet it with success, this might have been the case. Clarendon and I had already spoken about the possibility of Lord John going to Vienna to negotiate on the "Four Points;" and if I had remained at the head of the Government, I can have little doubt that peace would have been made. Had the peace been confirmed, I might then have irresistibly pressed my proposed retirement in his favour; or if the peace had been censured, the Government would at least have fallen in a cause of which I should have felt proud to the end of my days. Instead of this euthanasia, however, I was ignominiously overthrown in consequence of Lord John's decision.

Although I do not deny that I may have felt some reason to complain, this step was much more warmly resented by my friends than by myself; for in truth it made little or no change in my feelings towards Lord John. Knowing what he did, it seemed to me not un-
natural that he might think me too slow and undecided in giving effect to my intentions, for I will not do him the injustice of supposing that he ever for a moment doubted my sincerity. It is possible, too, that although I am convinced that he entered into the Government from the most generous and high-minded motives, he may have found himself in a somewhat false position, and that he may have miscalculated his powers of enduring this position with equanimity for any length of time.

But however this step may have been regarded by my friends at the moment, I trust that, seeing how little I have felt it myself, and looking to subsequent events, all asperity of feeling is now entirely at an end.

It gives me the greatest satisfaction to be informed by you of the good opinion and friendly feelings of Lord John. I can truly say that my conscience tells me that I have done my best to deserve them. I know that he has sometimes complained of my want of confidence in him, but for this there never was any real foundation. Any appearance of the kind was entirely the effect of accident, and never of intention. I may, perhaps, myself have thought Lord John over-sensitive, or sometimes rash or impracticable. But these are trifles. We parted with expressions of mutual regard, which on my side were perfectly sincere, as I have no doubt they were on his. These expressions I am happy in having the opportunity to renew; as well as, with my admiration of his great powers and noble impulses, to assure you that I shall always feel a warm interest in his reputation and honour.

And in another letter (January 11, 1857) to the Duke, he says:—

' I now return the letter from Clarendon, which you had the goodness to send me, and which I have read with pleasure. I think it takes very much the same view of
the matter as I had already stated to you; and it seems to me that you have obtained all the information of which the subject is susceptible. It is perfectly true that in my daily intercourse with Clarendon he became fully aware of all my views, wishes, and intentions; and that he had my entire confidence.

It is right, however, you should know that, although these wishes were strongly entertained and unequivocally expressed, they were not the result of any engagement or obligation on my part; but that the whole proceeding was perfectly spontaneous and free. It must also be recollected that I always explicitly declared that any steps to be taken by me having in view the substitution of Lord John as the head of the Government, must have the assent of the Cabinet;—that I would not agree to break up the Administration for this object. Now I am bound to say that I met with as much reluctance to entertain the project from some other members of the Cabinet as from those who were more especially considered my own friends.

At all events the war put an end for the time to any further practical measures being taken on the subject.

Situated as we then were, I could only look forward to the return of peace as the moment when the attempt to carry my wishes into effect might successfully be renewed.

I did not regard this as a distant prospect; for, as I had most reluctantly entered into the war, I was determined, if I remained at the head of the Government, that the first reasonable terms of peace within our reach should be accepted; and in this respect I am happy to believe that I did not materially differ from Lord John.'

The Duke's reply is:

'You tell me although your wishes were strongly entertained and unequivocally expressed, they were not the result of any engagement or obligation on your part, and
that the whole proceeding was perfectly spontaneous and free. That is precisely my own understanding of the case.'

I am sorry to have troubled you at so great a length, but my father's reputation is naturally very dear to me, and I should much regret that any part of his career should be exposed to misconstruction through the words of one whose lightest sayings carry so much weight as yours. His name may not be, like yours, a household word throughout the country. His fame may not, like yours, be a cherished possession of which all Englishmen are jealous. Known comparatively to few, his calm sagacity and his impartial justice may probably never be fully appreciated. But on that very account I am all the more anxious that his motives and conduct should not so be represented to the public as to be needlessly misunderstood.

Sir James Graham, shortly before his death, thus wrote to me:

'I do not remember the exact terms used by me in a former letter with regard to cases which might require your interposition, and the use of materials even of recent date, if your father's character and conduct were unjustly attacked by any writer or speaker worthy of notice. I consider you the accredited guardian of his fair fame, and you are armed with weapons for its defence. Let me illustrate my meaning.'

And he goes on to give cases which would require intervention and the publication of documents of recent date; and such are the subjects of pressing interests to which I referred.' Among these cases, the share of Lord Aberdeen in the transactions relating to the war, and the relations existing between him and yourself, are not omitted.

