EX BIBLIOTHECA
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HAVING in the second chapter revealed all the dark mysteries of atheism, and produced the utmost strength of that cause; and in the third made an introduction to the confutation of those atheistic grounds, by representing all the several forms and schemes of atheism, and shewing both their disagreements amongst themselves, and wherein they all agree together against Theists; we have been hitherto prevented of that full and copious confutation of them, intended by us, by reason of that large account given of the Pagan polytheism: which yet was no impertinent digression neither, it removing the grand objection against the naturality of the idea of God, as including onelines in it; as also preparing a way for that defence of Christianity, designed by us against Atheists. Wherefore that we may not here be quite excluded of what was principally intended, we shall subjoin a contracted and compendious confutation of all the premised atheistic principles. The first whereof was this, that either men have no idea of God at all, or else none but such as is compounded and made up of impossible and contradictory notions; from whence these Atheists would infer him to be an unconceiveable Nothing. In answer whereunto, there hath been something done already, it being declared in the beginning of the fourth chapter, what the idea of God is, viz. a perfect understanding nature, necessarily self-existent, and the cause of all other things. And as there is nothing either unconceiveable, or contradictory in this idea, so have we shewed, that these confounded Atheists do not only, at the same time when they verbally deny an idea of God, implicitly acknowledge and confess it, for as much as otherwise, denying his existence, they should deny the existence of nothing; but also that they agree with Theists in this very idea; it being the only thing, which Atheists contend for, that
That Sense is not Knowledge, Book I.

the first original and head of all things is no perfect understanding nature, but that all sprung from Tohu and Bobu, or dark and senseless matter fortuitously moved. Moreover, we have not only thus declared the idea of God, but also largely proved, and made it clearly evident, that the generality of mankind in all ages have had a prolepsis or anticipation in their minds, concerning the real and actual existence of such a being; the Pagans themselves, besides their other many Gods (which were understanding beings superior to men,) acknowledging one chief and sovereign Numin, the Maker of them all, and of the whole world. From whence it plainly appears, that those few Atheists, that formerly have been, and still are, here and there up and down in the world, are no other than the monsters and anomalies of human kind. And this alone might be sufficient to repel the first atheistic assault, made against the idea of God.

Nevertheless, that we may not seem to dissemble any of the Atheists strength, we shall here particularly declare all their most colourable pretences against the idea of God, and then shew the folly and invalidity of them. Which pretences are as follow; first, That we have no idea nor thought of any thing not subject to corporeal sense; nor the least evidence of the existence of any thing, but from the same. Secondly, That the Gods themselves acknowledging God to be incomprehensible, he may be from thence inferred to be a non-entity. Thirdly, That the idea of God including infinity in it, is therefore absolutely unconceivable and impossible. Fourthly, That Theology is an arbitrary compulsion of inconsistent and contradictory notions. And lastly, That the idea and existence of God owes all its being, either to the confounded non-sense of astonish'd minds, or else to the fiction and imposture of politicians.

We begin with the first; That we can have no idea, conception, or thought of any thing, not subject to sense; nor the least evidence of the existence of any thing, but from the same. Thus a modern atheistic writer says, Whatsoever we can conceive, hath been perceived first by sense, either at once or in parts; and a man can have no thought representing any thing not subject to sense. From whence it follows, that whatsoever is not sensible and imaginable, is utterly unconceivable, and to us nothing. Moreover, the same writer adds, That the only evidence, which we have of the existence of any thing, is from sense; the consequence whereof is this, that there being no corporeal sense of a Deity, there can be no evidence at all of his existence. Wherefore, according to the tenor of the atheistic philosophy, all is resolved into sense, as the only criterion of truth, accordingly as Protagoras in Plato's Theaetetus concludes knowledge to be sense; and a late writer of our own determines sense to be original knowledge. Here have we a wide ocean before us, but we must contract our sails. Were sense knowledge and understanding; then he, that sees light and colours, and feels heat and cold, would understand light and colours, heat and cold, and the like of all other sensible things; neither would there be any philosophy at all concerning them. Whereas the mind of man remaineth altogether unsatisfied, concerning the

nature of these corporeal things, even after the strongest sensations of them, and is but thereby awakened to a further philosophick inquiry and search about them, what this light and colours, this heat and cold, &c. really should be; and whether they be indeed qualities in the objects without us, or only phantasm and sensations in our selves. Now it is certain, that there could be no suspicion of any such thing as this, were sense the highest faculty in us; neither can sense it self ever decide this controversy; since one sense cannot judge of another, or correct the error of it; all sense as such, (that is, as phancy and apparition) being alike true. And had not these Atheists been notorious dunces in that atomick philosophy, which they so much pretend to, they would clearly have learn’d from thence, that sense is not knowledge and understanding, nor the criterion of truth as to sensible things themselves; it reaching not to the essence or absolute nature of them, but only taking notice of their outside, and perceiving, its own passions from them, rather than the things themselves: and there is a higher faculty in the soul, of reason and understanding, which judges of sense; detects the phantasy and imposture of it; discovers to us that there is nothing in the objects themselves like to those forementioned sensible ideas; and resolves all sensible things into intelligible principles; the ideas whereof are not foreign and adventitious, and mere passive impressions upon the soul from without, but native and domestick to it, or actively exerted from the soul it self; no passion being able to make a judgment either of it self, or other things. This is a thing so evident, that Democritus himself could not but take notice of it, and acknowledge it, though he made not a right use thereof; he, in all probability, continuing notwithstanding a confounded and besotted Atheist; Sextus Empiricus having recorded this of him: 'Еν τοις κανόνις δύο φαινεται ἡ γνώσις τόν μὲν διὰ τῶν αἰδίων, τόν δὲ διὰ τῆς διανοίας: τό τοῦ μνείως γράψων κατάγει, προσμεταφέρεται αὐτῇ τῷ πιστῷ εἰς ἀληθείαν ἡμῶν, τό δὲ διὰ τῶν αἰδίων συμπεριφέρεται ὑπόμαινας ἀφανώθερα. Αὐτὸς τὸ πρῶτον διὰ γνώσεως τῷ ἀληθείᾳ αἰδίων ἄπληθος ἀπελευθερώθη λέγει δε κατὰ λέγει. Γνώμης δὲ δύο εἰσὶν ἤ ἡ μὲν γνώσις ἢ οὔ καταστρεφεῖ ἡ σκοτία τυχόν μείν τάδε σύντοιχοι ὀψις, ἀκοὴ, ὀδηγία, γνώσις, φαινήσεως ὡς δὲ γνώσις ἀποκεφαλήθη εἰς τούτοις. Democritus in his Canons affirmeth, that there are two kinds of knowledges, one by the senses, and another by the mind. Of which that by the mind is only accounted knowledge, he bearing witness to the faithfulness and firmness thereof for the judgment of truth. The other by the senses he calleth dark, denying it to be a rule and measure of truth. His own words are these: There are two species of knowledge, the one genuine, the other dark and obscure. The dark and obscure knowledge is seeing, bearing, smelling, tasting, touching. But the genuine knowledge is another more hidden and recondit. To which purpose there is another fragment also of this Democritus preferred by the fame Sextus; Νόμων γλυκῶν, καὶ νόμων τιμρον, νόμων ἐτερον, νόμων ψυχικῶν νόμων κρατον αὐτίκα δὲ ἀτομῶν και κατ' ὅπερ νοτιεῖται μὲν εἰσὶ καὶ δοξαζομαι τὰ αἰδίων, εἰ δὲ κατ' ἀλήθειαν ταῦτα. Bitter and sweet, hot and cold, are only in opinion or phancy. Colour is only in opinion; atoms, and vacuum alone in truth and reality. That

1 Lib. VII. adverf. Mathemat. §. 2 Id. ibid. §. CXXXV. p. 399.
CXXXVIII, CXXXIX. p. 400.
That which is thought to be, are sensibles; but these are not according to truth, but atoms and vacuum only. Now the chief ground of this rational discovery of the antient Atomits, that sensible things, as heat and cold, bitter and sweet, red and green, are no real qualities in the objects without, but only our own phancies, was because in body there are no such things intelligible, but only magnitude, figure, site, motion and rest. Of which we have not only sensible ideas, passively impressed upon us from without, but also intelligible notions, actively exerted from the mind it self. Which latter notwithstanding, because they are not unaccompanied with sensible phantasms, are by many unskilfully confounded with them. But besides these, we have other intelligible notions, or ideas also, which have no genuine phantasms at all belonging to them. Of which whatsoever doubts, may easily be satisfied and convinced, by reading but a sentence or two, that he understands, in any book almost, that shall come next to his hand; and reflexively examining himself, whether he have a phantasm, or sensible idea, belonging to every word, or no. For whoever is modest and ingenuous, will quickly be forced to confess, that he meets with many words, which though they have a sense, or intelligible notion, yet have no genuine phantasm belonging to them. And we have known some, who were confidently engaged in the other opinion, being put to read the beginning of Tully's Offices, presentely non-plus'd and confounded in the first word, quamquam; they being neither able to deny, but that there was a sense belonging to it, nor yet to affirm, that they had any phantasm thereof, save only of the sound or letters. But to prove, that there are cogitations not subject to corporeal sense, we need go no further than this very idea or description of God; a substance absolutely perfect, infinitely good, wise and powerful, necessarily self-existent, and the cause of all other things. Wherefore it is nothing but want of meditation, together with a fond and fottifh dotage upon corporeal sense, which hath so far imposed upon some, as to make them believe, that they have not the least cogitation of any thing not subject to corporeal sense; or that there is nothing in human understanding, or conception, which was not first in bodily sense; a doctrine highly favourable to atheism. But since it is certain, on the contrary, that we have many thoughts, not subject to sense, it is manifest, that whatsoever falls not under external sense, is not therefore unconceivable, and nothing. Which whatsoever asserts, must needs affirm life and cogitation it self, knowledge or understanding, reason and memory, volition and appetite, things of the greatest moment and reality, to be nothing but mere words without any signification. Nay, fancy and sense it self, upon this hypothesis, could hardly escape from becoming non-entities too, forasmuch as neither fancy nor sense falls under sense, but only the objects of them; we neither seeing vision, nor feeling action, nor hearing audition, much
Evidence of things not sensible.

We grant indeed, that the evidence of particular bodies, existing in the soul, without us, doth necessarily depend upon the information of sense; but yet nevertheless, the certainty of this very evidence is not from sense alone, but from a complication of reason and understanding together with it. Were sense the only evidence of things, there could be no absolute truth and falsehood, nor certainty at all of any thing; sense, as such, being only relative to particular persons, seeming and phantastical, and obnoxious to much delusion. For if our nerves and brain be inwardly so moved, and affected, as they would be by such an object present, when indeed it is absent, and no other motion or sensation in the mean time prevail against it and obliterate it; then must that object of necessity seem to us present. Moreover, those imaginations, that spring and bubble from the soul itself, are commonly taken for sensations by us when asleep, and sometimes in melancholick and fancifull persons also, when awake. That atheiftick principle, that there is no evidence at all of any thing as existing, but only from corporeal sense, is plainly contradicted by the Atomick Atheifts themselves, when they assert atoms and vacuum to be the principles of all things, and the exuvius images of bodies to be the causes both of sight and cogitation: for single atoms, and those exuvius images, were never seen nor felt; and vacuum, or empty space, is so far from being sensible, that these Atheifts themselves allow it to be the one only incorporeal. Wherefore they must here go beyond the ken of sense, and appeal to reaon only for the existence of these principles: as Protagoras, one of them, in Plato, professedly doth: \( \text{Θανατ. p.155} \) \( \text{αὔριον} \) \( \text{περισσοτέρον} \) \( \text{μάτις} \) \( \text{τῶν} \) \( \text{ἀμακτῶν} \) \( \text{ἐπικείμενος} \) \( \text{εἰσὶ} \) \( \text{μὴ} \) \( \text{οί} \) \( \text{οί} \) \( \text{οὐδὲ} \) \( \text{οἴ} \) \( \text{οἶμαι} \) \( \text{εἰσὶν} \), \( \text{ἡ} \) \( \text{Σερβίως} \), \( \text{οὐ} \) \( \text{άν} \) \( \text{δύνασθαι} \) \( \text{αὐτοῖς} \) \( \text{χεῖρον} \) \( \text{λαμβάνειν} \), \( \text{πῶς} \) \( \text{τὸ} \) \( \text{ἀράμενον} \) \( \text{ὑπὸ} \) \( \text{αὐτοῦ} \) \( \text{μεταφέρεται} \), \( \text{οὐ} \) \( \text{οὐ} \) \( \text{οί} \) \( \text{οὐ} \) \( \text{οἰ} \) \( \text{οἶμαι} \) \( \text{μὴ} \). Have a care, that none of the profane and uninitiated in the mysteries over-bear you. By the profane I mean (faith he) those, who think nothing to exist, but what they can feel with their fingers, and exclude all that is inobvious out of the rank of being. Were existence to be allow'd to nothing, that doth not fall under corporeal sense, then must we deny the existence of soul and mind in our selves and others, because we can neither feel nor see any such thing. Whereas we are certain of the existence of our own souls, partly from an inward consciousness of our own cogitations, and partly from that principle of reason, that nothing cannot act. And the existence of other individual souls is manifest to us, from their effects upon their respective bodies, their motions, actions, and discours. Wherefore since the Atheifts cannot deny the existence of soul or mind in men, though no

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such thing fall under external sense, they have as little reason to deny the
existence of a perfect mind, presiding over the universe, without which
it cannot be conceived; whence our imperfect ones should be derived. The
existence of that God, whom no eye hath seen nor can see, is plainly
proved by reason from his effects, in the visible phenomena of the uni-
verse, and from what we are conscious of within ourselves.

The second pretence of Atheists against the idea of God, and consequently
his existence, is, because Theists themselves acknowledging God to be in-
comprehensible, it may be from thence inferred, that he is a non-entity.
Which argumentation of the Atheists supposes these two things, first, that
what is incomprehensible is altogether unconceivable; and then, that what
is unconceivable is nothing. The latter of which two, perhaps, may be
granted to them, that what is so utterly unconceivable, as that no man can
frame any manner of idea or conception of it, is therefore either in itself, or
at least to us, nothing. Because though that of Protagoras be not true, in
his sense, πᾶλαν ἡμεῖς τινί ἐνα, τῶν μὲν ἄλλων ὡς ἐστὶ, τῶν δὲ μὴ
δοκῶμεν, ὡς εἰς εἰς ὑπάρχειν. That man is the measure of all things, either as existing or
not existing; he meaning indeed nothing else thereby, but that there was
no absolute truth or falsity of any thing, but all was relative to particular
persons, and phantastical or seeming only. And though it must not be
granted, that whatsoever any man’s shallow understanding cannot easily and
fully comprehend, is therefore presently to be expunged out of the catalogue
of beings; which is the reason, or rather infidelity of the Anti-trinitarians;
yet is there notwithstanding some truth in that of Aristotle, that ἡ ψυχή
που
πάντα, the rational soul or mind is in a manner all things; it being able to
frame some idea and conception or other of whatsoever is in the nature of
things, and hath either an actual or possible existence, from the very highest
to the lowest. Mind and Understanding is, as it were, a diaphanous and crys-
Htaline globe, or a kind of notional world, which hath some reflex image,
and correspondent ray, or representation in it, to whatsoever is in the true
and real world of being. And upon this account may it be said, that
whatsoever is in its own nature absolutely unconceivable, is indeed a non-
entity.

But the former is absolutely denied by us, that whatsoever is incompre-
hensible is unconceivable; and therefore when we affirm, that God is in-
comprehensible, our meaning is only this, that our imperfect minds cannot
have such a conception of his nature, as doth perfectly master, conquer,
and subdue that vast object under it; or at least is so fully adequate and
commensurate to the same, as that it doth every way match and equalize
it. Now it doth not at all follow from hence, because God is thus incom-
prehensible to our finite and narrow understandings, that he is utterly un-
conceivable by them, so that they cannot frame any idea at all of him, and
he may therefore be concluded to be a non-entity. For it is certain, that
we cannot fully comprehend ourselves, and that we have not such an adequate
and comprehensive knowledge of the essence of any substantial thing, as
that.
that we can perfectly master and conquer it. It was a truth, though abused by the Scepticks, that there is \( \text{ἀκαταλήπτως} \), something incomprehensible in the essence of the lowest substances. For every body itself, which the Atheists think themselves so well acquainted with, because they can feel it with their fingers, and which is the only substance, that they acknowledge either in themselves or the universe, hath such puzzling difficulties and entanglements in the speculation of it, that they can never be able to extricate themselves from. We might instance also in some accidental things, as time and motion. Truth is bigger than our minds, and we are not the same with it, but have a lower participation only of the intellectual nature, and are rather apprehenders than comprehenders thereof. This is indeed one badge of our creaturely state, that we have not a perfectly comprehensive knowledge, or such as is adequate and commensurate to the essences of things; from whence we ought to be led to this acknowledgment, that there is another perfect Mind or understanding Being above us in the universe, from which our imperfect minds were derived, and upon which they do depend. Wherefore if we can have no idea or conception of any thing, whereof we have not a full and perfect comprehension, then can we not have an idea or conception of the nature of any substance. But though we do not comprehend all truth, as if our mind were above it, or matter of it, and cannot penetrate into, and look quite thorough the nature of every thing, yet may rational souls frame certain ideas and conceptions, of whatsoever is in the orb of being proportionate to their own nature, and sufficient for their purpose. And though we cannot fully comprehend the Deity, nor exhaust the infiniteness of its perfection, yet may we have an idea or conception of a Being absolutely perfect; such a one as is nostro modulo conformis, agreeable and proportionate to our measure and scantling; as we may approach near to a mountain, and touch it with our hands, though we cannot encompass it all round, and enclasp it within our arms. Whatsoever is in its own nature absolutely inconceivable, is nothing; but not whatsoever is not fully comprehensible by our imperfect understandings.

It is true indeed, that the Deity is more incomprehensible to us than any thing else whatsoever, which proceeds from the fulness of its being and perfection, and from the transcendency of its brightness; but, for the very same reason, may it be said also, in some sense, that it is more knowable and conceivable than any thing. As the sun, though, by reason of its excesive splendour, it dazzle our weak sight, yet is it notwithstanding far more visible also, than any of the nebulojic stelle, the small milky stars. Where there is more of light, there is more of visibility; so where there is more of entity, reality, and perfection, there is there more of concepiibilility and cognoscibility; such an object filling up the mind more, and acting more strongly upon it. Nevertheless, because our weak and imperfect minds are lost in the vast immensity and redundancy of the Deity, and overcome with its transcendent light, and dazzling brightness, therefore hath it to us an appearance of darknes and incomprehensibility; as the unbounded expansion of light, in the clear transparent æther, hath to us the apparition
The incomprehensibility of the Deity is so far from being an argument against the reality of its existence, as that it is most certain, on the contrary, that were there nothing incomprehensible to us, who are but contemptible pieces, and small atoms of the universe; were there no other being in the world, but what our finite and imperfect understandings could span or fathom, and encompass round about, look thorough and thorough, have a commanding view of, and perfectly conquer and subdue under them; then could there be nothing absolutely and infinitely perfect, that is, no God. For though that of Empedocles be not true in a literal sense; as it seems to have been taken by Aristotle, \( \text{οἶκος} \, \text{μὲ} \, \text{οἶκος} \, \text{φύσεως}, \) &c. That by earth we see earth, by water water, and by fire fire; and understand every thing by something of the same within ourselves: yet is it certain, that every thing is apprehended by some internal congruity in that which apprehends, which perhaps was the sense intended by that noble philosophick poet. Wherefore it cannot possibly otherwise be, but that the finiteness, scantness, and imperfection of our narrow understandings must make them asymmetrical, or incommensurate, to that, which is absolutely and infinitely perfect.

And nature itself plainly intimates to us, that there is some such absolutely perfect Being, which, though not inconceivable, yet is incomprehensible to our finite understandings, by certain passions, which it hath implanted in us, that otherwise would want an object to display themselves upon; namely those of devout veneration, adoration, and admiration, together with a kind of ecstasy, and pleasing horror; which, in the silent language of nature, seem to speak thus much to us, that there is some object in the world, so much bigger and vaster than our mind and thoughts, that it is the very fame to them, that the ocean is to narrow vessels; so that when they have taken into themselves as much as they can thereof by contemplation, and filled up all their capacity, there is still an immensity of it left without, which cannot enter in for want of room to receive it, and therefore must be apprehended after some other strange and more mysterious manner, viz. by their being as it were plunged into it, and swallowed up or lost in it. To conclude, the Deity is indeed incomprehensible to our finite and imperfect understandings, but not inconceivable; and therefore there is no ground at all for this atheistical pretence, to make it a non-entity.

We come to the third atheistical argumentation; That because infinity (which according to theology is included in the idea of God, and pervades all his attributes) is utterly unconceivable, the Deity itself is therefore an impossibility, and non-entity. To this sense found sundry passages of a modern writer; as, Whatev' er we know, we learn from our phantasms; but there is no phantasm of Infinite, and therefore no knowledge or conception of it.

Again,

*De Animā, Lib. I. Cap. II. p. 3. Tom. II. Oper.*
Again, whatsoever we imagine is finite, and therefore there is no conception or idea of that which we call infinite. No man can have in his mind an image of infinite time, or of infinite power. Wherefore the name of God is used not to make us conceive him, but only that we may honour him. The true meaning whereof (as may be plainly gathered from other passages of the same writer) is thus to be interpreted; that there is nothing of philosophick truth and reality in the idea or attributes of God; nor any other fenfe in those words, but only to signify the veneration and astonishment of men's own confounded minds. And accordingly the word infinite is declared to signify nothing at all in that which is so called, (there being no such thing really existing) but only the inability of men's own minds, together with their rustick astonishment and admiration. Wherefore when the same writer determines, that God must not be said to be finite, this being no good courtship nor compliment; and yet the word infinite signifies nothing in the thing itself, nor hath any conception at all answering to it; he either does plainly abuse his reader, or else he leaves him to make up this conclusion, that since God is neither finite nor infinite, he is an unconceivable nothing. In like manner, another learned well-willer to atheism declareth, that he, who calleth any thing infinite, doth but rei quam non capit, attribute nomen, quod non intelligit; attribute an unintelligible name to a thing unconceivable; because all conception is finite, and it is impossible to conceive any thing, that hath no bounds or limits. But that, which is mistaken for infinite, is nothing but a confused chaos of the mind, or an unshapen embryo of thought; when men going on further and further, and making a continual progress, without seeing any end before them, being at length quite weary and tired out with this their endless journey, they fit down, and call the thing by this hard and unintelligible name, infinite. And from hence does he also infer, that because we can have no idea of infinite, as to signify any thing in that, which is so called; we therefore cannot possibly have germanam ideam Dei, any true and genuine idea or notion of God. Of which, they who understand the language of Atheists, know very well the meaning to be this; that there is indeed no such thing, or that he is a non-entity.

Now since this exception against the idea of God, and consequently his existence, is made by our modern and neoterick Atheists; we shall, in the first place, shew, how contradictory they are herein to their predecessors, the old philosophick Atheists; and consequently how inconsistent and disagreeing Atheists in several ages have been with one another. For whereas these modern Atheists would have this thought a sufficient confusion of a Deity, that there can be nothing infinite; it is certain, that the ancient philosophick Atheists were far from being of this persuasion, that some of them, as Anaximander expressly, made "Αῦτως, or infinite, the principle of all things; that is infinitely extended and eternal matter, devoid of all life and understanding. For though Melissus his "Αῦτως or infinite, which he made the first principle, was a most perfect being, eminently containing all things (as hath been already shewed) and therefore the true Deity; Anaxi-
Certain; that, never Nothing.

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maner's Αναμετρος, or Infinite, yet however called Θεος, or divine by him, (it being the only divinity, which he acknowledged) was nothing but sentential matter, an atheistick Infinite. Wherefore both Theists and Atheists in those former times did very well agree together in this one point, that there was something or other infinite, as the first principle of all things; either infinite mind, or infinite matter; though this latter atheistick infinity of extended matter be indeed repugnant to conception (as shall be proved afterwards) there being no true infinite, but a perfect Being, or the holy Trinity. Furthermore, not only Anaximander, but also, after him, Democritus, and Epicurus, and many others of that atheistick gang, heretofore asserted likewise a numerical infinity of worlds, and therefore much more than an infinity of atoms, or particles of matter. And though this numerical infinity of theirs were also unconceivable and impossible; yet does it sufficiently appear from hence, that these ancient philosophick Atheists were so far from being abhorrent from infinity, as a thing impossible, and a non-entity, that they were on the contrary very fond thereof; and therefore never went about to disprove a Deity after this manner, because there can be nothing infinite.

But, in the next place, we shall make it manifest, that these modern Atheists do no less contradict plain reason and their very selves also, than they do their predecessors in that impiety, when they thus go about to disprove the existence of a God, because there can be nothing infinite, neither in duration, nor in power, nor in any other regard. For first, though it should be doubted, whether there be a God or no; yet must it needs be acknowledged to be as indubitable, as any thing in all geometry, that there was something or other infinite in duration, or eternal, without beginning: because, if there had been once nothing at all, there could never have been any thing, that common notion, or principle of reason, having here an irresistible force, that nothing could ever come from nothing. Now, if there were never nothing, but always something, then must there of necessity be something infinite in duration, and eternal without beginning. Wherefore it cannot be accounted less than extreme foolishness and stupidity of mind in these modern Atheists, thus to impugn a Deity from the impossibility of infinite duration without beginning. But in the next place, we must confess it seems to us hardly conceivable, that any Atheist whatsoever could possibly be so prodigiously foolish, or so monstrously infatuated, as really to think, that once there was nothing at all, but that afterwards senseless matter happened (no body knows how) to come into being, from whence all other things were derived. According to which hypothesis it would follow also, that matter might as well some time or other happen again to cease to be, and so all things vanish into nothing. To conclude therefore, these Atheists must of necessity be guilty of one or other of these two things; either of extreme foolishness and stupidity, in acknowledging neither God, nor matter, nor any thing, to have existed infinitely from eternity without beginning; or else, if they do acknowledge the
CHAP. V. Nor World, nor Time, eternal.

pre-eternity of matter, or its infinite past-duration without beginning, then, of the most notorious impudence, in making that an argument against the existence of a God, which themselves acknowledge to matter.

Nevertheless we shall here readily comply with these modern Atheists thus far, as to grant them these two following things; First, That we can have no proper and genuine phantasm of any Infinite whatsoever, because we never had corporeal sense of any, neither of infinite number, nor of infinite magnitude, and therefore much less of infinite time or duration, and of infinite power; these two latter things, time and power, themselves not falling under corporeal sense. Secondly, That as we have no phantasm of any infinite, so neither is infinity fully comprehensible by our human understandings, that are but finite. But since it is certain, even to mathematical evidence, that there was something infinite in duration, or without beginning, insomuch that no intelligent Atheist, upon mature consideration, will ever venture to contradict it; we shall from hence extort from these Atheists an acknowledgment of the fallacies of these two theorems of theirs, that whatsoever we have no phantasm or sensible idea of, as also whatsoever is not fully comprehensible by us, is therefore a pure non-entity or nothing; and enforce them to confess, that there is something really existing in nature, which we have neither any phantasm of, nor yet can fully comprehend with our imperfect understandings.

Nay, we will yet go further in compliance with them, and acknowledge likewise, that as for those infinities, of number, of corporeal magnitude, and of time or successive duration, we have not only no phantasm, nor full intellectual comprehension of them, but also no manner of intelligible idea, notion, or conception. For though it be true, that number be somewhere said by Aristotle to be infinite, yet was his meaning there only in such a negative sense as this, that we can never possibly come to an end thereof: by addition, but may in our minds still add number to number infinitely, which is all one as if he should indeed have affirmed; that there can be no number actually and positively infinite, according to Aristotle's own definition of Infinite, elsewhere given, namely, that to which nothing can be added; no number being ever so great, but that one or more may still be added to it. And as there can be no infinite number, so neither can there be any infinity of corporeal magnitude; not only because if there were, the parts thereof must needs be infinite in number, but also because, as no number can be so great, but that more may be added to it; so neither can any body or magnitude be ever so vast, but that more body or magnitude may be supposed still further and further; this addition of finites never making up infinite. Indeed infinite space, beyond the finite world, is a thing, which hath been much talked of, and it is by some supposed to be infinite body, but by others to be an incorporeal infinite; through whose actual distance notwithstanding, (menurable by poles and miles) this finite world might roll on.

and tumble infinitely. But as we conceive, all that can be demonstrated
here, is no more than this, that how vast ever the finite world should be,
yet is there a possibility of more and more magnitude and body, still to be
added to it, further and further, by divine power, infinitely; or that the
world could never be made so great, no not by God himself, as that his own
omnipotence could not make it yet greater. Which potential infinity, or
indefinite increasableness of corporeal magnitude, seems to have been mis-
taken for an actual infinity of space. Whereas, for this very reason, because
more could be added to the magnitude of the corporeal world infinitely, or
without end, therefore is it impossible, that it should ever be positively and
actually infinite; that is, such, as to which nothing more can possibly be
added. Wherefore we conclude concerning corporeal magnitude, as we
did before of number, that there can be no absolute and actual infinity
thereof; and that how much vaster ever the world may be, than accord-
ing to the supposition of vulgar astronomers, who make the starry sphere
the utmost wall thereof; yet is it not absolutely infinite, such as really hath
no bounds or limits at all, nor to which nothing more could, by divine
power, be added. Lastly, We affirm likewise, concerning time, or succes-
vive duration, that there can be no infinity of that neither, no temporal
eternity without beginning: and that not only, because there would then be
an actual infinity, and more than an infinity of number; but also because,
upon this supposition, there would always have been an infinity of time past,
and consequently an infinity of time past, which was never present. Whereas
all the moments of past time must needs have been once present; and if so,
then all of them, at least save one, future too; from whence it will follow,
that there was a first moment, or beginning of time. And thus does reason
conclude, neither the world, nor time itself, to have been infinite in their
past duration, nor eternal without beginning.

Here will the Atheist think presently, he hath got a great advantage to
disprove the existence of a God; nonne, qui æternitatem mundi sic tollunt,
ædém operá etiam mundi conditori æternitatem tollunt? Do not they, who thus
destroy the eternity of the world, at the same time destroy also the eternity
of the Creator? For if time itself were not eternal, then how could the Deity, or
any thing, be so? The Atheist securely taking it for granted, that God him-
self could not be otherwise eternal, than by a successive flux of infinite time;
but we say, that this will, on the contrary, afford us a plain demonstration
of the existence of a Deity. For since the world and time itself were not in-
finite in their past duration, but had a beginning, therefore were they both
certainly made together by some other being, who is, in order of nature, se-
nior to time, and so without time, before time; he being above that suc-
cessive flux, and comprehending in the stability and immutable perfection
of his own being, his yesterday, and to-day, and for ever. Or thus; Some-
things was of necessity infinite in duration, and without beginning; but
neither the world, nor motion, nor time, that is, no successive being was
such; therefore is there something else, whose being and duration is not suc-
cessive and flowing, but permanent, to whom this infinity belongeth. The
Atheists
Atheists here can only smile, or make faces, and shew their little wit in quibbling upon nunc-utilis, or a standing now of eternity; as if that standing eternity of the Deity (which with so much reason hath been contended for by the ancient genuine Theists) were nothing but a pitiful small moment of time standing still, and as if the duration of all beings whatsoever must needs be like our own; whereas the duration of every thing must, of necessity, be agreeable to its nature: and therefore, as that, whose imperfect nature is ever flowing like a river, and conflfs in continual motion and changes one after another, must needs have accordingly a successive and flowing duration, sliding perpetually from present into past, and always poising on towards the future, expecting something of itself, which is not yet in being, but to come; so must that, whose perfect nature is essentially immutable, and always the same, and necessarily existent, have a permanent duration, never losing any thing of itself once present, as sliding away from it, nor yet running forwards to meet something of itself before, which is not yet in being; and it is as contradictory for it ever to have begun, as ever to cease to be.

Now whereas the modern Atheists pretend to have proved, that there is nothing infinite, neither in duration nor otherwise, and consequently no Deity, merely because we have no sense nor phantasm of Infinite, nor can fully comprehend the same; and therefore will needs conclude, that the words infinite and eternal signify nothing in the thing itself, but either men's own ignorance and inability to conceive, when, or whether, that, which is called eternal, began; together with the confounded nonsense of their absurd notions, and their stupid veneration of that, which their own fear and fancy has raised up as a bug-bear to themselves; or else the progress of their thoughts further and further backward indefinitely, (though they plainlie confute themselves in all this, by sometimes acknowledging matter and motion infinite and eternal, which argues either their extreme fottishnes or impudence:) we have shewed, with mathematical evidence and certainty, that there is really something infinite in duration, or eternal; by which therefore cannot be meant men's own ignorance, or the confounded nonsense of their devotion, nor yet the idle progres of their minds further and further indefinitely, which never reaches infinite, but a reality in the thing itself, namely this, that it never was not, nor had any beginning. Moreover, having demonstrated concerning this infinity and eternity, without beginning, that it cannot possibly belong to any successive being, we confidently conclude against these Atheists also, that it was not matter and motion, or this mundane system, but a perfect immutable nature, of a permanent duration, (that is, a God) to whom it belonged. To sum up all therefore, we say, that infinite and eternal are not words, that signify nothing in the thing itself, nor mere attributes of honour, compliment and flattery, that is, of devout and religious nonsense, error and falsehood; but attributes belonging to the Deity, and to that alone, of the most philosophick truth and reality. And though we, being finite, have no full comprehension and adequate...
understanding of this infinity and eternity (as not of the Deity) yet can we not be without some notion, conception and apprehension thereof, so long as we can thus demonstrate concerning it, that it belongs to something, and yet to nothing neither, but a perfect immutable nature. But the notion of this infinite eternity will be yet further cleared in the following explanation and vindication of infinite power.

For the Atheists principally quarrel with infinite power, or omnipotence, and pretend, in like manner, this to be utterly unconceivable and impossible, and subjected in nothing. Thus a modern atheistical writer concludes, that since no man can conceive infinite power, this is also but an attribute of honour, which the confounded nonsens e of atheistical minds bestows upon the object of their devotion, without any philosophick truth and reality. And here have our modern Atheists indeed the suffrage and agreement of the ancient philosophick Atheists also with them, who, as appears from the verses before cited out of Lucretius, concern'd themselves in nothing more, than affirming all power to be finite, and omnipotence, or infinite power, to belong to nothing.

First, therefore, it is here observable, that this omnipotence, or infinite power, ascribed by the atheists, has been commonly either ignorantly mistaken, or wilfully misrepresented by these Atheists, out of design to make it seem impossible and ridiculous, as if by it were meant a power of producing and doing any thing whatsoever, without exception, though never used conscriptious; as a late atheistick person, seeming to assert this divine omnipotence and infinite power, really and deservedly, notwithstanding, ascribed the fame, with this sceptick irony, That God, by his omnipotence, or infinite power, could turn this tree into a yllogism. Children indeed have sometimes such childish apprehensions of the divine omnipotence; and Ren. Cartesius, (though otherwise an acute philosopher) was here no less childish, in affirming, that all things whatsoever, even the natures of good and evil, and all truth and falsehood, do so depend upon the arbitrary will and power of God, as that, if he had pleased, twice two should not have been four, nor the three angles of a plain triangle equal to two right ones, and the like; he only adding, that all these things, notwithstanding, when they were once settled by the divine decree, became immutable; that is, I suppose, not in themselves, or to God, but unto us: than which no paradox of any old philosopher was ever more absurd and irrational. And, certainly, if any one did desire to persuade the world, that Cartesius, notwithstanding all his pretences to demonstrate a Deity, was indeed but an hypocritical Theist, or perforated and disguised Atheist, he could not have a fairer pretence for it out of all his writings, than from hence; this being plainly to destroy the Deity, by making one attribute thereof to devour and swallow up another; infinite will and power, infinite understanding and wisdom. For to suppose God to understand, and to be wise only by his will, is all one as to suppose him to have really no understanding at all. Wherefore

...Vide Respons. ad Objectiones Sextas, §. VI. p. 160. Edit. Amstel. 1655. in 4to.
we do not affirm God to be so omnipotent, or infinitely powerful, as that he is able to destroy or change the intelligible natures of things at pleasure; this being all one as to say, that God is so omnipotent and infinitely powerful, that he is able to destroy, or to battle and befool his own wisdom and understanding, which is the very rule and measure of his power. We say not therefore, that God, by his omnipotence, or infinite power, could make twice two not to be four, or turn a tree into a fyllogism; but we say, that omnipotence, or infinite power, is that, which can produce and do all whatsoever is possible, that is, whatsoever is conceivable, and implies no manner of contradiction; the very essence of possibility being no other than concep-
tibility. And thus has the point been stated all along, not only by Christian Theifts, but even the ancient Pagan theologers themselfes, that omnipotence, or infinite power, is that, which can do all things, that do not imply a con-
tradiction, or which are not unconceivable. This appearing from that of Agatho, cited before out of Ariosto, \(^1\) That nothing is exempted from the divine power, but only to make παραληθιν παραθν, what hath been done be undone, or the like hereunto. Now infinite power being nothing else but a power of doing whatsoever is conceivable, it is plainly absurd to say, that a power of doing nothing but what is conceivable is unconceivable.

But, because the Atheists look upon infinity as such a desperate and af-
frightful thing, we shall here render it something more easy, and take off that frightful vizard from it, which makes it seem such a mormo, or bug-
bear to them, by declaring, in the next place, that infinity is really nothing else but perfection. For infinite understanding and knowledge is nothing else but perfect knowledge, that which hath no defect or mixture of igno-
rance with it, or the knowledge of whatsoever is knowable. So in like man-
ner, infinite power is nothing else but perfect power, that which hath no defect or mixture of impotency in it; a power of producing and doing all whatsoever is possible, that is, whatsoever is conceivable. Infinite power can do whatsoever infinite understanding can conceive, and nothing else; conception being the measure of power, and its extent, and whatsoever is in itself unconceivable being therefore impossible. Lastly, Infinity of dura-
tion, or eternity, is really nothing else but perfection, as including neces-
sary existience and immutability in it: so that it is not only contradictory to such a being to cease to be, or exift, but also to have had a newness or begin-
ing of being, or to have any flux or change therein, by dying to the prent, and acquiring something new to itsel, which was not before. Not-
withstanding which, this being comprehends the differences of past, present, and future, or the succesive priority and posteriorty of all temporary things: and because infinity is perfection, therefore can nothing, which in-
cludeth any thing of imperfection, in the very idea and essence of it, be ever truly and properly infinite, as number, corporeal magnitude, and suc-
cesive duration. All which can only, mentiri infinitatem, counterfeit and inimitate infinity, in their having more and more added to them infinitely, whereby notwithstanding they never reach it, or overtake it. There is

\[^1\] Lib. VI. ad Nicomach. Cap. II. p. 98. Tom. III. Oper.
nothing truly infinite, neither in knowledge, nor in power, nor in duration, but only one absolutely perfect Being, or the holy Trinity.

Now, that we have an idea or conception of perfection, or a perfect being, is evident from the notion, that we have of imperfection, so familiar to us; perfection being the rule and measure of imperfection, and not imperfection of perfection; as a straight line is the rule and measure of a crooked, and not a crooked line of a straight: so that perfection is first conceivable, in order of nature, before imperfection, as light before darkness, a positive before the privative or defect. For perfection is not properly the want of imperfection, but imperfection of perfection. Moreover, we perceive divers degrees of perfection in the essences of things, and consequently a scale or ladder of perfections, in nature, one above another, as of living and animate things above senseless and inanimate, of rational things above sensitive; and this by reason of that notion or idea, which we first have of that, which is absolutely perfect, as the standard; by comparing of things with which, and measuring of them, we take notice of their approaching more or less near thereunto. Nor indeed could these gradual ascents be infinite, or without end, but they must come at last to that, which is absolutely perfect, as the top of them all. Lastly, We could not perceive imperfection in the most perfect of all those things, which we ever had sense or experience of in our lives, had we not a notion or idea of that, which is absolutely perfect, which secretly comparing the same with, we perceive it to come short thereof. And we might add here, that it is not conceivable neither, how there should be any lesser perfection existent in any kind, were there not first something perfect in that kind, from whence it was derived; this of Boetius being the very sense and language of nature in rational beings; Omne, quod imperfettum esse dicitur, id dimensione perfettis imperfettum esse perhibetur. Quo fit, ut fit in quolibet genere imperfettum quid esse videatur, in eo perfettum quoque alicuius esse, necesse sit. Etenim sublata perfecione, unde illud, quod imperfettum perhibetur, exsisterit, ne singi quidem posset. Neque enim a diminutis incommutatis natura rerum cepit existendum, sed ab integris absolutis procedens, in hac extrema, atque effecta dilabitur. Whatever is said to be imperfect, is accounted such by the diminution of that, which is perfect, from whence it comes to pass, that if in any kind any thing appear imperfect, there must of necessity be something also, in that kind, perfect. For perfection being once taken away, it could not be imagined, from whence that which is accounted imperfect should have proceeded. Nor did the nature of things take beginning from incommune and imperfect things, but proceeding from things absolute and complete, thence descend down to these lower, effete, and languid things. But of this more elsewhere.

Wherefore since infinite is the same with absolutely perfect, we having a notion or idea of the latter, must needs have of the former. From whence

whence we learn also, that though the word *infinite* be in the form thereof negative, yet is the sense of it, in those things which are really capable of the same, positive, it being all one with absolutely perfect; as likewise the sense of the word *finite* is negative, it being the same with imperfect. So that finite is properly the negation of infinite, as that which in order of nature is before it; and not infinite the negation of finite. However, in those things which are capable of no true infinity, because they are essentially finite, as number, corporeal magnitude, and time, infinity being there a mere imaginary thing, and a non-entity, it can only be conceived by the negation of finite; as we also conceive nothing, by the negation of something; that is, we can have no positive conception thereof.

We conclude, to assert an infinite Being, is nothing else but to assert a Being absolutely perfect, such as never was not, or had no beginning, which could produce all things possible and conceivable, and upon which all other things must depend. And this is to assert a God, one absolutely perfect Being, the original of all things: God, and Infinite, and Absolutely Perfect, being but different names for one and the same thing.

We come now to the fourth atheistic objection. That theology is nothing but an arbitraries component of inconsistent and contradictory notions. Where, first, we deny not, but that as some theologers (or bigotical religionists) of later times extend the divine omnipotence to things contradictory and impossible, as to the making of one and the same body, to be all of it, in several distant places at once; so may others sometimes unskilfully attribute to the Deity things inconsistent or contradictory to one another, because seeming to them to be all perfections. As for example, though it be concluded generally by theologers, that there is a natural justice and sanctity in the Deity, yet do some notwithstanding contend, that the will of God is not determined by any antecedent rule or nature of justice, but that whatsoever he could be supposed to will arbitrarily, would therefore be *ipsa facies* just; which is called by them the divine sovereignty, and looked upon as a great perfection; though it be certain, that these two things are directly contradictory to one another, *viz.* That there is something *φιλοσοφία*, in its own nature just and unjust, or a natural sanctity in God; and that the arbitrary will and command of the Deity is the only rule of justice and injustice. Again, some theologers determining, That whatsoever is in God, is God, or essential to the Deity; they conceiving such an immutability to be a necessary perfection thereof, seem thereby not only to contradict all liberty of will in the Deity, which themselves notwithstanding contend for in a high degree, that all things are arbitrarily determined by divine decree; but also to take away from it all power of acting *ad extra*, and of perceiving or animadverting things done successively here in the world. But it will not follow from these, and the like contradictions of mistaken theologers, that therefore theology itself is contradictory, and hath nothing of philosophick truth at all in it; no more than because philosophers
But in the next place we add, that though it be true, that the nature of things admits of nothing contradictory, and that whatsoever plainly implies a contradiction, must therefore of necessity be a non-entity; yet is this rule, notwithstanding, obnoxious to be much abused, when whatsoever mens shallow and gross understandings cannot reach to, they will therefore presently conclude to be contradictory and impossible. As for example, the Atheists and Materialists cannot conceive of any other substance besides body, and therefore do they determine presently, that incorporeal substance is a contradiction in the very terms; it being as much as to say, incorporeal body 1; wherefore when God is said by theologers to be an incorporeal substance, this is to them an absolute impossibility. Thus a modern writer; The universe, that is, the whole mass of all things, is corporeal; that is to say, body. Now every part of body is body, and consequently every part of the universe is body; and that which is not body, is no part thereof. And because the universe is all, that which is no part of it, is nothing. Therefore when spirits are called incorporeal, this is only a name of honour, and it may with more piety be attributed to God himself, in whom we consider, not what attribute best expresseth his nature, which is incomprehensible, but what best expresseth our desire to honour him. Where, incorporeal is said to be an attribute of honour; that is, such an attribute, as expresseth only the veneration of men's minds, but signifies nothing in nature, nor hath any philosophick truth and reality under it; a substance incorporeal being as contradictory as something and nothing. Notwithstanding which, this contradiction is only in the weakness and childishness of these mens understandings, and not the thing itself; it being demonstrable, that there is some other substance besides body, according to the true and genuine notion of it. But because this mistake is not proper to Atheists only, there being some Theists also, who labour under this same infirmity of mind, not to be able to conceive any other substance besides body, and who therefore assert a corporeal Deity; we shall in the next place shew, from a passage of a modern writer, what kind of contradictions they are, which these Atheists impute to all theology; namely, such as these, that it supposes God to perceive things sensible, without any organs of sense; and to understand and be wise, without any brains. Pious men (faith he) attribute to God Almighty, for honour's sake, whatsoever they see honourable in the world, as seeing, bearing, willing, knowing, justice, wisdom, &c. But they deny him such poor things, as eyes, ears and brains, and other organs, without which he can neither have, nor can conceive, such faculties to be; and so far they do well. But when they dispute of God's actions philosophically, then do they consider them again, as if he be bad, indeed such faculties. This is not well, and thence it is, that they fall into so many difficulties. We ought not to dispute of God's nature. He is no fit subject of our philosophy.

1 Hobbes's Leviathan. Cap. XXXIV.
True religion consists in obedience to Christ's lieutenants, and in giving 
God such honour, both in attributes and actions, as they in their several lieu-
tenancies shall ordain. Where the plain and undisguised meaning of the 
author seems to be this: That God is no subject of philosophy, as all real 
things are; (accordingly as he declareth elsewhere, that Religion is not a matter of philosophy, but only of law and 
absolute constitution) he having no real nature of his own, nor being any 
true inhabitant of the world or heaven, but (as all other ghosts and spirits) 
an inhabitant of men's brains only, that is, a figment of their fear and 
fancy, or a mere political scare-crow. And therefore such attributes are 
to be given to him, without any scrupulosity, as the civil law of every 
country shall appoint, and no other; the wise and natural very well under-
standing, that all this busines of religion is nothing but mere pageantry, 
and that the attributes of the Deity indeed signify neither true nor false, 
nor any thing in nature, but only men's reverence and devotion towards the 
object of their fear; the manner of expressing which is determined by civil 
law. Wherefore to say, that God sees all things, and yet hath no eyes; 
and that he hears all things, and yet hath no ears; and that he understands, 
and is wise, and yet hath no brains; and whatsoever else you will please to 
fay of him, as attributes of honour, and only as signifying devotion, is 
thus far well enough. But when men, not understanding the true cabala, 
will needs go further, they mistaking attributes of honour for attributes of 
nature, and of philosophick truth, and making them premises to infer abso-
olute truth, and convince falshood from, or matters to dispute and rea
upon; that is, when they will needs suppose such a thing as a God really 
to exist in the world, then do they involve themselves in all manner of 
contradiction, nonsense, and absurdity; as for example, to affirm seriously, 
that this God really sees all things in the world, and yet hath no eyes; and 
that he indeed hears all things, and yet hath no ears; and lastly, that he un-
derstands and is wise, and yet hath no brains, which things are all abso-
lutely contradictory, inconceivable and impossible. The sum of all is 
this, that when religion and theology, which is indeed nothing but law and 
phantasm, is made philosophy, then is it all mere jargon and insignificant 
nonsense. And now we see what those contradictions are, which the Athe-
ists charge upon theology; such as owe all their being only to the gross-
ness, fottishness, and brutishness of these men's own apprehensions. From 
whence proceedeth likewise, this following definition of knowledge and under-
standing*, That it is nothing but a tumult of the mind, raised by external 
things, press'the organical parts of man's body. O ye brutish among 
the people, when will ye understand? and ye fools, when will ye be wise? He 
that planted the ear, (and gave man's soul a power of hearing thereby) shall 
not be (though himself have no ears) hear? He that formed the eye (and gave 
the human soul a power of seeing, by it as an instrument) shall not be 
(though himself have no eyes) see? Lastly, he that teacheth man knowledge, 
(or gave him an understanding mind, besides brains) shall not be (though 
himself be without brains) know and understand?

* De Homine, Cap. XIV.  
2 Leviathan, Cap. XXXI. & Elementa de Cive, Cap. XV.  

**De Homine, Cap. XIV**

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**Leviathan, Cap. XXXI. & Elementa de Cive, Cap. XV**

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It is certain, that no simple idea, as that of a triangle or a square, of a cube or sphere, can possibly be contradictory to itself; and therefore much less can the idea of a perfect being (which is the compendious idea of God) be more simple than any of the other. Indeed this simple idea of a perfect being is pregnant of many attributes; and therefore the idea of God, more fully declared by them all, may seem to be in this respect a compounded idea, or one idea and conception, confounding or made up of many; which if they were really contradictory, would render the whole a non-entity. As for example, this, a plain triangle, whose three angles are greater than two right ones, it being contradictory and unconceivable, is therefore no true idea, but a non-entity. But all the genuine attributes of the Deity, of which its entire idea is made up, are things as demonstrable of a perfect being, as the properties of a triangle or a square are of those ideas respectively, and therefore cannot they possibly be contradictory; neither to it, nor to one another, because those things, which agree in one third, must needs agree together amongst themselves.

Nay, the genuine attributes of the Deity, namely, such as are demonstrable of an absolutely perfect Being, are not only not contradictory, but also necessarily connected together, and inseparable from one another. For there could not possibly be one thing infinite in wisdom only, another thing infinite only in power, and another thing only infinite in duration or eternal. But the very same thing, which is infinite in wisdom, must needs be also infinite in power, and infinite in duration, and so vice versa. That, which is infinite in any one perfection, must of necessity have all perfections in it. Thus are all the genuine attributes of the Deity not only not contradictory, but also inseparably connected; and the idea of God no congeries either of disagreeing things; or else of such, as are unnecessarily connected, with one another.

In very truth, all the several attributes of the Deity are nothing else but so many partial and inadequate conceptions of one and the same simple perfect being, taken in as it were by piece-meal, by reason of the imperfection of our human understandings, which could not fully conceive it all together at once; and therefore are they really all one thing, though they have the appearance of multiplicity to us. As the same simple light of the sun, diversly refracted and reflected from a torrid cloud, hath to us the appearance of the variegated colours of the rainbow.

Wherefore the attributes of God are no bundle of unconceivables and impossibles, huddled up together; nor attributes of honour and compliment only, and nothing but the religious nonsense of astonisht minds, expressing their devotion towards what they fear; but all of them attributes of nature, and of most severe philosophical truth. Neither is the idea of God an arbitrarius complement of things unnecessarily connected, and separable from one another; it is no factitious, nor fictitious thing, made up by any
any feigning power of the soul, but it is a natural and most simple uncompounded idea; such as to which nothing can be arbitrarily added, nor anything detracted from. Notwithstanding which, by reason of the imperfection of human minds, there may be, and are, different apprehensions concerning it. For as every one, that hath a conception of a plain triangle in general, doth not therefore know, that it includes this property in it, to have three angles equal to two right ones; nor doth every one, who hath an idea of a rectangular triangle, presently understand, that the square of the subtense is equal to the squares of both the sides; so neither doth every one, who hath a conception of a perfect being, therefore presently know all that is included in that idea. Moreover, men may easily mistake things for absolute perfections, which are not such, as hath been partly already shewed.

And now, whereas the Atheists pretend, in the next place, to give an account of that supposed contradictitiousness in the idea and attributes of God, namely, that it proceeded principally from fear, or the confounded nonsense of men’s astonished minds, huddling up together all imaginable attributes of honour, courtship, and compliment, without any philosophick truth, sense, or signification; as also, in part, from the fiction and impoture of politicians: all this hath been already prevented, and the foundation thereof quite taken away, by our shewing, that there is nothing in the genuine idea of God and his attributes, but what is demonstrable of a perfect Being, and that there cannot be the least either added to that idea, or detracted from it, any more than there can be any thing added to, or detracted from the idea of a triangle, or of a square. From whence it follows unavoidably, that there cannot possibly be any thing either contradictitious or arbitrary in the divine idea, and that the genuine attributes thereof are attributes of necessary philosophick truth; namely, such as do not only speak the piety, devotion, and reverence of men’s own minds, but declare the real nature of the thing itself. Wherefore, when a modern atheistical writer affirmeth of all those, who reason and conclude concerning God’s nature from his attributes, That, losing their understanding in the very first attempt, they fall from one inconvenience (or absurdity) to another, without end; after the same manner, as when one, ignorant of court-ceremonies, coming into the presence of a greater person than he was wont to speak to; and stumbling at his entrance, to save himself from falling, lets slip his cloak; to recover his cloak, lets fall his hat; and so, with one disorder after another, discovers his rusticity and astonishment: we say, that, though there be something of wit and fancy in this, yet, as it is applied to theology, and the genuine attributes of the Deity, there is not the least of philosophick truth. However, we deny not but that fome, either out of superstition, or elfe out of flattery, (for thus are they styled by St. Jerome, *suliti adulatores Dei, foolish flatterers of God Almighty*) have sometimes attributed such things to him as are incongruous to his nature, and, under a pretence of honouring him, by magnifying his power and sovereignty, do indeed most highly dishonour

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dilhonour him; they representing him to be such a Being as is no way amiable or desirable.

But the Atheists are most of all concerned to give an account of that unquestionable phenomenon, the general persuasion of the existence of a God in the minds of men, and their propensity to religion in all ages and places of the world; whence this should come, if there be really no such thing in nature: and this they think to do in the last place also, partly from men's own fear, together with their ignorance of causes, and partly from the fiction of law-makers and politicians, they endeavouring thereby to keep men in civil subjection under them; where we shall first plainly and nakedly declare the Atheist's meaning, and then manifest the invalidity and folly of these pretences to solve the aforementioned phenomenon.

First, therefore, these Atheists affirm, That mankind, by reason of their natural imbecility, are in perpetual solicitude, anxiety and fear, concerning future events, or their good and evil fortune to come; and this passion of fear inclining men to imagine things formidable and fearful, and to suspect or believe the existence of what really is not; I say, that this distrustful fear and jealousy in the minds of men, concerning their future condition, raises up to them the phantasm of a most affrightful spectre, an invisible understanding Being, arbitrarily governing and swaying the affairs of the whole world, and at pleasure tyrannizing over mankind. And when men's exorbitant fear and fancy has thus raised up to itself such a Mormon, or bug-bear, such an affrightful spectre as this, a thing that is really no inhabitant of the world, or of heaven, but only of men's brains, they afterward stand in awe of this their own imagination, and tremblingly worship this creature and figment of their own fear and fancy, as a thing really existing without them, or a God; devising all manner of expressions of honour and reverence towards it, and anxiously endeavouring, by all ways conceivable, to propitiate and atone the same. And thus have they brought upon themselves a most heavy yoke of bondage, and filled their lives with all manner of bitterness and misery.

Again, to this fear of future events the Atheists add also ignorance of causes, as a further account of this phenomenon of religion, so generally entertained in the world. For mankind (say they) are naturally inquisitive into the causes of things; and that not only of the events of their own good and evil fortune, but also of the phenomena of the world, and the effects of nature: and such is their curiosity, that wherever they can discover no visible and natural causes, there are they prone to feign and imagine other causes, invisible and supernatural. As it was observed of the tragick dramatists, that, whenever they could not well extricate themselves, they were wont to bring in a God upon the stage: and as Aristotle's recordeth of Anaxagoras, that he never betook himself to Mind, or Understanding, that is, to God for a cause, but only then when he was at a loss for other natural and necessary causes. From whence these Atheists would infer, that nothing but ignorance of causes made Anaxagoras to assert a Deity. Where-

fore it is no wonder (say they) if the generality of mankind, being ignorant of the causes almost of all events and effects of nature, have, by reason of their natural curiosity and fear, feigned or introduced one invisible power or agent omnipotent, as the supreme cause of all things; they betaking themselves thereto, as to a kind of refuge, asylum, or sanctuary for their ignorance.

These two accounts of the phænomenon of religion, from men’s fear and solicitude about future events, and from their ignorance of causes, together with their curiosity, are thus joined together by a modern writer: Perpetual fear of future evils always accompanying mankind, in the ignorance of causes, as it were in the dark, must needs have for object something. And therefore when there is nothing to be seen, there is nothing to accuse for their evil fortune, but some power or agent invisible. Moreover, it is concluded, that from the same originals sprang, not only that vulgar opinion of inferior ghofts and spirits also, subfervient to the supreme Deity (as the great ghost of the whole world, apparitions being nothing but men’s own dreams and fancies taken by them for fentations) but also men’s taking things casual for prognosticks, and their being so superstitiously addicted to omens and portents, oracles, and divinations and prophecies; this proceeding likewise from the same phantaftick supposition, that the things of the world are disposed of, not by nature, but by some understanding and intending agent or person.

But left these two forementioned accounts of that phænomenon of religion, and the belief of a Deity, so epidemical to mankind, should yet seem insufficient; the Atheists will superadd a third to them, from the fiction and imposture of civil sovereigns, crafty law-makers, and designing politicians: Who perceiving a great advantage to be made, from the belief of a God and religion, for the better keeping of men in obedience and subjection to themselves, and in peace and civil society with one another (when they are persuaded, that besides the punishments appointed by laws, which can only take place upon open and convicted transgressors, and are often eluded and avoided, there are other punishments, that will be inflicted even upon the secret violators of them, both in this life and after death, by a divine, invisible, and irresistible hand) have thereupon dextrously laid hold of men’s fear and ignorance, and cherished those seeds of religion in them (being the infirmities of their nature) and further confirmed their belief of ghofts and spirits, miracles and prodigies, oracles and divinations, by tales or fables, publickly allowed and recommended; according to that definition of religion given by a modern writer, Fear of power invisible, feigned by the mind, or imagined from tales publickly allowed, religion; not allowed, superstition. And that religion, thus nurtured up by politicians, might be every way compliant with, and obsequious to their designs, and no way refractory to the fame; it hath been their great care to persuade the people, that

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their laws were not meerly their own inventions; but-that themselves were
only the interpreters of the gods therein, and that the same things were
really displeasing to the gods, which were forbidden by them; God ruling
over the world no otherwise, than in them, as his vicegerents; according to
that assertion of a late writer, Deum nullem regnum in homines habere, nis
per eos, qui imperium tenent, that God reigneth over men, only in the civil so-
vereigns. This is therefore another atheiftick account of religion's so gene-
really prevailing in the world, from its being a fit engine of state, and politi-
icians generally looking upon it as an arcanum imperii, a mystery of go-

dernment, to poisies the minds of the people with the belief of a God, and
to keep them busily imployed in the exerces of religion, thereby to ren-
der them the more tame and gentle, apt to obedience, subjection, peace,
and civil society.

Neither is all this the meer invention of modern Atheifts, but indeed
the old atheiftick cabal, as may appear partly from that known passage of
the poet, That the gods were first made by fear; and from Lucretius his so
frequently insisting upon the fame, according to the mind of Epicurus.
For in his first book he makes terorem animi, & tenebras, terrore of
mind, and darkness, the chief caufes of theifm; and in his sixth, he further
pursues the fame grounds, especially the latter of them, after this manner;

Cetera que fieri in terris caloque tuentur
Mortales, pavidis quom pendent mentibus sepe,
Efficiunt animos humiles formidine divum;
Depressaque premunt ad terram, propertea quod
IGNORANTIA CAUSARUM conferre deorum
Cogit ad imperium res; & concedere regnum, &
Quorum operum causas nulla ratione videre
Possunt, nec fieri divino numine rentur.

To this sense; Mortals, when with trembling minds they behold the objects
both of heaven and earfh, they become depressed and sink down under the fear
of the gods; ignorance of causes setting up the reign and empire of the gods.
For when men can find no natural caufes of these things, they suppose them,
presently, to have been done by a divine power.

And this ignorance of causes is also elsewhere insifted upon by the fame
poet, as the chief source of religion, or the belief of a God.

Moreover, when a modern writer declares the opinion of ghostes to be
one of those things, in which confifteth the natural seeds of religion:
as also that this opinion proceedeth from the ignorance how to distinguish dreams, and other strong fancies, from vision and sense; he seemeth herein to have trod likewise in the footsteps of Lucretius, giving, not obscurely, the same account of religion in his fifth book 1:

Nunc que causa deum fcrib magis numina gentes
Pervolgarit, & ararum compleverit urbes, &c.
Non ita difficile e f rationem reddere verbis.
Quippe eteim jam tum divinum mortalia secla
Egregias animo facies vigilante videbant,
Et magis in somnis, mirando corporis auju.
His igitur sensum tricuebant, &c.

That is, How the noise of the gods came thus to ring over the whole world, and to fill all places with temples and altars, is not a thing very difficult to give an account of; it proceeding first from mens fearful dreams, and their phantasms when awake, taken by them for visions and sensations. Whereupon they attributed not only sense to these things as really existing, but also immortality and great power. For though this were properly an account only of those inferior and plebeian gods, called daemons and genii, yet was it supposed, that the belief of these things did easily dispose the minds of men also to the perfusion of one supreme omnipotent Deity over all.

Lastly, that the ancient Atheists, as well as the modern, pretended, the opinion of a God and religion to have been a political invention, is frequently declared in the writings of the Pagans; as in this of Cicero 2, It, qui dixerunt totam de diis immortabibus opinionem fidem esse ab hominibus sapientibus, reipublicae causa, ut quos ratio non possit, eos ad officium religio duceret; nonne omnem religionem funditus jufiterunt? They, who affirmed the whole opinion of the gods to have been feigned by wise men for the sake of the commonwealth; that so religion might engage those to their duty, whom reason could not, did they not utterly destroy all religion? And the sense of the ancient Atheists is thus represented by Plato; θεοι, μακάς, οι ποιητοι θεοί ἐστί τῆς, De Leg. I. 10c. θύει, ἀλλὰ τινι νόμωι, καὶ ταῖς ἀλλας ἀλλας, ὅπη τικτος συνειδήσας νομοθετά. [p. 666]

They first of all affirm, that the gods are not by nature, but by art and laws only; and that from whence it comes to pass, that they are different to different nations and countries, accordingly as the several humours of their law-makers did chance to determine. And before Plato, Critias, one of the thirty tyrants of Athens, plainly declared religion at first to have been a political intrigue, in those verses of his recorded by Sextus 3 the philologer, beginning to this purpose; That there was a time at first, when men's life was disorderly and brutish, and the will of the stronger was the only law: after which, they contented and agreed together to make civil laws; that to the disorderly might be punished. Notwithstanding which, it was still found, that men were only hindred from open, but not from secret injustices: whereupon some sagacious and witty person was the author of a further invention, to deter men as well from secret, as from open injuries:

1 Ver. 1160.
3 Lib. VIII. advers. Mathemat. §. LIV. 40.
Tom. IX. Oper.
God, no Figment of Fear, Book I.

Namely, by introducing or signifying a God immortal and incorruptible, who hears, and sees, and takes notice of all things. Critias then concluding his Poem in these words:

*Oυτως δε πρωτου υιομαι υεισις τινα
Ονπτων νομιζεινα δαιμονων ειναι γενες.*

And in this manner do I conceive, some one at first to have persuaded mortals to believe, that there is a kind of gods.

Thus have we fully declared the sense of the Atheists, in their account of the phenomenon of religion and the belief of a God; namely, that they derive it principally from these three springs or originals: First, from men's own fear and solicitude concerning future events, or their good and evil fortune. Secondly, from their ignorance of the causes both of those events, and the phenomena of nature; together with their curiosity. And, Lastly, from the fiction of civil sovereigns, law-makers, and politicians. The weaknesses and folly of all which, we shall now briefly manifest. First, therefore, it is certain, that such an excess of fear, as makes any one constantly and obstinately to believe the existence of that, which there is no manner of ground neither from sense nor reason for, tending also to the great distress of men's own lives, and the terror of their minds, cannot be accounted other than a kind of crazedness or distraction. Wherefore, the Atheists themselves acknowledging, the generality of mankind to be possessed with such a belief of a Deity, when they resolve this into such an excess of fear; it is all one, as if they should affirm the generality of mankind to be frighted out of their wits, or crazed and disTemper'd in their brains: none but a few Atheists, who being undaunted and undismay'd have escaped this panic terror, remaining sober and in their right senses. But, whereas the Atheists thus impute to the generality of mankind, not only light-minded credulity and phantasfry, but also such an excess of fear, as differs nothing at all from crazedness and distraction or madness; we affirm, on the contrary, that their supposed courage, stayedness and sobriety, is really nothing else but the dull and foftith stupidity of their minds; dead and heavy incredulity, and earthly diffidence or distrust; by reason whereof, they will believe nothing but what they can feel or see.

Theists indeed have a religious fear of God, which is consequent from him, or their belief of him, (of which more afterwards;) but the Deity itself, or the belief thereof, was not created by any antecedent fear, that is

*To these passages of the antients, wherein the origin of all religion is ascribed to these policy, add Seneca, Quæst. Natur. Lib. II. Cap. XLII. p. 536. Tom. II. Oper. and Sextus Empiricus, Lib. VIII. advers. Mathemat. p. 551.*

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by fear concerning men's good and evil fortune; it being certain, that none are less solicitous concerning such events, than they who are most truly religious. The reason whereof is, because these place their chief good in nothing that is ἀληθινόν, alien or in another's power, and exposer to the strokes of fortune; but in that which is most truly their own, namely, the right use of their own will. As the Atheists, on the contrary, must needs, for this very reason, be liable to great fears and solicitudes concerning outward events, because they place their good and evil in the πάθος ἤπειρος καὶ ὕπηρξις, the passion of pleasure and pain; or at least, denying natural honesty, they acknowledge no other good but what belongs to the animal life only, and so is under the empire of fortune. And that the Atheists are indeed generally timorous and fearful, suspicious and distrustful things, seems to appear plainly from their building all their politic, civil societies, and justice, (improperly so called) upon that only foundation of fear and distrust.

But the grand error of the Atheists here is this, that they suppose the Deity, according to the sense of the generality of mankind, to be nothing but a Mormo, Bug-bear, or Terriculum, an affrightful, burlful, and most un-desirable thing; whereas men every where invoke the Deity in their traits and difficulties for aid and assistance, looking upon it as exorable and pliable; and by their trust and confidence in it, acknowledge its goodnes and benignity. Synesius affirms, that though men were other wise much divided in their opinions, yet άγαθόν τοῦ Θεοῦ ὑμίνων ἀγάθος, ἀπαντάτη, καὶ τοῦ ἀλλοτρίου; They all every where, both wise and unwise, agree in this, that God is to be praised, as one who is good and benign.

If among the Pagans there were any, who understood that proverbial speech, Φθεωτόν το δαιμόνον, in the worst sense, as if God Almighty were of an envious and spiteful nature; these were certainly but a few ill-natur'd men, who therefore drew a picture of the Deity according to their own likeness. For the proverb, in that sense, was disclaimed and cried down by all the wiser Pagans; as Aristotle, who affirmed the Poets to have lied in this, as well as they did in many other things; and Plutarch, who taxeth Herodotus c. 2. [P. 263:] for insinuating, τὸ Θεῖον τῶν Φθεωτόν τε καὶ τακαχόδες; the Deity universally, (that is, all the gods) to be of an envious and vexatious or spiteful disposition; whereas himself appropriated this only to that evil daemon or principle asserted by him, as appeareth from the life of P. Aemilius, written by him, where he affirmeth, not that τὸ Θεῖον τῶν Φθεωτόν, the Deity universally was of an envious nature; but, that there is a certain deity or daemon, whose proper task it is, to bring down all great and over-swelling human prosperity, and to temper every man's life, that none may be happy in this world, sincerely and unmixedly, without a check of adversity; which is, as if a Christian should ascribe it to the devil. And Plato plainly declares the reason of God's making the world at first, to have been no other than this, ἀγαθόν τι, ἀγαθόν τι οἷος ἦν ἡ κόσμος ἀρχηγός θεὸς Φθεοῦ; Because he was good, and there is

1 Tom. II. Oper. p. 273. 2 In Timæo, Cap. XIV. p. 237, Edit. Fabricii.
The Sense of To Θεόν ὑπεραυξάνεται. Book I.

no manner of envy in that which is good. From whence he also concluded,

That God therefore willed all things should be made the most like himself; that is, after the best manner. But the true meaning of that ill-languaged proverb seems, at first, to have been no other, than what, besides Hesiod, the Scripture itself also attributes to God Almighty, that he affecteth to humble and abase the pride of men, and to pull down all high, towering, and lofty things, whether as noxious and hurtful to the men themselves, or as in some sense invidious to him, and derogatory from his honour, who alone ought to be exalted, and no flesh to glory before him. And there hath been so much experience of such a thing as this in the world, that the Epicurean poet himself could not but confess, that there was some hidden force or power, which seemed to have a spite to all over-swelling greatneses, and affect to cast contempt and scorn upon the pride of men;

Usum adit res humanas vis abdita quædam
Obterit, & pulbros fasces, sovagaque secures,
Proculcare, ac ludibrio fibi babere videtur.

Where he plainly reel'd and stagger'd in his atheism, or else was indeed a Theist, but knew it not; it being certain, that there can be no such force as this, in regno atomorum, in the reign or empire of fætuses atoms. And as for those among Christians, who make such a horrid representation of God Almighty, as one who created far the greatest part of mankind, for no other end or design, but only this, that he might recreate and delight himself in their eternal torments; these also do but transferibe or copy out their own ill nature, and then read it in the Deity; the Scripture declaring on the contrary, that God is love. Nevertheless these very persons, in the mean time, dearly hug and embrace God Almighty in their own conceit, as one that is fondly good, kind, and gracious to themselves; he having fastned his affections upon their very persons, without any consideration of their dispositions or qualifications.

It is true indeed, that religion is often expressed in the Scripture by the fear of God, and fear hath been said to be prima mensura Deitatis, the first measure of the Divinity in us, or the first impression, that religion makes upon men in this obnoxious and guilty state, before they have arrived to the true love of God and righteousness. But this religious fear is not a fear of God, as a mere arbitrary omnipotent Being, much less as hurtful and mischiefous, (which could not be disjoined from hatred:) but an aweful regard of him, as of one who is essentially just, and as well a punisher of vice and wickedness, as a rewarder of virtue; Lucretius himself, when he describes these religious fear of men, confessing it to be conjoined with a conscience of their duty, or to include the same within itself.

Tunc populi gentesque tremunt, &c.
Ne quod ob admìssum fâda die tramve superâ, 
Panarum grave fìu solvendi tempus adaebum.

And
And this is the sense of the generality of mankind, that there being a natural difference of good and evil moral, there is an impartial justice in the Deity, which presideth over the fame, and inclines it as well to punish the wicked, as to reward the virtuous: Epicurus himself acknowledging thus much, θεόν καί μυστής βλασφημίαν τοις κακοῖς ἐν Θεῷ ἰπαγέοι, καὶ αἱρετικας, τοῖς ἐκαστοῖς τῆς θείων ἰπαγέοις, καὶ αἱρετικος, n. P. 46. Gaff. The Beasts suppose, that there are both great evils inflicted upon the wicked from the gods; and also great rewards by them bestowed upon the good. And this fear of God, is not only beneficial to mankind in general, by restraining the growth of wickedness, but also wholesome and salutary to those very persons themselves, that are thus religiously affected, it being preservative of them both from moral evils, and likewise from the evils of punishment consequent thereupon. This is the true and genuine fear of religion, which, when it degenerates into a dark kind, of jealous and supsicious fear of God Almighty, either as a hurtful, or as a meer arbitrary and tyrannical being, then it is looked upon as the vice or extreme of religion, and distinguished from it by that name of παραδείκνυμι, superstition. Thus is the character of a superstitious man given by Plutarch, ἐξελθεῖσαν λυτρόν ἐκ καὶ βλασφήμων. That he thinks there are gods, but that they are noxious and hurtful; and αἵματα καὶ ματεία τὸν δεινοτάτον, καὶ θεοφανία τοῖς γενέα, per.] a superstitious man must needs hate God, as well as fear him. The true fear of God (as the son of Sirach speaks) is the beginning of his love, and faith is the beginning of cleaving to him. As if he should have said, the first entrance into religion is an awful regard to God as the punisher of vice; the second step forwards therein is faith or confidence in God, whereby men rely upon him for good, and cleave to him; and the top and perfection of all religion is the love of God above all, as the most amiable being. Christianity, the best of religions, recommendeth faith to us, as the inlet or introduction into all true and ingenuous piety; for be that cometh to God, must not only believe, that be is, but also that be is a rewarder of those that seek him. Which faith is better defined in the Scripture, than by any scholaftick, to be the substance of things (that are to be) hoped for, and the evidence of things not seen; that is, a confident persuasion of things, that fall not under sight, (because they are either invisible or future) and which also are to be hoped for. So that religious fear consisteth well with faith, and faith is near of kin to hope, and the refult of both faith and hope is love; which faith, hope and love, do all suppose an essential goodness in the Deity. God is such a Being, who, if he were not, were of all things whatsoever most to be wished for; it being indeed no way desirable (as that noble emperor concluded) for a man to live in a world, void of a God and providence. He, that believes a God, believes all that good and perfection in the universe, which his heart can possibly wish or desire. It is the interest of none, that there should be no God, but only of such wretched persons, as have abandoned their first and only true interest of being good, and friends to God, and are desperately resolved upon ways of wickedness.

The reason, why the Atheifts do thus grossly mistake the notion of God, and conceive of him differently from the generality of mankind, as a thing,
which is only to be feared, and must consequently be hated, is from nothing but their own vice and ill-nature. For first, their vice so far blinding them, as to make them think, that the moral differences of good and evil have no foundation in nature, but only in law or arbitrary constitution, (which law is contrary to nature, nature being liberty, but law restraint;) as they cannot but really hate that, which hinders them of their true liberty and chief good, so must they needs interpret the severity of the Deity so much spoken of against wickedness, to be nothing else but cruelty and arbitrary tyranny. Again, it is a wretched ill-natured maxim, which these Atheists have, That there is nulla naturalis charitas, no natural charity, but that omnis benevolentia oritur ex imbecillitate & metu, all benevolence arises only from imbecility and fear; that is, from being either obnoxious to another’s power, or standing in need of his help. So that all, that is now called love and friendship amongst men, is, according to these, really nothing, but either a crouching under another’s power, whom they cannot resist, or else Mercatura quaedam utilitatum, a certain kind of merchandizing for utilities. And thus does Cotta in Cicero declare their sense; Ne homines quidem cenfetis, nifs imbecilli effent, futuros beneficos aut benignos; You conceive that no man would be any way benificent or benevolent to another, were it not for his imbecillity or indigence. But as for God Almighty, these Atheists conclude, that upon the supposition of his existence, there could not be so much as this spurious love or benedelence in him neither towards any thing; because by reason of his absolute and irrefistible power, he would neither stand in need of any thing, and be devoid of all fear. Thus the forementioned Cotta. Quid est praefantius bonitate & beneficentia? Qua cum carere Deum vultis, neminem Deo nec Deum nec hominem carum, neminem ab alii amari vultis. Ita fit, ut non modo homines à diis, sed ipse dii inter se ab aliis aliis negotiantur. What is there more excellent than goodness and beneficence? which when you will needs have God to be utterly devoid of, you suppose, that neither any God nor man is dear to the supreme God, or beloved of him. From whence it will follow, that not only men are neglected by the gods, but also the gods amongst themselves are neglected by one another. Accordingly a late pretender to politicks, who in this manner discards all natural justice and charity, determines concerning God, Regnandi & puniendi eos, qui leges suas violent, jus Deo esse à solâ potentiâ irrefibili; That he has no other right of reigning over men, and of punishing those, who transgress his laws, but only from his irrefistible power. Which indeed is all one as to say, That God has no right at all of ruling over mankind, and imposing commands upon them, but what he doth in this kind, he doth it only by force and power, right and might (or power) being very different things from one another, and there being no jus or right without natural justice; so that the word right is here only abused. And contentaneously hereunto the same writer further adds; Si jus regnandi habeat Deus ab omnipotentia suâ, manifestum est obligationem ad praefandum ipsi obedientiam incumbere hominibus propter imbecillitatem; That if God’s right of commanding be derived only from his omnipotence, then

then it is manifest, that men's obligations to obey him lies upon them only from their imbecility. Or, as it is further explained by him; Homines ido Deo subjetos esse, quia omnipotentes non sunt, aut quia ad resistentium satis virium non habent; That men are therefore only subject to God, because they are not omnipotent, or have not sufficient power to resist him. Thus do we see plainly, how the Atheists, by reason of their vice and ill-nature, (which makes them deny all natural justice and honesty, all natural charity and benevolence) transform the Deity into a monstrous shape: such an omnipotent Being, as if he were, could have nothing neither of justice in him, nor of benevolence towards his creatures; and whose only right and authority of commanding them would be his irresistible power; whom his creatures could not place any hope, trust and confidence in, nor have any other obligation to obey, than that of fear and necessity, proceeding from their imbecility, or inability to resist him. And such a Deity as this is indeed a Mormon or Bug-bear, a most formidable and affrightful thing.

But all this is nothing but the Atheists false imagination, true religion representing a most comfortable prospect of things from the Deity; whereas on the contrary, the atheisticke scene of things is dismal, hopeless and forlorn, that there should be no other good, than what depends upon things wholly out of our own power, the momentary gratification of our intemperate appetites, and the perpetual pouring into a dolium perfunum, a perforated and leaking vessel: that ourselves should be but a congeries of atoms, upon the dissolution of whose compages, our life should vanish into nothing, and all our hope perish: that there should be no providence over us, nor any kind and good-natured Being above to take care of us, there being nothing without us but dead and senseless matter. True indeed, there could be no spiteful designs in senseless atoms, or a dark inconceivable nature. Upon which account, Plutarch would grant, that even this atheisticke hypothesis itself, as bad as it is, were, notwithstanding, to be preferred before that of an omnipotent, spiteful, and malicious being, (if there can be any such hypothesis as this:) a monarchy of the Manichean evil principle, reigning all alone over the whole world, without any corroboration, and having an undisputed empire. Nevertheless it is certain also, that there could be no faith nor hope neither in these senseless atoms, both necessarily and fortuitously moved, no more than there could be faith and hope in a whirlwind, or in a tempestuous sea, whose merciless waves are inexorable, and deaf to all cries and supplications. For which reason Epicurus himself confessed, that it was better to give credit to the fable of the gods, (as he calls it;) than to receive the atheisticke fate, or that material necessity of all things, introduced by those atheisticke Philosophers, Lencippus and Democritus: κρείτοις ἐγὼ τῇ σερί τῶν μαθήματων καταλαμβανώ, ἡ τῇ τῶν θεων εἰαρμένη στοιχείων ἀθεία ἑλπίδα παραπετάσματος ὑπογείας. ἔστειλα τῆς τῆς τῆς ἄθεου ἐπιφάνειας. Aeternitas i.e. perpetuity of things. Because there is hopet that the gods may be prevailed with by worship and prayer; but the other necessity is altogether deaf and inexorable. And though Epicurus thought to mend the matter, and make the atheisticke hypothesis more tolerable, by introducing into it (contrary to the tenor of those Principles) liberty of

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Atheism founded in Distrust. Book I.

will in men; yet this being not a power over things without us, but our selves only, could alter the case very little. Epicurus himself was in a panic fear, left the frame of heaven should sometime upon a sudden crack, and tumble about his ears, and this fortuitous complement of atoms be dissolved into a chaos;

*---Tria talia texta
Una dies dabit exitio; multisque per annos
Sufentata ruet moles & machina mundi.

And what comfort could his liberty of will then afford him, who placed all his happiness in security from external evils? Τῶν μὴ νομίζειν Ἄριστος, μὴ φαύλωσαι; (faith Plutarch:) The atheistical design in shaking off the belief of a God, was to be without fear; but by means hereof, they framed such a system of things to themselves, as, under which, they could not have the least hope, faith or confidence. Thus running from fear, did they plunge themselves into fear; for they, who are without hope, can never be free from fear. Endless of necessity must the fears and anxieties of these men be, who shake of that one fear of God, that would only preferve them from evil, and have no faith nor hope in him. Wherefore we might conclude, upon better grounds than the Atheists do of theism, that atheism (which hath no foundation at all in nature nor in reason) springs first from the impoffure of fear. For the faith of religion being the substance or confidence of such things not seen, as are to be hoped for; atheistical infidelity must needs, on the contrary, be a certain heavy idiffidence, despondence and misgiving of mind, or a timorous distrust and disbelief of God to be hoped for, beyond the reach of sense; namely, of an invisible Being omnipotent, that exercifeth a just, kind, and gracious providence, over all those who commit their ways to him, with an endeavour to please him, both here in this life, and after death. But vice, or the love of lawless liberty, prevailing over such disbelieving perfons, makes them, by degrees, more and more desirous, that there should be no God; that is, no such hinderer of their liberty; and to count it a happiness to be freed from the fear of him, whose justice (if he were) they must needs be obnoxious to.

And now have we made it evident, that these Atheists, who make religion and the belief of a God to proceed from the imposture of fear, do first of all disguise the Deity, and put a monstrous, horrid, and affrightful vizard upon it, transforming it into such a thing, as can only be feared and hated; and then do they conclude concerning it, (as well indeed they may) that there is no such thing as this really existing in nature, but that it is only a Mormo or Bug-bear, raised up by men's fear and fancy. Of the two, it might better be laid, that the opinion of a God sprung from men's hope of good, than from their fear of evil; but really, it springs neither from hope nor fear, (however in different circumstances it raises both those passions in our minds;) nor is it the imposture of any passion, but that whose belief is supported and sustained by the

* Lucret. Lib. V. Ver. 95.
Theism not from Ignorance of Causes.

strongest and clearest reason, as shall be declared in due place. But the
sense of a Deity often preventing ratiocination in us, and urging itself
more immediately upon us, it is certain, that there is also, besides a rational
belief thereof, a natural prolepsis, or anticipation, in the minds of men con-
cerning it, which, by Ariosto, is called Maerix, a vaticination.

Thus have we sufficiently confuted the first atheistick pretence to solve
the phenomenon of religion, and the belief of a God, so generally enter-
tained, from the imposition of fear. We come now to the second, That it
proceeded from the ignorance of causes also, or men's want of philosophy;
they being prone, by reason of their innate curiosity, where they find no
causes to make or feign them; and from their fear, in the absence of natu-
ral and necessary causes, to imagine supernatural and divine; this also af-
fording them a handfome cover and pretext for their ignorance: for which
cause these Atheists stick not to affirm of God Almighty, what some philo-
sophers do of occult qualities, that he is but perfugium & asylum ignorantiae;
a refuge and shelter for men's ignorance; that is, in plain and downright
language, the mere jantuary of fools.

And these two things are here commonly joined together by these A-
theists both fear, and ignorance of causes, as which jointly concur in the
production of theism; because, as the fear of children raises up bug-bears,
especially in the dark, so do they suppose in like manner the fear of men, in
the darkness of their ignorance of causes especially, to raise up the Mormo,
spectre, or phantasm of a God; which is thus intimated by the Epicurean
poet,

Omnia ceæcis,

In tenebris metuant.

And accordingly Democritus gave this account of the original of theism or
Steph. Poë.
religion, δὲ ἀρχαὶ τὰ ἐν τοῖς μεταφορις παθήματα οἱ παλαιοὶ τῶν ἀθρώτων, καθάπερ P hil. 158. ex:
βορρᾶς, ή ἀγραφας, ή κεραυνος, ή λύκει, ή και σιλευνη, εκλείψεις, έιθματα τοις οίδιμοις
tιτων αιτίων. That sober, in old times, men observed strange and affrightful
things in the meteors and the heaven, as thunder, lighning, thunderbolts, adverf. Ma-
and eclipses, they not knowing the causes thereof, and being terrified thereby,
presently imputed them to the Gods. And Epicurus declares this to have been
the reafon, why he took such great pains in the study of physiologi, that,
by finding out the natural and necessary causes of things, he might be able
to free both himself and others from the terror of a God, which would
otherwise invade and affault them; the importunity of men's minds, when
ever they are at a loss for natural causes, urging them so much with the
fear, suspicion, and jealousy of a Deity.

Wherefore the Atheists thus dabbling in physiologi, and finding out, as
they conceive, material and mechanical causes for some of the phe-
omena of nature, and especially for such of them as the unskilful vulgar
sometimes impute to God himself, when they can prove eclipses (for
example),

2 Lucret. Lib. II. verf. 54, 55.
example) to be no miracles, and render it probable, that thunder is not the voice of God Almighty himself, as it were roaring above in the heavens, merely to affright and amaze poor mortals, and make them quake and tremble; and that thunderbolts are not there flung by his own hands, as the direful messengers of his wrath and displeasure; they presently conclude triumphantly thereupon, concerning nature or matter, that it doth

\[1\] _Ipsa suá per se, sponte, omnia Diis agere expers,

do all things alone of itself without a God. But we shall here make it appear in a few instances, as briefly as we may, that philosophy, and the true knowledge of causes, leads to God; and that atheism is nothing but ignorance of causes and of philosophy.

For first, no Atheist, who derives all from senseless atoms, or matter, is able to assign any cause at all of himself, or give any true account of the original of his own soul or mind, it being utterly unconceivable and impossible, that soul and mind, sense, reason and understanding, should ever arise from irrational and senseless matter, however modified; or result from atoms, devoid of all manner of qualities, that is, from mere magnitude, figure, site and motion of parts: For though it be indeed absurd to say (as these Atheists allege) that laughing and crying things are made out of laughing and crying principles,

\[2\] _Et ridere posse non ex ridentibus factus;

yet does it not therefore follow, that sensitive and rational beings might result from a composition of irrational and senseless atoms; which, according to the Democritick hypothesis, have nothing in them but magnitude, figure, site, and motion, or rest, because laughing and crying are motions, which result from the mechanism of human bodies, in such a manner organized; but sense and understanding are neither local motion, nor mechanism. And the case will be the very same, both in the Anaximandrian or Hylopathian, and in the Stratonick or Hylozoick atheism; because sense and conscious understanding could no more result, either from those qualities of heat and cold, moist and dry, tempered together; or from the mere organization of inanimate and senseless matter, than it could from the

\[3\] _Concursum, motus, ordo, postura, figura,

of atoms devoid of all manner of qualities. Had there been once nothing but senseless matter, fortuitously moved, there could never have emerged into being any soul or mind, sense or understanding; because no effect can possibly transcend the perfection of its cause. Wherefore Atheists supposing themselves, and all souls and minds, to have sprung from stupid and senseless matter, and all that wisdom, which is any where in the world, both political and philosophical, to be the result of mere fortune and chance, must

1 Lucret. Lib. II. verf. 1091. 2 Id. ibid. verf. 985. 3 Id. Lib. I. verf. 656.
needs be concluded to be groly ignorant of causes; which had they not been, they could never have been Atheists. So that ignorance of causes is the feed, not of theism, but of atheism; true philosophy, and the knowledge of the cause of ourselves, leading necessarly to a Deity.

Again, Atheists are ignorant of the cause of motion in bodies also; by which notwithstanding they fuppofe all things to be done; that is, they are never able to solve this phenomenon, fo long as they are Atheists, and acknowledge no other substance besides matter or body. For first, it is undeniably certain, that motion is not effential to all body as fuch, becaufe then no particles of matter could ever reft; and consequently there could have been no generation, nor no fuch mundane fystem produced as this is, which requires a certain proportionate commixture of motion and reft; no fun, nor moon, nor earth, nor bodies of animals; since there could be no coherent confistency of any thing, when all things fluttered and were in continual separation anddivifion from one another. Again, it is certain likewise, that matter or body, as fuch, hath no power of moving itfelf freely or spontaneously neither, by will or appetite; both becaufe the fame inconvenience would from hence enufe likewise, and becaufe the phenomenas or appearances do plainly evince the contrary. And as for that prodigiously absurd paradox of some few hylozoick Atheists, that all matter as fuch, and therefore every smalleft particle thereof, hath not only life essentially belonging to it, but also perfect wisdom and knowledge, together with appetite, and self-moving power, though without animal fene or confcioufnes: this, I fay, will be elsewhere in due place further confuted. But the generality of the ancient Atheists, that is, the Anaximandrians and Democriticks, attributed no manner of life to matter as fuch; and therefore could afcribe no voluntary or spontaneous motion to the fame, but fortuitous only; according to that of the Epicurean poet 1 already cited,

Nam certè neque conflitia, primordia rerum.
Ordine fæque, atque fugaci mente locarunt;
Nec quos quæque darent motus pepigere profecta.

Wherefore these Democriticks, as Aristotle somewhere 2 intimates, were able to affign no other caufe of motion, than only this, That one body moved another from eternity infinitely, fo that there was no πρωτον κινων, no firft unmovèd mover, ever to be found; becaufe there is no beginning, nor firft in eternity. From whence probably, that doctrine of some atheiftick Stoicks in Alex. Abprécidius was derived, That there is no firft in the rank and order Alex. Abp. of caufts. In the footsteps of which philosophers a modern writer feemeth Lib. de Fato, to have trodden, when declaring himfelf after this manner 3: Si quis ab ef- feò quocunque, ad cauſam ejus immediatam, atque inde ad remotorem, ac fid perpetuo ratiocinatone ascenderit, non tamen in aternum procedere poterit, sed deftatigatus aliquando deficiet. If any one will will from whatsoever effect ascend upward to its immediate caufe, and from thence to a remoter, and

1 Lib. I. Ve I. 1020.
3 XXVI. p. 204.
Atheists; no Cause of Motion, Book I.

and so onwards perpetually, in his ratioination; yet shall be never be able to hold on thorough all eternity; but at length being quite tired out with his journey, be forced to desist, or give over. Which seems to be all one, as if he should have said, one thing moved or caused another infinitely from eternity, in which there being no beginning, there is consequently no first mover or cause to be reach’d unto. But this infinite progress of these Democriticks, in the order of causes, and their shifting off the cause of motion, from one thing to another, without end or beginning, was rightly understood by Aristotle, to be indeed the assigning of no cause of motion at all, εις ἀπειρον οὐσίαν, εἰ μὲν οὖν κατὰ φύσιν κινεῖν πρῶτον, They acknowledging (faith he) no first mover according to nature, must needs make an idle progress infinitely; that is, in the language of this philosopher, assign no cause at all of motion. Epicurus therefore, to mend the matter, though according to the principles of the atomick physis, he discarded all other qualities, yet did he notwithstanding admit this one quality of gravity or ponderosity in atoms, prefixing them continually downwards in infinite space. In which, as nothing could be more absurd nor unphilosophical, than to make upwards and downwards in infinite space, or a gravity tending to no centre, nor place of rest; so did he not assign any cause of motion neither, but only in effect affirm, the atoms therefore to tend downwards, because they did so; a quality of gravity, signifying only an endeavour to tend downwards, but why or wherefore, no body knows. And it is all one, as if Epicurus should have said, that atoms moved downwards by an occult quality, he either betaking himself to this as an asylum, a sanctuary or refuge for his ignorance; or else indeed more absurdly, making his very ignorance itself (disguised under that name of a quality) to be the cause of motion. Thus the atheists universally either assigned no cause at all for motion, as the Anaximandrians and Democriticks; or else no true one, as the Hylozoists; when, to avoid incorporeal substance, they would venture to attribute perfect understanding, appetite or will, and self-moving power to all senseles matter whatsoever. But since it appears plainly, that matter or body cannot move itself, either the motion of all bodies must have no manner of cause; or else must there of necessity be some other substance besides body, such as is self-active and hydraulical, or hath a natural power of ruling over matter. Upon which latter account Plato rightly determined, that cogitation, which is self-activity or autokinesis, was in order of nature, before the local motion of body, which is heterokinesis. Though motion considered passively in bodies, or taken for their translation, or change of distance and place, be indeed a corporeal thing, or a mode of those bodies themselves moving; yet, as it is considered actively for the vis movens, that active force, which causes this translation, or change of place, so is it an incorporeal thing; the energy of a self-active substance upon that sluggish matter or body, which cannot at all move itself. Wherefore in the bodies of animals, the true and proper cause of motion, or the determination thereof at least, is not the matter itself organized, but the soul either as cogitative, or plastically self-active, vitally united thereunto, and naturally ruling over it. But in the whole world it is either God himself, originally impress-
a certain quantity of motion upon the matter of the universe, and constantly conserving the same, according to that of the Scripture, In him we live and Act. xvii. 28. move; (which seems to have been the sense also of that noble Agrigentine poet and philosopher 1, when he described God to be only a pure or holy mind, that with swift thoughts agitates the whole world;) or else it is instrumentally an inferior created spirit, soul, or life of nature; that is, a subordinate hylarchical principle, which hath a power of moving matter regularly, according to the direction of a superior perfect Mind. And thus do we see again, that ignorance of causes is the seed of atheism, and not of theism; no Atheists being able to assign a true cause of motion, the knowledge whereof plainly leadeth to a God.

Furthermore, those Atheists, who acknowledge no other principle of things but senescence matter fortuitously moved, must needs be ignorant also of the cause of that grand phenomenon, called by Aristotle, the ὑμνήματος ἀφθονία, the swell and fit in nature; that is, of the most artificial frame of the whole mundane system in general, and of the bodies of animals in particular, together with the conspiring harmony of all. For they, who boasted themselves able to give natural causes of all things whatsoever, without a God, can give no other cause at all of this phenomenon, but only that the world happened by chance to be thus made as it is. Now, they, who make fortune and chance to be the only cause of this so admirable phenomenon, the most regular and artificial frame, and harmony of the universe, they either make the mere absence and want of a cause to be a cause, fortune and chance being nothing else but the absence or want of an intending cause; or else do they make their own ignorance of a cause, and they know not how, to be a cause; as the author of the Leviathan 2 interprets the meaning hereof: Many times (faith he) men put for cause of natural events their own ignorance, but disguised in other words; as when they say, that fortune is the cause of things contingent; that is, of things, whereof they know no cause. Or they affirm, against all reason, one contrary to be the cause of another, as confusion to be the cause of order, pulchritude and harmony; chance and fortune, to be the cause of art and skill; folly and senselessness, the cause of the most wise and regular contrivance; or, lastly, they deny it to have any cause at all, since they deny an intending cause, and there cannot possibly be any other cause of artificialness and conspiring harmony, than mind and wisdom, counsel and contrivance.

But because the Atheists here make some pretences for this their ignorance, we shall not conceal any of them, but bring them all to light; to the end that we may discover their weakness and foolery. First, therefore, they pretend, that the world is not so artificially and well made, but that it might have been made much better, and that there are many faults and flaws to be found therein; from whence they would infer, that it was not made by a God, he being supposed by Theists to be no bungler, but a perfect Mind, or a Being infinitely good and wise, who therefore should have made all things for the best.

But this being already set down by itself, as a twelfth atheistical objection against a Deity, we must reserve the confutation thereof for its proper place. Only we shall observe thus much here by the way; that those Theists of later times, who, either because they fancy a mere arbitrary Deity; or because their faith in the divine goodness is but weak; or because they judge of things according to their own private appetites, and selfish passions, and not with a free unencaptivated universality of mind, and an impartial regard to the good of the whole; or because they look only upon the present scene of things, and take not in the future into consideration, nor have a comprehensive view of the whole plot of divine providence together; or lastly, because we mortals do all stand upon too low a ground, to take a commanding view and prospect upon the whole frame of things, and our shallow understandings are not able to fathom the depths of the divine wisdom, nor trace all the methods and designs of providence; grant, that the world might have been made much better than now it is; which indeed is all one as to say, that it is not well made: these neoterick Christians (I say) seem hereby to give a much greater advantage to the Atheists, than the Pagan Theists themselves heretofore did, who flood their ground; and generously maintained against them, that Mind being the maker of all things, and not fortune or chance, nor arbitrary self-will, and irrational humour omnipotent, the τὸ βιοτικόν, which that is absolutely the best in every case, so far as the necessity of things would admit, and in compliance with the good of the whole, was the measure and rule both of nature and providence.

Again, the atomick Atheists further alledge, that though there be many things in the world, which serve well for uſes, yet it does not at all follow, that therefore they were made intentionally and designedly for those uſes; because though things happen by chance to be so or so made, yet may they serve for something or other afterward, and have their several uſes consequent. Wherefore all the things of nature happened (say they) by chance to be so made as they are, and their several uſes notwithstanding were consequent, or following thereupon. Thus the Epicurean poet:

\[\text{Nil ideo natum est in corpore, ut uti}\]
\[\text{Possemsus, sed quod natum est id procreat usum.}\]

Nothing in man’s body was made out of design for any use; but all the several parts thereof, happening to be so made as they are, their uſes were consequent thereupon. In like manner the old atheistical philosophers in Aristotele, concluded, τὸς ὀστέας ἐξ ἀνάκρισις ἀνατείλαι, τὸς μὲν ἑπταγενής ὀξὺς, ἑπταγενής πρὸς τὸ ὅρμα, τὸς ἐξ γογγεῖος πλατείας, καὶ χειρότερος πρὸς τὸ λείας τὴν τροφήν ἑπὶ τῇ τοῦτο ἐνεχθῆ ἡμᾶς, ἀλλὰ συμπεπετεῖ ὁμοίως ἐκ καὶ τῷ τῶν ἄλλων μερῶν, ἐν ὄσιν ὃς ὡς ὡπάρχει τὸ ἔνικά το, That the former teeth were made by material or mechanical necessity, thin and sharp, by means whereby they became fit for cutting; but the jaw-teeth thick and broad, whereby they became
Chap. V. Things made for Ends and Uses.

became useful for the grinding of food. But neither of them were intended to be such, for the sake of these uses, but happened by chance only. And the like concerning all the other parts of the body, which seem to be made for ends. Accordingly the same Aristotle represents the sense of those ancient Atheists, concerning the other parts of the universe, or things of nature, that they were all likewise made such, by the necessity of material (or mechanical) motions undirected, and yet had nevertheless, their several uses consequent upon this their accidental structure.

Titheus in virtutum, &c. 

What binders but that nature might all without any respect to ends or good and better, as Jupiter, or the heaven, raineth not intentionally to make the corn grow, but from necessity? because the vapours, being raised up into the middle region, and there refrigerated and condensed, must needs descend down again in the form of water. But this happens by mere chance, and without any intention, that the grain is made to grow thereby; as the contrary sometimes happens by the excess of it.

But to this we reply, that though a thing, that happens accidentally to be so or so made, may afterwards, notwithstanding, prove often serviceable for some use or other; yet, when any thing consisteth of many parts, that are all artificially proportioned together, and with much curiosity accommodated one to another, any one of which parts having been wanting, or otherwise in the least placed and disposed of, would have rendered the whole altogether inept for such a use; then may we well conclude it not to have been made by chance, but by counsel and design, intentionally, for such uses. As for example, the eye, whose structure and fabric consisting of many parts (humours and membranes) is so artificially composed, no reasonable person, who considers the whole anatomy thereof, and the curiosity of its structure, can think otherwise of it, but that it was made out of design for the use of seeing; and did not happen accidentally to be so made, and then the use of seeing follow, as the Epicurean poet would fain persuade us,

Lumina ne facias oculorum clara creat,
Proficere ut possumus.

You are by all means to take heed of entertaining that so dangerous opinion (to atheism) that eyes were made for the sake of seeing, and ears for the sake of hearing. But for a man to think, that not only eyes happened to be so made, and the use of seeing unintended followed; but also, that in all the same animals, ears happened to be so made too, and the use of hearing followed them; and a mouth and tongue happened to be so made likewise, and the use of eating, and (in men) of speaking, was also accidentally consequent thereupon; and feet were in the same animals made by chance too, and the use of walking followed; and hands made in them by chance also, upon which so many necessary uses depend; besides innumerable other parts of the body, both similar and organical, none of which could have

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have been wanting, without rendering the whole inept or uselefs: I say, to think, that all these things should happen by chance to be thus made in every one and the same animal, and not designed by mind or counsel, that they might jointly concur and contribute to the good of the whole; this argues the greatest insensibility of mind imaginable. But this absurd and ridiculous conceit hath been long since so industriously confuted, and the folly thereof so fully manifested by that learned Pagan philosopher and physician, Galen, in his book of the use of parts, that it would be altogether superfluous to insist any more upon it.

Wherefore, that the former teeth are made thin and sharp, and the jaw-teeth thick and broad, by chance only, and not for use, was one of the Democritick dotages; as also, that nothing in the clouds and meteors was intended for the good of this habitable earth, within whose atmosphere they are contained, but all proceeded from material and mechanical necessity. Which conceit though Cartesius seem to have written his whole book of meteors in favour of, he beginning it with the derision of those, who *seat God in the clouds, and imagine his hands to be employed in opening and shutting the cloisters of the winds, in sprinkling the flowers with dew, and thunder-striking the tops of mountains,* and closing his discourse with this boast, that he had now made it manifest, there was no need to fly to miracles (that is, to bring in a god upon the stage) to solve those phenomena; yet were it easy enough to demonstrate the defectiveness of those his mechanical undertakings in fundry particulars, and to evince, that all those things could not be carried on with such constant regularity, by mere fortuitous mechanism, without any superior principle to guide and steer them. Nevertheless, we acknowledge, that God and nature do things every where, in the most frugal and compendious way, and with the least operofenes; and therefore that the mechanick powers are not rejected, but taken in, so far as they could comply serviceably with the intellectual model and platform; but still so, as that all is supervis'd by one understanding and intending cause, and nothing paffes without his approbation, who, when either those mechanick powers fall short, or the stubborn necessity of matter proves uncompliant, does over-rule the same, and supply the defects there-of, by that which is vital; and that without letting his own hands immediately to every work too, there being a subservient minister under him, an artificial nature, which, as an Archeus of the whole world, governs the fluctuating mechanism thereof, and does all things faithfully, for ends and purposes, intended by its director.

But our atomick Atheists still further alledge, that though it might well seem strange, that matter fortuitously moved should, at the very first jump, fall into Such a regular frame as this is, having so many aptitudes for uses, so many correspondencies between several things, and such an agreeing harmony in the whole; yet ought it not to seem a jot strange, if atoms, by motion, making all possible combinations and contextures, and trying all manner of conclusions and experiments, should, after innumerable other

* Vide Laclan, de Opifcio Dei, Cap. VI. p. 1003.
other freaks, and difcongruous forms produced, in length of time, fall into such a system as this is. Wherefore they affirm, that this earth of ours, at first, brought forth divers monstrous and irregular shapes of animals:

Orba pedum partim, manuum viduata victissim;
Multa sine ore etiam, sine voluca caeca reperta.

Some without feet, some without hands, some without a mouth and face, some wanting fit muscles and nerves for the motion of their members. And the old philosophick Atheists were so frank and lavish herein, that they stuck not to affirm, amongst those monstrous shapes of animals, there were once produced Centaurs, and Scyllas, and Chimaeras; ἢ γὰρ ἀνθρώπως, mixtly biform and hominiform, biform and triform animals. But Epicurus, a little ashamed of this, as that which must needs look oddly and ridiculously, and seeming more cautious and castigate, pretends to correct the extravagancy of this fancy;

Sed neque Centauri fuerunt, neque tempore in ullo
Effe quaeque duplici natura, & corpore bino,
Ex alienigenis membris compaetis potestas.

Nevertheless, there were not then any Centaurs, nor biform and triform animals; he adding, that they, who feigned such things as these, might as well fancy rivers flowing with golden streams, and trees germinating sparkling diamonds, and such vasty gigantean men, as could ride over seas, and take up mountains in their clutches, and turn the heavens about with the strenght of their arms. Against all which, notwithstanding, he gravely gives such a reason, as plainly overthrows his own principles;

Res sic queque suo ritu procedit, & omnes
Feder e naturae certo discrimina servant.

Because things, by a certain covenant of nature, always keep up their specifick differences, without being confounded together. For what covenant of nature can there be in infinite chance? or what law can there be fet to the absolutely fortuitous motions of atoms, to circumcribe them by? Wherefore it must be acknowledged, that, according to the genuine hypothetis of the atomick Atheism, all imaginable forms of inanimate bodies, plants and animals, as Centaurs, Scylla's and Chimæra's, are producable by the fortuitous motions of matter, there being nothing to hinder it, whilst it doth

Omnimodis coire, atque omnia pertentare,
Quæcumque inter se possint congressa creare;

put itself into all kind of combinations, play all manner of freaks, and try all possible conclusions and experiments.

But

Lucret. Lib. V. Verf. 191.
But they pretend, that these monstrous, irregular shapes of animals, were not therefore now to be found, because by reason of their inept fabric, they could not propagate their kind by generation, as neither indeed preserve their own individuals. Thus does Lucretius declare the sense of Epicurus;

Lucret. Lib. V. Verf. 844.

_Latine natura abortuit autum,
Nec potuere caputum aetatis tangere florem,
Nec reperire cibum, nec jungi per veneris res._

And that this atheistical doctrine was older than Epicurus, appeareth from those words of Aristotle; οὐκ ἔναι ἄπαντα συνέχει, ταύτα μὲν εἴσωθεν ἀπὸ τὸ αὐτο-μέτα συγγίγα εἰπτηνίως, ὁσοὶ δὲ μὴ ἄτομος, ἄνωτερο, καθάπερ ἔμεθος ἄλγες τοῦ δοξεν κτὶ ἀδεξόμετον. When animals happened at first to be made, in all manner of forms, those of them only were preserved, and continued to the present time, which chanced to be fitly made (for generation,) but all the others perished, as Empedocles affirmeth of the partly-ox and partly-man-animals. Moreover, the ancient both Anaximandrian and Democritick Atheists concluded, that besides this one world of ours, there were other infinite worlds, (they conceiving it as absurd to think, there should be but one only world in infinite space, as that in a vast plowed and fowed field, there should grow up only one ear of corn, and no more;) and they would have us believe, that amongst these infinite worlds (all of them fortuitously made) there is not one of a thousand, or, perhaps, of ten thousand, that hath such regularity, concinnity, and harmony in it, as this world that we chanced to emerge in. Now it cannot be thought strange (as they suppose) if, amongst infinite worlds, one or two should chance to fall into some regularity. They would also confidently assure us, that the present system of things, in this world of ours, shall not long continue such as it is, but after a while fall into confusion and disorder again;

*Mundi naturam totius aetas
Quod potuit nequeat, posse quod non tuli ante*

The same wheel of fortune, which moving upward, hath brought into view this scene of things that now is, turning round, will, some time or other, carry it all away again, introducing a new one in its stead; and then shall we have Centaurs, and Scylla's and Chimaira's again, all manner of inept forms of animals, as before.

But because men may yet be puzzled with the univerfality and constancy of this regularity, and its long continuance through so many ages, that there are no records at all of the contrary any where to be found; the atomick Atheift further adds, that the fenseles atoms, playing and toying up and down, without any care or thought, and from eternity trying all manner of tricks, conclusions and experiments, were at length (they know

Lucret. Lib. V. Verf. 852.
Chap. V. Never any Inept System.

know not how) taught, and by the necessity of things themselves, as it were, driven, to a certain kind of trade of artificialnes and methodicalnes; so that though their motions were at first all casual and fortuitous, yet in length of time they became orderly and artificial, and governed by a certain law, they contracting as it were upon themselves, by long practice and experience, a kind of habit of moving regularly; or else being, by the mere necessity of things, at length forced so to move, as they should have done, had art and wisdom directed them. Thus Epicurus in his epistle to Herodotus, ἀλλὰ μὴν ὑπολείπουν ἡ τῶν Φάνη πολλαὶ ἡ παιδείᾳ ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν τῶν πραξιμάτων ἐπάθησαν την ὑπακοὴν. It must be held, that nature is both taught and necessitated by the things themselves: or else, as Gassendus interprets the words, quodam veluti naturali necessariaque doctîna fen Simpson, by little and little imbued with a certain kind of natural and necessary doctrine.

To which atheistical pretences we shall briefly reply, first, That it is but an idle dream, or rather impudent forgery, of these Atheists, that heretofore there were in this world of ours all manner of monstrous and irregular shapes of animals produced, Centaurs, Scylla’s, and Chimera’s, &c. and indeed at first none but such; there being not the least footstep of any such thing appearing in all the monuments of antiquity, and traditions of former times; and these Atheists being not able to give any manner of reason, why there should not be such produced as well at this present time, however the individuals themselves could not continue long, or propagate by generation; or at least why it should not happen, that, in some ages or countries, there were either all Androgyne, of both sexes, or else no animal but of one sex, male, or female only; or, lastly, none of any sex at all. Neither is there any more reason to give credit to these Atheists, when (though enemies to divination) they would prophecy concerning future times, that, in this world of ours, all shall sometime fall into confusion and nonsensë again. And, as their infinity of worlds is an absolute impossibility, so to their bold and confident assertion concerning those supposed other worlds, as if they had travelled over them all, that, amongst ten thousand of them, there is hardly one, that hath so much regularity in it as this world of ours, it might be replied, with equal confidence, and much more probability of reason, that were every planet about this sun of ours an habitable earth, and every fixed star a sun, having likewise its several other planets or habitable earths moving round about it, and not any one of these defect or uninhabited, but all peopled with animals; we say, were this so extravagant supposition true, that there would not be found any one ridiculous or inept system amongst them all, but that the divine art and wisdom (which being infinite, can never be defective, nor any where idle) would exercise its dominion upon all, and every where impress the sculptures and signatures of itself.

In the next place we affirm, That the fortuitous motions of senseless atoms, trying never so many experiments and conclusions, and making never so many
many combinations and aggregate forms of things, could never be able to
produce so much as the form or system of one complete animal, with all
the organick parts thereof so artificially disposed (each of these being as it
were a little world) much less the system of this great world, with that va-
riety of animals in it; but least of all could it constantly continue such regu-
larly and artificialness every where: for that the fortuitous motions of irra-
tional, senseless and stupid matter should in length of time grow artificial,
and contract a habit of acting as regularly and methodically, as if perfect
art or wisdom had directed them, this is the most prodigious nonsense ima-
ginable, and can be accounted no other than atheistic fanaticism.

It is no more possible, that the fortuitous motion of dead and senseless matter
should ever from itself be taught and necessitated to produce such an orderly
and regular system as the frame of this whole world is, together with the
bodies of animals, and constantly to continue the same, than that a man
perfectly illiterate, and neither able to write nor read, taking up a pen into
his hand, and making all manner of scralls, with ink upon paper, should
at length be taught and necessitated, by the thing itself, to write a whole
quire of paper together, with such characters, as being deciphered by a
certain key, would all prove coherent philosophick sense; or that we
ourselves, writing down the mere letters of the alphabet, transposedly, any
how, as it happens, without the least thought, either of words or sense, af-
ter our scribbling a long time together what was altogether insignificant,
should at length have been taught and necessitated by the thing itself, with-
out the least study and consideracion of our own, to write this whole volume.
Or, to use another instance, this is no more possible, than that ten or a
dozen persons, altogether unskilled in music, having several instruments
given them, and striking the strings or keys thereof, any how, as it
happened, should, after some time of discord and jarring, at length be taught
and necessitated to fall into most exquisite harmony, and continue the same
uninterruptedly for several hours together.

Wherefore, if it be ridiculous for one, that hath read over the works of
Plato or Aristotle, or those six books of T. Lucretius Carus, De natura re-
rum, to contend, that possibly the letters of those books might be all put
together by chance, or scribbled at random, without the least thought or
study of the writer, he having also no manner of philosophick skill in him;
or for one, that hears ten or a dozen persons playing in concert upon instru-
ments of music, and making ravishing harmony, to persuade himself, that
none of those players had, for all that, the least of musical art or skill in
them, but struck the strings as it happened; it must needs be much more
ridiculous and absurd, to suppose this artificial system of the whole world
to have resulted from the fortuitous motion of senseless atoms, without the
direction of any art or wisdom, there being much more of sense, art and
philosophy therein, than in any philosophick volume or poem ever written
by men; and more of harmony and proportion, than in any composition
of
of vocal musick. We conclude therefore with Aristotle, ἀναγεύσας τὸ ταῦτα Νατ. Ἀυτ. τὸν ἦκον τὸν γέρον, that it is absolutely impossible things should have come to [P. 475;] pass after this manner; that is, by mere fortune and chance, and without the direction of any Mind or God. The divine Mind and Wisdom hath per.] so printed its seal or signature upon the matter of the whole corporeal world, as that fortune and chance could never possibly have counterfeited the same.

Notwithstanding all which, the ancient Atheists would undertake, by their wonderful skill in logic, to demonstrate, that the frame of nature could not possibly be made by any intending cause, and for the sake of ends and uses; as for example, that eyes could not be first of all made intentionally for the use of seeing, nor ears intentionally for the use of hearing, and so for the rest; because, forsooth, these things were all of them, in order of time and nature, before their several uses. The argument is seriously propounded by Lucretius, after this manner:

Nec fuit ante, videre, oculorum lumina nata,
Nec dieiis orare, prius quam lingua creasset.
Sed potius longè lingue praecessit origo
ermenem, multoque create sunt prius aures,
Quam fonsus est auditus; & omnia denique membra
Antè fuere, ut opinor, eorum quam fuit usus.
Haud igitur potuere utendi cresceret causa.

To this sense; There was no such thing as seeing before eyes were made, nor hearing before ears, nor speaking before the tongue. But the original of the tongue much preceded speech: so likewise eyes and ears were made before there was any seeing of colours or hearing of sounds. In like manner, all the other members of the body were produced before their respective uses. And therefore they could not be made intentionally, for the sake of those uses. The force of which argument confineth in this proposition; That whatsoever is made for the sake of another thing, must exist in time after that other thing, for whose sake it was made: or, That, for which any thing is made, must not only be, in order of nature, but also of time, before that which is made for it. And this that Epicurean poet endeavours to prove by sundry instances:

At contra conferre manu certamina pugne,
Antè fuit multò quàm lucida tela volarent, &c.

Darts were made for the sake of fighting, but fighting was before darts, or else they had never been invented. Bucklers were excogitated and devised, for the keeping off of blows and strokes, but the declining of strokes was before bucklers. So were beds contrived for the sake of resting and sleeping, but resting and sleeping were older than beds, and gave occasion for the invention of them. Cups were intended and designed for the sake of drinking, which they would not have been, had there not been drinking before. According to the force of which instances, the poet would infer, that whosoever affirms eyes to have been made.
made for the sake of seeing, must suppose in like manner, there was some kind of seeing or other before eyes. But since there was no seeing at all before eyes, therefore could not eyes be made for the sake of seeing. And this is the atheiftick demonstration, that the parts of men’s bodies, and other things of nature, could not be made by any intending cause, for the sake of ends and uſes.

But it is evident, that this logick of Atheifts differs from that of all other mortals, according to which, the end, or that for which any thing is made, is only in intention before the means, or that which is made for it, but in time and execution after it. And thus was the more effectual way of fighting and doing execution, for whose fake darts were invented, in time after darts, and only in intention before them. It is true indeed, that fighting in general was before darts, sleeping before beds, and drinking before cups; and thereby did they give occaſion for men to think of means for the more effectual fighting, and more commodious sleeping and drinking; men being commonly excited from the experience of things, and the fense of their needs and wants, to excogitate and provide fit means and remedies. But it doth not therefore follow, that the Maker of the world could not have at once before-hand a preventive knowledge of whatfoever would be uſeful, and for the good of animals, and so make them intentionally for those uſes. Wherefore the argument should have been framed thus; whatfoever any thing is made for, as the end, that must needs be, in the knowledge and intention of the maker, before the exiftence of that, which is made for it. And therefore if eyes were made for the fake or end of seeing, seeing must of necessity be in the knowledge and intention of the maker of eyes, before there were any eyes actually exifting. But there could be no knowledge of seeing before there were any eyes. Wherefore eyes could not be made for the fake of seeing.

And this indeed is the genuine scope and drift of the premifed atheiftick argument, however it were disguised by them in their manner of propounding it. The reason whereof was, because they took it for granted, that all knowledge, as such is derived by fene from the things themselves known pre-exifting. From whence it follows, that there could be no knowledge of vision or seeing, before there was actual seeing and eyes; and so they think it to be demonstrated, that eyes could not be made by any Deity for the sake of seeing before there was seeing; no more than spectacles by men for the sake of eyes, before there were eyes. Thus does the Epicurean poet conclude triumphantly;

Illa quidem seorsum sunt omnia, qua prius ipsa
Nata, dedere sue potest notitiem uilitatis.
Quo genere imprimis sensus & membra videmus.
Quare etiam atque etiam procul est, ut credere posse,
Uilitatis ob officium potuisse creari.

That
That is, the members of man's bodies, and organs of sense, were first made by themselves, and then did they afterwards give the notice or knowledge of their several utilities; none of which could have been bad before. Wherefore we affirm again and again, that it is impossible things should have been made designedly for their uses.

So that the controversy is at last resolved wholly into this; Whether or no, all knowledge and understanding, as such, universally does arise from things antecedently existing without the knower? Which being asserted by Atheists, they conclude from thence, that the things of the world could not be made by the previous counsel, contrivance, and intention of any understanding Deity, but that they all blunder'd out themselves, one after another, according to the train or sequel of the fortuitous motions of matter; and that from thence knowledge and understanding, counsel and intention, sprung up afterward, as junior to things, and the world. But this being already made the eleventh atheistic argument against a Deity, viz. That all knowledge and mental conception is the information of the things themselves known, existing before and without the knower, and a passion from them; and therefore that the world must needs be before any knowledge or conception of it, and no knowledge or conception before the world, as its cause; we shall refer the answer to it, and confutation of it, to its proper place; where we shall plainly demonstrate, that knowledge or understanding, is not in its own nature, e~typal, but archetypal; and that it is older than the world, and the Maker of all things.

But the Atheists yet further urge, against the proving of a God from the τέλος τού ἔκτος τοῦ πολυτελοῦς, the regular frame of the whole world in general, and the artificial structure of the bodies of animals, after this manner; That it is altogether unreasonable to suppose, there should be no cause in nature for the phænomena thereof, especially for those things, which are daily generated, as the bodies of animals; but (as by the tragick poets) a god should be introduced, as it were from a machine, forcibly to solve them. And indeed though there were a God, yet they think he ought not to be detruded to such mean offices as this, viz. to make the body of every the most contemptible animal, as it were with his own hands miraculously; nor ought nature or the world to be supposed so imperfect, as if it must be bungled and botched up every where after this manner. It is nature therefore, which is the cause of these natural productions and generations. Which nature, that it doth not intend nor act designedly for ends and ules, appears not only from hence, because it never consults or deliberates, (which Aristotle intimates to have been the reafon, why some of old denied the things of nature to have been made for ends) but also because it hath no animal sense or consciousness, no understanding or appetite. Wherefore this opinion of intending, and final caufality in nature, can be accounted no other than an idolum specus (as some affect to phrase it) or a prejudice of men's minds,

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when they apply their own properties to things without them, and think, because themselves intend, and act for ends, that therefore nature doth the like. And they might as well say, that nature laughs and cries, speaks and walks, fyllogizes and philosophizes, because themselves do so. But, as a modern philosopher concludes, The universe, as one aggregate of things natural, hath no intention belonging to it. And accordingly, were all final causes rightly banished by Democritus out ofphysiology, as Aristotle recordeth of him, το οίδίκη άφιν άρχη, βαμιξίας ακναις εις χρησα καὶ φου. That be reduced all things to natural and necessary causes, altogether rejecting final.

To all which we briefly reply; That there are indeed two extremes here to be avoided, the one, of those, who derive all things from the fortuitous motions of senseless matter; which is the extreme of the atomick Atheists; the other, of bigotical religionists, who will needs have God άνεργον ἀρχην, to do all things himself immediately; as if all in nature were miracle. But there is a middle betwixt both these extremes; namely, to suppose, that besides God, and in subordination to him, there is a nature (not fortuitous, but) artificial and methodical; which governing the motion of matter, and bringing it into regularity, is a secondary or inferiour cause of generations. Now, this natura artificiosa, this artificial nature, though itself indeed do not understand the reason of what it doth, nor properly intend the ends thereof, yet may it well be conceived to act regularly for the sake of ends understood and intended by that perfect Mind, upon which it depends. As the manuay opificers understand not the designs of the architect, but only drudgingly perform their several tasks imposed by him; and as types or forms of letters, compos'd together, print coherent philosophick sense, which themselves understand nothing of. (Upon which artificial or spermatick nature, we have largely infinited before, in the Appendix to the third chapter.) And thus, neither are all things performed immediately and miraculously by God himself; neither are they all done fortuitously and temerariously, but regularly and methodically for the sake of ends, though not understood by nature itself, but by that higher Mind, which is the cause of it, and doth, as it were, continually inspire it. Some, indeed, have unskilfully attributed their own properties, or animal idiospathies to inanimate bodies; as when they say, that matter desires forms, as the female doth the male; and that heavy bodies descend by appetite towards the centre, that so they may rest therein; and that they sometimes again ascend in discretion, to avoid a vacuum. Of which fancifull extravagancies if the Advancer of Learning be understood, there is nothing to be reprehended in this following passage of his; "Incredibile est quantum agmen idolorum philosophiae immiserit naturalium operationum ad similitudinem actionum humanarum reducuntio: It is incredible, how many errors have been transfused into philosophy, from this one delusion, of reducing natural actions to the mode of human; or of thinking, that nature acteth as a man doth. But if that of his be extended further, to take away all final causes from the things of nature, as if nothing..."
nothing were done therein for ends intended by a higher mind, then is it the
very spirit of atheism and infidelity. It is no idol of the cave or den, (to
uſe that affected language) that is, no prejudice or fallacy impoſed upon
ourselves, from the attributing our own animalish properties to things with-
these would be to assign the true cause of a house, without declaring, that the architect first framed in his mind a model or platform of such a thing to be made out of those materials, so aptly disposed into a foundation, walls, roof, doors, rooms, stairs, chimneys, windows, &c. as might render the whole fit for habitation, and other human uses. And no more certainly can the things of nature (in whose very essence final causality is as much included) be either rightly understood, or the causes of them assigned, merely from matter and mechanism, or the necessary and unguided motion thereof, without design or intention for ends and good. Wherefore to say, that the bodies of animals became such, merely because the fluid seed, by motion, happened to make such traces, and begot such stamens and lineaments, as out of which that compages of the whole resulted; is not to assign a cause of them, but to dissemble, I mother, and conceal their true efficient cause, which is the wisdom and contrivance of that divine Architect and Geometer, making them every way fit for the inhabitation and uses of their respective souls. Neither indeed can we banish all final, that is, all mental causality, from philosophy or the consideration of nature, without banishing at the same time reason and understanding from ourselves, and looking upon the things of nature with no other eyes than brutes do. However, none of the ancient Atheists would ever undertake to assign necessary causes for all the parts of the bodies of animals, and their efformation, from mere matter, motion, and mechanism; those small and pitiful attempts in order thereunto, that have been made by some of them in a few instances, (as that the σπίνα δορφς came from the fluxure of the bodies of animals, when they first sprung out of the earth, the intestines from the flux of humours excavating a crooked and winding channel for itself, and that the nostrils were broke open by the eruption of breath;) these, I say, only showing the unfeasableness and impossibility thereof. And therefore Democritus was so wise, as never to pretend to give an account in this way of the formation of the foetus, he looking upon it as a thing absolutely desperate; nor would he venture to say any more concerning it (as Aristotle 3 inform us) than ὅτι ὦντος αἰτία ἀνάκους γίνεται, that it always cometh so to pass of necessity, but let us make all further enquiry concerning it after this manner, το εἰρετές το θεόν τις, πετά των τοντων τινες, το ξυπνίω εἰμι τα αἰτίας αὖχαν. That to demand, about any of these things, for what cause it was thus, was to demand a beginning of infinite. As if all the motions from eternity had an influence upon, and contributed to, whatsoever corporeal thing was now produced. And Lucretius, notwithstanding all his swaggering and boasting, that he and Epicurus were able to assign natural and necessary causes for every thing without a God, hath no where so much as one word concerning it. We conclude therefore, that Aristotle's judgment concerning final causes in philosophy is much to be preferred before that of Democritus, Καὶ ἀμφῶς μὲν τῷ θεῷ αἱ καταξιωματικαι αὐτίας, καὶ λόγος, δὲ τὸν τοῦ αἰτίας αἰτίαν γὰρ τὸ τῆς ἑκάστης, αὐτὰ τὰ αὐτὰ τὴν τι- λα, That both kind of causes (material and final) ought to be declared by a physiologer, but especially the final; the end being the cause of the matter, but the matter not the cause of the end. And thus do we

* This seems to be leveled against Des Cartes's book de formatione foetis. Cap. I. p. 471. 472.


we see plainly, that the atomick Atheists are utterly ignorant of the
cause, τὸ ἐξ ἀτόμων, of the regular and artificial frame of the things in
nature, and consequently the whole mundane system, the true knowledge
whereof necessarily leadeth to a God.

But it is prodigiously strange, that these Atheists should, in this their ig-
norance and sottishness, be justified by any professed Theists and Chriftians
of later times, who atomizing in their physiology also, would fain persuade
us in like manner, that this whole mundane system, together with plants and
animals, was derived merely from the necessary and unguided motion of
the small particles of matter, at first turned round in a vortex, or else jum-
bled all together in a chaos, without any intention for ends and good, that
is, without the direction of any mind; God in the mean time standing by,
only as an idle spectator of this inus atomorum, this sportful dance of atoms,
and of the various results thereof. Nay these mechanick Theists have here
quite outstripped and outdone the atomick Atheists themselves, they being
much more immodest and extravagant than ever thofe were; for the profef-
sed Atheists durft never venture to affirm, that this regular system of things
refulted from the fortuitous motions of atoms at the very fift, before they had
for a long time together produced many other inept combinations or aggregate
forms of particular things, and nonfenfical systems of the whole. And they
suppos'd also, that the regularity of things here in this world would not al-
ways continue such neither, but that some time or other confusion and disor-
der would break in again. Moreover, that, besides this world of ours, there
are at this very instant, innumerable other worlds irregular, and that there
is but one of a thousand, or ten thousand, amongst the infinite worlds, that
have such regularity in them. The reafon of all which is, because it was ge-
erally taken for granted, and looked upon as a common notion, that τὸ
ἀπὸ τῶν ἀτόμων, ἀτομάτως, ἀτομίκως, as Aristotle expreffeth it 1, that
none of those things, which are from fortune or chance, come to pass conftantly
and always alike. But our mechanick, or atomick Theifts will have their
atoms never so much as once to have jumbled in these their fortuitous mo-
tions, nor to have produced any inept system, or incongruous forms at all;
but from the very fift all along, to have taken up their places, and have
ranged themselves fo orderly, methodically and discreetly, as that they
could not possibly have done it better, had they been directed by the moft
perfect wildom. Wherefore these atomick Theifts utterly evacuate that
grand argument for a God, taken from the phænomenon of the artificial
frame of things, which hath been fo much insisted on in all ages, and which
commonly makes the strongest impression of any other upon the minds of
men, they leaving only certain metaphysical arguments for a Deity; which,
though never fo good, yet by reafon of their subttilty, can do but little exec-
tution upon the minds of the generality, and even amongst the learned do
sometimes beget more of doubtful disputation and fepeeckicism, than of clear
conviction and satisfaction; the Atheists in the mean time laughing in their
neckes,

A Computation

Book I.

Now, as this argues the greatest indefiniteness of mind, or formills and stupidity, in pretends. The general notice of the regular and artificial frame of things, of the figures of the divine art and wi-ness, eyes being entirely above the force of their mechanical powers, and partly contrary to the fame, can therefore never be followed by them, nor to look upon the world, and things of nature, with any other eyes than oxen and hares do. For there many things in nature, without final causes, and none, vital, might also add, amongst many others, the inclination of the planets of the universe to the fame. For though Carteys, through the inclination of the stars, nor perpendicularity of the earth, the annual and diurnal, would be much more conveniently made upon parallel and perpendicular, either to the fame, or to itself. As for example, that of the diaph-

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and not a little triumphing, to the caufe of the fame betray-
ed by its professed friends and affiliies, and the grand argument for the fame totally hurled by them, and to their work done, as it were, to their hands, for them.
The Mechanick Theifts.

sufficiently confuted by the learned Harvey, in his Book of Generation, that the seed doth materially enter into the composition of the egg; so is it all along precariously and exceptionable; nor does it extend at all to the differences, that are in several animals, or offer the least reason, why an animal of one species or kind might not be formed out of the seed of another.

It is here indeed pretended by these mechanick Theifts, that final causes therefore ought not to be of any regard to a philosopher, because we should not arrogate to ourselves to be as wife as God Almighty is, or to be privy to his secrets. Thus in the metaphysical meditations: *Atque ob hanc unicum rationem totum illud caufarum genus, quod a fine peti folet, in rebus physicis nullum uſum habere exiftimo; non enim abſque temeritate me puto, investigare pofse fines Dei.* And again likewise in the Principles of Philosophy: *Nullas unquam rationes circa res naturales a fine, quem Deus aut natura in its faciendis fibi propofuit, admittimus, quia non tantum nobis debemus arrogare, ut ejus conftitorum participes effe poffimus.* But the question is not, whether we can always reach to the ends of God Almighty, and know what is absolutely right in every cafe, and accordingly make conclusions, that therefore the thing is, or ought to be so; but, whether any thing at all were made by God for ends and good, otherwise than would of itself have resulted from the fortuitous motion of matter. Nevertheless, we see no reason at all, why it should be thought preſumption, or intrufion into the secrets of God Almighty, to affirm, that eyes were made by him for the end of seeing, (and accordingly fo contrived as might best conduce thereunto) and ears for the end of hearing, and the like. This being fo plain, that nothing but ftupidity, or atheiftick incredulity (marked perhaps under an hypocritical veil of humility) can make any doubt thereof. And therefore Aristotle *juftly reprehended Anaxagoras for that absurd aphorifm of his, dici to χειρος ἐχειν, Φυσικῶθεν εἰναι τῶν ἐξων τὸν ἄθρωπον. That man was therefore the wifteft, (or moft folert) of all animals, because he chance to have hands. He not doubting to affirm on the contrary; *εἴπον δὲ τὸ Φυσικῶθεν εἰναι τῶν ἐξων χειρος ἐχειν ἢ γὰρ φύσις ἂν διανέμει καθάπαυτον. Φυσικῶθεν, τὸ δυομοίρων χειρος ἐκ τῶν προσächtη γὰρ τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν αὐτῶν καὶ τὸν οὖν αὐτῆς ἐκ τῶν χειρῶν υἱῶν. Τὸ δὲ, εἴπον τὸν μεταφημένον τοῦτον. That it was far more reasonable to think, that because man was the wifteft (or moft folert and active) of all animals, therefore he had hands given him. For nature (faith he) did distribute, as a wife man doth, what is suitable to every one; and it is more proper to give pipes to one that hath musical skill, than upon him, that hath pipes, to becaufe musical skill.*

Wherefore these mechanick Theifts would further alledge, and that with some more colour of reason, that it is below the dignity of God Almighty to condescend to all those mean and trivial offices, and to do the things of nature himself immediately: as also, that it would be but a botch in nature, if the defects thereof were every where to be supplied by miracle. But to this also the reply is easy, that though the divine Wisdom itself con-

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trived the system of the whole world for ends and good, yet nature, as an inferiour minister, immediately executes the same; I say, not a dead, fortuitous, and meerly mechanical, but a vital, orderly and artificial nature. Which nature, ascerted by most of the ancient philosophers, who were.

Theists, is thus described by Proclus 1: ἡ φύσις ἐχάρησθαι μὲν ἐστὶν το τὸ συμπα-

tιοντεῖς τὸν αὐτὸν ὑμεροῦσιν αἰτίων, καὶ τὸ πέρας τοῦ τῶν αἰσιμάτων έστιν πλάσμα:

πλάσμας δὲ λόγου καὶ δι’ αὐτὸν ταῦτα τοιαύτη ἔσται προελι-

κειμένα απὸ τῆς τοιούτου θεωρίας.

Νάτοις σ’ αὐτῷ, τείς φύσις ἀπλήθει ἡφαίστια.

ἡ φύσις ταῦτα ζωὴν πρέεςειν, η το ὅμολα καὶ ἡ αἰσιμάτων ἔχαρησθαι αὐτῶν εἶναι

εἰς ἑαυτόν καὶ ἀναπεριφέρειν. φοιτά δεὶ τῶν ἡφαίστων αἰσιμάτων, καὶ πάντα εὐφράτει, ἐὰν τὰ αἰσ-

ιμάτων τοιαῦτα εὑρίσκειν τινός, καὶ τὰ Φειδιαῖα μένει διαμοιρηθεῖν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ, τοῖς εἰς

αὐτὴν τῶν εἴδων αἰτίων συνεχέονται.

'Αρξίης σ’ αὐτῷ φύσις αἰσιμάτων κόσμων το έχεσθαι.

Οἵκτεις τὸ λόγον, οἵκτεις οἴκει τὸ τὸν κατασώμον.

Καὶ τὰ έχεσθī.

Nature is the last of all causes, that fabricate this corporeal and sensible world, and the utmost bound of incorporeal substances. Which being full of reasons and powers, orders and presides over all mundane affairs. It proceeding (according to the Magick Oracles) from that supreme goddef, the divine wisdom, which is the fountain of all life, as well intellectual, as that which is concrete with matter. Which wisdom this nature always essentially depending upon, passes through all things unbinnderably; by means whereof even inanimate things partake of a kind of life, and things corruptible remain eternal in their species, they being contained by its standing forms or ideas, as their causes. And thus does the oracle describe nature, as presiding over the whole corporeal world, and perpetually turning round the heavens. Here have we a description of one universal, substantial life, soul, or spirit of nature, subordinate to the Deity: besides which the same Proclus elsewhere 2 supposed other particular natures, or sapermatick reasons, in those words of his, μετὰ τὴν ψυχὴν τὴν πρώτην, ψυχῶν ἦ χαρὰ γαρ τὸν ὅλον φύσιν, φύσις: After the first soul, are there particular souls, and after the universal nature, particular natures. Where it may be observed, by the way, that this Proclus, though he were a superstititious Pagan, much addicted to the multiplying of gods (subordinate to one supreme) or a bigotick Polytheist, who had a humour of deifying almost every thing, and therefore would have this nature, forthwith, to be called a goddef too; yet does he declare it not to be properly fuch, but abusively only (vīz. because it was no intellectual thing) as he faith the bodies of the sun, moon, and stars, supposed to be animated, were called gods too, they being the statues of the gods. This is the meaning of those words, καὶ θεὸς μὲν τῷ θεώσθαι, καὶ ἐκ αὐτῶν ἔχειν τὰ ἑαυτοῦ

Θεὸς: Ἰ ἄρθρο το θεῖα σύμμαχα, θεῶς καλεῖται, ὡς ἄρα καταματα τῶν θεῶν. Nature is a god or goddef, not as having godship properly belonging to it, but as the divine bodies are called gods, because they are statues of the gods.

Where-

Wherefore we cannot otherwise conclude concerning these our mechanick Theifts, who will thus needs derive all corporeal things from a dead and stupid nature, or from the necessary motions of senseless matter, without the direction of any mind or intention for ends and good; but that they are indeed cousin-germans to Atheifts, or possed, in a degree, with a kind of atheiftick enthuftasim, or fanaticifm, they being so far forth inspired with a spirit of infidelity, which is the spirit of atheift.

But these mechanick Theifts are again counterbalanced by another sort of Atheifts, not mechanical nor fortuitous; namely, the Hylozoifts, who are unquestionably convinced, that opera naturae sunt opera intelligentiæ, that the works of nature are works of understanding; and that the original of these corporeal things was not dead and stupid matter fortuitously moved: upon which account Strato derided Democritus his rough and crooked atoms, as mere dreams and dotages. But thefe notwithstanding, because they would not admit of any other substance besides matter, suppose life and perceiption, essentially to belong to all matter as such; whereby it hath a perfect knowledge of whatsoever it will do or suffer (though without animal consciousness) and can form itself to the best advantage, sometimes improving itself by organization to sense in brutes, and to reason and reflexive understanding in men. Wherefore, according to the principles of these Hylozoifts, there is not any need of a God at all; that is, of one perfect Mind or understanding Being prefiding over the whole world; they concluding, accordingly, the opinion of a God to be only a mistaking of the inadequate conception of matter in general, its life and energetick nature taken alone abstractly, for a complete substance by itself. Nevertheless these Hylozoick Atheifts are no way able, by this hypothesis of theirs neither, to solve that phenomenon of the regularity and harmony of the whole universe; because every part of matter being, according to them, a distinct percipient by itself, whose knowledge extendeth only to its own concernment; and there being no one thing prefiding over all, the things of the whole world (in which all things are co-ordered together) could never have fallen into one such agreeing and conspiring harmony.

And as for those other Cosmo-plasticke Atheifts, who suppose the whole world to be as it were but one huge plant, tree, or vegetable, or to have one spermatick, plastiick and artificial nature only, orderly and methodically disposed of the whole, but without sense and understanding, these can no way do the business neither; that is, solve the forementioned phenomenon, it being utterly impossible, that there should be any such artificial and regular nature, otherwise than as deriving from, and depending upon, a perfect mind or wisdom.

And thus do we see plainly, that no Atheifts whatsoever can solve the phenomenena of nature, and this particularly of the regular frame and harmony.
mony of the universe; and that true philosophy, or the knowledge of
causes, necessarily leadeth to a God.

But besides these phenomena of cogitation, or soul and mind in ani-
imals, local motion in bodies, and the artificial frame of things for ends and
uses, together with the conspiring harmony of the whole, which can no-
way be solved without a Deity; we might here further add, that the for-
tuitous, that is, the Anaximandrian and Democritick Atheists, who uni-
versally affected the novity of this mundane system, were not able to give
any tolerable account neither of the first beginning of men, and those greater
animals, that are no otherwise begoten, than in the way of generation, by
the commixture of male and female.

*Aristotle, in his book of the generation of animals, writeth thus; *Περὶ τῶν
ἀνθρώπων αἰτίας τετραπόδων γένεσις, ὑστολογία τῆς ἄνδρον ἐπιγείως. ἐπὶ τοῖς
ταῖς φασι τοῖς ὑπόταξις τοῦ ἐκπονοῦμεν, ἢ γὰρ ὡς οὐκ ἔσται συνοπτικὴ ἡ ἀρχὴ
τῶν. *If men and four-footed animals were ever generated out of the
earth, as some affirm, it may be probably conceived to have been one of these two
ways, either that they were produced, as worms, out of putrefaction, or else
formed in certain eggs, growing out of the earth. And then, after a while,
he concludes again, *ἐπὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς τῆς γένεσις τοῦ ἐκπώνως. *That if there were any beginning of the generation of all an-
imals, it is reasonable to think it to have been one of these two forementioned
ways. It is well known, that Aristotle, though a Theist, elsewhere affirm-
eth the world's eternity; according to which hypothesis of his, there was
never any first male nor female in any kind of animals, but one begat anoth-
er infinitely, without any beginning: a thing utterly repugnant to our
human faculties, that are never able to frame any conception of such an in-
finity of number and time, and of a successive generation from eternity.

Here Aristotle himself seems flagging, or sceptical, about it, if men were
ever generated out of the earth, and if there were any beginning of the gene-
ration of animals; as he doth also, in his Topicks, propound it for an in-
stance of a thing disputable, *Πάντως ὁ κόσμος ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ ἄλλωσ.
*Whether the world were eternal or no? he ranking it amongst those, *ὡς ὃς
λέγεις μὴ ἔχοις ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐαυτοῦ μεγάλων, *Those great things, for which we can give no certain reason one way
nor other. Now (faith he) if the world had a beginning, and if men were
once γενετοι, or ἀνυγόνες, earth-born, then must they have been, in all
probability, either generated, as worms, out of putrefaction, or else out of
eggs; he supposing (it seems) those eggs to have grown out of the earth.

But the generality of Atheists in Aristotle's time, as well as Theists, deny-
ing this eternity of the mundane system, as not so agreeable with their hypo-
theses, because so constant and invariable an order in the world, from etern-
ity, hath not such an appearance or semblance of chance, nor can be easi-
ly supposed to have been without the providence of a perfect mind presid-
ing over it, and fenior to it (as Aristotle conceived) in nature, though not
in time; they therefore, in all probability, concluded likewife, men at

3 Ibid. p. 666.
first to have been generated one of these two ways, either out of putrefaction, or from eggs; and this by the fortuitous motion of matter, without the providence or direction of any Deity. But after Aristotle, Epicurus fancied those first men and other animals to have been formed in certain wombs or bags growing out of the earth;

*Crescebant uteri terrae radicibus apti;

And this no otherwise than by the fortuitous motion of atoms also.

But if men had been at first formed after this manner, either in wombs or eggs (growing out of the earth) or generated out of putrefaction, by chance; then could there be no reason imaginable, why it should not sometimes so happen now, the motions of atoms being as brisk and vigorous, as ever they were, and so to continue to all eternity: so that there is not the least ground at all for that precarious fancy and pretence of Epicurus, that the earth, as a child-bearing woman, growing old, became at length effete and barren. Moreover, the men thus at first excluded out of bags, wombs or egg-shells, or generated out of putrefaction, were supposed by these Atheists themselves to have been produced, not in a mature and adult, but an infant-like, weak and tender state, just such as they are now born into the world; by means whereof they could neither be able to feed and nourish themselves, nor defend themselves from harms and injuries. But when the same Epicurus would here pretend also, that the earth, which had been so fruitful a mother, became afterward, by chance too, as tender and indulgent a nurce of this her own progeny, and sent forth streams or rivers of milk after them out of those gaps of her wounded surface, which they had before burst out of, as Crisolaus long since observed, he might as well have feigned the earth to have had breasts and nipples too, as wombs and milk; and then what should hinder, but that she might have arms and hands also, and swaddling-bands to boot? Neither is that less precarious, when the same atheistical philosopher adds, that in this imaginary state of the new-born world, there was for a long time neither any immoderate heat nor cold, nor any rude and churlish blasts of wind, the least to annoy or injure those tender earth-born infants and nurlings. All which things being considered, Anaximander seems of the two to have concluded more wisely, that men, because they require a longer time than other animals to be hatched up in, were at first generated in the bellies of fishes, and there nourished up for a good while, till they were at length able to defend and shift for themselves, and then were disgorged, and cast up upon dry land. Thus do we see, that there is nothing in the world so monstrous, nor prodigiously absurd, which men, atheistically inclined, will not rather imagine, and swallow down, than entertain the notion of a God.

Wherefore here is dignus vindice nodus, and this phenomenon of the first beginning of mankind, and other greater animals, cannot be solved otherwise,

1 Vide Lucret. Lib. V. Verf. 810.

2 Vide Lucret. Lib. V. Verf. 823, 824. & Lib. II. Verf. 1149.

3 Vide Lucret. Lib. V. Verf. 806.

wife, than according to the Mosaick history, by admitting of σώς ἀπὸ
μορμωτῆς, a God out of a machine, that is, an extraordinary manifestation of the
Deity, in forming man, and other animals, male and female, once out of
the earth; and that not in a rude, tender and infant-like state, but mature
and adult, that so they might be able immediately to shif for themselves,
multiply and propagate their kind by generation: and this being once done,
and now no longer any necessity of such an extraordinary way of proceeding,
then putting a stop immediately thereunto, that so no more terrigene, nor
autochthones, earth-born men, should be any longer produced. For all these
circumstances being put together, it plainly appears, that this whole phæ-
omenon surpasses not only the mechanical, but also the plastick powers;
there being much of discretion in it, which the latter of these cannot arrive
to neither, they always acting fatally and necessarily. Nevertheless, we
shall not here determine, whether God Almighty might not make use of the
subservient ministrty of angels or superfier pspirits, created before man, in
this first extraordinary efformation of the bodies of animals out of the
earth, in a mature and adult state, as Plato, in his Timeus 1, introduceth
the suprême God (whom he supposeth to be the immediate Creator of all
immortal souls) thus bespeaking the junior gods, and setting them a work
in the fabrisation of mortal bodies, τὸ δὲ λαόν τοιοῦτον, θεοῦ προσο-
Φανοις, άπεργάζεσθαι ὡς ὑπὸ γινώσκει. It is your work now to adapt the mortal
to the immortal, and to generate or make terrestrial animals: he afterwards adding 2, μεὶς τὸν σπόρον, τοῖς νυσὶ πράρθενοι θεοῖ, σώματα πλάσσειν ἥσος.
That after the sowing of immortal souls (the suprême God) committed to these
junior gods the task of forming mortal bodies. Which of Plato's some con-
ceive to have been derived from that of Mofes, Let us make man after our
own image.

Moreover, these Atheists are no more able to solve that other common
and ordinary phænomenon neither, of the conservation of the species of all
animals, by keeping up constantly in the world a due numerical proportion
between the sexes of male and female. For did this depend only upon for-
tuitous mechanism, it cannot well be conceived, but that, in some ages or
other, there should happen to be either all males or all females; and so the
species fail. Nay, it cannot well be thought otherwise, but that there
is in this a providence also, superior to that of the plastick or spermatick
nature, which hath not so much of knowledge and discretion allowed to it,
as whereby to be able alone to govern this affair.

Lastly, there are yet other phænomena, no less real, though not physio-
logical, which Atheists can no way solve; as that of natural justice, and ho-
esty, duty and obligation; the true foundation both of ethics and poli-
ticks; and the τὸ ἐὰν, liberty of will, properly so called, not that of for-
tuitous determination, when there is a perfect equality or indifferency of
eligibility in objects; but that whereby men deserve commendation and
blame, rewards and punishments, and so become fit objects for remune-
rative justice to display itself upon, a main hinge upon which religion
turneth;
And now have we already preventively confuted the third atheiftick pretence also, to solve the phænomenon of religion and the belief of a God, so generally entertained; namely, from the fiction and imposture of politicians: we having not only manifested, that there is a natural prelepsis and anticipation of a God, in the minds of men, as the object of their fear, preventing reason; but also that the belief thereof is sustained and upheld by the strongest reason; the phenomena of nature being no way solvable, nor the causes of things assignable, without a Deity; so that religion being founded, both upon the instincts of nature, and upon solid reason, cannot possibly be any fiction or imposture of politicians. Nevertheless, we shall speak something particularly to this also. The Atheists therefore conceive, that though those infirmities of human nature, men's fear and ignorant credulity, do much dispose and incline them to the belief of a God, or else of a rank of beings superior to men, (whether visible or invisible) commonly called by the Pagans, gods; yet would not this be so generally entertained, as it is, especially that of one supreme Deity, the first original of all things, and monarch of the universe, had it not been for the fraud and fiction of law-makers and civil sovereigns, who, the better to keep men in peace and subjection under them, and in a kind of religious and superstitious observation of their laws, and devotion to the same, devised this notion of a God, and then possessed the minds of men with a belief of his existence, and an awe of him.

Now, we deny not, but that politicians may sometimes abuse religion, and make it serve for the promoting of their own private interests and designs; which yet they could not do so well neither, were the thing itself a mere cheat and figment of their own, and had no reality at all in nature, nor any thing solid at the bottom of it. But since religion obtains so universally everywhere, it is not conceivable, how civil sovereigns throughout the whole world, some of which are so distant, and have so little correspondence with one another, should, notwithstanding, all so well agree in this one cheating mystery of government, or piece of state-cozenage; nor, if they could, how they should be able so effectually to possess the generality of mankind, (as well wise as unwise) with such a constant fear, awe, and dread, of a mere counterfeit thing, and an invisible nothing; and which hath not only no manner of foundation neither in sense nor reason, but also (as the Atheists suppose) tends to their own great terour and disquietment, and so brings them at once under a miserable vassalage both of mind and body. Especially since men are not generally so apt to think, that how much the more any have of power and dignity, they have therefore so much the more of knowledge and skill in philosophy and the things of nature,
nature, above others. And is it not strange, that the world should not all this while have suspected or discovered this cheat and juggle of politicians, and have smelt out a plot upon themselves, in the fiction of religion, to take away their liberty, and enthrall them under bondage; and that so many of these politicians, and civil sovereigns themselves also, should have been unacquainted herewith, and as simply awed with the fear of this invisible nothing, as any others? All other cheats and juggles, when they are once never so little detected, are presently thereupon dashed quite out of countenance, and have never any more the confidence to obtrude themselves upon the world. But though the Atheists have, for these two thousand years past, been continually buzzing into men's ears, that religion is nothing but a mere state-juggle and political imposture; yet hath not the credit thereof been the least impaired thereby, nor its power and dominion over the minds of men abated: from whence it may be concluded, that it is no counterfeit and fictitious thing, but what is deeply rooted in the intellectual nature of man; a thing solid at the bottom, and supported by its own strength. Which yet may more fully appear from Christianity, a religion founded in no human policy, nor tending to promote any worldly interest or design; which yet by its own, or the divine force, hath prevailed over the power and policy, the rage and madness of all civil states, Jewish and Pagan, and hath conquered so great a part of the perfecting world under it; and that not by reftifting, or opposing force, but by suffering deaths and martyrdoms, in way of adherence to that principle, That it is better to obey God than men. Which thing was thus prefigured in the prophetick Scripture 2: Why do the heathen rage, and the people imagine a vain thing? The kings of the earth set themselves, and the rulers take counsel together, against the Lord, and against his Christ, &c. He that sitteth in the heavens shall laugh; the Lord shall have them in derision. Then shall he speak unto them in his wrath, &c. Ye have I set my king upon my holy hill of Sion. I will give thee the heathen for thine inheritance, and the uttermost parts of the earth for thy possession. Be wise now therefore, O ye kings, &c.

