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WITH CRITICAL NOTES, COMMENTARY
AND APPENDICES

BY

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I. Οὶ μὲν δὴ φιλόσοφοι, ἥν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Γλαύκων, καὶ οἱ μὴ διὰ μακροῦ τινὸς διεξελθόντος λόγου μόνης πως ἀνεφάνησαν οἱ εἰσὶν ἐκάτεροι. Ἰσως γὰρ, ἐφη, διὰ βραχέος οὐ ράδιον. Οὐ γαίνεται, εἴπον· ἐμοὶ γοῦν ἑτὶ δοκεῖ ἄν βελτιώνως φανήναι, εἰ περὶ τούτον μόνον ἐδεί ῥηθήναι, καὶ μὴ πολλὰ τὰ λοιπὰ διελθεῖν μέλλοντι 5

4. ἐμοὶ γοῦν Ἰ: ἐμογ' ὀὖν Α.

484 A—485 A We have now to shew that Philosophers, as defined by us, should be entrusted with the government. It is they alone who, by virtue of the Ideal in their souls, are able to guard the laws and institutions of a city. We shall therefore make them our Guardians, if they possess the necessary practical qualifications. A study of their nature will shew that it is possible for them to unite both the requisites of re

484 A I διὰ μακροῦ — λόγου: ‘through the conclusion of a somewhat lengthy argument,’ διεξελθόντος is intransitive, as Schneider saw: cf. Lysias 805 β ἀλλὰ γὰρ εἰσὼν τὸν μὲν λόγον ἐστιν διεξελθεῖν, εἰ διεξελθόντος δὲ οὖτω τὸ δοκοῦν αἵρεσιν δεί. (The reference in εἰσὼν is to τὸν ἐμὸν δὲν διεξόδος αὕτη δὴ σχόλια τέλος ἰκανῶς ἀν μηρύσσει κτλ.) Cf. also Dem. in Mid. 84. The word διεξελθόντος is not otiose, because it is not till the very end of the argument that the φιλόσοφος is discovered (v 480 A).

The mistaken notion (held by Stallbaum) that the word must be transitive induced Herwerden (Mém. N. S. xix p. 333) to propose διεξέλθωσιν, a conjecture repeated also by Richards. Bäiter (after Hermann and Ast) reads διεξελθόντες with three inferior MSS, as if the philosophers had "run the gauntlet of the argument through which their nature is revealed" (J. and C.). τὸν λόγον (found in a few MSS) is favoured by Stallbaum, and suggested as an alternative also by Herwerden, as if διὰ μακροῦ τινὸς could mean 'at some length.' The first hand in Σ omits διὰ, but it occurs in all the other MSS. None of these expedients is nearly so good as the reading of the best MSS, if Schneider's explanation be adopted. μακροῦ has also caused difficulty, since the investigation extends over only six pages of Stephanus: see Krohn Pl. St. pp. 105 ff. By Pfeiderer (Zur Lösung etc. p. 54), who maintains (in partial agreement with Spengel) that v 471 c—vii (inclusive) embodies the dialogue Φιλόσοφος announced in the beginning of the Politicus and Sophist, μακροῦ is hailed as a significant lapsus calami, and referred to the investigations of the Sophist, Euthydemos and Politicus. But μακροῦ is qualified by τινὸς, and surely 474 c—480 A may be described as 'a somewhat lengthy enquiry.' There is no allusion to the proverbial μακρὸς λόγος of which Aristotle speaks in Met. Ν 3. 1091 b 7 ff. οἱ Σιμωνίδου μακρὸς λόγος· γινέται γὰρ ὁ μακρὸς λόγος ὡσπερ ὁ τῶν δοῦλων, ὅταν μηδὲν ἴγνες λέγων.

2 οὐ is found only in A and Ι: all the other MSS have οὐ. For οὐ cf. (with Schneider) 493 b and VIII 559 A.

5 πολλὰ κτλ. Herwerden conjectures πολλὰ <ὑπ>, which would weaken the emphasis on πολλὰ. For the omission of ὑπ see Schanz Nov. Comm. Pl. p. 33. From the standpoint of Books VI and VII
It is impossible to say what ‘just life’ means unless we know the idea of a good government etc. (see 506 a); hence pulla ta loiata dielthen.

484 b 9 πάντως κτλ. παντολεος was conjectured by Ast and is read by Stallbaum. It occurs as a late correction in A as well as in A (see cor. n.), and has some insignificant ms authority besides. The difference is like that between οδ and ωδ: see 484 a n. With πλανωμενοι cf. πλανητων in V 479 d. It is the fluctuation of the object which makes the subject fluctuate.

484 c 13 καθιστάναι: “sc. λέγοντες h.e. κελευθεῖτε” Schneider.

16 τυφλών. They who cannot see the Ideas are blind: cf. Plato’s retort to Antisthenes quoted on V 476 d.

17 καλ κτλ. A transcendental parádeigma of which he knew nothing would be useless to the philosopher-king. It does not however follow that the Ideas are not auta kath’ auta, but merely that we are concerned with them in so far as they are known by the φιλόσοφος. See on V 476 a. ωδ ωδον τε ἀκριβιστάτα admits that he may not see them in all their fulness and purity.

18 εἰς τό ἀληθιστατον κτλ. Cf. 500 c, 500 e—501 c (where the same figure is employed). The political value of the philosopher’s knowledge of the Idea is here for the first time explicitly affirmed and explained: see V 479 D n.

19 οὖτο δη ’τhen and not till then’ suggests that it is otherwise in existing States.

484 d 21 εἰν τῇ τιθεσθαι. If he has the happiness to be born ‘in his own country’ (IX 502 a), whose institutions are already modelled on the Ideas, he need only guard (φιλάττωτες suggests the φιλάττες) and preserve what is already established. Otherwise he must himself become a legislator. Cobet’s excision of τιθεσθαι is wholly gratuitous: his omission of τα in τα κείμενα is even worse, for the laws need not be of the philosopher’s own making.

22 διαφέρει. It would be easy to write διαφέρειν (with ἡ etc.), but διαφέρει may be impersonal, or Glauco may be
There is little or no indication to show that even the ἀρχοντες of I—IV knew or aspired to the Ideas (see 497 c. n.) and the ἐπίκοιποι certainly did not. Krohn is, in a certain sense, right when he maintains that in VI—VII we have "einen neuen Archontenstand und eine neue Archontendisciplin" (Pl. St. p. 107), but the distinction of the ‘golden’ and ‘silver’ races in III 415 A ff. prepares us for a more thorough-going discrimination between the two higher classes that was attempted in the earlier sketch, and we must of course remember that the new discipline is not intended to supersede, but to suprervene upon the old. See also Hirzel Der Dialog I p. 236.

485 B 8 ἐκείνης τῆς οὖσας. For the genitive cf. IV 444 E n.

9 γενέσεως καὶ φθοράς have not yet been employed in this half-technical sense (Krohn Pl. St. p. 112). The substance of the Ideas always ‘is: that of phenomena ‘is driven to and fro by generation and destruction’—by generation when it becomes determined in one particular direction (e.g. καλόν, ἑπτος, ἄνθρωπος), by destruction when it loses that particular determination and puts on another. Cf. V 479 A, B. Plato's form of expression seems to imply that there is a sort of οὐσία or substratum in phenomena. At a later stage he seems to have identified this with space—the ἐκμαγγιῶν καιροὺμενον τε καὶ διασχεματιζόμενον ὑπὸ
10 'Ωμολογήσω. Καὶ μὴν, ἥν δ' ἐγὼ, καὶ ὦτι πάσης αὐτῆς, καὶ οὔτε σμικροῦ οὔτε μείζονος οὔτε τιμωτέρου οὔτε ἀτιμωτέρου μέρους ἐκώντες ἀφίεναι, ὡστε ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν περί τε τῶν φιλοτιμίων καὶ ἐρωτικῶν διήλθομεν. Ὄρθως, ἐφη, λέγεις. Τόδε τοίνυν μετὰ τούτο σκόπει εἰ ἀνάγκη ἤχειν πρὸς τοῦτο ἐν τῇ φύσει οὐ ἀν μέλ—
15 λασιν ἐσέσθαι οἶον ἐλέγομεν. Τό ποίον; Τὴν ἀφεύδειαν καὶ τὸ ἐκόντας εἶναι μηδαμῇ προσδέχεσθαι τὸ ψεῦδος, ἀλλὰ μισεῖν, τὴν δ' ἀλήθειαν στέργειν. Εἰκὸς γ', ἐφη. Οὐ μόνον γε, ὃ φίλε, εἰκός, ἀλλὰ καὶ πάσα ἀνάγκη τὸν ἐρωτικὸν τὸν φύσει ἤχοντα πάν τὸ ἐννευέται τε καὶ οἰκεῖον τῶν παιδικῶν ἀγαπάν. Ὅρθως, ἐφη.

20 Ἡ οὖν οἰκείοτερον σοφία τι ἀλήθειαν ἄν εὕροις; Καὶ πῶς; ἦ δ' ὡς. Ἡ οὖν δυνατὸν εἶναι τὴν αὐτὴν φύσιν φιλόσοφον τε καὶ φιλοσυνή; Οὐδαμῶς γε. Τὸν ἄρα τῷ ὄντι φιλομαθῆ πάσης δ ἀλήθειας δεῖ εὐθὺς ἐκ νέου ὅ τι μάλιστα ὑπέρεθαι. Παντελῶς γε. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅτω γε εἰς ἐν τι αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι σφόδρα ἑρετοῦσιν, ἵσος 25 του ὅτι εἰς τὰλλα τοῦτο ἀσθενεστέραι, ὡστε πρέωμα ἐκεῖσε ἀπωκτειμένον. Τι μὴν; Ὅμι δὴ πρὸς τὰ μαθήματα καὶ πάν τὸ τοιοῦτον ἑρρήκασιν, περὶ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς, οἷμαι, ἢδονὴν αὐτῆς καθ' αὐτὴν εἰδέν ἂν, τὰς δὲ διὰ τὸν σῶματος ἐκέλευσον, εἰ μὴ πεπλασμένως ἀλλ' ἀλήθως φιλόσοφον τἰς εἴη. Μεγάλη ἀνάγκη. Ε

18 τῶν ἐρωτικῶν κτλ. Love me, love my friend. The Philosopher loves Wisdom, and Truth is Wisdom's kinswoman and familiar friend.

485 B 25 ὡσπερ πρεῖμα κτλ. The simile becomes almost an identification, as often in Greek: the desires are as it were a stream diverted εἰς ἐν τι. Cf. III 401 C (reading τις—ὡσπερ αἱρα), VII 519 A τὰς τῆς γενέσεως ἐννευέσι ψέφισα μολυβδίδαις καὶ VII 534 D n. To explain ἀπωκτειμένον as for ἀπωκτειμένα (with Stallbaum and others) is to obtrude our standpoint upon the Greeks. Schneider formerly agreed with Stallbaum, but afterwards drew back (Addit. p. 45) and translated "wie ein dorthin abgeleitet Strom."

28 τὰς δὲ, τὰς is probably an 'internal accusative' depending on ἐκλεῖπον, though rendered easier by the occurrence of περὶ τὴν ἡδονή—ἐιν ἂν just before. Schneider carries on περὶ, but the preposition is difficult to supply when the two clauses have different verbs. Cf. IV 428 C n.
Plato himself. See the eloquent words of Longinus περὶ ψυχῆς 35, and compare them with Goethe's noble characterisation of Plato: "Er dringt in die Tiefen, mehr um sie mit seinem Wesen auszufüllen, als um sie zu erforschen. Er bewegt sich nach der Höhe, mit Sehnsucht seines Ursprungs wieder theilhaft zu werden. Alles, was er äussert, bezieht sich auf ein ewig Ganzes, Gutes, Wahres, Schönes, dessen Forderung er in jedem Busen aufzuragen strebt."

31 ἀνελευθερός: μηδὲ ἀλάξων μηδὲ δελὸς ἐσθ᾽ ὅτε ἄν δυσέμβολος ἢ ἀδικος γένετο; Οὐκ ἔστω. Καὶ τούτῳ δὴ ψυχὴ σκοτῶν

485 E 3o σώφρων κτλ. Cf. III 389 D—390 E.

2 Anελευθερίας. άνελευθερία or φιλοχρήματος: in Plato the antithesis of ὀπερίσκεια: cf. II 391 C and Crítias 112 C. The virtuous mean is μεγαλοπρέπεια, which is a sort of highmindedness (cf. 503 C): hence μεγαλοπρέπεια just below and μεγαλοπρέπη in the summary at 487 A. Plato does not, like Aristotle (Eth. Nic. IV cc. 4—9), restrict μεγαλοπρέπεια and its opposing vices to pecuniary dealings, although φιλοχρήματα, for example, is a symptom of άνελευθερία (II 391 C).

2 τοῦ ὄλου καὶ παντὸς. Cf. Theaet. 173 E ff. This and the following sentence admirably describe the peculiar genius of Plato himself. See the eloquent words of Longinus περὶ ψυχῆς 35, and compare them with Goethe's noble characterisation of Plato: "Er dringt in die Tiefen, mehr um sie mit seinem Wesen auszufüllen, als um sie zu erforschen. Er bewegt sich nach der Höhe, mit Sehnsucht seines Ursprungs wieder theilhaft zu werden. Alles, was er äussert, bezieht sich auf ein ewig Ganzes, Gutes, Wahres, Schönes, dessen Forderung er in jedem Busen aufzuragen strebt."

486 C 15 εὐμαθῆς κτλ. J. and C. wrongly supply εἰς ἄρα. πέτρον is often omitted in such sentences: cf. Phaedr. 270 D and other examples in Ast's Lexicon s.v. πέτρων.

486 D 23 αὐτήν—ἐίναι. The text is successfully defended by Vahlen (Hermes 1877 p. 196) who compares II 375 E οὐ παρὰ φύσιν ἐγτρώμεν τουτοῦτον εἰναι τὸν φύλακα and (for the pleonasm) Phaed. 101 Ι ἱκανὸν γὰρ—ἀπόκειται αὐτοί αὐτοῖς ἀρίσκειν. Madvig's proposal (adopted by Baiter) αὐτήν ἐγτρώμεν δὲ εἰναι is neat but unnecessary; still less well we (with Herwerden) bracket δὲ εἰναι. With the sentiment Krohn (Pl. St. p. 303) compares Xen. Mem. iv 1 2.

24 ἀσχήμων. Herwerden should not have conjectured ἄμυθων. We are passing to a fresh point, ἄμυνα and ἀσχημοσύνη ("bad form") tend to ἀμετρία, 'excess', 'exaggeration' in behaviour (cf. Arist. Eth. Níc. iv 8 1125b 12—16); and extravagant behaviour is a form of untruth, because it makes a man appear what he is not. The love of truth will therefore save the philosopher from self-assertion and bad manners.

27 φύσει κτλ. The antecedent of ἂν is διάνοιαν: and φύσει ('by nature,' 'naturally') should be taken with the adjectives ἐμετρησθαι and ἐγχαρισθαι. It might seem possible to translate: 'Let us insist, then, on a modest and agreeable habit of mind for a nature whose innate disposition is to make it easy to lead to the Form of each essential Being,' making φύσει the antecedent to ἂν: but the ordinary view gives a better sense. The preceding note will explain how ἐμετρησθαι inlines one to the love of Truth or the Ideas. Stallbaum connects ἐκάστου with τὸ ἀνθρώπως, but cf. ν 480 Α ad fin. and 484 D (ἐκάστου τὸ ὅμως). ἰδεῖν is, I think, 'Form, 'Idea' (so Schneider etc.), rather than 'contemplation' (as Stallbaum translates). The word however suggests ἰδεῖν: see on ν 479 Α.

486 E 30 ἐπόμενα ἄλλας ἐν εἰς μόνῃ τῆς μεθοδοὺς τοῦ ἄνωτος ἰκανῶς τὸ καὶ τελείως αὐτὸς Πη ἐπὶ µῆτεν ἐτός µέτρων ἐν µηθῆναι. Αὐτῷ Α.Ⅲ.
Justice and Kindness accompany the other moral virtues (486 b). Aptness to learn, memory, and the virtue of a modest and agreeable disposition also fit one for the study of the Ideas: cf. 486 δ. n. It will be noticed that all the Virtues receive an intellectual colouring from their connexion —direct or indirect—with ‘amor intellectualis’: see above on 485 Α. ff.

487 Α—487 Ε. But, in point of fact, urges Adimantus, actual philosophers are regarded as useless, or worse. Socrates admits the correctness of this view, and proceeds to solve the difficulty by a paradox.

487 Β 10 οἱ ἀκοῦστοι—λέγεις: ‘those who from timeto time hear what you now say.’ The text has been suspected, but is, I think, sound. Adimantus implies that the philosopher-king was one of Socrates’ favourite themes, as—in one form or another—it certainly was: see on ν 473 c. The effect produced by Socrates’ usual way of reasoning on the subject is illustrated by a general description of the unsatisfying nature of Socrates’ dialectic; and λέγω δ’ εἰς τὸ παρὼν ἄποθεσα recalls us to the special case. The looseness lies chiefly in the use of δ’, where οἷα—Steinharth’s conjecture—would be expected; but δ’ need not be taken too strictly. Finicus omits τῶν.


13 μέγα—ἀναφαίνεσθαι. For the anacoluthon cf. Αρ. 21 Β and διαλέγομεν οὖν, ἔσθε μοι, L. 686 D and Xen. Αν. III 2. 12. In all these cases the verb used is ἔσθε, and ἀναφαίνεσθαι is a word of the same kind. Other examples of similar anacolutha are cited by Engelhardt Anacol. Pl. Spec. III p. 39. Richards would read παραγωμένου, but παραγωμένοι could hardly mean παραγωμένους ἑαυτοῦς.

487 c 15 ἀποκλείονται κτλ. The simile is probably taken from the game of πολει, on which see IV 432 Ε H. ϕέρον is technical of a move at draughts: cf. L. 730 Α. The balance ϕέρον—λέγωνdeserves notice: in both words, stress should be laid on the first syllable. Cf. 111 406 b, η. and Phaed. 83 D with Geddes ad loc. ἔν is used as in Euthyph. ΙΙ 10 τά ἐν τοῖς Νέοις ἔργα ἀποδιδότηκα καὶ οὐκ ἔθελε μενέν.
αὖ ταύτης τινὸς ἐτέρας, οὐκ ἐν ψήφοις, ἀλλ’ ἐν λόγοις· ἐπεὶ τὸ γε ἄληθες οὐδὲν τι μᾶλλον ταύτη ἔχειν. λέγω δ’ εἰς τὸ παρόν ἀποβλέψας. νῦν γὰρ φαίη ἂν τίς σοι λόγος μὲν οὐκ ἔχειν καθ’ ἐκαστὸν τὸ ἐρωτόμενον ἐναντιοῦσα, ἔργο δὲ ὅραν, ὅσοι ἂν ἐπὶ φιλοσοφῶν ὀρμῆσαντες μὴ τοῦ πεπαίδευσαι ἔνεκα ἀνάμενοι νέοι οὕτως ἀπαλλάττονται, ἀλλὰ μακρότερον ἐνδιατρίψωσιν, τοὺς μὲν πλείστους καὶ πάνιν ἄλλοκότους γιγνομένους, ἵνα μὴ παραπονήσουσιν, ἐπιθυμοῦσιν, τοὺς δ’ ἐπιεικεστάτους δοκοῦντας ὁμοί τοῦτο γε ὑπὸ 25 τοῦ ἐπιτηδεύματος, οὐ σὺ ἐπαινεῖς, πώς ὁμοίως τὰς πόλεις γιγνομένους. καὶ ἡδὸν ἀκούσας, ὧν οὖν, εἰπὼν, τοὺς ταύτα ἐξήγησας. Οὐκ οἶδα, ἢ δ’ ὃς ἂν τὸ σοὶ δοκοῦν ἢδεσ ἂν ἀκούσαι. Ἀκούσαι ἂν, ὅτι ἔρωτες φαίνονται τάληθεν. Πῶς οὖν, ἐφ’ ἐξήγη τάληθεν, ὅτι οὐ πρῶτον κακῶν 30 παύσουσιν αἱ πόλεις, πρὶν ἂν ἐν αὐταῖς οἱ γιγνομένοι ἀρχηγαῖοι, οὗτοι ἄρχοντες ἐνδοξολογοῦμεν αὐταῖς εἶναι; Ἔρωτας, ἢ δ’ ἔργον, ἐρώτημα δεόμενον ἀποκρίσεως δ’ εἰκόνι περισσότερον. Σὺ δὲ γε, ἐφ’ ἐξήγη, οἷμαι, οὐκ ἐνδοξολογοῦμεν δ’ εἰκόνι περισσότερον λέγειν.

IV. Εἰπὼν· σκόππετε ἐμβεβάλετε με εἰς λόγον ὑπὸ 35 δυσαπόδεικτον; ἄκουε δ’ οὖν τῆς εἰκόνος, ἵν’ ἐπὶ μάλλον ἔχοις, 488

18. ταύτης: 'Isto modo,' 'as you say.'

The simile is imitated by the author of the Eryxias (395 b).

20 ἐργά δὲ ὅραν κτλ., expresses a widely prevalent view in ancient as well as in modern times. It is enunciated with admirable force and vigour by the Platonic Caricles in Gorg. 484 c—486 c: cf. also Theaet. 173 c ff. and Phaed. 64 b. Although Isocrates called himself a φιλόσοφος, he was in general agreement with the popular verdict on Philosophy in the Platonic sense of the term (τὴν τε γεωμετρίαν καὶ τὴν ἀστρολογίαν καὶ τὸις διαλόγοις τῶν ἐρειστικῶν καλομένους, as he calls it Panath. 26): see ad loc. Soph. 1—8, 20, Antid. 258—260 (διατραγεῖ μὲν οὖν πρὶς πανδαίσις ταύτης χρόνον των συμβουλεύσαιμιν τοὺς νεωτέρους, μὴ μάντας περιμένειν τὴν φύσιν τὴν αὐτῶν κατασκευασθέναι ἐπὶ τούτου κτλ. 268) and Panath. 26— 32 (Spengel Isokr. 111, Plato pp. 15 ff., Dümmner Chron. Beitr. pp. 43 ff. and Teichmüller Lit. Fehd. 1 p. 193. Teichmüller supposes that τις in νῦν γὰρ φαίη ἂν τις κτλ. above is a specific reference to Isocrates, but this is very improbable). The well-known sentiment of Ennius’ Nceptolemus ‘philosophari est mihi necesse, at pacuam; nam omnino haut placet. Degustandum ex ca, non in cam ingurgitandum censeo’ (ap. Gell. Noct. Att. v 15. 9, 15. 6, cf. Cic. Tus. Dis. II 1 ff. al.) is probably translated from Euripides, but it admirably expresses the ordinary Roman view. See also on v 483 c, d.

487 d 23 ἄλλοκότους. They have, as we should say, ‘a twist.’

487 e 32 σοῦ δέ γε is of course ironical, as σκόπτετε shews. Müller in his translation (p. 53) strangely misses this point.

489 e—489 c Imagine a ship, in which the sailors struggle with one another to gain possession of the helm, although they have never learnt the art of steering, and actually deny that steering can be taught at all. They overpower the master of the vessel by opiates or strong drink, and sail merrily away to shipwreck. It never occurs to them that in order to steer a ship, it is necessary to learn how. The true pilot is to them a star-gazer, an idle
babbler, altogether useless. Our simile explains itself. What wonder that the philosopher is useless in a city? But the fault lies with those who make no use of him. It is not his part to sue for employment; those who need his services ought to appeal to him.

488 a 2 οδ γλύσχρως εικάζω: 'how greedy I am of parables' (lit. 'how greedily I make parables), not (as J. and C.) 'what a poor hand I am' at similes, an interpretation which deprives τι μάλλον of all its force. γλύσχρως (connected with γλα 'glue' and γλύσχωμαι) is used as in Ar. Ach. 452 γλύσχρως προσαίτων λιπαρών τε. 'Niggardly,' 'stingy' is a secondary meaning, as for example in vili 553 c and Crat. 414 c. The idea is the same that a man must be greedy of similes when he runs all over the world to find one (ἐκ πολλῶν ευναγαγών), αὐτὸ should be taken with εικάζων, by an easy hyperbaton.

5 τραγελάφους and similar fantastic creations were of frequent occurrence in Oriental art. The word is fully illustrated by Bllades on Ar. Frugs 937.

6 μιγνύτες should be taken with γράφοντες: 'as painters paint goat-stags and the like by fusing creatures together.'

tooutov κτλ. There is no occasion to read τοοιτῶν τι: see III 388 D M. For γεγομένων Richards would write γεγομένων, because of ὁρώντα etc. in B M, and γεγομένων in 488 E. But Plato rightly asks us to conceive of the completed scene, although the scene itself must of course be described by present participants.
'Politics cannot be taught' was (in Plato's view) the theoretical basis of Athenian political life: see Prot. 319 A—320 D. We are here invited to suppose that it was actually maintained in so many words by sophists, demagogues, and others. Something of the sort is asserted by Isocrates adv. Soph. 14, 21; but it is unlikely that Plato is alluding to Isocrates in particular, as Teichmüller supposes (Lit. Fehl. I p. 104).

14 τον λέγοντα κτλ. as Socrates and Plato constantly did. ἐγὼμισ κατατέμεναι admirably expresses the vindictive fury of the insulted demagogues, and should not be taken as an allusion to Socrates' fate. Plato felt his master's death too deeply to exaggerate on such a subject. See vii 517 A n.

488C 15 αὐτῷ is ejected by Herderen "quodommivictare." Bywater (J. Ph. x. p. 73) proposes αὐτῷ. The translators for the most part ignore the word, except Schneider, who translates 'him, the master of the ship.' Perhaps αὐτῷ is 'by himself,' ἵππι in the sense of soli, as in αὐτοὶ γὰρ εἴσεχον, and we should translate 'while they themselves constantly swarm around the solitary master of the ship.' Failing this explanation we must follow Schneider; unless we venture to take αὐτῷ in the sense of 'the Master' (cf. I 327 B n.) and regard τῷ ναυκλήρῳ as an explanatory gloss. On the whole I am inclined to think that Schneider is right.

περικεφάλασις: an anacoluthon, like ἀρχεῖν and πλέον below: we should expect περικεφαλήνους. For a parallel see Laws 666 A. Here, doubtless, the change of construction is in order to avoid too many participles.

17 ἀποκτείνεται. On the orthography of this word see Introd. § 5. ἀποκτεῖνεται (sic) in v and Vin. F may also be a trace of the spelling with ei. The reference in ἀποκτείνεται ἡ ἐκβάλλοντα is of course to the slaying or banishment of rival candidates for office: cf. Gorg. 466 B.

19 μανδραγόρα κτλ. False rulers dull the senses of the Demos by the opiate of Pleasure, and so escape detection. With μανδραγόρα cf. [Dem.] Phil. 4. 6 ἀλλὰ μανδραγόραν πεπωκόν ἢ τι φαρμακόν ἄλλο τοιούτον εἰκαμέναι ἄρθρωτον. 20 πίνουται τε κτλ. They are the ἑστιάτοραι ἐβαθμίσαν of iv 421 B, where see note. For ὡς το ἐκός Cobet writes ὡς εἰκός, and so also Herderen, who suggests as an alternative that we should bracket τοὺς τοιούτους. The expression ὡς εἰκός would refer to πίνουται τε καὶ εἰκονιμεύοντο ("and pass their time at sea in drinking and feasting, as you might expect with such a crew") D. and V.; but with ὡς το ἐκός (sc. πλεοῖ) the meaning is "make just such a voyage as might be expected of men like them" (J. and C. with Schneider, comparing Pol. 302 A and Laws 906 D), i.e. make shipwreck.

21 ἐπαινοῦνται is omitted by Cobet, but (as Richards points out) φέλουσαι supports it. Richards would transpose and read μὲν ναυτικοῖς. But ναυτικοῖς μὲν καλοῦσαι etc. is only an explanatory re-duplication of ἐπαινοῦσαι; hence μὲν is placed where it would have been if ἐπαινοῦσαι had been omitted. In any other position it would have failed to mark the antithesis between ναυτικοῖς (with its companion epithets) and ἄρθρωτον. For the rhetorical asyndeton cf. ii 362 B n. An alternative (less good) is to take ἐπαινοῦσαι as logically subordinate to καλοῦσαι ('in awarding praise they call' etc.).
23 δὲ ἐνελλαμβάνειν κτλ. Jackson suggests that Isocrates is intended (Proceedings of the Camb. Phil. Soc. XI 1883, p. 13). Possibly: but for my own part I do not think the description is sufficiently apposite to justify the identifican.

488 D 25 ἐπαινεῖται. I should adopt the accusative with Stallbaum and others were it not for οὐλομένου. Schneider is fully justified in saying "si Plato ἐπαίνεται scriperat et οὐλομένου, fieri vix poterat, quin prius vitiosum quibusdam et in accusativum mutandum videretur: alterius ipso distantia tumut erat." This is precisely what has happened, for while q (with some other MSS, but not II or Ξ) has ἐπαινεῖται, all the MSS, without exception, have οὐλομένου. The anacoluthon is not harsher than other instances in which the best MSS have the nominative instead of the accusative, e.g. Phaedr. 241 D, Soph. 219 E, Laws 885 D, Phaed. 81 A. See also Classen on Thuc. II 53. 4, where many parallel instances are quoted from Thucydides. A long and unperiodic sentence like the present is peculiarly liable to anacolutha: and one has occurred already in 488 C. For these reasons I now agree with Schneider and others that the text is sound. The nominatives πείθοντες and βιαζόμενοι may have suggested the change to Plato: "ἔχονται propert ἐπαίνεστα τετυλεί, mox velut impatients tenoris dim servati paullisper de via deflexit" (Schneider). Similar ungrammatical anacolutha are found occasionally also in Inscriptions, when the sentence runs to a considerable length: see Meisterhans' pp. 203, 205.

28 ὡτες δι... κυβερνητικήν. The sailors, Plato has already told us, have not the smallest idea that the true pilot must study the year and the seasons etc., if he is to be truly qualified to rule a ship (that is to say, from Plato's point of view, if he is to know how to steer), but as for how he shall steer—let people wish him to or no—of that they think it impossible to acquire either art or study and therefore, with litt: 'at once and' the art of steersmanship. We may translate the sentence thus: 'but art or system of how to steer, let alone whether people wish him to steer or no—that they think it impossible to acquire, and therewithal the art of steering.' The true pilot, according to Plato, is one who knows how to steer. Whether others wish him to steer or no, is wholly irrelevant; see Pol. 293 A ff., where this principle is declared to be of universal application, and illustrated as follows from the case of doctors: iatros δε οὖς ήκατα πενωλεκμαν, ἣν τε ἐκπαινεῖται καὶ τε ἀκούται νῆμα ἴνται—πάντως οὖν ἦτον ιατρὸς φαινε, ἐπετηρ ἄν ἐπιστημονεῖται τεχνεύ—σφεξον oὶ θεραπεύοντες ἐκαστον τα θεραπεύοντα. Cf. ibid. C ἀναγκαίον δὲ καὶ πολιτείαν: ταύτων ὅρθρᾳ διαφερόντων εἶναι καὶ μόνην πολιτείαν, ὃν τις ἐν εἰρήκοι τῷ ἀρχοντᾷ ἀληθῶς ἐπιστημονεῖα καὶ οὐ διόκηται μόνον, ἢν τε κατὰ νῆμα ἢν τε ἐν πνεύμων ἄρχουσι, καὶ ἄκοντως καὶ ἀκόντως κτλ. The expressions ἐν τε ἐκπαίνεται ἢν τε ἀκούται, καὶ ἄκονται καὶ ἀκόντως in these two passages, the general drift of which is the same as Plato's argument throughout this part of the Republic, exactly correspond to ἐν τε πίναις βούλονται ἢν τε μή, and enable us to interpret that clause, as Schneider has already pointed out. Cf. also 296 E—297 B. Plato, indeed, is ready to go farther still, and would maintain that he who knows how to steer is a true pilot, even although he does not touch the helm (cf. ibid. 292 E). If others wish for his services, it is their business to apply to him, not his to sue for the opportunity of doing them a service (infra 489 B, C). A like principle holds good in the government of cities, and the Platonic Socrates, though abstaining from political life, may fairly claim ἐπισκέπτεται τῇ ὡς ἄλληθ από λοιτη τῆς τής πολιτικῆς τῆς τῶν νῦν (Gorg. 521 D). The foolish sailors, on the other hand, desire only to get the
te tines 1 boilowntai eínai te mú, múte tékhnu ton tóutou múte melētēn E 30 ómoumenoi dunatov einai laβeiv áma kai tìn kubernetikìn. tóou tón dè peri tás náv γινομείνw tón wós alpíðos kubernetikón óuch ήgei an tó ónume kubernósçan te kai dòdēsχn kai áxhístovn sfísi kaileíthai upó tón en tais oútov katekeuasámenais naos 489 ploutóropn; Kái múla, ἐφη ὁ Ἀδύμαντος. Où ðí, ἐn ði égō, Ímá deisíthai se ἐξεταξομένηn tìn eikóna ἰδείν, óti tais pólēsai prós tóus alplžwv φιλοσόφουs tìn diábethi énokev, álλa maνthi-5 nêu ð légo. Kái múl, ἐφη. P riotón mén toívous ékeínov tòn dtaμázontâ, óti oi φιλοσόφai ou tímownta en tais pólēsai, diáskhke te tìn eikóna kai peirw pítheîn, óti polw αn dtaμastóterov ð, ei 1 etímuwto. 'Alída didáxa, ἐφη. Kái óti toívous tálhθè légei, B

helm into their hands (488 c): how to handle it, they know not, and deny that it is possible to learn (μήτε τέχνην—laβeiv). What of áma kai tìn kubernetikìn? These words should be taken closely with what goes before. The literal translation is (to acquire) 'at once and the art of steering': cf. Phil. 22 D ð bós oútov γέγονα aírètov áma kai áγαθo 'this life is at once choiceworthy and good.' Now 'to acquire at once the art of how to steer (ὅπως κυβερνήσει, τούτου τέχνην) and the art of steering' is merely a way of saying 'to acquire the art of how to steer and therewith the art of steering.' He who learns the art and study of how to steer necessarily learns therewith the art of steering ('quarium qui comos factus sit, simul gubernatoriam artem teneat' Schneider): for kubernetikh is, according to Plato, simply and solely the art of how to steer, τ̣̃̃ν kubernetikh, in short, is nothing but the tékhny and melētò toíou ὅπως κυβερνήσει, expressed from Plato's point of view. Thus in denying that it is possible to learn either tékhny or melētò of how to steer, the sailors are in effect emphatically denying that it is possible to learn kubernetikh in Plato's sense of the word at all: cf. 488 B φακοντες μηδὲ δαδακτῶν εἶναι. So much for the meaning of this passage as a whole. In regard to details, it should be noted that ótopos means 'how': ὅπως ad tòtov spectans modum et rationem potius quam finem significat (after Schneider). With Schneider also I understand κυβερνήσει as 'shall steer,' and not 'shall get possession of the helm,' melētò is 'study' (in the more concrete sense of the word), rather than actual exercise or practice: cf. III 402 B ἐταί τις αὐτῆς τέχνην τε καὶ μελέτην. With tékhny laβeiv cf. Pol. 300 E.

The above explanation agrees in the main with that of Schneider, and is in my opinion what Plato meant to say. For other views see App. I.

30 ómounon. ómounon is read by Stallbaum and others, but see note on line 25.


489 A 3 ἐξεταξομένην: 'cross-examined.'

489 B 8 kai ὥτι—λέγει. 'And also that what you say is true' etc. Socrates identifies Adimantus with his hypothetical objector in 487 D; cf. se λέγει in D below. Another possibility—less good, I think—is to take ὥτι as introducing a direct address: "and say to him also 'You speak truly, when you say'" etc. λέγειν is found in a few inferior ms.; and λέγει, which Stallbaum and Baiter adopt, occurs in Par. D. λέγειν is indefensible, and the corruption of λέγειν or λέγει to λέγεις is exceedingly improbable here. On τοίνυν = 'also' see 1 339 D n.
ός ἀρχηστοί τοῖς πολλοῖς οἱ ἐπεικέστατοι τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ τῆς μεῖντοι ἀρχηστίας τοὺς μὴ χρωμένους κέλευε αιτίασθαι, ἀλλὰ μὴ τοὺς ἐπεικεῖς. οὐ γὰρ ἔχει φύσιν κυβερνήτην ναυτῶν δεισθαι ἄρχωσαι ὑπάυτο, οὐδὲ τοὺς σοφοὺς ἐπὶ τὰς τῶν πλουσίων θύρας ἱναι, ἀλλ' ὁ τοῦτο κομψευσάμενος ἐφεύσατο, τὸ δὲ ἀληθές, πέφυκεν, εάν τε πλουσίοις εάν τε πένης κάμνῃ, ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ἐπὶ ισαρχοῦ θύρας ἱεῖν καὶ πάντα τῶν ἄρχωσαν δεόμενον ἐπὶ τὰς τοῦ ἄρχοντος ναυστής, οὐ νὰ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τί φθεῖσθαι. ἀλλὰ τοὺς τῶν πολιτικῶν ἄρχοντας ἄπεικάζον οἷς ἀρτὶ ἔλεγονται ναυτίς οὗ ἀμαρτήσας, καὶ τοὺς ὑπὸ τούτων ἀρχηστοὺς λεγόμενους καὶ μετεωρολέσχας τοὺς ὅσ ἀληθῶς κυβερνήταις. Ὁρθάτα, ἐφι. Ἐκ τοῦτων τούτων καὶ ἐν τοῦτων αὐτό ῥάδιον εὐδοκιμεῖν τὸ ὁμοίως ἐπιτίθεμεν ὑπὸ τῶν τὴν ἐπιτίθεμεν τοῦτον αὐτῶν φάσκοντας ἐπιτίθεϊται, οὐδὲ σὺ φῆς τὸν ἐγκαλοῦντα τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ λέγειν ὡς.
25 παμπόνηροι οἱ πλείστοι τῶν ἱόντων ἐπὶ αὐτῶν, οἱ δὲ ἐπιεικέστατον ἀχρήστου, καὶ ἐγὼ συνεχόρθησα ἀλήθη σε λέγειν. ἦ γὰρ; Ναί.

V. Οὔκοιν τῆς μὲν τῶν ἐπιεικῶν ἀχρήστιας τὴν αἰτίαν διελθάμεν; Καὶ μᾶλα. Τῆς δὲ τῶν πολλῶν πονηρίας τὴν ἀνάγκην βούλει τὸ μετὰ τούτο διέλθαμεν, καὶ οτι οὔδε τούτοι φιλοσοφία 30 αἰτία, ἀν δυνάμεθα, πειραθῶμεν δείξα; Πάνω μὲν οὖν. Ἀκούω-Ε μὲν ὅ, ἀλλὰ λέγομεν ἐκεῖθεν ἀναμνησθέντες, ὅθεν διήμεν τὴν φύσιν, οἴον ἀνάγκη φύσι τὸν καλὸν τὸ κάγαθον ἐσόμενον. Ἡ γενέτο 8' 490 αὐτῷ, εἰ νῦ ἔχεις, πρῶτον μὲν ἀλήθεια, ἦν διόκει αὐτῶν πάνως καὶ πάντῃ ἔδει, ἢ ἀλαζόν ὅτι μηδαμὴ μετεῖναι φιλοσοφίας ἀλήθινης. Ἡ γὰρ οὗτο λεγόμενον. Οὔκοιν ὑν μὲν τούτο σφόδρα 5 οὗτο παρὰ δὸξαν τοῖς νῦν δοκουμένοις περὶ αὐτοῦ; Καὶ μᾶλα, ἐφη. Ἀρ οὖν ὅ, ὅ μετρίως ἀπολογησόμεθα, ὅτι πρὸς τὸ ὅν

25 οὕτων ἐπὶ almost = 'woo her'; cf. 495 C ff., ῼμηρ. 310 A. πηλασάμει is similarly used in 496 B.

28 τὴν ἀνάγκην should be taken strictly. There is no possibility of escape: the majority must inevitably succumb. Cf. 492 E H.

490 E 31 ἵκεθεν—ὅθεν. As ἀναμνησκομαι takes the genitive of a noun, so it can be followed by a genitival—originally ablatival—adverb. ῾θεν is attracted for οὗ: cf. Soph. Τr. 701 and other examples in Kühner Gr. Gr. II p. 915.

32 καλὸν τε κάγαθον. The fashionable Greek phrase καλὸς κάγαθος for an ἐλευθερος or gentleman, was continually used by Socrates and his followers to express their ideal of what a man should be. An excellent discussion of the Socratic connotation of the word will be found in Döring Die Lehre des Sokrates pp. 398—415: for its usual implications reference may be made to Schmidt Ethik d. alten Griechen 1 pp. 338—344. In politics, the expression was applied to the wealthy or oligarchical party (cf. VIII 569 A and Thuc. VIII 48. 6). It is therefore probable that Socrates' habitual use of καλὸς κάγαθος fostered the not unwarranted suspicion that he and his friends were out of sympathy with democracy, and so contributed in some measure to his condemnation and death.

490 A 2 νῦ ἔχεις: 'you remember,' ἐν νῦ ἔχεις (as in some inferior MSS) would mean 'you intend.' Compare Euthyph. 2 B with Ap. 20 B. The reference is to 485 B—487 A.

3 ἦ = 'aliocin.' Cf. v 463 D H.

5 οὗτο κτλ. οὖθαν "ex Adimantii verbis repetitum et præcise dictum est pro οὗτῳ λεγόμενον ἦν." If the word is genuine, it must be taken in this way. J. and C. translate "to say no more," comparing μισθός οὖθαν and the like (see on Π 377 B). But there appears to be no other instance of this idiomatic οὖθαν with the adverb σφόδρα. οὖθαν σφόδρα in Ar. Frogs 88 is quite different, in spite of Blaydes on Ar. Wasps 461. It is just possible that οὖθαν is an interpolation from οὖθαν just before.

παρά δὸξαν. By selecting this form of expression Plato "opinionibus opinionem tribuit" (Schneider), loosely enough, but the words are practically equivalent to ἀναιρεῖσθαι. παράδοξον would be somewhat easier, but the text is probably sound. For a similar pleonasm see my note on Crit. 44 C.

δοκουμένοις. With the passive cf. x 612 B.

αὐτοῦ is masculine, and means Plato's καλὸς κάγαθος, i.e. the philosopher, whom popular opinion regards as ἀλαζῶν, if not as a liar.

6 ἀρ οὖν δὴ κτλ. 'Shall we not then fairly plead that the true lover of learning was disposed by nature to strive towards Being and carried not at the many particulars which are opined to be' etc? Socrates has just said that Truth is the leading attribute of the Philosopher. This proposition is challenged by public opinion (παρά δὸξαν τοῖς νῦν δοκουμένοις), and in support of it Socrates urges, what
he had asserted before (485 A—C) that the philosopher is a lover of to ὤν, ἔν (‘was,’ i.e. ‘is, as we saw’) would be the ‘philosophic imperfect’ in direct speech. For the rare change from ἡν to ἔν after a primary tense cf. Xen. Mem. 12. 34 δήλων (sc. ἐστιν) ὁτι ἁρπακτόν ἐν τοι τον ὅμοιο λέγει, where ἐν stands for ἡν (the usual ‘erat’ for ‘esset’ with words denoting obligation or necessity) of the direct, and Plato Charm. 156 B λέγοντι ὅτι αὐξ οὐ τοι αὐτόν μόνῳ ἐπιχείρειν τοῦ ὄρθωσις ἱστού, ἀλλ' ἀναγκαίον ἐν ἁμα και την κεφαλήν ἥρπασεν. (Madvig’s insertion of ἐν after ἀναγκαίον in this passage is without authority.) Cf. also Π 361 C ὑ. The sequence is all the more easy with the philosophic imperfect because its very nature involves a reference to the past. Ast’s conjecture ἀπελεγομένη is incorrect; for the philosopher’s zeal for Being has not yet been urged in defence of the statement—now for the first time formally challenged—that Truth is his leading characteristic. Madvig conjectures ἀπελεγομένη, which Baiter adopts, although the word is wholly inappropriate here. Cf. Χ 607 B ὑ.

The imagery should be compared with Thetis. 156 A ff. where the phenomena of Perception are thus analysed. The Subject unites with the Object, and from this union are born two children, one the αἰσθήσεως e.g. Sight, the other the αἰσθήτων e.g. τὸ μέλαν. The former belongs more peculiarly to the Subject, the latter to the Object. Similarly with the phenomena of Knowledge. The Subject unites with the Idea, and the children of this union are τοῦ (or rather, strictly speaking, νόησις i.e. the action of τοῦ), on the side of the Subject, and the νοητών, i.e. Truth, on the side of the Object. We miss an essential point if we take τοῦ as the object of Knowledge; it is the faculty of Reason, no longer dormant, but suddenly called into actuality. Plato means that Reason does not really live until it lays hold on the Idea. νοησις corresponds to τοῦ; it is by the begetting of τοῦ that we come to know. The aorist denotes the instantaneous act; cf. Συμπ. 210 E πρὸς τὸν ἄγον — ἐξ αἰνής κατὰ τελειότατον τι θαυμαστών τὴν φύσιν καλύπτει κτλ. See also on 508 D and cf. VII 517 C. In like manner ἀληθεία περιβάλλει ἀληθείας: there is no true life without knowledge of the Truth. ἀληθεύω goes also with τρέφω: cf. Φαεδρ. 247 D and 248 B, C. With ὤνοιοι cf. Φαεδρ. 251 E (ὧνοιον ἔλεγχον) and Συμπ. 206 E. It is tempting to suppose that in ὤνοιος Plato is thinking not merely of the lover’s pangs, but also of the pangs of birth. The knowledge of the Idea is indeed in Plato’s view an intellectual and moral regeneration. But ἀναλητέος τοῦ ἐρωτὸς shews that ὤνοιος means the throes of love; and the further view introduces a confusion of ideas which is alien to the peculiar character of Plato’s ‘mysticism.’

14 μετέστη. With μετέστη cf. Χ 606 Β λογίζεσθαι γὰρ—ὅλγος τις μετ-
16

15 μυσείν; 1 Μυσείν, ἐφη. 'Ἡγουμένης δὴ ἀληθείας οὐκ ἐν τοῖς, ζ οὐμαι, φαίμεν αὐτῇ χρόνῳ κακῶν ἀκολουθήσα. Πώς γὰρ; 'Αλλ' ὑμεῖς τε καὶ δίκαιον ἢδος, εὐ καὶ σωφροσύνη ἐπεσθαί. Ὁρθῶς, ἐφη. Καὶ δὴ τὸν ἄλλον τῆς φιλοσοφοῦ φύσεως χρόνον τί δεῖ πάλιν εἰς ἀρχής ἀναγκάζοντα τάττειν; μέμνησαι γὰρ ποῦ, ότι ξυνέβη 20 προσήκον τούτοις ἀνδρεία, μεγαλοπρεπεία, εὐμάθεια, μνήμη καὶ σοῦ ἐπιλαμβάνειν, ότι πάς μὲν ἀναγκασθῆσεται 1 ὁμολογεῖν οἷς ὁ λέγομεν, εἰταὶ δὲ τοὺς λόγους, εἰς αὐτῶν ἀποβλέψας περὶ ὧν ὁ λόγος, φαίν ὅραν αὐτῶν τοὺς μὲν ἀρχήστους, τοὺς δὲ πόλλοις κακῶς πάσαν κακίαν, τῆς διαβολῆς τῆς αὐτίαν ἐπισκοπουῦντες ἐπὶ 25 τοῦτῳ νῦν γεγόναμεν, τί ποθ' οἱ πολλοί κακοὶ, καὶ τούτῳ δὴ ἔνεκα

23. μὲν II: om. A.
Plato distinguishes between two kinds of φιλοσοφία, that which results from the corruption of the truly philosophical nature, and the φιλοσοφία of pretenders to philosophy. It is the latter—so we are told—which is responsible for the prejudice under which Philosophy labours (cf. 480 D); but the former is by far the more serious evil (491 E, 495 B), though engendered, not by Philosophy, but by the seductive influence of public opinion.

The philosophic nature is a rare growth, whose very virtues render it peculiarly liable to corruption, when it is placed in unfavourable surroundings. The clamorous voice of public opinion, expressed in assemblies and other gatherings of the people, inevitably corrupts the youth by moulding them into conformity with itself. Where necessary, force is employed, under the name of punishment. Against these influences, no teacher can possibly contend, although the providence of God may save some. As for the Sophists, they do but make into a system and teach the opinions of the Multitude, which they are wholly unable to justify, but accept without reserve, as their profession requires them to do. Remember too that the Ideas are foolishness to the Many, so that they will never love Wisdom or her followers. Socrates concludes with a vivid and lifelike picture of a philosophic nature in process of corruption.

Cf. Prot. 355 D and Soph. Phil. 1009. άνάξιον (Benedictus) and άνάκτικον (Herwerden) are unhappy conjectures. 3 ἐπὶ πάντας: 'all the world over.' Cf. ἐπὶ ἄνθρωποι in Tim. 23 B.

Cobet, who formerly proposed γεννήσεσθαι, afterwards rejected the whole clause. The aorist infinitive with μελλει is rare, but thoroughly established in Plato, if any reliance is placed on the best MSS: see the examples collected by Schanz Vol. v p. vii.

The philosophic nature is half-proverbial. For καὶ άλλα, Stepshanus conjectured καὶ άλλας, or καὶ άλλας, Richards καὶ άλλας, comparing Arist. Eth. Nio. vii 1.1151 b 3ο δια τὸ τὴν ετέραν πολλὰς καὶ κάλλας εἰς τάνεραν. But καὶ άλλας would be inelegant after καὶ άνθρωποι, and Plato could not have written άλλας. A similar but easier change from the generic singular to the plural occurs 410 b 8 and infra 500 C. Translate, keeping the anacoluthon; 'that such a nature—one possessed of all the qualities' etc.—'such natures are few and far between among mankind.'

12 ἀπόλλυσιν κτλ. Krohn (Pl. St. p. 114) asks how courage and temperance can tend to corrupt the character. The answer is given by Plato in 494 B ff. They bring their possessor to the front, and therefore expose him to the solicitations of selfish and unscrupulous men. It should be carefully borne in mind that ἀνθρεια and the other virtues are here regarded, not as the result of education, but as natural qualities, derived from the philosopher's native love of truth. We are in fact dealing with the potentiality of the τελείων φιλόσοφος (491 A). It is this which suffers corruption, not the actualized philosopher. Cf. Krohn l.c.p. 115 and Pfeiderer Zur Lehre etc. p. 26.

491 c 17 ἔχεις γὰρ—λέγω: not "now I have given you an outline of my meaning" (D. and V.), but 'you understand the general type of the things I mean,' that is, the general character of things which φθείρει καὶ ἀποστῇ, though in themselves advantages or even virtues. Adimantus assents, but would like to have them specified more precisely. In reply, Socrates bids him grasp the notion of them correctly as a whole (αὐτῶν is neuter and δὲν αὐτῶν is practically equivalent to τόσον), and it will become clear to him, and τὰ προερχόμενα περὶ αὐτῶν (viz. that they ἀπόλλυσι καὶ ἀποστῇ —φθείρει καὶ ἀποστῇ b, c) will not appear ἄστω as before (ἀποτον—ἀκούσαι in δ).

The passage is somewhat loosely written; but αὐτῶν is certainly neuter and not 'the philosophic natures,' as J. and C. suppose.

491 D 21 ἔγγειον—ζύγων. These are possessive genitives. Richards says that "τῶν should probably be omitted before ζύγων or added before ἔγγειον." Cf. however IV 438 c n. In this instance I think Plato wrote τῶν ζύγων in order to call special attention to ζύγα as opposed to ἔγγεια. They are not on the same level of importance, as far as the argument is concerned, for it is the degeneration of ζύγα, not of ἔγγεια, which Plato has to explain.

23 πλείων is much more elegant than Madvig's conjecture πλείων. Plato's position on this matter, in the way in which he states it, is open to objection. It might be argued that the naturally strong nature is the best fitted to resist the corrupting influences of its environment. But the philosophic nature is remarkable for sensibility as well as strength, and the sensitive plant needs careful fostering. The general sentiment of this passage is Socratic, as Hermann (Gesch. u. System p. 330 n. 33) and Krohn (Pl. St. p. 365) have pointed out; cf. Mem. IV 1. 3, 4 ἄθρωτον τοῦ εὐφύεστον ἐρμηνευτικότατον ταῖς ψυχαῖς ὑπάρχει—παρευθεύνεται καὶ μαθάται ἃ δει πράττειν, ἄριστον τοι καὶ ἄθρωτον γλύφεται—ἀπαθεύτους δὲ καὶ ἀμαθεῖς γενομένους κακίστους τε καὶ βλαβερωτάτους γλύφεσθαι.
ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΣ § 19

492 A] 3 μη ἐν προσθηκοῦσαι: ι. κ. ἐν μη προσθηκοῦσῃ (which Stephanus wrongly read), by a common hyperbaton: cf. Crito 47 D and other examples in Braun De Hyperb. Pl. p. 15. With προσθηκοῦσῃ it is usual to supply μαθῆσαι. I think Plato intentionally selects a vague expression, intending ἐν προσθηκοῦσῃ to be taken with ἀπαρείπτως and φυτευθεία as well as with ἀρετή: for it is just as important that the philosophic nature should be sown and planted in a proper soil (491 D), as that it should receive proper education. Morgenstern, who formerly proposed προσθηκοῦσῃ <γ>, afterwards adopted much the same view as this: see Schneider Addit. p. 46.

5 θεών. See on θεοῦ μοιραὶ 493 A. ἤ καὶ σύ ἡγεῖ κτλ. This passage is appealed to by Grote (VIII pp. 200 ff.) in his famous defence of the Sophists. Plato certainly implies that the Sophists did not independently corrupt the young 'to any extent worth mentioning' (ὅ τι καὶ ἔξων λόγου). It is the Demos which is the primary source and fount of corruption; the Sophists are only the mouthpiece of a disgraceful public opinion which it is their profession to flatter and court (493 A—D). But from Plato's point of view this is itself a sufficiently grave indictment to bring against a professional teacher of Morality (see 493 c), so that the present attack on the Athenian people is far from being an apology for the Sophists.
tinas sofistas idiotikous, exisxen, idomous, oixen, akous tois tauteis legeontas megystous, mev einai sofistas, pайдеun de teleostata kai aerismexhetai oixous boulyontai einai kai neous kai 10 presbuvterous kai andras kai kynaiakas; Potheo, h 'o do, "Outan, eipov, synkathexemenei aeroin polloi eis ekklesias h eis dikoastiria h theatra h stratopeda h tina allon koino plithous exullologon xun pollio thoripto to mew xegwosi ton legeomewn h prattomewn, ta de epainwsi, uterbalkontos ekastera, kai ekbovntes kai krotou-15 tes, prws 'o autous ailetei kai to topos en o an oixen ethychoun- 
es diplasion throubion parexwto to fygou kai epainou, en de 

18 pogan. h 'o autous ferein, kai fhisen te to autois toutous kala kai
flood.) In this there is nothing but the common passage of a relative into a main sentence (see II 357 B n. and cf. Ap. 40 A with my note ad loc.), coupled with an easy change of subject, as in Cris 49 B. The sentence assumes the form which it has in the text, because both subordinate and main clauses can take the accusative with infinitive in Greek oratio obliqua: see Kühner Gr. Gr. II p. 1536. Stallbaum (followed by J. and C.) understands ὁμίλη to account for φθείρα, but the negative cannot be supplied, and if it could, it would give a wrong sense. Schneider's translation is correct, but not his note in the text. With the sentiment cf. Gorg. 510 d ff.