I hope, therefore, you will hold me excused for thus pointing out a misapprehension which it appears to me has
crept into your mind, and an expression which may, I think, possibly be misconstrued.—I am, &c.,

Arthur Gordon

Earl Russell to Sir Arthur Gordon.

Pembroke Lodge, February 1875.

My dear Sir Arthur,—I find that in the sixth chapter, as printed, in my volume of 'Recollections,' I had fallen into several errors, through lapse of memory. But what is worse than this, I have committed an injustice towards Lord Aberdeen, which I am anxious, as far as possible, to repair.

I will now endeavour, by the help of the letters which I have received from you, to trace the course of events which immediately preceded the breaking out of the war between Russia on the one side, and Great Britain and France on the other.

In 1853 the Government of Austria framed a Note of conciliation, which was despatched to St Petersburg, to Constantinople, to London, and to Paris, as a step to the settlement of all difficulties. Hence arose several questions of great moment. I will take them in the following order: First, the reception of the Austrian Note in London; next, the reception of the Note at Constantinople.

What I proposed to Lord Clarendon was, that we should give no option to Turkey with regard to the acceptance of the Austrian Note; that we should propose that Turkey should assent to the literal acceptance of the Austrian Note; and that we should at the same time warn her that if she did not choose to accept the Austrian Note, both in words and substance, we could no longer aid her in her contest with Russia.

I give a copy of a letter of mine to Lord Clarendon referring to this proposal:
Pembroke Lodge, Aug. 20, 1853.

‘In case I miss you to-day, I will say all I have to say on this small bit of paper.

‘I think the positive orders given to Stratford must produce their effect; if not, they must be repeated and enforced. The Turks must be told that if they will not make this moderate concession, which is, after all, scarcely more than their own last Note, they must be prepared to see the Principalities occupied all the winter, for we cannot not abet them in their obstinacy.

‘On the other hand, the Emperor of Russia must not be permitted to go beyond his present positions. He has no case for the invasion of Turkey. If he crosses the Danube, our fleet must go to the Bosphorus; but if he remains quiet, holding his material guarantee, he will have, before the spring, the diplomatic security he asks. The only danger is that the war party in Turkey may bring on a war by some imprudence—an attack on outposts, or the like. In that case Russia can hardly be kept in leash, and we must take fresh counsel with our other three allies.’

Lord Aberdeen had before this time expressed his concurrence with my proposed declaration. On the 29th of July he wrote in the following terms to Lord Clarendon:

‘I take for granted that you agree with Lord John in not giving to Stratford any option as to the acceptance by Turkey of our conditions, and that you adopt his proposed declaration. I think it quite necessary that this should be clearly understood by Stratford and the Turks.’

Lord Aberdeen observed (August 20) that he adhered to every syllable of my letter—namely, the one which I have just quoted.

We must now pass to Constantinople. When the Austrian Note arrived there, the Turkish Minister understood
the Note as trenching upon the independence of Turkey, and as establishing a Russian Protectorate over the Christian subjects of the Sultan.

On the 26th of August, Lord Aberdeen wrote to inform me that the Turks desired to introduce alterations into the Note, and expresses a doubt whether the Emperor of Russia will consent to them. He advised that, if the attempt to do so should fail, 'we are bound to make the Turks agree to the terms we have prescribed, or to let them take their own course.'

In my reply, dated from Roseneath on the 30th of August, I say: 'Hitherto we have shown great forbearance to Russia; it now becomes us to show a similar indulgence to Turkey, when she becomes in her turn wilful and wrong-headed.'

Up to this time Lord Aberdeen had agreed with me, and I had agreed with Lord Aberdeen; but from this time I found it impossible to agree to the course proposed by Lord Aberdeen, and which Lord Aberdeen himself gives up in a letter to me of the 22d of September:—

'When the Emperor gave his reasons for rejecting these modifications, we found that he interpreted the Note in a manner quite different from ourselves, and in a great degree justified the objections of the Turks. We could not, therefore, honestly continue to give an interpretation to the Note and ask the Turks again to sign it, when we knew that the interpretation of the Emperor was entirely different. The project, in consequence of this, fell to the ground. . . . I am not at all certain if something of the sort might not hereafter be received with advantage.'

The attempt to revise the Austrian Note, or to frame any declaration which might preserve peace without in any degree affecting the independence or dignity of the Sultan, entirely failed. One proposal was approved by three members of the Cabinet. Lord Aberdeen gives his rea-
sons for not adhering to it in a letter of the 20th of October:—

'Reasonable as it was, I have not thought it prudent to adhere to it. I found that Palmerston and Lord John were both determined to resist it to the utmost extremity, and I had to consider how far I should be justified in creating a breach on such grounds; for the practical question at issue would have been, whether we should impose on the Turks the necessity of making no alteration whatever in a Note which was to be signed by them and delivered in their name. To those who did not know all that had passed, such a condition would have appeared harsh and unjust, and I felt that it could not properly be made the ground of an irreconcilable difference in the Cabinet.'