But that theism, or religion, is no gullery or imposture, will be yet further made unquestionably evident. That the generality of mankind have agreed in the acknowledgment of one supreme Deity, as a Being eternal and necessarily existent, absolutely perfect and omnipotent, and the maker of the whole world, hath been already largely proved in the foregoing discourse. To which purpose is this of Sextus the philosopher 3; Καὶ ὡς πέρα ζωνίς ἑλέτες ἀθροίσει περὶ Θεὺς, καθ' ἡ μακάριον τι ἐκ τοῦ ἔστε λεγότως ἀπάντηψαν τι τίλειν ἐν εἰδέλειοι, λεγέντως εἰς ἀκακίαν ἅπαντας. All men have this common prolepsis concerning God, that he is a living Being incorruptible, perfectly happy, and uncapable of all manner of evil. And the notion of that God, which Epicurus opposed, was no other than this, An understanding Being, having all happiness, with incorruptibility, that framed the whole world. Now, I say,
say, that if there be no such thing as this existing, and this idea of God be a meer fictitious thing, then was it altogether arbitrarious. But it is unconceivable, how the generality of mankind (a few Atheists only excepted) should universally agree in one and the same arbitrarious figment. This argumentation hath been formerly used by some Theists, as appeareth from the forementioned Sextus; τέλειος δὲ ἵνα ἀληθήν, τὸ κατὰ Ἀδ. Μαθ. ἠμφατικὰ τῶν μετα-καθόλου ἰδιαρμάτων, ἢλλα μὴ φύσιν ὅτις ἐκκενδιδή, &c. 3.4.

It is altogether irrational to think, that all men should by chance light upon the same properties (in the idea of God) without being naturally moved thereunto. Neither is that any sufficient account, which the Atheists would here give, that statesmen and politicians every where thus posseffed the minds of men with one and the same idea; the difficulty still remaining, how civil sovereigns and law-makers, in all the distant parts of the world, and such as had no communication nor intercourfe with one another, should universally jump in one and the same fictitious and arbitrarious idea.

Moreover, were there no God, it is not conceivable how that forementioned idea should ever have entered into the minds of men, or how it could have been formed in them. And here the Atheists again think it enough to say, that this notion or idea was put into the minds of the generality of mankind by law-makers and politicians, telling them of such a being, and persuading them to believe his existence; or that it was, from the first seignior or inventor of it, propagated all along and conveyed down by oral tradition. But this argues their great ignorance in philosophy, to think, that any notion or idea is put into mens minds from without, meerly by telling, or by words; we being passive to nothing else from words but their sounds and the phantafms thereof, they only occasioning the soul to excite such notions, as it had before within itself (whether innate or adventitious) which those words, by the compact and agreement of men, were made to be signs of; or else to reflect also further upon those ideas of their own, consider them more distinctly, and compare them with one another. And though all learning be not the remembrance of what the soul once before actually understood, in a pre-existetnt state, as Plato somewhere would have it, according to that of Boëtius, &c.

Quod si Platonis musa personat verum, quod quisque dicit, immemor recordatur:

yet is all human teaching but maieutical, or obstetricious; and not the filling of the soul as a vessiel, merely by pouring into it from without, but the kindling of it from within; or helping it so to excite and awaken, compare and compound its own notions, as whereby to arrive at the knowledge of that, which it was before ignorant of: as the thing was better expressed by the forementioned philofophick poet, in these words,

Hæret profeito semem introrsum veri, quod excipiat ventilans doëtrina.

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Wherefore the more telling of men, there is a God, could not infuse any idea of him into their minds; nor yet the further giving this definition of him, that he is a being absolutely perfect, eternal and self-existent, make them understand any thing of his nature, were they not able to excite notions or ideas from within themselves, correspondent to those several words. However the difficulty still remains, how those civil sovereigns and law-makers, or how Critias his very first inventor of that cheat of a God, could form that idea within themselves; since upon supposition of his non-existence, it is the idea of nothing, or of a non-entity. And this was judiciously hinted also by the same Sextus; ο ἐπὶ δὲ διαμεροδηνέτας, φανερὸν τινα μορφάται των ἐνοπλικῶν τῶν αἰθέρων, τὴν περὶ θεόν δοξαν, μη εἰδότες ὀτρο ἀρχηγὸν ἀτομικον αὐλοφ περιμένει, Τατιάνους ὑπό τινος, πάθεν δέ ου μορφάται, μὴ δὲν πρότερον παραδόθω, τὸ θεόν εἰς ἐνοπλικῶν  ἔχει The Atheists affirming, that certain law-makers first put this notion of a God into the minds of men, do not consider, that they still remain intangled in the difficulty, if any one further demands of them, how those law-makers themselves could first form that idea? From whence it is afterwards concluded; ο τοιόν Θεόν, ἐδώ κατά τινα νομοθεσίαν, παρεξελέξετο οι παλαιοί τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἰναυ Θεόν. That therefore the notion of a God sprung not from the arbitrary fiction of law-makers and politicians.

But some Atheists will yet further reply, that there is a feigning power in the human soul, whereby it can frame ideas or conceptions of such things, as actually never were nor will be, as of a centaur, or of a golden mountain; and that by such a feigning power as this, the idea of God, though there be no such thing existing, might be framed. And here we deny not, but that the human soul hath a power of compounding ideas and things together, which exist severally, and apart in nature, but never were, nor will be, in that conjunction: and this indeed is all the feigning power, that it hath. For the mind cannot make any new cogitation, which was not before, but only compound that which is. As the painter cannot feign colours, but must use such as exist in nature; only he can variously compound them together, and by his pencil draw the figures and lineaments of such things as no where are; as he can add to the head and face of a man the neck, shoulders, and body of a horse. In like manner, that more subtle painter or limner; the mind and imagination of man, can frame compounded ideas of things, which no where exist, but yet his simple colours, notwithstanding, must be real; he cannot feign any cogitation which was not in nature, nor make a positive conception of that, which is absolutely nothing; which were no less than to make nothing to be something, or create something out of nothing. And though the whole of these fictitious ideas (as of a golden mountain) does not any where actually exist, yet for as much as it doth not absolutely imply a contradiction, for it so to do, therefore hath it also a possible entity too, and otherwise it could not be conceivable. As a triangular square, for example, being a contradictious thing, hath not so much as a possible entity, and therefore is not conceivable as such; (though both a triangle and a square severally be conceivable) it being meer nonsense, nothing, and no idea at all. Nay, we conceive, that a Theist may pre-
presume with reverence to say, that God Almighty himself, though he can create more or fewer really existent things, as he pleaseth, and could make a whole world out of nothing, yet can he not make more cogitation or conception, than is, or was before contained in his own infinite mind and eternal wisdom, nor have a positive idea of any thing, which hath neither actual nor possible entity.

But the idea of God is not a complement or aggregation of things, which exist scatterly and apart in the world; for then would it be a mere arbitrarious thing, and it might be what every one pleased, one adding more things together, and another fewer, but each of them writing the name or title of God, as bungling painters did under these their several figments: whereas we have already proved, that the idea of God is one most simple idea of an absolutely perfect Being, though having several partial and inadequate conceptions, so that nothing can be added to it, nor detracted from it, there being nothing included therein but what is demonstrable of a perfect Being, and therefore nothing at all arbitrarious.

Moreover, many of those partial conceptions contained in the entire idea of God are no where else to be found in the whole world, existing singly and apart; and therefore, if there be no God, they must needs be absolute non-entities; as immutability, necessary existence, infinity, and perfection, &c. So that the painter, that makes this idea, must here feign colours themselves, or create new cogitation and conception out of nothing, upon the atheistick supposition.

Lastly, If there be no God now existing, it is impossible, that ever there should be any, and so the whole idea of God would be the idea of that, which hath no possible entity neither; whereas those other fictitious ideas, made by the mind of men, though they be of such things as have no actual existence, yet have they all a possible entity, as was said before.

But that we may conceal nothing of the Atheists strength, we must here acknowledge, that some of them have yet pretended further, that besides this power of compounding things together, the human soul hath also another ampliating, or increasing and improving power; by both which together, though there be no God existing, nor yet possible, the idea of him may be fictitiously made; those partial ideas, which are no where else to be found, arizing, as they say, from a metābasis απὸ τῶν ἀδερφῶν, a transition and gradual procession from men, in way of amplification, augmentation and improvement. Thus do we read in Sextus, τὸ ἄδειον εἶναι τὸν Θεὸν, τῇ ἄνθρωπῳ, Adv. Math., τῇ τέλειᾳ ἐν οὐσίᾳ, παρὰ τὰ κατὰ τὸν ἀπὸ τῶν ἀδερφῶν μετάβασις ἡ γὰρ P. 317.[Lib. τοῦ κυρίου ἄδερφον ἀδερφαντες τῇ φαντασίᾳ, ἢ τὸν Θεον Κύριου, ὡς ἀδέρφων VIII. Ιουν. adv. Phylic. τοῦ τῆς νόσους ἡς μακάριον τῇ συμπεπληρωμένῃ πάσῃ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἡ πάλιν μόνον τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἡ πάλιν πολυχρώμῳ τῳ τῳ πολυχρώμῳ τῷ τῷ ἀτενίσιος ἀδερφον οἱ πάλαιοι, ἢ τὸν θεον τῷ Θεον εἰς ἀπειρον, ἢ τὸν θεον τῷ πολυχρωμῳ τῷ πολυχρωμῳ τῷ Θεον. Ιουν. adv. Phylic. Lib. I. Σελ. II. §. XLVI. Υ γ 559, 560.}
The Idea of God not from Ampliation. Book I

The ideas of the eternity, incorruptibility, and perfect happiness of the Deity, were fictitiously made by way of transition from men: for as, by increasing a man of an ordinary stature in our imagination, we fictitiously make the phantasm of a Cyclops; so when beholding a happy man, that aboundeth with all good things, we amplify, intend, and, as it were, swell the same in our minds higher and higher; we, then arrive at length to the idea of a Being absolutely happy, that is, a God. So did the ancients, taking notice of a very longeue man, and increasing this length of age further and further infinitely, by that means frame the notion or idea of eternity, and attribute the same to God.

But to this we reply, first, That according to the principles of the Atheists themselves, there could not possibly be any such amplifying and feigning power of the soul, as whereby it could make more than is; because they suppose it to have no active power at all; but all our conceptions to be nothing but mere passions from the objects without; according to that of Protagoras in Plato’s Theætetus, ἐγὼ γὰρ τὰ μὴ ὑπάρχοντα δοκίμασι, ἦτο αὐτόν. P. 167. Ser. πάντα ἐν πάντω It is neither possible for a man to conceive that which is not, nor any more or otherwise, than he suffers. Again, as Sextus the philosopher also intimates, the Atheists are here plainly guilty of that fallacy or error in ratioication, which is commonly called a circle, or ἅλλου τὸν τὸν ἅλλον. For whereas they could not otherwise judge the greatest perfection and happiness, which ever they had experience of in men, to be imperfect, than by an anticipated idea of perfection and happiness, with which it was in their minds compared; (by virtue of which idea also it comes to pass, that they are able to amplify those lesser perfections of men further and further, and can take occasion, from imperfect things, to think of that which is absolutely perfect) that is, whereas these Atheists themselves first make the idea of imperfection from perfection; they, not attending to this, do again go about to make up the notion or idea of that, which is absolutely perfect (by way of amplification) from that which is imperfect. But that men have a notion of absolute perfection in them, by which, as the rule or measure, they (comparing other things therewith) judge them to be imperfect, and which is therefore in order of nature first, may appear from hence, because all theologers, as well Pagan as Christian, give this direction, for the conceiving of God, that it should principally be done per viam remotionis, by way of remotion of all imperfection from him. Thus Alcinous, τὸν μὲν ἄνθρωπον ἀντὶ ἡμῶν ἀφίησι, the first way of conceiving of God is by remotion or abstraction. We add, in the last place, that finite things put together can never make up infinite, as may appear from that instance of human longevity proposed; for, if one should amplify that never so much, by adding of more and more past time or years to it, yet would he never thereby be able to arrive at eternity without beginning. God differs not from these imperfect created things in degrees only, but in the whole kind. And though infinite space may perhaps be here objected, as a thing taken for granted, which being nothing but extension or magnitude, must therefore confilt, or be made up, of finite parts, as it was before declared, we have


have no certainty of any more than this, that the finite world might have
been made bigger and bigger infinitely, or without end; which infinity of
magnitude is but like that of number, potential; from whence it may be
inferred as well of the one as the other, that it can never be actually infinite.
Wherefore, were there no infinitely perfect being in nature, the idea there-
of could never be made up by any amplifying power of the soul, or by the
addition of finites. Neither is that of any moment which Gassendus \(^1\) so
much objecteth here to the contrary, that though there were no God, or
infinite Being, yet might the idea of him as well be feigned by the mind, as
that of infinite worlds, or of infinite matter, was by some philosophers;
for infinite worlds, and infinite matter, are but words ill put together, in-
finity being a real thing in nature, (and no fiction of the mind) as well as
the world or matter, but yet proper to the Deity only. But it is no won-
der, if they, who denied a God, yet retaining this notion of infinity, should
misapply the same, as they did also other properties of the Deity, to
matter.

To conclude this; our human soul cannot feign or create any new cog-
itation, or conception, that was not before, but only variously compound
that which is; nor can it ever make a positive idea of an absolute non-enti-
ty, that is, such as hath neither actual nor possible existence; much less
could our imperfect beings create the entity of a vast thought, as that of
an infinitely perfect Being, out of nothing; this being indeed more than for
God Almighty, or a perfect Being, to create a real world out of nothing;
because there is no repugnancy at all in the latter, as there is in the former.
We affirm therefore, that were there no God, the idea of an absolutely or
infinitely perfect Being could never have been made or feigned, neither by
politicians, nor by poets, nor philosophers, nor any other. Which
may be accounted another argument for a Deity.

But that religion is no figment of politicians, will further unquestionably
appear from that, which now shall follow. As the religion of an oath is a
necessary vinculum of civil society; so obligation in conscience, respecting
the Deity as its original, and as the punisher of the violation thereof, is the
very foundation of all civil sovereignty: for pacts and covenants (into which
some would resolve all civil power) without this obligation in conscience,
are nothing but mere words and breath; and the laws and commands of ci-
vil sovereigns do not make obligation, but presuppose it, as a thing in order
of nature before them, and without which they would be invalid. Which
is a truth so evident, that the writer De Cive could not dissemble it, (though
he did not rightly understand this natural obligation) but acknowledgeth it
in these words; _Obligatio ad obedientiam civilis, cujus vi leges civiles vali-
sunt, omni legi civili prior est._ — _Quod si quis princeps summus legem civi-
lem in banc formulam conciperet, Non rebellabis, nihil efficet. Nam nisi pri-
us obligentur cives ad obedientium, hoc est, ad non rebellandum, omnis lex invalida
est._

\(^1\) In Disquisit. Metaph. seu dubitationibus & infantilis ad Cartesii Metaph. Dubit. IV,
Religion the Foundation of Civil Power; Book I.

Est; & si prius obligentur est superflua. The obligation to civil obedience, by
the force of which all the civil laws become valid, is before those civil laws.
And if any prince should make a law to this purpose, That no man should rebel
against him, this would signify nothing, because unless they, to whom it is made,
were before obliged to obey, or not to rebel, the law is invalid; and if they
were, then it is superfluous. Now this previous obligation to civil obedience
cannot be derived (as the forementioned writer De Cive, and of the
Leviathan, supposes) from men's private utility only; because every man
being judge of this for himself, it would then be lawful for any subject to
rebel against his sovereign prince, and to poison or stab him, whenever he
could reasonably persuade himself, that it would tend to his own advantage,
or that he should thereby procure the sovereignty. Were the obligation to
civil obedience made only by men's private utility, it would as easily be
dissolved by the same. It remaineth therefore, that conscience, and religi-
ous obligation to duty, is the only basis, and essential foundation, of a po-
lity or commonwealth; without which there could be no right or authority
of commanding in any sovereign, nor validity in any laws. Wherefore re-
ligious obligation cannot be thought to be the fiction or impotence of civil
sovereigns, unless civil sovereignty itself be accounted a fiction and impo-
sture, or a thing, which hath no foundation in nature, but is either wholly
artificial or violent.

Moreover, had a religious regard to the Deity been a mere figment or in-
vention of politicians, to promote their own ends, and keep men in obedi-
ence and subjection under them, then would they doubtless have so framed
and contrived it, as that it should have been every way flexible and com-
pliant; namely, by persuading the world, that whatsoever was commanded
by themselves, was agreeable to the divine will, and whatever was for-
bidden by their laws, was displeasing to God Almighty, and would be pu-
ished by him; God ruling over the world no otherwise than by and in
these civil sovereigns as his vicegerents, and as the only prophets and inter-
preters of his will to men. So that the civil law of every country, and
the arbitrary will of sovereigns, should be acknowledged to be the only mea-
sure of just and unjust; (there being nothing naturally such) the only rule
of conscience and religion: for, from religion thus modelled, civil sove-
reigns might think to have an absolute power, or an infinite right of doing
or commanding whatsoever they pleased, without exception, nothing being
unlawful to them, and their subjects being always obliged, in conscience,
without the least scruple, to obey.

But this is but a mere Larva of religion, and would be but a mocking of
God Almighty; and indeed this is the only religion, that can be called a po-

titical figment. Neither could the generality of mankind be ever yet thus
persuaded, that the arbitrary will of civil sovereigns was the only rule of
justice and conscience; and that God Almighty could command nothing,
nor reveal his will concerning religion to mankind otherwise than by the
as his prophets and interpreters. True religion and conscience are no such
waxed things, fervilely addicted to the arbitrary wills of men, but inmo-

rigorous,
Chap. V. but disowned by Politicians.

rigorous, stiff, and inflexible; they respecting the Deity only, his eternal or everlasting laws, and his revealed will; with which whenever human laws clash (a thing not impossible) they conclude, that then God ought to be obeyed, and not men. For which cause the profane politicians declare open war against this religion, as a thing utterly inconsistent with civil sovereignty; because it introduces a fear greater than the fear of the Leviathan, namely, that of him, who can inflict eternal punishments after death; as also because it clashes with that monstrous, infinite and unlimited power of theirs, which is such a thing, as is not attributed by genuine Theists to God Almighty himself; a power of making their mere arbitrary will the rule of justice, and not justice the rule of their will. Thus does a modern writer of politicks condemn it for feditious doctrine, tending to the dissolution of a commonwealth; That subjects may make a judgment of good and evil, just and unjust; or have any other conscience besides the law of the land. As also this, That subjects may sin in obeying the commands of their sovereign. He likewise adds, That it is impossible a commonwealth should stand, where any other than the sovereign hath a power of giving greater rewards than life, and of inflicting greater punishments than death. Now, eternal life is a greater reward than the life present, and eternal torment than the death of nature. Wherefore, God Almighty being the disposer of eternal rewards and punishments, this is all one, as if he should have said, It is impossible a commonwealth should stand, where the belief of a God, who can punish with eternal torments after this life, is entertained. Thus does the same writer declare, That if the superstitious fear of spirits (whereof God is the chief) and things depending thereupon, were taken away, men would be much more fitted than they are, for civil obedience: and that they, who affert the immortality of souls, or their capability of receiving punishments after death, fright men from obeying the laws of their country, with empty names, as men fright birds from the corn, with an empty doublet, a hat, and a crooked stick. And accordingly he concludes, that civil sovereigns do not only make justice, but religion also; and that no Scripture or divine revelation can oblige, unless it be first made law, or stamped with their authority. Now, since that, which can make religion and gods, must itself needs be greater than all gods, it follows, according to the tenor of this doctrine, that the civil sovereign is in reality the supreme Numen; or else at least, that the Leviathan (the king over all the children of pride) is the highest Deity, next to senseless omnipotent matter; the one of these being the Atheists natural, the other their artificial god. Nevertheless we shall here observe by the way, that whilst these atheistic politicians thus endeavour to swell up the civil sovereign, and to bellow upon him an infinite right, by removing to that end out of his way natural justice, conscience, religion, and God himself, they do indeed thereby absolutely divest him of all right and authority, since the subject is now no longer obliged in conscience to obey him; and so instead of true right and authority, they leave him nothing but mere brutish force. Wherefore, since theism and true religion are thus plainly disowned and disclaimed by these politicians,
as altogether inconsistent with their designs, they cannot be supposed to have been the figments of civil sovereigns, or the mere creatures of political art. And thus have we abundantly confuted those three atheistical pretences, to solve the phænomenon of religion; from fear, and the ignorance of causes, and the fiction of politicians.

But since, besides those ordinary phænomena before mentioned, which are no way solvable by Atheists, there are certain other phænomena extraordinary, that either immediately prove a God and Providence, or else that there is a rank of understanding beings, invisible, superior to men, from whence a Deity may be afterwards inferred; namely, these three especially, apparitions, miracles, and prophecies; (where the Atheists obstinately denying matter of fact and history, will needs impute these things, either to juggling fraud and knavery; or else to men’s own fear and fancy, and their ignorance; how to distinguish dreams, and other strong imaginations, from vision and sense; or lastly, to certain religious tales or legends, allowed by the publick authority of civil sovereigns, for political ends:) we shall here suggest something briefly, to vindicate the historick truth of those phænomena, against Atheists.

First therefore, as for apparitions, though there be much of fabulosity in these relations, yet can it not reasonably be concluded, that there is nothing at all of truth in them; since something of this kind hath been averred in all ages, and many times attested by persons of unquestionable prudence, and unsuspected veracity. And whereas the Atheists impute the original of these things to men’s mistaking both their dreams, and their waking fancies, for real visions and sensations; they do hereby plainly contradict one main fundamental principle of their own philosophy, that sense is the only ground of certainty, and the criterion of all truth: for if prudent and intelligent persons may be so frequently mistaken, in confounding their own dreams and fancies with sensations, how can there be any certainty of knowledge at all from sense? However, they here derogate so much both from sense, and from human testimonies, as that if the like were done in other cases, it would plainly overthrow all human life.

Wherefore other Atheists, being apprehensive of this inconvenience, of denying so many sensible appearances, and testimonies, or relations of fact, have chose rather to acknowledge the reality of apparitions; nevertheless concluding them to be things caused and created, by the power of imagination only: as if the strength of imagination were such, that it could not only create fancies, but also real sensible objects, and that at a distance too from the imaginers, such as whereby the sense of others shall be for the time affected, though they quickly vanish away again. From which prodigious paradox, we may take notice of the fanaticism of some Atheists, and that there is nothing so monstrously absurd, which men infected with atheistical incredulity will not rather entertain into their belief,
belief; than admit of any thing, that shall the least hazard or endanger the existence of a God. For, if there be once any invisible ghosts or spirits acknowledged as things permanent, it will not be easy for any to give a reason, why there might not be one supreme ghost also, presiding over them all, and the whole world.

In the last place therefore we shall observe, that Democritus was yet further convinced by these relations of apparitions, so as to grant, that there was a certain kind of permanent beings, and independent upon imagination, superior to men, which could appear in different forms, and again disappear at pleasure, called by him idols, or images; he supposing them to be of the same nature with those exuvious effluxes, that stream continually from the surface of bodies; only he would not allow them to have any thing immortal at all in them, but their concretions to be at length all dissolvable, and their personallities then to vanish into nothing. Thus Sextus the philosopher, δημακίσθε εἰδωλία τοις θεοῖς ὑπερέχουσιν τοῖς αὐθηροίσι, ἃ τῶν ταῦτα μεν εἰσίν αὐθηροίσιν, τὰ δὲ κακοποίον ἠθείως οὐκ ἔχουσιν, τοῖς δὲ εἰδωλοίσιν εἰσίν ἐκ τούτων μεγάλα κε μεγάλα σημαίνουσι, διὸ καρδιακά μὲν, εἰς ἀφθονίαν ταύτα μέλλοντα τοῖς αὐθηροίσιν, Θεομάρειν καὶ θεομάρειν. Democritus affirmed, that there are certain idols or spectres, that do often approach to men, some of which are beneficent, and some maleficient. Upon which account he wisely, that it might be his good hap to meet with fortunate idols. And he added, that these are of a vast bigness, and very longe, but not incorruptible, and that they sometimes do foresignify unto men future events, both visibly appearing to them, and sending forth audible voices. Now, though Democritus were much blamed for this concession of his by his fellow-Atheists, as giving thereby too great an advantage to Theists; yet, in his own opinion, did he sufficiently secure himself against the danger of a God from hence, by supposing all these idols of his to be corruptible, they being indeed nothing but certain finer concretions of atoms, a kind of aereal and ethereal animals, that were all body, and without any immortal soul, as he supposed men also to be; so that a God could be no more proved from them, than from the existence of men. For thus he adds in Sextus, θεοὶ τῶν αὐτῶν Φιλοσοφίως ακαταστάτες, οἱ πειπετοὶ, ὑπερέχουσιν εἰς Θεόν, μενενδοὶ, ἀλλὰ τερκταύτα ὑπερέχουσιν εἰς Θεόν, τῷ ἀφθονίᾳ φιλοσοφίως. Men, in ancient times, having a sense of these apparitions or idols, fell from thence into the opinion of a God, although there be, besides these idols, no other God, that hath an incorruptible nature. However, though Democritus continued thus grossly atheistical, yet was he further convinced than our modern Atheists will be, that the stories of apparitions were not all fabulous, and that there are not only terrestrial, but also aereal and ætheral animals; nor this earth of ours alone peopled and inhabited, whilst all those other vast regions above lie desert, solitary and waste. Where it may be observed again, that divers of the ancient fathers, though they agreed not so far with Democritus, as to make the angelical beings to be altogether corporeal, yet did they likewise suppose them to have their certain subtile ætherial or aereal bodies. In which respect St. Austin, in his 11th epistle, calleth angels, æthereos, and devils, æreos animantes.
Of Apparitions, Spirits, Book I.

Thus Phælius in his Dialogue perlegvste <t>demovus</t>, <t>γεν<sup>εν</sup></t>, το δαμασσων ετε ρολον, μετα <t>σωματες</t> δηρε, <t>αμφι</t> <t>σωματες</t> διατεροφθ. Και τουτο εστι τυ περ αυτων μαθηται των σεμων πατησων. Και Βασιλεις, ὥστε ο <t>δηρες</t>, ου δαμασσων μενον, <t>αλλα εις</t> τοις <t>αθροιοις</t> ἄγγελοις, εις εις <t>σωματες</t> διαινεομεν, δια των πνευματα λεζαναι των ἄγγειας, εἰς ἴπται. But you are to know, that demons or devils are not altogether incorporeal, but that they are joined to bodies, and so converse with bodies; which may be learned also from the fathers, the divine Basil contending, that there are bodies, not only in devils, but also in the pure angels themselves, as certain subtle, airy, defecate spirits. Where afterwards he shows, how the <t>σώματες</t> ἄγγελοις οὐκα, that body which is connate with angels, differs from that, which devils are united to, in respect of the radiant splendour of the one, and the dark fuliginous obscurity of the other. Moreover, that devils are not without bodies, he endeavours further to confirm from the words of our Saviour, that they shall be punished with fire; which (faith he) were a thing impossible, were they all of them incorporeal. And some perhaps will attempt to prove the same concerning angels too, from those other words of our Saviour, where, speaking of the resurrection state, he affirmeth, that they, who shall be accounted worthy thereof, shall neither marry, nor be given in marriage, but be εἰσαγγελείον, equal to the angels: which comparative expression of men, as to their bodies with angels, would be thought not so proper, were the angels absolutely devoid of all body. But of this we determine not.

To this phenomenon of apparitions might be added those two others of magicians or wizards, daemonick or Energumēni; both of these proving also the real existence of spirits, and that they are not mere phantacies, and imaginary inhabitants of men's brains only, but real inhabitants of the world. As also, that among those spirits there are some foul, unclean, and wicked ones, (though not made such by God, but by their own apostacy) which is some confirmation of the truth of Christianity, the Scripture insisting so much upon these evil demons or devils, and declaring it to be one design of our Saviour Christ's coming into the world, to oppose these confederate powers of the kingdom of darkness, and to rescue mankind from the thraldom and bondage thereof. As for wizards and magicians, persons who associate and confederate themselves in a peculiar manner with these evil spirits, for the gratification of their own revenge, lust, ambition, and other passions; besides the Scriptures, there hath been so full an attestation given to them by persons unconcerned in all ages, that those our so confident explorers of them, in this present age, can hardly escape the suspicion of having some hankering towards atheism. But as for the daemonick and Energumēni, it hath been wondered, that there should be so many of them in our Saviour's time, and hardly any, or none, in this present age of ours. Certain it is, from the writings of Josephus, in sundry places, that the Pharisaick Jews were then generally possessed with an opinion of these <t>δαμασσων</t> daemonick, men possessed with devils, or infested by them. And this was not a mere phrase or form of speech only amongst them for persons very ill affected in their bodies, may appear from hence, that.

Luke xx. 34, 36.
Witches, that which

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LXXVI.

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\textcolor{red}{\textit{Ant. Jud. Lib. 8. c. 2.}}

\[p. 419, 420\]

God also taught Solomon an art against demons and devils, for the benefit and cure of men; who composed certain incantations, by which diseases are cured, and left forms of exorcisms, whereby devils are expelled and driven away. Which method of curing prevails much amongst us at this very day. Notwithstanding which, we think it not at all probable what a late atheistical writer first asserted, that the heads of the Jews were then all of them so full of demons and devils, that they generally took all manner of bodily diseases, such as fevers and agues, and dumbness and deafness, for devils. Though we grant, that this very thing was imputed by Plotinus afterward to the Gnostic\textit{s}, that they supposed all diseases to be devils, and therefore not to be cured by physick, but expelled by words or charms. Thus he, \textit{En. 2. Lib. 9. c. 14.} 

\[\text{De Bello Judaico, Lib.VII. Cap.VI. §.III.} \]

\[\text{p. 417. Tom. II. Ed. Havercampii.} \]

\[\text{Hobbes. See Leviathan. Cap. XL.} \]

\[\text{F. 212. Oper.} \]

\[\text{De Bello Judaico, Lib.VII. Cap.VI. §.III.} \]

\[\text{p. 417. Tom. II. Ed. Havercampii.} \]

\[\text{Hobbes. See Leviathan. Cap. XL.} \]

\[\text{F. 212. Oper.} \]
Energumeni, or Daemoniacks, Book I.

SOME Devil. Neither was this proper to the Jews only at that time, to suppose evil demons to be the causes of such bodily diseases as had extraordinary symptoms, and especially madness; but the Greeks, and other Gentiles also, were embued with the same persuasion; as appeareth from Apollonius Tyanaeus his curing a laughing demoniac at Athens, he exclaiming that evil spirit by threats and menaces, who is said, at his departure, to have tumbled down a royal porch in the city with great noise; as also, from his freeing the city of Ephesus from the plague, by Stoning an old ragged beggar, said by Apollonius to have been the plague, which appeared to be a daemon, by his changing himself into the form of aflagged dog.

But that there is some truth in this opinion, and that at this very day evil spirits, or demons, do sometimes really act upon the bodies of men, and either inflict or augment bodily distempers and diseases, hath been the judgment of two very experienced physicians, Sennertus and Fernelius. The former in his book De Mania, Lib. i. cap. 15. writing thus; Eft siue ulla corporis morboj dispositione, Deo permittente, hominem obsidere & occupare daemon posseti, tamen quandoque morbis, & precipue melancholici, sese immiscet daemon; & forsae frequentius hoc accidit, quam sese creditur. Although the devil may, by divine permission, possess men without any morbid disposition, yet doth he usually intermingle himself with bodily diseases, and especially those of melancholy; and perhaps this cometh to pass oftener than is commonly believed or suspected. The other in his De abditis rerum Caufis, where having attributed real effects upon the bodies of men to witchcraft and enchantment, he addeth, Neeque folum morbos, verum etiam daemonas, sceleratim homines in corpora immittunt. Hi quidem vesuntur furoris quadem specie diiorti; hoc uno tamen a simplici furore dixt; quod sumi a rura obloquantur, praterita & acculta reiuntient, affidentiumque arcana referent. Neither do these wicked magicians only inflict diseases upon men's bodies, but also send devils into them; by means whereof they appear disordered with a kind of fury and madness, which yet differs from a simple madness (or the disease so called) in this, that they speak of very high and difficult matters, declare things past and unknown, and discover the secrets of those that fit by. Of which he subjoins two notable instances of persons, well known to himself, that were plainly demoniacal, possessed, or acted by an evil daemon; one whereof shall be afterwards mentioned. But when maniacal persons do not only discover secrets, and declare things past, but future also, and, besides this, speak in languages, which they had never learned; this puts it out of all doubt and question, that they are not mere madmen, or Maniaci, but demoniacs or Energumeni. And that since the time of our Saviour Christ there have been often such, may be made evident from the records of credible writers. Pselius in his book Itel' Eugyntas, Δαιμονια, De Operat. Daem. avers it of a certain maniacal woman, that though she knew nothing but her own mother tongue, yet, when a stranger, who was an Armenian, was brought into the room to her, she spake to him presently in the Armenian language, μηδε δε τις προστάτης ἡμεν ὃς, δι παλατίον ἑµπνηγών, καὶ καὶ μηδέποτε μηδ' εις ὑπ' ἀπολυτίκης τότος, μηδ' ἡμερόν εἰς ἓνα πλάνον ὑδρ. We all stood amazed.

amazed, when we heard a woman, that had never seen an Armenian before in all her life, nor had learnt any thing but the use of her disaff, to speak the Armenian language readily. Where the relation also affirmeth the same maniacal person to have foretold certain future events, which happened shortly after to himself; \( \Sigma \) ον, στρατεύσεις πρὸς ἐμι, μεγάλων ἐν χρυσῷ συμφώνῳ ὑπο. Page 65. 

Thus, after yet, the report of the Armenian prediction, whereof the author is minded to believe, it is in effect, 

*Then looking upon me, she (or rather the demon) said, Thou shalt suffer wonderful pains and torments in thy body, for the demons are extremely angry with thee, for opposing their services and worship; and they will inflict great evils upon thee, out of which thou shalt not be able to escape, unless a power, greater than that of demons, exempt thee from them. All which things (faith he) happened shortly after to me, and I was brought very low, even near to death, by them; but was by my Saviour wonderfully delivered. Whereupon Pfellus concludes, Τὸς ἐν ἑπι- 


curvo τὸν χρυσὸν ἑαυκὸς, ἣς τὰς μακρὰς πάσας, ὅλης πλημμελείας κινοῦσι, ἀλλὰ πάντα τραχύνια δαμανᾶν. Who is there therefore, that considering this oracle or prediction, will conclude (as some physicians do) all kind of madness to be nothing but the exorbitant motions of the matter or humours, and not the tragic passions of the demons. But because this infatuation is remoter from our present times, we shall set down another remarkable one of a later date, out of the forementioned Fernelius, who was an eye-witness thereof. A young man of a noble family, who was strangely convulsed in his body, having sometimes one member, and sometimes another, violently agitated, inform much that several persons were scarcely able to hold them; and this at first without any dissembler at all in his head, or crazedness in brain. To whom Fernelius, with other skilful physicians, being called, applied all manner of remedies; blisters, purgations, cupping-glasses, fomentations, unctions, plasters, and strengthening medicines; but all in vain. The reason whereof is thus given by the same Fernelius: Quoniam omnes longe 


callamurum à cognitione veri, nam mense terto primum depraventur daemon qui- 


dam totius malum auctor, vocis, infusorique verbis a sententiae tum Latinis tum 


grecis, (quangelani ignarus linguæ Graecæ laborans est) se prodes; is multa 


efficientium maximaque medicorum secreta degebat, ridens, quod irritis pharma- 


cis corpus hoc pendulans. Because we were all far from the knowledge of the truth; for in the third month, it was first plainly discovered to us, that it was a certain demon, who was the author of all this mischief; he manifesting himself by his speech, and by unusual words and sentences, both in Greek and Latin, (though the patient were altogether ignorant of Greek tongue;) and by his revealing many of the secrets of those, who fed by, especially of the physicians, whom also be derived for tormenting the patient in that manner with their frufraneous remedies. Here therefore have we an unquestionable instance of a daemoniac in these latter times of ours, and such a one, who at first, for two months together, had no manner of madness or mania at all upon him, though afterwards the demon poising his whole body, used his tongue, and spake therewith. Fernelius concludes his whole discourse in this manner: *These things do I produce, to make it manifest, that evil*
Of Miracles; and how

evil daemons (or devils) do sometimes enter into the very bodies of men, afflicting and tormenting them after an unheedful manner; but that at other times, though they do not enter into, and possess their whole body, yet partly by exag-itating and disturbing the profitable humours thereof, partly by reducing the noxious into the principal parts, or else by obstructing the veins and other passages with them, or disordering the structure of the members, they cause innumerable diseases. There are many other instances of this kind, recorded by modern writers unexceptionable, of persons either wholly daemonic, and possessed by evil daemons, (this appearing from their discovering secrets, and speaking languages which they had never learnt) or else otherwise so affected and infected by them, as to have certain unusual and supernatural symptoms; which, for brevity's sake, we shall here omit. However, we thought it necessary thus much to infilt upon this argument of daemoniacks, as well for the vindication of Christianity, as for the conviction of Atheists; we finding some so flattering in their religion, that from this one thing alone of daemoniacks (they being so strongly possessed, that there neither is, nor ever was any such) they are ready enough to suspect the whole Gospel, or New Testament itself, of fabulosity and imposture.

We come now to the second head propos'd, of miracles and effects supernatural. That there hath been something miraculous or above nature, sometimes done even among the Pagans, (whether by good or evil spirits,) appears not only from their own records, but also from the Scripture itself. And it is well known, that they pretended (besides oracles) to miracles also, even after the times of Christianity; and that not only in Apollonius Tyanæus, and Apuleius, but also in the Roman emperors themselves, as Vespasian and Adrian, but especially in the temple of Æsculapius; thus much appearing from that Greek table therein hung up at Rome, in which, amongst other things, this is recorded; That a blind man being commanded by the oracle to kneel before the altar, and then passing from the right side thereof to the left, to lay five fingers upon the altar, and afterwards lifting up his hand, to touch his eyes therewith; all this being done accordingly, he recovered his sight, the people all applauding, that great miracles were done under the emperor Antoninus, &c. But we have in the Scripture an account of miracles, both greater in number, and of a higher nature; done especially by Moses, and our Saviour Christ and his Apostles.

Wherefore it seems, that there are two sorts of miracles or effects supernatural. First, such as though they could not be done by any ordinary and natural causes here amongst us, and in that respect may be called supernatural; yet might notwithstanding be done, God permitting only, by the ordinary and natural power of other invisible created spirits, angels or daemons. As for example, if a stone or other heavy body should first ascend upwards, and then hang in the air, without any visible either mover or supporter, this would be to us a miracle or effect supernatural; and yet, according to vulgar opinion, might this be done by the natural power of created

* Vide Gruteri Inscription. Tom. I. p. LXXI.
created invisible beings, angels or daemons; God only permitting, without whole special providence it is conceived they cannot thus meddle with our human affairs. Again, if a perfectly illiterate person should readily speak Greek or Latin, this also would be to us a miracle, or effect supernatural; for so is the Apostle’s speaking with tongues accounted; and yet in Demoniacs is this sometimes done by evil daemons, God only permitting. Such also amongst the Pagans was that miraculum colis, (as Apuleius calls it) that miracle of the eunuch, done by Accius Navius, when, at his command, it was divided into two with a razor. But secondly, there is another sort of miracles, or effects supernatural, such as are above the power of all second causes, or any natural created being whatsoever, and so can be attributed to none but God Almighty himself, the author of nature, who therefore can controul it at pleasure.

As for that late theological politician, who, writing against miracles, denies as well those of the former, as of this latter kind, contending that a miracle is nothing but a name, which the ignorant vulgar gives to opus naturæ inffolium, any unwonted work of nature, or to what themselves can assign no cause of; as also, that if there were any such thing done contrary to nature, or above it, it would rather weaken than confirm our belief of the divine existence; we find his discourse every way so weak, groundless, and inconsiderable, that we could not think it here to deserve a confutation.

But of the former sort of those miracles, is that to be understood, Deuter. xiii. If there arise among you a prophet, or dreamer of dreams, and giveth thee a sign or a wonder, and the sign or wonder come to pass, whereof he spake unto thee, saying, Let us go after other gods, and serve them; thou shalt not hearken to the words of that prophet, or dreamer of dreams; for the Lord your God proveth you [here, whether you love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul. For it cannot be supposed, that God Almighty would himself purposely inspire any man to exhort others to idolatry, and immediately afflict such a one with his own supernatural power of doing miracles, in confirmation of such doctrine. But the meaning is, that by the suggestion of evil spirits, some false prophets might be raised up to tempt the Jews to idolatry; or at least, that, by assistance of them, such miracles might be wrought in confirmation thereof, as those sometimes done by the Egyptian sorcerers or magicians, God himself not interposing in this case to hinder them, for this reason, that he might hereby prove and try their faithfulness towards him. Forasmuch as both, by the pure light of nature, and God’s revealed will, before confirmed by miracles, idolatry, or the religious worship of any but God Almighty, had been sufficiently condemned. From whence it is evident, that miracles alone (at least such miracles as these) are no sufficient confirmation of a true prophet, without consideration had of the doctrine taught by him. For though a man should have done never so many true and real miracles amongst the Jews, and yet should persuade to idolatry, he was by them confidently to be condemned to death for a false prophet.

Accordingly,

Accordingly in the New Testament do we read, that our Saviour Christ forewarned his disciples, that false prophets and false Christs should arise, and show great signs or wonders, in so much, that if it were possible, they should seduce the very elect. And St. Paul foretelleth concerning the man of sin, or antichrist: That his coming should be after the working of Satan, with all power, and signs, and wonders (or miracles) of a lie. For we conceive, the former are not properly meant feigned and counterfeit miracles, that is, meer cheating and juggling tricks, but true wonders and real miracles, (viz. of the former sort mentioned) done for the confirmation of a lie, as the doctrine of this man of sin is there afterwards called; for otherwise how could his coming be said to be according to the working of Satan, with all power? In like manner also, in St. John's Apocalypse, where the coming of the same man of sin, and the mystery of iniquity, is again described, we read Chap. xiii. of a two-horned beast like a lamb, That he shall do great wonders, and deceive them, that dwell on the earth, by means of those miracles, which he hath power to do, in the sight of the beast. And again, Chap. xvi. Of certain unclean spirits like frogs, coming out of the mouth of the dragon, and of the beast, and of the false prophet, which are the spirits of devils working miracles, that go forth to the kings of the earth. And lastly, Chap. xix. Of the false prophet, that wrought miracles before the beast. All which seem to be understood, not of feigned and counterfeit miracles only, but of true and real alike, effected by the working of Satan, in confirmation of a lie, that is, of idolatry, false religion and imposture; God Almighty permitting it, partly in way of probation or trial of the faithfulness of his own servants, and partly in way of just judgment and punishment upon those, who receive not the love of the truth, that they might be saved; as the Apostle declareth. Wherefore those miracles, pretended, for divers ages past, to have been done before the relics of saints and images, &c. were they all true, could by no means justify or warrant that religious worship by many given to them; because true and real miracles, done in order to the promoting of idolatry, are so far from justifying that idolatry, that they are themselves condemned by it to be τισατα ἁμαρτεις, the miracles of a lie, done by the working of Satan.

But as for the miracles of our Saviour Christ, had they been all of them only of the former kind, such as might have been done, God permitting, by the natural power of created spirits, and their assistance; yet for as much as he came in the name of the Lord, teaching neither idolatry, nor any thing contrary to the clear light and law of nature, therefore ought he, by reason of those miracles, to have been received by the Jews themselves, and owned for a true prophet, according to the doctrine of Moses himself. Who both in the 13th and 18th chapters of Deuter. plainly supposeth, that God would in no other case permit any false prophet to do miracles by the assistance of evil spirits, save only in that of idolatry, and, (which is always understood of what is plainly discoverable by the light of nature

2 Luke xxiv. 24. 2 Thess. ii. 9. 3 Thess. ii. 10.
done by false Prophets.

The conclusion is, that though all miracles promiscuously do not immediately prove the existence of a God, nor confirm a prophet, or whatever doctrine; yet do they all of them evince, that there is a rank of invisible understanding beings, superior to men, which the Atheists commonly deny. And we read of some such miracles also, as could not be wrought, but by a power perfectly supernatural, or by God Almighty himself. But to deny and disbelieve all miracles, is either to deny all certainty of sense, which would be indeed to make sensation itself miraculous; or else monstrously and unreasonably to derogate from human testimonies and history. The Jews would never have so stiffly and pertinaciously adhered to the ceremonial law of Moses, had they not all along believed it to have been unquestionably confirmed by miracles; and that the Gentiles should at first have entertained the faith of Christ without miracles, would itself have been the greatst of miracles.
The last extraordinary phænomenon proposed was that of divination, oracles, prophecies, or predictions of future events, otherwise unforeknowable to men; which either evince a God, or at least that there are understanding beings superior to men. For if there be presenfion or foreknowledge of such future events, as are to human understanding alone altogether unforeknowable, then is it certain, that there is some more perfect understanding, or knowledge in the world, than that of men. And thus is that maxim of the ancient Pagan Theifts, in the genuine and proper sense thereof, unquestionably true; *Si divination est, dixit; If there be divination, or presenfion of future events, (undiscoverable by men) then are there gods: which, in their language, was no more than to say, understanding beings superior to men.

Wherefore we must here distinguish of oracles and predictions, after the same manner as we did before of miracles, that they may be of two kinds. First, such as might proceed only from the natural prefaging power of created spirits superior to men, whether called angels or demons. For these being supposed to have not only clearer understandings than men, and a greater insight into nature, but also by reason of their agility and invisibility, opportunity of knowing things remotely distant, and of being privy to men's secret machinations and consultations; it is easily conceivable, that many future events nigh at hand, which cannot be foreknown by men, may be (probably at least) foreseen by them; and that without any miraculous divine revelation, their causes being already in being. As men learned in astronomy can foretell eclipses of the sun and moon, which to the vulgar are altogether unforeknowable; and as princes or state-men, that are furnished with great intelligence, foreign and domestick, can preface more of war and peace, either at home or abroad, and of the events of kingdoms, than ignorant plebeians. And such were those predictions, which Democritus, though otherwise much addicted to atheism, allowed of; Cicero writing thus of him, *Plurimos locis, gravior auter Democritus presenfionem rerum futurarum comprobavit; Democritus, a grave writer, did in many places approve of the presenfion of future events. The reason whereof was, because he supposed certain understanding beings superior to men, called by him idols, which having a larger comprehension of things, and other advantages of knowledge, could therefore foretell many future events, that men were ignorant of. And though perhaps it may be thought, that Democritus would not have entertained this opinion of the foreknowledge of human events, had he not afflicted the necessity of all human actions and volitions, but held liberty of will, as Epicurus afterwards did: (as if this were inconsistent with all manner of prefage, and probable or conjectural foreknowledge;) yet is it certain, that there is not so much contingency in all human actions, by reason of this liberty of will, as heretofore was by Epicurus, and still is by many supposed; it being plain, that men act according to an appearance of good, and that in many cases and circumstances it may be foreknown, without any divine revelation, what such or such persons

prove Invisible Beings.

persons would do. As for example, that a voluptuous person, having a strong temptation to satisfy his sensual appetite, and that without incurring any inconvenience of flame or punishment, would readily close with the same. Besides which, such invisible spirits, as angels or daemons, may sometimes predict also what themselves cause and effect.

Secondly, There is another sort of predictions of future events, which cannot be imputed to the natural presaging faculty of any such created spirits, but only to the supernatural prescience of God Almighty, or a Being infinitely perfect: as when events remotely distant in time, and of which there are yet no immediate causes actually in being, which also depend upon many circumstances, and a long series of things, any one of which being otherwise would alter the case; as likewise upon much uncertainty of human volitions, which are not always necessarily linked and concatenated with what goes before, but often loose and free; and upon that contingency, that arises from the indifference or equality of eligibility in objects. Lastly, such things as do not at all depend upon external circumstances neither, nor are caused by things natural antecedent, but by some supernatural power; I say, when such future events as these are foretold, and accordingly come to pass, this can be ascribed to no other but such a Being as comprehends, fways, and governs all, and is, by a peculiar privilege or prerogative of its own nature, omniscient. Epicurus, though really he therefore rejected divination and prediction of future events, because he denied providence; yet did he pretend this further reason also against it, because it was a thing absolutely inconsistent with liberty of will, and destructive of the same; *μακρινὴν ἀνθυπαρχεῖν* εἶ δὲ νυπαρχεῖν, οὐδὲν παρὰ ημᾶς ἔδη τὰ γινόμενα. Diog. Laert. Divination is a thing, which hath no existence, nor possibility in nature: and if there were such a thing, it would take away all liberty of will, and leave nothing in men's own power. Thus also Carneades, in Cicero's, maintained, *Ne Apollinem quidem futura posse dicere, nisi ea, quorum causas natura ita continget, ut ea fieri necesse esset.* That Apollo himself was not able to foretell any future events, other than such, as had necessary causes in nature antecedent. And some Christian Theists of later times have, in like manner, denied to God Almighty all foreknowledge of human actions, upon the same pretence, as being both inconsistent with men's liberty of will, and destructive thereof. For, say they, if men's actions be free, then are they unknowable, they having no necessary causes; and again, if there be any foreknowledge of them, then can they not be free, they being *ipsa facta* necessitated thereby. But as it is certain, that prescience does not destroy the liberty of man's will, or impose any necessity upon it, men's actions being not therefore future, because they are foreknown, but therefore foreknown, because future; and were a thing never so contingent, yet upon supposition that it will be done, it must needs have been future from all eternity: so is it extreme arrogance for men, because themselves can naturally foreknow nothing, but by some causes antecedent, as an eclipse of the sun or moon, therefore to presume to measure the knowledge of God Almighty according

* De Fato, Cap. XIV. p. 3281. Tom. IX. Oper.
The Scriptures triumphing

according to the same fcanling, and to deny him the presence of human actions, not considering, that, as his nature is incomprehensible, so his knowledge may well be looked upon by us as such too; that which is past our finding out, and too wonderful for us. However, it must be acknowledged for an undoubted truth, that no created being can, naturally, and of itself, foreknow any future events, otherwise than in and by their causes anteceding. If therefore we shall find, that there have been predictions of such future events as had no necessary antecedent causes; as we cannot but grant such things therefore to be foreknowable, so must we needs from thence infer the existence of a God, that is, a Being supernatural, infinitely perfect and omniscient, since such predictions as these could have proceeded from no other cause.

That there is foreknowledge of future events to men naturally unforeknowable, hath been all along the persuasion of the generality of mankind. Thus Cicero, Vetus opinio est, jam usque ab horoicis duat: temporius us, caque & populi Romani, omnium Gentium firmata consensa, verius quam inter homines divinationem, quam Graeci & Romani appellant, id est, præfensionem & scientiam rerum futurarum. This is an old opinion derived down all along from the heroic times (or the mythical age); and not only entertained amongst the Romans, but also confirmed by the consent of all nations, that there is such a thing as divination, and prediction or foreknowledge of future events. And the same writer elsewhere, in the person of Balbus, Quamvis nihil tam irriter det Epicurus, quem praedictionem rerum futurarum nibi videtur tamen vel maximè confirmare, Deorum providentia consuli rebus humanis. Et eum praedictionem divinationis, quod multis locis, rebus, temporibus appareat, cium in privatis tum maximè in publicis. Multa cernunt aruspices, multa augures provident, multa oraculis providentur, multa vaticinationibus, multa somnis, multa portentis. Although Epicurus derive nothing more than the prediction of future things; yet does this seem to me to be a great confirmation of the providence of the gods over human affairs, because there is certainly divination, it appearing in many places, things, and times, and that not only private, but especially publick. Soothsayers foresee many things, the augurs many; many things are declared by oracles, many by prophecies, many by dreams, and many by portents. And indeed that there were even amongst the Pagans predictions of future events, not discoverable by any human sagacity, which accordingly came to pass, and therefore argue a knowledge superiour to that of men, or that there are certain invisible understanding beings or spirits, seems to be undeniable from history. And that the augurs themselves were sometimes not unsatisfied by these officious genii, is plain from that of Attius Navius before mentioned, as the circumstances thereof are related by historians; that Tarquinius Priscus having a mind to try what there was in this skill of augury, Dixit ei se cogitare quiddam; id postea fieri, confuluit. Ille augurio etio, poste respondet. Tarquinius autem dixit se cogitasse cotem novaculam posse praecidi; tum Attium jussisse experiri: ita cotem in comitum illatum, inspicientes & regem & populum, novaculam esse discessam. Told Navius, that he thought of something, and he would know

know of him, whether it could be done or no. Navius having performed his augurating ceremonies, replied, that the thing might be done. Whereupon Priscus declared what his thought was, namely, that a whetstone might be cut in two with a razor. Navius willed them to make trial: wherefore a whetstone being brought immediately into the court, it was in the sight of the king and all the people divided with a razor. But the predictions amongst those Pagans were, for the most part, only of the former kind, such as proceeded merely from the natural prefaging faculty of these daemons; this appearing from hence, because their oracles were often expressed ambiguously, so as that they might be taken either way; tho' daemons themselves, it seems, being then not confident of the event; as also, because they were sometimes plainly mistaken in the events. And from hence it was, that they seldom ventured to foretel any events remotely distant, but only what were nigh at hand, and shortly to come to pass; and therefore might be probably conjectured of from things then in being. Notwithstanding which, we acknowledge, that there are some few instances of predictions amongst the Pagans, of the other kind. Such as that intimated by Cicero in his book of Divination 1, where he declareth the doctrine of Diodorus concerning necessity and contingency; Non necesse fuiffe Cypelum regvare Corinti, quamquam id millefimo ante anno Apollinis oraculo editum effet: That it was not necessary Cypelus the tyrant should reign at Corinth, though that were a thing predicted by Apollo's oracle a thousand years before. As also this recorded by Varro 2, of Vestius Valens, an augur in the time of Romulus, who when Rome was a building, from the flying of twelve vultures prefaged, that the continuance of that city would be for twelve hundred years: which seems to have been accordingly fulfilled, in the year of our Lord four hundred fifty and five, immediately after the death of the third Valentinian (whom some make to be the last real emperor of the West or Rome) when Genericus the Vandal took the city the second time, and fired it. But above all, that of the Sibyls; of whose prophecies such things are recorded by pagan writers, as makes it very suspicious, that they did foretel the coming of our Saviour Christ, and the times of Christianity. But were these, and the like pagan prophecies, real, then must they needs have had some higher original than the natural prefaging faculty of their daemons, especially those of the Sibyls; who, for aught we know, might be as well afflicted supernaturally to predict our Saviour Christ, amongst the Pagans in the West, as Balaam was in the East.

But here the Scripture triumpheth over Paganism, and all its oracles and divinations; there being contained in it so many unquestionable predictions of events to follow a long time after, and such as can be imputed to nothing but the supernatural foreknowledge and omniscience of God Almighty. As for example, those concerning the Messiah, or our Saviour Christ, delivered by Jacob, Moses, David, Isaiah, Jeremy, Daniel, and most of the prophets; foretelling many particular circumstances of his coming, and that grand event, which followed after, of the Gentiles or Pagans.

1 It should be; De Fato, Cap. vii. p. 3269. 2 In the Fragments of the XVIth Book of his Antiquitates Rerum Humanarum.
gans to general reception and entertainment of Christianit... a Deity; neither can these possibly be imputed by Atheists, as other things, to men's fear and fancy, nor yet to the fiction of politicians. Nor do they only evince a Deity, but confirm Christianity also; partly as predicted by them in Cardan, &c. Vide Hieronymum Comment. in Daniel. Tom. V. Oper. p. 481.
in its several circumstances, a grand one whereof was the Gentiles reception of it; and partly as itself predicting future events, this spirit of prophecy being the testimony of Jesus. Both which Scripture-prophecies, of Christ in the Old Testament, and from him in the New, are of equal, if not greater force to us in this present age, for the confirmation of our faith, than the miracles themselves recorded in the Scripture; we having now certain knowledge our selves of many of those events, and being no way able to suspect, but that the prophecies were written long before.

To conclude; all these extraordinary phænomena of apparitions, witchcraft, possessions, miracles, and prophecies, do evince that spirits, angels or demons, though invisible to us, are no phancies, but real and substantial inhabitants of the world; which favours not the atheistic hypothesis: but some of them, as the higher kind of miracles and predictions, do also immediately enforce the acknowledgment of a Deity; a Being superior to nature, which therefore can check and control it; and which comprehending the whole, foreknows the most remotely distant, and contingent events.

And now have we not only fully answered and confuted all the atheistic pretences against the idea of God, tending to disprove his existence; but also occasionally proposed several solid and substantial arguments for a Deity: as, that all successive things, the world, motion, and time, are in their own nature absolutely incapable of an ante-eternity; and therefore, there must of necessity be something else of a permanent duration, that was eternal without beginning; that no Atheist, according to his principles, can possibly give any account of the original of his own soul or mind; that the phænomenon of motion cannot be solved without an incorporeal principle, presiding over the whole; that the το έ τι καὶ ξαλλός, the artificial, regular, and orderly frame of things, together with the harmony of the whole, demonstrate an understanding and intending cause of the world, that ordered things for ends and good. Besides, that there are several other phænomena, both ordinary and extraordinary, which Atheists being no way able to solve, are forced to deny.

True indeed, some of the ancient Atheists have themselves affirmed, that there could be no demonstration of a God: which assertion of theirs hath been by others misunderstood into this sense, as if there were therefore no certainty at all to be had of God's existence, but only a conjectural probability; no knowledge or science, but only faith and opinion. Whereas the true meaning of those ancient Atheists, who denied that there could be any demonstration of a God, was only this, That the existence of a God could not be demonstrated a priori, himself being the first cause of all things. Thus doth Alexander Aphrodisius, in his Physical Doubts and Solutions, after he had propounded an argument for a God, according to Aristotle's principles, from motion, declare himself; η δείγης κατα αναλυτικα, καὶ μονοποιητικω της φρονειας αναλωμιν, κατα το προς ταυτα συμφωνιαν αλλωτι χρωματις συνθησατη τη ενειο φωσιν That this argument...
The Cartesian Scepticism; that

that was in way of analysis only; it being not possible, that there should be a demonstration of the first Principle of all. Wherefore (faith he) we must here fetch our beginning from things, that are after it, and manifest; and thence, by way of analysis, ascend to the proof of that first nature, which was before them. And to the same purpose Clements Alexandrinus, having first affirmed, \\
\[\text{\footnotesize Strom. I. 5.}\\n\text{\footnotesize p. 388.}\\n\text{\footnotesize [Cap. XII. p. 695. Edit. Potteri.]}\]

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\text{\footnotesize Des Cartes.}'

common
common notions. But when we are once assured of the existence of such a God as is essentially good, who therefore neither will nor can deceive; then, and not before, will this supposition utterly vanish, and ourselves become certain, that our faculties of reason and understanding are not false and impious, but rightly made. From which hypothesis it plainly follows, that all those Theists, who suppose God to be a mere arbitrary being, whose will is not determined by any nature of goodness or rule of justice, but itself is the first rule of both (they thinking this to be the highest perfection, liberty, and power) can never be reasonably certain of the truth of any thing, not so much as that two and two are four; because, so long as they adhere to that persuasion, they can never be assured, but that such an arbitrary omnipotent Deity might designedly make them such, as should be deceived in all their clearest perceptions.

Now though there be a plausibility of piety in this doctrine, as making the knowledge of a God essentially good so necessary a praecognitum to all other science, that there can be no certainty of truth at all without it; yet does that very supposition, that our understanding faculties might possibly be so made, as to deceive us in all our clearest perceptions, (wherefore ever it is admitted) render it utterly impossible ever to arrive to any certainty concerning the existence of a God essentially good; forasmuch as this cannot be any otherwise proved, than by the use of our faculties of understanding, reason, and discourse. For to say, that the truth of our understanding faculties is put out of all doubt and question, as soon as ever we are assured of the existence of a God essentially good, who therefore cannot deceive; whilst this existence of a God is in the mean time itself no otherwise proved, than by our understanding faculties; that is, at once to prove the truth of God's existence from our faculties of reason and understanding, and again to prove the truth of those faculties from the existence of a God essentially good: this, I say, is plainly to move round in a circle, and to prove nothing at all; a grofs oversight, which the forementioned philosopher seems plainly guilty of.

Wherefore, according to this hypothesis, we are of necessity condemned to eternal scepticism, both concerning the existence of a God, when, after all our arguments and demonstrations for the same, we must at length gratify the Atheists with this confession in the conclusion, that it is possible notwithstanding there may be none; and also concerning all other things, the certainty whereof is supposed to depend upon the certainty of the existence of such a God as cannot deceive.

So that if we will pretend to any certainty at all concerning the existence of a God, we must of necessity explode this new sceptical hypothesis of the possibility of our understandings being so made, as to deceive us in all our clearest perceptions; by means whereof we can be certain of the truth of nothing, and to use our utmost endeavour to remove the same. In the
first place therefore we affirm, that no power, how great soever, and therefore not omnipotence itself, can make any thing to be indifferently either true or false, this being plainly to take away the nature both of truth and falsity, or to make them nothing but words, without any signification. Truth is not factitious; it is a thing, which cannot be arbitrarily made, but is. The divine will and omnipotence itself (now supposed by us) hath no imperium upon the divine understanding; for if God understood only by will, he would not understand at all. In the next place we add, that though the truth of singular contingent propositions depends upon the things themselves existing without, as the measure and archetype thereof; yet, as to the universal and abstract theorems of science, the terms whereof are those reasons of things, which exist no where but only in the mind itself (whole noemata and ideas they are) the measure and rule of truth concerning them can be no foreign or extraneous thing without the mind, but must be native and domestick to it, or contained within the mind itself, and therefore can be nothing but its clear and distinct perception. In these intelligible ideas of the mind, whatsoever is clearly perceived to be, is; or, which is all one, is true. Every clear and distinct perception is an entity or truth, as that, which is repugnant to conception, is a non-entity or falsity. Nay, the very essence of truth here is this clear perceptibility, or intelligibility; and therefore can there not be any clear or distinct perception of falsity: which must be acknowledged by all those, who, though granting false opinions, yet agree in this, that there can be no false knowledge. For the knowledge of these universal abstract truths is nothing but the clear and distinct perception of the several ideas of the mind, and their necessary relations to one another: wherefore, to say, that there can be no false knowledge, is all one as to say, that there can be no clear and distinct perceptions of the ideas of the mind false. In false opinions, the perception of the understanding power itself is not false, but only obscure. It is not the understanding power or nature in us, that erreth, but it is we ourselves, who err, when we rashly and unwarily assent to things not clearly perceived by it. The upshot of all is this, that since no power, how great soever, can make any thing indifferently to be true; and since the essence of truth in universal abstract things is nothing but clear perceptibility, it follows, that omnipotence cannot make any thing, that is false, to be clearly perceived to be, or create such minds and understanding faculties, as shall have as clear conceptions of falsities, that is, of non-entities, as they have of truths or entities. For example, no rational understanding being, that knows what a part is, and what a whole, what a cause and what an effect, could possibly be so made, as clearly to conceive the part to be greater than the whole, or the effect to be before the cause, or the like. Wherefore, we may presume with reverence to say, that there could not possibly be a world of rational creatures made by God, either in the moon, or in some other planet, or elsewhere, that should clearly and distinctly conceive all things contrary to what are clearly perceived by us; nor could our human faculties have been so made, as that we should have as clear conceptions of falsities as of truths. Mind or understanding facul-
ties in creatures may be made more or less weak, imperfect, and obscure, but they could not be made false, or such as should have clear and distinct conceptions of that which is not, because every clear perception is an entity; and though omnipotence can make something out of nothing, yet can it not make something to be nothing, nor nothing something. All which is no more, than is generally acknowledged by the theologers, when they affirm, that God Almighty himself cannot do things contradictory; there being no other reason for this assertion, but only this, because contradictory is repugnant to conception. So that conception and knowledge are hereby made to be the measure of all power, even omnipotence, or infinite power itself, being determined thereby; from whence it follows, that power hath no dominion over understanding, truth, and knowledge; nor can infinite power make anything whatsoever to be clearly conceivable. For could it make contradictory things clearly conceivable, then would itself be able to do them; because whatsoever can be clearly conceived by any, may unquestionably be done by infinite power.

It is true indeed, that sense, considered alone by itself, doth not reach to the absoluteness either of the natures, or of the existence of things without us, it being, as such, nothing but seeming, appearance, and phancy. And thus it is that laying of some ancient philosophers to be understood, that πάντα φαντασία ἀληθεία, every phantasy is true; namely, because sense and phancy reach not to the absolute truth and falsehood of things, but contain themselves only within seeming and appearance; and every appearance must needs be a true appearance. Notwithstanding which, it is certain, that sense often represents to us corporeal things otherwise than indeed they are, which though it be not a formal, yet is it a material falsity. Wherefore sense in the nature of it is not absolute, but πρό τι, or τοι, relative to the sentient. And by sense alone, without any mixture of reason or understanding, we can be certain of no more concerning the things without us, but only this, that they do seem to us. Hence was that of the ancient atomick philosophers in Plato, ἢ σὺ διψάσας ταῦτα ἄν ὁ οἶδα σου Φαντάσματα, p. 154. [κατ' ἑαυτὸν χερῶν, των, εἰς ῥυόναν, ἐν ὑμιᾷ ἐν οὐ ζωῷ. Neither you nor any man else can [p. 119. Ed. Ficini.] be certain, that every other man and brute animal hath all the very same phantasms of colours, that himself hath. Now were there no other perception in us, but that of sense, (as the old atheifick philosophers concluded knowledge to be sense) then would all our human perceptions be merely seeming, phantastical and relative; and none of them reach to the absolute truth of things. Every one in Protagoras' his language would then τὰ αὐτοῦ μόνον ἄναλημα, think or opine only his own things; all his truths being private and relative to himself. And that Protagorean aphorism were to be admitted also in the sense of that philosopher, that πάντων χερουκατον μὲτκνος ἀνθρώπων, Every man is the measure of all things to himself; and, that no one man’s opinion was righter than another’s, but τὰ Φαντασία ἑαυτῆς. That which seemed to every one, was to him true, to whom it seemed; all truth and perception being but seeming and relative. But here lies one main difference betwixt understanding, or knowledge, and sense; that whereas the latter is

Vide Platon. in Theaeteto, p. 118.
Mind reaches absolute Truth. Book I.

Phantastical and relative only; the former reacheth beyond phancy and appearance to the absoluteness of truth. For as it hath been already declared, whatsoever is clearly and distinctly perceived in things abstract and universal, by any one rational Being in the whole world, is not a private thing, and true to himself only that perceived it; but it is, as some Stoicks have called it, ἀληθεία καθολικά, a publick, catholick, and universal truth: it obtains everywhere, and, as Empedocles fang of natural justice,

* Διὰ τ’ εὐρωπέον
 Ἀληθείαν οὐκ εὐτύχει, διὰ τ’ ἀληθές ἀνδρόν.

It is extended throughout the vast ether, and through infinite light or space. And were there indeed infinite worlds, all thickly peopled with rational animals, it would be alike true to every one of them. Nor is it conceivable, that omnipotence itself could create any such understanding beings, as could have clear and distinct perceptions of the contrary to all that is perceived by us, no more than it could do things contradistinct. But in all probability, because sense is indeed but seeming, phantastical, and relative, this is the reason, that some have been so prone and inclinable to suspect the like of understanding, and all mental perception too, that this also is but seeming and relative; and that therefore men's minds or understandings might have been so made, by an arbitrary omnipotent Deity, as clearly and distinctly to perceive every thing that is false. But, if notwithstanding all that hath been said, any will still sing over the old song again; that all this, which hath been hitherto declared by us, is indeed true, if our human faculties be true, or rightly made; but we can go no further than our faculties; and whether these be true or no, no man can ever be certain: we have no other reply to make, but that this is an over-stiff and heavy adherence to a prejudice of their own minds; that not only sense, but also reason and understanding, and all human perception is meerly seeming, or phantastical, and relative to faculties only, but not reaching to the absoluteness of any truth; and that the human mind hath no criterion of truth at all within itself.

Nevertheless, it will probably be here further objected; that this is too great an arrogance, for created Beings to pretend to an absolute certainty of any thing, it being the sole privilege and prerogative of God Almighty to be infallible, who is therefore styled in Scripture, ὁ μόνος σύζυγος, the only wife; to which we briefly answer, that the Deity is the first original fountain of truth and wisdom, which is said to be the brightness of the everlasting light, the unspotted mirror of the power of God, and the image of his goodness. The divine Word is the archetypal pattern of all truth; it is ignorant of nothing, and knoweth all things infallibly. But created Beings have but a derivative participation hereof, their understandings being obscure, and they erring in many things, and being ignorant of more. And it seems to be no derogation from Almighty God to suppose, that created minds by a participation of the divine mind,

mind, should be able to know certainly, that two and two make four; that equals added to equals will make equals; that a whole is greater than the part; and the cause before the effect; and that nothing can be made without a cause; and such like other common notions, which are the principles from whence all their knowledge is derived. And indeed were rational creatures never able to be certain of any such thing as this at all; what would their life be but a mere dream or shadow? and themselves but a ridiculous and pompous piece of phantastick vanity? Befides, it is no way congruous to think, that God Almighty should make rational creatures, so as to be in an utter impossibility of ever attaining to any certainty of his own existence; or of having more than an hypothetical assurance thereof, if our faculties be true, (which possibly may be otherwise) then is there a God. We shall conclude this discourse against the Cartesian scepticism with that of Origen's, Μἐνοω τῶν ὅτων διεξαμεν ἡμᾶς, Knowledge is the only thing in the world, which creatures have, that is in its own nature firm; they having here something of certainty, but nowhere else.

Wherefore we having now that, which Archimedes required, some firm ground and footing to stand upon, such a certainty of truth in our common notions, as that they cannot possibly be false; without which, nothing at all could be proved by reason: we shall in the next place endeavour, not to shake or diftelle any thing thereby, (which was the undertaking of that geometrician) but to confirm and establish the truth of God's existence, and that from the very idea of him, hitherto made good and defended against all the assualts of Atheists.

It is well known, that Cartesius hath lately made a pretence to do this, with mathematical evidence and certainty, and he dispatches the business briefly after this manner: God, or a perfect Being, includeth necessary existence in his very idea; and therefore he is. But though the inventor of this argument, or rather the reviver of that, which had been before used by some Scholasticks, affirmeth it to be as good a demonstration for the existence of a God, from his idea, as that in geometry, for a triangle's having three angles equal to two right, is from the idea of a triangle; yet nevertheless it is certain, that, by one means or other, this argument hath not hitherto proved so fortunate and successful, there being many, who cannot be made sensible of any efficacy therein, and not a few, who condemn it for a mere sophism. As for ourselves, we neither have any mind to quarrel with other men's arguments pro Deo; nor yet would we be thought to lay stress, in this cause, upon any thing which is not every way solid and substantial. Wherefore we shall here endeavour to set down the utmost that possibly we can, both against this argument, and for it, impartially and candidly; and then, when we have done, leave the intelligent readers to make their own judgement concerning the same.

Against it in this manner; first, because we can frame an idea in our own

own minds, of an absolutely perfect Being, including necessary existence in it, it will not at all follow from thence, that therefore there is such a perfect Being really existing without our minds; we being able to frame in our minds the ideas of many other things, that never were, nor will be. All that can be certainly inferred from the idea of a perfect Being seems to be this, that if it contain nothing, which is contradictory to it, then it is not impossible, but that there might be such a Being actually existing. But the strength of this argument not lying meerly in this, that because we have an idea of a perfect Being, therefore it is; but because we have such an idea of it, as includeth necessary existence in it, which the idea of nothing else besides doth; therefore may it be here further objected in this manner: That though it be very true, that a perfect Being doth include necessary existence in it, because that cannot be every way perfect, whose existence is not necessary, but contingent; yet will it not follow from hence, that therefore there is such a perfect Being actually existing; but all that can be deduced from it, will be no more than this, that whatsoever hath no necessary and eternal existence, is no absolutely perfect Being. And again, that if there be any absolutely perfect Being, then was its existence always necessary, and will be always such; that is, it did both exist of itself, from all eternity, without beginning, and must needs exist to eternity incorruptibly; it being never able to cease to be. It seems indeed no more to follow, that because a perfect Being includes necessary existence in its idea, therefore there is such a perfect Being actually existing; than because a perfect Being includes necessary omniscience and omnipotence in it, that therefore there is such a perfect omniscient and omnipotent Being: all that follows in both cases, being only this; that if there be any Being absolutely perfect, then it is both omniscient and omnipotent, and it did exist of itself necessarily, and can never cease to be. Wherefore here lies a fallacy in this argumentation, when from the necessity of existence affirmed only hypothetically, or upon a supposition of a perfect Being, the conclusion is made concerning it absolutely. As some would prove the necessity of all human events, as for example of Adam’s finning, in this manner, that it always was true before, that either Adam would eat the forbidden fruit, or not eat it; and if he would eat it, he would certainly eat it, and not contingently; and again, if he would not eat it, then would he certainly and necessarily not eat it: wherefore whether he will eat it, or not eat it, he will do either necessarily, and not contingently. Where it is plain, that an absolute necessity is wrongly inferred in the conclusion from an hypothetical one in the premises. In like manner, when upon supposition of an absolutely perfect Being, it is affirmed of it, that its existence must not be contingent, but necessary, and from thence the conclusion is made absolutely, that there is such a perfect Being; this seems to be the very same fallacy. From the idea of a perfect Being including necessary existence in it, it follows undeniably, that if there be any thing absolutely perfect, it must exist necessarily, and not contingently: but it doth
doth not follow, that there must of necessity be such a perfect Being existing; these two propositions carrying a very different sense from one another. And the latter of them, that there must of necessity be a God, or perfect Being existing, seems to be a thing altogether indemonstrable; it implying, that the existence of God, or a perfect Being, may be proved a priori, or from some antecedent necessary cause; which was before declared to be a thing contradictory and impossible.

And now in justice are we obliged to plead the best we can also on the defensive side. Thus therefore, the idea of God, or an absolutely perfect Being, including in it, not an impossible, nor a contingent, but a necessary schesis, or relation to existence, it follows from thence absolutely, and without any ifs and ands, that he doth exist. For as of things contradictory, having therefore in the idea of them an impossible schesis to existence, we can confidently conclude, that they never were, nor will be; and as of other things not contradictory or impossible, but imperfect only, which therefore have a contingent schesis to existence, we can pronounce also, that possibly they might be, or might not be: in like manner, a perfect Being including in the idea of it a necessary schesis to existence, or an impossible one to non-existence, or containing existence in its very essence; we may by parity of reason conclude concerning it, that it is neither impossible to be, nor yet contingent to be, or not to be; but that it certainly is, and cannot but be; or that it is impossible it should not be. And indeed when we say of imperfect Beings, implying no contradiction in them, that they may possibly either be, or not be, we herein tacitly suppose the existence of a perfect Being, because nothing, which is not, could be possible to be, were there not something actually in being, that hath sufficient power to cause or produce it. True indeed, we have the ideas of many things in our minds, that never were, nor will be; but these are only such as include no necessary, but contingent existence in their nature; and it does not therefore follow, that a perfect Being, which includes necessity of existence in its idea, may, notwithstanding, not be. Wherefore this necessity of existence, or impossibility of non-existence, contained in the idea of a perfect being, must not be taken hypothetically only or consequentially after this manner, that if there be any thing absolutely perfect, then its existence both was, and will be necessary; but absolutely, that though contradictory things cannot possibly be, and things imperfect may possibly either be, or not be, yet a perfect Being cannot but be; or it is impossible that it should not be. For otherwise were the force of the argumentation merely hypothetical, in this manner; If there be a perfect Being, then its existence both was, and will be necessary; this would plainly imply, that a perfect Being, notwithstanding that necessity of existence included in its nature, might either be, or not be, or were contingent to existence; which is a manifest contradiction, that the same thing should exist both contingently and necessarily. And this hypothetical absurdity will more plainly appear, if the argument be expressed in other words, as that necessity of existence, and impossibility of non-existence, and actual existence, belong to the very essence of a perfect Being; since it would be then ridiculous to go about to evade in this manner, that if there
be a perfect Being, then it is, and cannot but be. Which identical proposition is true of every thing else, but absurd. Wherefore there is something more to be inferred from the necessity of existence included in the idea of a perfect Being than so; which can be nothing else but this, that it absolutely and actually is. Moreover, no Theists can be able to prove, that God, or a perfect Being (supposed by them to exist) might not happen by chance only to be; if from the necessity of existence included in the idea of God, it cannot be inferred, that he could not but be. Notwithstanding which, here is no endeavour, (as is pretended) to prove the existence of a God, or perfect Being, à priori neither, or from any necessary cause antecedent; but only from that necessity, which is included within itself, or is concomitant and concurrent with it; the necessity of its own perfect nature. And now we shall leave the intelligent and impartial reader to make his own judgment concerning the forementioned Cartesian argument for a Deity, drawn from its idea, as including necessity of existence in it, that therefore it is; whether it be meerly sophistical, or hath something of solidity and reality in it. However, it is not very probable, that many Atheists will be convinced thereby, but that they will rather be ready to say, that this is no probation at all of a Deity, but only an affirmation of the thing in dispute, and a mere begging of the question; that therefore God is, because he is, or cannot but be.

Wherefore we shall endeavour to make out an argument, or demonstration, for the existence of a God, from his idea, as including necessary existence in it, in some other ways. And first, we shall make an offer towards it in this manner. Though it will not follow from hence, because we can frame an idea of any thing in our minds, that therefore such a thing really existeth; yet nevertheless, whatsoever we can frame an idea of, implying no manner of contradiction in its conception, we may certainly conclude thus much of it, that such a thing was not impossible to be; there being nothing to us impossible, but what is contradictory and repugnant to conception. Now, the idea of God, or a perfect Being, can imply no manner of contradiction in it, because it is only the idea of such a thing; as hath all possible and conceivable perfections in it; that is, all perfections, which are neither contradictory in themselves, nor to one another. And they, who will not allow of this consequence, from the idea of a perfect Being, including necessity of existence in it, that it doth therefore actually exist, yet cannot deny, but that this at least will follow, from its implying no manner of contradiction in it, that it is therefore a thing possible, or not impossible to be. For thus much being true of all other contingent things, whose idea implieth no contradiction, that they are therefore possible; it must needs be granted of that, whose very idea and essence containeth a necessity of existence in it, as the essence of nothing else but a perfect Being doth. And this is the first step, that we now make in way of argumentation, from the idea of God, or a perfect Being, having nothing contradictory in it, that therefore God is at least possible, or no way impossible to have been. In the next place, as this particular idea of that, which is possible, includeth necessity of existence in it; from these two things put together at least, the possibility of such a Being, and its necessary existence
existence (if not from the latter alone) will it according to reason follow, that he actually is. If God, or a perfect Being, in whose essence is contained necessary existence, be possible, or no way impossible to have been; then he is: because upon supposition of his non-existence, it would be absolutely impossible, that he should ever have been. It does not thus follow concerning imperfect Beings, that are contingently possible, that if they be not, it was therefore impossible for them ever to have been; for that, which is contingent, though it be not, yet might it, for all that, possibly have been. But a perfect necessarily existent Being, upon the bare supposition of its non-existence, could no more possibly have been, than it could possibly hereafter be; because, if it might have been, though it be not, then would it not be a necessary existent Being. The sum of all is this, a necessary existent Being, if it be possible, it is; because, upon supposition of its non-existence, it would be impossible for it ever to have been. Wherefore God is either impossible to have been, or else he is. For if God were possible, and yet be not, then is he not a necessary, but contingent Being; which is contrary to the hypothesis.

But because this argumentation may perhaps run the same fate also with the former, and, by reason of its subtility, do but little execution neither, if not be accounted sophistical too; men being generally prone to distrust the firmness and solidity of such thin and subtle cobwebs, (as these and the like may seem to be) or their ability to support the weight of so great a truth; and to suspect themselves to be illaqueated and circumvented in them: therefore shall we lay no stress upon this neither, but proceed to something, which is yet more plain and downright, after this manner. Whatever we can frame an idea of in our minds, implying no manner of contradiction, this either actually is, or else if it be not, it is possible for it to be. But, if God be not, he is not possible hereafter to be; therefore he is. The reason and necessity of the minor is evident; because, if God be not, and yet possible hereafter to be, then would he not be an eternal and necessarily existent Being, which is contradictory to his idea. And the ground of the major, upon which all the weight lies, hath been already declared, where we proved before, that if there were no God, or perfect Being, we could never have had any conception or idea of him in our minds, because there can be no positive conception of an absolute nothing, that which hath neither actual nor possible existence. Here the posture of the argument is only inverted; because we have an idea of God, or a perfect Being, implying no manner of contradiction in it, therefore must it needs have some kind of entity or other, either an actual or possible one; but God, if he be not, is not possible to be, therefore he doth actually exist.

But perhaps this argumentation also, how firm and solid soever, may prove less convictive of the existence of a God to the generality; because whatever is received, is received according to the capacity of the recipient: and though a demonstration be never so good in itself, yet is it more or less such
to particular persons, according to their ability to comprehend it; therefore shall we, in the next place, form yet a plainer demonstration for a God from the idea of him, including necessary existence in it; it being first premised, that unquestionable something or other did exist from all eternity, without beginning. For it is certain, that every thing could not be made, because nothing could come from nothing, or be made by itself; and therefore if once there had been nothing, there could never have been any thing. Whence it is undeniable, that there was always something, and consequently, that there was something unmade, which existed of itself from all eternity. Now all the question is, and indeed this is the only question between Theists and Atheists; since something did certainly exist of itself from all eternity, what that thing is, whether it be a perfect, or an imperfect Being? We say therefore, that whatsoever existed of itself from eternity, and without beginning, did so exist naturally and necessarily, or by the necessity of its own nature. Now, nothing could exist of itself from eternity, naturally and necessarily, but that, which containeth necessary and eternal self-existence in its own nature. But there is nothing, which containeth necessary eternal existence in its own nature or essence, but only an absolutely perfect Being; all other imperfect things being in their nature contingently possible, either to be, or not be. Wherefore since something or other must and doth exist of itself naturally and necessarily from eternity unmade, and nothing could do this, but what included necessary self-existence in its nature or essence; it is certain, that it was a perfect Being, or God, who did exist of himself from eternity, and nothing else; all other imperfect things, which have no necessary self-existence in their nature, deriving their Being from him. Here therefore are the Atheists infinitely absurd and unreasonable, when they will not acknowledge that, which containeth independent self-existence, or necessity of existence (which indeed is the same with an impossibility of non-existence) in its nature and essence, that is, a perfect Being, so much as to exist at all; and yet in the mean time assert that, which hath no necessity of existence in its nature, the most imperfect of all Beings, inanimate body and matter, to have existed of itself necessarily from all eternity.

We might here add, as a farther confirmation of this argument, what hath been already proved, that no temporary successive Being, (whose duration is in a continual flux, as if it were every moment generated anew) and therefore neither our own souls, nor the world, nor matter moving, could possibly have existed from eternity, and independently upon any other thing, but must have had a beginning, and been caused by something else; namely, by an absolutely perfect Being, whose duration therefore is permanent, and without any successive generation, or flux.

But besides all these arguments, we may otherwise from the idea of God (already declared) be able both exactly to state the controversy between Theists and Atheists, and satisfactorily to decide the same. In order where-
unto, there is yet something again to be premised; namely this, that as it is certain every thing was nor made, but something existed of itself from eternity unmade; so is it likewise certain, that every thing was not unmade neither, nor existed of itself from eternity, but something was made, and had a beginning. Where there is a full agreement betwixt Theists and Atheists, as to this one point, no Atheist affirming every thing to have been unmade, but they all acknowledging themselves to have been generated, and to have had a beginning; that is, their own souls and personalities, as likewise the lives and souls of all other men and animals. Wherefore, since something certainly existed of itself from eternity, but other things were made, and had a beginning, (which therefore must needs derive their being from that which existed of itself unmade,) here is the state of the controversy betwixt Theists and Atheists, whether that, which existed of itself from all eternity, and was the cause of all other things, were a perfect Being and God, or the most imperfect of all things whatsoever, inanimate and senefelefs matter. The former is the doctrine of Theists, as Aristotle affirmeth of those ancients, who did not write fabulously concerning the first principles, aitq δευτερων:—κυριακοις τινες, το γηνηκαι πρωτον το αιωνο τιγέεσι, ut οι Μάγοι, εκ των άκτων δε αυτο, οιοι Ερμειδούλας τε, & την Ανεκδόθης; As namely, Pherecydes, and the IV. Oper.] Magi, and Empedocles and Anaxagoras, and many others; that they agreed in this, that the first original of all things was the best, and most perfect.

Whereby the way we may observe also, that, according to Aristotle, the ancient Magi did not acknowledge a substantial evil principle, they making that, which is the best and most perfect Being, alone by itself, to be the first begetter of all. This, I say, is the hypothesis of Theists, that there is one absolutely perfect Being, existing of itself from all eternity, from whence all other lesser perfections, or imperfect Beings, did gradually descend, till at last they end in senefelefs matter or inanimate body. But the atheistic hypothesis, on the contrary, makes senefelefs matter the most-imperfect thing, to be the first principle, or the only self-existent Being, and the cause of all other things; and consequentlly all higher degrees of perfections, that are in the world, to have climbed up, or emerged by way of ascent from thence; as life, senfe, understanding, and reason from that, which is altogether dead and senefelefs. Nay, as it was before observed, there hath been amongst the ancient Pagans, a certain kind of religious Atheists, such as acknowledging verbally a God, or soul of the world, predicing over the whole, supposing this notwithstanding to have first emerged also, out of senefelefs Matter, Night and Chaos; and therefore doubletis to be likewise dissolvable again into the same. And of these is that place in Aristoteles to be understood, βασιλευον το Ανεκδόθης, δεικνυται κα η Πρώτη; πετρικες ουοι Ναυτα, ουοι Ερμειδούλας, η Χάος, η ουοι Ωκεανός, αμαλλα το δή λα-founder. Δια. They suppose, not the first things, as Night, and the Heaven, and Chaos, and the Ocean, but Jupiter (or God) to rule and govern all. Where it is intimated, that the Heaven, Night, Chaos, and the Ocean, according to these, were seniors to Jupiter, or in order of nature before him; they apprehending, that things did ascend upward from that, which was most imperfect, as Night and Chaos, to the more perfect, and at length to Jupiter himself, the mundane Soul, who governeth the whole world, as our soul doth our body. Which same opinion is afterwards again taken notice of, and reprehended

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by
The controversy being thus clearly stated betwixt Theists and Atheists, it may now with great ease, and to the full conviction of all minds unprejudiced, and unprepossessed with false principles, be determined; it being, on the one hand, undeniably evident, that lesser perfections may naturally descend from greater, or at least from that, which is absolutely perfect, and which virtually containeth all: but, on the other hand, utterly impossible, that greater perfections, and higher degrees of being, should rise and ascend out of lesser and lower, so as that, which is the most absolutely imperfect of all things, should be the first fountain and original of all; since no effect can possibly transcend the power of its cause. Wherefore it is certain, that in the universe things did not thus ascend and mount, or climb up from lower perfection to higher; but, on the contrary, descend and slide down from higher to lower: so that the first original of all things was not the most imperfect, but the most perfect Being. But to speak more particularly; it is certain, notwithstanding all the vain pretences of Lucretius, and other Atheists, or Semi-Atheists, to the contrary, that life and sense could never possibly spring out of dead and senseless matter, as its only original, either in the way of atoms, (no composition of magnitudes, figures, sites, and motions, being ever able to produce cogitation) or in the way of qualities, since life and perception can no more result from any mixture of elements, or combinations of qualities of heat and cold, moist and dry, &c. than from unqualified atoms. This being undeniably demonstrable from that very principle of reason, which the Atheists are so fond of, but misunderstanding abuse, (as shall be manifested afterward) that nothing can come from nothing. Much less could understanding and reason in men ever have emerged out of stupid matter, devoid of all manner of life. Wherefore we must needs here freely declare against the darkness of that philosophy, which hath been sometimes unwarily entertained by such as were no Atheists, that sense may rise from a certain modification, mixture, or organization of dead and senseless matter; as also that understanding and reason may result from sense: the plain consequence of both, which is, that senseless matter may prove the original of all things, and the only Numen. Which doctrine therefore is, doubtable, a main piece of the philosophy of the kingdom of darkness. But this darkness hath been of late in great measure dispelled by the light of the atomick philosophy, restored, as it was in its first genuine and virgin state, unflower'd as yet by Atheists; this clearly showing, how far body and mechanism can go, and that life and cogitation can never emerge out from thence; it being built upon that fundamental principle, as we have made it evident in the first chapter, that Nothing can come from nothing. And Strato
and the hylozoick Atheists were so well aware, and so sensible of this, that all life and understanding could not possibly be generated or made, but that there must be some fundamental and substantial, or eternal unmade life and knowledge, that they therefore have thought necessary to attribute life, and perception (or understanding) with appetite, and self-moving power, to all matter as such, that so it might be thereby fitly qualified to be the original of all things; than which opinion as nothing can be more monstrous, so shall we elsewhere evince the impossibility thereof. In the mean time, we doubt not to aver, that the argument proposed is a sufficient demonstration of the impossibility of atheism; which will be further manifested in our answer to the second atheistical objection against a divine creation, because nothing can come from nothing.

But this controversy between Theists and Atheists may be yet more particularly stated from the idea of God, as including mind or understanding, in it essentially, viz. Whether mind be eternal and unmade, as being the maker of all; or else, Whether all mind were itself made or generated, and that out of senfeless matter? For, according to the doctrine of the Pagan Theists, mind was πνευμάτικον, καὶ Κύριος κτίσαν Φύσιν, the oldest of all things, senior to the world and elements, and by nature both a princely and lordly dominion over all. But, according to those Atheists, who make matter, or body, devoid of all life and understanding, to be the first principle, mind must be ὑπογενέστερον, a post-natal thing, younger than the world; a weak, umbratile, and evanish image, and next to nothing.

And the controversy, as thus stated, may be also clearly and satisfactorily decided. For first, we say, that as it is certainly true, that if there had been once nothing at all, there could never have been any thing; so is it true likewise, that if once there had been no life in the whole universe, but all had been dead, then could there never have been any life or motion in it; and if once there had been no mind, understanding, or knowledge, then could there never have been any mind or understanding produced. Because, to suppose life and understanding to rise and spring up out of that which is altogether dead and senfeless, as its only original, is plainly to suppose something to come out of nothing. It cannot be said so of other things, as of the corporeal world and matter, that if once they had not been, they could never possibly have been; because, though there had been no world nor matter, yet might these have been produced from a perfect, omnipotent incorporeal being, which in itself eminently contains all things. Dead and senfeless matter could never have created or generated mind and understanding, but a perfect omnipotent mind could create matter. Wherefore, because there is mind, we are certain, that there was some mind or other from eternity without beginning; though not because there is body, that therefore there was body or matter from eternity unmade. Now these imperfect minds of ours were by no means themselves eternal or without beginning, but from an antecedent non-existence brought forth into being; but since no mind could spring out of dead and senfeless matter, and...
and all minds could not possibly be made, nor one produced from another
infinitely; there must of necessity be an eternal unmade mind, from whence
those imperfect minds of ours were derived. Which perfect omnipotent
mind was as well the cause of all other things, as of human souls.

But before we proceed to any further argumentation, we must needs take
notice here, that the Atheists suppose no small part of their strength to lie
in this very thing, namely, their disapproving a God from the nature of
understanding and knowledge; nor do they indeed swagger in any thing
more than this. We have already set it for the eleventh atheistick argu-
ment, that knowledge being the information of the things themselves known, and
all conception the action of that which is conceived, and the passion of
the conceivier; the world and all sensible things must needs be before there could
be any knowledge or conception of them, and no knowledge or conception before
the world as its cause. Or more briefly thus: the world could not be
made by knowledge and understanding, because there could be no know-
ledge or understanding of the world, or of any thing in it, before it was
made. For, according to these Atheists, things made knowledge, and not
knowledge things; they meaning by things here such only, as are sensible
and corporeal. So that Mind and Understanding could not be the creator of
the world and these sensible things, itself being the mere creature of them;
a secondary, derivative result from them, or a phantastick image of them;
the youngest and most creaturely thing in the whole world. Whence it
follows, that to suppose mind and understanding to be the maker of all
things would be no better sense, than if one should suppose the images
in ponds and rivers to be the makers of the sun, moon and stars, and
other things represented in them. And upon such a ground as this,
does a modern writer presume to determine, that knowledge and un-
derstanding are not to be attributed to God Almighty, because they
imply imperfection, and dependence upon corporeal things without:

De Cive Rel. Quoniam scientia & intellectus in nobis nihil aliud sunt, quam sufficitatur à
6.15. Sec. 14. rebus externis organa prementibus animi tumulatus, non est putandum ali-
quid tale accidere Deo. Signum enim est potentiae ab aliis dependentis. Which
Lev. cap. 31. is again Englished thus; Knowledge and understanding being in us nothing
else but a tumult in the mind; raised by external things, that press the organ-
for the demonstration of the contrary, namely, the existence of a God, or a
Mind before the world, from the nature of knowledge and understanding.
First, therefore it is a foolish conceit of these Atheists, proceeding from
their not attending to their own cogitations, that not only sense, but also
knowledge and understanding in men, is but a tumult, raised from corpo-
real things without, pressing upon the organs of their body; or else, as they
declare themselves more distinctly, nothing but the activity of sensible objects
upon them, and their passion from them. For if this were true, then would
every thing, that suffered and reëcted motion, especially polite bodies, as
looking-glasses, have something both of sense and of understanding in
them. It is plain, that there comes nothing to us from bodies without us,
but only local motion and pressure. Neither is sense itself the meer pas-
sion of those motions, but the perception of their passions in a way of
phancy. But sensible things themselves (as for example, light and colours)
are not known or understood either by the passion, or the phancy of sense,
nor by any thing meerly foreign and adventitious, but by intelligible
ideas exerted from the mind itself, that is, by something native and domes-
tick to it: nothing being more true, than this of Boetius', that, Om-
ne, quod sedit, non ex sua, sed ex comprehensioni naturâ, vi, & facul-
tate cognoscitur; Whatever is known, is known not by its own force and
power, but by the force and power, the vigour and activity of that thing
itself, which knows or comprehends it. Wherefore, besides the phantasms
of singular bodies, or of sensible things existing without us, (which are
not meer passions neither) it is plain, that our human mind hath other
cogitations or conceptions in it; namely, the ideas of the intelligible na-
tures and effences of things, which are universal, and by and under which
it understands singulars. It is a ridiculous conceit of a modern atheistic
writer, that universalists are nothing else but names, attributed to many sin-
gular bodies, because whatsoever is, is singular. For though whatsoever
exists without the mind be singular, yet is it plain, that there are concep-
tions in our minds objectively universal. Which universal objects of our
mind, though they exist not as such any where without it, yet are they
not therefore nothing, but have an intelligible entity for this very reason,
because they are conceivable; for since non-entity is not conceivable,
whatsoever is conceivable, and an object of the mind, is therefore some-
thing. And as for axiomatical truths, in which something is affirmed
or denied, as these are not all passions from bodies without us, (for
what local motions could impress this common notion upon our minds,
that things which agree in one third, agree amongst themselves, or any
other?) to neither are these things only gathered by induction from re-
peated and reiterated sensations; we clearly apprehending at once, that
is is impossibly they should be otherwise. Thus Aristotel 2 ingeniously;

Tom. I. Oper.
could we not rest satisfied in this, as having therefore a sufficient knowledge hereby; but would seek further after a demonstration of it: sense reaching only to singulars, but knowledge to universals. When from the universal idea of a triangle, which is neither here, nor there, nor any where; without our mind, but yet hath an intelligible entity, we see a plain necessity, that its three angles must be equal to two right, then do we know the truth of this universal theorem, and not before: as also we understand, that every singular triangle, (so far as it is true) hath this property in it. Wherefore the knowledge of this, and the like truths, is not derived from singulars, nor do we arrive to them in way of ascent from singulars to universals; but, on the contrary, having first found them in the universals, we afterwards descending, apply them to singulars: so that our knowledge here is not after singular bodies, and secondarily or derivatively from them, but in order of nature before them, and proleptical to them.

Now these universal conceptions, some of which are also abstract, (as life, sense, reason, knowledge, and the like) many of them are of such things, whose singulars do not at all fall under sense; which therefore could never possibly be impressed upon us from singular bodies by local motion: and again some such, as though they belong to corporeal and sensible things, yet, as their accuracy cannot be reached to by sense, so neither did they ever exist in that matter of this lower world, which here encompasseth us, and therefore could not be stamped upon us from without: as for example, the ideas of a perfect trait line, and a plain superficies, or of an exact triangle, circle, sphere, or cube; no material thing here amongst us being terminated in those trait lines, but that even by microscopes there may be discovered much irregularity and deformity in them; and very probable it is, that there are no perfectly trait lines, no such triangles, circles, spheres, or cubes, as answer to the exactness of our conceptions, in any part of the whole material universe, nor never will be. Notwithstanding which, they are not absolute non-entities, since we can demonstrate things concerning them, and though they never were nor will be, yet are they possible to exist, since nothing can be conceived, but it either is, or else is possible to be. The human mind therefore hath a power of framing ideas and conceptions, not only of what actually is, but also of things, which never were, or perhaps will be, they being only possible to be. But when, from our conceptions, we conclude of some things, that though they are not, yet they are possible to be; since nothing that is not, can be possible to be, unless there be something actually in being, which hath sufficient power to produce it; we do implicitly suppose the existence of a God or omnipotent Being thereby, which can make whatsoever is conceivable, though it yet be not to exist; and therefore material triangles, circles, spheres, cubes, mathematically exact.

The result of what we have hitherto said is this, that since singular bodies are not the only objects of our mind and cogitation, it having also universal and abstract ideas of the intelligible natures or essences of things; (some of which are such, whose singulars do not
at all fall under sense; others, though they belong to bodies, yet sense can
never reach to them, nor were they ever in matter;) moreover, since our
mind can conceive of things, which no where actually exist, but are only
possible, and can have such a demonstrative science of universal truths, as
sense can never ascend to: that therefore human knowledge and under-
standing itself is not the mere image and creature of singular bodies only;
and so derivative, or cetypal from them, and in order of nature junior to
them, but that, as it were hovering aloft over all the corporeal universes, it
is a thing independent upon singular bodies, or proleptical to them, and in
order of nature before them.

But what account can we then possibly give of knowledge and under-
standing, their nature and original? Since there must be Нови, that which
is intelligible, in order of nature, before Нови, or intellectus? Certainly no
other than this, that the first original knowledge is that of a perfect being,
infinitey good and powerful, comprehending itself, and the utmost extent
of its own fecundity and power, that is, the possibilities of all things; their
ideas, with their several relations to one another, all necessary and immu-
table truths. Here therefore is there a knowledge before the world
and all sensible things, that was archetypal and paradigmatical to the same.
Of which one perfect mind and knowledge all other imperfect minds (being
derived from it) have a certain participation; whereby they are enabled to
frame intelligible ideas, not only of whatsoever doth actually exist, but also
of such things, as never were, nor will be, but are only possible, or objects
of divine power.

Wherefore, since it is certain, that even human knowledge and under-
standing itself is not a meer passion from sensible things, and singular
bodies exiting without (which is the only foundation of that foremen-
tioned atheisticke argument, that things made knowledge, and not know-
ledge things) and consequently it must needs have some other original:
moreover, since knowledge and understanding apprehend things prolepti-
cally to their existence, (mind being able to frame conceptions of all
possible entities and modifications) and therefore in their nature do plainly
suppose the actual existence of a perfect being, which is infinitely fecund
and powerful, and could produce all things possible or conceivable; the
first original Knowledge, or Mind, from whence all other knowledges and
minds are derived, being that of an absolutely perfect and omnipotent
Being, comprehending itself, and the extent of its own power, or of its com-
muicability, that is, the ideas of all possibilities of things, that may be produ-
ced by it, together with their relations to one another, and their necessary
immutable truths; accordingly as wisdom and understanding are described to
be, Δείκτης της του Θεου δυναμεως, ανέπαφος της του παντεσπάρτος θείας, ἡ ουσία της του Θεου κυρι. 1. 7
ιμηγαία, κα κίνων της θεοτητος. The breath (or vapour) of the power of
God, and an efflux (or emanation) from the glory of the Almighty, a clear mir-
voor (or looking glass) of his active energy or virtue, and the image of
his goodness: I lay, the refult of all is this, that the nature of knowledge
and understanding is so far from being a ground of disproving a Deity (as

V O L. II. 5 B the
the Atheists (ignorantly pretend) that it affordeth a firm demonstration to us, on the contrary, of the existence of a God, a perfect omnipotent Being, comprehending itself, and the extent of its own power, or all possibilities of things; a mind before the world, and senior to all things; no eternal, but archetypal thing, which comprehended in it, as a kind of intellectual world, the paradigm or platform, according to which this sensible world was made.

And this may be further confirmed from what is generally acknowledged, and indeed cannot reasonably be denied by any, viz. that there are eternal verities, such as were never made, nor can ever be destroyed, or cease to be: as for example, such common notions as these, that equals added to equals make equals; that the cause is in order of nature before the effect, &c. together with all geometrical theorems; as Aristotle himself declareth, he writing in his Ethicks, after this manner, πέρι αἰδών αύτες βουλεύεται, ὃς περὶ τῆς διαμέτρου ἴσης, θότης ἀναθείμασθαι. Concerning eternal (and immutable) things no man does consult; as for example, concerning the diameter or diagonal of a square, whether it should be incommensurable to the sides, or no. Where he plainly affirmeth this geometrical theorem, that the diameter or diagonal of a square is incommensurable to the sides, to be an eternal truth. Neither are there such eternal truths as these only in mathematics, and concerning quantity, but also in ethicks concerning morality; there being here αἰώνα διάμα, as Justin Martyr calls them, things eternally just, which were not made such at certain times by law and arbitrary command, but, being such in their own nature immutably, were from everlasting to everlasting, and (as it is said of that eternal Word, which comprehends all truth) the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever.

For of these is that famous passage of Sophocles in his Antigone,

Οὐ γάρ τι ἔργα κακῶν ἔπειτ' ἀλλ' ἂν ἐστὶν ἡ τριγώνον,
καὶ ἐδώ συνέβη ἐν ὑπάρξει.

These are not things of to-day, or yesterday, but they ever live, and no man knows their date, or from whence they came. No man can declare the time, when all common notions, and geometrical truths were first made and generated out of nothing, or brought out of antecedent non-existence into being. Certain it is, that such truths as these, that the diameter and sides of a square are incommensurable, or that the power of the hypotenuse in a rectangular triangle is equal to the powers of both the sides, were not made by any man's thinking, or by those first geometers, who discovered or demonstrated the same: they discovering and demonstrating only that which was. Wherefore these truths were before there was any man to think of them, and they would continue still to be, though all the men in the world should be annihilated; nay, though there were no material squares and triangles any where in the whole world neither, no nor any matter at all: for they were ever without beginning before the world, and would of necessity be ever after it, should it cease to be.

Now

1 Hebr. xii. 8.
2 Hebr. xiii. 8.
3 Ver. 467. 468.
4 P. 99. Tom. III. Oper.
Chap. V. and Intelligibles.

Now, if there be eternal truths, which were never made; and could not but be, then must the rationes rerum, the simple reasons of things also, or their intelligible natures and essences, out of which those truths are compounded, be of necessity eternal likewise. For how can this be an eternal truth, that the diameter of a sphere is incommensurable with the sides, if the rationes, the reasons of a square, diameter, and sides, or their intelligible essences, were not themselves eternal? These are therefore called by Plato (a man of much meditation, and no contemptible philosopher) not only αἱ τάξιν ὡς ζωῆς ἔγχρωται, things, which are always the same, and unchangeable, but also, τὰ μὴ γνώμενα, αλλ᾿ αἱ ὡς ζῶτα, things, which were never made, but always are; and sometimes, μὴ γνώμενα, μὴ ἀπολλυόμενα, things, that were neither made, nor can be destroyed; sometimes, τὰ αἰγίπτωτα καὶ αἰνήσεις, things ingenerable and incorruptible. Of which Cicero thus, ἦς Plato negat digni, sed semper esse, & rationes & intelligibilia continentur. These things Plato affirmed to have been never made, but always to be, and to be contained in reason and understanding. And, though perhaps it may seem strange, even Aristotle himself also, notwithstanding his so often clashing with Plato’s ideas, here really agrees in the main, that the forms and species, or the universal intelligible essences of things, which are the proper and immediate objects of science, were eternal and never made. Thus in his Metaphysics, τὸ εἰδος οὐδ᾿ οὐδεὶς οὐδὲ γεννατος. No man makes the form, or species of a thing, nor was it ever generated; and again, τὸ Φαιδίου εἶναι ἐκ ἑνὶ γένεσις. There is no generation of the essence of a sphere; and, ένυ γενεσις καὶ Φωτις τα εἰδό, The forms or species of things are without any generation or corruption. And he sometimes calleth these objects of science ἀκινητος οὐκαίος, or Φωτις, an immutable essence or nature. Lastly, where he writeth against the Heracliticks, and those other Scepticks, who denied all certainty of science, he first discovers the ground of their error herein to have been this, that they supposed singular bodies, or sensibles existing without, to be the only things or objects of the mind, or knowledge; οὐκίον τινς τούτων, ὅτι οἱ προς τῶν οὐκον τῆς ἀληθείας ἐξοχόν, τὸ δὲ οὶ προς τηλελάθου εἰς τα ἀληθή μονον, έν ὑμίν τον ποιλήν το οἱ αἵρεσις Φωτις τὰ καταγεγραμμένα — έτι δὲ ποίων ἑμεῖς τούτων καθήκοντα τινίν, καθαγα το μεταφύλλοις τοις οὐδεναι ἀληθείμουν, περιέχει το πάϊτος πώς το μετάθαλλον, ᾧ οἱ εἰκόνες ἀληθείμουν. The original of these men’s mistake was this, because truth is to be looked for in things, and they conceived the only things to be sensibles, in which it is certain there is much of the indeterminate nature. Wherefore they, perceiving all the nature of sensibles to be moveable, or in perpetual flux and mutation, since nothing can possibly be verified or constantly affirmed concerning that, which is not the same but changeable, concluded, that there could be no truth at all, nor certainty of science; those things, which are the only objects of it, never continuing the same. And then he subjoins in way of opposition to this sceptical doctrine of theirs, and the forementioned ground thereof, άξιαν ως οὐ περιέχειν οὐξ ἀληθίνον εὐδαι διαταυτην εἰς τον οὐκο, η οὔτε κιννυς υπάρχειν εὐδαι Φωτις ἢ γένεσις τὸ παράτης, We would have these men therefore to know, that there is another kind of essence of things, besides that of sensibles, to which belongeth neither

1 De Oratore ad Brutum, Cap. III. p. 695. IV. Oper.
Objects of Geometry immutable. Book I.

Neither motion, nor corruption, nor any generation at all. By which essences of things, that have no generation nor corruption, he could understand nothing else, but those intelligible natures, species, and ideas, which are the standing and immutable objects of science. And certain it is, that there could be no constant and immutable science at all, were there no other objects of the mind, but singulares and sensibles, because these are all mutable. Wherefore the proper and immediate objects of the geometrical science are no singular and material triangles, squares, spheres, and cubes, &c. not only because none of these are found mathematically exact, and because geometers, in all the several distant ages and places of the world, could not have the same singular bodies before them, but also because they do none of them continue immutably the same; all corporeal things being more or less in perpetual motion and mutation; whereas, that of which any geometrical theorem is verified and demonstrated, must be immutably and unalterably the same. The triangles and circles, spheres and cubes of Euclid, Archimedes, Pappus, Apollonius, and all other ancient and modern geometers, in all the distant places and times of the world, were both indivisibly one and the same, and also perfectly immutable and incorruptible, the science of geometry being such. For which cause it is affirmed also of these mathematical things, by the aforementioned Aristotle, that they are no where as in a place, as all singular bodies are, διότου δὲ τοῦ τόπου ἀμα τοῖς ςπειροῖς τοῖς Μαθηματικοῖς ποιέσαι, ὅ μὲν γὰρ τὸν ἑαυτὸν ὑστέρος δεὶ καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ τόπον τα ἐν Μαθηματικὰς, ἐν τοῦ. It is absurd to make mathematical things to be in a place, as solid bodies are; for place belongeth only to singulares, which are therefore separable from one another by place; but mathematical things are not anywhere. Because they being universal and abstract, are only in minds: nevertheless, for the same reason are they also everywhere, they being in every mind, that apprehends them. Lastly, these intelligible essences and ideas of things are called also by Philo, ἀνάφασιν ὑστέρος φύσις, the most necessary essences; as being not only eternal, but having likewise necessary existence belonging to them: for though there be no absolute necessity, that there should be matter or body, yet is there an absolute necessity that there should be truth.

If therefore there be eternal intelligibles or ideas, and eternal truths, and necessary existence do belong to them; then must there be an eternal mind necessarily existing, since these truths and intelligible essences of things cannot possibly be any where but in a mind. For by the essences of things, when they are said to be eternal, must not be meant their very substance, as if every thing were in itself eternal and uncreated; or that God in creation did only, as a modern writer abusively expresseth it, sartoris iniar, vestire essentias rerum novâ existentii, clothe the antecedent essences of things with a new garment of existence; but only their esse cognitum, their possible and intelligible natures, as they were objects of infinite power and understanding, before they were made. There must be a mind senior to the world, and all sensible things, and such as at once comprehends in it the ideas of all intelligibles, their necessary schemes and relations to one another,
enminds partake of one.

And from hence it is evident also, that there can be but one only original mind, or no more than one understanding Being self-existent; all other minds whatsoever partaking of one original mind; and being, as it were, stamped with the impression or signature of one and the same seal. From whence it cometh to pass, that all minds, in the several places and ages of the world, have ideas or notions of things exactly alike, and truths indivisibly the same. Truths are not multiply'd by the diversitv of minds, that apprehend them; because they are all but ectypeal participations of one and the same original or archetypal mind and truth. As the same face may be reflected in several glasses; and the image of the same sun may be in a thousand eyes at once beholding it; and one and the same voice may be in a thousand ears listening to it: so when innumerable created minds have the same ideas of things, and understand the same truths, it is but one and the same eternal light, that is reflected in them all, (that light, which enlighteneth every man that cometh in the world;) or the same voice of that one everlasting Word, that is never silent, re-echoed by them. Thus was it concluded by Themistius, that one man, by teaching, could not possibly beget in the mind of another the same notions, conceptions, and knowledges, which himself had in his own mind, ει μη ταυτος εν το νοημα τη διδασκαλω τη μανισωνη; Were not the minds both of the teacher and of the learner, as it were, printed and stamped alike. As also that men could not possibly so confer together as they do, presently apprehending one another's meaning, and raising up the very same fenses in their minds, and that merely by occasion of words and sounds, ει μετα της Εις Νοης ε πατες ινωνωμεν. Were there not some one mind, which all men did partake of. As for that anti-monarchical opinion of many understanding beings, or minds, self-originated, and independent, (none of which therefore could be omnipotent) it is neither conceivable, how such should all agree in the same truths, there being no common measure of truth betwixt them, no more than any common rule of their wills; nor indeed how they should have any knowledge or understanding at all, properly so called, that being the comprehension of the possibilities of things, or of the extent of infinite power; whereas according

1 Vide Metaphys. Lib. XIV. Cap. IX. p. 483.
to this hypothesis, there is no infinite power at all, the power of each of
those many supposed principles or deities being limited and finite, and
therefore indeed not creative of any thing neither, since that, which could
create one thing, could create all, and consequently would have all depending
upon it. We conclude therefore, that from the nature of mind and
knowledge it is demonstrable, that there can be but one original and self-
existent Mind, or understanding Being, from which all other minds were
derived. And now have we, more copiously than we designed, confuted
the first atheistic argument; we having not only asserted the idea of God,
and fully answered and refelled all the atheistic pretences against the same;
but also from this very idea of God, or a perfect Being, demonstrated his
existence. We shall dispatch the following atheistic objections with
more brevity.

We come, in the next place, to the Achilles of the Atheists, their in-
vincible argument against a divine creation and omnipotence; be-
cause, Nothing could come from nothing. It being concluded from hence,
that whatsoever substantially or really is, was from all eternity of itself un-
made or uncreated by any Deity. Or else thus; by God is always under-
stood a Creator of some real entity or other out of nothing; but it is an
undoubted principle of reason and philosophy, an undeniable common no-
tion, that Nothing can be made out of nothing, and therefore there can be no
such creative power as this. And here we shall perform these three things;
first, we shall shew, that in some senses, this is indeed an unquestionable
truth, and common notion, that Nothing can come from nothing, and what
those senses are. Secondly, we shall make it evident, that in the sense of
this atheistic objection, it is absolutely false, that Nothing can come from
nothing, or be made out of nothing; and that a divine creation and omni-
potence can be no way impugned from the forementioned principle rightly
understood. Thirdly and lastly, we shall prove, that as from this principle
or common notion, Nothing out of nothing, there can be no execution at
all done against the same, or a divine creation; so from the very same rightly
understood, the impossibility of all atheism may be demonstratively proved,
it bringing something out of nothing in an impossible sense; as also the
existence of a God evinced.

We grant therefore, in the first place, that this is in some sense an undoubt-
ed principle of reason, or an undeniable common notion, that Nothing can
come from nothing. For first, it is unquestionably true, that Nothing, which
once was not, could ever of itself come into being; or, that Nothing could bring
itself out of non-existence into being; that Nothing can take beginning of existence
from itself; or, that Nothing can be made or produced without an efficient
cause. And from hence, as hath been already intimated, is it demonstra-
tively certain, that every thing was not made, but that there is something ne-
cessarily self-existent, and which could not but be. For had every thing
been
been made, then must something of necessity have been made out of nothing by itself; which is impossible.

Again; As nothing, which was not, could ever of itself come into being, or be made, without an efficient cause; so is it certain likewise, that nothing can be efficiently caused or produced by that, which hath not in it at least equal (if not greater) perfection, as also sufficient power to produce the same. We say, nothing which was not, could ever be brought into being, by that, which hath not formally equal perfection in it; because nothing can give what it hath not, and therefore so much of the perfection or entity of the effect, as is greater than that of the supposed cause, so much thereof must needs come from nothing, or be made without a cause. Moreover, whatsoever hath equal perfection to another thing, could not therefore cause or produce that other thing; because it might either have no active power at all, as matter hath not, it being merely passive, or else no sufficient active and productive power. As for example, though it be not impossible, that motion, which once was not, should be produced; yet is it impossible, that it should be ever produced without a sufficient cause. Wherefore, if there were once no motion at all in the whole world, nor no life, or self-active power in any thing, but all were dead; then is it certain, that there could never possibly arise any motion or mutation in it to all eternity. There being no sufficient cause to produce the same; since nothing can produce motion, but that which hath life, or self-activity in it; and if motion, or any thing else, should begin to be, without a sufficient cause, then must it needs be caused by itself, or of itself come into being; which is a thing impossible. Now no imperfect Being whatsoever hath a sufficient emanative power to create any other substance, or produce it out of nothing; the utmost, that can be done by imperfect beings, is only to produce new accidents and modifications; as human souls can produce new cogitations in themselves, and new local motion in bodies. No imperfect Being is substantially emanative, or can produce another substance out of non-existence. Therefore for any substance to be brought into being, by an imperfect substance, which hath not sufficient emanative or creative power, is a thing plainly impossible; it being all one as to say, that a substance might of itself come out of nothing into being. And thus is it granted, that no substance could be created, or brought out of non-existence into being, but by the sole efficiency of an absolutely perfect Being, which hath both greater perfection, (it eminently containing all things in it,) and also a sufficient emanative or creative power.

And now have we given an account of two senses, wherein it is impossible for any thing to come from nothing; one, for a thing, which was not, to bring itself into being, or to be made without an efficient cause. Another, for a thing to be efficiently caused by that, which hath not at least equal perfection in it, or a sufficient emanative, or productive power. Both which senses of this axiom respect the efficient cause; and thus was it frequently understood by divers of the ancients, and particularly by Cicero. We shall

\* Vide Lib. ejus de Fato.
shall now propound a third sense, wherein this axiom is also verified, that Nothing can be made out of nothing, respecting chiefly the material cause. For since no imperfect natural being hath any creative power, or can efficiently produce any new substance, or real entity, which was not before, into being, but only act upon pre-existing matter by motion, and modify the same; and since matter, as such, being meekly passive, cannot cause any thing, that was not before, or will not result from the composition or modification of it; it follows undeniably, that in all natural generations and productions out of pre-existent matter (without a divine creation) there can never be any new substance or real entity brought out of non-existence into being. And this was that very thing, and no other, which the ancient physiologists meant, when (as Aristotle tells us) they so much insisted upon this principle, Τά γεγομένα ἐν μη ἐκτιν γένοθείν ἀδύνατον. That it was impossible, that any real entity should be (naturally) made or generated out of nothing; or, as it is also otherwise expreſsed, Οὐδὲ οὐδὲ γένοθείν οὐδὲ θείοθείν των ὑπον. That no real entity was either generated or corrupted. That is, that in natural generations, corruptions, and alterations, (where God is supposed not miraculously to interpose) there is no creation of any new substance, or real entity, out of nothing, nor annihilation, or destruction of any into nothing.

We are not ignorant, that the generality of modern writers have interpreted this doctrine of the old physiologists in Aristotle into quite different senses; as designing therein to take away all divine creation out of nothing, (or non-existence;) they making all things to have sprung out of matter (exifting of itself from eternity) either without a God, or else rather (because Parmenides and Empedocles, and other afferrers of this doctrine, were undoubted Theifts) with him. So that God could not create any new entity out of nothing, but only make things out of pre-existing unmade matter, as a carpenter doth a house, or a weaver a piece of cloth. And thus is it commonly taken for granted, that no Pagan philosopher ever went so far, as to acknowledge a divine creation of any thing out of nothing, in the sense of Christian theologists. And here we grant indeed, that, besides the Stoicks, there have been some other philofopher Theifts amongst the Pagans of this persuasion, that nothing was, nor could be made by God, otherwife than out of something pre-existing; as Plutarchus Cheronensis for one, who in a place already cited positively affirmeth, τὸν μὲν κάλλιον ὑπὸ Θεοῦ γενομενιν, τὸ δὲ κάλλιον ἡ ἔλεύθερον ἀλλὰ ὑποκειμενως αἰτὶ τὸ ὑποκειμενως. That though the world were indeed made by God, yet the substance or matter, out of which it was made, was not made. And then he subjoins this very reafon for it, ὡς γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ κακοῦ γένετο, ἀλλὰ ἐκ τοῦ καλοῦ, πρὸς ἔκμας ἐκοινωνός, ὡς δὲ κακίας ἐκ ματσίν καὶ ἀδικίας. Because there can be no making of any thing out of nothing, but only out of something pre-existing, not rightly ordered, or sufficiently disposed, as in a house, garment, or statue. From which conceal of Plutarch's, though they were otherwise ingenious, it may well be supposed, that

3 Libro de procreat. animae ex Timaeo p. 1014. Tom. II. Oper.
the dull Boeotick air had too much effect upon him. However, neither Plutarch nor the Stoicks, as we conceive, are for this to be accounted absolute and downright Atheists, but only imperfect, mungrel, and spurious Theists. And therefore were Atheists never so much able to prove, that there could be no creation out of nothing præ-existing, which they cannot at all do; yet would not this overthrow theism in general, there being a latitude therein. Nevertheless, it will undeniably appear from what shall follow, that those ancient Italicks and Phytagoricks were so far from intending here any such thing, to deduce all things out of matter, either without, or with a God, as that they plainly designed the very contrary; namely, to prove, that no new real entity could be made out of matter. And indeed all those Pagan philosophers, who affected the incorporeity of souls, must of necessity, in like manner, suppose them not to have been made out of præ-existing matter, but by God out of nothing. Plutarch being only here to be excepted, by reason of a certain odd hypothesis, which he had, that was peculiarly his own, of a third principle, besides God and matter, a disorderly foul, or evil demon self-existent, who therefore seems to have supposed all particular human souls to have been made neither out of nothing, nor yet out of matter, or body præ-existing, but out of a certain strange commixture of the substance of that evil soul, and God, blended together: upon which account does he affirm souls to be, not so much ἐγὼν ὡς μηδεῖς ζωόν, not so much the work of God, as a part of him. And now let any one judge, whether upon Plutarch's account, there be not yet further reason to complain of this Boeotick air. Wherefore we conclude, that those old physiologers in Aristotle, who insisted so much upon that principle, that no real entity could be made or generated out of nothing, acted only as physiologers therein, and not as theologers or metaphysiicians; they not opposing a divine creation out of nothing præ-existing, but only contending, that no new entity could be made out of matter, and that in natural generations and corruptions there was no creation or annihilation of any thing.

But what the true scope and meaning of these physiologers indeed was, will more plainly appear from that use or improvement, which themselves made of this philosophick principle; and this was twofold. For first, it is certain, that upon this foundation, they all of them endeavoured to establish a peculiar kind of physiology, and some atomology or other, either an homœomery, or an anomœomery, a similar or dissimilar atomology. For Anaxagoras looking upon this maxim of the Italick philosophers, that nothing could be physisally made out of nothing, or no real entity generated or corrupted, as an undoubted principle of reason; and being also not able to conceive other wise of the forms and qualities of bodies, than that they were real entities, distinct from the substance of matter, or its
Atomology, and Incorporeity

Book I

modifications; concluded, that therefore in generations, corruptions, and alterations, these were not created out of nothing, and annihilated into nothing, but that every thing was naturally made, in πρε-εξιστέων καὶ ἐν-εξιστέων, out of pre-existent, and in-existent things; and consequently that there were, in all things, similar atoms and particles of every kind, though by reason of their parvitude insensible to us, and every thing seemed to be only that, which was most predominant and conspicuous in it. To wit, that bone was made out of bony atoms, and flesh out of fleshy, hot things out of hot atoms, and cold things out of cold, black out of black, and white out of white, &c. and nothing out of nothing, but every thing out of pre-existing similar atoms. Thus was the sense of Anaxagoras plainly declared by Aristotle, that because contraries were made out of one another, they were therefore before in-existent. For since every thing must of necessity be made, either out of something, or out of nothing, and all physiologers agree, that it is impossible for any thing to be made out of nothing; it follows unavoidably, that whatever is generated, must be generated out of things pre-existing and in-existing, though by reason of their parvitude insensible to us; that is, out of similar or homogenial atoms, of which there are some of all kinds in every thing, every thing being mingled in every thing. Here therefore have we the Anaxagorean homeomery, or similar atomology, built upon this principle of reason, as its foundation, that Nothing can naturally be made or generated out of nothing.

But the Italicks or Pythagoricks, as well before Anaxagoras, as after him, (with whom also hitherto concurred Leucippus, Democritus, and Epicurus, those atheizers of the Italick physiology) did with much better reason from the same fundamental principle conclude, that since these forms and qualities of bodies were unquestionably generated and corrupted, they were therefore no entities really distinct from the substance of matter, or its modifications, but only different dispositions or modifications of the insensible parts thereof, causing in us different phantasmis: and this was the first original of the dissimilar atomology. In matter or body therefore, as such, there was nothing else to these philosophers conceivable, but only magnitude of parts, figure, size, and motion, or rest; and these were those few elements, out of which in-existing, and variously combined together, they supposed all those forms and qualities of bodies, (commonly so called) in generations to result, without the production of any new real entity out of nothing. For as out of a few letters in the alphabet of every language, differently placed and combined, do result innumerable syllables, words, and sounds, signifying all the several things in heaven and earth; and sometimes from all the very same letters, neither more nor fewer, but only transposed, are begotten very different phantasmis of sounds in us, but without the production of any new real entity out of nothing: in the very same manner, from those fewer letters in the alphabet of the corporeal nature, variously combined, or from the different modifications of matter, in respect of magnitude of parts, figure, size, and motion, are made up and spelled out all those syllables of things, that are in the whole world,
world, without the production of any new real entity. Many times the very same numerical matter, neither more nor less, only differently modified, causing very different phantasms in us, which are, therefore vulgarly supposed to be forms and qualities in the things, as when the same water is successively changed and transformed into vapour, snow, hail, and ice. And to this very purpose is the forementioned similitude elegantly pursued by the Epicurean Poet, in these following verses:

Quin etiam referre nosiris in versus ibis,
Cum quibus & quali fini ordine qua locata.
Namque eadem caelum, mare, terras, flumina, solem,
Significant, eadem fruges, arbusla, animantes.
Sic ipsis in rebus item jam materiâ
Concurfus, motus, orae, postura, figura.
Cum permutantur, mutari res quoque debent.

For were those supposed forms and qualities, produced in generations and alterations, entities really distinct from the substance of matter, or its different modifications, in respect of the magnitude, figure, site, and motion of parts, (there being no such things before in-existing, as Anaxagoras supposed,) then would they materially proceed from nothing, which is a thing impossible. And this dissimilar atomology of the ancient Italicks, so far as to these material forms and qualities, seems to be undoubtedly the only true physiology; it being built upon this sure principle of reason, that because nothing can give what it hath not, therefore no new substance or real entity can be materially produced in the generations and alterations of nature as such, but only modifications. As when an architect builds a house, or a weaver makes a piece of cloth, there is only a different modification of the pre-existent matter.

This is the first improvement, which the ancient Italick philosophers made of this principle, that Nothing can be (physically and materially) generated out of nothing; or that No real entity is naturally generated or corrupted; that therefore the forms and qualities of bodies were no real entities, but only different modifications. But besides this, there was also another thing, which these philosophers principally aimed at herein, as a corollary deducible from the same principle concerning souls; that since the souls of animals, especially human, are unquestionably entities really distinct from matter, and all its modifications; (no magnitudes, figures, sites, and motions, being ever able to beget cogitation or consciousness, much less a power of understanding eternal verities) that therefore these could not be generated out of matter, nor corrupted into the same. Because forms and qualities are continually generated and corrupted, made out of nothing, and reduced to nothing again; therefore are they no entities really distinct from matter, and its different modifications; but because souls, at least human, are unquestionably entities really distinct from matter, and all its modifications; therefore can they not possibly be generated out of matter.
Generation and Corruption of Animals; Book I.

Generation, nor corrupted into the same. For if human souls were generated out of matter, then must some real entity be materially produced out of nothing, there being nothing of life and cognition in matter; which is a thing absolutely impossible. Wherefore, these philosophers concluded concerning souls, that being not generated out of matter, they were insinuated or introduced into bodies in generations. And this was always a great controversy betwixt Theists and Atheists concerning the human soul, as Lucretius expresseth it:

Nata fit, an contrà nascentibus insinuetur.

Whether it were made or generated out of matter, (that is, indeed out of nothing) or else were ἑξ ἀόρατων, from without, insinuated into bodies in generations? Which latter opinion of theirs supposes souls as well to have existed before the generations of all animals, as to exist after their deaths and corruptions; there being properly nothing of them generated, but only their union with those particular bodies. So that the generations, and corruptions or deaths of animals, according to this hypothesis, are nothing but an anagrammatical transposition of things in the univerfe, præ and post-existent souls being sometimes united to one body, and sometimes to another. But it doth not therefore follow, because these ancient philosophers held souls to be thus ingenerable, and to have præ-existed before the generation of animals, that therefore they supposed all souls to have existed of themselves from eternity unmade: this being a thing, which was never affected any more by Theist than Atheist; since even those philosophick Theists, who maintained æternitatem animorum, the eternity of human minds and souls, together with the worlds, did notwithstanding affect their essential dependence upon the Deity, like that of the lights upon the sun; as if they were a kind of eternal effulgency, emanation, or eradication from an eternal sun. Even Proclus himself, that great champion for the eternity of the world and souls in this very case, when he writes against Plutarch's self-existent evil soul, expressly declaring, that πάντα ἐκ κακοῦ γίνονται ἐκ τοῦ κακοῦ, there is no self-existent soul; but every soul whatsoever is the work, effect and production of God. Wherefore, when they affirmed souls to be ingenerable, their meaning was no more than this, that they were not meer accidental things, as forms and qualities are, nor any more generated out of matter, than matter itself is generated out of something else; upon which account, as Aristotle informs us, souls were called also by them, ἑξ ἀόρατων, principles, as well as matter, they being both of them substantias in the univerfe alike original; that is, neither of them made out of the other. But they did not suppose them to be ἑξ ἀόρατων, ingenerate or unmade in the other sense, as if they had been self-originated, and independent, as Plutarch's second and third principles, his evil soul, and matter, were by him imagined to be; but so doubtless, as that if the world had had any beginning, they should then have been all-created together with it out of nothing præ-existing. But as for the perpetual creation of new souls, in the successive generations of animals, this indeed is a thing

1 Lib. I. Verf. 114.
2 Comment. in Timæum Platon. Lib. II. Tom. II. Oper.
thing, which these philosophers were extremely abhorrent from, as thinking it incongruous, that souls, which are in order of nature senior to bodies, should be in order of time juniors to them; as also not reasonable, that divine creation (as it were prostituted) should without end perpetually attend and wait upon natural generations, and be intermingled with them.

But as for this praë-existence of souls, we have already declared our own sense concerning it, in the first chapter. Though we cannot deny, but that, belides Origen ¹, several others of the ancient fathers before the fifth council, seem either to have espoused it, or at least to have had a favour and kindness for it; insomuch that St. Austin ² himself is sometimes flagging in this point, and thinks it to be a great secret, whether men's souls existed before their generations or no; and somewhere concludes it to be a matter of indifferency, wherein every one may have his liberty of opining either way without offence. Wherefore, all that can be certainly affirmed in this case is, that human souls could not possibly be generated out of matter, but were some time or other created by God Almighty out of nothing praë-existling, either in generations or before them. Lastly, as for brute animals, we must confess, that if they be not meer machines or automata, as some seem inclinable to believe, but conscious and thinking beings; then from the same principle of reason it will likewise follow, that their souls cannot be generated out of matter neither, and therefore must be derived from the fountain of all life, and created out of nothing by him; who since he can as easily annihilate as create, and does all for the best, no man need at all to trouble himself about their permanency, or immortality.

And now have we given a full and particular account of all the several senses, wherein this axiom must be acknowledged to be undeniably true, that Nothing can possibly be made out of nothing, or come from nothing; namely, these three. First, that nothing, which was not, could ever bring itself into being; or efficiently produce itself; or, that nothing can possibly be made without an efficient cause. Secondly, that nothing, which was not, could be produced, or brought into being by any other efficient cause, than such as hath at least equal perfection in it, and a sufficient active or productive power. For if any thing were made by that, which hath not equal perfection, then must so much of the effect, as transcended the cause, be indeed made without a cause (since nothing can give what it hath not) or be caused by itself, or by nothing. Again, to suppose a thing to be produced by that, which hath no sufficient productive power, is really to suppose it also to be produced from itself without a cause, or from nothing. Where it is acknowledged by us, that no natural, imperfect created being can create, or emanatively produce a new subsistence, which was not before, and give it its whole being. Hitherto is the axiom verified in respect of the efficient cause. But in the third place, it is also true in respect of the material likewise. Not that nothing could possibly be ever made by any power whatsoever, but only out of praë-existent

¹ Vide Petr. Dan. Huetium in Origenianis
Nothing from Nothing; causally. Book I.

pre-existent matter; and consequently, that matter itself could be never made, but was self-existent. For the falsity of this is sufficiently evident from what hath been already declared concerning human souls, their being undoubtedly substances incorporeal, which therefore could never be generated out of matter; and it will be further manifested afterwards. But the third and last sense is this; That nothing, which is materially made out of things pre-existing (as some are) can have any other real entity, than what was either before contained in, or resulteth from the things themselves so modified. Or, that there can be no new entities or substances naturally generated out of matter; and therefore that all natural generations are really nothing else but mixtures, or new modifications of things pre-existent.

These, I say, are all the senses, wherein it is impossible, that any thing should be made out of nothing, or come from nothing; and they may be all reduced to this one general sense, That nothing can be made out of nothing causally; or, that nothing cannot cause any thing, either efficiently or materially. Which as it is undeniably true, so is it so far from making any thing against a divine creation, or the existence of a God, that the same may be demonstratively proved, and evinced from it, as shall be shewed afterward.

But there is another sense, wherein things may be said to be made &c., or out of nothing, when those words are not taken causally, but only so as to signify the terminus a quo, or term from which they are made, to wit, an antecedent non-existence. And then the meaning of this proposition, that Nothing can possibly be made out of nothing, will be this; that Nothing, which once was not, could by any power whatsoever be afterwards brought into being. And this is the sense insinuated in this second atheistic argumentation, framed according to the principles of the Democritick or Epicurean atheism; That no real entity, which once was not, could by any power whatsoever be made, or brought out of non-existence into being; and consequently, that no creative power out of nothing can possibly belong to any thing, though supposed never so perfect.

In answer whereunto, we shall perform these two things. First, we shall make it appear, that Nothing out of nothing, taken in this sense declared, is so far from being a common notion, that it is not at all true. And secondly, we shall prove, that if it were true, yet would it of the two make more against Atheism, than it doth against Theism, and therefore ought by no means to be used by Atheists, as an argument against a Deity. First, therefore, it is unquestionably certain, that this cannot be universally true, that nothing, which once was not, could possibly be made, or brought out of non-existence into being; because, if it were, then could there be no such thing as making or causing at all; no action nor motion, and consequently no generation nor mutation in the corporeal universe, but the whole world would be like a stiff immovable adamantine rock; and this would doubtless be a better argument against motion, than any of Zeno's was. But we have all experience within ourselves of a power of producing
producing new cogitations in our own minds, new intellectual and moral habits, as also new local motion in our bodies, or at least new determinations thereof, and of causing thereby new modifications in bodies without us. And therefore are the Atheists forced to refrain the sense of this proposition to substantial things only, that though there may be new accidents and modifications produced out of nothing, yet there can be no new substances made; however they be not able in the mean time to give any reason, why one of those should be in itself more impossible than the other, or why no substance should be makeable. But that some are so stagger'd with the seeming plausible of this argument, is chiefly upon these following accounts. First, by reason of the confusion of their own conceptions; for, because it is certain, that nothing can possibly be made out of nothing, in one sense, to wit, causally; they not distinguishing senses, nor being aware of the equivocation, that is in this *ex nihilo*, out of nothing, inadvertently give their assent to those words in a wrong sense; that no substance (as matter) could possibly be brought out of non-existence into being. Secondly, by reason of their unskilful arguing from artificial things; when, because nothing can be artificially made, but out of pre-existing matter, as a house or garment, and the like, (there being nothing done in the production of these things, but only a new modification of what before substantially was) they over-hastily conclude, that no power whatsoever could produce any thing otherwise, than out of pre-existing matter, and that matter itself therefore could not possibly be made. In which conceit they are again further confirmed from hence, because the old physiologists maintained the same thing concerning natural generations likewise, that nothing was in them produced *ex nihilo*, out of nothing neither; or that there was no new substance or entity made in them really distinct from the pre-existing matter and its modifications; they unwarily extending this beyond the bounds of physicks into metaphysicks, and unduly measuring, or limiting infinite power accordingly. Lastly, because it is undeniably certain concerning ourselves, and all imperfect created beings, that none of these can create any new substance, which was not before; men are therefore apt to measure all things by their own scantling, and to suppose it universally impossible, according to human reason, for any power whatsoever thus to create; whence it follows, that theology must in this be acknowledged to be contradictions to the principles of natural light and understanding. But since it is certain, that imperfect created beings can themselves produce some things out of nothing pre-existing, as new cogitations, and new local motion, new modifications and transformations of things corporeal; it is very reasonable to think, that an absolutely perfect Being could do something more, that is, create new substances out of nothing, or give them their whole being. And it may well be thought to be as easy for God, or an omnipotent Being, to make a whole world, matter and all, *ex nihilo*, out of nothing, as it is for us to create a thought, or to move a finger, or for the sun to send out rays, or a candle light; or lastly, for any opaque body to produce the image of itself in glasses or water, or to project a shadow; all these imperfect things being but the energies,
Only one Self-Existen. Book I.

energies, rays, images, or shadows of the Deity. For a substance, which once was not, to be made by God, or a Being infinitely perfect, this is not for it to be made out of nothing, in the impossible sense, it coming from him, who is all. Nor can it be said to be impossible, for any thing whatsoever to be made by that, which hath not only infinitely greater perfection, but also a sufficient active power to produce the same, it being substantially emanative. It is true indeed, that infinite power itself cannot do things in their own nature impossible; and this is therefore the only thing, which the Atheists have to prove, that it is in itself absolutely impossible, for a substance (though not for an accident or modification) to be produced out of non-existence into being. Whereas nothing is in itself absolutely impossible, but what implies a contradiction; and though it be contradictory for a thing to be, and not be, at the same time; yet is there no manner of contradiction at all in this, for any imperfect contingent Being, which before was not, afterwards to be. Wherefore, this being in itself no way impossible, it must be acknowledged to be a due object of infinite power, or that which may be done by a perfect omnipotent Being existing.

If nothing could be made \textit{ex nihilo, out of nothing}, in this latter sense, that is, \textit{Nothing which before was not}, afterwards brought into being; then must the reason hereof be, because no substance or real entity can be caused by any other substance, so as to receive and derive its whole being from it; and consequently whatsoever substance or real entity is in the whole world, was not only from eternity without beginning, but also existed of itself necessarily, and independently upon any thing else. But first, it hath been already declared, that it is repugnant to the human faculties, that any temporary successive being whatsoever, or that time itself should be eternal without beginning, because upon that hypothesis there would always have been an infinity of time past; and if so, then would there be necessity have been time past, which was never present. But, to make every substantial thing, not only to have existed from eternity without beginning, (which yet hath been done by some mistaken Atheists) but also to have existed independently upon any thing else as its cause, or original, and therefore of itself necessarily; this, I say, is itself to make \textit{Something to come from nothing in the impossible sense}, to wit, causally. For as when some Atheists affirm, that \textit{Nothing could ever move itself}, and yet suppose notwithstanding, that there hath been motion from all eternity, they plainly make this motion (however supposed to be eternal) to come from nothing in the impossible sense: so, in like manner, they, who suppose things to have existed of themselves necessarily, which have no self-existence, and necessary existence contained in their nature, (as nothing but a perfect Being hath) do make this necessary existence of such things to have come from nothing. Wherefore though it be certain, that something did exist of itself necessarily from all eternity, namely, a perfect Being, (whose necessary existence is therefore not from nothing; because essentially included in its own nature) yeu is it certain likewise, that there can be but one such thing; necessity of existence being natural and

\textit{See Enchir. Net. c. 10.}
and essential to no more. But as for all other things, which are in their own nature contingently possible to be or not to be, reason pronounces of them, that they could not exist of themselves necessarily, but were caused by something else; and derived their original from that one absolutely perfect, and necessarily existent Being. So that Plato's distinction must needs be here allowed of betwixt two kinds of beings, ὁ μὴ ἄλλος, ὁικίων δὲ οὐκ ἔχου, That which always is, and was never made, nor had beginning; and ὁ γεννήθησας μὴ ὄντος, οὗτος, That which was made, or had beginning, but never truly is; it having not a permanent, but successive or flowing duration. Accordingly whereunto, Aristotle also affirmeth, That there is no necessity all things should be unmade or self-originated; but some things might be made from others unmade.

Lastly, we shall disprove the truth of this assertion, that whatsoever substantially and really is, did exist of itself from all eternity unmade, after this manner. Because it would follow from thence, that not only matter, and unqualified atoms, (as the Democritick Atheists suppose) but also souls, especially human, must needs have exisited of themselves too, from eternity unmade. For as no man can be so fottish, as to conceive himself, or that which thinketh in him, his own soul or mind, and perfection to be no real entity, whilst every clod of earth is such; so is it certain, that mind can never be generated out of dead and senseless matter or body, nor result, as a modification thereof, out of magnitudes, figures, sites, and motions, and therefore must needs be a thing really distinct from it, or substance incorporeal; the Democritick Atheists being here grossly deceived in thinking, that because forms and qualities of bodies may be resolved into those forementioned elements of matter, and consequently concluded to be no entities really distinct from the substance thereof, but only different modifications of the same, that therefore the like may be said of souls too, the rational not excepted. Wherefore, if no substance or real entity could ever be brought out of non-existence into being, or be caused by any thing else, then must all human souls and personalities, as well as matter and atoms, have existed not only from eternity, without beginning, but also of themselves independently upon any other thing. But the Atheists are so abhorrent from this eternity of human souls, that they will by no means admit of their post-existence or immortality; they apprehending, that if any living understanding Being should prove immortal, they could not sufficiently secure themselves against the possibility and danger of a God. Some Theists indeed have asserted eternitatem animorum, not only the praeter-existence, but also the eternity of all human minds, together with the world, as Cicero more than once doth; who also, in his book of Divination, thus further declares himself concerning it: Animus, qui visisti ab omnium aeternitate, versatufque et cum innumerabilibus animis, omnia, que in natura rerum sunt, videst: Our mind, because it hath existed from all eternity, and conversed with innumerable minds, seeth all things that are in nature: and again, Cum animi bonorum semper fuerint futurique sunt: Since the minds of men ever were, and ever will be.

VOL. II.

5 D

Nevertheles,

Lib. VI. p. 479.


3 Lib. I. Cap. I. p. 3174. Tom. IX.
Nevertheless, none of these ever maintained, that human minds, and their distinct personalities, were thus all, of themselves, independently upon any thing as their cause or original. And, as it was before demonstrated from the nature of knowledge and understanding, (it comprehending the possibilities of all things, and therefore supposing infinite power) that there can be but one mind, or understanding Being, self-existent, all minds partaking of that one mind; so is it hardly possible for any one in good earnest to entertain such a conceit as this, that his own particular soul, mind, and personality, and consequently all human souls, though subject to such laws of fate as now they are, did not only pre-exist before their respective bodies, and were from eternity without beginning, but also existed of themselves necessarily and independently upon any thing else. Wherefore, if human souls, minds, and personalities, being unquestionably substantial things and really distinct from matter, (which therefore could not possibly be generated out of it) did not all exist from eternity of themselves, necessarily, and independently, it is certain, that they must derive their whole Being from the Deity, or be created ἐκ ὑλῆς, out of nothing, or non-existence by it. And if human souls were unquestionably thus created, it cannot reasonably be doubted, but that matter or body itself was created likewise out of nothing, or caused by the Deity: for as much as that, which created one thing out of nothing, could create every thing; and there is really more of substance, that is, a higher degree of entity, in minds and souls, conscious self-moving and understanding Beings, than in senseless matter, or unactive bulk.

But for as much as this doctrine of a divine creation out of nothing praexisting lies under no small prejudice upon this account, because it is so generally taken for granted, that none of the Pagan Theists, who are supposed to have kept close to the simple light of nature, did ever acknowledge in the Deity any such creative power out of nothing, or that God was the cause of any substance; we must of necessity here declare this, how common forever it be, to be a great mistake. For besides that Plato, in his Sophist, having defined the efficient or effective power in general after this manner; Παντοκράτορ ύλῆς ἐστιν, δύναμις, ὁ τίς ἐν αὐτῷ γίγνεται τὸ χρῆναι πρώτου ὑπὸ υλῆς ὑποδηλοῦ, to be a power or causality, whereby that, which was not before, was afterwards made to be; and then dividing this efficiency into divine and human, he immediately subjoins concerning the former, ζῶν ἐν πάση ὑπογέγραμμα, &c., μὴ ἄλλα τῶν ἢ θεῶν ἡμικεραίων φύσεως υπὸ υλῆς ὑποδηλοῦ πρώτου ὑπὸ ὑπογέγραμμα; Shall we not then say, that all animals, and other things, were by the divine efficiency alone, after they had not been made to be? Where thus much at least is certain, that Plato did not at all question the possibility of a thing's being made out of nothing in this sense; that is, brought into being, after it had not been by a divine power. But because it may be thought, that he meant this no further, than of the first compages of animals, in which notwithstanding every thing, souls and all, might be made out of praexisting matter; we shall here further add, what in his Timæus he declareth concerning the soul, τῶν ἰσχυρών ὑπὸ τῶν ὑποδηλοῦν ἐπικεφαλείαν

Chap. V. acknowledged by Philosophers.

... acknowledged by Philosophers.

... that God did not make it after body, and

... but body afterward, as that which is to be ruled and governed thereby.

... that soul was made first, as that which ruled; but

... and proficiency of bodies. From whence it is plain, that Plato's first γένεσις, or

... Plato's first γένεσις, or production of souls by God, could not be out of any present existent body or

... or matter, they being affirmed by him to be before, not only this and that particular body, but all body whatsoever, before longitude, latitude, and proficiency. Which may be further confirmed from hence, because in his

... he plainly condemns that opinion of some, τήν ψυχήν αυτήν σωμά τι κεκτηθεί, that the soul itself had something of body in it; and he often elsewhere declares the soul to be incorporeal. It is certain also, that not only Plato, but all those other Pagan philosophers too, who adhered the incorporeity and immortality of human souls, could not possibly conceive souls to have been made out of present existent matter, but either εἰς ἐν ὑπόσκος, out of nothing, they being not eternal, but having a newness of being, (as Plato himself seemed to suppose;) or else if they were conceived to be eternal by them, (which was the opinion of most of the junior Platonists, yet) to have derived their whole substance from the Deity, and always to depend upon it; as eternal light would depend upon an eternal sun. Plutarch, and his followers, being only here to be excepted, who would neither have souls made out of nothing by God, nor yet out of corporeal matter present existent, (they being themselves incorporeal;) but out of a strange commixture of the substance of God himself with the substance of a certain disorderly soul, self-existent and uncreated; of which we have spake already. But that the genuine Platonists did universally suppose, that one substance might be caused by another, and derive its whole being from it, is undeniably evident from hence, because their second divine hypostasis or substance, (though eternal) was according to them derived from, or begotten by their first, and their third hypostasis or substance produced both from the first and second; and other inferior orbs of being, as the particular souls of daemons and men, from that whole trinity of divine hypostases.
Matter, not to all Pagans unmade. Book I

postulates jointly concurring. And as for matter or body itself, it is certain also, that Proclus and other Platonists expressly denied it to have been ἀπ' ἀρχῆς, unmade or self-existent, and conceived it to have derived its whole being from the Deity; who accordingly is styled by Proclus 1, ἀπ' ἀρχῆς, the ineffable cause of matter. In like manner have we already showed, that, according to the Chaldee oracles, matter itself was also caused or produced by the Deity, to which purpose is this verse cited by Proclus 2, ἄπ' ἀρχῆς ἀποκρινόμενος παντοκράτορ, from whence (that is, from the Deity) abundantly springs forth the generation of the multiform matter. The metre here requiring, that it should be read ἄπ' ἀρχῆς, and not ἀπ' ἀρχῆς, as it is in Proclus his copy. Moreover, Jamblichus hath recorded in his Mysteries 3, that Hermes, and the old Egyptian thelogers likewise, held matter not to be ἀπ' ἀρχῆς, that is, self-existent, unmade, or un-derived from the Deity, but to have been caused by it. Whence does Proclus 4 conclude it probable, that Plato was of the same persuasion also; as likewise Orpheus before had been, he deriving this, as is supposed, with other things, from the Egyptians. It is true indeed, that many of these philosophers asserted matter, souls, and the whole world, to have been eternal without beginning, and consequently not created ἔκ τοῦ οὐκ αὐτοῦ, in that stricter sense, that is, out of an antecedent non-existence in-time. Notwithstanding which, they did suppose them to have received their whole being from the Deity, and to have depended on it every jot as much, as if, having once not been, they had afterward been made by it. And that, which gives to any substance its whole being, though from eternity, so that it never was not; the same upon supposition, that it once had not been, could unquestionably have produced it, ἔκ τοῦ οὐκ αὐτοῦ, out of nothing, or an antecedent non-existence.