492 D 25. The Demos is the Arch-Sophist: cf. 492 A n. οὐτοί is the contemptuous ἵστι: 'these teachers and sophists of yours.'

26. The fate of Socrates was the most conspicuous example of this in Plato's time, but it is hardly likely that Plato is specifically alluding to it here (as Steinhart and Susemihl suppose). The description is quite general. Contrast VII 517 A n.

492 E 30. Plato has just declared that it would be the height of folly in a teacher even to attempt to make a young man run counter to public opinion. The present sentence explains why. There is not, never has been, and never will be produced a character different from the Many in respect of virtue, by having been educated on principles opposed to the education which the Many provide (the force of public sentiment, expressed in assemblies etc.). Consequently every attempt to produce such a character by means of education in the teeth of public opinion is foredoomed to failure. The statement appears at first sight extraordinary; but from Plato's point of view it is, with the limitations which he makes, strictly correct. Cities are either actual or ideal. In the ideal city, education does not produce a type of character which conflicts with public opinion, because public opinion is itself formed by education. In actual cities, education must conform to the same standard if it is to exist at all: for τὸν μὴ πειθόμενον ἀτιμίας τε καὶ χρήματι καὶ θανάτους καλῶσαι (492 D). How then are we to explain the presence of great and good men in existing cities? They are θείων ἱδρύμες, saved from corruption by grace of God: see on 493 A. In these circumstances, what is the political reformer to do? He must break with all existing cities (497 B), and found—as Plato now wishes to do—a new commonwealth in which sound education and public opinion no longer differ, but agree. In other words, his policy must be to make the Philosopher King. For other views of this passage see App. II.

33. The Many are the ‘merely human character.’ Plato makes an exception in favour of a θείων ἱδρύω, playing on the proverb τὸ θεῖον ἐξαιρέω λόγον, for which cf. Sym. 176 Σωκράτη δ’' ἐξαιρό.
λόγου, Phadr. 242 B Σιμιλαν Θεβαίων ἐξαιρετέος λόγου (λα dere), and Theat. 162 D. Ποτέ ἢ διείξατος οὐδέν τι καθαρτιός καὶ ἀπειληφόρος ἢ γόνυται, μή ἀλλα παρεδετὰ ἢ τάτα τά τῶν πολλῶν δόγματα, ἢ δοξάζουσαν ὅταν ἀδροισώσουν, καὶ σοφίαν ταύτην καλεῖν, ὅλοντες τις τὸ τήρημας καὶ ἐπιθυμίας κατεμάθατεν, ἦν τῇ προσελθεῖσιν χρή καὶ ὅπῃ ἁπασθαί αὐτοῦ, καὶ ὅπως εἰρή-

II. \( \text{κάτω \ τὸ πράσινον \ καὶ \ ἐκ \ τῶν \ χρυσῶν \} \) γίγνεται, καὶ φωνάζει ἡ ἐφ' ὅπ' ἐκάστα \ ἐλθεῖν \ φθέγγεσθαι, καὶ \ ὅπ' \ αὐτοῦ \ ἀλλο \ φθεγγομένου \ ἠμεροῦται \ το \ καθαρός \ καὶ \ 

for the birth of statesmen who are truly 

θεῖον. But they do not solve the difficulty, 

for the scientific knowledge of 

πολιτική is 

not only better and more 

stable in itself, 

but guarantees the permanent 

prosperity of 

a State, because it 

can be transmitted to 

posterity. 

Nor can we be sure that 

our statesmen 'by grace of 

God' will 

appear when they are most 

wanted. For 

a full discussion of 

θεία \ πορία in 

Plato see 

Zeller, I 1, p. 594 n. 4. 

4 \( \text{ἐκαστός} \) : sc. δοξάσων. Cf. I 334 B \( \text{and } \) 

Phaed. 80 A, \( \text{where } \) ψυχή, 

the reading of the best MSS, should 

be retained. 

Bairer is certainly wrong in 

reading \( \text{ἐκαστός} \) \ (with Stephanus and \( \text{v} \) ) 

for with personal subjects \( \text{δοξάς is used} \) 

personally. 

Dümmler (Chr. Beitr. p. 12) 

and Teichmüller (Lit. Fehld. I p. 104) 

suppose that Plato means 

Isocrates in 

particular. 

It is possible enough 

that he 

had Isocrates in his mind, but the 

description 

applies to many besides him: cf. \( \text{IV } \) 

426 C \( \text{sp} \). 

6 \( \text{δοξάζουν = } \) \( \text{opine is technical} \); 

cf. v 470 E. With \( \text{θρεματος etc. cf.} \) 

"The beast with many heads Butts me 

away" Shakespeare Coriol. IV 11; 

and a similar figure in Solon ap. Arist. 

Ath. Pol. 12 ad fin. and Theat. 174 D. 

493 B 11 \( \text{ἐκάστας} \). See \( \text{cn. \ } \) 

Van Prinsterer's emendation is now 

universally accepted. 

οὐδ' αὐτ σκλά. The party-cry.
13 kalístei (though kataomáblan) is written because of kataomáblan de, after which ekdäle would be less suitable. The situation is now treated as a possible one, after the picture has once been allowed.

16 ómousiǒn ktl.: 'employs all these terms in accordance with' (literally 'in dependence on') 'the opinions of the mighty Beast.' This interpretation is better than to suppose with Stallbaum that Plato means 'applies all these names to the opinions,' etc., though ómousiǒn ti épi tin is idiomatically used in that way.

19 tānagkaia—kaloi. tānagkaia does not mean "the physical necessities and exigencies of the great beast's nature." (J. and C.), but simply 'the inevitable.' Whatever happens, a public teacher or Sophist must conform to the opinions of the Beast (493 D). In what follows there is a hint of the profound philosophical view that the Works of Necessity are evil (cf. Tim. 29 E, 47 E ff.), and that Moral Freedom consists in following what is good. See supra 617 E.

22 dokai. As would read dokai, but óp of course goes with ónai: cf. IV 432 B. See for this idiom my note on Prov. 351 B and Blaydes on Ar. Waipr 1495.


493 D 25 óti μὲν γὰρ ktl. An anacoluthon. The apodosis which requires to be supplied is 'that much is certain' or the like: cf. v 465 A n. I formerly thought the anacoluthon too harsh, and proposed to read ó ti μὲν γάρ ἄν—ἐπιθεικόμενος, ἢ κτλ., taking ó ti as the object of ἐπιθεικόμενος, and ἡ ποίησιν ('either poetry' etc.) as in apposition to ó ti: but the text is better as it stands. Richards' proposal to read ἐστὶ οὐρ ὅτι is very unpleasing.

26 ποίησιν. Compare a striking passage in Law 659 B, c, where Poetry is said to have deteriorated after she accepted of pollä as her judge. See also Laws 700 E, 797 B, Gorg. 502 B ff. and infra x 605 A.

27 kuriōn áutō. We should certainly (with Schneider and the majority of editors) read áutōs and not áutō (which Stallbaum and others adopt, referring to polλα etc.). The MSS (except g) mostly read áutōs, but their authority in this matter is of no account. Cobet would read áutōs and eject τῶν polλον—on what ground, it is difficult even to conjecture.

πέρα τῶν ἀναγκαίων. By coming forward in a public capacity as a poet or
VIII. Ταύτα τούνων πάντα ἐννοοῦσα ἐκείνο ἀναμνήσθητε: αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν, ἄλλα μὴ τὰ πολλὰ καλὰ, ἥ αὐτὸ τί ἔκαστον καὶ μὴ τὰ πολλὰ ἐκαστά, ἓσθ' ὅπως | πλῆθος ἀνέχεται ἡ ἡγησίατε εἶναι; 494 Ἰκιστά ἡ, ἐφη. Φιλόσοφον μὲν ἄρα, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, πλῆθος ἀδύνατον εἶναι. Ἀδύνατον. Καὶ τοὺς φιλοσοφοῦντας ἄρα ἀνάγκη πέγεσαι ὑπ' αὐτῶν. Ἀνάγκη. Καὶ ὅπο τούτων ἢ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν, ὅσοι 5 προσομιλοῦντες ὄχλο ἀρέσκειν αὐτῷ ἐπιθυμοῦσι. Δῆλον. Ἐκ δὴ τούτων τῶν ὀρὲς σωτηρίαν φιλοσόφῳ φύει, ὅστ' ἐν τῷ ἐπιτη- δεύματι μείναναν πρὸς τέλος ἐλθεῖν; ἐνδεικτ' δ' ἐκ τῶν ἐμπρόσθεν. 1 ἀμφότερον ἡ μὲν ἐμφάνεια καὶ μνήμη καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ Β μεγαλοπρέπεια ταύτης εἶναι τῆς φύσεως. Ναὶ. Οὐκόν εὐθὺς ἐν

statesman or the like, he 'makes the Many his masters more than is necessary.' In a private station, he is, comparatively speaking, independent; but even then the Many are (in a certain sense) of necessity his masters: see 496 D. Ast and Stallbaum take the phrase with ἡ Διο- μήδεια ἀνάγκη. "Tungenda sunt verba sic: ἀνάγκη (ὅστιν) αὐτῷ πέρα τῶν ἀναγκαίων (ultra necessaria quae progregidatur) ἡ Διο- μήδεια λεγομένη, ut vocabulis ἡ λεγομένη Διομήδεια istud πέρα ἀναγκαίων declaratur." (Stallbaum). If this is what Plato meant, he expresses it in a harsh and dangerously ambiguous way, and it would be preferable to cancel πέρα τῶν ἀναγκαίων (with Cobet and Herwerden). But there is fortunately no occasion for such drastic treatment.

28 ἡ Διομήδεια κτλ. Most of the MSS write Διομήδεια (sic), but Διομήδεια γε at the end of a line in Ar. Ecl. 1029 makes it clear that the word is proparoxynon, unless, as Schneider supposes (Addit. p. 47), Aristophanes shortens the final syllable by poetic license. The proverb, which is used of an overmastering necessity, is illustrated by Leutsch u. Schneiderin Parosm. Gr. 1 p. 59, 11 p. 367, and also by Blydies on Ar. l.c. Two explanations of it were given. According to the first, which is adopted by the Scholiast on this passage, the phrase originated in the treatment meted out by Diomede to Odysseus, when they were returning from Ilium to the Greek camp after stealing the Palladium. Odysseus attempted to kill Diomede, but failed, and Diomede paid him out by tying his arms together and driving him home with blows from the flat of his sword. The Scholiast on Ar. l.c. explains differently. Διομήδεια: ὅτι Διομῆδης ἡ Θράκη, πόροι ἐχὼν ὑπαρξάμενος, τὸν πολλὰς ἐξένων ἐμβάλλοντα αὐτίς αὐτοῖς αὐτίς ἔχειν ὅσον κρύον σχέσιν καὶ ἀναλαβόων οἱ ἄνθρωποι. ἂς καὶ ὁ μῆδος ἐποὺς ἀνθρωποφάγους εἶπεν. I agree with Schneider that the proverb is more likely to have originated from the first story than from a euhemeristic explanation of the man-eating mares of Diomede of Thrace.

30 αὐτῶν. The μεσαραβοῦντες ἱδώται, not 'the Many.' Plato is probably thinking of actual eulogies of the Athenians by Isocrates and others like him.

32 ἀναμνήσθητε. See v 475 E. 494 λ ἀνέκτενον—ἐναι. The theory of Ideas is not a democratic philosophy. With Plato's attitude here to οἱ πολλοί cf. Gorg. 474 οί τοι δὲ πολλοί οὐδὲ διαλέγομαι. 4 καὶ—ὅτι. Cf. 490 c n. 494 λ ὀμόλογοντα. See 486 c, 486 λ, β and cf. also 490 c.
πασίν ὁ τοιοῦτος πρώτος ἦσται ἐν ἄπασιν, ἄλλος τε καὶ ἕαν τὸ 40 σῶμα φυ̣ ̣ ς προσφερῆς τῇ ψυ̣ χῇ; Τί δ' οὖ μέλλει; ἐφή. Βουλής- 60 σουνται δῆ, οἷς, αὐτὸς χρῆσθαι, ἐπειδὰν πρεσβύτερος γίγνηται, ἐπὶ τὰ αὐτῶν πρῶτα ὡς τε ὀικεῖοι καὶ οἱ πολῖται. Πῶς δ' οὖ; 80 Ὑποκείονται τ' ἀρα δεόμενοι καὶ τιμῶντες, προκαταλαμβάνοντες καὶ προκολακεύοντες τὴν μέλλονσαν αὐτὸν δύναμιν. Φιλεὶ γοῦν, 10 ἐφη, οὕτω γίγνεσθαι. Τί οὖν οἶξ, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, τοῦ τοιοῦτον ἐν τῷς τοιούτοις ποιήσειν, ἄλλος τε καὶ ἕαν τό ὀχυρά μεγάλης πόλεως ὅν καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ πλοῦσιος τε καὶ γενναίος, καὶ ἐτι εὐειδῆς καὶ μέγας; ἀρ' οὖ πληρωθήσεθαι ἀμιχάνου ἐλπίδος, θηγούμενον καὶ τὰ τῶν 20 Δ’ Ἑλλήνων καὶ τὰ τῶν βαρβάρων ἰκανόν ἐσεθαι πράττειν, καὶ αἱ ἑπὶ τούτων ψυ̣ χῆλον ἐξαρεῖν αὐτὸν, σχηματισμὸν καὶ φρονή-


10 πασίν. See cf. n. πασίν is re-
tained by Schneider, who takes it as masculine and ἄπασιν as neuter. Her-
werden also approves of πάσαν: but εὐθὺς ἐν πασίν (which most of the editors adopt) gives the only correct antithesis to ἐπειδὰν πρεσβύτερος γίγνηται ("when he is growing older"). a and α are easily interchanged in ninth century MSS: see Introd. § 5.

11 φυ̣ γ. Herwerden proposes φύ̣ ς προσφερῆς, comparing Soph. Ajax 1077 καὶ σῶμα γεννησθή μέγα, but no change is necessary, as Herwerden himself allows. For προσφερῆς, some inferior MSS have προφερᾶς, an easier, but less elegant and idiomatic reading. Schneider also points out that if Plato had written προφερᾶς, he ought to have added αὐτῷ with τὸ σῶμα.

14 ὑποκείονται: 'they will pro-
strate at his feet' is the future perfect of ὑποκείμενον, ὑποκείονται, which Herwer-
den conjectures, would be less expressive, and denote an act, or series of acts, in stead of a never-waering attitude of supplication and adoration. They so to speak besiege his soul with flatteries and prayers.

494 C 17 ἐὰν τόχη κτλ. It has long been admitted that this picture is drawn chiefly from Alcibiades. In an-
tiquity Plutarch seems to have suspected something of the sort, for he describes Alcibiades’ degeneration in language adapted from the present passage (Alc. 4. 1). But the personal touches must not blind us to the fact that Plato is portraying the type, although Alcibiades sits for the portrait.

18 πλούσιος—μέγας describe Alci-

19 θηγούμενον κτλ. Plutarch (Alc. 17. 2, 3) declares that Alcibiades intended the Sicilian expedition to be a step towards an almost universal empire: Sicily was to be merely the ἑθθα τοῦ πολέμου. Alcibiades says nearly as much himself in Thuc. VI 90. 2, with which compare 15. 2. Grote (VII p. 79) is inclined to deny that even Alcibiades dreamt of anything beyond the conquest of Sicily, but the ancient historians thought differently: cf. also Alc. II 141 Β ff. Many of the Athenians, probably not without reason (though Plutarch I.c. 35. I leaves the point unsettled), suspected him of aiming at a τυραννία (Thuc. VI 15. 4 and Isocr. peri ζέγονος 38).

494 D 21 ἐξαρεῖν κτλ. See cf. n. ἐξαρεῖν appears also in several MSS besides ν. The present, though retained by Schneider, is very difficult after πνημω- 496 "θοςεθα. For the interchange of α and a cf. Introd. § 5. Alcibiades’ φρονήμα was notorious: see for example Alc. 1 104 Α, Thuc. V 43. 2, VI 16 ff., Plut. Alc. 34. 6 and the highly characteristic anecdote in 23. 8. Plato’s words appear to embody
an extract from some tragic poet (probably Euripides), as may be inferred both from the rhythm (σχηματισμοῦ—κενοῦ) and the language. ἄνευ νοῦ is declared by van Prinsterer, Cobot and others to be a gloss on κενοῦ. Possibly they are right; but (as Schneider remarks) οὗ τοῦ ἐνέστων αὐτῷ in favour of retaining the words, and they occur in all the mss.

23 οὕτω διατηθείμενο: not “while he is in this frame of mind” (D. and V.), but ‘when he is sinking into this condition.’

24 τὸ δὲ is not here the idiomatic τὸ δὲ (as in 1v 443 c), but ‘hoc autem’ i.e. νοῦ (Stallbaum).

27 τὸ γυγγενὲς κτλ.: i.e. the affinity of what is said with his nature, “weil die Reden mit ihm verwandt sind” (Schneider). D. and V.’s translation “an inborn taste for philosophic inquiry” is wrong.

28 has often been doubted; but Schneider’s explanation is certainly right, that τὸ ὀφθαλμικὸν ἔχοντα is the individual typifying a class, and that ἐς denotes one of the class. The idiom is analogous to the plural after a typical or generic singular: see on 1347 a. The emendations proposed (διαθέθηκεν for ἔς αἰσθάνεται Stallbaum, εἰσαχθεῖς Richter, εἰς Madvig, εἰσαχθένοι οἱ εἰσαχθένοις Richards) are not only superfluous, but indefensible in themselves. Plato hardly expects more than one such person to pause at all on his downcast career. Here again we naturally think of Alcibiades, whose interviews with Socrates (according to Simp. 215 D) profoundly impressed him for the moment, but failed to effect a permanent reform in the midst of so many temptations (ib. 216 b). Perhaps Socrates once hoped that Alcibiades would be his ‘scientific ruler,’ and bring back true prosperity to Athens. A tone of sorrow for the ‘lost leader’ seems to make itself felt in Plato’s words.

494 E 29 τοὺς ἡγούμενους: i.e. of ἡγούμενω, whence the article, which Herderen wrongly rejects. The voice should pause a little between ἡγούμενου (which refers to 494 c) and τοὺς ἡγούμενους.

30 λέγοντας τε κτλ. We should expect the future indicative, and on this ground the insertion of διατηθείμενο has been proposed by Richards (Stephanus had previously desiderated διατηθείμενο). So serious an alteration lacks every element of probability. Ast must be wrong in making λέγοντας etc. depend on ὀφθαλμα. If the text is sound, we should supply πάντα δράσεω or the like after ὀφθαλμα, and regard the participles as agreeing with the subject of δράσεω. (Schneider and J. and C. take nearly the same view). δράσεω is of course easy to understand, but it is less easy to dispense with πάντα. Could Plato have written ὄ <πάν>, πᾶν μὲν ἔργον κτλ.? Cf. IX 575 E and πᾶν ποιεῖν in Ap. 39 a and Gorg. 479 c. I prefer the anacolouthon.

31 τὸν πειθόντα. Such was Socrates, and he was brought to trial. Plato may well have thought of his master when he wrote ὁμοίως ἐς ἡγούμενα καθιστάτως. The most fatal count in the charge against Socrates was that he corrupted the youth (Ap. 24 b), and Alcibiades was held to be a case in point (Xen. Mem. i 2 12). Plato now turnsthe tables on the Athenian people. He says in effect ‘It was you who corrupted Alcibiades: and you impeached Socrates for trying to save him.’
495 C] ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΣ Σ

Όπως άν μὴ οἶδο τ’ ἦ, καὶ ἴδια ἐπιθυμεύοντας καὶ δημοσία εἰς 495 ἀγάνας καθιστάντας; | Πολλή, ἦ δ’ ὦς, ἀνάγκη. Ἐστιν οὖν ὅπως ὁ τοιοῦτος φιλοσοφίσσει; Οὐ πάνω.

IX. Ὡρᾶς οὖν, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, ὅτι οὐ κακῶς ἐλέγομεν, ὡς ἁρά καὶ αὐτά τὰ τῆς φιλοσοφοῦ φύσεως μέρη, ὅταν ἐν κακῇ τροφῇ γένηται, αὕτη τρόπον τίνα τοῦ ἐκπεισεῖν ἐκ τοῦ ἐπιτηδεύματος, καὶ τὰ 5 λεγόμενα ἀγαθα, πλοῦτοι τε καὶ πᾶσα η τοιαύτη παρασκευή; Οὐ γὰρ, ἀλλ’ ὁρθώς, ἔφη, ἐλέγκη. Ὁ οὕτος δὴ, ἐποι, ὁ βαθμίσει, ὃ ὀλεθρός τε καὶ διαφθορὰ τοσαύτη τη 1 καὶ τοιαύτη τῆς βελτίστης φύσεως ἐις τὸ ἀριστον ἐπιτηδεύμα, ὀλγής καὶ ἄλλως γνωμημένης, ὡς ἡμεῖς φαμέν, καὶ ἐκ τούτων δὴ τῶν ἁνδρῶν καὶ οἱ τὰ μέγιστα 10 κακὰ ἐργαζόμενοι τὰς πόλεις γίγνονται καὶ τοὺς ἰδιώτας, καὶ οἱ τάγαθα, οἱ ἃν ταύτῃ τύχοις ῥὐνέται· σμικρὰ δὲ φύσεις οὐδὲν μέγα οὐδέποτε οὐδέναι οὔτε ἰδιότητι οὔτε πόλιν ὑμᾶς. 'Αληθέστατα, ἦ δ’ ΣΩΣ. Οὕτως μὲν δὴ οὕτως ἐκπίπτοντες, οὗς μάλιστα 1 προσήκει, ἔρημων καὶ ἀτέλη φιλοσοφίαν λειπόντες αὐτοὶ τε βίον οὐ προσή- 15 κοντα οὗτ’ ἀληθῆ ξῶσιν, τὴν δὲ ὀστίρ ὀρφανῆν ξυγγενῶν ὄλλοι ἐπεισελθόντες ἀνάξιοι ᾦςχυνόν τε καὶ ὑπείρασαν, οἷα καὶ ς ὁ ὀνειδίζεις τῶν ὀνειδίζοντας, ὡς οἱ ξυνόντες αὐτὴ οἱ μὲν οὐδενός, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ πολλῶν κακῶν ἀξίοι εἰςν. Καὶ γὰρ οὖν, ἔφη, τά γε

3. ὁρᾶς Π: ἁρὰ Λ.

495 A 3 ἰδέαμον. 491 B ff.
495 B 9 εἰς should be taken with ἀληθος and διαφθορά, as Schneider points out. They are spoiled 'with reference to' or 'for the best of all vocations.' Jowett wrongly connects εἰς with βελτίστης.
10 φαμέν. 491 A, B. ἐκ τούτων κτλ. Corruptio optimi pessimina.
οἱ— ἰδραμόμενοι was true of Alcibiades: see Grote viii p. 116 and Lysias In Alloc. 1 16, 39, 35 ff. Isocrates' attempt in his περὶ λέοντος to make out that Alcibiades was a benefactor to his city is a futile and fantastic performance.
12 ῥυντής κτλ. With the metaphor cf. 485 D. For σκιρα—ὁρᾶ see 419 E n.
495 B—496 A Abandoned by her rightful lovers, Philosophy, alone and desolate, is forced into a shameful alliance with base pretenders. The offspring of this unhallowed union is a bastard brood of sophisms.
16 ἀληθῆ is like ἀληθῶς ἡμιν in 490 B, a passage where the same kind of imagery is employed.
17 ἦςχυνόν τε κτλ. Is the aorist gnomie or past? It is usually taken as gnomie, but Plato may be thinking of his own times, in which Philosophy had come to shame, because the unworthy had defiled her.
σὺ φᾶς. Cf. 489 D and 487 C, D.
20 λεγόμενα ταύτα. Εἰκότως γε, ἂν δ’ ἐγὼ, λεγόμενα. καθορώντες γὰρ ἄλλοι ἀνθρωποτάσκοι κενὴν τὴν χώραν ταύτην τιγγυμόμενην, καλὸν δὲ ὀνομάτως καὶ προσχημάτως 1 μεστήν, ὅσπερ οἱ ἐκ τῶν εἰργῶν δεῖ τὰ ἱερά ἀποδιδράκοντες, ἁμενοὶ καὶ οὕτω ήκ τῶν τεχνῶν ἐκπειδοσών εἰς τὴν φιλοσοφίαν, οὐ δὲ κομψῶτατοι ὑπέστη τυγχάνονσι 25 περὶ τὸ αὐτὸν τεχνίον. ὅμως γὰρ δὴ πρὸς γε τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας καίπερ οὕτω πραπτοῦσιν φιλοσοφίας τὸ ἀξίωμα μεγαλοτρεπτέρων λείπεται, οὐ δὲ ἐφείμενοι πολλοὶ, ἀτελεῖς μὲν τὰς φύσεις, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν τεχνῶν τε καὶ δημιουργῶν ὦστε τὰ σώματα λειω-βητησι, οὕτω καὶ τὰς 1 ψυχὰς ξυνεκκλασμένους τε καὶ ἀποτεθρυμέ 30 μένοι διὰ τὰς βαναυσίας τυγχάνουσιν: ἢ οὐκ ἄναγκης; Καὶ

495 δ 23 εκ των τεχνων κτλ. It has been supposed that Plato has in view Antithenes and the Cynic Diogenes, the latter of whom apparently started life as a moneychanger (D. L. vi 20). But the description which follows applies to sophists and sophistical rhetoricians rather than to the Cynic philosophers. The poet Gray says “this seems to be aimed at Protagoras, who was an ordinary countryman and a woodcutter” (see Gellius Noct. Att. v 3 and other authorities cited by Frei Quaest. Prot. pp. 6 ff.). Hermann (Gesch. u. Syst. p. 618) cites Euthydemus and Dionysodorus as cases in point (cf. 496 A n.). Each of these sophists had formerly taught the art of fighting in full armour (Euthydem. 271 c—272 b, 273 b). As speech-writing and rhetoric generally were counted among the arts, we may think also of Isocrates, who loved above everything to call himself a φιλόσοφος (Antid. 271 ff.). But although these and other examples may be quoted in illustration of what Plato here says, the tone of the whole passage shews that Plato is describing a familiar phenomenon of his own times, when clever and ambitious young men were in the habit of forsaking their handicrafts and devoting themselves to ‘culture.’ Cf. Prot. 318 ε σὰς τὰς τέχνας αὐτοῖς περευ- γότας ἄκοιται πάλιν αὖθις ἁγνοῦτε ἐμβλη- λουμεν εἰς τέχνας (sc. Hippias etc.), λογισμοὺς τε καὶ ἀστρονομίας καὶ γεωμε- τρίαν καὶ μουσικήν διδάσκοντες, and my article in Cl. Rev. xv p. 230.

27 ἐφείμενοι κτλ. is an anacolouthon. The natural flow of the sentence is interrupted by the question ἢ οὐκ ἄναγκης; which is intended to obtain Adelantanus’ assent to τὰς ψυχὰς—τυγχάνουσιν. On resuming, Plato interposes a comparison, and to this the general idea which forms the logical predicate to πολλοὶ is accommodated in ποι’ ἁπτα—φάθαλα. The sentence was thus understood by the editor of § for τυγχάνουσιν, which seems a difficulty on this theory, is in π τυγχά- νουσιν. But τυγχάνουσι would be extremely inelegant; and Plato writes τυγχάνουσιν to correspond to λειωβηται. Even in other cases a finite verb sometimes replaces a participle in the second of two contrasted clauses, e.g. Ap. 21 E. J. and C. explain the passage in nearly the same way, as well as (apparently) Schneider and Stallbaum. It is impossible for many reasons to connect τυγχάνουσιν with ἐφείμενοι and so escape the anacolouthon. I formerly suspected the text, and proposed ἀπότεθρυμεν (‘miss the mark,’ i.e. fail to win the distinction which they covet). Another solution might be to place the troublesome τυγχάνουσιν after πολλοί. But neither change is in any degree probable; and it is better to acquiesce in the reading of the MSS. Plato’s anacoloutha are a device for imparting life and reality to his dialogues. A careful translation should preserve them all.

495 ε 29 ἀποτεθρυμικοῖ: lit. ‘broken off’ i.e. ‘truncated,’ ‘maimed.’ The word is rare, and apparently used only here by Plato. Schneider thus explains the preposition: “quorum animis quasi arboribus cacuminis defracta et virens ad ententum necessariae debilitatae sunt.” A comparison of θεατ. 173 Πολλὰ κάμπτοται καὶ συγκλίνονται and Prot. 325 ὅσπερ ἔως τινος διαστρεφόμενοι καὶ καταστρεφομεν εἰσίνοις ἀπελάπας καὶ
πληγάς makes it not unlikely that the metaphor is as Schneider supposes. On the
vox nihilīt ἀποστειρόμενων (in the margin of Flor. A) see Ruhnken on
Timaeus Lex. s.v. Timaeus seems to have found it in this text of the Republic.
30 διὰ τὰς βανασσίας. Cf. Xen. Oec. 4. 2 αἰ γε βανασσικαί καλολείεισα (σε.
tύχαι)-καταλημνήσσων-τὰ σώματα τῶν τέρατων καὶ τῶν ἑπιμελοῦσιν,
ἀναγκάζουσα καθησαί καὶ σκαφέσις, έκεί δὲ καὶ πρὸς πόλημος καὶ τῶν
dὲ εἴσωντων θηλυκομένων καὶ αἰ ψυχή
tοῦ ἁρμονίταιρα γίγνονται. It is probable
that βανασσία was "primarily a military conception, dependent for its
origin on the obvious fact that certain
modes of life and the exercise of certain
trades disqualify from prowess in the
field" (Greenidge Gr. Const. History p. 22,
quota in support Hdt. ii 165-167).
"Sedentary and within-door arts," says
Bacon (quoted by Newman Politics of
Aristotle i p. 105), "have in their nature a
contrariety to a military disposition."
In practice the term is freely applied by
the writers the best period to every
kind of mechanical or illiberal labour or
pursuit. Aristotle defines βανασσία in
these words: βάνασων δ' ἔργων εἰσὶν δὲ
tούτοι νομίζων καὶ τέχνην ταύτην καὶ
μάθησιν, ὅσι πρὸς τὰς χρήσεις καὶ τὰς
πράξεις τὰς τῆς ἄριστης ἀχρονίτων ἀπεργα-
ζουσα τὸ σῶμα τῶν θελυκομένων ἡ τῆς
ψυχῆς ἡ τῶν διάνοιαν (Pol. Θ 2. 1337β
8 ff.). See also Whibye Gr. Οίκων
The ancients mostly derived the word
from βαύς 'a furnace' and τύχα "quasi
βαυατος qui caminum ascendit" (Stephanus-Hase Thes. s.v.). In view of
the Boeotian βαυατουλασον and βαυατας: 'νεανικας
Bowow in Pessychis, I have conjectured in
Cl. Rev. v. p. 112 that βαυατος, which does not look like an Attic word, may be
connected with βαυατος. If so, the word
perhaps originally meant 'elceminate'
'unmanly': cf. θηλυκομένων in the ex-
tract quoted from Xenophon. In any case,
however, the ancient etymology can hardly be right.
31 δοκεῖ οὖν τι κτλ. In the 'little
bald tinker' several critics have recognised
Isocrates: see for example Teichmüller
Lit. Fühls. i p. 105 and Jackson's article
on the Sophists in the Enc. Brit. Εκ
deμοι λεμυμένων-ἐν βαλανειρ ἐκ λε-
υμένου is an admirable example of
rhetorical παρομοίωσις, and satirises
the tricks of style for which Isocrates was
notorious. But all the sophistical
rhetoricians of the school of Gorgias
affected meretricious ornaments of this
kind (see Hug on Symp. 194 ε ff. and
especially Cope's Rhetoric of Aristotle
iii pp. 105, 106), and Plato's shafts are
not levelled at Isocrates alone. As usual,
he individualises the type, and if the
resultant picture resembles Isocrates, so
much the worse for him. Plato would
not be sorry (cf. Euthyd. 305 ff., with
Spengel's Isor. u. Pl. pp. 35-40), and
doubtless intended his readers to think of
Isocrates, as they certainly would. See
also on 498 ε.
2 Meineke ἀνδρών νεοπλουτοποιημένων |
ἀλαχρών.
φαλακροῦ καὶ σμικροῦ. Was Isocr-
cates bald and short? The bust of him
in the Villa Albani is not bald, and
it would be pressing the personality to
the verge of absurdity to take these
words so seriously. The poverty (πενὲς
etc.) and loneliness is of course the
daughter's (cf. 495 δ ἐρήμων καὶ δρέλη
φιλοσοφιαν λείτουργε), not her father's,
as D. and V. suppose. In other words
τοῦ διαδότου belongs only to τὴν
θυγα-
tέρα.
οταν αυτης πλησιαζουτες ομιλωσι μη κατ' αξιαν, ποι τατα φομεν 5 γενειν διανοιματα τε και δοξας, αρ' ουχ ως αληθος προσηκοντα ακουσαι σοφιματα και ουδεν γνησιον ουδε φρονησεως αληθινης εχομενον; Παιντελως μεν ουν, εφη.

X. Πάνωμικρον δη τι, εφην εγω, ο 'Αδείμαντε, λειπεται των κατ' αξιαν ομιλουτων φιλοσοφία, η που υπο τυχης καταληφθεν Β 10 γενειαν και εν τεθραμμενον θος, ιπτορια των διαφθερουτων κατα φυσιν μειναι επ' αυτη, η εν συμπρο πολει οταν μεγηθη ψυχη φυη

6. φρονησεως Αστ: φρονησεως αξιων Αξη: φρονησεως αξιων ου Π. 8. εφην Π: εφη ην δ' Α.
ατιμάσασα τὰ τῆς πόλεως ὑπερίδη καὶ μὲν ἀλλὰς τέχνης δικαίως ἀτιμάσαν εὐφνές ἐπ᾽ αὐτὴν ἄν ἐλθοῦν. εἰ δ᾽ ἄν καὶ ὁ τοῦ ἡμετέρου ἐπαίρον Θεάγονος χαλινὸς ὦς κατασχεῖν. οὗτος τὰ μὲν ἀλλὰ πάντα παρεσκεύασται πρὸς τὸ ἐκ-15 πεσεῖν φιλοσοφίας, ἢ δὲ τοῦ σώματος νοστροφία ἀπειρούσα αὐτοῦ τῶν πολιτικῶν κατέχει. τῷ δ᾽ ἡμέτερου οὐκ ἄξιον λέγειν, τὸ δαίμονιον σμεῖον. ἢ γὰρ ποὺ τιν ἄλλῳ ἢ οὐδείς τοῦ ἐμπροσθέν γέγονεν. καὶ τούτων δὴ τῶν ὀλίγων οἱ γενόμενοι καὶ γενόμενοι ὡς ἴδου καὶ μακάριον τὸ κτῆμα, καὶ τῶν πολλών αὐτ ἰκανός ἰδώντες τὴν μανίαν, καὶ ὑπὲρ οὐδεὶς οὐδὲν ὑγίες ὡς ἔτος εἰπεῖν περὶ τῶν πόλεων πράττειν, οὐδὲ ἐστὶν ᾧ μαχαῖς, μεθ᾽ ὅτου τις ἴδων ἐπὶ τὴν τῷ δικαίῳ βοηθείαν σφοῖντ᾽ ἄν, ἀλλ᾽ ὡσπερ εἰς θηρία ἀνθρώπος.

13. ἀν ἐλθοῦν Ἡ: ἀνέλθοι Ἄ.

12 βραχύ δὲ ποὺ τι κτλ. Some have thought of Phaedo of Elis, and Simon the Athenian, both of whom were members of the Socratic circle (Steinhart I.c. p. 209). The latter (whose very existence has been denied by some recent critics, but—as Hirzel Der Dialog pp. 102 ff. shews—on wholly inadequate grounds) was once a shoemaker (D. L. Π 122). We may also in some respects compare the architect-philosopher Hippodamus of Miletus: see Susemihl and Hicks' Polities of Aristotle I pp. 331—334. Zeller I Π 1, p. 52 n. I thinks Plato may have had Socrates himself in view, but the δαίμονιον σμεῖον accounts for him.

14 Θεάγονος. Cf. Αρ. 33 E, where it is implied that Theages died before Socrates. The tribute which Plato pays to his memory is all the more touching because Greek literature too seldom recognises that physical weakness may be combined with mental and moral strength: see III 406 C n. Plutarch (de tuenda san. præcértá 126 C, quoted by Stallbaum) remarks καὶ γὰρ φιλοσοφεῖν ἀρρώστια πολλοὺς παρέχοις—a reminiscence, perhaps, of Plato.

19 τούτων—γενόμενοι: ‘those who have become members of this small band.’ J. and C. quote an exact parallel from Thuc. III 56. 6 ὧν ἡμεῖς γενόμενοι; cf. also supra Π 360 A, Phaed. 69 D, Parm. 127 D (τῶν τῶν πράκτορα γενόμενον) and Lact. 754 D. γενόμενοι is found in some inferior MSS, and was accepted still Schneider, who restored the true reading. Liebholt absurdly conjectures ἐκδημῆνοι.

21 ὡς ἔτος εἰπεῖν. See on Ι 341 B.
since been found that τὸ δικαίως is actually the reading of Α. ἡ τῶν δικαιῶν βοήθεια would mean something quite different, as Schneider shews; viz., "auxilia vel iustas vel rebus in iustis, vel contra iustos seu iusta latum vel ferendum." With the general sentiment cf. Ἀρ. 31 Ε—32 Α, a passage which proves—if proof were needed—that Liebold's extraordinary proposal to read σφυνάς for σφύ μαμ is untenable.

ἐς θρησι ἄνθρωπος κτλ. Herwerden would read ἄνθρωπος 'among men who are as beasts.' But the point is that the philosopher in existing common-wealths is like a lonely human being in the midst of wild beasts. Cf. Τίτιον of Athens IV 3 "The commonwealth of Athens is become a forest of beasts." The comparison may have been suggested to Plato by Pherecretes' Ἀγριῶς, to which he alludes in Ἀρ. 327 D. In Pherecretes' play the Ἀγριῶς were savages, to whom apparently some Athenians betook themselves, in the hope of finding more happiness than they enjoyed in Athens; see Kock's Com. Graec. Fr. I pp. 146—150. Plato points out that there are savages enough at home. In τάσσω ἄγριως the emphasis is on τάσσω: we should translate 'to hold out alone where all are savages.' Cf. ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων ἑκ. 579 B. Herwerden weakens the effect by adding ὀσίων after ἄγριως.


οἶον ἐν χειμῶνι κτλ. Jowett constructs χειμῶνι with κοινωρίῳ; but χειμῶν κοινωρίῳ for 'a storm of dust' is scarcely a Greek idiom. κοινωρίῳ —φερομένου is of course a descriptive genitive absolute.

In this way Schneider also took the passage. ἦλη is 'tempestuous rain' μετὰ ὀμβρον πτοπός, as Hesychius explains. χαλάργη was once conjectured by Ast, but he afterwards rightly withdrew the suggestion. Herwerden proposes οἰον ἐν ἦλη κοινωρίῳ ὑπὸ κτλ., and Richards in χειμῶν και κοινωρίῳ ἦλη (ο ἦλη κοινωρίῳ). Neither proposal is supported by any of the ancient citations, except that of Themistius (Or. viii p. 104 C) whose reproduction of this passage is in other respects, as in this, extremely inaccurate: see Schneider’s note. And ἦλη κοινωρίῳ is, to say the least, a questionable phrase. It is not well to mar the wonderful force and beauty of writing such as this by tasteless and inept conjectures. The passage has often been compared with Lucretius’ "Suae mari magno," but the difference is greater than the resemblance. The Platonic philosopher is content (ἀγαπή), if he can keep his own soul pure, because he cannot, as things now are, save both himself and others. But it is no pleasure for him to see "quibus ipse malis caret," for he would fain help others if they would but let him. That they will not is a misfortune, not for others only, but for him (αὐτός τε μᾶλλον αἰχμασταί κτλ.). We seem to catch in Plato’s words a certain tone of sorrow, as if he had not himself attained the highest of which he was capable, because he could not find a philosophic city in which to dwell: see Morgenstern De Plat. rep. p. 161, where reference is made to Ἀρ. 31 Ε and to the Platonic Epistles V 322 A, B, VII 324 B—326 B, 330 C—331 D: cf. also Gorg. 515 Α—522 B, and Susemihl Gen. Entw. II p. 190.
497 C] ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΣ §

πολιτείας προσηκούσης. ἐν γὰρ προσηκούσῃ αὐτὸς τε μᾶλλον αὐξήσεται καὶ μετὰ τῶν ἰδίων τὰ κοινὰ σώσει.

XI. Τὸ μὲν οὖν τῆς φιλοσοφίας ὁν ἔνεκα διαβολὴν εἶληφεν, καὶ ὅτι οὐ δικαίως, ἐμοὶ μὲν δοκεί μετρίως εἰρήσθαι, εἰ μὴ ἐτ' ἄλλο λέγεις τι σὺ. Ἀλλ' οὖδέν, ἢ δ' ὅσ, ἢτι λέγω περὶ τούτου. ἄλλα τὴν προσηκούσαν αὐτὴ τίνα τῶν νῦν λέγεις πολιτείων; Ὁὐδ' Β' ἠμτυνοῦν, εἰπόν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπαιτιῶν, μηδεμίὸν ἀξίαν εἶναι τῶν νῦν κατάστασιν πόλεως φιλοσόφοι φύσεως. διὸ καὶ στρέφειν σταὶ τε καὶ ἀλλοιώσθαι αὐτήν: ὅσπερ ξεινοῦν στέρμα ἐν γῇ ἀλλή σπειρόμενον ἐξήλθοιν εἰς τὸ ἐπιχώριον φιλεῖ κρατούμενον ἰέναι, οὕτω καὶ τοῦτο τὸ γένος νῦν μὲν οὖν ἰσχεῖν τὴν αὐτοῦ δύναμιν, ἀλλ' εἰς ἀλλότριον ἱὸς ἑκτίπτειν εἰ δὲ λήψεται τὴν ἀρίστην

C πολιτείαν, ἂστερ καὶ αὐτὸ ἄριστον ἕστι, τότε δηλόσει, ὅτι τοῦτο 15 μὲν τὸ ὡστὶ θεῶν ἢν, τά δὲ ἀλλὰ ἀνθρώπινα, τά τε τῶν φύσεων καὶ τῶν ἑπτάδεκατῶν. δῆλος δὴ οὖν εἰ ὅτι μετὰ τούτω ἐρήσει τῆς αὐτῆς ἡ πολιτεία. Οὐκ ἔγνως, ἔφη· οὐ γὰρ τούτῳ ἐμελλον, ἀλλ' εἰ αὐτῆς, ἢν ἡμεῖς διεκπλήθαμεν ὀλικεύοντες τὴν πόλιν, ἢ ἄλλη. Τὰ μὲν ἅλλα, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, αὐτὴ· τοῦτο δὲ αὐτὸ ἔρρηθη μὲν καὶ τότε, ὅτι 20

497 a 3 προσηκούσης. The only city suited to the philosophic nature is Plato's: cf. IX 592 a.

497 a—498 c Our justification of Philosophy is now complete. It remains to ask—Where is the political constitution adopted to the philosophic nature? Where, in other words, is the best polity? In the city which we have founded, except that the position of the Rulers requires to be more fully explained. A State, which is to handle Philosophy without danger, must assume a new attitude towards the subject. Philosophy should receive more, instead of less attention, as a man grows older.

497 b 10 κατάστασιν πόλεως is treated as a single noun: cf. πόλεως διοίκησις in Prot. 319 D and Pol. 296 E.

11 ὥσπερ—ἐκτίπτειν explains and amplifies στρέφεσθαι τε καὶ ἀλλοιώσθαι. Asyndeton is regular in such cases, and Stephanus ought not to have proposed the insertion of καί before ὥσπερ: cf. IV 432 D, VIII 557 C and Prot. 311 E, where more illustrations are cited in my note. Stallbaum's punctuation is here, I think, preferable to that of Schneider, who prints only a comma before ὥσπερ.

12 εἰς τὸ ἐπιχώριον: as though 'a foreign geranium, allowed to run wild in England' were to 'degenerate into one of the English wild geraniums.' The illustration is due to Bosanquet. Plato's botanical error, such as it is, does not affect the argument.

14 ἱὸς is read by II as well as A. The majority of ms read εἰδός, which was accepted till Schneider restored the better and more authoritative reading.

497 c 15 δηλώσει = 'experience will shew' is idiomatic. See Blaydes on Ar. Frogs 1361.

16 ἢν. The past does not exclude the present: cf. IV 436 C n.

17 τῆς—πολιτεία: i.e. what the best constitution is. Adimantus was about to ask whether the ἀριστή πολιτεία is not the one which they have described. The reply is yes, provided that the position and status of the Rulers is made clearer. As it stands it is not the best: cf. VIII 543 E καλλίω εἰς ἔχων (imperfect participle) εἰτειν πόλιν τε καὶ ἀνδρα (the Philosopher's City and the Philosopher), where see note.

20 ὅτι δειγμόν κτλ.: 'that there would always have to be present in the city a
certain factor possessed of a reasoned theory of the constitution, identical with that possessed by you, the legislator, when you made the laws. The rulers must understand the constitution and not merely accept it on the legislator's authority, if the spirit of the original legislator is to survive his death. ἀρετὴ δὲξα is not enough; in order to fill the place of the founder of the city they require ἐπιστήμη. Plato confesses that he did not make this clear enough before (ὁς ικανὸς ἐδρόμηθη), and his confession is most true. In one passage (iv 429 C n.), indeed, he seems expressly to imply that the Rulers do not fill the legislator's shoes. But there are also some hints or traces of the later view; see on III 414 A, iv 423 E (to which, perhaps, ἐρωθῆ is intended to refer, although the reference is hardly justified), and 442 C. Cf. 502 D, 503 A, 504 B n. n.

497 D 23 ὑν κτλ.: i.e. ἐκεῖνον ὑν κτλ. The literal translation is 'through dread of the topics to which claving you have shewn that the demonstration thereof is long and difficult.' (So also Schneider.) ἀντιλαμβανόμενοι (the opposite of ἀφέναι as used in v 449 B and infra 504 E) refers to Adimantus' and the others' resolute determination not to let Socrates slurr over the questions relating to women and children (v 449 B ff.) and to the possibility of realising the perfect city (471 Cff.). Cf. infra 505 A. φόβος is explained by v 450 C ff., 457 C, 473 E. J. and C. take ὡν as "ἐκεῖνον ἃ (cognate accusative)," understanding ἀντιλαμβανόμενοι as 'objecting to' or 'attacking,' but no objections were made by Glauco and Adimantus. They merely asked for further explanation, and were in fact favourably disposed rather than otherwise (v 450 D, 451 B). Herwerden's conjecture ὑο for ὡ refutes itself.

24 αὐτῷ (like the subject of ἐπιθητικῶς) refers to the position of the Rulers in Plato's city—with everything that it involves, including the Community of wives and children, the Philosopher-king and all the leading topics discussed in v—vii; and τὸ λαὸν is what remains of this topic—the rest of vi and vii in fact.

25 πάντως. Bekker's πάντως (cf. Λατὸς 779 E οὐ πάντως εἰκολάσσω) is a neat emendation, which Baiter and others have accepted. But ὡν πάντως ῥατὸν 'not in every respect quite easy' (with the usual Greek litotes), is quite unobjectionable, as Schneider points out, and the confusion of s and v is rare.

27 τὸ λεγόμενον κτλ. D. and V. wrongly make τῷ δυτὶ part of the proper. Translate 'and it is true, as the proverb says, that beautiful things are hard.' Cf. iv 435 C and (for τῷ δυτὶ) viii 503 E.

497 E 33 ὡν καὶ ἀπότομοι κτλ. καὶ = 'at all.' Cf. τῶν καὶ ἐκλεκτῶν 498 A.

498 A 1 τὸ μετέξι means 'in the interval before entering upon' (Richards
καὶ χρηματισμοῦ πλησιάσαντες αὐτοῦ τὸ χαλεπώτατο ἀπαλ- λάττουναι, οἱ φιλοσοφῶτα τοιούτων, λέγοντες ἐν δὲ χαλεπῶτατον τὸ περὶ τούτων λόγους: ἐν δὲ τῷ ἐπειτα, ἐὰν καὶ ἄλλοι συντο- τοὺς παρακαλοῦνειν ἐθέλουσιν ἀκροταί  γίγνεσθαι, μεγάλα  ἤγονται, πάρεργον οἴομενοι αὐτῷ δεῖν πράττειν· πρὸς δὲ τὸ γῆρας ἔκτος δὴ τῶν ὀλγῶν ἀποσβέννυνται πολὺ μᾶλλον τοῦ Ἡρακλε- Β τείου ἡλίου, ὁ ὁποὺ αὖθις οὐκ ἔξαπττοναι. Δεῖ δὲ τῶν; ἐφη. Πάν τούτων μειράκια μὲν ὄντα καὶ παίδας μειράκια ἑυδείαν καὶ φιλοσοφίαν μετακειρίζεσθαι, τῶν τε σωμάτων, ἐν δὲ βλαστάνει το  καὶ ἀνδροῦται, εὖ μάλα ἐτυπελείασθαι, υπνερείαν φιλοσοφίας κτωμένους· προοίμιος δὲ τῆς ἡλικίας, ἐν ἐν ἡ ἡ ψυχὴ τελείουσθαι

in Cl. Rev. ii p. 324). The correlating or contrasting notion is idiomatically omitted; cf. note on περιαγώγη in vii 518 E. Plentiful examples of this usage are supplied by Shilleto on Dem. F. L. 181, and Blaydes on Ar. Ach. 124. metaxv τῶν "Ipôis and Birds 187. With the senti- ment cf. 487 C n. Richards was, I believe, the first to point out the true meaning of this passage: see also Solomon in Cl. Rev. vii. p. 11. The traditional view, that metaxv κτλ. means "in the spare moments of house- keeping and business," though still given as an alternative by J. and C., is unten- able.

οἰ—ποιούμενοι: 'and they it is, forsooth, who are regarded as accom- plished in philosophy.' Sarcasm is often expressed by an appositional participial clause at the end of a sentence: cf. e.g. Αφ. 34 A, Κριτ. 51 A. ποιεῖται here is the passive of ποιέω in the sense of 'to construct in fancy,' 'represent,' as e.g. in Theaet. 197 D and infra X 669 C. The usage is at first sight strange, but occurs again in vii 538 C, IX 573 B and 574 D, where no other meaning is suitable. Stallbaum's attempt to explain the pas- sages differently is unsuccessful, and the proposed emendations (such as Ast's δοκοῦ- μενοι for ποιούμενοι) are unsatisfactory in each of the four cases. See notes ad il.

ἐὰν καὶ goes with ἔθνσων Schnei- der: 'if they do consent' (cf. καὶ ἀπτηνεύω above). It is implied that many, or most of them, do not.

μεγάλα κτλ. Plato distinguishes three stages. In the first, τὸ περὶ λόγους is a man's γραφικ after boyhood until he begins practical life; it then becomes his πάρεργον, and he 'thinks it great things' to go to an occasional lecture: towards old age all but very few neglect philo- sophy entirely. The proper study of philosophy reverses all this (ἐὰν τούτων) as is shewn in b and c.

τοῦ Ἡρακλείτου ἡλίου. Hera- clitus fr. 32 Bywater νέον ἂ ν ἡμῆρα ἠμός. Heraclitus meant the saying to be taken literally, and not merely as an expression of the universal law of change: see the authorities cited by Bywater ad loc. and Zeller1 p. 684 n. 2.

498 B 10 φιλοσοφίαν κτλ. φιλοσοφίαν in its wider sense denotes any 'liberal' training or study; cf. Thuc. 1.43 D, 172 C, and Prot. 335 D with my note ad loc. D. and V. are in error (as Bosanquet re- marks) when they translate παθεῖν καὶ φιλοσοφικάν by 'a course of training in phi- losophy.' Nor is Susemihi (Gen. Entw. II p. 187) right in supposing that the refer- ence is to the musical education of the earlier books. Plato explains what he means in vii 536 D, E.

ἀνδροῦται. The early editors read ἀδροῦται (with Ε). ἀδροῦται is a rare and somewhat obscure word, nowhere found in Plato; and it is better to retain ἀνδροῦται, although the subject is not μεράκι, but σώματα.

ὑπνερείαν φιλοσοφία κτωμένους sums up in a single phrase the Platonic theory of athletics: see on III 410 A ff. and on IX 591 C, D.

12 ἐν ἐν. Richards would write ὦ φιλοσοφάν, as in ἐν ὦ βλαστάνει above, asserting that "ἡ ἡλικία is their years, not any particular time of life"; but ἡ ἡλικία is often so used, e.g. Symp. 200 B and Men. 89 B. Nor is ἐν ὦ, 'while,' appropriate here. Translate 'when the years advance, in which the soul begins to reach its maturity.'
498 C 14 γίγνεται κτλ. The subject is still ἡ ρώμη, ‘their physical strength,’ not τις (as J. and C. assert). In ἀφέτοντας νέμεσθαι the metaphor (as observed by Heindorf on Prot. 320 A) is taken de grege numini alicui consccrato: cf. Critias 119 D ἀφέτον δικτων ταύτων εν τῷ τοῦ Ποσείδωνος ιερῷ. νέμεσθαι is properly ‘to graze.’ The effect of the Greek may be conveyed by rendering ‘they roam the sacred fields at will,’ although ἀφέτοντας of course agrees with the subject of νέμεσθαι.

498 C—502 C Adimantus hardly expects the reasoning of Socrates to carry conviction to most of his hearers. But Socrates will not despair, believing that his words may perhaps bear fruit hereafter, if not here. As for the Multitude, their dissent is easily explained. They have heard enough of jingling rhetoric, but they have never yet seen a Philosopher-king, nor are they accustomed to discourses whose only aim is truth. Our perfect city is realised always and everywhere, wheresoever and whencesoever Philosophy sits on the throne. The Multitude will assent, if we approach them rightly; for their hatred is against the false philosophers, and not against the true. The lover of Truth is absorbed in contemplation of the changeless Realities, on the model of which he will frame human institutions, should he be called upon to enter public life. Point this out to the Many, and reason with them, and they will agree. Our proposals, though difficult, are not impossible.