Thus the failure of the attempts to avoid a war between Great Britain and France on the one side, and Russia on the other, did not arise from any reluctance of Lord Aberdeen to insist on the signature of the Austrian Note by Turkey, but was owing to an irreconcilable difference between Lord Palmerston and me on the one side, and Lord Aberdeen and various members of the Cabinet on the other. The Emperor of Russia was at this time in a state of frenzy, and would not have been content with anything less than the total destruction of the independence and dignity of the Sublime Porte.

Some of the friends of Lord Aberdeen seem to have thought that a sentence in my book was intended to imply that Lord Aberdeen, once established in power, was reluctant to relinquish it and slow to carry out the wish he had expressed. Such was never my meaning or my opinion. I believed, as I believe now, and as I was taught by Sir James Graham to think, that Lord Aberdeen was unwilling to retain office as Prime Minister, but that he was surrounded and beset by colleagues and adherents who could
not bear that he should give way to me, and thereby favour views of a more decided character than those of which he himself was the patron. I believe no man has entered public life in my time more pure in his personal views, and more free from grasping ambition or selfish considerations.

I am much grieved that anything I have written should have been liable to an interpretation injurious to Lord Aberdeen.—I remain yours truly,

Russell.

Sir Arthur Gordon to Earl Russell.

Ascot Wood, February 27.

My dear Lord Russell,—I have been much gratified by your letter, and you must permit me to express my very hearty thanks to you for the promptness and fulness with which you have responded to my appeal; as well as for the intention you have intimated to me of correcting in a future edition of your 'Recollections' those passages which are liable to misconception.

It is, however, in truth, no more than I expected, for I felt certain that, when once your attention had been called to the subject, you would be the first to desire the removal of all inaccuracy or ambiguity from your pages.

I do not clearly understand with respect to what subject those 'more decided views' were held which you consider to have been distasteful to those by whom, in your opinion, Lord Aberdeen was 'beset.' Not Reform; for on that subject you and Lord Aberdeen were in entire agreement. Not the War; for, as has been pointed out, the suggestion that he should resign in your favour was made to his colleagues by Lord Aberdeen at a moment when all danger of war was supposed to have been averted by the acceptance of the Vienna Note.

I must also observe, that although I have named but three members of the Cabinet as approving of the suggested
declaration of October 1853, it would be erroneous to conclude from that fact that it was approved by those three members of the Cabinet only.

I cannot conclude without again thanking you for the kindness and courtesy you have shown me throughout our communications on this subject.—I remain yours very sincerely,

ARTHUR H. GORDON.

P.S.—To those not well acquainted with the history of the Vienna Note, I think your reference to its origin may convey the erroneous impression that it was the work of the Government of Austria alone, and transmitted simultaneously by that Government to the different Courts named; instead of being, as in fact it was, the joint composition of the Governments of England, France, Austria, and Prussia, subsequently submitted by the Vienna Conference to the Emperor of Russia and the Sultan for acceptance or rejection.

NOTE V.

Respecting the Day on which the Czar and the Sultan began to be in a State of War.

Some imagined that the state of war began on the 4th of October—the date of the Declaration; but that is a mistake. It was Lord Stratford who devised the plan of a contingent declaration of war (‘Eastern Papers,’ part ii. p. 198); and he, of all men living, would be the least likely to be wrong as to the time when the state of war began. Reporting to the Home Government the effect of the decision of the Great Council as conveyed to him by Reshid Pasha, Lord Stratford writes, that 'Omar Pasha will be instructed to
resummon Prince Gortschakoff by letter to evacuate the
Principalities within fifteen days from the receipt of his
letter; that the Prince's refusal will be considered as tan-
tamount to a declaration of war on the part of Russia;
that hostilities will be declared thereupon by the Porte;
that all persons now here in the employment of Russia
will then be requested to withdraw; and, finally, that all
merchant vessels under Russian colours will also be re-
quired to leave the port of Constantinople.'—('Eastern:
Papers,' part ii. p. 151.) After the 4th of October, and at
a time when the state of war was erroneously supposed to
have begun, the Turkish Government was sending to Prince
Gortschakoff the summons devised by Lord Stratford—a
summons which the Sublime Porte described as 'the last
expression of its pacific sentiments.'—(Ibid. p. 154.) The
mistake was sustained by a notion that the postponement
of hostilities applied only to 'hostilities on the Danube;'
but Lord Stratford's despatch of the 21st of October shows
that—not only on the Danube, but—on the Asiatic frontiers
the attack was to be 'immediately after the expiration of
the fifteen days.'—(Ibid. p. 198.) At one time, the Turk-
ish Ministers set up a theory that, as Prince Gortschakoff's
answer (dated the 10th of October) was virtually a refusal,
the term offered by the summons was brought to a close on
that day—the 10th (ibid. p. 198); but the very fact that
they were discussing with Lord Stratford this question
about the state of war beginning on the 10th, shows con-
clusively that neither they nor Lord Stratford had any
notion of its having begun on the 4th of October.
ADVERTISEMENTS TO PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