We have now sufficiently disproved the truth of that assertion, that Nothing could be made out of nothing, in the atheistical sense thereof, viz. that Nothing, which before was not, could afterwards possibly be made to be: though this should not be extended so far, as to accidental things, and modifications, but restrained and confined only to substantials; That no substance whatsoever could have a newness of being, or be caused by any other substance: but whatsoever substantial thing any where is in the world, the same did exist of itself from eternity, and independently upon any thing else; nothing but different modifications being made or produced. Which same assertion has been also sometimes otherwise thus expressed; Nothing can be made but out of pre-existing substance; the meaning hereof being this, that nothing can be made, but new accidental modifications of what before substantially was; no substance itself being makeable or producible by any other substance, neither in time, (so as to have a newness or beginning of being) nor yet from eternity. Where the Atheists and some others taking it for granted, that there is no other substance besides body, or matter, do further limit and restrain the sense of that proposition in this manner: Nothing can be made but out of pre-existing matter; that is, nothing can be made, but out of
of corporeal substance præ-existing. An *idolum specus* (if I may use that language) which in all probability had its first original chiefly from men's measuring the extent of all power by their own production of artificial things. Because forsooth, a carpenter or architect cannot make a house, but out of præ-existing timber, bricks, and stones; nor a tailor a garment, but out of præ-existing cloth; nor a cook, puddings or pyes, but out of præ-existing materials or ingredients; that therefore no power whatsoever, no not that of God Almighty, can extend any further, than to the new-modifying of præ existent matter, but not to the production or causing of any substance. We shall in the next place make it appear, that were this assertion true, That no substance or real entity, which once was not, could be caused or produced, yet would it notwithstanding, of the two, more impugn atheism, than theism (it being possible for falsehoods, though not for truths, to disagree) forasmuch as the Atheists do bring more out of nothing, or non-existence, than the Theists do; and therefore ought not to make this an objection against theism. For though, according to the true and genuine theology, God, or a perfect Being, be supposed to be the only necessary self-existent thing, and the cause of all other substance, and consequently to have produced all imperfect things, not only souls, but also matter itself, *ix ex nihilo, out of nothing*, or an antecedent non-existence; yet is there, by reason of the weakness of human understandings, a latitude in theism. Wherefore some there are, who though imposed upon by that *idolum specus*, or imprisoned in it, Think not possibly be made, but out of præ-existing matter, by the new modification thereof; do notwithstanding devoutly worship a Deity, according to their notion of it, a perfectly understanding Being, unmade; though not the creator of matter, yet the maker of the whole world out of it, and the supreme governor of the same; they thus supposing two principles in the universe, an active and a passive one, God and Matter. Besides which, it is not impossible for others to think, that though matter or body be not the only substance, but human souls are incorporeal, yet the substance of these souls was not created out of nothing, no more than that of body, but they were made either out of some præ-existing common soul, (as their intelligible matter) or out of the substance of the Deity itself; or else existent of themselves from eternity unmade: and yet nevertheless may these acknowledge one supreme understanding Being self-existent also, though neither the creator of matter, nor of souls, yet the supreme governor and orderer of all. And it is certain, that Plutarch’s God was no better than this; and yet was that Pagan, notwithstanding, a devout religionist in his kind, as well as a hearty moralist. And such a theism or theology, as either of those forementioned, (though not genuine and sincere, but imperfect and mongrel things) would perhaps be to the Atheists little less troublesome and uneasy, than the true. Thus have we shewed, that this principle, *That nothing can come out of nothing*, or be made, otherwise than out of præ-existing substance or matter, though it be indeed contradictory to the true and genuine theology, yet is it not absolutely inconsistent with all manner of religion; there being certain spurious, or imperfect forms of theism built upon this foundation. But now, on
...the contrary, we shall make it manifest, that this very principle, made use of by the Atheists, is in truth and reality contradictory to all manner of atheism, and destructive of the same; the Atheists universally generating and corrupting real entities, and substantial things, that is, producing them out of nothing, or non-existence, and reducing them to nothing again: forasmuch as they make all things whatsoever, the bare substance of matter only excepted, (which to them is either no determinate thing, or else nothing but mere bulk, or resiling and divisible magnitude) to come out of nothing, and to go to nothing. Thus does Aristotle, in a place before cited, declare the atheistic fentiment, εἰσὶν γὰρ τοις, οἱ Φασιν δένον αγένοςτον ἐναὶ τῶν πραξικῶν, ἀλλὰ πάντα φυσικία. There are certain men, who affirm, that nothing is unmade, but all things generated or made. Whole fentiment is afterwards more distinctly thus proposed by him, τὰ μὲν ἀλλὰ φυσικία τε ὡς μὲν, εἰναι δὲ ποιοῦσα ἐνδείχθαι ἐν δὲ τιην μόνον ὑποτιμεῖν, ἐξ ὧν τὰ πάντα μεταβαλλόμενα πείρασι. That all other things are generated and flow, and none of them firmly is, (they being perpetually educed out of nothing, and reduced to nothing) but that there is only one thing, which remains; namely that, out of which all the other are made, by the transformation thereof. Which one thing (to wit, matter) as the same Aristotle further adds, they affirmed to be the only substance, and from eternity unmade; but all other things whatsoever, being but πάντως ὡς, τῶν ὑποτιμεῖται, passions, affections, and dispositions thereof, γενόμεναι τῶν φυσικῶν ἀντίγραφαν, to be generated and corrupted infinitely; that is, to be produced out of nothing, or non-existence, and reduced again to nothing without end. And doubtless, this is the true meaning of that passage in Plato’s tenth De Legibus, not underftood by the Latin interpreters; where being to repreffent the atheistic hypothefis of the fystem of the universe, he discovereth their grand arcanum, and that, which they accounted, σοφιστάκεν ἀνάλυσιν λόγον, the wisest and moft mysterious of all doctrines, after this manner: ἡγεῖσαι τὸν τινι ὡς πάντα εἰς τὰ πράξατα γνώβωσι καὶ μεταμορφοῦσιν τὰ μὲν φύσι, τὰ δὲ τίγχα, τὰ δὲ διὰ τόχο. Certain men affirm, that all things are made, and have been made, and will be made; some by nature, and some by art, and some by fortune or chance. For unquestionably here, Plato’s λέγει τὸν τινι ὡς πάντα ἐν τὰ πράξατα γνώβωσι, Certain men affirm, that all things are generated or made, &c. is the very fame with Aristotle’s εἰτε γὰρ τινι, οἱ Φασιν, ἐν τῶν αγένοςτων ἐκ τῶν πραξικῶν, ἀλλὰ πάντα φυσικία, Certain men affirm, that there is nothing unmade, but that all things are made or generated. And perhaps this of Aristotle’s was taken out of that of Plato’s: which yet nevertheless is no to be underftood, as it is afterwards explained by Aristotle; all things whatsoever, the bare substance of matter only excepted. Wherefore it is certain, that either there is no real entity in the whole world, besides the bare substance of matter; that is, besides divisible and separable extension, or resiling magnitude, and consequently that life and cogitation, fentiment and consciousness, reafon and understanding, all our own minds, and personalities, are no real entities; or else, that there are, according to the atheistic hypothefis, real entities produced out of nothing, and reduced to nothing again. Whereas
Chap. V. Their Argument retorted.

Theists suppose all the greatest perfections in the universe, as life and understanding, to have been eternal and unmade in a perfect Being, the Deity, and neither brought out of nothing or non-existence, nor reducible to nothing; only imperfect beings to have been made out of nothing, or produced out of non-existence, by this one perfect Being or Deity: the Atheists, on the contrary, supposing the lowest and most imperfect of all beings, matter, bulk, or divisible and refusing extension, to be the only self-existent and unmade thing, conclude all the greatest perfections in the universe, life, cogitation, and understanding, to be made out of nothing, or non-existence, as also to be reduced to nothing again. Indeed the hylozoick Atheists, being sensible somewhat of this inconvenience of making all life and understanding out of nothing, and that there must of necessity be some fundamental life and perception, which is not accidental but substantial, and which was never generated, and cannot be corrupted, have therefore attributed a kind of life and perception to all matter as such. Notwithstanding which, even these also, for as much as they deny to matter animal sense, and consciousnes, suppose all animal life or sense, and conscious understanding, to be generated and corrupted, produced out of nothing, and reduced to nothing again. Neither can life, cogitation, and understanding, be reckoned amongst the modes of matter, that is, of magnitude, or divisible and antitypous extension, since they may be conceived without the same; whereas modes cannot be conceived without their substance. Standing, sitting, and walking, cannot be conceived without a body, and that fitly organized too; and therefore are they nothing but different modes of such a body. When that human body, which before did stand, doth afterwards sit, or walk, no man can think, that there is the miraculous production of any new real entity out of nothing; nor when the same matter, which was square or cubical, is made spherical or cylindrical. But when there is life and understanding, which was not before, then is there unquestionably a new real entity produced. But the Democritick and Epicurean Atheists themselves, according to the tenour of the atomick physiology, acknowledge no other modes of matter or body, but only more or less magnitude of parts, figure, site, motion, or rest. And upon this very account do they explode qualities, considered as entities really distinct from these modes; because, in the generation and alteration of them, there would be real entities made out of nothing, or without a cause, whereupon they resolve these qualities into mechanism and fancy. But life, cogitation, and understanding, are things, which have more real entity in them, and can no way be solved by mechanism and phancy; wherefore undoubtedly they are no modes of matter or body, but attributes of another kind of substance incorporeal. All cogitative beings, especially human souls, and personalitie, are unquestionably substantial things; and yet do the Atheists bring these, and consequently themselves out of nothing, or non-existence, and reduce them to nothing again. The conclusion is, that these very Atheists, who contend against Theists, that Nothing can be made out of nothing, do themselves bring all things out of nothing or non-existence, and perpetually reduce them to nothing again; according to whose principles, as once there was.
The absolute Impossibility of Atheism; Book I.

no life nor understanding at all in the universe, so may there be none again. They who deny a God, because there can be no creative power belonging to any thing, do themselves notwithstanding attribute to matter (though a mere passive, sluggish, and unactive thing) a creative power of things substantial (as human souls and personalites) out of nothing. And thus is that formidable argument of the Atheists, that there can be no God, because nothing can be made out of nothing, not only proved to be false, but also retorted upon these Atheists themselves, they bringing all things besides senseless and unqualified matter out of nothing.

We have now declared, first, in what sense this proposition is unquestionably true, that nothing, can be made out of nothing, or come from nothing, viz. causally, that nothing, which before was not, could afterward be made without a cause, and a sufficient cause. Or more particularly these three ways; first, that nothing, which before was not, could afterward be brought into being by itself, or without an efficient cause. Secondly, that nothing, which once was not, could be made or produced efficiently by any thing, which had not at least equal perfection in it, and a sufficient active or productive power; and consequently that no new substance can be made, but by a perfect Being, which only is substantially emanative. Thirdly and lastly, that when things are made out of pre-existing matter, as in artificial productions, and natural generations, there can be no new real entity produced, but only different modifications of what before substantially was; the material cause, as such, efficiently producing nothing. And thus was this axiom understood by Cicero, that Nothing could be made out of nothing, viz. causally, in his book de Fato, where he reprehendeth Epicurus for endeavouring to avoid fate, and to establish liberty of will by that absurd fragment of atoms declining uncertainly from the perpendicular. Nec cum haec ita finit, cf. causa, cur Epicurus fatum exficiat, & ab atomis petat presciium, caufae de via deduct; & uno tempore fuscipiat res duas inendables, unam, ut fine causâ fiat liquid, ex quo existet, ut de nihilo quipiam fiat; quod nec ipfi, nec cuiquam physico placet. Nor is there for all that any reason, why Epicurus should be so much afraid of fate, and seek refuge in atoms, be supposing them, in their infinite descents, to decline uncertainly from the perpendicular, and laying this as a foundation for liberty of will; whereby be plunged himself at once into two inextricable difficulties, the first whereof was the supposing of something to be made without a cause, or, which is all one, out of nothing; a thing, that will neither be allowed by any physiologer, nor could Epicurus himself be pleased or satisfied therewith. The reason whereof is, because it was a fundamental principle of the atomick philosophy, that Nothing (in this sense) could be made out of nothing. Moreover, we have in the next place declared, in what other sense this proposition, that Nothing can be made out of nothing, is false, namely, when this out of nothing is not taken causally, but so as to signify the terminus from which; that nothing can be made out of an antecedent non-existence: that no real entity or subsistence, which before was not, could by any power whatsoever be afterwards brought into being: or, that no-

3 Cap. IX. p. 3273. Tom. IX. Oper.
thing can possibly be made, but out of something præ-existing, by the
new modification thereof. And it appears from that of Cicero, that the
ture and genuine sense of this proposition, De nihilo nihil fit, (according
to the mind of those ancient physiologers, who laid so great stress there-
on) was not, that nothing could by any power whatsoever be brought
out of non-existence into being ; but only, that nothing could be made with-
out a cause. Nor did they here by cause mean the material only, in
this sense, as if nothing could possibly be made, but out of præ-existi-
ing matter; Epicurus being taxed by Cicero for introducing that his
third motion of atoms, or elinamen principiorum, out of nothing, or
without an efficient cause; as indeed all motion also was, to those ato-
mick Atheists, in this sense, from nothing. Nevertheless, we have also
shewed, that if this proposition, Nothing out of nothing, in that atheistick
sense, (as levell’d against a Deity) were true; yet would it of the two
more impugn atheifm itself, than it does theiſm; the Atheists generat-
ing and corrupting all things, the substance of matter only excepted,
alife, sense and understanding, human souls, minds and personali-
ties, they producing these, and consequently themselves, out of nothing, and
resolving them all to nothing again. We shall now, in the third and
laſt place, make it manifest, that the Atheists do not only bring real
entities, and substantial things, out of nothing in the second sense, that
is, out of an antecedent non-existence, (which yet is a thing poſsible
only to God, or a perfect Being) but also that they bring them out of no-
thing in the absolutely impossible sense; that is, suppose them to be made
without a cause, or nothing to be the cause of something.

But we must prepare the way hereunto, by setting down, First, a
brief and compendious sum of the whole atheifick hypothesis. The A-
thelial therefore, who contend, that nothing can be made, but only new
accidents, or modifications of præ-existing substance; taking it for granted,
that there is no other substance besides body or matter, do conclude accor-
dingly, that nothing can be made, but out of præ-existing matter or body.
And then they add hereunto, that matter being the only substance, the
only unmade self-existent thing, whatsoever else is in the world, besides
the bare substance of this matter, was made out of it, or produced by it. So
that there are these three things contained in the atheifick hypothesis;
First, that no substance can be made or caused by any thing else, but only
new modifications. Secondly, that matter or body is the only substance;
and therefore whatsoever is made, is made out of præ-existing matter.
Thirdly and laſtly, that whatsoever there is else in the whole world, besides
the substance of matter, it is made or generated out of matter. And now we
shall demonstrate the absolute impossibility of this atheifick hypothesis,
from that very principle of the ancient physiologers, that Nothing can be
made out of nothing, in the true sense thereof; it not only bringing real en-
tities, and substantial things, out of an antecedent non-existence, (though
nothing but an infinitely perfect Being neither can thus create) but also pro-
ducing them without a cause.
First, therefore, when they affirm matter to be the only substance, and all things else whatsoever to be made out of that alone, they hereby plainly suppose all things to be made without an efficient cause, which is to bring them out of nothing, in an impossible sense. For though it be not true, that nothing can be made, but out of praexisting matter (and consequently that God himself, supposing to exist, could in this respect do no more, than a carpenter or taylor doth;) I say, though it be not universally true, that every thing, that is made, must have a material cause, (so that the quaternio of causes in logic is not to be extended to all things caused whatsoever;) yet is it certain, that nothing, which once was not, could possibly be made without an efficient cause. Wherefore, if there be any thing made, which was not before, there must of necessity, besides matter, be some other substance existing, as the efficient cause thereof; forasmuch as matter alone could not make any thing; as marble cannot make a statue, nor timber and stones a house, nor cloth a garment. This is our first demonstratation of the impossibility of the atheiftick hypothesis; it supposing all things, besides the bare substance of matter, to be made out of matter alone, without any other active principle or deity, or to be made without an efficient cause; which is to bring them from nothing, in an impossible sense. To which may be added, by way of appendix, that whereas the Democratick and Epicurean Atheifts admit of no other efficient causality in nature, than only local motion, and allow to matter or body, their only substance, no self-moving power, they hereby make all the motion, that is in the whole world, to be without a cause, and from nothing; action without any subject or agent, and the efficiency of all things without an efficient.

In the next place, should we be so liberal, as to grant to the atomick Atheifts motion without a cause, or permit Strato and the hylozoick Atheifts to attribute to matter a self-moving power; yet do we affirm, that this matter and motion both together could not possibly produce any new real entity, which was not before; matter, as such, efficiently causing nothing, and motion only changing the modifications of matter, as figure, place, site, and disposition of parts. Wherefore, if matter, as such, have no animal senfe and conscious understanding, effentially belonging to it, (which no Atheifts as yet have had the impudence to assert;) then can no motion or modification of matter, no contexture of atoms, possibly beget senfe and understanding, soul and mind; because this would be to bring something out of nothing, in the impossible senfe, or to suppose something to be made by itself without a cause. Which may serve also for a conputation of thofe imperfect and spurious Theifts, who will not allow to God Almighty (whether supposed by them to be corporeal or incorporeal) a power of making any thing, but only out of praexistent matter, by the new-modifying thereof; as a carpenter makes a house out of praexistent timber and stone, and a taylor a garment out of praexistent cloth. For since animal life and understanding are not by them supposed to belong at all to matter as such; and since they
they cannot result from any modifications, or contexts thereof, it would
plainly follow from hence, that God could not possibly make animals, or
produce sense and understanding, souls and minds, which Nevertheless these
Theists suppose him to have done; and therefore ought in reason to acknowledge him,
not only to be the maker of new modifications of matter, (and one, who built the world only as a carpenter doth a house) but also of real entities distinct from the same.

And this was the very doctrine (as we have already declared) of the most ancient atomick physiologers; not that every thing whatsoever might be made out of pre-existing matter; but, on the contrary, that in all natural generations there is no real entity produced out of the matter, which was not before in it, but only new modifications; and consequently, that souls and minds, being not mer modifications of matter, in respect of magnitude, figure, site, and motion, could never be produced out of it, because they must then of necessity come from nothing; that is, be made either by themselves without a cause, or without a sufficient cause. It hath also been before noted out of A ris tol, how the old atheistical materialists, being assaulted by those Italic philosophicals after that manner, that nothing, which was not before in matter, besides its modifications, could possibly be produced out of it, because nothing can come out of nothing, and consequently, that in all natural generations and corruptions, there is no real entity made or destroyed; endeavoured, without denying the words of that proposition, to evade after this manner; διὸ τὸ τῶν γίγαντων οὐδὲν οὐκι, οὐκ ἀπολλυσθαι, ὃς τῆς τοιαύτης φύσεως ἄει σωζόμενης, ὕστερ δὲ τοῦ Ἴωράτωρ, &c. That there is indeed nothing generated or corrupted, (in some sense,) as much as the same substance of matter always remains, it being never made nor destroyed. For, as men do not say, that Socrates is made, when he is made musical or handsome; nor destroyed, when he loseth these dispositions, because the subject Socrates was before, and still remaineth; so neither is any substantial thing, or real entity in the world, made or destroyed in this sense; because matter, which is the substance of all, perpetually remains; and all other things whatsoever are but παθηνας ἐξ ἐξομολογίας, passions and affections, and dispositions thereof, as musicalness and unmusicalness, in respect of Socrates. Which is all one, as if they should say, that all things whatsoever, besides matter, being but accidents thereof, are generated out of it, and corruptible into it, without the production of any real entity out of nothing, or the reduction of any into nothing, so long as the substance of matter, which is the only real entity, remains always the same. Wherefore, though life, sense, and understanding, all souls and minds, be generated out of matter; yet does it not follow from thence, that therefore there is any real entity made or produced, because these are nothing but accidents, and modifications of matter. This was the subterfuge of the old hylopathian Atheists.

Now it is true indeed, that whatsoever is in the universe, is either substance, or accidents; and that the accidents of any substance may be generated

generated and corrupted, without the producing of any real entity out of nothing, and reducing of any into nothing; for as much as the substance still remains entirely the same. But the Atheists taking it for granted, that there is no other substance besides body or matter, do therefore falsely suppose that, which is really incorporeal substance, or else the attributes, properties, and modes thereof, to be the mere accidents of matter, and consequently conclude there to be generable out of it, without the production of any real entity out of nothing. We say therefore, that it does not at all follow, because the same numerical matter, (as for example, a piece of wax) may be successively made spherical, cubical, cylindrical, pyramidal, or of any other figure; and the same man may successively stand, sit, kneel, and walk; both without the production of any thing out of nothing; or because a heap of stones, bricks, mortar, and timber lying all together disorderly and confusedly, may be made into a stately palace, and that without the miraculous creation of any real entity out of nothing; that therefore the same may be affirmed likewise of every thing else, besides the bare substance of matter, as namely, life and understanding, soul and mind, that though there be no such thing in matter itself, yet the production of them out of matter would be no production, of something out of nothing.

One ground of which mistake hath been from men's not rightly considering, what the accidents of a substance are, and that they are indeed nothing but the modes thereof. Now, a mode is such a thing, as cannot possibly be conceived, without that, whereof it is a mode; as standing, sitting, kneeling, and walking, cannot be conceived, without a body organized, and therefore are but modes thereof; but life and cogitation may be clearly apprehended without body, or any thing of extention: nor indeed can a thought be conceived to be of such a length, breadth, and thickness, or to be hewed and sliced out into many pieces, all which laid together, as so many small chips thereof, would make up again the entireness of that whole thought. From whence it ought to be concluded, that cogitation is no accident, or mode of matter, or bulky extention, but a mode or attribute of another substance, really distinct from matter, or incorporeal. There is indeed nothing else clearly conceivable by us in body or bulky extention, but only more or less magnitude of parts, figures, site, motion, or rest; and all the different bodies, that are in the whole world, are but several combinations or syllables, made up out of these few letters: but no magnitudes, figures, sites, and motions, can possibly spell or compound life and sense, cogitation and understanding, as the syllables thereof; and therefore to suppose these to be generated out of matter, is plainly to suppose some real entity to be brought out of nothing, or something to be made without a cause; which is impossible.

But that, which hath principally confirmed men in this error, is the business of sensible qualities and forms, as they are vulgarly conceived to be distinct entities, from those aforementioned modifications of matter, in respect of magnitude of parts, figure, site, motion, or rest. For since these qualities and forms are unquestionably generated
Chap. V. Accidents of Matter.

...and corrupted, there seems to be no reason, why the same might not be as well acknowledged of life, sense, cogitation, and understanding, that these are but qualities or accidents of matter also, (though of another kind) and consequently may be generated out of it, without the making of any real thing out of nothing. But the Democritick and Epicurean Atheist themselves have, from the principles of the atomick philosophy, sufficiently confuted and rectified this mistake concerning sensible qualities; they exploding and banishing them all, as conceived to be entities really distinct from the forementioned modifications of matter, and that for this very reason, because the generation of them would, upon this supposition, be the production of something out of nothing, or without a cause; and concluding them therefore to be really nothing else but mechanism, or different modifications of matter, in respect of the magnitude of parts, figure, site, and motion, or rest; they only causing different fancies and apparitions in us. And in very truth, this vulgar opinion of real qualities of bodies seems to have no other original at all, than men’s mistaking their own phancies, passions, and affections, for things really existing in the objects without them. For as sensible qualities are conceived to be things distinct from the forementioned modifications of matter, so are they really nothing but our own phancies, passions, and affections; and consequently no accidents or modifications of matter, but accidents and modifications of our own souls, which are substances incorporeal. Now if these Democritick and Epicurean Atheists themselves concluded, that real qualities, considered as distinct from the modifications of matter, could not possibly be generated out of it, because this would be the production of something out of nothing; they ought certainly much more to have acknowledged the same, concerning life and cogitation, sense and understanding, that the generation of these out of senseless matter would be an impossible production of something out of nothing; and consequently, that these are therefore no corporeal things, but the attributes, properties, or modes of substance incorporeal; since they can no way be resolved into mechanism and phancy, or the modifications of matter, as the vulgar sensible qualities may, and ought to be. For though the Democriticks and Epicureans did indeed suppose all human cogitations to be caused or produced by the incursion of corporeal atoms upon the thinker; yet did never any of them arrive to such a degree, either of foolishness or impudence, as a modern writer hath done, to maintain, that cogitation, intelligence, and volition, are themselves really nothing else but local motion or mechanism, in the inward parts of the brain and heart; or that mens nili nihil præter quam motus in partibus quibusdam corporis organici, that mind itself is nothing but motion in some parts of the organized body; who therefore, as if Cartesius had not been sufficiently paradoxical, in making brute animals, (though supposed by him to be devoid of all cogitation) nothing but mere machines, and not contented herewith, hath advanced much further, in making this prodigious conclusion, that all cogitative beings, and men themselves, are really nothing else but machines and automata; whereas he might as well have affirmed heaven to be earth, colour...
Epicureans Liberty of Will from Nothing. Book I.

to be found, number to be figure, or any thing else in the world to be any thing, as cogitation and local motion to be the very self-same thing. Nevertheless, so strong was the atheistic intoxication in those old Democriticks and Epicureans, that though denying real qualities of bodies, for this very reason, because Nothing could be produced out of nothing, they notwithstanding contradicting themselves, would make sense, life, and understanding, to be qualities of matter, and therefore generable out of it; and so unquestionably produced real entities out of nothing, or without a cause.

Moreover, it is observable, that Epicurus having a mind to assert contingent liberty in men, in way of opposition to that necessity of all human actions, which had been before maintained by Democritus, and his followers, plainly acknowledges, that he could not possibly do this, according to the grounds of his own philosophy, without supposing something of contingency, in the first principles, that is, in the motion of those atoms, out of which men and other animals are made:

Lamb. [Verf. 251.]

Si semper motus conneéitur omnis,
Et vetere exoritur semper novus ordine certo,
Nec declinando factunt primordia motus
Principium quoddam, quod fati sædera rumpat,
Ex infinito ne causam causa sequatur;
Libera per terras unde bæc animantibus extat,
Unde ëst bæc, inquam, fatis avolfa voluntas?

The reason for which is afterwards thus expressed by him, Quoniam de nihil nil fit, because Nothing can be made out of nothing. Upon which account he therefore ridiculously feigned, besides his two other motions of atoms from pondus and plagæ, weight and strokes, a third motion of them, which he calls clinamen principiorum, a contingent and uncertain declination, every way from the perpendicular; out of design to solve this phenomenon of free-will in men, without bringing something out of nothing, according as he thus subjoineth,

Quare in feminibus quoque idem fateare necesse est,
Ésæ aliam præter plagas & pondera causam
Motibus, unde bæc ëst nobis innata potestas;
De Nihilo quoniam Fieri Nil posse videmus.
Pondus enim prohibet, sed plagis omnia fiant
Externa quasi vi. Sed nemens ipsa necessum
Intestinum habeat cuntidis in rebus agendis,
Et devia quasi cogatur ferre patique,
Id facit exiguum CLINAMEN PRINCIPORUM,
Nec ratione loci certa, nec tempore certo.

Now if Epicurus himself conceived, that liberty of will could not possibly be generated, in men out of matter or atoms, they having no such thing at all

* Lucret. Lib. II. verf. 283.
all in them, (that is, no contingent uncertainty in their motion) without bringing of something out of nothing; which was contrary to the fundamental principles of the atomick philosophy, (though this were intolerably absurd in him, thus to suppose contingency, and a kind of free-will in the motions of senseless atoms, so that indeed he brought his liberty of will out of nothing;) certainly sense and understanding, soul and mind in animals and men, could not possibly be generated out of atoms or matter, devoid of all sense and understanding; for the very same reason, Quoniam de nihilo nil fit, Because nothing can be made out of nothing. For unquestionably, were all life and understanding, all souls and minds generated out of dead and senseless matter; and were there no substantial or essential life and understanding in the whole universe; then must it of necessity be all made out of nothing, or without a cause, and consequently real entities and substantial things be made out of nothing, which is absolutely impossible. For though we do not say, that life and cogitation, sense and understanding, abstrusely considered, are substances; yet do we affirm them to be entities really distinct from matter, and no modifications or accidents thereof, but either accidents and modifications, or rather essential attributes of substance incorporeal; as also that souls and minds, which are the subjects of them, are indeed substantial things. Wherefore, we cannot but here again condemn the darkness of that philosophy, which educes not only species visible and audible, (entities perfectly unintelligible) and real qualities, distinct from all the modes of body, and even substantial forms too, (as they call them) but also sensitive souls themselves, both in men and brutes, ex potentia materiae, out of the power of the matter; that is, indeed out of nothing. For as much as this prepares a direct way to atheism; because, if life and sense, cogitation and consciousnifs, may be generated out of dead and senseless matter, then might this well be supposed the first original of all things; nor could there reasonably be any stop made at rational souls, especially by these men, who also conclude them to be rafa tabula, meer white sheets of paper, that have nothing at all in them, but what is scribbled upon them by corporeal objects from without; there being nothing in the understanding or mind of man, which was not before in sense: so that sense is the first original knowledge, and understanding but a secondary and derivative thing from it, more unbrittle and evanish.

Hitherto have we demonstrated that all things whatsoever could not possibly be made out of matter, and particularly that life and sense, mind and understanding, being no accidents or modes of matter, could not by motion be generated out of it, without the production of real entities out of nothing. But because some may possibly imagine, that matter might otherwise than thus by motion, by a miraculous efficiency, produce souls and minds, we shall add in the last place, that nothing can efficiently produce any real entity or substantial thing, that was not before, unless it have at least equal perfection to it, and a substantially emanative or creative power. But scarcely any man can be so fothith, as to imagine, that every atom of dust hath equal perfection in it to that of the rational soul in man, or to at-
Theism proved, from Nothing out of Nothing. Book I.

tribute a creative power to all matter, (which is but a passive thing) whilst this is in the mean time denied by him to a perfect Being; both these assertions also, in like manner as the former, producing real entities out of nothing causally. And thus have we demonstrated the impossibility and non-sense of all atheism, from this very principle, by which the Atheists would assault theism, in the true sense thereof, that Nothing can be made without a cause, or that Nothing cannot be the cause of any thing.

Now, if there be no middle betwixt atheism and theism, and all things must of necessity either spring from senseless matter, or else from a perfect understanding Being; then is this demonstration of the impossibility of atheism a sufficient establishment of the truth of theism; it being such a demonstration of a God, as the geometricians call a deduction ad impossibile, which they allow of for good, and frequently make use of. Thus, either there is a God; or else matter must needs be acknowledged to be the only self-existent thing, and all things else whatsoever, to be made out of it; but it is impossible, that all things should be made out of senseless matter: therefore is there a God. Nevertheless, we shall here, for further satisfaction, show how the existence of a God may be directly demonstrated also from this very principle, which the Atheists endeavour to take sanctuary in, and from thence to impugn theism, De nihilo nihil, that Nothing can be made out of nothing causally, or that Nothing cannot be the cause of any thing.

In the first place therefore, we shall fetch our beginning from what hath been already often declared, that it is mathematically certain, that Something or other did exist of itself from all eternity, or without beginning and unmade by anything else. The certainty of which proposition dependeth upon this very principle, as its foundation, that Nothing can come from nothing, or be made out of nothing, or that Nothing, which once was not, can of itself come into being without a cause; it following unavoidably from thence, that if there had been once nothing, there could never have been any thing. And having thus laid the foundation, we shall in the next place make this further superstructure, that because something did certainly exist of itself from eternity unmade, therefore is there also actually a necessarily existent Being. For to suppose, that any thing did exist of itself from eternity, by its own free-will and choice, and therefore not necessarily, but contingently, since it might have willed otherwise; this is to suppose it to have existed before it was, and so positively to have been the cause of itself; which is impossible, as hath been already declared. When a thing therefore is said to be of itself, or the cause of itself, this is to be understood no otherwise, than either in a negative sense, as having nothing else for its cause; or because its necessary eternal existence is essential to the perfection of its own nature. That therefore, which existed of itself from eternity, independently upon any thing else, did not so exist contingently, but necessarily; so that there is undoubtedly something actually in being, whose existence is, and always was necessary. In the next place,
it is certain also, that nothing could exist necessarily of itself, but what included necessity of existence in its own nature. For to suppose any thing to exist of it self necessarily, which hath no necessity of existence in its own nature, is plainly to suppose that necessary existence of it to come from nothing, since it could neither proceed from that thing it self, nor yet from any thing else. Lastly, there is nothing, which includes necessity of existence in its very nature and essence, but only an absolutely perfect being. The result of all which is, that God, or a perfect Being, doth certainly exist; and that there is nothing else, which existed of it self from eternity, necessarily and independently; but all other things whatsoever derived their being from him, or were caused by him, matter or body itself not excepted.

That which hath staggered some Theists here, and made them so inclinable and prone to believe, that matter also existed from eternity unmade, is partly (as hath been already intimated) an idiotical conceit, that because nothing can be artificially made by men, otherwise than out of pre-existing matter, as houses and garments, puddings and pies; therefore there could be no other making of any thing, by any power whatsoever: though even men themselves can produce something out of no pre-existent matter, as cogitations and local motion. And the same partly proceedeth also from certain false opinions entertained concerning matter. For some Theists have supposed θανάτωμα, an incorporeal first matter; out of which incorporeal matter, together with an incorporeal form joined to it, they conceived the essence of body to have been compounded, and made up. And no wonder, if these same fanciful philosophers have further added also herto, that from this incorporeal matter, by an incorporeal form, were begotten likewise incorporeal qualities of body. Now it is not conceivable, what else should be meant by this incorporeal Hyle, or matter, but only a metaphorical notion of the potentiality, or possibility of things, respectively to the Deity; which, because it is indeed eternal, and as much unmade as God himself is, it being nothing but the divine power considered passively, or the reverse of it; therefore, in all probability, were these philosophers so prone to think the physical matter of this corporeal universe to have been eternal and unmade. Neither was this incorporeal Hyle, or matter, a novel opinion, entertained only by some junior Platonists, but older L. 1. c. 6, than Aristote himself, as appeareth plainly from these following words of [P. 273. Tom. IV. Oper.] his in his Metaphysics, ει μον γαρ ος θανατον τη αγρη κληρον, έιναι ζωσσε, έιναι δε θανατον τη δοσις, Some speak of the principle as matter; whether they suppose this matter to be body, or to be incorporeal. But this incorporeal matter in physiology can be accounted no better than a kind of metaphysical nonsense. Again, others seem to have been the more prone to think matter or body to have been self-existent and unmade, because they both conceived it to be really the same thing with space, and also took it for granted, that space was infinite and eternal, and consequently necessarily existent. In answer whereunto, we reply first, that though space and distance should be granted to be positively infinite, or to have
no bounds nor limits at all, as also to have been eternal; yet, according to
the opinion of some, would it not follow from thence, that matter was in-
finitive, eternal, and necessarily existent; not as if space or distance could
exist alone by itself, an accident without a substance, it being plainly im-
possible, that nothing should have any accidents, modifications and attributes,
or be mensurable by yards and poles; but because this space is by them sup-
pposed, not to be the extension of body, but the infinite and unbounded
extension of the Deity. But, in the next place, if space be concluded to be
certainly nothing else but the extension and distance of body, or matter, con-
considered in general, (without respect to this or that particular body) and ab-
tractly in order to the conception of motion, and the mensuration of
things; (for space thus considered, is necessarily immovable, as to the parts
thereof respectively; as the two extremes of a yard distance can never possibly
come nearer to one another:) then do we say, that there appeareth no suffi-
cient ground for this positive infinity of space, we being certain of no more
than this, that be the world, or any figurative body, never so great, it is
not impossible, but that it might be still greater and greater, without end.
Which indefinite increableness of body and space seems to be mistaken for
a positive infinity thereof. Whereas, for this very reason, because it can
never be so great, but that more magnitude may still be added to it, there-
fore can it never be positively infinite. Nor is there perhaps so great an ab-
furdity in this, that another world could not possibly be made a mile di-
tant from this, for as much as there being nothing between them, they
must needs touch; or that this finite world could have no mountains and
valleys in the exterior surface of it, since it might be either spherical, cubical,
or cylindrical, or of any other regular figure, whatsoever the maker pleased
to form it in. To conclude therefore, by space without the finite world,
is to be understood nothing but the possibility of body, further and fur-
ther, without end, yet so as never to reach to infinity; and such a space,
as this was there also, before this world was created, a possibility of so
much body to be produced. But space and actual distance, as really men-
surable by yards and poles, though it may be greater and greater without
end, yet can it not be positively infinite, so as that there could be no more
added to it; and therefore there can be no argument from hence, to prove
the necessary existence of matter.

Moreover, the existence of a Deity might be further demonstrated from
this common notion, That nothing can come from nothing casually; because,
if there were no God, as we could not have had any idea of him, or a perfect
Being, since it must have come from nothing, and have been the idea or
conception of nothing; so neither could there have been indeed any know-
ledge or understanding at all. For singular bodies existing without us can-
not enter into us, and put understanding in us; nor is there any thing but
local motions propagated from them to our organs of sense. The Mind
must have its immediate Intelligibles within itself, for otherwise it could
not possibly understand any thing; which Intelligibles and their relations to
one another, or Verities, are (as was said before) eternal. Moreover, the
mind
Mind can frame ideas or conceptions, not only of things actually existing, but also of all possibilities; which plainly implies and supposes the actual existence of a Being infinitely powerful, that could produce them. So that the proper object of Mind and Understanding is a perfect Being, and all the extent of its power; which perfect Being, comprehending it self and the extent of its own power, or the possibilities of all things, is the first original Mind, of which all other minds partake. Wherefore, were there no perfect omnipotent Being, comprehending it self, and its own power, or all the possibilities of things; the intelligible objects of the mind and ideas must have come from nothing.

However, it hath been already proved from this principle, Nothing from nothing, that the powers of sense and understanding, or the entities of soul and mind, could never have resulted from any modifications of senseless matter whatsoever. Wherefore, since it is mathematically certain, that our human souls and persons could not possibly have been generated out of matter, one of these two things will undeniably follow; That either they must all have existed of themselves, from eternity unmade; or else have been created and out of an antecedent non-existence, by a perfect understanding Being unmade, or at least have derived their whole substance from it. So that it is altogether as certain, that there is a God, as that our human souls and persons did not all exist from eternity of themselves. And that there must be some eternal, unmade Mind, hath been already demonstrated also from the same principle, Nothing out of nothing. Thus, have we abundantly confuted the second atheistic argumentation, that there can be no omnipotence, nor divine creation, because nothing can be made out of nothing; we having plainly shewed, that this very principle, in the true sense thereof, affordeth a demonstration for the contrary.

The six following atheistic argumentations, driving at these two things, First, the disproving of an incorporeal, and then of a corporeal Deity; (from both which, the Atheists conceive, it must flow of necessity, that there can be none at all;) we shall take them all together, and, in order to the confutation of them, perform these three things. First, we shall answear the atheistic argumentations against an incorporeal Deity, (contained in the third and fourth heads.) Secondly, we shall shew, that from the very principles of the atheistic corporealism, (as represented in the fifth and sixth heads) incorporeal substance is demonstrable. And lastly, that there being undeniably incorporeal substance, the two following atheistic argumentations also, against a corporeal Deity, (in the seventh and eighth sections) prove altogether insignificant.

We begin with the first of these; to shew the invalidity of the atheistic argumentations against an incorporeal Deity. It hath been already observed, that

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though all Corporealists be not therefore of necessity Atheists, yet Atheists univerally have been Corporealists; this being always their first and grand posultumat, That there is no other substanct besides body. Thus Plato long ago declared concerning them; διασυμβολας τοτε εις μοιον δε παρεχεσ προτ.

Thus [Soph. p. 172. Fic. [P. 160.] βολαι κα ιπαθη των, τυπατε σωμα κα ιπαθων ορισμους των δε άλλων ειτε. Ονει με σωμα έχον εικα, καλαφεστε το παραπατα, και επιστατες αλλα ακαν. They contend strongly, that that only really is, which is tangible, or can rest their touch; concluding body and substance to be one and the self-same thing: and if any one should affirm, that there is any thing incorporeal, they will presently cry him down, and not bear a word more from him. For there can be no doubt, but that the persons here intended by Plato were those very Atheists, which himself spake of afterward, in the same dialogue: μον τη των πολλων δοιματι εγκαρμας κα χαρμενος Φομεν της Φύσις αυτοι πολληγενην απο των αιτιων αυτων μεταφορας αν ανεαν διακισε Φιλοσοφος και μετα λογον επιστημονικα τις απο Άθεοι ρηξην οικη. Whether shall we assent to that opinion now-a-days entertained by so many, That nature generateth all things from a certain fortuitous cause, without the direction of any Mind or Understanding? or rather, that it produceth them, according to reason and knowledge, proceeding from God? Indeed the philospher there tells us, that some of these atheistical persons began then to be somewhat ashamed of making prudence, and justice, and other moral virtues, corporeal things, or bodies, ανακοποιησαν την μεν ψυχην αυτοι δοιμεν χαρακταριζονται, και ημεραν διακις Φιλοσοφος εις των δε άλλων ακαν δια των φυσικων νατα τις μεταφορας. Though they affirm concerning the soul it self, that this seems to them to be corporeal; yet, concerning prudence, and those other virtues mentioned, some have now fearfully the confidence to maintain these to be either bodies or nothing. But this (faith he) was indeed no less than the quite giving up of the cause of atheism; ει γαρ τι συνεκτικον εδουμη των δυναι συξυμβειν ανωμαλως ιταρει. because, if it be but once granted, that there is never so little incorporeal, this will be sufficient to overthrow the atheistical foundation. Wherefore he concludes, that such as these were but mongrel and imperfect Atheists, ιταται αυτων ου και εις επικοινωνιαν, ου γαι αυτων παροικοι γαι αυτοτεχνεις, άλλω διαλεουμεν τις, παι τις ανα δυναται ταις χερις επικοινωνους, αν αφαι τατο ινατο το παραπατα ειτε. For they, who are thorough-paced and genuine Atheists indeed, will boggle at neither of those forementioned things, but contend, that whatsoever they cannot grasp with their hands, is altogether nothing. That is, that there is no other substance nor entity in the world, but only body, which that is tangible, or resists the touch. Aristotle also re-presenteth the atheistical hypothesis after the same manner, τατο τι τοσουτων φανει ηυ απαξιος ιτατο, τα δε άλλα πατα παθει τατων. They affirm, that matter, or body, is all the substance, that is; and that all other things are but the passions and affections thereof. And again, in his Metaphysics, και το πατος.

[274.] Tome IV. Opera.

P. 163.
in our days, that body, or that which is tangible and divisible, is the only substantial thing; from whence it follows, that an incorporeal substance would be the same with an incorporeal body, i.e. an impossibility, and that there can be no incorporeal Deity.

But in the management of this cause, there hath been some disagreement amongst the Atheists themselves. For first, the Democriticks and Epicureans, though consenting with all the other Atheists, in this, That whatsoever was unextended, and devoid of magnitude, was therefore nothing; (so that there could neither be any substance, nor accident, or mode of any substance, unextended;) did notwithstanding distinguish concerning a double nature. First, that which is so extended, as to be impenetrable, and tangible, or resift the touch, which is body. And secondly, that which is extended also, but penetrably and intangibly; which is space or vacuum: a nature, according to them, really distinct from body, and the only incorporeal thing that is. Now since this space, which is the only incorporeal, can neither do nor suffer any thing, but only give place or room to bodies to subfift in, or pass thorough; therefore can there not be any active, understanding, incorporeal Deity. This is the argumentation of the Democritick Atheists.

To which we reply, That if space be indeed a nature distinct from body, and a thing really incorporeal, as they pretend, then will it undeniable follow from this very principle of theirs, that there must be an incorporeal substance; and (this space being supposed by them also to be infinite) an infinite, incorporeal Deity. Because, if space be not the extension of body, nor an affection thereof, then must it of necessity be, either an accident existing alone by itself, without a substance, which is impossible; or else the extension, or affection, of some other incorporeal substance, that is infinite. But here will Gaffendus step in, to help out his good friends the Democriticks and Epicureans at a dead lift; and undertake to maintain, that though space be indeed an incorporeal thing, yet it would neither follow of necessity from thence, that it is an incorporeal substance or affection thereof; nor yet that it is an accident existing alone by itself, without a substance; because this space is really neither accident, nor substance, but a certain middle nature or essence betwixt both. To which subterfuge of his, that we may not quarrel about words, we shall make this reply; that unquestionably, whatsoever is, or hath any kind of entity, doth either subsist by itself, or else is an attribute, affectation, or mode of something, that doth subsist by itself. For it is certain, that there can be no mode, accident or affection of nothing; and consequently, that nothing cannot be extended, nor measurable. But if space be neither the extension of body, nor yet of substance incorporeal, then must it of necessity be the extension of nothing, and the affection of nothing; and nothing must be measurable by yards and poles. We conclude therefore, that from this very hypothesis of the Democritick and Epicurean Atheists, that space is a nature distinct from body, and positively infinite, it follows undeniable, that there must be some incorporeal substance
Epicurus his Self-Contradiction.  Book I.

substance, whose affection its extension is; and because there can be nothing infinite, but only the Deity, that it is the infinite extension of an incorporeal Deity; just as some learned Theists and Incorporealists have asserted. And thus is the argument of these Democritick and Epicurean Atheists, against an incorporeal Deity, abundantly confuted; we having made it manifest, that from that very principle of their own, by which they would disprove the fame, it is against themselves demonstrable.

To which it might be here further added, that Epicurus, who professedly opposed Plato's incorporeal God, as an impossibility, did notwithstanding manifestly contradict himself, when he asserted such a Democracy of monogrammous gods, as were not compounded of atoms and vacuum, (though, according to him, the only principles of body,) that to they might be incorruptible; nor yet could touch or be touched, but were penetrable, as is declared in those verses of Lucretius:

Tenuis enim natura deum, longeque remota
Senibus a nosiris, animi vix mente videtur.
Quae quoniam manum tažum suffugit & ieiunum,
Tactile nil nobis quod sit, contingere debet.
Tangere enim non quis, quod tangi non licet ipsum.

(though tangibility and impenetrability were elsewhere made by him the very essence of body;) and lastly, such as had not corpus, but quæsi corpus, and therefore must needs be really incorporeal. Though there is no doubt to be made, but that Epicurus colluded in all this; himself not believing a jot of it, nor any such gods at all.

But other Atheists there were, who concluding likewise, That whatsoever was unextended was nothing, were sensible of the inconvenience of making space thus to be a thing really distinct from body, (from whence it would follow unavoidably, that it was an affection of incorporeal substance;) and therefore acknowledged, not two natures of extended things, but as we had it before in Aristotle, ἡμιν τινα θεόν ἐνεπτωνωσίμως, one only nature, and that bodily; space being therefore to them, either a mere imaginary thing, that hath no reality without our minds, but only a phantasm of our own, and, in their modern language, a kind of ghost, apparition, or spectre of a body; or else indeed the very extension of body itself, considered in general, and abstracly, from this or that singular body, moveable. And these men therefore framed their argumentation against an incorporeal Deity after this manner: Nothing truly is, but what is extended, or hath a certain magnitude, (because that which is unextended, and hath no magnitude, is no where, and consequently nothing;) But whatsoever is extended, and in a place, is body. Therefore is there no other substance besides body, and consequently there can be no incorporeal Deity. Or else to put the argument into a more approveable syllogistic form; whatsoever is extended, is body,

2 Lib. V. ver. 149.
CHAP. V. Whether any thing unextended.

or corporeal; but whatsoever is, is extended. Therefore whatsoever is, is body, or corporeal. And by consequence, there can be no incorporeal Deity.

To which argumentation the assertors of incorporeal substance have replied two manner of ways. For first, the generality of the ancient Incorporealists taking it for granted, that whatsoever was extended in magnitude, and had parts one without another, was divisible, as also probably impenetrable by any thing else extended, because there can be no penetration of dimensions; and therefore no one magnitude can be imbibed or swallowed up into another, but must of necessity stand without it, adding so much to the quantity thereof: they readily gave their assent to that proposition. That whatsoever is extended into longitude, latitude and profundity, is body. But being strongly persuaded of the existence of some other substance besides body, they denied that other proposition of theirs, that whatsoever is, is extended; or what is unextended, is nothing: maintaining, that besides body, or extended substance, there was another substance incorporeal, which therefore was ἀδιάστατος, and ἀμηχανικός, and ἀπόλυτος, and ἀμήχανος, and ἀδιεξοθέλον, unextended, and devoid of quantity and magnitude, without parts; and indiscernible. That Plato himself philosophized after this manner, might be proved from sundry passages of his writings; as that in his tenth De Legibus, where he affirmeth, that the soul it self, and those things, which belong to it, as cogitative, are πρότερον μήκος συμπάθων ἢ βαθύς ἢ πλατύς, in order of nature, before the longitude, latitude, and profundity of bodies. Where, doubtless, his meaning was not, as if there were longitude, latitude and profundity in souls, but of a different kind from that longitude, latitude, and profundity of bodies, and before it; but that longitude, latitude and profundity, being the essential properties of body only, soul and cogitation, as devoid of these, was in order of nature before them. Again, from that in his Timæus, where speaking of place, space, and matter, he condemneth this for a vulgar error, That whatsoever is, must of necessity be in some place or other, and what is in no place, is nothing. Ἀγαθος δὲ ἡγεῖται τὰ τῆς χώρας ἔχει τὰ παρεκεῖν ὑπάρχον ἐξαίρετον εἰκόνα πάντων—πρῶτον δὲ οὐ τὰ ἐν εἰρημέναις ἀκτίοις, τὰ δὲ παρεκεῖν ἐν τῷ τοῦτο τῇ ἐν κτισι παρακαταλαλοῦσθαι τῇ δὲ μέτα ἐν ὑγίᾳ, μητέρᾳ κατ' ἑρέμων, ἥτιν τοιούτῳ. The third kind is that of space, which gives room to all things, that are generated. And when we look upon this, we dreamingly affirm, That every thing, that is, must of necessity be in some place, and possess a certain room and space, and that whatsoever is not somewhere, either in earth, or in heaven, is nothing. Which dreamy or dreaming imagination, (faith he,) like a ghost, continually haunteth and possesseth men, and that even then, when they think of that true and awakened nature of the Deity. Whereas this philosopher himself, discoursing elsewhere of God, under the title of τὰ ἀπαθητεύοντα τὰ καλά, the vast sea of pulchritude, describeth him after this manner, ἡμίτθαν τὸ ἐν γῇ ἢ ἐν ὕδατι ἢ ἐν ἁλικόν, ἀλλ' ἀντιος, μεθ' ἀντίοις, μεσολόγγιον ἄνθρωπος ἐν τοιούτῳ, τὸ δὲ ἀλλ' πάντα καλὰ καὶ ἐν κύκλῳ μικροτομά. As that, which is not any where, either in earth, or in heaven, but it self alone by it self, and with it self, all other beautiful things partaking of it. And as for Aristotle's sense in this particular; that
that he here departed not, as he did in some other things, from his master. Plato, may appear from that whole chapter, or section, at the end of his physicks, expat upon this very subject, to prove, ὅτι τὰς ἀμείας ἀνακαλύπτον εἶναι, ή μὲν ἀξίων μὴν εἶναι. That his first Immovable Mover (which is God Almighty) must of necessity be devoid of parts, or indivisible, and have no magnitude at all. The conclusion of which section, and his whole book of Physicks 1, is this, ἀνικρισίας δὲ τῶν Φανερῶν ὑπὲρ τοῦ πρῶτον κινοῦν ἐκεῖν τὴν μέγεθον εἶχει, οἷς εἴσαξαν τὸν πεπερατόν παντὸς ἐπικοινών, ἡ αὐτοτοίν Α' περιον μὲν ὄν ὁ ὅμοιον ἐνδεχόμενον μεγέθη εἶναι, ἐνθεύματι πρός τοὺς Φυσικοῖς. ὅτι δὲ τὸ πεπερατόν αὐτοτοῖον ἐκεῖν ἀπιερον δύναμιν, διακατακαλύπτων Φανερῶν τοὺς, ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἀδιάφορον εἶναι, ή μὲν ἀμείας, ή μὲν ἀξίων μὴν εἶναι. These things being thus determined, it is manifestly impossible, that the first Mover should have any magnitude. For if it hath magnitude, that must of necessity be either finite, or infinite. But that there can be no infinite magnitude, was before demonstrated in the Physicks; and that nothing, which hath a finite magnitude, can have infinite power, hath been now proved. Wherefore it is plain, that the first mover is indivisible, and devoid of parts, and hath no magnitude at all. Which same Doctrine is again taught and asserted by Aristotle, in his Metaphysics, ὅτι μὲν ἐν ὑπὸν ὁσα τε ἐν τοῖς ἐπικοινων, ή μὲν ἀμείας, ή μὲν ἀκροτήματος ἐκεῖν ἀπιερον δύναμιν, καὶ ὅρρος ἐν ὑπὸν ἀπιερον. From what hath been declared, it is manifest, that there is an eternal and immovable substance, separate from sensibles; as also, that this substance cannot possibly have any magnitude, but is devoid of parts, and indivisible. Because no finite thing can have infinite power, and there is no such thing possible as infinite magnitude. Neither doth Aristotle appropriate this to the supreme Deity. To be thus devoid of magnitude and of parts, and consequently indivisible; he somewhere 2 attributing the fame alio to all other immaterial or incorporeal things, and particularly to the human mind, ὅτι συνεχεῖ τὸν ἄνωθεν ἔκειν ὅποι τὸν αὐτοτοίν οὗτος, ὅποι ὁ ἀπεριότητος τοῦ, εἴδατο, ὅτι ἐν εὐθείᾳ. ἂν, ἂν ἐν τῶν μοριῶν τοῦ αὐτοῦ. Each of these affirmeth, that they are no magnitudes, though ridiculously (after his manner) imputing the contrary opinion to Plato, ὅτι ἴσως τὸ λέγει τοῦ φυσικοῦ. From which the like doth he assent, at once, both concerning the mundane, and the human soul, that they are no magnitudes, though ridiculously (after his manner) imputing the contrary opinion to Plato. 3 It is not rightly affirmed either of the mundane, or rational soul, that they are magnitudes. For the Intellect is one and continuous, as Intelligence is, which is the same with the Intelligibles. But these are one, not as magnitudes, but as numbers. Therefore the Intelligible is not so continuous, but either devoid of parts, or not continuous as magnitude. For bow, being magnitude, could it

1 P. 610. Tom. I. Oper.
it understand with any of its parts, whether conceived as points, or as lesser magnitudes; since either way there would be an innumerable company of intellects? Moreover, how can it conceive anything, that is indivisible, by what is divisible? Furthermore, in this same book De Animâ, Aristotle stifly denies souls in general either to be in a place, or to be locally moved, otherwise than by accident, as they are said to be moved together with the motion of the body. Thus Simplicius, ὡσ τὸν πανταχῦ τὰς υματικὰς ἀποστείλαρ τῆς ψυχῆς κυνώς, See how Aristotle doth every where remove, or exclude from the soul, corporeal (or local) motions. And again, ἧν κυριακοῦν μὲν κυριακοῦν. Fol. 6; τὰ ἀφώματα τῆς κυριακῆς ἀπείκεν καὶ πρῶτα καὶ μέσα καὶ ἐξάραν τῇ, Aristotle will by no means allow any incorporeal things whatsoever, whether of the first, second, or lowest rank, (they being all the causes of motion) themselves to be moved.

Philoponus, like Plotinus, ὡσ τὲς ἀρχές τὰς υματικὰς κυνώς ἀποδείκνυται, ὡτε αὐτὸν ἀκόρον εἶναι φιλοσοφεῖν παντὶ γὰρ τὸ ἐν τῆς γούμα ἐν τον. Τοῦτο εἶπεν ἕνως Αριστοτέλει, respecting corporeal motions, pronounces of the soul, that it is immovable. For whatsoever is in a place (and moveable) is body. Lastly, in that passage before cited, Aristotle plainly makes the essence of corporeal substance, as opposed to incorporeal, to confit in magnitude.

Besides Plato and Aristotle, we might here instance in sundry other of the ancient Incorporeals, who clearly maintained the same doctrine. Philo doth not only assert in general a double essence or substance, ἀναλογικοῦ, and διανοητικοῦ, a distant, and indistinct one; but somewhere writeth thus concerning the Deity, ὡτί τὸ Θεόν παντάρχειν τὰ πάντα, περιτυχῇ τὰ περιτυχεῖν, De Confus. τὸν πανταχῦ τοῦ ἐντολῆς συνεβεβηκέν εἶναι μόνος ἡμᾶς μὲν ὁτι ζῷον τὸ τόπον Ling. p. 334, αὐτὸς τῶν σώματος υματικῶν τὸ ὁτι περιτυχεῖν ἐν εὐθεία τῶν γεγονότων Θείας επειδὴ περιτυχεῖαν παντάρχει, ὑμνεῖ τοῦ ὅτι συνάμεις αὐτοῦ δυνατας γης ὁ θεὸς ἐφευρέας τῶν, &c. All things are filled with God, as containing them, but not as being contained by them, or in them; to whom alone it belongeth to be both every where, and no where. Nowhere, because himself created space and place, together with bodies, and it is not lawful to include the Creator within any of his creatures. And every where, because be extendeth his virtues and powers throughout earth and water, air and heaven, and leaveth no part of the world destitute thereof; but, collecting all things together under himself, hath bound them fast with invisible bonds. But none hath more indistinctly pursued this business, than Plotinus, who every where asserts body and magnitude to be one and the same thing; and that, besides this, there is another substance incorporeal, which, consequently, is ἀποστάξεως, and αἰσθημάτως, and αἰσθητός, devoid of quantity, and of magnitude, and of parts, locally distant from one another; ὃ εἰτα διὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὑπάρχει τὸ ποιόν ὑπάρχειν, it having in its nature transcended the imperfection of quantity. And who hath also written two whole books upon this very subject, τὸ ὃ εἰτα τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ ἀναφερόμενον αὖτα πανταχοῦ ἐνὶ ἀναφερόμενον. That one and the same numerical thing may be all of it entirely every where. Wherein his prin-
Ancients generally asserted. Book I.

P. 667.
[Lib. IV. Cap. IX]

Principal design was to prove, that the Deity is not part of it here, and part of it there; and so much thereof in one place, and so much in another, (as if the very substance of it were menfurable by yards and poles;) but the whole undivided Deity every where, Ἡθο τοῦ εἰς τόπον ἀπαίνον (faith he) God is before all things, that are in a place. And ἡ ἐπιμάκειν υ ὅς, εἰ καίντο, μὲν τι, εἰ τόπος, παρὰ τοῦ εἰς τόπῳ άντι, ὁλας ὑπάρχειν, ὁντι γὰρ ὁ λόγος, ὡς ἀναλήθειν αὐτῷ τὸν πότον καὶ εἰρήχοντι, ὁ παρέστη, τότε ὕλον παρείσι. It is not at all to be wondered at, that God, being not in a place, should be present to every thing, that is in a place, wholly and entirely; reason pronouncing, that he, having no place, must therefore of necessity be ὅνος, all of him individually present to whatsoever he is present. Neither is this, faith he, a thing only deduced by reason, but that, which is before reason, suggested by the infinites of mankind; τοῦ εἰς χείρϊν αὕριζ, παραχαίρει αἷνα ὕλον εἰναι, καθώς ἐνανθα Φυσίν εἰς ὑπάρχειν, ὡς πάντες καθημερινα αὐτοῦς ἐλγέουνον τόν ἐν ἰκάτω ἡμῶν ὶνων, ὡς ἐνα παρά τοῦ αὐτοῦ. That one and the same numerical substance (to wit, of the Deity) is at once entirely, every where, is agreeable to the common notions, as sentiments of mankind: when we do so often by the infinites of nature speak of that God, who is in every one of us, supposing him to be one and the same in all. Where the philosopher subjoins, ὡς ἐν παρὰ παντῶν βεντωιαν ἐδέχατο, ὡς δικαίως οἱ Φύσες Ἀνάιγουναι, καὶ. And this is the firmest of all principles, that, which our souls do, as it were, naturally and of themselves speak; and which is not collected by reason, but comes forth from them before ratiocination. Moreover, he often affirms of the human soul, or rather takes it as a thing for granted, that this is the whole or all of it, in every part of the body, that is, undividedly: ἣ ὡς ἐν τῆς Φύσῃ, τον αὐτόν ἀνήγαγα, τό εἰς τόπῳ, ὡς ἐν τῆς χείρι ὑπάρχει, As for the human soul, it is one and the same numerically in the hand, and in the foot. And again, εἰς τοῖς εἰς τοῖς ἐν τῇ χείρι τῆς αὐτῆς, τόν δὲ καὶ τῇ δέ μένει τὸ πάντοτε, ἡ τῆς αὐτῆς τῆς εἰς τοῦτο. Since we commonly suppose our own soul to be the same, both in our soul and in our hand, why should we not, in like manner, acknowledge that of the mundane soul, or Deity, which is in one part of the universe, to be the same with that in another? In like manner, Simplicius, proving that body is not the first principle, because there must of necessity be something self-moving, and what is so, must needs be incorporeal, writeth thus; τοῦ εἰς τοῖς αὐτοῖς εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν εἰς, καὶ αὐτὸν ἀναλήθειν, μερεῖς γαρ ἡ ἀνάλογα τοῦ ὑπάρχειν, εἰ δύναται ξένος ἐκ του ἐργαζόμενον, ὡς τοῦ ἔρχεται καὶ καίν, ὡς ἐν τοῦ ἀναλήθει. Because what is such, must of necessity be indivisible, and indissolent; for were it divisible, and distant, it could not all of it be conjoined with its whole self; so that the whole should both actively move, and be moved. Which same thing seems further evident in the soul's being all conscious of itself, and reflexive of its whole self; which could not be, were one part of it distant from another. Again, the same philosopher expressly denieth the soul, though a self-moving substance, to be at all locally moved, otherwise than by accident, in respect of the body, which is moved by it, ὡς τοῖς σωματικαὶς κυρίμον κυρίας (κατά γαρ εἰςως αὐτῶν ἐργαζόμενον ἔστι) ἀλλὰ τοῖς σωματικαῖς, καὶ εὐμακα τῇ ἔκπειτει χειρισμένη, ἐφηκτεῖς, εἰς εἰς τοῦ σώματος κατὰ τοῖς σωματικαῖς κυρίαις. The soul, being not moved by corporeal, or local motions,
tions, (for in respect of these it is immoveable) but by cogitative ones only, (the names whereof are Consultation and Deliberation, &c.) by these moveth bodies locally. And that this was really Plato's meaning also, when he determined the soul to be a self-moving subsance, and the cause of all body's motion; that moving itself in a way of cogitation, it moved bodies locally, (notwithstanding that Aristotle would not take notice of it) sufficiently appears from his own words, and is acknowledged by the Greek scholasts themselves upon Aristotle's De Anima. Thus again Simplicius elsewhere, *Είδε τον ἀνθρώπον ἐν τῷ πνεύματι, καὶ τοὺς ἐν τῷ πνεύματι κινήτες, *Είναι τὸν πνεύματι κινηθέν. Since the soul is not in a place, it is not capable of any local motion.

We should omit the testimonies of any more philosophers, were it not that we find Porphyrius so full and express herein, who makes this the very beginning of his ἄφορμα πρὸς τὰ ζώη, his Manuduction to Intelligibiles; Πάντως, οὐκ ἐν τῷ πνεύματι, πάντως οὐκ ἐν τῷ πνεύματι ἐν τῷ πνεύματι. That though every body be in a place, yet nothing, that is properly incorporeal, is in a place: and who afterwards further pursues it in this manner, *Είδε τοπικὰς κατάλοιπα τὸ ἀνθρώπον ἐν τῷ πνεύματι; οὐκ ἔχεινυ; οὐκ γὰρ συμφησιαίοις τῷ πνεύματι τό δὲ ἐκείνον παντελῶς ἀμβλυγεῖται, ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν ὧν ἀκατατυποῖ, τοπικῶς τε καὶ ποιητικῶς ἀμβλυγεῖται, διὰ τοῦ τοίχου τοίχως εὐεργετεῖται, οὐκ άμβλυγεῖται, ὕπο τῶν ἐκείνων αὐτῶν Μανεάδος λαοὶ γένεται. Neither does that, which is incorporeal, move locally by will, place being relative only to magnitude and bulk. But that, which is devoid of bulk and magnitude, is likewise devoid of local motion. Wherefore it is only present by a certain disposition, and inclination of it to one thing more than another; nor is its presence there discernible otherwise, than by its operations and effects. Again, concerning the three divine hypostases he writeth thus; *ὁ Θεὸς πάντα ταχύ οὐ κατατύπῳ, καὶ τὸ πνεύμα ταχύ οὐ κατατύπῳ, &c. The supreme God is therefore every where, because he is no where; and the same is true also of the second and third divine hypostasis, Nous and Psyche. The supreme God is every where and no where, in respect of those things which are after him, and only his own, and in himself. Nous, or Intellect, is in the supreme God, every where and no where, as to those things, that are after him. Psyche, or the mind, or soul, is both in intellect and the supreme God, and every where and no where, as to bodies. Lastly, body is both in the soul of the world, and in God. Where he denies God to be locally in the corporeal world, and thinks it more proper to say, that the corporeal world is in God, than God in it; becaufe the world is held and contained in the divine power, but the Deity is not in the locality of the world. Moreover, he further declares his fenfe after this manner: *εἰ μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἐν τῷ ἐννοοῦσθαι ἀνθρώπου, ἐν λειτουργίᾳ τε εἰκών τε, ἐν οὐκ οὐκ οὐκ, οὐκ οὐκ οὐκ. *εἰ μὲν οὖν καὶ ἐν τῷ ἐννοοῦσθαι πλαίσι, τοῦ ἔντον ἐννοοῦσθαι. *Εἰ μὲν οὖν καὶ ἐν τῷ ἐννοοῦσθαι πλαίσι, τοῦ ἔντον ἐννοοῦσθαι. *Εἰ μὲν οὖν καὶ ἐν τῷ ἐννοοῦσθαι πλαίσι, τοῦ ἔντον ἐννοοῦσθαι. *Εἰ μὲν οὖν καὶ ἐν τῷ ἐννοοῦσθαι πλαίσι, τοῦ ἔντον ἐννοοῦσθαι.
And as for Christian writers, besides Origen, who was so famous an affirter of incorporeal substance, that (as Socrates recordeth) the Egyptian monks and Anthropomorphites threatened death to Theophilus the Alexandrian bishop, unless he would at once excommunicate and renounce the writings of Origen, and profess the belief of a corporeal God of human form; and who also maintained incorporeal substance to be unextended, as might be proved from fundry passages, both of his book against Celsus, and that Peri Archon; we say, (besides Origen, and others of the Greeks) St. Austin amongst the Latins clearly affirter the same; he maintaining in his book De Quantitata Anima, and elsewhere, concerning the human soul, that being incorporeal, it hath no dimensions of length, breadth and profundity, and is illocabiliis, no where as in a place. We shall conclude with the testimony of Boethius, who was both a philosopher and a Christian; Quod sunt (faith he) communes animi conceptiones, per se notae, apud sapientes tantum; ut incorporeala non esse in loco; There are certain common conceptions of the mind, which are known by themselves amongst wise men only; as this for example, That incorporeals are in no place. From whence it is manifest, that the generality of reputed wise men were not formerly of this opinion, Quod gressum est, nihil est, That what is no where, or in no certain place, is nothing; and that this was not looked upon by them as a common notion, but only as a vulgar error.

By this time we have made it unquestionably evident, that this opinion of incorporeal substance being unextended, indifferent, and devoid of magnitude, is no novel or recent thing, nor first started in the scholastic age; but that it was the general persuasion of the most ancient and learned affirters of incorporeal substance, especially that the Deity was not part of it here, and part of it there, nor the substance thereof menurable by yards and poles, as if there were so much of it contained in one room, and so much.

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*a* Vide Part. I. Sententiar. §. XVIII. p. 225.


*3* It is published in the first Tome of the Benedictine Edition of St. Auguftine's Works.

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*a* Dr. Cudworth seems to have quoted this passage from memory out of Boethius's Book, intitled, Quaemodo Substantia in eo, quod est, bona sunt, cum non sint Substantia bona, p. 167.
much and no more in another, according to their several dimensions; but that the whole undivided Deity was at once in every part of the world, and consequently no where locally after the manner of bodies. But, because this opinion seems so strange and paradoxical, and lies under so great prejudices, we shall in the next place shew, how these ancient Incorporeals endeavoured to acquit themselves, in repelling the several efforts and plausibilities made against it. The first whereof is this, That to suppose incorporeal substances unextended and divisible is to make them absolute par
titudes, and by means of that, to render them all (even the Deity itself) contemptible: since they must of necessity be either physical minimums, that cannot actually be divided further by reason of their littlenesfs, (if there be any such thing) or else mere mathematical points, which are not so much as mentally divisible: so that thousands of these incorporeal substances, or spirits, might dance together at once upon a needle's point. To which it was long since thus replied by Plotinus, \( \alpha \chi_\) \( \xi \tau \omega \) \( \delta \) \( \alpha \mu \epsilon \rho \epsilon \zeta \) \( \omega \zeta \) \( \mu \iota \kappa \rho \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \micr
Incorporeal; no Points nor Parvitudes. Book I.

No point is incorporeally extended; nor can any point exist.

De Animā, Lib. II. Cap. VI. p. 13.

Vide etiam Metaphys. Lib. XIII. Cap. XII. Oper.

p. 471. Tom. IV. Oper.
most incorporeal of all the elements; and Aristotle himself used the word in the same manner, when he affirmeth, that all philosophers did define the soul by three things, motion, sensible, and incorporeity; several of these, there mentioned by him, understanding the soul to be no other wise incorporeal, than as ὁμοίως κατάλογος, a skin and subtile body. In answer to which objection, we may remember, that Plato, in the passage before cited, declareth this to be but a vulgar error, that whatsoever doth not take up space, and is in no place, is nothing. He intimating the original hereof to have sprung from men’s adhering too much to those lower faculties of sense and imagination, which are able to conceive nothing, but what is corporeal. And accordingly Plotinus, ο κ αἰσθ. ή προσέχοντες αναπταίριν τοις λεγομέναις, λέγει ὅτι ὧδε καὶ ὧδε, ὃ δέ λόγος το ὧδε καὶ ὧδε φεστίν, ἐκ ἐκκλησίας ὧδε καὶ ὧδε γενοῦσαι, ἀλλα το εἰσελθεῖ δια το ἀνατιμήθη, οὐχι αἰσθάτως αὐτοῦ. Sense indeed, which we attending to, disbelieve these things, tells us of here and there; but reason dictates, that here and there is to be understood of the Deity, not as if it were extendedly here and there, but because every extended thing, and the several parts of the world, partake every where of that, being indistinct and unextended. To the same purpose Porphyryus, διὶ τοῦν ἐν ταῖς σκέψισι καλακρατίας τῆς ἑκατέρις ἱδίς ψευδερλητίας καὶ ἑπαλλακτίας τοις φύσεσι καὶ τῶν πρᾶξιν τῶν τοσάκα, καὶ τοιούτα, ὃς Φαντασίῳ καὶ ὃς δοξάζειν τι ἀαμάζειν τῶν μικρά ὑπάρκτων, εἰ συνθέσει πάσιν ἑκείναις ἐν μιᾷ γενέσι γενέσι, ἀυτός ἐν τοῖς Φαντασίαις κρατάτοις. We ought therefore, in our disquisitions concerning corporeal and incorporeal beings, to preserve the property of each, and not to confound their natures; but especially to take heed, that our phancy and imagination do not so far impose upon our judgments, as to make us attribute to corporeals what properly belongeth to bodies only. For we are all accustomed to bodies; but as for incorporeals, scarcely any one reaches to the knowledge of them, men always fluating about them, and differing them, so long as they are held under the power of their imagination. Where afterwards he profoundeth a form for this, how we should think of incorporeals, so as not to confound their natures with corporeals; ὑπὲρ αἱτερίας μέτειν το διάστημα περιεχέσθαι διὰ τοῦ τοις ἐκ των ἐντάξεων, οὗ καὶ ἐν τοῖς παρακμασίας των μετακομίσεων, ὡς τοῦ περιεχεῖν τοις παρακμασίας τῶν ἐντάξεων αὐτοῦ, ἀλλα τὸ τοις τοις μετακομίσεως τῶν ἐντάξεων. That the indistinct and unextended Deity is the whole of it present in infinite parts of the distant world, neither divided, as applying part to part; nor yet multiplied into many wholes, according to the multiplicity of these things, that partake thereof. But the whole of it (one and the same in number) is present to all the parts of the bulky world, and to every one of those many things in it, undividedly and unmultiplyed; that in the mean time partaking thereof dividely. It was granted therefore by these ancients, that this unextended, and indistinct nature of incorporeals is ἀφώνον, a thing altogether unimaginable; and this was concluded by them to be the only reason, why so many have pronounced it to be impossible, because they attended only to sense and imagination, and made them the only measure of things and truth; it having been accordingly maintained by divers of them, (as Porphyryus tells us) that imagination and intellect are but two different names for...
for one and the same thing; ὁμοιὸς διὰφορὰς προσφέρεις τῷ του ὑπογράφει, καὶ τῷ τῆς φλυτησίας, ἃ ἐπὶ λογικῆς ἐνοτητίας διδούσθε ὀντὸς φήμη, There is a difference of names only, and no more, between mind and phantasy; phantasy and imagination, in rational animals, seeming to be the same thing with intellect. But there are many things, which no man can have any phantasy or imagination of, and yet are they, notwithstanding, by all unquestionably acknowledged for entities, or realities; from whence it is plain, that we must have some other faculties in us, which extend beyond phantasy and imagination. Reason indeed dictates, that whatsoever can either do, or suffer any thing, must therefore be undoubtedly something; but that whatsoever is extended, and hath no distant parts one without another, must therefore needs be nothing, is no common notion, but the spurious suggestion of imagination only, and a vulgar error. There need to be no fear at all, left a Being infinitely wise and powerful, which acts upon the whole world, and all the parts thereof, in framing and governing the same, should prove a non-entity, merely for want of bulk and extension; or, because it swells not out into space and distance, as bodies do, therefore vanish into nothing. Nor does active force and power, as such, depend upon bulk and extension; because then whatsoever had the greater bulk, would have the greater activity. There are therefore two kinds of substances in the universe; the first corporeal, which are nothing but ὅς, bulks, or tumours, devoid of all self-active power; the second incorporeal, which are ὅς ὃς ὅς ὅς ὅς ὃς, substantial powers, vigours, and activities; which, though they act upon bulk and extension, yet are themselves unbulky, and devoid of quantity and dimensions; however, they have a certain in them in another sense, an essential profundity, according to this of Simplicius, μέσα· μέσα· μέσα· πάντα, ἀλλὰ ἄλλα· τῶν· καθέναν· καθέναν· καθέναν· καθέναν. All corporeal substance is simply divisible, some parts of it being here, and some there; but intellectual substance is indivisible, and without dimensions, though it hath much of depth and profundity in it in another sense. But that there is something ἀπαθάτως, unimaginable, even in body itself, is evident, whether you will suppose it to be infinitely divisible, or not, as you must of necessity suppose one or other of these. And that we ought not always to pronounce of corporeal things themselves according to imagination, is manifest from hence; because, though astronomical reasons assure us, that the sun is really more than a hundred times bigger than the whole earth, yet can we not possibly, for all that, imagine the sun of such a bigness, nor indeed the earth itself half so big, as we know it to be. The reason whereof is, partly because we never had a sense or sight of any such vast bigness at once, as that of either of them; and partly because our sense always representing the sun to us, but ὡς πεδίων, as of a foot diameter; and we being accustomed always to imagine the same according to the appearance of sense, are not able to frame any imagination of it, as very much bigger. Wherefore, if imagination be not to be trusted, nor made the criterion, or measure of truth, as to sensible things themselves, much less ought it to be, as to things insensible. Besides all which, the ancient

ancient Incorporealists argued after this manner, that it is as difficult for us
to conceive a substance, whose duration is unextended or unstretched out in
time, into past, present and future, and therefore without beginning; as
that which is unextended as to parts, place or space, in length, breadth, and
thickness; yet does reason pronounce, that there must needs be not only a
duration without beginning, but also *a timeless eternity*, or a
permanent duration, differing from that successive flux of time, (which is
one of Plato's *things generated*, or that had a beginning) this parti-
ty of reason is by Plotinus thus infisled on, *δὲ γὰρ ἐν χρόνῳ, ἀλλὰ παντὸς p. 669.*
*Χρόνος ἐστὶν, τὰ μὲν χρόνα χαλασμένα αἰτεῖ πρὸς διάστασιν, τὰ δὲ αἰωνῶν ἔτι τὰ αυτῶ μεί-
νον* ἡ *κρατίνη*, ὁ πλείονος ὅποιος δυσάμεν αἰώνας ἐτειχίσεις ἔνας ἑνώς ἡγεῖται χρόνον. For the same reason, that we deny local extension to the Deity,
muft we also deny temporal distance to the fame; and affirm, that God is not
in time, but above time, in eternity. Forasmuch as time is always scattered
and stretched out in length and distance, one moment following after another;
but eternity remained in the same, without any flux, and yet nevertheless out-
goeth time, and transcendent the flux thereof, though seeming to be stretched
and spun out more into length. Now, the reason, why we cannot frame a con-
ception of such a timeless eternity, is only, because ourselves are effentially
involved in time, and accordingly are our conceptions chained, fettered
and confined to that narrow and dark dungeon, that ourselves are imprisoned
in; notwithstanding which, our freer faculties, affuring us of the existence of
a being, which far transcended ourselves, to wit, one that is infinitely
perfect; we have, by means hereof, *μανίδα τινὰ, a certain vaticination*, of
such a standing timeless eternity, as its duration.

But as for that conceit, of immaterial or incorporeal bodies, or that
God, and human souls are no otherwise incorporeal than as *έναρχα λεπτέως, a thin and subtile body*, such as wind or vapour, air or æther; it is certain,
that, according to the principles of the most ancient atomick philosophy,
(before it was atheized) there being no such real quality of subtilty or te-
nuity, (because this is altogether unintelligible) but this difference arifing
wholly from motion, dividing the insensible parts, and every way agitating
the same, together with a certain contexture of those parts; it is not im-
possible, but that the finest and moft subtile body, that is, might become
as gross, hard, heavy, and opake, as flesh, earth, stones, lead, or iron; and
again, that the groftest of these bodies, by motion, and a different con-
texture of parts, might not only be crystallized, but also become as thin,
soft, and fluid as the finest æther. So that there is no specific difference
betwixt a thick and thin, a gross and fine, an opake and pellicul, an hard
and soft body, but accidental only; and therefore is there no reafon, why
life and understanding should be thought to belong to the one rather than
to the other of them. Besides which, the reafons of the ancient Incorpore-
alis, (afterwards to be produced) will evince, that the human soul and
mind cannot possibly be any body whatsoever, though never fo fine, thin,
and subtile, whose parts are by motion dividable, and separable from one
another.

Vol. II.

5 H

Ret

In Timæo, p. 529. Oper.
But it is farther objected against this unextended nature, of incorporeal substances, as they are said to be all in the whole, and all in every part of that body, which they are united into, or act upon; that this is an absolute contradiction and impossibility, because if the whole of the Deity be in this one point of matter, then can there be nothing at all of it in the next adjoining, but that must needs be another whole, and nothing the same with the former. In like manner, if the whole human soul be in one part of this organized body, then can there be none at all of it in any other part thereof; and so not the whole in the whole. To which objection the ancient IncorpoREALISTS made this two-fold reply. First, in way of concession, That this is indeed an absolute contradiction for an extended substance, or body, to be all of it in every one part of that space, which the whole occupies. Thus Plotinus; 

Thus Plotinus; οὐκ ἦνρεται ἀνίκητον ἐν πλείοντι τοι ἀντι ὅλον εἴναι, ἢ το πρόσ τε ὅλον ὑπάρχειν. It is is impossible for a body, or extended substance, to be one and the same, all of it in every part of that space, which it possesses; and for every part thereof, to be the same with the whole. But secondly, as for an unextended and indissoluble substance, which hath no parts one without another, it is so far from being a contradiction, that it should be all of it in every part of that body, which it acts upon; that it is impossible it should be otherwise, only a part in a part thereof, so that an equal quantity of both should co-exist together, because this is to suppose an unextended substance to be extended. We say it is contradictory to the nature of that substance, which is supposed to be, ἀμετάθεται, ἀποστειλμένος, ὑπάρχων ὄσον ὑπάρχουσαν, ἀμετάθεται, ἀμετάθεται, ἀμετάθεται, δεχόμενος of magnitude, and of quantity, and of parts indissoluble, and indivisible; that it should be otherwise united to, or conjoined with an extended body, than after this way, which is looked upon as such conjuring; namely, that the whole of it should be present with, and act upon every part thereof. Thus Plotinus, οὐκ ἦνρεται ἀνίκητον ἐν πλείοντι τοι ἀντι ὅλον εἴναι, ἢ το πρόσ τε ὅλον ὑπάρχειν. This form of doctrine, concerning Incorporeal, is necessarily taken from the thing itself (viz. the nature of them as unextended) and hath nothing in it alien from that essence, as confounding the corporeal nature therewith. Whatever is unextended and indissoluble, cannot possibly co-exist with an extended substance, point by point, and part by part, but it must of necessity be, ὅλον ἐν το ἀντίδιατο ἀφθαρσί. All of it, one and the same numerically; that is, (like itself) undividedly, in every part of that which it acts upon. Wherefore the word ὅλον, in this form, when it is said, that the whole Deity is in every part of the world, and the whole soul in every part of the body, is not to be taken in a positive sense, for a whole consisting of parts, one without another, but in a negative only, for μὴ μεμερισθείναι, an whole undivided; so that the meaning thereof is no more than this, that the Deity is not dividedly in the world, nor the soul dividedly in the body, a part here and a part there; but the Τὸ Θεῖον is παντοθέν ὅλον μὴ μεμερισθείναι, every where all of it, undividedly. Thus again Plotinus, εἰ ἐν πανταχῷ ζῆται, εἰ ὅλον τε μεμερισθείναι εἰ γὰρ ἐν ἑν το πανταχῶ autēς
CHAP. V. All in every Part.

All throughout magnitude no that ylv (from and alfo to tu undivided, not to tw X7TifX~ puzzling because would himfelf X7TifX as they this 7T£o'f wo* but (puersi what (j.sv or certain si?; Secondly, this of if xx hath by of as that thing. Moreover, this would be all one, as if a magnitude were cut and divided into many parts, every one of which parts could not be that whole magnitude. Lastly, this would be the very fame, as to make God a body. Now if these things be impoffible, then muft that fo much disbelieved thing (look'd as such a puzzling griphus, or rather as contradictory nonsence) be an undoubted truth, according to the common notions of mankind, that God is every where; to wit, that he is all of him the fame whole, undividedly, every where. The sum of all is, that though it be an absolute contradiction, for a body, or quantum, to be ῥως παί, all of it in every part of that space, which the whole is in; yet it is no contradiction at all for an unextended and indiftant beings, to be all of it undividedly, in every part of that body it acts upon; but on the contrary, it would be flatly contradictory to it, to fay, that it is only part of it in a part; this being to divide an indivifible thing into parts.

The fourth and laft objection against incorporeal and unextended substance is from that illocality and immobility (which will follow thereupon) of human fouls, and other finite particular spirits, fuch as daemons or angels; that this is not only itself very absurd, to fuppofe thefe finite and particular beings, to be thus illocal and immovable, no where, and every where; (from whence it would feem to follow, that they might act the whole corporeal univerfe, or take cognizance of all things therein every where) but also, that this conceit is contradictory to the very principles of religionifts themselves, and plainly confuted by the fame; they acknowledging universally, that human fouls (at death) departing out of this body, do locally move from thence into a certain other place, called Hades, Hell, or Inferi. Now the latter part of this objection is firft to be anfwered. And this is indeed a thing, which the ancient aflertors of incorporeal substance, as unextended, were not unawares of; that the vulgarly received tradition, of human fouls (after death) going into Hades, might be objected againft them. For the satisfying whereof, Plotinus fuggefteth thefe two things; Firft, Τὸ μὲν εἰς Ἀδη γίνεται, εἰ μὲν εἰ τῷ Ἀδη οὐκ ἔστιν χρής λέγειν. That if Ex. 6. 1. οὐκ ἔστιν that by Hades be meant nothing but τὸ ἀνάδει, the invisible, (as many times it is) [Cap. XVL then is there no more signified by the fouls going into Hades, than its no longer being vitally united to this earthly body, and but acting apart by itself, and jo hath it nothing of place necessarily included in it. Secondly, Εἰ ἢ τῶν χειρῶ τόπων τὸ θαυμαστὸν; ἐτεῖ ἢ τὸν τόπων οὐκ ἔστιν χρής λέγειν έκείνοι αὐλα ἐκ οὗ τὸ εἰδολον εἰ μὴ ἀποσπασθεῖν, τῷ δὲ εἰκεί ἢ τῷ εἰδολον. But if by Hades be underftood a certain worfe place, (as sometimes it also is)
That wonder is this? since now where our body is, there in the same place is our soul said to be also? But you will reply, how can this be, when there is now no longer any body left? We answer, that if the idol of the soul be not quite separated from it, why should not the soul itself be said to be there also, where its idol is? Where, by the idol of the soul, Plotinus seems to mean an airy or spirituous body, quickned and vitalized by the soul, adhering to it after death. But when the same philosopher supposes this very idol of the soul to be also separable from it, and that so as to subsist apart by itself too, this going alone into Hades, or the worser place, whilst that liveth only in the intelligible world, (where there is no place nor distance) lodged in the naked Deity, having nothing at all of body hanging about it, and being now not a part but the whole, and so situate neither here nor there; in this high flight of his, he is at once both absurdly paradoxical, in dividing the life of the soul as it were into two, and forgot the doctrine of his own school, which, as himself elsewhere intimateth, was this; τὸν ἀντίστροφον ψυχῷ τὸς μὴ σῶμα καταλείψειν, οὐ πάντες δὲ ἔξω σῶματός ἐστιν. That our soul, though it shall quit this body, yet shall it never be disunited from all body. Wherefore Porphyrius anfwering the fame objection, though he were otherwise much addicted to Plotinus, and here ues his language too, yet does he in this depart from him, adhering to the ancient Pythagorick tradition; which, as will appear afterwards, was this, That human souls are always united to some body or other. Ὡσπέρ τὸ ἐπὶ τῆς ἐκεί τοῦ ψυχῆς εἶναι, καὶ τὸ τῆς ἐκεῖ τοῦ σώματος, ὡς τὸ σῶμα, τὸ δὲ προσετὰ τοῦ σώματος, τὸ γῆς ἐπκατοικήματος ὡς τὸν περιστέραιον οἰκῆα τῆς ἀρχῆς, τοῦ δὲ τοῦ ὄργανου, οὐκέτι ἐν τοῖς σωματικῶς, ἃ ἐν αὐτῷ ἐτέλεσθαι ἡ ψυχή. ὡς οὖν προς τῇ καταλείψει τοῦ σώματος, τῶν περιστέραιον οἰκημένων ὡς τὸν ὄργανον, οὐκέτι ἐν τοῖς σωματικῶς, ταῦτα ἐν τῷ καταλείπειντος. As the soul’s being here upon earth, (faith he) is not its moving up and down upon it, after the manner of bodies, but its presiding over a body, which moveth upon the earth; so is its being in Hades nothing but its presiding over that idol, or enlivened vaporous body, whose nature it is to be in a place, and which is of a dark substance. Wherefore, if Hades be taken for a subterraneous and dark place, yet may the soul nevertheless be said to go into Hades, because when it quits this gross earthly body, a more spirituous and subtle body, collected from the spheres (or elements) doth still accompany it. Which spirit being moist and heavy, and naturally descending to the subterraneous places, the soul itself may be said in this sense to go under the earth also with it, not as if the substance thereof paled from one place to another, but because of its relation and vital union to a body which does so. Where Porphyrius addeth, contrary to the sense of Plotinus; That the soul is never quite naked of all body, but hath alway some body or other joined with it suitable and agreeable to its own present disposition, (either a purer or impurer one.) But that at its first quitting this gross earthly body, the spirituous body, which accompanieth it, (as its vehicle) must needs go away fouled and incrassated with the gross vapors.
Chap. V. Body, the old Philosphick Cabala.

pours and beams thereof, till the soul afterwards by degrees purging it self, this becometh at length a dry splendour, which bath no misty obscurity, nor castseth any shadow.

But because all this doctrine of the ancient Incorporealists, concerning the human soul’s being always (after death) united to some body or other, is more fully declared by Philoponus than by any other, that we have yet met withal, we shall here excerp some passages out of him about it. First, therefore, Arril.: De he declareth this for his own opinion, agreeable to the sense of the best philosophers: Τὴν μὲν λογικὴν χαρίσιν, τὴν δὲ ἀλογίαν, τούτη μὲν χαρίσιν, ἄλλα μετονιμῶς σώματος ἀκράτειαν, λέγε τι τὸ Πνευματικόν, εἰς ᾧ ἀληθῆς ὀνόματος, ὡς διεξάγειν: That the rational soul, as to its energy, is separable from all body; but the irrational part, or life thereof, is separable only from this gross body, and not from all body whatsoever, but bath (after death) a spiritual or airy body, in which it aftereth: this I say is a true opinion, as shall be afterwards proved by us. And again, ἔν τε ἐκ τῶν τῶν ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς, ὡς ἄλλης καὶ ἄλλης ἐκ τοῦ πνευματικοῦ σώματος τὰς ἀκράτειας τις ὑποθέτεται ᾧ καὶ αὐτῶ τῶν τῶν ἐκ τῶν πνευμάτων, λέγεται δὲ ἐκ τῶν πνευμάτων τὰς ἀκράτειας τις ἀπετέλεσται καὶ τοῦ γίνεται, λέγεται ἐκ τῶν πνευμάτων. The irrational life of the soul bath not all its being in this gross earthly body, but remaineth after the soul’s departure out of it, having for its vehicle and subject, the spiritual body; which itself is also compounded out of the four elements, but receiveth its denomination from the predominant part, to wit, air; as this gross body of ours is called earthy, from what is most predominant therein. Thus do we see, that, according to Philoponus, the human soul, after death, does not merely exercite its rational powers, and think only of metaphysical and mathematical notions, abstract things, which are neither in time nor place, but exerciseth also its lower sensitive and irrational faculties, which it could not possibly do, were it not then vitally united to some body; and this body then accompanying the soul he calls pneumatical, that is, (not spiritual in the Scripture-sense, but) spiritual, vaporous, or airy. Let us therefore, in the next place, see what rational account Philoponus can give of this doctrine of the ancients, and of his own opinion agreeably thereunto: τῇ ψυχῇ, ἐν ἡμείσαις, μετὰ τὴν εἰς τὸ σώματος τοῦ ἐκ τοῦ ὀνόματος, ὁμολογεῖται, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀπόθανεν. Eic ómμα πνευματικόν, καὶ τοὺς ἐκ τῶν τῶν, καὶ καὶ ἁντικυριότερον παράκλησις τοῦ ψυχής, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐκ τοῦ ἐμφανίσεως, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐκ τῶν πνευμάτων, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐκ τῶν πνευμάτων, τοῦ ἐκ τῶν πνευμάτων. Ὑπάρχουσα εἰς τὸν πνευματικόν σώματος, ἀνακληθεῖν τοῦ πνευματικοῦ σώματος, ἀπεισθείν τοῦ πνευματικοῦ σώματος, ἀνακληθεῖν τοῦ πνευματικοῦ σώματος, ἀπεισθείν τοῦ πνευματικοῦ σώματος.

Our human soul (in those who are not purged and cleansed in this life) after its departure out
of this body, is acknowledged, or rather demonstrated, to go into Hades, there to receive punishment for its evil actions past. For providence does not only take care of our being, but also of our well-being. Therefore is the soul, though lapsed into a preternatural state, yet not neglected by providence, but hath a convenient care taken of it, in order to its recovery. And since sinning had its original from the desire of pleasure, it must of necessity be cured by pain: for here also contraries are the cures of contraries. Therefore the soul being to be purged, is punished and pains in those subterraneous judicatories and prisons, in order to its amendment. But if the soul be incorporeal, it is impossible for it to suffer. How then can it be punished? There must of necessity be some body joined with it; which being immoderately confringed or agitated, concreted or secreted, and discordantly moved by heat and cold, or the like, may make the soul sensible of pain, by reason of sympathy, as it is here in this life. What body therefore is that, which is then conjoined with the soul, after the dissolution of that earthly body into its elements? Certainly it can be no other than this pneumatical, or spiritual body, which we now speak of; for in this are seated, as their subjeet, the irascible and corporable passions, and they are inseparable from the same; nor could they be in the soul disdained from all body: and that soul, which is freed from these, would be forthwith freed from generation; nor would it be concerned in those subterraneous judicatories and prisons, but be carried up aloft to the higher celestial regions, &c. After which he endeavours further to confirm this opinion from the vulgar phænomena, άτομα ἄτομον δέ οἷς ἣ τετελεί ἡ πνευματικὴ σώμα, καί τέκνα ἄχωρα τοις Σωμαὶς καὶ ἐπιθυμίαις, ἣν οὕς τοις πνευμάτων ἐνεφείδαι τὸν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς τάφοις τοῦ Ζωοῦν οὐκ οὐκ οὕς πνευμάτων οὐκ οὕς πνευμάτων οὐκ οὕς πνευμάτων οὐκ οὕς πνευμάτων οὐκ οὕς πνευμάτων. Furthermore, that there is such a pneumatical (spirituous, vaporous, or airy) body, which accompanied souls unpurged after death, is evident also from the phenomena themselves. For what account can otherwise be given of those spectres and phantoms, which appear shadow-like about graves or sepulchres, since the soul itself is neither of any figure, nor yet at all visible? Wherefore these ancients say, that impure souls, after their departure out of this body, wander here, up and down, for a certain space, in their spirituous, vaporous, and airy body, appearing about sepulchres, and haunting their former habitations. For which cause there is great reason, that we should take care of living well, as also of abstaining from a fouler and grosser diet; these ancients telling us likewise, that this spirituous body of ours, being fouled and incraved by evil diet, is apt to render the soul, in this life also, more obnoxious to the disturbances of passions. And here Philoponus goes on to gratify us with a further account of some other of the opinions of these ancients, concerning this spirituous or airy body, accompanying the soul after death; εἰς γὰρ τὸν οὐκ αὐτόφασι τοῦ ζωοῦν ζωῆς, καί γὰρ πρεκαθεύνει, πρεκαθεύει δὲ οὐκ ἄκουσίς τοῦ τοῦ τῶν αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ δι' αὐτῶν ἐν αὐτῶν, αὐτήν ἐδόθη, Φίλων εἰπεῖν, ως δὲ τοὺς ἂν ζωοῦν, ἀφεσθαι
CHAP. V.  Body (supposed) after Death.

They further add, that there is something of the plantal and plastiick life also, exercised by the soul, in those spirituous or airy bodies after death; they being nourished too, though not after the same manner, as these gros earthy bodies of ours are here, by vapours, and that not by parts or organs, but throughout the whole of them, (as sponges) they imbibing every where those vapours. For which cause, they who are wise, will in this life also take care of using a thinner and dryer diet, that so that spirituous body (which we have also at this present time within our groffer body) may not be clogged and incrassated, but attenuated. Over and above which, those ancients made use of cathartics, or purgations, to the same end and purpose also: for as this earthy body is washed by water, so is that spirituous body cleansed by cathartick vapours; some of these vapours being nutritive, others purgative. Moreover, these ancients further declared concerning this spirituous body, that it was not organized, but did the whole of it, in every part throughout, exercise all functions of sense, the soul bearing, and seeing, and perceiving all sensibles, by it every where. For which cause, Arisotle himself affirmeth, in his Metaphysics, that there is properly but one sense, and but one senfory; be, by this one sensory, meaning, the spirit, or subtile airy body, in which the sensitive power doth all of it, through the whole, immediately apprehend all variety of sensibles. And if it be demanded, how it comes then to pass, that this spirit appears organized in sepulchres, and most commonly of human form, but sometimes in the form of some other animals, to this those ancients replied, That their appearing so frequently in human form proceedeth from their being incrassated with evil diet, and then, as it were, stamped upon with the form of this exterior ambient body in which they are, as crystal is formed and coloured like to those things, which it is fastned in, or reflects the image of them; and that their being sometimes other different forms proceedeth from the phantastick power of the soul itself, which can at pleasure transform this spirituous body into any shape: for being airy, when it is condensed and fixed, it becometh visible, and again invisible, and vanishing out of sight, when it is expanded and rarified.

Now, from these passages cited out of Philonous, it further appeareth, that the ancient afferters of the soul's immortality did not suppose human souls, after death, to be quite stript stark naked from all body; but that the generality of souls had then a certain spirituous, vaporeous, or airy body accompanying them, though in different degrees of purity or impurity respectively to themselves. As also, that they conceived this spirituous body (or at least something of it) to hang about the soul also here in this life, before death, as its interioir indument or vesture, which also then sticks to it, when that other gros earthy part of the body is, by death,
death, put off, as an outer garment. And some have been inclined to think (by reason of certain historick phenomena) these two to be things so distinct, that it is not impossible for this spirituous body, together with the soul, to be locally separated from the other grosser body, for some time before death, and without it. And indeed thus much cannot be denied, that our soul acteth, not immediately only upon bones, flesh and brains, and other such like gross parts of this body, but firft, and chiefly, upon the animal spirits, as the immediate instruments of sense and phancy, and that, by whose vigour and activity the other heavy and unwieldy bulk of the body is so nimbly moved. And therefore we know no reason, but we may attent here to that of Poliphemus, to αἷμα νομιμοὶ τῇ τρεχῆς ἐγις τῇ πνεύματος, τῇ δὲ πνεύμῳ ὑψίστα τῆς ψυχῆς; That the blood is the food and nourishment of the spirit, (that is, that subtle body called the animal spirits) and that this spirit is the vehicle of the soul, or the more immediate seat of life.

Nevertheless, the same Philoponus there addeth, that, according to these ancients, besides the terrestial body, and this spirituous and airy body too, there is yet a third kind of body, of a higher rank than either of the former, (peculiarly belonging to such souls after death, as are purged and cleansed from corporeal affections, lufts and passions) called by them, σῶμα αὐρεοειδές, and ἱδέαν, and οἰστήριον, &c. a luciformal, and celestial, and aetherial body. The soul (faith he) continueth either in the terrestial or the aerial body, so long, ένας εαυτὴν καθέκοσα αἰθεριαδίπα, τῆς γενεσίους ἀπαλαγείας, τότε τοῦ ἵππος τοῦ θεάματος, καὶ τῶν ἐπιθυμίων ἀποτίθεντα, μείζον τῆς εἴκόνας τῆς πνεύματος λεῖψα, εἴοικος δὲ τῇ τῆς μέλα τῶν άκλακτών αἰθερίων αὐτῆς ἐξημερίου, σῶμα ωφελίου καὶ διὰ τῶν ἀἰδίων, τὸ φαινοµένος ἢ Αὐρεοειδές τῶν γαρ ἐπιθυμίων ἐκάστῳ αἰθερίῳ πάντως ἐξελθεῖν τοῖς χλεύοντας διὰ τοὺς μέρους τοὺς τῶν καρπῶν καὶ ταῦτα αἰκίαστρον ἐστι, δὴ δεί αὐτῷ ἀεὶ ενενεχθέναι, δὲν ἐξελθεῖν αἰθερίως ἐξημερίου τὸ σῶμα, δὲν ζωοτοπίειν διὰ ταῦτα δὲ τὸ Αὐρεοειδὲς φασί σῶμα αὐτῷ ἀεὶ εἴχει, until that having purified itself, it be carried aloft, and freed from generation. And then doth it put off both the irascible and concupiscible passions at once, together with this second vehicle, or body, which we call spirituous. Wherefore these ancients say, that there is another heavenly body always conjoined with the soul, and eternal, which they call luciformal, and star-like; for it being a mundane thing, must of necessity have some part of the world as a province allotted to it, which it may administer. And since it is always moveable, and ought always to be, it must have a body eternally conjoined with it, which it may always enliven. And for these causes do they affirm, the soul always to have a luciformal body. Which lucid and aetherial body of the soul is a thing often mentioned by other writers also; as Proclus, in his commentary upon the Timaeus, καὶ τὸν αἰθεριαῖον ψυχής ἐπεξεργάζεται τῷ τοιούτῳ ἐκχεμα αἰθερίου, ἀλλ᾽ αὐτὸς Φεσκός ἐμβεβαιώσας γενεσίας ἐκείνης ἐκέχειν τῷ θεάματος καὶ τῷ τοιούτῳ ψυχῆς, καὶ γὰρ πάσης ψυχῆς αἰκίαν πρὸς τῶν θυγατέρων, αἰθερίου καὶ ζωοτοπίου χρωθείν, τούτῳ, αὐτῷ ἀεὶ ἐκείνου τῷ παλιῷ; The human soul bath also (faith he) such an aetherial vehicle belonging to it, as Plato himself intimates, when he affirmeth the Demiurgus at

Chap. V. luciform and heavenly Body.

First to have placed it in a chariot. For of necessity every soul, before this mortal body, must have an eternal and easily moveable body, it being essential to it to move. And elsewhere the same Proclus, when he speaks of the 'Epi
tic united body, in the usual manner, states that the soul is the vehicle of its own thoughts and all nature. Wherefore Plato, and Hierocles before him, and the rest, do not deny this, but only that it should have a separate body; and this body is called the ethereal body, and is composed of the four elements, and is the vehicle of the soul, and is called the soul's body, as the soul is the body of the soul.

Moreover, Hierocles calls this luciform and ethereal body, and the soul has no need of such a body, for the soul can exist without it. For the soul is the vehicle of the soul, and the soul is the body of the soul, and the soul is the body of the soul, and so on, ad infinitum.

Comment, Ubi 5.
Souls pre-existing, created

as well as it is by St. Paul, \( \sigma \mu \alpha \ \phi \omega \chi \mu \omega \nu \), the animal or natural body.

So that this spiritual body of Hierocles is not the airy, but the ethereal body, and the same with \( \delta \nu \gamma \eta \mu \mu \nu \) \( \theta \varepsilon \eta \pi \varepsilon \iota \omicron \omicron \nu \), his divine body. And that this distinction of two interior vehicles or tunicles of the soul, besides that outer vestment of the terrestrial body (styled in Plato to \( \delta \gamma \varepsilon \iota \omega \delta \varsigma \), the crustaceous, or ostraceous body) is not a mere figment of the latter Platonists since Christiannity, but a tradition derived down from antiquity, appeareth plainly from Virgil, in his sixth Æneid, where, though not commonly understood, he writeth first of the spirituous, or airy body, in which unpurged souls receive punishment after death, thus:

\[ \text{Quin & supremo cum lumine vita reliquit,} \]
\[ \text{Non tamen omne malum miseros, nec funtibus omnes} \]
\[ \text{Corporae excedunt pesetas; penitusque necesse est} \]
\[ \text{Multa diu concreta modis inolefcere miris.} \]
\[ \text{Ergo exercentur faniis, veterunque malorum} \]
\[ \text{Supplicia expendunt; alia panduntur inanes} \]
\[ \text{Subjngle ad ventos; alia sub gurgite cafo} \]
\[ \text{Infestum eluitur fleclus, aut exuritur igni.} \]

And then again of the other pure ethereal and fiery body, in this manner:

\[ \text{Donec longa dies perfecito temporis orbe} \]
\[ \text{Concretam exemit labem, parumque reliquit} \]
\[ \text{Æthereum jensum, atque aurai simplicis ignem.} \]

Now, as it was before observed, that the ancient asserters of the soul's immortality, supposing it to have, besides this terrestrial body, another spirituous or airy body, conceived this not only to accompany the soul after death, but also to hang about it here in this life, as its interior vest or tunicle; (they probably meaning hereby the same with that, which is commonly called the animal spirits, diffused from the brain, by the nerves, throughout this whole body) in like manner it is certain, that many of them supposing the soul, besides those two forementioned, to have yet a third luciform, or ethereal body, conceived this in like manner to adhere to it even in this mortal life too, as its innmost clothing or tunicle; yet, so as that they acknowledged the force thereof to be very much weakened and abated, and its splendour altogether obscured by the heavy weight and gross flemas or vapours of the terrestrial body. Thus Suidas, upon the word \( \Lambda \nu \gamma \eta \iota \alpha \omicron \iota \alpha \delta \iota \omicron \), tells us out of Æsop, \( \alpha ^\circ \varepsilon \iota \iota \epsilon \nu \iota \iota \Lambda \nu \gamma \eta \iota \alpha \omicron \iota \alpha \delta \iota \omicron \), \( \Lambda \nu \gamma \eta \iota \alpha \omicron \iota \alpha \delta \iota \omicron \), \( \lambda \nu \gamma \eta \mu \nu \alpha \omicron \iota \alpha \delta \iota \omicron \nu \), \( \gamma \nu \tau \omicron \mu \omicron \nu \) \( \delta \nu \gamma \eta \mu \mu \nu \), \( \Lambda \nu \gamma \eta \iota \alpha \omicron \iota \alpha \delta \iota \omicron \nu \), \( \gamma \nu \tau \omicron \mu \omicron \nu \) \( \delta \nu \gamma \eta \mu \mu \nu \), \( \Lambda \nu \gamma \eta \iota \alpha \omicron \iota \alpha \delta \iota \omicron \nu \), \( \gamma \nu \tau \omicron \mu \omicron \nu \) \( \delta \nu \gamma \eta \mu \mu \nu \). That, according to some philosophers, the soul hath a certain luciform vehicle, called also star, or sun-like, and eternal; which luciform body is now shut up within this terrestrial body (as a light in a dark lanthorn) it being supposed by some of them to be included within the head, &c. With which agreeeth Hierocles, \( \lambda \nu \nu \alpha \nu \omicron \nu \omicron \iota \) \( \nu \omicron \omicron \nu \omicron \iota \omicron \), \( \lambda \nu \nu \alpha \nu \omicron \nu \omicron \iota \) \( \nu \omicron \omicron \nu \omicron \iota \iota \omicron \nu \), \( \nu \omicron \omicron \nu \omicron \iota \iota \omicron \nu \), \( \gamma \nu \tau \omicron \mu \omicron \nu \) \( \delta \nu \gamma \eta \mu \mu \nu \), \( \Lambda \nu \gamma \eta \iota \alpha \omicron \iota \alpha \delta \iota \omicron \nu \), \( \gamma \nu \tau \omicron \mu \omicron \nu \) \( \delta \nu \gamma \eta \mu \mu \nu \). The splendid, or luciform body, lieth in this mortal body of ours, continually.

1 Cor. xv. 44. 2 De Homaniis p. 140, Oper.
nually inspiring it with life, and containing the harmony thereof. The ground of which opinion was, because these philosophers generally conceived the human soul to have pre-existed before it came into this earthly body, and that either from eternity, or else from the first beginning of the world's creation; and being never without a body, and then in a perfect state, to have had a lucid and æthereal body, either co-eternal, or co-eve with it, (though in order of nature junior to it) as its chariot or vehicle; which being incorruptible, did always inseparably adhere to the soul, in its after-lapses and descents, into an æreal fist, and then a terrestrial body; this being, as it were, the vinculum of union between the soul and them. Thus Plietbo * declares their sense; δια δε τοις σώμασι το δε ποτε την Ζυείδι την αληωστιν πυρηνι συγκεκριμένην, ἐλα ἄλω το το ἐμεῖναι ζωτικά πνεύματι διά συνεπειας ισόπλακον οτι πνευματις των ἡ αυτι τον. By this æthereal body is our human soul connected with its mortal body; the whole thereof being implicated with the whole vital spirit of the embryo, for as much as this itself is a spirit also. But long before Plietbo was this doctrine declared and asserted by Galen, as agreeable both to Plato's and his own sense; he first premising, Dog. Hip. & that the immediate organ or instrument of light was αυγοειδες, a luciform and æthereal spirit; δεντας δι ετυχεν αυγοειδες μη ειναι το της ρασιδος δικρανος, αυγοειδες δε το της ακοης, ατμοειδες δε το της ακοης, κα το μετ της ρασιδος ώραν, το δε της ακοης γνώσεις, &c. Wherefore we may reasonably affirm, that the organ of sight is a luciform or æthereal body; as that of hearing is æreal; that of smelling vaporous; that of taste moist or watery; and that of touch earthy; like being perceived by like. And he accordingly thus understanding those known verses of Empedocles, which as Aristotle otherwise interprets them, are nonenfes; κα τουτον και το δουλεια διου το 'Εμπεδοκλης εν οις Φιντι, Ταιν μεν γαρ γαλαξ, &c. αισθαματικα γεια δυτις των μην γεωδεστων των αθοντων, της γεωδις τους, του αυγοειδεστως τος αρας, την 'Αυγοειδας. And this was that, which Empedocles meant to signify, in these famous verses of his; it being certain, that by the most earthy of our senses, the touch, we perceive the earthy nature of sensibles; and by the most luciform, viz. that of sight, the passions of light; by that, which is æreal, sounds; by that, which is moist and sponge-like, tastes; and lastly, by the organ of smelling, which is the extremity of those former cavities of the brain, as replenished with vapours, odours. After which he writeth of the essence or substance of the soul, in this manner; ει δε του περι πυρης αυτης απεφθασαι χρη, δουν 'Αρατης ἀνακηκος επιε, η τοτ ειε το τω 'Αρατης, κα τη' 'Αρατης εις αρατης λεκτην αυτην, εις η μεν μη δουλεια και ακολουθοις ακολουθοις σωφροιν, η αυτη μεν ααομαλων υπερεχειν τοις, ακολουθοις το πρωτον αυτης ειναι τωτο το σώμα, ει δε μετ της προσ της αλλα σώματα κανωνιαν λαμβανειν τοτο μεν εις αυτο δε ηλικιωτα της εκπερας τω δε με τω προς αυτον κωποι το κατα τας ενειριν αυτου πεπρα αναγενεσθαι γενεσθαι. And if we should now declare any thing concerning the essence or substance of the soul, we must needs affirm one or other of these two things; that either itself is this luciform and æthereal body (which the Stoicks, whether they will or no, by consequence will be brought unto, as also Aristotle himself) or else that the soul is itself an incorporeal substance, but that this luciform æthereal body is its first vehicle, by which, as a middle, it communicates with the other bodies. Wherefore we must say, that this æthereal

* In Orac. Chald.
real lucid body is extended throughout the whole brain; whence is that lucifer, spirit derived, that is the immediate instrument of light. Now from hence it was, that these philosophers, besides the moral purgation of the soul, and the intellectual or philosophical, recommended very much a mystical or telestic way of purifying this æthereal body in us, by diet and catharms. Thus the forementioned Hierocles, &c, told the Athenians, when purifying the soul, that it was in the brain, &c. Since to our lucid or splendid body, this gross mortal body is come by way of accession, we ought to purify the former also, and free it from sympathy with the latter. And again afterwards, it is necessary, &c, to purify the soul, that it may be made light, and slate or wingy, might no way hinder the soul's ascent upward: but be, that endeavours to purify the mind only, neglecting the body, applies not himself to the whole man. Whereupon he concludes, both the Telesticæ, Telesticæ, and the Athenians, that the soul is purifying the æthereal body, and that this is a mystic or mystic operation; which he recommends about the purgation of the lucid or æthereal vehicle. And whereas philosophy was by Plato and Socrates defined to be a continual exercise of dying (which Pliny thought to be nothing but an hypochondriacal or atrabiliarian idleness in them, in those words of his, which Salmasius, and other critics, can by no means understand, Est etiam quidam morbus, per sapientiam mori): That the dying by wisdom or philosophy, is also but a certain kind of bodily disease or overgrown melancholy: though they supposed this principally to consist in a moral dying to corporeal lusts and passions; yet was the design of this partly mystical and telestic also, it driving at this further thing, that when they should put off this terrestrial body, they might at once die also to the spiritual or æreal; and then their soul having nothing left hanging about it, but only the pure æthereal body, its light-winged chariot: which in Virgil's language is

Purumque relinquui
Æthereum sensum, atque aurant simplicis ignem.

Notwithstanding which, the Pythagoreans and Platonists seem not to have been all of them of this persuasion, that the same numerical æthereal body, which the soul was at first created with, continued still about it, and adhered to it inseparably to all eternity, during its descents into other groser bodies: but rather to have supposed, that, according to the moral disposition of the soul, it always finds or makes a cognate and suitable body correspondently pure or impure: and consequently, that by moral virtue and philosophy, it might again recover that celestial body, which was lost by its fall and descent hither. This seemeth to have been Porphyryus's his sense, in these words of his, quid tibi etiam quidam morbi, qui sapientiam per mortem tendet. This supposing that, when the soul, while it is in itself affected, so does it always find

Ibid. p. 216.
2 Vide Plin. in Phaedon. p. 373.
3 Vide Plin. in Phaedon. p. 373.
4 In Sententias ad Intelligibilia ducentibus, § XXXI. p. 233.
find a body suitable and agreeable to its present disposition; and therefore to
the purged souls does naturally accrue a body, that comes next to immateriality;
that is, an ethereal one. And probably Plato was of the same mind, when he affirmed, the soul to be always in a body, but sometimes of
one kind, and sometimes of another.

Now from what hath been declared, it appeareth already, that the most
ancient afforlers of the incorporeity and immortality of the human soul
supposed it, notwithstanding, to be always conjoined with a body. Thus
Hierocles plainly, ἔ ἐνοικεν ὅπον σύμφως ἐν ἄμωμα κατα, ή τῷ παρεὶ το θεώσει; εἰς
to εἶναι παρέλθει, ὡς μήτε τῷ ὁμωμα εἶναι αὐτῷ, μήτε ἂντε σώματα, ἀλλ' αὐτοῖ μὲ
σώματα, ἀποτελεῖσθαι δι᾽ εἰς ὁμωμα τὸ ὅλω αὐτές εἰς. The rational nature boun-
ing always a cognate body, so proceeded from the demiurgus, as that neither
itself is body, nor yet can it be without body; but though itself be incorporeal,
yet its whole form, notwithstanding, is terminated in a body. Accordingly
whereunto, the definition, which he gives of a man, is this, ἡ ἀνθρωπική μετὰ τοὺς
σώματες τῆς κυριαρχίας σώματα, a rational soul, together with a cognate immortal
body. He concluding there afterwards, that this enlivened terrestrial body,
or mortal man, is nothing but ἡ ἁμαρτία ἐνθεσμος τοῦ θεοῦ, τὸ ἱερὸν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τῆς
true man, or an accession thereunto, which is therefore separable from the same. Nei-
ther doth he affirm this only of human souls, but also of all other rational
beings whatsoever, below the supreme Deity, and above men, that they
always naturally actuate a body. Wherefore a daemon or angel (which
words are used as synonymous by Hierocles): is also defined by him after
the same manner, ἡ ἀγγελικὴ μετὰ θεωσειν σώματα, a rational soul together
with a lucid body. And accordingly Proclus upon Plato's Timæus affirm-
eth, πᾶν ἐναικος τῆς ἀμφίκτυνας ψυχῶν, καὶ νεφαν ἡ κατα ψυχήν, καὶ ἡ ψυχή
angels. Thus that every daemon, superior to human souls, hath both an intellectual
and an ethereal vehicle, the ensemble thereof being made up or compounded
of these two things. So that there is hardly any other difference left be-
twixt daemons or angels, and men, according to these philosophers, but
only this, that the former are liable into aerial bodies only, and no fur-
ther; but the latter, into territioal also. Now Hierocles positively af-
firmeth this to have been the true cabala, and genuine doctrine of the an-
cient Pythagoreans, entertained afterwards by Plato: καὶ τότε τού πνευματος
ψυχων, ὥς ἄγας τοῦ πλατωνικοῦ ἑνοικος, καὶ πλατωνικῶς ἐνεργητικῶς ὑποκειμενον ἐν νεφαν ἡ
ψυχής τῆς ἀμφίκτυνας ψυχῆς. And this was the doctrine of the
Pythagoreans, which Plato afterwards declared; be resembling every, both
human and divine soul (that is, in our modern language, every created ra-
tional being) to a winged chariot, and a driver or charioteer, both together:
meaning by the chariot, an enlivened body; and by the charioteer, the in-
corporeal soul itself actting it.

And now have we given a full account, in what manner the ancient
afforlers of incorporeal substance, as unextended, answered that objection
against

1 De Legibus, Lib. X.
2 P. 214.
3 Lib. V. p. 320.
4 Vide Perphyr. de Ablin. I. p. 38. P. 81, & alios.
5 Ubi supra, p. 213.
against the illocality and immobility of particular finite spirits, 
angels, and human souls; that these being all naturally incorporate, 
ever in themselves and directly immovable, yet were capable of being in 
senfe moved, by accident, together with those bodies, respectively, which 
they are vitally united to. But as for that pretence, that these finite spirits, 
or substances incorporeal, being unextended, and so having in themselves 
no relation to any place, might therefore actuate and inform the whole cor-
pooreal world at once, and take cognizance of all things therein; their rep-
ly hereunto was, That these being essentially but parts of the universe, and 
therefore not comprehensive of the whole, finite or particular, and not uni-
versal beings, (as the three hypostases of the Platonick trinity are) the sphere 
of their activity could not possibly extend any farther, than to the quicken-
ing and enlivening of some certain parts of matter and the world, allotted 
to them, and thereby of becoming particular animals; it being peculiar to 
the Deity, or that incorporeal substance, which is infinite, to quicken and 
actuate all things.

But it would be no impertinent digression here, (as to the main scope of 
our present undertaking) should we briefly compare the forementioned doc-
trine and cabala of the ancient Incorporealisists (the Pythagoreans and Pla-
onists) with that of Christianity; and consider the agreement, or disagree-
ment, that is betwixt them. First therefore, here is a plain agreement of 
these best, and most religious philosophers, with Christianity, in this; 
That the most consummate happiness, and highest perfection, that human 
nature is capable of, consisteth not in a separate state of souls, fritip naked 
from all body, and having no manner of commerce with matter, as some 
high-flown persons in all ages have been apt to conceive. For such amongst 
the philosophers (and Platonists too) was Plotinus; the unevenness and un-
safeness of whose temper may sufficiently appear from hence, that as he 
conceived human souls might possibly ascend to so high a pitch, as quite to 
shoke off commerce with all body; so did he on the other hand again ima-
gine, that they might also descend and sink down so low, as to animate not 
only the bodies of brutes, but even of trees and plants too; two inconsis-
tent paradoxes; the latter whereof is a most prodigious extravagancy, which 
yet Empedocles (though otherwife a great wit) seems to have been guilty of 
also, from thofe verfs of his in Athenæus 1;

"Ἡν γαρ ποι ἐγὼ γενόμενο κόσμον κόσμον τε, 
Θέαμον, τ' οίκων τε ἐν ἅλι ἔλλην ἔχων ἡμας."

And amongst the Jews, the famous Maimonides was also of this persuasion, it 
being a known aphorism of his, in his great work, קְנָנָה מַעֵה הַבֶּן הֲפֶלֶל הַלְּשָׁנָה לְאֵל לָגוּדָה: That in the world to come (or state of consummate happenefes) 
there shall be nothing at all of body, but pure incorporeity. Upon which ac-
count, being accused as a denier of the resurrection, (an article as well of the 
Jewih, as of the Christian faith) he wrote that book intitled, Iggereth Teman 
purposely

1. Deipnoalphil, Lib. VIII. p. 510.
Chap. V. Separation from all Body.

purposely to purge himself, and to reconcile these two assertions together, which he doth after such a manner, as that there should be indeed a resurrection, at the first coming of the Jewish Messiah, of some certain persons, to live here a while upon the earth, eat and drink, marry and be given in marriage, and then die again; after which, in the world to come, they should for ever continue pure souls, un-united to any body. In which it may be well suspected, that the design Maimonides drove at, was against Christianity; which, notwithstanding, as to this particular, hath the concurrent suffrages of the best philosophers, that the most genuine and perfect state of the human soul, which in its own nature is immortal, is to continue for ever, not without, but with a body: and yet our high-flown enthusiasts generally (however calling themselves Christians) are such great Spiritualists, and so much for the inward resurrection, (which we deny not to be a Scripture-notion also; as in that of St. Paul, If ye be risen with Christ, &c. And again, If by any means I might attain to the resurrection of the dead) as that they quite allegorize away, together with the other parts of Christianity, the outward resurrection of the body; and indeed will scarcely acknowledge any future immortality, or life to come, after death, their spirituality thus ending in Sadducism and infidelity, if not at length in downright atheism and sensuality.

But, besides this, there is yet a further correspondence of Christianity with the forementioned philosophick cabala, in that the former also supposes the highest perfection of our human souls, not to consist in being eternally conjoined with such gross bodies, as these we now have, unchanged and unaltered: for as the Pythagoreans and Platonists have always complained of these terrestrial bodies, as prisons, or living sepulchres of the soul; so does Christianity seem to run much upon the same strain, in these Scripture-expressions; In this we groan earnestly, desiring to be clothed upon with our body which is from heaven: and again, We that are in this tabernacle do groan, being burdened, not for that we would be unclothed, (that is, strip quite naked of all body) but so clothed upon, that mortality might be swallowed up of life: and laffly, Ourselves also, which have the first-fruits of the Spirit, groan within ourselves, waiting for the adoption (sonship or inheritance) namely, the redemption of our bodies; that is, the freedom of them from all those evils and maladies of theirs, which we here lie oppressed under. Wherefore we cannot think, that the same heavy load and luggage, which the souls of good men being here burdened with, do so much groan to be delivered from, shall, at the general resurrection, be laid upon them again, and bound fast to them, to all eternity: for, of such a resurrection as this, Plotinus (though perhaps mistaking it for the true Christian resurrection) might have some cause to affirm, that it would be but ἀναστασία εἰς ἄλλον ὄμον, a resurrection to another sheep; the soul seeming not to be thoroughly awake here, but, as it were, fooporated with the dull dreams and opiate vapours of this gross body. For thus the author of the Book of Wisdom, The corruptible body preffeth down the soul, and the earthly tabernacle weigheth down the

1 Col. iii. 1.
2 Phil. iii. 2.
3 2 Cor. v. 2.
4 2 Cor. v. 4.
5 Rom. viii. 23.
6 Chap. ix. 15.
The Agreement of Christianity, Book I.

the mind, that must upon many things. But the same will further appear, from that account, which the Scripture itself giveth us of the resurrection: and first, in general, when St. Paul, answering that query of the philosophick infidel, \( \text{How are the dead raised, or what body do they come?} \) replieth in this manner, \( \text{Thou fool, (that is, thou, who thinkest to puzzle or baffle the Christian article of the resurrection, which thou understandest not) that which thou sowest, is not quickened (to the production of any thing,) except it first die to what it was. And thou sowest not that body, that shall be; but bare grain, as of wheat, or of barley, or the like; but God (in the ordinary course of nature) giveth it a body, as it hath pleased him (that is, a body, and an ear, having many grains with husks in it, and therefore neither in quantity nor quality the same with that, which was sowed under ground) nor does he give to all seeds one and the same kind of body neither, but to every seed its own correspondent body; as to wheat one kind of ear, and to barley another. As if he should have said; Know that this present body of ours is to be looked upon but as a kind of seed of the resurrection-body, which therefore is accordingly in some sense the same, and in some sense not the same with it. Besides which general account, the particular oppositions, which the Scripture makes betwixt the present and future body, seem very agreeable to those of the philosophick cabala: for, first, the present body is said to be sowed in corruption, but the future raised in incorruption. For the children of the resurrection cannot die any more. And then mortality shall be swallowed up of life. Wherefore the Christian resurrection-body, as well as that of the philosophick cabala, is \( \text{σώμας ἁπάνατος, and αἰώνιος too, (2 Cor. v. i.) an eternal and immortal body.} \) Again, the body sowed, is said to be a dishonourable, ignominious, and inglorious body; and therefore called also by St. Paul, \( \text{τὸ σώμα τῆς ταπεινώσεως ἡμῶν, The body of our humility, or humiliation; a body agreeable to this lapse state of the soul, but the body, which shall be raised, shall be a glorious body; and σώματι τῷ σώματι τῆς ἑκάστης ἑκάστης, conformable to that glorious body of Christ: who, when he was but externally transfigured, his face did shine as the sun, and his raiment was white as the light. The glory of a body consisteth only in the comeliness of its proportion, and the splendour thereof: thus is there one glory of the sun, and another glory of the moon, and another glory of the stars, that is, a different splendour of them. Wherefore the future body of the righteous, according to the Scripture also, as well as the philosophick cabala, will be \( \text{σώμα φασίνων, and σώμα ἀπολλύσεως, and σώμα ἀποθανόντων, a glorious, splendid, luciferous and star-like body.} \) 

Wisdom iii. 7, ιο το αυτο τον ιπποτην αυτων Κυλλωσιον, The righteous, in the time of their visitation, shall shine forth. Daniel xii. 2, 3. 

They, that be wise, shall shine as the brightness of the firmament; and they, that turn many to righteousness, as the stars for ever and ever. And Matth. xiii. 43. 

Then shall the righteous shine forth as the sun in the kingdom of their father. And therefore probably this future glorious resurrection-body is that inheritance of the saints in light, which the Scripture speaks of, Col. i. 12. Moreover, there is another difference betwixt this present and that future body of the righteous,
righteous, wherein St. Paul and Hierocles do well agree; the first being called by both of them, χωρὶς ψυχῆς, an animal body, the second χωρὶς πνευματικόν, a spiritual body. Which latter expression, in Scripture, does not only denote the subtlety and tenuity thereof; but also as this present body is called an animal body, because it is suitable and agreeable to that animal life, which men have common with brutes, so is that future called spiritual, as bearing a fit proportion and correspondence to souls renewed in the spirit of their mind, or in whom the divine Spirit dwelleth and acteth, exercising its dominion.

There is an animal body, and there is a spiritual body. And, the first Adam was made a living soul, the last Adam a quickening Spirit. And thus are ψυχῆς, in the Scripture, taken for οἱ πνεῦμα μὴ ψυχῆς, they who have not the Spirit.

And ψυχῆς ἀνθρώπου ἡ ἐκ θεοῦ ἡμῖν ἐκ τοῦ πνευματικοῦ, the animal, man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God.

Which Spirit is also said, in Scripture, to be the earnest of that our future inheritance, Ephes. i. 14. and the earnest of this spiritual and heavenly body, 2 Cor. v. 5. It is also said to be that, by which (efficiently) these mortal bodies shall be quickened, Rom. viii. 11.

If the Spirit of him, that raised up Jesus from the dead, dwell in you; be, that raised up Christ from the dead, shall also quicken your mortal bodies by his Spirit, that dwelleth in you. Neither doth Hierocles fall much short of this Scripture-notion of a spiritual body, when he describes it to be that, ὅ τι νοεῖ τελείωτα τῆς ψυχῆς σωματικῆς, which[P.217. Edit. is agreeable to the intellectual perfection of the soul. This spiritual body is Needhami.] that, which the ancient Hebrews called, νοῦς ἄνθρωπος, eagles wings; we reading thus in the Gemara of the Sanhedrin, (c. 11. fol. 92. col. 2.) ἄνθρωποι τίνος ψυχῆς ταύτης ἰδιαίτερα ξυλάν τις ἄνθρωποι, which methinks If you ask, What shall become of the righteous, when God shall renew the world? the answer is, God shall make them wings like eagles, whereby they shall fly upon the face of the waters. Again, as this present body is called, in Scripture, an earthly body, so is the future body of the righteous styled by St. Paul, as well as the Pythagoreans, a heavenly body, and they, who shall then be possessors thereof, ἡμῶν ἀνθρώπων, heavenly men. 1 Cor. xv. As is the heavenly, such are they, that are heavenly. Besides which, as philosophers supposed both demons (or angels) and men, to have one and the same ζωὴν ἄγγελον, ἐναντίων and ἀνθρώπων, or a like lucid, heavenly and ætherial body; so from that of our Saviour, when he affirmeth, that they, who shall be accounted worthy to obtain that world, and the resurrection from the dead, will neither marry, nor be given in marriage; nor can die any more; for they are ζωῆς ἄγγελοι, equal to the angels.

From hence, I say, we may venture to call this resurrection-body of the just also an angelical or isangelical body; and the rather because the ancient Hebrews (as we learn from Nachmonides, in Sbær Haggemuhl) styled it ליבשת הופך ומלאה ימי נפש המלכים, the angelical clothing of the soul; and Tertullian himself, angelificatam carnem, angelified flesh. But, lastly, St. Thus St. Au. Paul is not only positive in his doctrine here, but also negative; Now this is that, Corpus I say, brethren, that flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God; neither doth corruption inherit incorruption. Which place being undoubtedly, and Qualia not rum.

Vol. II.

5 K

1 1 Cor. xv. 44. 4 1 Cor. ii. 14.
2 Comment. in aurea Pythag. carmina. 5 Luke xx. 36.
3 1 Cor. xv. 45.
The Mystery of the Resurrection; Book I.

not to be allegorized, it may be from thence inferred, that the happy resurrection-body shall not be this foul and grofs body of ours only varnished and gilded over on the outside of it, it remaining still naft, fluttish, and ruinous within, and having all the same seeds of corruption and mortality in its nature, which it had before, though by perpetual miracle kept off, it being as it were by violence defended from being seized upon and devoured by the jaws of death; but that it shall be so inwardly changed in its nature, as that the possessor thereof cannot die any more. But all this, which hath been said of the resurrection-body, is not so to be understood, as if it belonged universally to all, that shall be raised up at the last day, or made to appear upon the earth in their own persons, at that great and general affizes; that they shall have all alike (wicked as well as good) such glorious, spiritual and celestial bodies; but it is only a description of the ἀνάσας τις ζωῆς, the resurrection of life; which is emphatically called also by our Saviour Christ, ἀνάσας δέ ἐστιν τοῦ νεκροῦ, the resurrection from the dead, or to a happy immortality; as they, who shall be thought worthy thereof, are likewise styled by him ὁ ἀνέσας-δόθης, the children of the resurrection. Of which resurrection only it is that St. Paul treateth, in that fifteenth chapter of his to the Corinthians. And we say, that this Christian resurrection of life is the vesting and settling of the souls of good men in their glorious, spiritual, heavenly and immortal bodies. The complete happiness of a man, and all the good that can be defined by him, was by the Heathen poet thus summed up, Ut sit mens sana in corpore sano, That there be a sound mind in a sound body; and the Christian happiness seems to be all comprised in these two things; first, in being inwardly regenerated and renewed in the spirit of their mind, cleansed from all pollution of flesh and spirit, and made partakers of the divine life and nature; and then, secondly, in being outwardly clothed with glorious, spiritual, celestial and incorruptible bodies. The Scripture plainly declareth, that our souls are not at home here, in this terrestrial body, and these earthly mansions, but that they are strangers and pilgrims therein; which the patriarchs also confessed, plainly declared, that they fought a country, not that which they came out from, but a heavenly one. From which passages of Scripture some indeed would infer, that souls being at first created by God pure, pre-existed, before this their terrene nativity, in celestial bodies; but afterwards fraggled and wandered down hither, as Philo for one, ἀναληπτὴς μὴ γὰρ ἡ φύσις τοῦ ὑφόνου τόπου, καὶ κατεξήλθος ἀπὸ τοῦ χῶρου ἐλευθερώθη. Our soul (faith he) having left its heavenly mansion, came down into this earthly body, as a strange place. But thus much is certain, that our human souls were at first intended and designed by God Almighty, the maker of them, for other bodies and other regions, as their proper home and country, and their eternal resting-place: however, to us, that be not first, which is spiritual, but that which is natural, and afterwards that which is spiritual. Now though some, from that of St. Paul, where he calls this happy resurrection-body, ἑκατέρῳ κυριώ τοῦ ἡλίον ἡμῶν, that house of ours, that is from heaven, or which cometh out of heaven, would infer, that therefore it will not be taken out of graves.

1 Luke xx. 25.
2 De Agricult. p. 197. & in Libro, quis divi-
3 2 Cor. v. 1.
graves and charnel houses; they conceiving also, that the individuation and
sameness of men's persons does not necessarily depend upon the numerical
identity of all the parts of matter, because we never continue thus the same,
our bodies always flowing like a river, and passing away by insensible tran-
spiration; and it is certain, that we have not all the same numerical mat-
ter, and neither more nor less, both in infancy and in old age, though we
be for all that the self-same persons: yet, nevertheless, according to the best
philosophy, which acknowledges no essential or specific difference of
matter, the foulest and grossest body that is, merely by motion may not
only be crystallized, but also brought into the purity and tenuity of the
finest ether. And undoubtedly, that same numerical body of our Saviour
Christ, which lay in the sephulchre, was after his resurrection thus trans-
formed into a spiritual and heavenly body; the subtilty and tenuity whereof
appeared from his entering in when the doors were shut, and his vanishing
out of sight; however its glory were for the time suspended, partly for the
better convincing his disciples of the truth of his resurrection, and partly
because they were not then able to bear the splendor of it. We conclude
therefore, that the Christian mystery, of the resurrection of life, consists
not in the soul's being reunited to these vile rags of mortality, these gross
bodies of ours, (such as now they are;) but in having them changed into the
likeness of Christ's glorious body, and in this mortal's putting on immor-
tality.

Hitherto have we seen the agreement, that is betwixt Christianity and
the old philosophick cabala, concerning the soul, in these two things:
First, that the highest happiness and perfection of the human soul con-
sists not in a state of pure separation from all body; and secondly, that
it does not consist neither in an eternal union with such gross terrestrial
bodies, as these unchanged; the soul being not at home, but a stranger and
pilgrim in them, and oppressed with the load of them: but that at last,
the souls of good men shall arrive at glorious, spiritual, heavenly and
immortal bodies. But now as to that point, whether human souls be always
united to some body or other, and consequentially when by death they put off
this grose terrestrial body, they are not thereby quite divested, and stript
naked of all body, but have a certain subtile and spiritual body, still ad-
hering to them, and accompanying them? or else, whether all souls, that
have departed out of this life, from the very beginning of the world, have
ever since continued in a state of separation from all body, and shall so con-
tinue forwards till the day of judgment or general resurrection? we must
confess, that this is a thing not so explicitly determined, or expressly de-
cided in Christianity, either way. Nevertheless, it is first of all certain from
scripture, that souls departed out of these terrestrial bodies are therefore
neither dead nor asleep, till the last trump and general resurrection, but
still alive and awake; our Saviour Christ affirming, that they all live unto
God; the meaning whereof seems to be this, that they, who are said to be
dead, are dead only unto men here upon earth; but neither dead unto them-
selves, nor yet unto God, their life being not extinct, but only disappar-

5K 2
Of the State of the Soul

Book I.

Of G? evident, live and be or as much as they are gone off this stage, which we still continue to act upon. And thus it is said also of our Saviour Christ himself, and that after his resurrection too, that he lived unto God (Rom. vi. 10.) From whence it is evident, that they, who are said to live to God, are not therefore supposed to be less alive, than they were, when they lived unto men. Now it seemeth to be a privilege or prerogative proper to the Deity only, to live and act alone, without vital union or conjunction with any body. Quareendum, faith Origen, si possibile est, penitus incorporeas remanere rationables creaturas, cum ad summum sanitatis ac beatitudinis venirent? An necesse est eas semper conjunctas esse corporibus? It is worth our inquiry, whether is be possible for rational creatures to remain perfectly incorporeal, and separate from all body, when they are arrived to the highest degree of holiness and happiness? or whether they be always of necessity conjoined with some bodies; and afterwards he plainly affirmeth it to be impossible, Vivere prater corpus ullam aliquam naturam, prater Patrem, & Filium, & Spiritum Sanctum: For any other nature, besides the Father, and the Son, and Holy Ghost, to live quite without a body. Indeed if this were most natural to the human soul, and most perfective of it, to continue separate from all body, then doubtless (as Origen implied) should the souls of good men, rather after the day of judgment, continue in such a state of separation, to all eternity. But on the contrary, if it be natural to souls to enliven and enform some body or other, (though not always a terrestrial one) as our inward sense inclines us to think, then can it not seem so probable, that they should, by a kind of violence, be kept so long in an unnatural or prerte-natural state of nakedness and separation from all body, some of them even from Adam till the day of judgment.

Again, the Scripture also intimates, that souls departed out of this life have a knowledge of one another, and are also capable of the punishment of sense or pain: Fear him, (faith our Saviour) who after he hath killed, hath power to cast into hell, Luke xii. And the soul of the rich man is said to be immediately after death in torments, before the day of judgment; as likewise to have known Abraham and Lazarus. And it seems neither agreeable to our common notions, nor yet to piety, to conclude, that the souls of wicked men, departing out of this life, from the beginning of the world in their several ages, till the day of judgment, have all of them no manner of punishment inflicted on them, save only that of remorse of conscience, and future expectation. Now it is not conceivable, how souls after death should know and be knowable, and converse with one another, and have any punishment of sense or pain inflicted on them, were they not vitally united to some bodies. And thus did Tertullian reason long ago; Delet apud inferos anima cujusdam, & punitur in flamma, & cruciatur in linguâ, & de digito anime salicioris implorat solutum reris. Imaginem exilitis, exi- tum illum pauperis lutantis, & divitis mercantis. Et quid illic Lazari nomen, si non in veritate res est? Sed etiam imagina credenda est, testimonium erit verita-tatis. Si enim non babet anima corpus, non caperet imaginem corporis. Nec mentiretur de corporalibus membris scriptura, si non erant. Quid est autem illud,
C H A P. V. after Death, Tertullian,

iliud, quod ad inferna transsextur, post divertium corporis? quod detinetur, & in diem judicii revocatur? Ad quod & Christus moriendo defendit? puto ad animas patercharum? Incorporalitas animae ab omni genere custodia liberat; immunis ad pena & ad foveola. Per quod enim patitur aut foveaut, hoc erit corpus. Igitur si quid tormenti fervat anima praepet in carcerem, vel diversario infernum, in igni vel in fum Abrahæ, probata erit corporalitas animae. Corporealitas enim nihil patitur, non habens per quod pati possit: aut si habet, hoc erit corpus. In quantum enim omne corporale possibile est; in quantum quod possibile est, corporale est. We read in Scripture of a soul tormented in hell, punished with flames, and deprived of a drop of water to cool his tongue. You will say, perhaps, that this is parabolical and fictitious. What then does the name of Lazarus signify there, if it were no real thing? But if it be a parable never so much, yet must it, notwithstanding, as to the main, speak agreeably to truth. For if the soul (after death) have no body at all, then can it not have any corporeal image, shape, or figure. Nor can it be thought, that the Scripture would be concerning corporeal members, if there were none. But what is that, which, after its separation from this body, is carried down into hell, and there detained prisoner, and referred till the day of judgment? And what is that, which Christ dying descended down unto? I suppose to the souls of the patriarchs. But incorporeality is free from all custody or imprisonment, as also devoid of pain and pleasure. Wherefore, if souls be sensible of pain after death, and tormented with fire, then must they needs have some corporeity; for incorporeality suffers nothing. And as every corporeal thing is passive or patible, so again whatsoever is passive is corporeal. Tertullian would also confirm this from a vision or revelation of a certain former prophet, (miracles and prophecy being said by him not to be then altogether extinct,) Inter cætera ostensa est mibi anima corporaliiter, & spiritus videbatur, tenera & lucida, & æræi coloris, & formæ per omnia humanae: There was (said he) among other things, a soul corporally exhibited to my view, and it was tender and lucid, and of an æreal colour, and every way of human form. Agreeably to which, Tertullian himself addeth; Ejfigiem non aliæ animæ humanae depuiandam præter humanam, & quidem ejus corporis, quod unicoque circumstali. There is no other shape to be assigned to a human soul, but human; and indeed that of the body, which is before carried about. It is true indeed, that Tertullian here drives the business so far, as to make the soul itself to be corporeal, figurate, and colorate, and after death to have the very same shape, which its respective body had before in this life; he being one of those, who were not able to conceive of any thing incorporeal, and therefore being a religionist, concluded God himself to be a certain body also. But the reasons, which he here insinueth on, will indeed extend no further than to prove, that the soul hath after death some body vitally united to it, by means whereof it is both capable of converse, and sensible of pain, for as much as body alone can have no sensë of any thing.

And this is that, which Irenæus from the same Scripture gathereth; not that the soul is a body, but that it hath a body, after death, conjoined with it.

2 Ubi supra, Cap. IX. p. 166.
it, and that of the same form and figure with that body, which it had
before here in this life; Pleniissime autem Dominus ducit, non solum perfe-
verare, non de corpore in corpus transgridientes animas, sed & chara&erem
corporis, in quo etiam adaptantur, custodire eundem: et memini&e eas operum,
que egerunt bic, & a quibus coelaverunt; in narratione, que scribitur de Di-
vite & de Lazaro, qui refrigerabatur in finu Abraham: in qua ait Divitum cog-
no&ere Lazaram post mortem; et manere in suo ordine unumquemque ipsorum.
Our Lord hath most plainly taught us, that souls do not only continue after
death, without passing out of one body into another, but also, that they keep the
character of body, wherein they are then also adapted, the same, which they had
before; as likewise, that they remember the actions and omissions of their life
past, in that narration, which is written concerning the rich man and La-
zarus, who was refreshed in Abraham's bosom; wherein he affirmeth the rich
man to have known both Lazaro and Abraham after death, as also each of
them to remain in their own order. And thus again in the following chap-
ter; Per hac manifestissime declaratum est, per&everarre animas; & non de
corpore in corpus exire; & habere hominis figuram; (ut etiam cognoscantur)
& memini&e eorum, quae hic sint; & dignam habitationem unamquamque gen-
tem percipere, etiam ante judicium. By these things it is most manifestly de-
clared, that souls do both perseverere after death, and that they do not tran-
migrate out of one body into another, and that they have a human figure or
shape, (whereby they may be known;) as also that they remember the things
here upon the earth, and their own actions; and lastly, that each kind of good
and bad have their distinct and suitable habitations assigned them, even before
the judgment. Now, that I&renus did not here mean, that souls are them-
elves bodily substances, and consequently have a certain character, form
and figure of their own, but only that they have certain bodies conjoined
with them, which are figure&ate, is first of all evident from the words them-
elves, characterem corporis, in quo etiam adaptantur, custodire eundem; the
natural sense whereof is this, that they keep the character of body (wherein
they are then also adapted after death) the same with that, which these bodies
before had here in this life. And it is further manifest from hence, because
he elsewhere plainly declareth souls themselves to be incorporeal; as in his
fifth book and seventh chapter, Flatus autem vitae incorporalis est, but the
breath of life is incorporeal.

Furthermore, Origen was not only of the same persuasion, that souls af-
after death had certain subtile bodies united to them, and that those bodies of
theirs had the same i&ermo o&ergwv, characterizing form, which these
their terrestrial bodies before had: but also thinks, that this, together
with the soul's immortality, may be sufficiently proved from the frequent
apparitions of ghosts or departed souls; in way of opposition to Celsus,
endeavouring to invalidate the Scripture testimonies concerning the appar-
itions of our Saviour Christ, and imputing them either to magical impo-
ture, or fanatick phrenzy, or the disciples mistaking their own dreams and
phancies

P. 300.
concerning Souls after Death.

phancies for visions and sensations, after the Epicurean way, τὸ δὲ ἐδεί τινι κατὰ θεωρωματίαν ἦν οὐκ εὐδοκεῖν δόματει, ὡς ἦν ὁ ἐνθεύτης τῶν ἀπαναστάσεων ὑπέρτην πεπηῦχαι περὶ τῆς ἀθανασίας αὐτῆς, τῷ τῷ δόμαι καὶ τοιαύτης ὡς ὕπαρκτον ἐν τῷ περὶ τῆς ψυχής λέγει, ζωοίωθην πνεύματα περὶ μονημεία τοῖς γεγονοῖς τῶν ἁντων ἀνθρώπων. Though this might seem to have been smartly opposed by Celsus, yet are these very apparitions of ghosts, notwithstanding, a sufficient argument or proof of a certain necessary opinion, that souls do subsist after death. Neither did Plato vainly conclude the immortality and permanency of the soul, besides other things, from these shadow-like phantasms of the dead, that have appeared to many about graves and monuments. Whereupon he giveth this further account of these apparitions, τῷ μὲν δὲ γινόμενα περὶ ψυχῆς τεθνακέως ψυχῆς τοῖς πνεύματα ἀπὸ τῆς ὑποκρίσεως γνώσει, τῷ κατὰ τῆς ὑποψίαν ἐν τῷ καλεμένῳ' Ἀτσιοῦντος Ἐναμφιτροφόντος. For these apparitions of the dead are not meer groundles imaginings, but they proceed from souls themselves, really remaining and surviving after death, and subsisting in that, which is called a luciform body. Where, notwithstanding Origen takes this Ἐναμφιτροφόντος, in a larger sense, than the Greek philosophers were wont to do; namely, so as to comprehend under it that airy or vaporous body also, which belongeth to unpurged souls, who do therein most frequently appear after death; whereas it is thought proper to the purged souls to be clothed with the luciform body only. Besides which, the same Origen tells us, that the thing, which St. Thomas the Apostle did believe, was not our Saviour's appearing after death, as if he had thought it impossible for ghosts or souls departed visibly to appear, but only his rising and appearing in that same solid body, which had been before crucified, and was laid in the sepulchre; συνεκαταλείπαν μὲν γὰρ ἑαυτῶν τῇ θεωρωματία τῆς ἔκκλησις αὐτοῦ ἐφοράκεναι, ἡς ἦν ἀθεωρητικά διὰ τῆς ὑποκρίσεως τῆς ἐθνικῆς ἀπήκουσα ἡ ἐκτενείᾳ δ' ἐνομιζότας εἰς τὸ ἐν σώματι αὐτοῦ ἀντίτυπον ἐνηγείσχει. Thomas also, as well as the other Apostles, attested to the woman affirming, that she had seen Jesus; as not thinking it at all impossible for the soul of a dead man to be seen: but he did not believe him to have risen and appeared in that fell-fame solid body, which before he lived in; for which cause he said, not only, unless I see him, but added also, And unless I shall put my finger into the print of the nails, and thrust my hand into his side, I will not believe. Where again Origen subjoins, Ταῦτα δ' ἐλέγετο ὑπὸ τῷ Θεωραμένῳ, κρῖνος δὲ ἐπὶ δυτικὴν ὁρθολογικός αἰσθητοῖς Φανακιοῖς ψυχής Σώμα πάντα τῷ προτερῷ εἶναι, —αὐτοῖς τινα, ἡ δέ μάκατα καλὰ ἐνομείζοντας, ἢ ψυχήν, Πόλλας ὥς ὅ τι αὐτῷ ἐπί τῷ χρόνῳ εἶματ' ἐκοίμησις. These things were said by Thomas, not as doubting at all, but that the body of a soul departed (to wit, condensed) might be seen with the eyes of sense, every way resembling that form which it had before in this life, both in respect of bigness, figure, colour, and voice; and oftentimes also in the same customary garments. Wherefore, according to Origen, the Jews were at that time generally possest with this opinion, that souls after death had certain bodies united to them, wherein they might visibly appear; neither is that

of any great moment to the contrary, which a learned critick objecteth, that *Josephus*, writing of their opinions, maketh no mention hereof; he omitting, besides this, other considerable dogmata of theirs also, as that of the resurrection. However this at least is certain from hence, that *Origen* himself took it for granted, that human souls departed were not altogether naked or unclothed, but clothed with a certain subtile body, wherein they could also visibly appear, and that in their prifine form.

Moreover, it might be here observed also, that when upon our Saviour's first appariition to his disciples, it is said, that they were affrighted, as supposing they had seen a spirit; our Saviour does not tell them, that a spirit or ghost had no body at all, wherein it could visibly appear; but (as rather taking that for granted *) that a spirit had no flesh and bones (no σῶμα ἀντίτου) no such solid body as they might find him to have; bidding them therefore handle him, to remove that scruple of theirs. As if he should have said, Though spirits or ghosts, and souls departed, have bodies (or vehicles) which may by them be so far condensed, as sometimes to make a visible appearance to the eyes of men; yet have they not any such solid bodies as those of flesh and bone; and therefore by feeling and handling may you satisfy yourselves, that I am not a mere spirit, ghost, or soul, appearing, as others have frequently done, without a miracle; but that I appear in that very same solid body, wherein I was crucified by the Jews, by miraculous divine power, raised out of the sepulchre, and now to be found no more there. Agreeable to which of our Saviour Christ is that of *Apolлонius in Philostratus*, 

\[\frac{\text{ἀλα}}{\text{μι}}, \frac{\text{φθορά}}{\text{σις}}, \frac{\text{εἰσάγω} \text{εἰς}, \text{εἰδώλου}}{\text{εἰς}}, \frac{\text{ιδιώτ} \\text{μα}}{\text{αὐτ}} \\
\text{ὑπομείνω} \text{μα}, \text{αὐτοκειμένα} \\
\text{παραφύομαι} \text{τὸ σῶμα.} \]

Touch me and handle me, and if you find me to avoid the touch, then may you conclude me to be a spirit or ghost; (that is, a soul departed;) but if I firmly resist the same; then believe me really to live, and not yet to have cast off the body.

And indeed though spirits or ghosts had certain subtile bodies, which they could so far condense, as to make them sometimes visible to men; yet is it reasonable enough to think, that they could not consipitate or fix them into such a firmness, grossness, and solidity, as that of flesh and bone is, to continue therein; or at least, not without such difficulty and pain, as would hinder them from attempting the same. Notwithstanding which, it is not denied, but that they may possibly sometimes make use of other solid bodies, moving and acting them, as in that famous story of *Phelegon's*, where the body vanished not, as other ghosts use to do, but was left a dead carcass behind. Now, as for our Saviour Christ's body, after his resurrection, and before his ascension, which notwithstanding its solidity in handling, yet sometimes vanished also out of his disciples sight: this probably, as *Origen* conceived, was purposely conferred for a time, in a certain middle state, betwixt the crafaddens of a mortal body, and the spirituality of a perfectly glorified, heavenly, and ethereal body.