20 ἀντιτεινόντας κτλ. I formerly read ἀντιτεινόν with Stephanus and others; but the present, which is in all the mss, gives a good sense and makes a better balance with λέγειν προθύμως. Translate ‘offer a still more enthusiastic opposition, being not in the least likely to agree.’ The majority of editors retain the present.

ἀπὸ Θρασυμάχου κτλ. Thrasymachus was not likely to agree with so fierce an onslaught on his profession: see 493 A ff., 495 C ff.


24 ἀδίδω σεινομένου ‘born again’ implies the re-incarnation of the Soul, as described in the end of Book X: see on 608 D ff. It is from casual allusions like the present, made in all seriousness, that we can best understand how profound and practical was Plato’s belief in immortality. The seed sown here may bear its fruit in another life, so that the educator need not despair.

25 εἰς μικρὸν κτλ. is not merely ironical but incredulous. We need not therefore (with J. and C.) be surprised
at Glauco's incredulity and wonder in x 608 D. For οὔδεν 'a mere nothing', 'nought,' the much less expressive οὔδενa was conjectured by Hirschg and others. An exact parallel may be found in x 608 c. The grandeur and elevation of this passage recall vii 456 A. 498 E 29 τοιαύτα ἀττά κτλ. Plato is here alluding to epideictic harangues by sophistical rhetoricians of the school of Gorgias. τοιαύτα ἀττά ῥήματα = 'expressions of this sort' refers to the jingle in γενόμενον—λεγόμενον, which is an example of the rhetorical device called παραμολογίας: see Arist. Rhet. III 9, 1410a 24 ff. παραμολογίας δ' ἐὰν ὁμοία τὰ ἔσχατα ἐχύ εἰκέρων τὸ κῦλον, e.g. ἐν πλείσσι θεό φροντίδας καὶ ἐν ἐλαχίσταις ἐπικαλέσθαι, and many other examples: see Cope ad loc. In ἐξεπιθήνας—ὕμωμενα, 'assimilated to one another of set purpose,' the same device is meant. Isocrates and his literary brethren employed it constantly: see the references on 495 k. άλλ' οὐκ—συμπεσότα κτλ.: 'instead of spontaneously chiming together, as in the present case' etc., where the παραμολογίας of γενόμενον and λεγόμενον is ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦματον ('natural,' 'spontaneous,' 'accidental' as opposed to ἐξεπιθήνας). παρασυμεμένον and ὑμωμεμένον are said with a reference to παράλογος (the equality of clauses, as for example in Isocr. Paneg. 76: see Cope I.e. p. 106) and παραμολογίας. The Many have had quite enough of παράλογος etc. in words; but they have never seen a Μαν (ἀδοξάσις emphatic),' 'with heartache hand, One still strong man in a blantant land, Who can rule, and dare not lie' (Tennyson). It is highly probable, as Dümmler holds (Chron.Betr.p.14), that Plato has specially in view Isocrates' Panegyricus throughout this passage. The contemptible devices which Plato here ridicules are extraordinarily similar to those in that harangue. For other views of this passage see App. III. 499 A 5 δόξαν is 'seeming,' 'appearance') (to ἄληθες above (Schneider): cf. 505 D. The rendering 'applause' (D. and Β.) or 'fame,' is, I think, less likely to be right. For ἐρωτε cf. v 454 A n. 499 B 7 τούτε. Υ 473 D. 8 οὔτε—οὔτε—οὔδε γε is a common sequence where stress is laid on the last alternative: cf. 492 E and x 608 B. οὔτε γε ἀνήφηv = 'no, nor yet an individual man' is said because even the philosopher is not tέλεος except in the philosopher's city: cf. 497 A. δοκοις means simply 'in
like manner, 'likewise,' and should not be construed with ἑλοῦς in the sense of 'equally perfect,' as J. and C. translate.

11 ἀνάγκη—παραβάλη. See ἐρ. ἡ. παραβάλλειν means accedere (not, as has been asserted, accidere): cf. VIII 556 c and Lyr. 203 b. The word is not however quite appropriate here: and I should much prefer a convincing emendation of the text of Δ, Π and other MSS (ἀνάγκη—περιβάλη). As it stands, περιβάλη must either be intrasitive, or else the infinitive ἐπιμελήθηναι serves as its object in place of an accusative. Neither view is supported by any evidence. I formerly conjectured ἀνάγκη τις εἰκ τόχης περιβάλη 'until some one happens to compel these philosophers etc., but τις ἀνάγκη—γέγονεν in c does not favour this remedy. It is perhaps safest to read παραβάλη provisionally and πρὸ τοῦτο. With εἰκ τόχης cf. IX 592 A ἐὰν μὴ βῆλα τις ἐπιμελήθῃ and Ep. VII 327 E.

13 κατηκομ. Schleiermacher's conjecture is accepted by Madvig, Baiter, and J. and C. Stallbaum was inclined to read κατηκομ. If κατηκομ. is right, it must stand for κατηκομ., the nominative being due to the interposition of εἰτε βούλονταί κτλ. But the construction is difficult, and the sense unsatisfactory. We require some guarantee that the city will obey (cf. 502 b), and κατηκομ. is the only reading which provides it.

101, 3. when the elder Dionysius was just dead" (Thomas Gray Works ed. Gosse IV p. 251). In the parallel passage V 473 D Plato speaks of kings and ὁδηγόντα, but not yet of kings' sons. The substance of Gray's conjecture is confirmed by recent criticism (see e.g. Hirmer Entst. u. Kompf. etc. p. 668): but Dionysius I died in Ol. 102, 2 (357 B.C.) and not in Ol. 101, 3 (374 B.C.), and Plato's second visit to Sicily seems to have taken place just after the old tyrant's death (Grote X pp. 346-356). See also on V 473 D, VI 490 B and Introd. § 4.

499 C 15 τούτων δὲ πότερα κτλ. Grote pronounces the Platonic commonwealth impossible because "we cannot understand from whence the force is to come, tending and competent to generate" it at the first. Once begun, he holds, "there is no reason why it might not have continued." That the real difficulty is in starting it, Plato himself clearly understands (cf. 501 A ἡ.). He would not however allow that the difficulty is insurmountable; since a thea τό τόχη (IX 592 A) may well occur. But the true fulfilment of Plato's Ideal, as he himself foretells in IX 592 B, is to be sought, not in any single earthly commonwealth, but in its influence, direct and indirect, upon the moral, political, religious, and intellectual progress of mankind: see V 470 E. h. and Zeller's dissertation on Der platonische Staat in seiner Bedeutung für die Folgezeit in his Vortrügen und Abhandlungen ² pp. 68 ff.

17 ἄλλος κτλ. For ἄλλος 'merely' cf. Thead. 176 D γῆς ἄλλος ἄχθη. Ὅν εὐχαί see V 450 D n.
λέγοντες. ἢ οὐχ οὕτως; Οὕτως. Εἰ τοῦνν ἄκροις εἰς φιλοσοφίαν πόλεως τις ἀνάγκη ἐπιμεληθῆναι ἢ γέγονεν ἐν τῷ ἀπείρῳ τῷ παρελθόντος χρόνῳ, ἢ καὶ νῦν ἐστὶν ἐν των βαρβαρικῷ τόπῳ. 20

D πόρρω ποιού ἐκτὸς ὄντι τῆς ἡμετέρας ἐπούσεως, ἢ καὶ ἐπειτα γενήσεται, περὶ τούτου ἐσόμοι τῷ λόγῳ διαμάχεσθαι, ὡς γέγονεν ἢ εἰρήμενη πολιτεία καὶ ἑστίν καὶ γενήσεται γε, ὅταν αὐτὴ ἡ Μόσσα πόλεως ἐγκρατῆς γένηται. οὺ γὰρ ἀδύνατος γενέσθαι, οὐδὲ ἤμεις ἀδύνατα λέγομεν· χαλεπὰ δὲ καὶ παρ’ ἡμῶν ὀμολογεῖται. 25 Ἐν ἔμοι, ἔφη, οὕτω δοκεῖ. Τοῦς δὲ πολλοὺς, ἂν δ’ ἐγώ, ὅτι οὐκ E αὐτοὶ δοκεῖ, ἔρεις; Ἡ σως, ἔφη. Ὁ μακάριε, ἂν δ’ ἐγώ, ἡμὴ πάνιν οὕτω τῶν πολλῶν κατηγόρει. ἀλλοιαν τοῦ δόξαν ἔξουσιν, ἐὰν αὐτοῖς μὴ φιλονικῶν ἀλλὰ παραμυθόντος καὶ ἀπολύνοντος τὴν τῆς φιλο-μαθίας διαβολὴν ἐνυδεκτεῖ ὦς λέγεις τοὺς φιλοσόφους, καὶ διορίζῃ 30 ὁσπερ ἄρτι τήν τε φύσιν αὐτῶν καὶ τήν ἐπετίθεσέν, ὡς μὴ ἤγονται σε λέγειν οὐσ αὐτοὶ οὕνται. ἢ καὶ ἐὰν οὕτως θεόνται, ἀλλοιαν τ’ οὐ φήσης αὐτοῖς δόξαν λήψεθαι καὶ ἀλλὰ ἀποκρι- 

500 νεσθαι; ἢ οἶει τινὰ χαλεπάνειν τῷ μὴ χαλεπῷ ἢ φθονεῖν τῷ μὴ φθονερῷ ἀφθονοῖ τε καὶ πράον ὄντα; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ σε προφθάσας 5 

λέγω, ὅτι ἐν ὀλίγοις τισιν ἴγρομαι, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐν τῷ πλῆθει χαλεπῶν

23. αὐτὴ ΑΠ: αὐτὴ Α. 3. τ’ οὐ Baiter: τοι ΑΠΕΞ. ἀποκρινέσθαι Π: ἀποκρινεσθαι Α.

20 βαρβαρικῷ—ἐπούσεως. Cf. Phaed. 78 A. Touches of this kind are rare in Plato and generally full of pathos, as if the hope of mankind no longer lay in Hellas. The present sentence is a confession of the fact that the foundations of Plato’s city are not laid in Hellenisism, but in Humanity, understood as Plato himself understands the word in 501 B. See on 470 E.

499 D 22 ἔσομαι. The ellipse of the first one of the copula is rare, except when ἢγόρ or ἢμεὶς is expressed, but έσομαι is a privileged word: cf. Parmn. 137 B and other examples in Schanz Nov. Comm. Pl. p. 35.

23 αὐτὴ ἡ Μόσσα. Philosophy. 499 E 27 μὴ πάνιν κτλ. Plato’s attitude to οἷς πολλοί (as Krohn remarks Pl. St. p. 118) has somewhat altered since 492 B ff., partly, perhaps, because his wrath has been diverted against the false philosophers. But this attempt to soothe the many-headed Beast should not be taken too seriously: see 501 E—
ούτω φύσιν γέγονεθαί. Καὶ έγώ ἀμέλει, ἐφη, ἡννοίομαι. 1 Οὐκοῦν Β καὶ αὐτὸ τούτῳ ξυνοίει, τοῦ χαλεπῶς πρὸς φιλοσοφιάν τοὺς πολλοὺς διακείσθαι ἐκείνους αἰτίους εἶναι τοὺς ἐξωθεν οὐ προσήκον
10 ἐπεισεκεμοκακότας, λοιδορουμένους τε αὐτοῖς καὶ φιλαπεχθημόνως ἔχοντας καὶ αἰτὶ περὶ ἀνθρώπων τοὺς λόγους ποιομένους, ἥκεστα φιλοσοφία πρότον ποιούντας; Πολὺ γ', ἐφη. 
XIII. Οὐδὲ γὰρ που, ὦ Ἀδείμαντε, σχολὴ τῷ γε ὡς ἄλθος πρὸς τοὺς οὐδὲ τὴν διάνοιαν ἔχοντι κἀτω βλέπειν εἰς ἀνθρώπων
15 πραγματείας καὶ μαχόμενον αὐτοῖς φθόνον τε καὶ δυσμενείας C ἐμπύπλασθαι, ἀλλ' εἰς τεταγμένα ἄττα καὶ κατὰ ταῦτα αἰτὶ ἔχοντα ὀρώντας καὶ θεομένους οὖτ' ἀδικοῦντα οὖτ' ἀδικούμενα ὑπ' ἀλλήλων, κόσμῳ δὲ πάντα καὶ κατὰ λόγον ἔχοντα, ταῦτα μεμεισθαί τε καὶ ὁ τι μάλιστα ἄφοιμοποίθαί. ἢ οἷει τινα μιχανήν
20 εἶναι, ὦτο τοῖς ὀμλεις ἀγάμενος, μὴ μεμεισθαί ἐκείνο; Ἀδύνατον, ἐφη. Θεύω δὴ καὶ κοσμίω ὁ γε φιλόσοφος ὀμιλῶν κόσμος τε 1 καὶ D 

17. ἀδικούμενα Ἐλ.: ἀδικούμενος ΑΠ:Σ2: ἀδικούμενος ΗΠ.

500 B 9 τοὺς ἐξωθεν κτλ. Isocrates seems to have taken this as a personal attack, as perhaps it was intended to be. His reply may be found in Antid. 260 ff. περὶ τοῦ πολιτικὸν λόγου ημεῖς ὀνεῖς, οὐκ ἐκεῖνοι φανοί εἶναι φιλαπεχθημόνας (cf. φιλαπεχθημόνως ἔχοντας here), πολὺ πράσινον τυγχάνοντος αὐτῶν ὄνεις; ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἄτταν τι περὶ ἡμῶν φανοντ τοιούτων, ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδὲν ἂν εἴπαμαι τοιούτων, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα ἀληθείας χρήσαμεν περὶ αὐτῶν κτλ. See the interesting discussion in Dümmler l.c. pp. 8 ff.

10 αὐτοῖς and not αὐτοὶ is certainly what Plato wrote. False philosophers, like bad scholars, are always abusing one another. The middle, which is reciprocal, is also decisive in favor of αὐτοῖς: cf. Charm. 154 Α λοιδορουμένους ἀλλήλους. J. and C. (with Stallbaum and the editors generally, except Schneider) read αὐτοῖς, remarking that "It was by no means an uncommon practice of the old philosophers to abuse the people." Plato is not speaking of the old philosophers at all, but only of sophists and pretenders, who do not abuse, but flatter and cajole the people (493 A ff.).


12 πολὺ γε: sc. ἡννοτα. Adimantus accommodates his answer to the last clause of Socrates' question. See on ν 465 E.


500 C 16 εἰς τεταγμένα ἄττα κτλ. With the general sense cf. Theaet. 174 D ff., Phaed. 79 C, D, Tim. 47 B, C and Euripides Fr. 902 δίδον μίαν τῆς ἀστραπῆς | ἔχει μέθυσαν | μὲν πολιτικὰς ἐτι πιθανο- ντην | μὴ εἰς αδικούμενος πράξεις ὄρμον | ἀλλὰ ἀδικαντον καθορων φύσεωι | κόσμου ἀγήρων, τῇ τε συνερτῇ | καὶ σύη καὶ δείπον, τοῖς δὲ τοιούτοιοι οὐδέποτε αἰσχρῶν | ἔργον με- λέτημα προσέξει. Euripides' lines are conceived in the spirit of Plato and exactly illustrate his meaning, especially if, as is usually supposed, they refer to the philosopher Anaxagoras. An eloquent modern parallel may be found in Stevenson's 'Virginibus puerisque' p. 260.

17 ὀρώντας. For the change from singular to plural cf. 1 347 Α. η. 

21 κοσμίω. It has been thought that there is a play on κόσμος in the sense of the Universe or Heavens. But the philosopher's gaze outsoars the Heavens, and is fixed on the ὑπέρουπον τόρος, where the Ideas dwell (Phaedr. 247 C).
501 A] ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΣ 5

θείος εἰς τὸ δυνάτον ἀνθρώπῳ γίγνεται; διαβολή δ' ἐν πάσι πολλή. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἂν οὖν τις, εἰπὼν, αὐτὸ ἀνάγκη γένηται ἃ ἐκεῖ ὀρᾶ μελετήσαι εἰς ἀνθρώπων ἡθὲ καὶ ἴδια καὶ δημοσία τιθέναι καὶ μὴ μόνον ἐαυτῶν πλάτεσσιν, ἀρα κακὸν δημοσίργαν αὐτὸν οἷοι 25 γενήσεσθαι σωφροσύνης τε καὶ δικαιοσύνης καὶ ξυμπάστης τῆς δημοτικῆς ἀρετῆς; "Ἡκεστά γε, ἦ δ' ὅς, 'Αλλ' ἐάν δὴ αἰσθητοῦ

Εἰ οἱ πολλοί, ὅτι ἀληθῆ περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγομεν, 1 χαλεπανοῦσι δὴ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις καὶ ἀπωτητήσουσιν ἡμῖν λέγομεν, ὃς οὐκ ἂν ποτὲ ἄλλως εὐδαιμονίσει τόλμης, εἰ μὴ αὐτὴν διαγράφεσαι οἱ τῷ θείῳ παρα-30 δείγματι χρώμενοι ξιγγραφοί; Οὐ χαλεπανοῦσιν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἐάνπερ 501 αἰσθητοῦ. ἄλλα δὴ τίνα λέγει τρόπον τῆς διαγραφῆς; Δα-βόντες, ἦ δ' ἐγώ, ὅστε πίνακα πόλιν τε καὶ ἴδια ἀνθρώπων πρῶτον μὲν καθαρῶν ποιήσεωι ἄν, ὃ οὖν πάνω ῥάδιον: ἄλλ' οὖν οἴσθ ὅτι τοῦτό ἂν εὕρης τῶν ἄλλων διενεγκοιει, τῷ μίτῃ ἵδιοτόν μυτῇ πόλεως ἐθελησί αὐ τὸν ἄγαςθαι μηδὲ γράφειν νόμους, πρὶν ἦ τοι 5 παραλαβεῖν καθαρῶν ᾧ̄ αὐτοῦ ποιήσαι. Καὶ ὀρθῶς γ', ἐφη. Ὅψι-

4. διενέγκοι εἰς; διενεγκεῖν ΑΠΙ: διενεγκεῖν (sic) Σ. 1

500 D 22 διαβολὴ κτλ. ἐν πάσι is neuter, 'albeit misrepresentation is rife everywhere,' "there is always detraction going on" (J. and C.).

23 ἂν οὖν τὸς κτλ. Cf. 484 C.

27 δημοτικῆς ἀρετῆς. Not scientific virtue, because its intellectual basis in the minds of the people is ὡς δὲ, and not ἐπιστήμη. See IV 430 c n, and on δημοτικὴ ἀρετὴ generally Zeller II 11, pp. 593-601, and Archer-Hind's edition of the Phaedo App. I. The 'demotic virtue' which the philosopher constructs is of course the best of its kind.

501 A 3 ὁ οὐ πάνω ῥάδιον. Cf. 499 C n. Plato's κάθαρσις is sufficiently drastic. He would rusticate the entire population above ten years of age, and bring up the remainder in the principles of his καλλιτέκτον (VI 540 E ff. n.).

4. διενέγκοιει. See cr. n. Schneider retains διενεγκεῖν, comparing other passages in which ὁτι is followed by an inceptive. Instances of this irregularity occasionally occur (Kühner Gr. Gr. II p. 877), but it is unusually awkward here, and the majority of editors are probably right in following γ. With the sentiment cf. Laws 735 B—736 C, where the necessity of an initial κάθαρσις is equally insisted on, and various forms of legislative purgation are described.

μιτῆ ἱδιοτοῦ κτλ. The individual is cleansed by the Socratic elenchus, which purges him of his false persuasion of knowledge: cf. Soph. 230 B—E, where this kind of κάθαρσις is expounded in detail. Gildersleeve (A. Ἱ. Ph. 111 p. 201) points out that the 'articulate infinitive' with ἄν is rare in Plato.

5 γράφειν νόμους: 'to paint or draft laws.' Richards is inclined to cancel μηδὲ—νόμους as involving "a most awkward and inartistic confusion of the figure (painting) with the thing figured (legislation)." Nothing is more usual in Plato than such a 'confusion,' if the phrase employed bears, like γράφειν νόμους, or is capable of bearing, like ἄνθρωπος below, a meaning of its own as well as an application in the simile, and it is a narrow conception of art which pronounces the idiom inartistic. Cf. 507 A n. and Euthyph. 3 A with my note ad loc., and see also on ν. 451 B. Cobet's ἐγγράφοντας νόμους, which Baiter adopts, is another unsuccessful attempt to obliterate this characteristic feature of Plato's style.

6 παραλαβεῖν καθαρῶν. Plato would cite as examples a tutor who is entrusted with the sole authority over a child, and legislators who (as in the Laws 702 B ff.) receive autocratic power in order to found a colony. Cf. 499 B n.
501 B 9 τὸ φύσει δίκαιον is assuredly the Idea of Justice, as opposed to τὸ νόμῳ δίκαιον 'conventional justice': cf. 500 C and (for φύσει) V 476 B. See also on x 508 A. Bosanquet ignores the most essential and characteristic feature of Plato's teaching when he remarks that "the 'natural' principles of justice and other moral qualities are no doubt those which Plato believes himself to have found present, in various degrees, throughout inorganic and organic nature and the animal world, and culminating in the life of man." It is better to let Plato soar where we cannot follow him than thus to clip his wings. See the Appendix to Book vii On Plato's Dialectic.

10 καὶ πρὸς ἑκείνῳ κτλ. The legislative painter looks now at his model (the φύσει δίκαιον etc.), now at his picture (the δίκαιον etc. which he is implanting among men), rubbing out one part and painting another in again (τὸ μὲν—ἔγγραφον), till he is satisfied with the result. He combines and mixes various ἔπιγραφαμετα or institutions, till he produces the true ἄνθρωπον or 'colour and likeness of true Manhood'; just as the painter mixes various colours to produce his ἄνθρωπον or flesh-tint. ἄνθρωπον in painting was a sort of flesh-colour, made by mixing various colours together: see Crat. 424 E, Xen. Oec. 10. 5, Arist. de gen. an. i 18. 725a 26 and Ruhnken on Timaeus Lex. s.v. To this Plato of course alludes, but he intends us also to take the word in its etymological signification, as is clear from θεοεἰκόνων below. The stress in ἄνθρωπον, as in θεοεἰκόνων, is on the first part of the compound: it is not the mere ἄνθρωπος εἶδες, but the θεο- like, at which the legislator aims: cf. the force of ἄνθρωπος in 498 E. ἄνθρωπος might be translated by 'the human form divine,' except that 'form' suggests a wrong notion. For other views on this passage see App. V.

13 θεοεἰκόνων. ΙΙ. 1 131 et al. It is pleasing to meet with so cordial and spontaneous an acknowledgment of Homer as a kindred spirit in a passage so full of Plato's characteristic idealism. There is more than a grain of truth in Longinus' observation: μόνον ὁ Ἱρέδοτος ὁ ὑμηρωμάτιστος ἐγένετο; Στρατιάρχοι ἔτι πρότερον ὤ τ' Ἀρχιλόχος, πάντως δὲ τοιῶν μᾶλσα ὁ Πλάτων ἀπὸ τοῦ Ὑμηρουκοῦ γενέων νῷματος εἰς αὐτὸν μυρίων ὡςα παρατρέπαν ἀποχετευόμενον (περὶ θύσων 13. 3). By the words ἄνθρωπον—θεοεἰκόνων Plato means to suggest that Man is then most manlike when he most resembles God: and (as Tennyson says) "then most godlike being most a man." Cf. Ἱ. 589 b 13. This sure and abiding conviction of the presence of a divine element within us, rendering our nature essentially and truly human, makes itself felt in nearly all the dialogues of Plato. It is the ultimate source of all his idealism, religious and metaphysical, no less than moral and political, and may well be considered the most precious and enduring inheritance which he has bequeathed to posterity.

501 C 15 δὲ τὰ μάλιστα should be taken with ποιήσαι, and εἰς δον ένδεχεται with θεοφθη: 'until, as far as possible, they have made mere human characters as dear to God as human
characters can be. For the σχῆμα ἐκ
παραλλήλου see Schanz, Nov. Comm. Pl.
pp. 12-15. Schneider can hardly be
right in connecting διὰ μᾶλλον with ἄν-
θρωπεια. For theοφιλὴ Badham con-
jectured theωδή—a most arbitrary change,
though approved by Cobet and Baier. How
could theωδή have degenerated into the-
οφιλή, which is in all the MSS? The
opposite correction was far more likely.
Plato means us to understand that God
loves most those most who most resemble Him:
cf. x 612 ε and Laws 716 c.
17 ἐφησά. V 474 A.
20 αὐτὸ: viz. the statement ὅ τι τοιοῦτος
—αὐτὸς with its interpretation in the
preceding exposition.
501 d 27 φῆσε. We should ex-
pect φῆσοιν, but the transition from plural to
singular is common (see on 1
347 A), and Plato is probably thinking
of the object in 487 c (φῆνι ἂν τις
κτλ.); cf. 489 b and 490 d. ὅπς ἄγαθὴ
just above (instead of μὴ ἄγαθὴ as in μὴ
τὰν φῶν) prepares the way for φῆσει,
by shewing that the infinitives are begin-
nxing to escape from the sway of ἀμφιθη-
tήσαι. φῆσει in φῆσει λογίζεσθαι 11 366 A
furnishes an exact parallel to φῆσει here.
The best MSS—see cr. n.—read φῆσοι, which is retained by Schneider and
others. If φῆσει is right, we must
either (1) refer it to ἐξουσι, and suppose
that the future is "οὐ ἐστὶν πρὸ πᾶν;
receptum" (Schneider, Stallbaum), or
(2) supply an οὖ (J. and C.). Neither
explanation is in my judgment possible.
φῆσες, the reading of q and editors be-
fore Bekker, may be defended from
489 b and 489 d, where Aminatus is
identified with the antagonist of 487 c,
but the correction is not a very likely
one. Madvig, more suo, expels the word.
Cf. Introd. § 5.
501 E 31 μὴ ἦττον. Herwerden would
insert χαλέψοις or πικρῶς, Richards
ἀγρίως or ἀγριῶς. If ἦττον is pro-
nounced with emphasis, its meaning is
easily caught, after ἦττον in Aminatus' reply. It is virtually a quotation:
"wollen wir nicht statt dieses weniger"
etc. (Schneider).
XIV. Οὖν τοις τοίνυν, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, τούτω πεπεισμένων ἔστων: τοῦτο δὲ πέρι τις ἀμφισβητήσει, ὡς οὐκ ἂν τύχοιεν γενόμενοι 5 βασιλέων ἐγκοινοὶ ἢ δυναστῶν τὰς φύσεις φιλόσοφοι; Οὔτε ἂν εἷς, ἐφη. Τοιούτως δὲ γενομένως ὡς πολλὴ ἀνάγκη διαφθαρῆται, ἔχει τις λέγειν; ὡς μὲν γὰρ χαλεπον παρθῆναι, καὶ ἴμιους ἐκχω- ροῦμεν; ὡς δὲ ἐν παντὶ τῷ ἱρόνω τῶν πάντων οὐδέποτε οὐδ' ἂν ἐνε σωθείσι, ἐσθ' ὡστὶ ἀμφισβητήσει; Καὶ πῶς; 'Αλλὰ μὴν, ἢν 10 δ' ἐγὼ, εἰς ἰκανός γενόμενος, πολὺν ἔχων πειθόμενην, πάντ' ἐπιτε- λέσαι τὰ νῦν ἀπιστοῦμενα. Ἰκανὸς γάρ, ἐφη. 'Αρχιους γάρ 15 του, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, τιθυντο μας νόμοις καὶ τὰ ἐπιτιθεῦματα, ἢ διελεύθημεν, ὦ δὴντο ἀδύνατον ἄθλεκεν τοις πολῖτας. Οὔτε ὅπωστιον. 'Αλλὰ δὴ ἄπερ ἢμιν δοκεῖ, δοξαί καὶ ἄλλοις ὅμα σαντὸν τι καὶ ἀδύνατον; Οὐκ οἷμαι ἐγγωγε, ἢ δ' ὅς. Καὶ δὲν ὅτι γε βέλτιστα, ἐπεὶ δυνατα, ἰκανός ἐν τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν, ὡς ἑγραια, δυνάθομεν. Ἰκανὸς γάρ. Νῦν δὴ, ὥς ἐοικεν, ἐγυμβαίνει ἢμιν περὶ τῆς νομοθεσίας ἀρίστα ἐν ὑπερεῖ ἀλλομεν, εἰ γενοῦτο, χαλεπά δὲ γενέσθαι, οὐ μέντοι ἀδύνατα γε. Ἐγυμβαίνει γάρ, ἐφη. 20 XV. Οὐκοῦν ἐπειδῆ τούτῳ μόνης τέλος ἐσχεν, τὰ ἐπιλοιπα δὴ μετὰ τούτῳ λεκτέων, τίνα 1 τρόπον ἢμιν καὶ ἐκ τίνων μαθημάτων τε 9. ἀμφισβητήσεις ὃ: ἀμφισβητήσεις Ἀξ; ἀμφισβητήσεως Ι. 

502 A 3 πεπεισμένων ἄστων. See on 499 B. Plato's attempt to conciliate the Many is obviously half-hearted. The Multitude can never be philosophers (494 A), and are not likely to believe in the Philosopher-king. But it was necessary to prove or postulate some degree of ascent or at least quiescence on their part in order to demonstrate the possibility of the perfect city. Cf. 502 C n.

4 τίς. τίς is read by A, but Adimantus's reply makes it probable that the indefinite pronoun is correct.

5 βασιλέων ἐκγοινοὶ. See on 499 B. 502 B 10 εἰς ἰκανός κτλ. Krohn (Pl. St. p. 125) justly sees in this sentence "an expression of the convictions which led Plato to Sicily" in 367 B C. Cf. Grelot Plato I p. 126 and supra 496 B. Richards would read "<σοζ> γενύμενοι or γενύμενοι <τε και σοζ γενύ- μενοι> or something similar." <τερ> γενύμενοι would give the same sense, and be better Greek. But γενύμενοι = εἰ γέ- νωσο, 'should he arise,' is sufficient. He could not be said to be ἰκανός if he were corrupted.

14 ἄπερ ἢμιν δοκεῖ: i.e. the arrangements of Plato's καλλιγορία, as J. and C. point out. A ruler may arise who will approve of these, and frame laws accordingly. Plato is trying to prove that his ideal city is not impossible.

502 C 19 οὐ μέντοι ἀδύνατα γε. 'Not impossible' is the final verdict which Plato's readers, like Plato himself, will pass upon his city. His tone is far less hopeful than in Books II—IV, and even in V 473 B ff. he is, I think, more optimistic. It is impossible not to feel that 501 C—502 C is written, in some measure, invidia Minortia. Plato is glad to escape from so difficult and uncongenial a topic into his native element again. He is beginning to see that the Perfect City is in truth a παράδειγμα ἐν οἰκονομίᾳ (ix 592 b). See on V 470 E, VI 499 C, 499 E, 502 A and VII 540 D— 541 B, and cf. Hirmer Entst. u. Komp. etc. p. 638.

502 C—504 A Our next duty is to
describe the Rulers and their position in our city. We have already seen that they must be patriotic; let us now add that they must be philosophers. Those who combine the peculiar features of the philosophic temperament are necessarily few, and they must be submitted to stringent intellectual as well as moral tests, to see whether they will be able to endure the greatest of all studies.

502 D 22 ἐνέσονται, ἐγγενὴσονται
is conjectured by Richards, who compares 521 C and VIII 552 E, 557 C. The proposal is attractive, but involves too great a departure from the MSS. ἐνέσονται moreover is better suited to καὶ κατὰ πολίαν—ἀπτόμενοι than ἐγγενὴσονται would be. τῶν τριτῶν ἐνέσονται means, I think, not how they will be produced (that is expressed in ἐκ τινῶν—ἐπιτηθευμάτων), but how they will be in the city, i.e. the whole subject of their position and standing in the State. It is this, as well as their education, which is described in the sequel. The present sentence is intended as a full and accurate forecast of the rest of VI and VII. Σ has ἐνεσονται, which was read till Bekker restored ἐνέσονται.

24 οὐδέν κτλ. Cf. 497 C, D nn.
There, as here, the κατάστασις τῶν ἄρχοντων and the position of women and children etc. are treated as parts of one and the same question. The first obscure hint of this connexion is in IV 423 E, but it is not till V 471 C ff. that we begin to see the intimate relation between the two subjects. In V 450 C Socrates for the first time touches on the question 'Are our proposals about women' etc. 'possible?' The same question reappears in 471 C, but with a larger scope 'Is the perfect city possible as a whole?' The reply

is 'Yes, if Philosophers are Kings;' and thus is re-opened the whole subject of the κατάστασις τῶν ἄρχοντων. Plato is therefore justified in connecting, as he does, the two topics here mentioned. But he overstates the case when he asserts that the κατάστασις τῶν ἄρχοντων has been omitted in Books III and IV (see III 412 B ff.), or slurred over in the same way as the Community of Wives and Children, in spite of various hints of a fuller treatment still to come (III 414 A: cf. IV 442 C n.), See also on 503 A and Krohn Pl. St. p. 127, Pfeiderer Zur Lösung etc. p. 28, with the replies of Grimmel de reip. Pl. comp. et util. p. 49 and Westerwick de reip. Pl. comm. pp. 54 ff.

26 τῆς—κατάστασις = 'the appointment of the Rulers' is equivalent, as in the title or heading of a chapter, to τὸ περὶ τῆς—κατάστασις. Of this subject the Rulers' education naturally forms the most important part; but we ought not to explain τῶν ἄρχοντων as brachylogically for τῆς τῶν ἄρχοντων παιδείας (with Krohn Pl. St. p. 126).

27 παντελῶς ἀληθῆς. The adjective should be translated literally, so as to suggest that the best κατάστασις is also the truest. The ideal is the true in Plato: cf. v 473 A n.

502 E 29 τὸ δὲ—δὲ. Plato admits that the subject of the Rulers requires to be reinvestigated practically from the beginning. Their strictly intellectual needs have hitherto been almost ignored: see 497 C n. But Plato does not propose to supersede the earlier education in Music and Gymnastic, nor are the two schemes theoretically incompatible, as Krohn appears to hold (Pl. St. p. 127). We are clearly intended to suppose that the
Rulers receive the moral as well as the intellectual training, although in practice, no doubt, some modifications might be necessary, so long as the two proceeded simultaneously. See VII 536 D and II 376 E n.

30 ἀλείγομεν. III 412 C—414 B.
503 A 2 τὸ δόγμα τοῦτο. The patriots’ creed: see III 412 E, 413 C.

4 ἦ=‘aliaquin.’ Cf. v. 463 D n.

7 καὶ ἀδήλα is ejected by Cobet. The precise words do not occur in III 414 A, but they are unobjectionable, and end the sentence well. Cf. v. 460 B καὶ γέγρα εὕρετο καὶ ἀδήλα, and see also on v. 465 D.

8 παρακαλωττομένου: ‘putting on her veil.’ The λόγος is personified, as often.

κινεῖ τὸ νῦν παρόν. There is perhaps a hint of the proverb εὖ κείμενον καθὼς μὴ κίνει. No one who reads III 412 B—414 B without reference to the present passage would detect that the λόγος ‘leaves the high road’ in 414 B because she is afraid to raise the question of the Philosopher-king. The words ὡς ἐν τούτῳ, μὴ δὲ ἀκριβεῖα, εἰρήναθα would not suggest to him anything of the kind; and the impression which the earlier account of the Rulers leaves on us is that it was intended by Plato himself to be complete in outline, though not in detail. From the standpoint of Book VI it is certainly even in outline incomplete. Cf. Krohn IV. St. p. 126, where the case is somewhat overstated; and see on 497 C, 502 D. But there is nothing in all this to justify any chorizontic inference, if only we have regard to the laws of the Dialogue as a form of literary art. See Introd. § 4.

503 B 9 δόκοι κτλ. Examples of the omission of ἢν will be found in Schanz Nov. Comm. Pl. p. 33. 92 has ὠκουν: but cf. V 450 D.

11 ὁτι—καθιστάναι: lit. ‘that we must appoint philosophers in the persons of our most perfect guardians,’ i.e. that the rulers we appoint must be philosophers. The ἀκριβεστάτουs φύλακες are the same as the τέλεοι φύλακες of IV 428 D: and the whole expression is equivalent to ὅτι φιλοσόφους δεῖ εἶναι τοὺς ἀκριβεστάτουs φύλακας οὓς καθιστάμεν. To read καθεστάναι for καθιστάναι (with ν) is much less elegant; still less should we follow D. and V. in transposing φύλακας and φιλοσόφους. For the sense of ἀκριβεστάτουs cf. (with Jackson) I 341 B, 342 D.

15 διεσπασμένη. Cobet proposes διεσπασμένα, which he wrongly asserts to be the reading of A. But the parts of the philosophic φύσις are not torn asunder: it is the φύσις itself which is in partes disiuncta. Bywater’s διεπαράθενα avoids this difficulty; but διεσπασμένη is much better, because it suggests that the disjunction is ‘unnatural’ (in the Platonic sense of παρὰ φύσιν): see on IV 443 B.
καὶ ἀγχίνοι καὶ ὀξεῖς καὶ ὀσὰ ἄλλα τούτοις ἑπταὶ καὶ νεανικῷ τε καὶ μεγαλοπρεπεῖς τὰς διανοίας οἶσθ' ὅτι οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν ἀμαρί λύσει οἴοι κοσμίως μετὰ ἰσχύς καὶ βεβαιότητος ἐθέλεις ἄν, ἀλλ' οἱ τοιοῦτοι ὑπὸ ὄξυττος φέρονται ὅτι ἄν τύχωσιν, καὶ τὸ βέβαιον ἄνταν αὐτῶν ἐξοίχεται. Ἀληθῆ, ἐφ' ἐρείσ. Οὐκοῦν τὰ 20 βέβαια αὐτὸ ταῦτα ἤθη καὶ οὗκ εὑμετάβολα, οἰς ἄν τις μᾶλλον ὡς πιστῶς 1 χρήσαιτο, καὶ ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ πρὸς τοὺς φόβους δυσκίνητα ὑντα πρὸς τὰς μαθήσεις αὐτοὶ ποιεῖ ταύτων. δυσκινώτως ἔχει καὶ δυσμαθώς ῥώπερ ἀπονεαρκομάνα, καὶ ὑπὸν τε καὶ χάριμα ἐμπίστηται, ὅταν τι δέρ τοιοῦτον διαποιεῖν. Ὅστι παῦτα, ἐφ' ἑφα. 25 Ἡμεῖς δὲ γε ἐφαμεν ἀμφότεροι δεῖν ἓτ' ὑπὸ καὶ καλὸς μετέχειν, ἡ μήτε παιδείας τῆς ἀκριβεστάτης δεῖν αὐτῷ μεταδίδοναι μήτε τιμῆς μήτε ἀρχῆς. Ὅρθος, ἡ ὅ. Οὐκοῦν σπάνιον αὐτῷ οἰεὶ ἐσεῖσαι; ΕΠΩ δ' οὖ; Βασανιστέον δὴ ἐν τε ὁς τότε ἐλέγομεν πόνοις τε καὶ φόβοις καὶ ἴδιοις, καὶ ἔτι ἐδ' τότε παρεῖμεν νῦν λέγομεν, ὅτι καὶ 30 ἐν μαθήμασι πολλοῖς γυμνάζειν δεῖ σκοποῦντας εἰ καὶ τὰ μέγιστα 504 μαθήματα δυνάτη ἑσται ἐνεγκείω, εἰτα καὶ ἀποδειλάσει, ῥώπερ οἱ

16. καὶ νεανικῷ τε—διανοίας post ἑπταί nos: post φέσειαν codd.
en tois áthlois ápodeiλiωντες. Prépei ge to δή, ἡφι, οὕτω σκοπεῖν: ἀλλὰ ποία δὴ λέγεις μαθήματα μέγιστα;

XVI. Μηνομενεῖς μὲν ποι, ἢν δ’ ἐγὼ, ὅτι τριττὰ εἶδη ψυχῆς 5 διαστησάμενοι εὐνεββαζόμεν δικαιοσύνης τε πέρι καὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ σοφίας δ’ ἐκαστὸν εἶν. Μὴ γὰρ μηνομενοῦν, εἴη, τὰ λοιπὰ ἀν εἶν δικαίως μὴ ἀκοῦειν. Ὅ καὶ τὸ προρρήθην αὐτῶν: 1Τὸ ποιον δή; Ἐλέγομέν ποι, ὦτι, ὡς μὲν δυνατὸν ἢν κάλλιστα B αὐτὰ κατιδεῖν, ἀλλὰ μακροτέρα εἰ ηὲ περιελθόντο κατα-

2. ἄθλοις Orelli: ἄθλοις codd.

504 A 2 ἄθλοις. See cr. n. Orelli’s emendation has met with considerable favour; but Schneider, Stallbaum, and J. and C. still retain ἄθλοι. With the ms. reading we must, I think, translate ‘in the other cases’ i.e. in the πῶνον etc. spoken of just before. (If Plato merely meant ‘in other kinds of effort’ it was not worth his while to insert the clause at all.) But ἄφετε certainly suggests something more than a mere comparison between flinching at moral, and flinching at intellectual tests; and nothing could be more appropriate, or more in Plato’s way, than an allusion to the games: see on V 465 D. That ἄθλοι in this sense is half-poetic, “occurring only in the Timaeus and the Laws” (J. and C.), is scarcely an objection in Plato. ἄθλοι also suits well with γνωμάζειν. In [Αἰχίσχ.] 365 A occur the words ὦς γὰρ ἀγωνίσατε διάλει, ἐν τοῖς γνωμασίων γεναιον φανήμες, ἀπόκλεισας ἐν τοῖς ἄθλοις. The author of the Αἰχίσχιοθεσία may have been thinking of the present passage, and if so, he certainly read ἄθλοι. See also the fine anecdote in Plut. Thom. 11. 3.

504 A—505 B "Adimantus enquires what these 'greatest studies' are. You will remember, says Socrates, that we described our earlier or psychological method of arriving at the Virtues as inadequate and incomplete. Our guardians must travel by a longer road, if they would reach their proper goal, i.e. the highest of all studies, which is something above and beyond even the virtues. And these very virtues must no longer be seen merely in outline; they must be studied in all their fulness and perfection. The highest study is the Idea of the Good, as Adimantus has often heard before. It is the knowledge of this Idea which alone renders all other knowledge useful and profitable.

504 A 5 διαστησάμενοι. IV 436 A ff. ἐλεββαζόμεν: ‘we drew conclusions,’ viz. in IV 441 C ff. The use of συμβαθάνειν as a synonym for συμπεριένθαλαι, συλλογίζειν, is common in Aristotle: for examples see Bonitz Ind. Ar. s. v.

504 B 8 ἄλγομεν. See IV 435 D n. ἣν: "ut ékōw et similia dictum" (Schneider). There is no reason to eject the word (with Madvig) or to write εἰ: why should not the mood of the oratio recta be retained? εἰ would be unpleasing with εἰν following so soon. Liebhold’s ὃς μὲν δυνατὰ ἢ is unclassical; see on 1 349 C. Richards conjectures ὃς μὲν <ὡς> ὁ ως ὁ ως τὸ δὲ δυνατὸν κάλλιστα κτλ., taking ὃς with κατιδεῖν. But we ought not to multiply instances of ὃς for ὅτε in Plato (Π 365 D n.). The infinitive means simply ‘for describing,’ ‘in order to describe them in the best possible way’: see Goodwin MT. p. 308 and Kühner Gr. Gr. ii. p. 586.

9 αὐτὰ is of course the four cardinal virtues, like ταῦτα in 504 D. The ‘longer circuit’ is the educational training necessary in order to enable the guardians to obtain scientific knowledge of the virtues by discerning their relation with the Idea of Good: cf. 506 A. In Book iv Justice, Temperance etc. were regarded as psychological qualities or relations; but the philosophic Guardians must learn their metaphysical import. Throughout the rest of vi and vii Plato, in short, discards Psychology for Metaphysics. Thus much is clear; but many difficult and interesting questions arise in connexion with this passage, as to Krohn and others have pointed out. The μακροτέρα περιβολας mentioned in IV 435 D appears to be a longer way of determining, not the essential nature of the virtues, but whether Soul has ‘parts’ or not. (A
solution of this difficulty is suggested on 435 D). Socrates' shorter road, again, is not a way by which the Guardians are to go, but a method employed by himself in studying primarily the Soul, and secondarily the virtues. Finally, what is the relation between the psychological conception of Virtue and the metaphysical? And does the metaphysical conception involve a revised psychology or not? The last question is touched on in the notes to χ 611 B, where Plato himself appears to raise it. For the last but one see on 504 D.

10 ἐπομέναι: 'corresponding with,' 'on a level with' (Jowett) viz. in point of ἀκριβεία: cf. IV 435 D τῶν γε προσερμο-μένων τε καὶ προσεκαμένων ἀξίων, where see note. For the genitive with ἐπομένου cf. (with Stallbaum) Pol. 271 E and LatoS 899 C (ἐπόσα τούτων ἔσωτεμον, according to the best MS). By water would read ἐξο-μένα αὐτοι καὶ ἐξομένα in the Politicus, but it is safer to make no change, although the reverse corruption of ἐξομένα for ἐπομένα apparently occurs in Gorg. 494 E, if Bekker's restoration is correct.

504 C 14 ἄλλα ὃς φίλε κτά. Socrates سوفيتيإئا پری دیو ماه (区分 11)—plays on the etymological sense of μετρίως. In effect he says 'Don't say 'μετρίως': short measure in such cases is no measure at all: for—if 'Measure' be rightly understood—there can be no imperfect measure of anything." Etymologically, for example, ἀτελεῖ méτρον ὑπάρ η σ is a more-or-less, for the measure must be exactly commensurable with the water. Hence the méτρον τῶν ἀκριβεστάτων must itself be ἀκριβεστά-των (cf. 504 E). The essential perfection of méτρον, τὸ méτρον and the like is expounded in Pol. 284 A II., Phil. 64 D II. and 66 A: cf. also Laws 716 C III., where we read that God, not Man, is the Measure of all things. The translation 'Nothing imperfect is the measure of anything' (Jowett and others) suggests, I think, a wrong idea, and is not so well adapted to méτρον—γένεται.

17 τισι: with reference, perhaps, to Adimantus and the others (J. and C., comparing Π 372 E. Cf. also v 465 t). Adimantus betrays no consciousness of the allusion in his reply.

504 D 22 ἦς αλώσιν. Cf. V 463 D H. νόν δη. The reference (somewhat loose, as usual) is to 503 E.
25 διήλθομεν; Καὶ μείζων, ἢν ἐγώ, καὶ αὐτῶν τούτων οὐχ ὑπογραφή δεῖ ὠσπερ νῦν θεάσασθαι, ἀλλὰ τὴν τελευτάτην ἀπεργασίαν μὴ παριέναι. ἦν οὐ γελοῖον ἐπὶ μὲν ἄλλοις σμικροῦ ἄξιος πάντων συντεινομένους, ὅπως ὦ τι ἀκριβέστατα καὶ καθαρότατα ἐξεί, τῶν δὲ μεγίστων μὴ μεγίστας ἄξιον εἶναι καὶ τὰς ἀκριβείας; 30 Καὶ μάλα, ἐφη. ὃ μέντοι μέγιστον μάθημα καὶ περὶ ὦ τι αὐτὸ λέγεις, οἴει τιν ἂν σε, ἐφη, ἀφεῖναι μὴ ἐρωτησάντα τί ἐστίν; ὦ ἀνή, ἢν ὦ ἐγώ· ἀλλὰ καὶ σὺ ἑρώτα. πάντως αὐτὸ οὐκ ὀλγὰκες ἀκήκοας, νῦν δὲ ἢ οὐκ ἐννοεῖς ἢ αὖ διανοεῖ ἐμοὶ πράγματα παρέχειν 505 ἀντιλαμβανόμενος. οἴμαι δὲ τούτῳ μᾶλλον, ἐπεὶ ὅτι γε ἤ τοῦ ἐφη: ἐφη, ἄξιον τὸ διαόγμα codd.

25 καὶ μείζων κτλ. καὶ—καὶ= 'not only—but also.' αὐτῶν τούτων is 'harum ipsarum virtutum.'

ὀχι ὑπογραφή—ὡσπερ νῦν is as clear a proof as we could wish that Justice and the other virtues, as described in Book iv, are not the transcendental αὐτὰ καὶ εἶδος: see on III 402 ν. They are only a ὑπογραφή or 'adumbratio' of the Ideas, being, we may suppose, simply the psychological relations which result from the παρονία of the Ideas in certain particulars, viz. in human souls, during their union with human bodies. ὠσπερ νῦν admits moreover that the Rulers of III and IV (apart from a few suggestions to the opposite effect: see on 497 c) had only 'correct opinion' and not 'knowledge' (in the strict Platonic sense): it was their duty to accept and carry out the precepts of Plato, the founder of the city (IV 429 ν. c.).

27 παρέναι. The present is better than παρεῖναι, which Herderen conjectures.

504 καὶ 30 καὶ μάλα. See cr. n. The words ἄξιον τὸ διαόγμα are not strictly suitable to ἢν ὡγεῖον, and although διαόγμα is of course a Platonic word, it is questionable whether Plato could have used it in this way. Perhaps we owe the comment to a gratified monk, who may have applied the observation to systematic theology. The comment is at all events a just one. Cf. 406 A. n. Plato's remark is best illustrated by the case of the exact sciences; and in a certain sense it may be said that he wished to make Politics into an exact science.

505 A 2 ἀντιλαμβανόμενος: 'by holding on fast to me,' 'refusing to let me go,' is the opposite of ἀφέναι: cf. viii 544 B n. 'By raising objections' (D. and V.) is incorrect: see on 497 D. Socrates means 'you intend to bother me as before'—ἄδ refers to ν 449 B. —'by not letting me off, but on this occasion you won't succeed, for I have the answer ready, so ask away!' Cf. ἐρώτα in Gorg. 448 B. ἦ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἱδέα κτλ. It is clear from πολλὰκις ἀκήκοας that the supremacy of the Idea of Good was already a recognised tenet of the Platonic school. No proof of the doctrine is here attempted by Plato (cf. ν 475 E. n.): it is merely expounded and explained. τὸ Πλάτωνος ἀγαθὸν was in antiquity a proverb for any dark or obscure saying: see Amphis ap. D. L. 11 27 ἵττον ἰδά τοῦτ' ἕνω, ἢ ὦ ἀσποτ', ἢ τὸ Πλάτωνος ἀγαθὸν. (Another allusion occurs in Alexis ap. Athen. viii
8. εἶναι ξένοι εἴδεναι ΑΠ, sed δ ἐτέρα γενέσται notavit ΑΔ.

354 D) Some account of the enormous literature of the subject will be found in Zeller 11 1. pp. 709 ff., 718 n. 1. In addition to Stumpf’s treatise to be presently named, I have found the monograph by Biichl Die Idee des Guten bei Platon Graz 1879 particularly good and useful. Other special treatises are also referred to in the course of the notes. The majority of interpreters are now agreed in identifying Plato’s Idea of the Good with his philosophical conception of the Deity. The best and fullest proof of the identity is still, I think, Stumpf’s exhaustive dissertation Das Verhältniss des Platonischen Gottes zur Idee des Guten Halle 1869. There is only one passage in his works where Plato himself appears expressly to identify the two, viz. Phil. 22 c, but on the principle that things which are equal to the same thing are equal to one another, the identification is complete, and I have therefore thought myself at liberty throughout the notes occasionally to illustrate Plato’s metaphysics by his theology.

3 δίκαια καὶ τάλλα. It is only by κοινομιον with the Idea of Good that δικαια, καλα etc. become good i.e. useful and beneficial (synonyms of ‘good’): see ν 457 b m.). Otherwise they are altogether useless. δικαια does not of course mean the Idea of Justice, but τα πολλα δικαια in the widest sense of the term, including νομισμα περι δικαλα: see on ν 476 λ, 476 c, 479 λ. Baier’s δη καὶ for δικαία καὶ occurs in one or two inferior MSS, but is certainly wrong: see on 506 λ.

5 διὶ—τιμεφ. Cf. 505 D ff., VII 517 b ff., 532 E ff. and Tim. 28 C, where much the same is said of the παθη του παντός.

6 εἶ δὲ μη τιμεφ καλ.: ‘and if we know it not, and should know all else excepting it never so well’ etc. Cobet does ill to expunge εἰ δὲ μη τιμεφ. The repetition of εἰ before επισταμεθα is necessary because, while τιμεφ expresses a fact, επισταμεθα is only an improbable supposition: see next note. The sentiment is one of Plato’s commonplaces: see for example Alc. 11 144 D ff. (where it is expounded in detail), 147 b, Charm. 173 a ff., Euthyd. 280 e ff., 285 a ff., 291, and cf. also Lach. 199 C, Lys. 219 b ff., Phaed. 69 b. Stumpf das Verhältniss etc. p. 87 m. compares also the language about the Gods in Laws 905 c. The Euthydemus and Charmides already forecast the city of the Philosopher-king, in which the Knowledge of Good shall ‘sit alone in the helm of the state’ (Euthyd. 291 d): see Noble die Statistehre Pl. pp. 39—48.

8 κεκτημεθα. To possess a thing ἄνευ τοῦ ἄγαθον is matter of common and daily occurrence; to know everything (except the Good) is not. Hence the indicative κεκτημεθα is as appropriate now as the optative επισταμεθα was before. I formerly read κεκτημεθα with II and the majority of editors, but now agree with Schneider that there is no reason to depart from the text of A.

505 B 9 φρονεῖν ἄνευ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. The last three words were suspected by Morgenstern and bracketed by Stallbaum and others. If we take these words (like ἄνευ ταύτης above) with τάλλα, they are not superfluous: ‘οι enim quod quis reliqua omnia excepto bono intel- ligit, efficier ut nihil, quod pulchrum et bonum sit, intelligat’ (Schneider). That some writers might have omitted the
phrase is no ground for interfering with Plato's characteristic fulness of expression.

505 B—506 A What then is the Good? The majority answer 'Pleasure,' others, who are more refined, 'Knowledge.' Neither of these views is tenable. Men are constantly disputing about the Good, but its existence is practically admitted by all, for it is the ultimate object of all endeavour. The Idea of the Good must be known by our Guardians; for unless they know the connexion between the Good, and particular instances of the just, the honourable etc., they cannot guard the latter, or even indeed be said to know them in any adequate measure.