ADVERTISEMENT TO SECOND EDITION.

A few notes have been added to this edition, but not a word of the text has been changed.

ADVERTISEMENT TO THIRD EDITION.

The reason which made it a duty to withhold some portions of the Despatch of the 29th of June has ceased to operate, and the Despatch is now given entire.

Some notes have been added, and some passages contained in the second volume have been moved on to other parts of the same chapter;* but not a word has been withdrawn from the text, and not a word has been added to it.

Since the publication of the first edition, I have been engaged in a great deal of discussion with military men on the subject of transactions in which they bore a part. This discussion has been laborious; but the result of it is satis-

* The exact extent to which this has been done is shown in the Direction, p. xlviii. N.B.—The foregoing part of this footnote was attached to the "advertisement" as originally published, and referred, of course, to a page in the third edition.
factory; for it entitles me to believe that none of the
officers I speak of are now at variance with me upon any
grave matters of fact; and yet (as will be seen, I think,
from the purport and from the scantiness of the very few
notes now appended) I have been able to stand fast to the
tenor of the narrative as given in the first and second
editions. It was in the nature of things than an honest
comparison of the impressions of several eyewitnesses
should throw more and more light upon the matters to
which it related; but the farther and more minute facts
thus brought to my knowledge have not proved to be of
such a kind as to contravene the narrative. On the con-
trary, their tendency has been to elucidate its meaning,
and to strengthen its outlines. So, by merely inserting a
few foot-notes, I have been able to give to the public the
fruit of the discussion which has been going on, and to do
this, as I have already said, without resorting to the plan
of withdrawing any words from the text.

ADVERTISEMENT TO FOURTH EDITION.

In this edition many notes have been added; and there is
a sentence in the second volume which has been moved
forward to a page further on. The spelling of the names
of several English officers, and of one foreigner, has been
corrected. Not a word has been withdrawn from the text,
and not a word has been added to it.

Of the notes, there are some few which correct or
qualify the words of the text. For a book which chances
to be a subject of controversy, this way of setting right
all mistakes is, I think, the fairest and best. Far from
hiding the mended spot, it makes the newly-found truth
more conspicuous than it would have been if it had been
allowed to glide quietly into the text. For example: In one of the lists of wounded officers, I or my printers chanced to leave out the name of Colonel Smith. Upon the omission becoming known to me, I attached to the passage a mark of reference, which seizes the eye of the reader and carries him to the foot of the page, where instantly he sees it stated that Colonel Smith was one of the wounded. In this way the omitted fact is presented to the reader more effectually than it would have been if the word 'Smith' had been blended with the text, standing there with thirteen other names.

But also, by this method, I acknowledge and publicly record against myself every single inaccuracy, however minute and trivial, which had struck me as requiring correction when last I went through the book. Whether I could have been so venturesome as to do thus, if the emendations required had been many and important, I will not undertake to say. As it is, I am enabled to take this method of courting any criticism which may be founded upon my confessions of error.

The plan, therefore, is a fair one; but it is also, I think, very needful to adopt it, and I will say why.

The book is undergoing discussion; and in order that the conflict it raises may be honestly waged, it seems right to take care that the subject of dispute shall not be a shifting thing—a thing shifting this way and that under stress of public scrutiny.

Again, there is a charge now pending. Rightly or wrongly, the accusers say that in public journals—in journals still sold under honourable titles—the writers are now and then suffered to misstate the tenor of books; and it seems that the printed accounts which have been given of this work are put forward as some of the instances in which misdescription has occurred. I have not myself taken the pains which would warrant me in declaring a
resemblance, or a want of resemblance, between the book and its likenesses; but knowing that the charge has been brought, I see it to be right that all those who are called upon to judge the question should have before their eyes the very text of a book which is the subject of the alleged misdescriptions—the very text with all its sins and wickednesses, not having one single word added, nor one single word withdrawn.