But there is a place of Scripture, which, as it hath been interpreted by the generality of the ancient fathers, would naturally imply, even the soul of our

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1 Luke xxiv. 37.  
2 In Vita Apollonii Tyanei, Lib. IX. Cap.  
3 In Libello de Rebus Mirabilibus, Cap. I.  
5 Tom. VIII. p. 2694.
our Saviour Christ himself, after his death, and before his resurrection, not
to have been quite naked from all body, but to have had a certain subtile
or spirituous clothing, and it is this of St. Peter, Θαυατωθησθω μη σαρκι, ζωον
πενελειν του πνευματος, et ω της εως φυλακης πνευματος ποτενεις εκποιησεν: Which
being understood by those ancients, of our Saviour Christ's descending in
to Hades or hell, is accordingly thus rendered in the vulgar Latin, Put to
death in the fleshe, but quickened in the spirit: in which (spirit) also, he went
and preached to those spirits that were in prifon, &c. So that the word
πνευμα, or spirit here, according to this interpretation, is to be taken for
a spirituous body; the fense being this, That when our Saviour Christ was
put to death in the fleshe, or the fleshy body, he was quickened in the spirit, or
a spirituous body: in which (spirituous body) also, he went and preached to ad ea loca, in
those spirits that were in prifon, &c. And doubtless it would be said, by
the affertors of this interpretation, that the word spirit could not here be
taken for the soul of our Saviour Christ, because this being naturally im-
mortal, could not properly be said to be quickened and made alive. Nor
could he, that is, our Saviour Christ's soul, be so well said to go, in this
spirit neither, that is, in itself, the soul in the fpirit, to preach to the spi-
rits in prifon. They would add also, that spirit here could not be taken
for the divine Spirit neither, which was the efficient cause of the vivifica-
tion of our Saviour's body at his resurrection; because then there would be
no direct opposition betwixt being put to death in the fleshe, and quicken-
ed in the spirit; unless they be taken both alike materially. As also the
following verfe is thus to be understood; that our Saviour Christ went in
that spirit, wherein he was quickened, when he was put to death in the fleshe,
and therein preached to the spirits in prifon. By which spirits in prifon al-
so would be meant, not pure incorporeal substances, or naked souls, but
souls clothed with subtile spirituous bodies; as that word may be often un-
derstood elsewhere in Scripture. But thus much we are unquestionably cer-
tain of from the Scripture, that not only Elias, whose terrestrial body seems
to have been, in part at least, spiritualized, in his afcent in that fiery char-
riot, but also Moses appeared visibly to our Saviour Christ and his disci-
plies upon the mount, and therefore (since piety will not permit us to think
this a mere prestigious thing) in real bodies; which bodies also seem to
have been άναμονη, luciform or lucid, like to our Saviour's then tran-
figured body.

Again, there are fundry places of Scripture, which affirm, that the rege-
ergate and renewed have here in this life a certain earnest of their future
inheritance; which is their spiritual or heavenly body; as also the quick-
nling of their mortal bodies is therein attributed to the efficiency of the spi-
rit dwelling in them. Which is a thing, that hath been taken notice of by
some of the ancients, as Irenæus; Nunc autem partem aliquam spiritus ejus
sumimus, ad perpetuum & perpetuum incorruptum, paulatim affiguis,
capere & portare Deum. Quod & pignus dixit apòstolus; bonum, partem ejus
honoris, qui a Deo nobis promisit est.——Si ergo pignus hoc habitans in no-
bis jam spirituales efficit, & absolvit mortale ab immortalitate. Now have
Whether any created Spirit

we a part of that Spirit, for the preparation and perfection of incorruption; we being accustomed by little and little to receive and bear God. Which also the Apostle hath called an earnest; that is, a part of that honour, which is promised to us from God. If therefore this earnest (or pledge) dwelling in us hath made us already spiritual, the mortal is also swallowed up by immortality. And Novatian; Spiritus Sanctus id agit in nobis, ut ad aeternitatem & ad resurrectionem immortalitatis corpora nostra perducat, dum illa in se afficeat cum celesti virtute miserii. This is that, which the Holy Spirit hath in us, namely, to bring and lead on our bodies to eternity, and the resurrection of immortality; without in itself it accustomed us to be mingled with the heavenly virtue. Moreover, there are some places also, which seem to imply, that good men shall, after death, have a further incoation of their heavenly body, the full completion whereof is not to be expected before the resurrection or day of judgment. We know, that if our earthly house of this tabernacle were dissolved, we have a building of God, a house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens. For in this we groan earnestly. And verse 5. He that hath wrought us for the self-same thing is God, who also hath given us the earnest of the Spirit. Now how these preludiums and prelubions of an immortal body can confit with the soul’s continuance, after death, in a perfect separation from all manner of body, till the day of judgement, is not so easily conceivable.

Lastly, it is not at all to be doubted, but that Irenæus, Origen, and those other ancients, who entertained that opinion, of souls being clothed after death with a certain thin and subtile body, suspected it not in the least to be inconsistent with that of the future resurrection; as it is no way inconsistent for one, who hath only a shirt or waifcoat on, to put on a suit of clothes, or exterior upper-garment. Which will also seem the less strange, if it be considered, that even here in this life, our body is, as it were, twofold, exterior and interior; we having, besides the grossly tangible bulk of our outward body, another interior spiritual body, the soul’s immediate instrument, both of sense and motion; which latter is not put into the grave with the other, nor imprisoned under the cold sods. Norwithstanding all which, that hath been here suggested by us, we shall not our selves venture to determine any thing in so great a point, but sceptically leave it undecided.

The third and last thing in the forementioned philosophick or Pythagoric cabal is concerning those beings superior to men, commonly called by the Greeks, daemon, (which Philo 5 tells us are the same with angels amongst the Jews, and accordingly are those words daemons and angels, by Hierocles 4 and Simplicius, and other of the latter Pagan writers, sometimes used indifferently as synonymous) viz. That these daemons or angels are not pure, abstrad, incorporeal substances, devoid of vital union with any matter; but that they consist of something incorporeal, and something corporeal, joined together: so that, as Hierocles writeth of them, τὸ μὲν ἄνω κατὰ πτέρυγα  ἔστω.
without a corporal Indument.

The Deity, though it be not properly ψυχὴ ἰπτυκόμως, a mundane soul, such as, together with the corporeal world, as its body, makes up one complete and entire animal; yet because the whole world proceeded from it, and perpetually dependeth on it, therefore must it needs take cognizance of all, and act upon all in it; upon which account it hath been styled by these Pythagoreans, ψυχὴ ὑπεροκόμως, (not a mundane, but) a supra-mundane
dane soul. Wherefore this ancient Pythagorick cabala seems to be agreeable to reason also, that God should be the only incorporeal being in this sense, such whose essence is compleat, and life entire within itself, without the conjunction or appendage of any body; but that all other incorporeal substances created should be compleated and made up by a vital union with matter, so that the whole of them is neither corporeal nor incorporeal, but a complication of both; and all the highest and divinest things in the universe, next to the supreme Deity, are animals consisting of soul and body united together. And after this manner did the ancient affesters of incorporeal substance, as unextended, decline that absurdity objected against them, of the illocality of all finite created spirits, that these being incorporeal substances, vitally clothed with some body, may, by reason of the locality and mobility of their respective bodies, truly be said to be here and there, and to move from place to place.

Wherefore we are here also to shew what agreement or disaffession there is betwixt this part of the Pythagorick cabala, and the Christian philosophy. And first, it hath been already intimated, that the very same doctrine with this of the ancient Pythagoreans was plainly affestered by Origen. Thus, in his first book, Peri Archon, c. 6. Solius Dei, (faith he) id est Patris, & Filii, & Spiritus Sancti; naturæ id proprium est, ut sine materiali substantia, & abque ullo corpore adhesionis societate, intelligatur subsistere. It is proper to the nature of God only, that is, of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, to subsist without material substance; or the society of any corporeal adhesion. Again, L. 2. c. 2. Materialem substantiam opinione quidem, & intellectu solam separari, à naturis rationalibus, & propuis, vel posse ipsas esseam videri; sed nunquam sine ipsa eas vel vivisse, vel vivere: solum namque trinitatis incorporea vita existere recte putatur. Material substance in rational natures is indeed separable from them in conception and understanding, it seeming to be made for them, and in order of nature after them; but it is not really and actually separable from the same; nor did they ever, or can they, live without it: for a life perfectly incorporeal is rightly deemed to belong to the Trinity only. So also, in his fourth book, and his Anaephalaeos, Semper erunt rationeables naturæ, que indigent indumentum corporeum. Semper ergo erit natura corporea, cujus indumentis ut necessæ est rationables creaturas. Nisi quis putet se possisse ostendere, quod natura rationabilis abque ullo corpore vitam degere possit. Sed quam difficili id sit, & quam propè impossibile intellectu nostro, in superioribus ostendimus. There always will be rational natures, which stand in need of a corporeal indument. Wherefore there will be always corporeal nature, as a necessary indument or clothing for these rational creatures. Unless any one could shew, that it is possible for the rational nature to live without a body. Which how difficult and almost impossible it is to our understanding, hath been already declared. Aquinas affirmeth: Origen, in this doctrine of his, to have followed the opinion of certain ancient philosophers; and undoubtedly it was the old Pythagorick cabala, which the learned Origen here adhered to; that η λογική φύσις, as it is in Hierocles,

*In Summâ Theol. Part I. Qüest. LI. p. 1.*
Hierocles, and ὁ λογικὸς ἰδίονν ὁ φυσικὸς, the rational nature made by God; that is, all created understanding beings are neither body, nor yet without body, but have always a cognate or congenit body, as their vehicle or indument. So that angels or daemons, as well according to Origen as Hierocles, are all of them incorporeal substances, not naked and abstract, but clothed with certain subtle bodies, or animals compounded and made up of soul and body together.

Wherefore Huætius¹, and other learned men, seem not well to have understood Origen here, but to have confounded two different opinions together, when they suppose him to have asserted angels, and all understanding creatures, not to have bodies, but to be bodies, and nothing else; and consequently, that there is no incorporeal substance at all besides the Deity: whereas Origen only affirmeth, that nothing besides the Trinity could subsist and live alone, absque ulla corporeæ adhesionis societate, without the society of any corporeal adhesion; and that the material nature is only a necessary indument or clothing of all rational or understanding creatures. And in this sense it is, that an incorporeal life is paid by him to be proper only to the Trinity; because all other understanding beings are animals compounded of soul and body together. But that Origen acknowledged even our human soul itself to be incorporeal, as also that there is something in angels incorporeal, might be made evident from sundry passages in his writings; as this particularly in his sixth book against Celius, ἡ τελικὴς ἀνθρώπου ὑπὸν ἐκ ἐκτος ἦν ποτέν ἐκ παραγωγῆς, ἢ εἰς τὸν ἑαυτοῦ ἡμῶν τὸ ἐπέτειλον, &c. ὁ πρὸς ἡμᾶς We do not think an incorporeal substance to be combustible, nor that the soul of man can be resolved into fire, or the substance of angels, thrones, dominions, principalities, or powers. Where, by the substance of angels, he doubtless meant the souls of them; Origen's sense being thus declared by St. Jerome², in libris ὑπὸν ἀγγέλων, angels, & thrones, & dominations, & potestates, & rectores mundi & tenebrarum, & omne nomen quod nominatur, dicit, animas eis eorum corporum, quæ vel defiderio vel ministerio suæceperint: that in his book of principles he affirmeth, angels, and thrones, and dominions, and powers, and the governors of the darkness of this world, and every name that is named (in St. Paul) to be all of them the souls of certain bodies, such as either by their own desire and inclination, or the divine allotment, they have received. Now there can be no question made, but that he, who supposed the souls of men to be incorporeal, in a strict philosophick sense, and such as could not suffer any thing from fire, did also acknowledge something incorporeal in angels. And thus doth he somewhere declare himself, in that book Peri Arcbeon³, Per Christum creatum dixit (Paulus) omnia visibilia & invisibilia; per quod declaratur, esse etiam in creaturis quasdam invisibiles, secundum proprietatem iisam, substantias; sed hœ, quamvis ipsæ non sunt corporea, utuntur tenem corporibus, licet ipsæ sunt corporeæ substantiæ meliores. Ilia vero substantiæ trinitatis neque corpus, neque in corpore, esse credenda est; sed in toto incorpore. When Paul affirmeth all things, visible and invisible, to have been created by Christ, or the λόγος, he intimated, that even amongst the

² Epil. L. ad Pammachium de Erroribus. § Lib. IV. Cap. II.
the creatures, there are some properly invisible substances. Which invisible substances created, though they be not bodies, yet do they use bodies, themselves being better than corporeal substance. But the substance of the Trinity is neither body, nor yet in body, but altogether incorporeal. Wherefore angelical and human souls are not, as Huetius supposeth, called incorporeal by Origen, only as subtile bodies sometimes are by the more simple and unskilful, but in a strict philosophick sense; only he supposed them to differ from the Deity in this, that though they be not bodies, yet they are always in bodies, or clothed with bodies; whereas the Deity is in both senses incorporeal, it having not so much as any corporeal indument. So that there is here no contradiction at all to be found in Origen, he constantly ascertaining angels to have something incorporeal in them as their superior part, and not in that vulgar sense of a subtile body, but in the philosophick; nevertheless, to have also a corporeal indument or clothing, as their outside or lower part, and in that regard only calling them corporeal.

It is true indeed, that there were, amongst the ancient fathers, some, who were so far from supposing angels to be altogether incorporeal, that they ran into the other extreme, and concluded them to have nothing at all incorporeal in them, but to be mere bodies. But these either affected, that there was no such thing at all as any incorporeal substance; and that not only angels, and human souls, but also God himself was a body: or at least they concluded, that nothing created was incorporeal; and that God, though himself incorporeal, yet could create nothing but bodies. These are here the two extremes; one, that angels have nothing corporeal at all belonging to them; the other, that they are altogether corporeal, or have nothing incorporeal in them: a middle betwixt both which is the Origenick hypothesis, the same with the Pythagoric: that in angels there is a complication of incorporeal and corporeal substance both together, or that they are animals consisting of soul and body. We shall now make it appear, that the greater part of the ancient fathers were for neither of the two forementioned extremes, either that angels were wholly incorporeal, or that they were wholly corporeal; but rather for the middle hypothesis, that they had bodies, and yet were not bodies, but, as other terrestrial animals, spirits or souls, clothed with ethereal or aerial bodies. And that the generality of the ancient and most learned fathers did not conceive angels to be mere un-bodied spirits, is unquestionably evident from hence, because they agreed with the Greek philosophers in that conceit, that evil daemons, or devils, were therefore delighted with the blood and nouders of sacrifices, as having their more gross, airy, and vaporous bodies nourished and refreshed with those vapours, which they did as it were luxuriate and glutonize in. For thus does Porphyrius write concerning them, in his book De Absintentia, οι χαιροτες λοει τε, κυστη τε, οι ου αυτον, το σωματον νυ πνευματω παινεται: έν γαρ τετο ατμων νυ ανασιμαμασι: These are they, who take pleasure in the incense, fumes, and nouders of sacrifices, wherewith their corporeal and spirituous part is as it were pungified; for this lives, and is nourish'd by vapours and fumigations. And that

* Lib. II. §. XLII. p. 86.
that, before Porphyrius, many other Pagan philosophers had been of the same opinion, appeareth from this of Celsum; *For why should we at all admire spirits*, Origen. 1. 8. [P. 417.] We ought to give credit to wise men, who affirm, that most of these lower and circumstaneous demons are delighted with gesture, blood, and nimour, and such like things, and much gratified therewith; though they be not able to do any thing more in way of recompence, than sometimes perhaps to cure the body, or to foretell good and evil fortunes to men and cities. Upon which account himself, though a zealous Pagan, persuadeth men to moderation in the use of these sacrifices, as principally gratifying the inferior and worser demons only. In like manner Origen frequently in his Commentary upon I saiah, because there is something philosophick in it; namely, the fathers did to the Philanthropia through all the heavenly and earthly regions, as Chrysostom supposed in his homilies, i. 5., *and* the wise may, *are* nourished by the vapours and fumes arising from them, and that these evil demons therefore did as it were delicate and Epicurized in them. And before Origen, most of the ancient fathers, as Justin Martyr, Athenagoras, Tatianus, Tertullian, C. 1. [§s. 27., p. 398. Tom. 1. Oper. Ba. filii in Appendix.] sacrifices are things of no small pleasure and advantage to demons; because the blood, being evaporated by fire, and so attenuated, is taken into the compages and substances of their bodies: the whole of which is throughout nourished with vapours, not by eating, and stomachs, or such like organs, but as the hairs and nails of all animals, and whatsoever other things receive nourishment into their whole substance. And thus do we see it undeniably manifest, that many of the ancient fathers supposed devils to have bodies; neither can it at all be doubted, but that they concluded the fame of angels too, these being both of the same kind, and differing but as good and evil men. And though they do not affirm this of good angels, but of devils only, that they were thus delighted and nourished with the fumes and vapours of sacrifices, and that they Epicurized in them; yet was not the reason hereof, because they conceived them to be altogether incorporeal, but to have pure ethereal or heavenly bodies; it being proper to those gross and vaporous bodies of demons only to be nourished and refreshed after that manner. And now, that all these ancient fathers did not suppose either angels or devils to be altogether corporeal, or to have nothing but body in them, may be concluded from hence, because many of them plainly declared the souls of men to be incorporeal; and therefore it cannot...
cannot be imagined, that they should so far degrade angels below men, as not to acknowledge them to have any thing at all incorporeal.

But we shall now instance in some few, amongst many of these ancients, who plainly asserted both devils and angels to be spirits incorporate, and not to be mere bodies, but only to have bodies; that is, to consist of soul and body, or corporeal and incorporeal substance joined together. That angels themselves have bodies, is every where declared by St. Austin in his writings; he affirming, that the bodies of good men, after the resurrection, shall be qualia sunt angelorum corpora, such as are the bodies of angels; and that they shall be corpora angelica, in societate angelorum, angelical bodies, fit for society and converse with angels; and declaring the difference between the bodies of angels and of devils in this manner, Damones, antequem transgressio, celestia corpora gerebant, ut jam possint ab igne pati: That though devils, before the transgression, had celestial bodies, as angels now have, yet might these afterwards, in way of punishment, be changed into aerial ones, and such as now may suffer by fire. Moreover, the same St. Austin somewhere calleth good angels by the name of anima beatæ aequo sanè, happy and holy souls. And though it be true, that in his Retractions he calleth and correcteth this, yet was this only a scrupulosity in that pious father concerning the mere word, because he no where found in Scripture angels called by the name of souls; it being far from his meaning, even there to deny them to be incorporeal spirits joined with bodies. And certainly he, who every where concludes human souls to be incorporeal, cannot be thought to have supposed angels to have nothing at all but body in them. Again, Claudianus Mamertus \(^1\), writing against Fanus, who made angels to be mere bodies without souls, or any thing incorporeal, maintaineth, in way of opposition, not that they are mere incorporeal spirits, without bodies (which is the other extreme) but that they consist of corporeal and incorporeal, soul and body joined together; he writing thus of devils, Diabolus ex duplici diversaque substanitia conficit, & corporos est & incorpores: The devil consists of a double and different substance, he is corporeal, and he is also incorporeal. And again of angels, Patet beatos angelos, urinque substantia, & incorpores esse in ea parte, qua ipsis visibilis Deus, & in ea itidem parte corpores, qua hominibus sunt ipsi visibiles. It is manifest, that the blessed angels are of a two-fold substance: that they are incorporeal in that part of theirs, wherein God is visible to them, and again corporeal, in that other part, wherein themselves are visible to men. Moreover, Fulgentius writeth concerning angels in this manner; Planè ex duplici eos esse substantia afferunt magni & docti viri. Id est, ex spiritu incorporeo, quo à Dei contemplatione nuncuam recedunt; & ex corpore, quod ex tempore hominibus apparent. Corpora vero ætheria, id est, ignea, eos dicunt babere; damones vero corpus ætherum. Great and learned men affirm angels to consist of a double substance; that is, of a spirit incorporeal, whereby they contemplate God; and of a body, whereby they are sometimes visible to men: as also, that they have

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\(^1\) De Mufici, Lib. VI. Cap. XVII. §. 59.  
Chap. V. Angels, embodied Spirits.

Ethereal or fiery bodies, but devils aereal. And perhaps this might be the meaning of Joannes Thesalonicensis, in that dialogue of his, read and approved of in the seventh council, and therefore the meaning of that council itself too, when it is thus declared, noresis mihi avtes h eatholik ikkalkia giwthes, x mi avesmaktes panti ej eptuu, lptesoumaktes de, ej avesades, ej pneades, &c. That the catholic church acknowledges angels to be intellelual, but not altogether incorporeal and invisible; but to have certain subtle bodies, either airy or fiery. For being there only denied, that they were altogether incorporeal, one would think the meaning should not be, that they were altogether corporeal; nor indeed could such an opinion be fastened upon the catholic church; but that they were partly incorporeal, and partly corporeal; this being also sufficient in order to that design, which was driven at in that council. However Pfellus, who was a curious inquirer into the nature of spirits, declares it not only as his own opinion, but also as agreeable to the fene of the ancient fathers, as x avesmak tov to avsoumin iat Philon, meli samousi di y. That the demoniack or angelick kind of beings is not altogether incorporeal, or bodilieus, but that they are conjoined with bodies, or have cognate bodies belonging to them. Who there also further declares the difference betwixt the bodies of good angels and of evil demons, after this manner; to mi gar avgelikous, alatwv tiv wvs xenaqev x, tois evetes eTrexiwos P.35[P.43], eino avxefontov tiv x avpotatov to avsoumin di, ei mi tovstoi diptote ow, ak diwce eitei, eino elv, iropros. Hecai ton ikeoeota xalooxai eulosxai ton di alal afoxai oivw, ej avxearan evi, ej tois sirkases upsero, xolaiwto tiv suhpeis Photos, ej to mi avgelikou pantatapwv eino aulov sw i di di pantai evi terei dioerwv x, ou, ej tiv xalav kai- tivs x, o avxekis tiv, to mi gar dia sarmatai aposanwous iswos, aps terei tiv miwv x, kai avxam, kai alatwv x, kai avxam, wpmemei, ate o, xulo xihwv, tiv, o, w, evi evi, to prouswv, ow, x, x, kai x, x, kai x, x. The angelical body sending forth rays and splendoris, such as would dazzle mortal eyes, and cannot be borne by them; but the demoniack body, though it seemeth to have been once such also, (from Iliasis his calling him, that fell from heaven, Lucifer) yet is it now dark and obscure, foul and gauldian, and grievous to behold; being deprived of its cognate light and beauty. Again, the angelical body is so devoid of gross matter, that it can pass through any solid thing, it being indeed more impassible than the sun-beams; for though these can permeate pellucid bodies, yet are they hindered by earthy and opaque, and refracted by them: so the angelical body is such, as that there is nothing so imporous or solid, that can resist or exclude it. But the demoniack bodies, though, by reason of their tenacity, they commonly escape our sight, yet have they, notwithstanding, gross matter in them, and are pitiable, especially those of them, which inhabit the subterreneous places; for these are of so gross a consistency and solidity, as that they sometimes fall also under touch, and being bruken, have a sense of pain, and are capable of being burnt with fire. To which purpose, the Thracian there addeth more afterwards from the information of Marcus the monk, a per-
Angels called Incorporeal, Book I.

P. 94. [P. 142]

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Notwithstanding which, this latter opinion hath indeed prevailed most in these latter ages; time being rightly compared to a river, which quickly sinks the more weighty and solid things, and bears up only the lighter and more superficial. Though there may be other reasons given for this also, as partly because the Aristotelick philosophy, when generally introduced into Christianity, brought in its abstract intelligences along with it; and partly because some spurious Platonists talking so much of their Henades and Noes, their simple monads and moveable un bodied minds, as the chief of their generated and created gods; probably some Christians might have a mind to vie their angels with them: and lastly, because angels are not only called in Scripture Spirits, but also by several of the ancients said to be incorporeal; whilst this, in the mean time, was meant only either in respect of that incorporeal part, soul or mind, which they supposed to be in them, or else of the tenuity and subtility of their bodies or vehicles. For this account does Pfellus give hereof, χ ημετέροις κ τοις πνεάθεν, εϊωθος εις τα παρεστηρα των σωματων σωματικοι λειψιν 0.

P. 56.
chap. V. as having subtile Bodies.

ēi λεπτομερέις ἵνα ηῇ τῷ ἀιμὶ διαφυγόντω, ἵνα τῷ ζῷῳ ἀσώματο, ἦ μὲν οἱ καθ ἡμᾶς ἄλλαξαν, ἀλλὰ ὁ πολλοὶ τῶν ἱπτῶν ἄξιοι λέγουν. Ἡ is usual both with Christian writers, and Pagans too, to call the graver bodies corporeal, and these, which, by reason of their subtility, avoid both our sight and touch, incorporeal. And before Pellus, Joannes Thessalonicensis, in his dialogue, approved in the seventh Council: έι δὲ τῷ ἐκείνῳ ἀσώματος καλυμμένος τῷ ἄγγελῳ, ἦ δαίμονας, ἦ φυσικός, εἰ μὴ ὡς ἔςει συμμετέχως τοῦ ἑλεγείσθαι τῷ σώματι, ὡς τοιαύτα σώματα παρά ἐς αὐτότως, οἷα καὶ συνειμένης, ἦτοι αὐτός προσηνεσκίνησεν. If you find angels, or demons, or separate souls called sometimes incorporeal, you must understand this in respect of the tenuinity of their bodies only; as not consisting of the graver elements, nor being so solid and antitypous as those, which we are now imprisoned in. And before them both, Origen, in the proeme of his Peri Archon, where, citing a passage out of an ancient book, intituled, The doctrine of Peter, wherein our Saviour Chrift is said to have told his disciples, that he was not ἀσώματος, an incorporeal demon, though rejecting the authority of that book, he thus interprets those words; Νον idem fenius ex if fo fermone ἀσώματος indicatur, qui Grœcis vel Gentilibus autócribus ofenditur, quum de incorpore natœ à philosphiis disputatur. In hoc enim libello, incorporeum demonium dixit, ἐπ᾿ eo, quod ipse ille quicunque est habitus vel circumscriptio demonici corporis, non est similes buie nostro crassiori, vel visibili corpori; sed secundum senium, ejus qui composit illam Scripturam, intelligendum est, quod dixit; non esse tale corpus, quale habent demones, quod est naturaliter subtile, & voluit aura tenue; & propter hoc vel imputatur à multis, vel dicitur incorporeum; sed habere se corpus solidum & palpabile. The word ἀσώματος, or incorporeal, is not to be taken here in that sense, where-in it is used by the Greek and Gentile writers, when they philosophized concerning the incorporeal nature. But a demon is here said to be incorporeal, because of the disposition of the demoniack body, not like to this gross and visible body of ours. So that the sense is, as if Chrift should have said, I have not such a body as the demons have, which is naturally subtile, thin and soft, as the air, and therefore is either supposed to be by many, or at least called incorporeal; but the body, which I now have, is solid and palpable. Where we see plainly, that angels, though supposed to have bodies, may, notwithstanding, be called incorporeal, by reason of the tenuinity and subtility of those bodies, comparatively with the grossness and solidity of these our terrestrial bodies. But that indeed which now most of all inclineth some to this persuasion, that angels have nothing at all corporeal hanging about them, is a religious regard to the authority of the third Lateran council, having passed its approbation upon this doctrine; as if the seventh Occumenical (so called) or second Nicene, wherein the contrary was before owned and allowed, were not of equal force, at least to counter-balance the other.

But though this doctrine of angels, or all created understanding beings superior to men, having a corporeal indument or clothing, does so exactly agree with the old Pythagorick cabala; yet have we reason to think, that it was not therefore merely borrowed or derived from thence by the ancient fathers;

fathers; but that they were led into it by the Scripture itself. For first, the historick phænomena of angels in the Scripture are such, as cannot well be otherwise solved, than by supposing them to have bodies; and then not to lay any stress upon those words of the Psalmist, "who maketh his angels spirits, and ministers a flame of fire," (though, with good reason, by the ancient fathers interpreted to this sense) because they may possibly be understood otherwise, as sometime they are by rabbinical commentators; nor to insist upon those passages of St. Paul, where he speaks of the tongues of angels, and of the voice of an arch-angel, and such like; there are several other places in Scripture, which seem plainly to confirm this opinion. As first, that of our Saviour before mentioned to this purpose, Luke xx. 35. They who shall be accounted worthy to obtain that world, and the resurrection from the dead, neither marry nor are given in marriage, neither can they die any more; for they are equal unto the angels. For were angels utterly devoid of all bodies, then would the souls of good men, in a state of separation, and without any resurrection, be rather equal to angels, than after a resurrection of their bodies. Wherefore the natural meaning of these words seems to be this, (as St. Auflin hath interpreted them) that the souls of good men, after the resurrection, shall have corpora angelica, angelical bodies, and qualia sunt angelorum corpora, such bodies as those of angels are. Wherein it is supposed, that angels also have bodies, but of a very different kind from those of ours here. Again, that of St. Jude, where he writeth thus of the devils; the angels, which kept not their first estate (or rather, according to the vulgar Latin, sium principatum, their own principality) but left their proper habitation (or dwelling house) hath be referred in everlasting chains, under darkness, unto the judgment of the great day. In which words it is first implied, that the devils were created by God pure, as well as the other angels, but that they kept not the ινου εισεξησθαι, their own principality, that is, their lordly power and dominion over their worser and inferiour part, they having also a certain duplicity in their nature, of a better and worser principle, of a superiour part, which ought to rule and govern, and of an inferiour, which ought to be governed: nor is it indeed otherwise easily conceivable, how they should be capable of finning. And this inferiour part in angels seems to have a respect to something, that is corporeal or bodily in them also, as well as it hath in men. But then, in the next place, St. Jude addeth, as the immediate refult and natural consequence of these angels sinning, that they thereby left or lost, το ινου εισεξησθαι, sium proprium domicilium; that is, not only their dwelling-place at large, those ethereal countries, and heavenly regions above, but also their proper dwelling-house, or immediate mansion; to wit, their heavenly body. Forasmuch as that heavenly body, which good men expect after the resurrection, is thus called by St. Paul, το εισεξησθαι εις ις εξω, Our habitation, or dwelling house that is from heaven. The heavenly body is the proper house or dwelling, clothing or indument, both of angelical and human souls; and this is that, which makes them fit inhabitants for the heavenly regions. This, I say, was the natural consequence of these angels sinning, their leaving, or losing

3 Psalm civ. 4. 2 Cor. xiii. 1. 1 Thees. iv. 16. 3 2 Cor. v. 1.
loft their heavenly Body.

losing their pure and heavenly body, which became thereupon forthwith obscured and incrassated; the bodies of spirits incorporate always bearing a correspondent purity or impurity to the different disposition of their mind or soul. But then again, in the last place, that, which was thus in part the natural result of their sin, was also, by the just judgment of God, converted into their punishment; for their ætherial bodies being thus changed into gross, aerial, feculent and vaporous ones, themselves were immediately hereupon, as St. Peter in the parallel place expresseth it, ταρταρών, cast down into Tartarus, and there imprisoned or reserved in chains under darkness, until the judgment of the great day. Where it is observable, that the word ταρταρών, used by St. Peter, is the very fame that Apollodorus and other Greek writers frequently make use of in a like cafe, when they speak of the Titans being cast down from heaven; which seems to have been really nothing else but this fall of angels poetically mythologized. And by Tartarus here, in all probability, is meant this lower caliginous air, or atmosphere of the earth, according to that of St. Augustin, concerning these angels, Post secutum in hanc sunt detrahi caliginem, ubi tamen est aëris. That after their sin, they were thrust down into the misty darkness of this lower air. And here are they, as it were chained and fettered also by that same weight of their gross and heavy bodies, which first sunk them down hither; this not suffering them to re-ascent up, or return back to those bright ætherial regions above. And being thus for the present imprisoned in this lower Tartarus, or caliginous air or atmosphere, they are indeed here kept and reserved in custody unto the judgment of the great day, and general assizes; however they may, notwithstanding, in the mean time seem to domineer and lord it for a while here. And, lastly, our Saviour's: Go ye cursed into everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels, seems to be a clear confirmation of devils being bodied; because, first, to allegorize this fire into nothing but remorse of conscience, would endanger the rendering of other points of our religion uncertain also; but to say, that incorporeal substances, united to bodies, can be tormented with fire, is, as much as in us lieth, to expose Christianity, and the Scripture, to the scorn and contempt of all philosophers and philosophick wits. Wherefore Pselus lays no small fireps upon this place; P. 37. [p. 52] εἰμι μὲν ἐκάστῳ τῶν τῷ Σωτῆρος λόγῳ πεπερευκτωρίας τάτως πιστεύξατε, ἡς κατὰ τός ἐκείνος. ὡς ἐν τούς παθεῖν αὐτοῖς ἀμαράτης ἐδώκει; τὸ γὰρ ἀσώματον αὐτόκτονον παθεῖν ὑπὸ τῶν εἰμῶν. ἢν ἐναύλον ἐκὼς τῶν καλῶν ἐνδύκτησι περιφέρουσα πάθεων. I am also convinced of this, that demons have bodies, from the words of our Saviour, affirming, that they shall be punished with fire: which could it be, were they altogether incorporeal? it being impossible for that, which is both itself incorporeal, and vitally ununitied to any body, to suffer from a body. Wherefore of necessity it must be granted, by us Christians, that devils shall receive punishment of sense and pain hereafter, in bodies capable of suffering.

Now if angels in general, that is, all created beings superiour to men, be substances incorporeal, or souls vitally united to bodies, though not always the

2 Pet. ii. 4. 2 Math. xxv. 41.
the same, but sometimes of one kind, and sometimes of another, and never quite separate from all body; it may seem probable from hence, that though there be other incorporeal substances besides the Deity, yet, *vita incorporea*, a life perfectly incorporeal in the forementioned Origenick sense, or *vita incorporea adhesionis societate vivere*, to live altogether without the society of any corporeal adhesion, is a privilege properly belonging to the holy Trinity only; and consequently therefore, that human souls, when by death they are divested of these gros earthy bodies, they do not then live and act completely, without the conjunction of any body, and so continue till the resurrection or day of judgment; this being a privilege, which not so much as the angels themselves, and therefore no created finite being, is capable of; the imperfection of whose nature necessarily requires the conjunction of some body with them, to make them up complete: without which, it is unconceivable, how they should either have sense or imagination. And thus doth Origen, contentaneously to his own principles, conclude: and *τῇ ἑαυτῇ τῇ Φύσει ἄορας καὶ ἀέρας ψυχήν, εἰς παντὶ σωματίων τόπων τυλίγοντας, διε- λαχομεν ὑμῖν τῇ Φύσει τῷ τόπῳ εἰκών ὁπερ ἐστὶν μεν Φωσεί, ἀπεπήρημαν πνεύματος αἰωνίας γένος, περιείς τις ὡς πρὸς τὰ διενεργά· οὕτως δὲ ἐπιευπερικένων πνεύματος ἡμεῖς, διομένῳ κατεξελέποις ἀναπτύξοντες εἰς τὼν καθαρωτέρων καὶ αἰσθήσεως καὶ ἀγάπης τῶν. Our soul, which in its own nature is incorporeal and invisible, in whatsoever corporeal place it existeth, doth always stand in need of a body, suitable to the nature of that place respectively: which body it sometimes beareth, having put off that, which before was necessary, but is now superfluous for the following state; and sometimes again putting on something to what before it had, now standing in need of some better clothing, to fit it for those more pure, ethereal, and heavenly places. But, in what there follows, we conceive, that Origen's sense having not been rightly understood, his words have been altered and perverted; and that the whole place ought to be read thus: ὡς ἐπὶ τῆς τοῖς γένεσιν ἐξελέπου, τῷ χρήσιμῳ πρὸς τὸν ἐν τῇ ὁμοίῳ τῆς ἀνθρώπης, εἰς τῷ ἐν αὐτῷ ἐνεύριστον ὡς πρὸς ἑαυτόν, οὕτως ἐν αὐτῷ τῇ ἐν τῇ γῆς μείζων διάχυτῳ εἶναι πάλιν ὁμοίος τῶν Φωσείς, καὶ εἰρόμενοι ἀναπτύσσομεν τῷ Φωσεί, καταλειπομένοι μὲν ἕπαισιν ὑπέρ τῶν ἐν τῇ ἐπικρίνει ὑπερβάλλει ὑπερβάλλει, τῷ ἔκκινον ἐπενδυσάμενοι ὑπερβάλλει ἐκείνης, αἰώνιον ἐν τῷ ἐκείνῃ λήφθείναι δὲ τῷ τῇ ἐκείνῃ τῷ πνεύματι ἐκπλησσάσθαι, αὐτὸς ἀναπτύσσομεν. The sense whereof this is: the soul defending neither into generation, put on first that body, which was useful for it while it continue in the womb; and then again afterward such a body, as was necessary for it to live here upon the earth in. Again, it having here a two-fold kind of body, the one of which is called Σκένος, by St. Paul, (being a more subtile body, which it had before) the other the superinduced earthly house, necessarily subservient to this Skenos here; the Scripture oracles affirm, that the earthly house of this Skenos shall be corrupted or dissolved, but the Skenos itself, superinduce or put on a house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens: the same declaring, that the corruptible shall put on incorruption, and the mortal immortality. Where it is plain, that Origen takes that Σκένος, in St. Paul (*1 Corinthians* vi. 1.) for a subtile body, which the soul had before its terrene nativity, and
and which continues with it after death; but in good men will, at
last, superindue, or put on (without death) the clothing of immortality.
Neither can there be a better commentary upon this place of Origen, than
those Excerpta out of Methodius the Martyr, in Photius 2, though seeming
to be vitiated also; where, as we conceive, the sense of Origen and his fol-
lowers is first contained in those words, μητρον τοι Κρίνεις, κατ το Κρίνεις η οικία,
μητρον μικης του ιναι και το Κρίνεις, That in St. Paul the to Κρίνεις is one thing, and
the earthly house of this Κρίνεις another thing; and we, that is, our souls, a
third thing, distinct from both. And then it is further declared in this that
follows, της ζωης καταλαθειαις της ωμαάρας την ρον της ανακάθαρσας εντον δικαιωμα
αι θυραι παρα τω Σεβ, ένω αν ανακατανοθεις αυτην ναπλαυ αναλαβομεν την σωμα
ζωης μη τυποζομεν με διπλοτε τη σωμα απεθαναται ἀλλ’ ει αυτη την λατην ἐπε
δισαναι ζωης το ματαιον το ει θρυς, ο επεθυσαται επι.Σώματον τη Σωμασία
That this short life of our earthly body being destroyed, our soul shall then have, 
before the resurrection, a dwelling from God, until we shall at last receive it
renewed, restored, and so made an incorruptible house. Wherefore in this we
groan, desirous not to put off all body, but to put on life or immortality upon
the body which we shall then have. For that house, which is from heaven, that
we desire to put on, is immortality. Moreover, that the soul is not altogeth
ner naked after death, the same Origen endeavours to confirm further from
that of our Saviour, concerning the rich man and Lazarus; άλλα η
ο καλός εμες πλασμος, και το εν κόλπος Δεσαλμ πλην αναπλανομαν, προ της παρε
κοιαι τη σωματος, και το προ της σωματος της άυτος, και δια το το προ της ανακάθαρ
σιν την την και την την απαλλαγη σωματος εντυπωσε η ψυχη. The rich man put
nihsed, and the poor man refreshed in Abraham's bosom, before the coming of
our Saviour, and before the end of the world, and therefore before the resur-
rection, plainly teaches, that even now also after death, the soul usheth a body.
He thinketh the same also to be further proved from the visible apparition
of Samuel's ghost, άλλα η τον ωμεν Φαιανομενως, ας δηλων ει το ρεπτον, παρεις τη
τη σωμα περικεκτο, Samuel also visibly appearing after death, maketh it man-
ifest, that his soul was then clothed with a body. To which he adds in Phot-
iius 2, το της ψυχης αρια τη απαλλαγη χρησκο ομοιως τη παρεις και ρησος σωματος.
That the external form and figure of the soul's body after death doth re-
semble that of the gross terrestrial body here in this life; all the histories of
apparitions making ghosts, or the souls of the dead, to appear in the same
form, which their bodies had before. This, therefore, as was observed, is
that, which Origen understandeth by το σωμα in St. Paul; not this gross ter-
restrial body, but a certain middle body betwixt it and the heavenly, which
the soul after death carries away with it. Now, this opinion of the learned
Origen's was never reckoned up by the ancient fathers, or his greatest adver-
saries, in the catalogue of his errors; nor does Methodius the martyr, who
was so great an anti-Origenist, where he mentions this Origenick opinion in
Photius, seem to tax it otherwise, then as Platonical, implying the soul
to be incorporeal. Methodius himself, on the contrary, contending, not
that the soul hath a body conjoined with it after death, as a distinct thing
from it, but that itself is a body; ο τας μονας Δολιας ασώματος δι, αν γι για
αι τη απαλλαγη και παλαις των ολων, σωματα νεορα υπάρχονται, εις λαοφ. Σωματι
μελη

1 Biblioth. Cod. CCXIV. p. 919. 2 Apud Phot. ubi supra p. 930.
Joannes thesalianensis, and Pfellus. book I.

But we have already shewed, that Origen was not singular in this opinion, Irenæus before him having affirmed the same thing, that souls after death are adapted to certain bodies, (where the word in the Greek probably was προσώποις) which have the same character with these terrestrial ones; and Philoponus after him, who was no Pagan, but Christian philosopher, dogmatizing in like manner. We might here add, that Joannes thesalianensis, in that dialogue of his, read in the seventh Synod, seemeth to have been of the same persuasion also, when he affirment of souls, as well as angels and daemons, that they were θεοτόκες παρά πλευνόντας πληνώμενα, τοι τοις οικεύοντας αυτοῦ σώματος, often seen by many sensibly, in the form of their own bodies. However, it is a thing, which Pfellus took for granted, where, speaking of devils, insinuating their temptations into men's souls, by affecting immediately the phantastick spirit, he writeth after this manner,  ὁ λέγων, πόρρωθεν μὲν ἄν ἵκχοπτος ἀλών ὁ δοξηθη, οὐχὶ δὲ γνώμην, εἰς τὰ τὰ αἰκῶν ἵνα θυρίζων ὑποπόνοιοι, εἰς το το αἰκῶν ἵνα θυρίζων υποπόνοιοι, οὐ γὰρ οὕτω συνεμίηται πνευματική τῆς θυρίσας, ἀλλὰ ὡς ἐκεῖνοι θυρίζοντες, ἀλλ' ὃ ὁ κατὰ περιστεραίας κοιλαίας πρὸς τὸ δεχόμενον ἐγκύμονον, ὡς φασίν τὰς ψυχάς ἐξεύρισκε τῶν σώματος εἰς τὸ γὰρ τοῖς ἀπλάκειος ὁμοίως ἀλλάξιος. When one man speaks to another from afar off, he must (if he would be heard) make a loud cry or noise; whereas, if he stood near to him, he might softly whisper into his ear. But could be immediately approach to the spirit (or subtile body of the soul,) he should not then need so much as to make a whisper, but might silently, and without noise, communicate whatsoever thoughts of his own to him, by motions made thereupon. And this is said to be the way, that souls, going out of these bodies, converse together; they communicating their thoughts to one another without any noise. For Pfellus here plainly supposeth souls after death to have προσώπα, that is, a certain subtile body, adhering to them, by motions upon which they may silently converse with each other. It is true indeed, that St. Austin, in his twelfth book De Genesi ad Literam, does not himself close with this opinion,
CHAP. V. St. Austin's Judgment in the Case.

of the soul's having a body after death, but much less of its being a body: nevertheless does he seem to leave every man to his own liberty therein, in these words; *St autem queritur, dum anima de corpore extirrit, utrum ad aliqua loca corporalia feriatur, an ad incorporea corporalis familia; an vero nec ad ipsa, sed ad illud quod & corporibus & similitudinis corporum est excellentius; citi quidem responderim: ad corporalia loca can vel non feri nist cum aliqua corpore, vel non localiter feri. Jam utrum habeat aliquod corpus, ostendat, qui potest; ego autem non puto. Spiritalem enim arbitror esse, non corporalem; ad spiritualem vero pro meritis fertur, aut ad loca punalia familia corporibus. But if it be demanded, when the soul goes out of this body, whether it be carried into any corporal places, or to incorpors like to corporals, or else to neither, but to that, which is more excellent than both bodies, and the likeness of bodies? the answer is ready; that it cannot be carried to corporal places, or not locally carried any whither, without a body. Now whether the soul have some body, when it goes out of this body, let them, that can, show: but, for my part, I think otherwise. For I suppose the soul to be spiritual, and not corporal; and that, after death, it is either carried to spiritual things, or else to penal places, like to bodies, such as have been represented to some in extases, &c. Where St. Austin himself seems to think the punishment of souls, after death, and before the resurrection, to be phantastical, or only in imagination: whereas there could not be then so much as phantastick punishments neither, nor any imagination at all in souls, without a body, if that doctrine of Aristotle be true, that phancy or imagination is nothing else but a weaker sense; that is, a thing, which results from a complication of soul and body both together. But it is observable, that in the forecited place, which St. Austin chiefly opposed, was the soul's being a body, as Tertullian, Methodius, and others had asserted; but as for its having a body, he faith only this, *Ostendat qui potest, let him that can show it; he granting, in the mean time, that the soul cannot be locally carried any whither at all after death, nor indeed be in any place without a body. However, the same St. Austin, as he elsewhere condemneth the opinion of those, who would take the fire of hell metaphorically, acknowledg- ing it to be real and corporeal; so does he somewhere think it not improbable, but after death, and before the resurrection, the souls of men may suffer from a certain fire, for the consuming and burning up of their drosses; *Post istius sané corporis mortem, donec ad illum veniat, qui post resurrectionem corporum futurus est damnationis & remunerationis ultimus dies: si hoc temporis intervallo, ejusmodi ignem dicentur perpetui, quem non sentient illi, qui non habuerint tales mores & amores in buius corporis vital, ut eorum ligna, & cestum, & stipula comminuat; aliis vero sentiunt, qui ejusmodi secum securit adfica portaverunt, &c. non redarguo, quia forsan verum est. If in this interval of time, betwixt the death of the body and the resurrection or day of judgment, the souls of the dead be said to suffer such a fire as can do no execution upon those, who have no wood, hay, nor stubble, to burn up, but shall be felt by such, as have made such buildings or superstructures, &c. I re- prehend it not, because perhaps it is true. The opinion here mentioned, is thus


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De Anima, Lib. III. Cap. IX. p. 53. Tom. II. Oper.
thus expressed by Origen, in his fifth book against Celsus, which very place St. Aujlin seems to have had respect to; εις υποθετετε θετε Ελλήνων τινιν ἔδειξεν, ἄ το τῆς καταδύσεως ἐπάγαγε τῷ καλοῖς εἰκὼν δ’ ἄ το καὶ ἐκάση τοῦ ὄραμαν τῆς διώ καὶ τῶν εἰκών καὶ τοῦ καθαροῦ μεν καὶ τοῦ κακοῦ. Ἡμεῖς δὲ μὴ ἔχομεν ὡλήν διορίσμεν ἀναλύειν τον ἔκθεσιν τῶν πυρὸς καὶ τῆς εἰς τῇ διά τῶν πυρὸς καὶ τῶν πυρὸς καὶ τῶν πυρὸς καὶ τῶν πυρὸς καὶ τῶν πυρὸς καὶ τῶν πυρὸς καὶ τῶν πυρὸς. Now since souls cannot suffer from fire, nor any thing else in way of senile or pain, without being vitally united to some body, we may conclude, that St. Aujlin, when he wrote this, was not altogether abhorrent from souls having bodies after death.

Hitherto have we declared, how the ancient affirers of incorporeal substance, as unextended, did repel the assaults of Atheists and Corporealists made against it; but especially how they quitted themselves of that absurdity, of the illocality and immobility of finite created spirits, by supposing them always to be vitally united to some bodies, and consequently, by the locality of those their respective bodies, determined to here and thither; according to that of Origen; η υποθετετε υποθετε τοῦ αἰτίας, διὰ τῆς ἐκάσης μεταχείσης,

C. Cels. 1. s. our soul stands in need of a body in order to local motions. We shall in the next place declare, what grounds of reaason there were, which induced those ancients to assert and maintain a thing so repugnant to sense and imagination, and consequently to all vulgar apprehension, as a substance in itself unextended, indifferent and indivisible, or devoid of magnitude and parts. Wherein we shall only reprent the sense of those ancient Incorporealists, so far as we can, to the best advantage, in order to their vindication, against Atheists and Materialists; ourselves in the mean time not asserting any thing, but leaving every one, that can, to make his own judgment; and so either to close with this, or that other following hypothesis, of extended incorporeals.

Now it is here observable, that it was a thing formerly taken for granted on both sides, as well by the affirers as the deniers of incorporeal substance, that there is but one kind of extension only; and consequently, that whatsover hath magnitude and parts, or one thing without another, is not only intellectually and logically, but also really and physically divisible or inviscible, as likewise antitypous and impenetrable; so that it cannot co-exist with a body in the same place: from whence it follows, that whatsoever arguments do evince, that there is some other substance besides body, the same do therefore demonstrate, according to the sense of these ancients, (as well Corporealists as Incorporealists) that there is something unextended, it being suppos'd by them, both alike, that whatsoever is extended, is body.

Never-
Chap. V. for unextended Substance.

Nevertheless we shall here principally propound such considerations of theirs, as tend directly to prove, that there is something unextendedly incorporeal; and that an unextended Deity is no impossible idea; but, from hence, because there is something unextended even in our very selves. Where, not to repeat the forementioned ratiocination of Simplicius, that whatsoever can act and reflect upon its whole self, cannot possibly be extended, nor have parts distant from one another; Plotinus first argues after this manner, τίτοιος Φύσεως, οί τῇ ψυχῇ σώμα είναι λέγουσι, πρώτον μὲν τερηκάτῳ μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς τῆς ἐν τῷ αὐτῶ τῷ σώματι, πέτρου ἔκαστον ψυχήν, οἷα εἶναι γὰρ ὁ λόγος, ἰός τινὸς τοῦ μέρους τῆς ψυχῆς τῆς ἐν τῷ αὐτῶ τῷ σώματι, πέτρου ἔκαστον ψυχήν, ὡς εἶναι γὰρ ὁ λόγος. 

What then will they say, who contend, that the soul is a body (or extended) whether or no, they grant concerning every part of the soul in the same body (as that of it which is in the foot, and that in the hand, and that in the brain, &c.) and again every part of those parts, that each of them is soul, such as the whole? If this be consented to, then it is plain, that magnitude, or such a quantity, would confer nothing at all to the essence of the soul, as it would do were it an extended thing; but the whole would be in many parts or places, which is a thing, that cannot possibly belong to body; that the same whole should be in more, and that a part should be what the whole is. But if they will not grant every part of their extended soul to be soul, then, according to them, must the soul be made up, and compounded of soul-less things. Which argument is elsewhere thus propounded by him; εἰ δὲ ἐκαστὸς ζωήν ἐχει, κἂν ἐκαστὸς εἶναι μέλος αὐτῶν ζωῆς ἐχοις οἱ σώματες. 

πᾶσαι ὁμοίως, εἴτε τοίον μεῖλλον δὲ αὐτῶν συμβολφούσι συμματῶν ζωῆς ἐχοις εἰ δὲ οὐκ αὕτη τὰ ζώα τῶν καθάρτων. If every one of the parts of this extended soul or mind have life in it, then would anyone of them alone be sufficient. But to say, that though none of the parts alone have life in them, yet the conjunction of them altogether makes life, is absurd; it being impossible, that life and soul should result from a congeries of life-less and soul-less things, or that mind-less things put together should beget mind. The sum of this argumentation is this, that either every part of an extended soul is soul, and of an extended mind, or not. Now if part of a soul, as supposed to be extended alone, be soul, or have life and mind in it, then is it certain, that the whole, resulting from all the parts, could have no life nor mind, because nothing can (caufully) come from nothing. It is true indeed, that corporeal qualities and forms, according to the atomick philology, result from a composition and contexture of atoms or parts, each of which, taken alone by themselves, have nothing of that quality or form in them,

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----Ne ex albis alba rearis; 
Aut ea, que migrant, nigro de femine nata.

You are not to think, that white things are made out of white principles, nor black things out of black; but the reason of the difference here is plain, be-
caufe these qualities and forms are not entites really distinct from the magnitude, figure, site, and motion of parts, but only such a composition of them, as caufe different phancies in us; but life and understanding, soul and mind, are entites really distant from magnitude, figure, site, and motion of parts; they are neither mere phancies, nor syllables of things, but simple and uncompounded realities. But if every supposed part of a soul be soul, and of a mind, mind, then would all the rest of it besides any one part be superfluous; or indeed every supposed part thereof would be the same with the whole: from whence it follows, that it could not be extended, or have any real parts at all, since no part of an extended thing can possibly be the same with the whole.

Again, the same philosopher endeavours further to prove, that the human soul itself is unextended and indivisble, from its energies and operations, and that as well those of senation as of intellect. First, therefore, from external sensations, he reasons in this manner: Eti melia, aisthentesiis thus in autem dein est, h' to autem patu, avthilamabathentov. H' ei dia pellass aisdh triovvdwos xelud to etiosata, h' pellas xeri ev poientes, h' en de piokiyov, ovvoos xeludov' h' xoal allov onv sialov, allvd xalov ovv sialov' h' ei to mel de ommatwv to de oxe de, h' ev de dein estis h' ev oxe omen h' ev oxe omen estis xeri eto. xalov, dh' estis o autov xalov oemov aistsihov ev. That, which perceiveth in us, must of necessity be one thing, and by one and the same indivisibl perceiveth all; and that, whether they be more things, entering through several organs of sense, as the many qualities of one substance, or one various and multiform thing, entering through the same organ, as the countenance or picture of a man. For it is now one thing in us, that perceiveth the nose, another thing the eyes, and another thing the mouth; but it is one and the self-same thing, that perceiveth all. And when one thing enters through the eye, another through the ear, these also must of necessity come all at least to one indivisibl, or else they could not be compared together, nor one of them affirmed to be different from another; the several sentiments of them meeting nothing together in one. He concludes therefore, that this one thing in us, that senibly perceiveth all things, may be refembled to the centre of a circle, and the several senses to lines drawn from the circumference, which all meet in that one centre. Wherefore that, which perceiveth and apprehends all things in us, must needs be really one and the very same; that is, unextended and indivisibl. Which argument is yet further pursued by him, more particularly thus: If that, which senibly perceiveth in us be extended, so as to have distant parts one without another; then one of these three things must needs be acknowledged, that either every part of this extended substance of the soul perceiveth a part of the object only, or every part of it the whole object, or else all comes to some one point, which alone perceiveth both the several parts of the object, and the whole, all the other being but as circumferential lines leading to this centre. Now of the former of these three, Plotinus thus: mev' avi tov, avmav evai de ev de elov de elov meros, ke mvdhna hmev de to avtov aisth Timiov ixi' avte ev ei' ev de elov su de elov aibou. If the soul be a magnitude, then must it be divided together with the sensible object, so that one part of the soul
must perceive one part of the object, and another, another; and nothing in it, the whole sensible: just as if I should have the sense of one thing, and you of another. Whereas it is plain by our internal sense, that it is one and the self-same thing in us, which perceives both the parts and the whole. And of the second, he writeth in this manner; έτ δε στιν παιδος αιδοσλοι: εις απερα οιακωτα το μεγα εοντον χαθας, απειας και αληθειας και κατ' ικανον αδελφον συμβεοτα, γανονθα ινατω οιον το αιται απειας αν τον εγκοινον ημων εικονα. But if every part of the extended soul perceive the whole sensible object, since magnitude is infinitely divisible, there must be in every man infinite sensations and images of one and the same object. Whereas we are intimately conscious to ourselves, that we have but only one sensation of one object at the same time. And as for the third and last part of this disjunction, that what sensibly perceives in every one, is but a single point, either mathematical or physical; it is certain, first, that a mathematical point, having neither longitude, latitude, nor profundity, is no body nor substance, but only a notion of our own mind, or a mode of conceiving in us. And then, as for a physical point or minimum, a body so little, that there cannot possibly be any less, Plotinus asserting the infinite divisibility of body, here explodes the thing itself. However he further intimates, that if there were any such physical minimum, or absolutely least body or extension, this could not possibly receive upon it a distinct representation and delineation of all the several parts of a whole visible object at once, as of the eyes, nose, mouth, &c. in a man's face or picture, or of the particularities of an edifice; nor could such a partitude or atom as this be the cause of all animal motions. And this was one of Aristotle's arguments, whereby he would prove unextended incorporeals, πως το αμα το μεγα τον. If the soul were indivisible as a point, how could it perceive that, which is divisible? that is, take notice of all the distinct parts of an extended object, and have a description of the whole of them at once upon itself? The sum of the whole argumentation is this, that if the soul be an extended substance, then must it of necessity be either a physical point or minimum, the least extension, that can possibly be, (if there be any such least, and body or extension be not infinitely divisible) or else it must consist of more such physical points, joined together. As for the former of these, it hath been already declared to be impossible, that one single atom, or smallest point of extension, should be able distinctly to perceive all the variety of things: to which might be added, that to suppose every soul to be but one physical minimum, or smallest extension, is to imply such an essential difference in matter or extension, as that some of the points thereof should be naturally devoid of all life, sense, and understanding, and others again naturally sensitive and rational. Which absurdity, though it should be admitted, yet would it be utterly unconceivable, how there should come to be one such sensitive and rational atom in every man and no more, and how this should constantly remain the same, from infancy to old-age, whilst other parts of matter transpire perpetually. But as for the latter, if souls be extended substances, consisting of more points, one without another, all concurring in every sensation; then must every one of those points,

1 De Animâ, Lib. I. Cap. III. p. 10, Tom. II. Opera.
points, either perceive a point and part of the object only, or else the whole. Now, if every point of the extended soul perceive only a point of the object, then is there no one thing in us, that perceives the whole, or which can compare one part with another. But if every point of the extended soul perceive the whole object at once, consisting of many parts, then would there be innumerable perceptions of the same object in every sensation; as many, as there are points in the extended soul. And from both these suppositions, it would alike follow, that no man is one single percipient or person, but that there are innumerable distinct percipients and persons in every man. Neither can there be any other supposition made, besides these three forementioned; as, that the whole extended soul should perceive both the whole sensible object, and all its several parts, no part of this soul in the mean time having any perception at all by itself; because the whole of an extended being is nothing but all the parts taken together; and if none of those parts have any life, sense, or perception in them, it is impossible, that there should be any in the whole. But in very truth, to say, that the whole soul perceiveth all, and no part of it any thing, is to acknowledge it not to be extended, but to be indivisible, which is the thing that Plotinus contends for.

And that philosopher here further inculps upon internal sensations also, and that Συμπάθεια, or Ὀμοπάθεια, that sympathy, or homopathy, which is in all animals, to the same purpose: it being one and the same thing in them, which perceives pain, in the most distant extremities of the body, as in the sole of the foot, and in the crown of the head; and which moves one part to succour and relieve another labouring under it, which could not possibly be by traduction of all to one physical point, as the centre, for divers reasons. Εἰ τοῖς κατὰ διάδοσιν ψυχοῖς οἶνοες τὴν αἰσθησιν τὸ τούτῳ γίνεσθαι, μὴ ἐν σώματι ὡς ὑπτι, ἀλλὰ παθοῦξε, ἀλλὰ γνῶσιν ἐγείρειν (πᾶσας γὰρ μεγάλα τὸ μὲν ἄλλα, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο ἢ ἢ) δεῖ τοὺς τὴν ἰσιτίαν τὸ αἰσθανόμεθα, οὗς παθεῖς αὐτῷ ναυτὸ τὸ κατὰ ἐμείς τέτοιο ὑπτι. ἐν τοίς τινι τῶν δὲ ἐν τοῖς σώματι ποιεῖς προεῖκεν. Since therefore these sympathetical senses cannot possibly be made by traduction, at last to one thing; and body being bulky or out-swelling extension, one part thereof suffering, another cannot perceive it (for in all magnitude, this is one thing, and that another) it followeth, that what perceiveth in us, must be every where, and in all the parts of the body, one and the same thing with itself. Which therefore cannot be itself body, but must of necessity be some other entity or substance incorporeal. The conclusion is, that in men and animals there is one thing indivisibly the same, that comprehendeth the whole outside of them, perceiveth both the parts and the whole of sensible objects, and all transmitted through several senses, sympathizeth with all the distant parts of the body, and acteth entirely upon all. And this is properly called, I myself, not the extended bulk of the body, which is not one, but many substances, but an unextended and indivisible unity, wherein all lines meet and concentre, not as a mathematical point or least extensum, but as one self-active, living power, substantial or inside-being, that containeth, holdeth, and connecteth all together.

Last'y,
Lastly, the forementioned philosopher endeavours yet further to prove the human soul to be unextended and devoid of magnitude, and indivisible, from its rational energies or operations, its noetic notions, and indivisib. notions, intelligences of intelligibles, and apprehensions of things devoid of magnitude, πούς γὰρ μὴν οὔσις τοῦ μὴν μὴν νοὴς, κἂν τὰ μέρη τοῦ μὴν μὴν νοητοῖν. For how could the soul (faith he) if it were a magnitude, understand that, which hath no magnitude? and with that, which is indivisible, conceive what is indivisible? Now, it is certain, that we have notions of many things, which are ἀφώνητα, altogether unimaginable, and therefore have nothing of length, breadth, and thickness in them, as virtue, vice, &c. ἀμέτρητος οὖσις, of which τὸ καλὸν, τὸ δύσκολον, καὶ τὸ τίτων ἄρχοντα, ὡς καὶ προείστα καὶ τὰ ἀμετρητὰ πολλάκις, καὶ ἀνίκητον ἀμετρήτος. Justice and honesty, and the like, are things devoid of magnitude, and therefore must the intelligences of them needs be such too. So that the soul must receive these by what is indivisible, and lodge them in that which is indivisible. We have also a notion not only of meer latitude or breadth, indivisible as to thickness; and of longitude or a line, indivisible both as to breadth and thickness; but also of a mathematical point, that is every way indivisible, as to length, breadth and thickness. We have a conception of the intention of powers and virtues, where-in there is nothing of extension or magnitude. And indeed all the abstract essences of things, (or the αὐτόκενως) which are the first objects of intelligence, are indivisible: εἰ δὲ τῶν ἐν ἀληθείᾳ τῶν ὑποθερμικῶν εἰμι, ἀλλὰ κρίσις εἰμὶ τοῦ μεθανοῦσα τίς νοῦς αὐτὸν τὴν ομόθεσιν ἔχει, οὐ γὰρ μετὰ σαφέσιν, &c. And though we apprehend forms, that are in matter too, yet do we apprehend them as separated and abstracted from the same; there being nothing of flesh in our conception of a man, &c. Nay, the soul conceives extended things themselves, un-extendedly and indivisibly; for as the distance of a whole hemisphere is contract into a narrow compass in the pupil of the eye, so are all distances yet more contracted in the soul itself; and there understood indifferently; for the thought of a mile distance, or of ten thousand miles, or semidiameters of the earth, takes up no more room in the soul, nor stretches it any more than does the thought of a foot or inch, or indeed of a mathematical point. Were that, which perceiveth in us, a magnitude, then could it not be, ἵνα πάντι ἀαθητῇ, equal to every sensible, and alike perceive both leffer and greater magnitudes than itself: but least of all could it perceive such things, as have no magnitude at all. And this was the other part of Aristotel's argumentation, to prove the soul and mind to be unextended and indivisible', ποὺς γὰρ νοὴς τὸ ἀμετρητὰ μεταφέρει; For how could it perceive, that which is indivisible by what is divisible? he having before demanded, how it could apprehend things divisible, and of a great extension, by a mere point, or absolute parvitude. Where the soul, or that which perceives and understands, is, according to Aristotel, neither divisible, as a continued quantity, nor yet indivisible, either as a mathematical, or as a physical point, and absolute parvitude; but as that, which hath in itself no out-

swelling distance, nor relation to any place, otherwise than as it is vitally united to a body, which (wherever it be) it always sympathizes with, and acts upon.

Besides which, these ancient affurers of unextended incorporeals would, in all probability, confirm that opinion from hence, because we cannot only conceive extension without cogitation, and again cogitation without extension; from whence it may be inferred, that they are entities really distinct and separable from one another, (we having no other rule to judge of the real distinction and separability of things, than from our conceptions) but also are not able to conceive cogitation with extension. We cannot conceive a thought to be of such a certain length, breadth, and thickness, mensurable by inches and feet, and by solid measures. We cannot conceive half, or a third part, or a twentieth part of a thought, much less of the thought of an indivisible thing; neither can we conceive every thought to be of some certain determinate figure, either round or angular; spherical, cubical, or cyndrical, or the like. Whereas, if whatsoever is unextended be nothing, thoughts must either be mere non-entities, or else extended too into length, breadth, and thickness; divisible into parts, and mensurable; and also (where finite) of a certain figure. And consequently all verities in us (they being but complex axiomatical thoughts) must of necessity be long, broad, and thick, and either spherically, or angularly figure. And the same must be affirmed of volutions likewise, and appetites or passions, as fear and hope, love, and hatred, grief and joy; and of all other things belonging to cogitative beings, (souls and minds) as knowledge and ignorance, wisdom and folly, virtue and vice, justice and injustice, &c. that these are either all of them absolute non-entities, or else extended into three divisions of length, breadth, and profundity, and mensurable not only by inches and feet, but also by solid measures, as pints and quarts; and last of all (where they are finite as in men) figure. But if this be absurd, and these things belonging to soul and mind (though doubtless as great realities at least, as the things, which belong to bodies) be unextended, then must the substances of souls and minds themselves be unextended also. Thus Plotinus of mind, Nós τό διασάς d' Ἰαντον, mind is not distant from itself: and indeed were it so, it could not be one thing (as it is) but many; every conceivable part of distant and unextended substance being a substance by itself. And the same is to be said of the human soul, though it act upon distant parts of that body, which it is united to, that itself, notwithstanding, is not scattered out into distance, nor dispersed into multiplicity, nor infinitely divisible; because then it would not be one single substance, or monad, but a heap of substances. Soul is no more divisible than life, of which the forementioned philosopher thus, ἄρα γε τιν χων μηριᾶς ἀλλ' εἰσὶ τῶν ἐν χων, το μέγας χων οὖν ἢ τα. Will you divide a life into two? then the whole of it being but a life, the half thereof cannot be a life. Lastly, if soul and mind, and the things belonging to them, as life and cogitation, understanding and wisdom, &c. be outspread into distance, having one part without another; then can there be no good reason given, why they should not be as well really and physically, as intellectually divisible; and one part
part of them separable from another: since, as Plotinus, πάντα μαγεύει τὸ μὲν ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο. In all magnitude or extension, this is one thing, and that another. At least, no Theist ought to deny, but that the divine power could cleave or divide a thought, together with the soul, wherein it is, into many pieces; and remove them to the greatest distances from one another, (for as much as this implies no manner of contradiction, and whatsoever is conceivable by us, may be done by infinite power) in which case, neither of them alone would be soul or mind, life or thought, but all put together make up one entire mind, soul, life, and thought.

Wherefore, the sense of the ancient Incorporealists seems to have been as follows: That there are in nature two kinds of substances specifically differing from one another; the first, οἴσης, bulks, or tumours, a mere passive thing; the second, Διδυμεῖς, self-active powers or virtues, or Φύσει δεξιοτητὰ, the energetick nature. The former of these is nothing else but magnitude or extension, not as an abstract notion of the mind, but as a thing really existing without it. For when it is called res extensa, the meaning is not, as if the res were one thing, and the extension thereof another, but that it is extension, or distance, really existing, or the thing thereof (without the mind) and not the notion. Now, this in the nature of it is nothing but aliud extra aliud, one thing without another, and therefore perfect alterity, difunity, and divisibility. So that no extension whatsoever, of any sensible bigness, is truly and really one substance, but a multitude or heap of substances, as many as there are parts, into which it is divisible. Moreover, one part of this magnitude always standing without another, it is an essential property thereof to be antitypous or impenetrable; that is, to jostle or shoulder out all other extended substance from penetrating into it, and co-existing with it, so as to possess and take up the same room and space. One yard of distance, or of length, breadth, and thickness, cannot possibly be added to another, without making the whole extension double to what it was before, since one of them must of necessity stand without the other. One magnitude cannot imbibe or swallow up another, nor can there be any penetration of dimensions. Moreover, magnitude or extension, as such, is mere outside or outwardness; it hath nothing within, no self-active power or virtue; all its activity being either keeping out, or hindering, any other extended thing, from penetrating into it: (which yet it doth merely by its being extended, and therefore not so much by any physical efficiency, as a logical necessity,) or else: local motion, to which it is also but passive; no body or extension, as such, being able to move itself, or act upon itself.

Wherefore, were there no other substance in the world besides this magnitude or extension, there could be no motion or action at all in it; no life, cogitation, conscientiousness; no intellect, appetite, or volition, (which things do yet make up the greatest part of the universe) but all would be a dead heap or lump: nor could any one substance penetrate another, and co-exist in the same place with it. From whence it follows of necessity,
that besides this outside bulky extension, and tumourous magnitude, there must be another kind of entity, whose essential attribute or character is life, self-activity, or cogitation. Which first, that it is not a mere mode or accident of magnitude and extension, is plain from hence, because cogitation may be as well conceived without extension, as extension without cogitation; whereas no mode of any thing can be conceived without that, whereof it is a mode. And since there is unquestionably much more of entity in life and cogitation, than there is in mere extension or magnitude, which is the lowest of all being, and next to nothing; it must needs be imputed to the mere delusion and imposture of imagination, that men are so prone to think this extension or magnitude to be only substance, and all other things besides the mere accidents thereof, generable out of it, and corruptible again into it. For though that secondary and participated life (as it is called) in the bodies of animals be indeed a mere accident, and such as may be present or absent without the destruction of its subject; yet can there be no reason given, why the primary and original life itself should not be as well a substantial thing, as mere extension and magnitude. Again, that extension and life, or cogitation, are not two inadequate conceptions neither, of one and the self-same substance, consider'd brokenly and by piece-meal; as if either all extension had life and cogitation essentially belonging to it, (as the Hylozoists conclude) or at least all life and cogitation had extension; and consequently all souls and minds, and even the Deity itself, were either extended life and cogitation, or living and thinking extension; (there being nothing in nature unextended, but extension the only entity; so that whatsoever is devoid thereof, is, ipso facto, absolutely nothing:) This, I say, will also appear from hence, because, as hath been already declared, we cannot conceive a life, or mind, or thought, nor any thing at all belonging to a cogitative being, as such, (as wisdom, folly, virtue, vice, &c.) to be extended into length, breadth, and thickness, and to be measurable by inches, feet, and yards. From whence it may be concluded, that extension, and life or cogitation, are no inadequate conceptions of one and the self-same thing, since they cannot be complicated together into one, but that they are distinct substances from each other. Lives and minds are such tight and compact things in themselves, and have such a self-unity in their nature, as that they cannot be lodged in that, which is wholly scattered out from itself into distance, and dispersed into infinite multiplicity; nor be spread all over the same, as co-extended with it. Nor is it conceivable, how all the several parts of an extended magnitude, should jointly concur and contribute to the production of one and the same single and indivisible cogitation; or how that whole heap or bundle of things should be one thinker. A thinker is a monad, or one single substance, and not a heap of substances; whereas no body or extended thing is one, but many substances; every conceivable or smallest part thereof being a real substance by itself.

But this will yet further appear, if we consider, what kind of action cogitation is. The action of an extended thing, as such, is nothing but local motion,
motion, change of distance, or translation from place to place, a mere outside and superficial thing; but it is certain, that cogitation, (phancy, intellect, and volition) are no local motions; nor the mere fridgeting up and down of the parts of an extended substance, changing their place and distance; but it is unquestionably an internal energy; that is, such an energy, as is within the very substance or essence of that, which thinketh, or in the inside of it. From which two kinds of energies we may now conclude, that there are also two kinds of entity or substance in nature; the one meer outside, and which hath nothing within it; the other such a kind of entity, as hath an eternal energy; acteth from itself, and within itself, and upon itself; an inside thing, whose action is within the very essence or substance thereof; it being plain, that the cogitative or thinking nature is such a thing, as hath an essential inside or profundity. Now, this inside of cogitative beings, wherein they thus act or think internally within themselves, cannot have any length, breadth, or thickness in it, because if it had, it would be again a meer outside thing. Wherefore all cogitative beings (souls and minds) extension and magnitude never so much belonging to them, as some suppose them to have, yet could this, for all that, be nothing but the meer outside of their being; besides which, they must of necessity have also an unextended inside, that hath no outwelling tumour, and is not scattered into distance, nor dispersed into multiplicity, which therefore could not possibly exist a part in a part of the supposed extension, as if one half of a mind or thought were in one half of that extension, and another in another; but must of necessity be all undividedly, both in the whole of it, and in every part. For had every twentieth or hundredth part of this extensum not the whole of a life or mind in it, but only the twentieth or hundredth part thereof, then could none of them have any true life or mind at all, nor consequently the whole have any. Nor indeed is it otherwise conceivable, how a whole quantity of extended substance should be one thing, and have one personality, one I myself in it all, were there not one indivisible thing presiding over it, which held it all together, and diffused itself thorough all. And thus do we see, how this whole in the whole and in every part (do men what they can) will, like a ghost, still haunt them, and follow them every where. But now it is impossible, that one and the self-same substance should be both extended and unextended. Wherefore in this hypothesis of extended understanding spirits, having one part without another, there is an undiscerned complication of two distinct substances, extended and unextended, or corporeal and incorporeal, both together; and a confusion of them into one. Where, notwithstanding, we must acknowledge, that there is so much of truth aimed at, as that all finite incorporeal substances are always naturally united to some bodies; so that the whole of these created animals is compleated and made up of both these together, an extended inside, and an unextended outside, both of them substances indeed really distinct, but yet vitally united each to other.

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The sum of all is, that there are two kinds of substances in nature, the first extension or magnitude, really existing without the mind, which is a thing, that hath no self-unity at all in it, but is infinite alterity and divisibility, as it is also meer outside and outwardness, it having nothing within, nor any other action belonging to it, but only locally to move, when it is moved. The second, life and mind, or the self-active cogitative nature, an inside being, whose action is not local motion, but an internal energy, within the substance or essence of the thinker himself, or in the inside of him; which therefore, though unextended, yet hath a certain inward recess, &c., or essentia profundity. And this is a thing, which can act all of it entirely upon either a greater or lesser quantity of extended substance or body, and its several parts, penetrating into it, and co-existing in the same place with it. Wherefore it is not to be looked upon either as a mathematical, or as a physical point, as an absolute parvitude, or the least extensum possible, it having not only such an essentia inside, bathos, or profundity in it, wherein it acteth and thinketh within itself, but also a certain amplitude of active power ad extra, or a sphere of activity upon body. Upon which account, it was before affirmed by Plotinus, that an unextended incorporeal is a thing bigger than body, because body cannot exist otherwise than a point of it in a point of space; whereas this one and the same indivisible can at once both comprehend a whole extensum within it, and be all of it in every part thereof. And lastly, all finite incorporeals are always naturally united to some body or other; from both which together is compleated and made up in every created understanding being one entire animal, consisting of soul and body, and having something incorporeal, and something corporeal in it, an unextended inside, and an extended outside, by means whereof it is determined to here and there, and capable of moving locally, or changing place.

Thus have we represented the sense of the ancient unextended Incorpo- realists to the best advantage, that we could, in way of answer to the premised atheistical argument against incorporeal substance, and in order to the vindication of them from the contempt of Atheists; and we do affirm, that the fore-mentioned arguments of theirs do evince, that there is some other substance besides body, which therefore, according to the principles of these Atheists themselves, must be acknowledged to be unextended, it being concluded by them, that whatsoever is extended is body. But whether they do also abolutely prove, that there is, θεῖα ἄμετα, ἄνάσα, ἀνωτέρως, and ἀνάμετρον, a substance devoid of magnitude, indif- fect, without parts, and indivisible; this we shall leave others to make a judgment of. However, it is certain, that Atheists, who maintain the contrary, must needs assert, that every thought, and whatsoever belongeth to soul, mind, (as knowledge, virtue, &c.) is not only mentally and mathematically divisible, so that there may be half, a third part, or a quarter of a thought, and the rest supposed; but also physically separable, or discernible, together with the soul, wherein it is. They must also deny that
that there is any internal energy at all, or any other action besides that outside superficial action of local motion, and consequently make all cogitation nothing but local motion or translation. And lastly, they must maintain, that no substance can co-exist with any other substance (as soul with body) otherwise than by juxta-position only, and by possessing the pores, or filling up the intervals thereof, as a net with the water.

And this is the first answer to the forementioned atheistic argument against incorporeal substance; That though whatsoever is extended be body, yet every thing is not extended; but that life, or mind and cogitation, are an unextended, indistant and indivisible nature. But, as we have already intimated, there are other learned asserters of incorporeal substance, who, left God and spirits, being thus made unextended, should quite vanish into nothing, answer that atheistic argumentation after a different manner, by granting to thefe Atheists that proposition, that whatsoever is, is extended; and what is unextended, is nothing; but then denying that other of theirs, that whatsoever is extended, is body; they asserting another extension, specifically differing from that of bodies: for, whereas corporeal extension is not only impenetrable, so as that no one part thereof can enter into another, but also both mentally and really divisible, one part being in its nature separable from another; they affirm, that there is another incorporeal extension, which is both penetrable, and also indiscernible, so that no one part thereof can possibly be separated from another, or the whole; and that to such an incorporeal extension as this belongeth life, cogitation, and understanding, the Deity having such an infinite extension, but all created spirits a finite and limited one, which also is in them supposed to be contractible and dilatable. Now it is not our part here to oppose Theists, but Atheists: wherefore we shall leave these two sorts of Incorporeallists to dispute it out friendly amongst themselves; and indeed therefore with the more moderation, equanimity, and toleration of different mutually, because it seemeth, that some are in a manner fatally inclined to think one way in this controversy, and some another. And whatever the truth of the case be, it must be acknowledged, that this latter hypothesis may be very useful and serviceable to retain some in theism, who can by no means admit of a Deity, or any thing else, unextended; though, perhaps, there will not be wanting others also, who would go in a middle way betwixt these two, or compound them together, by supposing the Deity to be indeed altogether unextended, and all of it everywhere; but finite incorporeals, or created spirits, to have an unextended inside, a life or mind, diffusing itself into a certain amplitude of outward extension, whereby they are determined to a place, yet so as to be all in every part thereof; which outward extension is therefore not to be accounted body, because penetrable, contractible, and dilatable, and because no one part thereof is separable from the rest, by the rushing or incursion of any corporeal thing upon them. And thus is the Atheists argument against incorporeal substance answered two manner of
ways; first, That there is something unextended; and, secondly, That if there were none, yet must there be necessity be a substance otherwise extended than body is, so as to be neither antitypous nor discernible. And ourselves would not be understood here dogmatically to assert any thing in this point, save only what all Incorporealists do agree in, to wit, that besides body, which is impenetrably and divibly extended, there is in nature another substance, that is both penetrable of body and indiscernible, or which doth not consist of parts separable from one another. And that there is at least such a substance as this, is unquestionably manifest from what hath been already declared.

But the Atheist will, in the next place, give an account of the original of this error (as he calls it) of incorporeal substance, and undertake to shew from what mistake it proceeded, which is yet another pretended confusion thereof; namely, that it sprung partly from the abuse of abstract names and notions, men making substances of them; and partly from the scholasticke effences, distinct from the things themselves, and said to be eternal. From both which delusions and dotages together the Atheists conceive, that men have been first of all much confirmed in the belief of ghosts and spirits, daemons and devils, invisible beings called by several names. Which belief had also another original, men’s mistaking their own phancies for realities. The chief of all which affrightful ghosts and spectres, according to these Atheists, is the Deity, the Oberon, or prince of fairies and phancies. But then, whereas men, by their natural reason, could not conceive otherwise of these ghosts and spirits, than that they were a kind of thin, aerial bodies, their understandings have been so enchanted by these abstract names (which are indeed the names of nothing) and those separate essences and quiddities of scholastics, as that they have made incorporeal substances of them; the atheistic conclusion is, that they, who assert an incorporeal Deity, do really but make a scholasticke separate essence, or the mere abstract notion of an accident, a substantial thing, and a ghost or spirit presiding over the whole world.

To which our reply in general first of all is, That all this is nothing but idle romantick fiction; the belief of a Deity, and substance incorporeal, standing upon none of those imaginary foundations. And then, as for that impudent atheisticke pretence, that the Deity is nothing but a figment or creature of men’s fear and imagination, and therefore the prince of fairies and phancies; this hath been already sufficiently confuted in our answer to the first atheisticke argumentation, where we have also over and above shewed, that there is not only a natural prolepsis or anticipation of a God in the minds of men, but also that the belief thereof is supported by the strongest and most substantial reason, his existence being indeed demonstrable, with mathematical evidence, to such as are capable, and not blinded with prejudice, nor enchanted by the witchcraft of vice and wickedness, to the debauching of their understandings. It hath been also shewed, that the opinion of other ghosts and spirits, besides the Deity, sprung not merely
merely from fear and phancy neither, as children’s bugbears, but from real phænomena; true sensible apparitions, with the histories of them in all ages, without which the belief of such things could never have held up so generally and constantly in the world. As likewise, that there is no repugnancy at all to reason, but that there may be as well aerial and ethereal, as there are terrestrial animals; and that the dull and earthy stupidity of men’s minds is the only thing, which makes them so prone to think, that there is no understanding nature superior to mankind, but that in the world all is dead about us; and to disbelieve the existence of any thing, which themselves cannot either see or feel. Assuredly, the Deity is no phancy, but the greatest reality in the world, and that, without which there could be nothing at all real, it being the only necessary existent; and consequently atheism is either mere folly, or else a strange kind of irreligious fanaticism.

We now further add, that the belief of ghosts and spirits incorporeal, and consequently of an incorporeal Deity, sprung neither from any ridiculous mistake of the abstract names and notions of mere accidents for substances, nor from the scholastick essences, said to be eternal. For, as for the latter, none of those scholasticists ever dream’d, that there was any universal man, or universal horse, existing alone by itself, and separate from all singulars; nor that the abstract metaphysical essences of men, after they were dead, subsisting by themselves, did walk up and down amongst graves, in airy bodies: it being absolutely impossible, that the real essence of any thing should be separable from the thing itself, or eternal, when that is not so. And were the essences of all things look’d upon by these scholasticists as substances incorporeal, then must they have made all things (even body itself) to be ghosts, and spirits, and incorporeal; and accidents also (they having their essences too) to be substantial. But in very truth, these scholastick essences, said to be eternal, are nothing but the intelligible essences of things, or their natures as conceivable, and objects of the mind. And in this sense, it is an acknowledged truth, that the essences of things, (as for example, of a sphere or triangle) are eternal, and such as were never made; because there could not otherwise be eternal verities concerning them. So that the true meaning of these eternal essences is indeed no other than this, that knowledge is eternal; or that there is an eternal mind, that comprehendeth the intelligible natures and ideas of all things, whether actually existing, or possible only, their necessary relations to one another, and all the immutable verities belonging to them. Wherefore, though these eternal essences themselves be no ghosts nor spirits, nor substances incorporeal, they being nothing but objective entities of the mind, or Noemata, and ideas; yet does it plainly follow from the necessary supposition of them, (as was before declared) that there is one eternal unmade Mind, and perfect incorporeal Deity, a real and substantial Ghost or Spirit, which comprehending itself, and all the extent of its own power, the possibility of things, and their intelligible natures, together with an exemplar or platform of the whole world, produced the same accordingly.

But
But our atheiftick argumentator yet further urges, that those scholaficks and metaphyficians, who, becaufe life or cogitation can be confeidered al- lone abftractly, without the confeideration of body, therefore conclude it not to be the accident or action of a body, but a fubftance by itself, (and which also, after men are dead, can walk amongst the graves) that thefe (I fay) do fo far abuse thofe abftracft names and notions of mere accidents, as plainly to make fubftances incorporeal of them. To which therefore we reply also, that were the abftracft notions of accidents in general made incorporeal fubftances, by thofe philofophers aimed at, then muft they have fuppoled all the qualities or affections of bodies, fuch as whitenefs and blacknefs, heat and cold, and the like, to have been fubftances incorporeal alfo; a thing yet never heard, or thought of. But the cafe is far otherwife as to confeious life or cogitation, though it be an abftracft alfo; becaufe this is no accident of body, as the Atheift (ferving his own hypofthesis) fecurely takes it for granted, nor indeed of any thing elfe, but an effential attribute of another fubftance, diftinct from body, (or incorporeal;) after the fame manner, as extension or magnitude is the effential attribute of body, and not a mere accident.

And now having fo copiously confuted all the moft confeiderable atheiftick grounds, we are neceffitated to difpatch thofe that follow, being of leffer moment, with all poifible brevity and compendiousnefs. The four next, which are the fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth atheiftick argumentations, pretend to no more than only this, to difprove a corporeal Deity; or from the fuppoftion, that there is no other fubftance in the world besides body, to infer the impoftibility of a God; that is, of an eternal unmade Mind, the maker and governour of the whole world; all which therefore signify nothing at all to the affertors of a Deity incorporeal, who are the only genuine Theifts. Nevertheless, though none but Stoicks, and fuch other Corporealifts, as are notwithstanding Theifts, be directly concerned in an answer to them, yet fhall we, firft, fo far confider the principles of the atheiftick corporealfm, contained in thofe two heads, the fifth and sixth, as from the abfolute impoftibility of these hypofhes to demonftrate a neceffity of incorporeal fubftance, from whence a Deity will alfo follow.

Here, therefore, are there two atheiftick hypofhes, founded upon the fuppoftion, that all is body: the firft, in the way of qualities, generable and corruptible, which we call the Hylopathian; the fecond, in the way of unqualified atoms, which is the Atomick, Corporealm, and Atheiftm. The former of thefe was the moft ancient, and the firft fciography, or rude delineation of atheiftm. For Aristotle 1 tells us, that the moft ancient Atheifts were thofe, who fuppoled matter or body, that is, bulky extension, to be the only fubftance, and unmade thing, that, out of which all things

things were made, and into which all things are again resolved; whatsoever is else in the world being nothing but the passions, qualities, and accidents thereof, generable and corruptible, or producible out of nothing, and reducible to nothing again. From whence the necessary consequence is, That there is no eternal unmade life or understanding, or that mind is no god, or principle in the universe, but essentially a creature.

And this Hylopolitan atheism, which supposeth whatsoever is in the universe to be either the substance of matter and bulk, or else the qualities and accidents thereof, generable and corruptible, hath been called also by us Anaximandrian. Though we deny not, but that there might be formerly some difference amongst the Atheists of this kind; nor are we ignorant, that Simplicius and others conceive Anaximander to have asserted, besides matter, qualities also eternal and unmade, or an homeomery, and similar atomology, just in the same manner as Anaxagoras afterwards did, have only that he would not acknowledge any unmade mind or life; Anaximander supposing all life and understanding whatsoever, all soul and mind, to have risen up, and been generated from a fortuitous commixture of those similar atoms, or the qualities of heat and cold, moist and dry, and the like, tempered together. And we confess, that there is some probability for this opinion. Notwithstanding which, because there is no absolute certainty thereof, and because all these ancient Atheists agreed in this, that life and understanding are either first and primary, or else secondary qualities of body, generable and corruptible; therefore did we not think it fit to multiply forms of Atheism, but rather to make but one kind of Atheism of all this, calling it indifferently, Hylopolitan, or Anaximandrian.

The second atheistical hypothesis is that form of atheism described under the sixth head, which likewise supposing body to be the only substance; and the principle thereof devoid of life and understanding, does reject all real qualities, according to the vulgar notion of them, and generate all things whatsoever, besides matter, merely from the combinations of magnitudes, figures, sites, and motions, or the contexts of unqualified atoms, life and understanding not excepted: which therefore, according to them, being no simple primitive and primordial thing, but secondary, compounded, and derivative, the mere creature of matter and motion, could not possibly be a God or first principle in the universe. This is that atomick atheism called Democritical; Leucippus and Democritus being the first founders thereof. For though there was, before them, another atomology, which made unqualified atoms the principles of all bodies, it supposing, besides body, substance incorporeal; yet were these, as Laertius declares, the first, that ever made, ἄξοι τοῦ θάνου ἄτομα, senseless atoms, the principles of all things whatsoever, even of life and understanding, soul and mind.

Indeed it cannot be denied, but that from these two things granted, that all is body, and that the principles of body are devoid of all life and

1 Lib. IX. Segm. 44. p. 573.
understanding, it will follow unavoidably, that there can be no corporeal Deity. Wherefore the Stoicks, who professed to acknowledge no other substance besides body, and yet nevertheless had a strong persuasion of the existence of a God, or an eternal unmade Mind, the Maker of the whole world, denied that other proposition of the atheistic Corporealists, that the principles of all bodies were devoid of life and understanding, they asserting an intellectual fire, eternal and unmade, the Maker of the whole mundane system; which postulatum, of a living intellectual body eternal, were it granted to the Stoicks, yet could not this their corporeal god, notwithstanding, be absolutely incorruptible, as Origen often inculcated: 

"Atheists, who say: 'The Stoicks is a body, and therefore mutable, alterable, and changeable; and he would indeed be perfectly corruptible, were there any other body to act upon him. Wherefore he is only happy in this, that he wants a corruptor or destroyer.' And thus much was therefore rightly urged by the atheistic argumentator, that no corporeal Deity could be absolutely in its own nature incorruptible, nor otherwise than by accident only immortal, because of its divisibility. For were there any other matter without this world, to make inroads and incursions upon it, or to disseminate the parts thereof, the life and unity of the Stoical corporeal God must needs be scattered and destroyed. And therefore of this Stoical god does the same Origen thus further write: 'The God of the Stoicks being a body, hath sometimes the whole for its begemnonick in the conflagration; and sometimes only a part of the mundane matter. For these men were not able to reach to a clear notion of the Deity, as a being every way incorruptible, simple, uncompounded, and indivisible. Notwithstanding which, these Stoicks were not therefore to be ranked amongst the Atheists, but far to be preferred before them, and accounted only a kind of imperfect Theists."

But we shall now make it evident, that in both these atheistick corporealisms, (agreeing in those two things, that body is the only substance, and that the principles of body are not vital) there is an absolute impossibility; not only because, as Aristotle 1 objected, they supposed no active principle; but also because their bringing of life and understanding (being real entities) out of dead and senseless matter is also the bringing of something out of nothing. And indeed the atomick Atheist is here of the two rather the more absurd and unreasonable, forasmuch as he, discarding all real qualities, and that for this very reason, because nothing can come out of nothing, doth himself notwithstanding, produce life, sense, and understanding (unquestionable realities) out of mere magnitudes, figures, sizes, and motions, that is, indeed out of nothing. Wherefore there being an absolute impossibility of both these atheistick hypotheses, (neither of which is able to solve the phænomenon

nomenon of life and understanding) from that confessed principle of theirs, that matter, as such, hath no life nor understanding belonging to it, it follows unavoidably, that there must be some other substance besides body or matter, which is essentially vital and intellectual: Ό η λεγε λοι ἔσοσμεν, because all things cannot possibly have a peregrine, adventitious and borrowed life, but something in the universe must needs have life naturally and originally. All life cannot be merely accidental, generable and corruptible, producible out of nothing, and reducible to nothing again, but there must of necessity be some substantial life, which point (that all life is not a mere accident, but that there is life substantial) hath been of late, with much reason and judgment, insisted upon, and urged by the writer of the life of nature. Neither must there be only such a substantial life, as is naturally immortal for the future, but also such as is eternal, and was never made; all other lives and minds whatsoever, (none of which could possibly be generated out of matter) being derived from this eternal unmade fountain of life and understanding.

Which thing the hylozoick Atheists being well aware of, namely, that there must of necessity be both substantial and eternal unmade life, but supposing also matter to be the only substance, thought themselves necessitated to attribute to all matter as such, life and understanding, though not animalish and conscious, but natural only; they conceiving, that, from the modification thereof alone by organization, all other animalish life, not only the sensitive in brutes, but also the rational in men, was derived. But this hylozoick atheism, thus bringing all conscious and reflexive life or animality, out of a supposed senseless, stupid, and insensible life of nature in matter, and that meerly from a different accidental modification thereof, or contexture of parts, does again plainly bring something out of nothing, which is an absolute impossibility. Moreover, this hylozoick atheism was long since, and in the first emersion thereof, solidly confuted by the atomick Atheists, after this manner: If matter, as such, had life, perception, and understanding belonging to it, then of necessity must every atom, or smallest particle thereof be a distinct percipient by itself; from whence it will follow, that there could not possibly be any such men and animals as now are, compounded out of them, but every man and animal would be a heap of innumerable percipients, and have innumerable perceptions and intellects; whereas it is plain, that there is but one life and understanding, one soul or mind, one percceiver or thinker in every one. And to say, that these innumerable particles of matter do all confederate together; that is, to make every man and animal to be a multitude or commonwealth of percipients, and persons, as it were, clubbing together, is a thing so absurd and ridiculous, that one would wonder the hylozoists should not rather choose to reject that their fundamental error of the life of matter, than endeavour to seek shelter and sanctuary for the same, under such a pretence. For though voluntary agents and persons may many of them resign up their wills to one, and by that means have all but as it were one artificial will, yet can
they not possibly resign up their sense and understanding too; so as to have all but one artificial life, sense, and understanding; much less could this be done by senseless atoms, or particles of matter supposed to be void of all consciousness or animality. Besides which, there have been other arguments already suggested, which do sufficiently evince, that sense and understanding cannot possibly belong to matter in any way, either originally or secondarily, to which more may be added elsewhere.

And now from these two things, that life and understanding do not essentially belong to matter as such, and that they cannot be generated out of dead and senseless matter, it is demonstratively certain, that there must be some other substance, besides body or matter. However, the Anaximandrian and Democritick Atheists taking it for granted, that the first principles of body are devoid of all life and understanding, must either acknowledge a necessity of some other substance besides body, or else deny the truth of that axiom, so much made use of by themselves, That nothing can come out of nothing. And this was our second undertaking, to shew, that from the very principles of the atheistic corporealism, represented in the fifth and sixth heads, incorporeal substance is against those Atheists themselves demonstrable.

Our third and last was this, That there being undeniably substance incorporeal, the two next following atheistic argumentations, built upon the contrary supposition, are therefore altogether insignificant also, and do no execution at all. The first of which (being the seventh) impugning only such a soul of the world, as is generated out of matter, is not properly directed against theism neither, but only such a form of atheism (sometimes before mentioned) as indeed cometh nearest to theism. Which, though concluding all things to have sprung originally from senseless matter, Night and Chaos; yet supposes things from thence to have ascended gradually to higher and higher perfection; first, inanimate bodies, as the elements, then birds and other brute animals (according to the fore-mentioned Aristophanick tradition, with which agreeeth this of Lucretius,

Principio genus alituum, varieque volucres;)

afterward men, and in the last place gods; and that not only the animated stars, but Jupiter, or a soul of the world, generated also out of Night and Chaos, as well as all other things. We grant indeed, that the true and real Theists amongst the ancient Pagans also held the world's animation, and whoever denied the same, were therefore accounted absolute Atheists. But the world's animation, in a larger sense, signifies no more than this, that all things are not dead about us, but that there is a living sentient and understanding nature eternal, that first framed the world, and still presideth over it; and it is certain, that in this sense all Theists whatsoever must hold the world's animation. But the generality of Pagan Theists held the world's

Lib. V. Ver. 797.
world's animation also in a stricter sense: as if the world were truly and properly an animal, and therefore a god, compleated and made up of soul and body together, as other animals are. Which soul of this great world-animal was to some of them the highest or supreme Deity, but to others only a secondary god, they supposing an abstract mind superiour to it. But God's being the soul of the world in this latter Paganick sense, and the world's being an animal or a god, are things absolutely disclaimed and renounced by us. However, this seventh atheiftick argument is not directed against the soul of the world in the sense of the Paganick Theifts neither, (this being, as they think, already confuted,) but in the sense of the atheiftick Theogonists; not an eternal unmade soul or mind, but a native or generated one only, such as refulted from the disposition of matter, and contexture of atoms, the off-spring of night and chaos: the Atheifts here pretending, after their confutation of the true and genuine theism, to take away all shadows thereof also, and so to free men from all manner of fear of being obnoxious to any understanding being, superiour to themselves. Wherefore we might here omit the confutation of this argument, without any detriment at all to the cause of theism: nevertheless, because this in general is an atheiftick afferotion, that there is no life and understanding prefiding over the whole world, we shall briefly examine the supped grounds thereof, which alone will be a sufficient confutation of it. The firft of them therefore is this, that there is no other substance in the world besides body; the second, that the principles of bodies are devoid of all life and understanding; and the last, that life and understanding are but accidents of bodies refulting from such a composition or contexture of atoms, as produceth soft flesh, blood, and brains, in bodies organized, and of human form. From all which the conclusion is, that there can be no life and understanding in the whole, because it is not of human form, and organized, and hath no blood and brains. But neither is body the only substance, nor are life and understanding accidents refulting from any modification of dead and lifeless matter; nor is blood or brains that, which understandeth in us, but an incorporeal soul or mind, vitally united to a terrestrial organized body; which will then understand with far greater advantage, when it comes to be clothed with a pure, spiritual, and heavenly one. But there is in the univerfe also a higher kind of intellectual animals, which, though consisting of soul and body likewise, yet have neither flesh, nor blood, nor brains, nor parts so organized as ours are. And the most perfect mind and intellect of all is not the soul of any body, but complete in itself, without such vital union and sympathy with matter. We conclude therefore, that this paffage of a modern writer, *We worms, cannot conceive, how God can understand without brains, is vox pecudis, the language and philosophy rather of worms or brute animals, than of men.

The next, which is the eighth atheiftick argument, is briefly this; that whereas the Deity by Theifts is generally supposed to be a living Being perfectly happy, and immortal or incorruptible; there can be no such living

* Hobbes.
being immortal, and consequently none perfectly happy. Because all living beings whatsoever are concretions of atoms, which as they were at first generated, so are they again liable to death and corruption; life being no simple primitive nature, nor substantial thing, but a mere accidental modification of compounded bodies only, which upon the disunion of their parts, or the disordering of their contexture, vanisheth again into nothing. And there being no life immortal, happiness must needs be a mere insignificant word, and but a romantic fiction. Where first, this is well, that the Atheists will confess, that according to their principles, there can be no such thing at all as happiness, because no security of future permanency; all life perpetually coming out of nothing, and whirling back into nothing again. But this atheistic argument is likewise founded upon the former error, that body is the only substance, the first principles whereof are void of all life and understanding; whereas it is certain, that life cannot possibly result from any composition of dead and lifeless things; and therefore must needs be a simple and primitive nature. It is true indeed, that the participated life in the bodies of animals (which yet is but improperly called life, it being nothing but their being actuated by a living soul) is a mere accidental thing, generable and corruptible; since that body, which is now vitally united to a living soul, may be disunited again from it, and thereby become a dead and lifeless carcasse; but the primary or original life itself is substantial, nor can there be any dead carcasse of a human soul. That which hath life essentially belonging to the substance of it, must needs be naturally immortal, because no substance can of itself perish, or vanish into nothing. Besides which, there must be also some, not only substantial, but also eternal unmade Life, whose existence is necessary, and which is absolutely unannihilable by any thing else; which therefore must needs have perfect security of its own future happiness; and this is an incorporeal Deity. And this is a brief confutation of the eighth atheistic argument.

But the Democritick Atheist proceeds, endeavouring further to disprove a God from the phenomena of motion and cogitation, in the three following argumentations. First therefore, whereas Theists commonly bring an argument from motion, to prove a God, or first unmoved Mover, the Atheists contend, on the contrary, that, from the very nature of motion, the impossibility of any such first unmoved Mover is clearly demonstrable. For, it being an axiom of undoubted truth concerning motion, that whatsoever is moved, is moved by some other thing; or, that nothing can move itself; it follows from thence unavoidably, that there is no \textit{aeternum Immobile}, no \textit{eternal unmoved Mover}; but on the contrary, that there was \textit{aeternum Motum}, an eternal \textit{Moved}; or, that one thing was moved by another, from eternity infinitely, without any first mover or cause, because,
as nothing could move itself, so could nothing ever move another, but what was itself before moved by something else.

To which we reply, That this axiom, whatsoever is moved, is moved by another, and not by itself, was, by Aristotle, and those other philosophers, who made so much use thereof, restrained to the local motion of bodies only; that no body locally moved, was ever moved originally from itself, but from something else. Now it will not at all follow from hence, that therefore nihil movetur nisi à moto, that no body was ever moved, but by some other body, that was also before moved by something else; or, that of necessity one body was moved by another body, and that by another, and so backwards, infinitely, without any first unmoved or self-moving and self-active mover, as the Democritick Atheist fondly conceits; for the motion of bodies might proceed (as unquestionably it did) from something else, which is not body, and was not before moved. Moreover, the Democritick Atheist here also, without any ground, imagines, that were there but one push once given to the world, and no more, this motion would from thence forward always continue in it, one body still moving another to all eternity. For though this be indeed a part of the Cartesian hypothesis, that, according to the laws of nature, a body moving, will as well continue in motion, as a body resting in rest, until that motion be communicated and transferred to some other body; yet is the case different here, where it is supposed, not only one push to have been given to the world at first, but also the same quantity of motion or agitation to be constantly conferred and maintained. But to let this pass, because it is something a subtle point, and not so rightly understood by many of the Cartesians themselves, we say, that it is a thing utterly impossible, that one body should be moved by another infinitely, without any first cause or mover, which was self-active, and that not from the authority of Aristotle only, pronouncing ὅτε δυνάτων οὐδὲν οὐκ ἑξίπτερ τῆς κινήσεως ἱώνι εἰς ἑαυτὸν, &c. That in the causes of motion, there could not possibly be an infinite progress; but from the reason there subjoined by Aristotle, because, ὅπως μόνην Ἰτι το πτωτον, ὅλος αὐτον ἑδίων ἔστι, If there were no first unmoved mover, there could be no cause of motion at all. For were all the motion, that is in the world, a passion from something else, and no first unmoved active mover, then must it be a passion from no agent, or without an action, and consequently proceed from nothing, and either cause itself, or be made without a cause. Now the ground of the Atheist's error here is only from hence, because he taketh it for granted, that there is no other substance besides body, nor any other action but local motion; from whence it comes to pass, that, to him, this proposition, No body can move itself, is one and the same with this, Nothing can arise from itself, or be self-active.

And thus is the atheisticke pretended demonstration against a God, or first cause, from motion, abundantly confuted; we having made it manifest, that there is no consequence at all in this argument, that because no body can move

move itself, therefore there can be no first unmoved mover; as also having discovered the ground of the Atheifl's error here, their taking it for granted, that there is nothing but body; and lastly, having plainly shewed, that it implies a contradiction there should be action and motion in the world, and yet nothing self-moving or self-active: so that it is demonstratively certain from motion, that there is a first cause, or unmoved mover. We shall now further add, that from the principle acknowledged by the Democritick Atheifts themselves, That no body can move itself, it follows also undeniably, that there is some other substance besides body, something incorporeal, which is self-moving and self-active, and was the first unmoved mover of the heavens or world. For if no body from eternity was ever able to move itself, and yet there must of necessity be some active cause of that motion, which is in the world, (since it could not cause itself) then is there unquestionably some other substance besides body, which having a power of moving matter, was the first cause of motion, itself being unmoved.

Moreover, it is certain from hence also, that there is another species of action, distinct from local motion, and such as is not heterokinésy, but autokinésy, or self-activity. For since the local motion of body is essentially heterokinésy, not caused by the substance itself moving, but by something else acting upon it, that action, by which local motion is first caused, cannot be itself local motion, but must be autokinésy, or self-activity, that which is not a passion from any other agent, but springs from the immediate agent itself, which species of action is called cogitation. All the local motion, that is in the world, was first caused by some cogitative or thinking being, which not acted upon by any thing without it, nor at all locally moved, but only mentally, is the immovable mover of the heaven, or vortices. So that cogitation is, in order of nature, before local motion, and incorporeal before corporeal substance, the former having a natural imperium upon the latter. And now have we not only confuted the ninth atheiftick argument from motion, but also demonstrated against the Democritick Atheifts from their own principle, that there is an incorporeal and cogitative substance, the first immovable mover of the heavens, and vortices; that is, an incorporeal Deity.

But the Democritick Atheift will yet make a further attempt to prove, that there can be nothing self-moving or self-active, and that no thinking being could be a first cause; he laying his foundation in this principle, that nothing taketh its beginning from itself, but from the action of some other agent without it. From whence he would infer, that cogitation itself is heterokinésy, the passion of the thinker, and the action of something without it, no cogitation ever raising up of itself without a cause; and that cogitation is indeed nothing but local motion or mechanism, and all living understanding beings machines, moved from without; and then make this conclusion, that therefore no understanding being could possibly be a first cause: he further adding also, that no understanding being
Chap. V. Something Self-active.

Being as such, can be perfectly happy neither, as the Deity is supposed to be, because dependent upon something without it; and this is the tenth atheistic argumentation.

Where we shall first consider that, which the Democritick Atheist makes his fundamental principle, or common notion to disprove all autokinely or self-activity by, that Nothing taketh beginning from itself, but from the action of some other thing without it. Which axiom, if it be understood of substantial things, then is it indeed acknowledged by us to be unquestionably true, it being the same with this, That no substance, which once was not, could ever possibly cause itself, or bring itself into being; but must take its beginning from the action of something else: but then it will make nothing at all against theism. As it is likewise true, that no action whatsoever, (and therefore no cogitation) taketh beginning from itself, or causeth itself to be, but is always produced by some substantial agent; but this will no way advantage the Atheist neither. Wherefore, if he would direct his force against theism, he ought to understand this proposition thus, that no action whatsoever taketh beginning from the immediate agent; (which is the subject of it) but from the action of some other thing without it; or, that nothing can move or act otherwise, than as it is moved and acted upon by something else. But this is only to beg the question, or to prove the thing in dispute, identically, that nothing is self-active, because nothing can act from itself. Whereas it is in the mean time undeniably certain, that there could not possibly be any motion or action at all in the universe, were there not something self-moving or self-active, for as much as otherwise all that motion or action would be a passion from nothing, and be made without a cause.

And whereas the Atheists would further prove, that no cogitation taketh its beginning from the thinker, but always from the action of some other thing without it, after this manner; because it is not conceivable, why this cogitation, rather than that, should start up at any time, were there not some cause for it, without the thinker: here, in the first place, we freely grant, that our human cogitations are indeed commonly occasioned by the incursions of sensible objects upon us; as also, that the concatenations of those thoughts and phantasms in us, which are distinguished from sensations, (whether we be asleep or awake) do many times depend upon corporeal and mechanical causes in the brain. Notwithstanding which, that all our cogitations are obtruded and imposed upon us from without; and that there is no transition in our thoughts at any time, but such as had been before in sensae; (which the Democritick Atheist avers) this is a thing which we absolutely deny. For, had we no mastery at all over our thoughts, but they were all like tennis-balls, bandied, and struck upon us, as it were, by rackets from without; then could we not steadily and constantly carry on any designs and purposes of life. But on the contrary, that of Aristotle* is most true, (as will be elsewhere further proved) that man, and all rational beings, are

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in some sense, ἀρχὴ πράξεως, a principle of actions, subordinate to the Deity; which they could not possibly be, were they not also a principle of cogitations, and had some command over them; but these were all as much determined by causes without, as the motions of the weathercock are. The rational soul is itself an active and bubbling fountain of thoughts; that perpetual and restless desire, which is as natural and essential to us, as our very life, continually raising up and protruding new and new ones in us; which are as it were offered to us. Besides which, we have also a further self-recollective power, and a power of determining andfixing our mind and intention upon some certain objects, and of ranging our thoughts accordingly. But the Atheist is here also to be taught yet a further lesson, that an absolutely perfect mind, (such as the Deity is supposed to be,) doth not (as Aristotle writeth of it) ὅτε μὴν νοεῖ ὅτε ὁ δὲ νοεῖ, sometimes understand, and sometime not understand: it being ignorant of nothing, nor fyllogizing about any thing but comprehending all intelligibles with their relations and verities at once within itself; and its essence and energy being the same. Which notion, if it be above the dull capacity of Atheists, who measure all perfection by their own scantling, this is a thing, that we cannot help.

But as for that prodigious paradox of Atheists, that cogitation itself is nothing but local motion or mechanism, we could not have thought it possible, that ever any man should have given entertainment to such a conceit, but that this was rather a meer flander raised upon Atheists; were it not certain from the records of antiquity, that whereas the old religious atomists did, upon good reason, reduce all corporeal action (as generation, augmentation, and alteration) to local motion, or translation from place to place; (there being no other motion besides this conceivable in bodies) the ancient Atheizers of that philosophy (Leucippus and Democritus) not contented herewith, did really carry the business still on further, so as to make cogitation itself also nothing but local motion. As it is also certain, that a modern atheistical pretender to wit hath publickly owned this same conclusion, that mind is nothing else but local motion in the organick parts of man's body. These men have been sometimes indeed a little troubled with the phancy, apparition, or seeming of cogitation that is, the consciousnes of it, as knowing not well what to make thereof; but then they put it off again, and satisfy themselves worshipfully with this, that phancy is but phancy, but the reality of cogitation nothing but local motion; as if there were not as much reality in phancy and consciousnes, as there is in local motion. That, which inclined these men so much to this opinion, was only because they were sensible and aware of this, that if there were any other action, besides local motion admitted, there must needs be some other substance acknowledged, besides body. Cartesius indeed undertook to defend brute animals to be nothing else but machines; but then he supposed that there was nothing at all of cogitation in them, and consequently nothing of true animality or life, no more than is in an artificial automaton, as a wooden eagle, or the like: nevertheless, this was justly thought to be paradox enough. But that cogitation itself should be local motion, and men
chap. v. that cogitation, local motion.

men nothing but machines; this is such a paradox, as none but either a stupid and belotted, or else an enthusiastick, bigotical, or fanick Atheift, could possibly give entertainment to. Nor are such men as these fit to be disputed with any more than a machine is.

But whereas the Atheiftick objector adds also, over and above, in the last place, that no understanding Being can be perfectly happy neither, and therefore not a God, because essentially dependent upon something else without it; this is all one, as if he should say, that there is no such thing as happiness at all in nature; because it is certain, that without consciousness or understanding nothing can be happy, (since it could not have any fruition of itself) and if no understanding Being can be happy neither, then must the conclusion needs be that of the Cyrenaicks, that ἡ τύχη ἀναφαίρεται, happiness is a meer chimer, a phantastic notion or fiction of men's minds; a thing, which hath no existence in nature. These are the men, who afterwards argue from interest also against a God and religion; notwithstanding that they confess their own principles to be so far from promising happiness to any, as that they absolutely cut off all hopes thereof. It may be further observed also in the last place, that there is another of the Atheists dark mysteries here likewise couched, that there is no scale or ladder of entity and perfection in nature, one above another; the whole universe, from top to bottom, being nothing but one and the same senseless matter, diversely modified. As also that understanding, as such, rather speaks imperfection; it being but a meer whistling, evanid, and phantastic thing; so that the most absolutely perfect of all things in the universe is grave, solid, and substantial senseless matter: of which more afterwards. And thus is the tenth atheistic argument also confuted.

But the Democritick and Epicurean Atheists will make yet a further assault from the nature of knowledge, understanding, after this manner; if the world were made by a God, or an antecedent mind and understanding, having in itself an exemplar or platform thereof, before it was made, then must there be actual knowledge both in order of nature and time, before things; whereas things, which are the objects of knowledge and understanding, are unquestionably in order of nature before knowledge; this being but the signature of them, and a passion from them. Now, the only things are singular sensible or bodies. From whence it follows, that mind is the youngest and most creaturely thing in the world; or that the world was before knowledge, and the conception of any mind; and no knowledge or mind before the world as its cause. Which is the eleventh atheistic argument.

But we have prevented ourselves here in the answer to this argument, (which would make all knowledge, mind, and understanding junior to the world, and the very creature of sensibles,) having already fully confuted it; and clearly proved, that singular bodies are not the only things, and objects of the mind, but that it containeth its immediate intelligibles

5 Q. 2
intelligibles within itself; which intelligibles also are eternal, and that mind
is no phantastick image of sensibles, nor the stamp and signature of them,
but archetypal to them; the first mind being that of a perfect being, com-
prehending itself, and the extent of its own omnipotence, or the possibili-
ties of all things. So that knowledge is older than all sensible things:
mind senior to the world, and the architect thereof. Wherefore we shall
refer the reader for an answer to this argument, to page 729. and so
onwards, where the existence of a God, (that is, a mind before the world)
is demonstrated also from this very topick, viz. the nature of knowledge
and understanding.

We shall in this place only add; that as the Atheists can no way solve
the phænomenon of motion, so can they much les that of cogitation, or
life and understanding. To make which yet the more evident, we shall
briefly represent a syllabus or catalogue of the many atheistick halluci-
nations or delirations concerning it. As first, that senselss matter being
the only substance, and all things else but accidental modifications thereof;
life and mind is all a meer accidental thing, generable and corruptible, pro-
ducible out of nothing, and reducible to nothing again; and that there is
no substantial life or mind any where. In opposition to which, we have
before proved, that there must of necessity be some substantial life, and
that human souls being lives substantial, and not meer accidental modi-
fications of matter, they are consequently in their own nature immortal, since
no substance of itself ever vanisheth into nothing.

Again, the Democriticks, and other Atheists conclude, that life and mind
are no simple and primitive natures, but secondary and compounded things;
they resulting from certain concretions and contextures of matter, and
either the commixtures and contemptorations of qualities, or else the com-
binations of those simple elements of magnitude, figure, site, and motion;
and so being made up of that, which hath nothing of life or mind in it.
For as flesh is not made out of fleshly particles, nor bone out of bony, (as
Anaxagoras of old dreamed) so may life, as they conceive, be as well
made out of lifeless principles, and mind out of that which hath no mind
or understanding at all in it: just as syllables pronounceable do result from
combinations of letters, some of which are mutes, and cannot by them-
selves be pronounced at all, others but semi-vocal. And from hence do
these Atheists infer, that there could be no eternal unmade life or mind, nor
any that is immortal or incorruptible; since upon the dissolution of that
compages or contexture of matter, from whence they result, they must
needs vanish into nothing. Wherefore according to them, there hath pro-
ably sometime heretofore been no life nor understanding at all in the uni-
verse, and there may possibly be none again. From whence the conclusion
is, that mind and understanding is no God, or principle in the universe; it
being essentially factitious, native, and corruptible; or, as they express it in
Plato's, Spiritus in Spiritum, mortal from mortal things: as also, that the souls of

* De Legibus Lib. X: p. 666.
men cannot subsist separately after death, and walk up and down in airy bodies; no more than the form of a house or tree, after the dissolution thereof, can subsist by itself separately, or appear in some other body. But all this foolishness of Atheists hath been already confuted, we having before shewed, that life and understanding are active powers, vigours, and perfections, that could never possibly result from mere passive bulk, or dead and senseless matter, however modified and compounded; because nothing can come effectively from nothing. Neither is there any consequence at all in this, that because flesh is not made out of fleshy principles, nor bone out of bony, red out of red things, nor green out of green; therefore life and understanding may as well be compounded out of things dead and senseless: because these are no syllables or complexions, as the others are, nor can either the qualities of heat and cold, moist and dry; or else magnitudes, figures, sites, and motions, however combined together, as letters spell them out, and make them up, but they are simple and primitive things. And accordingly it hath been proved, that there must of necessity be some eternal unmade life and mind. For though there be no necessity, that there should be any eternal unmade red, or green, because red and green may be made out of things not red nor green, they, and all other corporeal qualities (so called) being but several contexts of matter, or combinations of magnitudes, figures, sites, and motions, causing these several phancies in us: and though there be no necessity, that there should be eternal motion, because, if there were once no motion at all in matter, but all bodies rested, yet might motion have been produced by a self-moving or self-active principle: and lastly, though there be no necessity, that there should be eternal unmade matter or body neither, because had there been once no body at all, yet might it be made or produced by a perfect omnipotent incorporeal being: nevertheless, is there an absolute necessity, that there should be eternal unmade life, and mind, because were there once no life nor mind at all, these could never have been produced out of matter altogether lifeless and mindless. And though the form of a house cannot possibly exist separately from the matter and substance thereof, it being a mere accidental thing, resulting from such a compages of stone, timber, and mortar, yet are human souls and minds no such accidental forms of compounded matter, but active substantial things, that may therefore subsist separately from these bodies, and enliven other bodies of a different contexture. And however some, that are no Atheists, be over prone to conceive life, sense, cogitation, and consciousness in brutes, to be generated out of dead, senseless, and unthinking matter, (they being disposed thereto by certain mistaken principles, and ill methods of philosophy) nevertheless is this unquestionably in itself a seed of atheism; because if any life, cogitation, and consciousness, may be produced out of dead and senseless matter, then can no philosophy hinder, but that all might have been so.

But the Democritick Atheists will yet venture further to deny, that there is any thing in nature self-moving or self-active, but that whatsoever moveth and
and acteth, was before moved by something else, and made to act thereby; and again, that from some other thing, and so backward infinitely; from whence it would follow, that there is no first in the order of causes, but an endless retro-infinity. But as this is all one, as to affirm, that there is no such thing at all as life in the world, but that the universe is a compages of dead and stupid matter, so has this infinity in the order of causes been already exploded for an absolute impossibility.

Nevertheless, the Atheists will here advance yet an higher paradox; that all action whatever, and therefore cogitation, phancy, and consciousness itself, is really nothing else but local motion; and consequently not only brute-animals, but also men themselves mere machines, which is an equal, either foolishness or impudence, as to affert a triangle to be a square, or a sphere, a cube, number to be figure, or any thing else to be any thing: and it is really all one as to affirm, that there is indeed no such thing in ourselves as cogitation; there being no other action in nature, but local motion and mechanism.

Furthermore, the Democritick and Epicurcan Atheists universally agree in this, that not only sensations, but also all the cogitations of the mind, are the mere passions of the thinker, and the actions of bodies existing without upon him; though they do not all declare themselves after the same manner herein. For first, the Democriticks conclude, that sense is caused by certain grosser corporeal effuvia, streaming from the surfaces of bodies continually, and entering through the nerves; but that all other cogitations of the mind, and men’s either sleeping or waking imaginations, proceed from another sort of simulachra, idols, and images of a more fine and subtile contexture, coming into the brain, not through those open tubes, or channels of the nerves, but immediately through all the smaller pores of the body: so that, as we never have sense of any thing, but by means of those grosser corporeal images, obtruding themselves upon the nerves, so have we not the least cogitation at any time in our mind neither, which was not caused by those finer corporeal images, and exuvius membranes, or effuvia, rushing upon the brain or contexture of the soul. 

Leucippus and Democritus determined, that as well 

Noesis as Alkebesis, mental cogitation as external sensation, was caused by certain corporeal idols, coming from bodies without; since neither sensation nor cogitation could otherwise possibly be produced. And thus does Laertius also represent the sense of these atheistic philosophers, that the effuvia from bodies called idols were the only causes, 

of all the motions, passions, and affections, and even

the very volitions of the soul. So that as we could not have the least sensation, imagination, nor conception of any thing otherwise than from those corporeal effuvia, rushing upon us from bodies without, and begetting the same in us, at such a time; so neither could we have

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2 Laertius does not ascribe this opinion to Leucippus, but only to Democritus, Lib. IX. fegm. 44. p. 575.
Chap. V. and Passion of the Thinker.

have any passion, appetite, or volition, which we were not in like manner corporeally passive to. And this was the ground of the Democritick fate, or necessity of all human actions, maintained by them, in opposition to the τὸ ἐὰν, or liberty of will, which cannot be conceived without self-activity, and something of contingency; they supposing human volitions also, as well as all the other cogitations, to be mechanically caused and necessitated from those effluvium images of bodies coming in upon the willers. And, however Epicurus sometime pretended to assert liberty of will against Democritus, yet, forgetting himself, did he also here securely philosophize after the very same manner;

Nunc age, que moveat animum res, accipe paucis;
Quae veniant veniant in mentem, percipe paucis.
Principio hoc dicere simulachra vagari, &c.

Lucret. L. 4.

p. 358, 360

[ver. 726.]

But others there were amongst the ancient Atomists, who could not conceive sensations themselves to be thus caused by corporeal effuvia, or exuous membranes streaming from bodies continually, and that for divers reasons alleged by them; but only by a pressire from them upon the optic nerve, by reason of a tension of the intermedium air, or ether, (being that, which is called light;) whereby the distant object is touched and felt, ὅπως δὲ βαστάζω, as it were by a staff. Which hypothesis concerning the corporeal part of the sense is indeed much more ingenious, and agreeable to reason, than the former. But the atheizers of this atomology, as they supposed the sense to be nothing else, but such a pressire from bodies without; so did they conclude imagination and mental cogitation to be but the reliques and remainders of those motions of sense formerly made, and conserved afterwards in the brain, (like the tremulous vibrations of a clock or bell, after the striking of the hammer, or the rolling of the waves, after the wind is ceased;) melting, fading, and decaying insensibly by degrees. So that, according to these, knowledge and understanding is nothing but failing and decaying sense, and all our volitions but mechanic motions, caused from the actions, or trunions of bodies upon us. Now, though it be true, that in sensation there is always a passion antecedent, made upon the body of the sentient from without; yet is not sensation itself this very passion, but a perception of that passion: much less can mental conception be said to be the action of bodies without, and the meer passion of the thinker; and least of all volitions such, there being plainly here something ἐὰν ἐὰν, in our own power, (by means whereof we become a principle of actions, accordingly deserving commendation, or blame,) that is, something of self-activity.

Again, according to the Democritick and Epicurean Atheists, all knowledge and understanding is really the same thing with sense; the difference between these two, to some of them, being only this, that what is commonly called sense, is primary and original knowledge, and knowledge but secondary, or fading and decaying sense; but to others, that sense is caused by those more vigorous idols, or effluvia from bodies, intromitted through


Cap. XV. p. 311. Tom. II. Oper, & La-
through the nerves; but understanding and knowledge by those more weak and thin, umbратile and evanid ones, that penetrate the other smaller pores of the body: so that both ways understanding and knowledge will be but a weaker sense. Now from this doctrine of the atheistic Atomists, that all conception and cognition of the mind whatsoever is nothing else but sense and passion from bodies without, this absurdity first of all follows unavoidably; that there cannot possibly be any error, or false judgment, because it is certain, that all passion is true passion, and all sense or seeming, and appearance, true seeming and appearance. Wherefore, though some sense and passion may be more obscure than other, yet can there be none false, itself being the very essence of truth. And thus Protagoras, one of these atheistic Atomists, having first asserted, that knowledge is nothing else but sense, did thereupon admit this as a necessary consequence, that ἡδὲ ἐκ τῆς ἀληθείάς, every opinion is true; because it is nothing but seeming and appearance, and every seeming and appearance is truly such; and because it is not possible for any one to opine that which is not, or to think otherwise than he suffers. Wherefore Epicurus, being sensible of this inconvenience, endeavoured to solve this phenomenon of error and false opinion, or judgment, consistently with his own principles, after this manner; that though all knowledge be sense, and all sense true, yet may error arise notwithstanding, ex animi opinatu, from the opinion of the mind, adding something of its own, over and above, to the passion and phancy of sense. But herein he shamefully contradicts himself; for if the mind, in judging and opining, can superadd anything of its own, over and above to what it suffers, then is it not a mere passive thing, but must needs have a self-active power of its own, and consequently will prove also incorporeal; because no body can act otherwise, than it suffers, or is made to act by something else without it. We conclude therefore, that since there is such a thing as error, or false judgment, all cogitations of the mind cannot be mere passions; but there must be something of self-activity in the soul itself, by means whereof it can give its assent to things not clearly perceived, and so err.

Again, from this atheistic opinion, That all knowledge is nothing else but sense, either primary or secondary, it follows also, that there is no absolute truth nor falsity, and that knowledge is of a private nature, relative, and phantastical only, or mere seeming, that is, nothing but opinion; because sense is plainly seeming, phantasy, and appearance; a private thing, and relative to the sentient only. And here also did Protagoras, according to his wonted freedom, admit this consequence, that knowledge being sense, there was no absoluteness at all therein; and that nothing was true otherwise, than τέτων ἐπὶ τῶι, to this and to that man so thinking; that every man did but τὰ ἑαυτοῦ μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐκείν, opine only his own things; that πάνων ἔρματων μῖτε ἀνθρώπων, every man was the measure of things and truth to himself; and lastly, τὸ δὲ ἐνσώματος ἐντὸς τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ἐννοίας, he said whatsoever seemed to every one, was true to him, to whom it seemed. Neither could Democritus himself, though a man of more discretion than Protagoras, dissemble this consequence from

from the same principle asserted by him, that understanding is phantaftical, and knowledge but opinion; he owning it sometimes before he was aware, as in these words of his 1, ἔνδοξον χρῆ ἀδοξάσθεν τοῦτο τῷ καθῷ, ὡς αὐτοῦ ἀπειλεήσατο. We ought to know man, according to this rule, that he is such a thing, as hath nothing to do with absolute truth. And again, αὐτὸ (or ἵναι) ἐκείνον τῷ ἔρει ἐδοκόμα, ἀλλ' ἐπειραμένη ἐκάθεν ἔσσε: We know nothing absolutely, concerning anything; and all our knowledge is opinion. Agreeably to which, he determined, that men's knowledge was diversified by the temper of their bodies, and the things without them 2. And Aristotle judiciously observing both these doctrines, That there is no error or false judgment, but every opinion true; and again, That nothing is absolutely true, but relatively only; to be really and fundamentally one and the same, imputeth them both together to Democritus, in these words of his 3, ὡς οὖν ἐκείναιν ἀλληλος ὑπὲρ διὰ τὸ ὑπολαμβάνειν ἑαυτὸν μὲν τὴν αἰσθήσαν, τὸ Φαίδομενον κατὰ τὴν αἰσθήσαν ἐκλάθης εἰδεκτά; Democritus held, that there was nothing absolutely true; but because he thought knowledge or understanding to be sense, therefore did he conclude, that whatsoever seemed according to sense, must of necessity be true (not absolutely, but relatively) to whom it so seemed. These gross absurdities did the atheistick Atomists plunge themselves into; whilst they endeavoured to solve the phænomenon of cogitation, mind, or understanding, agreeably to their own hypothesis. And it is certain, that all of them, Democritus himself not excepted, were but mere blunderers in that atomick physiology, which they so much pretended to, and never rightly understood the same; for as much as that, with equal clearness, teaches these two things at once, that sense indeed is phantaftical and relative to the sentient; but that there is a higher faculty of understanding and reason in us, which thus discovers the phantastry of sense, and reaches to the abso- luteness of truth, or is the criterion thereof.

But the Democritick and Epicurean Atheists will further conclude, that the only things or objects of the mind are singular sensibles, or bodies existing without it; which therefore must needs be, in order of nature, before all knowledge, mind, and understanding whatsoever, this being but a phantaftick image or representation of them. From whence they infer, that the corporeal world, and these sensible things, could not possibly be made by any mind or understanding, because essentially junior to them, and the very image and creature of them. Thus does Aristotle observe 4, concerning both Democritus and Protagoras, that they did ὑπολαμβάνειν τῆς ὑπερ τοῦ μόνον ἐνόμον τῷ αἰείντα, suppose the only things or objects of the mind to be sensibles; and that this was the reason, why they made knowledge to be sense, and therefore relative and phantaftical. But we have already proved, that mind and understanding is not the phantaftick image of sensibles or bodies, and that it is in its own nature not ectypal, but archetypal and architectonical of all; that it is senior to the world, and all sensible things, it not looking abroad for its objects any where without, but containing them within

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3 Plato. Logicos, § 137, p. 399.
itself; the first original mind being an absolutely perfect being, comprehending itself, and the extent of its own omnipotence, or all possibilities of things, together with the best platform of the whole, and producing the same accordingly.

But it being plain, that there are, besides singulars, other objects of the mind universal, from whence it seems to follow, that sensibles are not the only things; some modern atheistical wits have therefore invented this further device to maintain the cause, and carry the business on, that universals are nothing else but names or words, by which singular bodies are called; and consequently that in all axioms and propositions, sententious affirmations and negations (in which the predicate at least is universal) we do but add or substract, affirm or deny, names of singular bodies; and that reason or syllogism is nothing but the reckoning or computing the consequences of these names or words. Neither do they want the impudence to affirm, that besides those passions or phantasies, which we have from things by sense, we know nothing at all of any thing but only the names, by which it is called; than which there cannot be a greater shallowness or madness: for if geometry were nothing but the knowledge of names, by which singular bodies are called, as itself not only could not deserve that name of a science, so neither could its truths be the same in Greek and in Latin; and geometricals, in all the several distant ages and places of the world, must be supposed to have had the same singular bodies before them, of which they affirmed and denied those universal names.

In the last place, the Epicurean and Anaximandrian Atheists, agreeably to the premised principles, and the tenour of their hypothesis, do both of them endeavour to depreciate and undervalue knowledge or understanding, as a thing, which hath not any higher degree of perfection or entity in it than is in dead and senseless matter; it being, according to them, but a passion from singular bodies existing without, and therefore both junior and inferior to them; a tumult raised in the brain, by motions made upon it from the objects of sense; that which essentially includeth in it dependence upon something else; at best but a thin and evanish image of sensibles, or rather an image of those images of sense, a mere whistling and phantasick thing; upon which account they conclude it not fit to be attributed to that, which is the first root and source of all things, which therefore is to them no other than grave and solid senseless matter, the only substantial, self-existent, independent thing, and consequently the most perfect and divine. Life and understanding, soul and mind, are to them no simple and primitive natures, but secondary and derivative, or syllables and complexions of things, which sprung up afterwards, from certain combinations of magnitudes, figures, fits, and motions, or contemplations of qualities, contextures either of similar or dissimilar atoms. And as themselves are juniors to senseless matter and motion, and to those inanimate elements, fire, water, air and earth, the first and most real productions of nature and chance, so are their effects, and the things that belong to them, comparatively with those other real things of nature, but flight, ludicrous, and umbratile, as landskip
in picture, compared with the real prospect of high mountains, and low valleys, winding or meandering rivers, towering steeples, and the shady tops of trees and groves; as they are, accordingly, commonly disparaged under those names of notional and artificial. And thus was the sense of the ancient Atheists represented by Plato; for it to μεν Μίγμα καὶ Κάλλις αὐτοῖς. D. Leg. L. 10. γάρ εἰς Φύσις καὶ Τύχῃ, τα ἐς Συμποτερές Τέχνην ἐν ἐς πάντα Φύσις λαμβάνουσαν, p. 589. των των μεγάλων καὶ πρωτών νομίζων ἑρμών, πλατείας καὶ τεκλανωθαί παντα τά συμπότερα, ἐς τή τεχνική προσοφορείμενοι. They say, that the greatest and most excellent things of all were made by senseless nature and chance; but all the smaller and more inconsiderable, by art, mind, and understanding; which taking from nature those first and greater things as its ground-work to act upon, doth frame and fabricate all the other lesser things, which are therefore commonly called artificial. And the mind of these Atheists is there also further declared by that philosopher after this manner: The first, most real, solid and substantial things in the whole world are those elements, fire, water, air and earth, made by senseless nature and chance, without any art, mind or understanding: and next to these the bodies of the sun, moon, and stars, and this terrestrial globe, produced out of the forefaid inanimate elements, by unknowing nature or chance likewise, without any art, mind, or God. The fortuitous conourse of similar or dissimilar atoms begetting this whole sytem and compages of heaven and earth; τέχνην τε τοῦ τοῖνον οὐσίας, ἀνήλιος θεόν εἰς θεωρω ὀυσίας γενομένης καὶ τιμών φύσις καὶ τεκλαμμένης, ἀλλὰ εὐνομίας καὶ τεχνικής προσοφόρειόνς, οἷα ἐγείρει εὐνομίας καὶ τεχνικής. But that afterwards art or mind, and understanding, being generated also in the last place out of those same senseless and inanimate bodies or elements, (it rising up in certain smaller pieces of the universe, and particular concretions of matter called animals) mortal from mortal things, did produce certain other ludicrous things, which partake little of truth and reality, but are mere images, unbrages, and imitations, as picture and landskip, &c. but above all, those moral differences of just and unjust, base and dishonest, the mere fragments of political art, and flight unbrabile things, compared with good and evil natural, that consist in nothing, but agreement and disagreement with sense and appetite: ταὶ γὰρ καλὰ Φύσις μὲν ἀλλὰ πάντων ἡ τεχνή, τὰ δὲ δικαια μὲν τοῖνον οὐσίας. For, as for things good and base, those, that are such by nature, differ from those, which are such by law; but as for just and unjust, there is by nature no such thing at all. The upshot and conclusion of all is, that there is no such scale or ladder in nature as Theists and Metaphysicians suppose, no degrees of real perfection and entity one above another, as of life and sense above inanimate matter, of reason and understanding above sense; from whence it would be inferred, that the order of things in nature was in way of descent from higher and greater perfection, downward to lesser and lower, which is indeed to introduce a God. And that there is no such scale or ladder of perfection and entity, they endeavour further to prove from hence, because, according to that hypothesis, it would follow, that every the smallest and most contemptible animal, that could see the fun, had a higher degree of entity and perfection in it, than the fun itself; a thing ridiculously absurd; or else, according
to Cotta's instance; Ideired formicam anteponendam esse buic pulcherrimae urbii, quod in urbe sensus sit n ullus, in formica non modo sensus, sed etiam mens, ratio, memoria. That therefore every ant or pismire were far to be preferred before this most beautiful city of Rome, because in the city there is no sene, whereas an ant hath not only sene, but also mind, reason and memory; that is, a certain sagacity superior to sense. Wherefore they conclude, that there is no such scale or ladder in nature, no such climbing stairs of entity and perfection, one above another, but that the whole universe is one flat and level, it being: indeed all nothing but the same uniform matter, under several forms, dresses, and disguises; or variegated by diversity of accidental modifications; one of which is that of such beings, as have phancy in them, commonly called animals; which are but some of sportful or wants natures, more trimly artificial and finer Gammaeus or pretty toys; but by reason of this phancy they have no higher degree of entity and perfection in them, than is in sensefeles matter: as they will also be all of them quickly transformed again into other seemingly dull, unthinking and inanimate shapes. Hitherto the sense of Atheists.

But the pretended grounds of this atheistical doctrine, (or rather madness) have been already also confuted, over and over again. Knowledge and understanding is not a meer passion from the thing known, existing without the knower, because to know and understand, as Anaxagoras of old determined, is natalis, to master and conquer the thing known, and consequently not meerly to suffer from it, or passively to lie under it, this being natalis, to be mastered and conquered by it. The knowledge of universal theorems in sciences is not from the force of the thing known existing without the knower, but from the active power, and exerted vigour or strength of that, which knows. Thus Severinus, Beelthiues; Videsne, ut in cognoscendo, cuncta faci potius faculata, quam eorum, qua cognoscentur, uantatur? Neeque id injuria, nam cum omne judicium judicantis actu existat, necesse est, ut ssum qui quae operam, non ex alio, sed ex propriis potestate perficiat. See you not how all things, in knowing, use their own power and faculty rather, than that of the thing known? For since judgment is the action of that, which judgeth, every thing must of necessity perform its own action, by its own power, strength, and faculty, and not by that of another. Sense itself is not a mere passion, or reception of the motion from bodies without the sentient, for if it were so, then would a looking-glass, and other dead things see; but it is a perception of a passion made upon the body of the sentient, and therefore hath something of the soul's own self-activity in it. But understanding, and the knowledge of abstract sciences is neither primary sense, nor yet the fading and decaying remainders of the motions thereof, but a perception of another kind, and more inward than that of sense; not sympathetical, but unpassionate, the Noemata of the mind being things distinct from the Phantaffinata of sense and imagination; which are but a kind of confused cogitations. And though the objects of sense be only singular bodies, existing without the sentient, yet are not these sensibles therefore the only things and cogitables;
cogitables; but there are other objects of science, or intelligibles, which
the mind containeth within itself. That dark philosophy of some, tend-
ing to directly to atheism, that there is nothing in the mind or un-
derstanding, which was not first in corporeal sense, and derived in way of
passion from matter, was both elegantly and solidly confuted by Boëthius Boet. Cons.
his Philosophick Muse, after this manner:

Quandam porticus attulit,
Qui sensus & imagines
Credant mentibus imprimi;
Mos est æquore paginae
Presias figere literas,
Nibil motibus explicat,
Notis subdita corporum,
Rerum reddit imagines,
Cernens omnia notio?
Aut que cognita dividit?
Alternunque legis iter,
Nunc decidunt in infima;
Veris falsa redarguit?
Longe causa potentiior
Impressas patitur notas,
Et vires animi movens,
Cum vel lux oculos ferit,
Tum mentis vigor excitus,
Ad motus semiles vocans,

Objeuros nimium sénès,
E corporibus extinmis,
Ut quandam celéri fyllo
Que nullas babeat notas,
Sed mens fi propriis vigens
Sed tantum patiens jacet
Cassisque in speculi vicem
Unde haec fce animis viget,
Que vis singula propicit?
Que divisa recolligit?
Nunc summis caput inferunt
Tum sfes referens sfibi
Hec est efficientis magis,
Quam que materie modo
Precedit tamen excitans
Vivo in corpore passio.
Vel vox auribus intrepit:
Quas intus species tenet,
Notis applicat exteris.

It is true indeed, that the Novum, or thing understood, is, in order of na-
ture, before the intellefion and conception of it; and from hence was it,
that the Pythagoreans and Platonists concluded, that Nōs, Mind or Intellect,
was not the very first and highest thing in the scale of the universe, but
that there was another divine hypothesis, in order of nature before it, called
by them, ʻEo and T° ʻαγασóv, One and the good, as the Novum or Intelligible
thereof. But as those three archetical hypotheses of the Platonists and Pytha-
goreans are all of them really but one Θεo or divinity, and the first of
those three (superior to that which is properly called by them, Mind or
intellect) is not supposed therefore to be ignorant of itself; so is the first
Mind or Understanding no other, than that of a perfect Being, infinitely
good, fecund, and powerful, and virtually containing all things; compreh-
hending itself and the extent of its own goodness, fecundity, virtue, and
power; that is, all possibilities of things, their relations to one another,
and verities; a Mind before sense, and sensible things. An omnipotent un-
derstanding Being, which is itself its own intelligible, is the first original
of all things. Again, that must of necessity be some other substance
besides body or matter, and which, in the scale of nature, is superior to
it, is evident from hence, because otherwise there could be no motion at
all therein, no body being ever able to move itself. There must be some-
thing self-active and hylarchical, something that can act both from itself, and upon matter, as having a natural imperium, or command over it. Cognition is, in order of nature, before local motion. Life and understanding, soul and mind, are no syllables or complexions of things, secondary and derivative, which might therefore be made out of things devoid of life and understanding; but simple, primitive, and uncompounded natures: they are no qualities or accidental modifications of matter, but substantial things. For which cause souls or minds can no more be generated out of matter, than matter itself can be generated out of something else: and therefore are they both alike (in some sense) principles, naturally ingenerate and incorruptible, though both matter, and all imperfect souls and minds, were at first created by one perfect, omnipotent, understanding Being. Moreover, nothing can be more evident than this, that mind and understanding hath a higher degree of entity or perfection in it, and is a greater reality in nature, than mere senseless matter or bulky extension. And consequently, the things which belong to souls and minds, to rational and intellectual beings as such, must not have less, but more reality in them, than the things which belong to inanimate bodies. Wherefore, the differences of just and unjust, honest and dishonest, are greater realities in nature, than the differences of hard and soft, hot and cold, moist and dry. He, that does not perceive any higher degree of perfection in a man than in an oyster, nay, than in a clod of earth or lump of ice, in a piece of paxte or pye-crust, hath not the reason or understanding of a man in him. There is unquestionably a scale or ladder of nature, and degrees of perfection and entity, one above another, as of life, sense, and cognition, above dead, senseless, and unthinking matter; of reason and understanding above sense, &c. And if the sun be nothing but a mass of fire, or inanimate subtile matter agitated, then hath the most contemptible animal, that can see the sun, and hath consciousness and self-enjoyment, a higher degree of entity and perfection in it, than that whole fiery globe; as also than the materials (stone, timber, brick and mortar) of the most stately structure, or city. Notwithstanding which, the sun in other regards, and as its vastly extended light and heat hath so great an influence upon the good of the whole world, plants and animals, may be said to be a far more noble and useful thing in the universe, than any one particular animal whatsoever. Wherefore there being plainly a scale or ladder of entity, the order of things was unquestionably, in way of descent, from higher perfection downward to lower; it being as impossible for a greater perfection to be produced from a leffer, as for something to be caused by nothing. Neither are the steps or degrees of this ladder (either upward or downward) infinite; but as the foot, bottom, or lowest round thereof is stupid and senseless matter, devoid of all life and understanding; so is the head, top, and summity of it a perfect omnipotent Being, comprehending itself, and all possibilities of things. A perfect understanding Being is the beginning and head of the scale of entity; from whence things gradually descend downward; lower and lower, till they end in senseless matter.

Note. Mind is the eldest of all things, senior to the elements,
elements, and the whole corporeal world; and likewise, according to the
same ancient Theists, it is ἐν οὐκ ἔτοι κατὰ φύσιν, by nature lord over all, or hath
a natural imperium and dominion over all, it being the most hegemonical
thing. And thus was it also affirmed by Anaxagoras, Νές βασιλεῖς ἑραίου τε
καὶ γίνεται, that mind is the sovereign king of heaven and earth.

We have now made it evident, that the Epicurean and Anaximandrian
Atheists, who derive the original of all things from seneflefs matter, de-
void of all manner of life, can no way solve the phenomenon of cogita-
tion (life and understanding, soul and mind) no more than they can that of
local motion. And the reason, why we have insisted so much upon this
point, is, because these Atheists do not only pretend to solve this phænome-
non of cogitation without a God, and so to take away the argument for a
Deity from thence, but also to demonstrate the impossibility of its existen-
ted from the very nature of knowledge, mind, and understanding. For if
knowledge be, in its own nature, nothing but a passion from singular bodies
existing without the knower; and if life and understanding, soul and mind,
be junior to body, and generated out of seneflefs matter, then could no
mind or understanding Being possibly be a God, that is, a first principle,
and the maker of all things. And though modern writers take little or no
notice of this, yet did Plato anciently make the very state of the controversy
betwixt Theists and Atheists principally to consist in this very thing, viz.
Whether life and understanding, soul and mind, were juniors to body, and
sprung out of seneflefs matter, as accidental modifications thereof; or else were
substantial things, and in order of nature before it. For after the passages
before cited, he thus concludes:  χωρισμεν ὑπὸ λήγων ταῦτα, τῷ ἐκ νυστάτων ὑπογίνο
ἄλλα, πρώτῳ λεγείσα τῶν πάντων εἶναι, ἡ τοῦ φύσιν οὐραμάζειν ταῦτα αὐτά, ὑποκεῖσθαι ἐκ
τῶν ὑπόταν ὑπογίνον ταῦτα αὐτά, ὡς οὖν ἔφερεν ἐκεῖν ἐκ νυστάτων, ἀλλὰ ὑπὸ σημαίνειν ταῦτα ἐχεῖν
τος τοῦ λόγος. Αὕτω ὑπὲρ ἐντολής τινα ἄνωθεν ὑπὸ ἐνενεργοῦμεν ἀνάρχων, ὑπὸ τῶν ὑπάτων ἐφιάλα
Τύμπανος. Τοὺς μὲν τελες ὑπὸ αὐτῶν ἐφημενίσκομεν ἀνάρχων, τοὺς μὲν τελες ὑπὸ αὐτῶν ἐφιάλα
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Τύμπανος. Ἡ ὑπὸ αὐτῶν ἐφημενίσκομεν ἀνάρχων, τοὺς μὲν τελες ὑπὸ αὐτῶν ἐφιάλα
Τύμπανος. Ἡ ὑπὸ αὐτῶν ἐφημενίσκομεν ἀνάρχων, τοὺς μὲν τελες ὑπὸ αὐτῶν ἐφιάλα
Τύμπανος.
The Generation of Souls out of Book I.

The last thing, to be the first. And hence is it, that they err concerning the essence of the gods. For they are ignorant what kind of thing soul is, and what power it hath, as also especially concerning its generation and production, that it was first of all made before body, it being that, which governs the motions, changes, and transformations thereof. But if soul be first in order of nature before body, then must those things, which are cognate to soul, be also before the things, which appertain to body; and so mind and understanding, art and law, be before hard and soft, heavy and light; and that, which these Atheists call nature, (the motion of inanimate bodies) junior to art and mind, it being governed by the same. Now that soul is in order of nature before body, this philosopher demonstrates only from the topic or head of motion, because it is impossible, that one body should move another infinitely, without any first cause or mover; but there must of necessity be something self-moving and self-active, or which had a power of changing itself, that was the first cause of all local motion in bodies. And this being the very notion of soul, that it is such a thing, as can move or change itself (in which also the essence of life consists) he thus inferreth: *κενοτάτα δεινέτι τοις πάνω προσεχετάτεν γενομένα το αρχικον πάσσων. It is therefore sufficiently demonstrated from hence, that soul is the oldest of all things in the corporeal world, it being the principle of all the motion and generation in it. And his conclusion is, *οὐκ ἔστιν ἄρα εἰρήνης ἡ μια ὄνωψ συμμείκτης σώμασι τῷ πάσσῳ, τῷ πρώτῳ. σώμα ταῦτα, το αρχικόν του μικρόν. It hath been therefore rightly affirmed by us, that soul is older than body, and was made before it, and body younger and junior to soul; soul being that, which ruleth, and body that, which is ruled. From whence it follows, that the things of soul also are older than the things of body; and therefore cogitation, intellect, volition, and appetite, in order of nature before length, breadth and profundity. Now it is evident, that Plato in all this understood, not only the mundane soul, or his third divine hypothesis, the original of that motion, that is in the heavens and the whole corporeal universe, but also all other particular lives and souls whatsoever, or that whole rank of beings called soul; he supposing it all to have been at first made before the corporeal system, or at least to have been in order of nature senior to it, as superior and more excellent, (that which ruleth being superior to that which is ruled) and no soul or life whatsoever, to be generated out of senseless matter.

Wherefore we must needs here condemn that doctrine of some professed Theists and Christians of latter times, who generate all souls, not only the senstive in brutes, but also the rational in men, out of matter; for as much as hereby, not only that argument for the existence of a God, from souls, is quite taken away, and nothing could hinder, but that senseless matter might be the original of all things, if life and understanding, soul and mind, sprung out of it; but also the Atheist will have an advantage to prove the impossibility of a God from hence; because if life and understanding, in their own nature, be factitious, and generable out of matter, then are

P. 668.
P. 669.
Matter, a Seed of Atheism.

are they no substantial things, but accidental only; from whence it will plainly follow, that no mind could possibly be a God, or first cause of all things, it being not so much as able to subsist by itself. Moreover, if mind, as such, be generable, and educible out of nothing, then must it needs be in its own nature corruptible also, and reducible to nothing again; whereas the Deity is both an unmade and incorruptible being. So that there could not possibly be, according to this hypothesis, any other God, than such a Jupiter, or soul of the world, as the atheistic Theogonists acknowledged, that sprung out of Night, Chaos, and Non-entity, and may be again swallowed up into that dark abyss. Senseless matter therefore, being the only unmade and incorruptible thing, and the fountain of all things, even of life and understanding, it must needs be acknowledged to be the only real Numen.

Neither will the case be much different, as to some others, who, though indeed they do not professedly generate the rational, but only the sentient soul, both in men and brutes; yet do nevertheless maintain the human soul itself to be but a mere blank, or white sheet of paper, that hath nothing at all in it, but what was scribbled upon it by the objects of sense; and knowledge, or understanding, to be nothing but the result of sense, and so a passion from sensible bodies existing without the knower. For hereby, as they plainly make knowledge and understanding to be, in its own nature, junior to sense, and the very creature of sensibles; so do they also imply the rational soul, and mind itself, to be as well generated as the sentient, wherein it is virtually contained; or to be nothing but a higher modification of matter, agreeably to that Leviathan-doctrine, that men differ no otherwise from brute animals, than only in their organization, and the use of speech or words.

In very truth, whoever maintaineth, that any life or soul, any cogitation or consciousness, self-perception and self-activity, can spring out of dead, senseless and inactive matter, the same can never possibly have any rational assurance, but that his own soul had also a like original, and consequently is mortal and corruptible. For if any life and cogitation can be thus generated, then is there no reason, but that all lives may be so, they being but higher degrees in the same kind; and neither life, nor any thing else, can be in its own nature indifferent, to be either substance or accident, and sometimes one, and sometimes the other; but either all life, cogitation and consciousness, is accidental, generable and corruptible; or else none at all.

That, which hath inclined so many to think the sentient life, at least, to be nothing but a quality, or accident of matter, generable out of it, and corruptible into it, is that strange Protean transformation of matter into so many seemingly unaccountable forms and shapes, together with the scholastick opinion thereupon of real qualities; that is, entities distinct from the substance of body, and its modifications, but yet generable out of it, and corruptible into it; they concluding, that as light and colours, heat

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and cold, &c. according to those phancies, which we have of them, are real qualities of matter, distinct from its substance and modifications; so may life, sense, and cogitation, be in like manner qualities of matter also, generable and corruptible. But these real qualities of body, in the sense declared, are things, that were long since justly exploded by the ancient Atomists, and expunged out of the catalogue of entities, of whom Laertius has recorded, that they did figurae tacs, quite calber and banish qualities out of their philosphy; they resolving all corporeal phenomenae, and therefore those of heat and cold, light and colours, &c. intelligibly, into nothing but the different modifications of extended substance, viz. more or less magnitude of parts, figure, figure, motion or rest, (or the combinations of them,) and those different phancies caufed in us by them. Indeed there is no other entity, but substance and its modifications. Wherefore the Democriticks and Epicureans did most shamefully contradict themselves, when, pretending to reject and explode all those entities of real qualities, themselves nevertheless made life and understanding such real qualities of matter, generable out of it, and corruptible again into it.