12 tois μέν πολλοῖς κτλ. We need not (with Tietze Die Id. d. Guten u. d. Gottesbegriff p. 9) find in this an allusion to Aristippus and the Cyrenaics. Plato means what he says and no more. Pleasure is always the sumnum bonum of the Many: cf. Arist. Eth. Nic. 3. 1093b16. In tois κοιμητέρως Dümmler (Antith. p. 43) and others have recognised Antisthenes: cf. RP 218 B n. b. Hermann (Gesch. u. System p. 329 n. 332) interprets the words—more correctly, I think—of Socrates (cf. Xen. Mem. IV 5. 6) and his immediate followers, Antisthenes included. The Megarians sometimes held the same view (D. L. II 106). See also next note.

505 C 19 ἐπειδὰν κτλ.: "when they utter the mysterious word 'good.'" For φθέγγονται of a high-sounding, oracular, impressive utterance cf. VII 527 A, VIII 568 A, Prot. 342 E, Phaedr. 238 D, Ar. Clouds 315. Plato's criticism applies to himself, in common with the other pupils of Socrates, and was doubtless intended to do so. He constantly declares that 'knowledge of the good' is the all-important possession for man: see on εί δέ μὴ ἰσομεν 505 A. The present discussion removes the petitio principii by explaining what the ιδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ really means.

21 ἢ οὔ καλ οὔτοι κτλ. This is exactly what happens to Callicles in Gorg. 495 A—499 C. If Plato is referring to any dialogue at all, the Gorgias L.C. illustrates his point much better than the Philebus (13 A—C), to which Zeller II 1 p. 548, Susemihi Gen. Entw. II p. 192, and others of the older generation of scholars suppose that Plato is alluding. But there is nothing to suggest any cross-reference at all. On the question whether the Philebus is or is not prior to the Republic see Jackson in J. Ph. xxv pp. 65—82.

505 D 25 τόδε οὔ φανερόν κτλ. The contrast is between δικαία, καλά on the one hand, and ἀγαθά or ὕβεμα (V 457 B n.) on the other. All men desire the reality of good (cf. IV 438 A n.), but many are content with the semblance of honour. Cobet expunges τά δοκοῦντα, and καὶ before δοκεῖ, thereby leaving a very crabbed piece of Greek. Ast's καὶ διδοῦσκε for καὶ δοκεῖ is on a higher plane of criticism. The text is nevertheless sound. δοκεῖν 'to seem' is used absolutely, as in II 361 B,
καὶ καλὰ πολλοὶ ἂν ἔλοιπο τὰ δοκοῦντα, κἂν μὴ ἕν, ἢ ὡμοί ταῦτα πράττειν καὶ κεκτήσθαι καὶ δοκεῖν, ἀγαθά δὲ οὐδενὶ ἐτί ἀρκεῖ τὰ δοκοῦντα κτάσαται, ἄλλα τὰ ὄντα ἔφυσιν, τὴν δὲ δόξαν ἑνταῦθα
Ε ἡδι πᾶς ἄτιμαζει: Καὶ μάλα, ἐφη. "Ὁ δὴ διώκει μὲν ἄπασα ψυχή καὶ τοῦτον ἑικαὶ πάντα πράττει, ἀπομαντευομένη τι εἶναι, 30 ἀποροῦσα δὲ καὶ οὐκ ἔχουσα λαβεῖν ἱκανὸς τι ποτ’ ἐστὶν οὐδὲ πίστει χρῆσασθαι μοιμόσ, οὐ καὶ περὶ τὰλλα, διὰ τοῦτο δὲ ἀποτυχίαι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων εἰ τι ὄφελος ἦν, περὶ δὴ τὸ τοιοῦτον
506 καὶ τοιοῦτον | οὐτὸς φῶμεν δεῖν ἐσκοπῶσθαι καὶ ἐκεῖνος τοὺς βελτίστους ἐν τῇ πόλει, οἷς πάντα ἐγκερκομένες; "Ἡκιστά γ’, ἐφη. Οἴμαι γοῦν, εἴπον, δικαία τε καὶ καλὰ ἁγιοῦμενα ὅπ’ ποτὲ ἀγαθά ἐστιν, οὐ πολλῷ τινὸς ἢ’ ἔξιον φύλακα κεκτήσθαι ἂν ἑαυτῶν τὸ τοῦτό ἁγιοῦντα, μαντεύομαι δὲ μιθέα αὐτὰ πρότερον γινώσχει 5 ἱκανός. Καλὸς γὰρ, ἐφη, μαντεύει. Οὐκοῦν ἢμῖν ἡ πολιτεῖα
Β τελέως 1 κεκοσμήσεται, ἐὰν ο τοιοῦτος αὐτὴν ἐπισκόπη φύλαξ, ο τοιοῦτον ἐπιστήμων;

and prepares the way for δόξαν 'seeming' (cf. 499 A) below. So also Schneider and Stallbaum understand the passage. For ἐτι καὶ ἡδι see on III 412 B.

29 δὴ διώκει κτλ. With δ followed by τοῦτο cf. II 357 B n. Cobet's ὅτιν τοῦτο for τοῦτο is an un lucky venture. Stumpf justly observes that the Idea of Good is here regarded as the final cause: cf. Phaed. 98 B ff. and Phil. 20 D, 54 C. For a striking theological presentation of the same view see Laws 715 B ff. and 903 B—D. Plato's ιδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ said "the foundations of the teleological view of the world" (Krohn Pl. St. p. 131).


32 διὰ τοῦτο κτλ. See 505 Α n.

506 Α 1 καὶ ἐκεῖνος: i.e. as well as ὁ πολλός. For καὶ cf. VII 510 Β.

3 οἵματι γοῦν κτλ. No one who does not know the ιδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ can possibly know in what respect or how far particular δικαία (such as, for example, a particular νόμοις περὶ δικαίων: see ν 479 B n.) are good, because it is the παρουσία τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ in them which makes them good (505 A n.). And no one who is ignorant ὅπ’ ποτὲ ἀγαθὰ ἐστίν can possibly defend δικαία (such as for example the δικαία ἐπιστήμωμα of Plato's city), because he is at the mercy of anyone who attempts to shew that they are bad. Nor, until we know how far particular δικαία are good (πρότερον), can we adequately know these δικαία themselves, i.e. know which of these really is δικαίον and which not, for we do not know how they stand in relation to the ultimate source of all justice, viz. the Idea of the Good. It is this which, in the last resort, is the true 'measure of all things' (Laws 716 C ff., where Plato employs the language of theology). Hence the supreme necessity for our Guardians to know the ιδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. Bekker first restored the true reading of this passage, which had been strangely mutilated in earlier editions. Stallbaum reads μῆν ἄν ἐνα with ἔνα, but instances of the future with ἄν—see on 492 C—should not be wilfully multiplied.

508 Β 8 τοιούτων: i.e. τὰ δικαία τε καὶ καλά, ὅπ’ ποτὲ ἀγαθὰ ἐστίν.

508 Β—508 Β After some hesitation, Soeates undertakes to describe the Idea of Good, not as it is in itself, but through its image, analogue, or offspring.
Let me remind you (he proceeds) of our
usual distinction between Particulars and Ideas, the former apprehended by Sight, the latter by Reason. In the case of most of the senses, nothing is required except the faculty and its object in order that a sensation may take place. But in order that we may see, a third requisite is necessary, viz. Light. Now the author of Light is the Sun, and we may therefore say that the Sun is the cause of Sight. We must not identify either Sight or the Eye with the Sun, although the Eye resembles the Sun more closely than any other organ of sense, and the Sun himself is seen by the Eye.

506 C. Ο πότερον ἐπιστήμην κτλ. Even if it could be shown that the Phælius is earlier than the Republic— 
and recent critics take the opposite view —there would be no sufficient reason for holding (with Zeller4 II 1. p. 708 n.) that Plato is referring to that dialogue, although he there denies that either Knowledge or Pleasure is the Chief Good (20 b ff., 60 e). See also on 505 C and 506 e.

11 οὗτος κτλ. καλῶς has in reality—see cor. n.—more and better MS support than καλῶς, which Schneider retained in the belief that A read καλῶς. Used in this way, καλῶς is colloquial (Jebb on Soph. Ο. Τ. 1008 καλῶς εἶ δῆλος οὐκ εἶδως τι ὁρᾶς).

506 C 15 δοκεῖ σοι δικαίων κτλ. The sentence is ironical, as is clear from ἐξών παρ' ἄλλως (the Sophists forsooth) ἀκούειν φανά τε καὶ καλά in D below. Plato frequently feigns ignorance and self-distrust before expounding some great principle of whose truth he is himself profoundly convinced: cf. v. 450 D. The notion that he really lays claim only to δόξα or even ὅρθος δόξα of the Good is hardly to be entertained, although he does not claim to have perfect knowledge: 10 that we may, perchance, attain hereafter. See 505 A n.

19 ἣ δοκοῦσι τί σοι κτλ. On ὅρθῆ δόξα see Mem. 97 a—98 A, Theaet. 201 c, Tim. 51 D, E. Correct opinion believes, but does not know, and is therefore blind and insecure. Its ethical correlate is πολιτικῆς ἡμῶν ὁρθῆς: cf. 500 D and 450 C mm. See in general Zeller4 II 1. pp. 588 ff.

21 σκολιὰ = 'crooked,' 'awry' is objected to by Hermann on the ground that ὅρθαι δόξαι may be blind, but cannot be 'crooked.' This is true, but ai ἄνευ ἐπιστήμης δόξαι may be both blind and awry; and ἀλήξαρα, which looks back to ἀλήξαρα, shews that it is not correct opinions, but opinions without knowledge generally, which are described in τυφλά—σκολιά. Socrates' mock humility will not pretend to more than δόξα, let alone ὅρθῆ δόξα. If you wish for 'science,' go to your sophistical rhetoricians, forsooth, and 'hear things bright and beautiful.' φανά τε καὶ καλά may be an allusion to the 'luminaria orationis' of Isocrates and his friends: see 498 E n. σκοτία, which Hermann conjectures, is apparently not used by Plato.
ἀλλων ἀκούειν φανά τε καὶ καλά; Μή πρὸς Διός, ἣ δ’ ὦς, ὦ Σωκρατες, ὦ Πλάτων, ὦσπερ ἐπὶ τέλει ὡν ἀπωστήσῃ. ἀρκέσει γὰρ ἡμῖν, κἂν ὁ σετέρ δικαιοσύνης πέρι καὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων διήλθες, οὕτω καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ διέλθης. Καὶ γὰρ ἐμοὶ, ἣν δ’ 25 ἐγὼ, ἡ ἐταίρη, καὶ μᾶλ ἀρκέσει: ἀλλ’ ὅποις μὴ οὐχ οἶος τ’ ἐσομαι, προθυμούμενοι δὲ ἀσχημονῶν γέλοτα ὀψφίσω. ἀλλ’ ὦ μακάριοι,
Ε αὐτὸ μὲν τ’ ποτ’ ἐστὶ τάγαθων, εάσουμεν τὸ νῦν εἶναι πλέον γὰρ μοι φαίνεται ἦ κατὰ τὴν παρούσαν ὀρμήν ἐφικέσθαι τοῦ γε δοκοῦντος ἐμοὶ τὰ νῦν; ὃς δὲ ἐγκονος τοῦ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φαίνεται καὶ ὀμοῦ 30 τατος ἐκεῖνο, λέγειν ἑθέλω, εἰ καὶ οὕτω φίλον, εἰ δὲ μὴ, εἶν. ’Ἀλλ’, ἐφη, λέγε: εἰσαῦθι γὰρ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀποτείσεις τὴν διήγησιν.

507 Βουλοίμην ἄν, εἴπον, ἐμε τε δύνασθαι αὐτὴν | ἀποδόναι καὶ ὑμᾶς κομίσασθαι, ἀλλὰ μή ὁσπερ νῦν τοὺς τόκους μόνον. τούτον δὲ δὴ

506 23 ὁσπερ ἐπὶ τέλει ὡν: not 'just as you are reaching the goal' (Jowett), but 'as if you were at the end,' Jowett practically omits ὁσπερ in his translation.

506 Ε 29 ὑμήν. The idea is as of a start or obstacle which enables one to clear the obstacles in the way: cf. Β 451 C. 30 τα νῦν should be taken with ἐφικέσθαι. If we take it with δοκοῦντος, we must suppose that Socrates intends to suggest that his view of the matter may change (so D. and V.). He is hardly likely to have made such a suggestion, even ironically. έπεμπτεν τό νῦν εἶναι is also in favour of connecting τα νῦν with ἐφικέσθαι. Cf. Τιμ. 48 C 1. τὴν μὲν γὰρ περι ἀπαντῶν εἴτε ἄρχην ἢτε ἄρχας—τὸ νῦν ο’ρήτων, δι’ ἄλλο μὲν οὐδὲν, διὰ δὲ τὸ χαλετὸν εἶναι κατὰ τον παροῦντα τρόπον τὴς διεξοδοῦ δηλουσαι τὰ δοκοῦντα κτλ. The emphasis on τὸ νῦν εἶναι and τα νῦν seems to hint that a description of the ἀγαθοῦ, as it is in itself, may be expected on some future occasion. But there is no dialogue in which the Idea of Good is so clearly described as in the Republic, and it is not without reason that every historian of Philosophy regards this passage as the locus classicus on the subject. O. Schneider (Versuch einer genet. Entw. d. Pl. ἀγαθ. ν p. 15) thinks of the Philebus; Susemihl (Gen. Εντ. 11 p. 193) of the Φιλόσοφος, which was perhaps planned, but probably never executed (see on Β 484 Α). The Philebus is unsuitable; and of the Φιλόσοφος we know nothing. I am inclined to think—in view especially of Βουλοίμην ἄν κτλ. below—that, although Plato may have cherished the idea of describing the Good without the aid of a simile—εἰδέναι αὐτός δ’ αὐτῶν—, he never, at all events in any of his dialogues, did so. In a certain sense, perhaps, the Timaeus describes the Good (see Archer-Hind’s edition p. 27), but even there, we study the ‘Father of all’ not in himself so much as in his works. I agree with Stumpf’s conclusion (I.C. p. 75) that Plato could hardly have depicted the Idea of Good at all except by means of a comparison. Certainly nothing else could have made it equally clear; and, in point of fact, ‘es wird nirgends Mehr gegeben’ (Stumpf, L.C. p. 59 n.). See also next note.

δ’s δ’ ἐγκονος κτλ. The ἐγκονος is the Sun, as presently appears. Socrates’ procedure in Phæd. 99 C—ἐ is in some respects like his procedure here. A nearer parallel is Phaedr. 246 Λ, where, before describing the soul, Socrates observes ὁ λον μὲν ἔτι, πάντως πάντων θείας ἐναι καὶ μακρὰς διαγγέλειες, ὅ δ’ ἐοικεν, ἀνθρωπίνης τε καὶ ἑλάστονος. The Idea of Good, like the Soul, is best described by one man to another in a figure. On εἰσαῦθι see last note and Β 430 C n.

507 Α 2 τῶν τόκων. The comparison, which is already suggested in ἀποτείσεις, ἀποδοθαίναι (‘pay’ as well as ‘render’), and κομίσασθαι, culminates in the word τόκος (‘interest’ and ‘offspring’). See on γραφεῖν νῦμος 501 Α and (for a
οὖν τὸν τόκον τε καὶ ἐκγενοῦν αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἁγαθοῦ κομίσασθε: εὑλα-
βείσθε μέντοι, μή τη ἐξαπατήσῃ υἱὸς ἁγίου, κιβδηλον ἀποδεδοῦς
5 τὸν λόγον τοῦ τόκου. Εὐλαβησόμεθα, ἐφι, κατὰ δύναμιν· ἀλλὰ
μόνον λέγε. Διομολογησάμενος γε, ἐφίν ἐγώ, καὶ ἀναμνήσας υἱὸς
τά τ' ἐν τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν ῥηθέντα καὶ ἄλλοτε ἡδον ἀπολλάκης εἰρήμενα.
Τὰ ¹ πολλά; ἢ δ' ὡς. Πολλὰ καλά, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ πολλὰ ἁγαθὰ καὶ Β
ἐκάστα ὦτως εἶναι φαμὲν τε καὶ διορίζομεν τὰ λόγω. Φαμὲν γάρ.
10 Καὶ αὐτὸ δὴ καλὸν καὶ αὐτὸ ἁγαθὸν καὶ ὦτω περὶ πάντων, ἀ
τότε ὡς πολλὰ ἐτίθημεν· πάλιν αὐ καὶ ἰδέαν μιὰν ἐκάστου, ὅς μιᾶς
οὐσίας, τιθεῖτες, δ' ἐστιν ἐκαστόν προσαγορεύομεν. Ἑστὶ τάτα.
Καὶ τὰ μὲν δὴ ὀραθαὶ φαμὲν, νοεῖσθαι δ' οὖ, τὰς δ' αὐ ἰδέας
νοεῖσθαι μὲν, ἵνα ὡς οὖν. Παντάπασι μὲν ὦτων. Τῷ ὦτων ὡς
15 ὀρόμεν ἡμῶν αὐτῶν τὰ ὀρόμενα; Τῇ ὦψει, ἐφί. Οὐκοῦν, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ,
καὶ ἀκοή τὰ ἀκούόμενα καὶ ταῖς ἀλλαὶς αἰσθήσεως πάντα τὰ
ἀισθητὰ; Τῇ μῆν; Ἄρ' ὦν, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, ἐννένοικος τῶν τῶν

3. κομίσασθε Α comboBox: κομίσασθαι Α

similar play on τόκος) cf. vii 555 B and
Ar. Theim. 842—845. κιβδηλον below
is a metaphor from counterfeit coinage.
6 διομολογησάμενος γε. γε ('yes,' 'not until': cf. with Schneider Phaedr.
228 δ' ἔδειξε γε πρῶτον κτλ.) was restored by
Bekker from the best MSS. Stephanus
(with Σ etc.) read δὲ.
7 ἐν τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν. Cf. V 475 E n.
507 B 9 ὑπαί is not of course used in
its technical sense, otherwise it would
be inconsistent with the end of Book v.
Socrates means only that the Platonic
distinctions between two categories—τὰ
πολλά, and the Ideas.
10 καὶ ἄλτα δὴ κτλ. The literal mean-
ing of the text above printed is as follows:
'So likewise a Beautiful itself, and a
Good itself and similarly about all which
we formerly took' (or 'postulated') 'as
many; reversing our procedure (πάλιν αὐ),
we postulate also one Idea of each, be-
thieving that there is but one, and call it
the essential so-and-so.' καὶ—ἐτίθημεν is
best explained as still under the influence
of φιλον—νουφ. τότε (as Schneider ob-
serves) refers 'ad eam, quae modo facta
est, multorum commemorationem': cf.
510 B. Stallbaum is mistaken in sup-
posing that the allusion is to v 475 ε ff.
Plato's meaning will appear from a single
eample. We postulate both πολλά
dikaios and also ἐν δικαιοῦν, viz. the ἰδέα μιᾶς
δικαίων, and we call the latter ὀπτων δικαιοῦν: cf. Phaedr. 75 B τοῦ δ ἐστιν ὅσον,
Symp. 211 C and elsewhere. We postu-
late only one ἰδέα δικαίον, because we
believe that there is but one; see x
597 C, D, where Plato shews why there
cannot be more. For αὐτὸ used of the
Ideas, see on IV 438 B, 438 C and V
476 A n. Instead of καὶ ἰδέαν, the mss—
see cr. n.—read καὶ ἱδέαν (καὶ δὶς ἤνικον 
Vind. F.). For the interchange of καὶ and κατὰ
see Schaefer's Grág. Cor. p. 234 n. 26. An
unduly sloping accent is enough to account
for the corruption of ΚΑΙΔΙΕΑΝ into ΚΑΙΔΙΕΑΝ
(as in uncial mss it would be written: see Thompson Gr. 
Palaogr. p. 247). See also my article in
Cl. Rev. xiii p. 100. Other views on
the text and interpretation of this difficult
passage are discussed in App. VII.
507 C 17 ἀρ' ὦν κτλ. On the
unique position of Sight among the senses
see Phaedr. 250 D and Bonitz on Arist.
Met. A 1. 980 823: cf. also Phaed. 65 B,
Tim. 47 A ff. Hesp. Major 207 E ff. It
is the costliest (πολυτελεσάτης) because it
requires an additional precious or valuable
element (μὴ ἄρας 508 A) beyond what is
necessary for the operation of the others,
de An. II 7. 418 2 ff.
20 ἐστιν ὁ τι κτλ. Steinhardt (p. 689 n. 213) and others remark on Plato's error in denying that a medium is necessary in Hearing etc. Aristotle was well aware of this fact (see his de An. 11.7. 419a 25 ff.), and there are several indications that it was not altogether unknown to Plato. In Tim. 67 b, for example, air is regarded as in a certain sense the medium of sound. Here, however, where a scientific analysis of perception is not proposed, Plato takes his stand upon the broad fact of experience, that whereas we can hear, touch, etc. either in light or in darkness, we can see only where there is light.

507 D 23 οὖν ἄλλας πολλαίς. 'Non aliquës suppletion est, quique quae amplius tres supersint, sed δυναμει vel δυνάμεως συνέξειν' (Schneider). It may be added that the antecedent of ἄλλας is the same as that of τινα and τὴν τῆς ὄψεως καὶ τοῦ ὀράματος, and τῆν is certainly for τὴν δύναμιν: cf. τὴν τοῦ ὀράματος καὶ ὀράσει τῷ τοῖς πάθεσιν: cf. Theat. 156 Α.

27 ἐν αὐτοῖς κτλ. If ἐν αὐτοῖς is right, αὐτοῖς must be interpreted as τοῖς ὄρωμενοι, for it is clear from 508 c ὃν ἔν τὰς χρῶσι τὸ ἡμεροῦν φῶς ἐπέχρισε that colour is here regarded as inherent in the object. Grammatically, however, αὐτοῖς can scarcely mean anything except τοῖς ὄρωμενοι, and in my edition of 1897 I accordingly proposed to read ἐν αὐτοῖς <τοῖς ὄρωμενοι>. Ficinus translates præcinctum ilmen color, omitting ἐν αὐτοῖς altogether. For other views see App. VIII.

507 Ε 30 τίνος—τούτοις. The genitive has been variously explained as (1) dependent on γένος (Schneider), (2) in agreement with παραγεγομένων understood (Stallbaum, Campbell), (3) like ἐπίνω in τί δὲ ἐπίνω ὀπίς; v 459 b (Jowett). (2) is in my opinion grammatically impossible. For (3) cf. v 470 α. n. Jowett’s view is perhaps possible, but we should have expected simply τί δὲ λέγεις—τῶν; Schneider’s explanation (‘Pray what is this whose γένος you mention?’) is, I think, the least unsatisfactory. Perhaps we should read δεν for δεῖ.

δὲ δὲ κυαλεῖς. Herwerden needlessly writes δὲ καὶ κυαλεῖς. For (3) cf. δὲ καὶ κυαλεῖς.

31 ὁ σμικρὸς κτλ. ἑδα, ‘kind,’ ‘class,’ is here a synonym for γένος as in Thesp. 184 b, Pol. 289 b. The dative expresses the ‘amount of difference’ after the comparative τιμώτερῳ (‘more precious!’: cf. πολυεὐλογεῖται in 507 c). Cf. In 373 E and IX 579 c τοὺς τούτους κακοὺς πλείω καρποτάται with note ad loc.
508 a 4 τῶν ἐν ὀρφανῷ θεῶν: the heavenly constellations, which form the ὀρφανῶν θεῶν γένος (Tim. 40 A). Plato's description of the sun is instinct with religious feeling. The 'clear god and patron of all light, From whom each lamp and shining star doth borrow The benificent influence that makes him bright' claims adoration from Plato not merely as an ὀρφανῶν θεός, like the other stars, but as the symbol and scion (ἐγγόνος) of the Supreme Idea or God. Cf. Bonitz Disq. Plat. d. a., p. 6 n. 3, and especially Paul Shorey in Chicago Studies in Cl. Phil. Vol. 1 pp. 224 ff. The sunworship of some of the Neo-Platonists was instilled in no small measure by this passage of the Republic; see in particular Julian's 'Address to the Sovereign Sun' (ἐις τὸν βασιλέα ἥλιον) Or. iv. Cf. 508 b 11.

508 b 9 ἡλιακεστάτης. The Eye is the Body's Son: cf. Ar. Thesm. 16, 17 ὥ μὲν βλέπειν χρῆ πρῶτ' ἐμπνευσάτο | ὕψιθαλμόν ἀντίμεμον ἥλιον τρόχῳ. A similar idea appears in St Matth. 6. 22 ὁ λόγχος τοῦ ὑπάτου ἐστιν ὁ ὕψιθαλμός. Conversely, the Sun is often in Greek poetry called the Eye of the World or of Day, and Shakespeare invokes the Sun in the words 'O eye of Eyes!' (Rape of Lucrece); cf. also Milton Par. Lost v 171 'Thou Sun of this great world both eye and soul.' Both comparisons rest ultimately on the favourite Greek idea of the Universe as the Macrocosm, and Man as the Microcosm. See on this subject Zeller II 2. p. 498, III 2. pp. 130, 397 sqq., and Stein Psych. d. Stoa i pp. 205—214.

11 ὀσκύλω κτλ. Findar Fr. 107 (Bergk) expresses the same idea in the language of poetry: Ἀκτις δήλω, τί το- λύκος· ἐμφάσα, θοῦ μάτερ ὀμάτων. τὴν δύναμιν is of course τὴν δύναμιν τοῦ ὄρου, 'the power of seeing.' The translation 'faculty' (D. and V.) for δύνα- μιν is incorrect; for the faculty of ὄφας is supposed to be present in the eyes even when there is no light (507 d). But the eye has no 'power' to see, i.e. cannot exercise the faculty of ὄφας unless such a power is constantly dispensed (ταυμε- νόμεν) to it from the Sun. Cf. Biehl die Id. a. Gules p. 52, where the same view is taken. The word εἰπτρούνα (flowing over,' overflowing it,' cf. Tim. 80 D) as well as ταυμενώμεν unmistakably points the allusion to Light. See also on ὄφας μὲν κτλ. and τοῦτο τοῖς κτλ. in 508 D.

509 b—509 a So much for our similitude. The interpretation is as follows. The offspring and image of the Good is the Sun, whose relation to Sight and its objects is the same as that of the Good to Thought (vōs) and the objects of Thought. The analogue of Light is Truth; as we cannot see without Light, so, where Truth is absent, we cannot know. The idea of the Good is the source of Truth and Knowledge, although itself apprehended by Knowledge. As Light and Sight resemble the Sun, so Truth and Knowledge resemble the Good, but the Good is not identical with either, for it transcends both.

14 φάναι. Cf. 473 A n.
508 C 15 6 τί περ—ὁρμενα explains ἀνάλογον ἐντύρω, which should be understood in its strict sense of proportionate or 'geometrical equality': see Gorg. 508 A ἡ λασθής ἡ γεωμετρικὴ καὶ ἐν θεοῖ καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώπως μέγα δύναται.
16 τοῦτο after τοῦτο is needed to balance αὐτὸ (cf. 511 B): in construction, it depends, like ὁ, on ἐγένεσας (Schneider). τοῦτο itself, like ἀνάλογον ἐντύρω, is predicative ('ut hoc esset').
Stallbaum erroneously supplies φανερὰ μὲ λέγειν to govern τοῦτο.
19 ὅν ἄν—ἐπέχει, ἐπέχει 'occiput' as in the Homeric ἐπά τοῦ ἐπέσχε πελεθρα and the like. With ἐπί of light cf. Minn. 2. 8 ἐπὶ ἵππο κλίνεται ἡ ἄλος. The Greek will not admit of D. and V.'s translation 'upon which the light of day is shedding colour'; and Plato moreover, both here and in Tim. 67 c, looks on Colour as something inherent in the Object, not imparted by Light, although Light is of course necessary in order to see it. Cf. 507 D n.

φῶς—φέγγον: 'lux—luminæ.' The words are constantly interchanged, but, when contrasted with φέγγον, φῶς denotes a natural or primary, φέγγον an artificial or derivative light. See Neil on Ar. Knights 1310. Plato knew that the Moon's light is borrowed from the Sun (X 616 E).

22 ὅν ὁ ἔλασσ οὐ κτλ. 'The Sun,' is here said loosely for the 'Sunlight' or 'light of Day' (τὸ ἀμερῶν φῶς above); for, as appears from 508 E, 508 A, it is not the Sun, but Light, which is to be equated with Truth and Being (ὅπερ καταλάμπει ἄλθεια καὶ τὸ ὄν in D). See also on τοῦτο τοὺς κτλ. in 508 D. In stead of καταλάμπει, καταλάμπησι is read by a majority of editors, with several MSS, including Ξ: but δό for δό ὁ is, to say the least, extremely rare in prose, and the corruption καταλάμπησι was easy after ἄνα καταλάμπει was, if I mistake not, originally the reading of Λ (see c. n.), and is at least as well supported by the other MSS as καταλάμπησι. J. and C., reading καταλαμπῆς, strangely observe that ἂν would be felt as superfluous after ἄταν.

509 D 23 ἐνοῦσα φαίνετα: sc. καθαρὰ ὄψις, supplied from καθαρὰς ὀψιν above. '≪δύσ≫ ἐνοῦσα ≪σαφής≫ lubens suppleverim' says Herwerden, and ὄψις is found in a few MSS, including g. But the feminine inflexion prevents the possibility of mistake: cf. 503 E n. The initial syllable of ἐνοῦσα should be emphasized to point the contrast with οὐκ ἐνοῦσα, where οὐκ is also emphatic.
24 ὅταν μὲν κτλ. ἄπειρησθηκε is 'is stayed upon' (cf. IX 581 A), not 'has fastened upon' (D. and V.), which suggests an altogether different and much less appropriate idea. Cf. Phaed. 79 D ἐπέποντα τοῦ πλάνου, Plot. xx. 4 Kirchhoff πάσας ὅτι τις περὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς τὸν πλάνην ἐνείρυθει τῷ νοῆτος, and Dante Parad. 4. 124, 125 'o veggio ben che giacquai non si sazi degli intelletto, se l'her non lo illustra. The soul can find no rest except in that 'whereon Truth and Being shine': elsewhere she is tossed to and fro with every wind of doctrine (ἅν—μεταβαλλω). For ἄν καὶ κατὰ see Heindorf on Gorg. 495 A).
Instead of οὗ, van Heusde proposes δ, but οὗ is proved correct by ὥ above. With ἐνθύσεν τε καὶ ἐγὼ cf. 490 B η. Here, as there, the aorist
denote instantaneous action. The faculty of νοῦς is suddenly actualized into νόησις by being turned upon its proper object. Then and not till then does the Soul 'appear to have reason,' for Reason has hitherto lain dormant within. Cf. (with Biehl l.c. p. 51) Tim. 37 c, Parm. 136 E and vii 518 c—519 A. See also on τότῳ τοινυν κτλ. below, and 508 E n. 26 
κεκραμένον. The suggestion κεκραμένον forgets that τὸ γλυφόμενον is not total darkness but only twilight. It is ἀμφοτέρων μετέχειν, τὸν εἶναι τέλα καὶ μὴ εἶναι (V 478 c: cf. also 479 c)—a halfway house between absolute Not-Being and absolute Being.

27 δοξάζει is explained by v 476 D ff.
20 
τότῳ τοινυν κτλ. The following equations are involved:

τότῳ ὁράτος = τόπου νοστός.
(1) Sun = Idea of Good.
(2) Light = Truth.
(3) Objects of Sight = Objects of Knowledge (Ideas).
(4) Seeing Subject = Knowing Subject.
(5) Organ of Sight = Organ of Knowledge (νοῦς).
(6) Faculty of Sight (οφθαλμός) = Faculty of Reason (νοῦς).
(7) Exercise of Sight (οφθαλμία) = Exercise of Reason (νοῦς i.e. νόησις, γνώσεις, ἑπιστήμη).
(8) Ability to see = Ability to know.

With regard to (2), Light has been variously interpreted as symbolizing the Idea of Good (Plotinus, as appears from xxiii 4), Reason (Steinhart, Einleitung, pp. 212 ff.), and the Ideas (Susemihl Gen. En. 11 pp. 195 ff.). But the chiasmus in 508 E, 509 A (ἐπιστήμην—δοξα) clearly establishes equation (2) as well as (6), and the entire simile is plunged in confusion if Light is equated with anything except Truth. Cf. Stumpf l.c. p. 60 n. and Biehl l.c. pp. 50—53.

Plato means that as Light, coming from the Sun, enables colours to be seen, and the faculty of Sight to see, so Truth (or rather Trueness, as Bosanquet remarks), coming from the Good, enables the Idea to be known, and the faculty of νοῦς to know. It should be carefully noted that Truth (or its source, the Idea of Good) is not yet regarded as creating, but only as actualizing the faculty of Reason. The conception of the Good as the ultimate cause of all Existence follows later (509 B ff.): here it is represented only as the cause of Knowledge. See also on 490 B, 508 D (ὅταν μὲν κτλ.). If we would grasp the full significance of Plato's comparison, we must not be content with the merely philosophical interpretation of Light, but remember also the many poetical and religious associations which attached themselves to such words as φῶς and φηγήγος, especially in the Mysteries: see Neil on Ar. Knights 1319, Mommsen Fest d. Stadt Athen pp. 229 f., 255 f. and Hatch on The influence of the Mysteries upon Christian usages in his Hibbert Lectures pp. 283—309. The prominent position occupied by Light in the half-religious, half-philosophical teaching of Plotinus (see Zeller ii 2 pp. 408 f., 500 n. 2, 516 al.) may to a large extent be attributed to the elaboration and expansion of the mystical elements involved in Plato's simile, the whole of which, together with the similes of the Line and the Cave, is of the greatest importance for the history of Neoplatonism. Cf. also 508 A, B nn.

508 E 30 
τήν δύναμιν sc. τοῦ γλυφόμενον τῇ δύναμιν ἀποδιδόν τὴν τοῦ ἁγαθοῦ ἱδέαν φάθι.
exposition suffers somewhat from the want of a strict philosophical nomenclature. Aristotle would have used the same meaning by saying that ὅψις and νοῦς are two δύναμεις, which ἐνεργοῦσι through Light and Truth respectively, becoming in the one case δρᾶσις, in the other νόησις. Plato's τὴν δύναμιν, in fact, is nearly equivalent to Aristotle's τὴν ἐνέργειαν. Cf. Biehl l.c. pp. 50—53.

31. αἰτίαι κτλ. 'And being the cause of Knowledge and Truth, I would have you conceive of it as apprehended, no doubt, by Knowledge, but beautiful as is the act of Knowledge, and beautiful though Truth be, you will be right in thinking that it is something other and even more beautiful than these.' The words αἰτίαι—ἀληθείας sum up and carry on τὸ—ἀποδίδον. ὡς γνωσκόμενης is in predicative agreement with αἰτίαι after ἀποδίδον (cf. Pol. 258 C πᾶσας τὰς ἐπιστῆμας ὡς ὄσις δῶ ἐδώ διανοηθήμενα; the words are the counterpart of ὃ ἡλιος—ἀφαντίζειται ὑπ’ αὐτῆς τοῦτος (sc. τῆς δύναμεως) in the simile 508 B, μὲν αὖτις παροἰκεῖσθαι τοιοούσας δὲ ἀποθέου; though apprehended by Knowledge, and therefore in some sense subject thereto, the Idea of Good is (as being the cause of both) more beautiful than Knowledge and Truth. I have (with van Heusde) altered γνωστικομένης of the best MSS—

see cr. n.—to γνωσικομένην. On other interpretations of this difficult passage see App. IX.

509 A 5 τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἔξων: i. q. τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὡς ἔχει (F. and C.).
6 οὐ γὰρ διῆτο κτλ. is said in view of the question in 506 B. There is certainly no allusion to the Philebus: see 505 C n.

509 A—C In the second place the Sun also provides the objects of sight with generation (γένεσιν), increase, and nutriment, although generation is not identical with the Sun. In like manner, the objects of Knowledge receive their Being and Existence from the Good, which is itself distinct from and higher than Existence.

509 B ff. 8 τὸν ἡλίον κτλ. The Good has been shewn to be the cause of Knowledge: Socrates now proceeds to show that it is also the cause of Being. In the philosophy of Plato, Knowledge is the epistemological counterpart of Being, Being the ontological counterpart of Knowledge: see V 476 E ff. nn. The final unity in which both Knowledge and Being meet is the Idea of the Good, which is therefore the supreme and ultimate cause of the Universe. See also on οὐκ ὁὐσιας κτλ. below and the Appendix to Book VII On Plato's Dialectic.
10 οὐ γένομεν αὐτοῦ ὄντα. See on οὐκ ὁὐσιας ὄντος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ below.
μόνον τὸ γεγονόσκεψαί φάναι ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ παρεῖναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ
tὸ εἶναι τε καὶ τὴν οὔσιαν ὑπὲρ ἐκείνου αὐτοῖς προσεῖναι, οὐκ οὔσιας
ὀντος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἀλλὰ ἐπὶ ἑπέκεινα τῆς οὔσιας προσβεία καὶ
dυνάμει ὑπερέχουσαι.

XX. 1 Καὶ ὁ Γλαῦκων μᾶλα γελοῖος, Ἀπολλωνί, ἔφη, δαιμονίας C
ὑπερβολῆς. Ὅτῳ γὰρ, ἣν δ' ἔγω, αἰτίος, ἀναγκάζων τὰ ἑμοὶ δοκοῦντα
περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγειν. Καὶ μηδαμῶς γ', ἔφη, παύσῃ, εἰ μὴ τι, ἀλλὰ

18. ἀλλὰ Εὐ: ἀλλὰ Α.

12 φάναι. V 473 A n.
Met. A 8. 988a 10 τὸ γὰρ ἐδή τοῦ τί ἐστιν
αἰτία τοῖς ἄλλοις, τοῖς δ' εἶδε τὸ ἔν. Plato
identified τάγαθων καὶ τὸ ἔν: see the
anecdote in Aristox. Harm. § 30 Mar-
quard.

13 οὐκ οὔσιας κτλ. has occasioned a
vast amount of discussion. Krohn boldly
declares that 'Die Idee τοῦ ἄγαθοῦ ist
keine Idee, denn sie hat keine οὐσία,
sondern es ist eine Macht, die mit un-
serer Denkweise nur als die Gottheit
begriffen werden kann' (ZPl. St. p. 146).
Fouillé La Philosophie de Platon 11 p.
109 draws an over-subtle distinction be-
tween εἰναι καὶ οὔσια, holding that
although the Good is not οὐσία, it never-
thless is ὄν (cf. vii 518 C). Others have
suspected the text, O. Schneider, for
example, proposing οὔ <μόνον> οὐσίας
ἀγαθοῦ p. 16). That is the text right,
the balance with οὕτως—οὕτος con-
clusively shews. The Sun, said Socrates,
is the cause of γένεσις, though not himself
γένεσις. Just so the Good is the cause of
οὐσία, though not itself οὐσία, (but to use
a Neoplatonic expression) ὑπερβολῆς.
Plato's meaning is as follows. The Sun
is not γένεσις in the sense in which the
objects which he produces are γεγονόμενα.
Yet in a certain sense he too is γένεσις,
for he is ὁράσθη: see vii 520 C ff. and
Tim. 25 B. (Bosanquet cannot be right in
denying that Plato regards the Sun as a
γεγονόμενον). As the cause of γένεσις, we
may, in fact, regard the Sun as the only
true γένεσις, for all γεγονόμενα are derived
from him. Similarly the Good is not
οὐσία in the sense in which the Ideas are
ὀντα; but in a higher sense it is the
only true οὐσία, for all οὐσίαι are only
specific determinations of the Good. The
ὑπερβολής της του Γεότος is merely
Plato's way of saying that the first Prin-
ciple of all existence must itself be un-
derived. See on ἄρχων ἀνυπόθετων 510 B
and cf. Beihl l.c. p. 62 and Fouillé l.c.
in pp. 105—111, where the matter is very
clearly explained. The doctrine of the
ὑπερβολής of the Highest afterwards
became a cardinal point with the Neo-
platonists: see Plotinus ap. RP. p. 528,
and for other references Hermann Vind.
disp. de id. boni pp. 40 n. 84, 41 n. 87,
Zeller 1112. 2. pp. 490 ff. Fouillé La Philo-
sophie de Platon III pp. 289, 291 n.,
and Shorey Chicago Studies in Cl. Phil. I p.
188 n. 1. It is highly characteristic of
Plato's whole attitude that he finds the
true keystone of the Universe—the ulti-
mate fountain from which both Know-
ledge and Existence flow—in no cold
and colourless ontological abstraction,
like Being, but in that for which πάντα
ἦ κτίσις αυτοπάρει καὶ συνοδείει (Republic
8. 22)—viz. τὸ ἀγαθόν. Cf. Phaed. 97
C ff. and see also on 508 D. The concep-
tion is poetical and religious no less than
philosophical, and may be compared with
Dante's 'L' Amor che muove il Sole e l'
altra Stella' and Tennyson's 'For so the
whole round earth is every way Bound
by gold chains about the feet of God,' as
well as with Aristotle's πρῶτον καὶ
ἀληθέντων Met. A 7 et al.

509 C 16 καὶ ὁ Γλαῦκων κτλ.
"Glaucus exclaimed, very comically, 'Save
us all, what an amazing transcendence!'"
It is Glaucus's προθυμία which is γελοῖον:
see 506 D. ὑπερβολῆς is not 'exaggera-
tion' (Jowett), but refers to ὑπερέχουσαι:
cf. ἀπήχανον κάλλος λέγει 509 λ. A
ὑπερβολῆς which transcends existence may
well be called δαιμονία ('supernatural,'
miraculous').

18 εἰ μὴ τι, ἀλλὰ κτλ. Stephanus
proposed ἀλλὰ for ἀλλὰ (as in 501 C), but
cf. Men. 86 εἰ εἰ μὴ τι οὖν, ἀλλὰ συμφρά-
γε μοι τὴν ἄρχητον ἡθάναιν.
request, now proceeds to expound the similitude more fully. Let us take a line, and divide it into two unequal parts, to represent the objects of Sight and the objects of Thought respectively. If we further subdivide each part in the ratio of the original sections, we shall have four segments, representing, in order of clearness, (1) Images and the like, (2) so-called real things, (3) the objects of that intellectual method which descends from assumptions to a conclusion, using sensible objects as images or illustrations, (4) the objects of that intellectual method, which descends from assumptions to an unassumed first principle, without making use of any sensible illustrations whatsoever, and thereafter descends to a conclusion. The third section represents the objects investigated by the so-called "Arts" or mathematical sciences; the fourth is the sphere of Dialectic. The corresponding mental states are called by Socrates εκ.hexas, πισε, θουσία, and ζήσεις. Each of these is clear or sure exactly in proportion as its objects are true.

509 D ff. The simile of the Line contains perhaps more Platonic teaching than any passage of equal length in Plato's writings, and is of primary and fundamental importance for the interpretation of his philosophy. I have discussed the various difficulties as they occur, partly in the notes and partly in the Appendices to this Book. For a consecutive exposition of the whole simile in its connexion with the simile of the Cave see App. I to Book VII.


24 ἣν μὴ οὐρανός κτλ. "I do not say 'of heaven,' lest you should imagine that I am etymologising on the name." The Sun might well be called βασιλεύς οὐρανός. Socrates pretends to avoid the word οὐρανός, lest by equating it with ὀρατόν (for the contrast with νοητόν would suggest that οὐρανός = ὀρατόν) he should be accused of deriving οὐρανός from ὀρασί, as certain clever people did in Plato's time (Crat. 396 B). The same derivation is given by Philo Jud. de mund. p. 10. For σφιξιδαι in this sense cf. σφίξα in Crat. 396 c, d. E. S. Thompson (Proceedings of the Camb. Phil. Soc. 1888 p. 14) takes σφιξιδαι simply as 'pun' and thinks that the pun is between σφίξα (suggested in νοητόν above) and οὐρανός, quoting ἀπ' οὐρανός πέτειων. But such a pun is both far-fetched and pointless, and in view of the passage from the Cratylius there should be no doubt that Plato more suo is merely scoffing at a well-known contemporary etymology. The reading οὐρανός—see cr. n.—would be fatal to Thompson's theory, but οὐρανός (which most MSS read) is more pointed and idiomatic, and perhaps right, though the accusative is not indefensible.

27 ἄνωσα. It appears from the Scholiast that even ancient critics debated whether ἄνωσα or ἵσα (εἰς ἵσα ν) should be read. Proclus (in Plat. remp. 1 p. 288 Kroll) and the author of the third Quast. Pl. in Plutarch (1001 c ff.) read ἄνωσα: ἵσα appears in a grammarian cited by Stallbaum from Villers' Ameud. Gr. 11 p. 199. The dispute still reigns, Stallbaum and some others
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\[ \text{Fig. i. The Line.} \]

\[ \text{Fig. ii. To illustrate the Cave.} \]

\text{ef. oòs.}

\text{gh. teixiov.}

\text{ab. Row of Prisoners.}

\text{cd. Wall on which the Shadows are thrown.}
5 σκευαστῶν ὅλων γένος. Τίθημι, ἐφη. Ἡ καί ἐθέλοις ἀν αὐτὸ
φάναι, ἦν δὲ ἑτῶ, διψήθην τι ἄλθεια τε καὶ μή, ὡς τὸ δοξαστῶν
πρὸς τὸ γνωστόν, οὔτω τὸ ὁμοιωθεὶ πρὸς τὸ ὦ ὁμοιότη; Ἐγὼγ',
ἐφη, καὶ μάλα. Σκόπεσε δὲ αὐτ καὶ τὴν τοῦ νυκτοῦ τομήν ἥ τημτέων. Β
Πῆ; Ἡ τὸ μέν αὐτοῦ τοῖς τότε μυμθείσιν ὡς εἰκόσιν χρωμένη
ψυχῆς ἣν δικαίωται εἶ ὑποθέσεων ὥστε ἐπ' ἀρχὴν πορευομένην,
ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τελευτήν, τὸ δ' αὐτ ἑτερον ἐπ' ἀρχὴν ἀνυπόθετον εἶ ὑπόθε-

II. ἑτερον Λστ; ἑτερον τὸ codd.

5 αὐτό: viz. τὸ ὁρμομεν, with reference
to εν μέν τι ορμομεν above.
6 ὡς τὸ δοξαστῶν κτλ. i.e.
AD : DC :: AC : CB.
Hitherto AC has not been called δοξα-
στῶν, only ὅρατων. The new terminology
appears again in 511 D (δύση) and VII
534 A; see also on VII 516 D, 523 C.
δοξαστῶν is of course a wider term than
ὁρατῶν, for it includes the entire domain of
τὰ πολλά, by whatever sense or faculty
acquired (v. 479 D ff.). δύση is, in
fact, the intellectual state of the ordinary
uneducated man. This further specification
of AC is of no small importance for the
understanding of the similes of the Line
and Cave: see VII 514 A, 517 A nns.
and App. I to Book VII.

510 B 9 ἣ κτλ. With ἣ cf. Theaet.
172 D. τὸ μέν is CE.

toίς τότε μυμθεῖσιν: i.e. the
objects represented by CD, which were
'imitated' or copied in AD. They were
originals then, but are only images now:
this is the force of the collocation μυ-
μθείσιν—εἰκόνα. Cf. 510 E α ἀπάττοντι 
καὶ γράφοντι, ὅταν καὶ σχοιν συν ἐκ
εὐαίσθητον οἷον, τούτοις μέν ὡς εἰκόναν ἀν
χρώμουν, 511 A εἴκοσὶ δὲ χρωμάτων αὐτοῖς
τοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν κάτω ἀπεκαθενεῖ, καὶ ἐν
the meaning of μυμθείσιν X 599 A τὸ τε
μυμθείσιμον καὶ τὸ εἴδωλον καὶ Λαύς
668 B. I have restored the reading of
A, μυμθείσιν, with which Proclus (in
Plat. temp. I p. 291 Kroll) also agrees.
tυμβοθέων, which appears to be adopted
by all other editors, occurs in all the
available mss except A. But τοῖς τότε
tυμβοθέων would include AD as well as
DC, and the illustrations employed in
the inferior νοτών are drawn solely from
DC, as is proved by 510 E (cited above),
as well as by the actual facts of the case.
The sole objection to μυμθείσιν is that the
word is generally used only of "artificiosa
imitatio" (Schneider); yet in Pol. 203 B,
297 C. Phil. 40 C and Arist. Hist. An. II
8, 502 B 9 the 'imitatio' can hardly be
called 'artificiosa.' 511 A seems to me
sufficient by itself to prove that A is right.
Schneider (Ad. p. 51) refers to a dis-
sertation by Mommsen published in 1843
as taking the view here advocated.

10 εἰς υποθέσεων. υπόθεσις is correctly
defined in the Platonic δρός (415 B) as ἀρχή
ἀναπάθετος, a starting-point which is
not demonstrated, but taken for granted,
assumed, postulated. The mathematician,
for example, ὑποτίθεται the odd, the even,
etc., i.e. assumes that his definition of
odd, even, etc. is correct, and draws
conclusions from his υπόθεσίς of the odd,
the even, etc. by means of exclusively
deductive reasoning: cf. H. Sidgwick in
J. Ph. II p. 100. If we attack his
ὑπόθεσις, as Lucian for example does
(Hermot. 74, quoted by Stallbaum), he
must, quod arithmetician, throw up the
sponge, for the υπόθεσις of the inferior
νοτών can be demonstrated (or over-
thrown) only by Dialectic. Cf. generally
Men. 86 E ff. Schneider may be right
in supposing that Aristotle had the
present passage in view when he wrote
ἐν γάρ καὶ Πλάτων ἑτέρω τούτῳ καὶ
ἐξήνει, τότερον ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἡ ἐπί
tάς ἀρχὰς ἐστιν ἡ δοῦσ, ὡστε ἐν τῷ
υπόθεσι ἀπὸ τῶν ἀναπάθετων ἐπὶ τὸ πέρας
ἢ ἀνάπαλν (Eth. Nic. I 2. 1095 b 32),
though it is perhaps better (with Zeller
II 1, p. 587 n. 2) to suppose that he
is alluding to Plato's oral instruction.

II ἡ το 8' αὐτ ἑτερον κτλ. ἡ το 8' ἑτερον is
Ε.Β. The article after ἑτερον (see cr. n.)
stands self-condemned, although its
intrusion is difficult to explain. δ', which
Schneider proposes, is also difficult,
though in harmony with Cicinus (alterum
vero, quod exegi et animus), for the verb
of the relative clause can hardly be omit-
σεως ιούσα και ἂνευ ἄντερ ἐκεῖνο εἰκόνων αὐτῶις εἰδεσι δι' αὐτῶν τὴν μέθοδον ποιουμένην. Ταῦτ', ἔφη, ἄ λεγες, οὐχ ἰκανὸς ἔμαθον.

C 'Ἀλλα' ἀδῆς, ὡς δ' ἐγὼ· ῥὰν ςτ τοῦτων προειρημένων μαθήσει.

ted. ἄλφας, once proposed by Hermann, has nothing in its favour. ζητεί must be supplied to govern τὸ ἔτερον.

ἀρχὴν ἀνυποθέτουν. The only ἀρχὴ ἀνυποθέτου is the Idea of the Good: cf. VII 532 A ff. Towards this the Dialectician travels, starting from ὑποθέσεις. He may begin, for example, by 'assuming' the 'just.' In such a case he assumes that his definition of 'just' is correct, i.e. corresponds exactly to the Idea of 'Just.' But whereas the arithmetician treats his ὑποθέσεις as an ultimate truth, and proceeds deductively to a conclusion, making use of sensible images by way of illustration, the dialectician treats his hypothesis as purely provisional, testing, revising, rejecting (VII 533 C n.), and reconstructing, and gradually ascending step by step to the first principle of all (τὸν τόου παντὸς ἀρχήν), without employing any sensible objects to illustrate his reasoning. The one gives no account of his ὑποθέσεις (ὑπόθετα λόγων—φανερῶν in C below); the other not only does, but must do so, just because he is a dialectician: cf. VII 533 C ff.

He connects his ὑποθέσεις with others, subsuming them under higher and yet higher—better and truer—ὑποθέσεις, until at last he has traversed the whole region of νοητά. Such of his ὑποθέσεις as survive will be improved at each stage in the ascent, and finally, as soon as the Idea of Good is reached, all his surviving ὑποθέσεις will actually have become perfect counterparts of the Ideas which they have hitherto been only assumed to represent. In the meantime the ἀρχή τοῦ παντός, which Plato himself described dogmatically δι' εἰκόνας in 507 Α—509 C, will have ceased to be a mere ὑποθέσις: it will have become, in the fullest sense of the term, an ἀρχὴ ἀνυποθέτως: for the highest rung of the ladder is not reached until the entire domain of the knowable has been exhausted, and shewn to be the expression of the Idea of Good. Plato's ideal—it is no more—is a comprehensive and purely intellectual view of the totality of νοητά, in which every department is seen in its connexion with every other, and all in their dependence on the Good, which is in itself ἀνυπο-

θέτως and ὑπερθέτως—ἀνυποθέτως because higher than all ὑποθέσεις and itself proved by an exhaustive scrutiny of all νοητά, ὑπερθέτουs because higher than, and the cause of, all existence. See also on 511 B and the Appendix to Book VII Of Plato's Dialectic, together with Jackson J. of Ph. X pp. 145 f., where the distinctive peculiarities of the two methods are very clearly explained.

12 ἄντερ ἐκεῖνο εἰκόνων: i. q. ἄνευ τῶν αὐτέρκειν ἐκείνων (ζητεί) εἰκόνων. I formerly read τῶν περὶ ἐκεῖνο εἰκόνων (with γ), but now think (with Schneider and others) that Α is right. The attraction of a relative in the dative case is rare, but not unexampled. Van Cleef (de attract. in enunt. rel. usu Plat. p. 45) cites Gorg. 509 Α, Prot. 361 Ε, These. 144 Α, Rep. VII 531 Ε (all examples of ἐντυγχάνω, whose proper construction in the sense of 'fall in with' is the dative, not the genitive), and Ep. VII 327 Α (with προσέτηκεν); for examples in other authors see Kühn Gr. Gr. II p. 914. If ἄνευ and εἰκόνως are pronounced with emphasis, the meaning, I think, is easily caught. Stallbaum reads ὥν περὶ κτλ. with one Vienna ms, understanding, I suppose, χρήται.

αὐτός—δι' αὐτῶν. αὐτὰς (ἱςι=} soles) is further accentuated by δι' αὐτῶν ('through themselves alone'): cf. 511 C. The εἴδος of the dialectician do not employ the adventitious aid of εἰκόνας: see on 511 Β. The use of εἴδος here must not be held to imply that even the dialectician's conceptions of the Ideas are correct before he has reached the Idea of the Good. Till then, they are only ὑποθέσεις, though the false ὑποθέσεις are weeded out (VII 533 C n.), and the hypothetical character of the survivors is gradually eliminated in the course of the ascent. See on ἀρχὴν ἀνυποθέτου above, and contrast 511 C.