But, besides his reasons for the course he is taking, a man may have his motive; and I acknowledge that, with me, a chief motive for declining to alter the text is this:—I wish to keep a check upon those who might like to be able to say that I had materially altered the book. If anybody shall try to say such a thing in defiance of the plan I have adopted, he will find himself painfully tethered; for, the words of the text standing fast, he will be unable to range beyond the circle of those little matters—matters chiefly minute, and of detail—which are dealt with in a few corrective foot-notes. Either he must say what is not true under circumstances which make his exposure a simple task, or else he will have to browse upon such scant herbage as is afforded by notes of this sort:—'No [not a squadron]; only one troop.' 'No [not sixty-six years old]; only sixty-four.' 'Here the words "Laurence and " should be inserted.' 'Instead of "a wing," read "the whole."'

The first of the commentators who found himself checked in this way was thrown into so angry a state, that when I stood observing his struggles, I was glad to think of the prudence which had led me to keep him tied up.

I said just now that some of the writings which purported to give the tenor of these volumes had been put forward as instances of unfaithful description. I have not enabled myself to assist this inquiry by comparing the accounts of things contained in the book with the book itself; and it is not desirable for me to do so, because an
author can hardly expect to be looked upon as a good judge of what is, or is not, an honest abridgment or statement of his words; but I may be allowed to adduce two curious instances of the errors into which men may be led by looking to the accounts which have been given of a book instead of to the book itself.

On the 15th of February, a stranger, who had been present at the battle of the Alma, addressed to me a letter from a distant foreign station, which began thus: 'Sir,— It has not been yet my good fortune to see a copy of your recent . . . work, the "Invasion of the Crimea," but a critique upon it in the' (here the writer of the letter gives the name of his newspaper) 'of the 27th of January last, purporting to give an outline of some parts of the narrative, contains an assertion, made with reference to a description of the battle of the Alma—viz., that under the fire sustained by Lord Raglan's Headquarter Staff, "not a man of it received a scratch,"—which I take to be incorrect.'

The writer proceeds to state, with admirable clearness, the circumstances which enabled him to speak as an eyewitness of what went on with the Headquarter Staff, and then says:—'I presume to detail these particulars, in order to show, sir, that having thus, like yourself, taken part in, and been an eyewitness of, the movements of the Staff on the memorable day referred to, I may venture to point out how far the statement as to the Staff having come out of it scathless seems to be inaccurate;' and the writer then proceeds to prove to me, with great clearness and perspicuity, that on the two spots of ground which he rightly and carefully describes, two officers of the Headquarter Staff were wounded.

Supposing that his newspaper was guiding him faithfully, well indeed might this critic remonstrate with me for the inaccuracy of which he had been led to suppose me
guilty, because the Staff, so far from coming off scathless, had been more than decimated. When my correspondent at that foreign station shall see the book itself, he will know that I disclose this fully, giving the names of the two wounded officers; and, indeed, it would have been strange if I had omitted to do so, for Leslie and Weare, the two Staff officers wounded, were both of them struck down on the part of the field where I was, and one of them fell within a few paces of me.

Thus, then, it appears that even a careful and accurate man who has to put up with his newspaper's account of a book, at a time when he remains debarred from access to the book itself, is so misled by this method of seeking for the real purport of a volume that he thinks it his duty to address the author with a view to correct a gross error—a gross error not existing in the book itself, but appearing to do so in the mind of one who receives his account of it from a newspaper.

On the 18th of March last, another letter was written, which I doubt not to be also an instance of the effect produced upon a mind of fair intelligence by accounts purporting to give the tenor of a book. When Captain Mends thought it his duty to address his letter to the newspaper about the buoy, he introduced the subject by writing, and suffering to be printed and published, the following words:

— As I have been referred to by many as to the truth of Mr Kinglake's statement in his "Invasion of the Crimea," that the landing of our army at Old Fort was materially delayed by the wilful displacement of a buoy by the "French," I feel called upon in justice, &c. Now Captain Mends not only made that statement, but suffered it to be printed in the newspaper with inverted commas, exactly as given above. Well, those words are not in the book. Not only is there no such passage in the book—not only is there no assertion that material delay was oc-
casioned by the wilful displacement of the buoy by the 'French'—but the book actually makes light of the delay, saying that there was 'much less delay, and much less confusion, than might have been expected;' and, far from undertaking to assert that the displacement of the buoy was wilful, it goes out of its way to suggest that one of the hypotheses which would account for the displacement was 'sheer mistake.' I cannot doubt that Captain Mends intended to quote accurately; and I account for his mistake by supposing that, instead of copying from the book itself he must have been induced to give what purported to be a quotation, by taking his words from one of those printed representations of the contents of the book which were current at the time when he wrote his letter to the newspaper.