There is nothing in body or matter, but magnitude, figure, figure, and motion or rest: now it is mathematically certain, that these, however combin'd together, can never possibly compound, or make up life or cogitation; which therefore cannot be an accident of matter, but must of necessity be a substantial thing. We speak not here of that life (improperly so called) which is, in vulgar speech, attributed to the bodies of men and animals; for it is plainly accidental to a body to be vitally united to a soul, or not. Therefore is this life of the compound corruptible and destroyable, without the destruction of any real entity; there being nothing destroyed, nor lost to the univerfe, in the deaths of men and animals, as such, but only a diffusion, or separation made of those two substances, soul and body, one from another. But we speak here of the original life of the soul itself, that this is substantial, neither generable nor corruptible, but only creatable and annihilable by the Deity. And it is strange, that any men should persuade themselves, that that, which rules and commands in the bodies of animals, moving them up and down, and hath sense or perception in it, should not be as substantial, as that stupid and senseless matter, that is ruled by it. Neither can matter (which is also but a mere passive thing) efficiently produce soul, any more than soul matter; no finite, imperfect substance being able to produce another substance out of nothing. Much less can such a substance, as hath a lower degree of entity and perfection in it, create that, which hath a higher. There is a scale, or ladder of entities and perfections in the univerfe, one above another, and the production of things cannot possibly be in way of ascent from lower to higher, but must of necessity be in way of descent from higher to lower. Now to produce any one higher rank of being from the lower, as cogitation from magnitude and body, is plainly to invert this order in the scale of the universe from downwards to upwards, and therefore is it atheistical; and by the same reason, that one
higher rank or degree in this scale is thus unnaturally produced from a lower, may all the rest be so produced also. Wherefore we have great reason to stand upon our guard here, and to defend this point against the Atheists; that no life, or cogitation, can either materially or efficiently result from dead and senseless body; or that souls, being all substantial and immaterial things, can neither be generated out of matter, nor corrupted into the same, but only created or annihilated by the Deity.

The grand objection against this substantiality of souls sensitive, as well as rational, is from that consequence, which will be from thence inferred, of their permanent subsistence after death, their perpetuity, or immortality. This seeming very absurd, that the souls of brutes also should be immortal, or subsist after the deaths of the respective animals: but especially to two sorts of men; first, such as scarcely in good earnest believe their own soul's immortality; and secondly, such religionists, as conclude, that if irrational, or sensitive souls subsist after death, then must they needs go presently either into heaven or hell. And R. Cartesius was so sensible of the offensiveness of this opinion, that though he were fully convinced of the necessity of this disjunction, that either brutes have nothing of sense or cogitation at all, or else they must have some other substance in them, besides matter, he chose rather to make them mere senseless machines, than to allow them substantial souls. Wherein, avoiding a leffer absurdity or paradox, he plainly plunged himself into a greater; scarcely any thing being more generally received, than the sense of brutes. Though in truth all those, who deny the substantiality of sensitive souls, and will have brutes to have nothing but matter in them, ought consequentially, according to reason, to do as Cartesius did, deprive them of all sense. But, on the contrary, if it be evident from the phenomena, that brutes are not mere senseless machines or automata, and only like clocks or watches, then ought not popular opinion and vulgar prejudice so far to prevail with us, as to hinder our assent to that, which found reason and philosophy clearly dictates, that therefore they must have something more than matter in them. Neither ought we, when we clearly conceive any thing to be true, as this, That life and cogitation cannot possibly rise out of dead and senseless matter, to abandon it, or deny our assent thereunto, because we find it attended with some difficulty not easily extricable by us, or cannot free all the consequences thereof from some inconvenience or absurdity, such as seems to be in the permanent subsistence of brutish souls.

For the giving an account of which, notwithstanding, Plato and the ancient Pythagoreans proposed this following hypothesis: That souls, as well sensitive as rational, being all substantial, but not self-existent, (because there is but one fountain and principle of all things,) were therefore produced or caused by the Deity. But this, not in the generations of the respective animals; it being indecorous, that this divine, miraculous, creative power should constantly lacquey by, and attend upon natural generations; as also incongruous, that souls should be so much

juniors
The Pythagorean Cabala, for the Book I.

Where his light chariots, which all lives or souls, at their very first creation by God, are placed in, and in which being wafted, they are both together, as it were, fowed into the grofs terrestrial matter, are thin, aereal and ethereal bodies. But this is plainly declared by Proclus upon the Timæus, after he had spoken of the fouls of Æamount and men, in this manner; of γὰρ πάντων ζωγραφικῶν αὐτοῖς ἤδη τῶν θυσίων σωμάτων, οὗτοι καὶ τινὲς ταῖς πρότερον ἀθανάτους ἄθροιζον, ὡς καὶ ῥάξιον ἔχοντο τὸ ῥυότιν. And every soul must of necessity have, before these mortal bodies, certain eternal and easily moveable bodies, it being essential to them to move. There is indeed mention made by the fame Proclus, and others, of an opinion of ἀλογοι δαίμονες, irrational or brutifh demons, or daemoniac aereal brutes; of which he sometimes speaks doubtfully, as εἰπέρ γὰρ εἶναι ἀλογοι δαίμονες, ὡς οἱ Ἱπποκράτ. If there be any irrational demons, as the Theurgists affirm. But the dispute, doubt, or controversy here only was, Whether there were any such irrational demons immortal, or no. For thus we learn from these words of Ammonius upon the Porphyrian Isagoge: οἱ μεν γὰρ φασὶν εἶναι τι δαίμονιαν ἀλογον, γινόμενον ἢ διὰ τούτων, οἱ δὲ φασὶν γὰρ τοποτοῖς ἀλογον ἠγούμενον. Some affirm, that there is a certain kind of irrational demons immortal; but others, that all thefe irrational, or brutifh demons are mortal. Where, by irrational demons immortal, feem to be understood fuch, as never defcend into terrestrial bodies, (and fhefe are here disclaimed by Ammonius;) but the mortal ones, fuch as act also upon grofs terrestrial bodies, obnoxious to death and corruption. As if Ammonius should have faid, There are no other brutifh, or irrational demons, than only the fouls of fuch brute animals, as are here amongft us, fometimes acting only aereal bodies. Thus, according to the ancient Pythagorick hypothesis, there is neither any new fubftantial thing now made, which was not before, nor yet any real entify destroyed into nothing; not only no matter, but alfo no foul nor life; God, after the first creation, neither making any new fubstance, nor yet

Tu caufis animas paribus vitaeque minores
Provebis, & levibus sublimes curribus aptans.
In calum terramque seris.

L. 5 p. 250. 258

L. 4 p. 288

yet annihilating any thing made. He then creating nothing, that was not fit to be conserved in being, and which could not be well used and placed in the universe; and afterward never repenting him of what he had before done. And natural generations and corruptions being nothing but accidental mutations, concretions and secretions, or anagrammatical transpositions of præ- and post-exiting things, the same foulcs and lives being sometimes united to one body, and sometimes to another; sometimes in thicker, and sometimes in thinner clothing; and sometimes in the visible, sometimes in the invisible; (they having aerial, as well as terrestrial vehicles;) and never any soul quite naked of all body. And thus does Preclus complain of some, as spurious Platonists, οὐ Φιέτωνε τὸ ὄψ τὰ αὐτακαταλείπονται περὶ πάντων. ἔστιν νοῦ τῷ σωματίῳ, ᾧς, destroying the thinner vehicles of souls, were therefore necessitated sometimes to leave them in a state of separation from all body, or without any corporeal indament. Which Cabala, probably derived from the Egyptians by Pythagoras, was before fully represented by us out of Ovid; though that tranmigration of human souls there, into ferine bodies, hath not been by all acknowledged, as a genuine part thereof. And the same was likewise insisted upon by Virgil, Georg. I. 4. as also owned and confirmed by Macrobius for a great truth; Confut. secundum Sum. Sacr. Tum vero rationem affertionem, quam nec Cicero neceit, nec Virgilius ignorat, 2. C. 12. dicendo,

* Nec morti esse locum; —

Confut, inquam, nihil intra vivum mundum perire, sed eorum, quæ interire videntur, salam mutari speciem. It is manifest, according to reason and true philosophy, which neither Cicero, nor Virgil were uneaquainted with, (the latter of these affirming, that there is no place at all left for death;) I say, it is manifest, that none of those things, that to us seem to die, do absolutely perish within the living world, but only their forms changed.

Now, how extravagant forever this hypothesis seem to be, yet is there no question, but that a Pythagorean would endeavour to find some countenance and shelter for it in the Scripture; especially that place, which hath so puzzled and non-plus’d interpreters, Rom. viii. 19. For the earnest expectation of the creature waiteth for the manifestation of the sons of God. For the creature was made subject unto vanity, not willingly, but by reason of him, who hath subjected the same in hope. Because the creature itself also shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption, into the glorious liberty of the children of God. For we know, that the whole creation groaneth, and travelleth in pain together until now. And not only they, but ourselves also, which have the first-fruitts of the Spirit, groan within ourselves, waiting for the adoption, even the redemption of our bodies. Where it is first of all evident, that the ζητεῖ, creature, or creation spoken of, is not the very same with the πάντα or υἱὸς Θεοῦ, the children or sons of God; but something distinct from them. Wherefore, in the next place, the Pythagorean will add, that it must of necessity be understood, either of the inanimate creature only, or of the lower animal creation, or else of both these togethér.
Brutish Souls, out of Bodies, Book I.

together. Now, though it be readily acknowledged, that there is a profopoeia here, yet cannot all those expressions, for all that, without difficulty and violence, be understood of the inanimate creation only, or senseless matter; viz. that this hath ἀποκαταστάσας ἄρειον, an earnest expectation of some future good to itself; that it is now made subject paπαθεντι, to vanity, frustration and disappointment of desire; and ὅσος ἡμών, to corruption and death; and that ἀνακαταστάσας, not willingly, but reluctantly; and yet ἐν ὑποξείᾳ, in hope, notwithstanding, of some further good to follow after; and that it doth in the mean time σὺν εὐσχεμών and συνεργῶν, groan and travel in pain together, till it be at length delivered from the bondage of corruption into the glorious liberty of the children of God. Moreover, in the generations and corruptions of senseless bodies, as of minerals and vegetables, or when, for instance, oil is turned into flame, flame into smoke, water into vapour, vapour into snow or hail, grass into milk, milk into blood and bones, and the like; there is, I say, in all this, no hurt done to any thing; nor any real entity destroyed, all the substance of matter still remaining entirely the flame, without the least diminution, and only accidental transformations thereof made. All this is really nothing, but local motion; and there is no more toil or labour to an inanimate body in motion, than in rest; it being altogether as natural for a body to be moved by something else, as of itself to rest. It is all nothing, but change of figure, distance, light, and magnitude of parts, causing several sensations, phancies, and apparitions in us. And they, who would have the meaning of this place to be, That all such-like mutations, and alternate vicissitudes in inanimate bodies, shall at length quite cease; these groaning in the mean time, and travelling in pain to be delivered from the toilsome labour of such senseless motion, and to be at ease and quiet; by taking away all motion thus, out of a fond regard to the ease and quiet of senseless matter, they would thereby, ἵπταντα, petrify the whole corporeal universe, and consequently the bodies of good men also after the resurrection, and congeal all into rocky marble or adamant. And as vain is that other conceit of some, that the whole terrestrial globe shall at last be vitrified, or turned into transparent crystal, as if it also groaned in the mean time for this. For whatsoever change shall be made of the world in the new heaven and the new earth to come, it is reasonable to think, that it will not be made for the sake of the senseless matter, or the inanimate bodies themselves, to which all is alike; but only for the sake of men and animals, the living spectators and inhabitants thereof, that it may be fitter, both for their use and delight. Neither indeed can those words, for the creature itself shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption into the glorious liberty of the children of God, be understood of any other, than animals; for as much as this liberty of the children of God, here meant, is their being clothed, instead of mortal, with immortal bodies; of which no other creatures are capable, but only such as consist of soul and body. And that πᾶσα ξυλίν, that whole creation, which is laid afterwards to groan and travel in pain together, may be well understood of all that of the creation, which can groan, or
be sensible of evil or misery. Wherefore, the Pythagorean would interpret this place of the lower animal creation only, which is sensible of good and evil; that as this was unwillingly, or against its own inclination (after the fall of man, or lapse of souls) made subject to vanity, and the bondage of corruption, pain, misery, and death, in those gross terrestrial bodies; in the manifestation of the sons of God, when they, instead of these mortal bodies, shall be clothed with celestial and immortal ones, then shall this creature also have its certain share in the felicity of that glorious time, and partake in some measure of such a liberty, by being freed in like manner from these their gross terrestrial bodies, and now living only in thin aereal and immortal ones; and so a period put to all their miseries and calamities by him, who made not death, neither hath pleasure in the destruction of the living, but created whatsoever liveth to this end, that it might have its being, and enjoy itself. But however thus much is certain, that brute animals, in this place, cannot be quite excluded; because the πᾶσα κτίσις, the whole creation, will not suffer that: and therefore a Pythagorist would conclude it a warrantable inference from this text of scripture, that that whole rank in the creation of irrational and brutish animals below men shall not be utterly annihilated in the consummation of things, or future renovation of the world, quite stript of all this furniture, men being then left alone in it; but that there shall be a continuation of this species or rank of being. And not only so neither; as if there should still be a constant succession of such alternate generations and corruptions, productions or births, and deaths of brute animals, to all eternity; but also, that the individuals themselves shall continue the same, for as much as otherwise there would be none at all delivered from the bondage of corruption. And lastly, that these very souls of brutes, which at this time groan and travel in pain, shall themselves be made partakers of that liberty of the children of God; since otherwise they should be with child, or parturient of nothing; groaning not for themselves, but others. But enough of this Pythagorick hypothesis, which supposing all manner of souls, senstive as well as rational, to be substantial things, and therefore to have a permanency after death, in their distinct natures, allows them certain thin aereal Ochemata, or vehicles, to subsist in, when these gross terrestrial ones shall fail them.

But let these aereal vehicles of the souls of brutes go for a whimsey, or mere figment; nor let them be allowed to act or enliven any other than terrestrial bodies only, by means whereof they must needs be, immediately after death, quite destitute of all body; they subsisting nevertheless, and not vanishing into nothing, because they are not mere accidents, but substantial things: we say, that in this case, though the substances of them remain, yet must they needs continue in a state of insensibility and inactivity, unless perhaps they be again afterwards united to some other terrestrial bodies. Because though intellect be the energy of the rational soul alone, without the concurrence of body, yet is the energy of the sensitive, always conjoined with it; sense being, as Aristotle hath rightly determined,

1 De Animâ Lib. II. Cap. VI. p. 27. Tom. II. Oper.
mined a complication of soul and body together, as weaving is of the weaver and weaving instruments. Wherefore we say, that if the irrational and sensitive souls in brutes, being substantial things also, be after death quite destitute of all body, then can they neither have sense of any thing, nor act upon any thing, but must continue for so long a time, in a state of insensibility and inactivity. Which is a thing therefore to be thought the less impossible, because no man can be certain, that his own soul in sleep, lethargies, and apoplexies, &c. hath always an uninterrupted consciousness of itself; and that it was never without thoughts, even in the mother's womb. However, there is little reason to doubt, but that the sensitive souls of such animals, as lie dead or asleep all the winter, and revive or awake again, at the approaching warmth of summer, do for that time continue in a state of inactivity and insensibility. Upon which account, though these souls of brutes may be said in one sense to be immortal, because the substance of them, and the root of life in them, still remains; yet may they, in another sense, be said also to be mortal, as having the exercise of that life, for a time at least, quite suspended. From whence it appears, that there is no reason at all for that fear and suspicion of some, that if the souls of brutes be substantial, and continue in being after death, they must therefore needs go either to heaven or hell. But as for that supposed possibility of their awakening again afterwards, in some other terrestrial bodies, this seemeth to be no more, than what is found by daily experience in the course of nature, when the silk-worm, and other worms, dying, are transformed into butterflies. For there is little reason to doubt, but that the same soul, which before acted the body of the silk-worm, doth afterward act that of the butterfly: upon which account it is, that this hath been made by Christian theologers an emblem of the resurrection.

Hitherto we have declared two several opinions, concerning the substantial souls of brutes, supposed therefore to have a constant subsistence after death; one of Plato's and the Pythagoreans, that when they are divested of these gross terrestrial bodies, they live, and have a sense of themselves, in thin aerial ones; the other of such, as exploding these aerial vehicles of brutes, and allowing them none but terrestrial bodies, affirm the substances of them, surviving death, to continue in a state of inactivity and insensibility, sleep, silence, or stupor. But now, to say the truth, there is no absolute necessity, that these souls of brutes, because substantial, should therefore have a permanent subsistence after death to all eternity; because though it be true, that no substance once created by God will of itself ever vanish into nothing, yet is it true also, that whatsoever was created by God out of nothing, may possibly by him be annihilated and reduced to nothing again. Wherefore, when it is said, that the immortality of the human soul is demonstrable by natural reason, the meaning thereof is no more than this, that its substantiality is so demonstrable; from whence it follows, that it will naturally no more perish or vanish into nothing, than the substance of matter itself: and not that it is impossible either for it, or matter
ter, by the divine power to be annihilated. Wherefore the assurance, that we have of our own soul's immortality, must depend upon something else besides their substantiality, namely, a faith also in the divine goodness, that he will converse in being, or not annihilate, all such substances created by him, whose permanent subsistence is neither inconsistent with his own attributes, nor the good of the universe, as this of rational souls unquestionably is not; they having both morality and liberty of will, and thereby being capable of rewards and punishments, and consequently fit objects for the divine justice to display itself upon. But, for aught we can be certain, the case may be otherwise as to the souls of brute animals, devoid both of morality and liberty of will, and therefore incapable of reward and punishment; that though they will not naturally of themselves vanish into nothing, yet, having been created by God in the generations of the respective animals, and had some enjoyment of themselves for a time, they may by him again be as well annihilated in their deaths and corruptions; and if this be absolutely the best, then doubtless it is so. And to this feemeth agreeable the opinion of Porphyrius, amongst the philosophers, when he affirmed every irrational power or soul to be resolved into the life of the whole; that is, retracted and refumed into the Deity, and so annihilated as to its creaturely nature: though possibly there may be another interpretation of that philosopher's meaning here, viz. that all the sentient souls of brutes are really but one and the same mundane soul, as it were, outflowing and variously displaying itself, and acting upon all the several parts of matter, that are capable to receive it, but at their deaths retiring again back into itself. But we have sufficiently retund the force of that objection against the ingenerability of all souls, and the substantiality of those of brutes also, from their consequent permanence after death; we having shewed, that, notwithstanding this their substantiality, there is no absolute necessity of their perpetuity after death, and permanency to all eternity, or else, that if they do continue to subsist, (God annihilating no substance) unless they have aerial vehicles to act, they must remain in a state of inactivity and insensibility, silence or sleep.

Now therefore, if no souls, no life, nor cogitation, could possibly be ever generated out of dead and senseless matter, they being not mere accidents, but substantial things, which must in this case have come from nothing; then either all souls existed of themselves from eternity, or else there must of necessity be some eternal unmade life and mind, from whence all the other lives and minds were derived. And that this was the doctrine of the ancient Theists, That no soul or mind, no life or understanding, was ever generated out of matter, but all produced by the Deity, the sole fountain of life and understanding, might be here proved, were it needful, at large, by sundry testimonies; but it may sufficiently appear from those verses of Virgil, first in his sixth Æneid, where, after he had spoken of God, as a Spirit and Mind diffused throughout the whole world, he addeth,

Vide Sententias ad Intelligibilia ducentes, Par. I. §. XXII. p. 227. §. XXIV. p. 228.* & alii.
Hylozoick Atheism, the

* Inde hominum pecudumque genus, vitaeque volantium,
  Et que marmorea fert monstra sub aquo sub pontus,

That from thence are the lives of all men and beasts, birds flying in the air, and monsters swimming in the sea. And again in his Georgicks, where, after these words,

* — Deum namque ire per omnes
  Terrasque, tridusque maris, calumque profundum,

That God passeth through all tracts of earth, seas, and heavens, he sub-joineth,

Hinc pecudes, armenta, viros, genus omne seratam,
  Quemque sibi tenues nascentem arcerefereitas.
  Scilicet huc reddi deinde, & resoluta referri,
  Omniam, nec mori efo locum.

And from hence, not only men, but also all manner of brute animals and beasts, when produced into this world, do every one derive their lives or souls, as also at their deaths they render the same back again to him, in whose band or custody they remain undestroyed; so that there is no place any where in the world left for death. This was therefore undoubtedly the genuine doctrine of the ancient Atheists, however some of late have deviated and swerved from it; that no life was generated out of matter, but all created by the Deity, or derived from it, the sole fountain of lives and souls.

And it is a truth so evident, that life being substantial, and not a mere accidental thing generated and corrupted, there must therefore of necessity be some eternal unmade life and mind, from whence all other lives and minds are derived, that the Hylozoick Atheists themselves (in this far wiser than the Atomicks) were fully convinced thereof; nevertheless being strongly possessed with that atheistical prejudice, that there is no other substance besides body, they attribute this first original unmade life and understanding to all matter as such (but without animal consciousness) as an essential part thereof, or inadequate conception of it. From which fundamental life of nature in matter, modified by organization, they phancy the lives of all animals and men to have proceeded. So that though the modified lives of animals and men, as such, according to them, be accidental things, generated and corrupted, produced out of nothing, and reduced to nothing again; yet this fundamental life of matter, which is the basis, upon which they stand, being substantial, is also eternal and incorruptible. These Hylozoists therefore, to avoid a Deity, suppose every atom of senseless matter to have been, from all eternity, infallibly omniscient, that is, to know all things without either error or ignorance, and to have a knowledge before sense, and undervived from sensibles (quite contrary to the doctrine of the atomick Atheists, who make all knowledge, sense,

* Verse 728.  * Lib. IV. Verse 221.
or the product thereof) though without any animal consciousness and self-perception.

But as nothing can be more prodigiously absurd, than thus to attribute infallible omniscience to every atom of matter; so is it also directly contradictitious to suppose perfect knowledge, wisdom, or understanding, without any consciousness or self-perception, consciousness being essential to cogitation: as also, that the substantial and fundamental life in men and other animals should never perish, and yet notwithstanding their souls and personalities in death utterly vanish into nothing. Moreover, this hypothesis can never possibly solve the phenomenon of men and animals neither; not only because no organization or modification of matter whatsoever could ever produce consciousness and self-perception in what was before unconscious; but also because every smallest atom thereof being supposed to be a percipient by itself, and to have a perfect life and understanding of its own, there must be in every one man and animal, not one, but a heap or commonwealth of innumerable percipients. Lastly, whereas these Hylozoick Atheists make every atom of matter omnipotent, but nothing at all omnipotent, or assert perfect knowledge, without any perfect power, a knowledge without sense, and undervided from sensibles; we demand of them, where the intelligibles or objects of this knowledge are? and whence the ideas thereof are derived? For since they proceed not in a way of passion from sensibles existing without, nor could result from those atoms neither, as comprehending themselves, they must needs come from nothing, and many of them, at least, be the conceptions of nothing. There cannot possibly be any other original, by the wit of man devised, of knowledge and understanding, than from an absolutely perfect and omnipotent being, comprehending itsefl, and the extent of its own infinite power, or all possibilities of things, that is, all intelligibles. But there can be but one such omnipotent being, and therefore no more than one original, and eternal unmade mind, from whence all the other minds are derived. Wherefore this hylozoick atheism is nothing but the breaking and crumbling of the simple Deity, one perfect understanding Being, into matter, and all the several atoms of it.

And now have we made it manifest, that these Atheists are so far from being able to disprove a God from this topic of cogitation, knowledge or understanding, that they cannot possibly solve the phenomenon thereof, without a God; it indeed affording invincible arguments of his existence. For, first, if no life or cogitation, soul or mind, can possibly spring out of matter or body, devoid of life and understanding, and which is nothing but a thing extended into length, breadth and thickness; then is it so far from being true, that all life and understanding is junior to senseless matter, and the offspring thereof; that of necessity either all lives and souls were self-existent from eternity, or else there must be one perfect unmade life and mind, from whence all other imperfect ones were derived: there must be an eternal knowledge before sense and sensibles; which is that
Atheist's Arguments against

Book I.

that hath printed the stamps and signatures of itself, upon the matter of the whole world. Indeed nothing can be more certain than this, that all knowledge and understanding in ourselves is not a meer passion from singular sensibles or bodies existing without us, as the forementioned Atheists also conclude; (from whence they would again infer, that knowledge, as such, is in its own nature junior to sensibles, and the meer creature of them, and consequently no creator;) there being nothing, which comes to us from the objects of sense without, but only local motion and pressure, and there being other objects of the mind, besides singular sensibles; not only all universals, but also such intelligibles, as never were, nor can be in sense. Now, if our human knowledge and understanding be not a passion from things existing without us; then can it have no other original than in way of participation, from a perfect mind, the mind of an infinitely fecund and powerful being, comprehending itself, and in itself all things; all the possibilities of things before they were made, their respects and the verities belonging to them. So that a perfect omnipotent being, together with the possibilities of things contained in it is the first Nonst, intelligible, or object of mind and understanding, by which all other singulars are understood. And were there no such perfect, infinitely fecund, and powerful being, there could have been no mind or understanding at all. As also, were there no perfect mind, viz that of an omnipotent Being comprehending itself, and all possibilities of things virtually contained in it; all the knowledge, and intelligible ideas of our imperfect minds, must needs have sprung from nothing. And thus is the existence of a God again demonstrated from that phenomenon of knowledge or understanding.

Having quite routed and vanquished the Atheists main body, we shall now blow away the remainder of their weaker and scattered forces, viz. their objections against Providence, their queries, and their arguments from interest, with a breath or two. Their first objection is against providence, as to the fabric of the world, from the faultiness of the mundane system, intellectually considered, and in order to ends; Quia tantâ fætat prædita culpa; That because it is so ill-made, therefore it could not be made by a God. Where the Atheist takes it for granted, that whatsoever afferts a God, or a perfect mind, to be the original of all things, does therefore ipso facto suppose all things to be well-made, and as they should be. And this doubtless was the sense of all the ancient theologers, however some modern Theists deviate therefrom; these concluding the perfection of the Deity not at all to consist in goodness, but in power and arbitrary will only. As if to have a will determined by a rule or reason of good, were the virtue of weak, impotent, and obnoxious beings only, or of such as have a superiour over them to give law to them, that is, of creatures; but the prerogative of a being irresistibly powerful, to have a will absolutely in-

* Lucret. Lib. II. Verf. 183:
different to all things, and undetermined by any thing but itself, or to will nothing because it is good, but to make its own arbitrary or contingent and fortuitous determination the sole reason of all its actions, nay, the very rule or measure of goodness, justice, and wisdom itself. And this is sup-
poded by them to be the liberty, sovereignty, and dominion of the Deity. Wherefore such Theifts as these would think themselves altogether uncon-
cerned in these atheiftick objections against Providence, or in defending the fabric of the world, as faultless, they being as ready as the Atheifts them-
selves, to acknowledge, that the world might really have been much better made than it now is; only that it must be said to be well, because so made, but pretending nevertheless, that this is no impeachment at all of the exis-
tence of a God, Quia Deus non tenetur ad optimum, because God is no way bound or obliged to the best; he being indeed, according to them, nothing but arbitrary will omnipotent. But what do these Theifts here else, than whilst they deny the fortuitous motion of senile matter to be the first original of all things, themselves in the mean time enthrone fortuitousness and contingency in the will of an omnipotent Being, and there give it an absolute sovereignty and dominion over all? So that the controversy betwixt the Atheifts and these Theifts seems to be no other than this, whether senile matter fortuitously moved, or a fortuitous will omnipotent, such as is alto-
gether undetermined by goodness, justice and wisdom, be the sovereign Numen, and original of all things. Certainly we mortals could have little better ground for our faith and hope, in such an omnipotent arbitrary will as this, than we could have in the motions of senile matter furiously agi-
tated, or of a rapid whirl-wind. Nay, one would think, that of the two it should be more desirable to be under the empire of senile matter, fortuit-
ously moved, than of a will altogether undetermined by goodness, justice, and wisdom, armed with omnipotence; because the former could harbour no hurtful or mischievous designs against any, as the latter might. But this irrational will, altogether undetermined by goodness, justice and wisdom, is so far from being the highest liberty, sovereignty and dominion, the greatest perfection, and the divinest thing of all, that it is indeed nothing else but weakness and impotency itself, or brutish folly and madness. And therefore those ancients, who affirmed, that Mind was Lord over all, and the supreme King of heaven and earth, held at the same time, that Good was the sovereign monarch of the universe, Good reigning in Mind, and together with it, because Mind is that, which orders all things for the sake of Good; and whatsoever doth otherwife, was, according to them, not Nix, but Ασωθ, not Mens, but Dementia, and consequently no God. And thus does Celsus in Origen declare the nature of God, ε' ὑπὸ τῆς πλασμαίης. Η. 240. ἀποθεωότας, ὡς τῆς πιστασμαίης αὐτομαίοις, ἀλλὰ τῆς ὁμοιότητος διακής θεὸν ἡ ἀτρόκτησις, God is not the president or head of irregular and irrational lust or appetite, and of loose erratic disorderliness, but of the just and righteous na-
ture. And though this were there misapplied by him against the Christian doctrine of the resurrection (not underflood) yet is the passage highly approved by Origen; he adding further, in confirmation thereof, and that
Divine Goodness asserted.

Book I.

as the general sense of Christians too 1, for the divinity is spread 2 to Christians, who hold the resurrection say as well as you, that God can do nothing, which is in itself evil, inept, or absurd; no more than he is able not to be God. For if God do any evil, he is no God. And again 2, to the Thee, most, according to the purpose of Plutus, for to Thee, as to分布, ποιεῖ το Θεῖον ὧς πένθε, πεπ.κε ὅς κατὰ τόν αὐτὸν σκότων; το το καλόν ἐν ταῖς ἐνεργείαις αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν δικαιωμάτων σωματικῶν, εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἐξέλεται, τὸν ὁμίλημα. The Deity acteth according to its own nature and essence; and its nature and essence displayeth goodness and justice: For if these things be not there, where should they else be found? And again, elsewhere, the Thee, απέρ ἔχον εἰς τὸν τοὺς ὑπὸ συνάντη, ἀλλὰ ἢ ἢ ὑπὸ τὸ ἐν τῷ ἄρχει τὸν ἂν ἄνω ἂν, God is essentially that, which Ought to be; and therefore he did not happen to be such as he is; and this first Ought to be is the principle of all things whatsoever, that ought to be. Wherefore the Deity is not to be conceived, as mere arbitrariness, humour, or irrational will and appetite omnipotent, (which would indeed be but omnipotent chance) but as an overflowing fountain of love and goodness, justly and wisely dispensing itself, and omnipotently reaching all things. The will of God is good, justice, and wisdom; or decorousness, fitness, and Ought itself, willing; so that the To Βιβλιστικών, that, which is absolutely the best, is μὲν ἐναρκτικών, an indispensable law to it, because its very essence. God is μέτρον πάντων, an impartial balance, lying even equal and indifferent to all things, and weighing out heaven and earth, and all the things therein, in the most just and exact proportions, and not a grain too much or too little of any thing. Nor is the Deity therefore bound or obliged to do the best, in any way of fertility, (as men fondly imagine this to be contrary to his liberty) much less by the law and command of any superiour (which is a contradiction) but only by the perfection of its own nature, which it cannot possibly deviate from, no more than ungod itself. In conclusion, therefore, we acknowledge the Atheist's argument to be thus far good; that if there be a God, then of necessity must all things be well-made, and as they should be; and vice versa. But no Atheist will ever be able to prove, that either the whole system of the world, could have been better made, or that so much as any one thing therein is made ineptly.

There are indeed many things in the frame of nature, which we cannot reach to the reasons of, they being made by a knowledge far superiour and transcendent to that of ours, and our experience and ratiocination, but flowly discovering the intrigues and contrivances of providence therein; witness the circulation of the blood, the milky and lymphatick vessels, and other things, (without which the mechanism structure of the bodies of animals cannot be understood) all but lately brought to light; wherefore we must not conclude, that whatsoever we cannot find out the reason of, or the use,
CHAP. V. Inclination of the Earth's Axis.

that it serveth to, is therefore ineptly made. We shall give one instance of this; the *interstimum cæcum*, in the bodies of men and other animals, seems, at first sight, to be but a mere botch or bungle of nature, and an odd impertinent appendix; neither do we know, that any anatomist or physiologer hath given a rational account thereof, or discovered its use: and yet there being a valve at the entrance of it, these two both together are a most artificial contrivance of nature, and of great advantage for animals, to hinder the regurgitation of the feces upward towards the ventricle.

The first atheiftick instance of the faultiness of things, in the frame of nature, is from the constitution of the heavens, and the disposition of the æquator and ecliptick, intersecting each other in an angle of three and twenty degrees and upwards; whereby, as they pretend, the terrestrial globe is rendered much more uninhabitable than otherwise it might be 1. But this is built upon a false supposition of the ancients, that the torrid zone, or all between the tropicks, was utterly uninhabitable by reason of the extremity of heat. And it is certain, that there is nothing, which doth more demonstrate a Providence than this very thing, it being the most convenient site or disposition, that could be devised, as will appear, if the inconveniences of other dispositions be considered, especially these three; first, If the axes of those circles should be parallel, and their plains coincident; secondly, If they should intersect each other in right angles; and thirdly, (which is a middle between both) If they should cut one another in an angle of forty five degrees. For it is evident, that each of these dispositions would be attended with far greater inconveniences to the terrestrial inhabitants, in respect of the length of days and nights, heat and cold. And that these two circles should continue thus, to keep the same angular intersection, when physical and mechanicke causes would bring them still nearer together; this is a farther eviction of a providence also.

In the next place, the Atheist supposeth, that, according to the general persuasion of Theists, the world and all things therein were created only for the sake of man 2, he thinking to make some advantage for his cause from hence. But this feemeth, at first, to have been an opinion only of some strait-laced Stoicks, though afterward indeed recommended to others also, by their own self-love, their over-weening, and puffy conceit of themselves. And so fleas and lice, had they understanding, might conclude the bodies of other greater animals, and men also, to have been made only for them. But the whole was not properly made for any part, but the parts for the whole, and the whole for the maker thereof. And yet may the things of this lower world be well said to have been made principally, (though not only) for man. For we ought not to monopolize the divine goodnes to ourselves, there being other animals superiour to us, that are not altogether unconcerned neither in this visible creation; and it being reasonable to think, that even the lower animals likewise, and whatsoever hath conscious life, was made

1 Vide Lucret. Lib. V. verf. 201. 2 Id. Lib. II. verf. 174, 175.
made partly also, to enjoy itself. But Atheists can be no fit judges of worlds being made well or ill, either in general, or respectively to mankind, they having no standing measure for well and ill, without a God and morality, nor any true knowledge of themselves, and what their own good or evil consists in. That was at first but a sullen speech of some sullen discontented persons, when things falling not out agreeably to their own private, selfish, and partial appetites, they would revenge themselves, by railing upon nature (that is, Providence) and calling her a stepmother only to mankind, whilst she was a fond, partial, and indulgent mother to other animals, and though this be elegantly set off by Lucretius,

But as for evils in general, from whence the Atheist would conclude the God of the Theist to be either impotent or envious; it hath been already declared, that the true original of them is from the necessity of imperfect beings, and the incomposibility of things; but that the divine art and skill most of all appeareth in bonifying these evils, and making them, like discord in music, to contribute to the harmony of the whole, and the good of particular persons.

Moreover, a great part of those evils, which men are afflicted with, is not from the reality of things, but only from their own phantasy and opinions, according to that of the moralist, Tor&omicum τούς ἄθλους καὶ τὰ περίγραμα, ἀλλὰ τὰ πει τῶν περίγραμαν ἢγιαν. It is not things themselves, that disturb men, but only their own opinions concerning things. And therefore it being much in our own power to be freed from these, Providence is not to be blamed upon the account of them. Pain is many times nearly linked with pleasure, according to that Socratic fable, That when God could not reconcile their contrary natures (as he would) he tied them head and tail together. And good men know, that pain is not the evil of the man, but only of the part so affected, (as Socrates also) Τὸ ἀγῶν ἐν τῷ σκέλει μάνει, It goes no further than the leg where it is. But this is many times very serviceable to free us from the greater evils of the mind; upon which all our happiness dependeth. To the Atheists, who acknowledge no malum culpa, no evil of fault, (turpitude, or dishonesty) death is the greatest and most tragic of all evils. But though this, according to their forlorn hypothesis, be nothing les than an absolute extinction of life; yet, according to the doctrine of the genuine Theists, which makes all souls substantial, no life-of itself (without divine annihilation) will ever quite vanish into nothing, any more than the substance of matter doth. And the ancient Pythagoreans and Platonists have been here so kind, even to the souls of brutes also, as that they might not be left in a state of inactivity and insensibility after death, as to befall upon them certain sublime bodies, which they may then continue to act in. Nor can we think otherwise, but that Aristotel, from this fountain, derived that doctrine of his in his second

2 Lib. V. verf. 223. lib. V. §. XIX. p. 159.
3 Epictet. in Enchiridio, Cap. V. Vide Apud Platon, in Phædon, p. 376.
second book, De Gen. An. c. 3. where, after he had declared the sensitive soul to be inseparable from body, he addeth, πάντες ἴπ τις τοις ψυχής ἰδιμάς ἀνύμοι σώματος οἷον κεκοιμημέναις ἠ τις ἰτιοτι των καλαμάνιν γαρ ζώοι οὐκ ἔνδει νομοτι τιμιότης αἷς ψυχήι γάρ ομοιαὶ ἀλλικαῖ οὕτως ἦν τοιαῦτα διαφέρσαντι φύσει. All souls therefore seem to have another body, and diviner than that of the elements; and as themselves differ in dignity and nobility, so do these bodies of theirs differ from one another. And afterwards calling this subtle body πνεῦμα, or spírit, he affirmeth it to be, ἀνάλογον τοῦ τῶν ἀπεργον τοιχίνι, analogous to the element of the stars. Only as Galen, and S. Austin, and others, have conceived, Arifóstolé deviated here from the Pythagoreans in this, that he supposed the sensitive soul itself to be really nothing else, but this very subtle and star-like body, and not a distinct substance from it, using it only as a vehicle. Nevertheless, he there plainly affirmeth the mind or rational soul to be really distinct from the body, and to come into it from without pre-existing; and consequently should acknowledge also its after-immortality. But whatsoever Ari-stolé’s judgment were (which is not very material) it is certain, that dying to the rational or human soul is nothing but a withdrawing into the ty-ring-house, and putting off the clothing of this terrestrial body. So that it will still continue after death, to live to God, whether in a body, or without it. Though, according to Plato’s express doctrine, the soul is never quite naked of all body, he writing thus; ἡ ψυχὴ ἑπιτησαμένη σώματι, τοτε μὲν ἄλλω τοτε ἄλλω: the soul is always conjoined with a body, but sometimes of one kind, p. 903. and sometimes of another; which many Christian doctors also, as is before p. 672 declared, have thought highly probable. However, our Christian faith assures us, that the souls of good men shall at length be clothed with spiritual and heavenly bodies, such as are, in Arifótolé’s language, ἀνάλογον τοῦ τῶν ἀπεργον τοιχίνι, analogous to the element of the stars. Which Christian resurrection therefore, to life and immortality, is far from being, as Celsus 2 reproached it, αἰκαλέον ἐκ τις, the mere hope of worms. And thus much shall suffice, in way of confutation, of the first atheistical objection against Providence, which is the twelfth argumentation propounded in the second chapter.

The thirteenth atheistical argument, or second objection against Providence, is from the seeming confusion of human affairs; that all things fall alike to all; the innocent and the nocent, the pious and the impious, the religious and the profligate; nay, that many times the worser causes and men prevail against the better, as is intimated in that passage of the poet 3, though in the person of a Theist,

Vixtix causa Deo placuit, sed vita Catoni;

And that the unjust and ungodly often flow in all kind of prosperity, whilst the innocent and devout worshippers of the Deity, all their lives long, conflict with adversity. Whereas, were there a God and Providence, as they conceive, profligate and irreligious persons would be presently thunderstruck from heaven, or otherwise made remarkable objects of divine ven-

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1 P. 672. Tcm. II. Oper.
2 Κρυόν. Lib. V. p.
3 Lucan, Lib. I. Verf. 131.
Providence in the Economy

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Atance, as also the pious miraculously protected and rescued from evil and harms.

Now we grant indeed, that this consideration hath too much puzzled and staggered weak minds in all ages. Because "sentence against an evil work is not executed speedily, therefore is the heart of the sons of men fully set in them to do evil." And the Psalmist himself was sometime much perplexed with this phenomenon, the prosperity of the ungodly, who set their mouths against heaven, and whose tongue walketh through the earth; so that he was tempted to think, "he had cleansed his heart in vain, and washed his hands in innocence; (till at length, entering into the sanctuary of God, his mind became illuminated, and his soul fixed in a firm trust and confidence upon divine providence; Whom have I in heaven but thee, &c. My flesh and my heart faileth, but God is the strength of my heart, and my portion for ever.) For as some will from hence be apt to infer, That there is no God at all, but that blind chance and fortune steer all (the fool hath said in his heart, there is no God) so will others conclude, That though there be a God, yet he either does not know things done here below, (how does God know and is there knowledge in the Most High?) or else will not so far humble himself, or disturb his own ease and quiet, as to concern himself in our low human affairs.

First of all therefore, we here say, that it is altogether unreasonable to require, that divine Providence should miraculously interpose upon every turn in punishing the ungodly, and preserving the pious, and thus perpetually interrupt the course of nature, (which would look but like a botch or bungle, and a violent busines) but rather carry things on ως δυνατόν ἐκλεισόν, in a still and silent path, and shew his art and skill in making things of themselves fairly unwind, and clear up at last into a satisfactory close. Passion and self-interest is blind, or short-sighted; but that, which steers the whole world, is no fond, pettish, impatient and passionate thing, but an impartial, disinterested, and uncapitivated nature. Nevertheless, it is certain, that sometimes we have not wanted instances, in fairs extraordinary, of a ὡς απὸ τῆς θεοῦ, God appearing, as it were, miraculously upon the stage, and manifesting himself in taking immediate vengeance upon notorious malefactors, or delivering his faithful servants from imminent dangers or evils threatened; as the same is often done also by a secret and undiscerned over-ruling of the things of nature. But it must be granted, that it is not always thus, but the periods of divine providence here in this world are commonly longer, and the evolutions thereof slower; according to that of Euripides, which yet has a tang of prophane柔es in the expression,


1 Ecclef. viii. 11. 2 Piat. lxxiii. 3 Piat. xiv. 1. 4 Piat. lxxii. 20.

5 In Orref. Verf. 429. 6 De fera Nummis Vindidâ, Tom. II. Oper. P. 559.
that all things may be carried on with more pomp and solemnity; or lastly, for other particular reasons, as Plutarch ventures to assign one, why it might not be expedient for Dionysius the tyrant, though so profane and irreligious a person, to have been cut off suddenly. But wicked and ungodly persons oftentimes fail not to be met withal at last, and at the long-run, here in this life, and either in themselves or posterity, to be notoriously branded with the marks of divine displeasure: according to that of the poet, &c. It is seldom, that wickedness altogether escapes punishment, though it come slowly after, limping with a lame foot; and those proverbial speeches amongst the Pagans,

"O θείς ἀλήθεια μέλλει, ἀλήθεια δέ λευτά.

Mills of the Gods do slowly wind."

But byd at length to powder grind.

and, Divine justice seals on softly with woollen feet, but strikes at last with iron bands.

Nevertheless we cannot say, that it is always thus neither, but that wicked persons may possibly sometimes have an uninterrupted prosperity here in this life, and no visible marks of divine displeasure upon them: but as the generously virtuous will not envy them upon this account, nor repine at their own condition, they knowing, that "οὐδὲν ημερῶν τῷ ἄραθῷ οὐδὲ τῷ φαύλῳ ἄραθων, There is neither any thing truly evil to the good, nor good to the evil; so are they so far from being staggered herewith in their belief of a God and Providence, that they are rather the more confirmed in their persuasions of a future immortality and judgment after death, when all things shall be set straight and right, and rewards and punishments impartially dispensed. That of Plutarch therefore is most true here, εἰς ὦ ὤ λόγῳ ὦ τῷ Ἱερῷ τῶν προφανῶν ἄμα συ τῷ διάμορφῳ τῆς ἀδερφίνης ψυχής βεβαιών, ἀτερον δὲ τινι αὐτοτπίαν ἀκαίρετα ἰδέαρον, That there is a necessary connexion betwixt those two things, divine providence, and the permanence or immortality of human souls, one and the same reason confirming them both; neither can one of these be taken alone without the other. But they, who, because judgment is not presently executed upon the ungodly, blame the management of things as faulty, and Providence as defective, are like such spectators of a dramatick poem, as when wicked and injurious persons are brought upon the stage, for a while swaggering and triumphing, impatiently cry out against the dramatist, and presently condemn the plot; whereas, if they would but expect the winding up of things, and stay till the last close, they should then see them come off with shame and sufficient punishment. The evolution of the world, as Plotinus calls it, is ἀληθερεφι ποίησα, a truer poem; and we men hisironical actors upon the stage, who, notwithstanding, insert something of our own into the poem too; but God Almighty is that skilful dramatist, who always connecteth that of ours,
which went before, with what of his follows after, into good coherent sense; and will at last make it appear, that a thread of exact justice did run through all, and that rewards and punishments are measured out in geometrical proportion.

Lastly, It is in itself fit, that there should be somewhere a doubtful and cloudy state of things, for the better exercise of virtue and faith. For as there could have been no Hercules, had there not been monsters to subdue; so were there no such difficulties to encounter with, no puzzles and entanglements of things, no temptations and trials to assault us, virtue would grow languid, and that excellent grace of faith want due occasions and objects to exercise itself upon. Here have we therefore such a state of things, and this world is, as it were, a stage erected for the more difficult part of virtue to act upon, and where we are to live by faith, and not by sight; that faith, which is the substance of things to be hoped for, and the evidence of things not seen; a belief in the goodness, power, and wisdom of God, when all things are dark and cloudy round about us. The just shall live by his faith.

We have now sufficiently confuted the second atheistical objection also, against Providence, as to the conduct and oeconomy of human affairs. Nevertheless this is a large field, and much more might be said in defence of Providence, both as to these and other inlets, had we room here to expatiate in. Wherefore, for a supplement of what remains, we shall refer the reader to the writings of others, who have professedly undertaken apologies for Providence, both as to the fabric and oeconomy of the world; but especially the learned and ingenious author 1 of the Divine Dialogues. Only we shall here add some few considerations, not so much for the confusion of Atheists, as for the better satisfaction of such Religionists, who, too easily concluding, that all things might have been much better than they are, are thereupon apt to call in question the divine attribute of goodness in its full extent, which yet is the only foundation of our Christian faith.

First therefore we say, that in judging of the works of God, we ought not to consider the parts of the world alone by themselves; and then, because we could fancy much finer things, thereupon blame the Maker of the whole. As if one should attend only to this earth, which is but the lowest and most dreary part of the universe; or blame plants, because they have not sense; brutes, because they have not reason; men, because they are not demons or angels; and angels, because they are not gods, or want divine perfection. Upon which account, God should either have made nothing at all, since there can be nothing besides himself absolutely perfect, or else nothing but the higher rank of angelical beings, free from mortality, and all those other evils, that attend mankind, or such fine things as Epicurus his gods were feigned to be, living in certain delicious regions 2, where there was neither blustering winds, nor any lowering clouds, nor nipping frosts, nor scorching heat, nor night, nor shadow, but the

1 Dr. Henry More.
2 Vide Lucet. Lib. III. Ver. 19.
the calm and unclouded aether, always smiling with gentle serenity, whereas were there but one kind of thing (the best) thus made, there could have been no music nor harmony at all, in the world, for want of variety. But we ought, in the first place, to consider the whole, whether that be not the best, that could be made, having all that belongeth to it; and then the parts in reference to the whole, whether they be not, in their several degrees and ranks, congruous and agreeable thereunto. But this is a thing, which hath been so well infused upon by Plotinus, that we cannot speak better to it, than in his words: "Ολον γαρ τι ἐποιησε πάλαιαν, ἔργας αὐτοῦ, ὑμᾶς ἠμῖν."

P. 256. Providentia, Ennead. III. lib. II. cap. III. [Lib. II. de Providentia, Ennead. III. lib. II. cap. III.]

But the Whole to be considered.

For we ought to consider the parts, not alone by themselves, but in reference to the whole, whether they be harmonious and agreeable to the same. Otherwise we shall not blame the universe, but some of its parts only, taken by themselves; as if one should blame the hair or toes of a man, taking no notice at all of his divine visage and countenance; or omitting all other animals, one should attend only to the most contemptible of them; or, lastly, overlooking all other men, consider only the most deformed Theristae. But that, which God made, was the whole as one thing; which be that attends to, may bear it speaking to him after this manner: God Almighty hath made me, and from thence came I, perfect and compleat, and standing in need of nothing, because in me are contained all things; plants, and animals, and good souls, and men happy with virtue, and innumerable demons, and many gods. Nor is the earth alone in me adorned with all manner of plants, and variety of animals; or does the power of soul extend as much further than to the seas; as if the whole air, and ether, and heaven, in the mean time, were quite devoid of soul, and altogether unadorned with living inhabitants. Moreover, all things in me desire good, and everything reaches to it, according to its power and nature. For the whole depends upon that first and biggest good, the gods themselves, who reign in my several parts, and all animals, and plants, and whatsoever seems to be inanimate in me. For some things in me partake only of being, some of life also, some of sense, some of reason, and some of intellect above reason. But no man ought to require equal things from unequal; nor that the finger should see, but the eye; it being enough for the finger to be a finger, and to perform its own office. And again, afterwards, ὡσπερ τεκνίτης ὁ πάντα τὰ ἐν τῷ ζῷον ἐπιτρέπει τὸν θεὸν ἐντυπωσάμενον, ὡσπερ ἐν θεῷ πάντα τὰ ἐν τῷ θεῷ εἰσαγόμενα ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν θεῖα, τὸ τῆς ἐπιστήμης ἐνέργειαν, ἐν τῷ θεῷ ὁ δὲ τῷ μὲν τοίχῳ, ὁ δὲ τῷ ἔθελεν τῷ ἐν τῷ θεῷ συγκεντρωμένον, διὸ καὶ ἀναζητῶν τὰ ἡγεσίας ἐν τῷ θεῷ πάντα τὰ ἐν τῷ θεῷ ἀποκάλυπτα, καὶ τοῖς ἐν τῷ θεῷ ἐντυπωσάμενοις. As an artificer would not make
make all things in an animal to be eyes; so neither has the divine eyes, or spermatick reason of the world, made all things gods; but some gods, and some demons, and some men, and some lower animals; not out of envy, but to display its own variety and fecundity. But we are like unskilful speculators of a picture, who condemn the limner, because he hath not put bright colours every where; whereas he had suited his colours to every part respectively, giving to each such as belonged to it. Or else are we like those, who would blame a comedy or tragedy, because they were not all kings or heroes, that acted in it, but some servants and rustic clowns introduced also, talking after their rude fashion. Whereas the dramatick poem would neither be compleat, nor elegant and delightful, were all those worse parts taken out of it.

Again, We cannot certainly conclude, that the works of God and his creation do not transcend those narrow limits, which vulgar opinion and imagination sets them, that commonly terminates the universe, but a little above the clouds, or at most supposes the fixed stars, being all fastned in one solid sphere, to be the utmost wall, or arched roof, and rolling circumference thereof. Much less ought we, upon such groundless suppositions, to infer, that the world might therefore have been made much better than it is, because it might have been much more roomy and capacious. We explode the atheistical infinity of distant worlds; nor can we admit that Cartesian, seemings more modest, indefinite extension of one corporeal universe, which yet really, according to that philosopher's meaning, hath nullos fines, no bounds nor limits at all. For we persuade ourselves, that the corporeal world is as uncapable of a positive infinity of magnitude, as it is of time; there being no magnitude so great, but that more still might be added to it. Nevertheless, as we cannot possibly imagine the sun to be a quarter, or an hundredth part so big as we know it to be; so much more may the whole corporeal universe far transcend those narrow bounds, which our imagination would circumcribe it in. The new celestial phenomena, and the late improvements of astronomy and philosophy made thereupon, render it so probable, that even this dull earth of ours is a planet, and the sun a fixed star in the centre of that vortex, wherein it moves, that many have shrewdly suspected, that there are other habitable globes, besides this earth of ours, (which may be round about in a year or two) as also more suns, with their respective planets, than one. However, the distance of all the fixed stars from us being so vast, that the diameter of the great orb makes no discernible parallel in the sight of them; from whence it is also probable, that the other fixed stars are likewise vastly distant from one another: this, I say, widens the corporeal universe to us, and makes those flammantia mania mundi, as Lucretius calls them, those flaming walls of the world, to fly away before us. Now, it is not reasonable to think, that all this immense vastness should lie waste, desert, and uninhabited, and have nothing in it that could praise the Creator thereof, save only this one small spot of earth. In my father's house (faith our Saviour) are many mansions. And Baruch, (chapter iii. appointed by our church to be read publickly) O Israel, bow

* Lib. I. verf. 73, 74.
great is the house of God, and how large is the place of his possession? Great and bath no end, high and unmeasurable. Which yet we understand not of an absolute infinity, but only such an immense vastness, as far transcends vulgar opinion and imagination.

We shall add but one thing more, that, to make a right judgment of the ways of providence, and the justice thereof, as to the economy of mankind, we must look both forwards and backwards, or besides the present, not only upon the future, but also the past time. Which rule is likewise thus set down by Plutus: "οθ' έκείνων αποθελέσθη τού λόγου, θ' έ ή πρός το παρόν έκάστοτε φησί βλέπειν' αλλά πρός τας πρόδει περισσε, ή αύ το μέλλων." Neither is that doctrine of the ancients to be neglected, that, to give an account of Providence, we ought to look back upon former periods, as well as forward to what is future. Indeed he, and those other philosophers, who were religious, understood this fo as to conclude a pre-existent state of all particular souls, wherein they were at first created by God pure, but by the abuse of their own liberty degenerated, to be a necessary hypothesis, for the solving that phenomenon of the depraved state of mankind in general here in this life. And not only so, but they endeavoured in like manner to give an account also of those different conditions of particular persons as to morality, from their infancy, and their other different states here, deriving them all, in τον προεξιστόμων, from their several demeanours before in a pre-existent state. And there have not wanted Christian doctors, who have complied with these philosophers in both. But our common Christianness only agrees thus far, as to suppose a kind of imputative pre-existence in Adam, in whom all were created pure, and so consequently involved in his after-miscarriage, to solve the pravity of human nature; upon which account we are all said to be, ὅθεν έίπον ὃγγισ', by nature children of wrath. But as for the different conditions of persons, and their several states, more disadvantageous to some than others, this indeed the generality of Christian doctors have been content to resolve, only into an occult, but just Providence. And thus does Origens himself sometimes modestly pass it over, as in his third book against Celsus: "πολλαί αύτά τὸ έκείνων τούτων περίθεται, ὡς μακρόθεν φανεραίων ἐπώρτησαν τοὺς Κριτικοτης, ἵνα ἐπιτρεπτέραι, τοιών λαβέναι. ἀλλ' ηδή πρὸς τήν ἡμείς ἦττον ἐκ παιδείας εἶναι αναλοίαν. οἵ ἐγείροντες εἰν ἀληθείᾳ, ἐκ γεγονοῦσας, τῆς ιερους τετωνοί τοσοῦτος ἑπάχθη τῷ άταμῳ τῆς ἐπαινόμενής ἄλλο τούτους τέλειον διὰ ποιήσαν, τις δὲ πρωτος άτος τούτων τετωνοί μεί εἶναι, εἴ τις τού παρεκάμος λόγους. πίπτειν δὲ αὐτας τύχαις, εἰκ τοῖς ἐγείροντες. It happened to many, so to have been brought up from their very childhood, as that, by one means or other, they could have no opportunity at all of thinking of the better things, &c. And it is very probable, that there are causes of these things in the reasons of providence, though they do not easily fall under human notice.

But there is yet a third atheistical objection against Providence behind, That it is impossible any one being should animadvert and order all things in the distant places of the world at once; and, were this possible, yet would such infinite negligence be very uneasy and disquieting to it, and altogether inconsistent.

1 Eph. ii. 5.
ficient with happiness. Nor would a being, irrefitibly powerful, concern itself in the good or welfare of any thing else, it standing in need of nothing, and all benevolence and good-will arising from indigency and imbecility, Wherefore such a being would wholly be taken up in the enjoyment of itself, and its own happiness, utterly regardless of all other things.

To which the reply is, first, That though ourselves, and all created beings, have but a finite animadversion, and narrow sphere of activity; yet does it not therefore follow, that the case must be the same with the Deity, supposed to be a Being infinitely perfect, \( \text{απειροδοξουμενος} \), that hath no manner of defect, either of knowledge or power in it. But this is a mere idolium specus, an idol of the case or den; men measuring the Deity by their own canting and narrowness. And indeed, were there nothing at all but what we ourselves could fully comprehend, there could be no God. Were the fun an animal, and had life co-extended with its rays and light, it would see and perceive every atom of matter, that its outstretched beams reached to, and touched. Now all created beings are themselves, in some sense, but the rays of the Deity, which therefore cannot but feel and sensibly perceive all these its own effluxes and emanations. Men themselves can order and manage affairs in several distant places at once, without any disturbance; and we have innumerable notions of things in our mind, that lie there easily together, without crouding one another, or causing any distraction to us.

Nevertheless, the minds of weak mortals may here be somewhat eased and helped, by considering what hath been before suggested; that there is no necessity God Almighty should \( \text{απειροδοξουμενος απαντα} \), do all things himself immediately and knowingly; but he may have his inferior ministers and executioners under him, to discharge him of that supposed encumbrance. As first of all, an artificial plastick nature, which, without knowledge and animal consciousness, dispenses the matter of the universe according to the platform or idea of a perfect mind, and forms the bodies of all animals. And this was one reason, why we did before insist so much upon this artificial, regular, and methodical nature, namely, that divine providence might neither be excluded from having an influence upon all things in this lower world, as resulting only from the fortuitous motions of senseless matter, unguided by any mind; nor yet the Deity be supposed to do every thing itself immediately and miraculously, without the subservient ministry of any natural causes, which would seem to us mortals, to be not only a violent, but also an operose, cumberome, and moliminous business. And thus did Plato\textsuperscript{2} acknowledge, that there were, \( \text{γυφεονος} \text{ φεως αιτια αυς} \), \( \text{αναγερουσις χειται} \) \( \text{ο θεος} \). Certain causes of a prudent, that is, artificial and orderly nature, which God makes use of, as subservient to himself in the mundane economy. Besides which, those instincts also impressed upon animals, and which they are passive to, directing them to act for ends either not understood, or not attended to by them, in order to their own good

\( ^1 \) Vide Xenophonem de Memorabilib. So-\( ^2 \) In Timaeo, §. XXXVI. p. 256. etatis, Lib. I. p. 575.
and the good of the universe, are another part of that divine fate, which, inferred into things themselves, is the servant and executioner of Providence. Above all which, there are yet other knowing and understanding ministers of the Deity, as its eyes and hands; daemonick or angelick beings, appointed to preside over mankind, all mundane affairs, and the things of nature; they having their several distinct offices and provinces assigned them. Of which also Plato thus; τατοιοι ειδος ἀρχοντες προσταταιρῶι εικάτοις, ετί τὸ σμικρότατον αἰτὶ πάσης ἀρχῆς: There are certain rulers or presidents appointed by the supreme God, who governs the whole world, over all the several things and parts therein, even to the smallest distribution of them. All which inferior caues are constantly overlooked and supervised by the watchful eye of God Almighty himself, who may also sometimes extraordinarily interpose.

We need not, therefore, restrain and confine divine Providence to a few greater things only, as some do, that we may thereby consult the ease of the Deity, and its freedom from distraction; but may and ought to extend it to all things whatsoever, small as well as great. And indeed the great things of the world cannot well be ordered neither, without some regard to the small and little: οὐδὲ τὸν σμικράτατον τὸ μεγάλον Πασῶς οἱ λεγοντες λέοντες ἐξ ἰδίως οὐχ ἡ ἀρχὴ; as architects affirm, that great stones cannot be well placed together in a building without little. Neither can generals of armies, nor governours of families, nor masters of ships, nor mechanic artificers, discharge their several functions, and do their works respectively as they ought, did they not mind small things also, as well as the great. Μὴ τοιοῦτο (faith the formentioned philosopher *) τὸν γὰρ καλὸν τὸν μεγάλον λόγον τὸν θεον ἀκτίως μην διέφθερα, τὸ τῶν πραξιῶν πρῶτον ἡμῶν, τὸ τῶν ἀκτίων ἡ ἀρχὴ ἡ ἡπειρωτικὴ μὴ τίτλον σμικρὰτα ἡ μεγάλα ἀπεργάζωσι: Let us therefore make God Almighty inferior to mortal opificers, who, by one and the same art, can order small things as well as great; and so suppose him to be supine and negligent. Nevertheless, the chief concernment and employment of divine Providence in the world is the oeconomy of souls, or government of rational beings, which is by Plato contracted into this compendium; ὅπερ τὸν ἱερὸν τὸν παντελὲν λέγεις τὸ μὲν ἁμαρτίων γνώμην ἔκτος εἰς βελτίων τὸν χειρὸν εἴναι τῶν χειρον, ἑκκ. There is no other work left for the supreme Governor of all, than only to translate better souls into better places and conditions, and worser into worser; or, as he after addeth, to dispose of every one in the world in such a manner, as might best render ἡμῶν ἀφαίρεσιν, τίμημαν ἐνορία τιμόμενον ἐν καθεκιστήρι, virtue victorious, and triumphant over vice. And thus may the flow and imperfect wits of mortals be satisfied, that Providence to the Deity is no moliminous, laborious, and distraughtious thing.

But that there is no higher spring of life in rational animals, than contracted self-love, and that all good-will and benevolence ariseth only from indigency and imbecility, and that no being whatsoever is concerned in the welfare of any other thing, but only what itself stands in need of; and lastly therefore, that what is irreftitibly powerful, and needs nothing, would

* * Plato de Legib. Lib. X. p. 671.  a Ibid.
have no manner of benevolence, nor concern itself in the good and welfare of any thing whatsoever; this is but another idol of the Atheists den, and only argues their bad nature, low-funk minds, and grofs immorality. And, the same is to be said also of that other maxim of theirs, That what is perfectly happy would have nothing at all to do, but only enjoy its own ease and quiet; whereas there is nothing more troublesome to ourselves, than this ἄνεξας, this having nothing to do; and the activity of the Deity, or a perfect Being, is altogether as easy to it, as its essence.

The atheiftick queries come next to be answered; which, being but three, are naturally to be dispofed of in this order: First, If there were a God, or perfect Being, who therefore was sufficiently happy in the enjoyment of himself, why would he be about to make a world? Secondly, If he must needs make a world, why did he not make it sooner? this late production thereof looking, as if he had been newly awakened out of a long sleep throughout infinite past ages, or else had in length of time contracted a satiety of his solitude. Thirdly and lastly, What tools or instruments? what machines or engines bad be? Or how could be move the matter of the whole world, especially if incorporeal? because then he would run through all things, and could not lay hold, nor fasten upon any thing.

To the first therefore we say, That the reason, why God made the world, was from his own overflowing and communicative gooodsness, that there might be other beings also happy, besides him, and enjoy themselves. Nor does this at all clash with God’s making of the world for his own glory and honour; though Plotinus 1 were so shy of that, γελοῖον ἕνα τιμωτα, γα μεταφέρον ἀπὸ τῶν ἀγαλματικῶν τῶν θεῶν, It is ridiculous to say, that God made the world, that he might be honoured; this being to transfer the affections of human artificers and flatsaries upon him. But the chief reason of his laying so was, because that philosopher conceived the world to have proceeded, not so much from the will of the Deity, as the necessity of its nature. Though this be true also, that God did not make the world meere to ostentate his skill and power, but to communicate his goodness, which is chiefly and properly his glory, as the light and splendour of the sun is the glory of it. But the Atheist demands, What hurt had it been for us never to have been made? and the answer is easy, We should then never have enjoyed any good, or been capable of happiness; and had there been no rational creatures at all made, it must have been either from impotent sterility in the Dity, or else from an invidious, narrow, and contracted selfishness, or want of benignity, and communicative goodness; both which are inconsistent with a perfect Being. But the argument may be thus retorted upon these Atheists; What hurt would it be for us to cease to be, or become nothing? And why then are these Atheists, as well as others, so unwilling to die?

But then in the next place they urge, Why was not the world made sooner, since this goodness of God was without date, and from everlafting?

1 Vide Diogen. Laert. Lib. X. Segm. 159. 2 Libro contra Gnosticos, Ennead. II. Lib. IX. Cap. IV. p. 262.
But this question may be taken in two different senses; either, Why was not the world from eternity, as God and his goodness are eternal? or else, secondly, If the world could not be from eternity, yet, notwithstanding, why was it not sooner, but so lately made? In both which queries the atomick Atheists take it for granted, that the system of the world was not from eternity, but had a beginning. Now we say, that the reason, why the world was not made from eternity, was not from any defect of goodness in the divine will, but because there is an absolute impossibility in the thing itself; or because the necessity and incapacity of such an imperfect being hindered. For we must confess, that, for our parts, we are prone to believe, that could the world have been from eternity, it should certainly have been so. And just thus does Philoponus, in his confutation of Proclus his arguments for the world’s eternity, cavell.] declare himself, and no otherwise: Και ουκ από μη έισε τιν ηνόμον αδεων ούτων δέμεσα, έτε το εν τον Θεον αει άραξαν αφαξαμεσα, έτε αδελφαν τις άλλας αναυαξεις αυτη καταγραφειν δαμακεις, αλλα μη άλλας αει εισε του ηνόμον δι αυτον τι τε λεγειν ήν άλλοις Φιλοπονος ουκ αυτεις. Ourselves also supposing the world not to have been eternal, do neither ascribe this to any defect either of goodness or of power in the Deity, but only to the impossibility of the thing itself. Where, in the following words, he gives a two-fold account of this impossibility of the world’s eternity: οτε τε το άξιωμα κατ’ ιναμειαν ηποτων η διεξεις εισει, αδελφικυ λεγει έτε οτε σφαλας εισε το ποιειτο το γνώμενον θεου εις έχει έχει. First, because there can be nothing actually infinite, and yet run through, as all the past duration of the world hath been; and secondly, because that, which is made, or brought into being by another, as a distinct thing from it, cannot be co-eternal with its maker. Where it is probable, that Philoponus, being a Christian, designed not to oppose the eternal generation of the Son of God, but only to assert that nothing, which was properly made or created by God, and nothing, which was not itself God, could be from eternity, or without beginning. And now we see, how those atheistical exceptions against the novelty of the divine creation, as if God must therefore either have slept from eternity, or else have at length contracted a fatuity of his former solitude, and the like, do of themselves quite vanish into nothing. But then, as to the second sense of the question, Why the world, though it could not possibly be from eternity, yet was no sooner, but so lately made? we say, that this is an absurd question; both because time was made together with the world, and there was no sooner or later before time; and also because whatsoever had a beginning, must of necessity be once but a day old. Wherefore the world could not possibly have been so made by God in time, as not to be once but five or six thousand years old, and no more; as now it is.

And as for the third and last query, How God could move and command the matter of the whole world, especially if incorporeal? we reply; first, that all other things being derived from God, as their only fountain and original, and essentially depending on him, who, by his absolute power also, could annihilate whatsoever he created;
he must needs have a despotic power over all; and every thing whatsoever be naturally subject and obsequious to him. And since no body can possibly move itself, that, which first moved matter, must of necessity be incorporeal; nor could it move it by local motion, as one body moves another, or as engines and machines move by truflion or pulsion, they being before moved, but must do it by another kind of action, such as is not local motion, nor heterokinesy, but autokinesy; that is, by cogitation. Wherefore, that conceit of the Atheists, that an incorporeal Deity could not possibly move the matter of the world, because it would run through it, and could not fasten or lay hold thereupon, is absurd, because this moves matter not mechanically, but vitally, and by cogitation only. And that a cogitative being, as such, hath a natural imperium over matter, and power of moving it, without any engines or machines, is unquestionably certain, even from our own souls; which move our bodies, and command them every way, meerly by will and thought. And a perfect mind, presiding over the matter of the whole world, could much more irresistibly, and with infinitely more ease, move the whole corporeal universe, meerly by will and cogitation, than we can our bodies.

The last head of atheiftick argumentation is from interest. And first, the Atheists would persuade, that it is the interest of mankind in general, and of every particular person, that there should be no God, that is, no Being infinitely powerful, that hath no law, but its own will; and therefore may punish, whom he pleases, eternally after death.

To which our first reply is, that if there be a God, and souls be immortal, then is it not any man's thinking otherwise, that will alter the case, nor afford the Atheists any relief against those two imagined evils of theirs. For things are fullen, and will be as they are, whatever we think them, or wish them to be; and men will at last discover their error, when perhaps it may be too late. Wishing is no proving; and therefore this atheiftick argument from interest is no argument at all against the existence of a God, it being nothing but the ignorant wish, and vain desire of befotted Atheists.

In the next place, this wish of Atheists is altogether founded upon a mistaken notion of God Almighty too, that he is nothing but arbitrary will omnipotent; which indeed is not the most desirable thing. But as it hath been often declared, the will of God is the will of goodness, justice, and wisdom itself omnipotent. His will is not meer will, such as hath no other reason besides itself; but it is law, equity, and chancery; it is the to δίκαιον, or Ought itself, decreeing, willing, and acting. Neither does God punish any, out of a delight in punishment, or in the evil and suffering of the persons punished; but to those, who are not αἰτίου, altogether incurable, διὰ κακίας, his punishment is physic, in order to their recovery and amendment; so that the source and fountain thereof is goodness to the
CHAP. V. Infinite Hopes from the Deity.

the persons themselves punished. But to such as are incurable, the punishment inflicted on them is intended for the good of the whole. So that this attribute of justice in God doth not at all clash with the attribute of goodness, it being one branch thereof, or particular modification of the same. Goodness and justice in God are always complicated together; neither his goodness being fondness, nor his justice cruelty; but he being both good in punishing, and just in rewarding and dispensing benefits. Wherefore, it can be the interest of none, that there should be no God nor immortality, unless perhaps of such desperately and incurably wicked persons, who abandoning their true interest of being good, have thereupon no other interest now left them, than not to be, or become nothing.

To be without a God, is to be without hope in the world; for Atheists can have neither faith, nor hope, in fenelefs matter, and the fortuitous motions thereof. And though an understanding being have never so much enjoyment of itself for the present, yet could it not possibly be happy, without immortality, and security of the future continuance thereof. But the Atheists conclude, that there is nothing immortal, and that all life perishes and vanishes into nothing; and consequently also, that \( \textit{σοφός} \) \( \textit{ανθρώπος} \), happiness is a thing, that hath no existence in nature, a mere figment and chimæra, or idle wish and vain dream of mortals. Wherefore it cannot be the interest of mankind, that this hypothesis should be true, which thus plainly cuts off all hope from men, and leaves them in an utter impossibility of being ever happy.

God is such a being, as if he could be supposed not to be, there is nothing, which any, who are not desperately engaged in wickedness, no not Atheists themselves, could possibly more with for, or desire. To believe a God, is to believe the existence of all possible good and perfection in the universe; it is to believe, that things are as they should be, and that the world is so well framed and governed, as that the whole system thereof could not possibly have been better. For peccability arises from the necessity of imperfect free-willed beings, left to themselves, and therefore could not by omnipotence itself have been excluded; and though sin actual might perhaps have been kept out by force and violence, yet, all things computed, it was doubtless most for the good of the whole, that it should not be thus forcibly hindered. There is nothing, which cannot be hoped for, by a good man, from the Deity; whatsoever happiness his being is capable of, and such things, as eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, nor can now enter into the heart of man to conceive. Infinite hopes lie before us, from the existence of a Being infinitely good and powerful, and our own souls' immortality; and nothing can hinder or obstruct these hopes, but our own wickedness of life. To believe a God, and do well, are two the most hopeful, cheerful, and comfortable things, that possibly can be. And to this purpose is that of Linus;

Wherefore, as for Democritus and Epicurus, whose encomiums the Atheists here so loudly sing forth, we say, that however they have made so great a noise in the world, and have been so much cried up of late, yet were they really no better than a couple of infatuated sophists, or witty fools, and debauchers of mankind.

And now come we to the last atheistical argumentation, wherein they endeavour to recommend their doctrine to civil sovereigns, and to persuade them, that theism or religion is absolutely inconsistent with their interest; their reasons for which are these three following. First, because the civil sovereign reigns only in fear; and therefore, if there be any power and fear greater than the power and fear of the Leviathan, civil authority can signify little. Secondly, because sovereignty is in its own nature absolutely indivisible, and must be either infinite, or none at all; so that divine laws (natural and revealed) superior to it, circumscribing it, would consequently destroy it. Wherefore religion and theism must of necessity be displaced, and removed out of the way, to make room for the Leviathan to roll and tumble in. Thirdly and lastly, private judgment of good and evil, just and unjust, is also contradictory to the very being of a body politic; which is one artificial man, made up of many natural men united under one head, having one common reason, judgment and will, ruling over the whole. But conscience, which religion introduces, is private judgment of good and evil, just and unjust, and therefore altogether inconsistent with true politics; that can admit of no private confinences, but only one publick conscience of the law.

In way of answer to the first of which, we must here briefly unravel the atheistical ethicks and politicks. The foundation whereof is first laid in the villainizing of human nature; as that, which has not so much as any the least seeds, either of politickness, or ethicalness at all in it; nothing of equity and philanthropy; (there being no other charity or benevolence any where, according to them, save what results from fear, imbecillity, and indigency) nothing of publick and common concern, but all private and selfish; appetite and utility, or the desires of sensual pleasure, and honour, dominion, and precelency before others, being the only measures of good in nature. So that there can be nothing naturally just or unjust, nothing in itself sinful or unlawful, but every man by nature hath jus ad omnia, a right to every thing, whatsoever his appetite inclineth him unto, or himself judgeth profitable; even to other men’s bodies and lives. Si occidere cupis, jus habes; if thou desirest to kill, thou hast then naturally a right thereto; that is, a liberty to kill without any sin or injustice. For jus and lex, or justitia, right and law, or justice, in the language of these atheistical politicians, are directly contrary to one another; their right being
a bellonie liberty, not made, or left by justice, but such as is founded in a
supposition of its absolute non-existence. Should therefore a son not only
murder his own parents, who had tenderly brought him up, but also ex-
quifitely torture them, taking pleasure in beholding their rueful looks, and
hearing their lamentable shrieks and outcries, there would be nothing of
sin or injustice at all in this, nor in any thing else; because justice is no na-
ture, but a meer factitious and artificial thing, made only by men, and ci-
vil laws. And, according to these men's apprehensions, nature has been very
kind and indulgent to mankind herein, that it hath thus brought us into the
world, without any fetters or shackles upon us, free from all duty and ob-
ligation, justice and morality, these being to them nothing but restraints
and hindrances of true liberty. From all which it follows, that nature ab-
solutely dissociates and segregates men from one another, by reason of the
inconsistency of those appetites of theirs, that are all carried out only to
private good, and consequently, that every man is, by nature, in a state of
war and hostility against every man.

In the next place therefore, these atheiftick politicians further add, that
though this their state of nature, which is a liberty from all justice and
obligation, and a lawless, loose, or bellonie right to every thing, be in itself
absolutely the best; yet nevertheless by reason of men's imbecillity, and
the equality of their strengths, and inconsistency of their appetites, it proves
by accident the worst; this war with every one making men's right or li-
berty to every thing indeed a right or liberty to nothing; they having no
security of their lives, much less of the comfortable enjoyment of them.
For as it is not possible, that all men should have dominion, (which were
indeed the most desirable thing, according to these principles) so the gene-
rality must needs be sensible of more evil in such a state of liberty with
an universal war against all, than of good. Wherefore, when men had
been a good while hewing, and slashing, and justling against one an-
other, they became at length all weary hereof, and conceived it necessary
by art to help the defect of their own power here, and to chufe a lef-
fer evil, for the avoiding of a greater; that is, to make a voluntary abate-
ment of this their infinite right, and to submit to terms of equality with
one another, in order to a sociable and peaceable cohabitation; and not
only so, but also for the security of all, that others should observe such
rules as well as themselves, to put their necks under the yoke of a common
coercive power, whose will being the will of them all, should be the very
rule, and law, and measure of justice to them.

Here therefore these atheiftick politicians, as they first of all flander hu-
man nature, and make a villain of it; so do they, in the next place, re-
proach justice and civil sovereignty also, making it to be nothing, but an
ignoble and basely brat of fear; or else a lefser evil, submitted to mere-
ly out of necessity, for the avoiding of a greater evil, that of war with
every one, by reason of men's natural imbecillity. So that according to
this
Justice to Atheistics a necessary Evil. Book I.

this hypothesis, justice and civil government are plainly things not good in themselves, nor desireable, (they being a hinderance of liberty, and nothing but shackles and fetters,) but by accident only, as necessary evils: and thus do these politicians themselves sometimes distinguish betwixt good and just, that bonum amatur per se, justum per accidentem; good is that, which is loved for itself, but just by accident. From whence it follows unavoidably, that all men must of necessity be atores δίκαιοι, unwillingly just, or not with a full and perfect, but mixt will only; just being a thing, that is not sincerely good, but such as hath a great dash or dose of evil blended with it. And this was the old atheistic generation of justice, and of a body politic, civil society, and sovereignty. For though a modern writer affirm this hypothesis (which he looks upon as the only true scheme of politicke) to be a new invention, as the circulation of the blood, and no older than the book de Civis, yet is it certain, that it was the commonly received doctrine of the atheistic politicians and philosophers before Plato's time; who represent their sense concerning the original of justice, and civil society in this manner:

De Rep. 1. 2. ο διδον οέτον έτερα περι τηταί ακη, τι τε δι τυχαιον ήο έτον γένος δικαιοσυνα περικοις γαρ δι Φασι το μεν αδικειον αχαζον, το δε αδικεια καινοι πλεον δε καινοι υπερεξαλλην το αδικεθαν, δ αυχοι το αδικεια. άντι ιπτειν αλληλοις αδικαιοι τε ή αδικαιοι, ή αμφοτεροι γενουναι, τοις μη δυναμεις το μεν εκφυλην το δε αειν, δοκει λοιπον ευθειαν αλληλοις, μηδ αδικει, μηδ αδικειαν, αντι ιπτειν ή αδικειαν νομος τιειαν, ήδ ονομασαι το υπο το νομο ιπτειαν νομιμον τε ή δικαιοι. Αμ να declare first what justice is, according to the sense of these philosophers, and from whence it was generated. They say therefore, that by nature, lawless liberty, and to do that, which is now called injustice, and injury to other men, is good; but to suffer it from others, is evil. But of the two, there is more of evil in suffering it, than of good in doing it: whereupon when men had cloathed a good while, doing and suffering injury, the greater part, who by reason of their imbecility were not able to take the former without the latter, at length compounded the bunioness amongst themselves, and agreed together by pacts and covenants, neither to do nor suffer injury, but to submit to rules of equality, and make laws by compact, in order to their peaceable cohabitation, they calling that, which was required in those laws, by the name of just. And then is it added; ή εισι ταυτων γενοι τε ή αλλων δικαιοσυνει, μεταξι άυτων το μεν αρειον διον, ένω αδικοι μη διον δικα, τω δι καινε το δε δικαιον έν μεγα δι των αμφοτεροι, αγαπαται άλλ ια αγαζον, άλλ οι άρρωσται το αδικεια τιμαμουν. And this is, according to these philosophers, the generation and essence of justice, as a certain middle thing betwixt the best and the worst. The best, to exercise a lawless liberty of doing whatsoever one please to other men without suffering any inconvenience from it; and the worst to suffer evil from others, without being able to revenge it. Justice therefore, being a middle thing betwixt both these, is loved, not as that which is good in itself, but only by reason of men's imbecility, and their inability to do injustice. For as much as he, that bad sufficient power, would never enter into such compacts, and submit to equality and subjection. As for example, if a man bad Gyges his magical ring, that he could do whatsoever he listed, and not be seen or taken notice of by any, such
Their Authority, made by Words.

a one would certainly never enter into covenants, nor submit to laws of equality and subjection. Agreeably whereunto, it hath been concluded also by some of these old atheistic philosophers, that justice was ἀλήθεια ἀγαθός, Not properly and directly one's own good, the good of him, that is just, but another man's good, partly of the fellow-citizens, but chiefly of the ruler, whofe vassal he is. And it is well known, that after Plato's time, this hypothesis concerning justice, that it was a mere factitious thing, and sprung only from men's fear and imbecillity, as a lesser evil, was much insisted on by Epicurus also.

But let us in the next place see, how our modern atheistic philosophers and politicians, will manage and carry on this hypothesis, so as to consolate men by art into a body politic, that are naturally dissociated from one another, as also make justice and obligation artificial, when there is none in nature. First of all therefore, these artificial justice-makers, city-makers, and authority-makers, tell us, that though men have an infinite right by nature, yet may they alienate this right, or part thereof, from themselves, and either simply renounce it, or transfer the same upon some other person; by means whereof it will become unlawful for themselves, afterwards, to make use thereof. Thus a late writer, men may by signs declare, Velle se non licitem sibi amplius fore curium aliquid facere, quod iure antea feciffi poenit; That it is their will, it shall no longer be lawful for them, to do something, which before they had a right to do; and this is called by him, a simple renunciation of right. And further, faith he, they may declare again Velle se non licitem sibi amplius fore aliqui refistere, &c. That it is their will, it shall be no longer lawful for them, to resist this or that particular person, whom before they might lawfully have resisted; and this is called a translation of right. But if there be nothing in its own nature unlawful, then cannot this be unlawful for a man afterwards, to make use of such liberty, as he had before in words renounced or abandoned. Nor can any man, by his mere will, make any thing unlawful to him, which was not so in itself; but only suspend the exercise of so much of his liberty, as he thought good. But however, could a man by his will oblige himself, or make any thing unlawful to him, there would be nothing got by this, because then might he, by his will, disoblige himself again, and make the same lawful as before. For what is made meerly by will, may be destroyed by will. Wherefore, these politicians will yet urge the busines further, and tell us, that no man can be obliged but by his own act, and that the essence of injustice is nothing else but dati repetitio, the taking away of that, which one had before given. To which we again reply, that were a man naturally unobliged to any thing, then could he no way be obliged to stand to his own act, so that it should be really unjust and unlawful for him, at any time, upon second thoughts, voluntarily to undo, what he had before voluntarily done. But the Atheists here plainly render injustice a meer ludicrous thing, when they tell us, that it is nothing but such an absurdity in life, as it is in dispute, when a man denies a proposition, that he had before granted;

Vol. II. 5 Y which

Hobbes, Elem., de Cive, Cap. II. §. IV. 2 Id. ibid. Cap. III. §. III. 3 Id. ibid.
which is no real evil in him as a man, but only a thing called an absurdity, as a disputant. That is, injustice is no absolute evil of the man; but only a relative incongruity in him, as a citizen. As when a man speaking Latin, observes not the laws of grammar, this is a kind of injustice in him, as a Latinist or grammarian; so when one, who lives in civil society, observes not the laws and conditions thereof, this is, as it were, the false Latin of a citizen, and nothing else. According to which notion of injustice, there is no such real evil or hurt in it, as can any way withstand the force of appetite and private utility, and oblige men to civil obedience, when it is contrary to the same. But these political jugglers and enchanter will here cast yet a further mist before men’s eyes with their pacts and covenants. For men by their covenants, say they, may unquestionably oblige themselves, and make things unjust and unlawful to them, that were not so before. Wherefore, injustice is again defined by them, and that with more speciousness, to be the breach of covenants. But though it be true, that if there be natural justice, covenants will oblige; yet, upon the contrary supposition, that there is nothing naturally unjust, this cannot be unjust neither, to break covenants. Covenants, without natural justice, are nothing but mere words and breath; (as indeed these atheistical politicians themselves, agreeably to their own hypothesis, call them) and therefore can they have no force to oblige. Wherefore, these justice-makers are themselves at last necessitated to fly to laws of nature, and to pretend this to be a law of nature, that men should stand to their pacts and covenants. Which is plainly to contradict their main fundamental principle, that by nature nothing is unjust or unlawful; for if it be so, then can there be no laws of nature; and if there be laws of nature, then must there be something naturally unjust and unlawful. So that this is not to make justice, but clearly to unmake their own hypothesis, and to suppose justice to have been already made by nature, or to be in nature; which is a gross absurdity in supposition, to affirm what one had before denied. But these their laws of nature are indeed nothing but juggling equivocation, and a meer mockery; themselves again acknowledging them to be no laws, because law is nothing but the word of him, who hath command over others; but only conclusions or theorems concerning what conduce to the conservation and defence of themselves, upon the principle of fear; that is, indeed the laws of their own timorous and cowardly complexion: for they, who have courage and generosity in them, according to this hypothesis, would never submit to such sneaking terms of equality and subjection, but venture for dominion, and resolve either to win the saddle, or lose the horse. Here therefore do our atheistical politicians plainly dance round in a circle; they first deriving the obligation of civil laws, from that of covenants, and then that of covenants from the laws of nature; and lastly, the obligation both of these laws of nature, and of covenants themselves, again, from the law, command, and sanction of the civil sovereign; without which neither of them would at all oblige. And thus is it manifest, how vain the attempts of these politicians are, to make justice artificially, when there is no such thing naturally; (which is indeed no less than to make something out of nothing.)
thing) and by art to confocitate into bodies politic those, whom nature had dissociated from one another; a thing as impossible, as to tie knots in the wind or water; or to build up a stately palace or castle out of sand. Indeed the ligaments, by which these politicians would tie the members of their huge Leviathan, or artificial man together, are not so good as cobwebs; they being really nothing, but meer will and words: for if authority and sovereignty be made only by will and words, then is it plain, that by will and words they may be unmade again at pleasure.

Neither indeed are these atheiftick politicians themselves altogether unaware hereof, that this their artificial justice and obligation can be no firm vinculum of a body politic, to confocitate those together, and unite them into one, who are naturally dissociated and divided from one another; they acknowledging, that covenants without the sword, being but words and breath, are of no strength to hold the members of their Leviathan, or body politic together. Wherefore, they plainly betake themselves at length from art to force and power, and make their civil sovereign really to reign only in fear. And this must needs be their meaning, when they so constantly declare all obligation, just and unjust, to be derived only from law; they by law there understanding a command directed to such as by reason of their imbecillity are not able to resist: so that the will and command of the more powerful obliges by the fear of punishment threatened. Now, if the only real obligation to obey civil laws be from the fear of punishment, then could no man be obliged to hazard his life for the safety of his prince and country; and they, who could reasonably promise themselves impunity, would be altogether disobligeed, and consequently might juftly break any laws, for their own advantage. An assertion so extravagant, that these confounded politicians themselves are ashamed plainly to own it, and therefore disguise it, what, they can by equivocation; themselves sometimes also confessing so much of truth, that Pena non obligat, sed obligatum tenet, punishment does not oblige, but only holds those to their duty, whom were before obliged. Furthermore, what is made by power and force only, may be unmade by power and force again. If civil sovereigns reign only in the fear of their own sword, then is that right of theirs so much talked of, indeed nothing else but might, and their authority, force; and consequenty successful and prosperous rebellion, and whatsoever can be done by power, will be ipso facto thereby justified. Lastly, were civil sovereigns, and bodies politic, meer violent and contra-natural things, then would they all quickly vanish into nothing, because nature will prevail against force and violence; whereas men constantly every where fall into political order, and the corruption of one form of government is but the generation of another.

Wherefore, since it is plain, that sovereignty and bodies politic can neither be meerly artificial, nor yet violent things, there must of necessity be some natural bond or vinculum to hold them together, such as may both really oblige subjects to obey the lawful commands of sovereigns, and fo-

Hobbes, Leviathan, Cap. XV I. 2 Id. ibid. Cap.XIV. §. II.

Id. Element. de Cive, Cap. XV. §. V.
Sovereignty, no Creature of the People. Book I.

Sovereigns in commanding to seek the good and welfare of their subjects; whom these atheistical politicians, (by their infinite and bellumine right) quite discharge from any such thing. Which bond or vinculum can be no other than natural justice; and something of a common and publick, of a conmenting and conglutinating nature, in all rational beings; the original of both which is from the Deity. The right and authority of God himself is founded in justice; and of this is the civil sovereignty also a certain participation. It is not the meer creature of the people, and of men's wills, and therefore annihilable again by their wills at pleasure; but hath a stamp of divinity upon it, as may partly appear from hence, because that firm vitæ & necis, that power of life and death, which civil sovereigns have, was never lodged in singulurs, before civil society; and therefore could not be conferred by them. Had not God and nature made a city; were there not a natural conciliation of all rational creatures, and subjection of them to the Deity, as their head (which is Cicero's, Una civitas deorum atque hominum, one city of gods and men) had not God made Deorum vicis & Deorum, ruling and being ruled, superiority and subjection, with their respective duty and obligation, men could neither by art, or political enchantment, nor yet by force, have made any firm cities or polities. The civil sovereign is no Leviathan, no beast, but a God, (I have said ye are gods:) he reigns not in meer brutish force and fear, but in natural justice and conscience, and in the right and authority of God himself. Nevertheless, we deny not, but that there is need of force and fear too, to constrain those to obedience, to whom the conscience of duty proveth ineffectual. Nor is the fear of the civil sovereign's own sword alone sufficient for this neither, unaftifted by religion, and the fear of an invisible Being omnipotent, who feeth all things, and can punish secret, as well as open transgressors, both in this life, and after death. Which is a thing so confessedly true, that Atheists have therefore pretended religion to have been at first a meer political figment. We conclude therefore, that the civil sovereign reigneth not, meerly in the fear of his own power and sword; but first in the justice, and authority, and then in the power and fear also of God Almighty. And thus much for the first atheistical pretence, from the interest of civil sovereigns.

To their second, that sovereignty is essentially infinite, and therefore altogether inconsistent with religion, that would limit and confine it, we reply; that the right and authority of civil sovereigns is not, as these our atheistical politicians ignorantly suppose, a meer bellumine liberty, but it is a right essentially founded in the being of natural justice, as hath been declared. For authority of commanding is such a right, as supposes obligation in others to obey, without which it could be nothing but meer will and force. But none can be obliged in duty to obey, but by natural justice; commands, as such, not creating obligation, but presupposing it. For, if persons were not before obliged to obey, no commands would signify any thing to them. Wherefore, the first original obligation is not from will, but nature. Did obligation to the things of natural justice, as many suppose, arise from the will and positive command of God, only

2 Psalm lxxxii. 6.
only by reason of punishments threatened, and rewards promised; the consequence of this would be, that no man was good and just, but only by accident, and for the sake of something else; whereas the goodness of justice or righteousness is intrinsic to the thing itself, and this is that, which obligeth, (and not any thing foreign to it) it being a different species of good from that of appetite, and private utility, which every man may dispense withal. Now there can be no more infinite justice, than there can be an infinite rule, or an infinite measure. Justice is essentially a determinate thing; and therefore can there not be an infinite jus, right or authority. If there be any thing in its own nature just and obliging, or such, as ought to be done; then must there of necessity be something unjust, or unlawful, which therefore cannot be obligingly commanded by any authority whatsoever. Neither ought this to be thought any impeachment of civil authority, it extending universally to all, even to that of the Deity itself. The right and authority of God himself, who is the supreme sovereign of the universe, is also in like manner bounded and circumscribed by justice. God’s will is ruled by his justice, and not his justice ruled by his will; and therefore God himself cannot command, what is in its own nature unjust. And thus have we made it evident, that infinite right and authority of doing and commanding anything without exception, so that the arbitrary will of the commander should be the very rule of justice itself to others, and consequently might oblige to any thing, is an absolute contradiction, and a non-entity; it supposing nothing to be in its own nature just or unjust; which if there were not, there could be no obligation nor authority at all. Wherefore the Atheists, who would flatter civil sovereigns with this infinite right, as if their will ought to be the very rule of justice and confidence, and, upon that pretence, prejudice them against religion, do as ill deserve of them, as of religion hereby; they indeed absolutely divesting them of all right and authority, and leaving them nothing, but mere brutish force and bellumine liberty. And could civil sovereigns utterly demolish and destroy confidence and religion in the minds of men, (which yet is an absolute impossibility) they thinking thereby to make elbow-room for themselves, they would certainly bury themselves also in the ruins of them. Nevertheless, thus much is true; That they, in whom the sovereign legislative power of every polity is lodged, (whether single persons, or assemblies) they, who make civil laws, and can reverse them at pleasure, though they may unquestionably sin against God, in making unjust laws, yet can they not sin politically or civilly, as violators or transgressors of those laws cancelled and reversed by them, being superior to them. Nor is this all; but these sovereign legislative powers may be said to be absolute also in another sense, as being absolute, unjudicable, or uncorrectable by any human court; because, if they were so obnoxious, then would that court or power, which had a right to judge and censure them, be superior to them; which is contrary to the hypothesis. And then, if this power were again judicable by some other, there must either be an infinite progress, or endless circulation, (a thing not only absurd, but also utterly inconsistent with government and property; because, there being no ultimate judgment unappealable from, there could never be any final determination.
determination of controversies;) or else at last, all must be devoted to the multitude of singulars, which would be a dissolution of the body politic, and a state of anarchy. And thus have we fully confuted the second atheistic pretence also, for the inconsistency of religion with civil sovereignty.

Their third and last follows; That private judgment of good and evil is contradictory to civil sovereignty, and a body politic, this being one artificial man, that must be all governed by one reason and will. But conscience is private judgment of good and evil, lawful and unlawful, &c. To which we reply, That it is not religion, but, on the contrary, the principles of these atheistic politicians, that unavoidably introduce private judgment of good and evil, such as is absolutely inconsistent with civil sovereignty; there being, according to them, nothing in nature of a publick or common good, nothing of duty or obligation, but all private appetite and utility, of which also every man is judge for himself. For if this were so, then, whenever any man judged it most for his private utility to disobey laws, rebel against sovereigns, nay, to poison or stab them, he would be unquestionably bound by nature, and the reason of his own good, as the highest law, to do the same. Neither can these atheistic politicians be ever able to bring men out of this state of private good, judgment and will, which is natural to them, by any artificial tricks and devices, or meer enchantments of words, as artificial justice, and an artificial man, and a common person and will, and a publick conscience, and the like. Nay, it is observable, that themselves are necessitated, by the tenour of these their principles, casuistically to allow such private judgment and will, as is altogether inconsistent with civil sovereignty; as, that any man may lawfully resist in defence of his own life; and that they, who have once rebelled, may afterwards justly defend themselves by force. Nor indeed can this private judgment of men, according to their appetite and utility, be possibly otherwise taken away, than by natural justice, which is a thing not of a private, but of a publick and common nature; and by conscience, that obligeth to obey all the lawful commands of civil sovereigns, though contrary to men's appetites and private interest. Wherefore conscience also is, in itself, not of a private and partial, but of a publick and common nature; it respecting divine laws, impartial justice and equity, and the good of the whole, when clashing with our own selfish, good, and private utility. This is the only thing, that can naturally confecrate mankind together, lay a foundation for bodies politic, and take away that private will and judgment, according to men's appetite and utility, which is inconsistent with the same; agreeably to that of Plato's, τὸ κοινὸν ἀριθμὸν, τὸ διὰ μόνον διὰσυν. That, which is of a common and publick nature, unites; but that, which is of a private, segregates and disassociates. It is true indeed, that particular persons must make a judgment in conscience for themselves, (a publick conscience being nonsensical and ridiculous,) and that they may also err therein; yet is not the rule neither, by which conscience judgeth, private; nor itself unaccountable, unleas in such mistaken fanaticks, as professeeully follow private impulses; but either the natural and eternal laws of God, or else his revealed will, things more pub-
Chap. V. One Perfect Being, the Root of all.

lick than the civil laws of any country, and of which others also may judge. Nevertheless, we deny not, but that civil persons may, and do sometimes make a pretence of conscience and religion, in order to sedition and rebellion, as the best things may be abused; but this is not the fault of religion, but only of the men; conscience obliging, though first to obey God, yet, in subordination to him, the laws of civil sovereigns also. To conclude, conscience and religion oblige subjects actively to obey all the lawful commands of civil sovereigns, or legislative powers, though contrary to their own private appetite, interest, and utility; but, when these same sovereign legislative powers command unlawful things, conscience, though it here obliges to obey God, rather than man, yet does it, notwithstanding, oblige not to resist. Rom. xiii. Whosoever resistent the power, résisteth the ordinance of God, and they that resist shall receive to themselves damnation. And Matthew xxvi. All they that take the sword, shall perish with the sword. Here is the patience and the faith of the saints. And thus does religion give unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's, as well as unto God the things that are God's.

And now, having fully confuted all the atheistick grounds, we confidently conclude, That the first original of all things was neither stupid and senseless matter fortuitously moved, nor a blind and nescient, but orderly and methodical plastiick nature; nor a living matter, having perception or understanding natural, without animal sense or conscientious; nor yet did every thing exist of itself necessarily from eternity, without a cause. But there is one only necessary existent, the cause of all other things; and this an absolutely perfect Being, infinitely good, wise, and powerful; who hath made all, that was fit to be made, and according to the best wisdom, and exerciseth an exact providence over all; whose name ought to be hallowed, and separated from all other things; To whom be all honour, and glory, and worship, for ever and ever. Amen.
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51 XLIV. That Plato took the theology or pneumatology of the ancients alone, rejecting their atomical physiology; and upon what prejudices he did so.

52 XLV. That Aristotle followed Plato herein. A commendation of his philosophy, (together with an impartial censure) and a deferred preference thereof before the Democritick and Epicurean.

53 CHAP. II.

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II. Though Epicurus, who was an atomical Corporealism, pretended to af-

fert a democracy of gods, yet was he for all that an absolute Atheist. And that Atheists commonly equivocate and disguise themselves. 90

III. That the Democritick philosophy, which makes senseless atoms, not only the first principles of bodies (as the ancient atomology did) but also all things whatsoever in the universe, and therefore of Soul and Mind, is nothing else but a system of atheology, or atheism swaggering under a pretence to wisdom and philosophy. And though there be another opposite form of atheism, which we call Stratonical, yet is the Democritick atheism chiefly considerable; all the dark mysteries whereof will be here revealed. 61

IV. That we being to treat concerning the Deity, and to bring all those pro-

phane and unhallowed mysteries of atheism into light, in order to a confusion of them; the divine assistance and direction ought to be implored, as it commonly was by Pagans themselves in such cases.

V. That we are both to discover the Atheists pretended grounds of reason against the Deity, and their attempts to solve all the phenomena without a God. The first of their grounds, that no man can have an idea or conception of God, and therefore he is but an incomprehensible nothing. ibid.

VI. A second atheistical argumentation, that there can be no creation out of nothing, nor omnipotence, because nothing can come from nothing; and therefore whatsoever substantially is, was from all eternity, of it self, uncreated by any Deity.

64 VII. A third pretended ground of reason against a Deity; that the strictest notion of a God implying him to be incorporeal, there can be no such incorporeal Deity, there being no other substance besides body. Because whatsoever is, is extended; and whatsoever
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is extended, is either empty space, or body. Page 65

VIII. The Atheists pretence, that the doctrine of incorporeal substance sprung from a ridiculous mistake of abstract names and notions for realities. Their impudence in making the Deity but the chief of spectres, an Oberon or prince of fairies and phanecies. This the fourth atheistic argument, that to suppose an incorporeal Mind to be the original of all things, is nothing else, but to make the abstract notion of a mere accident to be the first cause. 67

IX. A fifth pretended ground of atheism, that an incorporeal Deity being already confuted, a corporeal one may be disproved also, from the principles of corporealism in general; because matter being the only substance, and all other differences of things nothing but the accidents thereof, generate and corruptible; no living, understanding Being can be essentially incorruptible. The Stoical God incorruptible only by accident. 69

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all from Night and Chaos. A descrip-
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therefore could not result from an egg
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by him in the forementioned acc.piation,
but certain ancient philosophers, who
also were not Atomists, but ascerters of
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atheism by several good authors, his
next successor, Anaximander, is rather
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1. That these two forms of atheism, are not therefore condemned by us, meerly because they suppose a life of nature, distinct from the animal life: however
however this be a thing altogether exploded by some professed Theifts, there
in symbolizing too much with the Democriticke Atheists. \textit{Page 146}

2. That if no plaffick artificial nature be admitted, then one of these
two things must be concluded; that either all things come to pass by for-
tuitous mechanism or material necessity (the motion of matter unguided) or else
that God doth ἁνεργείον ἀπαλά, do all things himself immediately and mirac-
culously; framing the body of every gnat and fly, as it were, with his own
hands: forasmuch as divine laws and commands cannot execute themselves,
nor be alone the proper efficient causes of things in nature. 147

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4. That it seems neither decorous in respect of God, nor congruous to rea-
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culously, without the subserviency of any natural causes. This further con-
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5. Reasonably inferred from hence, that there is an artificial or plaffick na-
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orderly disposal of matter: but not without a higher providence also pref-
ding over it; forasmuch as this plaffick nature cannot act elec
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cerning motion, which the mechanick Theists themselves suppose, really no-
thing else, but a plaffick nature, or sper-
matick reasons. 150

6. The agreeableness of this doctrine with the sentiments of the best philo-
osophers of all ages. \textit{Anaxagoras}, though a professed Theist, severely cen-

cured both by \textit{Plato} and \textit{Aristotle} as an encourager of atheism, merely because he
used material and mechanick causes, more than mental and final. Phylo-

glogers and astronomers, for the same reason alio, vulgarly suspected of athe-


nature, acting upon the same from within more commandingly, doth its work easily, cleverly and silently. Human art acteth on matter mechanically, but nature vitally and magically. Page 155

10. The second pre-eminence of nature, that whereas human artists are often to seek and at a loss, anxiously consult and deliberate, and upon second thoughts mend their former work; nature is never to seek or unresolved what to do, nor doth she ever repent of what she hath done, and thereupon correct her former course. Human artists themselves consult not as artists, but always for want of art; and therefore nature, though never consulting nor deliberating, may notwithstanding act artificially and for ends. Concluded, that what is by us called Nature, is really the divine art. 156

11. Nevertheless, that nature is not the divine art pure and abstract, but concreted and embodied in matter: the Divine art not archetypal but ektypal. Nature differs from the Divine art or wisdom, as the manuary opificer from the architect. 155

12. Two imperfections of nature, in respect whereof it falls short of human art. First, that though it act for ends artificially, yet it self neither intends those ends, nor understands the reason of what it doth; for which cause it cannot act electively. The difference betwixt spermatick reasons and knowledge. That nature doth but ape or mimick the divine art or wisdom; being it self not matter of that reason, according to which it acts, but only a servant to it, and drudging executioner thereof. 156

13. Proved, that there may be such a thing as acteth artificially, though it self do not comprehend that art and reason, by which its motions are governed. First from musical habits; the dancer resembles the artificial life of nature. Page 157

14. The same further evinced from the instincts of brute animals, directing them to act rationally and artificially, in order to their own good and the good of the univerfe, without any reason of their own. These instincts in brutes but passive impreffes of the divine wisdom, and a kind of fate upon them. 158

15. The second imperfection of nature, that it acteth without animal phancy, φαντασία, con-fence, or conscientiousness, and hath no express self-perception and self-enjoyment. ibid.

16. Whether this energy of the plastick nature be to be called cogitation or no, nothing but a logomachy, or contention about words. Granted, that what moves matter vitally, must needs do it by some energy of its own, distant from local motion; but that there may be a simple vital energy, without that duplicity, which is in synæsthesia, or clear and express conscientiousness. Nevertheless, that the energy of nature may be called a certain drowsy, una-wakened, or astonisfed cogitation. 159

17. Several instances, which render it probable, that there may be a vital energy without synæsthesia, clear and express conscientiousness. 160

18. Wherefore the plastick nature, acting neither knowingly nor phantastically, must needs act fatally, magically and sympathetically. The divine laws and fate, as to matter, not meer cogitation in the mind of God, but an energetick and effectual principle in it. And this plastick nature, the true and proper fate of matter, or of the corporeal world. What magick is, and that nature, which acteth fatally, acteth also
also magically and sympathetically. Page 161

19. That nature, though it be the divine art, or fate, yet for all that, is neither a god, nor goddes, but a low and imperfect creature, it acting artificially and rationally, no otherwise than compounded forms of letters, when printing coherent philosophick sense; nor for ends, than a saw or hatchet in the hands of a skilful mechanick. The plastick and vegetative life of nature, the lowest of all lives, and inferior to the sensitive. A higher providence, than that of the plastick nature, governing the corporeal world it self. ibid.

20. Notwithstanding which, forasmuch as the plastick nature is a life, it must needs be incorporeal. One and the self-same thing having in it an entire model and platform of the whole, and acting upon several distant parts of matter, cannot be a body. And though Aristotle himself do no where declare this nature to be either corporeal or incorporeal, (which he neither clearly doth concerning the rational soul) and his followers commonly take it to be corporeal; yet, according to the genuine principles of that philosophy, must it needs be otherwise. 165

21. The plastick nature being incorporeal, must either be a lower power lodged in souls, which are also conscious, sensitive or rational; or else a distinct substantial life by it self, and inferior soul. That the Platonists affirm both; with Aristotle's agreeable determination; that nature is either part of a soul, or not without soul. ibid.

22. The plastick nature, as to the bodies of animals, a part, or lower power, of their respective souls. That the phenomena prove a plastick nature or archus in animals; to make which a distinct thing from the soul, would be to multiply entities without necessity. The soul endued with a plastick nature, the chief formatrix of its own body, the contribution of other causes not excluded. Page 166

23. That, besides the plastick in particular animals, forming them as so many little worlds, there is a general plastick or artificial nature in the whole corporeal universe, which likewise, according to Aristotle, is either a part and lower power of a conscious mundane soul, or else something depending thereon. 167

24. That no less according to Aristotle, than Plato and Socrates, our selves partake of life from the life of the universe, as well as we do of heat and cold from the heat and cold of the universe. From whence it appears, that Aristotle also held the world's animation, which is further undeniably proved. An answer to two the most considerable places in that philosopher objected to the contrary. That Aristotle's first immoveable mover was no soul, but a perfect intellect abstract from matter, which he supposed to move only as a final cause, or as being loved; and besides this, a mundane soul and plastick nature to move the heavens efficiently. Neither Aristotle's nature nor mundane soul the supreme Deity. However, though there be no such mundane soul, as both Plato and Aristotle conceived, yet may there be, notwithstanding, a plastick or artificial nature depending upon a higher intellectual principle. 168

25. No impossibility of other particular plasticks; and though it be not reasonable to think every plant, herb and pile of graft, to have a plastick or vegetative soul of its own, nor the earth to be an animal; yet may there possibly
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possibly be one plastiick artificial nature presiding over the whole terraqueous globe, by which vegetables may be severally organized and framed, and all things performed, which transcend the power of fortuitous mechanism. Page 171

26. Our second undertaking, which was to show, how grossly those Atheists (who acknowledge this artificial plastiick nature, without animality,) misunderstand it, and abuse the notion, to make a counterfeit God Almighty, or Numen of it; to the exclusion of the true Deity. First, in their supposing that to be the first and highest principle of the universe, which is the left and lowest of all lives, a thing as essentially derivative from, and dependent uppon, a higher intellectual principle, as the echo on the original voice. Secondly, in their making sense and reason in animals to emerge out of a senseless life of nature, by the meer modification and organization of matter. That no duplication of corporeal organs can ever make one single inconscius life to advance into redoubled consciousness and self-enjoyment. Thirdly, in attributing (some of them) perfect knowledge and understanding to this life of nature, which yet themselves suppose to be devoid of all animal sense and consciousness. Lastly, in making this plastiick life of nature to be meere corporeal; the hylozoists contending, that it is but an inadequate conception of body as the only substance, and fondly dreaming, that the vulgar notion of a God is nothing but such an inadequate conception of the matter of the whole universe, mistaken for an entire substance by it self the cause of all things. And thus far the digression. Page 172

The idea of God declared, in way of answer to the first atheistic argument; and the grand objection against the naturality of this idea (as essentially including unity or onelineness in it) from the Pagan polytheism, removed. Proved, that the intelligent Pagans generally acknowledged one supreme Deity. A fuller explication of whose polytheism and idolatry intended; in order to the better giving an account of Christianity.

CHAP. IV.

I. THE either stupid insensibility, or gross impudence of Atheists, in denying the Word of God to have any signification; or that there is any other idea answering to it, besides the mere phantasm of the found. The disease called by the philopher 'απολυμακτών, the petrification, or dead insensibility of the mind.

II. That the Atheists themselves must needs have an idea of God in their minds, or otherwise, when they deny
deny his existence, they should deny the existence of nothing. That they have also the same idea of him in general with the Theists; the one denying the very same thing, which the others affirm Page 194

III. A lemma, or preparatory proposition to the idea of God: That though some things be made or generated, yet it is not possible, that all things should be made, but something must of necessity exist of itself from eternity unmade, and be the cause of those other things, that are made.

IV. The two most opposite opinions concerning what was self-existent from eternity, or unmade, and the cause of all other things made; one, that it was nothing but senseless matter, the most imperfect of all things. The other, that it was something most perfect, and therefore conscious intellectual. The asserters of this latter opinion, Theists, in a strict and proper sense; of the former, Atheists. So that the idea of God in general is, a perfect consciously understanding Being (or Mind,) self-existent from eternity, and the cause of all other things. 194, 195

V. Observeable, that the Atheists, who deny a God, according to the true Idea of him, do notwithstanding often abuse the word, calling senseless matter by that name; they meaning nothing else thereby but only a first principle, or self-existent, unmade thing; according to which notion of the word God, there can be no such thing as an Atheist, no man being able to persuade himself, that all things sprung from nothing. 195

VI. In order to a more punctual declaration of this divine idea, the opinion of those taken notice of, who suppose two self-existent, unmade principles, God and Matter: according to which, God, not the Principle of all things, nor the sole Principle, but only the chief. 196, 197

VII. These Materiarians, imperfect and mistaken Theists. Not Atheists, because they suppose the world made and governed by an animalish, sentient and understanding nature; whereas no Atheists acknowledge conscious Animality to be a first principle, but conclude it to be all generable and corruptible; nor yet genuine Theists, because they acknowledge not omnipotence in the full extent thereof. A latitude therefore in theism; and none to be condemned for absolute Atheists, but such as deny an eternal, unmade Mind, theramer and governour of the whole world. 198, 199

VIII. An absolutely perfect Being, the most compendious idea of God; which includeth in it, not only necessary existence, and conscious intellectual, but also omnipotence, omnipotence, or infinite power. Wherefore God the sole Principle of all things and Cause of matter. The true notion of infinite power. And that Pagans commonly acknowledge omnipotence, or infinite power, to be included in the idea of God. 200, 201

IX. That absolute perfection implies yet something more than knowledge and power. A vaticination in men's minds of a higher good than either. That, according to Aristotle, God is better than knowledge; and hath morality in his nature, wherein also his chief happiness consisteth. This borrowed from Plato, to whom the highest Perfection, and supreme Deity, is goodness itself, substantial, above Knowledge and Intellect. Agreeably with which, the Scripture makes God, and the supreme Good, Love. This not to be understood of a soft, fond, and partial love; God being rightly called also an impartial Law, and the Measure of all things. Atheists also suppose goodness to be included in the idea of that God, whose existence they deny.
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deny. This Idea here more largely declared. Page 207, 203, &c.

X. That this forementioned idea of God essentially includeth unity, oneliness, or solitariness in it; since there cannot possibly be more than one absolutely Supreme, one Cause of all things, one Omnipotent, and one infinitely Perfect. Epicurus and his followers professedly denied a God, according to this notion of him. 207

XI. The grand objection against the idea of God, as thus essentially including oneliness and singularity in it, from the polytheism of all nations formerly, (the Jews excepted) and of all the wise men, and philosophers. From whence it is inferred, that this idea of God is not natural, but artificial, and owes its original to laws and arbitrary institutions only. An enquiry therefore here to be made concerning the true sense of the Pagan polytheism; the objectors securely taking it for granted, that the Pagan polytheists universally ascertained many, unmade, self-existent, intellectual beings and independent deities, as so many partial causes of the world. 208, 209.

XII. The irrationality of which opinion, and its manifest repugnancy to the phenomena, render it less probable to have been the belief of all the Pagan Polytheists. 210

XIII. That the Pagan deities were not all of them universally look’d upon as so many unmade, self-existent beings, unquestionably evident from hence; because they generally held a Theogonia, or generation of gods. This point of the Pagan theology insisted upon by Herodotus, the most ancient profäck Greek writer. In whom the meaning of that Question, Whether the gods were generated or exist’d all from eternity, seems to have been the fame with this of Plato’s, Whether the world were made or unmade. 211

Certain also, that amongst the Heliodyian gods, there was either but one self-existent, or else none at all. Hesiod’s Love supposed to be the eternal God, or the active Principle of the universe. 212

That the Valentinian thirty gods, or Aions (having the greatest appearance of independent deities) were all derived from one self-originated Being, called Byibus, or an unfathomable Depth. 213

That, besides the Manichæans, some Pagans did indeed acknowledge a ditheism, or multiplicity of unmade gods, one the principle of good, the other of evil. (Which the nearest approach, that can be found, to the supposed polytheism.) Plutarchus Chersonensis one or the chief of these, though not so commonly taken notice of by learned men. His reasons for this opinion propofed. 213, &c.

Plutarch’s pretence, that this was the general persuasion of all the ancient philosophers and Pagan nations. His grounds for imputing it to Plato examined and confuted. 218, &c.

The true account of the Platonick origin of evils, from the necessity of imperfect things. 220

Pythagoras, and other philosophers, purged likewise from this imputation. 221

That the Egyptians probably did but perpetuate evil, (the confusion, and alternate vicissitude of things in this lower world,) by Typhon. The only question concerning the Arimanius of the Persian Magi. This, whether a self-existent principle, or no, disputed. 222

Plutarch and Atticus the only professed asserter of this doctrine among the Greek philosophers; (besides Numenius in Chalcidius:) who therefore probably the persons cenfured for it by Athenæus. 223, 224

Aristotle’s explosion and confutation of πολλά ἡξαῖ, many principles. 225

That a better judgment may be made of
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of the Pagan deities, a general survey of them. They all reduced to five heads; The souls of men deceased, or hero's, the animated stars and elements, demons, accidents and things of nature personated; and lastly, several personal names given to one supreme God, according to the several manifestations of his power and providence in the world; mistaken, for so many substantial deities, or self-existent minds. 226, &c.

Pagans acknowledging omnipotence, must needs suppose one sovereign Numen. Faustus the Manichean, his conceit, that the Jews and Chriftians paganized in the opinion of monarchy. With St. Austin's judgment of the Pagans thereupon. 231, 232

XIV. Concluded, that the Pagan polytheism must be understood of created, intellectual beings, superior to men, religiously worshipped. So that the Pagans held both many gods, and one God, in different senses; many inferior deities subordinate to one Supreme. Thus Onatus the Pythagorean, in Stobaeus. The Pagans Creed in Maximus Tyrius; One God the King and Father of all, and many gods the sons of gods. The Pagan Theogonia thus to be understood, of many gods produced by one God. 233, 234

This Pagan Theogonia really one and the same thing with the Cosmogonia. Plato's Cosmogonia a Theogonia, 234, &c. Hesiod's Theogonia the Cosmogonia, 238

The Persians and Egyptians in like manner, holding a Cosmogonia, called it a Theogonia. 239

This Pagan Theogonia, how by some mistaken. Ibid.

Both this Theogonia and Cosmogonia of the ancient Pagans to be understood of a temporary production. Ibid.

That Plato really ascertained the newness or beginning of the world. 240, 241

Amongst the Pagans, two sorts of Theegoniasts, atheiftick and divine. Plato a divine Theogoniast. 242, 243

Other Pagan Theogoniasts, Theists, or asserterers of an unmade Deity. 244, 245, &c.

These divine Theogoniasts also made Chaos and Night senior to the Gods; that is, to the generated ones. 248

The Orphick Cabala of the world's production from Chaos (or Night) and Love; originally Mofaicall. 249

Other Pagan Theists neither Theogoniasts, nor Cosmogoniasts; they holding the eternity of the world, and of the gods: as Arifotle and the junior Platoniasts. 250, &c.

These notwithstanding acknowledged all their eternal gods have one, to be γενετικός, that is, to have been derived from that One; and that there was, in this sense, but ὁ θεὸς ἀγάμος, one only unmade, or self-existent God. 253, 254

Necessary here to shew, how the Pagans did put a difference between the one supreme, unmade Deity, and their other many inferior generated gods. 255

This done, both by proper names, and appellatives emphatically used. 256, &c. ὁ θεὸς, or gods, often put for inferior gods only, in way of distinction from the Supreme. 261

Τὸ ὑπωπτικὸν and Τὸ Δικαίωμα also the supreme Deity. 263

Other full and emphatical descriptions of the supreme God, amongst the Pagans. 264, 265

XV. Further evidence of this, that the intelligent Pagan Polytheists held only a plurality of inferior deities subordinate to one Supreme. First, because after the emersion of Christianity, and its contest with Paganism, no Pagan ever ascertained many independent Deities, but all professed to acknowledge one Sovereign, or Supreme. 265

= Apollonius Tyaneus, set up amongst the Pagans for a rival with our Saviour Christ. 266, &c.
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He, though styled by 

Vopiscus a true friend of the gods, and though a stout champion for the Pagan polytheism, yet a professed acknowledger of one supreme Deity. 

Page 269, 270

Celsus the first publick writer against Christiannya, and a zealous Polytheist; notwithstanding freely declareth for one first and greatest omnipotent God. ibid.

The next and most eminent champion for the Pagan cause, Porphyrius, an undoubted adherer of one supreme Deity. Who, in Proclus, not only opposeth that evil principle of Plutarch and Artemis, but also contendeth, that even matter it self was derived from one perfect Being.

Hierocles the next eminent antagonist of Christianity, and champion for the Pagan Gods, did, in the close of his Philalethes, (as we learn from Laëntianus) highly celebrate the praises of the one supreme God, the parent of all things. 271, &c.

Julian, the emperor, a zealous contender for the restitution of Paganism, plainly derived all his Gods from one.

This true of all the other opposers of Christiannya, as Jamblichus, Syrianus, Proclus, Simplicius, &c. Maximus Madurenfs, a Pagan philopher in St. Aulfin, his profession of one sovereign Numen above all the Gods. The same also the sense of Longinianus. 275, 276

The Pagans in Arnobius universally disclaim the opinion of many unmade Deities, and profess the belief of an omnipotent God. 

These Pagans acknowledg'd by others of the fathers also, to have held one sovereign Numen. 279, &c.

But of this more afterwards, when we speak of the Arians.

XVI. That this was no refinement or interpolation of Paganism, made after Christianity, (as might be suspected) but that the doctrine of the most ancient Pagan Theologers, and greatest promoters of polytheism, was consonant hereunto; which will be proved from unsuspected writings.

Concerning the Sibylline Oracles, two extremes. 281

That Zoroaffer, the chief promoter of polytheism in the East, professed the acknowledgment of one sovereign Deity, (and that not the sun neither, but the maker thereof) proved from Eubulus in Porphyr. 285, 286

Zoroaffer's supreme God Oromafdes. 287

Of the Triplafian Mithras. 288

The Magick, or Chaldaick Trinity. 289

The Zoroaftrian Trinity, Oromafdes, Mithras, and Arimanes. Thus the Persian Arimanes no substantial evil principle, or independent god. 290

Concerning the reputed Magick or Chaldaick Oracles. 292, 293

XVII. That Orpheus, commonly called by the Greeks the Theologer, and the father of the Grencanick polytheism, clearly asserted one supreme Numen. The history of Orpheus not a mere romance. 294, 295

Whether Orpheus were the Father of the poems called Orphical. 296, 297

Orpheus his polytheism. 298

That Orpheus, notwithstanding, asserted a divine monarchy, proved from Orphick Verfes, recorded by Pagans: there being other Orphick Verfes counterfeit. 300, 301

In what sense Orpheus, and other mystical Theologers amongst the Pagans, called God 'Aphirodos, Hermaphrodite, or of both sexes, male and female together. 304

Orpheus his recantation of his polytheism a fable; he at the same time acknowledging both one unmade God, and many generated gods and goddresses. 305

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That besides the opinion of monarchy, a trinity of divine hypostases subordinate was also another part of the Orphick Cabala. Orpheus his trinity, Phanes, Uranus, and Chronus. Page 306

The grand arcanum of the Orphick theology, that God is all things; but in a different sense from the Stoicks. 306, 307

God’s being all, made a foundation of Pagan polytheism and idolatry. 308

XVIII. That the Egyptians themselves, the most polytheistical of all nations, had an acknowledgment amongst them of one supreme Deity. The Egyptians the first Polytheists. That the Greeks and Europeans derived their gods from them, and, as Herodotus affirmeth, their very names too. A Conjecture, that Αθια of the Greeks was Nisis or Nisus, the tutelar god of the city Sais; a colony whereof the Athenians are said to have been. And that Neptune, the Roman sea-god, was derived from the Egyptian Nephthus, signifying the maritime parts. Of the Egyptians worshipping brute animals. 309, 310

Notwithstanding this multifarious polytheism and idolatry of the Egyptians, that they had an acknowledgment of one supreme God, probable first, from that great fame, which they had for their wisdom. Egypt a school of literature before Greece. 311

The Egyptians, though attributing more antiquity to the world than they ought, yet of all nations the most constant affirers of the Cosmogonia, or novelty and beginning of the world; nor did they think the world to have been made by chance, as the Epicureans; Simplicius calling the Mosiac history of the creation an Egyptian fable. 312, 313

That besides the pure and mixt mathematicks, the Egyptians had another higher philosophy, appears from hence; because they were the first affirers of the Vol. II.

immortality and transfmigration of souls, which Pythagoras from them derived into Greece. Certain therefore, that the Egyptians held incorporeal substance.

Page 313, 314

That the Egyptians, besides their vulgar and fabulous, had another arcane and recondite Theology. Their Sphinges, and Harpocrates, or Sigalions, in their Temples. 314, 315

This arcane theology of the Egyptians concealed from the vulgar two manner of ways, by allegories and hieroglyphicks. This doubtless is a kind of metaphysics concerning God; as one perfect being, the original of all things.

316

An objection from Chremon (cited by Porphyrius, in an epistle to Anesio, an Egyptian Priest,) fully answered by Jamblicbus, in the person of Abamno, in his Egyptian Mysteries. 317, 318

That monarchy was an essential part of the arcane and true theology of the Egyptians, may be proved from the Trismegistick Writings, though not at all genuine, (as the Pana oder, and Sermon in the Mount, concerning regeneration;) because, though they had been all forged by Christians never so much, yet being divulged in those ancient times, they must needs have something of truth in them: this at least, That the Egyptians acknowledged one supreme Deity; or otherwise they would have been presently exploded. 319, 320

That Casaubon, from the detection of forgery in two or three at the most of these Trismegistick books, does not reasonably infer them to have been all Christian cheats; these also not excepted, that have been cited by ancient fathers, but since loft. 320, 321

That there was one Thoth or Thoth, (called by the Greeks Hermes) an inventor of letters and sciences amongst the ancient Egyptians, not reasonably to be doubted. Besides whom, there is said...
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said to have been a second Hermes, surnamed Trismegistus, who left many volumes of philosophy and theology behind him, that were committed to the custody of the priests. Page 321, &c.

Other books also written by Egyptian priests, in several ages successively, called Hermaical, (as Jamblicbus informed us) because entitled (pro more) to Hermes, as the president of learning. 322

That some of those old Hermaick Books remained in the custody of the Egyptian priests, till the times of Clemens Alexandrinus. 323

Hermaick Books taken notice of formerly, not only by Christians, but also by Pagans and philosophers. Jamblicbus his testimony of them, that they did really contain Hermaical opinions, or Egyptian learning. Fifteen of these Hermaick Books published together at Athens before St. Cyril's time. 324, 325

All the philosophy of the present Hermaick Books not merely Greckick, as Catoebon affirmeth. That nothing perisheth; old Egyptian philosophy, derived by Pythagoras, together with the transmigration of souls, into Greece. 326, 327

The Asclepian Dialogue, or Perfect Oration, (said to have been translated into Latin by Apuleius) vindicated from being a Christian forgery. 328

An answer to two objections made against it; the latter whereof from a prophecy taken notice of by St. Austin, That the temples of the Egyptian Gods should shortly be full of the sepulchres of dead men. ibid.

Petavius his further suspicion of forgery, because, as Laestantius and St. Austin have affirmed, the Christian Logos is herein called a second God, and the first begotten Son of God. The answer, that Laestantius and St. Austin were clearly mistaken, this being there affirmed only of the visible and sensible world. 329, 330

That besides the Asclepian Dialogue, others of the present Trismegistick Books contain Egyptian doctrine. Nor can they all proved to be spurious and counterfeit. This the rather insisted on, for the vindication of the ancient fathers. Page 331, 332

Proved that the Egyptians, besides their many gods, acknowledged one first Supreme, and universal Deity, from the testimonies of Plutarch, Horus Apollo, Jamblicbus, (affirming that Hermes derived all things, even matter itself, from one divine Principle) lastly of Damascius declaring, that the Egyptian philosophers at that time had found in the writings of the ancients, that they held one Principle of all things, praised under the name of the Unknown Darkness. 334, &c.

The same thing proved from their vulgar religion and theology; Hammon being a proper name for the supreme God amongst them; and therefore styled the Egyptian Jupiter. 337

Though this word Hammon were probably at first the same with Ham or Cham, the son of Noab, yet will not this hinder, but that it might be used afterwards by the Egyptians for the supreme God. 338

The Egyptian God Hammon neither confined by them to the sun, nor to the corporeal world, but, according to the notation of the word in the Egyptian language, a hidden and invisible Deity. This farther confirmed from the testimony of Jamblicbus. 339

This Egyptian Hammon more than once taken notice of in Scripture. 339, 340

That the Egyptians acknowledged one universal Numen, farther proved from that famous inscription upon the Saitick temple, I am all, that was, is, and shall be, and my veil no mortal hand ever yet uncovered. That this cannot be understood of senseless matter, nor of the corporeal universe, but of a divine Mind, or Wisdom, diffusing itself thorough all.

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The peplum, or veil, cast over the statue as well of the Saitick as Athenian Minerva, hieroglyphically signified the invisibility and incomprehensibility of the Deity which is veiled in its works. From what Proclus addeth to this inscription beyond Plutarch, And the sun was the fruit which I produced; evident, that this was a Demiurgical Deity, the creator of the sun and of the world. Page 341, 342

How that passage of Hecataeus in Plutarch is to be understood, That the Egyptians supposed the first God and the universe to be the same, viz. because the supreme Deity diffuseth itself through all things. To πᾶν a name of God also amongst the Greek philosophers. 343

That Pan, to the Arcadians and other vulgar Greeks, was not the corporeal world, as senseless and inanimate, but as proceeding from an intellectual Principle diffusing itself through all; from Macrobius and Phornus. Socrates his prayer to Pan, as the supreme God, in Plato’s Phaedrus. 343, 344

Our Saviour Christ called the Great Pan by demons. 345

How the old Egyptian theology, that God is all things, is everywhere insinuated upon in the Trismegistic Writings. 346

That the supreme God was sometimes worshipped by the Egyptians under other proper, personal names, as Ῥας, Osiris and Serapis, &c. 349, &c.

Recorded in Eusebius, from Porphyry, that the Egyptians acknowledged one intellectual Demiurgus, or Maker of the world, under the name of Cnepb, whom they pictured, putting forth an Egg out of his mouth. This Cnepb said to have produced another God, whom the Egyptians called Piba, the Greeks, Vulcan, the Soul of the world, and artificial Platonic Nature. The testimony of Plutarch, that the Thebaïtes worshipped only one eternal and immortal God under this name of Cnepb. 412

Thus, according to Apuleius, the Egyptians worshipped one and the same supreme God, under many different names and notions. ibid.

Probable, that the Egyptians distinguished hypostases in the Deity also. Kircherus his Egyptian hieroglyphick of the trinity. An intimation in Jamblenichus of an Egyptian trinity, Eilion, Emepb, or Hempha, (which is the same with Cnepb,) and Piba. Page 413

The doctrine of God’s being all, made by the Egyptians a foundation of polytheism and idolatry, they being led hereby to perfonate and deify the several parts of the world, and things of nature, (which, in the language of the Aspleian Dialogue, is to call God by the name of every thing, or every thing by the name of God,) the wife amongst them nevertheless’s understanding, that all was but one simple Deity, worshipped by piece-meal. This allegorically signified by Osiris his being dismembred and cut in pieces by Typhon, and then made up one again by Isis. 354, 355

XIX. That the poets many ways deprav’d the Pagan theology, and made it to have a more Ariflescratical appearance. 355, &c.

Notwithstanding which, they did not really assert many self-existent and independent Gods, but one only unmade; and all the rest generated or created. Homer’s Gods not all eternal and unmade, but generated out of the ocean; that is, a watry Chaos. Homer’s Theogonia, as well as Hesiod’s, the Cosmogonia, and his generation of gods, the same thing with the production or creation of the world. 357, 358

Nevertheles, Homer distinguished, from all those generated gods, one unmade God, the father or creator of them and of the world. 359

Homer thus understood by the Pagans themselves, as Plutarch, Proclus and Aristotle. 359, 360

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Though Hisiod's gods, properly so called, were all of them generated, yet did he suppose also one unmade God, the maker of them, and of the world,

360, 361

Pindar likewise a divine Theogonist; an afferter of one unmade Deity (and no more) the caufe of all things; yet nevertheless, of many generated gods, besides his one God to be worshipped far above all the other gods. Page 361, 362

The supposition, which Anistotle sometime had of Hisiod, and Plato of Homer, seems to have proceeded from their not understanding that Mofaick Cabala, followed by them both, of the world's being made out of a watry Chaos. 362

That famous passage of Sophocles, concerning one God, the maker of heaven, earth and seas, (cited by so many ancient fathers) defended as genuine. 363

Clear places in the extant tragedies of Euripides to the same purpose; with other remarkable ones cited out of his now inextant tragedies: besides the testimonies of other Greek poets. 363, &c.

The consent of Latin poets also, in the monarchy of the whole. 365

XX. After the poets of the Pagans, their philosophers considered. That Epicurus was the only reputed philosopher, who pretending to acknowledge gods, yet professedly opposed monarchy, and verbally afferter a multitude of eternal, unmade deities, but such as had nothing to do either with the making or governing of the world. He therefore clearly to be reckoned amongst the Atheists. All the Pagan philosophers, who were Theists, (a few Dithestes excepted) universally afferter a mundane monarchy.

369, 370

Pythagoras, a polytheist as much as the other Pagans; nevertheless a plain afferter of one supreme God, the maker of the universe. 371

Pythagoras his Dyad no evil god, or daemon self-existent, as Plutarch supposed. 372

But this Dyad of his, whether matter or no, derived from a Monad. One simple Unity the caufe of all things. Page 372, 373

That Pythagoras, acknowledging a trinity of divine hypostases, did therefore sometimes describe God as a Monad, sometimes as a Mind, and sometimes as the Soul of the world. 373

The Pythagorick Monad and first God the fame with the Orphick Love, similar to Japhet and Saturn, and the oldest of all the gods, a substantial thing. But that Love, which Plato would have to be the youngest of the gods, (the daughter of Penia, or Indigency, and a parturient thing,) nothing but a creaturely affection in souls, perfonated and deified. Parmenides his Love, the first created god, or lower soul of the world, before whose production, necessity is said to have reigned; that is, the necessity of material motions undirected for ends, and good. 374, 375

That Pythagoras called the supreme Deity not only a Monad, but a Tetrad, or Tetraetys also. The reasons for this given from the mysteries in the number Four, trifling. More probability of a late conjecture, that the Pythagorick Tetraetys was not the Hebrew Tetragrammaton, not altogether unknown to the Hetrurians and Latins. 375, 376

Xenophanes a plain afferter both of many gods, and of one God, called by him, One and All. Simplicius his clear testimony for this theophony of Xenophanes, out of Theophrastus. Xenophanes misrepresented by Anistotle, as an afferter of a spherical corporeal god. 377, 378

Heraclitus, though a cloudy and confounded philosopher, and one who could not conceive of any thing incorporeal, yet both a hearty moralist, and a zealous afferter of one supreme Deity. 378, 379

The Ionick philosophers before Anaxagoras, being all of them Corporealists, and some of them Atheists; that Anaxagoras
Anaxagoras was the first, who asserted an incorporeal mind to be a principle, and though not the cause of matter, yet of motion, and of the regularity of things. The world, according to him, not eternal, but made, and out of pre-existent similar atoms; and that not by chance, but by Mind or God. This Mind of his purely incorporeal, as appeareth from his own words, cited by Simplicius. Page 380

Probable, that Anaxagoras admitted none of the inferior Pagan gods. He condemned by the vulgar for an Atheist, because he ungoded the stars, denying their animation, and affirming the sun to be but a mass of fire, and the moon an earth. This disliked also by Plato, as that, which in those times would dispose men to Atheism. 381

Anaxagoras further cenured, both by Plato and Aristotle, because, though asserting mind to be a principle, he made much more use of material than of mental and final causes; which was looked upon by them as an atheistic tinge in him. Nevertheless Anaxagoras a better Theist than those Christian philosophers of later times, who quite banish all mental causality from the world. 382, 383

XXI. Parmenides his acknowledgment of one God the cause of Gods. Which supreme Deity, by Parmenides, styled One-all immovable. That this is not to be taken physically, but metaphysically and theologically; proved at large. The first principle of all, to these ancients, one, a simple unity or monad. This said to be all, because virtually containing all, and distributed into all; or because all things are distinctly displayed from it. Lastly, the same said to be immovable, and indivisible, and without magnitude, to distinguish it from the corporeal universe. 383, &c.

"Εἰ τὸ θαῦμα, One All, taken in different senses; by Parmenides and Xenophanes, &c. divinely, for the supreme Deity, (one most simple Being, the original of all things;) but by others in Aristotle metaphysically, as if all things were but one and the same matter diversly modified. But the One-all of these latter, not immovable but moveable; it being nothing else but body; whereas the One-all-immovable is an incorporeal Deity. This does Aristotle, in his Metaphysics, close with, as good divinity. That there is one incorporeal immovable principle of all things. Simplicius his observation, that though divers philosophers maintained a plurality or infinity of moveable principles, yet none ever asserted more than one immovable. Page 385,

Parmenides in Plato distinguishes three divine hypotheses, the first whereof called by him, "Εἰ τὸ θαῦμα, one-all; the second, "Εἰ νόησις, one all things; and the third, "Εἰ νόησις, one and all things. 386, &c.

But that Parmenides by his One-all-immovable really understood the supreme Deity, yet farther unquestionably evident from the verses cited out of him by Simplicius; wherein there is also attributed thereunto a standing eternity, or duration, different from that of time. 388

The only difference betwixt Parmenides and Melissus, that the former called his One-all-immovable, finite; the latter, infinite; this in words rather than reality: the disagreeing agreement of these two philosophers fully declared by Simplicius. Melissus his language more agreeable with our present theology. Though Anaximander's Infinite were nothing but senseless matter, yet Melissus his Infinite was the true Deity. 389

That Zeno Eleates, by his One-all-immovable, meant not the corporeal world neither, no more than Melissus, Parmenides, and Xenophanes; but the Deity, evident from Aristotle. Zeno's demon-
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demonstration of one God, from the idea of a most powerful and perfect being, in the same Aristotle. Page 390

Empedocles his first principle of all things, τὸ ἕν, or a unity likewise, besides which he supposed contention and friendship to be the principles of all created beings; not only plants, brutes, and men, but gods also. 391, &c.

Empedocles his original of all the evil both of human soul and demons, from this vui, Discord and Contention, together with the ill use of their liberty.

XXII. The doctrine of divers other Pythagoreans also the same; as Philolaus, Archytas, Ocellus, Aristæus, &c. Timeus Locrus his God the creator of gods. Onatus his many gods, and his one God, the Corypheus of the gods. Euclides Megarensis his one the very Good. Aristophanes his many popular gods, but one natural God. Diogenes Sinopensis his God that filleth all things.

XXIII. That Socrates assered one God, undeniable from Xenophon. 398, 399

But that he disclaimed all the other inferior gods of the Pagans, and died, as a martyr, for one only God, in this sense, a vulgar error. 400

What the impiety imputed to him by his adherents, appeareth from Plato’s Euthyphro, viz. that he freely and openly condemned those fables of the gods, wherein wicked and unjust actions were imputed to them. 401

That Plato really assered one only God and no more, a vulgar error likewise; and that thirteenth epistle to Dionysius, wherein he declared himself to be furious, only when he began his epistles with God, and not with gods, (though extant in Eusebius his time,) furious and supposititious. He worshipping the sun and other stars also (supposed to be animated) as inferior gods.

Nevertheless, undeniably evident, that Plato was no polyarchist, but a monarchist, no afferter of many independent gods, or principles, but of one original of all things; one firtt God, one greatest God, one Maker of the world and of the gods. 403, 404

In what sense the supreme God, to Plato, the cause and producer of himself, (out of Platorinus;) and this notion not only entertained by Seneca and Plotinus, but also by Laëntius, that Plato really assered a Trinity of universal divine hypostases, that have the nature of principles. The first hypostasis in Plato’s Trinity properly aviswet, the original Deity, the cause and king of all things: which also said by him to be ἰδεῖν τὴν ἄνα, or ὑπερσύνετο, above essence. 407

Xenophon, though with other Pagans he acknowledged a plurality of gods, yet a plain afferter also of one supreme and universal Numen. 408

XXIV. Aristotle a frequent acknowledger of many gods. And whether he believed any δαίμονes or no, which he sometimes mentions (though sparingly) and infinuates them to be a kind of aerial animals, more immortal than men; yet did he unquestionably look upon the stars, or their intelligences, as gods.

Notwithstanding which, Aristotle doth not only often speak of God singularly, and of the divinity emphatically, but also professedly opposes that imaginary opinion of many independent principles, or unmade deities. He confuting the same from the phenomena or the compages of the world, which is not ἀπειρολογέω, but all uniform, and agreeably conspiring into one harmony. 410, 411

Aristotle’s supreme Deity, the first immoveable
moveable mover. The difference here betwixt Plato and Aristotle; Plato's original of motion; a self-moving soul Aristotle's an immoveable mind. But this difference not so great as at first it seems; because Aristotle's immoveable Mind doth not move the heavens efficiently, but only finally, or as being loved. Besides which, he must needs suppose another immediate mover, which could be nothing but a soul of them. Page 412

Aristotle's immoveable Mind not only the cause of motion, but also of well and fit; all the order, pulchritude and harmony, that is in the world, called therefore by Aristotle the separate good thereof. This together with nature, (its subordinate instrument) the efficient cause of the whole mundane system: which however co-eternal with it, yet is, in order of nature, junior to it. 413, 414

Aristotle and other ancients, when they affirm Mind to have been the cause of all things, understood it thus, that all things were made by an absolute wisdom, and after the best manner. The divine will, according to them, not a meer arbitrary, humourome, and fortuitous thing, but decency and fitness it self. 415

From this passage of Aristotle's, that the Divinity is either God, or the work of God, evident, that he suppose all the gods to have been derived from one, and therefore his intelligences of the spheres. 415

That according to Aristotle, this speculation of the Deity constitutes a particular science by itself, distinct from physiology and geometry: the former whereof (physiology) is converfant about what was inseparable and moveable, the second (geometry) about things immoveable, but not really separable; but the third and last (which is theology) about that, which is both immoveable and separable, an incorporeal Deity. 416

Four chief points of Aristotle's theology or metaphysicks, concerning God; first, that though all things are not eternal and unmade, yet something must needs be such, as likewise incorruptible, or otherwise all might come to nothing. Secondly, that God is an incorporeal substance, separate from sensibles, indivisible and devoid of parts and magnitude. Thirdly, that the divine intellect is the same with its intelligibles, or containeth them all within itself; because the divine mind, being senior to all things, and architectonical of the world, could not then look abroad for its objects without itself. The contrary to which supposed by Atheists. Lastly, that God being an immoveable substance, his act and energy is his essence; from whence Aristotle would infer the eternity of the world. Page 416, 417

Aristotle's creed and religion contained in these two articles, first, that there is a Divinity which comprehends the whole nature, or universe. And secondly, that besides this, there are other particular inferior gods; but that all other things, in the religion of the Pagans, were fabulously superadded hereunto for political ends. 417

Speusippus, Xenocrates, and Theophrastus, monarchists. 418

XXV. The Stoicks no better metaphysicians than Heraclitus, in whose footsteps they trode, admitting of no incorporeal substance. The qualities of the mind also, to these Stoicks, bodies. 419, 420

But the Stoicks, not therefore Atheists; they supposing an eternal unmade Mind, (though lodged in matter) the maker of the whole mundane system. 420

The Stoical argumentations for a God not inconsiderable, and what they were. 421, 422
The Stoical god, not a meer plastick and
and methodical, but an intellectual fire. The world, according to them, not a plant, but animal; and Jupiter the soul thereof. From the supposed onelines of which Jupiter, they would sometimes infer, the singularity of the world: (Plutarch on the contrary affirming, that though there were fifty, or an hundred worlds, yet would there be, for all that, but one Zeus or Jupiter.) Page 423

Nevertheless the Stoicks as polytheistical as any sect. But so, as that they supposed all their gods, save one, to be not only native, but also mortal; made out of that one, and resolved into that one again: these gods being all melted into Jupiter, in the conflagration. 424, 425.

Wherefore during the intervals of successive worlds, the Stoicks acknowledged but one solitary Deity, and no more; Jupiter being then left all alone, and the other gods swallowed up into him. Who, therefore not only the creator of all the other gods, but also the decreator of them. 425, 426.

The Stoicks, notwithstanding this, religious worshippers of their many gods; and thereby sometime derogated from the honour of the Supreme, by sharing his sovereignty amongst them. 426, 427.

Nevertheless, the supreme God praised and extolled by them far above all the other gods; and acknowledged to be the sole maker of the world. 427, &c.

Their professing subjection to his laws as their greatest liberty: 430
And to submit their wills to his will in every thing, so as to know no other will, but the will of Jupiter. ibid.
Their pretending to look to God, and to do nothing without a reference to him; as also to trust in him and rely upon him. 431
Their praising him as the author of all good. ibid.

Their addressing their devotions to him alone, without the conjunction of any other god; and particularly imploring his assistance against temptations. Page 432

Cleantus his excellent and devout hymn to the supreme God. 433

XXVI. Cicero, though affecting to write in the way of the new academy, yet no sceptick as to theism. Nor was he an affirmer of many independent deities. Cicero's gods (the makers of the world) the same with Plato's eternal gods, or trinity of divine hypostases subordinate. This language the Pagans in St. Cyril would justify, from that of the Scripture, Let us make man. 434, 435, &c.

Varro's threefold theology, the fabulous, the natural, and the civil or popular; agreeably to Scaevola the pontifex his three sorts of gods, poetical, philosophical, and political. The former condemned by him as false; the second, though true, said to be above the capacity of the vulgar; and therefore a necessity of a third or middle betwixt both; because many things true in religion, not fit for the vulgar to know. Varro's supreme Numen, the great Soul or Mind of the whole world: his inferior gods, parts of the world animated. Image-worship condemned by him, as disagreeable to the natural theology. 438, 439.

Seneca, a Pagan polytheist, but plain affirmer of one supreme Numen, excellently described by him. That in his book of Superstition (now lost) he did as freely cenure the civil theology of the Romans, as Varro had done the fabulous or theatrical. 440

Quintilian, Pliny, Apuleius, their clear acknowledgments of one sovereign universal Deity. Symmachus, (a great tickler for paganism) his assertion, that it was one and the same thing, which was worshipped
worshipped in all religions, though in different ways. Page 440, 441

The writer De Mundo, though not Aristotle, yet a Pagan. His cause that containeth all things, and God from whom all things are. Which passage being left out in Apuleius his Latin version, gives occasion of suspicion, that he was infected with Plutarch's Ditheism, or at least held matter to be unmade.

Plutarch, a priest of Apollo, however unluckily ingaged in those two false opinions, of an evil principle, and matter unmade, yet a maintainer of one sole principle of all good. 442

Dio Chrysostomus, a Sophist, his clear testimony, βασιλεύει τσ θεον, that the whole world was under a kingly government or monarchy. ibid.

Galen's true hymn to the praise of him, that made us, in his book De usu Partium.

Maximus Tyrius his short account of his own religion; one supreme God the monarch of the whole world, and three subordinate ranks of inferior gods, the sons and friends of God, and his ministers in the government of the world.

A most full and excellent description of the supreme God in Aristides his first oration, or hymn to Jupiter, wherein he affirmeth, all the several kinds of gods to be but a defluxion and derivation from Jupiter. 445, 446

All the latter philosophers after Christianitie, (though maintainers of the world's eternity, yet) agreed in one supreme Deity, the cause of this world, and of the other gods. Excellent speculations in them concerning the Deity, especially Plutinus; who, though deriving matter and all from one divine principle, yet was a contender for many gods; he supposing, the grandeur and majesty of the supreme God to be declared by the multitude of gods under him. Themistius; that the same supreme God was worshipped by Pagans, Christians, and all nations, though in different forms; and that God was delighted with this variety of religions. Page 446, 447

The full testimony of St. Cyril, that the Greek philosophers universally acknowledged one God, the maker of the universe, from whom were produced into being certain other gods, both intelligible and sensible. ibid.

XXVII. This not only the opinion of philosophers and learned men, but also the general belief of the vulgar amongst the Pagans. A judgment of the vulgar and generality, to be made from the poets. Dio Chrysostomus his affirmation, That all the poets acknowledged one first and greatest God, the father of all the rational kind, and the king thereof. 447

The testimony of Aristotle, That all men acknowledged kingship or monarchy amongst the gods; Of Maximus Tyrius, that notwithstanding so great a discrepancy of opinion in other things, yet throughout all the gentile world, as well the unlearned as learned, did universally agree in this, that there was one God the king and father of all, and many gods the sons of that one God: Of Dio Chrysostomus also to the same purpose; he intimating likewise, that of the two, the acknowledgment of the one supreme God, was more general than that of the many inferior gods.

448, 449

That the sense of the vulgar Pagans herein is further evident from hence, because all nations had their several proper names for the one supreme God; as the Romans Jupiter, the Greeks Zeus, the Africans and Arabians Hammon, the Scythians Pappaeus, the Babylonians Bel, &c. ibid.

True, that Origen, though allowing Christians to use the appellative names
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for God in the languages of the several nations, yet accounted it unlawful for
to call him by those proper names; because not only given to idols, but also
contaminated with wicked rites and fables: according to which, they should
be indeed rather the names of a daemon
than of a God. Notwithstanding which,
he does not deny, those Pagans ever to have
meant the supreme God by them,
but often acknowledge the fame. But
Laërtius indeed denies the Capitoline
Jupiter to be the supreme God, and
that for two reasons. First, because he
was not worshipped without the part-
nership of Minerva and Juno, his
daughter and wife. Granted here, that
there was a mixture of the fabulous
or poetical theology with the natural
to make up the civil. But that wise
men understood these to be but three
several names or notions of one supreme
God. This confirmed from Macrobius.

Page 450

Vossius his conjecture, that in this Ca-
pitoline Trinity there was a further my-
stery aimed at, of three divine hypo-
stales. This Roman trinity derived
from the Samothracian Cabiri. Which
word being Hebraical, gives cause to
suspect this tradition of a trinity among
the Pagans to have sprung from
the Hebrews.

Laërtius his second reason, because
Jupiter being Jovans Pater, was a
name below the dignity of the supreme
God. The answer, that the true ety-
mon thereof was Jovis Pater, the He-
brew Tetragrammaton. ibid.

That the Capitoline Jupiter was the
supreme God, evident from those titles
of Optimus Maximus; and of Omni-
potent by the pontifices in their pub-
liek sacrifices. Seneca's testimony, that
the ancient Fletrurians by Jupiter meant
the mind and spirit, maker and gover-
nour of the whole world. The Roman
soldiers acclamation in Marcus Aurelius
his German expedition, (To Jove the
god of gods, who alone is powerful) ac-
cording to Tertullian, a testimony to
the Christians God. Page 452, 453.

That as the learned Pagans in their
writings, so likewise the vulgar in their
common speech, when most serious, of-	en used the word God, singularly and
emphatically, for the Supreme, proved
from Tertullian, Minutius Felix, and
Laërtius: together with the testimo-
ny of Proclus, that the one supreme
God was more universally believed
throughout the world, than the many
gods.

Page 454

That Kyrie Eleison was anciently a
Pagan litany to the supreme God,
proved from Arianus. The supreme
God often called by the Pagans also
Kyrie, or the Lord.

Page 454, 455

That even the most foolishly super-
fittish, idolatrous, and polytheistical
amongst the Pagans, did, notwithstanding,
generally acknowledge one supreme
Deity; fully attested and elegantly de-
clared by Aurelius Prudentius in his Apo-
theosis.

Page 455

However, some of the ancient Pa-
gans were said to have acknowledged
none but visible and corporeal gods, yet
as they conceived these to be endued with
life and understanding, so did they sup-
pose one supreme amongst them, as ei-
ther the whole heaven or aether ani-
mated, or the subtle fiery substance, that
pervadeth all things, the God of the
Heracliticks and Stoicks; or the sun the
Cleanthean god.

Page 455, 456

Though Macrobius refer so many of
the Pagan gods to the sun, and doubt-
lessly himself looked upon it as a great
god, yet does he deny it to be omnipotent-
tissimum Deum, the most omnipotent God of
all; he alleging a Trinity of divine hyp-
ostales superior to it, in the Platonick
way.