14 ἀλλ' ἀδῆς κτλ. 'Then have it over again, said I.' The ellipse has a colloquial effect. Ast's εἴδος for ἀδῆς is unlikely: nor does Cobet's <ἐρω> after ἐγὼ sound right. If Plato had written ἐρω, he would, I think, have placed it after ἀδῆς. μάθητα, or the like, supplied from ἔμαθον, suits the con-
15 οἴμαι γάρ σε εἰδέναι, ὅτι οἱ περὶ τὰς γεωμετρίας τε καὶ λογισμοὺς καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πραγματευόμενοι, ὑποθέμενοι τὸ τε περιττὸν καὶ τὸ ἀρτίον καὶ τὰ σχῆματα καὶ γωνίων τριττὰ εἶδῃ καὶ ἄλλα τούτων ἀδελφὰ καθ’ ἐκάστην μέθοδον, ταῦτα μὲν ὡς εἰδότες, ποιημένοι ὑποθέσεις αὐτὰ, οὐδένα λόγον οὔτε αὐτοῖς οὔτε ἄλλοις ἐτί ἄξιοναι 20 περὶ αὐτῶν διδόμαι ὡς παντὶ φανερῶν, ἐκ τούτων δ’ ἀρχόμενοι τὰ Δ λοιπα ἐκεῖνα διέξοιτε τελευτῶσιν ὁμολογούμενοι ἐπί τούτῳ, οὐ δὲν ἐπὶ σκέψιν ὀρμήσοσι. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἐφη, τοῦτό γε οἶδα. Οὐκινὸς καὶ ὃτι τοῖς ὀρμομένοις εἰδεῖσι προσχρόνται καὶ τοὺς λόγους περὶ αὐτῶν ποιοῦνται, οὐ περὶ τούτων διανοοῦμενοι, ἄλλ’ ἐκεῖνον 25 πέρι, οἷς ταῦτα ἑοικε, τοῦ τετραγώνου αὐτοῦ ἑνέκα τοὺς λόγους
text (μὴν γὰρ—μαθήσει) best. Similarly in D below, ὁδῷ is understood under Glauce's reply. Cf. also ἀλλ' ὡδε in I 532 E.

510 c 15 οἱ περὶ κτλ. In CE, as will afterwards appear, are included five sciences, which form the προοιμίαν (VII 531 D) or προσπαθεία (ib. 536 D) to Dialectic, represented by ΕΒ. They are the Science of Number, Plane Geometry, Stereometry, Astronomy, and Harmonics: VII 522 c—531 c. In each of these the method, according to Plato, is the same. Certain ὑποθέσεις are taken for granted, and inferences drawn from them by purely deductive reasoning, aided by the use of similar likenesses or illustrations. See also App. I to Book VII.

18 ὡς εἰδότες. They have no knowledge of their ὑποθέσεις, otherwise they would be able to give an account of them: see VII 533 c and 531 E μὴ δύνατον τινες ὄντες δοῦναι τα καὶ ἀποδείξασιν λόγων εἴσησαι ποτέ τι ὑπ' φαινέν δειν εἰδεῖαι; ὅδ' αὖ, ἐφο, τοῦτο γε.

510 D 21 ὁμολογομένων="folgerchterweise" (Cohen Pl. Ideenl. us. d. Math. p. 29) refers to the agreement between premises, intermediate steps, and conclusion: cf. VII 533 C, where ὁδολογία is used in the same way. "With perfect unimarity" (D. and V.) is incorrect and pointless.

23 τοῖς ὀρμομένοις εἰδεὶσι κτλ. They use the 'visible kinds,' i.e. visible squares, visible diagonals, etc., but they are thinking about mathematical squares and diagonals etc. Cf. generally Leit. 290 B οἱ δ’ αὖ γεωμέτραι καὶ οἱ ἀστρονίμοι καὶ οἱ λογιστικοί θηρευτικοὶ γάρ εἰσι καὶ ὀστοῦνο γὰρ ποιοῦσι τὰ διαγράμματα ἑκαστοι toútwv allá tâ thta aneuplaskonov, and VII 527 L.

25 ἑοικε. Visible σχῆματα are imperfect copies of 'mathematical' σχῆμαta: cf. VII 526 A and App. I to Book VII. τοῦ τετραγώνου αὐτοῦ κτλ.: 'for that with a view to which they are discoursing is the square itself and a diagonal itself, not this which they draw' etc. αὖθι (by itself, i.e. apart from its embodiment in perceivable squares) is ambiguous, and might (so far as language is concerned) refer either to the Idea of Square (cf. 476 A ff.) or to the Mathematical Square (cf. VII 525 D, E nn.), which—see App. I to Book VII—Plato holds to be distinct from the Idea. But the ambiguity is resolved as soon as we are shown (in 511 C ff.) how to interpret διανοούμενοι and διανοεῖ (511 A), and we then see that Plato is here speaking of the mathematical square. The singular τοῦ τετραγώνου is generic (cf. ὁ σοφιστής for the whole class of Sophists), for there are many 'mathematical' squares, diagonals etc. (VII 526 A π). and App. I to Book VIII). It is conceivably for this reason that Plato drops the article with διαμέτρου ('a diagonal itself'), thereby also getting a more precise antithesis to ἄλλ’ αὖ τῶντις, or else (if this suggestion is hypercritical) διαμέτρου is also generic. Sidgwick is, I think, mistaken when he says (J. Ph. 11 p. 103) that the language of this passage "in no way supports the interpretation 'of intermediates (Aristotle's τὰ μεταξὺ) between particulars and Ideas'; for διανοούμενο involves διάνοια, and since διάνοια is intermediate between νοῦς and δῆξα (511 D), we may reasonably suppose that its objects are likewise intermediate
XXI. To the toonv nootn men to eidos elegov, yutodhtes o' evangka'zomenvn ywikhv chrôsai peri thn zhtsion autv, oiv ev' arkhv ioudvav, oiv ou dynamenvn twv yuto'edewn anotérov ekbaivnev, eikvsi de chrômenvn autois tois upo tov káto òpeikavseisin kai 5 ek eigvnois prós ekavna wv énargveta deðoxamvneis te kai tetmêmenois.

6. tetmêmenov Æür: tetmêmenovs Ævg.

between the higher noptá and doçastá. See App. I to Book viii.

27 pláptoußn: with reference to models of geometrical figures, orerrises etc., all of which belong to CD, and may themselves have shadows and likenesses in AD.

28 áv ekvsvn av chrômenv. See 510 n b. The anacoluthon in autá mév taíttá—taíttov mév chrômenv is illustrated by Engelhardt Anvct. Pl. Spec. III p. 8; cf. also vii 520 D.

29 ðtoûntes te. Instead of te, I formerly read de (on slight as authority), with Ast and Stallbaum; but the corruption of de to te is exceedingly improbable here. The antithetical force of the clause ðtoûntes—idev is weakened by the occurrence of the words áv ekvsvn av in the mév clause. If the objects in question are used as images, the further statement that the real object of investigation is their originals (autá ekavna) loses its antithetical force, and becomes a sort of adjunct. Hence te following ðtoûntes is more appropriate than autá de ekavna ðtoûntes idev, which would be the natural way of expressing an antithesis. Cf. Latus 927 B deðv mév ákovouâ bë pé svat te deðv (where the order is the same as here), Phaedr. 266 c and other examples cited by Hoef er de part. Pl. pp. 17 f.

511 A 1 tì ðianvov. See on tov tetragwnov autév 510 D.

2 elegov. 510 B.

3 anagkaxomvénv. For the participle we might expect anagkaxvsvs. But anagkaxomvénv gives a better balance with noptov, and the meaning is 'Accordingly I described this class as intelligible indeed, but the soul as compelled' etc.

4 tov wv yuto'edewn—ekbainvov: 'to step out of and above assumptions,' viz. by reaching the arkhv anuvvôhov: cf. 510 B m.

5 autov tois kl. autov is 'the actual things,' the originals, as in autá mév taíttá 510 B: 'employing as images the originals from which images were made' (lit. 'the imaged-from' 'abgebildet' Schneider) 'by the objects below,' i.e. employing as images the originals in CD, which were copied by the shadows etc. in AD. For òpeikavseis in this sense cf. òpeikavseis in Tim. 48 c and (with J. and C.) eikvstivs in Phaedr. 250 B.

Another views of this passage are discussed in App. X.

kal ekavna kl.: 'those also, in comparison with those remoter objects, being esteemed and honoured as palpable and clear.' kal is 'also' and not 'and,' as some have supposed. ekavna is DC, and ekavna AD. Plato uses the pronouns ekavna to indicate that the objects in CD are less near to the mind of the mathematician than those in CE, which are the immediate object of his study (cf. Sidgwick in 7. Pl. ii p. 98). He could not, even if he had wished to, have written kal autov (et ipsis) without sacrificing autov just before. ekavna is said because AD is remoter still. See also App. X.

6 deðoxamvneis means, I believe, 'esteemed,' 'valued,' as in Polyb. vi 53.

9 tov wv ev' árëtov deðoxamvneinwv árðov: cf. the regular use of deðoxmév for 'glorify' in the N. T. No other certain instance of this usage appears to occur in Plato, or even in classical Greek: at all events neither Thuc. 111 45. 6 nor Dionys.
Mantwino, ἐφη, ὅτι τὸ ὑπὸ ταῖς γεωμετριαῖς τε καὶ ταῖς ταύτης ἀδελφαῖς τέχναις λέγεις. Το τοῖνν ἔτερον μάνθανε τμῆμα τοῦ νοητοῦ λέγοντα με τούτο, οὐ αὐτός ὁ λόγος ἀπεται τῇ τοῦ διαλειογεσθαί δυνάμει, τὰς ὑποθέσεις ποιούμενος οὐκ ἄρχας, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι ὑποθέσεις, οἷον ἑπιβάσεις τε καὶ ὑμέραις, ἱνα μέχρι τοῦ ἀνυποθέτου ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ἄρχην ἰῶν, ἀφάμενος αὐτῆς, πᾶλιν ἄδ

Thesm. i. 24 Meineke, cited by L. and S., is a case in point. But the collocation with τετμημένος makes it probable that the usage, though rare, is Platonic; and every other interpretation of the word is beset with serious difficulties, as is shown in App. X.

τετμημένος. τετμημένος is read by Schneider, with several ms (see cf. n.), and understood as 'cut off' (abgeschnitten); but, as J. and C. observe, this does not suit δεδεμένος, and it is doubtful if the objects can be said to be 'cut,' although the line is: see on τετς τῆς μουθεσίων 510 b. 511 b 7 ταύτης in spite of γεωμετρίαι because Geometry is itself one art: cf. vii 533 c γεωμετρίας τε καὶ τὰς ταύτης ἑπομένας. The plural γεωμετρίαι does not mean the 'various branches of geometry' (as D. and V. suppose), but geometrical investigations: cf. λογισμοῦς for 'Arithmetic' in 510 c. 9 αὐτὸς ὁ λόγος κτλ.: 'the argument grasped by itself, through the power of dialectic.' λόγος is not the faculty of reason ('Vernunft' Schleiermacher), which is νοῦς, or even 'thought' ('Gedanke' Schneider), but rather the 'impersonal reason, or drift of the argument' (Bosanquet), the instrument by which νοῦς works (Krohn Pl. St. p. 140). ὁ λόγος is of course personified, as it constantly is in this sense.

10 δυνάμει should not be translated 'faculty,' but simply 'power' (cf. 508 π.): the argument, unaided by ἐλέει (αὐτός 'by itself,' cf. αὐτός ἑδέσι 510 b π. Grasps its object by the inherent power of dialectical argumentation (διαλεγομένων), and nothing else. In spite of Grimmelt (de rep. unit. etc. p. 52) it is certainly an error to identify ὁ λόγος with νοῦς. Why does Dialectic dispense with all sensible images or illustrations? Plato (it should be remembered) holds that the intrusion of any element of sense-perception, however small, impedes the exercise of thought: see Phaed. 79 c ff. The ὑποθέσεις of the dialectician may be and often are generalisations from αἰσθητά, but a generalisation, regarded in itself, is wholly νοητόν. These ὑποθέσεις it is the province of Dialectic to test in every possible way, to demolish where necessary (vii 533 c.n.), to correct by one another, to classify according to their mutual coherence and interdependence, until by an exhaustive scrutiny of all νοητά we grasp the unifying principle of all existence—the Idea of the Good. Cf. vii 517 c n. and see on τοῦ ἀνυποθέτου below and the Appendix to Book vii On Plato's Dialectic.

τῶν ὑποθέτων indicates that we are to take the word in its literal etymological signification, 'literally hypotheses or underpositions, stepping-stones as it were and starting-points.' For this use of τῶν ὑποθέτων kindred expressions see i 343 c, v 474 a.n. and W. G. Headlam, On editing Aeschylus pp. 138 ff. With ἑπιβάςεις cf. Smp. 211 c ὡσπερ ἐπαναβασμὸς χρώμενον.

11 τοῦ ἀνυποθέτου. See on ἀρχὴν ἀνυποθέτου 510 b. Plato makes no attempt in the Republic to classify Ideas in such an ascending scale as he here suggests, though it is probable from 509 a that Knowledge and Truth would rank near to the Good. Nor is there any dialogue in which an exhaustive classification is even attempted. Such hints as Plato gives us throughout his writings are enumerated in Stumpf das Verhältniss etc. pp. 50, 56, 76, and in Zeller 4 i. i, pp. 704—707: cf. also Fouillé La Philosophie de Platon ii pp. 99—104. We must suppose that each higher Idea will excel all the lower both in range and in excellence. These two characteristics are, from Plato's point of view, the same. The wider an Idea is in range and extension, the greater will be the sum of existences of which it is the cause. But the Idea of Good is the cause of all existence, so that each higher Idea will be better than all below it, because it contains more of
Good. Beyond this it is perhaps safer not to go. A systematic attempt to correlate all intelligibles among themselves and in their connexion with the Good would have been premature in Plato’s day, and is premature still. The permanent value of Plato’s conception lies in the ideal which it sets before every succeeding generation of investigators.

12 πάλιν αὐτῷ κτλ. The dialectician’s progress involves both an ascent and a descent—an ascent ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχήν, and a descent ἀπό τῆς ἀρχῆς ἐπὶ τὴν τελευτά (cf. Aristotle quoted on 510 b). By the time that he reaches the Idea of the Good, all his surviving ποθέσεις have become exact counterparts of the Ideas which are their objective correlates; the others have all of them been demolished (vii 533 c n.). The conclusions (τελευταί) of dialectic are therefore impregnable; நுேதிஃ போஷ்பாமா is a contradiction in terms (v 477 e n.). For more on this subject see the Appendix to Book vii On Plato’s Dialectic.

511 c 14 εἰδέσιν—εἰδήν. On αὐτοῦς δὲ αὐτῶν see 510 b n. εἰδέσιν may now be taken in its full force; for after the Idea of Good has been reached, the dialectician’s conception of each εἶδος is accurate and complete; see last note. I formerly read αὐτοῖς δὲ αὐτῶν, rejecting εἰς αὐτά as superfluous on account of καὶ τελευτά εἰς εἶδος. But αὐτοὺς is certainly wrong (cf. 510 b), and εἰς αὐτά, which may well be taken loosely with καταβάσις or a participle supplied from it, merely states that the conclusions of dialectic are likewise εἶδος: whereas καὶ τελευτά εἰς εἶδος seems to lay emphasis on the fact that dialectic never descends below εἶδος to particulars (‘und bei Begriffen endigt’ Schneider). We may translate ‘and with Ideas end.’ Plato means to emphasize the fact that the Dialectic ὁδι Dial-

lectician does not draw conclusions as to particulars; if he did, he could scarcely be said αἰσθητῷ παντάπασιν οὖνειν προσχρόμενος, ἀλλ’ εἰδέσιν αὐτοῖς δὲ αὐτῶν εἰς αὐτά, καὶ τελευτά εἰς εἰδή. Μανθινώ, ἔφη, ικανῶς 15 μὴν οὐ δοκεῖς γὰρ μοι συχνὸν ἔργον λέγειν: ὃτι μεῖνοι βούλει διώριζεν σαφέστερον εἶναι τὸ ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι ἐπιστήμης τοῦ ὄντος τε καὶ νοητοῦ θεοροῦμενον ἢ τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν τεχνῶν καλο-

μένων, αἰς αἱ υποθέσεις ἀρχαὶ καὶ διανοίᾳ μὲν ἰαναγκάζονται ἀλλὰ

16. οὐ Λ-Ξγ: οὖν Α'.
20 μη αἰσθήσεων αὕτα θεάσαι οἱ θεώμενοι, διὰ δὲ τὸ μὴ ἂρχην ἄνελθόντες σκοπεῖν, ἀλλ' ἐξ ὑποθέσεων, νοοῦν οὐκ ἱσχεῖν περὶ αὕτα δοκοῦσί σοι, καίτοι νοητῶν ὄντων μετὰ ἄρχης. διάνοιαν δὲ καλεῖν μοι δοκεῖς τὴν τῶν γεωμετρικῶν τε καὶ τὴν τῶν τοιούτων ἐξέων, ἀλλ' οὐ νοοῦ, ὡς μεταξὺ τὸ δόξης τε καὶ νοοῦ τὴν διάνοιαν οὐσαν. Ἰκανώ-
25 τατα, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, ἀπεδέξω. καὶ μοι ἐπὶ τοὺς τέταρτος τμῆμας τέταρτα ταῦτα παθήματα ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γεγονόμενα λαβέ, νοοσὶν μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ ἀνοσίατο, 1 διάνοιαι δὲ ἐπὶ τῷ δευτέρῳ, τῷ τρίτῳ δὲ πίστιν ἔποδος καὶ τῷ τελευταίῳ εἰκασίαν, καὶ τάξον αὐτὰ ἀνά λόγον,

145 A, B and see Tannery L'Éducation Platonicienne in Rev. Philos. x p. 523, the Appendix to Book vii On the præpædactic studies of the Republic and my article in Cl. Rev. xv p. 220, where I have tried to shew that the use of the word 'Arts' in 'Bachelor of Arts' etc. is an inheritance from the Platonic Academy.

καὶ—θεώμενοι. The relative sentence passes into a main clause, as in II 357 B, where see note.

αὕτα: viz. the subject-matter of the so-called 'Arts': cf. vii 518 B.

 millennia—ἄρχης: 'although they are intelligibles with a first principle.' The mathematician does not ascend to an ἄρχη, and therefore does not exercise—
for ἱσχεῖν in its original half-inchoative sense cf. IX 585 B and Kühner-Blass Gr. Gr. 1 2, p. 234 n.—νοοῖς on his subject, but nevertheless his subject is νοοῖν (as we have been told before 510 B, 511 A, C) and has an ἄρχην, viz. his ὑποθέσεις (αἰ 
and we see elsewhere in Plato for καίτερ with a participle (Hoefer de part. II. p. 28) but occurs in Simplices ap. Prot. 339 C, in Asis. 364 B and Lysiás 31. 34. To write καίτερ (with Kugler de part. 701 etc. p. 18) would be rash. For other views on this difficult clause see App. Xl.

καὶ δὲ δοκεῖς. See 510 D n.

☒ ὡς—οὕσταν διάνοια is the most general word for a state (ἐξή) of mind or mode of thought in Greek, and the limitation here introduced is entirely Plato's own. Plato apparently attempts to fortify his innovation by etymology, hinting that the word διάνοια is by derivation that which is between (καὶ μετὰ) νοοῖς and δόξα. So also J. and C. Cf. εἰκασία (with allusion to εἰκόνες) in Ε.

On δόξης see 510 A n.
άσπερ ἐφ’ οἷς ἐστὶν ἀληθείας μετέχειν, οὕτω ταῦτα σαφήνειας ἡγησάμενος μετέχειν. Μανθάνω, ἐφη, καὶ ξυγχωρῶ καὶ τάτω ὡς 30 λέγεις.

τέλος πολιτείας 5'.

29 ἀσπερ ἐφ’ οἷς κτλ.: “attributing to them such a degree of clearness as their objects have of truth” J. and C. Liebh- hold's ἐφ’ ὅσον for ἐφ’ οἷς is an unhappy suggestion: cf. VII 534 A. A corrector in q changed the first μετέχειν to μετέχει, which, in deference to Schneider’s arguments, I formerly printed. But the text is quite sound. Stated categorically, the clause would run ἀσπερ ἐφ’ οἷς ἐστὶν ἀληθείας μετέχει, οὕτω ταῦτα σαφήνειας μετέχει. Under the government of ἡγησάμενος, the first as well as the second μετέχει becomes μετέχευ; for the accusative with infinitive may be employed even in the subordinate clauses of Indirect. See on 492 c. The jingle μετέχευ—μετέχευ is inoffensive: cf. X 614 A, 621 B.
APPENDICES TO BOOK VI.

I.

VI 488 D. ὅπως δὲ κυβερνήσει ἕαν τὲ τινες βούλωνται ἕαν τε μὴ, μὴτε τέχνην τοιτού μὴτε μελέτην οἴομενοι δυνατον εἶναι λαβέαν ἁμα καὶ τὴν κυβερνητικὴν.

Schneider's translation of this sentence is as follows:—"wie aber zu steuern sei, es mögen nun einige wollen oder nicht, davon glauben sie nicht dass es eine Kunst und Übung gebe, mit der man dann eben die Steuermannskunst habe." The view which I have given in the notes is in general harmony with this interpretation; but I think that the word μελέτη denotes 'study' rather than actual 'practice' ('Uebung' or "exercitatio" Schneider): see the notes.

The strength of Schneider's explanation lies in its conformity with the whole course of Plato's argument both here and in the passages which I have cited from the Politicus. In particular, the exact parallel between ἕαν τὲ τινες βούλωνται ἕαν τε μὴ and ἕαν τε ἐκόντας ἕαν τε ἄκοντας (in Pol. 293 b) appears to me the strongest possible confirmation of the general soundness of his view. No interpretation that I know of, Schneider's alone excepted, assigns its proper force to ἕαν τὲ τινες βούλωνται (cf. ἕαν τε ἐκόντας, Pol. l.c.) as well as to ἕαν τε μὴ. The true pilot cares just as little whether people wish him to steer as whether they do not: his art has nothing whatever to do with the sentiments with which his passengers regard his rule. Schneider's interpretation is also supported by the emphatic μὴτε τέχνην—μὴτε μελέτην: the false pilot will not allow that you can learn 'either art or theory' of how to steer, because according to him there is absolutely nothing technical or theoretical about steering. The only 'art of steering' which he will admit is the art of collaborating with himself in order to get command of the ship (ναυτικὸν μὲν καλοῦντας καὶ κυβερνητικὸν καὶ ἑπιστάμενον τὰ κατὰ νὰς ὅσ ἐν ἕυλαμβάνει δεινὸς ἡ ὅπως ἄρξουσιν κτλ.). It must, however, be admitted that ἁμα καὶ τὴν κυβερνητικὴν is not altogether easy on Schneider's view. The reader naturally expects τὴν κυβερνητικὴν to be different from the τέχνη and μελέτη: for on a first examination of the passage, Plato seems to be speaking of the impossibility of acquiring at the same time two different arts: whereas Schneider holds that the two arts are the same, τὴν κυβερνητικὴν being only Plato's way of expressing the τέχνη and μελέτη τοιτού ὅπως κυβερνήσει.

Is it possible to devise any explanation which, while agreeing in the main with Schneider's, will escape the apparent difficulty to which I have just drawn attention?

We note that κυβερνητικὴν has already been implicitly defined by the sailors as the art of helping them to get command (κυβερνητικὸν κτλ.
above). Why then should we not suppose that the sailors 'think it impossible to acquire an art of how to steer (ὤς κυβερνήσει) along with κυβερνητικήν' in their sense of the term, i.e. (practically) along with the art of making themselves masters of the ship? This interpretation, as far as concerns the language, seems to me possible enough; but it implies that the sailors do think it possible to learn the art of how to steer independently and by itself: whereas they have already said that such an art cannot be taught at all (φασκόντας μηδὲ διδακτόν εἶναι 488 b). For this among other reasons I think that this solution should not be entertained.

I have endeavoured in the notes to justify Schneider's explanation of ᾅμα καί, and here it need only be added that one source of embarrassment is the tendency which we feel to give to ᾅμα more of a strictly temporal signification than necessarily belongs to it in that idiomatic phrase.

An entirely different view of the sentence is taken by Ast and others. According to Ast, Plato is here distinguishing between two arts, viz. (1) scientific pilotage (the knowledge of astronomy etc.), and (2) the "ars imperandi—ut quae scientia et ars ipsum docent, a multitudine ipsi subdita fieri curat." τὴν κυβερνητικήν is (1), and τέχνην τούτου (2). On this view Plato asserts that the crew in general consider it impossible to acquire both the art of steering (τὴν κυβερνητικήν) and that of steering whether people wish it or no (ὅπος κυβερνήσει τέχνην τούτου), i.e. in other words, enforcing and maintaining authority. Both arts—so Ast interprets—are united, according to Plato, in the true pilot.

This explanation Stallbaum apparently accepts, conjecturing only τῇ κυβερνητική for τὴν κυβερνητικήν. I do not deny that it can be elicited from Plato's language, if we take this sentence by itself: but it is open to serious objection on the score of meaning, as has been pointed out by H. Sidgwick (J. Ph. v pp. 274—276), Richards (Cl. Rev. viii p. 23), and Shorey (A. J. Ph. xvi p. 234). It represents the sailors as admitting that there is a true art of steering, which under certain circumstances it is possible to acquire. But this is precisely what they deny (see 488 b πρὸς δὲ τούτους φάσκοντας μηδὲ διδακτόν εἶναι), nor could they possibly admit it, so long as they 'have not so much as a notion that the true Pilot should study the year and the seasons' etc. (488 d). Their solitary notion of an art of steering is how to get the helm into their hands (488 c πάντα ποιοῦντα ὅπος ἄν σφώτι τὸ πηδάλιον ἐπιτρέψῃ and c, d, ναυτικοῖς μὲν καλόντας καὶ κυβερνητικοῖς—δὲ ἐν ἐξήλλαμβάνειν δεινὸς ὧ κτλ.). Moreover, even if they were to allow that there is an art of steering, they would certainly not allow that others possessed it rather than themselves: cf. Pol. 302 A, b. Nor, again, does Plato ever admit that the art of enforcing one's authority has anything whatever to do with the art of steering. In the Politicus, he is careful to point out that they are entirely distinct: see the passages referred to in the note.

1 For another special discussion of the passage see Richter in Fleckeisen's Jahrbuch, 1867, p. 145.
APPENDICES TO BOOK VI.

Jowett and Campbell’s explanation is somewhat different. They do not suppose that Plato himself means to attribute to the true pilot both knowledge and power to enforce his authority; but apparently agree with Ast that the false pilot admits the existence of a scientific κυβερνητική, which can be acquired by itself, but cannot be combined with the art of getting possession of the helm. This view is open to all except the last of the objections already noted.

Sidgwick and Richards both agree with Grote (Plato III p. 80) that Plato does not regard scientίκ κυβερνητική as involving the power to enforce one’s authority as well as knowledge of steering. According to Richards, we should read αδύνατον instead of δυνατόν. “The crew deem it by no means as impossible as it really is that, while a man acquires κυβερνητική, he should at the same time acquire this other art” (viz. ὁπος κυβερνήσει, ειν τε τινες βούλευσαι ειν τε μή). This view is attractive in some ways, but the corruption of αδύνατον to δυνατόν is not a very probable one, and it would still seem to be implied that the crew admit the existence of a true art of steering, which is, under certain circumstances, capable of being learnt. If, with Sidgwick, we read οἰομενός, in agreement with αἰτεῖ, this particular difficulty disappears. I formerly accepted Sidgwick’s proposal, but there is force in Richards’ criticism that “the sentence would be most clumsy in form, nor is it to the point what the true steersman thinks; Plato is describing the state of mind of the crew.” δέ after ὁπος is also a difficulty.

On the whole, I am now inclined to think that Schneider’s interpretation has the most numerous and important arguments in its favour, and for this reason I have adopted it in the notes.

II.

VI 492 E. οὐ γὰρ, ἵν δὲ ἐγὼ, ἄλλα καὶ τὸ ἐπιχειρεῖν πολλὴ ἀνοικ. οὔτε γὰρ γέγονεν οὔτε γέγονεν οὐδὲ ὁν μὴ γέγονεν ἄλλοιον ἥδος πρὸς ἀρετὴν παρά τὴν τοῦτων παιδείᾳ πεπαιδευμένου, ἀνθρώπειον, ὦ ἑταῖρε. θείον μέντοι κατὰ τὴν παρομοίαν ἔξαιρομεν λόγον.

I agree in the main with Schneider’s view of this passage, which he translates—more freely than usual—as follows: “Denn keine Erziehung, o Freund, vermag oder vermochte oder wird auch vermögen der Erziehung dieser gegenüber ein Gemüth zur Tugend umzuleiten, nämlich ein menschliches; das göttliche freilich müssen wir wie es im Sprichwort heisst, ausnehmen von unserer Rede.” J. and C. (with Ast) connect πρὸς ἀρετήν with πεπαιδευμένων, comparing Prot. 342 D Λακεδαμίων πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν—ἀριστα πεπαιδευται and Gorg. 471 D εὖ πρὸς τὴν ῥητορικὴν πεπαιδευθαι, but the adverbs make all the difference. Without an adverb Plato writes εἰς ἀρετήν παιδείᾳ (e.g. Gorg. 519 ε). An entirely different explanation is given by Stallbaum and others. Stallbaum translates as follows: “neque enim indoles iuxta istorum erudita disciplinam neque fit neque facta est, nec vero unquam fiet ad virtutem (virtutis habita ratione) aliusmodi (ἄλλων) humana quidem” etc. But (1) Plato is professedly giving a reason (οὔτε γὰρ
APPENDICES TO BOOK VI.

κτλ.) why it is the height of folly to attempt to teach a young man what is opposed to public opinion, and Stallbaum's translation gives no such reason: (2) παρά cannot mean 'iuxta' 'according to,' but only 'opposed to.' Stallbaum's view, which is as old as Ficinus, has been widely accepted, but no one has yet explained how παρά can be used for κατά.

The adherents of this erroneous view have also in many cases suspected the word ἀλλοιον. Even if we adopt Schneider's explanation, ἀλλοιον seems at first sight strange: should not Plato have written ἀμενον, which Vermehren (Pl. ῾Οκτ. p. 95) considers more natural? I think not, for Plato means to suggest that public opinion will not tolerate any kind of dissent, whether better or worse than itself, except the θείον ἥθος, which is a special example of the ἀλλοιον ἥθος πρὸς ἀρετήν. Instead of ἀλλοιον the following proposals have been made, all of them (except the last) on the mistaken assumption that παρά means κατά: (1) οὐκ ἄλλοιον ('not alien to' Nägelsbach), (2) <ἄλλο ἥ> ἄλλοιον ('other than alien to,' Hermann, who also suggests ἄλλο ἥ οὖνεδος for ἀλλοιον ἥθος), (3) ἀξιολογον (Vermehren), (4) ἀληθιον (Richards). The last of these critics 'strongly suspects' that Plato also wrote κατά and not παρά.

III.

VI 498 D, E. οὐ γὰρ πῶστε εἶδον γενόμενον τὸ νῦν λεγόμενον, ἄλλα πολὺ μᾶλλον τοιαῦτα ἀττά ῥήματα ἐξεπτύθησε ἄλλῳ λεγομένῳ ὑμωμένῳ, ἄλλ᾽ οὐκ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου, ἀπὸ τοῦ νῦν, συμπεσόντα· ἀνδρα δὲ ἀρετὴ παρισιμιοῦν καὶ ὁμοιομενόν μέχρι τοῦ δυνατοῦ τελέως ἐργα τε καὶ λόγω, δυσανεύοντα ἐν πόλει ἐτέρα τοιαύτη, οὐ πῶστε εὐφράκασιν κτλ.

The view which I take of this passage is new in some of its details, but Reinhardt had already pointed out that Plato is referring to Isocrates (de Isocr. eum. p. 39), and Dümmler has made it probable that the reference is specifically to the Panegyricus (probably published about 380 B.C.). The same general view is adopted by the French editors of Book VI (Espinas and Maillet), and was also held by Schneider, as appears from his translation "denn sie haben das jetzt aufgestellte niemals in der Wirklichkeit gesehen, sondern viel eher etwa solche Worte, sorgfältig mit einander in Gleichklang gebracht, nicht zufällig, wie diese, zusammengesetzt; einen Mann aber, der sich mit der Tugend in Einstimmung und Gleichklang gebracht so vollkommen wie möglich in Werk und Wort—haben sie niemals gesehen" etc. See also Hirmer Entstehung u. Kompos. d. pl. Pol. pp. 664, 665. Schneider appears to understand τοιαυτ᾽ ἀττά ῥήματα as referring only to what follows (ἐξεπτύθησε—συμπεσόντα), and the same view is apparently taken by Dümmler (Chr. Beitr. p. 14). That they refer more naturally to what precedes will hardly be denied, and γενόμενον—λεγόμενον is as good an example of παραμολογος as one could wish. Reinhardt (l.c.) supposes that τοιαυτ᾽ ἀττά ῥήματα means proposals for political reform, resembling Plato's ideal State, and on this ground holds.
that it is the *Areopagiticus*, and not the *Panegyricus*, of which Plato is thinking. But Plato would hardly have compared any of Isocrates’ political speeches to his own *Republic*, and the following words show that the contrast is intended to be between mere vapouring rhetoricians and true Men. Nor is it likely that the *Republic* alludes to a work published so late as 354, the approximate date of the *Areopagiticus* (Christ Litteraturgesch. p. 297). The interpretation which I have given of τοιαῦτα ῥήματα appears to me exactly to suit ἀλλ’ οὖν ἂν τοῦ αὐτο-μάτου, ὥσπερ νῦν, συμπεψόντα. It is perfectly true, as Plato says, that the figure of παραμοιώσεις is never deliberately aimed at by him; or, if it is, he has the good manners to conceal his art. Isocrates’ ῥήματα, on the other hand, are correctly described as ἐξεπίθεσε ἀλλήλως ὁμοιωμένα.

Davies and Vaughan completely miss the meaning of the passage when they translate “they have met with proposals somewhat resembling ours, but forced expressly into appearing of a piece with one another, instead of falling spontaneously into agreement, as in the present case.” Jowett errs in much the same way, except that he seems to have suspected an allusion to the sophistical rhetoricians in ῥήματα—ὁμοιωμένα. The view adopted in J. and C.’s note is practically identical with that of D. and V.

IV. 500 A. ἦ καὶ ἐν οὖν θεώται, ἀλλοίων τ’ οὖν φήσεις αὐτοῦς δόξαν λήψεσθαι καὶ ἄλλα ἀποκρινεῖσθαι;

The reading of the best MSS ἦ καὶ—ἀλλοίων τοι κτλ. is retained by Schneider and (with v’s change of τοι to τε) by Stallbaum and Hermann. On this view ἀλλοίων δόξαν λήψεσθαι must be understood as denoting a change of opinion from the ἀλλοίων δόξαν of 499E. But it is extremely awkward to suppose that the ἀλλοία δόξα is different in the two cases; nor can men be said to change an opinion which it is doubtful if they ever held. These difficulties have led Hermann to read ἀλλ’ οὖν τοι (with Stephanus and some inferior MSS) in 499E, understanding λογιζόμενος before οὖν τοι—surely a strange ellipse, and otherwise an insufficient remedy. ἀλλ’ οὖν τοι in 499E was also adopted by Ast, with other changes much too extensive to need refutation, though supported in part by the reading of inferior MSS. There should be no doubt that ἀλλοίων τοι in the earlier passage is sound. In 500A Jowett proposes to read ἦ καὶ, joining καὶ and οὖν, and placing a full stop after ἀποκρινεῖσθαι. A similar view was held by Ast. But καὶ could hardly be taken with οὖν, and ἦ καὶ would strike every reader as the usual particle of interrogation. ἦ γάρ (interrogative), which Vermehren conjectures (Pl. Stud. p. 98), is highly improbable. I formerly read ἦ οὖν, and altered τοι to τε. ἦ οὖν is favoured also by Campbell, but the authority for the negative—q and Flor. U—is extremely slight, and Bayler’s emendation accounts more easily for the reading of the oldest MSS. The retention of καὶ ‘even’ is also an improvement: if a negative had been used, we should have expected rather οὐδέ than οὖν.
VI 501 a, b. "Επειτα, οὖμαι, ἀπεργαζόμενοι παλαι ἄν ἐκατέρωσε ἀποβλέποις πρὸς τὸ φύσει δίκαιον καὶ καλὸν καὶ σωφρόν καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα, καὶ πρὸς ἐκεῖνον αὖ, ὃ ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐμποιεῖτε, ἐνμυλημέντες τε καὶ κεραυνίες ἐκ τῶν ἑπτάσεων τὸν ἀνθρείκελον κτλ.

My view of this passage agrees closely with that of Schneider (see his translation pp. 169, 303) except that I think it is better to translate ἀνθρείκελον by the 'colour and likeness of true Manhood,' rather than by "die Farbe des Menschen," so as to bring out the double signification of the word (see on γράφειν νόμους 501 a). Schneider formerly denied that ἀνθρείκελον meant anything beyond "imagō hominis," but he retracts this view in his Additamenta (p. 49) and Translation.

Schneider's text is followed also by Baiter. The majority of editors prefer καὶ πρὸς ἐκεῖνον αὖ τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐμποιεῖτε ἐνμυλημέντες κτλ. (see οὕτω). In that case we must emend and write either ἐμποιεῖτε τε (Schleiermacher) or καὶ ἐμποιεῖτε (Ast), or ἀποβλέποις instead of ἀποβλέποις (Stallbaum), or something else to the same purpose. Hermann and J. and C. ignore the difficulty altogether. But even with such an emended text, the sense is faulty; for the legislator who starts with a tabula rasa need not trouble about τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις δίκαιον etc. His constitution is not a compromise between for example Athens and the World of Ideas, but something as near the latter as the limitations of earthly existence will allow—in other words such a polity as is described in the Republic. The Philosopher-king is not the man to paint an imperfect picture, though he knows that it will be but a picture after all.

Burnet prints ἐπειτα—πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα, καὶ πρὸς ἐκεῖν' αὖ τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐμποιεῖτε, κτλ. This emendation appears to me to deprive ἐκατέρωσε of all meaning and point.

VI 503 c. Εἰμαθεῖς καὶ μνήμονες καὶ ἀγχίνοι καὶ ἀξεῖς καὶ ὁσα ἄλλα τούτοις ἐπεται ὁποθ' ὁτι οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν ἀμα φύεσθαι καὶ νεανικοὶ τε καὶ μεγαλοπρεπεῖς τοῖς διανοιαί οὐκοι κοσμίως μετὰ ἱσονχίας καὶ βεβαιώτητος ἐθέλειν ζην, ἀλλ' οἱ τουοῦν ὑπὸ ἀξυνής φέρονται ὅτι ἄν τόχωσι, καὶ τὸ βεβαιὸν ἀπαν αὐτῶν ἔζοιχεται.

Such is the reading of A and II: and none of the other mss have any variant worth discussing.

Of the qualities named, the following appear in the description of the philosophic character (485 c—487 a): εἰμαθεῖς, μνήμη, μεγαλοπρέπεια. It is also clear that οὐκοι κοσμίως—ζῆν represents σωφροσύνη (485 b). ἀγχίνοι and ἀξεῖς certainly refer to intellectual qualities, as appears from their combination with εἰμαθεῖς καὶ μνήμονες, and with ὁσα ἄλλα τούτοις ἐπεται: cf. also Theaet. 144 a. νεανικοὶ 'spirited' has af-
finities with ἀνδρεῖοι (486 b—487 a), but Vermehren (Pl. Stud. pp. 98—103) is mistaken in holding that the two notions are identical.

According to Schneider, who retains the reading of the mss, εὐμαθείς—μεγαλοπρεπεῖς τὰς διανοιὰς forms the predicate, the subject being οἷοι—ζην. This interpretation gives the right sense, but is otherwise forced and unnatural in the last degree. Moreover, if οἷοι is the subject, we can scarcely dissociate οἷοι τοιούτοι from it, and even on Schneider’s view οἷοι τοιούτοι refers to εὐμαθείς—διανοιὰς.

Stallbaum prints a comma after φόροςθαι, and understands Plato to mean that a combination of the intellectual virtues enumerated in εὐμαθείς—οἷεῖς is itself rare, as well as the union of spirit and sobriety. Such a view, even if grammatically possible, is certainly awkward; and we have every reason to suppose that Plato did not consider the union of kindred intellectual qualities as in any way exceptional. It is the union of certain intellectual and moral virtues with certain other moral virtues which he considers rare: cf. Theaet. 144 a, b, the whole of which passage is important for the understanding of Plato here.

Others, such as Vermehren l.c. and J. and C., suppose that οἷοι—ζην is a consequence of νεανικὸς—μεγαλοπρεπεῖς. This is however (as Shorey points out A. J. Ph. xvi p. 236) opposed to every statement made by Plato on the subject. The opposition between θυμοειδεῖς, νεανικὸς, ἀνδρεῖον (by which is meant, in this particular contrast, the active side of Courage) and πάνω, κόσμιον, σωφρον etc., is regarded by him as the fundamental antithesis of human character: see for example 11 375 c, 111 399 c, 410 d, Pol. 306 c ff., 307 c, 309 e, 311 b, Tim. 18 a and Laws 731 b. We have no right to hide this fact by explaining away νεανικὸς. The word means ‘full of youthful vigour,’ ‘spirited,’ and nothing more. νεανικὸς is of course a constituent factor in ἀνδρεῖον, but it is not identical with it, nor do any of the passages which Vermehren cites (Theaet. 168 c, Rep. 425 c, 491 e, 563 e, Lys. 204 e, Alc. 104 a) prove any such identity. Still less does the word mean “generous” (J. and C.), or “kräftig, mannhaft, und sittlich tüchtig” (Vermehren).

We may therefore be certain that νεανικὸς—μεγαλοπρεπεῖς is opposed to οἷοι—ζην. The ms reading will admit of this only if we construe φόρεσθαι with οἷοι, and suppose that καὶ νεανικὸς—διανοιὰς is added parenthetically as a sort of afterthought. This was Schleiermacher’s view, and it is also one of J. and C.’s alternatives. It is certainly right in sense, but the construction is intolerably ambiguous and awkward (cf. Susenmühl, Gen. Entw. 11 p. 191 n.).

Various solutions are possible. I formerly (with Heindorf on Theaet. 144 a) transposed καὶ, reading φόρεσθαι νεανικὸς—καὶ οἷοι κτλ. Heindorf’s remedy is however not quite satisfactory, because it lays all the stress upon the difficulty of finding the two opposite kinds of moral qualities united with intellectual sagacity, whereas—as appears from the next sentence—the relevant point is that intellectual vivacity and acumen are seldom found along with one of the two phases of moral character, viz. sobriety and stedfastness. For this reason I now venture on the transposition printed in the text. It is worthy of note that in two places where the scribe of A omitted a passage of some length,
without the excuse of homoioteleuton, the number of letters is 41 and 39. (See \textit{ib.} on 504 D, \textit{ib.} on 601 A and \textit{Intro.} § 5). Here it is 40. \textit{kai} \\
\textit{neanikoi—diavolas may} of course be an interpolation, but it is more likely to be an omitted line or lines wrongly replaced.

\textbf{VII.}

\textbf{VI 507 B.} \textit{kai aitw deut kalon kai aitw agathon, kai ouw peri pantow atoto wos pollla etibem, palin ad kai idean mian ekaston, wos miaj oujhs, tiheutes, \textit{di estin ekaston prosagoreunomene}.}

The difficulties of this sentence have hardly received sufficient attention at the hands of editors.

If \textit{kat} idean—the reading of all the ms—is genuine, what is the grammatical object of \textit{tiheutes}?

Two possibilities suggest themselves. One is to understand \textit{ein} or the like, as parallel to \textit{aitw kalon} and \textit{aitw agathon}. This view is apparently adopted by Schneider, who translates “Und dann ein schönes selbst und ein gutes selbst und so bei allem, was wir dort als vieles setzten, wiederum \textit{eins} nach der angenommenen Einheit des Begriffs eines jeden setzend nennen wir jedes das, was ist.” Stallbaum seems to have taken a similar view, although his note is not quite explicit. But it is so difficult to supply \textit{ein} as an object to \textit{tiheutes} that we must, I think, reject this interpretation altogether. The second and more plausible alternative is—with Prantl, and the English editors and translators—to regard the object of \textit{tiheutes} as identical with that of \textit{etibem}. But \textit{kai} idean mian \textit{tiheutes} is far from clear. \textit{Tiheutes} ought clearly to be understood in the same sense as \textit{etibem}, and the whole phrase should express the antithesis of \textit{wos pollla etibem}. We are hardly justified in translating \textit{tiheunti kai} idean mian as ‘reduce to a single form’ (D. and V.) or ‘bring under a single idea’ (Jowett), although the phrase might possibly here mean ‘regard as belonging to one Idea.’ If \textit{kai} idean is sound, the least unsatisfactory course is perhaps to print a colon after \textit{etibem}, and explain thus: ‘reversing our procedure, we view them as falling under a single Idea of each,...and call each that-which-is’: i.e. for example \textit{dikaion, souphon} etc., each of which we took as \textit{polla}, we now regard as belonging to or falling under one Idea of \textit{dikaion}, one of \textit{souphon} etc. But neither this interpretation nor any other which I can devise (such as ‘regard according to’ or ‘in the light of’ one Idea of each) furnishes a thoroughly clear and simple sense, or a satisfactory antithesis to \textit{wos pollla etibem}. The only suitable contrast is that between the one Idea itself and the \textit{polll}. For this reason I have ventured to replace \textit{kat} by \textit{kai}. The occurrence of \textit{tau} \textit{de} ad ideas in the next sentence is also, so far as it goes, in favour of the proposed correction.

If we read \textit{kai} for \textit{kata}, we ought certainly (with Bosanquet) to take \textit{di estin ekaston} as a secondary predicate after \textit{prosagoreunomene}. The translation “we call each ‘that-which-is’” (Schneider and others) is grammatically possible and even necessary, I think, if \textit{kata} is retained; but it will scarcely be denied that \textit{di estin ekaston}, taken by itself, is

\textbf{A. P. II.}
most easily and naturally understood as the generalised form of the idiom δ' ἐστιν καλόν, ὤ ἐστιν ἄγαθόν etc. If so, δ' ἐστιν ἐκαστον is an additional reason for reading καί instead of κατά. We postulate ‘one Idea of each’ and call it ‘what each is.’ The balance between ἰδέαν μίαν ἐκάστον and δ' ἐστιν ἐκαστον could not be more precise.

In order to provide an object for τιθέντες, I formerly read ἐκαστον, instead of ἐκάστον, but the correction now suggested appears to me better and more likely to be right.

VIII.

VI 507 D, E. Τὴν δὲ τῆς ὄψεως καὶ τοῦ ὁρατοῦ οὐκ ἐννοεῖς ὅτι προσ-βεῖται; Πῶς; Ἑννούσης τοῦ ἐν ὁμοιωματική ὄψεως καὶ ἐπιχειροῦντος τοῦ ἐχόντος χρήσης αὐτή, παρούσης δὲ χρῶς ἐν αὐτοῖς, εάν μή παραγένηται γένος τριτῶν ἀρίθμη. ὡστ' ὅτι η̣ ὅψις οὐδὲν ὀψεῖται τά τέ χρωμάτα ἐστιν ἀόρατα.

The mss have no variant of any consequence.

Schneider boldly understands αὐτῶς as τοῖς ὁμοιωματικά, referring to Tim. 67 c ff., where it is virtually said that Colour, in an act of Sight, ἐμπίπτει εἰς τὴν ὄψιν. But a careful study of the analysis of Sight in the Timaeus will shew that Schneider’s view is not supported by that dialogue. If ἐν αὐτοῖς = ἐν τοῖς ὁμοιωματικά, it is clear from the rest of the sentence that Plato thinks Colour may be present in the eyes even where there is no light. But in the Timaeus Colour does not ἐμπίπτει εἰς τὴν ὄψιν when light is absent: see 45 c with Archer-Hind ad loc. The fact is that both in the Timaeus and in the Republic Colour is regarded as inherent in things and not in the eyes: see Tim. 67 c χρῶς ἐκαλέσαμεν, φλόγα τῶν σωμάτων ἐκάστων ἀπορρέουσαν and Rep. 508 C ὡστ' ἐν τάς χρῶσις τὸ ἱμεροῦν φῶς ἐπέχει.

By Schmelzer and the Oxford editors, αὐτῶς is interpreted as τοῖς ὁρατοῖς “from τοῦ ὁρατοῦ supra.” Plato certainly allows himself great latitude in matters of this kind, but not, I think, where the result would be that he must inevitably be misunderstood; and even an intelligent reader might here be forgiven if he referred αὐτῶς to τοῖς ὁμοιωματικά.

Various corrections have been proposed. ἐν αὐτοῖς ὁρατοῖς is Richards’ conjecture; but Plato is careful throughout this whole discussion to use ὁρατοῦ only in the singular, as a general term for the visible: cf. 508 C, 509 D (bis). For ‘things seen’ he uses ὁρώμενα 507 C, 508 A, 508 C, 510 D. On this account ἐν αὐτοῖς ὁρώμενοι or (better) ἐν αὐτοῖς ὁρώμενοι appears to me preferable, if the passage is to be emended on these lines.

In Cl. Rev. xiii p. 99 I ventured to submit another emendation. It will be observed that in the latter part of the sentence Plato treats the colours themselves as the objects of vision (τά τε χρωμάτα ἐσται ἀόρατα), without alluding to the visible objects in which the colours inhere. Cf. also Tim. 67 C ff., and Arist. de An. II 7. 418a 26 ff. Hence I proposed to read παρούσης δὲ χρῶς, ἐν αὐτοῖς εάν μή para-γένηται κτλ., i.e. ‘unless they’ (viz. ἦ ὅψις and χρῶς s. τά χρωμάτα) ‘are re-
inforced by one genus—making three in all—specially adapted by Nature for this very purpose, you are aware that Sight will see nothing and the colours will be invisible.' The order of words recalls δ εάν μὴ παραγένηται τρίτον above, and the position of ἐν may perhaps be defended as calling special attention to this one thing without which an act of sight is altogether impossible, and as inviting Glauco's question τίνος δή—τοῦτον; Morgenstern retained ἐν αὐτοίς and connected it with the following clause, but ἐν does not go well with παραγένηται, and the emphasis on ἐν αὐτοίς is excessive.

Other suggestions are ἐφ' ἤ ἐστι for ἐν αὐτοίς (Biehl Die Id. d. Guten p. 52), [ἐν] αὐτοίς (Stallbaum) and ἐπ' αὐτοίς (Ast).

If we might venture to read παροῦσης δὲ χρόος, ἐὰν (or ἤν) αὐτοῖς μὴ παραγένηται κτλ., all difficulty would disappear. Meantime, as none of the remedies hitherto suggested is convincing, I have thought it safest to retain the ms reading, understanding αὐτοίς perforce as τοῖς ὅρμῳνοι. The interesting analysis of Sight in Theaet. 156 δ ff. is unfortunately of no use for emending the present passage.

IX.

VI 508 d, e. τοῦτο τοῖς τὸ τῆν ἀλήθειαν παρέχον τοῖς γεγονόκαινενοι καὶ τῷ γεγονόσκοντι τὴν ὀνειρὸν ἀποδόν τὴν τοῦ ἁγαθοῦ ἱδέαν φάθι εἰναι, αἰτήν δὲ ἐπιστήμης οὕτω καὶ ἀλήθειας ὁς γεγονόκηκεν μὲν διανοοῦ, οὕτω δὲ καλῶν ἀμφότερον ὧν τούτου γνώσεως τε καὶ ἀληθείας, ἀλλο καὶ κάλλιον ἐτι τούτων ἡγούμενοι αὐτὸ δρόθως ἡγήσετε.

So Α reads. The only important variant is διὰ νοῦ (Ξυ and several other mss) for διανοοῦ.

Jowett and Campbell, following Schneider and Hermann, retain the text of A, and translate as follows: "This then, which imparts truth to the things that are known and gives to the knower the power of knowing, is what I would have you call the idea of good: and this you will deem to be the cause of knowledge and of truth so far as the latter is known: but fair as are both these, knowledge and truth, you will be right in thinking that it is something fairer than these." μὲν is explained as belonging strictly to αἰτίαν and "opposed to the following δὲ: the idea of good is indeed (μὲν) the cause of knowledge and truth, but (Ďé) it is other and fairer than they." Schneider's explanation and translation differs hardly at all from that of the Oxford editors.

The above rendering is open to grave objections both on the score of grammar and of sense. διανοɵθαι can hardly be used with a participle (ὁσαν) without ὧς: and ὡς γεγονόκηκεν μὲν surely cannot mean 'so far as known.' It is also, to say the least, extremely difficult to explain the position of μὲν. διὰ τοῦ ἐγχειροῦτα μὲν ἔρωτα, which Schneider (Addit. p. 51) cites from X 607 ε, is a very remote parallel. Nor is there any point, so far as I can discover, in saying that the Idea of the Good is the cause of truth so far as truth is known. The Idea of the Good is the cause of all Truth, known and unknown. And
there is no echo of any such limitation in the analogous description of Light.

For these and other reasons, Schneider’s explanation is, in my opinion, untenable. Nor can I devise any other reasonable solution without altering the text. Of emendations there is, as usual, no lack.

The smallest change is to read διὰ νοὺ, with Σ etc. and the editors down to Bekker. But the construction remains extraordinarily obscure. Few will agree with Schmelzer in construing γιγώμενος δὲ (τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἓδειαν) αἰτίαν ἐπιστήμης—νοὺ, γιγώμενος δὲ οὕτω καλῶν κτλ. Other proposals are (1) to omit μὲν (Stephanus, who also suggests that a clause may be lost), (2) δὲ αὐτοῦ (viz. τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ) for διαινοῦ (Νägelsbach), (3) to omit αἰτίαν—διαινοῦ or ὡς—διαινοῦ, in the latter case reading γ’ for δ’ after αἰτίαν (Ast), (4) to transpose and read φάθι εἶναι, ὡς γιγνωσκοµένη μὲν διὰ νοὺ, αἰτίαν δ’ ἐπιστήμης οὕσων καὶ ἀληθείας (van Heusde), (5) to cancel ὡς—γιγνοµενείς as a gloss (Stallbaum), (6) to read δὲ for δὲ αἰτίαν and διὰ νοὺ for διαινοῦ (Richter. Flec. Jb. 1867 p. 143).