I repeat that I have done nothing towards that collation of passages which is necessary for determining whether any given account of the tenor of the book is an account given in good faith; but it struck me that the above two instances of men who trusted to printed versions of the contents of the book, instead of to the book itself, might possibly help the inquiry, and could hardly fail to serve as wholesome examples.

In the general controversy which the book has engendered I am not taking part; but having in my hands large means of proof and disproof, I ought, of course, to aid towards the attainment of right conclusions upon disputed matters of fact; and it is only with that view that I am now going to speak—not of the nature and spirit, but—of the mere abundance of the scrutiny which the book has undergone.

The book treated of such subjects, and of a time so little removed from the present, that there were great numbers of public men—ministers, diplomatists, and military and naval officers—who were not only likely to have strong
motives for narrowly scrutinising the accuracy of the narrative, but were able to speak upon some or one of the subjects it touches with the authority of partakers or eyewitnesses. Thence, as was to be expected, there were addressed to me a quantity of communications, some personal, and some by letter. In these communications, the speakers and writers pointed out what they deemed to be errors or omissions. In almost every instance they made their representations with great precision, and with a strikingly rigid adherence to the subject-matter.*

But, besides the authoritative criticism of those numbers of men who had been actors in the scenes described, there was the criticism of the periodical press. This was applied to the book, both at home and abroad; and so diligently, that already the works of the commentators must be many times greater in bulk than the original book. Of the publications which yielded these floods of comment, there were some whose conductors trusted mainly to public sources for the information on which they rested, but there were other conductors of reviews and newspapers who placed themselves under the guidance of some public man—some minister, some soldier, some sailor—who had been what is called "an actor in the 'scene.'" The criticism resulting from this last method was of a composite sort, for it more or less covertly uttered the notions of some public man whose reputation was at stake, but expressed them in the name of the journal through whom he addressed the public.

* I include in this category of communications from individuals some few which also appeared in print; as, for instance, one about the age of Sir George Brown, and the way he carried his plumes—another about the exact rank with which Colonel Codrington went out—and one or two more of a less important kind; but I do so rightly, because these communications had reached me before the time when they got published. I also include in this category the communication from Colonel Norcott, because, though his letter appeared in a newspaper, it was a letter addressed to me.
From causes to which I need not advert, the commentaries were delivered, not only with great animation and zeal, but with a persistency not often applied to the criticism of one mere book. Diligence of the most varied kinds was brought to bear; for since the book involved politics as well as history, it fairly enough became the subject—not merely of reviews, but also—of what they call 'articles;' and seeing that it touched things abroad, correspondents employed by the conductors of newspapers in foreign capitals were encouraged or suffered to remit their daily toil of gathering 'news,' and take part for a time with their colleagues at home in finding something to say about this book. Finally, it was made to appear, that if an officer would submit to the condition of writing to a newspaper, and would begin his letter with a criticism upon the book of a kind approved by the managers, he might append to his comments a narrative of his own achievements, with the certainty that his own account of his own deeds would be read in one day by thousands and thousands of people.

It may be imagined that the immense body, both of authoritative and anonymous criticism, thus brought to bear upon one book, could hardly fail to show that mistakes had crept in here and there; but if any reader shall take the pains to separate from the bulk of the notes every sentence which puts right an error, he will be able to judge and say whether the corrections are many and important, or whether they are scanty and slight.

Be that as it may, I must state that, with the exceptions which I shall presently enumerate, I owe all these corrections to the public men and officers who have done me the honour to communicate with me either personally or by letter.

For reasons of larger scope than those which only apply to the questioned worth of a book, the public, I imagine, has an interest in knowing what impression has been made
upon these volumes by the exertions of the periodical press. Certainly my own reading of the criticisms brought to bear on the book has been not only very imperfect, but has been conducted without method; and although I have taken other means besides my own scanty reading for learning what statements of mine upon matters of fact have been disputed in respectable publications, I cannot be sure, nor even indeed imagine, that I have dealt with every contradiction upon matters of fact which has been taken in print to my statements. All I can say is, that when last I went through these volumes I did not knowingly pass by any error; and it must be remembered that there is this safeguard—namely, that every public writer whose challenge upon a matter of fact I may have failed to notice, will not only be able to exclaim against me for my neglect of his strictures, but will even be likely to do so, because it is according to nature that any critic who may have taken pains to give to a book this kind of antagonistic assistance should be loth to see his industry wasted.