Page 456, 457

That the Persians themselves, the
most notorious sun-worshippers, did, not-
withstanding,
withstanding? acknowledge a Deity superior to it, and the maker thereof; proved from Eubulus. As also that the Persians country}-Jupiter was not the fun, confirmed from Herodotus, Xenophon, Plutarch, and Curtius. Cyrus his Lord God of heaven, who commanded him to build him a house at Jerusalem; the same with the God of the Jews. Page 458

That as (besides the Scythians) the Ethiopians in Strabo, and other barbarian nations, anciently acknowledged one sovereign Deity; so is this the belief of the generality of the Pagan world to this very day. 458, 459

XXVIII. Besides Themistius and Symmachus, asserting one and the same thing to be worshipped in all religions, though after different ways, and that God Almighty was not displeased with this variety of his worship; Plutarch’s memorable testimony, that as the same sun, moon, and stars, are common to all, so were the same gods. And that not only the Egyptians, but also all other Pagan nations worshipped one reason and providence ordering all; together with its inferior sublervient powers and ministers, though with different rites and symbols. 459, 460

Titus Livius also of the same persuasion, that the same immortal gods were worshipped every where; (namely, one supreme, and his inferior ministers) however the diversity of rites made them seem different. 460

Two Egyptian Philosophers, Heraclius and Asclepiades, professedly insisting upon the same thing, not only as to the Egyptians, but also the other Pagan nations: the latter of them, (Asclepiades) having written a book entitled, The symphony, or harmony of all theologies or religions, to wit, in these two fundamentals, that there is one supreme God, and besides him, other inferior gods, his sublervient ministers to be worshipped. From whence Symmachus and other Pagans concluded, that the differences of religion were not to be scrupulously stood upon, but every man ought to worship God according to the law and religion of his own country. The Pagans sense thus declared by Stobæus, that the multitude of gods is the work of the Demiurgus, made by him together with the world. Page 461

XXIX. That the Pagan Theifts must needs acknowledge one supreme Deity, further evident from hence; because they generally believed the whole world to be one animal, actuated and governed by one soul. To deny the world’s animation, and to be an Atheist, all one, in the sense of the ancient Pagans. Against Gaijendus, that Epicurus denied the world’s animation, upon no other account, but only because he denied a providential deity. This whole animated world, or the soul thereof, to the Stoicks, and others, the Πρώτος Θεός, the first and highest God, 462

Other Pagan theologers, who though asserting likewise the world’s animation, and a mundane soul, yet would not allow this to be the supreme Deity, they conceiving the first and highest God to be no soul, but an abstract and immoveable mind superior to it. And to these, the animated world and mundane soul but Δεύτερος Θεός, a second God. 463

But the generality of those, who went higher than the soul of the world, acknowledged also a principle superior to Mind or intellect, called, τὸ ζῷον, and τὸ ἄγαμον the one, and the good; and so asserted a Trinity of divine hypostases subordinate, Monad, Mind, and Soul. So that the animated world or soul thereof was to some of these, but τρίτος Θεός, the third God. 463

The Pagans, whether holding soul, or mind, or monad, to be the highest, 462

 respectful acknowledgment of the nature and power of God.
acknowledged only one in those several kinds, as the head of all; and so always reduced the multiplicity of things to a unity, or under a monarchy.

Page 464

Observed, that to the Pagan theologers universally, the world was no dead thing, or meer machine and automaton, but had life or soul diffused thorough it all; those being taxed by Aristotle as Atheists, who made the world to consist of nothing, but monads or atoms, dead and inanimate. Nor was it quite cut off from the supreme Deity, how much ever elevated above the same: the forementioned trinity, of Monad, Mind, and Soul, being supposed to be most intimately united together, and indeed all but one entire divinity; displayed in the world; and supporting the same.

XXX. The sense of the Hebrews in this controversy. That according to Philo, the Pagan polytheism consisted not in worshipping many independent gods, and partial creators of the world, but, besides the One supreme, other created beings superior to men. 465, 466

That the same also was the sense of Flavius Josephus; according to whom, this the doctrine of Abraham; that the supreme God was alone to be religiously worshipped, and no created thing with him. Aristaeus his assertion in Josephus, that the Jews and Greeks worshipped one and the same supreme God, called by the Greeks Zene, as giving life to all. 466, 467

The latter Rabbinical writers generally of this persuasion, that the Pagans acknowledging one supreme and universal Numen, worshipped all their other gods, as his ministers, or as mediators and intercessors between him and them. And this condemned by them for έξω σερβλευμενον strange worship or idolatry. The first commandment thus interpreted by Maimonides, and Baal Ikkarim; Thou shalt not set up, besides me, any inferior gods as mediators, nor religiously worship my ministers or attendants. The miscarriage of Solomon and other kings of Israel and Judah this, that believing the existence of the one supreme God, they thought it was for his honour, that his ministers also should be worshipped. Abravanel his ten species of idolatry, all of them but so many several modes of creature-worship; and no mention amongst them made, of many independent gods. Page 467, &c.

Certain places of Scripture also interpreted by Rabbinical writers to this purpose; that the Pagan nations generally acknowledged one sovereign Numen.

The Jews, though agreeing with the Greeks and other Pagans in this, that the stars were all animated, nevertheless denied them any religious worship.

XXXI. This same thing plainly confirmed from the New Testament; that the Gentiles or Pagans, however Polytheists and Idolaters, were not acquainted with the true God. First from the epistle to the Romans, where that, which is knowable of God, is said to have been manifest amongst the Pagans; and they to have known God, though they did not glorify him as God, but hold the truth in unrighteousness; by reason of their polytheism and idolatry. (or image-worship) the latter of which accounted by the Jews the greatest enormity of the Pagans, as is proved from Philo: and this the reason, why their polytheism called also idolatry. Plainly declared by St. Paul, that the Pagan superstitious consisted not in worshipping many independent gods and creators, but in joining creature-worship some way or other with the worship of the Creator. Παρε γάρ Κρίστου, how to be understood; and in what sense, the
the Pagans, though acknowledging the Creator, might be said to have worshipped the creature, beyond him. Page 471, 472

Again, from St. Paul's oration to the Athenians, where their unknown God is said to be that same God, whom St. Paul preached, who made the world and all things in it. And these Athenian Pagans are affirmed 

Lastly, that Aratus his Zeus was the true God, whose offspring our souls are, proved not only from the context of that poet himself, undeniably, and from the scholiast upon him, but also from St. Paul's positive affirmation. Nor was Aratus singular in this; that ancient prayer of the Athenians, commended by M. Antoninus for its simplicity, ("Τοὺς, ὅσοι ζεῖν Ζεὺς, ῥαῖν, ῥαῖν, Ο γεράς Jupiter, &C.) no otherwise to be understood. And how that other passage of St. Paul, That in the wisdom of God, the world by wisdom knew not God, does not at all clash herewith. Page 475, 476

XXXII. In order to a fuller explication of the Pagan theology, and making it the better appear, that the polytheism thereof was not contradictory to the acknowledgment of one supreme omnipotent Numen; three things to be considered. First, that much of their polytheism was but seeming and phantastical only, and really nothing, but the polyonymy of one God. Secondly, That their real and natural polytheism consisted only in religiously worshipping, besides this one supreme universal Numen, many other particular and inferior created Beings; as animated stars, demons, and heroes. Thirdly, that they worshipped both the supreme and inferior gods; in statues, images, and symbols; these were also sometimes abusively called gods. To one or other of which three heads, all the Pagan polytheism referrible. Page 477

For the better persuading, that much of the Pagan polytheism, was really nothing, but the polyonymy of one supreme God, or the worshipping him under several personal names; to be remembered again, what was before suggested; that the Pagan nations generally, besides their vulgar, had another more arcane theology, which was the theology of wise men and of truth. That is, besides both their fabulous and poetical, their political and civil theology, they had another natural and philosophick one. This distinction of the vulgar and civil theology, from the natural and real, owned by the Greeks generally, and amongst the Latins, by Secvola the pontifex, Varro, Cicero, Seneca, and others. ibid.

That the civil theology of the Pagans differed from the natural and real, by a certain mixture of fabulosty in it. Of the Romans suffering the statue of Jupiter's nurse to be kept in the very capitol, as a religious monument. Jupiter's nativity, or his having a father and a mother, atheistically fabulous; poets themselves acknowledging so much of the natural and true theology, that Jupiter being the father of gods and men, the maker of the whole world, was himself eternal and unmade. Page 478

That the civil as well as poetical theology had some appearance of many independent deities also; they making several supreme, in their several territories and functions; one chief for one thing, and another for another. But according to the natural and philosophick theology, the theology of wise men and of truth, all these but poetical, commenstious, fictitious, and phantastick gods; such as had no distinct substantial essences of their own; and therefore really to be accounted nothing else.
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else, but several names or notions of one supreme God.

Certain, that the Egyptians had several proper and personal names for that one supreme universal Numen, that comprehends the whole world, according to several notions of it, or its several powers: as Ammon, Ptothi, Osiris, Neith, Cneph; to which may be added Serapis and Isis too. Besides Jamblicbus, Damascus his testimony also to this purpose; concerning the Egyptian theology. This the pattern of the other, especially European theologies, the Greek and Roman. 479, 480

That the Greeks and Romans also often made more gods of one, or affected a polynomy of the same gods, evident from those many proper and personal names bestowed, first upon the gods, (of which Macrobius) who therefore had this epithet of τολλίωμες, given to him; and then upon the moon, styled also polynymous, as well as her brother the sun; and lastly upon the earth, famous likewise for her many names, as Vesta, Cybele, Ceres, Proserpina, Ops, &c. Wherefore not at all to be doubted, but that the supreme God, or sovereign Numen of the whole world, was much more polynymous. This title given to him also, as well as to Apollo in Hesychius. He thus invoked by Cleanthes. Zeno, the writer De Mundo, Seneca, Macrobius, clearly confirm the same. Maximus Madaurenfs in St. Austin his full acknowledgment thereof. 480, 481

The first instances of the polynomy of the supreme God, amongst the Pagans in such names as these; Bocostes, Ætios Polides, Miltiades, Phiæus, Phæos, Stenæ, &c. And amongst the Latins, Vistor, Invitus, Opitulus, Stator, Tigillus, Centapede, Almus, Ruminus, &c. Again, Atage, Emarvion, Papatum, Mêlê, Alphat, all several names of the one supreme God, as likewise were Clotho, Lachesis, and Atropos, in the writer De Mundo. And amongst the Latins, not only Fate, but also Nature and Fortune too, as Cicero and Seneca affirm. Page 482

But besides these, there were other proper names of the supreme God, which had a greater shew and appearance of so many several gods, they having their peculiar temples, and several appropriated rites of worship. And first, such as signify the Deity, according to its more universal nature. As for example, Pan; which not the corporeal world inanimate, or endued with a senseless nature only, but a rational, or intellectual principle displaying it self in matter, framing the world harmoniously, and being, in a manner, all things. This also the universal pastor and shepherd of all mankind. 483

Again Janus; first invoked by the Romans in their sacrifices, and never omitted. The most ancient God, and first beginning of all things. Described by Ovid, Martial, and others, as a universal Numen. Concluded by St. Austin to be the same with Jupiter, the Soul or Mind of the whole world. The word Janus probably derived from Zavor, the Ætolian Jupiter. 483, 484

Genius also, one of the twenty select Roman gods, according to Februus, a universal Numen; that God, who is the begetter of all things. And, according to Varro in St. Austin, the same with Jupiter. 484, 485

That Chronos, or Saturn, no particular Deity but a universal Numen also, which comprehends the whole nature of the world, affirmed by Dionysius Halicarnassensis. The word Saturn Heptarian (and originally from the Hebrew וָשָׁנָה) signifies hidden; called by the Latins Deus Latius, the Hidden God; whence Italy Latium, and the Italians Latins; as worshippers of this hidden God, or the occult Principle of all things. This, according to Varro, he, that produceth out of himself the hidden seeds and forms of all things, and
and swalloweth them up into himself again; which, the devouring of his male children. This Sinus quidam Nature, &c. a certain inward and deep recess of Nature containing all things within it self; as God was sometimes defined by the Pagans. This to St. Athlin the fame with Jupiter; as likewise was Cælus, or Uranus, in the old inscription, another name of God too. The poetick theology of Jupiter’s being the son of Saturn, and Saturn the son of Cælus; an intimation (according to Plato) of a Trinity of divine hypoftases universal.

Though Minerva or Athena were sometimes confined to a narrower sense, yet was it often taken for a name of God also, according to his universal notion; it being to Athenagoras the divine wisdom displaying it self through all things. This excellently described by Arifides, as the first-begotten off-spring of the original Deity or the Second divine hypoftasis, by which all things were made; agreeably with the Christian theology.

Aphrodite Urania, or the Heavenly Venus, another name of God also, according to his universal notion; it being the fame with that love, which Orpheus, and other philosophers in Arifotle, made the first original of all things. Plato’s defcription of an elder and a younger Venus: the former, the daughter of Uranus, without a mother, or the heavenly Venus: said to be senior to Japhet and Saturn. The latter, afterwards begotten from Jupiter and the nymph Dione, the vulgar Venus. Urania, or the heavenly Venus, called by the oriental nations, Myllita; that is, the mother of all things. Temples in Pausanias dedicated to this Heavenly Venus. This described by Asfbylus, Euripides, and Ovid, as the supreme Deity, and the creator of all the gods. God Almighty also thus described, as a Heavenly Venus, or Love, by Sev. Boethius. To this Urania, or the Heavenly Venus, another Venus in Paunianias near a-kin; called Ανεφαλαί or Verticordia; as convertible of men’s minds upwards, from unchaste love, or unclean lust.

Though Vulcan, according to the common notion of him, a special god, yet had he sometimes a more universal consideration. Zeno in Laertius, that the supreme God is called Vulcan as sitting in the artificial fire of nature. Thus the Soul of the world styled by the Egyptians Pitha; which, as Jamblichus tells us, was the same with the Greeks Hephaestus, or Vulcan. Page 489, 490

Besides all which names of the supreme God, Seneca informs us, that he was sometimes called also Liber Pater, because the parent of all things; sometimes Hercules, because his force is unconquerable; and sometimes Mercury, as being reason, number, order and knowledge.

But besides this polyonymy of God, according to his universal notion, there were other dī speciales, or special gods also, amongst the Pagans; which likewise were really but several names of one and the same supreme Deity, variē utentis sua potestate, (as Seneca writeth) diversely using his power, in particular cases, and in the several parts of the world. Thus Jupiter, Neptune and Pluto (miftaken by some Christians, for a trinity of independent gods) though three civil gods, yet were they really but one and the same natural and philosophick god; as acting in those three parts of the world: the heaven, the sea, the earth and hell. Pluto in Plato’s Cratylus, a name for that part of divine providence, which is exercised in the government of separate souls after death.

This styled by Virgil the Stygian Jupiter. But to others, Pluto together with Ceres, the manifestation of the Deity, in this whole terrestrial globe. The celestial and terrestrial Jupiter but one
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one God. *Zeus* and *Hades* one and the
same to *Orpheus*. Euripides doubtful
whether God should be invoked by the
name of *Zeus*, or *Hades*. Herme
dianus the Colophonian poet, makes *Pluto*
the first of those many names of God, syno-
nymous with *Zeus*. Page 490, 491

*Neptune* also, another special god, a
name of the supreme Deity, as acting
in the seas only. This affirmed by *Xen-
nocrates in Stobaeus*, *Zeno in Laetius*,
*Balbus* and *Cotta in Cicero*, and also by
*Maximus Tyrius*.

The Statue of *Jupiter* with three eyes,
in *Pauflanias*; signifying, that according
to the natural theology, it was one and
the same God, ruling in those three se-
veral parts of the world, the heaven,
the sea, and the earth; that was called
by three names, *Jupiter*, *Neptune* and
*Pluto*. Wherefore, since *Proserpina* and
*Ceres* are the same with *Pluto*, and *Sal-
aea* with *Neptune*, concluded, that all
these, though several poetical and political
gods, yet were but one and the same na-
tural and philosophick God. 492, 493

*Juno* also, another special Deity, a name
of the supreme Deity, as acting in the
air. Thus *Xenocrates* and *Zeno*. The
Pagans in St. *Austin*, that God, in the
aether, is called *Jupiter*, in the air, *Juno*.
So *Minerva* likewise, when taken for a
special God, a name of the supreme
God, according to that particular con-
sideration of him, as acting in the higher
aether. From whence, St. *Austin* disput-
teth against the Pagans. *Maximus Ty-
rius*, of these and many other gods of
the Pagans, that they were but *Si a i m-
paxa*, divine names. 493, 494

Yet many other special gods amongst
the Pagans, which also were really no-
thing but divine names, or names of
God, as variously exercising his power,
or bestowing several gifts; as in corn
and fruit, *Ceres*; in wine, *Bacchus*; in
medicine, *Aesculapius*; in traffick, *Mer-
cury; in war, *Mars*; in governing the
winds, *Aeolus*; &c. Page 494

That not only philosophers did thus
interpret the many poetical and political
gods, into one and the same natural
God; but the poets themselves also
sometimes openly broached this more
arcane, free and true theology; as Her-
meidianus amongst the Greeks, and Vale-
rinus Soranus amongst the Latins. 494,
495

That St. *Austin* making a large enu-
meration of the other special gods, a-
mongst the Pagans, affirmed of them
universally, that, according to the sense
of the Pagan doctors, they were but one
natural god, and all really the same with
*Jupiter*. 495, 496

*Apuleius*, in his book *De Deo Socratis*,
either not rightly understood by that
learned and industrious philologer, *G. T.
Vossius*, or else not sufficiently attended
to. His design there plainly to reduce
the Pagans civil Theology into a con-
formity with the natural and philo-
osophick; which he doth as a Platonift, by
making the *dei consentes* of the Romans,
and other invisible gods, to be all of
them nothing but the divine ideas;
and so the offspring of one highest God.
An occasion for this phancy, given by
*Plato*, where he calls his ideas animals.

Nor was *Apuleius* singular herein; *Julian* in his book against the Christians
going the very same way; and no other-
wise understood by St. *Cyril*, than as to
make the invisible gods worshipped by
the Pagans to be the divine ideas. A
phancy of the same *Julian*, who opposed
the incarnation of the eternal Word, that
*Aesculapius* was first of all the idea of the
medicinal art, generated by the supreme
God, in the intelligible world; which
afterwards, by the viviffick influence of
the sun, was incarnated, and appeared
in human form about *Epidaurus*. And
that this Pagan doctrine, older than
Chri-
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Christianity, proved out of Philo, writing of a sun, and moon intelligible, as well as sensible, religiously worshipped by the Pagans; that is, the ideas of the archetypal world. And thus were these ideas of the divine Intellect, controverted, intelligible gods, to Plotinus also. Page 496, &c. 501

Wherefore Julian, Apuleius, and those others, who thus made all the Pagan invisible gods to be nothing else but the divine ideas, the patterns of things in the archetypal world, supposed them not to be so many independent deities, nor really distinct substances, separate from one another, but only so many partial considerations of one God. Julian before affirming them, ες αυτων γενειναι αυτες, σωματικον τε και ενυπαρξις αυτων. As to have been generated out of him; so also to coexist with him, and inexist in him. 501, 502

That the Pagans appointed some particular god or goddes by name, to preside over every thing; (there being μη δειν αυτων, nothing at all without a god to them) appeareth from that catalogue of their ignoble, or petty gods, collected by St. Austin out of Varro. Now it is incredible, that they should think all these to be so many single, substantial spirits of each sex, really existing apart in the world: they must therefore needs take them to be so many partial considerations of the Deity, either in the way of the more high-flown Platonists, as his ideas exemplarily and virtually containing all things; or else in that more common and easy way of the generality; as so many several denominations of him, according to the several manifestations of his power and providence; or, as the Pagans in Eusebius declare themselves, those several virtues and powers of the supreme God, themselves personated and defied. Which yet, because they were not executed, without the subfervient ministrv of created spirits, angels or de-

mons appointed to preside over such things; therefore might these also, collectively taken, be included under them. Page 502, 503

But for the fuller clearing of this point, that the Pagan polytheism was in great part nothing but the polyonymy of one God, two things here to be taken notice of. First, that the Pagan theology universally supposed God to be diffused thorough all, to permeate and pervade all, and intimately to act all. Thus Horus Apollo of the Egyptians. Thus, among the Greeks, Diogenes the Cynick, Arisbtote the Italick, and Stoical philosophers. Thus the Indian Brahmins before Strabo. Thus also the Latin Poets; and Seneca, Quintilian, Apuleius and Servius, besides others. 503, 504

That Anaxagoras and Plato also, though neither of them confounded God with the world, but affirmed him to be unmingled with any thing, yet concluded him in like manner to permeate and pervade all things. Plato's etymology of διακολων, as taken for a name of God, to this purpose in his Cratylus. Where a fragment of Heraclitus, and his description of God agreeably hereunto; a most subtle and swift subsance, that permeates and passes through every thing, by which all things are made. But Plato disclaiming this corporeity of the Deity, will neither have it fire, nor heat; but a perfect Mind, that passes through all things unmixedly. 505

Wherefore no wonder, if the Pagans supposing God to be diffused through all things, called him in the several parts of the world, and things of nature, by several names, as in the earth, Ceres; in the sea, Neptunus; &c. This account of the Pagan polytheism given by Paulus Orosius, That whilst they believed God to be in many things, they indiscriminately made many gods of him. 505, 506

Further to be observed, that many of the
the Pagan thelogers seemed to go yet a strain higher, they supposing God not only to pervade all things, but also to be himself all things. That the ancient Egyptian theology ran so high, evident from the Satyrick inscription. A strong tang hereof in Ἀφροδίτη; as also in Lucan. Neither was this proper to those, who held God to be the Soul of the world, but the language also of those other more refined philosophers, Xenophanes, Parmenides, &c. they affirming God to be One and All, with which agreeeth the author of the Asclepius Dialogue, that God is Unus Omnia, one all things; and that before things were made, he did then ἑπτάνυμον bide them, or occultly contain them all within himself. In like manner Orphens. Page 506, 507.

This not only a further ground of the polyonymy of one God, according to the various manifestations of himself in the world, but also of another strange phænomenon in the Pagan theology, their personating the inanimate parts of the world, and natures of things, and bestowing the names of gods and goddesses upon them. Thus Mofchopulus before cited, and Arnobius. This Plutarch thinks to have been done at first metonymically only, the effects of the gods being called gods; as the books of Plato, Plato. And thus far not disliked by him. But himself complaineth, that afterwards it was carried on further by superflitious religiousus, and not without great impiety. Nevertheless, that inanimate substances, and the natures of things, were formerly deified by the ancient Pagans, otherwise than metonymically, proved from Cicero, Philo, and Plato. For they supposing God to pervade all things, and to be all things, did therefore look upon every thing as sacred or divine; and theologize the parts of the world and natures of things; particularly making them gods and goddesses. But especially such things, as wherein human utility was most concerned, and which had most of wonder in them. Page 507, 510.

This properly the phylological theology of the Pagans, their personating and deifying the natures of things, and inanimate substances. That the ancient poetick fables of the gods were many of them, in their first and true meaning, thus phylologically allegorical, and not mere herology, affirmed against Eusebius. Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus, famous for thus allegorizing the fables of the gods. Chrysippus his allegorizing an obscene picture of Jupiter and Juno in Samos. Plato, though no friend to these poetick fables, yet confesseth some of them to have contained allegories in them: the same doth also Dionysius Halarocenus; and Cicero likewise, who affirmeth this personating and deifying the natures of things, to have filled the world with superstitition. 510, 512.

Against Eusebius again, That the whole theology of the Pagans consisted not in thus deifying the natures of things, and inanimate bodies; because he, that acknowledgeth no animant God, acknowledges no God at all, but is a downright Atheist. 512.

Neither ought this phylological theology of the Pagans, that consisted in personating and deifying the natures of things and inanimate bodies, to be confounded with that natural and philosophical theology of Varro, Scævola and others, which admitted of no other but animant gods, and such as really existed in nature: for which cause it was called natural, in opposition to the fictitious and phantaftick poetick gods. 512.

St. Austin's just cenure and condemnation of the Pagans, for their thus theologizing of phylology, or fictiously personating and deifying the natures of things.

But though the Pagans did thus verbally personate and deify the things of nature,
nature, yet did not the intelligent amongst them therefore count these true and proper gods. Cotta in Cicero, 'though we call corn Ceres, and wine Bacchus, yet was there never any one so mad, as to take that for a God, which himself feeds upon and devours.' The Pagans really accounted that only for a God, by the invoking whereof they might expect benefit to themselves; and therefore nothing inanimate. This proved from Plato, Aristotle, Lucretius, Cicero and Plutarch. Wherefore these natures of things deified, but fictitious and phantastick gods. Nor can any other sense be made of them than this, that they were really but so many several names of one supreme God, as severally manifested in his works: according to that Egyptian theology, that God may be called by the name of every thing, or every thing by the name of God. With which agreeeth Seneca, that there may be as many names of God, as there are gifts and effects of his; and the writer De Mundo, that God may be denominated from every nature, he being the cause of all things.

Page 513, 515

Wherefore these deified natures of things were not directly worshipped by the intelligent Pagans, but only relatively to the supreme God, or in way of complication with him only; and so not so much themselves, as God worshipped in them. The Pagans pretence, that they did not look upon the world with such eyes as oxen and horses do, but with religious eyes, so as to see God in every thing. They therefore worshipped the invisible Deity, in the visible manifestations of himself; God and the world together. This sometimes called Pan and Jupiter. Thus was the whole world said to be the greatest God, and the circle of the heavens worshipped by the Persians; not as inanimate matter, but as the visible manifestation of the Deity, displayed from it, and pervaded by it. When the Roman sea-captains sacrificed to the waves, their worship intended to that God, who stilleth the waves, and quieteth the billows. Page 515, 516

These Pagans also apprehended a necessity of permitting men to worship the invisible God in his visible works. This account given by them in Eusebius. Plato himself approved of worshipping the invisible God in the sun, moon, and stars, as his visible images. And though Maximus Tyrius would have men endeavour to rise above the starry heavens, and all visible things, yet does he allow the weaker to worship God in his progency. And Socrates persuades Euthydemus to be contented herewith. Besides which, some Pagans worshipping the elements, directed their intention to the spirits of those elements, as Julian in Ammianus, (these being suppos'd also to be animated) or else to those daemons, whom they conceived to inhabit them, or preside over them. Page 516, 518

XXXIII. Further to be observed, that amongst those natures of things, some were merely accidental, as hope, love, desire, memory, truth, virtue, piety, faith, justice, concord, clemency, victory, echo, night. According to which, the vulgar Athenians supposed St. Paul to have deified Anaphitis, or made a goddef of the resurrection, as well as a God of Jesus. Vices also sometimes thus deified by them, as Contumely and Impudence, (to whom were temples dedicated at Athens) though to the end, that these things might be deprecated. These accidents sometimes deified under counterfeit proper names, as Pleasure under the name of Volupia, and Lubentina Venus; Time under the name of Cronus or Saturn; Prudence, or Wisdom, under the names of Athena, or Minerva; against which, Origen in his answer to Celsus, 6 D 2

Cicero
Cicero himself allowed of dedicating temples to mind, virtue, piety, faith, &c. Page 518, 520

But such accidents and affections of things deified could not possibly be accounted true and proper gods, they having not ὑπόστασις καὶ ιόν, any real substance, or substantial essence of their own. And thus does Origen again dispute against Minerva’s godship, as tropologized into prudence. As he doth also elsewhere, upon the same ground, against that of Memory, the mother of the muses, and that of the graces; he concluding these and such like therefore, to be nothing but figments of the Greeks, they being things personated, and feigned with human members. Thus the Pagan condemned by Prudentius also, for feigning things incorporeal, with counterfeit members. These gods plainly exploded by Cotta, or Cicero in disguise; as having only vim rerum, but not deorum, the force of things, but not of gods in them; or being but nature rerum, and not figure deorum. 520, 521

Wherefore the true meaning of these deified natures of things could be no other than this, that God was to be acknowledged and worshipped in all things; or, as the Pagans themselves declare it, that the force of every thing was, both governed by God, and it self divine. Pliny of this breaking and crumbling of the Deity into parts, every one worshipping that in God, and for a god, which himself most stood in need of. This dividing of the simple Deity, and worshipping it brokenly by parcels and piece-meal, as manifested in all the several things of nature, and parts of the world, justly cenured, and elegantly perstringed, by Prudentius against Symmacetus. Where Prudentius grants, that Symmacetus, who declared, that it was one thing, which all worshipped; when he sacrificed to Victory, did sacrifice to God Almighty, under that partial notion, as the giver of victory. This, in the Egyptian allegory, Osiris mangled and cut in pieces by Typhon. Victory and Virtue, as well as Neptune, Mars and Bellona, but several names or notions of Jupiter, in the prologue of Plautus his Amphitryon. Page 521, 522

Vossius his opinion, that these deified accidents, and natures of things, as well as the other Pagan invisible Gods, were commonly look’d upon by the vulgar, as so many single, substantial minds, or spirits created by the supreme God, and appointed to preside over those several things respectively. Where it is acknowledged, that neither the political, nor the poetical gods of the Pagans, were taken so much as by the vulgar, for so many independent deities. 523, 524

Probable, that by these gods the wiser Pagans sometimes understood daemons in general, or collectively; that is, whoever they were, that were appointed to preside over those several things, or dispense them. As Aelius in Arrianus seems to be taken for the daemons appointed by God Almighty to preside over the winds. 524, 525

Lactantius his reason, why the Confess and select gods, vulgarly worshipped by the Romans, could not be single daemons or angels. 525

And from Aristotle’s observation, against Zeno. That, according to law, or civil theology, one God was chief for one thing, and another for another, concluded, that these political gods were not properly the subservient ministers of the Supreme; and therefore could be nothing but several names and notions of one natural God, according to his various powers and effects. 525, 526

And thus does Vossius himself afterwards confess, that, according to the natural theology, all the Pagan gods were but several denominations of one God. Where, notwithstanding, this learned
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learned and industrious philologer seems to take the natural and philopohick theology for the phylologick, he making the god thereof the nature of things. Whereas the natural theology was the true, and real, and phylologick, opposed both to the fictions of the poets, and the institutes of law-makers and politicians. As Varro affirmeth, that in cities those things were worshipped and believed, according to false opinions, which had no nature, nor real subsistence, neither in the world, nor without it. The God of the Pagans not the nature of things, which could be the Numen of none but of Atheists; but an understanding Being, the great Mind, or Soul of the whole world, pervading all things. Thus unquestionably true, that the many poetical and political gods were but several names or notions of one natural, real, and true God. Besides which, there were other inferior ministers of this supreme God, acknowledged to be the instruments of his providence, and religiously worshipped also. A brief, but full account, of the Pagans natural theology, set down by Prudentius. Page 526, 527.

And when the more high-flown Pagans referred these poetical and politicoal gods to the divine ideas, or patterns of things in the archetypal world; which, besides the Platonists, the Egyptians in Celsus are said to have done, making the brute animals worshipped by them, but symbols of the eternal ideas; they hereby made these gods to be but so many partial considerations of one God neither, as being all things, or containing in himself the causes of all things; as Julian himself declareth in his sixth oration. 527, 528

An anacephalæosis, that much of the Pagan polytheism was but the polyonymy of one God; he being worshipped under several names. First, according to several general notions of him; as of Janus, Genius, Saturn, Minerva, Urania, or the heavenly Venus, or Love, and others before declared. So also of Summanus, according to S. Austin, and Themis, afterwards to be mentioned. Page 528, 529.

And secondly, according to other more particular notions of them, (in their special gods) as acting in some parts of the world only, or exercising some particular powers. 529, 530.

And lastly, as pervading all things, and being all things, or the cause of all things, he was thereupon called by the name of every thing, or every thing by his name. The Pagans in S. Austin; that their ancestors were not so fottish, as not to understand, that these things of nature were but divine gifts, and not themselves gods. And the Pagans in Eusebius; that the invisible God, the cause of all things, ought to be worshipped in his visible effects, wherein he hath displayed himself. 530.

Though the two former kinds of these gods only called by Athenæus poetical and fiditious, he opposing them to those of the third sort, that were natural and real things; yet may these also be well called poetical, fiditious, and phantastical gods too; because though themselves were real things, existing in nature, yet was their peroration, and deification, meer fiction, fancy and poetry. And accordingly, were they before called by Origen Ελπίνοι άναπλάσαντα, meer signets of the Greeks. 530, 531

XXXIV. Of those Pagans, who supposed the supreme God to be the whole animated world. Hitherto shewed, that even the most refined of the Pagans agreed in these two things. First, in breaking and crumbling the one simple Deity, and multiplying it into many gods; or parceling it out into several particular notions, according to its several powers and virtues (Πολυνομος being,
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The same plainly declared also by the Pagans in Athanasius, that not the divided parts of the world were by them accounted so many several gods, but the whole, made up of them all, one God; which yet might be worshipped in its several parts.

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The Pagans being thus divided, as to their opinions, concerning the natural and true theology; some of them worshipped the world as the body of God, but others only as his image or temple. Thus Plutarch, though disliking the deifying of inanimate things, did notwithstanding approve of worshipping God in the whole world, as his most sacred temple. And the Persian Magi, allowing of no artificial temples, made with mens hands, worshipped God sub dio, and upon the tops of mountains, as conceiving the whole world to be his natural temple. For the same reason did they condemn also artificial statues and images, concluding fire, earth, and water, and the like parts of the world, to be the natural images of the Deity. Thus Dino in Clemens Alexandrinus. This difference amongst the Pagan theologers noted by Macrobius. Thus were all the Pagans world-worshippers, in different senses; but not as a dead and inanimate thing, but either as the body of God, or else as his temple or image.

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Wherefore though these Pagans deified the parts of the world and natures of things, as well as the powers of the mundane soul; yet did not the intelligent amongst them worship them severally, as so many true and proper gods, but only as the parts and members of one great animal or god; or rather worship the great mundane Soul (the life of the whole world) in them all. This proved from S. Austin. 536,

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Furthermore, the Pagans universalliy acknowledging the world to be an animal, those of them, who suppos'd it not to be the first and highest God, conceiv'd it to be either a second, or else a third God; and so worshipp'd it, not only as a temple or image, but also as the son of the first God. Celsus pretended the Christians to have called their Jesus, the Son of God, in imitation of these Pagans, who stiled the world so. Page 539, 540

Thus have we made it fully to appear, that, according to the saying of Antiphon, the many popular gods of the Pagans were but one and the fame natural God; or, according to that of Euclides, their many gods were but many names. So that neither their poetical, nor yet their political theology, was looked upon by them as true and natural. 540

Nevertheless, the wiser Pagans generally concluded, that there ought to be another theology, besides the natural, fitly calculated for the vulgar, and having a mixture of falsehood and fabulosity in it. Varro and Scévola agreed, that the vulgar being incapable of the true and natural theology, it was expedient for them to be deceived in their religion. Strabo also, that the vulgar cannot by philosophick reason, and truth, be carried on to piety; but this must be done by superition, and by the help of fables, and prodigious relations. The same partly acknowledged by Synesius for true. Plato also, that it is hard to find out God, but impossible to declare him to the vulgar; and therefore a necessity of a civil theology, distinct from the natural and philosophical. 540, 542

XXXV. We come now to the next thing proposed, that, besides this seeming and phantastick polytheism of the Pagans, which was nothing but the polyonymy of one God, they had another real polytheism, even in their natural and philosophick theology itself. But this not of self-existent gods, but generated or created ones only. Thus, according to Plutarch, one highest unmade God is the maker and father of all the other gods, generated or derived from him. And Proclus concludes, all the gods to derive their godship from the first God; who therefore is the fountain of the Godhead. Page 542, 543

These inferior Pagan gods styled by Ammianus Marcellinus substantial powers, in way of opposition to those other poetical and political gods, that were not substantial or real, but only several names or notions of one supreme God. These substantial powers (as divination and prophecy was by them imparted to men) said to be all subject to that one sovereign Deity, called Themis, placed by Pagan theologers in the throne of Jupiter. This Themis also another name or notion of the supreme God, besides those before mentioned. Poetry and phantastick intermingled by the Pagans with their natural or philosophick theology. 543, 544

Thus the Pagans held both one God, and many gods, in different senses, Onatus and Plotinus, that the majesty of the supreme God confineth in having multitudes of gods dependent on him, and ruled by him; and that the honour done to them redounds to him. The gods of the original Pagans, not meer dead statues and images, but living understanding beings, represented by them. That Christians asserted no solitary Deity, as Pagans pretended, but agreed with this of Seneca, that God hath generated or created, innumerable understanding beings superiour to men, ministers of his kingdom; the only difference being this, that they gave them no religious worship: out of Laëntius. 544, 546 XXXVI.
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XXXVI. That besides the inferior gods, generally received by all the Pagans, (namely, animated stars, demons, and heroes,) the more refined of them, who accounted not the animated world the supreme Deity, acknowledged a Trinity of divine hypostases, superior to them all. Which doctrine affirmed by Plotinus to have been very ancient, and no invention of Plato's. Page 546

Parmenides an asserter of a trinity, long before Plato. This imputed to the Pythagoreans, by Moderatus in Simplicius, and Jamblicbus in Proclus. Before Pythagoras, Orpheus had his trinity, Phanes, Uranus, and Chronus; the fame with Plato's three kings or principles. Probable, that Pythagoras and Orpheus derived the fame from the theology of the Egyptian Hermes. Some footsteps of such a trinity, in the Mithraick mysteries, amongst the Persians, and the Zoroastrian Cabala. The fame expressly declared in the Magick or Chaldaic oracles. A trinity of gods worshipped anciently by the Samothracians, and called by an Hebrew name Cabiri, the mighty gods. From thence the Roman Capitoline trinity derived; the second whereof, Minerva, or the divine wisdom. The Ternary, a number used by the Pagans, in their religious rites, as mysterious. 546, 547

It being no way probable, that such a trinity of divine hypostases should have sprung from human wit, we may reasonably assent to what Proclus affirmeth, that it was at first Ἵστορία, a theology of divine tradition or revelation; as having been first imparted to the Hebrews, and from them communicated to other nations. Nevertheless, as this divine Cabala was but little understood by these Pagans, so was it by many of them depraved and adulterated. 547, 548

This called univerfally by them, a trinity of gods; or a first, second, and third god: by some a trinity of causes, and of principles, and of opificers. The tradition of the three gods, in Proclus, ancient and famous. Numenius his three gods, called by him, the father, the son, and the nephew, (or grandson.) Nous or Intellect, to Plotinus, a second god: as also the world an image of all the three gods. Plotinus and Porphyrius, their ecftatick union with the firt of these three gods. Page 548, 549

That Philo, a religious Jew, and zealous opposer of the Pagan polytheism, called, notwithstanding, the divine Word also a second god. This not agreeable to the principles of Christianity. Nevertheless S. Agin partly excuses this language in the Pagans. 549, 550

And they perhaps the more excusable, because they sometimes called also those three hypostases, taken all together, the first god. 551

Nor was this trinity of divine hypostases ill-linguaged only by the Pagans, but also the Cabala thereof much depraved and adulterated by some Platonifts and Pythagoreans. As first, such as made the world to be the third god. Such a trinity, a confounding of God and creature together. 551, 552

And that this an adulterated notion of the trinity, evident from hence; because no reason, why these philosophers should stop here, since the sun, moon and stars, and their other generated gods, differ not in kind, but only in degree, from the world. 552

Neither will this excuse them, that they understood this chiefly of the soul of the world; since if there were such a mundane soul, as together with the world made up one animal, this itself must needs be a creature also. ibid.

This probably the reason, why Philo, though acknowledging the divine Word,
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Word, as a second god, and second cause, yet no where speaketh of a third god; lest he should thereby seem to deify the whole created world. Though he call God also, in some sense, the soul of the world too, (whether meaning thereby his first, or his second god.) So that Philo seems to have acknowledged only a duality, and not a trinity, of divine hypostases. Page 552, 553

Another depravation of this Σεκομηνίας theology of divine tradition, or Cabala of the trinity, that some of these Platonists and Pythagoreans, concluding all those several ideas of the divine intellect, or archetypal world, to be so many distinct substances, animals, and gods; have thereby made their second hypostasis, not one, but a heap of innumerable gods and hypostases; and consequently destroyed their trinity. 553

Though Philo again here Platonized so far, as to suppose an incorporeal heaven and earth, and an intelligible sun, moon, and stars, to have been made before the corporeal and sensible; yet does he no where declare them to be so many distinct substances and animals, much less gods; but on the contrary censures that for Pagan idolatry. This pretence of worshipping the divine ideas, in all sensible things, that which gave sanctuary and protection to the foul and soutlheart of all the Pagan idolatries; the Egyptians worshipping brute animals thus, and the Greeks the parts of the world inanimate, and natures of things. 554

A third depravation or adulteration of the divine Cabala of the trinity, by Proclus and other latter Platonists, affenting an innumerable company of Henades, particular unities, superior to the first Noes, or Intellect, their second hypostasis; as also innumerable Noes, substantial Minds or Intellects, superiour to the first Psyche, their third hypostasis.

These Noes seem to be asserted by Platonius also; as likewise the Henades and Agathotetes were by Simplicius. Page 555

A swarm of innumerable Pagan gods from hence; besides their intelligible gods; or ideas, particular Henades and Noes, unities and intellects. ibid.

Now since these particular Henades and Noes of theirs must needs be creatures; the trinity of Proclus and such others, nothing but a scale or ladder of nature, wherein God and the creature are confounded together; the juncture or commixture betwixt them being no where discernible; as if they differed only in degrees: a gross mistake and adulteration of the ancient Cabala of the trinity. 556, 557

This that Platonick, or rather Pseudo-Platonick trinity, by us opposed to the Christian, viz. such a trinity, as confounds the differences betwixt God and the creature; bringing the Deity, by degrees, down lower and lower, and at length scattering it into all the animated parts of the world; a foundation for infinite polytheism, cosmolatry or world-idolatry, and creature-worship. Hence the Platonists and Pythagoreans the fittest men to be champions for Paganism against Christianity. 557, 558

Concerning the Christian Trinity, three things to be observed. First, that it is not a trinity of meer names and words, nor logical notions, or inadequate conceptions of God; this doctrine having been condemned by the Christian church, in Sabellius and others; but a trinity of hypostases, substantial, or persons. 558, 559

The second thing observable in the Christian Trinity, that though the second hypostasis thereof were begotten from the first, and the third proceedeth both from

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from the first and second; yet neither of them creatures. First, because not made ἐν ὑμνῷ, or from an antecedent non-existence brought forth into being, but both of them co-eternal with the father. Secondly, because all necessarily existent, and unannihilable. Thirdly, because all of them universal, or infinite, and creatures of all other particular beings. Page 559

The third observable as to the Christian Trinity, that the three hypostases thereof are all truly and really one God; not only by reason of agreement of will, but also of a mutual ἐνεργείᾳ and ἐνέργεια, permission of each other, and inexistence. Though no instance of the like unity to be found elsewhere in nature; yet since two distinct substances, corporeal, and incorporeal, make one man and person in our selves, much more may three divine hypostases be one God. ibid.

Though much of mystery in the Christian Trinity, yet nothing of plain contradiction to reason, therein; that is, no nonsense, and impossibility. The ill design of those, who represent the Christian Trinity as absolutely contradictory to reason, that they may thereby debauch men’s understandings, and make them swallow down other things, which unquestionably are such. 560

The Christian Trinity much more agreeable to reason, than the Pseudo-Platonick, in the three particulars before mentioned. First, its making their third hypostasis the animated world, or mundane soul. Which, not only too great a leap betwixt the second and third, but also a gross debasement of the Deity, and confounding it with the creature; a foundation for world-idolatry, and worshipping inanimate things, as parts and members of God. ibid.

God to Origen, but quæst anima mundi, as it were the soul of the world, and not truly and properly such. All the perfection of this notion to be attributed to God, but not the imperfection thereof. Page 560, 561

Certain, that, according to the more refined Platonists, their third divine hypostasis, not a mundane, but supramundane soul, and the ὑποβάθρον, or φύσις of the whole world. So to Aemilius, Porphyrius, and Plotinus. A double soul of the world to Plato likewise. The third hypostasis, to these, no creature, but a creator. 562

So in their second particular, (whereby the forementioned Pseudo-Platonick trinity, no trinity) its making all the ideas and archetypal paradigms of things, so many hypostases, animals, and gods. This a monstrous extravagancy. Not to be doubted, but that Plato well understood these ideas to be nothing but Noëmata, or conceptions of the divine mind, existing no where apart by themselves; however called ὑποψίς, essences or substances, because not such accidental and evanil things as our human thoughts are, they being the standing and eternal objects of all science. As also ὑποψίς, or animals; to signify, that they were not mere dead forms, as pictures upon paper, or carved statues. And thus did not only Aemilius understand St. John, concerning the Logos, whatsoever was made was life in him, but also divers of the ancient fathers, Greek and Latin. This deifying of ideas but a piece of Pagan poetry.

Lastly, whereas Proclus and others intermingle many particular gods with those three universal hypostases, and Ilcades and Agathoetès, unities and goodneses, substantial above the first intellect; and Nos, particular minds or intellects, above the first soul; this hypothesis of theirs altogether irrational and absurd; there being nothing essentially goodnes, wisdom, and sanctity, but the three divine hypostases, all other beings having; only
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Only a participation thereof. Thus Origen expressly; who therefore acknowledgeth no higher rank of created beings, than such as the Platonists call Souls, that are self-moveable, vitally unitable to bodies, and peccable. With whom agreeth S. Jerom, and others of the fathers, that God is the only impecable Being; but all understanding creatures, free-willed, and lapable. Page 564, 565

An opinion of Simplicius, that even in that rank of beings called Souls (though not essentially immutable, but self-moveable) some are of so high a pitch, as that they can never degenerate, nor sink or fall into vicious habits. Infomuch that he makes a question, whether Proverbs belong to them or no.

But whatever is to be thought of this, Origen too far in the other extreme, in denying any other ranks of souls above human; and supposing all the difference, that is now betwixt the highest angels, and men, to have proceeded only from their merits, and different uses of their free will; his reason being this, because God would be otherwise a Prosopoleptes, or acceptor of persons. This also extended by him to the soul of our Saviour Christ; as not partially chosen to that dignity, but for its faithful adherence to the divine word in a pre-existent state; which he would prove from Scripture. But if a rank of souls below human, and specifically differing from them, as Origen himself confesseth those of brutes to be; no reason, why there might not also be other ranks or species superior to them.

But least of all can we assent to Origen, when from this principle, that all souls are essentially endued with free will, and therefore in their nature peccable, he infers those endless circuits of souls, upwards and downwards, and consequently denies them any fixed state of holiness and happiness by divine grace; an assertion contrary to the tenour and promises of the gospel. Thus perhaps that to be understood, that Christ brought life and immortality to light through the gospel; not as if he were the first, who taught the soul's immortality, a thing believed before by the Pharisaick Jews, and generality of Pagans; but because these held their endless transmigrations and circuits, therefore was he the first, who brought everlasting life and happiness to light. Page 567, 568

That Origen, a man well skilful in the Platonick learning, and so much addicted to the dogmata thereof, would never have gone so far into that other extreme, had there been any solidity of reason for either those Henades, or Noes, of the latter Platonists. This opinion all one, as if a Christian should suppose, besides the first person, or father, a multitude of particular paternities, superior to the second person; and also besides the one Son, or Word, a multitude of particular sons or words, superior to the third, the Holy Ghost. This plainly to make a breach upon the Deity, and to introduce a company of such creaturely gods, as imply a contradiction in their very notion.

Lastly, this not the catholick doctrine of the Platonick school neither, but a private opinion only of some late doctors. No footsteps of those Henades and Agathotetes to be found any where in Plato; nor yet in Plotinus. This language little older than Proclus. Nor does Plato speak of any absolute or separate mind, save only one; his second things about the second, being Ideas; as his thirds about the third created beings. Plotinus also doubtful and staggering about these Noes, he seeming sometimes to make them but the heads or summities of souls. Wherefore

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this Pseudo-Platonick trinity to be exploded, as confounding the differences betwixt God and the creature. Whereas the Christian Trinity homogeneal, all Deity or Creator; all other things being supposed to be the creatures of those three hypostases, and produced by their joint-concurrence and influence; they being all really but one God.

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Nevertheless, these forementioned depravations and adulterations of that divine Cabala of the trinity, not to be charged upon Plato himself, nor all the other ancient Platonifts and Pythagoreans; some of which approached so near to the Christian Trinity, as to make their three hypostases all truly divine, and creators, other things being the creatures of them. ibid.

First therefore, Plato himself, in his Timæus, carefully distinguifheth betwixt God and the creature, and determineth the bounds of each, after this manner. That the first is that, which always is, and was never made; the second, that which is made and had a beginning, but truly is not. His meaning here perverted by junior Platonifts, whom Boètius also followed. Where Plato takes it for granted, that whatsoever hath a temporary and successive duration, had a beginning; and whatsoever had no beginning, hath no successive, but permanent duration: and so concludes, that whatever is eternal, is God; but whatever exists in time, and hath a beginning, creature. 570, 572

Now to Plato, more eternal gods than one. Which not ideas or Nomoi, but true substantial things; his first, second, and third, in his epiftle to Dionyfus, or trinity of divine hypostases, the makers or creators of the whole world. Cicero's gods, by whose providence the world and all its parts were framed. 572, 573

The second hypostasis in Plato's trinity, to wit, Mind or Intellecf, unquestionably eternal, and without beginning. The same affirmed by Plotinus also of the third hypostasis, or Psyche, called the Word of the second, as the second, the Word of the first. Porphyrius his testimony to this purpose in S. Cyril; where also Mind, or the second divine hypostasis, (though said to have been begotten from the first, yet) called ὀ̂νοματωπη, and ὀνοματερ, its own-parent, and its own-offspring; and said to have sprung out ὀνοματερ, self-begettenly. Page 573, 574

This mysterious riddle expounded out of Plotinus. The plain meaning thereof no more than this, that though this second hypostasis proceeded from the first, yet was it not produced by it after a creaturely manner, nor arbitrarily by will and choice, but in way of natural and necessary emanation. Thus have some Christians ventured to call the Logos, ὁνοματωπη, and ἐξ ἐπιφονον Dem, God from himself. 574, 575

Dionyfus Petavius, having declared the doctrine of Arius, that the Father was the only eternal God, and the Son, or Word, a creature, made in time, and out of nothing; concludes it undeniable manifest from hence, that Arius was a germane, true, and genuine Platonift. Whereas it is most certain from hence, that Arius was no Platonift at all; and that Petavius himself did not well understand the Platonick doctrine. Had Plato denied the eternity of his second hypostasis, called Nous, he must have denied the eternity of Wisdom and Understanding it self; this being to him that wisdom by which God himself is wise, and whereby he made the world. With which agreeeth also Athanasius; our Lord is wisdom, and not second to any other wisdom; and, the Father of the Word is not himself Word; and, that was not Word and Wisdom, which produced Word and Wis-
dom. This in opposition to Arius, who maintained another word and wisdom, se-
nior to that word and wisdom in Christ. These Platonists, so far from denying the eternity of the word, that they rather attributed too much to it, in making it self-
be-gotten. Wherefore Plato, adverting the eternity of his second hypostasis, Nous or Logos, and not of the world, did thereby, according to Albinus his own doctrine, make it to be no creature.  Page 575
Nor is there any force at all in that testimony of Macrobius, cited by Petavius, to the contrary, wherein the first hypostasis is said to have created Mind from it self, and the second to have created Soul; because these ancient Pagans did not confine the word create to such a narrow sense, as Christians commonly do; but used it generally for all manner of production. Petavius his miftake, chiefly from that spurious tri-
unity of the latter Platonists, whose third god is by themselves called πνεύμα, a creature. But this not the doctrine of the ancients. 576
Nevertheless, some more reason to doubt, whether Plato's third hypostasis were eternal, because in his Timæus, he generates the mundane Soul, this con-
troversy decided, by supposing a double Psyche, Ἴναλωσία, and Ἴπερολωσία, a mundane and supra-mundane soul; the first of these called by Plotinus, a heavenly Venus, and a separate soul. Where-
more, though the lower Venus, or mundane soul, according to Plato, made in time together with the world; yet the higher divine Soul, or heavenly Venus, the son of Chromus without a mother, his third hypostasis, eternal, and with-
out beginning. 576, 577
This further evident from hence, be-
cause Plato, in his epistle to Dionysius, affirmed as well of the second and third, as of the first, that in all those things that are cognate to our human soul, (or creaturely) there is ἑν τούτῳ, nothing like thereunto. 577
Secondly, the three hypostases of Plato's trinity, not only all eternal, but also necessarily existent, and absolutely unannihilable. Nor could the first any more exist without the second and third, than the sun without its primary light, and secondary splendour. These also, according to Plotinus, the three prin-
ciples of the universe; so that there could be neither more, nor fewer. They who called the second autopater, signified thereby the necessity of its existence.  Page 577, 578
Thirdly, these three Platonick hypostases, as eternal and necessary, so likewise universal, or comprehensive of the whole world, that is, infinite and omnipotent. Therefore called principles and causes, and opificers. Though Nous, or Mind, vulgarly looked upon as the highest principle of all things, yet Plato set before it one most simple Good. When Nous, said by Plato to be γεννήτορ, of the same kind with the first Cause of all things, this all one as if he had affirmed it to be ὁμοούσιον, co-essential or con-substantial with it. 578, 579
Plato's third hypostasis, Psyche or the superiour, mundane Soul, called by him Zeus, from ζῦν, as also the Caufe and Fountain of life, and the Prince and King of all things. And when said to be γεννήτορ, the Offspring of the highest Mind, thereby made confused with it also. So that Plato's whole trinity Homooousian. 579
Though by the Demiurgus or Opificer Plato commonly meant the second hypostasis, Mind or Intellect; yet Atticus, Amelius, Plotinus and others, called the third, or the higher Psyche also, by that name. Wherefore, according to the ge-
une Platonick, and Parmenidian trinity, all the three hypostases joint crea-
tures of the whole world. Thus Ficinus often, and Proclus. Porphyryus his af-
firmation, that the Deity, according
to Plato, extends to three hypotases  Page 579
Certain therefore, that Arius did not Platonize, but rather Albanafius and the Nicene fathers; who, notwithstanding, made not Plato, but the Scriptures, their foundation. The genuine trinity of Plato and Parmenides, a middle betwixt that of Sabellius, and that of Arius; it being neither a trinity of words and names as the former; nor an heteroufious trinity, a confused jumble of God and the creature together; but homoufious and homogeneal: all eternal, necessarily existent, infinite or omnipotent, and creator. 579, 580
But that it may yet more fully appear, how far the most refined Platonick and Parmenian trinity does either agree, or disagree, with the Scripture and Christian doctrine, two things further to be observed concerning it. First, that the Platonists universally afferted an essential dependence of their second and third hypotases upon the first, as also a gradual subordination in them. Thus Platonius; Chronos, or the second hypotasis, is in a middle state betwixt his father, who is greater, and his son, who is inferior. And that in this eternal generation or emanation no progress upward, but all downward, and a gradual defcent.
More of the dependence and gradual subordination of the second and third hypotases of the Platonick trinity to the first. Each following hypotasis called ἥχος and τόςε σ and εἰκών, and εἰδωλος, and μίμησις of that before it. Philo's offensive expression, that the Logos, or Word, is the shadow of God. This gradation commonly illustrated by the ἑνεδρας, or ἀπαίγωνα, the effulgency, or out-shining splendour of the sun. 581, 582
The same further manifested from the several distinctive characters given to each hypotasis, in the true Platonick, or Parmenidian trinity. The first, ἐν πόσῳ, one before all things; the second, ἐν πάσῃ, one all things, as to their distinct ideas; the third, ἐν καὶ πάντα, one really producing all things. The first, Unity and Goodness essential; the second, Understanding and Wisdom; the third, self-active Love and Power. The first, or Father ἀναγέννησις, above action; the second or Son, the Demiur- gus, the Maker or contriving Architect of the world, but an immovable nature; the third a moveable Deity, and the immediate governor of the whole world. Amelius his distinction of them into τὸν ὀντὸν τοῦ λογοτ, τοῦ ὀρέστα. 582, 583
The greatest difficulty in the distinctive characters of these three Platonick hypotases; that Understanding; Reason and Wisdom, should be made peculiar to the second, as if the first were therefore devoid of Mind, Reason and Wisdom. This an arcana of the Platonick and Pythagorick theology; that whereas Anaxagoras, Aristotle, and the vulgar, make Mind and Understanding the oldest of all things, and the highest principle in the universe; this supposes Mind, Knowledge and Wisdom, to be not the first, but second. Partly because there is multiplicity in Knowledge, but there must be unity before multiplicity. And partly because there must be Νοειον before Νος, an Object or Intelligible before Intellect. As also, because Intellection, or Knowledge, is not the highest good, or happiness; and therefore to be some substantial thing, in order of nature superior to Mind. Hence concluded, that the supreme Deity is better than Logos, Reason, Word, or Intellect. That not Logos, from whence Logos is derived. Thus Philo; The God before Reason, or Word, better than all the rational nature. But this difficulty common to Platonism with Christianity; which likewise makes Word, or Reason and Wisdom, not the
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The first, but second hypothesis. Thus does Athanasius deny, that there is any word, reason, or wisdom, before the Son of God. What then? Is the first hypothesis therefore άλογos and άλογóε, devoid of reason and mind? Plotinus his attempt to answer this; that the first hath φως, ἄλκη, a simple light, different from that multiform light of knowledge. Again, that the first is νοeσ; αντι, intelligence itself, and therefore superior to intellect, or that which hath intellecttion. (For ά νοeσ ν οσ, intelligence it self doth not understand.) Besides which, another attempt also to solve this difficulty. Page 585, 586.

The ground of this Platonick dependence and subordination in the divine hypotheses; because there is but one fountain of the Godhead; so that the second must needs differ from the first, as the ἄραγραμα from the Φως, the splendor from the sun. 586, 587.

Though the second hypotheses said to have been begotten from the first; yet this not to be taken for such a generation, as that of men, where three men, (father, son, and grand-son) all adult, have no essentiel dependence upon one another, nor gradual subordination. This but an imperfect generation. 587.

Furthermore, the Platonists would recommend this their gradation in the Deity, or subordination of hypotheses, from hence, because by this means, not so great a leap or jump in the creation, as otherwise there must be; nor the whole Deity screwed up to such a disproportionate height, as would render it incapable of having any intercourse with the lower world. Were the whole Deity, either one simple Monad, or else an immovable Mind, it could have no such liberty of will as is commonly attributed to it, nor be affectible with any thing here below; nor indeed any fitter object for men's devotion, than an adamantine rock. Whereas as all the phenomena of the Deity solvable by this Platonick gradation. Page 587, 588.

As also, according to this hypothesis, some reasonable satisfaction to be given, why just so many divine hypotheses, and neither fewer, nor more. 588.

The second thing to be observed, concerning the genuine Platonick, or Parmenian trinity; that though the hypotheses thereof be called three Natures, and three Principles, and three Opificers, and three Gods; yet they all really make up but one Divinity. For the world, being created by all three, and yet having but one creation, they must needs be all one Creator. Porphyris in S. Cyril explicitly, that, according to Plato, the essence of the Deity extendeth to three hypotheses. 588, 589.

Platonists further add, that were it not for this essentiel dependence, and subordination, the three divine hypotheses must needs be three co-ordinate gods; and no more one god, than three men are one man, or three suns one sun. Whereas the sun, its splendor, and derivative light, may all well be accounted one and the same thing. 589.

These Platonists therefore suppose to close a union, and so near a conjunction, betwixt their three hypotheses; as no where else to be found in nature. Plotinus; that there is nothing between them, and that they are only not the very fame. They acknowledge also their Perichoresis or mutual inexistence. The three hypotheses one divinity to the Platonists, in the same manner, as the centre, radius distance, immoveable, and moveable circumference, of a sphere, all one sphere. The first infinite Goodness, the second infinite Wisdom, the third infinite active Love, and power substantial. 590, 591.

From this full account of the true and
and genuine Platonick trinity, its both agreement and disagreement with the Christian, plainly appeareth. First, its agreement in the three fundamental things before mentioned; and consequently its discrepancy from Arianism. Page 591, 592

Secondly, its disagreement notwithstanding, from the now-recited doctrine, in that it supposes the three hypostases not to have one and the same singular essence, nor yet an absolute co-equality, but a gradual subordination, and essential dependence. Upon which account, said by some, to symbolize with Arianism, however different from it in the main point.

Besides which, the best of the Platonists, sometimes guilty of extravagant expressions. Plotinus his ὁ ἐπιτάχθης ἂ ν ἰματίσθη, that our human soul is of the same species with the mundane soul, or third hypostasis; that being but the elder sister. Which indeed is to make it co-essential or substantial with us men, as S. Iustinus understood it. This a foundation for creature-worship or idolatry. Why the Arians by Constantine called Porphyrianists. But this doctrine, as repugnant to Plato, so elsewhere contradicted by Plotinus himself. 593, 594

That notwithstanding, a Platonick Christian would apologize for Plato and the genuine Pythagoreans, after this manner. First, that having no scriptures, councils, nor creeds, to direct them in the darkness of this mystery, and to guide their language, they the more excusable, if not always uniform, and sometimes extravagant. More to be wondered at, that they should approach so near the Christian truth. 594, 595

And for their gradual subordination of hypostases, and dependence of the second and third upon the first; that these Platonists herein the more excusable, because the majority of Christian doctors, for the first three centuries, seem to have affirmed the same. Page 595, 596

The Platonick Christians further apology; that the Platonists intention in subordinating their three hypostases, only to exclude a plurality of co-ordinate independent gods. That none of Plato's three hypostases, creatures, but that the essence of the godhead belongs to them all; they being all eternal, necessarily existent, infinite, or omnipotent, and creators. Therefore in the sense of the Nicene council, co-essential and co-equal. The essence of the godhead, wherein all the three hypostases agree, as well to the fathers, as Platonists, general and universal. 596, 597

Besides which, the genuine Platonists would acknowledge also, all their three hypostases to be homoousian, co-essential or substantial, yet in a further sense, as making up one entire divinity: as the root, stock and branches co-essential to a vine. The Trinity not so undivided, as if three were not three in it. The inequality and subordination in the Platonick Trinity, within the Deity it self only, and in the relation of the hypostases to one another; they being ad extrà all one and the same God, jointly concurring in the same actions, and in that respect, devoid of inequality. 597, 598

Furthermore, the Platonick Christian would urge, that according to the principles of Christianity it self, there must needs be some dependence and subordination in these hypostases, in their relation to one another; a priority and posteriority of order and dignity: that which is originally of it self, having some kind of priority and superiority, over that which is wholly derived from it. The second and third hypostases, not so omnipotent as the first, because not able to beget or produce that. Hence
Hence first styled by Macrobins, the most omnipotent of all. Sundry passages in Scripture favouring this hypothesis, as also orthodox fathers. Athanasius his resemblances to the original light and the secondary splendour; to the fountain and the stream, the root and the branch, the water and the vapour. The equality asserted by the orthodox, in way of opposition to the Arian inequality of God and creature; that they equally God, or uncreated. Notwithstanding which, some inequality amongst them allowed by Petavius and others, as this God, and that person.

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However, no necessity of any more inequality and subordination in the Platonick, than in the Christian Trinity; they being but infinite goodness, and infinite wisdom, and infinite active love, and power substantial. Another hypothesis of some Platonists, hinted by S. Austin out of Porphyry, which makes the third hypothesis a middle between the first and second; and implies, not so much a gradation, as a circulation in the Trinity.

As for the Platonists supposing their three hypotheses (though one entire divinity) to have their distinct singular essences, without which they conceive they could be nothing, but three names; the Platonick Christian would make this apology, that the orthodox fathers themselves were generally of this persuasion, that the essence of the Godhead, wherein all the three persones agree, not one singular, but only one common or universal essence. Their distinction to this purpose, betwixt σόιη and φύσιν; that the former was common or generic, the latter singular or individual. Theodoret, Basil, and many others. Petavius his acknowledgment, that the Greeks universally agreed herein.

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The opinion of Gregory Nyssen, Cyril, DAMASCEN, and others, that the persons of the Trinity no otherways one, than as three individuals under the same species, or as three men agree in the same common humanity. These the chief afferers of an absolute, independent, and unsubsordinate equality. This the only fault, that S. Cyril finds in the Platonists, that they did not assert such a consubstantiality. Whereas this trinity, tritheism; the three persons thereof being no more one God, than three men are one man; however this certain, that these fathers did not suppose, the three hypotheses of the Trinity to have all the same singular essence. Another extreme, that sprung up afterwards in the room of the former tritheism, and owned by no other authority, than of a Lateran council.

Page 603, 604

And that this sameness of singular essence was not asserted by the Nicene fathers, and first opposers of ARIUS; first, clearly acknowledged by Petavius:

604, 605

But this further evident from hence; because the same orthodox fathers, who opposed Arianism, did also condemn Sabellianism; which affered, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, to be but one hypothesis, that is, to have but one and the same singular essence; and consequently acknowledged no other Trinity than of names or words.

605

It appeareth also from hence, because the word Homoousious had never any other sense, than to signify the agreement of things numerically differing, in some common and general nature or essence. S. Basil, that the same thing is not homoousious, co-essential, or consubstantial with itself; but always one thing with another. To ουκ ουκανυν τον τον ως τον ως νυνιν in Plutarch. So also in Athanasius, he affirming, the branches to be homo-
moousious and congruous with the root. Besides which, ὀμογενής, ὀμοειδής, and ὀμοφυής, used by Athanasius, and other authors, as synonymous with ὀμοόσιος. None of which words signify an identity of singular essence, but general or universal only. The council of Chalcedon, that our Saviour Christ, as to his humanity, was homousious or confubstantial with us men. Thus does Athanasius deny, the Son or Word, as such, to be homousious or confubstantial with creatures; as also he affirmeth men to be confubstantial with one another, every son confubstantial and coessential with his father. Page 605, 606

Moreover the sense of the Nicene fathers, in their confubstantiality, may more fully appear from the doctrine of Arius opposed by them; which made the Son a creature, and therefore (as Athanasius writeth) ἑπαρθόντος or ἡλεκτρόφισιος, of a different essence or substance from the father. Proved clearly from Athanasius, that by the confubstantiality of the word was meant no more, than its being not a creature, or uncreated.

Page 606, 608

Further proof, out of Athanasius, that by confubstantiality is not meant a sameness of singular, but only of general essence. As also out of S. Justin. 608, 611

Lastly, that the homousious fathers did not assert, against Arius, a sameness of singular essence, evident from their disclaiming those two other words, τευτειόσιον, and μοιεσιον, (as having a Sabellian sense in them,) the former by Epiphanius, the latter by Athanasius. So that they, who asserted the Son to be homousious, confubstantial with the Father, denied him to be monoousious, or tautoousious, that is, to have the same singular essence. 612, 613

From all these considerations, concluded by the Platonick Christian, that as the genuine Trinity of Plato agreed, with that of the orthodox Christians, in being not heterousious, but homousious, coessential or confubstantial; not made up of God and creature, but all homogeneal of uncreated, or creator: so did the Trinity of the first orthodox Anti-Arians herein agree with the Platonick Trinity, that it was not monoousious, or tautoousious, one and the same singular essence, under three names or notions only; but really three hypostases or persons.

Page 612

Nevertheless, here remaineth a question to be answered; whether Athanasius, the Nicene fathers, and all the first Anti-Arians did therefore assert the same thing with Greg. Nyssen, Cyril, and others, that the three persons in the Trinity were but three co-ordinate individuals, under the same species, having only a specific unity or identity, (besides content of will;) or that they all agree in the uncreated Nature only. This grossly asserted in the dialogues of the Trinity, vulgarly imputed to Athanasius, and to that purpose also, that three men are not three men, but only three, when they differ from one another in will and opinion. But these dialogues pseudographous. Nevertheless to be granted, that Athanasius himself, in that book of the common essence of the persons, seems to lay something too much stress upon this common nature, essence, or substance, of the three persons, as to the making of them all but one God. However, it is certain, he does not there rely upon that alone; and elsewhere acknowledgeth it to be insufficient. The true reason, why Athanasius laid so great a stress upon the Homousiates, not because this alone would make them one God, but because they could not possibly be one God without it. For if the Father be uncreated, and the Son a creature, then
can they not both be one God. Several passages of Athanafius cited to this purpose. Thofe expressions in him of one Godhead, and the sameness of the Godhead, and one essence or substance in the Trinity, not fo to be understood, as if the three persons were but several names, notions, or modes of one thing.

Page 612, 616

Wherefore, though Athanafius lay his foundation in this ἕν ἃλλα ἕνωσ, common specific unity of the persons, (which is their consubstantiality,) in order to their being one God; yet does he superadd other considerations also thereunto. As firft of all this, that they are not three principles, but only one; the essence of the father being the root and fountain of the Son and Spirit; and the three hypostases, gathered together under one head. Where Athanafius implies, that, were they perfectly co-ordinate and independent, they would not be one, but three gods.

In the next place, he further addeth, that these three hypostases are not three separated disjoined things, but indivisibly united; as the splendour is indivisible from the sun, and wisdom from him that is wise. That neither of these persons could be without the other; nor any thing come between them: they so immediately conjoined together, as that there is a kind of συνεχεία, or continuity betwixt them. 616, 617

Thirdly, Athanafius goes yet higher; affirming these three hypostases, not only to be indivisibly conjoined, but also to have a mutual inexistence in each other. This afterwards called an Empirichoresis. That of our Saviour, I am in the Father, and the Father in me, therefore quarrelled at by the Arians, because they conceived of things incorporeal, after a corporeal manner. That the Godhead of the Son, is the Godhead of the Father; and the Father exercises a providence over all, in the Son.

Page 617, 619

Laftly, Athanafius also in sundry places, supposes the three divine hypostases to make up one entire divinity; as the fountain and the stream make up one entire river; the root, stock, and branches, one entire tree. Accordingly the word Homoousios used by Athanafius, in a further sense, not only to signify things agreeing in one common and general essence, but also such as essentially concur to the making up of one entire thing. That the three hypostases do outwardly, or ad extra, produce all, πάντα ἐπεξεύρηκεν, one and the self-same all; the Father, by the Word, in the Holy Spirit, doing all things. That all this doctrine of Athanafius would have been readily assented to by Plato and his genuine followers. The Platonick Christian therefore concludes, that there is no such real difference betwixt the genuine Platonick trinity, and that of the first orthodox Anti-Arian fathers, as some conceive. From which notwithstanding that tritheistick Trinity, of S. Greg. Nofien, Cyril, and others, of three co-ordinate individuals under the same species, (as three men) seems to have been a deviation. 619, 620

Hitherto the Platonick Christians apology, for the genuine Platonick Trinity; or endeavour to reconcile it with the doctrine of the ancient church: where nothing is assered by our selves, but all submitted to the judgment of the learned in these matters. And whatsoever in Plato's trinity shall be found discrepant from the sense of the first orthodox Anti-Arian fathers, utterly disclaimed by us. Athanafius a great instrument of divine providence, for preferring the Christian Church from lapsing into a kind of paganick and idolatrous Christianity. ibid.

The reason of this apology, for the
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genuine Platonick trinity; because it is against the interest of Christianity, that this should be made more discrepant from the Christians, than indeed it is. Moreover certain, that this genuine Platonick trinity was Anti-Arian; or rather the Arian Anti-Platonick. Wherefore Socrates wondered, that Georgius and Timotheus Presbyters should adhere to the Arian faction; when one of them was accounted much a Platonist, the other an Origenist. Page 620, 621

Furthermore, Platonick Pagans, after Christianity, highly approved of the beginning of St. John’s Gospel concerning the Logos, as exactly agreeing with their Platonick doctrine. Thus Amelius in Eusebius, and others. A Platonist in S. Autin, that it deserved to be writ in golden letters, and set up in some eminent places in every Christian church. But that, which is most of all considerable, to justify this apology, the generality of Christian fathers, before and after the Nicene council, looked upon this Platonick trinity, if not as really the same thing with the Christian, yet as approaching so near thereunto, that it differed chiefly in circumstances, or manner of expression. Thus Justin Martyr, Clemens Alexanderinus, Origen, St. Cyprian, or the author of the book De Spiritu Sancto, Eusebius Caesariensis, and, which is most of all to the purpose, Athanasius himself, he giving a signal testimony thereunto. To which may be added S. Autin and Theodoret. S. Cyril, though blaming the Platonick subordination, (himself supposing the Trinity to be three co-ordinate individuals, under the same specific nature of the Godhead) yet acknowledges, that Plato was not altogether ignorant of the truth, &c. But that Plato’s subordination, of his second hypostasis to the first, was not (as the Arian) of a creature to the Creator; already made unquestionably evident. Page 621, 625

Wherefore a wonderful providence of Almighty God here to be taken notice of; that this doctrine, of a trinity of divine hypostases, should be entertained in the Pagan world before Christianity, as it were to prepare a way for the reception of it amongst the learned. Which the junior Platonists were sufficiently of, that besides their other adulterations of the Platonick trinity before mentioned, (for the countenancing of their polytheism and idolatry) they at length innovated and altered the whole Cabala, now no longer acknowledging a trinity, but at least a quaternity of divine hypostases; namely, before and besides the trinity, another hypostasis superior thereunto, and standing alone by it fell. This first started by Jamblichus, carried on by Proclus, taken notice of by St. Cyril: besides which, Proclus also added other phantastick trinities of his own. 625, 627

Another advantage of this Platonick trinity, extending to the present time; perhaps not unintended also by divine providence, to abate the confidence of those conceited wits, who so boldly decry the Trinity for nonsense, absolute contradiction to reason, and impossibility, when they shall find, that the best and freest wits amongst the Pagans, though having no Scripture-revelation to impose upon them, were yet fond of this hypothesis. 627

And now it sufficiently appears, that the ancient Platonists and Pythagoreans were not to be taxed for polytheists and idolaters, in giving religious worship to their three divine hypostases. One grand design of Christianity, to free the world from idolatry and creature-worship: and this the reason, why the ancient fathers so zealously opposed Arianism, because it thwarted that
that design, it paganizing and idolatriz- 
ing that, which was intended for the un-paganizing of the world. One re-
markable passage of Athanasius to this pur-pose. Page 627, 629
Where first observable, that Athana-
sius expressly affirmeth the Pagans to have worshipped only one uncreated, and many created Gods. Thus Greg. Naz. that there was but one divinity amongst the Pagans also. And Irenæus, that they attributed the first place of the De-
ity to one supreme God, the maker of this universe. And secondly, that to Athanasius, and all those other fathers, who charged the Arians with idolatry, this was supposed not to consist in wor-
shipping many independent and self-
existent Gods, but in giving religious wor-
ship to creatures: as the Arians gave a religious worship to the Son or Word, suppos’d by themselves to be but a creature.

629, 630
But if Arians guilty of polytheism or idolatry, for believing religious wor-
ship upon the Son or Word, as a crea-
ture, (though the chief of creatures, and that, by which all others were made) much more they guilty hereof, who reli-
giously worshipped other inferior beings. Athanasius; That no creature the object of religious worship, and that the Or-
thodox worshipped the divinity in the humanitv of our Saviour Christ. Nefo-
rinius branded with the name of a man-
worshipper. Some suppose that neces-
fary to idolatry, which is impossible, to worship more than one, as omni-
potent, or with mental latria. 630, 632
And now have we sufficiently an-
swered the objection against the natu-
rality of the idea of a God, as including onelikens in it, from the Pagan poly-
theism. What farther here intended concern- ing the same, (as a foundation for our defence of Christianity) differed, to make room for a confutation of all the atheistick arguments.

633, 634

CHAP. V.

A particular confutation of all the athe-

istick grounds.

The first atheistick argument; That there is no idea of God. That in answer to this, the idea of God hath been already declared; viz. a perfect, understanding Being, un-

made, or self-existent from eternity, and the cause of all other things, In which, nothing unconceivable, nor contradic-
tious. That these confounded Atheists themselves, who deny, that there is any idea of God at all, must withstanding, of necessity, suppose the contrary; because otherwise, denying his existence, they should deny the existence of no-
ting. And that they agree also with Atheists in the same idea; the one de-

nying the existence of that, which the other allows, That an understanding Nature is the original of all things. This idea of God, as containing onelikness and singularity in it, not only largely defended and made good against that objection from the Pagan poly-
theism; but also proved, that the gen-
erality of mankind have a natural pro-

lepsis or anticipation in their minds con-
cerning the real and actual existence of such a Being. Atheists but monsters, and anomalies of mankind. This a suf-
cient confutation of the first atheistick argument.

Page 633, 634. 

Nevertheless, That Atheists may not pretend, any of their strength to be concealed; all their particular excep-
tions against the idea of God here de-

clared, being five. Their first excep-
tion, That we can have no idea nor thought of any thing not subject to sense; much less any evidence of the existence thereof. The answer. First, That whereas the Atheists suppose Sense to
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to be the only Knowledge, or at least original Knowledge; Senfe, as such, is not Knowledge, or Understanding; because if it were, then every one, that sees light and colours, or feels heat and cold, would understand light and colours, heat and cold. Plainly proved also from that atomick philosophy, (which the Epicurean Atheists so much pretend to,) that there is a higher faculty of the soul, which judges of senfe, detects the phantafy thereof, resolves sensible things into intelligible principles, &c. No passion able to make a judgment, either of it self, or of other things. The confounded Democritus himself sometimes acknowledged Senfe to be but feeming and phantafy, and not to reach to the absolute truth and reality of things. He therefore exploded qualities out of the rank of entities, because unintelligible; concluding them to be but our own phantafms. Undeniably evident, that we have ideas, notions, and thoughts of many things, that never were in Senfe, and whereof we have no genuine phantafms. Atheists attend not to their own cogitations. That opinion, That there is nothing in the understanding, which was not before in Senfe, falfe and atheistical. Men having a notion of a perfect, understanding Being, the cause of all things, as the object of their devotion; the Atheists, notwithstanding, would here persuade them, that they have none, and that the thing is a nonentity, merely because they have no sensible idea, or phantasm thereof. And so may they as well prove, not only Reason and Understanding, Appetite and Volition, to be non-entities, but also Phancy and Senfe it self; neither of these falling under Senfe, but only the objects of them. Were God indeed corporeal, as some mistaken Atheists suppose, yet his essence chiefly consisting in Mind and Understanding, this of him could not possibly be subject to Senfe. But that there is also substance incorporeal, which therefore in its own nature is insensible, and that the Deity is such, will be elsewhere demonstrated.

Page 634, 637

Though the evidence of singular bodies existing, depend upon the information of Senfe, yet the certainty of this very evidence, not from Senfe alone, but a complication of Reason and Understanding with it. Senfe phantastical, not reaching to the absolute truth of things; and obnoxious to delusion. Our own imaginations, taken for sensations and realities, in sleep, and by melancholized persons, when awake. Atomick Atheists themselves assert the existence of such things, as they have no senfe of; atoms, membranes, or exuvions images of bodies, may incorporeal space. If the existence of nothing, to be acknowledged, which falls not under Senfe, then not the existence of Soul and Mind. God the great Mind, that rules the whole universe; whence our imperfect minds derived. The existence of that God, whom no eye can see, demonstrated by reason from his effects. 637,

638

The second atheistical pretence against the idea of God, and his existence, from Theists own acknowledging him to be incomprehensible; from whence they infer him to be a non-entity. Here perhaps it may be granted, in a right senfe, that whatsoever is altogether unconceivable, is either in it self, or at least to us, Nothing. How that of Protagoras, That every man is the measure of all things to himself, in his senfe falfe. Whatsoever any man's shallow understanding cannot clearly comprehend, not therefore to be presently expunged out of the catalogue of beings. Nevertheles, according to Ariistle, the Soul and Mind in a manner all things. This a crystalline globe, or notional world, that hath some image
in it of whatsoever is contained in the real globe of being. Page 638
But this absolutely false; That whatsoever cannot be fully comprehended by us, is therefore utterly unconceivable and consequently nothing. For we cannot fully comprehend our selves, nor have such an adequate conception of any substance, as perfectly to master and conquer the same. That of the Scepticks so far true, That there is something incomprehensible in the essence of every thing, even of body itself. Truth bigger than our Minds. Proper to God Almighty, (who alone is wise,) perfectly to comprehend the essences of all things. But it follows not from hence, that therefore we have no idea nor conception at all of any thing. We may have a notion or idea of a perfect Being, though we cannot fully comprehend the same by our imperfect minds, as we may see and touch a mountain, though we cannot encompass it all round within our Arms. This therefore a false theorem of the Atheists, That whatsoever cannot be fully comprehended by Men's imperfect understandings, is an absolute non-entity. 638, 639
Though God more incomprehensible than other things, because of his transcendent perfection, yet hath he also more of conceitibleness: as the sun, dazzling our sight, yet hath more of visibility also, than any other object. The dark incomprehensibility of the Deity, like the azure obscurity of the transparent aether, not any thing absolutely in itself, but only relative to us. 639, 640
This incomprehensibility of the Deity, so far from being an argument against its existence, that certain, on the contrary, were there nothing incomprehensible to our imperfect minds, there could be no God. Every thing apprehended by some internal congruity. The scantiness and imperfection of our narrow understandings must needs make them asymmetrical or incommensurate to what absolutely perfect. Page 640
Nature itself intimates, that there is something vastly bigger than our mind and thoughts, by those passions implanted in us, of devout veneration, adoration, and admiration, with ecstasies and pleasing horour. That of the Deity, which cannot enter into the narrow vessels of our minds, must be otherwise apprehended, by their being plunged into it, or swallowed up, and lost in it. We have a notion or conception of a perfect Being, though we cannot fully comprehend the same; because our selves being imperfect, must needs be incommensurate thereunto. Thus no reason at all, in the second atheistical pretence, against the idea of God, and his existence; from his confessed incomprehensibility. ibid.
The third follows, that infinity, supposed to be essential to the Deity, is a thing perfectly unconceivable, and therefore an impossibility and non-entity. Some passages of a modern writer to this purpose. The meaning of them, That there is nothing of philosophick truth in the idea or attributes of God, nor any other sense in the words, than only to signify the veneration and astonishment of men's own minds. That the word infinite signifies nothing in the thing itself so called, but only the inability of our understandings, and admiration. And since God, by the Atheists, is denied to be finite, but cannot be infinite, therefore an unconceivable nothing. Thus another learned well-willer to atheism, That we have no idea of infinite, and therefore not of God. Which, in the language of Atheists, all one as to say, that he is a non-entity. 640, 641
Answer. This argument, That there can be nothing infinite, and therefore no God, proper to the modern and noterick Atheists only; but repugnant to the
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the sense of the ancients. Anaximander's ἀπαντάνω, infinite matter, though Melissus his "Ἀνήκοτος τῷ ὀρθῳ Διῷ." Formerly both Theists and Atheists agreed in this; that there must be something or other infinite, either an infinite Mind, or infinite matter. The ancient Atheists also asserted a numerical infinity of worlds. Thus do Atheists confute or contradict Atheists. Page 641, 642.

That the modern Atheists do no less contradict plain reason also, and their very selves, than they do their predecessors, when they would disprove a God from hence, because there can be nothing infinite. For first, certain, that there was something or other infinite in duration, or eternal without beginning: because, if there had been once nothing, there could never have been anything. But hardly any Atheists can be so sotish, as in good earnest to think there was once nothing at all, but afterwards something matter happened to be. Notorious impudence in them, who assert the eternity of matter, to make this argument against the existence of a God; because infinite duration without beginning, an impossibility. 642, 643.

A concession to the Atheists of these two things; That we neither have a phantasm of any infinite, because there was never any in sense; and that infinity is not fully comprehensible by finite understandings neither. But since, mathematically certain, that there was something infinite in duration, demonstrated from hence, against Atheists, That there is something really existing, which we have neither any phantasm of, nor yet can fully comprehend in our Minds. ibid.

Further granted, that as for infinity of number, magnitude, and time, without beginning; as we have no phantasm, nor full comprehension of them, so have we neither any intelligible idea, notion, or conception: from whence it may be concluded, that they are non-entities. Number infinite in Aristotle, only in a negative sense, because we can never come to an end thereof by addition. For which very reason also there cannot possibly be any number positively infinite, since one or more may always be added. No magnitude so great neither, but that a greater may be supposed. By infinite space, to be understood nothing but a possibility of more and more body, further and further infinitely, by divine power; or that the world could never be made so great, as that God was not able to make it still greater. This potential infinity, or indefinity of body, seems to be mistaken for an actual infinity of space. Lastly, no infinity of time past, because then there must needs be time past, which never was present. An argument of a modern Writer. Reason therefore concludes, neither world, nor time, to have been infinite in past duration. Page 643, 644.

Here will the Atheist think he has got a great advantage for disproving the existence of a God; they, who thus take away the eternity of the world, taking away also the eternity of a God. As if God could not be eternal otherwise, than by a successive flux of infinite time.

But we say, that this affordeth a demonstration of a God; because, since both the world and time had a beginning, there must of necessity be something, whose duration is not successive; but permanent, which was the Creator of them both. Wherefore the Atheists can here only make grimaces, and quibble upon nunc-ans; as if this standing eternity of the Deity was nothing but a pitiful moment of time standing still; and as if all duration must needs be the same with ours, &c.

644, 645.

Concluded, that infinite and eternal are not words which signify nothing in the thing itself, but only the idle progress of our minds, or our own ignorance.
range, stupid astonishment and veneration: not mere attributes of honour and complement, but attributes belonging to the Deity, (and that alone) of the most philosophick truth. And though we have no adequate comprehension thereof, yet must we have some notion of that, which we can demonstrate to be long to something. Page 645, 646

But the thing, which the Atheists principally quarrel with, is infinite power, or omnipotence; which they pretend also to be utterly unconceivable, and impossible, and a name of nothing. Where indeed our modern Atheists have the joint suffrage of the ancients also, who concerned themselves in nothing more than disproving omnipotence, or infinite power.

This omnipotence, either wilfully or ignorantly misrepresented by Atheists, as if it were a power of doing things contradictory. An irony of a modern Atheist, that God could turn a tree into a yllogism. The absurd Doctrine of Cartesius, that God could have made twice two not to have been four; or the three angles of a triangle not to have been equal to two right. This to make one attribute of the Deity devour and destroy another; infinite will and power, infinite understanding and wisdom. To suppose God to understand and be wise only by will, really to give him no understanding at all. God not so omnipotent, as that he can destroy the intelligible natures of things; which were to baffle and befool his own wisdom. Infinite power, that which can do all that is possible; that is, conceivable, or implies no contradiction. The very essence of possibility, concep-

ability. And thus all the ancient Theists. Absurd for Atheists to say, that a power of doing nothing but what is conceivable is unconceivable. ibid. 646

But because Atheists look upon infinity as such a merco, we shall take off the wizard from it; by declaring, that it is really nothing else but perfection. Infinite understanding and knowledge, perfect understanding, without any defect, and the knowledge of all things knowable. Infinite power, perfect power, or a power of doing all things possible. Infinite duration, perfection of essence. Because infinity, perfection; therefore no-
thing, which includeth any thing of imperfection in the essence of it, can be truly and properly infinite; as number, magnitude and time: all which can but counterfeit infinity. Nothing one way infinite, which is not so every way, or a perfect Being. Page 647, 648

Now, that we have an idea of perfection, plain from that of imperfection. Perfection first in order of nature, as the rule and measure. This not the want of imperfection, but imperfection the want of perfection. A scale, or ladder of perfections in nature, perceived by means of that idea, which we have of a Being absolutely perfect, the measure of them. Without which, we could not take notice of imperfection, in the most perfect of all those things which we ever had sense of. Boëtius; That whatsoever is imperfect in any kind, implies something in that kind perfect, from whence it was derived. And that the nature of things took not beginning from any thing incompleat and imper-
fect; but descended downward, from what was absolutely perfect, by steps and degrees, lower and lower. 648

Wherefore, since infinite the fame with perfect, we having a notion of the latter must needs have of the former. And though the word infinite be negative, yet is the sense positive. Finite the negation of infinite, as which, in order of nature is before it; and not infinite of finite. However, in things un-
capable of true infinity; infinity being here a mere imaginary thing and non-
entity, can be only conceived by the
negation of finite, as nothing is, by the negation of something. An infinite being nothing but a perfect being, such as never was not, and could produce all things possible, or conceivable. Page 648, 649

The fourth atheifick pretence against the idea of God; That it is an arbitrary and various complement of contradictory notions. Where first we deny not, but that as some religionists extend the divine power to things contradictory, so may others compound contradictions together in the nature of the Deity. But it does not follow from thence, that theology itself is therefore contradictory, no more than that philosophy is so, because some philosophers also hold contradictory things; or that nothing is absolutely true, neither in divinity, nor philosophy, but all seeming and phantastical; according to the Protagorean doctrine. 649, 650

But though it be true, that whatsoever really implies a contradiction, is a non-entity; yet is this rule obnoxious to much abuse, when whatsoever men’s shallow understandings cannot reach to, is therefore profently cried down by them, as an impossibility, or nothing. As when the Atheists, and Materialists, explode incorporeal substance upon this pretence; or make it only an attribute of honour, expressing the veneration of men’s minds, but signifying nothing in nature, nor having any philosophick truth. But the Atheists true meaning in this objection, and what kind of contradictions they are, which they impute to all theology, may appear from a passage of a modern writer: namely such as these; when God is said to perceive sensible things, and yet to have no organs of sense; as also to understand, and yet to have no brains. The undisguised meaning of the writer, that religion is not philosophy, but law, and all mere arbitrary constitution; nor God a subject of philosophy, as all real things are; he being no true inhabitant of the world or heaven, but only of men’s brains and phancies; and his attributes signifying neither true nor false, nor any thing in nature, but only men’s reverence and devotion, towards what they fear. And so may any thing be said of God, no matter what, so it be agreeable to civil law. But when men mistake attributes of honour for attributes of philosophick truth; that is, when they will suppose such a thing as a God really to exist; then is all absurd non-sense and contradiction. God’s understanding without brains, no contradiction. 650, 651

Certain, That no simple idea, as of a triangle, or a square, can be contradictory to it self; much less can the idea of a perfect Being, the most simple of all. This indeed pregnant of many attributes, which, if contradictory, would render the whole a non-entity; but all the genuine attributes of the Deity, as demonstrable of a perfect Being, as the properties of a triangle, or a square; and therefore can neither be contradictory to it, nor one another. 652

Nay, the genuine attributes of the Deity, not only not contradictory, but also all necessarily connected together. ibid.

In truth all the attributes of the Deity, but so many partial and inadequate conceptions of one and the same perfect Being, taken into our minds, as it were by piece-meal. ibid.

The idea of God, neither fictitious, nor fictitious. Nothing arbitrarious in it, but a most natural and simple idea, to which not the least can be added, nor anything detracted from it. Nevertheless, may there be different apprehensions concerning God; every one that hath a notion of a perfect Being, not understanding all that belongeth to it; no more than of a triangle, or of a sphere. ibid. 653

Concluded therefore, that the attributes
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butes of God, no confounded nonsense of religiously astonished minds, huddling up together all imaginable attributes of honour, courtship, and complement; but the attributes of necessary philosophick truth; and such as do not only speak the devotion of men's hearts, but also declare the real nature of the thing. Here the wit of a modern atheiftick writer ill-placed. (Though no doubt but some, either out of superstition, or ignorance, may attribute such things to the Deity, as are incongruous to its nature.) Thus the fourth atheiftick pretence against the idea of God, confuted.

Page 653, 654

In the next place, the Atheifts think themselves concerned, to give an account of this unquestionable phenomenon; the general persuation of the existence of a God, in the minds of men, and their propenfity to religion; whence this should come, if there were no real object for it in nature. And this they would do by imputing it, partly to the confounded nonsense of astonished minds, and partly to the impotence of politicians. Or else to these three things; to men's fear, and to their ignorance of causes; and to the fiction of law-makers and civil sovereigns.

In the first of these atheiftick origins of religion; That mankind, by reason of their natural imbecillity, are in continual solicitude and fear concerning future events, and their good and evil fortune. And this passion of fear raises up in them for an object to it self, a most affrightful phantasm; of an invisible, understanding Being, omnipotent, &c. They afterwards standing in awe of this their own imagination, and tremblingly worshipping the creature of their own fear and phancy.

The second atheiftick origin of theifm and religion; That men having a natural curiosity to inquire into the causes of things, wherever they can discover no visible and natural causes, are prone to feign causes invisible and supernatural. As Anaxagoras said, never to have betaken himself to a God, but only when he was at a loss for necessary material causes. Wherefore no wonder, if the generality of mankind, being ignorant of the causes of all, or most things, have betaken themselves to a God, as to a refuge and sanctuary for their ignorance.

These two accounts of the phenomenon of religion; from men's fear and solicitude, and from their ignorance of causes and curiosity, joined together by a modern writer. As if the Deity were but a mormo or bugbear, raised up by men's fear, in the darkenss of their ignorance of causes. The opinion of other ghosts and spirits also deduced from the same original. Men's taking things casual for prognofticks, and being so addicted to omens, portents, prophesies, &c. from a phantasmagick and timorous supposition, that the things of this world are not disposed of by nature, but by some understanding person. 655

But left these two accounts of the phenomenon of religion should prove insufficient; the Atheifts superadd a third, imputing it also to the fiction and imposture of civil sovereigns; who perceiving an advantage to be made from hence, for the better keeping men in subjection, have thereupon dextrously laid hold of men's fear and ignorance; and cherished those seeds of religion in them, from the infirmities of their nature: confirming their belief of Ghosts and spirits, miracles, prodigies, and oracles, by tales, publickly allowed and recommended. And that religion might be every way obnoxious to their designs, have persuaded the people, that themselves were but the interpreters of the gods, from whom they received their laws. Religion an engine of state; to keep men busily employed; entertain their
minds; render them tame and gentle, apt
for subjection and society. Page 655, 656

All this not the invention of modern Atheists. But an old atheistic cabal;
That the gods made by fear. Lucretius;
That the causes of religion, terror of
mind and darkness; and that the em-
prise of the gods owes all its being to
men's ignorance of causes, as also, that
the opinions of ghosts proceeded from
men's not knowing how to distinguish
their dreams, and other frightful phan-
cies from fensations. 656, 657

An old atheistic fumeize also ; That
religion a political invention. Thus
Cicero ; The Atheists in Plato, That
the Gods are not by nature, but by art
and laws only. Critias, one of the
thirty tyrants of Athens, his poem to
this purpose.

That the folly and falseness of these
three atheistic pretences, for the origin
of religion, will be fully manifested.
First, as to that of fear and phancy.
Such an excess of fear, as makes any one
confantly believe the existence of that,
for which no manner of ground, neither
in sense, nor reason, highly tending
also to his own disquiet; nothing les
than distraction. Wherefore, the
generality of mankind here affirmed by
Atheists, to be frightened out of their
wits, and ditempered in their brains;
only a few of themselves, who have
escaped this panic terror, remaining
sober, or in their right senses. The
fobriety of Atheists, nothing but dull
stupidity, and dead incredulity; they
believing only what they can see or feel.
657, 658

True, that there is a religious fear,
consequent upon the belief of a God; as
also, that the sense of a Deity is often
awakened in men's minds, by their fears
and dangers. But religion no creature
of fear. None less solicitous about their
good and evil fortune than the pious
and virtuous; who place not their chief
happiness in things alien, but only in
the rightuse of their own will. Whereas
the good of Atheists wholly in things
obnoxious to fortune. The timorous
complexion of Atheists, from building
all their politicks and justice upon the
foundation of fear. Page 658, 659

The Atheists grand error here; That
the Deity, according to the general
sense of mankind, nothing but a terri-
culum, a formidable, hurtful and unde-
irable thing. Whereas men every
where agree in that divine attribute of
goodness and benignity. ibid.

*Θεον τῇ διόμον, in the worst sense,
taken by none but a few ill-natured
men, painting out the Deity according
to their own likenes. This condemned by
Arifbile in the Poets, (he calling
there them therefore lyars) by Plutarch in He-
rodatus, as spoken univerfally; Plutarch
himself restraining the sense thereof to
his evil principle. Plato's ascribing the
world to the divine goodnes, who there-
fore made all things most like himself.
The true meaning of this proverb;
That the Deity affeceth to humble and
abate the pride of men. Lucretius his
hidden force, that hath, as it were, a
spite to all overswelling greatneses,
could be no other than the Deity. Those
amongft Christians, who make the worst
reprehension of God, yet phancy him
kind and gracious to themelves. 659,
660

True, that religion often, expressed
by the fear of God. Fear prima mensura
Deitatis, the first impression that reli-
gion makes upon men in this lapsed state.
But this not a fear of God, as mis-
chievous and hurtful, nor yet as a mere
arbitrary Being, but as just, and an
impartial punisher of wickednes. Lucret-
tius his acknowledging men's fear of God
to be conjoined with a conscience of
duty. A natural discrimination of good
and evil, with a sense of an impartial
justice presiding over the world, and
both
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both rewarding and punishing. The fear of God, as either a hurtful, or arbitrary and tyrannical being,(which must needs be joined with something of hatred) not religion, but superstition. Fear, faith, and love; three steps and degrees of religion, to the son of Sirach. Faith better defined in scripture, than by any scholastics. God such a Being, as if he were not, nothing more to be wished for.

Page 660, 661.

The reason, why Atheists thus mistake the notion of God, as a thing only to be feared, and consequently hated; from their own ill-nature and vice. The latter disposing them so much to think, that there is no difference of good and evil by nature, but only by law; which law, contrary to nature, as restraint to liberty. Hence their denying all natural charity, and acknowledging no benevolence, or good-will, but what arises from imbecility, indigency, and fear. Their friendship at best no other than mercantura utilitatum. Wherefore, if there were an omnipotent Deity, this (according to the atheistical hypothesis) could not have so much as that spurious love or benevolence to any thing, because standing in need of nothing, and devoid of fear. Thus Cotta in Cicero. All this asserted also by a late pretendre to politicks; he adding thereunto, that God hath no other right of commanding, than his irresistible power; nor men any obligation to obey him, but only from their imbecility and fear, or because they cannot resist him. Thus do Atheists transform the Deity into a monstrous shape; an omnipotent Being, that hath neither benevolence nor justice in him. This indeed a mermo, or bug-bear. 661, 662.

But as this a false representation of theism, so the atheistical scene of thing most uncomfortable, hopeless and dismal, upon several accounts. True, that no spiteful designs in senseless atoms; in which regard, Plutarch preferred even this atheistical hypothesis before that of an omnipotent, mischiefous Being. However, no faith, nor hope neither, in senseless atoms. Epicurus his confession, that it was better to believe the fable of the gods, than that material necessity of all things, asserted by the other atheistical physiologers, before himself. But he not at all mending the matter, by his supposed free will. The panic fear of the Epicureans, of the frame of heaven’s cracking, and this complement of atoms being dissolved into a Chaos. Atheists running from fear plunge themselves into fear. Atheism, rather than theism, from the imposture of fear, distrust, and disbelief of good. But vice afterwards prevailing in them makes them desire, there should be no God. Page 663, 664.

Thus the Atheists, who derive the origin of religion from fear, first put an affrightful wizard upon the Deity, and then conclude it to be but a mermo or bugbear, the creature of fear and phancy. More likely of the two, that the opinion of a God, sprung from hope of good than fear of evil; but neither of these true, it owing its being to the imposture of no passion, but supported by the strongest and clearest reason. Nevertheless, a natural prolepsis, or anticipation of a God also, in men’s minds, preventing reason. This called by Plato and Aristotle, a vaticination. 664, 665.

The second atheistical pretence to solve the phenomenon of religion, from the ignorance of causes, and men’s innate curiosity (upon which account the Deity said by them to be nothing but an asylum of ignorance, or the sanctuary of fools,) next to be confuted. 665.

That the Atheists, both modern and ancient, here commonly complicate these two together, fear, and ignorance of causes; making theism the spawn of both; as the fear of children in the dark raise bugbears and spectres. Epicurus his
his reason, why he took such great pains in the study of physiology; that by finding out the natural causes of things, he might free men from the terror of a God, that would otherwise assault their minds. Page 665

The Atheists thus dabbling in physiology, and finding out material causes for some of those phenomena, which the unskilful vulgar solve only from a Deity; therefore, confident, that religion had no other original, than this ignorance of causes: as also, that nature, or matter, does all things alone without a God. But we shall make it manifest, that philosophy and the true knowledge of causes lead to a Deity; and that Atheism, from ignorance of causes, and want of philosophy. 665, 666

For first, no Atheist, who derives all from senseless matter, can possibly assign any cause of himself, his own soul or mind; it being impossible, that life and sense should be naturally produced from what dead and senseless; or from magnitudes, figures, fites, and motions. An Atheistick objection, nothing to the purpose; that laughing and crying things are made not out of laughing and crying principles; because these result from the mechanism of the body. The Hylozoists never able neither, to produce animal sense, and consciousness, out of what senseless and unconscious. The Atheists, supposing their own life and understanding, and all the wisdom that is in the world, to have sprung merely from senseless matter, and fortuitous motions; grossly ignorant of causes. The philosophy of our selves, and true knowledge of the cause of our own soul and mind, brings to God. 666, 667

Again, Atheists ignorant of the cause of motion, by which they suppose all things done; this phenomenon being no way solvable, according to their principles. First, undeniably certain, that motion not essential to all body or matter as such, because then there could have been no mundane system, no sun, moon, earth, &c. all things being continually torn in pieces, and nothing cohering. Certain also, that dead and senseless matter, such as that of Anaximander, Democritus, and Epicurus, cannot move it self spontaneously, by will or appetite. The Hylozoists further considered elsewhere. Democritus could assign no other cause of motion than this, that one body moved another from eternity infinitely; without any first cause or mover. Thus also a modern writer. To assert an infinite progress in the causes of motion, according to Aristotle, to assign no cause thereof at all. Epicurus, though an exploder of qualities, forced here to fly to an occult quality, of gravity. Which, as absurd in infinite space, and without any centre of rest; so indeed nothing but to make his own ignorance, and he knows not why, to be a cause. The motion of body, from the activity of something incorporeal. Though motion taken for translation, be a mode of matter; yet as it is taken for the vis movere, a mode, or energy, of something that is incorporeal, and self-active. The motion of the whole corporeal universe, originally from the Deity. Thus the ignorance of the cause of motion, another ground of atheism. Page 667, 669

Thirdly, the Atheists also ignorant of the cause of that grand phenomenon, the τὸ ἐξ οὗ ὡς, the regular and artificial frame of the mundane system, and of the bodies of animals; together with the harmony of all. They, who boast they can give causes of all things, without a God, able to give no cause of this, but only, that it happened by chance so to be. This, either to make the absence of a cause, a cause; (chance being but the absence of an intending cause) or their own very ignorance of the
the cause, and they know not why, to be a cause; or to make one contrary, the cause of another; (confusion of order and harmony, chance of art and skill,) or lastly, to deny it to have any cause at all, since they deny an intending cause. Page 669.

But here the Atheists make several pretences for this their ignorance. First, that the world is not so well made, but that it might have been much better; and many flaws to be found therein: whereas a God, or perfect being, would have bungled in nothing, but have made all things after the best manner. But this a twelfth atheistic argumentation, and the confutation thereof to be expected afterward. Reason, why some modern Theists give Atheists so much advantage here, as to acknowledge things be ill made; whilst the ancient Pagan Theists stood their ground, and generously maintained, that Mind being the maker of all things, and not blind fortune or chance, nor arbitrary will, and irrational human omnipotent; the τὸ βελτιστόν, that which is absolutely the best, in order to the good of the whole, (so far as the necessity of things would admit) the measure and rule of nature, and providence. 669, 670.

Again, the Atomick and Epicurean Atheists pretend, that though many things serve for uses, yet it does not therefore follow, that they were made intentionally for those uses; because things that happen by chance, may have uses consequent. Thus Lucretius, and the old atheistic philosophers before Arisotle, of the parts of the bodies of animals, and all other things. The answer, that when things consist of many parts, all artificially proportioned together, with much curiosity, as for example, the eye; no man who considers the anatomy thereof, and its whole structure, can reasonably conclude, that it happened so to be made; and the use of seeing followed: but that it was made intentionally for the use of seeing. But to maintain, that not only eyes happened to be so made, and the use of seeing followed, but also ears, and a mouth, and feet, and hands, and all the other parts organical and familiar, (without any of which, the whole would be inept or useless,) all their several uses, un-intended, following; gross insensibility, and stupidity. Galen of the use of parts. Page 671, 672.

Democritus his dotages; countenanced also by Cartesius his book of Meteors, (first written with design to solve all those phenomena without a God,) but unsuccessfully. Nevertheless we acknowledge, that God and nature do all things in the most frugal and compendious way; and that the mechanic powers are taken in, so far as they will serviceably comply with the intellectual platform. But nature not mechanical and fortuitous only, but also vital and artificial; the Archeus of the whole world. ibid. Again, Atheists further pretend, that though it may well seem strange, that matter fortuitously moved, should, at the very first, fall into such a regularity and harmony, as is now in the world; yet not at all strange, that atoms, moving from all eternity, and making all manner of combinations and contexts, and trying all experiments, should after innumerable other inept, and discongruous forms, at length fall into such a system as this. They say therefore, that the earth, at first, brought forth divers monstrous and irregular shapes of animals; some wanting feet, some hands, some without a mouth, &c. to which the ancients added Centaurs, Scyllas, and Chimæras; mixly boviform, and hominiform animals. Though Epicurus, ashamed to own these, would seem to exclude them, but without reason. But because we have now no such irregular shapes pro-
from fcribbled not but T that and ha-
676, therefore contrary the than
reafon made. theirs regularity
ifts they diforder in it as this of ours. Lastly, they prefage likewise, that this world of ours shall not always continue such, but after a while, fall into confusion and disforder again; and then we may have Centaurs, Scylla’s and Chimera’s as before. Page 672, 674

Nevertheless, because this universal and constant regularity of things, for so many ages together, is so puzzling; they would persuade us that the fenelefs atoms, playing and toying up and down, from eternity, without any care or thought, were at length taught, by the neceffity of things, and driven to a kind of trade, or habit of artificialnefs and methodicalnefs. 674, 675

To all which atheiftick pretences replied, first, That this is an idle dream, or impudent forgery, that there was once an inept mundane fystem; and in this world of ours, all manner of irregular shapes of animals: not only because no tradition of any fuch thing; but also because no reafon poiffibly to be given, why fuch should not be produced out of the earth still, though they could not continue long. That also another atheiftick dream, that in this world of ours, all will quickly fall into confusion and nonfence again. And as their infinite worlds an impossibility, fo their affair of the irregularity of the supposed other worlds well enough anfwered, by a contrary affair; that were every planet a habitable earth, and every fixed star a sun, having all more or fewer fuch habitable planets moving round about them, and none of them defert or uninhabited, there would not be found fo much as one ridiculous or inept fystem amongst them all; the divine act being infinite. Page 675

Again, that the fortuitous motions of fenelefs atoms fhou’d, in length of time, grow artificial, and contraft a habit, or trade of acting as regularly, as if directed by perfect art and wisdom: this atheiftick fanaticism. 675, 676

No more poiffible, that dead and fenelefs matter, fortuitously moved, fhou’d at length be taught, and neceffitated by it felf, to produce this artificial fystem of the world; than that a dozen or more persons, unskilled in mufick, and striking the ftrings as it happened, fhou’d at length be taught, and neceffitated to fall into exquifite harmony; or that the letters in the writings of Plato and Ariftotle, though having fo much philofophick fene, fhould have been all fcribbled at random. More philofophy in the great volume of the world, than in all Ariftotle’s and Plato’s works; and more of harmony than in any artificial composition of vocal mufick. That the divine art and wisdom hath printed fuch a ftignature of it felf upon the matter of the whole world, as fortune and chance could never counterfeit. 676, 677

But in the next place, the Atheifts will, for all this undertake to demonftrate, that things could not poiffibly be made by any intending caufe, for ends and uses; as eyes for seeing, ears for hearing; from hence, because things were all in order of time as well as nature, before their uses. This argument fériously propounded by Lucoruius in this manner; if eyes were made for the use of seeing, then of neceffity must seeing have been before eyes: but there was no seeing before eyes; therefore could not eyes be made for the fake of seeing. 677, 678

Evident, that the logick of these Atheifts
Atheists differ from that of all other mortals; according to which, the end, for which any thing is designedly made, is only in intention first, but in execution last. True, that men are commonly excited from experience of things, and sense of their wants, to excogitate means and remedies; but it doth not therefore follow, that the maker of the world, could not have a preventive knowledge of whatsoever would be useful for animals, and so make them bodies intentionally for those uses. That argument ought to be thus framed: whatsoever is made intentionally for any end, as the eye for that of seeing, that end must needs be in the knowledge and intention of the maker, before the actual exisitence of that which is made for it: but there could be no knowledge of seeing before there were eyes; therefore eyes could not be made intentionally for the sake of seeing.

This the true scope of the premised atheistical argument, however disguised by them in the first propounding. The ground thereof, because they take it for granted, that all knowledge is derived from sense, or from the things known, pre-existing without the knower. And here does Lucretius triumph. The controversy therefore at last resolved into this; whether all knowledge be in its own nature junior to things; for if so, it must be granted, that the world could not be made by any antecedent knowledge. But this afterwards fully confuted; and proved, that knowledge is not, in its own nature, estypal, but archetypal; and that knowledge was older than the world, and the maker thereof.

But Atheists will except against the proving of a God, from the regular and artificial frame of things; That it is unreasonable to think, there should be no cause in nature for the common phenomena thereof; but a God thus introduced to solve them. Which also, to suppose the world bungled and botched up. That nature is the cause of natural things, which nature does not intend, nor act for ends. Wherefore the opinion of final causality for things in nature, but an *idolum speeis. Therefore rightly banished, by Democritus, out of physiologv. Page 679, 680

The answer: Two extremes here to be avoided, one of the atomick Atheists, who derive all things from the fortuitous motion of senseless matter; another of bigotical religionists, who will have God to do all things himself immediately, without any nature. The middle between both, that there is not only a mechanical and fortuitous, but also an artificial nature, subservient to the Deity, as the manuary opificer, and drudging executioner thereof. True, that some philosophers have absurdly attributed their own properties, or animal idiosyn- thies, to inanimate bodies. Neverthe- less, this no idol of the cave, or den, to suppose the system of the world to have been framed by an understanding Being, according to whose direction, nature, though not it self intending, acteth. Balbus his description of this artificial nature in Cicero. That there could be no Mind in us, were there none in the universe. That of Aristotle true, that there is more of art in some things of nature, than in any thing made by men. Now the causes of artificial things, as a house or clock, cannot be declared without intention for ends. This excellently pursued by Aristotle. No more can the things of nature be rightly understood, or the causes of them fully assigned, merely from matter and motion, without intention or mind. They, who banish final or mental causality from philosophy, look upon the things of nature with no other eyes than oxen and horses. Some pitiful attempts of the ancient Atheists, to solve the phenomena of ani-
mals, without mental causality. Democritus and Epicurus so cautious, as never to pretend, to give an account of the formation of the foetus. Aristotle's judgment here to be preferred before that of Democritus. Page 680, 683

But nothing more strange, than that these Atheist should be justified in this their ignorance by professed Theists and Christians; who atomizing likewise in their physiologi, contend, that this whole mundane sytem refulted only from the necejary and unguided motion of matter, either turned round in a vortex, or jumbled in a chaos, without the direction of any mind. These mechanick Theists more immodest than the atomick Atheists themselves; they supposing these their atoms, though fortuitously moved, yet never to have produced any inept system, or incongruous forms; but from the very first, all along, to have ranged themselves so orderly, as that they could not have done it better, had they been directed by a perfect Mind. They quite take away the argument for a God, from the phenomena, and that artificial frame of things, leaving only some metaphysical arguments; which, though never so good, yet by reason of their subtlety, cannot do so much execution. The Atheists gratified to see the cause of thisin thus betrayed, by its professed friends; and the grand argument for the same totally flurred by them. 683, 684

As this great insensibility of mind, to look upon the things of nature with no other eyes than brute animals do; so are there sundry phenomena, partly above the mechanick powers, and partly contrary to the same, which therefore can never be solved, without mental and final causality. As in animals, the motion of the diaphragma in respiration, the syfbole and diafbole of the heart (being a muscular contriction and relaxation) to which might be added others in the macrocofm; as the interjection of the planes of the equator and ecliptick; or the earth's diurnal motion upon an axis not parallel with that of its annual. Carisius his confession, that, according to mechanick principles, these should continually come nearer and nearer together; which since they have not done, final or mental causality here to be acknowledged, and because it was best it should be so. But the greatest phenomenon of this kind, the formation and organization of animals; which these mechanists never able to give any account of. Of that posthumous piece of Carisius, De la Formation du Fatus. Page 684, 685

Pretended, that to affign final causes, is to presume our selves to be as wise as God Almighty, or to be privy to his counsels. But the question, not whether we can always reach to the ends of God Almighty, or know what is absolutely best in every case, and accordingly conclude things therefore to be so; but whether any thing in the world be made for ends, otherwise than would have resulted from the fortuitous motion of matter. No presumption, nor intrusion into the secrets of God Almighty, to say, that eyes were made by him intentionally for the sake of seeing. Anaxagoras his absurd aphorism, that man was therefore the most solert of all animals, because he chanced to have hands. Far more reasonable to think, (as Aristotle concludeh) that because man was the wisest of all animals, therefore he had hands given him. More proper to give pipes to one, that hath musical skill, than upon him, that hath pipes, to befrowned musical skill. 685

In the last place, mechanick Theists pretend, and that with some more plausibility, that it is below the dignity of God Almighty, to perform all those mean and trivial offices of nature, himself immediately. This answered again; That though
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though the divine wisdom it self contrived the system of the whole for ends, yet is there an artificial nature under him, as his inferior minister and executioner. Proclus his description hereof. This nature, to Proclus, a god or goddess; but only as the bodies of the animated stars were called gods, because the statues of the gods. Page 685, 686.

That we cannot otherwise conclude, concerning these mechanick Theists, who derive all things in the mundane system, from the necessary motions of senseless matter, without the direction of any Mind, or God; but that they are imperfect Theists, or have a certain tang of the atheistic enthusiasm, (the spirit of infidelity) hanging about them. 687

But these mechanick Theists counterbalanced by another sort of Atheists, not fortuitous, nor mechanical; namely, the Hylozoists, who acknowledge the works of nature to be the works of understanding, and deride Democritus his rough and hooky atoms, devoid of life; they attributing life to all matter as such, and concluding the vulgar notion of a God to be but an inadequate conception of matter, its energetic nature being taken alone by it self as a complete substance. These Hylozoists, never able to satisfy that phenomenon, of the one agreeing and conspiring harmony throughout the whole universe; every atom of matter, according to them, being a distinct percipient; and these unable to confer notions with one another. 687

Nor can the other Cosmopolitan Atheists (to whom the whole world, but one huge plant, or vegetable, endowed with a spermatick, artificial nature, orderly disposing the whole, without sense or understanding,) do any thing towards the solving of this, or any other phenomenon; it being impossible, that there should be any such regular nature, otherwise than as derived from, and depending on a perfect mind. Page 687.

Besides these three phenomena of cogitation, motion, and the artificial frame of things, with the conspiring harmony of the whole, (no way solvable by Atheists) here further added, that those who aserted the noviti of the world, could not possibly give an account neither of the first beginning of men, and other animals, not now generated out of putrefaction. Aristotle sometimes doubtful, and flattering concerning the world's eternity. Men and all other animals not produced at first by chance, either as worms out of putrefaction, or out of eggs, or wombs, growing out of the earth; because no reason to be given, why chance should not as well produce the same out of the earth still. Epicurus his vain pretence, that the earth, as a child-bearing woman, was now grown effete and barren. Moreover, men and animals, whether first generated out of putrefaction, or excluded out of wombs or egg-shells, supposed by these Atheists themselves, to have been produced in a tender, infant-like state, so that they could neither supply themselves with nourishment, nor defend themselves from harms. A dream of Epicurus, that the earth sent forth streams of milk after those her new-born infants and nurslings, corrupted by Critolaus in Philo. Another precarious supposition, or figment, of Epicurus; that then no immediate heats, nor colds, nor any blustering winds. Anaximander's way of solving this difficulty; that men were first generated and nourished in the bellies of fishes, still able to shift for themselves, and then digorged upon dry land. Atheists swallow any thing rather than a God. 688, 689.

Wherefore here being dignus vindice nodus, a θεός ὑπέρ εὐσκόρεως reasonably introduced; in the Mosaic Cabala, to 6 H 2
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solve the fame. It appearing, from all circumstances put together, that this whole phenomenon surpafs, not only the mechanick, but alfo the plattick powers; there being much of discretion therein. However, not denied, but that the minifter of spirits (created before man, and other terreftrial animals) might he here made ufe of. As in Plato, after the creation of immortal fouls by the supreme God, the framing of mortal bodies is committed to junior Gods.

Page 689, 690

Furthermore, Atheifts no more able to solve that ordinary phenomenon, of the conservation of fpecies, by the difference of fexes, and a due proportion of number kept up between males and females. Here a providence also, superior, as well to the plattick, as mechanick nature. ibid.

Laftly, other phenomenoa, as real, though not physical; which Atheifts cannot poftibly solve, and therefore do commonly deny; as of natural justice or honesty, and obligation; the foundation of politicks, and the mathematicks of religion. And of liberty of will, not only that of fortuitous self-determination, when an equal eligibility of objects; but alfo that, which makes men defend commendation and blame. These not commonly diftinguifh'd as they ought. Epicurus his endeavours to solve liberty of will, from atoms declining uncertainly from the perpendicular, mere madness and frenzy.

690, 691

And now have we already preventively confuted the third atheiftick pretence, to solve the phenomenon of theifm, from the fiction and imposture of politicians; we having proved, that philosophy and the true knowledge of causes infer the eftance of a God. Nevertheless, this is to be here further answered.

691

That statesmen and politicians could not have made such ufe of religion, as fometime they have done; had it been a mere cheat and figment of their own. Civil sovereigns in all the diſtant places of the world could not have fo universally conpired, in this one piece of state-craft or cozenage; nor yet have been able to poſsifh the minds of men evey where, with fuch a constant awe and dread of an invifible nothing. The world would long since have discovered this cheat, and fuppofted a plot upon their liberty, in the fiction of a God; at leaft governours themselves would have understood it; many of which, notwithstanding, as much awed with the fear of this invifible nothing, as any others. Other cheats and juggles, when once detected, no longer practifed. But religion, now as much in credit as ever, though fo long since decried by Atheifts for a politick cheat. That Christianity, a religion founded in no human policy, prevailed over the craft and power of all civil sovereigns, and conquered the perfecuting world, by fuffering deaths and martyrdoms. This pre-signified by the prophetick spirit.

Page 691, 692

Had the idea of God been an arbitrarious figment, not conceivable, how men should have universally agreed in the fame, and the attributes belonging thereunto: (this argument used by Sextus:) nor that civil sovereigns themselves should fo universally have jumped in it.

692, 693

Furthermore; Not conceivable, how this thought, or idea of a God, should have been formed by any, had it been the idea of nothing. The superficialnes of Atheifts, in pretending, that politicians, by telling men of fuch a thing, put the idea into their minds. No notions or ideas put into men's minds by words, but only the phantafms of the sounds. Though all learning be not remembrance, yet is all human teaching but mathematical or obftritious; not the filling of the foule as a veffel, but pouring into it from without; but the knowing
kindling of it from within. Words signify nothing to him, that cannot raise up within himself the notions, or ideas, correspondent to them. However, the difficulty still remains; how statemen themselves, or the first inventor of this cheat, could have framed any notion at all of a non-entity. Page 693, 694.

Here the Atheists pretend, that there is a feigning power in the soul, whereby it can make ideas and conceptions of non-entities; as of a golden mountain, or a Centaur: and that by this, an idea of God might be framed, though there be no such thing. Answer; That all the feigning power of the soul consists only in compounding ideas of things, that really exist apart, but not in that conjunction. The mind cannot make any new conceiptive cogitation, which was not before; as the painter or limner cannot feign foreign colours. Moreover, the whole of these fictitious ideas, though it have no actual, yet hath it a possible entity. The Deity it self, though it could create a world out of nothing, yet can it not create more cogitation or conception than is, or was always contained in its own mind from eternity; nor frame a positive idea of that, which hath no possible entity. 694, 695.

The idea of God no complement or aggregation of things, that exist severally, apart in the world; because then it would be a rare arbitrarious thing, and what every one pleased; the contrary whereunto hath been before manifested. 695.

Again; some attributes of the Deity, nowhere else to be found in the whole world; and therefore must be absolute non-entities, were there no God. Here the painter must feign colours, and create new cogitation, out of nothing. ibid.

Lastly, upon supposition, that there is no God, it is impossible, not only that there should be any for the future, but also that there should ever have been any: whereas all fictitious ideas must have a possible entity, since otherwise they would be unconceivable, and no ideas. Page 695.

Wherefore, some Atheists will further pretend, that besides this power of compounding things together, the soul hath another ampliying or amplifying power; by both which together, though there be no God existing, nor yet possible, the idea of him might be fictitiously made; those attributes, which are no where else to be found, arising by way of amplification or augmentation of something found in men. 695, 696.

Answer; first, that, according to the principles of these Atheists, that all our conceptions are nothing but passions from objects without, there cannot possibly be any such amplifying power in the soul, whereby it could make more than is. Thus Protagoras in Plato: No man can conceive any thing but what he suffers. Here also, (as Sextus intimateth, the Atheists guilty of that fallacy, called a circle or dialelus.) For having first undifcernedly made the idea of imperfection from perfection, they then go about again, to make the idea of perfection out of imperfection. That men have a notion of perfection, by which, as a rule, they judge things to be imperfect, evident from that direction given by all theologers, to conceive of God, in way of remotion or abstraction of all imperfection. Lastly, finite things added together can never make up infinite; as more and more time backward can never reach to eternity without beginning. God differs from imperfect things, not in degree, but kind. As for infinite space, said to consist of parts finite; we certain of no more than this, that the finite world might have been made bigger and bigger infinitely; for which very cause it could never be actually infinite. Gassenus his objection
objection, that the idea of an infinite God might as well be feigned, as that of infinite worlds. But infinite worlds are but words or notions ill put together, or combined; infinity being a real thing in nature, but misapplied, it being proper only to the Deity. Page 696, 697

The conclusion; that since the soul can neither make the idea of infinite, by amplification of finite; nor feign or create any new cogitation, which was not before; nor make a positive idea, of a non-entity; certain, that the idea of God no fictitious thing. 697

Further made evident, that religion not the figment of civil sovereigns. Obligation in conscience the foundation of all civil right and authority. Covenants, without this, nothing but words and breath. Obligations, not from laws neither, but before them; or otherwise they could not oblige. Lastly, this derived, not from utility neither. Were obligation to civil obedience made by men's private utility, then could it be dissolved by the fame. Wherefore if religion a fiction or imposture, civil sovereignty must needs be so too. 697, 698

Had religion been a fiction of politicians, they would then have made it every way pliable, and flexible; since otherwise it would not serve their turn, nor confift with their infinite right. 698

But religion in its own nature, a stuff, inflexible thing, as also justice, it being not fictitious, or made by will. There may therefore be a contradiction between the laws of God, and of men; and in this case does religion conclude, that God ought to be obeyed, rather than men. For this cause, atheistick politicians of latter times, declare against religion as inconsistent with civil sovereignty; it destroying infinite right, introducing private judgment, or conference, and a fear greater than that of the Leviathan; to wit, of him, who can inflict eternal punishment. Senecel's matter the Atheist's natural God; the Leviathan or civil sovereign his artificial one. Religion thus disowned and disclaimed by politicians, as inconsistent with civil power, could not be the creature of political art. Thus all the three Atheistick pretences, to solve the phenomenon of religion, from fear, ignorance of causes, and fiction of politicians, fully confuted. Page 698, 700

But because, besides those ordinary phenomena, before mentioned, there are certain other extraordinary ones, that cannot be solved by Atheists, which therefore they will impute, partly to men's fear and ignorance, and partly to the fiction and imposture of civil governours, (viz. apparitions, miracles, and prophecies;) the reality of these here also to be briefly vindicated.

First, as for apparitions; though much of fabulosity in these relations, yet unquestionably something of truth. Atheists imputing these things to men's mistaking their dreams and phancies for sensations, contradict their own fundamental principle, that sense is the only criterion of truth; as also derogate more from human testimony, than they ought. ibid.

That some Atheists sensible hereof have acknowledged the reality of apparitions, concluding them nevertheless to be the mere creatures of imagination; as if a strong phancy could produce real substanaces, or objects of sense. The fanaticism of Atheists, who will rather believe the greatest impossibilities, than endanger the being of a God. Invisible ghofts permanent easily introduce one supreme Ghost of the whole world. 700, 701

Democritus yet further convinced; that there were invisible beings superior to men, independent upon imagination, and permanent (called by him idols)
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idols) but having nothing immortal in them; and therefore that God could be no more proved from the existence of them, than of men. Granted by him, that there were, not only terrestrial, but also aereal and æthereal animals; and that all those vital regions of the universe above were not desert and uninhabited. Here something of the fathers, assenting angels to have bodies; but more afterwards. Page 701, 702.

To this phenomenon of apparitions may be added those two others, of witches and demoniacks; both of these proving, that spirits are not phancies, nor inhabitants of men’s brains only, but of the world; as also, that there are some impure spirits, a confirmation of the truth of Christianity. The confident expouders of witchcraft suspiciable for atheism. As for Demoniacks or Energumeni, certain from Josephus, that the Jews did not take these Demons or Devils for bodily diseases, but real substances, possessting the bodies of men. Nor probable, that they supposed, as the Gnosticks afterward, all diseases to be the infeftation of evil spirits; nor yet, (as some think) all Demoniacks to be madmen. But when there were any unusual and extraordinary symptoms, in any bodily distemper, but especially that of madness, they supposed this to be supernatural, imputed it to the infeftation of some Devil. Thus also the Greeks.

That Demoniacks and Energumeni are a real phenomenon; and that there are such also in these times of ours, asserted by Fernelius and Sennertus. Such maniacal persons, as not only discover secrets, but also speak languages, which they had never learned, unquestionably Demoniacks or Energumeni. That there have been such in the times since our Saviour, proved out of Psallius; as also from Fernelius. This for the vindication of Christianity, against those, who suspect the Scripture-demoniacks for figments. Page 704, 706.

The second extraordinary phenomenon proposed; that of miracles, and effects supernatural. That there have been such things amongst the Pagans, and since the times of Christianity 160, evident from their records. But more instances of these in scripture. 706.

Two sorts of miracles. First, such, as, though they cannot be done by ordinary causes, yet may be effected by the natural power of invisible spirits, angels, or demons. As illiterate Demoniacks speaking Greek. Such amongst the Pagans that miracle of the whetstone cut in two with a razor. Secondly, such as transcend the natural power of all second causes, and created beings.

That late Polisco-Theological Treatise, denying both these sorts of miracles, inconsiderable, and not deserving here a confutation.

Supposed in Deut. that miracles of the former sort might be done by false prophets, in confirmation of idolatry. Wherefore miracles alone not sufficient to confirm every doctrine.

Accordingly in the New Testament do we read of ἔφης, lying miracles; that is, miracles done in confirmation of a lye, and by the power of Satan, &c. God permitting it, in way of probation of some, and punishment of others. Miracles done for the promoting of creature-worship or idolatry, instead of justifying the same, themselves condemned by it.

Had the miracles of our Saviour been all of the former kind only, yet ought the Jews, according to Moses’s law, to have acknowledged him for a true prophet, he coming in the name of the Lord, and not exhorting to idolatry. Supposed in Deut. that God would not permit false prophets to do miracles, save
fave only in the case of idolatry; or when the doctrine is discoverable to be false by the light of nature; because that would be an invincible temptation. Our Saviour, that eximious prophet, foretold, by whom God would again reveal his will to the world; and no more out of flaming fire. Nevertheless some miracles of our Saviour Christ's such also, as could be done only by the power of God Almighty. 708, 709

All miracles evince spirits; to disbelieve which is to disbelieve sense, or unreasonably to derogate from human testimony. Had the Gentiles entertained the faith of Christ, without miracles, this it self would have been a great miracle.

Page 709

The last extraordinary phenomenon, divination or prophecy. This also evinces spirits, (called gods by the Pagans;) and thus that of theirs true; if divination, then gods.

Two sorts of predictions likewise, as of miracles. First, such as might proceed from the natural prefaging power of created spirits. Such predictions acknowledged by Democritus, upon account of his idols. Not so much contingency in human actions, by reason of men's liberty of will, as some suppose.

Another sort of predictions of future events imputable only to the supernatural presence of God Almighty. Epicurus his pretence, that divination took away liberty of will; either as supposing, or making a necessity. Some Atheists also denying the presence of God Almighty, upon the same account. Certain, that no created being can foreknow future events, otherwise than in their causes. Wherefore predictions of such events, as had no necessary antecedent causes, evince a God. 711, 712

That there is foreknowledge of future events, unforeknowable to men, formerly the general persuasion of men.

kind. Oracles and predictions amongst the Pagans, which evince spirits, as that of Actius Navius. Most of the Pagan oracles, from the natural presaging power of demons. Nevertheless some instances of predictions of a higher kind amongst them; as that of Vetius Valens, and the Sibyls. Thus Balaam divinely assisted to predict our Saviour.

Page 712, 713

Scriptures triumphing over Pagan oracles. Predictions concerning our Saviour Christ, and the conversion of the Gentiles. Amongst which that remarkable one of the seventy weeks. 713, 714

Other predictions concerning the fates of kingdoms, and of the church. Daniel's fourth ten-horned beast, the Roman empire. This prophecy of Daniel's carried on further in the Apocalypse. Both of them prophetick calendars of times, to the end of the world. ibid.

That this phenomenon of Scripture-prophecies cannot possibly be imputed by Atheists, as some others, to fear, or ignorance of causes, or to the fiction of politicians. They not only evince a Deity, but also the truth of Christianitie. To this purpose, of more use to us, who now live, than the miracles themselves recorded in Scripture. 714, 715

These five extraordinary phenomena all of them evince spirits to be no phantacies, but substantial inhabitants of the world; from whence a God may be inferred. Some of them immediately prove a Deity.

ibid.

Here have we not only fully confuted all the atheiftick pretences from the idea of God, but also, by the way, already proposed several substantial arguments for a Deity. The existence whereof will now be further proved from its very idea. ibid.

True, that some of the ancient Theists themselves declare God not to be demon-
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Demonstrable. Thus Alexander Aprodis. Clemens Alexander. But their meaning thence in no more than this, that God cannot be demonstrated a priori from any antecedent necessary cause. Not follow from hence, that therefore no certainty, or knowledge of the existence of a God; but only conjectural probability, faith, and opinion. We may have a certain knowledge of things, the διανομη cannot be demonstrated a priori; as, that there was something or other eternal, without beginning. Whenever a thing is necessarily inferred from what is altogether undeniable, this may be called a demonstration. Many geometrical demonstrations such; or of the διανομη only. Page 715, 716.

A special position of Cartesius; that there can be no certainty of any thing, no not of geometrical theorems, nor common notions; before we be certain of the existence of a God, essentially good, who therefore cannot deceive. From whence it would follow, that neither Atheists, nor such Theists, as assert an arbitrary Deity, can ever be certain of any thing; as that two and two are four. 716, 717.

However some appearance of piety in this assertion; yet it is a foundation of eternal scepticism, both as to all other things, and the existence of a God. That Cartesius here went round in a circle, proving the existence of a God from our faculties and then the truth of our faculties from the existence of a God; and consequently proved nothing. If it be possible, that our faculties might be false, then must we confess it possible, that there may be no God; and consequently remain for ever sceptical about it. ibid.

Wherefore a necessity of exploding and confuting this new sceptical hypothesis, of the possibility of our faculties being so made, as to deceive us, in all our clearest perceptions. Omnipotence

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it self cannot make any thing to be indifferently true or false. Truth not factitious. As to the universal theorems of abstract science, the measure of truth no foreign or extraneous thing, but only our own clear and distinct perception. Here whatsoever is clearly perceived, is; the very essence of truth, perceptibility. Granted by all, that there can be no false knowledge or understanding. The perception of the understanding never false, but only obscure. Not nature, that ereth in us, but we our selves, in assenting to things not clearly perceived. Conclusion; that omnipotence cannot create any understanding faculties, so as to have as clear and distinct conceptions of all fallhouts and non-entities, as of truths; because whatsoever is clearly and distinctly perceived, hath therefore an entity; and omnipotence it self (to speak with reverence) cannot make nothing to be something, or something nothing. This no more, than that it cannot do things contradictory. Conception the measure of power. Page 717, 719.

True, that sense as such is but phantastical and relative; and were there no other perception, all truth would be private, relative, and seeming, none absolute. This probably the reason, why some have suspected the fame of knowledge also. But mind and understanding reaches beyond phantasy and appearance, to the absoluteness of things. It hath the criterion of truth within itself.

719, 720.

Objected; that this an arrogance, for creatures to pretend to an absolute certainty of any thing. Answer; that God alone is ignorant of nothing, and infallible in all things: but no derogation from the Deity, to suppose, that he should make created minds such, as to have a certainty of something; as the whole to be greater than the part, and the like: since otherwise they would be
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be but a mere mockery. Congrous to think, that God hath made men so, as that they may possibly attain to some certainty of his own existence. Origen, that knowledge is the only thing, that hath certainty in it. Page 720, 721

Having now some firm ground or footing to stand upon, a certainty of common notions, without which nothing could be proved by reason; we shall endeavour, by means hereof, to demonstrate the existence of a God from his idea.

Cartesius his undertaking to do this with mathematical evidence; as this idea includeth in it necessary existence. This argument hitherto not so successful, it being by many concluded to be a sophism. That we shall impartially set down all that we can, both for it, and against it; leaving others to make a judgment.

First, against the Cartesian demonstration of a God. That because we can frame an idea of a necessarily existent being, it does not at all follow, that it is; since we can frame ideas of things, that never were, nor will be. Nothing to be gathered from hence, but only that it is not impossible. Again, from this idea, including necessary existence, nothing else inferrible, but that what hath no necessary existence, is not perfect; and, that if there be a perfect being, its existence always was, and will be necessary; but not absolutely, that it doth exist. A fallacy, when from the necessity of existence affirmed only hypothetically, the conclusion is made absolutely. Though a perfect being must exist necessarily, yet not therefore follow, that it must and doth exist. The latter a thing indemonstrable.

For the Cartesian demonstration of a God. As from the notion of a thing impossible, we conclude, that it never was nor will be; and of that, which hath a contingent fchesis to existence, that it might be, or might not be; so from that, which hath necessary existence in its nature, that it actually is. The force of the argumentation not meerly hypothetical, if there be a perfect Being, then is its existence necessary; because this supposes, that a necessary existent being is contingent to be, or not to be: which a contradiction. The absurdity of this will better appear, if, instead of necessary existence, we put in actual. No Theists can otherwise prove, that a God, though supposed to exist, might not happen by chance to be. Nevertheless God, or a perfect Being, not here demonstrated a priori, when from its own idea. The reader left to make a judgment. Page 723, 724

A progymnasma, or prelatory attempt, towards the proving of a God from his idea, as including necessary existence. First, from our having an idea of a perfect being, implying no manner of contradiction in it, it follows, that such a thing is possible. And from that necessary existence included in this idea, added to the possibility thereof, it further follows, that it actually is. A necessary existent being, if possible, is; because upon the supposition of its non-existence, it would be impossible for it ever to have been. Not so in contingent things. A perfect being is either impossible to have been, or else it is. Were God possible, and yet not, he would not be a necessary, but contingent being. However, no stress laid upon this.

Another plainer argument, for the existence of a God, from his Idea. Whatsoever we can frame an idea of in our minds, implying no contradiction, this either actually is, or else, if it be not, is possible to be. But if God be not, he is not possible to be. Therefore he is. The major before proved, that we
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we cannot have an idea of any thing, which hath neither actual nor possible existence. Page 725

A further ratiocination from the idea of God, as including necessary existence, by certain steps. First, certain, that something or other did exist of itself from eternity, without beginning. Again, whatsoever did exist of itself from eternity, did so exist naturally and necessarily, and therefore there is a necessary existent Being. Thirdly, nothing could exist of itself from eternity naturally and necessarily, but what contained necessary self-existence in its nature. Lastly, a perfect Being, and nothing else, containeth necessary existence in its nature. Therefore it is. An appendix to this argument; that no temporary successive being could be from eternity without beginning. This proved before. 725, 726

Again, the controversy betwixt Atheists and Theists first clearly stated from the idea of God, and then satisfactorily decided. Premised; that as every thing was not made, so neither was every thing unmade. Atheists agree in both. The state of the controversy betwixt Theists and Atheists; whether that, which being it self unmade, was the cause of all other things made, were the most perfect, or the most imperfect being. A certain kind of Atheistick Theism, or Theogonism, which acknowledging a God, or soul of the world, prevailing over the whole, supposed him, notwithstanding, to have emerged out of Night and Chaos; that is, to have been generated out of senseless matter. 726, 728

The controversy thus stated early decided. Certain, that lesser perfection may be derived from greater, or from that which is absolutely perfect; but impossible, that greater perfection, and higher degrees of entity, should rise out of lesser and lower. Things did not ascend, but descend. That life and sense may naturally rise from the mere modification of dead and senseless matter, as also reason and understanding from sense; the philosophy of the kingdom of darkness. The Hylozoists fo sensible of this, that there must be some substantial unmade life and understanding; that atheizing, they thought it necessary to attribute life and understanding to all matter, as such. This argument a demonstration of the impossibility of atheism. Page 728, 729

The controversy again more particularly stated, from the idea of God, as including mind and understanding in it; viz. whether all Mind were made or generated out of senseless matter; or whether there were an eternal unmade mind the maker of all. This the doctrine of Theists, that Mind the oldest of all things; of Atheists, that it is a post-nate thing, younger than the world, and an umbratile image of real beings. 729

The controversy thus stated again decided. Though it does not follow, that if once there had been no corporeal world or matter, there could never have been any; yet it is certain, that if once there had been no life nor mind, there could have never been any life or mind. Our imperfect minds, not of themselves from eternity, and therefore derived from a perfect unmade mind. 729, 730

That Atheists think their chief strength to lie here, in their disproving a God, from the nature of understanding and knowledge. According to them, things made knowledge, and not knowledge things. All mind and understanding the creature of sensibles, and a phantastick image of them; and therefore no mind their creator. Thus does a modern writer conclude, that knowledge and understanding is not to be attributed to God, because it implieth 612 depen-
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dependence upon things without; which is all one, as if he should have said, that senseless matter is the more perfect of all things, and the highest Numen.

Page 730

A compendious confutation of the premised Atheifick principles. Knowledge not the activity of fenfibles upon the knower, and his passion. Sensible things themselves not known by the passion, or phantasy of sense. Knowledge not from the force of the thing known, but of the knower. Besides phantasm of singular bodies, intelligible idea's universal. A late atheifick paradox, that universals nothing but names. Axiomatical truths in abstract sciences no passion from bodies by sense, nor yet gathered by induction from many singulants; we at once perceiving it impossible, that they should be otherwise. An ingenious observation of Aristotle's, that could it be perceived by sense, the three angles of a triangle to be equal to two right; yet would not this be science, or knowledge, properly so called: which is of universals first, and from thence descends to singulants. 730, 732

Again, we have conceptions of things incorporeal, as also of such corporeals as never did exist, and whose accuracy sense could not reach to; as a perfect straight line, and plain superficies, an exact triangle, circle, or sphere. That we have a power of framing ideas of things, that never were nor will be, but only possible. 732

Inferred from hence, that human science itself, not the meer image and creature of singular sensibles, but proleptical to them, and in order of nature before them. But since there must be verò before vis, intelligibles before intellectio; the only true account of knowledge and its original is from a perfect omnipotent Being, comprehending it self, and the extent of its own power, or the possibilities of all things, their relations and immutable truths. And of this one perfect mind all imperfect minds partake. Page 732, 733

Knowledge therefore, in the nature of it, supposeth the existence of a perfect omnipotent Being, as its verò, or intelligible. This comprehending it self, the first original knowledge, a mind before the world, and all sensibles, not ectypeal, but archetypal, and the framer of all. Wherefore not Atheism, but Theism, demonstrable from knowledge and understanding. Page 733, 734

This further confirmed from hence; because there are eternal verities, such as were never made, nor had any beginning. That the diagonal of a square incommeasurable to the sides, an eternal truth to Aristotle. Justin Martyr's adnum parum, or eternal morals, geometrical truths, not made by any man's thinking, but before all men; as also before the world and matter itself. 734

Now if there be eternal verities, the simple reasons and intelligible effences of things must needs be eternal likewise. These called by Plato things, that always are, but were never made, ingenerable and incorruptible. However Aristotle quarrels with Plato's ideas, yet does he also agree with him in this, that the forms or species of things were eternal, and never made; and that there is no generation of them; and that there are other things besides sensibles, the immutable objects of science. Certain, that there could be no immutable science, were there no other objects of the mind, but sensibles. The objects of geometrical science no material triangles, squares, &c. these, by Aristotle, said to be nowhere. The intelligible natures of things to Plato, the most necessary effences. 735, 736

Now if there be eternal truths, and intelligibles, whose existence also is necessary; since these can be no where but in
in a mind; there must be an eternal, necessarily existing Mind, comprehending all these ideas and truths at once, or being them. Which no other than the Mind of a perfect, omnipotent Being, comprehending it self, and all possibilities of things, the extent of its own power.

Therefore there can be but one only original Mind; which all other minds partake of. Hence ideas, or notions exactly alike in several men; and truths indivisibly the same: because their minds all stamp'd with the same original seal. Themistius; that one man could not teach another, were there not the same notion both in the learner and teacher. Nor could men confer together, as they do, were there not one Mind, that all partaked of. That anti-monarchical opinion, of many understanding beings eternal and independent, confuted. And now have we not only affented the idea of a God, and confuted all the atheiftick pretences against it; but also, from this idea, demonstrated his existence.

737, 738

S E C T. II.

A Confutation of the second atheiftick argument, against omnipotence and divine creation; that nothing can, by any power whatsoever, be made out of nothing. In answer to which, three things to be insinced on. First, that de nihilo nihil, nothing out of nothing, is in some sense an axiom of unquestionable truth, but then makes nothing against atheism, or divine creation. Secondly, that nothing out of nothing, in the sense of the atheiftick objectors, viz. that nothing, which once was not, could by any power whatsoever be brought into being, is absolutely false; and that, if it were true, it would make no more against atheism, than it does against athe-

ism. Lastly, that from this very axiom, nothing from nothing, in the true sense thereof, the absolute impossibility of atheism is demonstrable. Page 738

De nihilo nihil, nothing from nothing, in some sense, is a common notion of unquestionable truth. For first, certain, that nothing, which once was not, could ever of itself come into being; or, that nothing can take beginning of existence from itself; or, that nothing can be made or produced, without an efficient cause. From whence demonstrated, that there was never nothing, or, that every thing was not made, but something did exist of itself from eternity unmade, or underryed from any thing else. 738, 739

Again, certain also, that nothing could be efficiently produced by what hath not at least equal perfection, and a sufficient active or productive power. That of an effect, which transcends the perfection of its supposed cause, must come from nothing, or be made without a cause. Nor can any thing be produced by another, though having equal perfection, unless it have also a sufficient active or productive power. Hence certain, that were there once no motion at all in the world, and no other substance besides body, which had no self-moving power, there could never possibly be any motion or mutation to all eternity, for want of a sufficient cause, or productive power. No imperfect being hath a productive power of any new substance, which was not before, but only of new accidents and modifications; that is, no creature can create. Which two fore-mentioned senses respect the efficient cause.

Thirdly, nothing can be materially produced out of nothing pra-existing or inexisting. And therefore, in all natural generations (where the supernatural power of the Deity interposes not) no new real entity, or substance produced, which was not before, but only new
new-modifications of what substantially pre-existed. Page 739, 740
Nothing out of nothing, so much insisted on by the old physiologers before Aristotle, in this sense, commonly misunderstood by modern writers, as if they designed thereby, to take away all divine creation out of nothing pre-existing. Granted, this to have been the sense of the Stoicks and of Plutarch; he affirming, the world to have been no otherwise made by God, than a house is by a carpenter, or a garment by a taylor. Plutarch and the Stoicks therefore imperfect Theists, but nevertheless zealous Religionists. But the ancient Italick philosophers here acted only as physiologers, and not as theologers, or metaphysicians; they not directing themselves against a divine creation out of nothing pre-existing; but only contending, that neither in natural generations any new real entity was created, nor in corruptions annihilated; but only the modifications of what before existed, changed: or, that no new real entity could be made out of matter. 740, 741
That this was the true meaning of those ancient physiologers, evident from the use, which they made of this principle, nothing out of nothing; which twofold. First, upon this foundation, they endeavoured to establish a peculiar kind of physiology, and some atomology or other, either similar or dissimilar; homœomery or anomœomery. Anaxagoras from hence concluded, because nothing could be made out of nothing pre-existing and inexisting, that therefore there were in every body similar atoms, of all kinds, out of which, by concretions and secretions, all natural generations made; so that bone was made out of bony atoms pre-existing and inexisting; flesh out of fleshy, and the like. This the Anaxagorean homœomery, or similar atomology, built upon this principle, nothing out of nothing . Page 741, 742
But the ancient Italicks, both before and after Anaxagoras, (whom Leucippus, Democritus and Epicurus here followed) with greater sagacity concluded, from the same principle, nothing out of nothing, that those qualities and forms of bodies, naturally generated and corrupted, were therefore no real entities, distinct from the substance of matter, but only different modifications thereof, causing different phancies in us; and this an anomœomery, or dissimilar atomology, the atoms thereof being devoid of qualities. Those simple elements or letters (in nature's alphabet) out of which, variously combined, these philosophers spelled out, or compounded all the syllables and words (or complexions) of corporeal things, nothing but figure, fite, motion, rest, and magnitude of parts. Were qualities and forms real entities distinct from these, and not pre-existing, (as Anaxagoras dreamed) they must then have come from nothing, in natural generations; which impossible. 742, 743
Another improvement of this principle, nothing out of nothing, made by the Italick philosophers; that the souls of animals, especially human, since they could not possibly result from the mere modifications of matter, figure, fite motion, &c. were not produced in generations, nor annihilated in deaths and corruptions; but being substantial things, did pre-exist and post-exist. This set down as the controversy betwixt Atheists and Theists, in Lucretius. Whether souls were generated, or infused into bodies. Generations and corruptions of animals, to these Pythagoreans, but anagrammatical transpositions. That those philosophers, who affested the pre-existence and ingenerability of souls, did not therefore suppose them to have been self-
self-existent and uncreated, but derived them all from the Deity. Thus Proclus, though maintaining the eternity of souls, with the world. The ingenerability of souls in Plato's Timeus, no more than this, that they were not generated out of matter; and for this cause also, were they called principles, in the same sense, as matter was so accounted. Souls therefore, to Plato, created by God, though not in the generation of animals, but before. Page 743, 745

Saint Austin himself sometime staggered and sceptical, in the point of pre-existence. That we have a philosophick certainty of no more than this, that souls were created by God, out of nothing pre-existing, some time or other; either in generations, or before them. That unless brutes be mere machines, the reason the same also concerning brutish souls; that thefenot generated out of matter, but created, some time or other, by the Deity; as well as the matter of their bodies was.

That all these three fore-mentioned particulars, wherein it is true, that nothing can possibly come from nothing, are reducible to this one general proposition, that nothing can be caused by nothing; which will no way clash with the divine omnipotence or creative power, as shall be shewed afterwards; but confirm the same. But those same words, nothing out of nothing, may carry another sense; when that εἰ εἰκόνιδον, out of nothing, is not taken caufally, but only to signify the terminus à quo, the term from which, or an antecedent non-existence: and the meaning thereof will be, that nothing, which before was not, could afterwards, by any power whatsoever, be brought into being. And this the sense of the Democritic and Epicurean objection; viz. That no real entity can be made, or brought out of non-existence into being; and therefore the creative power of Theifis an impossibility. Page ibid.

Our second undertakings in way of answer hereunto; to shew, that nothing out of nothing, in this sense, is false; as also, that, were it true, yet it would make no more against theism, than it doth against atheism; and therefore ought not to be used by Atheists, as an argument against a God. If this universally true, that nothing at all, which once was not, could ever be brought into being, then could there be no making, nor causing at all, no motion nor action, mutation or generation. But our selves have a power of producing new cogitation in our minds, and new motion in our bodies. Wherefore Atheists forced to refrain this proposition to substantialis only. And here some deceived with the equivocation, in this εἰ εἰκόνιδον, out of nothing; which may be taken either causally, or else to signify the term from which, that is, from an antecedent non-existence; they confounding both these together; whereas the first only true, the latter false. Again, others staggered with the plausibility of this proposition; partly because no artificial thing (as a house or garment) can be made by men, but out of pre-existing matter; and partly because ancient physiologists maintained the same also concerning natural generations, that no new real entity or substance could be therein produced; and lastly, because it is certain, that no imperfect created being can create any new substance; they being therefore apt to measure all power whatsoever, by these scantlings. But as easy for a perfect Being to create a world, matter and all, out of nothing, (in this sense, that is, out of an antecedent non-existence,) as for us to create a thought, or to move a finger, or for the sun to send out rays. For an imperfect substance, which once was not, to be brought into being by God, this not impossible,
impossible, in any of the fore-mentioned senses; he having not only infinitely greater perfection, but also sufficient productive or emanative power. True, that infinite power cannot do things in their own nature impossible; but nothing thus impossible, but what contradictory: and though a contradiction for any thing, at the same time, to be and not be; yet none at all, for an imperfect being, (which is in its nature contingent to existence) after it had not been, to be. Wherefore, since the making of a substance to be, which was not before, is no way contradictory, nor consequently in its own nature impossible; it must needs be an object of perfect power.