Of these suggestions (1) is inadequate; (2) and (6) only make matters worse; (3) and (5) fail to provide a parallel to ὅραται ἕτερα ταύτης (sc. τῆς ὁψεως) in 508 B, and are also in themselves too drastic. Van Heusde’s solution (which (in common with Baier) I formerly adopted, gives a good sense, if ὡς be taken principally with the δὲ clause (‘as being the cause of Knowledge and Truth, although it is itself known by means of Reason’). But it is impossible to assign any probable motive for so serious a dislocation of the text of the mss. The usual devices of homoioteleuton and the accidental omission of a line in the archetype fail us here. See Introd. § 5.

The explanation given in the notes is, I think, satisfactory in point of sense, and assumes no corruption except that of γιγνωσκοµένης to γιγνωσκοµένης—a natural error after ἀληθείας. I now regard it as much more probable than Van Heusde’s solution (see his Init. Phil. Pl. ed. 1842 p. 388 n.).

X.

VI 511 A. εἰκόσι δὲ χρωµένην αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν κάτω ἀπεικασθέωσιν καὶ ἑκεῖνος πρὸς ἑκεῖνα ὡς ἔναργεῖς δεδοξασµένοις τε καὶ τετυµηµένοις.

The difficulties of this sentence are familiar to all students of Plato. After much consideration, I believe the text to be sound, and the meaning to be as explained in the notes.

In τῇ. Ph. x p. 76 Bywater objects to taking ἀπεικασθέωσιν as ‘copied’ or ‘imitated,’ urging that it must refer to the actual copies themselves. In order to obtain this meaning, he would read υποκάτω for ὑπὸ τῶν κάτω, and explain υποκάτω ἀπεικασθέωσιν as the ‘sensible copies, and not the (intelligible) originals,’ i.e. as CD and not CE. But (1) on this view αὐτοῖς loses its force, and (2) αὐτὰ μὲν ταῦτα ἑ πλάτωσιν τε καὶ γράφουσιν, ὡν καὶ σκιαὶ καὶ ἐν υδασίν εἰκόνες εἰσίν, τούτος μὲν ὡς εἰκόνιν αὐτοῖς χρωµένιν πεθεῖσιν in 510 E and τοῖς τότε μυθείσιν in 510 B (where see note) prove that ἀπεικασθέωσιν means not ‘copies’ but ‘copied.’
It is true that this sense of ἀπεικασθέντα is extremely rare, but Tim. 48 c furnishes a close parallel, and εἰκασθέντος in Phaedr. 250 b (quoted by J. and C.) certainly means ‘copied.’ In this passage ὑπὸ τῶν κάτω, and ἀπεικασθεῖν (combined with the play on εἰκός), as well as the precise parallel in 510 e, would make it impossible for a Greek to mistake Plato’s meaning. Stallbaum’s explanation (‘formae rerum adspectabilium intelligibilis, sive abstractae ab ipsis rebus et una mentis cogitatione conceptae, quae a rebus inferioribus, i.e. concretis, tanquam similitudine expressae sunt’) is in my judgment wholly wrong; see below. Liebhöld’s conjecture ἀπὸ for ὑπὸ would make the higher segment a copy of the lower! His further proposal, to read αὐταῖς (viz. ταῖς υποθέσεσιν) ὁμοίως τοῖς κτλ., plunges everything into hopeless confusion. The explanation which I have given of this part of the sentence agrees with that of Schneider and the Oxford editors.

καὶ ἐκεῖνος is also undeniably difficult; but κάκει (proposed by Bywater i.e.) is hardly less so; and we are certainly not justified in transposing αὐτοῖς and ἐκεῖνος, as Richards proposes to do. Should we perhaps punctuate ἀπεικασθεῖσα καὶ ἐκεῖνος, πρὸς ἐκεῖνα κτλ., and understand καὶ ἐκεῖνος as only ‘et illis,’ ‘illis quoque’ as in Synp. 212 a καὶ εἶτε τῷ ἄλλῳ ἀνθρώπῳ, ἀθανάτῳ καὶ ἐκείνῳ? The objects in CD are ‘also’ copied by those in AD, exactly as the νοητόν is by CD (510 a).

If δεδοξασμένοις is not ‘valued,’ it can only mean ‘opined,’ and we must translate either (1) ‘being opined and honoured as palpable,’ or else (2) ‘being opined as palpable’ (‘für wirklich gehalten’ Schneider), ‘and honoured accordingly.’ If we adopt the second alternative, ὡς ἐναργέσι belongs only to δεδοξασμένοις: but τε καὶ strongly suggests that ὡς ἐναργέσι was meant to be taken also with the second participle. The first alternative remedies this defect, but is hardly less unsatisfactory than the second. For ὡς ἐναργέσι must then mean one thing with δεδοξασμένοις, and another with τετειμμένοις—‘opined as palpable,’ i.e. ‘opined to be palpable’ and ‘honoured as palpable,’ i.e. ‘honoured because they are palpable.’ Or is δεδοξασμένος used absolutely, in the sense of the objects of opinion’? If so, this particular difficulty disappears, and Plato means that the contents of CD are the ‘objects of opinion’ (and not of some inferior ἔξις) because they are ἐναργήγ., and honoured for the same reason. The sentence would then prepare us for the distinction to be presently drawn between δόξα and εἰκασία (511 e). This interpretation is perhaps the least vulnerable, if δεδοξασμένοις can mean no more than ‘opined,’ but it is too subtle and obscure.

A wholly different explanation is given by Stallbaum, and adopted by D. and V. Stallbaum understands ἐκεῖνα as the objects contained in CE, compared with which, those in DC are ‘vulgarily esteemed distinct and valued accordingly.’ On this view ὡς would hint that the objects in DC are not in reality, compared with those in CE, ἐναργήγ.: and the same insinuation would be still further emphasized by δεδοξασμένος (‘opined’ as opposed to ‘known’). This interpretation is possible so far as the Greek is concerned, except that ἐκεῖνα can hardly mean anything but AD. Nevertheless, even if we allow that ἐκεῖνα could refer
to \( CE \), an allusion to the popular prejudice in favor of materialism would be out of place in a scientific classification of \( \tau \delta \sigma \eta \) in their order of ‘clearness.’ And Plato has already shewn a tendency to introduce the shadow segment at each stage ‘in order to make it quite clear at each step how the whole classification, coheres’ (Bosanquet): hence \( \tau \theta \iota \mu \mu \eta \theta \epsilon \epsilon \iota \varsigma \iota \iota \) (510 B) and \( \omega \nu \kappa \iota \kappa \iota \iota \iota \iota \nu \iota \varsigma \epsilon \iota \varsigma \iota \iota \) (510 E). Finally, the whole description in \( \tau \theta \theta \sigma \iota \theta \iota \iota \) passes first from \( CE \) to \( DC \), and then from \( DC \) to \( AD \) (\( \upsigma \tau \omega \nu \kappa \alpha \tau \omega \) ), and a return to \( CE \) in the last clause of the sentence, such as Stallbaum supposes, would be artistically unpleasing.

**XI.**

VI 511 C, D. ὅτι μέντοι βούλει διορίζειν σαφέστερον εἶναι τὸ ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι ἐπιστήμης τοῦ ὄντος τε καὶ νοητοῦ θεωρούμενον ἢ τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν τεχνῶν καλουμένων, αἰς αἱ ὑποθέσεις ἀρχαί καὶ διανοιαὶ μὲν ἀναγκαζόνται ἀλλὰ μὴ αἰσθητοίς αὐτὰ θεώσαι οἱ θεωροῦν, διὰ δὲ τὸ μὴ ἐπὶ ἀρχὴν ἀνελθόντες σκοπεῖν ἄλλα ἐξ ὑποθέσεων, νοῦν οὐκ ἰσχεῖν περὶ αὐτὰ δοκοῦσι σοι, καίτοι νοητῶν ὄντων μετ’ ἀρχῆς.

The ordinary view of the last clause of this sentence appears to be “obwohl es in Verbindung mit dem Anfänge denkbare ist” (Schneider: cf. Jowett’s “although when a first principle is added to them they are cognizable by the higher reason”). Some of the difficulties which this translation involves are pointed out by Krohn (Φλ. Στ. p. 141). The most serious of them is that it makes Plato imply that the objects of mathematical study as pursued by mathematicians are not νοητά, whereas he has repeatedly said that they are (see note ad loc.). It may be urged on the other hand that we ought not to take the words too strictly, and that νοῦν οὐκ ἰσχεῖν περὶ αὐτὰ δοκοῦσι σοι prepares us for taking νοητῶν in a narrower sense than it has hitherto had. But νοῦν οὐκ ἰσχεῖν is a different thing from the assertion that the objects are not νοητά, for νοῦς is expressly limited by Plato to the higher intellectual method throughout the whole of this passage, διάνοια being used for the lower, as the next sentence carefully explains. In a passage expressly occupied with defining terms, Plato is not, I think, likely to have contradicted himself within a single sentence, by first saying that μαθηματικά (as ordinarily studied) are νοητά and afterwards implying that they are not. \( \mu \eta \tau \iota \alpha \rho \chi \gamma \varsigma \) is also far from clear on the ordinary view, for (1) the use of the preposition is obscure, unless something like λαμβανόμενων is understood, and (2) it is not easy to interpret \( \alpha \rho \chi \gamma \varsigma \) of the \( \alpha \rho \chi \gamma \varsigma \) κατ’ ἐποχήν, i.e. the Good, just after we have been told that μαθηματικά possess \( \alpha \rho \chi \alpha \) of their own (αἰς αἱ ὑποθέσεις \( \alpha \rho \chi \alpha \)). It may be said that \( \alpha \rho \chi \gamma \varsigma \) in \( \epsilon \tau \pi \alpha \rho \chi \gamma \varsigma \) ανελθόντες is the Good. So no doubt it is, from Plato's point of view; but we should translate this also ‘a beginning,’ for the contrast is between the dialectician who ascends (\( \epsilon \tau \pi \alpha \rho \chi \gamma \varsigma \) ανελθόντες) to an \( \alpha \rho \chi \gamma \varsigma \) and the mathematician who does not, but nevertheless has one (without ascending) in his ὑποθέσεις.
On these grounds I am unable to accept what seems to be the current interpretation. Campbell appears to take νοητά μετ’ ἀρχής as a single phrase denoting a special sort of νοητά (“while not absolute νοητά, they are νοητά μετ’ ἀρχής” Vol. II p. 16). This is certainly better than Jowett’s view, but linguistically it is a little harsh, and in point of fact the higher νοητά (except of course the Good itself) are also νοητά μετ’ ἀρχής, for μετ’ ἀρχής cannot be construed ‘with a hypothetical ἀρχή.’ The interpretation which is given in the notes agrees with that of Prantl, and (if I understand him rightly) Krohn. It is, in my opinion, the only natural meaning of the Greek, and what Plato, if Plato wrote the words, intended to say.

The explanation of this clause is a matter of some importance because, if Schneider’s translation is right, it would appear that μαθηματικά can, under certain circumstances, be apprehended by the higher noetic process, and on this an argument might conceivably be founded for identifying them with Ideas. In App. I to Book vii I have tried to shew that Plato himself distinguishes no less clearly between the contents of the two higher segments of the line than Aristotle assures us that he did. In reality however the present sentence does not affect the question either way.

The use of καίτω is so strange that some may be inclined to suspect interpolation. It is noticeable that καίτω was often thus used by Plotinus (e.g. x 9. 490 init.). The clause could easily be spared, and may be spurious; but the evidence is not sufficient to justify its exclusion from the text.
Z.

I. Μετὰ ταύτα δὴ, εἶπον, ἀπείκασον τοιούτῳ πάθει τὴν ἡμετέραν φύσιν παιδείας τε πέρι καὶ ἀπαιδευθίας. ἰδὲ γὰρ

514 A—517 A The following comparison represents our nature in respect of education and the absence thereof. Let us imagine a number of prisoners confined in a subterranean cave, and unable to see anything except shadows of images and other such objects, cast by the light of a fire. Such men will believe that shadows of manufactured things are the only truth. If they are released, and led up step by step towards the light, they will turn and file back into the cave; but if we compel them to emerge, they will gradually grow accustomed to the brightness, and be able to gaze upon the Sun and understand his sovereignty in the domain of visible things. Pity for their former friends will then begin to mingle with joy at their own escape. Should they descend into their former place, the darkness will at first affect their vision, and expose them to the laughter of the others, who will, it may be, lay hands upon their deliverer and slay him.

514 A ff. The simile of the Cave presents us with a picture of the life of the uneducated man (ἡμετέραν φύσιν παιδείας τε πέρι καὶ ἀπαιδευθίας 514 A; cf. also 515 A). From this point of view it should be compared with Theaet. 172 C—177 C, and (in spite of the different situation) with Phaed. 109 A—E, where the equation is:—Depths of Ocean: Hollows of Earth = Hollows of Earth: The true Earth. Plato bids us connect the Cave with the Line (517 A), and does so himself (d.c., and 532 C). We have seen that the lower segment of the line (AC) is spoken of sometimes as ὀρατόν, sometimes as δοκαστῶν (VI 510 B n.).

Plato does not even now distinguish between the two terms; and since the ἀπαιδευθία is concerned with ὁ δοκαστῶν in general rather than with ὁ ὀρατόν exclusively, we shall best apprehend Plato's meaning if we interpret the simile by the following proportion:—Cave: ὀρατῶν s. δοκαστῶν = δοκαστῶν s. ὀρατῶν = νοητῶν. See on 517 A and App. I. 2 ἰδὲ γὰρ κτλ. Empedocles spoke of the terrestrial region as a cave (Ἀθλέομεν τὸς ὄντα γενέσθαι ὑπόθετερον 31 ed. Karsten), and similar expressions occur in the Orphic verses e.g. ταύτα πατὴρ ποιήσεις κατὰ στερεός ἑρεθίμες (Ap. Procl. in Tim. 95 i); see Rohde Psyche ii p. 178 n. and Dieterich Neukia p. 159 n. There is however nothing to show that Plato borrowed the underlying idea, much less the details, of his simile from any previous writer: for the metaphorical application of ἀνώ, ψυχήν and kindred words in connexion with true παιδεία is a favourite usage of Plato's (cf. Theaet. 175 B, Soph. 216 C, Phaed. 109 A ff.), and the simile might easily have been elaborated from such a metaphor. For a strikingly eloquent imitation see Cic. de nat. deor. II 95 (translated from Aristotle: see Frag. 14. 1476a 34 ff.). With the life of the cave-dwellers Bosanquet aptly compares the account of uncivilized humanity in Aesch. Prom. 447—453. A kindred though not identical figure is employed in Fitzgerald's Omar Khayyám LVIII: "We are no other than a moving show Of magic Shadow-shapes that come and go Round with the Sun-illumined Lantern held In Midnight by the Master of the Show."
3 áναπεπταμένην κτλ. Herderwen suspects corruption, on the ground that the cave is dark, except for the light of the fire. But unless the entrance to the cave is open to the light of day, how are the prisoners ever to emerge, as they ultimately do (515 E)? The ἐσόδος is long (μακράς) and steep (515 E), so that the daylight cannot reach the cave in any case. Frantl is right, I think, in understanding μακράν of length and not width, although Schneider and the English translators apparently hold the other view. See next note.

4 παρ’ ἀπαν τοῦ στήλαιον should (I believe) be taken separately from μακράν. The words define the width of the entrance, which is ‘along the whole of,’ i.e. ‘as wide as,’ the cave. ‘The reason will appear later: see on ὅρα τοῦ νῦν 514 B. The translation “extending along the entire length of the cavern” (D. and V.) seems to render μακράν altogether otiose. See Fig. II c 515-516. μένων τε αὐτοῖ. See cr. n. Hirsch's emendation, which Cobet approves and Hermann and others adopt, I now think right. μένων is not, I believe, used absolutely in the sense of μένειν αὐτοῖ, which is the meaning required here. It might be possible to understand μένων as equivalent to μένειν ἀκώνητος, in view of Crat. 436 E and Phaedr. 261 B, but ‘remain motionless’ is not quite suitable in point of sense. Still less does the possible rendering ‘remain by themselves’ fit the situation. On the other hand μένων τε αὐτοῖ ‘remain where they are,’ ‘remain in one place’ (cf. I 327 C, II 374 C), corresponds exactly to ἐν δειμοῖς τὰ σακχῆρη, just as εἰς τὸ πρὸςαθὴν μοίνον ὅραν echoes ἐν δειμοῖς τοὺς αὖχεινas. The τοῖς—τα after καί—καί suggests that Plato intended this correspondence. There is nothing to be said for Herwerden's proposal to insert ἀκώνητος.

514 Ἕ ὑπὸ τοῦ δειμοῦ κτλ. “Puerile interpretationum” says Herderwen, quite superfluously. Hirsch's διωματομήτατος for διωμάτιος is no improvement. The word, like ὄντα, depends of course on ὤν. For καύμανον, Hirsch, with Cobet's approval, conjectures καυμάκην, and so Baiter also reads: but καυμάκην leaves αὐτοῖ out in the cold. “Vide ne ὅσον τυρός ita in omnem notio- nem coalescant, ut alterius attribution simul etiam alteri conveniat” Hermann. This explanation is correct: cf. 517 B.

9 ἐπόνοον ὄδων, ἐπάνων (Badham), which means ‘ascension,’ is out of place here. ἐπόνοο means only that the road is at a higher elevation than the prisoners (so also Schneider): it should not be taken with ὄδων in the sense of a ‘raised way’ (Jowett). There is no reason why the ὄδως should be raised above the level of the ground, and it is unnecessarily harsh to construe the adverb with the noun. The fact that verbal nouns occasionally take an adverb in Plato (see on τιν 434 C) does not justify Jowett's construction in this passage.

10 ὅπερ τοῖς βαυματοποιοῖς κτλ. As in a Punch and Judy show. Cf. [Arist.] de Mundo 6, 398b 16 ff. οἱ νευροστάται μίαν μὴρον εἰσασπασμένου παρατιθεμένον καὶ αὐξάνει κινεῖται καὶ χείρα τοῦ ὑπὸ καὶ ὑγίων καὶ ὑβάλων κτλ. (Blümner, Privatalterth. p. 503 n. 5, where other references are given). I agree with the Oxford editors in holding that τῶν ἀνθρώπων denotes the performers, and not, as Schneider and others translate, the spectators. οἱ ἄνθρωποι could not, without further specification, stand for the spectators, and no further specification is given. But Jowett and Campbell are, I think, in error when they distinguish between the βαυματοποῖοι and the ἄν-
and suppose that the ἐπιστήμη is "not the actual exhibitor or puller of the strings, but the master of the show." The ἐπιστήμη and the ἐπιστήμη are the same, and Plato might, if he had been so minded, have written ὥσπερ τοὺς ἐπιστήμης ἐν ἑαυτῷ τῷ κτλ. The substitution of ἐναεροῦν for ἐπιστήμη puts the matter in a more objective way, and has also a contemptuous effect.

12 ὁ ἐκαλοῦν κτλ. τοιοῦν is 'also' (I 339 D n.). The low wall which crosses the εἴσωδος at a point between the prisoners and the fire intercepts the shadows of the παραφέρουσα; but the εἰσώδης which they carry, presumably on their heads, overtop the wall, and are reflected on the wall of the cave in front of the prisoners. See Fig. ii on p. 65. Plato adopts various devices in order to suggest a due proportion between the objects inside and outside the cave in point of reality. Thus (1) the typical examples ἀνθρώπους etc. are themselves images of the natural objects of the superior ὡφτῶν: (2) the originals of the Cave are all (except the prisoners themselves 515 A) σκέπαστα, whereas those of the superior ὡφτῶν are—primarily speaking—φωτεινά (for the significance of this see 532 C n.): (3) the contents of the Cave, both originals and shadows, may be regarded as less luminous and true than the ὡφταται, because they derive their light and truth, not from the Sun, but from an artificial Fire (see also on 517 c). The interpretation of the simile is to be sought in the ὡφτατῶν generally as well as in the ὡφτατον in particular (see on 517 A), but we need not suppose that every detail is significant. Comparisons have been made between the παραφέρουσα and (in the ὡφτατον) ἐφικτοί (Campbell ii p. 16, comparing Tim. 43), or (in the ὡφτατον) Sophists etc. (Shorey, Life of Plato etc. p. 235). The latter analogy is the more fruitful, but neither of them is altogether free from difficulty, and Plato may have intended the παραφέρουσα only as part of the machinery of his similitude. If the Cave is to represent the world of τὰ πολλὰ, it must have a semblance of life and motion; and without the παραφέρουσα the shadows would be motionless and dead.

515 A 2 οἷον εἰκὸς should be taken with what follows: cf. iv 419 A n.

3 φθειγομένους merely prepares the way for 515 B εἰ καὶ ήχον κτλ. and beyond this, it has, I think, no meaning. It certainly does not "prepare for the science of harmonics" (as J. and C. hold): see 532 B n. and App. Μ.

τῶν παραφερέστων (bracketed by Daiter) is natural enough, παρὰ τοῦτο τὸ παραφερόντα being too distant to cause difficulty.

515 B 8 τί δι; τῶν παραφερομένων κτλ. After τοῦτο supply οἷον ἐν ἐφαρμακεύναι αὐτοῖς. I have placed a mark of interrogation after τί δι, in order that τῶν παραφερομένων may have its proper emphasis: cf. v 470 A n.

 io οὐ τοιτα κτλ.: 'do you not suppose they would believe that they were
naming these particular passing objects which they saw? They have never seen anything of the real παρόντα (or παραφόρεμα): therefore (αύτινος) they suppose themselves to be naming, i.e., using the name of, not (as is in point of fact the case) the real παρόντα, but only these παρόντα which they see. For example, they call the shadow of a table ‘a table,’ and in so doing they are, without knowing it, naming, not, as they suppose, the shadow, but the substance. J. and C. remark that “παρόντα is rather confusing as it might signify either the shadows” (cf. 516 c) “or the realities” (cf. 515 D). True: but ταύτα τα παρόντα, ἀπερ ὄρυγα can signify only the shadows. The corruption παρόντα for παρόντα (see cr. n.) is easy, and occurs in some MSS at 516 c (where παρόντα again = παραφόρεμα σκαλι). Plato means (to interpret the allegory) that what the ἀπαίδευτος calls a substance is only a shadow. For other views of this sentence see App. IV.

12 ὡς καὶ ἥχω κτλ. The voices heard by the ἀπαίδευτος are as shadowy as the forms he sees: ψίλεων, ᾑβλπόμενος, κλέοντες, ὃς ἲκνος, ἄλλοι ὄντων. 16 σκευαστῶν is said by J. and C. to be "diminutive images of ordinary artificial objects," but the word does not convey this meaning. For the purposes of this simile σκευαστά are reckoned as less real than φιντέμα: see on δρα ταύτα κτλ. 514 B and φαντάσματα θεῖα 532 c. Plato takes no account of the fact that the prisoners also see shadows of themselves (515 A).

18 φύσει τοιὰς κτλ. φύσει has been variously interpreted as follows.
18 ὅτι γενομένος κτλ. ὅτι γενομένος κτλ. According to 552 B (where see saying), ἀξεχθαὶ ἴν ἀλλὰς ἔθελα (516 A) symbolizes Plato's πρωτάθεια or inferior νοημον.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

20 αὐχένα καὶ βαδίσεων καὶ πρὸς τὸ φῶς ἀναβλέπειν, πάντα δὲ ταῦτα ποιῶν ἄλγοι τε καὶ διὰ τᾶς μαρμαρυγάς ἄυνατοι καθορᾶν ἐκεῖνα, ὅπι κάτε τάς σκιὰς ἑώρα, τί ἀν οἷει αὐτὸν εἰπεῖν, εἰ τις αὐτῷ λέγοι, ὃ ὅτι τότε μὲν ἑώρα φλαναρίας, νῦν δὲ μᾶλλον τοῦ ἐγγυτέρω τοῦ ὄντος καὶ πρὸς μᾶλλον ὄντα τετραμμένος ὀρθότερον βλέποι, καὶ δὴ καὶ 25 ἐκαστὸν τῶν παριώτων δεικνύς αὐτῷ ἀναγκάζοι ἐρωτῶν ἀποκρινεῖν τί ἐστίν; οὗκ οἷει αὐτὸν ἀπορεῖν τε ἀν καὶ ἥγεισθαι τὰ τότε ὄρωμενα ἀληθέστερα ἢ τὰ νῦν δεικνύμενα; Πολὺ γ', ἔφη.

II. Ὄγοιν καί εἰ πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ φῶς ἀναγκάζοι 1 αὐτὸν βλέ- Επειν, ἄλγειν τε ἀν τὰ ὄμματα καὶ φεύγειν ἀποστρέφομεν πρὸς ἑκεῖνα, ὃ δύναται καθαρᾶν, καὶ νομίζειν ταῦτα τῷ ὄντι σαφέστερα τῶν δεικνυμένων; Οὔτως, ἔφη. Εἰ δὲ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐντεθέν ἐλκοί τις αὐτῷ βία διὰ τραχείας τῆς ἀναβάσεως καὶ ἀνάντους καὶ μὴ ἀνείη πρὶν ἐξελυσίει εἰς τῷ τοῦ ἡλίου φῶς, ἀρα οὐχὶ δούνασθαι τε ἀν καὶ ἀγανακτεῖν ἐλκόμενον, καὶ ἐπειδὴ πρὸς τὸ φῶς ἐξ θλοί, 516 αὐγῆς ἄν ἔχοντα τὰ ὄμματα μεστὰ ὄραν οὐδ' ἀν ἐν δυνασθαι τῶν νυν λεγομένων ἀληθῶν; Οὐ γὰρ ἀν, ἔφη, ἐξαίφνης γε. Συνηθείας δή, οἴμαι, δεότ' ἂν, εἰ μέλλοι τὰ ἄνω ὄψεσθαι, καὶ πρῶτον μὲν τὰς


20 τὸ φῶς is the light of the fire (514 B): contrast αὕτο τὸ φῶς 515 D. ἀναβλέπειν. ἀνα- is appropriate, for the fire is ἀνωθεν (514 B). Education always points upward in Plato (514 A i.), 516 D 23 ἐγγυτέρω. It is needless to add <ἀν>, as I formerly did (with Richards, who compares i 330 E). The copula is easily supplied, especially with τετραμμένος following.

24 ὀρθότερον and not ὀρθότερα (as seems to be generally believed, even by J. and C.) is the reading of A. The adverb (‘more truly sees’) can alone be justified. For the meaning see vi 1490 B u. βλέποι. The indicative ἔβλεπε (which I formerly read, with g, Flor. U, Bekker and others) would be more usual, “in an indirect quotation depending on an optative which refers to the future” (Goodwin MT 76: 61). But the rule which excludes the optative in such cases is not absolute, as appears from Dem. 16. 5 (cited by Goodwin l.c.), and εἶχα in VIII 544 A is in principle the same as βλέποι here. For the collocation of indicative (ἔβλεψ) with optative Schneider quotes Phaed. 96 B and 95 D.

καὶ δὴ κτλ. ἀπορεῖν is almost a technical term of Socrates’ dialectic (cf. Xen. Mem. III 10. 7 and Theaet. 149 A ff.), but Plato has in mind the effect of his own προταδεία, as appears from 532 B, C. 515 E 29 φεύγειν ἀποστρέφομεν κτλ. As when a bewildered disputation takes refuge again in the fallacious position from which he has been dislodged: see i 334 B u. For δύναται Richards would read δύναμι, comparing ἀπερ ὄρφεν in 515 B. δύναται treats the simile as a reality, exactly like ἀμβλυ-ώττει in 516 E: compare also 538 A u., and (for the construction) Phaed. 67 E οὐ πολλῇ ἢ ἀλογία εἰς, εἰ μὴ ἄμεσοις ἀκούσαι εἰς, δὲ αἰκίσκομαι ἐπίκτε ἐστίν οὐ διὰ βλέπων ἢ τυχόν πολλών.

31 ἐκάκοι κτλ. Cf. Theaet. 175 B ὅταν δὲ γε τινὰ αὐτῶς, ὅ φίλε, ἐξελυσάτρι ἄνω κτλ. The alliteration of ἄν- (ἀναβάσεις, ἀνάντους, ἀνείη, ἀγανακτεῖ) should be noticed: see on 514 A. With ἀνέγρα ἄν ἔχοντα κτλ. we may compare Theaet. 175 D βλέπων μετέρωσε ἀκούσας ὑπὸ ἄπειδας ἀδόμηνον και καὶ ἀπορών και βιβλιαρίζων κτλ. 516 A 4. πρῶτον μὲν κτλ. πρῶτον μὲν—ἐδώλα (the lower ὄρατον of the line)
symbolizes the higher stages of Plato's 
protaideia, and UESTrov de auta—ois 
estov (the higher iberaton) corresponds to 
the higher nozton. See 532 B, C NN. 
auta, ta en tov ouraf—uvkouw and ton 
Hlou represent an ascending scale of 
Ideas up to the Good: cf. note on tov 
Hvnpotevtov VI 511 B. It may be doubted 
whether in point of fact the released 
prisoner would not be able to look on 
the heavens by night sooner than upon 
'objects themselves' (auuta) by day. But 
the simile holds good in so far as the eye 
mounts ever higher: and the moon and 
stars are nearest to the sun (glosos), 
says Proclus in repa. I p. 294. 6 Krroll, 
which is the ultimate goal. 
516 B 13 tllyogizcito kta. should 
be interpreted by VI 509 B (the Good as 
the cause of BEing). ovtos is preferred 
by Stallbaum and others to autos (see cr. 
n.), in which J. and C. find a solemn 
emphasis. "There is no difficulty about 
the repetition (autou—autos), but autos 
'ipse' is less suitable here than the 
delictic ovtos: cf. auta in 517 C and VI 
462 B II.

516 C 20 tov uxtata kathorontor. 
ktl. "Induction conceived as inference from 
particulars to particulars, its test 
being prediction (not explanation), and 
its method being association of images or 
analysed likenesses, by contiguity in 
co-existence or succession" Bosanquet.
Plato is thinking chiefly of the empirical 
politician and political adviser, who fore-
tells the future from the present and the 
past (cf. Thuc. i 22), but limits his intel-
lectual horizon by his own experience, 
and knows nothing of the real deter-
m tining causes of events. The vast 
majority of Athenian statesmen belonged 
in Plato's opinion to this category: see 
on V 473 C and VI 488 B.
22 autov does not of course depend 
 on pioreva (as D. and V translate), but 
is a partitive genitive after ova.
25 τε καὶ ἐνδυναστεύοντας, ἢ τὸ τοῦ Ὄμηρον ἄν πεπωθέναι καὶ σφόδρα βούλεσθαι ἐπάροιον ἑόντα θητευέμεν ἄλλῳ, ἀνδρὶ παρ’ ἀκλήρῳ, καὶ οτιοῦν ἄν πεπωθέναι μᾶλλον ἢ ‘κεινα τε δοξάζειν καὶ έκεινος ξήν; Οὕτως, ἐφη, ἐγὼν οἴμαι, πάν μᾶλλον Εὔπορος ἄν δεξασθαι ἢ ξῆν έκεινός. Καὶ τόδε ἐννόησον, ἢν τοίον τουτούς καταβάς εἰς τὸν αὐτόν θάκον καθίζοι, ἃρ’ οὐ σκότους <ἄν> ἀνάπλεωσ σχοίν̃ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς εξαιφνής ἦκον ἐκ τοῦ ἤλευ; Καὶ μάλα γ’, ἐφη. Τάς δὲ δὴ σκιάς έκεινας πάλιν εἰ δέοι αὐτόν γρωματεύοντα διαμιλλάσθαι τοῖς αἰεί δεσμώταις ἐκεῖνος, ἐν ὣδ’ ἀμβλύωττε, πρὶν καταστήρῃ τὰ δραματα, Οὕτως 3757 οἱ χρόνος μὴ πάνω ὄριος εἰς τῆς συνηθείας, ἃρ’ οὐ γέλωτ’ ἃν παρά-σχοι, καὶ λέγοιτο ἄν περὶ αὐτοῦ, ὡς άναβας ἀνω διεθοραμένου ἢκει τὰ ὄμματα, καὶ ὅτι οὐκ άξιον οὐδέ πειράσθαι ἄνω ίνει; καὶ τὸν τοίον τουτοὺς Π: οὕτως Α. 31. <ἄρ> Baiter: om. codd.

516 D 25 τοῦ Ὄμηρον κτλ. I formerly proposed to omit πεπωθέναι, but a precise parallel is furnished by Ἔμφ. 190 B ἀτέχνως τὸ τοῦ Ὄμηρον ἐπτεύνθη, ἃν makes πεπωθέναι equivalent to the future perfect—a more vigorous form of expression than the future (or aorist with ἄν) would be. The quotation (which is from Od. xi 489, cf. supra 311 386 c) "has a curious felicity, being the words of Achilles in expressing his detestation of the world of the gods (lit. shadows) in comparison with the world of human life" (Bosanquet). It is better, I think, to connect ἄλλῳ with θητευέμεν (Ameis on Od. i.c.) than with παρὰ (as Schneider does).
27 καὶ ὅτι οὖν κτλ. ἃν (which Richards would alter to δή) is as suitable here as before, since ἄν πεπωθέναι depends in both cases directly on δοκεῖ. The confusion of ἄν and δή is not so frequent as some have thought: see on v. 460 c.
28 δοξάζειν = 'opine' is technical: for the cave is an allegory of τὸ δοξαστόν (514 A n.).
516 E 31 ἃν. See cr. n. and iv 437 B n. Stallbaum proposes ἄν πλέως, but Baiter's solution (which Cobet and Herwerden also recommend) is easier and better. ἀνάπλεως suggests contagion: see Ruhnken on Tim. Lex. s. v.
σχοίν̃ as usual is inchoative or ingressive ('get'): cf. 520 D and 517 B.
33 γρωματεύοντα: 'discriminating,' 'distinguishing,' 'judging,' as explained by the Scholiast (διάκρισινα, διαγνώσις, ἀκριβῶς), Suidas and Timaeus (if with Ruhnken we read γραμματεύοντα for γραμματεύοντα). A similar explanation appears in the margin of A (γραμματεύοντα γραμματεύοντα ἀκριβῶς). The word is derived from course from γράμμα ('means of judging,' 'test'), for which see Jebb on Soph. Tr. 593. γρωματεύον occurs only here in good Greek, but became more frequent afterwards (for instances see Ruhnken in Tim. Lex. s. v.). Here, as J. and C. remark, it seems to be 'fuscd with some degree of contempt' (like τευτάζω in 521 E).
34 ἀμβλύωττε. For the mood see 515 E n. ἀμβλύωττε occurs in q and Flor. U, and is read by Bekker and others. Herwerden adds εἴη after ἀμβλύωττε, comparing 517 D, but the text is sound.
517 A I οὕτως δ’ ὁ χρόνος κτλ. is still under the influence of εἰ. With ἂρ’ εὖ γέλωτ’ ἃν κτλ. cf. Phaedr. 249 D δια-ταμομεν δε των ἀνθρωπών σφυκτασμάτων, καὶ πρὸς τῷ θεῷ γενόμενον, κουβετέκαι μεν ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ὑπὸ παρακών, ἠθνο-σιάς δὲ ἀλλήλη τοὺς πολλοὺς, Theocr. 173 C, 174 C—175 B, Soph. 216 D and infra 517 D.
4 οὐκ ἄξιον κτλ. Καὶ τῶν ἐπιχειρουργά αῦτα κτλ. is a mani-
fest and touching allusion to the death
of Socrates, whose fate was the most
conspicuous example in Greek history
of the principle here laid down. See Zeller 4


Read in the light of another and even
more momentous sacrifice, the sentence
assumes a kind of prophetic import,
like the famous passage about the λέγον
θεος in the Phaedo (85 c, d). See
Geldes’s Phaedo of Plato pp. 286—287.
The test is difficult to determine. If we
retain λαβεῖν καὶ ἀποκτεῖναι, ἀποκτεῖναι ἂν, we
must either (a) regard ἄρ’ ὡς—
λέγοντ’ ἂν as equivalent to ἄρ’ ὡς ὑπὸ
γένοτ’ ἂν αὐτῶν παραχεῖν καὶ λέγονται ἂν,
and take λέγοντα ἂν as equivalent to
ἐκεῖνον ἂν εἰπέτω, carrying on ἐκεῖνον as
subject to ἀποκτεῖναι ἂν (Schneider), or
(b) supply ὑπὸ ὡς, although these words
do not occur after 516 c (J. and C.).
The second solution is preferable to the
first, but either is a tour de force. No
satisfactory explanation of the infinitive
ἀποκτεῖναι ἂν appears to be possible,
and the immediate juxtaposition of the
two forms of the infinitive is also in
itself suspicious. A few inferior MSS
read ἀπόκτειναι for the ἀπόκτειναι and
ἀὕ for the ἂν of Α: but otherwise there
is no important variant. The emendations
proposed are (1) λαβεῖν, καὶ ἀποκτεῖναι
(Asl), (2) λαβεῖν, καὶ ἀποκτεῖναι ἂν
(Stallbaum), (3) λαβεῖν, καὶ ἄποκτειναι
(Cobet), (4) λαβεῖν, καὶ ἀποκτεῖναι ἂν
(Baeyer). The correction in the text
appears to me not only easier, but
more in harmony with Plato’s fulness
of expression. I suppose that the error
arose thus. A scribe accidentally omit-
ted ἀποκτεῖναι, and the infinitive was
wrongly replaced after, instead of before,
ἀποκτεῖναι. This would give λαβεῖν καὶ ἀποκτεῖναι, ἀποκτεῖναι ἂν, from
which the change is inevitable to the
text of Α.

517 A—518 B The simile of the
Cave should be connected with the Line.
The Cave is the visible world, the fire
is the Sun, and the prisoners’ journey
towards the light resembles the ascent
of the soul into the intelligible sphere,
in which the Idea of Good reigns supreme.
We need not wonder that the philosopher
is unwilling to leave the light of thought
for the darkness of practical affairs, or
that he is dazed and confused when he
does.

7. ταύτην καὶ. If we interpret the
lower section of the line as ὁρᾶν and
nothing more, the following comparisons
are involved. (1) Fire = Sun: (2) Shadows
de ὁμόρρας and other σκέπαστα cast by
Fire = Shadows etc. of φυτεύματα καὶ
σκέπαστα cast by the Sun: (3) ὁμόρρας
and other σκέπαστα in the Cave = φυτεύματα καὶ
σκέπαστα in the ὁρᾶν: (4) the
ascent from the Cave into the ὁρᾶν = the
ascent from the ὁρᾶν into the νοησ. The
second comparison is of little or no
importance, for the ἀπαθέτουσα, of whose
condition the Cave is an allegory, does
not contemplate exclusively or even prin-
cipally natural shadows of φυτεύματα καὶ
σκέπαστα (cf. VI 511 E n.). Nor do the
other comparisons exhaust the signifi-
cance of the Cave as an allegory of
ἀπαθεσία. In order fully to apprehend
its meaning, we must regard the lower
section of the line as δοξαστὸν in the
sense of ν 475 E ff. Plato himself does
so: see VI 510 A n. The shadows and
originals within the cave will then sym-
bolise δόξα which are respectively twice
and once removed from the truth which
they seek to portray (see on 517 D), and
the ascent from the Cave into the ὁρᾶν
will represent the soul’s ascent from
the δοξαστὸν into the νοησ.—from the
πολλὰ (in the widest sense) to the ὕπ'.
着手βάζων καὶ θέαν τῶν ἀνω τῆς εἰς τὸν νοετὸν τότον τῆς ψυχῆς ἀνοδόν τιθείς ὑμῖν ἀμαρτήσει τῆς γ’ ἐμῆς ἐπίθεος, ἐπειδὴ ταύτης ἐπιθυμεῖς ἀκούειν. Θέος δέ ποιν οἴδεν, εἰ ἀλήθεις οὔσα τυχάνει. τὰ δ’ οὖν ἐμοὶ φαινόμενα οὐτῶ φαίνεται, εἰ τῷ γρωστῷ τελευταίᾳ. 15 ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἱδέα καὶ μόνις ὀράσθαι, ὄφθεισα δὲ συλλογιστάν ὦ εἶναι ὡς ἀρά πάση πάντων αὐτή ὄρθων τε καὶ καλῶν αἰτία, εἰν τε ὅρατῳ φῶς καὶ τὸν τούτον κύριον τεκόσια ἐν τοιατέρα ἐν τοι ποντῷ αὐτή κυρία ἀλληθείαν καὶ νοῦν παρασχομένην, καὶ δι’ αὐτή ταύτην ἱδεῖν τῶν μέλλοντος ἐμφρόνου πράξεων ἢ ἱδίᾳ ἢ δημοσίᾳ. Ξυνόλοιμαι, 20 ἐφ’ ἡ, καὶ ἑγὼ, ὅν γε δὴ τρόπον δύναμαι. 'Ἰθ' τοῦτον, ἢν δ’ ἐγὼ, καὶ τῶς ἐγνωθησέται καὶ μὴ θαμάσῃς, ὅτι οἱ ένεχθες εἴδοντες οὐκ ἐθέλονσιν τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων πράττειν, ἀλλ’ ἀνω αἰτί ἐπείγονται αὐτῶν αἰ ψυχαὶ διατρίβειν· εἰκός γὰρ ποιν οὕτως, εἴπερ αὐ κατὰ Θ τὴν προερεμένην εἰκόνα τούτ’ ἔχει. Εἰκός μὲντοι, ἐφ’ ἡ. Τί δὲ; 25 τῶς δέ λεῖ τι θαμαστῶν, εἰ ἀπὸ θελῶν, ἢν δ’ ἐγὼ, θεωρῶν ἐπὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπεια τις ἔλθων κακὰ ἀσχημοστὶ τε καὶ φαίνεται σφόδρα γελοίος ἢτι ἀμβλυώττων καὶ πρίν ἰκανώς συνήθης γενέσθαι τὰ παρόντα σκότος ἀναγκαζόμενος ἐν δικαιοστηρίου ἢ ἀλλοθ’ που ἀγωνιζόμεθα περὶ τῶν τοῦ δικαίου σκιῶν ἢ ἀγαλμάτων ὧν αἰ σκιαὶ, 30 καὶ διαμιμάσθαι περὶ τούτου, ὅτι τοτέ ἐν τοῦτον ποτὲ ἐν τοῦτον ταῦτα ἔν. 17. αὐτὴ γ’: αὐτὴ ἈΞ.: αὐτὴ (sic) II.
point at issue is not the law, but the judges' interpretation thereof. Plato is
doubtless thinking of Socrates and his
djudges throughout the whole of this
passage.

518 A 7 

7 фанотероν ('greater brightness,' 'more light') and 

λαμπρότερον are neuter. The omission of articles elevates 

the style. Richards would delete 

υπό λαμπρότερον, but the words balance 

υπό ἀθέας exactly as ἐκκόστατα balances 

μαρμαροφυξής ἐμπέπλησται, καὶ οὖτῳ δὴ 

τὴν μὲν 

εὐδαιμονίσειν ἀν 

τοῦ πάθους τε 

καὶ 

βίου, 

τὴν 

dὲ ελέγεσεν, 

καὶ 

εἰ ἡ 

εἰ οὗ τῇ 

ἀνωθὲν ἐκ 

φωτὸς ἠκούση. 

Καὶ 

μάλα, ἐφη, 

μετρίως 

λέγεις.

IV. 

Δεῖ δὴ, εἰπον, ἡμᾶς τοιοῦτο νομίσαι περὶ αὐτῶν, εἰ 

ταῦτ' 

ἀληθῆ; τὴν 

παιδείαν 

οὐχ 

οίαν 

τινὲς ἐπαγγελλόμενοι 

φασίν 

εἶναι,

9. εὐδαιμονίσειν ἃ: εὐδαιμονίσειν ἈΠΞ.

in our city, after they have ascended to 

the Good, must rejoin the prisoners whom 

they have left. To force them thus to 

redescend, may seem unjust; but Law 

seeks to make the whole city prosperous 

rather than a single class. And indeed 

it is also just that they should thus repay 

their country for having reared and 

educated them. They will themselves 

admit the force of our demands, and take 

their turn in the work of government, not 

eagerly, but as a necessity. We have seen 

that a well governed city is impossible 

unless a life better than that of ruling 

is open to its rulers, and the life of true 

philosophy is better.

518 Bff. Nothing that Plato has be-

queathed to us is more valuable than his 

theory of education as developed in this 

part of the Republic, and there is probably 

nothing in the whole range of educational 
literature, ancient or modern, which takes 

so far-reaching and profound a view of the 

aim and scope of education, or is so 

well fitted to inspire the teacher with in-

domitable courage and inextinguishable 

hope. See on 518 C and App. II.

13 αὐτῶν: 'the subject before us': cf. 
 VI 511. C, and αὐτὸ ἐν 1 339 B n.

14 ἐπαγγελλόμενοι κτλ. ἐπαγγέλ-

λεσθαὶ of sophist 'professions' is almost 

technical: cf. e.g. Prot. 319 A, Gorg. 

447 C and Isocr. S-ph. 1. τινὲς from its
position is emphatic, and makes us half-suspect some allusion to a particular Sophist: cf. Aristotle’s use of τινές (Bonitz Ind. Arist. p. 598). Similar sophistc ἐπανελεύσεως are ridiculed, though on different grounds, by Isocrates Soph. 2 ff.: see also Prot. 318 B ff. and Euthyd. 273 D ff. (ἀρετή, ἐθικ. sc. ὁ Ἐθυδήμος,— ὀδύμβω τι’ ἐπαράδειν κάλλιον’ ἀνθρώπων καὶ τέχνητα), and cf. Newman Politics of Aristotle I p. 385. It should be mentioned that the double εἰναι has not been suspected by Richards, who would omit the first; but Plato himself is not averse to such repetitions: cf. μετέχειν— μετεχέων in vi 511 E and x 621 B n.

518 C 16 ἐνεπθέναι. Cf. Theognis 429—438 (εἰ δ’ ἐναντίον τε καὶ ἐνεπθέντο ἀνδρὶ νομὴ 435). The grossly material and mechanical view of education which Plato here attacks has some affinity with what is sometimes called ‘cram.’ ἐνεπθέναι was used of a nurse feeding children (1.345 B n.); but such an allusion, though not in itself inappropriate, is scarcely intended here. Cf. also Symp. 175 D, E.

17 ὁ δὲ γε νῦν λόγος κτλ. Sophists profess to put ἐπανελεύσεως into the soul; but Plato’s argument indicates that the power or faculty of ἐπανελεύσεως (ταύτη τὴν δυναμὶν), and its organ νοῦς are already present in the soul of each individual, just as ὄψις and ὀμάα are already possessed by the prisoners in the cave. νοῦς is in fact the ἰδίων τι ἐν ἕναν, according to Plato, through whose indwelling man is most truly man by being like to God (vi 501 B, IX 589 D n.). The doctrine that μάθησις is ἀναμύνησι implies what is fundamentally the same view: see Menu 81 A ff. and Phaed. 72 E—76 D, especially 73 A ἐπαράδεινοι οἱ ἀνθρώποι, ἐὰν τις καλῶς ἔργα, αὐτὸν ἀλήθης πάντα ἢ ἔχει καίτοι εἰ ἡ ἐπίτυχεν αὐτοῦ ἐπανελεύσεως καὶ ὁ ὅθ’ ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ τοῦτο ποιηθέν. We may even go further and say that Plato’s conception of the divine element in man is the ultimate basis of all his proofs of Immortality. In its deeper bearings, therefore, the view of education here presented is incomparably grander and more profound than the usual connotation of the word either in ancient and in modern times. We educate our pupils not only for time, but for eternity, and therefore πείρας οὐδὲν ἀνάμυνησι, εἰς ἄν ἡ πείραμα καὶ τοῦτο καὶ τοῦ ἄλλου, ἡ πρόδρομο τήν ποιητήν ἐκείνου τῶν βιῶν, ὅταν αὖθις γενέμουν τούς τοιοῦτο ἐνεπθέντων λόγοι (vi 498 D). See also x 618 C ff. and Phaed. 107 D f. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο ἔχουσα εἰς Λίθῳ ἡ φυσική ἐρχεται πλῆρης πάσας τε καὶ τραφής κτλ. Michael Angelo used to say that every block of marble contained a statue, and that the sculptor brings it to light by cutting away the encumbrances by which the ‘human face divine’ is concealed. In like manner, according to Plato, it is the business of the teacher to prune the soul of his pupil of those unnatural excrescences and incrustations which hide its true nature (519 A, B n.), until the human soul divine (vi 501 B n.) stands out in all its pristine grace and purity. It should carefully be noted that in Plato’s theory of education the entire soul is involved (ἐν δήλη τῇ ψυχῇ). The Platonic περιαγωγή, although, or rather, perhaps, because, it applies primarily and immediately to the intellect, effects a moral no less than an intellectual revolution. The moral discipline of Books II—IV, so far from being overthrown, is strengthened and consolidated by being intellectualised. Cf. also 519 A B n.

18 ἐκάστου. ἐκάστῳ was read by Iamblichus (Preptet. 16) for ἐκάστου: but cf. 527 D n.

19 ἔξω. See on IV 424 D. Here, as in Gorg. 513 A and Laws 678 C, it implies an intimate, almost organic, connexion (‘in conjunction with’). Lina (de prior. text Plat. p. 33) is mistaken in holding that ἔξω introduces a mere “Anhängsel” in this passage.
καὶ τοῦ δύνας τὸ διαμηνύσαι θεωμένην.

D toû δ' εἶναι φανερὸν τἀγαθόν· ἡ γὰρ; Ναι. Τούτου τοῖνυν, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, αὐτοῦ τέχνη ἂν εἴη τῆς περιαγωγῆς, τίνα τρόπον ός μάρτα τε καὶ ἀναμιμοῦτα μεταστραφήσεται, οὐ τοῦ ἐμποίησαι 25 αὐτὸ τὸ ὄραν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἔχουν μὲν αὐτό, οἶκ ὀρθῶς δὲ τετραμμένῳ οὐδὲ βλέποντι οὐ ἔδει, τοῦτο διαμηνύσασθαι. „Εσοκεν γάρ, ἔφη. Αἴ μὲν τοῖνυν ἄλλαι ἀρεταί καλοῦμενα πνεύματα κινδυνεύουσι εὖγης τι εἶναι τοῦ τοῦ σώματος· τὸ δυνή γάρ οὐκ ἐνοῦσαι πρῶτον τοῦ ὄραν 27. διαμηνύσασθαι ἑθεῖ καὶ ἀσκήσειν. ἡ δὲ τοῦ φρονήσαι 30

518 D 23 τοῦτο τοῖνυν κτλ. "Construct: (ὅ πανδέλα) εἶναι τήν τῆς περιαγωγῆς (i.e. τοῦ περαγειν, quo praecluit) τοῦτον αὐτὸν (τοῦ ὄραμας τῆς πνεύματος, ὃ καταμαθαίει ἕκαστος)—οὐ (τεχνὴ) τοῦ ἐμποίησαι αὐτῷ τῷ ὄραν—ἄλλα (τοῦ) μεταστραφήσει τοῦτο (ὡς βλέπει εἰς ἐδεί") Ast. This interpretation is, I believe, correct. Plato began by asserting that Education is not what certain Sceptics declare it to be—the putting of sight, as it were, into blind eyes. For there is already in every man's soul an eye or ὄραμα, which sees or learns already; what is required is to turn this ὄραμα round. Hence he concludes (τοῖνυν) Education is not (as the Sceptics say) an art of putting sight into the soul's eye (τοῦ ἐμποίησαι αὐτῷ τὸ ὄραν refers to πυθόσις ὀφθαλμοῦ ὃς ἐνυπόκεντη), but an art of turning round just this very eye or ὄραμα which is present in every soul from the first. The prevailing view since Schneider regards τοῦτον αὐτῶν as anticipating and explained by, not as depending on, τῆς περιαγωγῆς. This yields a tolerable sense, but makes it difficult to supply the subject of μεταστραφήσεται, and αὐτῷ is also awkward. On Ast's view τῆς μεταστραφήσεται explains τοῦτον αὐτῶν τῆς περιαγωγῆς, and the subject of μεταστραφήσεται as well as the antecedent of αὐτῷ is at once seen to be τὸ ὄραμα καταμαθαίει ἕκαστος, for it is identical with the antecedent of τοῦτον αὐτῶν.

518 E 30 ἑθεῖ καὶ ἀσκήσειν. Aristotle Nic. Eth. ΙΙ Ι is in effect a commentary on this text: note in particular ἡ δ' ἡσύχη (ἄρετὴ) ἐκθέσει περιγράφεται (1103a 17)—οὐδέμεν τῶν ἑκάτον ἅρων φύσει ἡμῶν ἐγγύτεραι (ibid. 19)—τὰς ἄρετας λαμβάνον μεν ἐνεργοῦσαν πρὸς διόν (1103b 31).

518 η' δὲ τοῦ φρονήσαι κτλ. The ἄρετὴ of φρονήσαι (=φόρμας or the exercise of νοῦς) is not merely καλούμενη πνεύματα, but does in reality belong to (for παράλληλον ὁμώς αὐτὸν) 1 337 ν. n.—is an essential attribute of—something more divine (than that to which the other virtues belong),
519 D] ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΣ Z 101

V ξυγγενεῖς ὀσπέρ μολυβδίδας, 1 αἰ δὴ ἐδοδαῖς τε καὶ τοιούτων ἄδοιαίς τε καὶ λιχνείας προσφυγεῖς γίγνομεναι περικάτω στρέ

φουσι τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ὅψιν· ὅν εἰ ἀπαλλαγέν περιεστρέφετο εἰς τὸ ἀληθῆ, καὶ ἐκεῖνα ἂν τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο τῶν αὐτῶν ἀνωρθών

ἀνάρτα ἑώρα, ὀσπέρ καὶ ἐφ' ὃν τέτραπται. Εἰκός γε, ἐφη. 