Now, then, to speak of the corrections upon matters of fact which I owe to the periodical press. In writing a book of this kind, one naturally glances at many things which are not in strictness the subject of the History. Thus, before I came to the time when their actions brought them strictly within the range of this narrative, I glanced at the antecedent career of several public men, and in referring to those 'tidings from the Danube,' which I spoke of as stirring the public mind in England, I suffered myself to linger awhile on the ground whence the tidings had come. Well, in the course of those retrospective glances, I treated Lord Stratford's antecedent absence from Constantinople as lasting full double the number of months that it really did; I said that, in 1836, St Arnaud entered for the third time into 'the military profession,' when I ought rather to have said that he entered for the third time
upon the career of an officer serving with troops;’ I spoke of Lieutenant Glyn and his seamen as coming up from the sea with some gunboats, whereas I ought to have said that the gunboats they used at Giurgevo were lying in the river beforehand; and, finally, I spoke of General Airey as returning from Canada to England upon the death of his uncle, whereas I ought to have said that he came back some months before. These four mistakes were pointed out, the first three of them by respectable English journals, and the fourth by an American newspaper. So far as concerns my retrospective glances at things not falling within the strict limits of the History, these are, I think, all the corrections which I owe to the zeal of the press.

Well, but what impression has public criticism made upon the rest of the book? What (properly) historical errors have owed their correction to the vigilance of the periodical press?

They are as follows:—‘Garan’ should be ‘Gagarin;’ Captain ‘Schane’ should be Captain ‘Schaw;’ ‘Luxmore’ should be ‘Luxmoore;’ ‘Bisset’ should be ‘Bissett;’ ‘Woolcombe’ should be ‘Wollocombe;’ ‘Montagu’ should be ‘Montague.’*

For these corrections I am indebted to the conductors of an eminent English newspaper.†

* The press also suggested four perfectly just corrections in regard to the following matters:—The rank with which Colonel Codrington went out; the wrongly-spelt name of ‘Stacey;’ the omission of Colonel Smith from the list of wounded; the misspelling which gave ‘Wardlow’ instead of ‘Wardlaw;’ and the error about Sir George Brown’s exact age, and the way he carried his plumes; but these corrections had been previously supplied to me by means of private communication, and it is for that reason that I do not place them in the above enumeration of the corrections which I owe to the periodical press.

† The misspelling of the name of ‘Garan’ for ‘Gagarin’ was
I will repeat that there may, and there must be, numbers of printed challenges upon questions of fact with which I have not become acquainted; and there may be others which I have heard of and forgotten; but the above, I believe, are the only corrections supplied by the periodical press which I have hitherto seen fit to adopt.

What then did I do with all the rest of those charges of error in matter of fact which were brought against me by the press? Well, I looked through the book, and where I observed a statement which I knew at the time to have been denied, I did this: By a note at the foot of the page where a challenged assertion occurred, I supplied a sufficing portion of the proofs by which I supported my statement. Of the soundness and cogency of the proofs thus produced, it will be for the public to judge. They are all, or nearly all, documentary.

But, besides the unnumbered strangers and friends who have addressed to me private communications on the contents of the book, and besides the whole host of those who speak to the public through the medium of the periodical press, there is one persistent scrutiniser who (so far as concerns all questions of dry fact) has hitherto proved more formidable than all. He alone has succeeded in proving that, here and there, there is a mistake—slight enough perhaps in itself, but—occurring in a place where, to point to it, is to fix upon the part of the narrative in which it appears, a small, yet ugly blemish. For some years this caviller took an interest in the progress of the book, and it is believed that he still wishes well to it; but in his determination to insist upon strict accuracy without the least regard for the flow of the narrative, he is steadfast pointed out by the correspondent of the newspaper acting at Constantinople. The other misspellings of names were indicated in one of the many reviews of the book which appeared in the same journal.
and pitiless. What makes his scrutiny so formidable is, that—without the least merit on his part—he has chanced to become possessed—nay, is every day becoming more and more possessed—of the knowledge, the constantly accruing knowledge, which enables him to find fault with effect. This persistent, implacable critic is no other than the author himself.