Page 746, 748

Furthermore, if no real entity or substance could possibly be brought out of non-existence into being; then must the reason hereof be, because no substance can derive its whole being from another substance. But from hence, it would follow, that whatsoever is substantial, did not only exist from eternity, but also of itself, independently upon any thing else. Whereas, first, the pra-eternity of temporary beings not agreeable to reason: and then, to suppose imperfect substances to have existed of themselves and necessarily, is to suppose something to come from nothing, in the impossible sense; they having no necessary self-existence in their nature. As they, who affirm all substance to be body, and no body to be able to move it self, though supposing motion to have been from eternity; yet make this motion to come from nothing, or be caused by nothing. What in its nature contingently possible to be, or not be, could not exist of it self; but must derive its being from something else, which necessarily existeth. Plato's definition therefore betwixt two kinds of substances must needs be admitted, that, which always is, and was never made; and that, which is made, or had a beginning. Page 748, 749

Lastly, if this true, that no substance makeable or producible, it would not only follow from thence, (as the Epicurean Atheist supposes) that matter, but also that all souls, (at least human) did exist of themselves, from eternity, independently upon any thing else; it being impossible, that Mind or Soul should be a modification of senseless matter, or result from figures, sites, motions, and magnitudes. Human souls substantial, and therefore, according to this doctrine, must have been never made; whereas Atheists stiffly deny both their pra and post-existence. Those Pagan Theists, who held the eternity of human minds, supposed them, notwithstanding, to have depended upon the Deity, as their cause. Before proved, that there can be but one understanding Being, self-existent. If human souls depend upon the Deity as their cause, then doublets matter also. 749, 750

A common, but great mistake, that no Pagan Theist ever acknowledged any creative power out of nothing; or else, that God was the cause of any substance. Plato's definition of effective power, in general, and his affirmation, that the divine efficiency is that, whereby things are made, after they had not been. Certain, that he did not understand this of the production of souls out of matter, he supposing them to be before matter, and therefore made by God out of nothing præ-existing. All philosophers, who held the immortality and incorporeity of the soul, afferted it to have been caused by God, either in time, or from eternity. Plutarch's singularity here. Unquestionable, that the Platonists supposed one substance to receive its whole being from another; in that they derive their second hypostasis or substance, though eternal, from the first; and their third from both; and all
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all inferior ranks of beings from all three. Platonius, Porphyrius, Jamblicbus, Hierocles, Proclus, and others, derived matter from the Deity. Thus the Chaldee Oracles; and the old Egyptian, or Hermakick theology also, according to Jamblicbus. Thofe Platonifts, who suppos'd the world and fouls eternal, conceived them to have received their being, as much from the Deity, as if made in time. Page 750, 752

Having now disproved this proposition, nothing out of nothing, in the atheiftick fense, viz. That no fubftance was caused, or derived its being from another, but whatsoever is fubftantial, did exift of it felf from eternity, independently; we are, in the next place, to make it appear also, that were it true, it would no more oppofe theifm, than it doth atheiftm. Fallhoods (though not truths) may disagree. Plutarch, the Stoicks, and others, who made God the creator of no fubftance, though not genuine, yet zealous Theifts. But the ancient Atheifts, both in Plato and A-riftotle, generated and corrupted all things; that is, produced all things out of nothing, or non-exiflence, and reduced them into nothing again; the bare fubftance of matter only excepted. The fame done by the Democritick and Epicurean Atheifts themselves, the makers of this objection: though, according to the principles of their own atomick phylology, it is impossible, that life and understanding, fould and mind, fhould be mere modifications of matter. As Theifts give a creative power of all, out of nothing, to the Deity; fo do Atheifts to passive and dead matter. Wherefore this can be no argument againft theifm; it equally oppofing atheiftm. 752, 756

An Anacephalæofis; whereby obfervable, that Cicero makes de nihilo fieri, and fine caufa, to be made out of nothing, and to be made without a cause, one and the self-Same thing; as also, that he doth not confine this to the material caufe only. Our third and laft undertaking; to prove, that Atheifts produce real entities out of nothing, in the firft imposfible fense; that is, without a caufe. Page 756, 757

A brief synopfs of atheifm; that matter being the only fubftance, is therefore the only unmade thing; and that whatsoever else is in the world, besides the bare fubftance thereof, was made out of matter, or produced from that alone. 757

The first argument; when Atheifts affirm matter to be the only fubftance, and all things to be made out of that, they suppos'e all to be made without an efficient caufe; which is to bring them from nothing, in an imposfible fense. Though something may be made without a material caufe pre-exifling; yet cannot any thing poifibly be made without an efficient caufe. Wherefore, if there be any thing made, which was not before, there muft of neceflity be, besides matter, some other fubftance, as the active, efficient caufe thereof. The atheiftick hypothefis suppos'es things to be made, without any active or effeotive principle. Whereas the Epicurean Atheifts attribute the efficiency of all to local motion; and yet deny matter or body (their only fubftance) a felf-moving power. They hereby make all the motion, that is in the world, to have been without a caufe, or to come from nothing; all action without an agent; all efficiency without an efficient. 758

Again, should we grant these Atheifts motion without a caufe, yet could not dead and fenelefs matter, together with motion, ever beget life, fene, and understanding; because this would be something out of nothing, in way of caufality, local motion only changing the modifications of matter, as figure, place, site and disposition of parts.
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Hence also those spurious Theists confuted, who conclude God to have done no more in the making of the world, than a carpenter doth in the building of a house, (upon this pretence, that nothing can be made out of nothing;) and yet suppose him to make souls out of dead and senfelefs matter, which is to bring them from nothing in way of causality. Page 758, 759

Declared before, That the ancient Italicks and Pythagoricks proved in this manner, that souls could not possibly be generated out of matter; because nothing can come from nothing, in way of causality. The subterfuge of the atheiftick Ionicks out of Aristole; that matter being the only substance, and life, fenfe and understanding, nothing but the passions, affections and dispositions thereof; the production of them out of matter, no production of any new real entity. 759

Answer; Atheifts taking it for granted, that there is no other substance besides body or matter, therefore falsely conclude life, fenfe and understanding to be accidents or modes of matter; they being indeed the modes or attributes of substance incorporeal and self-active. A mode that, which cannot be conceived, without the thing, whereof it is a mode; but life and cogitation may be conceived, without corporeal extension; and indeed cannot be conceived with it. 759, 760

The chief occasion of this error, from qualities and forms; as because the quality of heat, and form of fire may be generated out of matter, therefore life, cogitation, and understanding also. But the atomick Atheifts themselves explode qualities, as things really distinct from the figure, site, and motion of parts, for this very reason, because nothing can be made out of nothing causally. The vulgar opinion of such real qualities in bodies, only from men's mistaking their own phancies, apparitions, passions, affections and seemings, for things really existing without them. That in these qualities, which is distinct from the figure, site, and motion of parts, not the accidents and modifications of matter, but of our own souls. The atomick Atheifts infinitely absurd; when exploding qualities, because nothing can come out of nothing, themselves bring life, senfe and understanding, out of nothing, in way of causality. That opinion, that cogitation is nothing but local motion, and men themselves but mere machines, prodigious fictitious, or intolerable impudence. Page 760, 762

Very observable here, that Epicurus himself, having a mind to assert contingent liberty, confeffeth, that he could not do this, unless there were some such thing in the principles; because nothing can be made out of nothing, or caused by nothing; and therefore does he ridiculoufly feign a third motion of atoms, to solve that phenomenon of free-will. Wherefore he must needs be guilty of an impossible production, of something out of nothing, when he brings soul and mind out of dead, senfelefs atoms. Were there no substantial and eternal life and understanding in the universe, there could none have been ever produced; because it must have come from nothing, or been made without a cause. That dark philosophy, which educes, not only real qualities and substantial forms, but also souls themselves, at least senfitive, out of the power of the matter, educes them out of nothing, or makes them without a cause; and so prepares a direct way to atheifm. 762, 763

They, who suppose matter, otherwise than by motion, and by a kind of miraculous efficiency, to produce souls, and minds, attribute that creative power to this senfelefs and unactive matter, which
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which themselves deny, to a perfect Being, as an absolute impossibility. Thus have we demonstrated the impossibility and nonsensé of all atheism from this very principle, That nothing can be made from nothing, or without sufficient cause. Page 763, 764

Wherefore, if no middle betwixt these two, but all things must either spring from a God, or matter; then is this also a demonstration of the truth of theism, by deduction to impossible: either there is a God, or else all things are derived from dead and senseless matter: but this latter is impossible; therefore a God. Nevertheless, that the existence of a God may be further directly proved also from the same principle, rightly understood, nothing out of nothing causally, or nothing caused by nothing, neither efficiently, nor materially. 764

By these steps; first, that there was never nothing, but something or other did exist of it self from eternity, unmade, and independently upon any thing else, mathematically certain; from this principle, nothing from nothing. Had there been once nothing, there could never have been anything. Again, Whatsoever did exist of it self from eternity, must have so existed necessarily, and not by any free will and choice. Certain therefore, that there is something actually in being, whose existence is and always was necessary. Now that, which exists necessarily, of it self, must have necessity of existence in its nature; which nothing but a perfect Being hath. Therefore there is a perfect Being; and nothing else besides this did exist of it self from eternity, but all other things whatsoever (whether souls or matter) were made by it. To suppose any thing to exist of it self necessarily, that hath no necessary existence in its nature, is to suppose that necessary existence to have come from nothing. Page 764, 765

Three reasons, why some Theists have been so flattering and sceptical about the necessary self-existence of matter. First, from an idiotical conceit, that because artificial things cannot be made by men, but out of pre-existent matter, therefore nothing by God, or a perfect Being, can be otherwise made. Secondly, because some of them have supposed ὅλως ἀνάμεσα, an incorporeal body, or first matter unmade; an opinion older than Aristotle. Whereas this really nothing, but a metaphysical notion of the potentiality or possibility of things, respectively to the Deity. Lastly, because some of them have conceived body and space to be really the same thing; and space to be positively infinite, eternal, and necessarily existent. But if space be not the extension of the Deity it self, as some suppose; but of body, only considered abstractly, from this or that, and therefore immovably; then no sufficient ground for the positive infinity, or the indefiniteness thereof, as Cartesius imagined: we being certain of no more than this, that be the world and its space, or extension, never so great, yet it might be still greater and greater infinitely; for which very cause, it could never be positively infinite. This possibility of more body and space, further and further indefinitely, or without end, as also its eternity, mistaken, for actual space and distance positively infinite and eternal. Nor is there perhaps any such great absurdity, in the finiteness of actual space and distance, (according to this hypothesis,) as some conceive.

Moreover, the existence of a God may be further proved from this common notion, nothing from nothing causally; not only because there was no God, that idea, which we have of a perfect

6 K 2
perfect Being, must have come from nothing, and be the conception of nothing; but also all the other intelligible ideas of our minds must have come from nothing likewise, they being not derived from sense. All minds, and their intelligible ideas, by way of participation, from one perfect omnipotent Being, comprehending itself. Page 766, 767

However, certain from this principle, nothing from nothing, or nothing caused by nothing; that souls and minds could never have emerged out of dead and senseless matter, or from figures, sizes and motions; and therefore must either have all existed of themselves, necessarily from eternity; or else be created by the Deity, out of nothing pre-existing. Concluded, that the existence of a God is altogether as certain, as that our human souls did not all exist from eternity, of themselves, necessarily. Thus is the second atheistic argumentation against omnipotence or divine creation, from that false principle, nothing out of nothing, in the atheistic sense, (which is, that nothing could be brought out of non-existence into being, or no substance derive its whole being from another substance, but all was self-existent from eternity) abundantly confuted; it having been demonstrated, that unless there be a God, or a perfect omnipotent Being, and Creator, something must have come from nothing in the impossible sense; that is, have been caused by nothing, or made without a cause. 767

S E C T. III.

The six following atheistic argumentations, driving at these two things, (the disproving, first of an incorporeal, and then of a corporeal Deity) next taken all together. In way of answer to which, three things. First, to confute the atheistic argumentations against an incorporeal Deity, being the third and fourth. Secondly, to shew, that from the very principles of the atheistic corporeality, in their fifth and sixth arguments, incorporeal substance is demonstrable. And lastly, that therefore the two following atheistic arguments, (built upon the contrary supposition) are also insignificant. Page 767

Before we come to the atheistic arguments, against an incorporeal Deity, premised; that though all Corporeals it be not Atheists, yet Atheists universally mere Corporeals. Thus Plato in his Sophist, writing of those, who maintained, that nature generated all things without the direction of any Mind, affirmed, that they held body and substance to be one and the self-same thing. From whence it follows, that incorporeal substance is incorporeal body, or contradictory nonsense; and that whatsoever is not body, is nothing. He likewise addeth, that they, who asserted the soul to be a body, but had not the confidence to make prudence and other virtues bodies, (or bodily) quite overthrew the cause of atheism. Aristotle also repreffeth the atheistic hypotheses thus, That there is but one nature, matter; and this corporeal, (or endued with magnitude) the only substance; and all other things, the passions and affections thereof. 767, 769

In disproving incorporeal substance, some difference amongst the Atheists themselves. First, they, who held a vacuum, (as Epicurus and Democritus, &c.) though taking it for granted, that what is unextended or devoid of magnitude, is nothing; yet acknowledged a double extended nature; the first impenetrable and tangible, body; the second penetrable and intangible, space or vacuum; to them the only incorporeal. Their argument thus;
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since nothing incorporeal besides space, (which can neither do nor suffer any thing) therefore no incorporeal Deity. The answer: If space be a real nature, and yet not bodily; then must it needs be either an affection of incorporeal substance, or else an accident without a substance. Gassendus his officiousness here to help the Atheists; that space is neither accident, nor substance, but a middle nature, or essence betwixt both. But, whatsoever is, must either subsist by itself, or else be an attribute, affection, or mode of something, that subsistent by itself. Space, either the extension of body, or of incorporeal substance, or of nothing: but nothing cannot be extended; wherefore space, supposed not to be the extension of body, must be the extension of an incorporeal substance infinite, or the Deity; as some Theists assert. Page 769, 770

Epicurus his pretended gods, such as could neither touch, nor be touched, and had not corpus, but quaeri corpus only; and therefore incorporeals distinct from space. But granted, that he colluded or juggled in this. 770

Other Atheists, who denied a vacuum, and allowed not space to be a nature, but a mere imaginary thing, the phantasm of a body, or else extension considered abstractly, argued thus: Whatever is extended, is body, or bodily; but whatsoever is, is extended; therefore whatsoever is, is body. 770, 771

This argument against incorporeal substance answered two manner of ways; some asserter of incorporeal substance denying the minor, whatsoever is, is extended; others the major of it, whatsoever is extended, is body. First, the generality of ancient Incorporealisists really maintained, that there was something un-extended, indistant, devoid of quantity, and of magnitude, without parts, and indivisible. Plato, that the soul is before longitude, latitude, and profundity. He also denies, that whatsoever is in no place, is nothing. Aristotle's, first immovable mover also devoid of magnitude. So likewise is Mind, or that which understands, to him. He also denies place, and local motion to the soul, otherwise than by by accident with the body. Page 771, 773

Philo's double substance, distant and indistant. God also to him, both everywhere, (because his powers extend to all things) and yet no-where, as in a place; place being created by him, together with bodies. Plotinus much concerned in this doctrine. Two books of his upon this subject, that one and the same numerical thing, (viz. the Deity) may be all, or the whole everywhere. God to him, before all things that are in a place; therefore wholly present to whatsoever present. This would he prove also from natural instincts. He affirmeth likewise, that the human soul is numerically the same, both in the hand, and in the foot. Simplicius his argument for unextended substance; that whatsoever is self-moving, must be indivisible and indistant. His affirmation, that souls, locally immovable, move the body by cogitation.

None more full and express in this, than Porphyrius. His affirmation, that were there such an incorporeal space, (as Democritus and Epicurus supposed) Mind, or God, could not be so extended with it; but only body. The whole Deity, indivisibly and indistinctly present, to every part of divisible and distant things. 775, 776

Thus Origen in his against Celsus. St. Augustine, that the human soul hath no dimensions. of length, breadth, and thickness, and is in itself immaterial. Boethius reckons this amongst the common notions, known only to wise men, that incorporeals are in no place. 776

This therefore no novel or recent opinion, that the Deity is not part of it here,
here, and part of it there, nor measurable by yards and poles; but the whole undivided, present to every part of the world. But because many objections against this; we shall further shew, how these ancient Incorporealists endeavoured to quit themselves of them. The first objection; that to suppose the Deity, and other incorporeal substances, un-extended, is to make them absolute parvitudes, and so contemptible things. Plotinus his answer; that what is incorporeal, not so indivisible as a little thing; either a physisal minimum, or mathematical point: for thus God could not congruere with the whole world, nor the soul with the whole body. Again, God not so indivisible, as the least, he being the greatest of all, not in magnitude, but power. He so indivisible, as also infinite. This an error proceeding from sense and imagination; that what unextended, therefore little Incorporeal substance, the whole of which is present to every part of body, therefore greater than body. Porphyrius to the same purpose, That God is neither to be looked upon as the least, nor as the greatest, in way of magnitude.

Page 776, 778

The second objection; that what neither great nor little, and possesses no place, a non-entity. This, according to Plato, Plotinus and Porphyrius, a mistake proceeding from men's adhering to sense and imagination. They grant, that an unextended Being is ἄνεπταριστον, unimaginable. Porphyrius, that Mind and Phancy are not the same, as some maintain. That, which can neither do, or suffer, not nothing, though it swell not out into distance. Two kinds of substances to Plotinus; bulky tumours, and bulky active powers. Which latter, said by Simplicius to have nevertheless a certain depth or profundity in them. Something ἄπεταριστον, unimaginable, even in body it self. We can not possibly imagine the fun of such a bigness, as reason evinces it to be. Urged also by Plotinus, that an un-stretched-out duration, or timelesser eternity, as difficult to be conceived as an unextended substance; and yet must this needs be attributed to the Deity.

Page 778, 781

That God and human Souls no otherwise incorporeal, than as ὄμοι λεπτομερεῖς a thin or subtile body, false. Because the difference of grossness and subtlety in bodies, according to true philosophy, only from motion. That the most subtile body may possibly be made as gross as lead or iron; and the groflest, as subtile as aether. No specific difference of matter.

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The third argument against unextended substance; that to be all in the whole, and all in every part, a contradiction, and impossibility. This granted by Plotinus to be true of bodies, or that which is extended; that it cannot be ὑπερ πᾶν but impossible, that what hath no parts, should be a part here, and a part there. Wherefore the word ἔλθω (in that, whole in the whole, and whole in every part) to be taken only in a negative sense, for μηκενειπαν, undivided. The whole undivided Deity every where; and not a part of it here only, and a part there.

Page 782, 783

The last objection is against the illocality and immobility of finite created spirits, and human souls only. That this not only absurd, but also contrary to that generally received tradition amongst Theists, of souls moving locally after death, into another place, called Hades. Two answers of Plotinus to this. First, that by Hades may be meant only the invisible, or the soul's acting without the Body. Secondly, that if by Hades be meant a worser place, the foul may be said to be there, where its idol is. But when this same philosopher supposeth the soul (in
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(in good men) to be separable also from this idol, he departeth from the genuine Cabala of his own school. That souls always united to some body or other. This asserted here by Porphyrius; That the soul is never quite naked of all body; and therefore may be said to be there, whatsoever its body is. Page 784.

Some exceptions out of Philoponus; wherein the doctrine of the ancients, concerning the soul's spiritual or airy body, (after death) is largely declared. 785, 787

Intimated here by Philoponus, that, according to some of these ancients, the soul hath such a spiritual body here in this life, as its interior indument, which then adheres to it, when its outer garment is stript off by death. An opinion of some, that the soul may, in this spiritual body, leave its grosser body for some time, without death. True, that our soul doth not immediately act upon bones and flesh; but certain thin and subtile spirits, the instruments of sense and motion. Of which Porphyrius thus; 'The blood is the food of the spirit, and the spirit is the vehicle of the soul.' 787, 788

The same Philoponus further addeth, that, according to the ancients, besides both the terrestrial, and this spiritual or airy body, there is yet a third kind of body, peculiar to such as are souls, as are more thoroughly purged after death; called by them a luciformal, and heavenly and ethereal, and star-like body. Of this Proclus also upon the Timaeus, (who affirmeth it to be unorganized;) as likewise Hierocles. This called the thin vehicle of the soul, in the Chaldee Oracles, according to Psellius and Pletho. By Hierocles, a spiritual body, in a sense agreeable to that of the Scripture: by Synesius, the divine body. This distinction of two interiour vehicles, or tu-

nicles of the soul, besides the terrestrial body (called by Plato the offterial body) no invention of latter Platonijis since Christianity; it being plainly intimated upon by Virgil, though commonly not understood. Page 788, 790

That many of these Platonists and Pythagoreans supposed the soul, in its first creation, when made pure by God, to be clothed with this luciform and heavenly body; which also did always inseparably adhere to it, in its afterdescents into the aerial and terrestrial; though souled and obfuscated. Thus Pletho. And the same intimations by Galen; when he calls this the first vehicle of the soul. Hence was it, that besides the moral and intellectual purgation of the soul, they recommended also a mystical or telestic way of purifying the ethereal vehicle, by diet and cathartics. This much intimated on by Hierocles. What Pliny's dying by wisdom, or the philosophick death. 790, 792

But this not the opinion of all, that the same numerical ethereal body always adhereth to the soul; but only, that it ever where either finds, or makes a body, suitable to it self. Thus Porphyrius. Plato also seems to have been of that persuasion. 792, 793

This affirmed by Hierocles, to have been the genuine Cabala of the ancient Pythagoreans, which Plato afterwards followed. Hierocles his definition of a man, a rational soul together with a cognate immortal body; he declaring, this enlivened terrestrial body to be but the idol or image of the true man, or an accession to him. This therefore the answer of the ancient Incorporealsists, to that objection against the incorporeality and immobility of created incorporeals; that these being all naturally united to some body or other, may be thus said to be in a place, and locally moved. And, that it does not follow, that because
because created incorporeals are unex-
tended, they might therefore inform
the whole corporeal universe. Page 793,
794

That it would be no impertinent di-
gression here, to compare the foremen-
tioned Pythagorick Cabala with the
doctrine of Christianity; and to con-
sider their agreement or disagreement.
First therefore, a clear agreement of
these most religious philosophers with
Christianity in this, that the highest
happiness and perfection of human na-
ture consisteth not in a separate state
of souls un-united to any body, as some
high-flown persons have conceived. Thus
Platarius, who sometimes runs as much
into the other extreme, in supposing
human souls to animate, not only the
bodies of brutes, but also of plants.
Thus also Maimonides amongst the Jews;
and therefore suspected for denying the
resurrection. His Isaggath Tehan writ-
ten purposely to purge himself of this
supposition. The allegorizers of the
resurrection, and of the life to come. 794,
795

Again, Christianity correspondeth with
the philosophick Cabala, concerning
human souls, in this, that their happy-
ness consisteth not in conjunction with
such gross terrestrial bodies as these we
now have; Scripture, as well as philo-
sophy, complaining of them, as a heavy
load, and burthen to the soul; which
therefore not to be taken up again at the
resurrection. Such a resurrection as
this called by Platarius, a resurrection
to another sleep. The difference be-
twixt the resurrection-body and this pre-
cent body in Scripture. The resurrection-
body of the just, (as that of the phi-
losophick Cabala) immortal and eternal,
glorious and lucid; star-like and spiri-
tual; heavenly and angelical. Not this
gross fleshly body, gilded and var-
nished over in the outside only, but
changed throughout. This the resur-
rection of life, in Scripture, emphati-
cally called the Resurrection. Our souls
strangers and pilgrims in these terrestrial
bodies: Their proper home and country,
the heavenly body. That the grossest
body, that is, according to philosophy,
may merely by motion be brought into
the purity and tenuity of the finest æther.

But whether human souls after death,
always united to some body, or else
quite naked from all body, 'till the re-
surrection; not so explicitly determined
in Christianity. Souls after death live
unto God. According to Origen, this
a privilege proper to the Deity, to live
and act alone, without vital union with
any body. If natural to the soul, to
enliven a body; then not probable, that
it should be kept so long in an unnatu-
ral state of separation. 799, 800

Again; probable from Scripture, that
wicked souls after death have punish-
ment of sense or pain, besides remorse
of conscience: which not easily conceiva-
ble, how they should have, without
bodies. Thus Tertullian. He adding,
that men have the same shape, or ef-
fegies, after this life, which they had
here. Though indeed he drive the bu-
finesses too far, so as to make the soul it
self to be a body, figurate and colourate.

But Irenæus plainly supposed the
soul after death (being incorporeal) to
be adapted to a body, such as has the
same character and figure with its body
here in this life. 801, 802

Origen also of this persuasion, that
souls after death have certain subtile
bodies, retaining the same characterizing
form, which their terrestrial bodies had.
His opinion, that apparitions of the
Dead are from the souls themselves, sur-
viving in that, which is called a luciform
body. As also, that Saint Thomas did
not doubt, but that the body of a soul
departed might appear every way like
the
the former: only he disbelieved our Saviour’s appearing in the same solid body, which he had before death. Page 802, 804

Our Saviour telling his disciples, that a spirit had no flesh and bones, that is, no solid body, as himself then had, seems to imply them to have thinner bodies, which they may visibly appear in. Thus in Apollonius, is touch made the sign to distinguish a Ghost appearing, from a living man. Our Saviour’s body after his resurrection, according to Origen, in a middle state betwixt this gross or solid body of ours, and that of a Ghost. 804

A place of Scripture, which, as interpreted by the Fathers, would naturally imply, the soul of our Saviour after death not to have been quite naked of all body, but to have had a corporeal spirit. Moses and Elias visibly appearing to our Saviour, had therefore true bodies. 804, 805

That the regenerate here in this life have a certain earnest of their future inheritance, (which is, their spiritual or heavenly body) gathered from Scripture by Irenæus and Novatian. Which praelations of the spiritual body cannot so well consist with a perfect separation from all body, after death, till the day of judgment. 805, 806

This opinion of Irenæus, Origen, and others, supposed by them, not at all to clash with the Christian article of the resurrection. Nothing in this point determined by us. 806

The last thing in the Pythagorick Cabala, that daemons or angels, and indeed all created understanding beings, consist, as well as men, of soul and body, incorporeal and corporeal, united all together. Thus Hierocles, universally all the rational nature; and that no incorporeal substance, besides the supreme Deity, is compleat, without the conjunction of a body. God the only incorporeal in this sense; and not a mundane, but a supra-mundane soul. Page 806, 808

Origen’s full agreement with this old Pythagorick Cabala, that rational creatures are neither body, nor yet without body; but incorporeal substances, having a corporeal indument. 808, 809

Origen misrepresented by Huetius, as asserting angels not to have bodies, but to be bodies; whereas he plainly acknowledged the human soul to be incorporeal, and angels also to have souls. He proveth incorporeal creatures from the Scriptures; which, though themselves not bodies, yet always use bodies. Whereas the Deity is neither body, nor yet clothed with a body, as the proper soul thereof. 809, 810

Some of the fathers, so far from supposing angels altogether incorporeal, that they ran into the other extreme, and concluded them altogether corporeal; that is, to be all body, and nothing else. The middle betwixt both these, the Origenick and Pythagorick hypothesis, that they consist of incorporeal and corporeal substance, soul and body joined together. The generality of the ancient fathers for neither of these extremes. That they did not suppose angels to be perfectly unbodied spirits, evident from their affirming devils, as the Greek philosophers did demons, to be delighted with the midours of sacrifices; as having their vaporous bodies, or airy vehicles, refreshed thereby. Thus Porphyrius, and before him Celsus. Amongst the Christians, (besides Origen) Juvin, Athenagoras, Tatianus, &c. S. Basil, concerning the bodies of daemons or devils, being nourished with vapours; not by organs, but throughout their whole substance. 810, 812

Several of the Fathers plainly afferting both devils and angels to consist of soul and body, incorporeal and corporeal substance, united together. Saint
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Austin, Claudianus, Mamertus, Fulgentius, Ioannes Thessalonicensis; and Pselius, who philosophizeth much concerning this. Page 812, 814.

That some of the ancients, when they called angels incorporeal, under flood nothing else thereby, but only, that they had not gross, but subtle bodies. 814, 815.

The Fathers, though herein happening to agree with the philosophick Cabala, yet seemed to have been led thereunto by Scripture. As from that of our Saviour, they who shall obtain the resurrection of the dead, shall be equal to the Angels; that is, according to Saint Austin, shall have angelical bodies. From that of Saint Jude, that angels finning lost their own proper dwelling-house; that is, their heavenly body, (called obdysis by Saint Paul) which made them fit inhabitants of the heavenly regions; and thereupon cast down into the lower Tartarus; interpreted by Saint Austin to be this caliginous air or atmosphere of the earth. Again, from that fire said to have been prepared for the devils: which being not to be taken metaphorically, therefore (as Pselius concludes) implies them to be bodied; because an incorporeal substance alone, and not vitally united to any body, cannot be tormented with fire. 815, 817.

Now if all created incorporeals, superior to men, be souls vitally united to bodies, and never quite separate from all body; then probable, that human souls, after death, not quite naked from all body, as if they could live and act compleatly without it; a privilege superior to that of angels, and proper to the Deity. Nor is it at all conceivable, how imperfect beings could have sense and imagination without bodies. Origen contra Celsum, 'Our soul in its own nature incorporeal always standeth in need of a body suitable to the place wherein it is. And accordingly, sometimes putteth off what it had before; and sometimes again putteth on something new.' Where the following words being vitiated, Origen's genuine sense restored. Evident, that Origen distinguisheth the το σώμα in St. Paul's, (translated tabernacle,) from the earthly house; he understanding by the former a thin spiritual body, which is a middle betwixt the earthly and the heavenly, and which the soul remaineth still clothed with, after death. This opinion of Origen's, that the soul after death, not quite separate from all body, never reckoned up in the catalogue of his errors. Origen not taxed by Methodius, for ascertaining souls to have bodies, but for not ascertaining them to be bodies; there being no truly incorporeal substance, according to Methodius, but the Deity. This one of the extremes mentioned. And the Origenick hypothesis to be preferred before that of Methodius. Page 817, 820.

Already observed, that Origen not singular, in this opinion concerning human souls; Irenæus, Philoponous, Ioannes Thessalonicensis, Pselius, and others, ascertaining the same. St. Austin in his de Gen. ad Lit. granted, that souls after death cannot be carried to any corporal places, nor locally moved, without a body. Himself seems to think, the punishment of souls, before the resurrection, to be phantastical. But gives liberty of thinking otherwise. In his Book de Civ. D. he conceives that Origenick opinion not improbable, that some souls after death, and before the resurrection, may suffer from a certain fire, for the consuming and burning up of their drosses: which could not be without bodies. 820, 822.

Hitherto shewed, how the ancient asserter of unextended incorporeals answered all the objections made against them, but especially that of the illocality
liety and immobility of created incorporeal; namely, that by those bodies, which they are always vitally united to, they are localized, and made capable of motion; according to that of Origen, the soul stands in need of a body for local motions. Next to be considered their reasons for this assertion, of unextended and indistinct substance, so repugnant to imagination. Page 822

That whatsoever arguments do evince other substance besides body, the same against the Atheists demonstrate, that there is something unextended; themselves taking it for granted, that whatsoever is extended, is body. Nevertheless, other arguments propounded by these ancients, to prove directly unextended substance. *Platimus his first, to prove the human soul and mind such. Either every part of an extended soul, is soul; and of mind, mind; or not. If the latter, that no part of a soul, or mind, is by itself soul, or mind; then cannot the whole, made up of all those parts, be such. But if every supposed part of a soul, be soul, and of a mind, mind; then would all but one be superficial; or every one the whole: which cannot be in extended things. 822, 824

Again, *Platimus endeavours to prove, from the energies of the soul, that it is unextended; because it is one and the same indivisible thing, that perceiveth the whole sensible object. This further pursued; if the soul be extended, then must it either be one physical point, or more. Impossible, that it should be but one physical point. If therefore more, then must every one of those points, either perceive a point of the object, and no more, or else the whole. If the former, then can nothing perceive the whole, nor compare one part of it with another: if the latter, then would every man have innumerable perceptions of the whole object at once. A fourth supposition, that the whole extended soul perceives both the whole object, and all the parts thereof; (no part of the soul having any perception by it self) not to be made; because the whole of an extended substance nothing but all the parts: and so if no part have any perception, the whole can have none. Moreover, to say the whole soul perceiveth all, and no part of it any thing, is indeed to acknowledge it unextended, and to have no distant parts. Page 824, 826

Again, This philosopher would prove the same thing from the sympathy or homopathy, which is in animals; it being one and the same thing, that perceives pain in the head, and in the foot; and comprehends the whole bulk of the body. 826

Lastly, he disputes farther from the rational energies. A magnitude could not understand, what hath no magnitude, and what is indivisible: whereas we have a notion, not only of latitude as indivisible to thickness, and of longitude as to breadth, but also of a mathematical point, every way indivisible. We have notions of things also, that have neither magnitude nor site, &c. Again, all the abstract fences of things indivisible. We conceive extended things themselves unextended; the thought of a mile, or a thousand miles distance, taking up no more room in the soul, than the thought of an inch, or of a mathematical point. Moreover, were that, which perceiveth in us, a magnitude, it could not be equal to every sensible, and alike perceive things greater and lesser than it self. 827, 828

Besides which, they might argue thus; that we, as we can conceive extension without cogitation, and again cogitation without extension, (from whence their distinction and separability is inferrible:) so can we not conceive cogitation with extension; nor the length, breadth, and thickness of a thought; nor the half, or a third, or the twentieth part thereof;
not that it is figure, round, or angular. Thoughts therefore must be non-entities, if whatsoever is unextended be nothing; as also metaphysical truths, they having neither dimensions, nor figure. So volitions and passions, knowledge and wisdom it sel, justice and temperance. If the things belonging to soul and mind be unextended, then must themselves be so. Again, if mind and soul have distant parts, then could none of them be one, but many substances. If life divided, then a half of it would not be life. Lastly, no reason could be given, why they might not be as well really, as intellectually divisible. Nor could a Theist deny, but that divine power might cleave a thought, together with the soul wherein it is, into many pieces. Page 828, 829

The sense of the ancient Incorporealists therefore this; that in nature, two kinds of substances. The first of them passive bulk, or distant and extended substance; which is all, one thing without another; and therefore as many substances as parts, into which it can be divided. Essentially antitypous; one magnitude joined to another always standing without it, and making the whole so much bigger. Body all outside, having nothing within, no internal energy, nor any action besides local motion; which it is also passive to.

Were there no other substance besides this, there could be no motion, action, life, cogitation, intellect, volition; but all would be a dead lump; nor could any one thing penetrate another. Wherefore another substance, whose character θών ἔρασπος, the active nature, life, self activity, cogitation: which no mode or accident of extension, it having more of entity in it. Nor are these two, extension and life, adequate conceptions of one and the same substance. A thinker a monad; or one single substance. Not conceivable, how the several parts of an extended substance should jointly concur to produce one and the same thought. Page 829, 830

The energies of these two substances very different. The one nothing but local motion, or translation from place to place; a mere outside thing: the other cogitation, an internal energy; or in the inside of that, which thinks. Which inside of the thinking nature hath no length, breadth, or profundity, no out-swellling tumour; because then it would be outside again. Were a cognitive being extended, yet must it have, besides this extended outside, an unextended inside. But one and the same substance cannot be extended and unextended. Therefore in this opinion of extended incorporeals, a complication of two substances, and a confusion of them together into one. True nevertheless, that all finite incorporeal substance is always naturally united with some extended body, as its outside.

All summed up together. 831

Hitherto the sense of the ancient afferers of unextended incorporeals represented to the best advantage. Nothing affered by us; but that these, and other arguments, do demonstrate, against the Atheists, some other substance besides body: but whether or no they prove this to be indiffant and unextended, left to others to make a judgment. The Atheists, who deny this, must acknowledge every thought to be not only mentally, but also physisicly divisible and separable, together with the soul; as also deny internal energy; and consequently make cogitation nothing but local motion; and lastly, hold, that no substance can co-exist with another substance, more inwardly than by juxta-position. 832, 833

This the first answer to the fore-mentioned atheistic argument against incorporeal substance, made by the ancients, by denying the minor, that though whatsoever
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 whatsoever is extended be body, yet every thing is not extended. But the argument otherwise answered by some learned affiers of incorporeal substance, by denying the major; that though every thing be extended, or what unextended nothing; yet whatever is extended is not body; they affiering another extension incorporeal, which is both penetrable, and not made up of parts physically separable from one another; to which belongeth life, self-activity, and cogitation. Probable, that some would compound both the forementioned hypotheses together; by supposing the Deity to be altogether unextended, and indivisibly all every where; but souls, or created incorporeals, to have an unextended inside, diffused, as it were, into an extended outside. Our selves here only to oppose Atheists; and dogmatize no further, than to affier, what all Incorporealists agree in, that, besides body, there is another substance, which consists not of parts really separable from one another; which is penetrable of body, and self-active, and hath an internal energy, distinct from local motion. All which is demonstratively certain. Thys the full answer to the first atheiftick Argument against incorporeal substance; that either there is something unextended, or at least extended other wise than body, so as to be penetrable thereof, and indisceeribly one with itself, and self-active.

Page 833, 834. The second atheiftick assault against incorporeal substance; by pretending the original of this mistake to have sprung from the scholastick essences, distinct from the things themselves; and the abuse of abstract names and notions, they being made to be substances existing by themselves. For, though the opinion of ghosts and spirits, (whereof God is the chief) sprung first from fear; yet that these should be incorporeal could never have entered into the minds of men, had they not been enchanted with these abstract names and separate essences. Page 834.

The first general reply to this, that it is all but romantick fiction. That the opinion of the Deity sprung not from fear; and that all invisible ghosts are not phantacies, already sufficiently proved; as also the existence of a God demonstrated by reason. That apparitions are real phenomena; and reasonable to think, that there may as well be invisible aerial and ætherial, as there are visible terrestrial animals. Sottifnes to conclude, that there is no understanding nature superior to man. 834, 835

The second particular reply, that the opinion of spirits incorporeal sprung not from the scholastick essences, whether considered concretely as universals only, or abstracely. No man supposing these to be things really and substantially existing without the mind; either an universal man and universal horse, or else humanity and equinity; and that these walk up and down in airy bodies; they being only noemata, or the intelligible essences of things, as objects of the mind. These essences of things said to be eternal, as their verities. The meaning of these eternal essences, not, that they are so many eternal substances incorporeal; but that knowledge is eternal, and that there is an eternal unmade Mind, that comprehends them; which all other minds partake of. 835, 836

Again, that another atheiftick dream, that the abstract names and notions of the mere accidents of bodies were made substances incorporeal; souls, minds, and ghosts. Conscience life no accident of bodies, as Atheists suppose; but the essential attribute of another substance, which incorporeal; as magnitude, or extension, is the essential attribute of body. 836

The following atheiftick arguments
The second atheistical corporealism, in
the way of unqualified atoms, producing
all things, even life, and understanding,
from figures, sites, motions and magni-
tudes of parts. From whence it will also follow, that Mind is no primordial
thing, but secondary, compounded, and
derivative; creature, and no creator.
This called Democritick; not because
Democritus was the first inventor of the
the dissimilar atomology; but because
he was the first atheizer of it, or the
first, who made dissimilar atoms the
principles of all things whatsoever, even
of life and understanding. Page 837

Not to be denied, but that from these
two things granted, that all is body, and,
that the first principles of body are de-
void of life and understanding, it would
follow unavoidably, that there is no
God. Therefore the Stoicks, who were
corporeal Theists, denied the latter;
they supposing an understanding Fire,
eternal and unmade, the maker of the
whole mundane system. Truly observed
by Origen, that this corporeal god of
the Stoicks was but by accident incor-
ruptible and happy; and only because
wanting a destroyer. This no genuine
theism. 837, 838

But an absolute impossibility in both
these atheistical corporealisms; not only
because they suppose no active principle;
but also, because they bring life and un-
derstanding, that is, something out of
nothing; or make them without a cause.
Where the atomick Atheists, of the
two, most to be condemned, because
so grossly contradicting themselves. From
that true principle, that matter, as such,
is devoid of life and understanding, an
absolute necessity of another substance in-
corporeal, which is essentially vital and
intellectual. That all life cannot pos-
sibly be fallacious and accidental, gen-
erable and corruptible; but there must
be substantial life; and also some eternal.
838, 839
The truth of this understood and acknowledged by the Hylozoists; that there must of necessity be both substantial and unmade life and understanding; who therefore attribute the same to all matter, as such, but without animality; which, according to them, is all fictitious and accidental. Wherefore this hylozoick atheism also brings conscious life and animality out of nothing; or makes them without a cause. The argument of the Epicurean Atheists, against Stratonism or Hylozoism, unanswerable: that upon this supposition there must be, in every man and animal, a heap of innumerable percipients, as many as there are atoms of matter; and so no one thinker. The pretense of the Hylozoists, that all the particles of matter in every animal do confederate, ridiculous, and impossible. Page 839, 840

Thus the fifth and sixth atheistick argumentations fully confused; and from that true supposition in them, matter, as such, is devoid of life and understanding, incorporeal substance plainly demonstrated: which was our second undertaking.

The third and last, that there being undeniably substance incorporeal, the two following atheistick argumentations, (built upon the supposition of the contrary) altogether insignificant. The seventh not properly directed against atheism, but against a religious kind of atheism or theogonism; which supposed a God or soul of the world generated out of senfeles matter, and the offspring of Night and Chaos. A sober and true sense of the world's animation; that there is a living, sentient and understanding Nature, presiding over the whole world. But the sense of Pagan Theists, that the whole corporeal world animated is a God, exploded by us. This argument therefore being not against atheism, but theogonism; the confusion thereof might be here well omitted, without any detriment to our cause. But because the denying of a living understanding nature, presiding over the world, is atheistical, the ground of this assertion briefly declared, that life and understanding are accidents of bodies, resulting only from such a composition of atoms, as produce flesh, blood, and brains, in bodies organized; and, that there is no reason to be found any where but only in human form; which also confused. A brutish passage of a modern writer, "that it is unconceivable by men, how God can understand without brains." Page 840, 841

The next, (which is the eighth atheistick argumentation) that there can be no living being immortal, nor perfectly happy; built upon that false supposition also, that all life and understanding results from a contexture of dead and senfeless atoms, and therefore is dissolvable and annihilable. But that there is life essential, and substantial, which naturally immortal: as also a necessity of an eternal life, and Mind unmade, and unannihilable; which perfectly happy.

841, 842.

S E C T. IV.

The Epicurean Atheists further endeavour to disprove a God, from the phænomena of motion, and cogitation; in the three following argumentations, the ninth, tenth, and eleventh. From motion, thus; that from this principle, Nothing can move itself, but whatsoever is moved, is moved by another; it will follow, that there can be no first caufe, and unmoved mover, but one thing moved another, from eternity infinitely; because nothing could move another, which was not it self first moved by something else, 842, 843.

Answer:
The meaning of this axiom; not that nothing can act from itself, as the Atheist supposes; he taking it for granted, that every thing is body, and that all action is local motion; but, that no body resting could ever locally move it self. A false supposition of the Atheists and some Cartesians; that were there but once motion in the matter, this would of it self continue to all eternity. True, that of Arisotle; that to make an infinite progress in the causes of motion, and no first mover, is all one as to say, that there is no cause at all thereof; or, that all the motion in the world, is a passion without an agent, or comes from nothing. Clearly impossible, that there should be any motion at all, were there nothing self-moving or self-active.

Wherefore from this principle, that no body can move it self, it follows undeniably, that there is some other substance in the world besides body, that hath an active power of moving body. Another corollary from the same principle; that there is another species of action, distinct from local motion, and which is not heterokinesy, but autokinesy. That the action, by which local motion is first caused, could not be itself local motion. All local motion caused originally by cogitation. Thus the ninth atheistical argument from motion confuted; and from hence, that no body can move it self demonstrated, that there is something incorporeal the first cause of local motion, by cogitation.

But the Atheists further pretend to prove, that cogitation it self is heterokinesy, the passion of the thinker, and the action of some other external agent upon him; because nothing taketh beginning from it self; and no cogitation can rise of it self, without a cause. That therefore, thinking beings themselves are machines, and cogitation local motion. And, no understanding being a first cause, nor perfectly happy; because dependent upon something else.

Answer. True, that no substance beginning from it self; as also, that no action causeth it self. But false, that no action taketh beginning from the immediate agent; or, that nothing can act otherwise, than as acted upon by something else. Atheists here affirm only, what they should prove, and beg the question. If nothing self-active, then all the motion and action in the universe must come from nothing, or be made without a cause.

True also, that our human cogitations are frequently occasioned from external objects, and that the concatenations of thoughts and phantasms often depend upon mechainick causes. But false, that all cogitations are obfuscated upon us from without; and that no transition in our thoughts, which was not before in sense. The human soul a principle of actions, and therefore also of cogitations. This a bubbling fountain of thoughts. But that there is such a perfect mind, as at once comprehends all truth, and was before sensibles.

This a prodigious paradox, and falsity of Atheists; that cogitation, local motion; and thinking beings, machines. Here a correction of what we wrote before, p. 761, and a change of our opinion, upon further consideration; that not only a modern writer, but also the ancient atheistical Atomists, did conclude cogitation to be really nothing else but local motion. Nevertheless, these men troubled with the phancy of cogitation; which because they cannot make local motion, they would persuade us to be no reality, or nothing. Atheists aware, that if there be any action besides local motion, there must then be some other substance acknowledged besides body. They, who make cognition local motion, and men machines, no more to
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be disputed with, than senfelefs machines.  
Page 846, 847

To affirm, that no understanding be-
ing can be happy, nor a God, becaufe
dependent upon fomething without it,
all one as to affirm, that senfelefs matter
is the moft perfect of all things; and
that knowledge, as fuch, speaking im-
perfection, is but a whiffling and phan-
taffick thing. But of this more after-
wards. Thus the tenth atheiftick argu-
ment confuted. 847

Another atheiftick argument, from
the nature of knowledge and under-
ftanding. That the world could not
be made by an understanding being,
because there was no knowledge be-
fore things, which are the objects of it; and
the only things are fenfibles, which
knowledge a passion from. Therefore
all mind, as fuch, a creature, and none
a creator. ibid.

This already fully anfwered, page
729, and fo forwards. Where proved,
that fingular bodies are not the only
things, and objects of the mind, but
that it containeth its intelligibles within
it felf. And that knowledge is arche-
typal to the world, and the maker of
all. So the exiftence of a God dem-
ftrable from the nature of knowledge
and understanding. 847, 848

That the Atheifts can no more solve
the phenomenon of cogitation, than
that of local motion, evident from
their many hallucinations concerning it;
whereof a catalogue fubjoined. First,
that all life and understanding, a meer
accidental thing, generable and corrup-
tible, and no life nor mind fubftantial
or effential. This before confuted. 848

Again, that life and mind no fimple
and primitive natures, but compounded
yllables of things; and therefore none
immortal nor incorruptible. Anfwer;
that life and understanding are active
powers, and could never refult from
meer paffive bulk; nor can any com-
position of dead and senfelefs matter,
poffibly begin life and understanding.
Though no neceffity, that there fould
be any eternal unmade red or green, be-
cause there might be made out of things
not red nor green; nor that there should
be eternal motion, because motion might
be produced from a felf-active princi-
ple; nor that there should be any et-
ernal unmade matter, because there was
none, it might notwithstanding be cre-
ated, by a perfect incorporeal being:
yet an absolute neceffity of eternal un-
made life and mind; becaufe had there
been once none, there could never have
been any. Page 848, 849

Another Atheiftick hallucination,
that there is nothing of felf-activity in
cogitation; nor any thing could act o-
therwise, than as it is made to act by
fomething efler. This to bring all ac-
tion from nothing, or to fuppofe it
without a caufe. 849, 850

Another madness of theirs already
mentioned, that cogitation, local motion,
and thinking beings, machines. This
equal fottifhnefs or impudence, as to af-
firm number to be figure, &c. 850

Another paradox of the Epicurean
and Democratiftc Atheifts, that mental
cogitation, as well as fenfation, the
meer paffions of the thinker, and the
actions of bodies exifting without him;
some of them fuppoing thoughts to
be caufed by certain finer images than
fenfations; others, that they are the
remainders of the motions of fense, for-
merly made. Anfwer; that fenfation
it felf is not a meer corporeal paffion,
but the perception of a paffion, in a
way of phancy; much fels mental co-
gitations fuch; and leaff of all voli-
tions. 850, 851

But conflentaneously hereunto, these
Atheifts determine, all knowledge and
underftanding to be really the fame
thing with fense. From whence fol-
low two abfurdives; firft, That there
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can be no such thing as error, because all passion is true passion, and all sense, true sense; that is, true sensing and appearance. This absurdity owned by Protagoras. Epicurus endeavoured to avoid this, but in vain, and contradictiously to his own principles. Page 851, 852

A second absurdity consequent thereupon; that there is no absolute truth nor falsehood, but all knowledge private and relative, and nothing but opinion. This freely owned likewise by Protagoras. Sometimes also by Democritus. Who therefore but a blunderer neither, in the Atomick philosophy; which plainly supposes a higher faculty of reason and understanding, that judges of sense, and discovers the phantastry thereof; it reaching to absolute truth. 852, 853

Another atheistic error; that singular bodies are the only objects of mental conception, as well as of sensation. This imputed by Aristotle, to Democritus and Protagoras. But sufficiently before confuted.

The better to maintain this paradox, added by a modern Atheistic writer, as his own invention; that universals are nothing else but names, by which many singular bodies are called; axioms or propositions, the addition and subtraktion of names; and syllogistic reasoning, the reckoning the consequence of them: and that therefore besides the passions of sense, we know nothing at all of any thing, but only the names by which it is called. Whence it would follow, that geometrical truths not the fame in Greek and in Latin, &c. 854

That the Atheists, according to these premised principles, endeavour to depreciate knowledge and understanding, as that which speaks no higher perfection, than is in senseless matter. Thus the Atheists in Plato make it but a ludicrous, umbratil and evanish thing; the meer image of bodies, the only realities. Their design in this, to take away the scale, or ladder of entities.

All the grounds of this again briefly confuted, and particularly, that opinion, so much favouring Atheism, that there is nothing in the understanding, which was not before in sense, out of Boethius. Just and unjust greater realities in nature, than hard and soft, &c. Unquestionably, a scale or ladder of entities; and therefore certain, that the order of things must be in way of descent, from higher perfection to lower, and not of ascent, from lower to higher. The steps of this ladder not infinite; the foot thereof inanimate matter; the head, a perfect omnipotent being, comprehending in it self all possibilities of things. Mind by nature lord over all; and sovereign king of heaven and earth. 856, 859

The reason, why we so much insist upon this; because Atheists pretend, not only to solve the phenomenon of cogitation without a God; but also from thence to demonstrate the impossibility of his existence. Though modern writers not so much aware hereof, yet is the controversy betwixt Theists and Atheists thus stated by Plato; whether Soul and Mind juniors to senseless matter, and the offspring thereof; or else substantial things, and in order of nature before it. Accordingly Plato confuteth Atheism no otherwise, than by proving Soul not to be junior to inanimate matter, and generated out of the same. Evident, that Plato by Soul here understood, not only the mundane Soul, but also that whole rank of beings, called Soul; and that no life was generated out of matter. 859, 860

Those professed Christains, who generate rational souls out of senseless matter, plain betrayers of the cause of Theism. 860, 861
Nor is the case much different, as to others; who, though they professedly
generate only sensitive souls, yet making the rational but meer blanks, which
have nothing in them, but what was scribbled upon them by sense; and so
knowledge, in its own nature, junior to sense and sensibles; highly gratify the
Atheists hereby. Page 861

If any life and cogitation may be generated out of dead and senseless matter,
then can no good reason be given, why all should not be. Life not partly ac-
cidental, partly substantial; but either all conscious life, accidental, generable
and corruptible; or else none at all. ibid.

The doctrine of real qualities gener-
abile and corruptible, favourable to Atheism also. And though the atheistick
Atomists explode all the other qualities, because nothing can come from no-
thing; yet, contradicting themselves again, do they make life and understanding
real qualities, generated out of matter, or caused by nothing. 861, 862

There being a scale or ladder of en-
tities in nature, to produce a higher
rank of beings, out of a lower; as life
and cogitation, out of matter, and mag-
nitude, is to invert the order of this
scale, from downwards, to upwards;
and so to lay a foundation for atheism.
Wherefore great reason to maintain this
post against the Atheists; that no souls
can be generated out of matter 862, 863

The grand objection against the sub-
stantiality of sensitive souls, from that
consequence of their permanent sub-
stance after death. Cartesius so sen-
sible thereof, that he would rather make
brutes to be senseless machines, than
allow them substantial souls; which he
granted they must have, if thinking
beings. What clearly demonstrable by
reason, not to be abandoned, because
attended with some difficulties, or seem-
ingly offensive consequences. 863

The Pythagorick hypothesis; that
gods all created by God, not in the ge-
genation of animals, but in the Cosmo-
gonia. These therefore first clothed
with thin and subtile bodies, aerial or
etherial Ochemata, wherein they subsist,
both before their ingress into terrestrial
bodies, and after their egress out of
them. Thus Boëthius and Proclus. Am-
monius his irrational Demons mortal;
brutish souls, in aerial bodies. Since
the first creation, no new substantial
thing made, or destroyed, and therefore
no life. This looked upon by Macro-
bius as a great truth. Page 863, 865

That the Pythagoreans would en-
devour to gain some counterence for
this hypothesis, from the scripture. 865,

But if these aerial vehicles of brutish
souls be exploded for a whimsey, and
none but terrestrial bodies allowed to
them; though after death they will not
vanish into nothing, yet must they
needs remain in a state of insensibility,
and inactivity, till re-united to other
terrestrial bodies. Wherefore these in
one sense mortal, though in another
immortal. Silkworms dying, and re-
viving in the form of butterflies, made
an emblem of the resurrection by
Christian theologers. 867, 868

But no absolute necessity, that the
souls of brutes, though substantial,
should have a permanent subsistence af-
ter death, either in a state of activity,
or inactivity; because, whatsoever cre-
ated by God may possibly by him be
annihilated. The substantiality only of
the rational soul demonstrable by rea-
son; or that it will not of itself vanish
into nothing; but not that it is abso-
lutely impossible, for it to be annihi-
lated; the assurance of this depending
upon a faith in the divine goodness.
Porphyrius his assertion, that brutish
souls are resolved into the life of the
universe. The whole answer to this
objection, against the substantiality of
6 M 2' brutish
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brutish souls; that they may, notwithstanding, possibly be annihilated in the deaths of animals, as well as they were created in their generations: but if they do subsist (without aerial vehicles,) they must remain in a state of inactivity and insensibility. Page 868, 869.

That this the doctrine of the ancient Pagan theologers, that no life, or soul, generated out of dead and senseless matter; but all produced by the Deity, as well as matter; proved out of Virgil: though sundry other testimonies also might be added thereunto. 869, 870.

The Hylozoick Atheists themselves so sensible thereof, that there must be some substantial and unmade life, (from whence the lives and minds of all animals are derived) that they attribute the same to matter; and conclude, that though the modificated lives of animals, and men, be accidental, generated and corrupted, yet the fundamental life of them is substantial, and incorruptible. These also asserted a knowledge before sense, and underived from sensibles. 870, 871.

This Hylozoick Atheism again contuted. Absurd to suppose, knowledge and understanding without consciousness; as also, that the substantial and fundamental life of men and other animals should never perish, and yet their souls, and personalities, vanish into nothing. That no organization can produce consciousness. These Atheists not able possibly to give an account, whence the intelligible objects and ideas, of their knowledge of matter, should spring. This Hylozoick atheism nothing but the crumbling of the Deity into matter. 871.

Concluded, that the phenomenon of mind and understanding can no way possibly be solved by Atheists, without a God; but affordeth a solid demonstration of his existence. 891, 872.

SECT. V.

There now remaining only the Athetick objections against Providence, their queries, and arguments from interest; their first objection, from the frame of the world, as faulty: or, because things are ill made, that therefore not made by a God. This directed against the sense of the ancient theologers; that God being a perfect Mind, therefore made the world after the best manner. Some modern theologers deviating from this, as if the perfection of the Deity consisted not at all in goodness, but in power and arbitrary will only. The controversy between these and Atheists; but whether matter fortuitously moved, or a fortuitous will omnipotent, be the original of all things. No ground of faith in a meer arbitrary deity. To have a will undetermined to good, no liberty, nor sovereignty, but impotency. God to Celsus the head or president of the righteous nature. This not only the sense of Origen, but of the ancient Christians in general. Plotinus; the will of God essentially that, which ought to be. God an impartial balance weighing out heaven and earth. The Deity, not fervilely bound to do the best; but this the perfection of its nature. No Atheists able to prove, the world to be ill made. Page 872, 874.

Not to be concluded, that whatsoever we cannot find out the reason or use of, is therefore ineptly made. For example: the infinitum cæcum, though seemingly an odd appendix, and which the generality of anatomists give little account of; yet that, with the valve at its entrance, both together, an artificial contrivance of nature, to hinder the regurgitation of the secces. 874, 875.

The first atheistic infance of the faultiness of things; in the disposition of;
of the equator and ecliptick intersecting each other in such an angle, whereby the terrestrial globe rendered not so habitable as it might have been. This objection founded upon a false supposition, that the torrid zone uninhabitable. But this the bent disposition, which being contrary to mechanicca causes, therefore its continuance, together with the constant parallelism of the earth's axis, a manifest eviotion of providence; and that the το βαλτρυ-μ, the best, is a cause in nature. Page 875

In the next place; the Atheists would prove against some Theists, that all things not made for the sake of man. This at first but the doctrine of freethought Stoics only; recommended afterward by men's self-love. Whereas Plato's doctrine, that the whole not made for any part; but the parts for the whole. Nevertheless, things in the lower world made principally (though not only) for man. Atheists no judges of the well or ill-making of worlds, they having no standing measure of good. That nature a step-mother to man, but a froward speech of some discontented persons, seeking to revenge themselves, by railing upon nature, that is, Providence. 875, 876

Evils in general from the necessity of imperfect beings, and incompossibility of things. 876

Men afflicted more from their own phancies, than reality of things. Pain (which a real evil of sense) often link'd with pleasure, according to the Socratic fable. This not the evil of the whole man, but of the outside only. Serviceable, to free men from the greater evils of the mind. Death, according to the atheistic hypothesis, an absolute extinction of all life; but, according to genuine Theism, only a withdrawing into the tiring-house, and putting off the terrestrial cloathing. The dead live to God. Christian faith gives assurance of a heavenly body hereafter. The Christian resurrection not the hope of worms. This the confutation of the twelfth atheistic argument. Page 876, 877

The thirteenth; but second objection against Providence, as to human affairs; because all things fall alike to all; and sometimes vicious and irreligious persons most prosperous. 877, 878

Granted, that this consideration hath too much staggered weak minds in all ages. Some concluding from thence, that there is no God, but that blind chance steereth all. Others, that though there be a God, yet he knows nothing done here below. Others, that though he do know, yet he neglegeth human affairs. 878

Unreasonable to require, that God should miraculously interpose at every turn; or to think, that every wicked person should presently be thunder-struck. That, which steereth the whole world, no fond and passionate, but an impartial nature. Yet, that there want not instances of an extraordinary providence. Good reasons for the slowness of divine vengeance. The notoriously wicked commonly met with at the long run. 878, 879

The sometimes impunity of wicked persons so far from staggering good men, as to Providence, that it confirms them in their belief of future immortality, and judgment after death. The evolution of human affairs a kind of dramatick poem, and God Almighty the skilful dramatist, who always connected that of ours, which went before, with what of his follows after, into coherent sense. A geometrical distribution of rewards and punishments. 879, 880

That these ought to be a doubtful and cloudy state of things, for the exercise of faith, and the more difficult part of virtue. Had there been no monstrosity to subdue, there could have been no
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Here we to live by faith, and not by sight. Page 880

But that to make a full defence of Providence would require a large volume. The reader therefore referred to others for a supplement. Only some few considerations to be here propounded, not so much for the confutation of Atheists, as satisfaction of Theists, sometimes apt to call in question the divine goodnens, though the very foundation of our Christian faith. ibid.

First; that in judging of the works of God, we ought not to consider the parts of the world alone by themselves, but in order to the whole. Were nothing made but the best, there could have been no harmony, for want of variety. Plutinus, that a limner does not make all eye, nor place bright colours every-where; nor a dramatift introduce only kings and heroes upon the stage.

Secondly; that we ought not to confine God's creation to the narrowness of vulgar opinion, which extends the universe but little beyond the clouds; and walls it in with a sphere of fixed stars. The world incapable of infinity of magnitude, as well as of time. Nevertheless, as the sun is much bigger than we can imagine it, so much more may the world be. The new celestial phenomena widen the corporeal universe, and make those phanced flaming walls thereof to fly away before us. Not reasonable to think, that all this immense vastness should be desert and uninhabited.

Thirdly; that we cannot make a right judgment of the ways of Providence, without looking both forwards upon what is future, and backwards upon what is past, as well as upon the present. That the Platonists and Pythagoreans solved many phenomena, from the ἔρχονται, things done in a pre-existent state. Our common Chri-
The second atheiftick query: If God’s goodness were the cause of his making the world, why then was it not made sooner? This question capable of a double fenfe: First, Why was not the world from eternity? The reply; This not from any defect in the divine goodness, but because there is an impossibility of the thing it self; the necessity and incapacity of such an imperfect being hindering it. Our selves prone to think, that could the world have been from eternity, it should have been so. Thus Philoponus, in his confutation of Proclus his arguments, for the world’s eternity. And now no place left for those atheiftick cavils, against the novelty of the creation; as if God must therefore have slept from eternity; or had contracted a fatiety of his former solitude. Another fenfe of the question; Why, though the world could not be from eternity, yet was it not made sooner? Anf. The world could not possibly have so been made in time, as that it should not have been once, but a day old; and also once, no more than five or six thousand years old. Page 886, 887

The third atheiftick query: How could God move the matter of the whole world, especially if incorporeal? Anf. That all things being derived from the Deity, and essentially depending on him, they must needs be commandable by him, and obsequious to him. And since no body can move it self, that, which first moved the matter, must be incorporeal, and not move it by machines and engines, but by cogitation or will only. That conceit, that an incorporeal Deity could not move matter, because it would run through it, absurd; this moving not mechanically but vitally. That cogitative beings have a natural power of moving matter, evident from our own souls moving our bodies, not by machines
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chines or engines, but merely by thought. More easily for the Deity, to move the whole world by will and cogitation; than for our own bodies. Page 887, 888

The last head of atheistical argumentation, from interest. First; that it is the interest of particular persons, there should be no being infinitely powerful, who hath no law but his own will. The first reply; wishing is no proving. Nor will any man's thinking make things otherwise than they are. 888

But secondly; this wish of Atheists founded upon a mistaken notion of God Almighty, That he is nothing but arbitrary will omnipotent. God's will not mere will, but law and equity; Ought it self willing. Nor does justice in God clash with goodness; but is a branch, or particular modification thereof. The interest of none, there should be no God, unless perhaps of such as are irreclaimably wicked, and wilfully abandon their own true good. 888, 889

To be without God, to be without hope. No faith nor hope in senseless matter. According to the atheistical hypothesis, no possibility of happiness, nor security of good. 889

God such a Being, as, if he were not, nothing more to be wished for. To believe a God, to believe the existence of all good and perfection; and that things are all made and governed as they should be. Peculiarity from the necessity of imperfect free-willed beings. Infinite hopes from a being infinitely good, and powerful. Democritus and Epicurus, however cried up so much of late, but infatuated Sophists, or witty fools, and debauchers of mankind. 889, 890

The last atheistical argumentation, That theism or religion is inconsistent with the interest of civil sovereigns. Their first pretence for this, that the civil sovereign reigns only in fear; and therefore there must be no power, nor fear greater than that of the Leviathan. 890

In answer to this, the atheistical ethics and politicks to be unravelled. Their foundation laid in the villainizing of human nature. That there is no natural justice, equity, nor charity. No publick nor common Nature in men, but all private and selfish. That every man by nature, hath a right to every thing, even to other men's bodies and lives. That an appetite to kill and torment, by nature, gives a right. That nature hath brought men into the world, without any fetters or shackles of duty and obligation, the hinderances of liberty. Lastly, that nature absolutely dissociates and segregates men from one another, by reason of the inconsistency of appetites, and private good. Every man by nature in a state of war against every man. 890, 891

But in the next place, they add, that though this state of nature, which is bellicose liberty, and lawless freedom to every thing, be in it self the best; yet by accident, and by reason of men's imbecility, does it prove the worst. Wherefore, when men had been weary of hewing and slashing, they thenbethought themselves at length of helping nature by art; by submitting to a lesser evil, for the avoiding of a greater; abating their infinite right, and yielding to terms of equality with others, and subjection to a common power. 891

Where, these Atheists first slander human nature; and then debase justice and civil authority, making it the ignoble and basely brutish of fear; or a lesser evil submitted to out of necessity, for the avoiding of a greater. According to which atheistical hypothesis, no man is willingly just. This no new invention of the writer De Cive, but the old atheistical generation of justice, and of a body politic, civil society, and sovereignty;
sovereignty; (before Plato's time:) it being fully described in his second book of a common-wealth. Where the philosopher concludes, justice, according to these, to be but a middle thing between the best and the worst; loved, not as good in it selt, but only by reason of men's imbecility: or, that justice is indeed another man's good, and the evil of him that is just. The same hypothesis also, concerning justice, as a factitious thing, that sprung only from fear and imbecility, and was chosen but as a lesser evil, infituted on by Epicurus. Page 891, 893

The vain attempts of our modern atheistick politicians, to make justice by art, when there is none by nature. First, by renouncing and transferring men's right, by will and words. For if nothing naturally unlawful, then can no man, by will and words, make any thing unlawful to himself. What made by will, may be destroyed by will. The ridiculous conceit of these atheistick politicians, that injustice is nothing but dati repetitio, and such an absurdity in life, as is in disputation, when a man denies a proposition he had before granted; no real evil in the man, but only a relative incongruity in him as a citizen. Again, these justice-makers and authority-makers pretend to derive their factitious justice from pacts and covenants. But pacts and covenants, without natural justice, (as themselves confess) nothing but words and breath; and therefore can have no force to oblige. Wherefore they make another pretence also from certain counterfeit laws of nature, of their own devising, that are nothing but mere juggling equivocation; they being but the laws of fear, or their own timorous and cowardly complexion. They ridiculously dance round in a circle, when they derive the obligation of civil laws from covenants; of covenants from laws of nature; and of laws of nature again, from civil laws. Their vain attempt, by art to confecrate what nature hath dissociated, like tying knots in the wind or water. Their artificial obligation, or ligaments, by which the members of their Leviathan are held together, more slender than cobwebs. Page 895

These artificial justice-makers and obligation-makers sensible of the weakness of these attempts artificially to confecrate, what nature hath dissociated; therefore fly at last from art, to force and power; making their sovereign to reign only in fear. This the true meaning of that opinion, that all obligation is derived from law; that is, the command of him, who hath power to compel. If obligation to obey civil laws only from fear of punishment, then is no man obliged to hazard his life for the safety of his prince; and whoever can promise themselves impunity, may justly disobey. If civil sovereigns reign only in fear, then is their authority nothing but force; and power would justify rebellion. Lastly, if civil right or authority nothing but force and violence, then could it not last long; what natural prevailing against what is violent. 895

Wherefore since civil authority and bodies politick can neither be merely artificial, nor yet violent things, there must be some natural vinculum, to hold them together, such as will both oblige subjects to obey the commands of sovereigns, and sovereigns, in commanding, to seek the good of their subjects; something of a common, publick and conglutinating nature; which no other than natural justice. The authority of God himself founded in justice; of which civil authority a participation. Sovereignty no creature of the people, and of men's wills; but hath a stamp of divinity upon it. Had not God made a city, men, neither by art, or political enchantment, nor by mere force, 

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could have made any. The whole world one city, of God and rational beings. The civil sovereign no Leviathan; that is, no beast, but a God. He reigns not in mere brutish force and fear, but in natural justice and conscience, and the authority of God himself. Nevertheless, need of force and fear too, to compel some to their duty; nor is the sovereign's sword here alone sufficient, but he must reign also in the fear of God Almighty.

Page 895, 896

The second atheistick pretence, to make religion inconsistent with civil sovereignty; because it limits and confines that, which in its own nature is, and ought to be infinite. The reply; That the Atheists infinite right and authority of civil sovereigns is nothing but bellune liberty: but true right and authority is essentially founded in natural justice; there being no authority to command, where there is not an obligation to obey; and commands not creating obligation, but presupposing it, without which they would signify nothing. The first original obligation not from will, but nature. The error of those Thiefs, who derive all obligation to moral things, from the will and positive command of God, as threatening punishments, and promising rewards. From whence it would follow, that no man is good and just, but by accident only, and for the sake of something else. Justice a different species of good from that of private utility. Infinite justice as absurd as an infinite rule or measure. If no infinite justice, then no infinite right and authority. God's own authority bounded by justice: his will ruled by justice, and not justice by his will. Atheists, under a pretence of giving civil sovereigns infinite right, really divest them of all right and authority, leaving them nothing but brutish force. Proved here, that the summe potestates must of necessity be divi
di overso. Page 896, 898

The last atheistick pretence for the inconsistency of religion with civil power, because conscience is private judgment of good and evil. Answer, That not religion, but atheism, introduceth such private judgment, as is absolutely inconsistent with civil sovereignty, it acknowledging nothing in nature, that tends to publick and common good, but making private appetite the only rule or measure of good, and utility of justice. The desperate consequence from hence, that private utility may justify rebellion and parricide. The Atheists professed affirmation, that they, who have one rebelled, may justly defend themselves afterward by force. Though private persons must make a judgment in conscience for themselves, (the Atheists publick conscience being nonenfe and contradiction;) yet is the rule of conscience not private, but publick, except only to mistaken fanaticks; who therefore sometimes make a pretence of conscience and religion, in order to sedition and rebellion. Religion and conscience oblige subjects, in all lawful things, actively to obey the sovereign powers; in unlawful, not to reft. 898, 899

The conclusion of the whole Book; That all the atheistick grounds being fully confuted, and the impossibility of atheism demonstrated; it is certain, that the original and head of all things is no blind and inconficious nature, but a perfect understanding Being, self-existint; who hath made all that was fit to be made, and after the best manner, and exercifeth a juft providence over all. To whom be all honour and glory, &c. ibid.
A DISCOURSE
CONCERNING THE
TRUE NOTION
OF THE
LORD'S SUPPER.

To which are added,
TWO SERMONS;

The First
On 1 John Chap. ii. Ver. 3, 4.

The Second

By R. Cudworth D.D.

THE FOURTH EDITION.
THE TRUE NOTION OF THE LORD'S SUPPER.

The Introduction.

All great errors have ever been intermingled with some truth. And indeed, if Falshood should appear alone unto the world, in her own true shape and native deformity, she would be so black and horrid, that no man would look upon her; and therefore she hath always had an art to wrap up herself in a garment of light, by which means she passed freely disguised and undiscerned. This was elegantly signified in the fable thus: Truth at first presented herself to the world, and went about to seek entertainment; but when she found none, being of a generous nature, that loves not to obtrude herself upon unworthy spirits, she resolved to leave earth, and take her flight for heaven; but as she was going up, she chanced, Elijah-like, to let her mantle fall; and Falshood, waiting by for such an opportunity, snatched it up pretently, and ever since goes about disguised in Truth's attire.

Pure falshood is pure non-entity, and could not subsist alone by itself; wherefore it always twines up together about some truth, as Athenagoras the Christian philosopher speaks, like an ivy, that grows upon some wall, twining herself into it with wanton and flattering embraces, till it have at length destroyed and pulled down that, which held it up. There is always some truth, which gives being to every error: There is ever some soul of truth, which doth secretly spirit and enliven the dead and unwieldy lump of all errors, without which it could not move or stir.

Though
The Jewish Custom of

Though sometimes it would require a very curious artist, in the midst of all Error's deformities, to defcry the defaced lineaments of that Truth, which first it did resemble: as Plutarch spake sometime of those Egyptian fables of Isis and Osiris, that they had had upon the altar, certain weak appearances and glimmerings of truth, but so as that they needed be called, some notable diviner, to discover them.

And this I think is the case of that great error of the Papists, concerning the Lord's Supper being a sacrifice; which perhaps at first did rise by degeneration from a primitive truth, whereof the very obliquity of this error yet may bear some dark and obscure intimation. Which will best appear, when we have first discovered the true notion of the Lord's Supper, whence we shall be able at once to convince the error of this Popish tenet, and withal to give a just account of the first rise of it. Reftum inden fui & obliqui.

CHAP. I.

That it was a custom among the Jews and Heathens, to feast upon things sacrificed; and that the custom of the Christians, in partaking of the body and blood of Christ once sacrificed upon the cross, in the Lord's Supper, is analogical hereunto.

The right notion of that Christian feast, called, The Lord's Supper, in which we eat and drink the body and blood of Christ, that was once offered up to God for us, is to be derived (if I mistake not) from analogy to that ancient rite among the Jews, of feasting upon things sacrificed, and eating of those things, which they had offered up to God.

For the better conceiving whereof, we must first consider a little, how many kinds of Jewish sacrifices there were, and the nature of them. Which, although they are very well divided, according to the received opinion, into four, מזון, מנן, מילין, מית, the burnt-offering, the sin-offering, the trespass-offering, and the peace-offering; yet perhaps I may make a more notional division of them, for our use, into these three species.

First, Such, as were wholly offered up to God, and burnt upon the altar: which were the holocausts, or burnt-offerings.

Secondly, Such, wherein, besides something offered up to God upon the altar, the priests had also a part to eat of. And these are also subdivided into the sin-offerings and the trespass-offerings.

Thirdly, Such, as in which, besides something offered up to God, and a portion beallowed on the priests, the owners themselves had a share likewise. And these were called מילין, or peace-offerings, which
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which contained in them, as the Jewish doctors speak, עָלָּיוֹן לְשֵׁנְיָה, a portion for God, and the priests and the owners also; and thence they use to give the etymology of the Hebrew word Shelamim. כָּל, because these sacrifices brought peace to the altar, the priests, and the owners, in that every one of these had a share in them.

Now, for the first of these, although (perhaps to signify some special mystery concerning Christ) they were themselves wholly offered up to God, and burnt upon the altar; yet they had ever peace-offerings regularly annexed to them, when they were not offerings for the whole congregation, but for any particular person; that so the owners might at the same time, when they offered up to God, feast also upon the sacrifices.

And for the second, although the owners themselves did not eat of them, the reason was, because they were not perfectly reconciled to God, being for the present in a state of guilt, which they made atonement for in these sacrifices; yet they did it by the priests, who were their mediators unto God, and, as their proxies, did eat of the sacrifices for them.

But in the peace-offerings, because such as brought them had no uncleanness upon them, (Levit. vii. 20.) and so were perfectly reconciled to God, and in covenant with him, therefore they were in their own persons to eat of those sacrifices, which they had offered unto God as a federal rite between God and them; which we shall explain at large hereafter.

So then the eating of the sacrifices was a due and proper appendix unto all sacrifices, one way or other, and either by the priests, or themselves, when the person, that offered, was capable thereof. Wherefore we shall find in the Scripture, that eating of the sacrifices is brought in continually as a rite belonging to sacrifice in general. Which we will now shew in divers instances.

Exod. xxxiv. 15. God commands the Jews, that when they came into the land of Canaan, they should destroy the altars and images, and all the monuments of idolatry among those Heathens thus; Let thou make a covenant with the inhabitants of the land, and they go a-whoring after their gods, and one call thee, and thou EAT of his sacrifice: Which indeed afterward came thus to pass, Num. xxv. 2. They called the people to the sacrifice of their gods, and the people did EAT, and bow down to their gods; or, as it is cited in Psal. cxi. 28. They joined themselves unto Baal-peor, and ATE the sacrifice of the dead.

When Jethro, Moses's father-in-law, came to him, Exod. xviii. 12. He took a burnt-offering and sacrifices for God; and Aaron came, and all the elders of Israel, TO EAT BREAD before the Lord; by sacrifices there are meant peace-offerings, as Aben-Ezra and the Targum well expound it, which, we said before, were regularly joined with burnt-offerings.

So Exod. xxxii., when the Israelites worshipped the golden calf, the text faith, that Aaron built an altar before it, and made a proclamation, saying, To-morrow is a FEAST unto the Lord; (see how the altar and the feast were a-kin to one another:) And they rose up early in the morning, and offered burnt...
burnt-offerings, and brought peace-offerings, and the people SAT DOWN TO EAT AND DRINK. Which passage St. Paul makes use of, being about to dehort the Corinthians from eating things sacrificed to idols, 1 Cor. x. Neither be ye idolaters, as some of them were, as it is written, The people SAT DOWN TO EAT AND DRINK: for this was no common eating, but the eating of those sacrifices, which had been offered up to the golden calf. 

The first of Sam. i. 3. it is laid of Elkanah, that he went up out of his city yearly to worship, and to sacrifice to the Lord of hosts in Shiloh: and when the time was come, that he offered, he gave to Peninnah his wife, and to all her sons and daughters, PORTIONS; and unto Hannah he gave a double PORTION; that is, portions to eat of those sacrifices, that had been offered up to God, as R. David Kimchi notes. And in the ninth chapter of the same book, when Saul was seeking Samuel, going towards the city, he met some maidens, that told him Samuel was come to the city, for there was a sacrifice for the people that day in the high place: As soon, say they, as you come into the city, you shall find him before he go up to the high place TO EAT; for the people will not EAT until he come, because he doth blest the sacrifice. Where, though the word Bamab properly signifies a high place, or place of sacrifice, whence the Greek word Θυσιας is thought to be derived; yet it is here rendered by the Targum, as often elsewhere, דָּוָּם דָּוָּם דזָּוָּם דתָּוָּם דזָּוָּם דתָּוָּם Domus accubitus, a house of feasting; because feasting and sacrificing were such general concomitants of one another.

So again, in the 16th Chap. Samuel went to Bethlehem to anoint David: I am come (faith he) to sacrifice to the Lord; sanctify yourselves, and come with me to the sacrifice. But when he understood, that Jesse's youngest son was absent, he faith to Jesse, Send and fetch him, for we will not SIT DOWN until he come.

So I understand that of the Siebenites, according to the judgment of the Jewish doctors, Judg. ix. 27. They went into the house of their god, and did EAT and DRINK, and cursed Abimelech; that is, they went into the house of their god to sacrifice, and did eat and drink of the sacrifice: which perhaps was the reason of the name, by which they called their god, whom they thus worshipped, BERITH, which signifies a covenant, because they worshipped him by this federal rite of eating of his sacrifices; of which more hereafter. 

Thus likewise the Hebrew Scholiasts expound that in the 16th chapter of the same book, verse 23. concerning the Philistines, when they had put out Sampson's eyes; They met together to offer a great sacrifice unto Dagon their god, and to REJOICE; that is, in feasting upon the sacrifices. 

Hence it is, that the idolatry of the Jews, in worshipping other gods, is so often described synecdochically under the notion of feasting: Isa. lxvii. 7. Upon a lofty and high mountain booth thou SET THY BED, and another wentest thou up to offer sacrifice. * For in those ancient times they
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thyselv, and sate upon a flately bed, with a table prepared before thee. Amos ii. 8. They laid themselves down upon clothes laid to pledge by every altar; i.e. laid themselves down to eat of the sacrifice, that was offered on the altar. And, in Ezek. xviii. 11. eating upon the mountains, seems to be put for sacrificing upon the mountains, because it was a constant appendix to it. He that hath not done any of these things, but hath even eaten upon the mountains, rendered ial ol ol, i.e. hath worshipped idols upon the mountains; so the Targum renders it. Lastly, St. Paul makes eating of the sacrifice a general appendix of the altar, Heb. xii. 10. We have an altar, whereof they have no right to eat, that serve the tabernacle.

I will observe this one thing more, because it is not commonly understood, that all the while the Jews were in the wilderness, they were to eat no meat at all at their private tables, but that, whereof they had first sacrificed to God at the tabernacle. For this is clearly the meaning of that place, Levit. xvii. 4, 5. Whatsoever man there be of the house of Israel, that killeth a lamb, or a goat, or an ox, within the camp, or without the camp, and bringeth it not to the door of the tabernacle, to offer an offering to the Lord, blood shall be imputed to him. And so Nachmonides there glosses, according to the mind of the ancient Rabbins, הור מתחול ת lassen שולש השם אוכלין שולשים, i.e. Be bold, God commanded at first, that all, which the Israelites did eat, should be peace-offerings. Which command was afterward dispensed with, when they came into the land, and their dwellings were become remote from the tabernacle, so that they could not come up every day to sacrifice. Deut. xii. 21. If the place, which the Lord thy God hath chosen be too far from thee; then thou shalt kill of the herd and of the flock, and thou shalt eat within thy gates whatsoever thy soul lusteth after. Only now there were, instead thereof, three constant and set times appointed in the year, in which every male was to come up and see God at his tabernacle, and eat and drink before him; and the sacrifice, that was then offered, was wont to be called by them, עלל דא לוי, a sacrifice of seeing.

Thus I have sufficiently declared the Jewish rite of joining feasting with sacrificing; and it will not be now amiss, if we add, as a manif sia to that discourse, something of the custom of the Heathens also in the like kind, the rather because we may make some use of it afterward. And it was so general amongst them in their idolatrous sacrifices, that Isaac Abrabanel, a learned Jew, observed it in Pirush Hattorah, הכמות לבר יבשל חל מ ששון. In those ancient times, whatsoever sacrificed to idols, made a feast upon the sacrifice. And the original of it amongst them was so ancient, that it is ascribed by their own authors to Prometheus, as Sabinaeus, in his Solino-Plinian Exercitations, notes, P. 129. a. Hunc sacrificii morum a Prometheo originem duixisse volunt, quo partem bovise in ignem conjiceris soliti sunt, partem ad fiuum viatum abuti. Which Prometheus, although, according to Eusebius his Chronicon, and our ordinary Chronologers, his time would fall near about the 3028th year of the Julian period, which was long after Noab; yet it is certain, that he lived much sooner, near about Noab's time, in that he is made to be the son of Japhet, which was Noab's son, from whom the Europeans descended, (Gen. Vol. II. 6 O x. 5.)
The Custom of the Heathens

Note that the islands of the nations is commonly used in Scripture as a proper name to express Europe by.

Lib. 1. de Idol.

Plato, in his second De Legibus, acknowledges these feasts under the name of Ἐστιά, μετὰ θυσία, feasts after divine worship offered up to the gods. Among the Latins, that of Lyceus in Plautus his Pamilus belongs to this purpose.

Conviivas volo
Reperire vobis commodos, qui unà fient,
Interibì attulerint exta.

And that of Gelasimus in Stichus.

Jámne exta cōsta sunt? quò agnis fecerat?

After this manner he, in Virgil's Eclogues, invites his friend,

Cùm faciam vitulá pro frugibus, ipse venito.

And thus Evander entertains Æneas, in the eighth Æneids.

Tum leiti juvenes certatim, armaque sacerdos,
Viscera tola ferunt taurorum—

Plutarch somewhere observes it as a strange and uncouth rite, in the worship of the goddess Hecate, that they which offered sacrifice unto her, did not partake of it. And the same author reports of Catiline and his conspirators, ὅτι καλοῦσαν ὁμορπους ἱευζωλος τῶν σαρκῶν, that sacrificing a man
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Man, they did all eat somewhat of the flesh; using this religious rite as a bond to confirm them together in their treachery. But Strabo tells us of a strange kind of worship used by the Persians in their sacrifices, where no part of the flesh was offered up to the gods, but all eaten up by those that brought it, and their guests; they supposing in the mean while, that whilft they did eat of the flesh, their god, which they worshipped, had the soul of the sacrifice, that was killed in honour to him. The author's own words are these in his 15th book; Μελαναντίας δι το τρόπον τα κρέατα της υμητεμάτω την ιδιοτήτινα, απάντησε διελόμενος, τής θείας υδόν αποτετεράκτες μίσος. Τῆς γὰρ ὙΣ ΧΗ Ω Φοσι το τις εἰκος τελθεὶ τον Θεόν, ἄλλω δὲ οἶδεν. Ὡμως δὲ τι ἐπίπλη τι μικροδ τιθασιν, ὡς προκείμενοι, εἰπὲ τὸ πρὸ—Suid quidque accepta abeat, nulla parte diis relata, dicunt enim Deum nibil velle preter hostia animam: quidam tamen (ut furtur) omeni partem igni impoununt.

From this custom of the Heathens of feasting upon sacrifices arose that famous controversy among the Christians in the primitive times, sometimes disputed in the New Testament, whether it were lawful ΕΣΘΕΙΝ ΕΙΔΩΛΟΤΑ, to eat things sacrificed to idols.

These Gentile feasts upon the sacrifices were usually kept in the temple, where the sacrifice was offered; as may be gathered from that passage of Herodotus in Clio, where speaking of Cleobus and Bithone, and what happened to them after that, which their mother put up to the gods for them, ως ἔδουσα (faith he) τοι ἵπποθεν, καλακοῦμητις εἰς αὐτῷ τῷ ἱερῷ, &c. As soon as they had sacrificed and feasted, lying down to sleep in the same temple, they died there, and never rose more. But it is very apparent from that of St. Paul, 1 Cor. viii. 10. If any man see thee, which hast knowledge, sit at meat to εἰδωλοις, that is, not, as Erasimus translates it, in epulo simulacrorum, but as Beza, and from him our interpreters, in the idol's temple; for so both the Syriack metaphraft expounds it ὁδα ἀνα, and the Arabick ἀλασκ in the house of idols.

If any thing were left, when these feasts were ended, they were wont to carry portions of them home to their friends: so that learned scholiast upon Aristophanes in Plutus tells us, τα γας ἐν θυσίαις οἰστες, ὕφαινεν εἰς αὐτῶς τῆς θυσίας τοῦ οἰκείου κατὰ νόμον τινά. Whence Petit, in that excellent collection of Attick laws, inferred this for one, viz. That they, that go home from a sacrifice, should carry part of it to their friends. And that Greek comedian himself alludemeth there to it in these words:

——Τέτο δι το κρέατον
Τὸν ἔδουσα της ἠμητεμάτω λαξέων.

Theocritus in his Bucolices doth express it fully;

——Καὶ τὸ δὲ θύσις
Ταῖς νυμφαῖς, Μόρφων καλὸ κέφαλο αὐτικα πέμψοι.

And Plautus in Miles;

——Sacrificant?
Dant inde partem majorem mibi quem fieri.

6 0 2

These
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These portions, which they carried home, were called commonly by the Greeks πρεσβίτης, and in the Umbrian language, as Festus tells us, Strobilus.

Thebrazus in his characters uses the word τῶμα in this sense, Kai τῶμας ἀνακειμένος, i.e. ad sacrificantes & epula concelebrantes accedit, ut inde portionem asperat.

And because they thought they did receive some blessing from the gods with it, therefore it was sometime called ψυίς, as we find in Hesychius, upon that word ψυίς, ἀψίλων ὑπὸ  ἑλαπτομενον, καὶ πᾶν τὸ ἐκ Χιλιοχειμένων, ὑπὸ μένας, ἦτε βολὴ, ἦν ψυίς.

But otherwise, if there were any thing yet remaining, it belonged to the priests, as we learn from that scholiast, which we have already commended, upon Vespas, νῦν ἄνευ τῆς ὑπολείτουμεν τῆς ψυίξ τῆς ψυίξ λαμπέσοντι, i.e. It was an ancient law among the Athenians, that the priests should have the remainder. Which is not only to be understood of the skin and such like parts, but of the flesh of the sacrifice itself; as we learn from St. Augustine in his exposition upon Rom. ii. who tells us also, that these relics were sometimes sold for them in the market; whence that speech of St. Paul, 1 Cor. x. 25. Whatsoever is sold in the market, do nothing that is for conscience sake.

I will shut up all with this one observation more, That as we said of the Jews, that in the wilderness they did eat no meat, but of that which they had first sacrificed; in like manner the Heathens were wont to sacrifice before all their feasts: whence it is, that Athenaeus observes, feasts among the ancient Heathens were ever accounted sacred and religious things. And thus we must understand that speech of St. Paul in the 27th verse of the forenamed chapter, If any one, that believes not, invite you, and you be disposed to go; whatsoever is, let before you eat, asking no question for conscience sake.

Nay, it was accounted a profane thing amongst them, to eat any meat at their private tables, whereof they had not first sacrificed to their gods; as appeareth by the Greek proverb, άνθισσειν, ufed by Anacreon and others as a brand of a notorious wicked man, viz. One, that would eat meat, whereof he had not sacrificed.

Now having thus shewn, that both amongst the Jews under the law, and the Gentiles in their Pagan worship, (for Paganism is nothing but Judaism degenerate) it was ever a solemn rite to join fasting with sacrifice, and to eat of those things, which had been offered up; the very concinnity and harmony of the thing itself leads me to conceive, that that Christian feast, under the Gospel, called THE LORD's SUPPER, is the very same thing, and bears the same notion, in respect of the true Christian sacrifice of Christ upon the cross, that those did to the Jewish and Heathenish sacrifices; and so is E P U L U M S A C R I F I C I A L E, a sacrificial feast; I mean, a feast upon sacrifice; or, E P U L U M E X O B L A T I S, a feast upon things offered up to God. Only this difference arising in the parallel, that because those legal sacrifices were but types and shadows of the true Christian sacrifice, they were often repeated and renewed, as well as the feasts, which were made upon them: but now the true Christian sacrifice being come, and offered up once for all, never to be repeated, we have therefore no more typical sacrifices left amongst us, but only the feasts upon the
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The true sacrifice still symbolically continued, and often repeated, in reference to that ONE GREAT SACRIFICE, which is always as present in God's sight, and efficacious, as if it were but now offered up for us.

CHAPTER II.

An Objection taken from the Passover answered. Proved, that the Passover was a true Sacrifice, and the Paschal Feast a Feast upon a Sacrifice, from Scripture, and Jewish Authors.

But methinks I hear it objected to me, that the true notion of the Lord's supper is to be derived rather from the passover among the Jews; it being the common opinion of divines, that the Jews had but two sacraments, viz. circumcision and the passover, that answer to those two amongst us, baptism and the Lord's supper: but the Jewish passover had no relation to a sacrifice, being nothing else but a mere FEST; and therefore from analogy to the Jewish we cannot make the Lord's supper to be EPULUM SACRIFICIALE, a feast upon sacrifice.

To which I answer, first, That I know not what warrant there is for that notion, that the Jews had but two sacraments, circumcision and the passover, and that it should therefore follow by inevitable consequence, that the Lord's supper must answer only to the Jewish passover. Sure I am, the Jews had many more. For not to instance in that of St. Paul, Our fathers were all BAPTIZED; Cor. xii. unto Moses in the cloud, and in the sea, like our Christian baptism; and did all eat the same spiritual meat, (viz. the manna) and did all drink the same spiritual drink, (viz. the water of the rock that followed them) like the bread and wine in the Christian Lord's supper: nor to examine all the other sacramental ceremonies, which they had, that were almost as many sacraments as ceremonies. These feasts upon the sacrifices, which we have all this while insisted on, were nothing else but true and proper sacraments joined with sacrifices.

But secondly, I will grant, that the Jewish passover hath a special resemblance to the Christian LORD'S SUPPER, although upon other grounds; for I say, undoubtedly the passover was a true and proper sacrifice, and therefore the paschal feast a feast upon a sacrifice: so that this shall still advance and improve our former notion.

For the better conceiving whereof, we must understand, that besides those four general kinds of sacrifices among the Jews before-mentioned, the burnt-offering, the sin-offering, the trespass-offering, and the peace-offering; there were some other peculiar kinds of sacrifices, as the masters tell us, viz. these three, the Firelings of Cattle, and the Tenth, and the Passover. And the reason, why these, in the distribution of
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of sacrifices, are thus distinguished by them from all the other general kinds of sacrifices, is thus given by the famous Maimonides upon the Mishna of the Talmud, in Maffecheib Zebachim, the sixth Chap. 

There being four named were such kind of sacrifices, as that a private person was often bound to each of them in several cases, and the whole congregation in several seasons; but these three were not of that nature, being peculiarly restrained to one cafe or season. Now these three kinds of peculiar sacrifices were in their nature all nearest of kin to the peace-offerings, and are therefore called by the Jewish doctors בַּשֵּׁבֵּה הַנָּוִּים, like to peace-offerings, because they were not only killed in the same place, being all מִנְסֵבְטָנִים בֵּיה וַסֵּבָטָנִים, light holy things, and had the מֵרָאִים, or inward parts thereof, to be burnt likewise upon the altar; but also, in that part of them was to be eaten by the owners. Inasmuch that the Talmudists, put many cafes, in which a lamb, that was set apart for a passover, and could not be offered in that notion, was to be turned into a peace-offering, as that which was near of kin to it.

But yet these matters tell us, there were three precise differences between the פָּסָחַה and the ordinary peace-offering. First, in that there was no laying on of hands upon the passover in the killing of it; for this was no where commanded, as in all the peace-offerings. Secondly, that there was no Mincab or meat-offering, nor Libamen or drink-offering, to be joined with it; (for so they use to include both in the word Nesachim.) Thirdly, that there was no waving of the breast and shoulder for the priests portion; the reason whereof was, because the priests were bound always to have passover-offerings of their own, as it is expressed Ezra vi. and so needed not any wave-offering.

But that the passovers were, in other respects, of the same nature with the peace-offerings, and therefore true and proper sacrifices, because it is a thing generally not so well understood, and therefore opposed by divers, I shall labour the more fully to convince it. I say, that the passovers were always brought to the tabernacle or the temple, and there presented and offered up to God by the priest, as all sacrifices were; that the blood of them was there sprinkled upon the altar, of which the Hebrew doctors well observe, * עֵנֶר הָעֵזֶב בֵּיהַו וַיֹּסַף, The very essence of a sacrifice is in sprinkling of the blood; and also that the Imurim, (as they call them) that is, the fat and kidneys, were burnt upon the altar; all this I shall endeavour to demonstrate.

Only first I must premise this, that when I say the passover was brought to the tabernacle, and offered by the priests, I do not mean, that the priests were always bound to kill the passovers: for I grant, that the people were wont to kill their own passovers; and so I find it expressly in the Mishna of the Talmud, Massech. Zebach, cap. v. sect. 6. פְּסַחֵי אֲדֹם לְפַסְחֵי אֲדֹם, All Israel killed the passover, and the priests received the blood. Which Talmudical expression alludes to that place, Exod. xii. 6. The whole assembly of the congregation of Israel shall kill it in the evening; where this seems to be commanded by God. And the practice consonant hereunto, I find

* Maimon. in Korban Pesach. ch. 2.
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intimated at least in Scripture, in Hozekiah's passover, 2 Chron. xxx. 17. There were many in the congregation, that were not sanctified; therefore the Levites had the charge of killing the passover for every one, that was not clean, to sanctify it unto the Lord. Where R. Solomon writeth thus: שֶׁלֶם אֵין וּמַמְלֶכֶת מֵאָדָם, Wonder not, why the owners themselves did not kill them, for it followeth, that many in the congregation had not sanctified themselves; therefore the Levites were appointed in their place to sanctify the work unto the Lord. And R. D. Kimri to the same purpose; Though many of them did eat the passover in uncleanness, it being a case of necessity, in that they had no time to purify themselves; yet for them to come into the court, and kill the passovers, this was not needful, when it might be done as well by the Levites. And therefore the same is to be thought likewise of the priests and Levites killing the passover, Ezra vi. because the people returning newly from captivity were not yet purified, as it is there also partly intimated.

But this doth not at all hinder our proceeding, or evince the passover not to be a sacrifice: for it is a great mistake in most of our learned writers, to think, that the killing of every sacrifice was proper to the priest; whereas indeed there was no such matter; but as we have already granted, that the people commonly killed their own passovers, so we will affirm, that they did the same concerning any of the other sacrifices, Levit. i. 4, 5. it is said concerning the burnt-offering, If any man bring a burnt-offering to the Lord, he shall lay his hand upon the head of the burnt-offering, AND HE SHALL KILL the bullock before the Lord, and the priests, Aaron's sons, shall take the blood. So concerning the peace-offerings, chap. iii. 2. He shall lay his hand on the head of his offering, and KILL IT at the door of the tabernacle of the congregation: And concerning the sin-offering, chap. iv. 24. HE shall lay his hand on the head of the goat, and KILL IT at the place, where they kill the burnt-offering before the Lord. We see then, what incompetent judges our own authors are in Jewish customs and antiquities. The Jewish doctors and antiquaries (which are so much contemned by some of our magisterial dictators in all learning) would have taught us here another lesson. For thus Maimonides, in Biath Hamnike, speaks to this point, שֶׁלֶם אֵין וּמַמְלֶכֶת מֵאָדָם, that is, the killing of the holy things may lawfully be done by strangers, yeal of the most holy things, whether they be the holy things of a private person, or of the whole congregation: as it is said (Levit. i.) And be shall kill the bullock; and the priests, Aaron's sons, shall take the blood. The same is avouched again afterward, by the same author, in Maaseh Korban, chap. v.

But if any one would therefore fain know, what were properly the priests actions about the sacrifice, which might not be done lawfully by any stranger, the same Jewish authors have a trite rule amongst them concerning it: מֵאָדָם אֲנָפָל קְרֻבּוֹת בַּרְכָּה הקָדָם, The receiving of the blood, and all the other parts, that were to be offered up, and all that folloeth after that, belongeth to the priest's office. And Isaac Abravanel will teach us more particularly, in his comment on Leviticus, that there were five things to be done by
by the owners of the sacrifice that brought it, and five things by the priest that offered it. The first five were, laying on of hands, killing, flaying, cutting up, and washing of the inwards; the other five were the receiving of the blood in a vessel, the sprinkling of it upon the altar, the putting of fire upon the altar, the ordering of the wood upon the fire, and the ordering of the pieces upon the wood. Hence it is, that upon the forenamed place of the Mijna, (which I brought to shew, that the people did kill the passovers) Rabbi Obadiab of Barterora thus glosseth, icorn יִשְׂרָאֵל יָשָׁרֵב יֵשָׁרֵב, i. e. The people of Israel might all kill the passovers themselves, if they pleased, because the KILLING OF ANY SACRIFICE might be done lawfully by strangers; but the priests received the blood.

Now, I come to prove what I have undertaken. And first, that the passover was always brought to the tabernacle or the temple, and there offered unto God as the other sacrifices were, is clear enough from Deut. xvi. 5. Thou shalt not sacrifice the passover within any of the gates, which the Lord thy God giveth thee; but at the place, which the Lord thy God chooseth to place his name there, there thou shalt sacrifice. And that this is to be understood not of Jerusalem in general, but of the tabernacle or temple, appears, both because the same expressions are used of the other sacrifices, Deut. xii. ver. 5, 6, 11, 14. where it is clearly meant, that they were to be brought to the temple; and because it is certain, that every thing, that was killed amongst the Jews, was either to be killed at the door of the tabernacle of the congregation, or else might be killed indifferently in any part of the whole land.

Let us now see, how the Jewish doctors comment upon this place, men better skilled in these rites than our own authors are, R. Moses BEN MAIMON, in Halachah Pesach, cap. 1. לֹא יִשָּׁלֵב לְעָם, &c. They kill not the passover but in the court, as the rest of the holy things; yea, in the time, when high places were permitted, they sacrificed not the passover in a private high place; for it is said (Deut. xvi.) Thou mayst not sacrifice the passover in any of the gates: We have learnt, that this is a prohibition to kill the passover in any private high place, although it be in a time, when high places are permitted. From which excellent gloss of theirs, it appeareth, that there was more preciseness in bringing of the passover to the place, where God's name was put, and offering it at the tabernacle or the temple, than of any of the other sacrifices. And this was the reason, as was before intimated out of KIMCHI, why in Hezekiah's passover the Levites had the charge of killing, because the passovers were to be killed in the court of the temple, whither the people being unclean could not enter; for otherwise, if it had been done without the court, they might as well have killed their own passovers, as have eaten them. And this may be farther confirmed, in that the passover is called a Korban: Numb. ix. 7. When certain men were defiled by a dead body, that they could not keep the passover, they came to Moses, and said, Wherefore are we kept back, that we may not OFFER an OFFERING to the Lord in his appointed season? And again, ver. 13. If any one be clean, and forbeareth to keep the passover, even that soul shall be cut off,
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off, because he brought not an OFFERING (or a KORBAN) to the Lord in his appointed season. Nothing was called an OFFERING, or a KORBAN, but that, which was brought, and offered up to God at the tabernacle or temple, where his name was put.

That the blood of the passovers was to be sprinkled by the priest, and fat only to be burnt upon the altar, although this must needs follow from the former, yet I prove it more particularly thus: Exod. xxiii. 18. Thou shalt not offer the blood of my sacrifice with leavened bread; neither shall the fat of my feast remain until the morning. For by the general consent of the Jewish scholiasts, and all those Christian interpreters, that I have seen, this place is to be understood only of the passover; and therefore ONKELOS, that famous Chaldee paraphrast, for כה בֵּית the blood of my sacrifice, made no question but to read כי the blood of my passover. But it appears undoubtedly from a parallel place in the xxxiv. chapter of the same book, ver. 23, 25, 26. where those 17, 18, and 19. verses of the xxiii. chap. are again repeated; Thrice in the year shalt all your men-children appear before the Lord. — Thou shalt not offer the blood of my sacrifice with leaven, neither shall the sacrifice of the feast of the passover be left unto the morning. The first of the first-fruit of thy land thou shalt bring into the house of the Lord thy God. Thou shalt not see a kid in its mother's milk. Here what was wanting in the former, is supplied; Neither shall the sacrifice of the feast of the PASSOVER be left unto the morning. And I have set down the whole context with it, because it will be needful, for the better clearing of it, to consider its coherence with other verses, which is the very fame in both chapters; and Isaac Abrabanel hath set it down excellently in this manner.

First therefore, saith he, when God had spoken of the Jews appearing thrice before him every year, viz. at the feast of the passover or of unleavened bread, the feast of weeks or Pentecost, the feast of tabernacles or in-gathering, בֵּית שָׁנְיֵהוּ וַעֲשַׂרְתָּם הַיַּעַר חֵם וְבֵית אֵד הָאֵד וּסְפַר מִיָּו לֹא קִלְבֶּל אֶלֶּה מִיָּו. i.e. When he had spake of these three feasts, he subjoins immediately some rule concerning every one of them in particular: First, for the passover, in those words, Thou shalt not offer the blood of my sacrifice with leaven, neither shall the sacrifice of the feast of the passover be left until the morning: Secondly, for the feast of Pentecost, in those words: The first of the first-fruits of the land thou shalt bring into the house of the Lord thy God: Thirdly, for the feast of tabernacles or in-gathering; Thou shalt not see a kid in his mother's milk; which words, for want of this light of the context, were never yet sufficiently explained by any of our interpreters. And the thread of this coherence alone led Abrabanel very near the true meaning of them, ere he was aware: יִתְנָה רֵאָה בֵּית שָׁנְיֵהוּ מִסְמֵה יִתְנָה וְשָׁנְיֵהוּ יֵעָלֵית עֲשָׂרָה בְּסִמְתָּם. i.e. It seems most probable, that this command was occasioned from a custom among the idolatrous Heathens, that at the time of their gathering in of fruits, they were wont to boil a kid in the dam's milk, thinking, that by this means they were made acceptable to their gods, and did procure a blessing by it. To confirm which gloss, he tells
us of a custom somewhat like to this, used in his time in some parts of Spain.

But because Abrabanel doth not tell his tale so handsomely as he should, I will help him out a little from an ancient Karaité, whose comment I have seen upon the Pentateuch, MS. (for the monuments of these Karaité Jews were never yet printed, and are very rarely seen in these European parts.) And it is thus: It was a custom of the ancient Heathens, when they had gathered in all their fruits, to take a kid, and boil it in the dam's milk, and then, ṣeveh berez, in a magical way, to go about and besprinkle with it all their trees and fields, and gardens and orchards; thinking by this means they should make them fruitful, and bring forth fruit again more abundantly the following year. Wherefore, God forbade his people the Jews, at the time of their in-gathering, to use any such superstitious or idolatrous rite. And I produce this the rather, because Abrabanel, toward the end of his comment on this place, mentions a gloss of some KARRAITIS author upon it, although it be altogether unlike to this, which we have here related. Scribunt sapientes KARRÆORUM, Nè coqnas hærim in lacte matris sine, hoc eft, Nè commissaentar germen cum radicibus.

But to return. As from the coherence of the whole context thus cleared it is manifest, that this verse in both places is to be understood only of the passover; so it may be farther confirmed from the Talmudists, who ever expound it in this sense, as appears by the Misná in Zebachin, chapter the sixth; ṣeveh berez, He, that killeth the passover with leaven, sinneth against a negative command, (which is more amongst the Jews, than to sin against a positive,) viz. that in these places already quoted, Thou shalt not offer the blood of my sacrifice with leaven; from whence they collected, as Maimonides tells us, that they were to put away leaven the fourteenth day, a day before the killing of the passover. Nay, this place cannot possibly be understood in any other sense, as of sacrifices in general, because leaven was sometimes commanded with sacrifices, as Levit. vii. 13.

But that the blood of the passovers was sprinkled, may be demonstrated farther, not only from that of Hezekiah's passover, 2 Chron. xxx. 16. The priests sprinkled the blood, which they received from the hand of the Levites; for there were many in the congregation, that were not sanctified; therefore the Levites had the charge of killing the passovers; but also from Jostab's, chap. xxxv. ver. 11. which can no ways be evaded; They, that is, the Levites, killed the passover, and the priests sprinkled the blood from their bands, and the Levites flayed them. Now the sprinkling of the blood is the essence of a sacrifice, as before we noted from the Jewish Doctors. And therefore the passover must needs be a sacrifice: שׁאף שׁאף שׁאף.

For a confirmation of all this, I will describe punctually the whole manner of the PASCHAL SACRIFICE from the Misná of the Jewish Talmud, a monument of such antiquity, as cannot be distrusted in these rites. Nothing (say they) was killed before the morning-sacrifice; and after the evening-sacrifice, nothing but the passover.
The evening-sacrifice was usually killed between the eighth and ninth hour; (that is, half an hour after two, in the afternoon,) and offered between the ninth and tenth, (that is, half an hour after three.) But in the evening of the passover, the daily sacrifice was killed an hour sooner; and after that began the killing of the passover, which was to be done between the two evenings; whereof the first began at noon, from the sun’s declination towards the west, the second at sun-set. Yet the Passover might be killed before the daily sacrifice, if there were but one to fhir the blood, and keep it from coagulating, till the blood of the daily sacrifice were sprinkled, for that was always to be sprinkled first. The passovers were always killed by three several companies, When the court was once full, they shut the doors, and the priests stood all in their ranks, with round vessels in their hands to receive the blood; those that were of gold, in a rank by themselves, and those that were of siluer; all without bottoms, left they should be set somewhere on the ground, and the blood congeal in them. And they killed the passovers, as the peace-offerings, in any part of the court, because they were דודים לנה שמש, the left holy things; as the דודים לנה שמש, the holy of holies, were always to be killed at the north-side of the altar. The priests then took the blood, and gave it from one to another, till it came to him that stood next the altar; and he sprinkled it all at once toward the bottom of the altar, which was a square of thirty-two cubits,save that the south-east horn had no bottom. After the blood was sprinkled, the lamb was slay’d, and cut up, the Imurim or inwards taken out and laid upon the altar; then the owner took up the lamb, with the skin of it, and carried it to his own home. The first company having ended, then the second came in, and afterward the third; and for every company they began a new the HALLEL, and sang all the while the passovers were killing; and when they had finished the Hallel, they sang it over a second time; and when they had gone over it a second time, they began it a third time; although it was never known, that the third time they sang out the Hallel quite, or came any farther than פָּסֹחַ*, before the priests had done.

But because, besides these Talmudick Jews, there is another sect of KARAITES, mentioned before, (that reject all Talmudical traditions, which are not grounded upon Scripture) though little known amongst us, yet famous in the orient; I will produce one testimony of theirs also from an ancient manuscript, that so it may appear we have the full content of all Jewish antiquity for this opinion. The author’s name to me is uncertain, because the papers have left both their beginning and end. But they contain in them large and complete discourses upon several arguments in the Karaite way, as about the Jewish year, the sabbath, the passover, &c. Concerning the passover, he divides his discourse into several chapters, whereof the title of one is this, "בֹּקִים הָּקָרְבָּן הָּפָסֹּחָה וּמַעְלָה, concerning the place where the passover was to be offered and eaten; where he thus begins: רֹאשׁ לֶחֶם הָּפָּסֹחָה, Đến מוקים הקרבני הפסחא, באתלב לא יטָל ליחות את הפסחא מג-done שערון, have known, that the offering of the passover was always in the place, which God had chosen (to put his name there, as it is written, Thou shalt not sacrifice the passover within any of thy gates; and the place of the killing of the passover"
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The Passover was in the court called HESRA, and the blood of it was poured out toward the bottom of the altar, and the Imurim or inward parts of it were burnt upon the altar, &c.

Hence it was, that when Ce§ius once demanded what the number of the Jews was that returned to Jerusalem, at the time of their solemn feasts, the priests made answer, and told him exactly how many lambs and kids were sacrificed at the passover, εἰκοσιενευτεὶς μυριάδες, πρόσει πενθακαλύπτες, twenty five myriads, five thousand and six hundred; which they could not have done, had not they sacrificed them at the temple.

But what need have we of any more dispute? When the passover was first kept in Egypt, were not the paschal lambs there killed in a sacrificial and expiatory way, when the blood thereof was to be sprinkled upon the houses, for God to look upon, and for Passover over them? It is true, they were killed in every private house; but the reason of that was, because there were then priests in every family, viz. the first-born, which were afterward redeemed, when the children of Israel gave up the whole tribe of Levi to God for his service. Such priests as these were those whom Moses sent to sacrifice, Exod. xxiv. 5. called there young men; Moses sent young men of the children of Israel, which offered burnt-offerings, and sacrificed peace-offerings to the Lord; where Onkelos the Chaldee paraphrases it, רבי בבא ינולש, be sent the first-born: to which agree the Arabick translation of R. Saadiab, and the Perian of Tawosius, as Mr. Selden notes, whom I cannot without honour mention, as the glory of our nation for oriental learning.

And was not the killing of the passover a special type of the death of Christ, the true sacrifice of the world? Give me leave to note one thing to this purpose, upon the credit of Justin Martyr, in his dialogue with Trypho, that in the ancient Hebrew copies of the bible, there was in the book of Ezra a speech of his, which he made before the passover, expounding the mystery thereof concerning Christ; which, because it favoured the Christians, was timely expunged by the Jews. The speech was this; Και ετίπευ Ἠσφάρας τῷ λαῷ, τοῦτο τῷ παρκό τῷ Σωτῆρι ἡμῶν ὡς ἢ καλαβρυτζή ἡμῶν. Καὶ εἶδον διαμονήτοις, ὡς αὐτοὶ ἡμῶν ἦν τῇ κυρίῳ, ὥστε μελέτον αὐτῶν ταπεινῶν ἐν σημείῳ, ὡς μετα ταῦται ἑλπίσσωμεν ἐν αὐτῶ, διδόντας τῷ εἴσω καὶ τῷ ἐξωτερικῶν τοῦ ἁγιαντικοῦ ἑρέμου, λέγει ο θεός τῶν ἀναμένων. Ἐὰν δὲ πιστεύτην αὐτῷ, μιᾶς ἑισαχωρίης τῷ κυρίῳ ἐστὶ, ἐστὶν ἐπίσημον τοῖς θεοῖς, i.e. Et dixit Esdras populo, Hoc paschab Salvator nostrer et perfugium nostrum. Et si in animum induxeritis, & in cor vestrum ascenderit, quod humilia turi cum simus in signo, & peplea speraturi in eum, non desolabitor locus iste in omne tempus, dicit Deus exercitum. Sin in eum non credideritis, neque audieritis annunciationem ejus, deridicum eritis gentibus. Remarkable it is, if it be true; and the author deferves the better credit in it, because he was a Samaritan, and therefore might be the better skilled in Jewish writings. But however, I am sure the Apostle tells us, not only that the passover was a type of Christ, in respect of his death, but also that the proper notion of the Paschal feast was to be a feast upon sacrifice, in those words, 1 Cor. v. 7, 8. Christ our passover is sacrificed for us; therefore let us keep the feast (that is, the paschal feast upon this sacrificed Christ) with the unleavened bread of sincerity and truth. Where alluding to that common Jewish custom of feasting
Philo's Opinion examined.

feasting upon sacrifices, of which we have before spoken, he implies, that the paschal supper was a feast of the same nature, a sacrificia feast.

### CHAP. III.

An Answer to some Objections against the Passover's being a Sacrifice: and the Controversy about the Day, upon which the Jews kept the Passover about the time of our Saviour's death, discussed. Proved against Scaliger, and others of that Opinion, that no Translations of Feasts from one Feria to another were then in use.

But yet we will not dimble, what there is of any moment, either in antiquity or reason, against our own opinion, ere we let this discourse pass, but subject all to an impartial view.

And first, the authority of Philo, who, in his third book De vita Mosis, speaks thus concerning the passtorm: *in eis enim tins sacrum unus, et unum sacrificium.*

And again, in his book De Decalogo, *Ev *

But to this we answer, that Philo doth not here deny the passover to be a sacrifice, but confirm it rather, in that he calls it often, here and elsewhere, *sacrum,* and faith, that they did *advocavit,* *bring it to the altar,* and that the people did *exercitationem,* sacrifice; and doth only distinguish this paschal sacrifice from all the other sacrifices in this, that here, according to his opinion, every one of the people was *sacrificium,* honoured with the priestly office, and that the law did *sacrificium,* the same, *sacrificium,* make every one a priest for that time, *offer their own pasover.*

But moreover, it is well known, that Philo, though he were a Jew by nation, yet was very ignorant of Jewish customs, having been born and bred up at Alexandria: and we have a specimen of his mistakes here, in that he seems to make this difference between the passover and the other sacrifices, that they were only killed by the priest, *Emend. Temp. cap. 25. circa tertium, Item in Matt. xxvii.*

*But the people themselves killed their own passovers, *in Luc. Trib. cap. 25.*

**de Decalogo.**

**To the assembly of the congregation of Israel shall kill it.** Gratia in Matt. xxvii.

For this is that solemn delirium of our late authors also, which we have chastised before. But, if he mean moreover, that the people did not only kill their passovers, but do all other priestly offices concerning them,
when he says they were ἐγὼ τίμημα τοῦ θεοῦ. This, as it hath no ground from Scripture, (and, I think, will hardly find a patron now to defend it,) so it doth not prejudice our opinion of the passover's being a sacrifice, but still much confirm it.

Secondly, it may seem to some a kind of impossibility to conceive, how so many sacrifices, as there must be at every passover, could all be offered upon one altar, since there were no more by the law permitted.

To which, nevertheless, I need not answer any thing but this; that there was nothing but the fat, and some of the inwards burnt upon the altar; and that the bigness of the altar was greater, than perhaps is ordinarily conceived: for under the second temple, the area thereof, upon the top, was a square of twenty-eight cubits, as the Talmudists constantly relate; to which Josephus also agreeeth very near, if the difference of those cubits, which he useth, be allowed. Only they may please to learn from the instance of Josiah's passover, which was said to be so great, that there was no passover like to that, kept in Israel, from the days of Samuel the prophet unto that time, that this was possible to be done; for it either is, or must be confessed, that then they were all offered upon the altar.

But lastly, we must confess ingenuously, that there is one great difficulty yet behind, concerning our Saviour's last passover, which, according to the general consent of our best divines, critics and chronologers, was kept a day before the Jews kept their passover: Whether therefore his paschal lamb, which he with his disciples did then eat, were first sacrificed at the temple; and how could that be?

Where, not to engage ourselves any more than needs we must, in that nice and perplexed, but famous controversy, concerning the time of the Jewish passover about our Saviour's death; it will not be amiss, first to take notice, that the Latin church ever maintained the contrary opinion against the Greeks, viz. That the Jews kept the passover on the same night, which our Saviour did; and though it be true, that at later times most of our best-learned authors have quitted that opinion of the Latins, and closed altogether with the Greeks, as Paulus Burgenstis, Munster, Scaliger, and Cazabon; yet, notwithstanding, our country-man Mr. Broughton (understanding, perhaps, better than they did, that the Jewish passover was a true and proper sacrifice, and first, according to God's command, was to be offered up to God, before feasted on,)elpied a difficulty here concerning our Saviour's passover, (which they took no notice of,) that could not easily be solved; and therefore he thought good scindere nodum, as Alexander did, to cut the knot, which he could not loose, and absolutely to deny, that the Jewish passover, and our Saviour's, were then celebrated on two several nights. And he is of late seconded by Johannes Cloppenburg, a Belgick divine, [in an epistle, written upon this argument to Ludovicus De Dieu,] insisting upon the very same ground, because the paschal lamb, which Christ with his disciples did eat, could not have been sacrificed at the temple, unless it had been at the same time, when the Jewish passover was solemnly celebrated. His words to this purpose, expressing fully Mr. Broughton's sense, are these;
the Jewish Passover.

Non potuit mačari agnus paschalis extra templum Hierosolymitanum: In templo mačari non potuit circu generalem populii consenium: Quare neque diec mačationis potuit anticipari. It follows, Vel ergo dicendum Christum comme- dise agnum non mačatinum in templo, atque boe facto (quod abjicit) legem violæfæ; (juxta legem enim agnus privatum comedendum est templo defraudendi domi erat in aedibus privatis, post igitur absumptam in templo adipem, & sanguinem delatam ad altare,) vel Judæos eodem tempore cum Chriſto pafceba celebrātē.

But I must confefs, although I am as much addicted to that hypothesis of the paffeover's being a sacrifice, and as tender of it, as Mr. Broughton could be, or any body else; yet I cannot but yield myself captive to truth, on which side poer it pretends itself, and though it be (as Aristotle faith a philoſopher should do) to the destruction of our own phenomena.

And indeed those two places especially, brought out of S. John's Gospell, to prove, that the Jews kept their pafover the day after our Saviour did his, seem to me to be unanswerable, nor any way cured by those cΦ2 χριστον, which are applied to them.

The first is chap. xix. ver. 14. where, the next day after Christ had kept his pafover with his disciples, when Pilate delivered him up to the Jews to be crucified, it is said, that it was then πασχαν ἐπὶ Πάσχα, the preparation of the pafover; where they tell us, that by the preparation of the pafover is meant the preparation of the sabbath, on which the second day of the pafover fell. But, en facrum criticum! as Scaliger sometimes cries out, and what a far-fetch'd conceit is this?

The second is that in chap. xviii. ver. 28. When Jefus was led into Pilate's judgment-hall, early in the morning, it is said, that the Jews themselves went not into the judgment-hall, lest they should be defiled, but that they might eat the pafover. Here we are told, that by eating the pafover is meant the eating of the Chagigah, that was killed the day before with the pafover, whereof something, perhaps, remained till the day following. And this gloss is little better than the former; for, although they appeal to that place in Deut. xvi. 2. to prove, that the Chagigah was sometimes called by the name of pafover, which indeed, if our English translation were authentick, would make something for them; Thou shalt therefore sacrifice the pafover unto the Lord thy God of the flock and the herd, as if there had been a pafover of oxen, as well as of sheep; yet in the Hebrew the words run thus, מ］טח פרש חיות חיות אלפים ואלפים דגים, which, according to a feve- ral punctation, and a feveeral-supplying of something, that must be under- stood, may be expounded several ways; any of which is far better than that, which our English translators have unhappily pitch'd upon.

Onkelos, in his paraphrase, (which seldom merits that name, being indeed commonly nothing but a rigid version,) reads it thus, מ］טח פרש חיות חיות אלפים ואלפים דגים, i.e. And thou shalt sacrifice the pafover before the Lord thy God of the sons of the flock, and the peace-offerings (thereof) of oxen; which interpretation is followed by R. Solomon and Aben-Ezra, מ］טח פרש חיות חיות אלפים ואלפים דגים, i.e. sacrifice for the pafover, and oxen for the peace-offerings, or the Chagigah. And it may be confirmed from that of Josiah's pafover, 2.Chr. xxxv. 7. Josiah gave to
No Passover of the Herd.

the people, of the flock, lambs and kids, all for the passover-offerings, to the number of thirty thousand, and three thousand bullocks: where the bullocks, or the herd, are divided from the passover-offerings, because they served for the peace-offerings, or the Chagigah, as appeareth from ver. 13. They roasted the passovers with fire, according to the ordinance; but the OTHER HOLY OFFERINGS (that is, the peace-offerings, or Chagigah) sod they in pots, and cauldrons, and pans. Nachmanides hath another interpretation of it to this purpose, [םכמ ויתא תולאש ידכ לא] כְּכֶנָּו, i.e. He commandeth here the passover, which was a lamb, as he bad laid before, (making the pause there;) and [בֵּן כִּי], the flock and the herd, or the sheep and the kids, and the young bullocks, for the Chagigah; giving other instances, in which the conjunctive particle vav, which he doth here supply, is in like manner to be understood.

And this exposition is rather approved than the former, not only by Abrahael, but also by the Karraite, which I have before commended; who, quoting one R. Aaron for the author of it, doth express it thus; [הָיָה עָמַר הָבְּלֹכְתָּו וַעֲצָמָא אָרוּם] אֵלּוֹהִים פַּשְׁת לוּאֵהוּ אֵלִיָּהוּ בְּחָכָמָא וַעֲצָמָא[םכמ ויתא תולאש ידכ לא] כְּכֶנָּו, i.e. The word הבכרת, (Thou shalt sacrifice) is to be repeated וַעֲצָמָא before THE FLOCK AND THE HERD, thus, And thou shalt sacrifice the passover to the Lord thy God, and thou shalt sacrifice sheep and oxen, or the flock and the herd; as in like manner Prov. xxx. 3. the particle נֶּל is to be repeated וַעֲצָמָא from the former part of the verse. So that it cannot hence be proved, that the peace-offerings, offered with the passover, were ever called by the name of passover.

There is another place in the same Evangelist, that hath not been observed by any one to this purpose, which, if it were rightly understood, would be as clear a testimony, as any of the rest. And it is in the xix. chapter, ver. 31. וְיָדָא מַעֲלָה וַעֲצָמָא יִקָּוָה בִּמְלָכָא, For that sabbath-day was a great day. ומגאלה הָמשׂא, in the Greek of the Hellenists, is used for the first, or the last day of every solemn feast, in which there was a holy convocation to the Lord. This appeareth from Isa. i. 13. Your new-moons and sabbaths, the calling of assemblies, (which was the first and last day of the feast) I cannot away with: which the Septuagint render thus, Τὰς Νυμπηνίας ὕπων γύτας, Your new-moons and sabbaths, and your GREAT DAYS. For the last day of the feast we have it used by our Evangelist, chap. vii. ver. 37. In the last day, the GREAT DAY of the feast, הָמשׂא בִּמגאלה תִּשְׁוַחֵה; and doubtless by the same Evangelist for the first day of the feast, in this place: and therefore the Jews did not eat their passover, till the night before, which was the same night our Saviour was crucified.

Which may be strengthened farther by this argument; that if the Jews had celebrated their passover the same night, which our Saviour did his, it is certain, they would never have gone about immediately with swords and staves to have apprehended him, and then have brought him to the high-priest's hall, and afterwards have arraigned him at Pilate's judgment-seat, and lastly have crucified him; all the
fame day. For the first day of unleavened bread was by the law an holy
convocation to the Lord, on which it was not lawful to do any work; and
we know the Jews were rigid enough in observing these legal ceremonies.

If then it must be granted, that our Saviour, with his disciples, kept
the passover the night before the vulgar Jews did celebrate it, our next
work is to shew, how it might be probable, that our Saviour's passover was
first sacrificed at the temple.

And here perhaps I might run for shelter to that story in Suidas, upon
the word Ἰνας, that Christ was enrolled into the number of the two and
twenty legal priests, that served at the altar, from the pretended confes-
|sion of an ancient Jew in Justinian's time; and then he might possibly sac-
|rifice his own passover at the temple, though the Jews had not solemnized
|theirs till the day after; but that I hold this to be a mere fable, and that
|not only ridiculous, but impious.

Or I might take up the opinion of the Greeks, that Christ did not keep
a true legal passover, but a feast of unleavened bread in imitation of it;
or, as the learned Hugh * Grotius (who hath lately assented this opinion)*
expresseth it, not Πάσχα Σάββατον, but μεθολογούμενον, such as the Jews at this
day keep, because the temple being down, their sacrifices are all ceased.
But this opinion hath been exploded by most of our late authors; and in-
|deed I can no way satisfy my self in it, and therefore will not acquiesce in
|this answer.

But before we be able to give a true account of this quære, we must
search a little deeper into the true ground of this difference between our Sa-
vour's passover and the Jews.

The common opinion is, that the Jews in our Saviour's time were
wont to tranlate their festivals from one Feria to another upon several oc-
casions; as whenever two festivals were immediately to follow one another,
to join them into one; and therefore when any fell upon the sixth Feria,
to put it over to the next Feria or the Sabbath, to avoid the concurrence
of two Sabbaths together; in the same manner, as the Jews use to do in
their calendar at this day, where they have several rules to this purpose,
expressed by abbreviatures, thus, Adi, Budu, Gabaz, Zabad, Agu; whereof
each letter is a numeral for some Feria. The rule for the passover is 722,
Budu; that is, that it should not be kept on the second, fourth, or sixth
Feria. (There is an extract of a Rabbinical decree to this purpose, un-
der the name of R. Eliezer, in Munster upon Matt. chap. xxvi.) And
therefore at this time, when our Saviour was crucified, the passover falling
upon the sixth Feria, or Friday, was, say they, by the Jews translated, ac-
cording to this rule, to the next Feria, and kept on Saturday, or the Sab-
bath; but our Saviour not regarding these traditions, observed that day
precisely, which was commanded in the law, 722 Σάββατον ἐγέρθη σήμερον τὸ πάσχα,
Luke xxii. 7. that is, as they expound it, Upon which the passover OUGHT
to have been killed; which was Friday, the day before.

But, under favour, I conceive, that all these decrees, together with that
Ratiocinium or calendar, to which they do belong, were not then in use in
our Saviour's time, (although it be so confidently averred by the incom-
parable
The beginning of the Month reckoned from the Phasis.
parable Joseph Scaliger) but long since invented by the Jews. Which I shall make appear;

First, in that the ancient Jews, about and since our Saviour's time, often solemnized as well the passovers, as the other fasts, upon the Feria's next before and after the Sabbaths, and those other Feria's, which have been made relictious since by that calendar. In the Talmudical title Succoth, chapter the last, we read of a feast going immediately before, or following immediately after, the Sabbath. And in Betzab, c. 1. that is, a feast that falls to be on the evening of the Sabbath, or the day after the Sabbath. In Chagigab, the second chapter, a

Secondly, in that the Jews ever, while the temple stood, observed their new moons and fasts, according to the Osn or appearance of the moon, and therefore had no calendar for their rule to sanctify their feasts by, but they were then sanctified by the heavens, as the Mifna speaks. This is so clearly delivered by R. Moses Ben Maimon, in that excellent Halachab, entitled, KIDDDUSH HACCHODESH, that I wonder so many learned men, that are well skilled in those authors, should misf of it. For having spoken of the rules of observing the Osn, he then adds, that these were never made use of since the Sanbedrin ceased in the land of Israel, after the destruction of the temple; since which time they have used a calendar, calculated according to the middle motion of the moon.

Et hoc erat traditio Mosis in monte Sinai, quod omnem tempore, quo duraret Sanbedrin, constituerent Neomenias juxta Ostae boc vero tempore, quo jam esserat Sanbedrin, constituerent secundum calculum kunc astronomicum, quo nos bodie utinam: nec ullo modo jam ad Ostae nos asstringimus, cum sepe contingat, ut dies legitimum secundum nostri calculum vel concurrat cum lunari Ostae, vel anteveact etiam unica die, vel etiam subsequitur. And again, a little after, most punctually;

Quando primium eaepravit omnes Israhelites computare secundum hunc calculum? A fine doctorum Talmudicorum, quando jam desolata erat terra Israhel, usque erat consiliorum aut synedrium, quod determinaret: nam per omnes dies doctorum Misnae & doctorum Gemarae, usque ad Abesse & Rabbeo, acquiescedant.
The Karraite Jews still observe the Phasis.

acquiescebant omnes Judaei in sanctione terrae Israeles. And those rules forementioned of not keeping the several feasts upon such and such Ferias were made together with this calendar, as the same author there also avoucheth:

i.e. In this account they never constituted the new-moon of Titri upon Adu, because this account was made according to the conjunction of the sun and moon in the middle motion; therefore now they constituted some legitimate and other rebellious days, which they could not do before, when the new-moon (and therefore all the other feasts) was determined according to the Phasis.

But the Talmud was not completely finished till about the 500th year of the Christian Era; therefore this Jewish calendar, and these rules concerning the translation of feasts, were not in being till about that time, and therefore could be no reason of this difference between the times, in which our Saviour solemnized the passover, and the other Jews.

For farther confirmation hereof, we may observe, that the Karraites, which have rejected the fond traditions of the Pharisees, retain still the ancient custom of reckoning their new-moons \( \delta \and Yb \; \Phi \alpha \omega \) : as Scaliger himself hath well observed: though in this he was mistaken, that he thought they had assumed it of late, merely out of hatred to the other Jews, whereas they have kept it in a constant succession from antiquity, and hold it still as necessary by divine right. This is confessed by all Israel, that from the time of the kingdom they were ever wont to consecrate the new-moons by the Phasis: and the very etymon of the word Chodesh implies so much, for it signifies the renewing of something: so that it is denominated from the change of the moon, or phasis, as the ephorh and beginning of it. And this is one of the great controversies to this day between those two sects of the Jews, the \( \chi \rho \alpha \mu \tau \nu \) or Karraei, and \( \chi \rho \alpha \mu \tau \nu \), or Rabbanai; which is grown at length to such a height, that the Karraites, deciphering the conditions of those witnesses, whose testimonies might be accounted valid for the Phasis, make this for one, that they should in no way belong to the sect of Rabbanitis: which perhaps to observe in the author's own words would not be unpleasant \( \tau \iota \omicron \nu \omicron \iota \alpha \nu \eta \alpha \zeta \omicron \gamma \alpha \zeta \omicron \iota \nu \omega \zeta \lambda \omicron \gamma \alpha \zeta \omicron \nu \pi \omicron \lambda \alpha \omicron \gamma \alpha \zeta \omicron \iota \nu \alpha \zeta \omicron \tau \iota \omicron \nu \omicron \iota \alpha \zeta \omicron \nu \delta \eta \alpha \nu \zeta \eta \kappa \omicron \alpha \zeta \omicron \nu \gamma \omicron \alpha \zeta \omicron \nu \pi \omicron \lambda \alpha \omicron \gamma \omicron \alpha \zeta \omicron \nu \beta \kappa \omicron \alpha \zeta \omicron \nu \chi \rho \alpha \mu \tau \nu \) or \( \chi \rho \alpha \mu \tau \nu \), that is, that they should be of the sect of the Jews, who do not observe the Phasis.

A second condition is, that they be not such, as hold an opinion concerning the sanctification of the new-moon different from the opinion of our wise-men. And therefore in this regard we may receive the testimony of the Ismaelites, (that is, the Turks and Saracens) because they follow the opinion of our wise-men concerning the Phasis, and in most of their appointed times they agree with us. But we may not receive the testimony of any one, that is of the sect of the Rabbins, because they are divided from us in this; and although they be our brethren and our flesh, yet herein they have rebelled and grieved his holy Spirit.
The Manner of consecrating the New-Moons.

Having thus disproved the common and received opinion, and removed the false ground of this difference of time between our Saviour's passover and the Jews, we come, in the next place, to lay down the true, which must be derived from that way of reckoning the months; and of determining the סדר ים שלשום, the head or beginning of the month, which was in use in our Saviour's time, which (as we have shewed already in general) was by the פאש; so it will be expedient to describe the whole manner of it more particularly from authentick authors *.

In the great or outer court of the temple there was a house called Beth-
yazek, where the senate sat all the thirtieth day of every month, to receive the witnesses of the moon's appearance, and to examine them. And here they always had a feast provided for the entertainment of those that came, to encourage men to come the more willingly. In ancient times they did admit of strangers, and receive their testimony, if it were approved upon examination. But when the heretics (that is, the Christians) afterward grew up, by whom (they say) they were sometimes deluded, they began to grow shy, and to admit of none but such, as were approved of to be of the Jews religion. If there came approved witnesses upon the thirtieth day of the פאש seen, then the chief man of the senate stood up and pronounced MEKUDASH, It is sanctified; and the people standing by caught the word from him, and cried out MEKUDASH, MEKUDASH. Whereupon there was notice presently given to all the country; which was done at first by torches from mountain to mountain, till at length the Christians (they say) abused them in that kind also with false fires; wherefore they were fain to send messengers from place to place over the whole land, to give intelligence of the new-moon. But if, when the confir-
ment had sat all the thirtieth day, there came no approved witnesses of the פאש, then they made an intercalation of one day in the former month, and decreed the following one and thirtieth day to be the calends. And yet notwithstanding, if after the fourth or fifth day there should come some witnesses from afar, that testified they had seen the פאש in its due time, nay, though they came toward the end of the month (אתך נרא דפורifica) the senate, when they had used all means by affrighting them from that testimony, that so, if it were possible, they might decline a new con-
ference, (after they had already made an Embolism in the former month) if the witnesses remained constant, were then bound to alter the beginning of the month, and reckon it a day sooner, to wit, from the thirtieth day.

Here we see the true ground of the difference of a day, that might arise continually about the calends of the month, and so consequent upon any of the other leaves, which did all depend on them; viz. between the true time of the moon's פאש, upon the thirtieth day, and that of the senate's decree, a day after. For since it appears out of their own monuments, how unwilling they were, having once made a consecration of the Neomenia, to alter it again; it may be probably conceived, that, in those degenerated times, the senate might many times refuse to accept the testimony of un-
doubted witnesses; and then, it seems, they had such a canon as this,
The Passover kept two Days together.

And now, at last, we are come again to the acme of the question, that was first propounded, How our Saviour's passover, notwithstanding all this, might be sacrificed the day before those of the other Jews were.

To which I answer, That upon this ground, not only our Saviour and his Apostles, but also divers others of the most religious Jews, kept the passover upon the fifteenth day from the true pasch of the moon, and not from the senate's decree: which I may confirm from the testimony of Epiphanius, in Panaros. The Jews about the passover; and so we may easily persuade those other Evangelists, that intimate Christ's passover, to have been solemnized, when many others kept it, to agree with S. John, who affirms us, that it was also by divers Jews kept the day after. Now, it was a custom among the Jews, in such doubtful cases as these, which oftentimes fell out, to permit the feasts to be solemnized, or passovers killed, on two several days together, Maimonides affirmeth, that, in the remotest parts of the land of Israel, they always solemnized the feast of the new-moons two days together; nay, in Jerusalem itself, where the senate were, they kept the new-moon of Tisri, which was the beginning of the year, twice, left they should be mistaken in it. In the Talmud we have an instance of the passover's being kept two days together, because the new-moon was doubtful, in Gemarah Rosh Hashanah, cap. 1. Hence the Karaites, who still keep the ancient custom of observing the moon's pasch, retain it as a rule to this day, כ بلد אלא שין מפסח עליו תשרו ושני ימים מספים.observare duas dies propter dubium. Nay, the Rabbinical Jews themselves, since they have changed the Pharis for the synod or conjunction of the moon in the middle motion, in imitation hereof still observe to keep the passover two days together, idem ceremonius, as the learned author of the Jewish synagogue reports; and Scaliger himself, not only of that, but also of the other feasts, Judæi post institutionem bodii usi cunctam solemnitatem celebrant bidui, proposera quod menfem incipient à medio motu lune: itaque propter dubium conjunctionis luminarii, Pascha celebrant 15. & 16. Nisan. Pentecosten 6. & 7. Sivan, Scenopega 15. & 16. Tisri; idque vacant תעשר יש לבן ל��ו, Pœstum secundum exflorunt.

Now then we see, that nothing hinders, but that the passover might be a sacrifice. And thus we have hitherto cleared the way.
Demonstrated, that the Lord’s Supper in the Christian Church, in reference to the true Sacrifice of Christ, is a Parallel to the Feasts upon Sacrifices both in the Jewish Religion and Heathenish Superstition.

BUT left we should deem all this while to set up fancies of our own, and then sport with them, we come now to demonstrate and evince, that the Lord’s Supper, in the proper notion of it, is EPULUM EX OBLATIS, or a FEAST UPON SACRIFICE; in the same manner with the feasts upon the Jewish sacrifices under the law, and the feasts upon ΕΙΔΩΛΟΘΥΤΑ, (things offered to idols) among the Heathens: and that from a place of Scripture, where all these three shall be compared together, and made exact parallels to one another.

1 CORINTH. Chap. X.

14. Wherefore, my dearly beloved, flee from idolatry.
15. I speak as to wise men, judge ye what I say.
16. The cup of blessing, which we blest, is it not the communion of the blood of Christ? The bread, which we break, is it not the communion of the body of Christ?
18. Behold Israel after the flesh, are not they, which eat of the sacrifices, partakers of the altar?
20. Now I say, that the things, which the Gentiles sacrifice, they sacrifice to devils, and not to God; and I would not, that ye should have fellowship with devils.
21. Ye cannot drink the cup of the Lord and the cup of devils: ye cannot be partakers of the Lord’s table, and of the table of devils.

Where the Apostle’s scope being to convince the Corinthians of the unlawfulness of eating things sacrificed to idols, he doth it in this manner: shewing, that though an idol were truly nothing, and things sacrificed to idols were physically nothing, as different from other meats [as, it seems, they argued, and S. Paul confesses, ver. 19.] yet morally and circumstantially, to eat of things sacrificed to idols in the idol’s temple, was to consent with the sacrifices, and to be guilty of them.

Which he doth illustrate, first, from a parallel rite in Christian religion; where the eating and drinking of the body and blood of Christ, offered up to God upon the cross for us, in the Lord’s Supper, is a real communication in his death and sacrifice: ver. 16. The cup of blessing, which we blest, is it not the communion of the blood of Christ? The bread, which we break, is it not the communion of the body of Christ?

Secondly, from another parallel of the same rite among the Jews; where always they, that ate of the sacrifices, were accounted partakers of the altar, that
The Lord's Supper no Sacrifice.

that is, of the sacrifice offered up upon the altar, ver. 18. Behold Israel after the flesh; are not they, which eat of the sacrifices, partakers of the altar? In verner legi quicunque adiunquantur ad edendum de bofiiis oblatis, cenfebantur, sacrifici, tanquam pro ipfis oblati, fieri particeps, & per illud facriificar: as a late commentator fully expresses it.

Therefore, as to eat the body and blood of Christ in the Lord's supper, is to be made partaker of his sacrifice offered up to God for us; as to eat of the Jewish sacrifices under the law was to partake in the legal sacrifices themselves: so to eat of things offered up in sacrifice to idols, was to be made partakers of the idol-sacrifices, and therefore was unlawful.

For, the things, which the Gentiles sacrifice, they sacrifice to devils; but Christ's body and blood was offered up in sacrifice unto God, and therefore they could not partake of both together, the sacrifice of the true God, and the sacrifice of devils. Ye cannot drink the cup of the Lord, and the cup of devils; ye cannot be partakers of the Lord's table, and the table of devils. St. Paul's argument here must needs suppose a perfect analogy between these three, and that they are all parallels to one another; or else it hath no strength. Wherefore I conclude from hence, that the LORD'S SUPPER is the same among Christians, in respect of the Christian sacrifice, that among the Jews the feasts upon the legal sacrifices were, and among the Gentiles the feasts upon the idol-sacrifices; and therefore EPULUM SACRIFICIALE, or EPUUM EX OBLATIS, OPER. 

CHAP. V.

The Result of the former Discourse; that the Lord's Supper is not an Sacrifice, but a Feast upon a Sacrifice.

Thus having declared and demonstrated the true notion of the Lord's supper, we see then how that theological controverts, which hath cost so many disputes, whether the Lord's supper be a sacrifice, is already decided: for it is not SACRIFICIUM, but EPULUM ex THERAE SANG, or A SACRIFICE, but a feast upon sacrifice; or else, in other words, not OBLATIO SACRIFICII, but, as Tertullian excellently speaks, PARTICIPATIO SACRIFICII, not the offering of something up to God upon an altar, but the eating of something which comes from God's altar, and is set upon our tables. Neither was it ever known amongst the Jews or Heathens, that those tables, upon which they did eat their sacrifices, should be called by the name of altars. St. Paul, speaking of the feasts upon the idol-sacrifices, calls the places, upon which they were eaten, The table of devils, because the devils eat upon them; not the altars of devils: and yet doubtless he spake according to the true propriety of speech, and in those technical words, that were then in use amongst them. And therefore, keeping the same analogy, he must needs—
The Lord's Supper a Federal Rite.

needs call the communion-table by the name of the Lord's table, i.e. the table, upon which God's meat is eaten; not his altar, upon which it is offered. It is true, an altar is nothing but a table; but it is a table, upon which GOD himself eats, confuming the sacrifices by his holy fire: but when the same meat is given from GOD unto US to eat of, the relation being changed, the place, in which WE eat, is nothing but a table.

And because it is not enough in any discourse, as Aristotle well observeth in his Ethicks, to confute an error, unless we can also shew ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ἱερῷ, the cause of that error; having thus discovered the true notion of the Lord's supper, we may easily discern from hence also, how that mistake grew up, and that by the degeneration of this truth. There is a sacrifice in the Lord's supper symbolically, but not there as offered up to God, but feasted on by us; and so not a sacrifice, but a sacrificial feast; which began too soon to be misunderstood.

C H A P. VI.

The farther Improvement of that general Notion, How the Lord's Supper is a Federal Rite between God and us, at large: concluded with a memorable Story out of Maimonides and Nachmanides.

I should now come to make some farther improvement of this general notion of the Lord's supper, by shewing what these feasts upon the sacrifices did signify under the law; and then applying the same in a more perfect manner to the Lord's supper under the gospel, being warranted thereunto by that analogy, which is between them. But because there may be divers glosses and interpretations of these feasts upon the sacrifices, which are obvious to every common understanding, we will decline them all, and pitch only upon one, which is not so vulgarly understood; and it is this, That the eating of God's sacrifices was a FEDERAL RITE between God and those that offered them; according to the custom of the ancients, and especially in those oriental parts, to confirm and ratify their covenants by eating and drinking together.

Thus when Isaac made a covenant with Abimelech the king of Gerar, the text faith, He made him and those that were with him a feast, and they did eat and drink, and rose up betimes in the morning, and sware to one another.

When Laban made a covenant with Jacob, Gen. xxxi. 44. Now therefore come (faith Laban) let us make a covenant, I and thou, and let it be for a witness between me and thee: Then it follows in the text, They took stones, and made a heap, and did eat there upon the heap; and Laban called it JEGAR-SAHA-DUTHA, in his Chaldee tongue, but Jacob (in the Hebrew language) GAL-LEED, i.e. a heap of witnesses; implying, that those stones, upon which they had eaten and drank together, should be a witness against either of them, that should first violate that covenant. R. Moses Bar Nachman, in his Comment, thus glosseth upon this place.
between God and us.

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They did eat there a little upon the heap for a memorial, because it was the manner of these, that enter into covenant, to eat both together of the same bread, as a symbol of love and friendship. And Isaac Abrahaban much to the same purpose, "It was an ancient custom among them, that they, which did eat bread together upon the same table, should be accounted ever afterward as entire brethren. And in this sense he conceived that place, Lamentations v. 6. may be expounded, We have given the hand to the Egyptians and to the Assyrians by fulness of bread, i.e. We have made a covenant with them.

Joshua ix. ver. 14. when the Gibeonites came to the Israellites, and desired them to make a league with them, it is said, The men of Israel took of their victuals, and asked not counsel of the mouth of the Lord; that is, they made a covenant with them, as Kimchi learnedly expounds it, "... Accipere dirigere viaticum, & comederunt eum illis per modum fideris. For so it follows afterward in the text, And Joshua made peace with them.

Hence also was that emphatical expression, Psalms xlii. 9. spoken literally by David of Achitophel, mine own familiar friend, that did eat of my bread, hath lifted up the heel against me; but seeming prophetically to glance at Judas, that dipping with Christ in the same dish betrayed him. The singular emphasis of which speech we, that are unacquainted with this custom of the oriental nations, cannot easily perceive; neither can we any where better learn it, than from that passage of Celsus in Origen, who remarking at that history of Judas his betraying Christ in the gospel, as an incredible thing, made, in the mean while, an excellent comment upon this prophecy, when he little thought of it. "Ori sebaptizat qui o nomocostas trepignap ner in autem epistem stout, pollox: plano o Theum en tiamnivoues ek dno autem epistthe dicto, i.e. Si hominum non inexistetrum ejusdem mensae participe, nullis minus Deo; And Origen's reply to him, which shows, that though this were an unusual thing, yet it sometimes came to pass, is very pregnant also for our purpose: Tis pare ek odos oti polloi koinonostates alloxy xtrepeis episthemos toin oswstos z, epi plpes es ein he Elyxwv he Bxealovs istoria toinon paradiejmaton. Koi oynidvow ge o Paxeis . 1.kamostoi su o Dukamkanta metax alyx xtrepeis suhka x dekathxvov, hiei proes avton, "Oxky o enoibideis megan, alas to x xtrapigew i.e. Quis ignorant multos ad communem salis & mensae adhibitos insidios tabernum suis contubernalia? Plena est historia tam Graecorum quam Barbarorum exemplis ejusmodi. Et Parius ille Iamerum scripserat, exprimans Lycaemae visulum factum quod sal & mensae conciliaverat, sic eum alloquitur, sacramentum iritaefti magnum, saltem atque memmom. All which makes manifest, what an heinous offence it was accounted anciently to be guilty of the breach of a covenant, which had been confirmed by eating and drinking together.

In the seventh verse of Obadiah, that prophet speaks to Edom in this manner; All the men of thy confederacy have brought thee to the border; the men, that were at peace with thee, have deceived thee; they, that ate thy bread, have laid a wound under thee.
Covenants made by Eating and Drinking together.

In the New Testament, that place (John iv. 9) is well observed by Heinfius, in his Aristarchus, to carry this notion, *How is it, that thou, being a Jew, keft drink of me, being a woman of Samaria?* *Suavissime dixit* (faith that forenamed critic) *ex eorum more, qui, cum peregrini essent, aut alieno suiffent animo, animis conciliandis cibum mutuò ac potum alter alterius gustabant.*

Wherefore I think from all these instances I may conclude, that this is the true etymology of that Hebrew word יִנְשָׁר, which signifies a covenant, or any federal communion betwixt parties, from יָרָה, comedere, because it was the constant custom of the Hebrews and Oriental nations to establish covenants by eating and drinking together; as hath been shewed.

And as the Jews, so likewise did the Heathens in the same manner, use to ratify their covenants between parties, by eating together. *Lucian in Tœxaris* reports it of the Scythians, that when any one was injured, and could not revenge himself, the manner was, that he should kill an ox, and cut it into small pieces; which being boiled, he was to fit down by them with his hands behind him, (which was a gesture of earnest supplication amongst them) and then whosoever was minded to help him, came, and did eat a piece of his flesh, and so with this ceremony promised to assist him. And this was accounted a covenant of mutual defence between them; whence that Greek proverb, Ἐπὶ βοῦς έκκες ἐκκεῖτο, *In tergo bovis defedit*, of which Erasmus in his Adages.

*Herodotus reporteth of the Persians, that they made their leagues and covenants at feasts; and of the Nasamones, a people of Libya, that they composed peace by stretching out a cup full of wine to each other, and pledging one another in it. Alexander ab Alexandro relates this of the Thracians and Egyptians, that *E cornibus bonum (quæ veteribus pectorum loco erant) vina fes iniocem prepiantas, id firmissimum contrasti factoris vinculum esse putabant.* Curtius reporteth of the Macedonians, *Gud patrio ritu fadus, quod canebimus vellent bateri, hic inibant, ut panem gladio divorum uterque libaret.*

And therefore Alexander, when he fell in love with Roxana, commanded bread forthwith to be brought before him; which when he had divided with his sword, and they had both tasted together of, he took her presently to himself as his wife. And there remaineth a custom to this day, something like this, at weddings in many countries, that when the bridegroom and bride are come from church, they have a piece of cake brought them, which when the bridegroom hath tasted, he gives it to the bride to taste of likewise, in token of a covenant between them. The Germans still use to conclude of bargains, and ratify friendship between parties, by drinking together, as appeareth by that phrase which they have, *den Fiden trin-chen, Pacem bibere.*

-In like manner, I say, the eating of sacrifices, which were God's meat, was a federal rite between God and those that did partake of them, and signified there was a covenant of friendship between him and them.

For the better conceiving whereof, we must observe, that sacrifices, beside the nature of expiation, had the notion of feasts, which
The Temple, God's Shechinah or Dwelling.