Τί δὲ; τόδε οὐκ εἰκός, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ἀνάγκη ἐκ τῶν προερημένων, μήτε τούς ἀπαιδεύτους καὶ ἀληθείας ἀπείρους ἰκανοὺς ἂν ποτὲ

C πόλει ἐπιτροπεύσαι, 1 μήτε τοὺς ἐν παιδείᾳ ἐσεμένους διατρίβειν 15
dia τέλους, τους μὲν ὅτι σκοτὸν ἐν τῷ βίῳ οὐκ ἔχουσιν ἐνα, οὐ

στοχαζομένους δεῖ ἀπαντα πράθειν, δ' ἂν πράττωσιν ἑιδά τε καὶ

δημοσία, τοὺς δὲ ὅτι ἐκόντες εἶναι οὐ πράξοντι, ἡγομένουι καὶ

μακάρων νήσοις γόντες ἐτί ἀρκείσθαι; Ἀληθῆ, ἐφη, Ἡμέτερον

dὴ ἐργον, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, τῶν οἰκίστων, τὰ τε βελτίστασι φύσεις 20

ἀναγκάσαι ἀρκείσθαι πρὸς τὸ μάθημα, δ' ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν ἐφαμεν

D εἶναι μέγιστον, ἑδείν το τὸ ἀγάθον 1 καὶ ἀναβιών 2 καὶ ἀνάβαντες ἰκανοὺς ἰδωσι, μὴ ἐπιτρέπετε

αὐτοὺς τὸ νῦν ἐπιτρέπεται. Τὸ ποιὸν δὴ; Τὸ αὐτοῦ, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, καταμένειν καὶ μὴ ἔθελον πάλιν καταβαίνειν παρ' ἐκεῖνοι τοὺς 25

dεσμώτας μηδὲ μετέχειν τῶν παρ' ἐκείνοι πόλον τε καὶ τιμοῦ, εἴπε

tagion, Embodies and imbrutes, till she quite lose. The divine property of her first being" (Comus 464 ff.). Through the

weight of these encumbrances the eye of the soul is turned down (cf. IX 386 A κατω δε βλέποντες και κεκυράτες εἰς γῆν

cαι εἰς τραπέζια κτλ.), nor can the soul look upwards until they are knocked away

(περικυψί: cf. περικυροθεύεσθαι in x 611 e). We may again compare the lines of

Milton “Mammon, the least erected spirit that fell From Heaven; for o’en in

Heaven his looks and thoughts Were always downward bent” (Par. Lost 1 679 ff.). For περικάτω cf. Phoebus περι-

κάτω τραπῆσθαι; αὕτη τῶν περιτραπῆ-

σεῖσται καὶ τῶν. The περι- balances περι-

in περιεστρέφετο just below. Instead of ἐδω-

δαι, Jackson suggests ἐδωδα, comparing III 389 Ε τῶν περὶ πότες καὶ ἀρφόδασα καὶ περὶ ἐδωδα ἱδώνων. The proposal is

attractive and may be right; but I think there is hardly sufficient reason for de-

parting from the MSS. See also on περι-

catō and the whole of this difficult and

highly important sentence, App. V.

519 B 10 ὅν εἰ ἀπαλλαγήν κτλ. For the

anacoluthon cf. Laws 810 D, E (Engel-


gratuitously adds τὰ before ἐφ' ᾧ. Cf.

519 A π. With the sentiment of VI 491 C, D nn., 494 C ff. nn. Plato may

well be thinking of Aleibades again.

The present passage is a conspicuous proof of the almost boundless influence which Plato ascribed to education, when applied to gifted natures.

519 C 16 σκοπόν—ἔνα κτλ. The εἰς

σκοπός of Plato’s guardians is the Idea of

Good, which is therefore clearly not only

a metaphysical but also an ethical con-

cept—the goal of conduct as well as the

ultimate cause of knowledge and exist-

ence. Cf. 540 A and App. III.

18 ἐκόντες εἶναι, I 436 E π. 19

τῶν οἰκίστων; the founders is

in explanatory opposition with ἡμετέροιο.

21 ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν. VI 505 A. 22 ἐδωδα τε κτλ. depends on ἀναγκαία

and explains ἀρφόδασα—μεγίστων (J. and

C.), τε balances καὶ before ἀφασίζων. This

explanation is better than to regard τε

as ‘and’ (with Schneider and D. and V.).
102 PLATÔNOS [519 D

φαιλότεραι εἰτε στουδαιότεραι. Ἐπειτ' ἐφ' ἀδικήσομεν αὐτοῖς, καὶ ποιήσωμεν χείρον ξῆν, δυνατὸν αὐτοῖς διν ἁμεῖν;

V. Ἐπελάθου, ἵνα δ' ἐγὼ, πάλιν, ὁ φίλε, ὅτι νόμω oὐ τοῦτο ἐμὲ μέλει, ὅπως ἐν τῷ γένος ἐν πόλει διαφέροντως εἴν πράξει, ἀλλ' ἐν ὁλῃ τῇ πόλει πολεύομεν μην ἀναγκάζεσθαι, ἐξωμαρμόττων τοὺς πολίτας πειθοὶ τε καὶ ἀνάγκη, ποιῶν μεταδίδοιναι ἀλλήλους τῆς ὀφελείας, ἵνα ἐκαστοι τὸ κοινὸν | δυνατοὶ ὠσὶν ὀφελεῖν, καὶ 520 αὐτοὶ ἐμποιοῖς τοιούτους ἀνδρὰς ἐν τῇ πόλει, οὐχ ἵνα ἀφίη τρέπεσθαι ὅπως ἐκαστὸς βουλέται, ἀλλ' ἵνα καταχρηται αὐτὸς αὐτός ἐπὶ τὸν ξύλῳς τῇ πόλεως. Ἀληθῆ, ἐφ' ἐπελαθόμην γάρ.

5 Σκέψαι τοίνυν, εἴπον, ὁ Γλαύκων, ὅτι οὐδ' ἀδικήσομεν τοὺς παρ' ἥμων φιλοσόφους γιγνομένους, ἀλλὰ δίκαια πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἐροῦμεν προσαναγάκαστες τὸν ἄλλον ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τε καὶ φυλάσσει. ἐροῦμεν γὰρ, ὅτι οἱ μὲν 1 ἐν ταῖς ἀλλαῖς πόλεσι τοιούτοι γιγνόμενοι θέλουσιν τοὺς ἐν αὐτῖς πόλεις αὐτοῖς πώς μετέχησον τὸν ἅμα τούτων ἀυτοίματοι γάρ ἐμ- 10 φυνοῦνται ἀρκοῦσης τῆς ἐν ἐκάστῃ πολιτείᾳ, δίκαια δ' ἐχεῖ τὸ γε αὐτοφυνὲς, μηδεὶς προφήν ὀφείλοι, μηδ' ἐκτίνειν τῷ προθυμεῖσθαι τὰ προφεία. ὑμᾶς δ' ἥμεις ὑμῖν τε αὐτοῖς τῇ τε ἄλλῃ πόλει ὁστέρεν ἐν σμέρειν ηγεμόνας τε καὶ βασιλέας ἐγεννήσαμεν, ἁμεῖνον τε καὶ

11. τῷ Π: τῷ Α.

27 ἐπεῖτα and ἔτσι are used like our 'what?' in indignant or quasi-indignant questions. Cf. Ὀστ. 466 C, Ἀρ. 28 B and elsewhere, with Blightes on Ἀρ. Ἀρ. 911. 519 D, Ἐ πελάθω ν κτλ. πᾶλιν does not mean that Glauco has forgotten twice, but only that he remembered before. The emphasis falls on ἐπελάθω rather than on πᾶλιν. Plato is thinking of ν 466 A, where Glauco says μέμνημαι when challenged on this point. To this explanation, which he gives as an alternative, Schneider inclines to prefer the view which sees in πᾶλιν a reference directly to ἅε 419 A. But the interlocutor there is Adimantus, not Glauco, and even Adimantus in 414 could not strictly be said to forget what Socrates for the first time expressly asserts (IV 420 B οὐ μὴ πρὸς τοῦτο—ἥ πᾶλιν) in reply to Adimantus' difficulties.

νώμῳ is the reading of all the best MSS, and was restored by Schneider for νομοθέτη. Law is personified throughout the whole sentence: cf. (with Schneider) Tim. 24 B. νομοθέτη gives a good sense, but is weaker than νώμῳ: Law, we feel, is free from selfishness and partiality, but a legislator need not be.

520 Α 4 ἐπὶ τὸν ξύλῳς is not 'so as to be the bond of the State' (as J. and C. suggest), but 'for binding the city together,' with reference to ξυμαρμόττων τοὺς πόλις. Cf. Laws 911 C. 5 τοιοῦν = 'further' (I 330 D n.). So-ocrates has not yet replied to Glauco's indignant ἀδικήσομεν αὐτοὺς; but proceeds to do so now.

οὖς ἀδικήσομαι: (besides what I have just said) we shall not be wronging them either. οὖς is used in the same way in Euthyph. 12 A and Laws 673 C. οὐ in οὖς cannot mean 'in spite of what you say' (as J. and C. imagine).

520 C 14 άμφοτέρων: “et publicorum negotiorum et philosophiae” Stallbaum. Cf. Gorg. 485 A ἄλλα, οἷα, τὸ ὅρθοταν οἷσθαν άμφοτέρων μετοχείν. Is the theo-

ητικός or the πρακτικός the better? It is clear that the subject was often de-
bated in Plato’s time: see the fragments of Euripides’ Ἀυτοφέρον in Pl. Gorg. 484 E ff. and Arist. Eth. Nic. 1 3. 1092b 17 ff., 7. 1177a 12 ff. If we contrast them with each other, Plato would reply, the theo-

ητικός easily wins the prize, but under the existing conditions of human nature the best life is a combination of both. The practical statesman must derive his in-
spiration from theoητις, and experience of affairs is an advantage as well as a duty to the thinker. Cf. VI 496 D—497 A ἡμ. 16 έγινεθέναι ταλ. Cf. 518 A ἡμ. 18 εἶδολα. 517 D ἡμ. The word is here used quite generally of all the idols of Plato’s cave. “We have risen to a point of view from which the σκέπαστα and the σκαλιά are included under one notion as εἰδώλα” (J. and C.). 19 ὑπάρ κατ. Cf. v 476 C. The Homeric line οὐκ ὑπάρ, ἄλλα ὑπάρ ἐσθόν, ὃ τοι τετελεσμένον ἐσται (Od. 19. 547) is in Plato’s mind, though ὑπάρ and ὑπάρ are here adverbial accusatives (cf. Cobet V. Ζ. 2 pp. 532 ff.). 20 σκιάμαχοιστῶν: ‘fights about shadows.’ See 517 D ἡμ. and cf. IX 586 C ἡμ. Dreamland is also shadowland. 520 D 23 ἐν πόλει ήτε κατ. On ή for ἐν see note on ἐν ἀπαρσον οἷσθα III 402 A. Van Cleef (de attr. in enunt. rel. u. Plut. p. 46) explains the construction as equival-

tent to ἐν ὑπάρ, comparing Μεν. 96 b, which is however (like Tim. 45 D) only an example of inverse attraction. 24 ταύτην: an anacoluthon, as in VI 510 E. For the sentiment see 1 347 D ἡμ. 25 σχοινίσων = ‘which gets’; a gnomic aorist participle. See Goodwin J. T. p. 55. Richards conjectures άψωσαν, and άψωσαν (which appears in the margin of A) has slight ms authority; but the inchoa-

tive sense (516 b ἡμ.) is better suited to οἱ μέλλοντες ἄρχειν. 27 έκαστοι. The plural implies re-
lays of governors relieving one another from time to time: cf. έκαστοι in 540 B. 28 μετ’ ἄλληλων κατ. “Far from the madding crowd’s ignoble strife,” ἐν τῷ καθαρῷ means ‘in the undefiled.’ The phrase is half-mystical, as καθαρός con-

tantly is in Plato. It is natural to think of the myth of the θάνατος (109 B ἡμ. αὐτῶν δὲ τὴν γίγαν καθαρὰν ἐν καθαρῷ κέδαται τῷ οὐραγῷ), but we should not translate “sub dive” (Ast), nor even “auf der rei-

nen Höhe” (Schneider). Either version is too precise, and ἐν καθαρῷ does not mean σὺ δίοι ἀνειν even in Homer. The Ideas in Plato are τὸ καθαρὸν: see Phaed. 79 D ἐκεῖσε σχέτοι εἰς τὸ καθαρὸν τε καὶ ἄλη ὑν καὶ ἀθάνατον καὶ ὀσάτως έχων.
in my opinion incorrect.
6 τάγαθον 'their good' (Bosanquet), hardly 'the chief good' (Jowett). Not possessing any ἴδια ἀγαθά in the shape of virtue, they are fain to make up for it at the expense of the State.

περιμάχητον κτλ. For the construction cf. (with J. and C.) Phaed. 69 b.

13 οὗ κτλ. The copula is rarely omitted in a relative clause except in statements of proportion like Gorg. 465 c. An example occurs in II 370 E: see also Kühner-Blass Gr. Gr. II 1 p. 41.

We ought not to revert to the old reading οἴσπερ for ὁ ἔπειρα βολεῖν (with q) and E. S. Thompson, Camb. Phil. Soc. Proc. XXI p. 14, who also suggests οἴσπερ ἔπειρεν, even if— which is far from clear—ὁ ἔπειρα can, as Thompson says, dispense with the copula more easily than ὁς.

521 c—523 a We have next to consider how we can lead our guardians up into the light. The studies which we re-
VI. Βούλευ τοῦτ’ ἡ δικαιοσύνη; τοῦτον τὸν τοιούτου έγγενέστασθαι, καὶ πώς τις ἀνάμει αὐτοῦς εἰς φόροι, ὀσπερ εἰς "Αἰδον λέγονται δὴ τινὲς εἰς θεοὺς ἀνέλθειν; Πῶς γὰρ οὐ βουλόμασται; ἐφη. Τούτο δή, ως εἰσελθειν, οὐκ ὀστράκον ἀν εἰ ἡ περιστροφή, ἀλλὰ ψυχής ἐπειραγωγὴ ἐκ νυκτερινῆς τινος ἡμέρας εἰς ἀληθείαν, τοῦ ὁπτὸς 
17. σκοπῶμεν Α"π: σκοπῶμεν Α!.

quire are such as will tend to draw the soul from Becoming to Being, and are at
the same time of some practical utility in
war. Our earlier training in
music will not serve the purpose; nor
yet will the mechanical arts. What do
you say to Number and Calculation,
which enter into every art and science?
Their importance in strategy is obvious,
and we shall find that they do emphatically,
if rightly used, lead the soul towards
Intelligence and Being.
521 c ff. For Plato’s theory of the
higher education see Appendix II on
The Paedagogic Studies of the Republic
and Appendix III on Dialogetic.
19 λέγονται δὴ τινὲς κτλ. With εἰς
θεοὺς ἀνέλθεν cf. Plat. de ser. num. viind. 566 λ ἔλεγεν δὲ ταῦτα τῶν Δίονυσον εἰς
θεοὺς ἀνέλθεν. If Plato’s words are
to be taken in their full significance, we
shall hardly (with J. and C.) suppose that
the allusion is to Heracles, Pollux etc.,
for Heracles’ descent to Hades was an
incident which happened long before his
ascent to Heaven; and Pollux’s life among
the gods was intermittent. Cf. Schneider
in his translation p. 304 n. 187. Schneider
himself suggests that Plato is thinking of
legends about e.g. Aesculapius’ deliverance
from Hades, after Zeus had smitten him
(cf. III 408 C and Roscher’s Lexicon
a. Mythologica I p. 629), and others have
thought of Bion and of the ἵκατογχηροι:
see Il. 1 402—405 and cf. Iles. Thes. 617—721. Mr Walter Headlam has
pointed out to me that Semele was also
raised from Hades to Heaven, citing
Paus. Π 31. 2 and ib. 37. 5: cf. also
Plut. l.c. Δίονυσον εἰς θεοὺς ἀνέλθεν καὶ
tὸν Σεμέλαν ἀνέγειρεν ὀστερον. These
examples are certainly more to the point.
It is worthy of remark that Justin Martyr
in a remarkable passage of his Apologia
pro Christianis speaks of the ascent of
Asclepius and others into Heaven as Pagan
parallels to the Christian doctrine of the
Ascension: Ἰσσων Χριστὸν—σταυρόθεντα καὶ ἀποθανόντα καὶ ἀναστάστα ἀνελθεῖν
eis τῶν οὐρανῶν, οὔ περ’ τοὺς παρ’ ὑμᾶς λεγο-
μένους νοῦς τῶν Δίκαιων τε φέρεται, τόσον γὰρ νοῦς φάσκως τοῦ Δίου οὐ παρ’ ὑμῖν τιμώμενοι συγγραφεῖς ἑπιστάσθης,
"Ερμής μὲν λόγον τῶν ἐρμηνευτικῶν καὶ παντὸς διδασκαλοῦν Ἀσκληπιόν δὲ καὶ θεα-
πευτήν γενόμενον, κεραυνοθετά, ἀνελθεῖ-
ναι εἰς υἱοθετὸν Δίονυσον δεὶς παρα-
χεῖτα κτλ. (I. c. 121: cf. also Dialogue sive
Tryphone 69). I was once half inclined
to suspect that the clause ὀστερον εἰς οἴνῳ
—ἀνέλθειν (although it appears in all MSS)
might be an early satirical adscript by
some Pagan scribe on the doctrine of our
Lord’s descent into Hell, and subsequent
resurrection and ascent into Heaven.
These might well be a specific allusion
(518 B n.), and there is more than a
suspicion of satire in δη. But I have
no longer any doubt that the text is
sound.
20 ὀστράκον—περιστροφή. On the
different interpretations given by the
ancients of this proverb see App. VI. The
proverb is derived from the game of
ὀστρακίνθα, the authorities for which are
cited by Grasberger Erziehung u. Unter-
richt 1 pp. 57—60. The players were
divided into two parties, separated by a
line. A shell, black on one side, and
white on the other, was thrown on the
ground by one of the boys, who shouted
νῦν ἡμέρα or νῦν ἔτη, 'Heads or Tails,'
as he threw it. According as the white
or black fell uppermost, one side ran
away and the other gave chase. Plato
means that education is not, like the
‘spinning of a coin,’ an affair of no
consequence, to be settled off-hand, and by
chance, but a slow and laborious scientific
process, dealing with the gravest of all
possible issues. See also App. VI.
ψυχής περιαγωγή κτλ.: ‘the turning
round of a soul from a day which is
as night into the true day, that is,
the ascent into Being’ (not the traversing
in γένομενον, which is the νυκτερινὴ ἡμέρα).
In νυκτερινῆς τινος ἡμέρας (for which see
520 C n.) Plato, more sue, plays on the
οὖναν ἑπάνωδον, ἢν δὴ φιλοσοφίαν ἀληθής φήσομεν εἰναι. Πάνω μὲν οὖν. Ὡκεῖοι δὲι σκοπεῖσθαι, τι τῶν μαθημάτων ἔχει τοιαύτην ἰδυναμίν; Πῶς γὰρ οὖ; Τί ἔν τούθι εἰ; ὁ Γλαύκων, μάθημα ψυχῆς. 25 ὁ λόγον ἀπὸ τοῦ γεγομένου ἔπι τὸ ὄν; τὸδε δ΄ ἐννοοῦ λέγων ἡμαῖς οὔκ ἀληθές μέντοι πολέμου ἐφαμεν τούτοις ἀναγκαίον εἶναι νέους ὄντας; Ἡ ἐφαμεν γάρ. Δεῖ ἃρα καὶ τοῦτο προσέχειν τὸ μάθημα, ὁ ζητοῦμεν, πρὸς ἐκείνῳ. Τὸ ποίον; Ἔνα ἀχρόνον πολεμικὸς ἀνδρόσιν εἶναι. Δεῖ μέντοι, ἐφή, ἐπερ ὁλόν τε. Γυμναστικὴ 1 μὴν E 30 καὶ μουσικὴ ἐν γε τῷ πρόσθεν ἐπαιδεύοντο ἢμῖν. Ἡν ταύτα, ἐφή. Γυμναστικὴ μὲν ποῖ τι γυγρόμενον καὶ ἀπολλύμενον τετεύτακεν, σώματος γὰρ ἀξίζεις καὶ φύσεως ἐπιστατεῖ. Φανεῖται. Τοῦτο μὲν δὴ οὐκ ἄν έφη δ ζητοῦμεν μάθημα. Οὐ γὰρ. 'Ἀλλ' 522 ἀρα μουσικὴ ὀσὴν τὸ πρότερον δυσλαβομεν; 'Ἀλλ' ἂν ἐκείνη γ', ἐφη, ἀντιστροφὸς τῆς γυμναστικῆς, εἰ μέμνησαι, ἔθεσι παιδεύουσα τοὺς φύλακας, κατά τε ἁρμονιάν εὐαρμοστίᾳ τινα, οὐκ ἐπιστήμην, 5 παραδοῦσα, καὶ κατὰ ῥυθμὸν εὐρυθμίαν, ἐν τε τοῖς λόγοις ἐτέρα τούτων ἄδελφα, ἐφη, ἀτά ἕχουσα, καὶ ὁσὶ μυθόδεις τῶν λόγων.

29. γυμναστικὴ—μουσικὴ Π: γυμναστικὴ—μουσικὴ Α.

exclamation 'νοε ἡμέρα'; cf. IV 422 D, E nn. (It may be noted that Plato's adaptation is from νοε ἡμέρα rather than from νοε ἡμέρα.) The words τοῦ διτοῦ—ἐπανοδον explain the figure, oáso 'that is' being used as in φοβαν oásoν βάδον 528 D. The daylight in which the ἀναιδεύσωσ lives is darkness; the true day is the ascent of the soul out of the ὅρατος and doxaστασ in to the φοβαν: cf. 517 B τῆν δὲ anābasion καὶ θέαν τῶν ἄνω τῆν εἰς τὸν φοβαν τότον τῆς ἑσύν άνοδον τινες oáso ἀναρχέτης τῆς γ ἐνεύς ελπίδος. This and this alone is true philosophy. The phrase τῆν τοῦ διτοῦ ἐπανοδον is copied by Alcinous from Plato (Leg. p. 7 ed. Hermann). Cf. also Clement Strom. v 14 p. 106 Migne ψυχῆς περιαγογῆ ἐκ νυκτερινῆ ποὺς ἡμέρας εἰς ἀληθείν τοῦ διτοῦ (v. n. II. δῖτον and δῖτον δῖτον) oásoν ἐπανοδον κτλ. Other views on the text and interpretation of this passage are discussed in App. VI.

521 D 26 μέντοι. For μέντοι in questions see on 1 339 B.

ἐφαμεν. Cf. ΙΙΙ 403 E, 416 D and VIII 543 B.

27 δεί ἃρα κτλ. The subject of προσέχειν is τὸ μάθημα δ ζητοῦμεν: its object is τούτο. With προσέχειν 'insuper habere' (a rare use) cf. προσγειώσαθα II 375 E nn. 521 E 30 ἐν γε τῷ πρόσθεν. II 376 E ff.

32 τετεύτακεν, τετάτακων πραγματεύομεν, ἐνδιατριβῶν (Tim. Leg. s.v., where Ruhnken elaborately illustrates the word. See also Stephanus-Hase Thes. s.v.). τετάτακω is always, I believe, semi-contemplative in Plato (Phil. 56 E, Tim. 90 b). Bruggmann's connection of the word with διαω (Vergl. Gr. i p. 362) may not be right, but the notion that τετάτακω is for τατατάω (L. and S.) certainly wrong.

522 A 2 δὴν κτλ. There is (as J. and C. remind us) a sense in which philosophía itself is μουσική: cf. ΙΙΙ 403 C n. and vi 499 D.

3 ἀντίστροφος κτλ. is best explained by ΙΙΙ 410 C—412 Α, and κατὰ τὰ ἀρμονίαν—εὐρυθμίαν by ΙΙΙ 400 D, E.

5 τοῖς λόγοις. II 377 ff., III 392 A ff.

6 ἐφη is repeated as in Philod. 78 A: cf. i 348 D n. and VIII 555 C, Euthydi. 296 D (ὑπ' δ' ἐγώ repeated). Here "iteratum ἐφη—eticam, ut ita dicam, vim habet" (Schneider). I formerly omitted the word (with Flor. T), but now believe it genuine. ἐφη (ΠΠ, v and two other MSS,
with Eusebius Praep. Evn. xiv 13. 3) is unsuitable in point of sense, and also because of ἄττα. 7 ἀληθινώτεροι: not = 'more true' but 'true on the other hand.' The comparative only points the contrast with μιθῶδεσις: cf. Homer's well-known γνακικών ἧδυπεράνων. πρὸς τοιούτου τι κτλ.: 'useful for any such purpose as you now require,' ἀγάθον goes with πρὸς, cf. with Schneider Xen. Mem. i. 6. 10 ὁ δ' οὖν τοὺς μὲν ἀγάθους πρὸς τὰ δεῦρα καὶ ἐπικίνδυνα δίτας ἀνδρέους ἥγει εἰς ὑμᾶς, τοὺς δὲ κακούς δειλοὺς. The words ὀνόμαζε—ζητεῖται are equivalent to πρὸς ὀνομαζόμενος. ζητεῖται sc. μάθημα ἀγάθου εἶναι: cf. ἐν πολλὲς ὡς ἐν πολλὲς ἐν ὡς (520 D n.), and (for ἄριθμον with infinitive) IV 443 B. The Oxford editors connect ἄγαθον with τοιοῦτον and not with μάθημα, referring ὅν τοῦν νῦν ἄγαθον 'probably to μάθημα'—a highly unnatural interpretation, because it separates ὀνόμαζε from τοιοῦτον, and leaves πρὸς out in the cold. ἄγαθον ( γρ II and Eusebius l. c.) for ἀγάθον is an obvious but wholly unnecessary 'emendation.' The present passage is Plato's authoritative statement of the relation between his two curricula of education. The aim of the first is morality, and its method habitation; in the second knowledge is attained by a scientific discipline. Cf. II 376 E, VI 502 E nnn. 522 B 10 α' τε κτλ. On τε used ἀνακολούθως see II 373 B n. "Quid addere Socrates in animo habuerit, Glaucionis intercipientis verba docent: καὶ μὲν τί ἐγὼ ἀλλο λειταρία μάθημα" (Schneider). ii εἶδον. VI 495 D. 522 C 15 διάνοια seriously means the mathematical sciences here, as J. and C. suggest, but simply 'modes of thought': cf. VI 511 D n. Plato does not, I believe, use the plural of διάνοια in its peculiar technical sense, and in any case such a meaning is here unsuitable. 17 τοῦ ἐν τε κτλ. Cf. Laws 818 C μήτε ἐν μήτε δύο μήτε τρία μήτε δύο μήτε δύο ἡταν καὶ περιττὰ δύομενοι γυναικεῖς, μηδὲ ἄριθμον τοῦ παραπένθει. (Epistles) 177 C. 18 ἄριθμον τε καὶ λογισμὸν. See on λογισμική τε καὶ ἀριθμητική 525 A. 522 D 22 ἐν ταῖς τραγῳδίαις κτλ. Plato speaks as if he were bored to death by Palamedes' damnable iteration. Plays on the subject of Palamedes were written by all three dramatists (see the fragments of Aeschylus 186 ff., Sophocles 426 ff., Euripides 582 ff. Dindorf), and the invention of number or the like is ascribed
to him by Aesch. Ic. Soph. Fr. 379 and Eur. Ic. Aeschylus also gives Prometheus the credit of the discovery (P. V. 459 f.).

27 καίτοι κτλ. 'Well, what do you think of Agamemnon for a general now?' καίτοι (lit. 'and yet' sc. if this was true) is often thus used to introduce a question 'cum quadam indignatione' (real or, as here, feigned); for examples see Kugler de part. toi ap. Pl. p. 18. τοῦ πνεύματος is derivative, as πνεύματος constantly is: see on 1530 A. D. and V.'s translation "Yet do you think that Agamemnon as a general?" misses the φύσεως of the original, which is correctly reproduced by Schneider and Jowett.

522 E 30 καὶ λαβηξεθαὶ τε κτλ. καὶ 'also,' because 'et aliarum rerum et arithmetice peritum imperatorem esse decet' (Schneider). Cf. VI 505 A. The word is omitted by II 7 Ψ and some other MSS. καί may of course be spurious, but it was not likely to have been added by a scribe, and the balance of MS evidence is in its favour. The other variants (ἡ and ὁ τό and μᾶλλον ἡ in place of καί) are corruptions due to the erroneous idea that ἀλλὰ τί is 'any other' and not 'nonne.'

31 μᾶλλον δὲ κτλ. μᾶλλον δὲ is 'vel potius,' as usual. ἄνθρωπος = 'human being,' not 'anything of a man' (D. and V.), which suggests an entirely wrong idea. We may compare the Latin use of homo, for example in Cic. ad Quinct. II 11. 5 'sed cum veneris, virum te putabo, si Sallusti Empedoclea legeris: hominem non putab.' For the sense cf. Laws 819 D, where the Greek ignorance of arithmetic appears to Plato ὁκ ἄνθρωποι ἄλλα ὄργανα τῶν εἰναι μᾶλλον δρεμάτων. The knowledge of number is one of the characteristic differences between man and the lower animals: see Tim. 39 B and [Epin.] 978 C.

523 A 1 φύσεως belongs to ἀγώνων (Schneider) rather than to εἰναι (Stallbaum and others), as is clear from the antithesis χρεσθαι δ' οὖνες αὐτῷ ὀρθῶς (explained in 525 C).

3 τὸ γ' ἐμοὶ δοκοῦν. Cf. 517 B 11. Plato is careful to eschew the appearance of dogmatism, even where his convictions are most profound.

523 A—524 C I distinguish (says Socrates) between two classes of perceptions, those which stimulate the intellect, and which those which do not. To the former belong all such sense-presentations as are self-contradictory. We have here, for example, three fingers. Slight tells us that each is a finger. So far there is no contradiction and the intellect is not roused. But it is otherwise with size and smallness, thickness and thinness, and the like. The perception which reports that such-and-such a thing is hard frequently tells us that it is also soft, and the same, mutatis mutandis, may be said of all perceptions which deal with relative qualities of this kind. In such cases the soul is perplexed, and appeals to the intellect for help. The intellect, promptly respond-
ing, apprehends 'great' and 'small' (for example) as distinct and separate from one another, unlike the senses, by which they were seen together and in confusion. It is thus that we are first led to ask 'What is the great?' 'What is the small?'

523 ff. In this section of the Republic, Plato ascribes the originating impulse of his intellectual discipline to the stimulus supplied by the self-contradictory evidence of sense-perception. On the connexion of this principle with earlier Greek philosophy see 523 c n., and on the aim and scope of Plato's theory of Education as a whole App. II.

8 ὃς ἰκανὸς κτλ. is taken by Krohn (Pl. Fr. p. 91) as excluding the possibility of Ideas of concrete things. Such an inference is unwarranted. ἰκανός, 'adequately' 'satisfactorily' (cf. ε βelow), does not imply that sensation can apprehend everything there is to know about e.g. a finger, but merely that in the case of a finger etc., sensible perception is as a rule all that we demand: we are not impelled to summon νοησις to our aid. Even the perception of a finger may awaken the intelligence, and in such cases we shall be led to the idea of finger (523 b n.).

9 ὃς τῆς αἰσθήσεως κτλ. On αἰσθήσις see 523 c n. πουλόνης has been doubted by Ast, who conjectures νοοματις; "sed αἰσθήσεως non est vocum" (Schneider). The Greek means 'produces no sound result.' 'nichts zuverlässiges gibt' (Schneider): the product of sensation is, in such cases, ἐπιστήμην or νοοματις. For οὐδὲν γίγας metaphorically used c., Philol. 90 ε. and (with Schneider) Ar. Plut. 50, 355 (πρὸς ἀνόρδα ὑμέν οὐδὲν γίγας έστι εἰργασμένον).

10 τὰ πόρρωτα κτλ. readily suggest themselves to Glauco, for they were familiar examples of optical delusion in the Platonic school: cf. (for πόρρωτα φανωμένα) Ἱερ. 356 c, θεατ. 191 B, infra x 602 c ff., and (for σκηναγραφήματα) 365 c n.

523 c 13 αἰσθήσις. Strictly speaking, of course, αἰσθήσις by itself does not, and cannot, present us with a judgment of any kind. It merely furnishes a particular sensation, which is referred to our mental picture of the objects in question, and the resulting judgment is not αἰσθήσις, but δέξα, which is, according to Plato, a combination of μνήμη and αἰσθήσις (see Phil. 38 B ff. with Bury's notes). And in point of fact, the sort of contradictory judgments which are here ascribed to the initial step in the psychological process, viz. αἰσθήσις (524 Α.), have already been attributed to δέξα in V 479 Β.—479 Ε. We have already seen that Plato throughout the whole of this part of the Republic is not careful to distinguish between αἰσθητόν (especially ὅμοιόν) and δύσοιστον (V 510 Α. n.); and the same tendency shows itself again here. But in this part of the dialogue, Plato's argument is no way affected by his imperfect analysis of the psychological process involved in such a judgment as 'This is a finger.' The relevant consideration is that in such cases the intellect is not, as a rule, aroused, and this is equally true whether we regard the judgment as an act of αἰσθήσις alone or as the joint product of αἰσθήσις and μνήμη.
15 μᾶλλον τοῦτο ἢ τὸ ἐναντίον δηλοῖ, εἶτ' ἐγκύθεν προσπίπτουσα εἰτε πόρρωθεν. ὥσε δὲ ἡ λέγω σαφέστερον εἰσεί. οὖντο, φαμέν, τρεῖς ἂν εἰεν δάκτυλοι, ὃ τε σμικρότατος καὶ ὁ δεύτερος καὶ ὁ μέσος. Πάντως, ἐφ. Ὡς ἐγκύθεν τοῖς ὀραμένως λεγόντος μου διανοοῦ. ἀλλὰ μοι περὶ αὐτῶν τάδε σκόπει. Τὸ ποίον; Δάκτυλος μὲν 20 αὐτῶν φαίνεται ὁμοίως ἐκαστὸς, καὶ τὰύτη γε οὐδὲν διαφέρει, εἰάν D τε ἐν μέσῳ ὅραται εάν τ' ἐν ἐσχάτω, εάν τε λευκός εάν τε μέλας, εάν τε παχύς εάν τε λεπτός, καὶ πάν ὃ τε τοιοῦτον. ἐν πᾶσι γὰρ τούτοις οὐκ ἀναγκάζεται τῶν πολλῶν ἡ ψυχὴ τὴν νόησιν ἑπερεθῆ, τι ποτ' ἐστι δάκτυλος• οὐδαμοῦ γὰρ ἡ ὄψις αὐτῇ ἣμα ἐσήμερως 25 τοῦ δάκτυλου τοῦναντίον ἢ δάκτυλον εἶναι. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν, ἐφ. Ὁύκοις, ἢν ο' ἐγώ, εἰκότως τὸ γε τοιοῦτον νοῆσως οὐκ ἂν παρακλητικόν οὐδ' ἐγερτικὸν εἶχ. Εἰκότως. Τί δὲ δή; τὸ μέγεθος Ε αὐτῶν καὶ τὴν σμικρότητα ἡ ὄψις ἀρα ικανός ὀρᾶ, καὶ οὐδέν αὐτῇ διαφέρει ἐν μέσῳ τινὰ αὐτῶν κεῖσθαι ἢ ἐπ' ἐσχάτω; καὶ ὁσαύτως 30 παχὺς καὶ λεπτότητα ἡ μαλακότητα καὶ σκληρότητα ἡ ἀφί'; καὶ

15 εἴτ' ἐγκύθεν κτλ. (like ὡς ἐγκύθεν etc. below) is said to prevent misapprehension, in view of Glanemo's τὰ πορρωθέν etc. in B.

16 ὥσε δὲ κτλ. The best commentary on the following exposition is Phaed. 101 A ff., especially 102 B ff.; cf. also Theaet. 154 C. These passages should be carefully read in connexion with the view enunciated here. I have endeavoured to explain some of the wider bearings of Plato's principle in a pamphlet on Classical Education published by Deighton, Bell and Co. 1895; see also App. II and Nettleship Hellen. pp. 152 ff. We should bear in mind that the antithesis of ἐν and πολλά was the fons et origo of Greek philosophy, and runs throughout its entire history. In Plato's time the question had become acute in connexion particularly with the problem of predication, and it was in trying to solve this special form of the antithesis that Plato devised his theory of Ideas. Nothing could be more natural or just than that his philosopher-kings should receive their first scientific impulse from the problem which had proved so great an intellectual stimulus in the past, and which had also led Plato himself to the goal whither he would have his guardians arrive, the contemplation of the Idea.

523 D 30 ἐναντιεμιμήσω κτλ.: i.e. εἴναι τε ἐν μέσῳ ἢ ὁ ὀραμένος κτλ. This is said with reference to their size: cf. E below and Phaed. 102 B, C, where the difficulty is explained by the theory of Ideas. Thus β is both great and small, great relatively to σ, small relatively to c. Similarly with the other antinomies. The Philobus dismisses such puzzles as τὰ διδυμιμένα τῶν μαθητῶν περὶ τὸ ἐν καὶ πολλά (14 D)—an indication perhaps of the priority in date of the Republic (cf. vii 505 C n. and Jackson in J. Ph. X pp. 203 ff.).

23 ἀναγκάζεται is said of the 'Drang nach Wahrheit': cf. 524 C, E, 525 D and 518 E ff. It is not the 'nature' of Soul to acquiesce in falsehood: for man is an ῥαίριον φυτόν, οὐκ ἐγκύθεν (IV 443 B n.).

24 οὐδαμοὺ: 'at no stage' viz. in the psychological process, not exactly 'never' (as Jowett, D. and V. etc.).
524 a 2 paragγέλλει κτλ.: 'intimates to the soul that the same thing is both hard and soft when it perceives it to be so.' With paragγέλλει (needlessly suspected by Stephanus) cf. Tim. 70 ι τού λόγου παραγγέλλαντος ὡς τις ἄδικος περὶ αὐτά γίνεται πρᾶξ. The English translators, together with Schneider, appear to take ὡς with αἰσθανομένη ("that it feels the same thing to be both hard and soft" D. and V.). But such a construction is difficult (cf. Kühner Cr. Gr. 11 p. 652) and the meaning scarcely satisfactory. It should be remembered that touch does not always report that an object is both hard and soft, but only when it feels the object hard in relation to one thing and soft in relation to another, and similarly in other cases. This limitation is expressed by αἰσθανομένη (as well as by ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις), and explains its emphatic position. I have sometimes thought that <οὕτως> should be added after αἰσθανομένη, but the object can be supplied from ὡς—μαλακόν. Prantl understands the construction in somewhat the same way as I do.

5 ἀπορεῖν. The word is Socratic: see on 515 D. It is worthy of note that Plato, like Socrates, makes intellectual ἀπορία the beginning of Education. See App. II.

αὕτη ἡ αἰσθήσις means 'this present sensation,' not the sense of touch in general, and similarly with ἡ τοῦ κοίνου κτλ., which J. and C. erroneously understand as a special sense, apparently the same which modern philosophers call the sense of resistance.' But Plato nowhere recognises any such sense, and if he did, he would call it ἡ τοῦ κοίνου καὶ βαρός, and not ἡ τοῦ κοίνου καὶ ἡ τοῦ βαρέως. The parallel in τί ποτε σημαίνει—λέγει shews that Plato means: 'what do the sensation of light and the sensation of heavy mean by light and heavy, if they indicate, the one that the heavy is light and the other that the light is heavy?' The last clause contains an elegant chiasmus. Schneider understands αὕτη ἡ αἴσθησις as ἡ αἴσθησις τοῦ σκληροῦ, but it is better taken as deictic: cf. 516 B, 533 C. Otherwise his view agrees with mine.

524 B 8 ἀποροι. Herderwen's ἀποροι is an elegant conjecture, in view of ἀπορεῖν in A and 524 E; but the text is more forcible. 9 ἐμπνεύσει = 'communications,' not 'interpretations,' as D. and V. translate. ἀισθάνεσθαι is as it were the ἐμπνεύσει καὶ ἀγγέλοις (Cran. 307 E) between the object of the perception and the soul; cf. παραγγέλλει in A.

10 λογισμὸν. See on λογιστικῶς 525 B. 12 οὐκόν εἶναι κτλ. Thus: Perception reports 'This finger' (let us say) 'is big-and-little.' Thereupon the soul is puzzled (ἀπορεῖ), and calls in νόησις. If big-and-little appear (viz. to νόησις) not one but two, then each of them appears distinct from the other, and one: cf. ν 479 A and Parm. 143 D. 'Accordingly—if each appears one, and both together two—νόησις, conceiving as it does of two (τὰ γε δύο), will conceive of them as separate; for otherwise it would
have conceived, not of two, but of one.  
Plato’s object is to make out that νόησις, in order to clear up the συγκεκριμένον τι of sensation (διὰ τὴν τούτων σαφήνειαν) is compelled to view sensation’s μέγα-και-σμικρόν (for example) separately, i.e. as τὸ μέγα and τὸ σμικρὸν. These antinomies consequently force us to ask: ‘What is the great?’ ‘What is the small?’ etc.; and just herein consists their periagogic or educative value, for to such questions the theory of Ideas alone furnishes an adequate and final answer (Phaed. 99 b ff.). κεχωρισμένα νόησις perhaps = ‘are separate to νόησις,’ but the ordinary view, which understands νόησις as subject to νοσεῖ, is better. It may have been this passage of the Republic, or Phaed. 96 e ff., or both which inspired the line of Theopompus ὅ ἐκ δύο μικρὸν (sic) ἐν λόγῳ, ὡς φιλόσοφον Πλάτων (D. L. 111 26).

524 c 15 καὶ ὅψεις: ‘sight also’ sc. as well as νόησις.
17 ἡμαγκάδη. See 523 d n.
524 c — 526 c Now consider — to which of these classes do number and ‘one’ belong? Our perception of ‘one’ is self-contradictory; for any unit which we see, we see both as one and as infinite in number. This is also true of number generally, since it is true of ‘one.’ The science of number is therefore a suitable study on educational as well as on utilitarian grounds, provided it is pursued in such a way as to lead the soul from visible to the invisible numbers of true mathematics. We may add that arithmetical studies are an excellent test of general capacity, a good intellectual discipline, and difficult.

524 d ff. On Plato’s treatment of ἀριθμητική — i.e. the Science of Number, not Arithmetic in the modern sense of the word: see on 525 a — reference may be made to Blass de Platone mathematico (Bonae 1861), Cantor Gesch. d. Mathen. pp. 183 ff., and especially Rothlaub’s excellent monograph Die Mathem. z. Platonos Zeit u. s. Beziehungen zu ihr (Jena 1878) pp. 19—49. See also App. II.

524 d 27 ποτέρων is intrinsically better than πότερον, which has considerable ms authority (including A1, E and M1), and is read by Hermann and Baiter. Cf. τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἢ ἐν εἰς κτλ. 535 a. For the error see Introd. § 5.
525 B] ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΣ Z 113

\[\text{ὀσπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ δακτύλου ἑλέγομεν: εἶ δ' ἀεί τι αὐτὸ ἀμα ὅραται ἐναντίωμα, ὅστε μηδὲν μάλλον ἐν ἐκ καὶ τοῦναντίον φαίνεσθαι, τοῦ ἐπικρινοῦντος δὴ δέωι ἄν ἤδη καὶ ἀναγκάζοιτ' ἂν ἐν αὐτῷ ψυχὴ ἀπορεῖν καὶ ξητεῖν κινοῦσα ἐν ἐαυτῇ τὴν ἐννοεῖν καὶ ἀνερτάν, τι

525 ποτε ἐστιν αὐτὸ τὸ ἐν, καὶ οὗτοι τῶν ἀγωγῶν ἐν εἰν καὶ μετα-

35 στρεπτικῶν ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ ὄντος θέαν ἡ περὶ τὸ ἐν μάθησιν. Α' Ἀλλ' μέντοι, ἐφη, τοῖοτο γ' ἔχει οὐχ ἡκιστα ἡ περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ὄψις: ἀμα γὰρ ταῦτα ὡς ἐν τὸ ὄρῳ καὶ ὡς ἀπειρα τὸ πλήθος. Ὑποκεῖν ἐπί τὸ ἐν, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, καὶ ἧμπτας ἀριθμός ταύτων πέποθει τοῦτο; Πῶς 5 δ' οὖ; 'Αλλ' ἡ μη λογιστικῇ τε καὶ ἁριθμητικῇ περὶ ἁριθμῶν πάσα.

Β Καὶ μάλα. Ταῦτα δὲ γε φαίνεται ἀγωγά 1 πρὸς ἄλλων. 'Τρι-

5 φυοῦσι μὲν οὖν. Ἡν ξητούμεν ἄρα, ὡς έοικε, μαθημάτων ἂν εἰς ζηλο-

10 μεικίῳ μὲν γὰρ διὰ τὰς τάξεις ἀναγκαῖον μαθεῖ ταῦτα, φιλο-

σόφῳ δὲ διὰ τὸ τῆς οὐσίας ἀπτέων εἶναι γενέσθεν ἐξαναθυτι, ἢ το-

μηδέποτε λογιστικῷ γενέσθαι. 'Εστὶ ταῦτ', ἐφη, 'Ὁ δὲ γε ἦμέρεος

5. τοῦτο II: τοῦτω Α.

624 Ε 31 έ η δ' ἀεί τι κτλ. Λ visible ἐν is always seen both as ἐν and πολλά (one wood, many trees; one tree, many branches etc.).

33 ἐν αὐτῷ is not ἐν τῷ ἐν, but 'in the case in question,' 'in such a case,' 'dabei' (Schneider): cf. I 339 E n.

35 αὐτῷ τὸ ἐν. See on αὐτῶν τῶν ἁριθμῶν 515 D.

525 Α 3 ἡ περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὄψις. I formerly read αὐτό instead of τοῦ αὐτοῦ with Ζ and a few inferior MSS. αὐτό, which Bekker, Schneider and Stallbaum adopt, is easier, but lacking in authority; and τοῦ αὐτοῦ is in reality more elegant. The marked antithesis between ἡ περὶ τὸ ἐν μάθησις ('the intellectual apprehen-

10 sion of the one') and ἡ περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὄψις ('the visual apprehension of the same') makes it clear that τοῦ αὐτοῦ means 'the same' as that with which ἡ μάθησις was concerned (viz. τὸ ἐν), and not (as Herrmann imagined) 'one and the same object of vision' (like ταύτῳ presently). Plato may have deliberately employed the two forms τοῦ αὐτοῦ and ταύτῳ in order to dis-

15 sociate them from one another. Καὶ ἧμπτες ἁριθμὸς κτλ. Because ἁριθμὸς is τοῦ ἐκ μονάδων συγκελέσομεν πλῆθος (Eulcid vii def. 2), or in other words a σύνταγμα μονάδων (Theo Smyrn. p. 18 ed. Hillel), and thus for example a visible three (i.e. three visible things) presents us with three separate cases of the contrast between ἐν and πολλά.

Τοῦτο (see cr. n.) is preferable to τοῦτω, which appears in no MS except Α, and would be superfluous after εἰπεῖν τὸ ἐν. Two MSS do in point of fact omit the word altogether.

6 λογιστικῇ τε καὶ ἁριθμητικῇ. Greek mathematicians distinguished be-

20 tween ἁριθμητικῇ 'the science of numbers' and λογιστικῇ 'the art of calculation' (Gow Greek Math. p. 23). It has been doubted whether Plato also held this distinction; but a comparison of Gorg. 451 B, 453 E, Theaet. 198 A (on ἁριθμητικῇ) with Gorg. 451 C, Charm. 196 A, Pol. 259 E (on λογιστικῇ) proves that he did (Rothlaub, l. c. pp. 19—21). Plato does not insist on the distinction here, but we may reasonably suppose that his pupils would begin with λογισμῷ (λογι-

25 στικῇ) and rise from thence to ἁριθμητικῇ: cf. C, D and Laws 817 E, 819 A ff. See also on λογιστικῷ in B.

7 ταῦτα: i.e. τά του ἁριθμοῦ.

525 Β 7 ἀλήθειαν: viz. the Ideas, and ultimately the Idea of Good (517 B).

10 γενέσθωσιν. See on 519 A.

11 λογιστικῷ: 'a reasoning proficient in the art of calculation,' with a play on λογισμός in its deeper sense, as

A. P. II.
Shorey points out (Chicago Studies 1 p. 222 n. 4), comparing the double meaning of αρτομοί in IV 434 D. logismoi in 524 B prepared the way for this; and the same ambiguity partly explains why Plato puts λογιστική rather than ἀριθμητική in the forefront of this discussion (cf. λογιστικὴ below and logismoi in C). We readily feel that λογιστική will arouse to λογιστικῶν. Cf. also x 662 ε. n. 13 καὶ πείδευν. προσήκοιν ἄν εἴη is carried on: cf. I 334 B n. and infra 520 B. J. and C.'s explanation, that "μάθημα (or αὐτό) is to be repeated in the accusative after νομοθετῆσαι and πείδευν ἐτι λογιστικὴν λέγει," is untenable.

14 τῶν μεγίστων is idiomatically used of government: cf. 534 D and Apol. 22 D with my note ad loc.

525 C 15 θέαν—αὐτή. The 'nature of numbers' cannot be fairly seen except in their connexion with the Good and with all other νοητά (VI 511 D—D nn.). Plato does not of course imply that ἀριθμητική by itself will achieve this result (although it may be doubted whether some of his successors did not exalt the science to something like this dignity: see e.g. the Ἐπικονίτι): neither ἀριθμητική nor all the propædeutic studies taken together will ever carry us so far. He only means that the student, having once set foot on the ladder, must not re-descend until he reaches the Good. Then and then only will he understand the 'nature of numbers' i.e. the Ideas of 1, 2, etc., because only then will he know Numbers dialectically (VI 511 B). On the use of φῶς see X 597 B n.

16 τῇ νοητῇ αὐτή: 'by thought alone.' αὐτό is 'by itself' i.e. (in this case) unadulterated with αἰθροῦσα: cf. 525 D n. and supra IV 437 E, 438 B, 510 B, D nn.

18 ἡμέρας. A few inferior MSS add καί after this word: A alone has ἡμέρας τε. I agree with Schneider in holding that the conjunctions are interpolated to avoid the concurrence of genitives, in which there is, however, no difficulty at all: cf. V 449 A. n.

20 νῦν καὶ ἐννοια. Cf. (with J. and C.) II 370 A ἐννοοῖ γὰρ καὶ αὐτῶν ἐπιστῶς ἀσός.

λογισμοῖς: see on λογιστικῆ in B.

525 D 24 αὐτῶν τῶν ἀριθμῶν: 'numbers themselves,' e.g. 1, 2, 3, 4 etc., in other words individual mathematical numbers and nothing more. αὐτῶν means 'by themselves,' 'alone,' i.e. with nothing ἀληθῆν about them, such as is present in the ὡς τὰ ἀπὸ σώματα ἑξορθά ἀριθμοὶ (= Aristotle's αἰθροῦσαν or σωματικὸν ἀριθμὸν: v. Bonitz Ind. Arist. s. v. ἀριθμόν), e.g. one man, two men etc. These mathematical numbers are not Ideas, but (like τὰ μαθηματικὰ generally) a half-way house between sensible and Ideas, and for this reason valuable as a προτάσεια to Dialectic: cf. 526 A n. and see on VI 510 D.
and App. I. For αὐτῶν in this sense cf. αὐτὸ τὸ ἐν ἐ, αὐτῇ τῇ νοθεί 526 B and αὐτῷ among αὐτῷ, οὖν σώματα ἐξώνων [Eurip. 990 c].

27 δεινοῦς. The word δοῦ, which was originally written after δεινοῦ (see cf. n.) in A and II, is probably due to a marginal adscript on the words ἐάν τις αὐτὸ τὸ ἐν ἑπιχείρη—τέμεναι. Burnet neatly conjectures δεινοῦς αὐ, but αὐ is inappropriate here.

525 E 27 ἦν τις κτλ. αὐτὸ τὸ ἐν means ‘the unit itself’ i.e. the mathematical number ‘one’ which is ex hypothesei and by definition ἀμέσως καὶ ἀδιάφερον (Theo Smyrn. 18). If any one maintains that the mathematical unit is divisible, the mathematicians taxagæλεως τοι καὶ οὖν ἀποδέγχονται. Quia mathematicians, they never condescend to justify either this or any other mathematical definition (οὐδένα λόγον οὔτε αὐτοὺς οὔτε ἄλλους ἐπὶ ἐξώνου—ἀδιάφερον νόμον 510 c), and think it ridiculous that any one should question the foundations of their science. The moment they begin to render an account of their ὑποθέσεις they cease to be mathematicians and become διαλεκτικοὶ. See also on VI 510 c and App. III.

28 ἦν σὺ κερατίζῃς κτλ.: ‘if you mince it, they multiply it.’ If you insist on dividing their unit, they insist on multiplying it (viz. by your divisor), and so defeat your purpose and keep the unit one and indivisible as before. ‘I cut that unit up!’ you exclaim. ‘I multiply it!’ is their reply; and you are checked. They have just as much right to multiply it as you to divide it; for the mathematical unit is only a ὑπόθεσις when all is said and done. Plato is humorously describing a passage-arms between mathematicians and some obstinate fellow who will not admit the indivisibility of their unit. The words ‘back again’ in D. and V.’s translation “they multiply it back again” correspond to nothing in the Greek and suggest an erroneous idea; nor can the Greek mean “that division is regarded by them as a process of multiplication, for the fractions of one continue to be units” (as Jowett suggests). Each of these explanations misses the humour of the original. The word μόρα is doubtless genuine, though its rejection (proposed by Herwerden) would improve the antithesis. Cf. μορὰν τὲ ἔχων ἐν ἑαυτῷ οὐδὲν (526 A), for which μόρα here prepares the way.

526 A 1 περὶ πολῶν κτλ. On the derisive ποὺ see 522 D N. Mathematical units are in every case ἐκαστάι equal each to each (πᾶς παντὶ), and destitute of parts; whereas sensible units (e.g. one horse, one cow etc.) are not equal to each other, and are divisible. In πᾶς παντὶ Plato copies the formal language of mathematicians: cf. ἐκατέρων ἐκατέρως and the like in Euclid passim. For the sense see Phil. 56 c ff., where these two kinds of number are made the basis of a distinction between philosophical or scientific and popular or unscientific ἀρίθμητική. It should be carefully noted that a plurality of mathematical units is expressly recognised both here (ἴσον τὸ ἐκαστὸν πᾶς παντὶ κτλ.) and in Phil. 1. c. (μονάδα μονάδος ἐκάστης τῶν μυρὼν μηδείς μᾶλλον ἄλλην ἄλλης διαφέροντα). This entirely confirms what Aristotle tells us, viz. that Plato placed μαθηματικὰ between αἰσθήτα καὶ ἐδοξ., τὸ τὰ μὲν πολὺ ἀττα δομεία εἶναι, τὸ δὲ εἶδος αὐτὸ ἐν ἐκαστῶν μονῶν (Met. A 6. 987 b14 ff.). There are therefore three kinds of μονάδας in Plato’s scheme—the Ideal μονας, of
who only one exists, the Mathematical and the Sensible, of each of which there are many. See on VI 510 D and App. I, where I have quoted further evidence on this subject, and endeavoured to explain the philosophical truth which is contained in the Platonic doctrine of mathematical numbers, magnitudes etc. as intermediates between the Ideas and sensibles.

5 ὃν κτλ. ὃν is for περὶ ὃν rather than ἀ (as J. and C. hold); cf. VI 510 D où περὶ τοῦτων διανοομένων, and (for the grammatical construction) ΙΙΙ 402 A ἀ. διανοηθέναι should be understood in the technical sense of VI 511 E.

7 τῷ ὄντι ἀναγκαῖον. Perhaps with a play on προσαναγκάζω (J. and C.); see on τῷ ὄντι VI 511 E.

526 B 11 ὀδεῖς κτλ. Plato was very emphatic on this point: see Laws 747 B and 819 C. φῶνται was restored by Schneider from the best mss. Earlier editions read φαίνονται on inferior authority.