Of the way in which I break in and find fault with the book wherever truth bids me do so, I can best speak by giving a single example. Guided by Sir Colin Campbell’s narrative of the operations of his brigade at the Alma, I narrated the advance of the 79th Highlanders against the flank of a Russian column then marching across its front, and—catching animation from that strangely kindling power with which Lord Clyde used to speak of these scenes—I said that the 79th ‘sprang at the flank’ of the Russian column. I never knew of anybody except myself who ever found fault with the accuracy of the sentence. But it happened that, long after the publication of the book, and for a purpose having nothing to do with the movement in question, Lord Clyde, one day, brought me a paper, written by an officer of the 79th, and containing more minute details of the advance of the regiment than had previously come to my knowledge. From these details I gathered that, although the 79th had advanced exactly in the direction I described, and against the flank of the Russian battalions then marching across its front, it had advanced more deliberately than I had supposed. I no sooner read this than I felt that my expression, ‘sprang at the flank,’ indicated a greater swiftness of attack than was consistent with the bare truth, and therefore needed to be qualified. Lord Clyde did not agree with me; he thought the expression sufficiently accurate, and deprecated the notion of my qualifying the words; but I was steadfast in my determination to show what I myself
judged to be the very truth, and therefore it is that, by a qualifying note, I wilfully mar and deface the sentence to which I appended it. This is only one example of the rigour with which the book is treated by its author.

And here I may say that, in order to substantiate disputed statements, I have not been always obliged to reopen the stores of information on which I founded my assertions. In many, and I think in most instances, I was saved the need of going back to papers long out of my sight, by the firm love of justice which brought men who had observed that I was wrongly contradicted to come forward of their own accord and lay before me the private letters and journals of eyewitnesses in support of the statements I had made. Of the written documents on which I based the narrative, I can say that, for the most part, I have hitherto kept them in reserve.

Until after the publication of the book, I think I was as much inclined as the generality of men to be doubtful of the possibility of getting very close to historical truth; and I knew, of course, that the occurrences of a battlefield are especially hard to seize; but I must acknowledge that the supply of fresh confirming proof by which I now find myself supported, has done something towards lessening any tendency I had towards this kind of historical scepticism. When the first edition of the book was published, I had never seen the private journal and letters of Colonel Hood, the officer who commanded the Grenadier Guards at the Alma, nor the clear and straightforward narrative of Sir Charles Russell, of the same regiment. I was without that letter of Colonel Percy of the same regiment, to which (as will be gathered from the notes) I attach great worth. I had never seen that journal of Colonel Annesley of the Fusilier Guards, which tells me the story so naturally and so well, that to glance through the written words is more like listening than reading. I had never seen the rough,
lifelike letters of Colonel Yea, nor the short telling letter of Colonel Aldworth. Yet when all this authentic testimony of eyewitnesses is laid before me, I find it confirming what I had asserted in print some months before. Seeing this, I cannot but think that—even in the battle-field—there is truth, after all, to be found.

If I might be suffered to press this view for a moment more by giving a chosen instance of the way in which it applies to my own narrative, I would venture to speak of one only amongst those several pieces of testimony by which I now support my account of the operations of the Grenadier Guards at the Alma. I support what I say of the battalion by giving extracts from the journal and private letters of its honoured chief, Colonel Hood. These extracts correspond so closely with the tenor of the narrative, that the reader would be likely to say,—'That journal and those letters were evidently the authority on which the author based his account of the operations of the Grenadier Guards.' It is, however, a fact, that I never saw the journal, nor the letters, and never knew anything of their tenor, until after the publication of the first and second editions of this book. It was then that Mrs Grosvenor Hood (the widow of him whose achievement on the banks of the Alma had won so large a share of my attention) resolved to give me fresh means of substantiating the narrative, by placing in my hands the treasured words which were written to her from the banks of the Alma.*

* This she did with the full approval of Lord Hood, the present head of the family. I may here say (though I think I have clearly explained it in the foot-note), that the order with respect to which Colonel Hood wrote, 'Thank God I disobeyed!' was not an order given by the Divisional General H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge. Colonel Hood had been directed by General Bentinck to conform to any movements on his left, and it was only by being applied to the event which afterwards happened—viz., the temporary retreat of the Fusilier Guards—that General Bentinck's order became in effect an order directing Colonel Hood to retreat.
Now, when it is seen that I make a series of statements—of statements planted thick with particulars—in regard to the operations of a given battalion at the Alma, and that, after the publication there comes to light a private record written on the field of the battle by the officer who commanded the battalion—a record confirming almost sentence by sentence the account I give in my narrative,—it is plainly a sound deduction to say, that the coincidence between the two accounts must result from the accuracy of both. But I venture to think that an inference of wider scope than that may fairly be drawn; for surely in the mind of anybody who shall be seeking after truth with the aid of accustomed principles, the appearance of new and confirmatory proofs of this sort will not only establish the particular assertion to which he finds them appended, but will even tend to strengthen his trust in other parts of the book.

ADVERTISEMENT TO PUBLICATION COMPRISING THE FIFTH EDITION

OF VOLUMES I. AND II., AND THE THIRD EDITION
OF VOLUMES III. AND IV.

The text still remains unaltered.

A. W. K.

1874.

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