God himself did, as it were, feed upon. Which I explain thus: When God had brought the children of Israel out of Egypt, resolving to manifest himself in a peculiar manner present among them, he thought good to dwell amongst them in a visible and external manner; and therefore, while they were in the wilderness, and sojourned in tents, he would have a tent or tabernacle built, to sojourn with them also. This mystery of the tabernacle was fully understood by the learned Nachmanides, who in few words, but pregnant, thus expresseth it, וְנִבְאָה לְעַנְקָא לְמְבִישָׁנָא לְאַמְּנָה לְשַׁבִּיתָהוּ suspend, מֵאָשׁ וְנְמוֹת הָיוּ בְּמֶשֶׁחְבָּה; and again, וְלָעָבִיתֲנָא לְמַהֵוֲרָא לְשַׁבִּיתָהוּ אֵשׁ עַל הָעֵין פְּיסָלֵי that is, The mystery of the tabernacle was this, that it was to be a place for the Shechinah, or habitation of divinity to be fixed in; and this, no doubt, as a special type of God's future dwelling in Christ's human nature, which was the True Shechinah. But, when the Jews were come into their land, and had there built them houses, God intended to have a fixed dwelling-house also; and therefore his moveable tabernacle was to be turned into a standing temple. Whence, by imitation, came all those temples among the Heathens, which they apprehended as so many places of peculiar residence, or habitation, for their deities, next the heavens, to dwell in; as appears by that of Silius, amongst many others,

——Tarpeia Pater, qui temple secundam
Incolis a caelo sedem.——

Now the tabernacle or temple being thus as a house for God to dwell in visibly, to make up the notion of dwelling or habitation complete, there must be all things suitable to a house belonging to it. Hence, in the holy place, there must be a table and a candlestick, because this was the ordinary furniture of a room; as the fore-commended Nachmanides observeth, הַשְּלוֹמִים וְהַמִּשְּרוֹרָה שֵׁם כְּלַעֲבֵהוּ וּוֹדֵר עֲלֵי עֵין הָדְּשֵׁם, i.e. He addeth a table and a candlestick, because these suit the notion of a dwelling-house. The table must have its dishes, and spoons, and bowls, and covers, belonging to it, though they were never used, and always be furnished with bread upon it. The candlestick must have its lamps continually burning.

Hence also there must be a continual fire kept in this house of God's upon the altar, as the focus of it: to which notion, I conceive, the prophet Isaiah doth allude, chap. xxxi. ver. 9. אַמְּנָה הָאֹר לְכֵם וַהָרָו מִיַּשְׁלָל, which I would thus translate, qui habet ignem suum in Sion, & focum suum in Jerusalem.

And besides all this, to carry the notion still farther, there must be some constant meat and provision brought into this house, which was done in the sacrifices, that were partly consummated by fire upon God's own altar, and partly eaten by the priests, which were God's family, and therefore to be maintained by him. That, which was consumed upon God's altar, was accounted God's MESS, as appeareth from the first chapter of Malachi, where the altar is called God's TABLE, and the sacrifice upon it God's MEAT; Ye say, the table of God is polluted, and the fruit thereof, his meat, is contemptible. And often in the Law the sacrifice is called God's מִלְאָלָה, that is, his bread or food. Whence, in that learned Hebrew book
book Cozri, the king Haber objects to the Jew Cozar against his religion, that it seemed to place corporeity in God, in making him to feed upon the flesh of beasts in these sacrifices. To which the Jewish doctor answers cabalistically in this manner; That as, in men, corporeal meat is a means to unite and continue the soul (which is a spirit) to the body; so, in the land of Israel, the blood of beasts offered up in sacrifice had an attractive power to draw down divinity, and unite it to the Jews. And methinks this may be a little farther convinced from that passage in the 50th Psalm, If I were hungry, I would not tell thee; for the world is mine, and the fulness thereof. Will I eat the flesh of bulls, or drink the blood of goats? For though it be here denied, that God did really feed upon the sacrifices, yet it is implied there was some such allusive signification in them.

Wherefore it is farther observable, that beside the flesh of the beast offered up in sacrifice, there was a mincab, or meat-offering, made of flour and oil, and a libamen, or drink-offering, that was always joined with the daily sacrifice, as the bread and drink, 'which was to go along with God's meat.

It was also strictly commanded, that there should be salt in every sacrifice and oblation, because all meat is unfavourable without salt; as R. Mofes Bar Nachman hath here also well observed, מפח שליא נסר ותכולת לולת תזב שמים, i.e. Because it was not honourable, that God's meat should be unsavoury, without salt.

Lastly, all these things were to be consumed on the altar only by the holy fire, that came down from heaven, because they were God's portion, and therefore to be eaten or consumed by himself in an extraordinary manner.

And this the devil sometime imitated, in some sacrifices offered up to him. For so I understand that passage of Pindar in his Olympiacks, Ode VII: speaking of the Rhodians, That when they had prepared, and were come to offer sacrifice to Jupiter, they had by chance forgotten to bring fire with them: but Jupiter, being conscious of their good intentions, rained down upon them A GOLDEN SHOWER, (as I understand it) A SHOWER of fire; a pure imitation of the sacred story. Take it in that elegant poet's own words:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Και τοι γαρ αιδοςας ἔχονες} \\
\text{Ὑπὲρα παντὼ φιλογενεύειν} \\
\text{Τενεινὸς ἁπτομεν προσευχής} \\
\text{Ἀπὸ τοῦ ἉΠΤΟΜΗΣ ἙΡΟΤΗΣ} \\
\text{Ἀδοκιμάζω εἰς ἐκεῖνον καὶ ἄνευς} \\
\text{ἔναγχον ὑποτάσσων πολλαπλασίων.} \\
\text{Πολὺς ὃς Χρυσὸς.}
\end{align*}
\]

That is, according to Benedillus his paraphrase, Etenim Rhodii ascenderunt; quamuis non habentes ardentis fermen ignis. Verum dum in愃rant sacrificiis ignis carentibus aram in arce, illis quidem flavam adducens nebula, nullum pluit [Jupiter] aurum.

And Salmahus reports it of the Vulcanian hill in Sicily, that they, which offered sacrifice upon it, never put fire to it, but expected it should be kindled from heaven. His words, according to Salmasius's edition, are these;
Salt a Symbol of a Covenant.

For salt was ever accounted amongst the ancients a most necessary concomitant of feasts, and condiment of all meats. 

but in the Jewish proverb in Berachoth, Omne convivium, in quo non est saltum, non est convivium. And therefore because covenants and reconciliations were made by eating and drinking, where salt was always used, salt itself was accounted among the ancients A M I C I T IÆ S Y M B O - L U M. 

Thus I understand...
The Lord's Supper a Federal Feast.

Understand that symbol of Pythagoras, τὸ δὲ παρατείνον, (by Erasimus's leave) for friendship and hospitality. There is a pregnant instance of this very phrase in the Scripture, Ezra iv. 14, where our translators read it thus, *Because we have maintenance from the king's palace:* but the words in the Chaldee run after this manner, *כְּעַר וּכְּלָל הַבָּלָא מַלֹּא מַלּוּךָ.* i.e. *quod sale palatii salurimus, Because we have eaten of the king's salt,* [that is, because we have engaged ourselves in a covenant of friendship to him, by eating of his meat] *therefore it is not meet for us to see the king's disfavour.* That proverb mentioned in Tully makes to this purpose, *Multos modios salis simul edendos esse, ut amicitiae munus completum sit:* which was, because that federal symbol had been so often abused. Nay, hence there remaineth a superstitious custom amongst us and other nations to this day, to count the overturning of the salt upon the table ominous, as betiding some evil to him, towards whom it falls: *Quia amoris & amicitiae symbolum.* And by this time I think I have given a sufficient comment upon מַלּוּךָ, the salt of the covenant in the text.

Only I must not forget, that as in God's sacrifices there was ever salt to be used, so the like was generally observed in the Heathen sacrifices; as that one place out of Pliny, among all, shall sufficiently testify: *Maxima salis auroritas est sacrificium veterum intelligitur,* apud quos nulla sacra fine mola falsa confecibatur. And the reason of it also is thus given by that famous scholiast upon Iliad ὁ δέ τε ἀδελφὸς ἐπυκολούθω, *because salt is a symbol of friendship,* which is the same with that reason given by God, why he would always have salt in his sacrifices, because it was מַלּוּךָ, that is, *sal symbolum federis,* as before was shewn. And this phrase, being thus explained, will clearly expound that other phrase, about which critics have laboured so much in vain, where the same words are used, but inverted; and a covenant is called a *covenant of salt,* as salt is here called the *salt of the covenant,* Numb. xviii. 19. and 2 Chron. xiii. 5. viz. because covenants were establisht by eating and drinking together, where salt was a necessary appendix.

Now therefore, that we may return: As the legal sacrifices, with the feasts upon those sacrifices, were FEDERAL RITES between God and men; in like manner, I say, the Lord's supper under the Gospel, which we have already proved to be EPULUM SACRIFICIALE, a feast upon sacrifice, must needs be EPULUM FOEDERALE, a feast of amity and friendship between God and men; where, by eating and drinking at God's own table, and of his meat, we are taken into a sacred covenant, and inviolable league of friendship with him.

Which I will confirm from that forerecommended place, whence I have already proved, that the Lord's supper is a feast upon sacrifice. For there the Apostle thus dehorts the Corinthians from eating of the feasts upon idol-sacrifices, which are a parallel to the feast upon the Christian sacrifice in the Lord's supper, because this was to have fellowship and federal communion with devils: *The things, that the Gentiles sacrifice, they sacrifice to devils, and not to God; and I would not, brethren, that ye should have FELLOWSHIP (or COMMUNION, συμμονίας) with devils.* Where the comment of St. Chrysofome is excellent to our purpose;
The Zabii’s Feasting with their Gods.

By these Zabii he means the ancient Chaldeans; the word in the original Arabick, according to the copy of Joseph Scaliger, being thus written,
blood was forbidden in the law, as Maimonides did, although, in the first place, he saith, it was because blood served in the sacrifices for expiation, otherwise than Maimonides, (for there was a great controversy between these two doctors about the nature of sacrifices;) but yet, in the second place also, he brings in this, also, because it was used superstitiously by the Heathens in the worship of their idol-gods. They performed their superstitious worship, by eating of blood in this manner; they gathered together blood for the devils their idol-gods, and then they came themselves, and did eat of that blood with them, as being the devils guests, and invited to eat at the table of devils; and so were joined in federal society with them. And by this kind of communion with devils, they were able to prophesy, and foretell things to come.
THE FIRST SERMON:
OR, A DISCOURSE
On I John, Chap. II. Ver. 3, 4.
Preached before the Honourable House of Commons, at
Westminster, March 31. 1647.

To the Honourable
HOUSE of COMMONS.

The scope of this Sermon, which not long since exercised your patience, Worthy Senators, was not to contend for this or that opinion, but only to persuade men to the life of Christ, as the pith and kernel of all religion; without which, I may boldly say, all the several forms of religion, though we please ourselves never so much in them, are but so many several dreams. And those many opinions about religion, that are every where so eagerly contended for on all sides, where this doth not lie at the bottom, are but so many shadows fighting with one another: so that I may well say of the true Christian, that is indeed possessed of the life of Christianity, in opposition to all those that are but lightly tinctured with the opinions of it, in the language of the poet,

"Οἷς πέπνυται, τοὶ δὲ ἐς σωιάλ ἀίττεται.

Wherefore I could not think any thing else, either more necessary for Christians in general, or more seasonable at this time, than to stir them up to the real establishment of the righteousness of God in their hearts, and...
that participation of the divine nature, which the Apostle speaketh of. That so they might not content themselves with mere phantasies and conceits of Christ, without the spirit of Christ really dwelling in them, and Christ himself inwardly formed in their hearts; nor satisfy themselves with the mere holding of right and orthodox opinions, as they conceive, whilst they are utterly devoid within of that divine life, which Christ came to kindle in men’s souls; and therefore are so apt to spend all their zeal upon a violent obtruding of their own opinions and apprehensions upon others, which cannot give entertainment to them: which, besides its repugnancy to the doctrine and example of Christ himself, is like to be the bellows, that will blow a fire of discord and contention in Christian commonwealths; whilst, in the mean time, these hungry and starved opinions devour all the life and substance of religion, as the lean kine in Pharaoh’s dream did eat up the fat. Nor, lastly, please themselves only in the violent opposing of other men’s superstitions, according to the genius of the present times, without substituting in the room of them an inward principle of spirit and life in their own souls. For I fear many of us, that pull down idols in churches, may set them up in our hearts; and whilst we quarrel with painted glass, make no scruple at all of entertaining many foul lufts in our souls, and committing continual idolatry with them.

This, in general, was the design of this following discourse, which you were pleased, noble Senators, not only to express your good acceptance of, but also to give a real signification of your great undeserved favour to the author of it. Who therefore cannot but, as the least expression of his thankfulness, humbly devote it to you; presenting it here again to your eye in the same form, in which it was delivered to your ear. Desirous of nothing more, than that it might be some way useful to you, to kindle in you the life and heat of that, which is endeavoured here to be described upon paper; that you may express it, both in your private conversations, and likewise in all your publick employments for the commonwealth. That you may, by your kindly influence, effectually encourage all goodness; and by virtue of your power and authority (to use the phrase of Solomon) scatter away all evil with your eye, as the sun by his beams scattereth the mists and vapours. That from you judgment may run down like waters, and righteousness like a mighty stream, to refresh this whole land, that thirsteth after them: which, whilst you distribute them plentifully to others, will bestow both strength and honour to yourselves. For justice and righteousness are the establishment of every throne, of all civil power and authority; and if these should once forfake it, though there be lions to support it, it could not stand long. These, together with a good peace, well settled in a commonwealth, are all the outward felicity we can expect, till that happy time come, which the prophet foretelth, and is therefore more than a Platonic idea; when the wolf shall dwell with the lamb, and the leopard shall lie down with the kid, and the calf, and the young lion, and the fatting together, and a little child lead them: When the fucking child shall play on the hole of the asp, and the weaned child shall put his hand on the cockatrice’ den: When they shall not hurt nor destroy in all God’s holy mountain; for the earth shall be full of the knowledge of the Lord, as the waters cover the sea.
I have but one word more, if you please to give me leave; That after your care for the advancement of religion, and the publick good of the commonwealth, you would think it worthy of you to promote ingenious learning, and cast a favourable influence upon it. I mean not that only, which furniseth the pulpit, which you seem to be very regardful of; but that, which is more remote from such popular use, in the several kinds of it, which yet are all of them both very subservient to religion, and useful to the commonwealth. There is indeed a πεποίησις, as the philosopher tells us, a bastardly kind of literature, and a συγγραφείς γνώσεως, as the Apostle instructeth us, a knowledge falsely so called; which deserve not to be pleaded for. But the noble and generous improvement of our understandings faculty, in the true contemplation of the wisdom, goodnes, and other attributes of God, in this great fabric of the universe, cannot easily be disparaged, without a blinsh of the Maker of it. Doubtles, we may as well enjoy that, which God hath communicated of himself to the creatures, by this larger faculty of our understandings, as by those narrow and low faculties of our senses; and yet no body counts it to be unlawful to hear a lesson played upon the lute, or to smell at a rose. And the raised improvements of our natural understandings may be as well subservient, and subordinate to a divine light in our minds, as the natural use of these outward creatures here below to the life of God in our hearts. Nay, all true knowledge doth of itself naturally tend to God, who is the fountain of it; and would ever be raising of our souls up upon its wings thither, did not we καταλέγω in ἀδικία, detain it, and hold it down, in unrighteousness, as the Apostle speaketh. All philosophy to a wise man, to a truly sanctified mind, as he in Plutarch speaketh, is but ὑπηρετικὴ θεολογία, matter for divinity to work upon. Religion is the queen of all those inward endowments of the soul; and all pure natural knowledge, all virgin and undeflowered arts and sciences, are her handmaids, that rise up, and call her blessed. I need not tell you, how much the skill of tongues and languages, besides the excellent use of all philology in general, conduceth to the right understanding of the letter of sacred writings, on which the spiritual notions must be built; for none can possibly be ignorant of that, which have but once heard of a translation of the Bible. The Apostle exhorteth private Christians to whatsoever things are lovely, whatsoever things are of good report, if there be any virtue, if there be any praise, to think on those things: and therefore it may well become you, noble Gentlemen in your publick sphere, to encourage so noble a thing as knowledge is, which will reflect so much luster and honour back again upon yourselves. That God would direct you in all your counsels, and still bless you, and prosper you in all your sincere endeavours for the publick good, is the hearty prayer of

Your most humble Servant,

Ralph Cudworth.
I John II. 3, 4.

And hereby we do know, that we know him, if we keep his commandments.

He that faith, I know him, and keepeth not his commandments, is a liar, and the truth is not in him.

We have much enquiry concerning knowledge in these latter times. The sons of Adam are now as busy as ever himself was about the tree of knowledge of good and evil, shaking the boughs of it, and scrambling for the fruit; whilst, I fear, many are too unmindful of the tree of life. And though there be now no cherubims with their flaming swords to fright men off from it; yet the way, that leads to it, seems to be so solitary and untrodden, as if there were but few, that had any mind to taste of the fruit of it. There be many, that speak of new glimmer discoveries of truth, of dawning of gospel-light; and no question but God hath referred much of this for the very evening and fun-of of the world; for in the latter days knowledge shall be increased: but yet I wish we could in the mean time see that day to dawn, which the Apostle speaks of, and that day-star to arise in men's hearts. I wish, whilst we talk of light, and dispute about truth, we could walk more as children of the light. Whereas, if S. John's rule be good here in the text, that no man truly knows Christ, but he that keepeth his commandments; it is much to be suspected, that many of us, which pretend to light, have a thick and gloomy darkness within, over-spreading our souls.

There be now many large volumes and discourses written concerning Christ, thousands of controversies discussed, infinite problems determined concerning his divinity, humanity, union of both together, and what not? so that our bookish Christians, that have all their religion in writings and papers, think they are now completely furnished with all kind of knowledge concerning Christ; and when they see all their leaves lying about them, they think they have a goodly flock of knowledge and truth, and cannot possibly mis of the way to heaven; as if religion were nothing but a little book-craft, a mere paper-skil.

But if S. John's rule here be good, we must not judge of our knowing of Christ by our skil in books and papers, but by our keeping of his commandments. And that, I fear, will discover many of us (notwithstanding all this light, which we boast of round about us) to have nothing but Egyptian darkness within our hearts.

The vulgar fort think, that they know Christ enough out of their creeds and catechisms, and confessions of faith; and if they have but a little acquainted themselves with these, and like parrots conned the words of them, they doubt not, but that they are sufficiently instructed in all the mysteries of
of the kingdom of heaven. Many of the more learned, if they can but wrangle and dispute about Christ, imagine themselves to be grown great proficient in the school of Christ.

The greatest part of the world, whether learned or unlearned, think that there is no need of purging and purifying of their hearts for the right knowledge of Christ and his gospel; but though their lives be never so wicked, their hearts never so foul within, yet they may know Christ sufficiently out of their treatises and discourses, out of their mere systems and bodies of divinity: which I deny not to be useful in a subordinate way; although our Saviour prescribed his disciples another method to come to the right knowledge of divine truths, by doing of God’s will; *He that will do my father’s will, (faith he) shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God.* He is a true Christian indeed, not he, that is only book-taught, but he, that is God-taught; he, that hath an unction from the Holy One (as our Apostle calleth it) *that teacheth him all things*; he, that hath the spirit of Christ within him, *that teacheth out the deep things of God:* for *as no man knoweth the things of a man,* *face the spirit of a man, which is in him; even so the things of God knoweth no man,* but the Spirit of God.

Ink and paper can never make us Christians, can never beget a new nature, a living principle in us; can never form Christ, or any true notions of spiritual things in our hearts. The Gospel, that new law, which Christ delivered to the world, it is not merely a dead letter without us, but a quickening spirit within us. Cold theorems and maxims, dry and jejune disputes, lean syllogistical reasonings, could never yet of themselves beget the least glimpse of true heavenly light, the least sip of saving knowledge in any heart. All this is but the groping of the poor dark spirit of man after truth, to find it out with his own endeavours, and feel it with his own cold and benumbed hands. Words and syllables, which are but dead things, cannot possibly convey the living notions of heavenly truths to us. The secret mysteries of a divine life, of a new nature, of Christ formed in our hearts, they cannot be written or spoken, language and expressions cannot reach them; neither can they be ever truly understood, except the soul itself be kindled from within, and awakened into the life of them. A painter, that would draw a rose, though he may flourish some likeness of it in figure and colour, yet he can never paint the scent and fragrance; or if he would draw a flame, he cannot put a constant heat into his colours; he cannot make his pencil drop a sound, as the echo in the epigram mocks at him;

—*Si vis semilem pingere, pinge sonum.*

All the skill of cunning artizans and mechanicks cannot put a principle of life into a statue of their own making. Neither are we able to inclose in words and letters the life, soul, and essence of any spiritual truths, and, as it were, to incorporate it in them.

Some philosophers have determined, that *αρετή is not διδασκόμενη, virtue cannot be taught* by any certain rules or precepts. Men and books may propound some directions to us, that may set us in such a way of life and practice, as in which we shall at last find it within ourselves, and be experimentally
The First Sermon.

tally acquainted with it; but they cannot teach it us like a mechanick art or trade. No, surely, there is a spirit in man; and the inspiration of the Almighty giveth understanding. But we shall not meet with this spirit any where but in the way of obedience: the knowledge of Christ, and the keeping of his commandments, must always go together, and be mutual causes of one another.

Hereby we know, that we know him, if we keep his commandments.
He that faith, I know him, and keepeth not his commandments, is a liar, and the truth is not in him.

I come now unto these words themselves, which are so pregnant, that I shall not need to force out any thing at all from them: I shall therefore only take notice of some few observations which drop from them of their own accord, and then conclude with some application of them to ourselves.

I. First then, If this be the right way and method of discovering our knowledge of Christ, by our keeping his commandments; then we may safely draw conclusions concerning our state and condition from the conformity of our lives to the will of Christ.

Would we know, whether we know Christ aright, let us consider whether the life of Christ be in us. Qui non habet vitam Christi, Christianum non habet; he that hath not the life of Christ in him, he hath nothing but the name, nothing but a phancy of Christ, he hath not the substance of him. He that builds his house upon this foundation, not an airy notion of Christ swimming in his brain, but Christ really dwelling and living in his heart, as our Saviour himself witneffeth, he buildeth his house upon a rock; and when the floods come, and the winds blow, and the rain descends, and beats upon it, it shall stand impregnably. But he that builds all his comfort upon an ungrounded persuasion, that God from all eternity hath loved him, and absolutely decreed him to life and happiness, and seeketh not for God really dwelling in his soul; he builds his house upon a quick-sand, and it shall suddenly sink and be swallowed up: His hope shall be cut off, and his trust shall be a spider's web; he shall lean upon his house, but it shall not stand; he shall hold it fast, but it shall not endure.

We are no where commanded to pry into these secrets, but the wholesome counsel and advice given us is this, to make our calling and election sure. We have no warrant in Scripture to peep into these hidden toils and volumes of eternity, and to make it our first thing, that we do, when we come to Christ, to spell out our names in the stars, and to persuade ourselves, that we are certainly elected to everlasting happiness, before we see the image of God, in righteousness and true holiness, shaped in our hearts. God's everlasting decree is too dazzling and bright an object for us at first to set our eye upon. It is far easier and safer for us to look upon the rays of his goodness and holiness, as they are reflected in our hearts, and there to read the mild and gentle characters of God's love to us, in our love to him, and our hearty compliance with his heavenly will; as it is safer for us, if we would see the sun, to look upon it here below in a pail of water, than to cast up our daring eyes upon the body of the sun itself, which is too radiant and
and scorching for us. The best assurance, that any one can have of his interest in God, is doubtless the conformity of his soul to him. Those divine purposes, whatsoever they be, are altogether unsearchable and unknowable by us; they lie wrappt up in everlasting darknes, and covered in a deep abyss; Who is able to fathom the bottom of them?

Let us not therefore make this our first attempt towards God and religion, to peruse ourselves strongly of these everlasting decrees: for if at our first flight we aim so high, we shall haply but scorch our wings, and be struck back with lightning, as those giants of old were, that would needs attempt to assault heaven. And it is indeed a most gigantick essay to thrust ourselves so boldly into the lap of heaven; it is a prank of Nimrod, of a mighty hunter, thus rudely to deal with God, and to force heaven and happiness before his face, whether he will or no. The way to obtain a good assurance indeed of our title to heaven, is not to clamber up to it by a ladder of our own ungrounted persuasions, but to dig as low as hell by humility and self-danal in our own hearts: And though this may seem to be the farthest way about, yet it is indeed the nearest and safest way to it. We must ascend downward, and descend upward, if we would indeed come to heaven, or get any true persuasion of our title to it.

The most gallant and triumphant confidence of a Christian riseth safely and surely on this low foundation, that lies deeper under ground, and there stands firmly and steadfastly. When our heart is once turned into a conformity with the word of God, when we feel our will perfectly to concur with his will, we shall then presently perceive a spirit of adoption within ourselves, teaching us to cry Abba, Father. We shall not then care for peeping into those hidden records of eternity, to see whether our names be written there in golden characters; no, we shall find a copy of God's thoughts concerning us written in our own breasts. There we may read the characters of his favour to us; there we may feel an inward sense of his love to us, flowing out of our hearty and unfeigned love to him. And we shall be more undoubtedly persuaded of it, than if any of those winged watchmen above, that are privy to heaven's secrets, should come and tell us, that they saw our names enrolled in those volumes of eternity. Whereas, on the contrary, though we strive to persuade ourselves never so confidently, that God from all eternity hath loved us, and elected us to life and happiness; if we do yet, in the mean time, entertain any iniquity within our hearts, and willingly close with any luft; do what we can, we shall find many a cold qualm ever now and then seizing upon us at approaching dangers; and when death itself shall grimly look us in the face, we shall feel our hearts even to die within us, and our spirits quite faint away, though we strive to raise them and recover them never so much with the strong waters and aqua-vite of our own ungrounted presumptions. The least inward luft willingly continued in will be like a worm, fretting the gourd of our jolly confidence and presumptuous persuasion of God's love, and always gnawing at the root of it; and though we strive to keep it alive, and continually besprinkle it with some dews of our own, yet it will be always dying and withering in our bosoms. But a good conscience within will be al-
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ways better to a Christian, than health to his navel, or marrow to his bones; it will be an everlasting cordial to his heart; it will be soother to him than a bed of down, and he may sleep securely upon it in the midst of raging and tempestuous seas, when the winds bluster, and the waves beat round about him. A good conscience is the best looking-glass of heaven, in which the soul may see God's thoughts and purposes concerning it, as so many shining stars reflected to it. Hereby we know Christ, hereby we know that Christ loves us, if we keep his commandments.

II. Secondly, If hereby only we know, that we know Christ, by our keeping his commandments, then the knowledge of Christ doth not consist merely in a few barren notions, in a form of certain dry and senseless opinions.

Christ came not into the world to fill our heads with mere speculations, to kindle a fire of wrangling and contentious dispute amongst us, and to warm our spirits against one another with nothing but angry and peevish debates; whilst in the mean time our hearts remain all ice within towards God, and have not the least spark of true heavenly fire to melt and thaw them. Christ came not to puff our brains only with some cold opinions, that send down nothing but a freezing and benumbing influence upon our hearts. Christ was viti magister, not schola: and he is the best Christian, whose heart beats with the truest pulse towards heaven; not he, whose head spineth out the finest cobwebs.

He that endeavours really to mortify his lusts, and to comply with that truth in his life, which his conscience is convinced of, is nearer a Christian, though he never heard of Christ, than he, that believes all the vulgar articles of the Christian faith, and plainly denieth Christ in his life.

Surely the way to heaven, that Christ hath taught us, is plain and easy, if we have but honest hearts: we need not many criticisms, many school-distinctions, to come to a right understanding of it. Surely Christ came not to enflaue us and entangle us with captious niceties, or to puzzle our heads with deep speculations, and lead us through hard and craggy notions into the kingdom of heaven. I persuade myself, that no man shall ever be kept out of heaven for not comprehending mysteries, that were beyond the reach of his shallow understanding, if he had but an honest and good heart, that was ready to comply with Christ's commandments. Say not in thy heart, who shall ascend into heaven? that is, with high speculations, to bring down Christ from thence; or, who shall descend into the abyss beneath? that is, with deep searching thoughts to fetch up Christ from thence: but lo, the word is nigh thee, even in thy mouth, and in thy heart.

But I wish it were not the dismuster of our times, to scare and fright men only with opinions, and make men only solicitous about the entertain-
ing of this and that speculation, which will not render them anything the better in their lives, or the liker unto God; whilst in the mean time there is no such care taken about keeping of Christ's commandments, and being renewed in our minds according to the image of God in righteousness and true holiness. We say, Lo, here is Christ, and, Lo, there is Christ, in these and these opinions; whereas, in truth, Christ is neither here, nor there, nor anywhere, but where the spirit of Christ, where the life of Christ is.
Do we not now-a-days open and lock up heaven with the private key of this and that opinion of our own, according to our several phancies, as we please? And if any one observe Christ's commandments never so sincerely, and serve God with faith and a pure conscience, that yet haply skills not of some contended-for opinions, some darling notions, he hath not the right Shibboleth, he hath not the true watch-word; he must not pass the guards into heaven. Do we not make this and that opinion, this and that outward form, to be the wedding-garment, and boldly sentence those to outer darkness, that are not invested therewith? Whereas every true Christian finds the least dram of hearty affection towards God to be more cordial and sovereign to his soul, than all the speculative notions and opinions in the world; and though he study also to inform his understanding aright, and free his mind from all error and misapprehensions, yet it is nothing but the life of Christ deeply rooted in his heart, which is the chymical elixir, that he feeds upon. Had he all faith, that he could remove mountains, (as St. Paul speaks) had he all knowledge, all tongues and languages; yet he prizeth one dram of love beyond them all. He accounteth him, that feedeth upon mere notions in religion, to be but an airy and chameleon-like Christian. He findeth himself now otherwise rooted and centred in God, than when he did before merely contemplate and gaze upon him; he tasteth and relisheth God within himself; he hath quendam saporem Dei, a certain favour of him; whereas before he did but rove and guesst at random at him. He feelseth himself safely anchored in God, and will not be disludged from it, though perhaps he skill not many of those subtleties, which others make the alpha and omega of their religion. Neither is he soiled with those childish affrightments, with which some would force their private conceits upon him; he is above the superstitious dreading of mere speculative opinions, as well as the superstitious reverence of outward ceremonies; he cares not so much for subtity, as for foundness and health of mind. And indeed, as it was well spoken by a noble philosopher, οὐκ ἐπείξες Θεός ἐπάνω μου, that without purity and virtue, God is nothing but an empty name; so it is as true here, that without obedience to Christ's commandments, without the life of Christ dwelling in us, whatsoever opinion we entertain of him, Christ is but only named by us, he is not known.

I speak not here against a free and ingenious enquiry into all truth, according to our several abilities and opportunities; I plead not for the captivating and enthraling of our judgments to the dictates of men; I do not disparage the natural improvement of our understanding faculties by true knowledge, which is so noble and gallant a perfection of the mind: but the thing, which I aim against, is, the dispiriting of the life and vigour of our religion by dry speculations, and making it nothing but a mere dead skeleton of opinions, a few dry bones without any flesh and sinews tied up together, and the misplacing of all our zeal upon an eager prosecution of these; which should be spent to better purpose upon other objects.

Knowledge indeed is a thing far more excellent than riches, outward pleasures, worldly dignities, or any thing else in the world besides holiness, and the conformity of our wills to the will of God; but yet our happiness con-
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Afterth not in it, but in a certain divine temper and constitution of soul, which is far above it.

But it is a piece of that corruption, that runneth through human nature, that we naturally prize truth more than goodnes, knowledge more than holines. We think it a gallant thing to be fluttering up to heaven with our wings of knowledge and speculation; whereas the highest mystery of a divine life here, and of perfect happiness hereafter, consisteth in nothing but mere obedience to the divine will. Happiness is nothing but that inward sweet delight, that will arise from the harmonious agreement between our wills and God’s will.

There is nothing contrary to God in the whole world, nothing that fights against him, but self-will. This is the strong castle, that we all keep garrison’d against heaven in every one of our hearts, which God continually layeth siege unto; and it must be conquered and demolished, before we can conquer heaven. It was by reason of this self-will, that Adam fell in paradise; that those glorious angels, those morning-stars, kept not their first station, but dropped down from heaven like falling stars, and sunk into this condition of bitterness, anxiety, and wretchedness, in which now they are. They all entangled themselves with the length of their own wings, they would needs will more, and otherwise than God would will in them; and going about to make their wills wider, and to enlarge them into greater amplitude, the more they struggled, they found themselves the smaller pinion’d, and crowded up into narrowness and servility; insomuch, that now they are not able to use any wings at all, but inheriting the serpent’s curse, can only creep with their bellies upon the earth. Now, our only way to recover God and happiness again is, not to soar up with our understandings, but to destroy this self-will of ours; and then we shall find our wings to grow again, our plumes fairly spread, and ourselves raised aloft into the free air of perfect liberty, which is perfect happiness.

There is nothing in the whole world able to do us good or hurt, but God and our own will; neither riches nor poverty, nor disgrace nor honour, nor life nor death, nor angels nor devils; but willing or not-willing, as we ought. Should hell itself cast all its fiery darts against us, if our will be right, if it be informed by the divine will, they can do us no hurt; we have then (if I may so speak,) an enchanted shield, that is impenetrable, and will bear off all. God will not hurt us, and hell cannot hurt us, if we will nothing but what God wills. Nay, then we are acted by God himself, and the whole divinity floweth in upon us; and when we have cashiered this self-will of ours, which did but hackle and confine our souls, our wills shall then become truly free, being widened and enlarged to the extent of God’s own will. Hereby we know, that we knew Christ indeed, not by our speculative opinions concerning him, but by our keeping of his commandments.

III. Thirdly, if hereby we are to judge, whether we truly knew Christ, by our keeping of his commandments; so that he, that faith be known in him, and keepeth not his commandments, is a liar; then, this was not the plot and design of the Gospel, to give the world an indulgence to sin, upon what presence forever.

Though
Preached before the House of Commons.

Though we are too prone to make such misconstructions of it; as if God had intended nothing else in it, but to dandle our corrupt nature, and contrive a smooth and easy way for us to come to happiness, without the toilsome labour of subduing our lusts and sinful affections: or, as if the Gospel were nothing else but a declaration to the world, of God's engaging his affections from all eternity on some particular persons in such a manner, as that he would resolve to love them, and dearly embrace them, though he never made them partakers of his image in righteousness and true holiness; and though they should remain under the power of all their lusts, yet they should still continue his beloved ones, and he would notwithstanding, at last, bring them undoubtedly into heaven. Which is nothing else but to make the God that we worship, the God of the New Testament, προσωπίστις, an accepter of persons, and one, that should encourage that in the world, which is diametrically opposite to God's own life and being.

And indeed nothing is more ordinary than for us to shape out such monstrous and deformed notions of God unto ourselves, by looking upon him through the coloured medium of our own corrupt hearts, and having the eye of our soul tinctured by the suffusions of our own lusts. And therefore because we mortals can fondly love and hate, and sometimes hug the very vices of those, to whom our affections are engaged, and kiss their very deformities; we are so ready to shape out a Deity like unto ourselves, and to fashion out such a God as well, in Christ at least, hug the very wickedness of the world, and in those, that be once his own, by I know not what fond affection, appropriated to himself, connive at their very sins, so that they shall not make the least breach betwixt himself and them. Some there are, that question, whether of the two be the worse idolatry, and of the deeper flaw, for a man to make a God out of a piece of wood, and fall down unto it and worship it, and say, Deliver me, for thou art my God, as it is expressed in the prophet Isaiah; or to set up such an idol-god of our own imagination as this is, fashioned out according to the similitude of our own fondness and wickedness; and when we should paint out God with the liveliest colours, that we can possibly borrow from any created being, with the purest perfections, that we can abstract from them; to draw him out thus with the black coal of our own corrupt hearts, and to make the very blot and blurs of our own souls to be the letters, which we spell out his name by. Thus do we, that are children of the night, make black and ugly representations of God unto ourselves, as the Ethiopians were wont to do, copying him out according to our own likenesses, and setting up that unto ourselves for a god, which we love most dearly in ourselves, that is, our lusts. But there is no such god as this any where in the world, but only in some men's false imaginations, who know not all this while, that they look upon themselves instead of God, and make an idol of themselves which they worship and adore for him; being so full of themselves, that whatsoever they see round about them, even God himself, they colour with their own tincture; like him, that Aristotle speaks of, that whatsoever he went, and whatsoever he looked upon, he saw still his own face, as in a glass, represented to him. And therefore it is no wonder, if men seem naturally more devoutly affected toward such an imaginary god, as we have now described,
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scribed, than to the true real God, clothed with his own real attributes; since it is nothing but an image of themselves, which, Narcissus-like, they fall in love with: no wonder if they kiss and dandle such a baby-god as this, which, like little children, they have dressed up out of the clouts of their own fond phancies, according to their own likenesses, of purpose that they might play and sport with it.

But God will ever dwell in spotless light, howsoever we paint him and disfigure him here below; he will still be circled about with his own rays of untailed and immaculate glory. And though the Gospel be not God as he is in his own brightness, but God veiled and masked to us, God in a state of humiliation, and concealed, as the sun in a rainbow; yet it is nothing else but a clear and unpotted mirror of divine holiness, goodness, purity; in which attributes lies the very life and essence of God himself. The Gospel is nothing else but God descending into the world in our form, and conversing with us in our likeness; that he might allure and draw us up to God, and make us partakers of his divine form. Θεὸς γένος ἀνθρώπων (as Abaranuus speaks) ἦν ἡμᾶς ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἰτανωμένη, God was therefore incarnated and made man, that he might deify us; that is, (as St. Peter expresseth it) make us partakers of the divine nature. Now, I say, the very proper character and essential tincture of God himself is nothing else but goodness. Nay, I may be bold to add, that God is therefore God, because he is the highest and most perfect good; and good is not therefore good, because God out of an arbitrary will of his would have it so. Whatsoever God doth in the world, he doth it as suitable to the highest goodness; the idea and fairest copy of which is his own essence.

Virtue and holiness in creatures, as Plato well discourseth in his Eutbyphro, are not therefore good, because God loveth them, and will have them be accounted such; but rather God therefore loveth them, because they are in themselves simply good. Some of our own authors go a little farther yet, and tell us, that God doth not fondly love himself, because he is himself; but therefore he loveth himself, because he is the highest and most absolute goodness; so that if there could be any thing in the world better than God, God would love that better than himself: but because he is essentially the most perfect good, therefore he cannot but love his own goodness infinitely above all other things. And it is another mistake, which sometimes we have of God, by shaping him out according to the model of ourselves, when we make him nothing but a blind, dark, impetuous self-will running through the world, such as we ourselves are furiously acted with, that have not the ballast of absolute goodness to poize and settle us.

That I may therefore come nearer to the thing in hand; God, who is absolute goodness, cannot love any of his creatures, and take pleasure in them, without bestowing a communication of his goodness and likeness upon them. God cannot make a Gospel to promise men life and happiness hereafter, without being regenerated, and made partakers of his holiness. As soon may heaven and hell be reconciled together, and lovingly shake hands with one another, as God can be fondly indulgent to any sin, in whomsoever it be. As soon may light and darkness be espoused together, and
and midnight be married to noon-day, as God can be joined in a league of friendship to any wicked soul.

The great design of God in the Gospel is to clear up this mift of sin and corruption, which we are here surrounded with, and to bring up his creatures out of the shadow of death to the region of light above, the land of truth and holiness. The great mystery of the Gospel is to establish a godlike frame and disposition of spirit, which consists in righteousness and true holiness, in the hearts of men. And Christ, who is the great and mighty Saviour, came on purpose into the world, not only to save us from fire and brimstone, but also to save us from our sins. Christ hath therefore made an expiation of our sins by his death upon the cross, that we, being thus delivered out of the bands of these our greatest enemies, might serve God without fear, in holiness and righteousness before him all the days of our life. This grace of God, that bringeth salvation, hath therefore appeared unto all men, in the Gospel, that it might teach us to deny ungodliness and worldly lusts, and that we should live soberly, righteously and godly in this present world; looking for that blessed hope, and glorious appearing of the great God and our Saviour Jesus Christ, who gave himself for us, that he might redeem us from all iniquity, and purify to himself a peculiar people, zealous of good works. These things I write unto you, (faith our Apostle a little before my text) that you sin not; therein expressing the end of the whole Gospel, which is, not only to cover sin by spreading the purple robe of Christ's death and sufferings over it, whilst it still remaineth in us with all its filth and noisomeness unremoved; but also to convey a powerful and mighty spirit of holiness, to cleanse us, and free us from it. And this is a greater grace of God to us, than the former, which still go both together in the Gospel; besides the free remission and pardon of sin in the blood of Christ, the delivering of us from the power of sin, by the Spirit of Christ dwelling in our hearts.

Christ came not into the world only to cast a mantle over us, and hide all our filthy fores from God's avenging eye, with his merits and righteousness; but he came likewise to be a chirurgeon and physician of souls, to free us from the filth and corruption of them; which is more grievous and burthensome, more noisome to a true Christian, than the guilt of sin itself.

Should a poor wretched and diseased creature, that is full of sores and ulcers, be covered all over with purple, or clothed with scarlet, he would take but little contentment in it, whilst his sores and wounds remain upon him; and he had much rather be arrayed in rags, so he might obtain but foundness and health within. The Gospel is a true Bethseada, a pool of grace, where such poor, lame and infirm creatures as we are, upon the moving of God's Spirit in it, may descend down, not only to wash our skin and outside, but also to be cured of our diseases within. And whatever the world thinks, there is a powerful Spirit, that moves upon these waters, the waters of the Gospel, spreading its gentle, healing, quickening wings over our souls. The Gospel is not like Abana and Pharpar, those common rivers of Damascus, that could only cleanse the outside; but is a true Jordan, in which such leprous Naaman, as we all are, may wash and be clean. Blessed indeed are they, whose iniquities are forgiven, and whose sins are covered: Blessed is
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the man, to whom the Lord will not impute sin: but yet rather blessed are they, whose sins are like a morning-cloud, and quite taken away from them. Blessed, thrice blessed are they, that hunger and thirst after righteousness, for they shall be satisfied: blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God.

Our Saviour Christ came (as John the Baptist tells us) with a fan in his hand, that he might thoroughly purge his floor, and gather his wheat into his garner: but the chaff he will burn up with unquenchable fire. He came (as the prophet Malachi speaks) like a refiner's fire, and like fuller's soap; to fit as a refiner and purifier of silver, and to purify all the sons of Levi, and purge them as gold and silver, that they may offer unto the Lord an offering in righteousness.

Christ came not only to write Holiness to the Lord upon Aaron's forehead, and to put his Urim and Thummim upon his breast-plate; but, This is the covenant, faith the Lord, that I will make with them in those days: I will put my law in their inward parts, and write it in their hearts; and then I will be their God, and they shall be my people. They shall be all kings and priests unto me. God sent his own Son (faith St. Paul) in the likeness of sinful flesh, and by a sacrifice for sin condemned sin in the flesh; that the righteousness of the law might be fulfilled in us, who walk not after the flesh, but after the Spirit.

The first Adam, as the Scripture tells us, brought in a real defilement, which, like a noisome leprosy, hath overspread all mankind; and therefore the second Adam must not only fill the world with a conceit of holiness, and mere imaginary righteousness; but he must really convey such an immortal seed of grace into the hearts of believers, as may prevail still more and more in them, till it have at last quite wrought out that poison of the serpent.

Christ, that was nothing but Divinity dwelling in a tabernacle of flesh, and God himself immediately acting a human nature, came into the world to kindle here that divine life amongst men, which is certainly dearer unto God, than any thing else whatsoever in the world; and to propagate this celestial fire from one heart flitt unto another, until the end of the world. Neither is he, nor was he, ever absent from this spark of his divinity kindled amongst men, wherefoever it be, though he seem bodily to be withdrawn from us. He is the standing, constant, inexhausted fountain of this divine light and heat, that still toucheth every soul, that is enlivened by it, with an out-stretched ray, and freely lends his beams, and disperseth his influence to all, from the beginning of the world to the end of it. We all receive of his fulness grace for grace; as all the stars in heaven are said to light their candles at the sun's flame. For though his body be withdrawn from us, yet, by the lively and virtual contact of his Spirit, he is always kindling, chearing, quickening, warming and enlivening hearts. Nay, this divine life, begun and kindled in any heart, wherefoever it be, is something of God in flesh, and, in a sober and qualified sense, Divinity incarnate; and all particular Christians, that are really possessed of it, so many mystical Christs.

And
And God forbid, that God’s own life and nature, here in the world, should be forlorn, forsaken, and abandoned of God himself. Certainly, where-ever it is, though never so little, like a sweet, young, tender babe, once born in any heart, when it crieth unto God the father of it, with pithful and bemoaning looks imploring his compassion, it cannot chufe but move his fatherly bowels, and make them yearn, and turn towards it, and, by strong sympathy, draw his compasionate arm to help and relieve it. Never was any tender infant so dear to those bowels, that begat it, as an infant new-born Christ, formed in the heart of any true believer, to God the father of it. Shall the children of this world, the sons of darkness, be moved with such tender affection and compasion towards the fruit of their bodies, their own natural off-spring? and shall God, who is the father of lights, the fountain of all goodness, be moved with no compasion towards his true spiritual off-spring, and have no regard to those sweet babes of light, ingendered by his own beams in men’s hearts, that, in their lovely countenances, bear the resemblance of his own face, and call him their father? Shall he see them lie fainting and gasping, and dying here in the world, for want of nothing to preferve and keep them, but an influence from him, who first gave them life and breath? No, hear the language of God’s heart, hear the founding of his bowels towards them: Is it Eberaim my dear son? Is it that pleasant child? Since I spake of him, I do earnestly remember him; my bowels, my bowels are troubled for him; I will surely have mercy upon him, faith the Lord. If those expressions of goodness and tender affection here, among the creatures, be but drops of that full ocean, that is in God; how can we then imagine, that this father of our spirits should have so little regard to his own dear off-spring, I do not say our souls, but that, which is the very life and soul of our souls, the life of God in us, (which is nothing else, but God’s own self communicated to us, his own Son born in our hearts) as that he should suffer it to be cruelly murdered in its infancy by our sins, and, like young Hercules, in its very cradle to be strangled by those filthy vipers? that he should see him to be crucified by wicked lufts, nailed fast to the cross by invincible corruptions, pierced and gored on every side with the poisonous spears of the devil’s temptations, and at last to give up the ghost; and yet his tender heart not at all relent, nor be all this while impassioned with so sad a spectacle? Surely, we cannot think he hath such an adamantine breast, such a stony nature, as this is.

What then? must we say, that though indeed he be willing, yet he is not able, to rescue his crucified and tormented Son now bleeding upon the cross; to take him down from thence, and save him? Then must sin be more powerful than God; that weak, crazy and sickly thing must be stronger than the rock of ages; and the devil, the prince of darkness, more mighty than the God of light. No surely; there is a weakness and impotency in all evil, but a masculine force and vigour in all goodness; and therefore, doubtless, the highest good, the potev avyna, as the philosopher calls it, is the strongest thing in the world. Nil potiusius surnmo Bono. God’s power, displayed in the world, is nothing but his goodness strongly reaching all things from height to depth, from the highest heaven to the lowest hell; and irresistibly imparting
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impacting itself to every thing, according to those several degrees, in which it is capable of it.

Have the fiends of darkness then, those poor forlorn spirits, that are fettered and chained up in the chains of their own wickedness, any strength to withstand the force of infinite goodnes, which is infinite power? or do they not rather sculk in holes of darkness, and fly, like bats and owls, before the approaching beams of this sun of righteousness? Is God powerful to kill and to destroy, to damn and to torment? and is he not powerful to save? Nay, it is the sweetest flower in all the garland of his attributes, it is the richest diadem in his crown of glory, that he is mighty to save: and this is far more magnificent for him, than to be styled mighty to destroy. For that, except it be in a way of justice, speaks no power at all, but mere impotency; for the root of all power is goodness.

Or must we say, lastly, that God indeed is able to rescue us out of the power of sin and Satan, when we sigh and groan towards him; but yet sometimes, to exercise his absolute authority, his uncontrollable dominion, he delights rather in plunging wretched souls down into infernal night and everlasting darkness? What shall we then make the God of the whole world? Nothing but a cruel and dreadful Erinnys, with curled fiery snakes about his head, and firebrands in his hands, thus governing the world? Surely this will make us either secretly to think, that there is no God at all in the world, if he must needs be such; or else to wish heartily there were none. But, doubtless, God will at last confute all these our misapprehensions of him; he will unmask our hypocritical pretences, and clearly, cast the shame of all our sinful deficiencies upon ourselves, and vindicate his own glory from receiving the least stain or blemish by them. In the mean time, let us know, that the Gospel now requireth far more of us, than ever the Law did; for it requireth a new creature, a divine nature, Christ formed in us: but yet withall it beftoweth a quickening spirit, an enlivening power, to enable us to express that, which is required of us. Whosoever therefore truly knows Christ, the same also keepeth Christ's commandments. But he, that faith, I know him, and keepeth not his commandments, is a liar, and the truth is not in him.

I have now done with the first part of my Discourse, concerning those observations, which arise naturally from the words, and offer themselves to us. I shall, in the next place, proceed to make some general application of them all together.

Now therefore, I beseech you, let us consider, whether or no we know Christ indeed: not by our acquaintance with systems and models of divinity, not by our skill in books and papers; but by our keeping of Christ's commandments. All the books and writings, which we converse with, they can but represent spiritual objects to our understandings; which yet we can never see in their own true figure, colour and proportion, until we have a divine light within, to irradiate and shine upon them. Though there be never such excellent truths concerning Christ and his Gospel, set down in words
words and letters; yet they will be but unknown characters to us, until we have a living spirit within us, that can decipher them; until the same spirit, by secret whistles in our hearts, do comment upon them, which did at first indite them. There be many, that understand the Greek and Hebrew of the Scripture, the original languages, in which the text was written, that never understood the language of the Spirit.

There is a caro and a spiritus, a flesh and a spirit, a body and a soul in all the writings of the Scriptures. It is but the flesh and body of divine truths, that is printed upon paper; which many moths of books and libraries do only feed upon; many walking skeletons of knowledge, that bury and destroy truths in the living sepulchres of their souls, do only converse with; such as never did any thing else, but pick at the mere bark and rind of truths, and crack the shells of them. But there is a soul and spirit of divine truths, that could never yet be concealed into ink, that could never be blotted upon paper; which, by a secret traduction and conveyance, paseth from one soul unto another, being able to dwell or lodge nowhere, but in a spiritual being, in a living thing, because itself is nothing but life and spirit. Neither can it, where indeed it is, express itself sufficiently in words and sounds, but it will best declare and speak itself in actions; as the old manner of writing among the Egyptians was, not by words, but things. The life of divine truths is better expressed in actions, than in words, because actions are more living things than words: words are nothing but dead refermblances and pictures of those truths, which live and breathe in actions; and the kingdom of God (as the Apostle speaketh) consisteth not in word, but in life and power. Τά περὶ τάσις και τοίχευσιν τοῦ ποιότητος και τῆς ἐποίησις τῶν ἡμῶν (faith the moral philosopher) ἀλά τις νομιμόν (περὶ τῆς περιτεχνίας τῆς φύσεως καὶ τῆς γάλας. Sheep do not come and bring their fodder to their shepherd, and show him how much they eat; but, inwardly conceiving and digesting it, they make it appear by the fleece, which they wear upon their backs, and by the milk, which they give. And let not us Christians affect only to talk and dispute of Christ, and so measure our knowledge of him by our words; but let us shew, απὸ τῶν Θεοφυλάκων περὶ τᾶς ἐργάσιμος; our knowledge concocted into our lives and actions; and then let us really manifest, that we are Christ's sheep indeed, that we are his discipes, by that fleece of holiness, which we wear, and by the fruits, that we daily yield in our lives and conversations: for bētriges (Faith Christ) is my Father glorified, that ye bear much fruit; so shall ye be my discipes.

Let us not, I beseech you, judge of our knowing Christ by our ungrounded persuasions, that Christ from all eternity hath loved us, and given himself particularly for us, without the conformity of our lives to Christ's commandments, without the real partaking of the image of Christ in our hearts. The great mystery of the Gofpel doth not lie only in Christ without us, (though we must know also what he hath done for us;) but the very pith and kernel of it consisteth in Christ inwardly formed in our hearts. Nothing is truly ours but what lives in our spirits. Salvation itself cannot save us as long as it is only without us, no more than health can cure us, and make us sound, when it is not within us, but somewhere at distance from us; no more than arts and sciences, whilst they lie only in books and papers.
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...The Gospel, though it be a sovereign and medicinal thing itself, yet the mere knowing and believing of the history of it will do us no good: we can receive no virtue from it, till it be inwardly digested and concocted into our souls; till it be made ours, and become a living thing in our hearts. The Gospel, if it be only without us, cannot save us, no more than that physician's bill could cure the ignorant patient of his disease, who, when it was commended to him, took the paper only, and put it up in his pocket, but never drank the potion, that was prescribed in it.

All that Christ did for us in the flesh, when he was here upon earth, from his lying in a manger, when he was born in Bethlehem, to his bleeding upon the cross on Golgotha, it will not save us from our sins, unless Christ by his Spirit dwell in us. It will not avail us to believe, that he was born of a virgin, unless the power of the Most High overshadow our hearts, and beget him there likewise. It will not profit us to believe, that he died upon the cross for us, unless we be baptized into his death by the mortification of all our lusts; unless the old man of sin be crucified in our hearts. Christ indeed hath made an expiation for our sins upon his cross, and the blood of Christ is the only sovereign balm to free us from the guilt of them: but yet, besides the sprinkling of the blood of Christ upon us, we must be made partakers also of his Spirit. Christ came into the world, as well to redeem us from the power and bondage of our sins, as to free us from the guilt of them. You know (faith St. John) that he was manifested to take away our sins: whatsoever therefore abideth in him, sineth not; whatsoever sinneth, hath not seen nor known him. Lo the end of Christ's coming into the world! Lo a design worthy of God manifested in the flesh!

Christ did not take all these pains to lay aside his robes of glory, and come down hither into the world, to enter into a virgin's womb, to be born in our human shape, and be laid a poor crying infant in a manger, and having no form or comeliness at all upon him, to take upon him the form of a servant, to undergo a reproachful and ignominious life, and at last to be abandoned to a shameful death, a death upon the cross; I say, he did not do all this merely to bring in a notion into the world, without producing any real substantial effect at all, without the changing, mending and reforming of the world; so that men should still be as wicked as they were before; and as much under the power of the prince of darkness, only they should not be thought so; they should still remain as full of all the filthy fores of sin and corruption as before, only they should be accounted whole. Shall God come down from heaven, and pitch a tabernacle amongst men? Shall he undertake such a huge design, and make so great a noise of doing something, which, when it is all hummed up, shall not at last amount to a reality? Surely Christ did not undergo all this to so little purpose; he would not take all this pains for us, that he might be able at last to put into our hands nothing but a blank. He was with child, he was in pain and travail; and hath been brought forth nothing but wind? hath been delivered of the very wind? Is that great design, that was so long carried in the womb of eternity, now proved abortive, or else nothing but a mere windy birth? No surely: the end of the gospel is life and perfection; it is a divine nature; it is a God-like
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like frame and disposition of spirit; it is to make us partakers of the image of God in righteousness and true holiness, without which salvation itself were but a notion.

Christ came into the world to make an expiation and atonement for our sins; but the end of this was, that we might eschew sin; that we might forsake all ungodliness and worldly lusts. The Gospel declares pardon of sin to those, that are heavy laden with it, and willing to be disburdened, to this end, that it might quicken and enliven us to new obedience. Whereas otherwise the guilt of sin might have detained us in horror and despair, and so have kept us still more strongly under the power of it, in sad and dismal apprehensions of God's wrath provoked against us, and inevitably falling on us: but Christ hath now appeared like a day-star, with most cheerful beams; nay, he is the Sun of righteousness himself, which hath risen upon the world with his healing wings, with his exhilarating light, that he might chafe away all those black despairing thoughts from us. But Christ did not rise, that we should play at sport, and wantonize with his light; but that we should do the work of the day in it; that we should walk εἰκόνες (as the Apostle speaketh) not in our night-clothes of sinful deformity, but clad all over with the comely garments of light. The Gospel is not big with child of a phaney, of a mere conceit of righteousness without us, hanging at distance over us, whilst our hearts within are nothing but cages of unclean birds, and like houses continually haunted with devils, nay, the very rendezvous of those fiends of darknes.

Holiness is the belt thing, that God himself can beftow upon us, either in this world, or the world to come. True evangelical holiness, that is, Christ formed in the hearts of believers, is the very cream and quintefience of the Gospel. And were our hearts found within, were there not many thick and dark fumes, that did arise from thence, and cloud our understandings, we could not easily conceive the substance of heaven itself to be any thing else but holiness, freed from those encumbrances, that did ever clog it and accloy it here; neither should we wish for any other heaven besides this. But many of us are like those children, whose stomachs are so vitiated by some disease, that they think ashes, coal, mud-wall, or any such trash, to be more pleasant than the most wholesome food: such sickly and distempered appetites have we about these spiritual things, that hanker after I know not what vain shews of happiness, whilst in the mean time we neglect that, which is the only true food of our souls, that is able to nourish them up to everlasting life.

Grace is holiness militant, holiness encumbered with many enemies and difficulties, which it still fights against, and manfully quits itself of; and glory is nothing else but holiness triumphant, holiness with a palm of victory in her hand, and a crown upon her head: Deus ipse cum omni sua bonitate, quatenus extra me est, non factit me beatum, sed quatenus in me est: God himself cannot make me happy, if he be only without me, and unless he give in a participation of himself, and his own likeness into my soul. Happiness is nothing but the releasing and unlettering of our souls from all these narrow, scant, and particular good things; and the espousing of them to the highest and most universal good, which is not this or that particular
good, but goodness itself: and this is the same thing, that we call holiness. Which, because we ourselves are so little acquainted with (being for the most part ever courting a mere shadow of it,) therefore we have such low, abject, and beggarly conceits thereof; whereas it is in itself the most noble, Heroical and generous thing in the world. For I mean by holiness nothing else but God stamped and printed upon the soul. And we may please ourselves with what conceits we will; but so long as we are void of this, we do but dream of heaven, and I know not what fond paradise; we do but blow up and down an airy bubble of our own phancies, which riseth out of the frotth of our vain hearts; we do but court a painted heaven, and woo happiness in a picture, whilst in the mean time a true and real hell will suck in our souls into it, and soon make us sensible of a solid woe and substantial misery.

Divine wisdom hath so ordered the frame of the whole universe, as that every thing should have a certain proper place, that should be a receptacle for it. Hell is the sink of all sin and wickedness. The strong magick of nature pulls and draws every thing continually to that place, which is suitable to it, and to which it doth belong; so all the heavy bodies press downwards towards the centre of our earth, being drawn in by it: in like manner hell, wherever it is, will by strong sympathy pull in all sin, and magnetically draw it to itself: as true holiness is always breathing upwards, and fluttering towards heaven, striving to embragon itself with God; and it will at last undoubtedly be conjoined with him; no dismal shades of darkness can possibly stop it in its course, or bear it back.

Nay, we do but deceive ourselves with names: hell is nothing but the orb of sin and wickedness, or else that hemisphere of darkness, in which all evil moves; and heaven is the opposite hemisphere of light, or else, if you please, the bright orb of truth, holiness and goodness: and we do actually in this life instate ourselves in the possession of one, or other of them. Take sin and disobedience out of hell, and it will presently clear up into light, tranquillity, serenity, and shine out into a heaven. Every true saint carrieth his heaven about with him in his own heart; and hell, that is without him, can have no power over him. He might safely wade through hell itself, and, like the three children, pass through the midst of that fiery furnace, and yet not at all be scorched with the flames of it: he might walk through the valley of the shadow of death, and yet fear no evil.

Sin is the only thing in the world, that is contrary to God. God is light, and that is darkness: God is beauty, and that is ugliness and deformity. All sin is direct rebellion against God; and with what notions soever we fugar it, and sweeten it, yet God can never smile upon it, he will never make a truce with it. God declares open war against sin, and bids defiance to it; for it is a professed enemy to God's own life and being. God, which is infinite goodness, cannot but hate sin, which is purely evil. And

though
though sin be in itself but a poor, impotent and crazy thing, nothing but straitness, poverty, and non-entity, so that of itself it is the most wretched and miserable thing in the world, and needeth no farther punishment besides itself; yet divine vengeance beats it off still farther and farther from God, and, whereas it is, will be sure to scourge it and lash it continually. God and sin can never agree together.

That I may therefore yet come nearer to ourselves: This is the message, that I have now to declare unto you, that God is light, and in him is no darkness at all. If we say, that we have fellowship with him, and walk in darkness, we lie, and do not the truth. Christ and the Gospel are light, and there is no darkness at all in them: if you say, that you know Christ and his Gospel, and yet keep not Christ's commandments, but dearly hug your private darling corruptions, you are liars, and the truth is not in you; you have no acquaintance with the God of light, nor the Gospel of light. If any of you say, that you know Christ, and have an interest in him, and yet (as I fear too many do) still nourish ambition, pride, vain-glory within your breasts, harbour malice, revengefulness, and cruel hatred to your neighbours in your hearts, eagerly scramble after this worldly self, and make the strength of your parts and endeavours serve that blind Mammon, the God of this world; if you wallow and tumble in the filthy paddle of fleshly pleasures, or if you aim only at yourselves in your lives, and make yourself the compas by which you fail, and the star, by which you steer your course, looking at nothing higher, or more noble than your selves; deceive not yourselves, you have neither seen Christ, nor known him: you are deeply incorporated (if I may so speak) with the spirit of this world, and have no true sympathy with God and Christ, no fellowship at all with them.

And, I beseech you, let us consider; Be there not many of us, that pretend much to Christ, that are plainly in our lives as proud, ambitious, vain-glorious as any others? Be there not many of us, that are as much under the power of unruly passions, as cruel, revengeful, malicious, conforous as others? that have our minds as deeply engaged in the world, and as much envassalled to riches, gain, profit, those great admired deities of the sons of men, and their souls as much overwhelmed and sunk with the cares of this life? Do not many of us as much give ourselves to the pleasures of the flesh, and though not without regrets of conscience, yet ever now and then secretly soil ourselves in them? Be there not many of us, that have as deep a share likewise in injustice and oppression, in vexing the fatherless and the widows? I wish it may not prove some of our cafes at that last day, to use such pleas as these unto Christ in our behalf; Lord, I have prophesied in thy name; I have preached many a zealous sermon for thee; I have kept many a long fast; I have been very active for thy cause in church, in state; say, I never made any question, but that my name was written in thy book of life: when yet, alas! we shall receive no other return from Christ but this, I know you not; depart from me, ye workers of iniquity. I am sure there be too many of us, that have long pretended to Christ, which make little or no progress in true Christianity, that is, holiness of life; that ever hang hovering in a twilight of grace, and never seriously
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... put ourselves forward into clear day light, but esteem that glimmering crepusculum, which we are in, and like that faint twilight better than broad open day: whereas the path of the just (as the wise man speaks) is as the shining light, that shineth more and more unto the perfect day. I am sure there be many of us, that are perpetual dwarfs in our spiritual stature, like those silly women (that St. Paul speaks of) laden with sins, and led away with divers lusts, that are ever learning, and never able to come to the knowledge of the truth: that are not now one jot taller in Christianity, than we were many years ago, but have still as sickly, crazy, and unfound a temper of soul as we had long before.

Indeed we seem to do something; we are always moving and lifting at the stone of corruption, that lies upon our hearts, but yet we never stir it notwithstanding, or at least never roll it off from us. We are sometimes a little troubled with the guilt of our sins, and then we think we must thrust our lusts out of our hearts; but afterwards we sprinkle ourselves over with I know not what holy-water, and so are contented to let them still abide quietly within us. We do every day truly confess the same sins, and pray against them; and yet still commit them as much as ever, and lie as deeply under the power of them. We have the same water to pump out in every prayer, and still we let the same leak in again upon us. We make a great deal of noise, and raise a great deal of dust with our feet; but we do not move from off the ground, on which we stand, we do not go forward at all: or if we do sometimes make a little progress, we quickly lose again the ground, which we had gained; like those upper planets in the heaven, which (as the astronomers tell us) sometimes move forwards, sometimes quite backwards, and sometimes perfectly stand still; have their stations and retrogradations, as well as their direct motions. As if religion were nothing else but a dancing up and down upon the same piece of ground, and making several motions and friskings on it; and not a sober journeying and travelling onwards toward some certain place. We do and undo; we do Penelopes telam texere; we weave sometimes a web of holiness, but then we let our lusts come, and undo and unravel all again. Like Silphius in the fable, we roll up a mighty stone with much ado, sweating and tugging up the hill; and then we let it go, and tumble down again unto the bottom; and this is our constant work. Like those Danaides, which the poets speak of, we are always filling water into a sieve, by our prayers, duties, and performances, which still runs out as fast as we pour it in.

What is it, that thus cheats us, and gulls us of our religion? that makes us thus constantly to tread the same ring and circle of duties, where we make no progress at all forwards, and the farther we go, are still nearer to our journey’s end? What is it, that thus starves our religion, and makes it look like those kine in Pharaos’s dream, ill-favoured and lean-flethed, that it hath no colour in its face, no blood in its veins, no life nor heat at all in its members? What is it, that doth thus be dwarf us in our Christianity? What low, fordid, unworthy principles do we act by, that thus hinder our growth, and make us stand at a stay, and keep us always at the very porch and entrance where we first began? Is it a sleepy, sluggis...
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gift conceit, that it is enough for us, if we be but once in a state of grace, if we have but once stepped over the threshold; we need not take so great pains to travel any farther? or is it another damping, choking, stifling opinion, that Christ hath done all for us already without us, and nothing need more to be done within us? no matter how wicked we be in ourselves, for we have holiness without us; no matter how sickly and diseased our souls be within, for they have health without them. Why may we not as well be satisfied and contented to have happiness without us too to all eternity, and so ourselves for ever continue miserable? Little children, let no man deceive you; be that doth righteousness is righteous, even as he is righteous: but he that commiteth sin is of the devil. I shall therefore exhort you in the wholesome words of St. Peter; Give all diligence to add to your faith, virtue; and to virtue, knowledge; to knowledge, temperance; and to temperance, patience; to patience, godliness; and to godliness, brotherly-kindness; and to brotherly-kindness, charity: For if these things be in you and abound, they make you, that ye shall neither be barren nor unfruitful in the knowledge of our Lord Jesus Christ. The Apostle still goes on, and I cannot leave him yet: But he that lacketh these things is blind, and cannot see far off, and hath forgotten, that he was once purged from his old sins. Wherefore the rather, brethren, give diligence to make your calling and election sure; for if ye do these things, ye shall never fall. Let us not only talk and dispute of Christ, but let us indeed put on the Lord Jesus Christ. Having those great and precious promises, which he hath given us, let us strive to be made partakers of the divine nature, escaping the corruption, that is in the world through lust: and being begotten again to a lively hope of enjoying Christ hereafter, let us purify ourselves, as he is pure.

Let us really declare, that we know Christ, that we are his disciples, by our keeping of his commandments; and amongst the rest, that commandment especially, which our Saviour Christ himself commendeth to his disciples in a peculiar manner; This is my commandment, that ye love one another, as I have loved you: and again, These things I command you, that ye love one another. Let us follow peace with all men, and holiness, without which no man shall see God. Let us put on as the elect of God, holy and beloved, bowels of mercies, kindness, humility, meekness, long-suffering, forbearing one another, and forgiving one another, if any man have a quarrel against any, even as Christ forgave us: and above all these things let us put on charity, which is the bond of perfectness. Let us in meekness infract those, that oppose themselves, if God peradventure will give them repentance to the acknowledging of the truth; that they may recover themselves out of the snares of the devil, that are taken captive by him at his will. Beloved, let us love one another; for love is of God, and whosoever loveth is born of God and knoweth God.

O divine love! the sweet harmony of souls! the musick of angels! the joy of God's own heart! the very darling of his bosom! the source of true happiness! the pure quintessence of heaven! that which reconciles the jarring principles of the world, and makes them all chime together! that which melts men's hearts into one another! See how St. Paul describes it, and it cannot chuse but enamour your affections towards it: Love enameth.
not, it is not puffed up, it doth not behave itself unseemly, seeketh not her
own, is not easily provoked, thinketh no evil, rejoiceth not in iniquity; beareth
all things, believeth all things, hopeth all things, endureth all things. I may
add in a word, it is the best-natured thing, the best complexioned thing in the
world. Let us express this sweet harmonious affection in these jarring times:
that so, if it be possible, we may tune the world into better music. Especially
in matters of religion, let us strive with all meekness to instruct and convince
one another. Let us endeavour to promote the Gospel of peace, the dove-
like Gospel, with a dove-like Spirit. This was the way, by which the Gos-
pel at first was propagated in the world: Christ did not cry, nor lift up his
voice in the streets; a bruised reed he did not break, and the smoking flax he
did not quench; and yet he brought forth judgment unto victory. He whisper'd
the Gospel to us from mount Zion, in a still voice; and yet the found there-
of went out quickly throughout all the earth. The Gospel at first came
down upon the world gently and softly, like the dew upon Gideon's
fleece; and yet it quickly soaked quite through it: and doubtless, this is
still the most effectual way to promote it farther. Sweetness and ingenuity
will more command men's minds than passion, frowardness and severity; as the
soft pillow sooner breaks the flint, than the hardest marble. Let us άνδρεν ὡ
άγαπάν, follow truth in love; and of the two indeed, be contented rather
to miss of the conveying of a speculative truth, than to part with love.
When we would convince men of any error by the strength of truth, let us
withal pour the sweet balm of love upon their heads. Truth and love are
two the most powerful things in the world; and when they both go toge-
ther, they cannot easily be withstood. The golden beams of truth, and
the silken cords of love, twilled together, will draw men on with a sweet
violence, whether they will or no.

Let us take heed we do not sometimes call that zeal for God and his Gos-
pel, which is nothing else but our own tempestuous and stormy passion.
True zeal is a sweet, heavenly and gentle flame, which maketh us active
for God, but always within the sphere of love. It never calls for fire from
heaven, to consume those, that differ a little from us in their apprehensions.
It is like that kind of lightning (which the philosophers speak of) that melts
the sword within, but findgeth not the scabbard: it strives to save the soul,
but hurteth not the body. True zeal is a loving thing, and makes us al-
ways active to edification, and not to destruction. If we keep the fire of
zeal within the chimney, in its own proper place, it never doth any hurt;
it only warmeth, quickeneth and enliveth us: but if once we let it break
out, and catch hold of the thatch of our flesh, and kindle our corrupt na-
ture, and set the house of our body on fire, it is no longer zeal, it is no
heavenly fire, it is a most destructive and devouring thing. True zeal is
an ignis lambens, a soft and gentle flame, that will not scorch one's hand; it
is no predatory or voracious thing: but carnal and fleshly zeal is like the
spirit of gun-powder set on fire, that tears and blows up all, that stands be-
fore it. True zeal is like the vital heat in us, that we live upon, which we
never feel to be angry or troublesome; but though it gently fed upon the
radical oil within us, that sweet balm of our natural moisture, yet it lives
lovingly with it, and maintains that, by which it is fed: but that other fur-
vious and distempered zeal is nothing else but a fever in the soul. To con-
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It may in what kind of zeal it is, that we should make use of in promoting the Gospel, by an emblem of God's own, given us in the Scripture, those fiery tongues, that, upon the day of Pentecost, fell upon the Apostles; which fire were harmless flames; for we cannot read, that they did any hurt, or that they did so much as singe an hair of their heads.

I will therefore shut up this with that of the Apostle: *Let us keep the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace.* Let this soft and filken knot of love tie our hearts together; though our heads and apprehensions cannot meet, as indeed they never will, but always stand at some distance off from one another. Our zeal, if it be heavenly, if it be true Vestal fire kindled from above, will not delight to tarry here below, burning up straw and stubble, and such combustible things, and sending up nothing but grofs and earthy fumes to heaven; but it will rise up, and return back pure as it came down, and will be ever striving to carry up men's hearts to God along with it. It will be only occupied about the promoting of those things, which are unquestionably good; and when it moves in the irresistible way, it will quarrel with nothing but sin. Here let our zeal busy and exercise itself, every one of us beginning first at our own hearts. Let us be more zealous than ever we have yet been, in fighting against our lusts, in pulling down those strong holds of sin and Satan in our hearts. Here let us exercise all our courage and resolution, our manhood and magnanimity.

Let us trust in the almighty arm of our God, and doubt not but he will as well deliver us from the power of sin in our hearts, as preserve us from the wrath to come. Let us go out against these uncircumcised Philistines, I mean our lusts, not with shield or spear, not in any confidence of our own strength, but in the name of the Lord of hosts; and we shall prevail, we shall overcome our lusts: for greater is he that is in us, than he that is in them. The eternal God is our refuge, and underneath are everlasting arms; be shall thrust out these enemies from before us; and be shall say, Destroy them. We shall enter the true Canaan, the good land of promise, that floweth with milk and honey, the land of truth and holiness. Wherefore take unto you the whole armour of God, that you may be able to withstand. Let your loins be girt about with truth; have on the breast-plate of righteousness; and let your feet be shod with the preparation of the gospel of peace. Above all, take the shield of faith, whereby ye shall be able to quench all the fiery darts of the wicked; and take the helmet of salvation, and the sword of the Spirit, which is the word of God. And lastly, be sure of this, that ye be strong only in the Lord, and in the power of his might.

There be some, that dishearten us in this spiritual warfare, and would make us let our weapons fall out of our hands, by working in us a despair of victory. There be some evil spies, that weaken the hands and hearts of the children of Israel, and bring an ill report upon that land, that we are to conquer, telling of nothing but strange giants, the sons of Anak, there, that we shall never be able to overcome. The Amalekites (say they) dwell in the South, the Hittites, Jebusites, Amorites in the mountains, and the Canaanites by the sea-coast; huge armies of tall, invincible lusts: we shall never be able to go against these people; we shall never be able to prevail against our corruptions. Hearken not unto them, I beseech you, but hear what Ca-
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Let us go up at once and possess it, for we are able to overcome them; not by our own strength, but by the power of the Lord of Hosts. There are indeed sons of Anak there, there are mighty giant-like lusts, that we are to grapple with; nay, there are principalities and powers too, that we are to oppose: but the great Michael, the Captain of the Lord's host, is with us; he commands in chief for us, and we need not be dismayed. Understand therefore this day, that the Lord thy God is he, which goeth before thee as a consuming fire; he shall destroy these enemies, and bring them down before thy face. If thou wilt be faithful to him, and put thy trust in him, as the fire consumeth the stubble, and as the flame burneth up the chaff, so will he destroy thy lusts in thee: their root shall be rottenness, and their blossom shall go up as the dust.

But let us take heed, that we be not discouraged, and, before we begin to fight, despair of victory: but to believe and hope well in the power of our God and his strength, will be half a conquest. Let us not think holiness in the hearts of men here in the world is a forlorn, forsaken, and outcast thing from God, that he hath no regard of holiness; wherever it is, though never so small, if it be but hearty and sincere, it can no more be cut off, and discontinued from God, than a sun-beam here upon earth can be broken off from its intercourse with the sun, and be left alone amidst the mire and dirt of this world. The sun may as well discard its own rays, and banish them from itself into some region of darkness far remote from it, where they shall have no dependence at all upon it, as God can forsake and abandon holiness in the world, and leave it a poor orphan thing, that shall have no influence at all from him to preserve and keep it. Holiness is something of God, wherever it is; it is an efflux from him, that always hangs upon him, and lives in him: as the sun-beams, although they gild this lower world, and spread their golden wings over us, yet they are not so much here, where they shine, as in the sun, from whence they flow. God cannot draw a curtain betwixt himself and holiness, which is nothing but the splendour and shining of himself; he cannot hide his face from it, he cannot desert it in the world. He, that is once born of God, shall overcome the world, and the prince of this world too, by the power of God in him. Holiness is no solitary neglected thing; it hath stronger confederacies, greater alliances, than sin and wickedness. It is in league with God and the universe; the whole creation smiles upon it: there is something of God in it, and therefore it must needs be a victorious and triumphant thing.

Wickedness is a weak, cowardly and guilty thing, a fearful and trembling shadow. It is the child of ignorance and darkness; it is afraid of light, and cannot possibly withstand the power of it, nor endure the sight of its glittering armour. It is allied to none but wretched, forlorn and apostate spirits, that do what they can to support their own weak and tottering kingdom of darkness, but are only strong in weaknesses and impotency. The whole polity and commonwealth of devils is not so powerful as one child of light, one babe in Christ; they are not able to quench the least smoking flax, to extinguish one spark of grace. Darkness is not able to make resistance against light, but ever, as it comes, flies before it. But if wickedness.
Preached before the House of Commons.

wickedness invite the society of devils to it, (as we learn by the sad experience of these present times, in many examples of those, that were possessed with malice, revengefulness and luft) so that those cursed fiends do most readily apply themselves to it, and offer their service to feed it and encourage it, because it is their own life and nature, their own kingdom of darkness, which they strive to enlarge and to spread the dominions of; shall we then think, that holiness, which is so nearly allied unto God, hath no good genius at all in the world to attend upon it, to help it and encourage it? Shall not the kingdom of light be as true to its own interest, and as vigilant for the enlarging of itself, as the kingdom of darkness? Holiness is never alone in the world, but God is always with it, and his loving Spirit doth ever associate and join itself to it. He, that sent it into the world, is with it, as Christ speaketh of himself; The Father hath not left me alone, because I do always those things that please him. Holiness is the life of God, which he cannot but feed and maintain wheresoever it is: and as devils are always active to encourage evil, so we cannot imagine, but that the heavenly host of blessed angels above are busily employ’d in the promoting of that, which they love best, that which is dearest to God, whom they serve, the life and nature of God. There is joy in heaven at the conversion of one sinner; heaven takes notice of it; there is a Choir of angels, that sweetly sings the epithalamium of a soul divorced from sin and Satan, and espoused unto Christ. What therefore the wise man speaks concerning wisdom, I shall apply to holiness: Take fast hold of holiness, let her not go, keep her, for she is thy life: keep thy heart with all diligence, for out of it are the issues of life, and of death too. Let nothing be esteemed of greater consequence and concernment to thee than what thou dost and actest, how thou livest. Nothing without us can make us either happy or miserable; nothing can either defile us, or hurt us, but what goeth out from us, what springeth and bubbleth up out of our own hearts. We have dreadful apprehensions of the flames of hell without us; we tremble, and are afraid, when we hear of fire and brimstone; whilst in the mean time we securely nourish within our own hearts a true and living hell,

\[\text{ccco carpinur igni}\]

The dark fire of our lufts consumeth our bowels within, and miserably scourgeth our souls, and we are not troubled at it. We do not perceive, how hell fleas upon us whilst we live here. And as for heaven, we only gaze abroad, expecting, that it should come in to us from without, but never look for the beginnings of it to arise within, in our own hearts.

But lest there should yet haply remain any prejudice against that, which I have all this while heartily commended to you, true holiness, and the keeping of Christ’s commandments, as if it were a legal and a servile thing, that would subject us to a state of bondage; I must here needs add a word or two, either for the prevention, or removal of it. I do not therefore mean
by holiness, the meer performance of outward duties of religion, coldly acted
over as a task; nor our habitual prayings, hearings, fallings, multiplied
one upon another, (though these be all good, as subservient to an higher
end:) but I mean an inward soul and principle of divine life, that spiriteth
all these, that enliveth and quickeneth the dead carcasse of all outward
performances whatsoever. I do not here urge the dead law of outward
works, which indeed, if it be alone, subjects us to a state of bondage; but
the inward law of the Gospel, the law of the spirit of life, than which no-
thing can be more free and ingenuous: for it doth not act us by principles
without us, but is an inward self-moving principle living in our hearts.

The first, though it work us into some outward conformity to God's com-
mandments, and doth hath a good effect upon the world; yet we are all this
while but like dead instruments of musick, that sound sweetly and harmo-
niously, when they are only struck and play'd upon from without by the mu-
cician's hand, who hath the theory and law of musick living within himself.

But the second, the living law of the Gospel, the law of the spirit of life
within us, is as if the soul of musick should incorporate itself with the in-
strument, and live in the strings, and make them of their own accord, with-
out any touch or impulse from without, dance up and down, and warble
out their harmonies.

They, that are acted only by an outward law, are but like Neurofpeics, or
those little puppets, that skip nimbly up and down, and seem to be full of
quick and sprightly motion; whereas they are all the while moved arti-
циально by certain wires and strings from without, and not by any principle
of motion from themselves within: or else like clocks and watches, that
go pretty regularly for a while, but are moved by weights and plummets,
or some other artificial springs, that must be ever now and then wound up,
or else they cease.

But they, that are acted by the new law of the Gospel, by the law of the
spirit, they have an inward principle of life in them, that from the centre
of itself puts forth itself freely and constantly into all obedience to the will
of Christ. This new law of the Gospel is a kind of musical soul, informing
the dead organ of our hearts, that makes them of their own accord delight
to act harmoniously according to the rule of God's word.

The law, that I speak of, is a law of love, which is the most powerful
law in world; and yet it freeth us in a manner from all law without us, be-
cause it maketh us become a law unto ourselves. The more it prevaleth in
us, the more it eateth up and devoureth all other laws without us; just as
Aaron's living rod did swallow up those rods of the Magicians, that were
made only to counterfeit a little life.

*Quis legem det amantibus?*
*Major lex amor est fisci.*

Love is at once a freedom from all law, a state of purest liberty; and yet
a law too of the most constraining and indispensible necessity.

The worst law in the world is the law of sin, which is in our members;
which keeps us in a condition of most absolute slavery, when we are wholly
under
under the tyrannical commands of our lusts: this is a cruel Pharaoh indeed, that lets his hard task-masters over us, and maketh us wretchedly drudge in mire and clay.

The law of the letter without us sets us in a condition of little more liberty, by restraining us from many outward acts of sin; but yet it doth not滇thral us from the power of sin in our hearts.

But the law of the spirit of life, the Gospel-law of love, it puts us into a condition of most pure and perfect liberty; and whosoever really entertain this law, he hath 

ibrust out Hagar quite, he hath cast out the bond-woman and her children; from henceforth Sarah the free woman shall live for ever with him, and the shall be to him a mother of many children; her seed shall be as the sand of the sea-shore for number, and as the stars of heaven.

Here is evangelical liberty, here is Gospel-freedom, when the law of the spirit of life in Christ Jesus hath made us free from the law of sin and death; when we have a liberty from sin, and not a liberty to sin: for our dear Lord and Master hath told us, that whosoever committeth sin, is the servant of it.

He that lies under the power and vassalage of his base lusts, and yet talks of Gospel-freedom, he is but like a poor condemned prisoner, that in his sleep dreams of being set at liberty, and of walking up and down wherefoever he pleafeth, whilst his legs are all the while locked fast in fetters and irons. To please ourselves with a notion of Gospel-liberty, whilst we have not a Gospel-principle of holiness within us, to free us from the power of sin, is nothing else but to gild over our bonds and fetters, and to fancy ourselves to be in a golden cage. There is a straitness, slavery and narrowness in sin: sin crowds and crumples up our souls, which, if they were freely spread abroad, would be as wide and as large as the whole universe.

No man is truly free, but he that hath his will enlarged to the extent of God's own will, by loving whatsoever God loves, and nothing else. Such a one doth not fondly hug this and that particular created good thing, and en-vasal himself unto it; but he loves every thing, that is lovely, beginning at God, and descending down to all his creatures, according to the several degrees of perfection in them. He enjoys a boundless liberty, and a boundless sweetness, according to his boundless love. He inclaspeth the whole world within his out-stretched arms; his soul is as wide as the whole universe, as big as yesterday, to-day, and for ever. Whosoever is once acquainted with this dis-position of spirit, he never desires any thing else, and he loves the life of God in himself dearer than his own life. To conclude this therefore; if we love Christ, and keep his commandments, his commandments will not be grievous to us; his yoke will be easy, and his burden light: it will not put us into a state of bondage, but of perfect liberty. For it is most true of evangelical obedience, what the wise man speaketh of wisdom, _Her ways are ways of pleasantness, and all her paths are peace: She is a tree of life to them that lay hold upon her, and happy are all they that retain her._

I will now shunt up all with one or two considerations, to persuade you farther to the keeping of Christ's commandments.

First, from the desire, which we all have of knowledge. If we would indeed know divine truths, the only way to come to this is by keeping of
Christ's commandments. The groviness of our apprehensions in spiritual things, and our many mistakes, that we have about them, proceed from nothing but those dull and foggy freams, which rise up from our foul hearts, and bcloud our understandings. If we did but heartily comply with Christ's commandments, and purge our hearts from all gross and fenfual affections, we should not then look about for truth wholly without ourselves, and enslave ourselves to the dictates of this and that teacher, and hang upon the lips of men; but we should find the great eternal God inwardly teaching our souls, and continually instructing us more and more in the mysteries of his will; and out of our bellies should flow rivers of living waters. Nothing puts a stop and hindrance to the paffage of truth in the world, but the carnality of our hearts, the corruption of our lives.

'Tis not wrangling disputes, and fyllogiftical reafonings, that are the mighty pillars, that underprop truth in the world: if we would but underlet it with the holinefs of our hearts and lives, it fhould never fail. Truth is a prevailing and conquering thing, and would quickly overcome the world, did not the earthinefs of our dispositions, and the darknes of our falle hearts hinder it. Our Saviour Christ bids the blind man wash off the clay, that was upon his eyes in the pool of Siloam, and then he fhould fee clearly; intimating this to us, that it is the earthinefs of men's affections, that darkens the eye of their understandings in spiritual things. Truth is always ready and near at hand, if our eyes were not clofed up with mud, that we could but open them to look upon it. Truth always waits upon our souls, and offers itself freely to us, as the sun offers its beams to every eye, that will but open, and let them shine in upon it. If we could but purge our hearts from that filth and defilement, which hangeth about them, there would be no doubt at all of truth's prevailing in the world. For truth is great, and stronger than all things: all the earth calleth upon truth, and the heaven bleffeth it; all works fhake and tremble at it. The truth endureth, and is always strong; it liveth and conquerrth for evermore. She is the strength, kingdom, power, and majesty of all ages. Bleffed be the God of truth.

Secondly, If we defire a true reformation, as fome would bethought to do; let us begin here in reforming our hearts and lives, in keeping Christ's commandments. All outward forms and models of reformation, though they be never fo good in their kind, yet they are of little worth to us without this inward reformation of the heart. Tin, or lead, or any other bafer metal, if it be cast into never fo good a mould, and made up into never fo elegant a figure, yet is it but tin or lead still; it is the fame metal, that it was before. If adulterate silver, that hath much alloy or dros in it, have never fo current a stamp put upon it, yet it will not pafs notwithstanding, when the touchstone trieith it. We must be reformed within, with a spirit of fire, and a spirit of barning, to purge us from the dros and corrupption of our hearts, and refine us as gold and silver; and then we fhall be reformed truly, and not before. When this once comes to pafs, then fhall Christ be set upon his throne indeed, then the glory of the Lord fhall overflow the land; then we fhall be a people acceptable unto him, and as Mount Sion, which he dearly loved.
THE SECOND SERMON: OR, A DISCOURSE
On 1 Corinthians. XV. 57.

But thanks be to God, which giveth us the Victory through our Lord Jesus Christ.

CHRISt's resurrection, which the Apostle treateth of in the former part of this chapter, is one of the main and principal articles of our Christian faith: for though Christ by his death upon the cross made a propitiatory sacrifice for the world, yet it was his resurrection only, which did manifest his death to be effectual and available for that end, and did evidence its acceptance with God. For if the grave had detain'd Christ, and held him prisoner, this would have been an argument, that the debt, for which he was committed to that dark dungeon, was not yet paid, nor satisfaction made; for if Christ be not raised (saith the Apostle) your faith is in vain, ye are yet in your sins. But now death and the grave having delivered up Christ out of their custody, his resurrection is an undoubted argument, that they had no more to lay to his charge, as he was a surety and undertaker for mankind; but the debt, which was owing to the law and divine justice, was in the court of heaven fully acquitted and discharged. For Christ was delivered from our sins, and rose again for our justification.

And though Christ's other miracles ought to have conciliated belief to his doctrine from the Jews; yet his resurrection from the dead, (foretold
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(foretold by himself, and really accomplished) added to all the rest, was a most undoubted and unquestionable confirmation of his prophetic ministry. For if it were supposed, (as the Jews of old, and the Talmudists of later times, maliciously calumniated our Saviour Christ) that a mere wizard or magician should have appeared, and not only have done many miracles by Beelzebub and the powers of darkness, but also have foretold, that after he had been put to death, he should rise again, and have given this as a farther sign to confirm his prophecy, as our Saviour did, Matt. xii. 39. it could never be conceiv’d, that Divine Providence should suffer such an impostor miraculously to rise again, in so remarkable a manner, and so often to appear before the eyes of so many spectators, and at last visibly to ascend up to heaven. Because this would have been
tentatio invincibilis to mankind; it being not imaginable, what greater assurance heaven itself could give, to confirm and seal a prophet, and persuade the world, that what he did was by the finger of God, and not by magical imposture, than this is. And therefore it is observable, that though a good while after our Saviour’s time, when the Jews had now forfeited that peculiar Providence, that watched over them, a certain counterfeit Messiah, one David El-Roy, was permitted to do several strange and miraculous things by magick and witchcraft, if the Jewish relations be true; yet, when he gave this for a sign to the Persian king, to prove himself the Messiah, that after he was beheaded by him, he should rise again, he plainly discovered his imposture, to the great disappointment of the deluded Jews, who (as Maimonides writes) in vain expected his resurrection a good while after.

Moreover, If Christ had not risen again after death, the world would not have had sufficient ground to trust and believe in him as a Saviour. St. Austin reckoned it as great a miracle as any, that Christ ever did upon earth, that the world should be brought off to believe in a crucified Saviour. For to worship יזרעא, as the Jews by way of disgrace call our Saviour, or דָּבָר זָּרוּבָּלִים גָּאֵרְבּ in Lucian’s language, one that was hanged, for a God, and to believe in him, could not but seem a monstrous and prodigious thing, both to Jews and Gentiles; and certainly it would never have been brought to pass, had there not been unquestionable assurance given of Christ’s resurrection from the dead. For who would be so foolish, as to believe in a dead Saviour, and to expect help and assistance from him, that had not been able to help himself, and therefore had given no proof, that he was able to help others? nay, from him, that, to all human appearance, had now no being at all? Upon which account the Psalmist upbraids the foolish Heathen, that they ate the sacrifices of the dead. Wherefore it is observable, in the Gospel, that when Christ was now dead, and buried in his sepulchre, the hope and expectation of his disciples, who had formerly believed in him, lay, as it were, intombed in the same sepulchre with him. And then the two disciples, that went to Emmaus, could only say, We trusted, that this had been he, which should have redeemed Israel. But afterwards, when they were able upon good grounds to affirm, that καὶ οὗτος ἰδοὺ ἀνεβαίνει, The Lord was risen indeed, then their faith revived a-new, and mounted up higher than ever, and grew triumphant in them.

Again,
Again, there was another excellent design in Christ's resurrection from the dead, which the Apostle pursues largely also in this chapter; viz. To give the world assurance of a life after death, and a blessed immortality to be enjoyed by all true believers and followers of Christ. Christ, by his resurrection, hath abolished death, and brought life and immortality to light, as the Apostle speaks, 2 Tim. 1. 10. or, as the Church fings in that divine anthem, *After he had overcome the sharpness of death, he opened the kingdom of heaven to all believers.*

The reasons of philosophy, that prove the soul's immortality, though firm and demonstrative in themselves, yet they are so thin and subtil to vulgar apprehensions, that they glide away through them, and leave no such palpable impressions on them, as can be able sufficiently to bear up against that heavy weight of gross infidelity, that continually sinks down the minds of men to a distrust of such high things, as be above the reach of sense. Neither are these considerations any longer of force, than men can actually attend to the strength and coherence of the demonstration; and when that actual attention (which is operose and difficult) is taken off, then the truth itself, like a spectre or apparition, suddenly vanishes away, and men question with themselves afterwards, whether there were any such thing, or no. Such thin and evanish things are philosophical speculations about the high mysteries of faith and religion. But Christ his raising of the self-same body, which was laid in the sepulchre, and afterwards appearing in it often to his disciples, gave such evident assurance of the soul's immortality and life after death, as must needs strike more strongly upon vulgar minds, and make more palpable impressions on them, and be always of more present and ready use, than any philosophical reasons and demonstrations.

And the Scripture is herein very harmonious, and agreeable to itself, both in the Old and New Testament; for, as in the one, it makes the original of death's entrance into the world to be the sin and disobedience of the first Adam, who was ὄψις in γῆς, χαοῖς, of the earth, earthy; so, in the other, it attributes the recovery of life and immortality to the meritorious obedience of the second Adam, that was ὁ Κυρίος ἐκ ἀρχῆς ἐπερχόμενος, the Lord from heaven, heavenly, who by his death vanquished and destroyed death. For as Sampson, who was a type of our Saviour, when he was besieged by the Philistines in the city Gaza (Judges xvi.) rose up at midnight, and pulled up the gates of the city, and the pofts, and laying them upon his shoulders, carried them up to the top of the hill; in like manner, Christ our Lord, when he was environed and encompassed by death, after he had been a while detained under the custody thereof, he ascended victoriously out of the power of the grave, and carried the gates of hell and death upon his shoulders along with him triumphantly into heaven: he flighted and dismantled that mighty garrison, whose walls were stronger than brass, and gates harder than adamant, that it should be no longer a prison, with doors and bars to shut up those, that believe in him, but an open and free passage, and a broad highway to life and immortality. He is the resurrection and the life, (John xi. 25.) and be that believeth in him, though he were dead, yet shall be live. For be that liveth, and was dead, and is alive for evermore, even he hath the keys of hell and of death, Rev. 1. 18.
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But that, which I chiefly aim at this time, concerning Jesus his resurrection, and ascension into heaven, is this, That by and after it he was made Lord and Christ, King and Saviour, and Sovereign of his church. Not but that Christ’s Humanity was always hypothetically united to the Divinity; but because the eonoeconomic kingdom of Christ, as Mediator, according to the Scripture-calculation, seems not to commence, till after his state of humiliation was, and so begins its epocha from Christ’s resurrection, or his exaltation to sit at God’s right-hand in heaven. Acts ii. 36. Let all the house of Israel know assuredly, that God hath made that same Jesus, whom ye have crucified, both Lord and Christ. Acts v. 31. Jesus, whom ye slew and hanged on a tree, him hath God exalted on his right-hand, to be a prince and a Saviour, &c. Philip. ii. 9. Who humbled himself, and became obedient to the death of the cross; wherefore God hath highly exalted him, and given him a name above every name, that at the name of Jesus every knee should bow, &c. and that every tongue should confess, that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father. And that article of our creed, concerning Christ’s sitting at God’s right-hand in heaven, signifies thus much unto us; that Christ, after his resurrection and ascension into heaven, hath all power given him, both in heaven and in earth, all things being made subject to him, excepting him only, that hath put all things under him. He being, for the comfort of his church and members here upon earth, according to his humanity, made God’s vicegerent, and seated in his Father’s throne; and having a mediatorial kingdom bestowed upon him, that shall continue, till be hath put down all authority and power, and hath subdued all his enemies under his feet; and then hath delivered up this eonoeconomic kingdom to God the Father, that God may be all in all.

And this is an unspeakable consolation, that Christian religion affords to us, and a most gracious condescension of the All-wise God; that forasmuch as we, who dwell in these houses of clay, are so far removed from the pure and abstracted Deity, and so infinitely disproportioned unto it, that there should be such a contrivance as this set on foot, that we should have one of our own flesh and blood, that was in all things tempted, like unto us, and had experience of all our difficulties and calamities; who demonstrated his infinite love to us in laying down his life for us, and therefore we cannot doubt, but hath a most tender sympathy and fellow-feeling with us in all our infirmities; I say, that we should have such a one exalted to God’s right-hand, and invested with all authority and power, both in heaven and earth, that he might administer all things for the good of his church and members, and supply them in all their wants and necessities. Which consideration must needs be far more comfortable, cheering, and reviving to every true Christian, than it was to the sons of Jacob, when they went down to Egypt to buy corn and provision for their necessities, to think, that Joseph their brother was made lord of all the land.

And yet, notwithstanding, this is wholly eluded and evacuated by those high-flown spiritualists of these latter times, that flight and reject the letter of the New Testament, as a mean and carnal thing, and will acknowledge no other death and resurrection of Christ, no other ascension and sitting at God’s right-hand; nay, no other day of judgment, nor resurrection
reception of the body, but what is mythical and allegorical; whereby they do not only impudently flur the Gospel, according to the history and the letter, in making it no better, than a romantiical legend, or a mere Æfopic fable, that contains a good ἐνθέσιον, or moral under it; but also plainly defeat the counsel of God against themselves and mankind, by anti-quating Christianity, and bringing in, instead thereof, old Paganism again, disguised under a few canting phrases of Scripture-language. For though Moses had a veil over his face, though there were many obscure umbrages and allegories in the Law, (the children of Israel being then not able to bear the brightness of that evangelical truth, that shined under them;) yet now, under the Gospel, we do all with open face behold, as in a glass, the glory of the Lord nakedly represented to us, being changed into the same image from glory to glory.

But to let pass these, and still to improve our former meditation farther; let us in the next place consider, that Christ, who received all this power after his resurrection and ascension, did not receive it in vain and to no purpose, either taking no notice of our human transactions here below, as having removed his pavilion too far into those regions of light and glory from us; or else remaining, notwithstanding, an idle spectator, and no way concerning or interesting himself in the issues of our human affairs. Which will be so much the more improbable, if we consider what the Scripture and experience tell us, that the devil and apostate spirits are perpetually active and busy in promoting the concernments of the kingdom of darkness. And therefore doubtless he, whom God hath made the shepherd and bishop of our souls, can never be so regardles of his office, nor so careless of his flock and tender lambs committed to his charge, as to suffer those cruel wolves to prey upon them at pleasure; and to have no pity at all for them, nor to extend his watchful providence over them, whom once he vouchsafed to redeem with his own precious blood. No certainly; he, that waded through so many difficulties and agonies for us in the days of his flesh; he, that bore our griefs, and carried our sorrows; he, that was wounded for our transgressions, and bruised for our iniquities; that sweet drops of blood in the garden, and was nailed to the cross for us in Golgota; he cannot so easily forget those, whom he hath so dearly bought, nor suffer all that power, which God hath invested him with for the good of his church, to lie by him idle and unemployed.

But to the end, that there might not be the least ground of suspicion, or distrust, left in the minds of men concerning this particular, Christ, after his ascension into heaven, thought good to give us a sensible demonstration, both of his kingly power, and of his watchful care and providence over his church, that he would not leave them orphans, and destitute of all assistance, by sending down his Holy Spirit on the day of Pentecost, in a visible and miraculous manner, upon his disciples. Acts ii. 32. This Jesus hath God raised up, of which we are all witnesses; therefore being by the right-hand of God exalted, and having received of the Father the promise of the Holy Ghost, he hath shed forth this, which ye now see and hear. And verily, if there had been no news heard of our Lord and Saviour Christ, after he ascended above the clouds out of his disciples sight, no real and visible de-
The Second Sermon.

monstration of his existence, power, and providence over his church; the dis-trustful hearts of men would have been too prone to suspect, that the pretence of an invisible kingdom at God's right-hand above had been no better than a mere dream, an airy and phantastick notion; and they would have been too ready to have called in question the truth of all his other miracles, his resurrection and ascension, witnessed only by his own disciples, and to have surmised those several apparitions of his, that we read of after his death, had been nothing else but spectres, or phantasmis, like the vulgarly believed apparitions of the ghosts of men in airy bodies. But the sensible and miraculous pouring out of the Holy Ghost upon his disciples, after his ascension into heaven, was a palpable confirmation of all Christ's other miracles, of the validity of his meritorious death and passion, of the truth of his resurrection and ascension; and gives most comfortable assurance to all believers to the world's end, that though his bodily presence be withdrawn from them, yet he hath not left his church utterly forlorn, and destitute of all assistance; but that his Spirit, the Holy Comforter, continueth to be present amongst them, as his vicegerent, and to assist them for all the holy purposes of the Gospel, to the world's end. Now the principal effects of Christ's Holy Spirit, which are to be hoped for, and expected by every true believer and private Christian, are comprised by the Apostle under three heads here in the text, as consisting in a threelfold vi-tory over a threelfold enemy. The sign of death is sin, and the strength of sin is the law; but thanks be to God, which giveth us the victory through our Lord Jesus Christ.

1. A victory over sin, as that which is the cause of death.
2. A victory over the law, as that which aggravates the guilt, and exasperates the power of sin.
3. Lastly, A victory over death, the fruit and consequent of sin.

First therefore, There is a victory over sin, to be obtained in and through Christ.

Some there are, that will acknowledge no other victory over sin, but an external one; that whereby it was conquered for us by Christ upon the cross, sixteen hundred years since, where he spoilt principalities and powers, and made a show of them openly, triumphing over them in it, Col. ii. 15. and where he redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us, Gal. iii. 13. And doubtless this was one great end of Christ's coming into the world, to make a propitiatory sacrifice for the sins of mankind: not only that he might thereby put a period to those continually-repeated and ineffectual sacrifices of brute beasts, and the offering of the blood of bulls and goats, that could not take away sin, nor propitiate his Divine Majesty; but also that he might at once give a sensible demonstration, both of God's high displeasure against sin, and of his placabilities and reconcileableness to sinners returning to obedience; and therefore, to that end, that the despair of pardon might not hinder any from repentance and amendment of life, promulgate free pardon and remission of sins, through his blood, to all that should repent, and believe the gospel. But.
But it is a very unfond and unwholesome interpretation of this salutary undertaking of Christ in the Gospel, as if the ultimate end and design of it were to procure remission of sin, and exemption from punishment only, to some particular persons still continuing under the power of sin, and to save them at last in their sins, that is, with a mere outward and carnal salvation; it being a thing utterly impossible, that those undefiled rewards of the heavenly kingdom should be received and enjoyed by men in their unregenerate and unregenerated nature.

For what is this else, but to make Christ the grand patron of the kingdom of darkness, and to suppose God to be such a Being as may be bribed and corrupted, by sacrifice and intercession, to a partial connivance and fond indulgence of men in their sins to all eternity? or else to insinuate, that there is no other evil at all in sin, but only in respect of that outward punishment consequent upon it? Which is to destroy the nature and reality of sin, and to make it nothing but a mere name or phancy; as if good and evil, just and unjust, (as some philosophers dreamed) were not Φίλες, but Νόμος and Δόξα only, had no reality in nature, but depended only upon arbitrary laws, enforced by outward punishments, or mere opinions; and so were only Πάντες, (as Democritus expresseth it) mere fictitious things, or else Φάντασμα, fictitious and imaginary: either of which opinions, if they were true, then indeed remission of sin, and exemption from punishment, would quite take away all the evil of sin.

But if sin be not a mere name or phancy, but that which hath a real and intrinsic evil in it, greater than that of outward punishment; then certainly it cannot be so transcendent a happiness, as some men carnally conceive, to have an impunity in finning to all eternity, that the accomplishment thereof should be thought the only fit undertaking for the Son of God to engage in, and that which would deservedly entitle him the Saviour of mankind. For that of Socrates in Plato must then needs be true, "Τὸ ἀδικίαν ἔχειν διὰ τὸν θάνατον, πάντων μὲν ἀδικοῦ τε ἔχειν παντὶ κακῷ, ἢ αὐτὸν. That (in those, which are not incorrigible and incorrigible) it is the greatest evil, that can possibly befal them, to continue in wickedness unpunished; and the greatest kindness, that they can receive, by the lesser evil of punishment and chastisement, to be cured of the greater evil of sin: For (as the same philosopher speaks) Ἡμοὶ τὰς παραπανακεχεκολμητῆς διὰ καιρὸν, chastisement and correction is the natural remedy and cure of wickedness, which our Saviour confirms, when he saith, As many as I love, I rebuke and chasten: and sure the remedy is not worse than the disease.

Wherefore it was so far from being the ultimate end of Christ's undertaking to die for sin, that men might securely live in it, that on the contrary the death of Christ was particularly intended as an engine to batter down the kingdom of sin and Satan, and to bring men effectually unto God and righteousness, as the Scripture plainly witnesseth, 1 Pet. ii. 24. His own self have our sins in his body on the tree, that we, being dead to sin, might live to righteousness. The death of Christ conducing to this great end, not only as it was exemplary, and hieroglyphically instructed us, that we ought to take up the cross likewise, and follow our crucified Lord and Saviour, suffering in the flesh, and ceasing from sin; but also as it doth most lively demonstrate to us God's high displeasure against sin, and the malignant nature of it.
that could not otherwise be expiated than by the blood of that innocent and immaculate Lamb, the only begotten Son of God; and lastly, as the hope of pardon and free remission of sin, in the blood of Christ, for the truly penitent, might invite and animate men to cheerfull and vigorous endeavours against sin.

Others there are, that tell us, there is indeed something farther aimed at in the Gospel besides the bare remission of sins, but that it is nothing else but the imputation of an external righteousness, or another's inherent holiness, which is so completely made ours thereby to all intents and purposes, as if we ourselves had been really and perfectly righteous; and this upon no other condition or qualification at all required in us, but only of mere faith scrupulously prefixed from all holiness and sanctification, or the laying hold or apprehending only (as they use to phrase it) of this external and imputed righteousness; that is, the merely believing and imagining it to be ours: which kind of faith therefore is but the imagination of an imagination, or of that, which really is not, and, as Pindar calls man, 

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ifof facto a right and title thereby to heaven and happiness without holiness; for, Rom. viii. 30. Whom be justified, them be also glori-fited. Neither can any thing be required inherently in them, where all inherency is perfectly supplied by imputation. And though it be pretended, that sanctification will spontaneoufly follow after by way of gratitude; yet this is like to prove but a very slippery hold, where it is believed, that gratitude itself, as well as all other graces, is already in them by imputation. Neither can it be reasonably thought, that true holiness should spring by way of gratitude or ingenuity from such a principle of carnality, as makes men so well contented with a mere imaginary righteousness.

But this opinion, as it makes God, in justifying, to pronounce a false sentence, and to conceive of things otherwife than they are, and to do that, which himself hath declared to be abominable, to justify the wicked (in a

Prov.xvii.15.forensick sence) and as it is irreconcilable to those many Scriptures, that assure us God will render to every man according to his works; so it also takes away the necessity of Christ's meritorious and propitiatory sacrifice for the remission of sins: for where a complete righteousness is imputed, there is no sin at all to be pardoned. And lastly, it vainly supposes righteousnesses and holiness to be mere phantastical and imaginary things; for otherwise it were no more possible, that a wicked man should be made righteous by another's righteousness imputed, than that a sick man should be made whole by another's imputed health. If a brother or sister be naked and destitute of daily food, and one of you say unto them, Depart in peace, be you warmed, and be you
you filled; notwithstanding you give them not those things, which are needful for the body; what doth it profit? James ii. 15, 16. Even so, what doth it profit, my brethren, if a man say he hath faith (or imputed righteousness) and have not works? (that is, real and inherent righteousness, or inward regeneration) can such a faith (that is, imagination or imputation) save him? Certainly no more than mere words can clothe a naked man's back, or feed a hungry man's belly, or warm and shaw him, whose blood is frozen and congealed in his veins. Nay, it is no more possible for a man to be made holy, than to be made happy, by mere imputation, which latter few men would be contented withal; and, were it not for their hypocrisy, they would be as little contented with the former; and it would as little please them to be opinionem tantum justi, as opinionem tantum beatii, to use Tully's expression against the Epicureans. Nay, since it is most certain, that the greatest part of our happiness confineth in righteousness and holiness, it will unavoidably follow, that if we have no other than an imputative righteousness, we can have no other than an imputative happiness, and a mere imaginary heaven, which will little please us, when we feel ourselves to be in a true and real hell.

But it is not our intention here to quarrel about words and phrases, as if Christ's meritorious satisfaction might not be said to be imputed to those, that repent and believe the Gospel for remission of sins; much less to deny what the holy Scripture plainly affers, true and living faith, that worketh by love, which is the very essence of the new creature, or regenerate nature, ἄγαλμα τοῦ εἰκοστοῦ, to be imputed, or accounted for righteousness under the Gospel-dispenfation, where God will not proceed according to legal rigour and severity with his fallen creatures, but according to that equity and Εὐτυχία, which the philopher tells us is the truest justice. But our only design is, to caution against that Antinomian error, which is too often insinuated under the notion of imputed righteousness, as if there were no necessity of inherent righteousness, and a real victory over sin, in order to salvation, but that an imputed or imaginary one might serve the turn. Which error springing up very early amongst the Gnostic Christians, St. John gives a very feaonal antidote against it, 1 John iii. 7. Little children, let no man deceive you: be that doth righteousness, is righteous, even as he is righteous: and in chap. ii. ver. 4. He that believeth, I know him, and keepeth not his commandments, is a liar, and the truth is not in him. To which purpose is that also in his first chapter, ver. 5. This is the message, which we have heard of him, and declare to you, that God is light, and in him is no darkness at all. If we say, that we have fellowship with him, and walk in darkness, we lie, and do not the truth: But if we walk in the light, as he is in the light, we have fellowship one with another, and the blood of Jesus Christ cleanseth us from all sin. Wherefore the same Apostle, in that epistle, tells us of overcoming the wicked one, chap. ii. 14. and of overcoming the world, by our faith in Christ, chap. v. 4. And in the Apocalypse he propoundeth, from Christ himself, divers remarkable promises to him that overcometh: That he shall eat of the tree of life, that is in the midst of the paradise of God, chap. ii. ver. 7. That he shall not be hurt of the second death, ver. 11. That he shall have the hidden manna, and a white stone with a new name written in it.,
The Second Sermon.

It, which no man knoweth, saving he that receiveth it, ver. 17. That he will
give him the morning-star, ver. 28. That he shall be clothed in white raiment,
and his name shall not be blotted out of the book of life, chap. iii. ver. 5. That
he shall be a pillar in the temple of God, ver. 12. And that he shall sit with
Christ in his throne, as he overcame and sat down with his Father in his
throne, ver. 21. The condition of all which promises being overcoming, we
may well conclude from thence, that there is a real, and not an imaginary
victory only, to be obtained over the power of sin, as well as the guilt
of it.

Nay, it is true, and very observable, that those places, which are usually
quoted as the foundation of an imputed righteousness in some other sense
than what we before mentioned, are indeed no otherwise to be understood
than of a real inward righteousness, that is wrought or infused by the Spirit
of Christ. As that principal one, Philip. iii. 8. “For doubtless, and I count all
things loss for the excellency of the knowledge of Christ Jesus my Lord;—
that I may know him, and be found in him, not having mine own righteousness,
which is of the law, but that which is of the faith of Christ, the righteous-
ness which is of God by faith. Where Christ, whom the Apostle defines to
win, and to be found in, the righteousness, which is through the faith of
Christ, and the righteousness, which is of God through faith, are no external
imputed righteousness, but the real inward righteousness of the new crea-
ture, wrought by the Spirit of Christ through faith, which is opposed here
to our own righteousness, and the righteousness, which is of the law; that is,
the righteousness of outward works done by our own natural power, accord-
ing to the letter of the law, in our unregenerate state: for so the following
words explain the meaning, That I may know him, and the power of his re-
urrection, and the fellowship of his sufferings, being made conformable unto
his death; if by any means I might attain to the resurrection of the dead. And
this same inward and real righteousness is often elsewhere called Christ, and
the new man, that is said to be in us, and which we are exhorted to put on;
not by conceit or imagination only, but by real conformity to his nature, and
participation of his spirit.

And whereas the magnifiers of free grace in an Antinomian sense, and the
deniers of inherent righteousness, commonly conceive, that the free grace of
God consists in nothing but either in the pardon of sin and exemption from
punishment, or the imputation of an external holiness, and accounting men just
freely, without any condition but only the mere believing of this, that they
are so accounted; and that faith is no otherwise considered in the Gospel,
than in order to the believing of this imputation; and that our own works,
when they are comparatively undervalued to grace and faith, are to be taken
for all inherent righteousness and holiness, even the new creature itself:
that all these are errors, as it might be abundantly proved from sundry other
places of Scripture, so it may sufficiently appear from that one, Eph. ii.
4, &c. God, who is rich in mercy, for his great love, wherewith he loved us,
even when we were dead in sins, hath quickened us together with Christ, (by
grace ye are saved,) and hath raised us up together—That in the ages to
come he might shew the exceeding riches of his grace, and his kindness towards
us in Christ Jesus. For by grace are ye saved through faith, and not of
yourselves;
Cor. Chap. xv. Ver. 57.

...it is the gift of God: not of works, lest any man should boast.

For we are his workmanship, created in Christ Jesus unto good works. For when we are here said to be saved by grace, it is plain, that the Apostle means by saved, inwardly quickened and sanctified: οὐκ ἐξ θεοῦ is purgari à vitius: which inward sanctification is here attributed to God's free grace, and denied to ourselves and to works; the meaning whereof is, that it is not effected by our own works (whether of outward morality or legal ceremonies) done by our natural power in the unregenerate state, but by the quickening and enlivening spirit of Christ inwardly creating us a-new. And lastly, faith is plainly made the instrument of this inward sanctification, that is not wrought by our own works, but the grace and spirit of Christ. Whence we may well conclude, that the true object of the Christian faith is not only the blood of Christ shed upon the cross for the remission of sin, but also the renewing spirit of Christ for the inward conquering and mortifying of it, and the quickening or raising of us to an heavenly life.

And I dare be bold to say, that the inward sense of every true and sincere-hearted Christian in this point speaks the same language with the Scripture. For a true Christian, that hath any thing of the life of God in him, cannot but earnestly desire an inward healing of his sinful maladies and dis-tempers, and not an outward hiding and palliation of them only. He must needs passionately long more and more after a new life and nature, and the divine image to be more fully formed in him; insomuch, that if he might be secured from the pains of hell without it, he could not be fully quieted and satisfied therewith. 'Tis not the effects and consequents of sin only, the external punishment due unto it, that he desires to be freed from, but the intrinsic evil of sin itself, the plague of his own heart. As he often meditates with comfort upon that outward cross, to which his Saviour's hands and feet were nailed for his sins; so he impatiently desires also to feel the virtue of that inward cross of Christ, by which the world may be crucified to him, and he unto the world; and the power of Christ's resurrection in him still to raise him farther unto newness of life. Neither will he be more easily persuaded to believe, that his sinful lusts, the malignity and violence whereof he feels within himself, can be conquered without him, than that an army here in England can be conquered in France or Spain. He is so deeply sensible of the real evil, that is in sin itself, that he cannot be contented to have it only histriohnically triumphed over. And to fancy himself covered all over with a thin veil of mere external imputation, will afford little satisfactory comfort unto him, that hangers and thirits after righteousnes, and is weary and heavy laden with the burthen of sins, and doth not desire to have his inward maladies hid and covered only, but healed and cured. Neither can he be willing to be put off till the hour of death for a divorce betwixt his soul and sin; nor easily persuaded, that though sin should rule and reign in him all his life-long, yet the last parting groan, that shall divide his soul and body asunder, might have so great an efficacy, as in a moment also to separate all sin from his soul.

But that we may not seem here either to beat the air in generals and uncertainties, or by an indiscreet zeal to countenance those conceited and...
The Second Sermon.

Phil. iii. 12. high-flown enthusiasts of latter times, that, forgetting that example of modesty given us by the blessed Apostle, [Not as though I had already attained, or were already perfect——But this one thing I do, forgetting those things which are behind, and reaching forth unto those things which are before, I press towards the mark.] boldly arrogate to themselves such an absolute perfection, as would make them not to fland in need of any Saviour, nor to be cleansed by the blood of the lamb, which therefore they allegorize into a mystical sense; we must declare, that we speak not here of inherent righteousness, and a victory over sin in a legal or pharisaical sense, but in such an evangelical sense, as yet notwithstanding is true and real.

The first degree whereof is a principle of new life, infused into the soul by the spirit of Christ through faith, (which the Apostle calls Semen Dei, the seed of God) inclining it to love God and righteousness, as a thing correspondent to its nature, and enabling it to act freely and ingenuously in the ways of God, out of a living law written upon the heart, and to eschew sin as contrary to a vital principle. For the true Gospel-righteousness, which Christ came to set up in the world, doth not consist merely in outward works, whether ceremonial or moral, done by our own natural power in our unregenerate state, but in an inward life and spirit wrought by God. Which those very philosophers seemed in a manner to acknowledge, that denied ἀείτω to be δεικτικὸν τι, that virtue could be taught by outward rules and precepts like an art or trade; and Aristotle himself alfo, when he inclines to think, that men are ἁθεὶ μόνος ἐγγενοί, and that their being good depends upon some extraordinary divine influence and assistance. Which I the rather take notice of, because some late pretenders to philosophy have profanely derided this doctrine after this manner, as if it made good thoughts and virtuous dispositions to be Poured and blown into men by God. But there is a second degree of victory over sin, which every true Christian ought not only to look upon as possible, but also to endeavour after, and resolutely to pursue; which is such a measure of strength in the inward man, and such a degree of mortification or crucifixion of our sinful lusts, as that a man will not knowingly and deliberately do any thing, that his conscience plainly tells him is a sin, though there be never so great temptations to it.

Whether or no this be that evangelical perfection, which was the mark, that S. Paul pressed towards, and which he seems mystically to call the resurrection from the dead, or any thing farther, I leave it to others to make a judgment of. But doubtless, they, that have attained to such a principle of new life, and such a measure of inward strength, as is already mentioned, that is, to the perfection of unfeigned sincerity, may, notwithstanding the irregularities of the first motions, violent assaults and importunities of temptations, sudden incursions and obstructions, sins of mere ignorance and inadvertency, (which are all washed away in the blood of Christ) in a true evangelical sense be said to have attained to a victory over sin.

Wherefore I demand, in the next place, Why should be thought impossible by the grace of the Gospel, and the faith of Christ, to attain to such a victory as this is over sin? For sin owes its original to nothing else but ignorance and darkness. Πᾶς ὁ παρὰς ἀγνοεῖ, Every wicked man is ignorant.
And therefore in that sense that other maxim of the Stoicks may have some truth also, that ξονία αμαθάνοι, Men sin against their will; because if they knew, that those things were indeed so hurtful to them, they would never do them. Now, we all know, how easily light conquers darkness, and upon its first approach makes it fly before it, and, like a guilty shade, seek to hide itself from it, by running round about the earth. And certainly the light of God arizing in the soul can with as much ease scatter away the night of sinful ignorance before it. For truth hath a cognition with the soul; and falseness, lies, and impostures are no more able to make resistance against the power of truth breaking forth, than darkness is able to dispute with light. Wherefore the entrance in of light upon the soul is half a conquest over our sinful lusts.

Again, though sin have had a long and customary possession in the soul, yet it has no just title, much less a right of inheritance in it. For sin is but a stranger and foreigner in the soul, an usurper and intruder into the Lord’s inheritance. Sin it is no nature, as St. Austin and others of the fathers often inculcate, but an adventitious and extraneous thing; and the true and ancient nature of the soul of man suffers violence under it, and is oppressed by it. It is nothing else but the preternatural state of rational beings, and therefore we have no reason to think it must needs be perpetual and unalterable. Is it a strange thing, that a jarring instrument by the hand of a skilful musician should ever be set in tune again? Doubtless if an instrument of music were a living thing, it would be sensible of harmony as its proper state, and abhor discord and dissonance as a thing preternatural to it. The soul of man was harmonical as God at first made it, till sin, disordering the strings and faculties, put it out of tune, and marr’d the music of it: but doubtless that great Harmodes, that tunes the whole world, and makes all things keep their times and measures, is able to set this lesser instrument in tune again. Sin is but a disease and dyscrasy in the soul; righteousness is the health and natural complexion of it; and there is a propension in the nature of every thing to return to its proper state, and to cast off whatever is heterogeneous to it. And some physicians tell us, that medicaments are but subjacent to nature, by removing obstructions and impediments; but nature itself, and the inward Archeus releafted and set at liberty, works the cure. Bodies, when they are bent out of their place, and violently forced out of the natural position of their parts, have a spring of their own, and an inward strong propension to return to their own natural posture, which produceth that motion of restitution, that philosophers endeavour to give a reason of. As for example, air may be forced into much a lesser room, than it would naturally expand itself into: but whilst it is under this violence, it hath a spring or strong conatus to return to its proper state, (of which several ingenious observations have been lately published by a learned hand.) Now sin being a violent and preternatural state, and a sinner’s returning to God and righteousness being motus restitutionis & liberationis, whereby the soul is restored to its true freedom and ancient nature; why should there not be such an elater or spring in the soul, (quickened and enlivened by divine grace) such a natural conatus of returning to its proper state again? Doubtless there is, and
the Scripture seems sometimes to acknowledge it, and call it by the name of Spirit, when it speaketh of our free acting in God’s ways from an inward principle. For the spirit is not always to be taken for a breath or impulse from without; but also for an inward propension of the soul, awakened and revived in it, to return to its proper state, as it is intellectual, and then to act freely in it according to its ancient nature. For if the spirit were a mere external force acting upon the soul, without the concurrence of an innate principle, then to be acted by the spirit would be a state of violence to the soul, which it could not delight always to continue under; whereas the state of the spirit is a state of freedom, and not of violence, as the Apostle witnesseth, when he calls it the freedom of the spirit: it is the soul’s acting from an inward spring and principle of its own intellectual nature, not by a mere outward impulse, like a boat, that is tugged on by oars, or driven by a strong blast of wind. Wherefore the soul’s returning from sin to righteousness, which is its primitive nature, must needs have great advantages, it going on secundo flumine, according to the genuine current of its true intellectual nature, and having besides the afflance of a gentle gale of the divine spirit from without to help it forwards.

Why should it be thought so great an impossibility for men willingly to do that, which is agreeable to the law of goodness, since this is the genuine nature of the soul, when once it is freed from mistakes and incumbrances, from that which is heterogeneous and adventitious to it, that clogs it and oppresses it: and every life and nature acts freely according to its own propensions? Why should it seem strange, that the superior faculties of the soul should become predominant, since they are φυσις δεσπότικαί, of a lordly nature, and made to rule, and the inferior faculties of a servile temper, and made to be subject? Why should it seem impossible for equity, light, and reason to be enthroned in the soul of man again, and there to command and govern those exorbitant affections, that do so lawlessly rebel against them? For if some grave commanders and generals have been able by the majesty of their very looks to hush and silence a disorderly and mutinous rout of soldiers; certainly Reason re-enthronecd in her majestick seat, and re-invested with her ancient power and authority, which is natural and not usurped, would much more easily be able to check and controul the tumultuous rabble of lusts and passions in us.

Doubtless God hath no other design upon us in religion, and the Gospel of his Son, than what is for our good, and to restore us to the rectitude and perfection of our own beings: wherefore he seeks to redeem and call off our affections from the perishing vanities of this world, which being so infinitely below us, do debase and pollute our spirits: wherefore he would not have us to addict ourselves wholly to the gratifications of our lower faculties, which are but the brute in us, but he would have the best in us to be uppermost, the man to rule the brute, and the Ἰησοῦς, that that is of God in us, to rule our manly and rational faculties. He would not have us, Narcissus-like, to be always courting our own shadow in the stream; for, according to the ancient Democritical philosophy, this whole visible world is nothing else but mere extended bulk, and hath nothing real in it but atoms or particles of a different magnitude, diversly placed and agitated.
tated in a continual whirlpool. But all the colour, beauty and varnish, all that which charms and bewitches us in these objects without us, is nothing but the vital sensations and relishes of our own souls. This gives all the paint and lustre to those beauties, which we court and fall in love withal without us, which are otherwise as devoid of reality and phantastical as the colours of the rainbow. So that this outward world is not unfitness compared to an enchanting palace, which seems indeed mighty pleasing and ravishing to our deluded senses, whereas all is but imaginary and a mere pretentious show: those things, which we are enamoured with, thinking them to be without us, being nothing but the vital energies of our own spirits. In a word, God would have man to be a living temple for himself to dwell in, and his faculties instruments to be used and employed by him; which need not be thought impossible, if that be true, which philosophy tells us, that there is cognatio quaedam, a certain near kindred and alliance between the soul and God.

Lastly, we must observe, though this inward victory over sin be no otherwise to be effected than by the spirit of Christ through faith, and by a divine operation in us, so that in a certain sense we may be said to be passive thereunto; yet notwithstanding, we must not dream any such thing, as if our active co-operation and concurrence were not also necessarily required thereunto. For as there is a spirit of God in nature, which produceth vegetables and minerals, which human art and industry could never be able to effect; namely, that spiritus intus alens, which the Poet speaks of, which yet notwithstanding doth not work absolutely, unconditionally, and omnipotently, but requireth certain preparations, conditions, and dispositions in the matter, which it works upon; (for unless the husbandman plow the ground and sow the seed, the spirit of God in nature will not give any increase:) In like manner the Scripture tells us, that the divine spirit of grace doth not work absolutely, unconditionally, and irresistibly in the souls of men, but requireth certain preparations, conditions, and co-operations in us; soasmuch as it may both be quenched, and stirred up or excited in us. And indeed unless we plow up the fallow-ground of our hearts, and sow to ourselves in righteousness, (as the prophet speaks) by our earnest endeavours; we cannot expect, that the divine spirit of grace will shower down that heavenly increase upon us. Wherefore if we would attain to a victory over sin by the spirit of Christ, we must endeavour to fight a good fight, and run a good race, and to enter in at the strait gate, that so overcoming we may receive the crown of life. And thus much shall suffice to have spoken at this time concerning the first particular, The victory over sin.

I shall now proceed to speak something briefly to the two other victories that remain, which are attainable also by Christ over the law and death.

And the law may be considered two manner of ways: first, as an outward covenant of works that pronounceth death and condemnation to all, that do not yield absolute and entire obedience to whatever is therein commanded; and which imposed also with the same severity a multitude of outward ceremonial observations, which had no intrinsical goodness at all in them, but kept men in a state of bondage and servility. Now the

Law,
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law, in this sense, as it is an outward letter and covenant of works, is already conquered externally for us by Christ's death upon the cross, Gal. iii. 13. Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us; for it is written. Cursed is every one that hangeth on a tree; that the blessing of Abraham might come on the Gentiles through Jesus Christ, that we might receive the promise of the Spirit through faith. And he hath thereby freed us also from our obligation to those commandments that were not good, having broken down the middle wall of partition, that was betwixt Jew and Gentile, abolishing in his flesh the enmity, even the law of commandments, Eph ii. 14, 15. And blotting out the hand-writing of ordinances, that was against us, which was contrary to us, and taking it out of the way, nailing it to his cross, Col. ii. 14.

Secondly, The law is sometimes also considered in Scripture as an inward state of mind, wrought by the law and truth of God, whether written outwardly in the letter of the Scripture, or inwardly in the conscience, prevailing only so far as to beget a conviction of men's duty, and of the wrath of God against sin, but not enabling them with inward strength and power to do what is commanded, willingly, out of a love of it. It is such a state, when men are only passive to God's law, and unwillingly subject to it (as an enemy) for fear of wrath and vengeance. And this must needs be a state of miserable bondage and servility, distraction and perplexity of mind; when men are at once strongly convinced of the wrath of God against sin, and yet under the power of their lusts haling and dragging of them to the commission of it. It is that state (as I conceive) which St. Paul describes, Rom. vii. after this manner; The law is spiritual, but I am carnal, sold under sin: for that which I do, I allow not; for what I would, that do I not, but what I hate, that do I. And again, I see another law in my members warring against my mind, and bringing me into captivity under the law of sin. O wretched man that I am! who shall deliver me from this body of death? Now from the law in this sense, that is, from the bondage and servility of the legal state, we are not delivered, nor made conquerors, by what Christ did outwardly upon the cross, as some imagine; as if he had there purchased for us an indulgence to sin without control; but by the inward working of his Holy Spirit, freeing us from the power and bondage of sin, and unbewitching us from the love of it.

Wherefore there is a double freedom from this legal state to be taken notice of; a true and a false freedom; which I cannot better explain, than by using the Apostle's own similitude in the beginning of the seventh chapter: Know ye not, brethren, that the law hath dominion over a man as long as he liveth? (or rather, as long as it, that is, the law, liveth?) For the woman, which hath an husband, is bound by the law to her husband so long as he liveth; but if her husband be dead, she is loosed from the law of the husband. So then, if while her husband liveth she be married to another man, she shall be called an adulteress: but if her husband be dead, she is free from that law; so that she is no adulteress, though she be married to another man. Where the law is compared to an husband; and one, that is under the law, or in a legal state, to a woman, that hath an husband. And as there are two ways, by which a woman may be freed from her husband; the one, if she break loose from him
him whilst he yet liveth, contrary to the laws of wedlock, and marry to another man; which is an undue and unlawful freedom, for then she is justly styled an adulteress: another, if she stay till her husband be dead, and then, being free from the law of her husband, does lawfully marry to another man: In like manner there are two ways, by which men may be freed from the law, as it is an inward state of bondage and servility. The first is, when men do illegally and unlawfully break loose from the law, which is their husband, whilst he is yet alive, and ought to have dominion over them, and marry themselves to another husband; which husband's name is carnal liberty, or licentiousness, too often miscalled in these latter times by the name of Christian liberty: and such as these may well be styled, in the Scripture-language, adulterers and adulteresses. But there is another freedom from the law, which is a due and just freedom, when we do not make ourselves free before the time, violently breaking loose from it; but when we stay till the law, which is our husband, is dead, and the compulsory power of it taken away by the mortification of our lusts and affections, and so marry another husband, which is Christ, or the Spirit of righteousness, Rom. viii. 2.

The law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus hath made me free from the law of sin and death.

Wherefore there are three general states of men, in order to God and religion, that may be here taken notice of. The first is of them, that are alive to sin, and dead to the law. This the Apostle speaks of, Rom. vii. 9. I was alive without the law once. These are they, whose consciences are not yet considerably awakened to any sense of their duty, nor to the discrimination of good and evil, but sin freely, without any check or control, without any disquieting remorse of conscience.

The second is, when men are at once alive both to the law and sin, to the conviction of the one, and the power and love of the other; both these struggling together within the bowels of the soul, checking and controlling one another. This is a broken, confounded, and shattered state; and these, in the Apostle's language, are said to be slain by the law. I was alive without the law once; but when the commandment came, sin revived, and I died. And the commandment, which was ordained to life, I found to be unto death. For sin taking occasion by the commandment, deceived me, and by it slew me. Here is no peace, rest nor comfort to be had in this state, men's souls being distracted and divided by an intestine and civil war between the law of the mind and the law of the members conflicting with one another.

Wherefore the third state is, when men are dead both to the law and sin, and alive unto God and righteousness; the law of the Spirit of life freeing them from the law of sin and death. In the first of these three states, which is the most wretched and deplorable of all, we are sin's freemen, that is, free to commit sin without check or control. In the second, we are bondmen to God and righteousness, and serve God out of a principle of fear, and according to an outward rule only; children of Hagar the bondmaid, and of the letter. In the third, we are God's freemen and sons, and serve him in the newness of the Spirit, out of a love to God and righteousness; children of the New Testament, and of Sarah the freewoman.

Wherefore
Wherefore here are two mistakes or errors to be taken notice of, that defeat and disappoint the design of Christ in giving us the victory over the law. The first is of those, that we have already mentioned, that seek to themselves a freedom from the bondage of the law otherwise than by Christ and the Spirit of righteousness; namely, in a way of carnal liberty and licentiousness; whereby, instead of being bondmen to God and righteousness, they become perfect freemen to sin and wickedness, which is the most deplorable thraldom in the world. Wherefore these men, instead of going forward from the second state unto higher perfection, wheel back again unto the first; just as if the children of Israel, after they had been brought out of Egypt, and travelled a while in the desert of Arabia, where the law was given, instead of entering into Canaan, should have wheeled back into Egypt, and then, enjoying the garlick and onions, and flesh-pots thereof, should persuade themselves this was indeed the true land of promise, that floweth with milk and honey. And there is very great danger, lest when men have been tired out by wandering a long time in the dry and barren wilderness of the law, where they cannot enjoy the pleasure of sin as formerly, and yet have not arrived to the relish and love of righteousness, by reason of their impatience, they should at last make more haste than good speed, being seduced by some false shews of freedom, that are very tempting to such weary travellers, and promise much comfort and refreshment to them, inviting them to sit down under their shadow; such as are a Self-chosen Holiness, Ceremonial Righteousness, Opinionative Zeal, the Tree of Knowledge mistaken for the Tree of Life, high-flown Enthusiasm and Seraphism, Epicurizing Philosophy, Antinomian Liberty, under the pretence of Free Grace and a Gospel Spirit.

The second mistake, that is here to be heeded, is, of those, that would by all means persuade themselves, that there is no higher state of Christian perfection to be aimed at, or hoped for, in this life, than this legal state; That the good they would do, they do not; the evil they would not do, that they do; That the law of sin in their members still leads them captive from the law of their minds: having no other ground at all for this, but a novel interpretation of one paragraph in the epistle to the Romans, contrary to other express places of Scripture, and the sense of all ancient interpreters; and yet with so much zeal, as if it were a principal part of the Gospel-faith to believe this, (which is indeed arrant infidelity) and as if it were no less than presumption or impiety to expect a living law written upon our hearts. But this is nothing else, but, instead of seeking liberty out of the bondage of the law, to fall in love with our bonds and fetters, and plainly to deny the victory over the law by Christ, and to affirm, that the Gospel is but the ministration of a dead and killing letter, and not of the Spirit that quickeneth and maketh alive.

I come now, in the third and last place, to the victory over death, expressed by the resurrection of the body to life and immortality; which, as it was meritoriously procured for us by Christ's dying upon the cross, (his resurrection afterward being an assured pledge of the same to us,) so it will be
be really effected at last by the same Spirit of Christ, that gives us victory over sin here. Rom. viii. 11. If the Spirit of him, that raised up Jesus, dwell in you, be, that raised up Christ from the dead, shall also quicken your mortal bodies by his Spirit, that dwelleth in you: as if he should have said, If the Spirit of Christ dwell in you, regenerating and renewing your souls, the very same Spirit hereafter shall also immortalize your very bodies. Avicen, the Mahumetan philosopher, in his Almahad, hath a conceit, that the meaning of the resurrection of the body is nothing else but this, to persuade vulgar people, that though they seem to perish, when they die, and their bodies rot in the grave; yet, notwithstanding, they shall have a real subsistence after death, by which they shall be made capable, either of future happiness, or misery. But because the apprehensions of the vulgar are so gros, that the permanency and immortality of the soul is too subtle a notion for them, who commonly count their bodies for themselves, and cannot conceive, how they should have any being after death, unless their very bodies should be raised up again; therefore, by way of condefcenfion to vulgar understandings, the future permanency and subsistence of the soul, in prophetical writings, is expressed under this scheme of the resurrection of the body, which yet is meant μετὰ ἀνάδεικτον, and not μετὰ ἀναθήματος. Which conceit, how well soever it may befit a Mahumetan philosopher, I am sure it no way agrees with the principles of Christianity; the Scripture here and elsewhere affuring us, that the resurrection of the body is to be understood plainly, and without a figure; and that the Saints, departed this life in the faith and fear of Christ, shall not be mere souls without bodies to all eternity, as Avicen, Maimonides, and other philosophers dreamed, but consist of soul and body united together. Which bodies, though, as the doctrine of the church instructeth us, they shall be both specifically and numerically the same with what they were here; yet, notwithstanding, the Scripture tells us they shall be so changed and altered, in respect of their qualities and conditions, that in that sense they shall not be the same. Ver. 36, 37. Thou fool, that, which thou sowe'st, is not quickened, except it die: thou sowe'st not that body, that shall be, but bare grain, it may chance of wheat, or of some other grain; but God giveth it a body, as it pleaseth him, and to every seed his own body. The Apostle here imitating the manner of the Jews, who (as appeareth from the *Talmud*) See Gen— were wont familiarly to illustrate the busines of the resurrection of the body, by the similitude of seed sown into the ground, and springing up again. Accordingly he goes on, It is sown in corruption, it is raised in incorruption; Num. 59. sown in dishonour, it is raised in glory; sown in weakness, it is raised in power; sown a natural body, raised a spiritual body. Which epithet was used also in this case, both by the philosophers and the Jews; for Hierocles upon the Golden Verfes calls them διάκωμα πνευματικά, vehicula spiritualia, spiritual bodies; and R. Menachem, from the ancient cabalists, מְנַבָּ protections, the spiritual clothing. Lastly, the Apostle concludes thus; Now this I say, brethren, that flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God, neither doth corruption inherit incorruption. For which cause he tells us elsewhere, that they, which do not die, must of necessity be changed. And indeed, it men should be restored after death to such gross, soul and cadaverous bodies, as these are here upon earth, which is the very region of

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death and mortality, without any change at all; what would this be else, but, as Plotinus the philosopher against the Gnosticks writes, τιλεροαι ές ἄθλη τον θανατόν τον εις τών επονου, to be raised up to a second sleep, or to be entombed again in living sepulchres? For the corruptible body presteth down the soul, and the earthly tabernacle weigheth down the mind, that must be upon many things, Wieldon ix. 15. Wherefore we must needs explode that old Jewish conceit, commonly entertained amongst the Rabbinical writers to this day, That the future resurrection is to be understood of such gross and corruptible bodies, as these are here upon earth, to eat, drink, marry, and be given in marriage, and (which must needs follow) afterward to die again. Nachmanides, in his Sbaar Haggemul, is the only Jewish author, that ventures to depart from the common road here, and to abandon this popular error of the Jews, endeavouring to prove, that the bodies of the just, after the resurrection, shall not eat and drink, but be glorified bodies: but *Abraham confutes him with no other argument, than this, That this was the doctrine and opinion of the Christians. Let us therefore now consider, how abundantly God hath provided for us by Jesus Christ, both in respect of our souls, and of our bodies; our souls, in freeing us by the Spirit of Christ (if we be not wanting to ourselves) from the slavery of fin, and bondage of the law, as it is a letter only; our bodies, in that this corruptible shall put on incorruption, and this mortal immortality, and that these vile bodies shall be made like to Christ's glorious body. In both which the complete salvation of man consisteth, the perfection and happiness both of soul and body. For, though our salvation consists chiefly in the former, in the victory over fin, and in the renovation of the mind, yet without the latter, which is the victory over death, and the immortalizing of our bodies, it would be a very lame and imperfect thing. For righteousness alone, if it should male habitare, dwell always in such inconvenient houses, as these earthly tabernacles are, however the high-floated Stoick may brag, it could not render our condition otherwise, than troublesome, solicitous and calamitous. Wherefore the holy men in Scripture, not without cause, longed for this future change. Rom. viii. 23. We groan within ourselves, waiting for the adoption, to wait, the redemption of our bodies. 2 Cor. v. 2. In this we groan earnestly, desiring to be clothed upon with our house, which is from heaven. But there is no obtaining of this future victory over death and mortality, except we first get a victory over fin here. For this is that crown of life, that Christ, the first-begotten from the dead, will set upon the heads of none, but those, that have here fought a good fight, and overcome. For as death proceeds only from sin and disobedience, so the way to conquer death, and to arrive at life and immortality, is by seeking after an inward conquest over fin. For righteousness is immortal, Wield. i. 15. and will immortalize the entertainers of it; and, as the Chaldee oracle speaks,


Having hitherto shewed, what are the great things we hope for by Christ, and are to endeavour after, namely, to procure an inward and real victory over sin by the Spirit of Christ, that so we may hereafter attain a victory over
over death and mortality: we cannot but take notice briefly of some errors of those, that, either pretending the impossibility of this inward victory over sin, or else hypocritically declining the combat, make up a certain religion to themselves out of other things, which are either impertinent, and nothing to the purpose, or else evil and noxious.

For first, some (as was intimated before) make to themselves a mere phantastical and imaginary religion, conceiting, that there is nothing at all for them to do, but confidently to believe, that all is already done for them, all imputed and accounted to them; that they are dearly beloved of God, without any conditions or qualifications to make them lovely. But such a faith as this is nothing but mere phancy and carnal imagination, proceeding from that natural self-love, whereby men fondly doat upon themselves, and are apt to think, that God loves them as fondly and as partially as they love themselves, tying his affection to their particular outward persons, their very flesh and blood; hereby making God a being like unto themselves, that is, wholly acted by arbitrary self-will, fondness, and partiality; and perverting the whole nature and design of religion, which is not mere phantastry and an historical shew, but a real victory over the real evil of sin, without which God cannot take pleasure in any man's person, nor can there be a possibility of being happy, a real turning of the soul from darkness unto light, from the power of Satan unto God.

Again, Some there are, that, instead of walking in the narrow way, that Christ commendeth to us, of subduing and mortifying our sinful lusts, make to themselves certain other narrow ways of affected singularity in things, that belong not to life and godliness, outward straitness and severities of their own chafing and devising; and then persuade themselves, that this is the strait gate and narrow way of Christ, that leadeth unto life. Whereas these are indeed nothing else but some particular paths and narrow slices cut out of the broad way. For though they have an outward and seeming narrowness, yet they are so broad within, that camels with their burdens may easily pass through them. These, instead of taking up Christ's cross upon them, make to themselves certain crosstes of their own, and then laying them upon their shoudders and carrying them, please themselves with a conceit, that they bear the cross of Christ; whereas in truth and reality they are many times too much strangers to that cross of his, by which the world should be crucified to them, and they unto the world.

Some place all their religion in endless scrupulosties about indifferent things, neglecting in the mean time the in the mean time the in the mean time the more weighty things both of Law and Gospel, and (as our Saviour farther expresseth it) διδάσκοντες τὰς κανόνας, τὰς κἀκεῖνοι νοηματικά, straining at a gnat, and swallowing a camel; that is, being not so scrupulous as they ought to be about the substantial things of religion and a good life. For as we ought not to place the chief of our religion in the mere observance of outward rites and ceremonies, whilst in the mean time we hypocritically neglect the morals and substantial; which may deservedly be branded with the name of superstition: so we ought to know, that it is equal superstition to have such an abhorrence of indifferent things, as to make it the main of our religion to abstain from them; both of these arguing equal ignorance of the nature of God, as if he were
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were some morose, humorous, and capacious Being; and of that righteousness, which the kingdom of God consisteth in, as if these outward and indifferent things could either hallow or defile our souls, or as if salvation and damnation did depend upon the mere using or not using of them. The Apostle himself instructeth us, that the kingdom of God consisteth no more in ἀνορθοσία than in ἐρτίνη, no more in uncircumcision than in circumcision; that is, no more in not using outward ceremonies and indifferent things than in using of them. Wherefore the negative superstition is equal to the positive, and both of them alike call off men’s attention from the main things of religion, by engaging them over-much in small and little things. But the sober Christian, that neither places all his religion in external observances, nor yet is superstitiously anti-ceremonial, as he will think himself obliged to have a due regard to the commands of lawful authority in adiaphorous things, and to prefer the peace and unity of the Christian church, and the observance of the royal law of charity, before the satisfaction of any private humour or interest; so he will be aware of that ἁμαρτία τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης, which many run into, of banishing away all the solemnity of external worship, the observance of the Lord’s day, and of the Christian sacraments, under the notion of ceremonies, quite out of the world. To conclude; unless there be a due and timely regard had to the commands of lawful authority in indifferent things, and to order, peace, and unity in the church, it may easily be foreseen, that the reformed part of Christendom will at length be brought to confusion, by crumbling into infinite feuds and division, and then to utter ruin.

Again, Many mistake the vices of their natural complexion for supernatural and divine graces. Some think dull and stupid melancholy to be Christian mortification. Others, that turbulent and fiery zeal is the vigour of the Spirit. Whereas zeal is one of those things, that Aristotle calls ἡ μέση, of a middle nature, neither good nor bad in itself, but which, as it is circumstantiated, may indifferently become either virtue or vice. For there is a πυρὸς ἡμέρας, as the Apostle calls it, a bitter zeal, which is contrary to all Christian love and charity, and is nothing else but the vices of acerbity, envy, malice, cruelty, tinctured and gilded over with a religious show. And there may be also a turbulent and factious zeal, when men, under a pretence of acting for the glory of God, violate just and lawful authority, in order to the advancement of their own private self-interest. Indeed there was amongst the Jews a certain right, called jus zelatarum, or the right of zealots; whereby private person, acted by a zeal for God, might do immediate execution upon some malefactors, without expecting the sentence of any court of judicature. And some conceive, that our Saviour, by this right of zealots, did whip the buyers and sellers out of the temple, and overturn the tables of the money-changers; because he was never questioned by the Jews for it. But this was then a legal and regular thing, permitted by the publick laws of that nation in some certain cases, yet so as that those zealots were afterward accountable to the Sanhedrin for what they did. However, a little before the destruction of the temple, as Josephus tells us, there were a crew of desperate miscreants, that, abusing this right, and calling themselves by the name of Kamain, i.e. zealots, made a pretence from hence to commit most villainous actions. And I with some had not too much entertain’d this opinion, that
that private persons might reform publick abuses, whether belonging to
the ecclesiastical or the civil polity, without and against the consent of the
supreme magistrate, in a turbulent manner, jure zelatorum, by the right of
zealots; nay, and that actions, that are otherwise altogether unwarrantable
in themselves, may notwithstanding be justified by zeal for God and good ends.
But God needs no man's zeal to promote an imaginary interest of his in the
world, by doing unjust things for him. Will you speak wickedly for God, or
talk deceitfully for him? will you accept his person? 'twas the generous ex-
postulation of Job with his friends; and he tells them in the following
words, that this was nothing else, but to mock God as one man mocketh
another.

True divine zeal is no Corybantick fury, but a calm and regular heat,
guided and managed by light and prudence, and carried out principally
neither for nor against indifferent rites and unnecessary opinions, but those
things, that are immutably good and fundamental to Christianity; always
acknowledging a due subordination to that authority civil and ecclesiastical
that is over us.

Lastly, some there are, whose pretence to religion and the spirit is found-
ed in nothing else but a faculty of rhetoricking and extemporizing with
zeal and fervency, which they take to be nothing less than divine inspi-
ration, and that which the Scripture calls praying in the Holy Ghost, an un-
doubted character of a person truly regenerated. Which being a great de-
lusion, whereby many are hindered from seeking after the real effects of the
Divine Spirit, by idolizing, instead thereof, that, which is merely natural, (if
not artificial;) I think it not impertinent here to speak a little of it. And
certainly that, which is frequently attained to in the very height by persons
grofily hypocritical and debauched, can never be concluded to be divine in-
spiration, or to proceed from any higher principle than mere natural enthu-
siasm. For there is not only a poetical enthusiasm, of which Plato dis-
courseth in his Ion, but, though oratory be a more sober thing, a rhetorical
enthusiasm also, that makes men very eloquent, affectionate and bewitching
in their language, beyond what the power of any bare art and precepts
could enable them unto; insomuch that both these, poets and orators, have
oftentimes conceived themselves to be indeed divinely inspired; as those
known verses testify:

\textit{Eft Deus in nobis, agitante calestimus illo;}

And,

\textit{Sedibus æthereis Spiritus ille venit.}

And concerning orators, the like might be proved, if the time would
here permit, by sundry testimonies: but I shall here instance only in Ariphi-
des, a famous orator, who not only speaks positively of himself, as inspi-
ed in his orations, but affirms the same also concerning rhetoric in general,
when it is extraordinary, that it comes by immediate inspiration as oracles
and prophecies do, and not from art or nature. Wherefore it is not at all
to be wondered at, if when men are employed in religious and devotional
\textit{exercizes},
exercises, the same natural enthusiasm, especially having the advantage of
religious melancholy, which makes men still more enthusiastic, should so wing and inspire the fancies of these religious orators, as to make them wonderfully fluent, eloquent and rapturous, so that they beget strange passions in their auditors, and conclude themselves to be divinely inspired. Whereas, notwithstanding, they may have no more of divine inspiration in all this than those poets and orators before mentioned had; that is to say, be no otherwise inspired, than by a rhetorical or hypochondriacal enthusiasm, that is merely natural. But it is far from my intention here to disparage the sincere and ardent affections of devout souls, naturally and freely breathing out their earnest desires unto God in private; although perhaps this be not without some kind of enthusiasm also. For enthusiasm, as well as zeal, and other natural things, may be well used, and, being rightly circumstanced, and subservient to a better principle, become irreprehensible. Some have observed, that no great work of the brain, that begot much admiration in the world, was ever achieved without some kind of enthusiasm; and the same may be affirmed of the most transcendently virtuous and heroic actions. But then the goodness of these actions is never to be estimated merely by the degree of enthusiasm heat and ardor, that is in them, but by such other laws and circumstances, as moralize human actions. Wherefore my meaning, as I said before, is only this, to caution against that vulgar and popular error of mistaking the natural and enthusiastic fervour of mens spirits, and the ebulliency of their fancy, when it is tinted with religion, and idolizing of it instead of the supernatural grace of God’s Holy Spirit; and of looking for the effect of God’s Spirit principally in words and talk, or thinking, that God is chiefly glorified with a loud noise, and long speeches. For the true demonstration of God’s Holy Spirit is no where to be look’d for but in life and action, or such earnest and affectionate breathings after a farther participation of the divine image, as are accompanied with real and unfeigned endeavours after the fame; which is the true praying in the Holy Ghost, though there be no extemporaneous effusion of words. And therefore, when some Corinthians were puffed up, by reason of a faculty, which they had of rhetoricating religiously, S. Paul, like an Apostle, tells them, that he would come amongst them, and know, not the speech of them, that were puffed up, but the power. For the kingdom of God (faith he) consists not in word, but in power and life. Wherefore, laying aside these and such like childish mistakes, and things that are little to the purpose, let us seriously apply ourselves to the main work of our religion; that is, to mortify and vanquish our sinful lusts by the assistance of God’s Holy Spirit through faith in Christ; that so being dead to sin here, we may live with God eternally hereafter.

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