ἀν—γιμνάσασθαι κτλ. Even Isocrates admits this, although his self-styled 'Philosophy' was something very different from Plato's: see Antid. 265—266, especially γιμνασάσθαι μέτοι τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ παρασκευήν ψυχοσφαίρας καὶ τὴν δια- τριβήν τῆς ποιοτητήν (mathematical studies).

526 C 14 ἀ γε μεῖο κτλ. is an important principle with Plato, who does not believe in any royal road to learning: cf. 530 C and VI 503 E. In antiquity, while algebra was still unknown, ἀριθμητική must have taxed the powers of thought far more than now, and been, from the Platonic point of view, all the more valuable on that account as an educative discipline. The treatment of numbers by Euclid Books VII—X will illustrate Plato's observation: see Gow Gk Math. pp. 74—85, with De Morgan's remarks there quoted.

16 ὃς τοῦτο. ὃς = 'quam' instead of ἃ is found sporadically in Greek literature after comparatives: see my note on Ap. 30 B, 36 D. To say that in all such cases the comparative is equivalent to ovtw with the positive is only to shelve the difficulty; and it is better to recognise the usage as exceptional than summarily to dismiss it as a barbarism (with Thomson on Gorg. 492 E). J. and C. after othē πολλά supply ἀ πῶλον ovtw μέχρι παρέ- χεται, but the ellipse is too difficult, especially as othē πολλά is only a kind of afterthought to or elaboration of ὁ ῥάδιος.

526 C—527 C Next in order comes Plane Geometry. On its practical uses we need not dilate; the important question is whether it tends to turn the soul towards Being. A mere tiro in Geometry knows that it is not a practical art, in spite of such terms as 'squaring' etc., which the poverty of language compels it to employ. The object of geometrical knowledge is ever-existent Being. For this reason we shall prescribe the study of Geometry, a subject which is moreover practically useful and an excellent educational propaedeutic.

526 C cf. On the subject of this
μείζω πόνον παρέχει μανθάνειν καὶ μελετῶντι, οὔκ ἂν ῥαδίως· οὖδὲ πολλὰ ἀν εὔροις ὡς τοῦτο. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. Πάντων δὴ ἐνεκα τοῦτων οὐκ ἀφετέον τὸ μάθημα, ἀλλ' οἱ ἀριστοὶ τὰς φύσεις παραδευτέοι ἐν αὑτῷ. Ἐξήμφησι, ἤ δ' ὤς.

IX. Τοῦτο μὲν τοῖν ἐπιπον, ἐπιτεν ἐν ἡμῖν κείσθω· δεύτερον δὲ τὸ ἐξημενον τοῦτον σκεφτόμεθα ἀρὰ τι προσῆκε ἡμῖν. Τὸ ποῦν· 20 ἡ γεωμετρία, ἔφη, λέγεις; Ἀυτὸ τοῦτο, ἤδ' ἐγώ. "Ὅσον μὲν, 

D ἔφη, πρὸς 1 τὰ πολεμικὰ αὐτοῦ τείνει, δῆλον δτι προσῆκεν· πρὸς γὰρ τὰς στρατοπεδεύσεις καὶ καταλήψεις χωρίων καὶ συναγωγάς καὶ ἐκτάσεις στρατιᾶς καὶ ὅσα δὴ ἄλλα σχηματίζοντα τὰ στρατόπεδα ἐν αὐτῶς τὲ τὰς μάχαις καὶ πορείας, διαφέροι ἄν αὐτὸς 25 αὐτοῦ γεωμετρικὸς καὶ μὴ ὄν. Ἀλλ' ὁν ὃδ', ἐπιτεν, πρὸς μὲν τὰ


section consult Blass and Cantor referred to on 524 D, Rothlau Ec. pp. 50—60, and App. II to this book. The great importance attached by Plato and his school to geometry and kindred studies is attested from many sources: see for example Philopoemen in Arist. de an. 1 3 (Comment. in Arist. p. 117. 26 ο Πλάτων οὐ καὶ πρὸ τὸ διάτριβην ἐπιγράφετο Ἀγεωμετρήτου μὴ εἰσίτω, Tzetzes Chil. VIII 973 μηδεὶς ἀγεωμετρήτου εἰσίτω μοι τὴν στέγην, Proclus in Euclid. pp. 29 f. Friedlein Πλάτων καθαρτικὴν τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ ἀναγοράν τῶν μαθηματικῶν εἰς σφάλμα ἀποθανεῖται, τὴν ἀχλὼν ἀφαιροῦν τοῦ νεφελὸς τὸν διάνοιαν φωτὸς κλπ., and D. L. 10 IV 10 πρὸς τὸν μήτη μονικὴν μήτη γεωμετρικὴν μήτη ἀστρονομίας μεμαθηκότα, βουλόμενον δὲ παρ αὐτὸς (Σενοκαῦτης) φοιτῶν Ποιείων, ἐφ' ἀκατά γὰρ οὐκ ἔχεις φιλοσοφίας. Among Plato's companions or pupils in the Academy, Eudoxus and Menachmus rendered the most conspicuous services to mathematical science (see Allman Greek Geometry from Thales to Euclid pp. 129—179), and Euclid himself, according to Proclus (in Euclid. p. 68), was τῷ παραδείγματι Πλατωνικός καὶ τῷ φιλοσοφίᾳ ταύτης οἰκείος. Τὸ δὲ θεῖο ἀδελ γεωμετρεῖ was a characteristic and profound saying of Plato's (Plut. Cont. Disc. VIII 2718 C ff.), on the meaning of which see App. I.

19 τὸ ἐξημενον τοῦτον. Αἱ γεωμετρία i.e. ἂν τὸ εἰπί εἶ ὀν (plane surfaces) πραγματεία (528 B) concerns itself with δεινέα αἴσθης, and Stereometry with τριτέα αἴσθης, we may infer that δεινήμητι deals with the πρῶτη αἴσθη, i.e. presumably the line, which, according to the Pythagoreans, is a collection of points (cf. Laws 894 A and Rothlau Ec. p. 51). And in point of fact the line represented number among the Pythagoreans exactly as the point is the geometrical symbol for the unit: cf. 1X 587 D n. Hence ἐξημενον τοῦτον: we take the δεινέα αἴσθη after the first. See also App. II to this Book, and App. I to Book VIII Part 1 § 2.

21 ἡ γεωμετρία κτλ. The sequence —Geometry after δραματική—was probably a usual one with teachers, even in Plato's time: see Grüber Erziehung u. Unterricht II p. 340 and cf. App. II.

ὅσον μὲν κτλ. is exactly the attitude of the historical Socrates, as Krohn (Pl. St. p. 376) and others have pointed out, comparing Xen. Mem. IV 7. 2 ff. Practical necessity of this kind probably originated the science (Gow Gk Math. pp. 134 ff.) and gave it its name γεωμετρία. The name μαθήματα (or μαθηματικά) in the special sense of Mathematics owes its origin, no doubt, to the position occupied by mathematical studies in Plato's μαθήματα: but the usage itself is not found till Aristotle (Rothlau Ec. p. 18), although it is clear from [ἐπίσημον] 590 D, that some Platonists resented the γεωμετρία κτλ. Glaucus represents the practical point of view throughout: cf. 527 D.

526 D 25 καὶ πορείας. "Scriptum vellem καὶ ἐν πορείας" (Stallbaum). The idiom is common enough: see Kühner-Blass Gr. Gr. II 1, p. 548.
526 Ε 31 τὸ εὐδαιμονέστατον τοῦ ὄντος is cited by Stumpf (I.c. p. 95 n. 3) in support of his identification of the Idea of Good with God: see on VI 505 Α.

32 γένεσιν. 510 Α π.

527 Α 3 αὕτη ἡ ἐπιστήμη κτλ.: 'the nature of this science is in precise contradiction to' etc. πᾶν τοιοῦντος is adverbial, and ἔξια 'intransitive. In what follows Plato is not (as Stallbaum strangely supposes) censuring contemporary geometricians, "sed viuit quoddam ipsius scientiae" (Schneider, who refers to VI 510 Β—511 Α), for even those ὅσα καὶ ἐκεῖρα gématria élμπειροι agree with him. It is however probable on other grounds that Plato himself was afraid lest his pupils should depend too much on geometrical figures and instruments; and Plutarch tells us that he reproved Eudoxus and others for this very reason: ἀπολύειται γάρ ὁ ὄντως καὶ διαφθείρεσθαι τὸ γεωμετρίας ἁγαθὸν ἀῤῥόν ἐπὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπων παλαιδρωμότα, καὶ μὴ ως ἀνήλικον ἀντπλασμανείς τῶν ἀφωνίων καὶ ἀφωνικών ἀκόων, πρὸς ὁστὲ ὃν ὁ θεός ἀπὶ θεοῦ ἐστὶ (Cons. Disp. VIII 2. 718 F; cf. also Vit. Marc. 14. 5—7. The anecdote refers in particular to stereometrical instruments, but its moral applies equally to the study of plane geometry). See Rothlaf I.c. pp. 66 ff. and Gow Gk Math. p. 181.

5 ἀναγκαῖος 'in beggarly fashion' ("nicht gedrungenen Weise" Prantl). They are 'hard up' for words to express their meaning, and must consequently use language which does not: cf. VI 510 D. J. and C.'s explanation "with merely practical needs in view" is quite wrong; nor does the word appear to me to contain "a facetious allusion to geometrical necessity" (in the sense of V 458 D), as they assert. Madvig's ἀδάκως for ἀναγκαῖος is a singularly unhappy suggestion.

7 παρατείνειν = 'to apply,' e.g. a parallelogram to a given line: cf. Meus. 87 Α (παρὰ τὴν δοθέασιν—γραμμὴν παρατείνειν κτλ.) with E. S. Thompson's note. Blass takes the same view (de Pl. math. p. 19). Euclid's expression for this is παραβάλλειν (x 18 ff. and passim: cf. Cantor I.c. p. 145). The ordinary translation 'produce' (as e.g. a line) has no authority, and Euclid's word for 'producing' a line is ἐκβάλλειν or προσκεβάλλειν (I 5. 17 and passim). So also in Aristotle: see the Ind. Arist. s.v.

προστιθέναι: 'to add,' sc. one μέγεθος to another in any geometrical construction: cf. Nicom. Introd. Ar. 11 12. 2. Euclid uses προστιθέναι, συγκεκρίμαι (x 16 and passim) of such an operation.

φθεγγόμενοι is said "non sine elegantis quadam irrisione" (Stallbaum): cf. VI 505 C μ.
8  τὸ δὲ: ‘whereas’; cf. i 340 d n.
527 B 10  τοῦ ἀεὶ ὄντος. Plato held the objects of mathematical study to be ἄνωθεν καὶ ἀληθὴν ‘eternal and unchangeable’ (Arist. Met. A 6, 987b 16: cf. vi 510 c ff., vii 556 A n.), but not Ideas. The Platonic meaning of τοῦ ἀεὶ ὄντος is certainly not exhausted by the observation that “the truths of every science are always true” (Bosanquet). ὄντος implies substantial existence, independently of our thoughts, and independently also of particulars. The existence of τὰ μαθηματικὰ as μηχανὴ τῶν ὄντων or copies of the Ideas, ‘moving in and out of’ the material substance of the Universe, which they stamp with an infinite diversity of forms and shapes, is a cardinal doctrine of Plato’s physics (Tim. 50 c al.), and Bosanquet appears to me to rob the words of Plato of half their significance, in the fruitless attempt to find in his ontology nothing but what commends itself to certain schools of philosophy in the present day. See v 476 e and App. I.
10  τοῦ ποτὲ κτλ.: ‘that which at a particular time is a particular instance of becoming and perishing:’ τὰ γεγομένα=ὅντος (the copula) γεγομένου τινὸς, but γεγομένου itself involves the copula, the presence of which would here be intolerable. Cf. v 473 d n. and Euthyd. 10 c εἰ τι γέγονεν ἢ τι πάσχει, οὐκ ὅτι γεγομένου ἢτι, γέγονεται, ἀλλ’ ὅτι γέγονεν, γεγομένου εἶτα. Here τι is indeclinable like τι in Lach. 200 b, Mevax. 247 b (τοιοῦτο πᾶς), Euthyd. 303 c (ῥημαίον τι εἶναι), οὐδὲν, μονόν etc. tolerably often in tragedy, and the adverbial use of ἀμφότερα and τάναιτα (e.g. Lach. 182 οἱ ἱδέας πάντοι ὁ ἅρματιν καὶ γεγομένων κτλ.): cf. also (with Schneider Adl. p. 57) Procl. in Tim. 136 b τοῦ—ἀποκρήμων πάντα ὄντος et al. The indeclinable form adds to the emphasis, and indeed τινὸς (if placed after ποτέ) could hardly stand at all. Schneider translates “des etwas werdenden und vergehenden,” apparently taking τι predicatively with γεγομένου. But the expression ‘that which becomes something’ suggests a substratum underlying γεγομένου, whereas the only correct antithesis to ὃν (τοῦ ἀεὶ ὄντος) is γεγομένου itself. Stallbaum wrongly explains τι as “alia ratione.” A few inferior MSS omit the word. I believe the text is sound, though possibly τι should be accent, as in the exactly similar Aristotelian usage of τις “ad significandam τὴν ἀποκρήμην” (Bonitz Ind. Ar. p. 763) e.g. τις ἄνθρωπος. The use of ποτὲ also reminds us of the ποτὲ of the Categories.
12 γεγομένου is an adjective (Schneider).
14 σχείν. The tense is inchoative or ingestive, as usual: see 516 e n. 527 c 16 καλλιτέλαι. Socrates relies Glauco on his ‘brail toun.’ The word, as J. and C. point out, is full of tenderness and affection. Callipolis was the name of several cities in Greece (Pape-Benseler Gr. Eigennamen, s.v.), a fact which sufficiently refutes Herderwen’s doubts as to the formation of the word: see also (with Schneider) Lobeck’s Phrynichus pp. 600—607. Herderwen ought not to have revived the tasteless and prosaic conjectures καλὴ τόλει (f) and καλλιτέλη τόλει (ξ).
120

ΠΑΤΩΝΟΣ

[527 c]

παραγωνα αυτοι ου σμικρα. Ποια; η δ' ου. "Α τε δη συ ειπες, ην δ' εγω, τα περι των πολεμων, και δη και προς πυσας μαθησεις, οπατ εκλογος αποδεχεσθαι, ιους που οτι τω δω και παντι 20 διοισει ημιμεσ τε γεωμετριας και μη. Τω παντι μεντοι νη Δ' ζηνα, ζηνα. Δευτερον δη τοντο τιθωμεν μαθημα τοις νεοις; Τιθωμεν, ζηνα.

X. Τη δε; τριτων θωμεν αστρονομιαν; η ου δοκει; 'Εμοι δ γοην, ζηνα; το γαρ περι ορας ευαισθητοτερως ζειν και μηνων και

24. ζηνα γοην Π; ζηνα' ουν Α.

17 αυτου: viz. του μαθηματος.
18 και δη και κτλ. See on 526 B.
20 ημιμεσ τε. Herwerden excises τε, comparing 526 D; but the MSS are a safer guide.

527 c—528 ε. Shall we prescribe Astronomy as our third subject? Glaucio approves, pointing to its usefulness in practical affairs. After reproving his friend for advocating the Platonic curriculum chiefly on this ground, Socrates observes that the solid should first be studied in itself, and afterwards the solid in motion. In other words Stereometry should precede Astronomy. Although the problems of Stereometry are not yet solved, we may hope for success under proper guidance, and with the support of the State.

527 D ff. On stereometry in the age of Plato see Rothlauf I.c. pp. 69—71, Cantor I.c. pp. 194—203, Tannery Rec. Phil. x (1880) pp. 523 ff. The most famous stereometrical problem of Plato’s time was the so-called ‘Delian problem’ or duplication of the cube, and it is highly probable that Plato had this question in his mind when he wrote the present chapter. A dramatic poet, whom Valckenaer supposed to be Euripides, had already made allusion to it in the lines μερος γ' ζηαξα βασιλικον σηξων ταφου | διπλασιον ζαστου. του καλου (v.l. κασου) δε μη σφαιρον | διπλαζ' εκαστον καλων εται ταφου (Nauck Trag. Gr. Fr. p. 676). The story runs that the Delians, having been commanded by an oracle to double a certain altar, were in great perplexity, διαπεμφανεσ ου δε τους παρα την Πλατονου εν Ακαδημαι γεωμετρας αξιων αυτους ειρεμεν το γηγομενον (Eratosthenes, quoted by Eutocius in Archim. Ilii. pp. 103 ff. Heiberg. See also Plut. de gen. Socr. 7, 579 B—D and de et ap. Delphos 6. 386 B f., and Johannes Philop. quoted by Sturm Das Delische Problem p. 10). Plato favourably entertained their application, and the students of the Academy set to work with extraordinary enthusiasm. A remarkable stimulus was thereby given to the study of stereometry, and the Delian problem was successfully solved. The anecdote may of course be apocryphal, but we have not the smallest reason for rejecting it. The memory of such incidents is usually cherished with peculiar care in the history of a College, and Eratosthenes (276—194 B.C.) was born only seventy-one years after Plato’s death. In any case the duplication of the cube may well have seemed in Plato’s time a question of the first importance for the purposes of stereometrical science, for, as Tannery remarks (I.c. p. 256), the duplication of the square, which had already been discovered (Men. 82 B ff.), was believed to be the key to plane problems, and so it was probably surmised that the διπλασιασμον του κυβου would give the solution of a whole series of solid problems. English readers will find a short account of this classical ρωμα with some of its ancient solutions in Kouse Ball’s Math. Recreations and Problems pp. 154 ff. The most elaborate and exhaustive history of the problem and its solutions in antiquity is that of Sturm Das Delische Problem 1856.

23 ζηνα γοην. Schneider and others write εμοι' ουν (see cr. n.), but ουν is too strongly illative for this passage. Cf. 1 335 E n.

24 το γαρ περι κτλ. Cf. 526 c n. and Xenophon there quoted, esp. § 4 εκελευε δε και αστρολογιας εμπειρους γεγονοι, και τατην μεντοι μεχρι του νυκτος τε οραν και μηνος και εναντιον δυνασθαι γηγομενοι κτλ. and infra τας ωρας των ειρμηνευν διαγιγνωσκοτες. The ana-
logy of this passage suggests that in Plato and (‘both’) μὴν καί ἐναυτῶν depends on ὤν, which is the accusative plural: cf. Liti. 812 b εὐαισθητῶν δὲν γεγονέται περὶ τοῦ πολλοῦ κτλ. Practical astrology will enable one to tell both the time of month and the time of year by looking at the moon and the sun. For ὥας μὴν κτλ. also, besides the passage of Xenophon just quoted, Eur. Alc. 449 f. Στάρετ κυκλάς άνικα Καρπέλων περίσσοτερα ὄρα μὴν κτλ. Schneider and the English translators take ὄρα as genitive and parallel with μὴν κτλ., but it is difficult to see what εὐαισθητοτέρους ἔχειν περὶ ἐναυτῶν can mean: for ἐπιμέλειαι ποιεῖται ἐναυτοῦ καί ὄραν in VI 458 D is quite different. Schlierenacher translates the passage correctly.

εὐαισθητοτέρους. For this form of the comparative adversee see I 343 E n.


27 μὴ δοκῆς κτλ. The usefulness of ‘useless’ studies is a fundamental principle in Plato’s theory; and (as Schneider points out) ὅτι ἐν τούτοις κτλ. is intended to shew that liberal studies are in the highest and truest sense useful.

τὸ δ’ ἐστιν. I 340 D n.

28 χαλεπών. Cobet’s παγχάλεπων (after Nicom. Intro. Ar. 111 7) is a wholly gratuitous change; see App. VII.

29 ἐκάστου. Every human being has an ὁμογενὸς ψυχήν; viz. φανέρω: it is indeed the possession of φανέρω which makes him at once truly human and therewithal divine (I 501 B n.). The genitive is much more expressive than ἐκάστω, which Herforden proposes: cf. 518 C n., and for the combination of genitives V. 449 A n.

ἐκκαθάρισθαι κτλ. ‘is purged and rekindled.’ In passages like this Plato hurst his metaphors about with Shakespearian vehemence and profusion. Cf. II 305 C n., and see the admirable remarks on metaphor by the author of the treatise περὶ ὥλους 32. 4 πάθησι καί τόμης μεταφορών—τὰ ἐκάστρα καί σφοδρά πάθη καί τὸ γενναίον ὕφος εἶναι φύμα ἤδω τὰ ἀληξοπαράδομα, ὃ ἀπὸ τῆς φορᾶς τοῦ πάθους ἐκάστος ἔστησε τὰ παράδομα, καὶ οὕτω τοῦ ἀκρατητῆς συγκληθείν περὶ τοῦ πάθους. The soul is purged of its blindness: its smouldering fires flame forth afresh. To translate ‘is polished’ like a soiled mirror” (J. and C.), besides being wrong, falls far below the level of Plato’s ψφος. The chiasmus in ἐκκαθάρισθαι—τυφλούμενον adds to the literary effect.

On other readings in this passage see App. VII.

527 E 52: ἄδυ μὲν ὄν κτλ. The logical sequence is somewhat difficult. Do not (says Socrates) be so anxious to persuade of πολλά of the usefulness of our curriculum. Its true utility is difficult to understand, and of πολλά will not easily be persuaded of it. Those who agree with us about its true utility will highly approve of your proposals; but of πολλά will not, for they can see no practical advantage (worthy of mention) accruing from them. δὸς εἰς λέγει attributes the proposals to Glauco as in D μὴ δοκῆς—προστάτειν, and άλλῳ is said with reference to τούτον. To the ψφελα of intellectual salvation such persons are blind; and they cannot see any other, i.e. any practical ψφελα worth mentioning in Plato’s studies. άλλῳ cannot be understood as “beyond their practical applications” (D), and V., unless we refer it to Glauco’s remark τὸ γάρ περὶ κτλ. in B, to the detrimen both of grammar and of sense.
257 E—258 A 35  söptei öv'n ktl.  
'Very well: make up your mind once for all with which of these parties you are discourseing: or are you not addressing your remarks to either, but 'etc.? Glauco's insistence on the practical uses of astronomy may be all very well with a popular audience, but are out of place in a philosophical discussion. For this peremptory autóthen cf. Synp. 213 A. óv πρὸς αὐτέρως lit. 'not to neither': cf. the familiar μάλλον ἡ ὁ for μάλλον ἡ (Kithner Gr. Gr. II pp. 771—773). I understand ἡ—όνωσαι (with Ast) as an independent question: for it is difficult to supply 'whether.' Schneider's objections to this view are based on the idea that ἡ ὁ (if interrogative) must have an affirmative answer; but ὁ has nothing to do with ἡ, and only balances ἀλλά: cf. Ar. Plit. 372 μόν ὁ κέλαφας, ἀλλὰ ἤπταικας; Plato makes this clear by placing the two contrasting clauses in close juxtaposition. ὁ is omitted by Ζ and some inferior mss. The text is, however, sound, and none of the proposed corrections—
so for ὁ (Schneider), ei πρὸς αὐτέρως (Madvig), οὐδὲ πρὸς ἄτερους (Cobet), ei οὐδὲ πρὸς ἄτερους (Baiter), ἡ πν' πρὸς αὐτέρως (Liebhold)—will bear examination, though Cobet's deserves the praise of elegance.

528 A 4 ἄναγε—εἰς τούτως: 'fall back then': cf. Ar. Birds 383 ἄναγε' ἐπὶ σκέλος, with Blydes' note. The metaphor is not naval (as Ast and Stallbaum hold), but military, nor is ἄναγεν (vaiv) even in naval language 'inhibere,' but 'put out to sea,' as in Hdt. vii 100, viii 76 et al. and occasionally in Attic (for ἄναγεσθαι). Cf. ἄνεχωρῆσαι 528 D.

5 ὁ οὐκ ὀρθῶς: see on τὸ ἐξώδειον τοῦτον 526 C. The subjects ought to follow each other in the order of their complexity: see App. II. Plato's error was of course deliberately "contrived to emphasize the principle which it violated" (Bosanquet), and also, it may be added, to enable him to call especial attention to the study of Stereometry, on which he laid very great stress (527 D n.).

7 ἡ ἡμέρα should be 'taken with ὅων ('already in revolution'), not (as D. and V.) with λαζόντες.

528 B 8 δευτέρα αὔξην κτλ. It is better (with Schneider) to translate αὔξη by 'increase' than by 'dimension'; for αὔξη always implies something increased, and in the phrases δευτέρα αὔξη etc. this 'something' is the point. Among the Pythagoreans, who probably originated these expressions, the line was regarded as an αὔξη of the point, the plane of the line, the solid of the plane. See App. II.

9 κύβων αὔξην: 'cubic increase,' i.e. the increase which belongs to, or results in, cubes, with perhaps also a play on a different sense of κύβων αὔξη, 'how to increase cubes,' as in the famous 'Delian problem' of the διπλασιασμός κύβου (so also Tannery l.c. x p. 525). See on 537 D. But as cubes are not the only solid bodies, Plato adds τὸ βάθος μετέχον. By Aristotle's time the name stereometria had been invented to designate the science as a whole (An. Post. 11 13, 78b 38).

10 ταύτα γε—ἡμέρησα. Plato does not of course mean to say that the study of Stereometry had not yet been invented, for the subject had already in one form or another engaged the attention of the Py-
thagoreans, Anaxagoras and Democritus (Blass l.c. p. 21, Tannery l.c. p. 524), not to speak of Hippocrates of Chios, who had concerned himself in the fifth century B.C. with the question of the duplication of the cube (Allman Gk Geometry etc. pp. 84 ff.). He only means that its problems had not yet been 'discovered' (νηρόσθηκα, as in Pythagoras' νηρης) or solved. When and by whom the 'Delian problem' in particular was definitively solved to the satisfaction of the Academy, is not quite clear. The tradition which ascribes a solution of it to Plato himself is beset with grave difficulties, as Blass (l.c. pp. 21—30) and others have pointed out (see especially Cantor l.c. pp. 194—202 and Sturm Das Delische Problem pp. 49 ff.). It is however universally allowed that the principle involved — the finding of 'two mean proportionals between one straight line and another twice as long' (Gow Gk Math. p. 169) — was first stated by Hippocrates of Chios and well known to Plato, at all events when he wrote the Timaeus (32 A ff.; see also Häbler Ueber zwei Stellen in Platonis Timaeus etc. pp. 1—17). We may perhaps infer from οὖτως ἄριστως that Plato did not think a final solution of this as of other stereometrical problems had yet been reached: there is at all events nothing in the Republic to justify the curious statement of Diogenes Laertius that (Ἀρχίτας) πρῶτος κύδων διάπλασιον εὗρεν, ωσος θείας Πλάτων ἐν πολιτείᾳ (viii 83), although it is probably true that Archytas was the first to offer a solution of the famous difficulty (see Sturm l.c. pp. 22—32). In D. L. l.c. Cobet reads πρῶτος κύδων εὗρεν κτλ., whether on his own responsibility, or on ms authority, he does not tell us. See also on 527 b, 528 c.

11 οtplib to κτλ. In Latus 819 E ff. Plato reproaches the Greeks for their ignorance of and indifference to stereometrical questions.

έντιμως ἔχει: 'holds in honour,' as in viii 548 A. The expression usually means 'is honoured' (Xen. An. ii 1. 7); hence ἄγει for ἔχει is proposed by Herwerden, who compares 528 c, 528 e. But the error is not an easy one in such a ms as A, and it is safe to keep ἔχει and take the phrase as 'ἐν τῷ ἔτει ἔχει (cf. ἐν ἀντίθετω ἔχει Hdt. iii 3, ἐν εὐνοίᾳ ἔχει [Dem.] 284. 11, and Jebb on Soph. An. 639) as ἄγειν ἐντίμως = ἄγειν ἐν τῷ (528 E).

14 ὡς νῦν ἔχει belongs no doubt to the following clauses (iv 419 A ff.): but see also on 528 c.

15 μεγαλοφρονούμενοι is condemned as un-Attic by Cobet (V. L. 2. pp. 233, 531); but μεγαλοφρονώ, μεγαλοφροσύνη are Attic, and Xenophon uses μεγαλοφρονεῖν, μεγαλοφρονοῦμαι (Cobet's emendation) would mean 'vaunting': cf. iii 395 D.

528 c 15 εἰ δὲ πόλις κτλ. is perhaps the earliest demand in literature for the State-endowment—of pure science (cf. Krohn Ph. St. p. 169). Plato implies that in his city this claim will be fully satisfied; and the Platonic Utopia is in fact "la revendication du pouvoir pour la science" (Tannery l.c. p. 521).

ξυνεπιστατοῖ κτλ.: 'should cooperate with the superintendent' etc. not (as Jowett) 'become the director of these studies'; for a special ἑπιστάτης—Plato has just said—is needed in any case. Plato's picture of the σωματειον stereometricum, if the phrase may be allowed, is evidently drawn from life. He seems to speak as if he had himself an ἑπιστάτης ready, and wished to secure for him public support in order that students might be willing to work under him. Now although ὡς νῦν ἔχει belongs, strictly speaking, to the following clause, the words may, so far as the Greek is concerned, be connected with ἔπαιτα καὶ γενομένον, and will then be equivalent to ὡς νῦν ἐγένετο ἑπιστάτης. I think it not impossible that Plato intended his readers to suspect him
of this further meaning. If there is anything in this conjecture, to whom does Plato allude? Not, surely, to himself, although some have suspected the philosopher of blowing his own trumpet in a somewhat similar passage of the Phaedo (78 A): see Lutoslawski's Plato's Logic pp. 263 ff. We are told by Plutarch de genio Socrates 7. 579 c that Plato referred the Delian delegation to Eudoxus, telling them that the problem was 'ος τοι φαύλων οὐδ' ἀμφός διανοιαὶ ὄρωσις, 'έκρυος δὲ τὰ γραμμὰς σφακίεσιν ἔργον εἶναι. τοῦτο μὲν ὁ Εὐδόξος αὐτὸς τὸν Κυδίον ἢ τὸν Κυκλήστρον Εὐσκόφω συνετελέσειν κτλ. Now we know that Eudoxus not only himself achieved a solution of the Delian problem (Sturm Lc. pp. 32—37), but was also, in the fullest sense of the term, 'the founder of scientific Stereometry' (Günther in Müller's Handbuch v 1, p. 36), and did more for the subject than any of Plato's disciples (Cantor Lc. pp. 208—210). For these reasons I think it not unlikely that Plato has Eudoxus in his mind. Eudoxus and his pupils seem to have been living and working in the Academy along with the followers of Plato sometime between Plato's second and third visits to Sicily (368 B.C. and 361 B.C. : see Allman Gr. Geom. etc. p. 178), and it is a pleasing and I hope pardonable conjecture—I do not claim that it is more—to suppose that Plato avails himself of this opportunity to pay a graceful compliment to his fellow-workers. See also on line 19 below and Introd. § 4.

16 ἐντίμως ἀγουσα. The phrase is illustrated by Lobeck Phryn. p. 419.

18 ὢτὸ δὲ κτλ. ὢτὸ depends on ἀτίμαι-

ζομέναι καὶ κολονώμεναι, in which the students also ἀτίμαιζομαι καὶ κολονώματι a subject, which they ἄθεν ζητοῦσι (b above). κολονώμεναι is in harmony with ἀθέωμαι (though cut short, the study still grows or advances. For other views on this sentence see App. VIII.

λόγος κτλ. The ἡγούμενες are the ἡγούμενος of β—not, I think, Plato's pupils, but men who cannot explain the true utility of stereometry (as described in 527 D, E), and are unwilling to throw their whole hearts into a 'useless' study.

19 βια—αἰτάνταθα. Blass (l.c. p. 22) observes that in these words "sine dubio mathematici ex schola Platonis profecti intelligendi sunt." It is just conceivable—though of course no stress should be laid on the conjecture—that ὢτὸ χάριτος conceals some complimentary allusion to a particular person. If so, Eudoxus may be intended (see above on 528 c). There is, it is true, a tradition that Plato and Eudoxus had not always been on the best of terms (Allman Gr. Geom. pp. 128 f.), but during the visit of Eudoxus to Athens between 368 and 361 B.C., they appear to have worked harmoniously and even cordially together (ib. pp. 133, 178). See also 530 A n. But we have no evidence to shew that Eudoxus bore the sobriquet of χάρις, though his character and personality (see Arist. Eth. Nic. x 2. 1172 b 15 f.), and even perhaps his name, deserved such a compliment. I think Plato means merely 'through elegance,' i.e. through the inherent elegance of the subject: cf. τὸ γε ἐπιχαρι καὶ διαφερέως ἔξει. The use of ὢτὸ is as in ὢτὸ δεος φωνή ἐρχεται and the like: see Kühner-Gerth Gr. Gr. ii 1, p. 533. Badham's ἐπιχαρία for ὢτὸ χάριτος is an unlucky venture. Dr Jackson suggests that ὢτὸ χάριτος may perhaps mean 'by grace, favour,' 'on sufferance': but Glauco's reply appears to me against this view.

528 C, D 20 ὀουδὲν—φανηναί—be brought to light, 'discovered,' 'solved': cf. X 602 D and ημᾶθαι and ἐκφαντ. above. Unless Badham, Madvig, and Baiter had entirely mistaken the meaning of φανηναί, they could scarcely have conjectured or approved of τοιαῦτα in place of αὐτὰ. Plato's language seems to point to some exceptional activity in connexion with the study of stereometrical problems, such as may have been occasioned by the application from Delos (527 D n.), and to encourage his pupils to hope for success at no distant date.
528 D 21 άλλα μοι κτλ. The recapitulation is intended to emphasize once more the principle regulating Plato's sequence of subjects (528 A n. and App. II).

24 σπεύδων—βραδύων: a proverbial saying, like our 'more haste, less speed': cf. (with Stallbaum) Pol. 264 b. If we σπεύδωνες τάχεως, we are apt σπεύδωνες βραδύων: hence the proverb σπεόδε βραδέως 'Eile mit Weile.' See Jebb on Soph. Αντ. 231.

26 ὅτι τῇ ζητήσει κτλ.: not "quaia ita est comparata, ut de ea querere ridiculum sit" (Stallbaum), but "qua ridicula tractatur": cf. (with Schneider) 529 D. 528 E — 530 C Astronomy will accordingly be fourth in order, and Stereometry third. Yes, says Glauco; for assuredly Astronomy compels the soul to look 'on high.' On the contrary, Socrates replies, as studied at present, Astronomy turns the soul's eye down, though the bodily eye looks upward. True astronomy is not observation of the visible heavens, which are, like all things seen, imperfect and subject to change; it is a mathematical science, which studies the true movements of intelligible stars and uses the visible firmament as its orrery. We shall therefore pursue Astronomy by making use of problems and leave the heavens alone.

528 E ff. We have seen that the study of Stereometry, the science which deals with τριτόν αἄνω, naturally follows the study of Geometry, in which δευτέρα αἄνω is investigated (526 C n.). Astronomy, like Stereometry, is still concerned with bodies of three dimensions, but in Astronomy we have one additional element, viz. Motion, so that the study of Astronomy, as Plato conceives it, is a degree more complicated than Stereometry, and forms its natural sequel: cf. 528 A, B. Plato's conception of δραματική and γεωμετρική would have commended itself in the main to the mathematicians of his day (cf. 525 D ff., 527 A); although they might not have accepted his view of the ontology of these sciences; but in the two remaining subjects of his curriculum, Astronomy and Harmonics, he consciously and deliberately parts company with his contemporaries (see 529 A — 530 C, 530 E — 531 C). After every allowance has been made for the perfunctory enthusiasm of Plato's style, it must be confessed that the application of the principles laid down in this chapter would have checked the progress of astronomical science. Both Astronomy and Harmonics are treated by Plato as branches of pure rather than applied mathematics; and in each of these sciences Plato either discourages or altogether prohibits observation. It must be remembered, on the other hand, that Plato's object is not to promote the study of physical science for its own sake, but to provide a suitable προκαταλείπα for those who are to crown their lives by the contemplation of the Idea, from which every element of sense-perception is far removed. The astronomy which Plato sketches in this chapter is a unique compound of poetry, metaphysics and mathematics. Besides the powerful appeal which it makes to the poetical imagination, it has a permanent value even in the
history of Astronomy as a passionate protest against mere empiricism, and an emphatic if exaggerated vindication of the theoretical side of the science. See also on 529 c, d and App. II.

528 e—529 a 31 ἵ σὖ μετέρχει: lit. 'in respect of that, in respect of which you pursue it,' i.e. 'in the way in which you pursue it.' no longer for its practical uses, as i did before (527 d), but because it leads the soul 'on high,' and from things here yonder ('from the things of this world to the next,' say D. and V., quite wrongly). The object of ἐπαίνον is not ἵ σὖ μετέρχει, but astronomy. Glauco has assimilated the phraseology of Socrates without its meaning. 'On high' and 'yonder' mean to Glauco the material heavens, not the νοῦς τῶν: and he thinks the soul looks upwards if the bodily eye is turned aloft! The essence of Glauco's error consists in materializing the spiritual; and Plato here warns us against a danger which is responsible for countless errors, not only in Platonic criticism, but in every department of human thought and dogma. See also on 529 b, c.

529 a 4 οἱ εἰς φιλοσοφίαν ἀνα-γοντεῖ: 'those who would lead us upwards to philosophy ('welche zur Wissenschaftsleben hinaufführen wollen,' Schneider). Plato is thinking of teachers who recognise (with Isocr. Inid. 261) that Astronomy and kindred subjects are the παρασκευὴ φιλοσοφίας, but nevertheless teach Astronomy on methods directly calculated to turn the soul's eye down. His description fits some of the Sophists, particularly Hippias (see Prot. 318 e and cf. Isocr. Pan. 26—28). In οἱ—ἀναγοντεῖ Plato takes them at their own valuation. For the Greek cf. 521 c φυσῆς πειραγωγὴ ἐκ νυκτερίδος τοὺς ἡμέρας εἰς ἀληθῆν, τοῦ ἐντούς οὐσίαν ἐπάθον, ἦν δὴ φιλος οὐ χρῆν ἀληθῆ φύσιμον εἶναι, where ἀληθῆ points the contrast with the false philosophy to which some would lead the soul. ἀνα-γοντεῖ preserves the idea of education as an ascent, in harmony with the prevailing metaphor throughout this book. The translation "those who embark on philosophy" (D. and V.) is untenable: so also are the two other versions in J. and C. ('raise astronomy to the rank of a science,' 'refer astronomy to philosophy'), as Shorey—whose view is more nearly correct—has pointed out (A. J. Ph. XVI p. 237).

5 οὐκ ἀγεννώς: 'with a fine audacity,' "non sine generosa fiducia." (Schneider), as in Gorg. 493 οὐκ ἀγεννώς ἔγε—ἐπεξήριε τῷ λόγῳ παρεσαξάμενος, and elsewhere.

529 b, c 7 κινδυνεύεις γὰρ κτλ. Glauco conceives of astronomy in exactly the same way as the Aristophanic So- crates; and this indignant repudiation by the Platonic Socrates is the more intelligible, if (with Nettleship Lect. and Rem. ll. p. 274, n.) we suppose that Plato is thinking of the Clouds. Our astronomy (says Plato in effect), our vision upward, is not what Stephanos made it appear to be, but something very different. See below on ἄνω κεχωρίσιν ἐν B and ἐν υπτίας νεών in C.
529 C 15 τήν ψυχήν: though his bodily eye looks upwards.
κάν εἶν υπτίας κτλ.: 'aye, even though the learner float face upwards on land or in the sea.' I understand εἶν υπτίας νῦν εἶν ἐν γῇ as an allusion to Socrates in the *Kreusírha*: cf. Αρ. 19 C εἰς τό δόσω· ἔλθε ἦσθαν καὶ αὐτοῦ ἐν τῇ Ἀριστοφάνου κωμῳδίᾳ, Σωκράτης τινὰ ἔσχεν περιεφρόμενον, φάσκοντα τα ἀερόβιατα κτλ. and see Ar. *Clouds* 218—226. If we suppose that Socrates lay supine in his swinging κρεμάθρα, as presumably he did, since he was looking at the moon, then any one who had seen the *Clouds* would at once catch the allusion, especially after ἄνω κεκρυφὸς and the other references just above. For νῦν of floating in the air, cf. ἀερωνυχίας Αρ. *Clouds* 337, with Blaydes ad loc. and on *Peace* 831.

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529 B 10 ἄλλο τι νομίσαι κτλ.: 'think any other thing one that makes,' etc. "Aliud esse puto νομίσαι τοι τοιει, allud ποιει idque huc loco magis aptum, scilicet non solum facere sive faciendo in praesentia occupatum esse, sed viment consuetudinem faciendi habere aliquid existimare" (Schneider). ποιείν is half adjectival, like συμφέρων in Χεν. Κεφ. Λεκ. I 6 (quoted by Λιστ) τότῳ συμφέρων τῇ εὐγνωμίᾳ ποιεόν. Heindorf's conjecture ποιείν was approved by Kühner [Gr. Gr. II p. 631]; but ποιείν is in all the MSS, and should be retained.

12 ἐὰν τε τις κτλ.: 'and if any one attempts to learn aught which is perceivable I care not whether his open mouth yawn upwards or his closed mouth look below—he will never, as I hold, learn,' etc. For ἐὰν τε, Hermann and Stallbaum read ἐὰν δὲ on slight MS authority; but o διάφανας and o (τε)—φημι are properly joined by τε (Schneider). The English translators understand συμμεμωκός of closed eyes; but the eyes must of course be open in any case, and the balance with ἄνω κεκρυφὸς is conclusive against this view. συμμωμικόν, as the Lexica shew, is used of closing any bodily aperture. The state of the mouth is ludicrously irrelevant, but κεκρυφὸς, which betokens rapt stupidity, inevitably suggests συμμεμωκός, and the whole expression is a finely indignant outburst of exuberant and extravagant satire on a gross misapprehension of Socratico-Platonic views.

ἄνω κεκρυφὸς refers perhaps specifically to *Clouds* 171—173 ἵπποιντοι αὐτοῦ τῆς σελήνης τὰς ὀδοὺς καὶ τὰς περιφορᾶς εἰσ' ἄνω κεκρυφὸς τοῖς ἄνω τὴς ὀρφῆς νῦκ-

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κάν εἶν υπτίας κτλ.: 'aye, even though the learner float face upwards on land or in the sea.' I understand εἶν υπτίας νῦν εἶν ἐν γῇ as an allusion to Socrates in the *Kreusírha*: cf. Αρ. 19 C εἰς τό δόσω· ἔλθε ἦσθαν καὶ αὐτοῦ ἐν τῇ Ἀριστοφάνου κω-
Platonic astronomer, on the other hand, looks with the eye of διάνοια at the ἀλήθη ποικίλματα, i.e. at the motions of true or mathematical stars. These mathematical stars φοράς πρὸς ἀλλήλα φέρεται εν τῷ ἀλήθινῳ ἀριθμῷ, i.e. in mathematical number, e.g. in 3 and 23 (not three months, etc.), and also ἐν ἀλήθεισι σχήμασι, i.e. in mathematical orbits, viz. the perfect ellipses which are imperfectly reproduced in the orbits of the visible material planets. Furthermore, although here perhaps our imagination may refuse to follow Plato in his flight, just as the visible Mars in his journey carries with him the γεγονόμενα which he contains, so Plato represents the true stars of mathematical astronomy as carrying round with them τὰ εὐνύτα, i.e. the mathematical realilities which are in them. The mathematical counterpart of Mars, for example, will take with it in its revolution those perfect mathematical forms which are imperfectly reproduced in the canals and snow-caps of the visible Mars. Plato in short conceives of a mathematical οὐρανός of which the visible heavens are but a blurred and imperfect expression in time and space, just as every visible and material triangle is only an approximation to a true or perfect, i.e. a mathematical, triangle. The following remark of Aristotle’s is intended as an objection to Plato’s theory, but, according to the doctrine of this part of the Κεραυνίς, Plato would have accepted the criticism as containing a just and true account of the astronomy which he prescribe: ἐνὶ δὲ εἴ τι παρὰ ταῦ ἔδο καὶ τὰ αἰσθήματα τὰ μεταξὺ θύσει τοὺς ἀπόριας ἔξει. δὴν γὰρ ὃς ὁμοῖος γραμματεύει τῇ παρ’ αὐτὸς καὶ τὰς αἰσθήματα ἐνσοῦται καὶ ἐκατὸν τῶν ἄλλων γενών. ὅσ᾽ ἐπείπερ ἀστρονομία μία τοῦ ἑξών ἐστίν, ἡταί τι καὶ οὐρανός παρὰ τῶν αἰσθητῶν οὐρανῶν καὶ ἦλιός τε καὶ σελήνη καὶ τάλλα ὁμοῖα τά κατὰ τῶν ἄλλων (Μετ. Β 2, 997b 12 fl.). It remains to speak of two particular difficulties. What does Plato mean by ταῦτα τὰ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ ποικίλματα, and by τὸ ὑπὸ τὸν ἁλίκον καὶ ἡ ὁδὸς βάθους? The ποικίλματα seem to be generally identified with the stars and nothing more. But inasmuch as astronomy deals with φορά βάθους, and the ordinary astronomer, according to Plato, studies τὰς τῶν ἄστρων φοράς (cf. 533 A) rather than...
Διερεύνων Α’II: διαφέροντος Α’.

άστρα themselves, it may be presumed that the ποικίλματα εν τῷ οὐρανῷ in reality denote the stars regarded as moving bodies, i.e., strictly speaking, the movements of the heavenly bodies revolving in their orbits (cf. Tim. 39 D and 40 C); and the presumption becomes a certainty when we reach the words τῶν ἀληθείων, ἀς—φέρει, for since the true ποικίλματα which true astronomy studies are identified with the movements of true stars, we are bound in like manner to suppose that the γεγραμμένα ποικίλματα which observational astronomy studies are the movements of γεγραμμένα ἀστρα. Some may be disposed to think that τὰ εὗραν ποικίλματα refers to the intricate and complex patterns which the orbits of the celestial bodies weave upon the Heavens; cf. Tim. 39 D τὰς τοιών πλάνας, πλήθει μὲν ἀμαχὼν χρωμένας, πεποικιλμένας δὲ διαφανεστός. But in view of expressions like Aesch. P. V. 24 ἡ ποικιλεῖμον νύξ and Eur. Hel. 1102 αὐτέρων ποικίλματα, it is better to hold that Plato adopts the word which was usually applied to the ‘spangles’ in the heavens, the “patines of bright gold,” with which “the floor of heaven is thick inlaid” (Merchant of Venice v 1), and uses it of the movements of the stars, especially as throughout this chapter he consistently represents the visible stars which popular astronomy investigates as nothing but visible or material φοιλα. I understand τὸ ὄν τάξος and ἡ οὐσία βραδυτῆς as the mathematical counterparts of visible stars. This interpretation is, I think, the only one which gives a proper sense to φόρος τε πρὸς ἄλληλα φέρεται καὶ τὰ ἐνώτα φέρει, and no other solution preserves in its full and unimpaired significance the necessary contrast between the astronomy of observation and Plato’s form of the science. The place which in popular astronomy is occupied by a γιγαντίαν τάχος, e.g. the planet Mercury, and a γιγαντίαν βραδύτης, e.g. the planet Mars, is in true astronomy filled by ὅν τάξος and οὐσία βραδύτης. Plato’s conception of a true science of Astronomy is a remarkable product of his peculiar half-poetical, half-philosophical imaginative faculty, and differs fundamentally from the theory and practice of the science both in antiquity and now. But it must in fairness be allowed that if a science of astronomy could be constructed on Platonic principles, admitting no element of sense-perception, and dealing exclusively with incorporeal mathematical abstractions, it would prove a better prelude to the study of the ἁρματός καὶ ἄσχηματος καὶ ἀναφής οὐσία (Phaedr. 247 C) than could ever be provided by the astronomy which depends on observation of the heavenly bodies. See further App. II, and for other views of this passage App. X.

529 D, E 25 παραδείγματι κτλ. The visible heavens may be used as a moving orrery, but nothing more. οὐσίαι κτλ. is a singularly apt illustration, because the special feature of Dacalus’ statues was that they moved (Euthyphr. 11 B ff., Men. 97 D ff., Eur. Frag. 373).
σπουδή, ὃς τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐν αὐτοῖς ληψώμενον ἵσων ἡ διπλασίων
| ἢ ἀληθικὸς τῶν συμμετριῶν. Τί δ’ οὐ μέλλει γελοῖον εἶναι; ἐφι. 530
Τῷ ὄντι δὴ ἀστρονομικόν, ἴν’ δ’ ἐγὼ, ὄντα ὅλον ὡς ὁ ἐπισκόπος
 eius τῶν ἄστρων φοράς ἀποβλέποντα; νομεῖν μὲν, ὡς ὁ ὅλον τε
cάλλιστα τὰ τοῖν πεῦκον πείσθαι, οὕτω ξυνετάναι τῷ τοῦ
5 οὐρανοῦ δημιουργῷ αὐτὸν τε καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ τὴν ἔκτοτὸς πρὸς
ἡμέραν εὐμετρίας καὶ τούτων πρὸς μήνα καὶ μήνα πρὸς ἑναῦνται
καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἄστρων πρὸς ταῦτα 1 καὶ πρὸς ἄλλαλα ὅλον ἄτοπον
, οὗτος, ἡγήσατο τὸν νομίζοντα γύνεισας τα ταύτα ἄει ὦσαὐ-
tως καὶ οὐδαμῇ οὐδεὶς παραλλάττεις, σομά τε ἔχοντα καὶ ὀρόμενα,
10 καὶ ξητεῖν παντὶ τρόπω τὴν ἀλήθειαν αὐτῶν λαβέων; 1 ’Εμοὶ γούν
δοκεῖ, ἐφ’ ὅσπερ, σοῦ νῦν ἀκούντες. Προβλήμασιν ἀρα, ἴν’ δ’ ἐγὼ,
χρόμονοι ὥσπερ γεωμετρίας οὕτω καὶ ἀστρονομίας μέτειμεν, τὰ δ’

530 λ. 2 τὸ ὄντι ἐς κτλ. It has been
conjectured by Brandt (s. Eututs. d. plat.
Lehr. v. d. Siedentallen p. 8) that Plato
is thinking of Eudoxus; but there is nothing
to suggest a specific reference here, as
there was in 526 b, c, and as Eudoxus,
the father of scientific astronomical ob-
server in Greece was preeminently “a
practical observer” (Allman Gk. Geometry
e. p. 142), he would hardly be described
by Plato in this passage as το ὄντα ἀστρο-
νουκός. See also Hirmer Entst. u. Komp.
d. plat. Pol. p. 667:
4. τὸ ταὐτά: i.e. ὅστα, σωματειδίω,
τὸ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ δημιουργῷ: the
Demigurges of the Timaeus.
5 τὴν δὲ νυκτὸς κτλ.; with which
astronomical observation is concerned.
Plato’s tone is very different in the
Timaeus (47 Αfl.) as Grote points out
(Plato III p. 235 n., where also an
amusing parallel is quoted from Male-
branch:); but it should be remembered that
it is with the educational value of
astronomy as a preparation for Dialectic
that we are here concerned (note εἰ μελ-
λομεν—ποιῆσαι in B, and see App. Π).
7 τῶν ἄλλων ἄστρων: ‘the other
stars’ (Schneider), as ταῦτα shews, not
the stars besides’ (as Stailbaum).
ταὐτά: viz. the Sun and Moon, which
make day, night, year, and month.
530 B 9 παραλλάττειν—ὁρόμενα
is a cardinal principle with Plato: see
Tim. 28 Α, Β, 37 δ and especially Pol.
269 D, E. παράλλαξις is used half-techni-
cally of any change or deviation in the
courses of the heavenly bodies, as for
example in the legend of Atreus (Pol.
269 λ): cf. Tim. 22 c.
10 ξητεῖν depends on ἄτοσον ἡγή-
σαι, ἄτοσον being now taken as neuter.
A reference to 525 B H. will shew that
Madvig’s ξητεῖν (or ξητεῖν δέων),
and Richards’ γρηγορία, with other conjectures,
are wholly beside the mark. J. and C.
(following Stallbaum) say ξητεῖν “depends
on νομίζοντα with the common ellipse of
dεϊων”; but δεῖων is not commonly omitted.
In ξητεῖν—λαβέων there is a slight sug-
gestion of something like the historical
Socrates’ distrust of astronomy (Xen.
Mem. IV 7. 6).
11 προβλήμασιν κτλ. Some have
cited in illustration “Leverrier and Adams
calculating an unknown planet into
existence by enormous heaps of algebra.”
(De Morgan, quoted by Bosanquet p. 293:
Lutoslawski Plato’s Logic p. 300). The
example is striking but inapposite; for,
according to this passage, the visible
perturbations of Uranus, which occasioned
the search for Neptune, would not have
seemed to Plato anything very extraordi-
nary. Unless he is greatly exaggerating
here, and I do not deny that throughout
this passage there is a touch of γενεαῖῶν
πάθος, ὥσπερ ὕπο μισας τῶν καὶ πνεύματος
ἐκθέσαι προσκεκλήθην καὶ ὀλίγη φαναῖαν
τοῦς λόγος (Longinus περὶ ὑφός 8. 4),
Plato’s views on law in the heavens must
have undergone considerable modifica-
tion before he wrote the Laws: see the
striking passage 821 B ff., and Tim.
47 Αεφ.
12 τὰ δ’ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ ἐάσομεν: ‘we
will dispense with the starry heavens.' There is a touch of fine audacity, not to say impiety, in Plato's phrase. Greater than the starry heavens is the mind of man. Nettleship (Lect. and Rem. II pp. 271—
277) and Bosanquet (Companion pp. 290—293) are, as it seems to me, unduly anxious throughout the whole of this epistle to minimise and explain away Plato's depreciation of the senses and their objects, although by so doing they can make his theories harmonize more nearly with the views of certain modern philosophers, and possibly also with the truth. Krohn (Pl. St. pp.170—174) inclines to the opposite error, although, except perhaps on verbal grounds, Plato would not quarrel with his definition of Platonic astronomy as "die Wissenschaft von den Bewegungen intelligenben Körper." Plato's Astronomy is in fact a kind of idealised Kinematics, with occasional illustrations from the visible movements of the heavenly bodies (τῇ περὶ τῶν οὐρανῶν ποικίλα παραδείγματα χρόστου κτλ. 529 D).

16 οἶμαι δὲ γε κτλ. 526 C H.

530 C—531 C. Next will come the science which is sister to Astronomy, viz. Harmonics. For particulars we will refer to the Pythagoreans, taking care, however, to maintain our leading principles intact. We may ignore the good people who try to determine a minimum interval and unit of measurement by the ear; but the Pythagoreans are also wrong, for it is the numerical ratios of audible consonances which they study. They ought to ascend to problems and examine which numbers are consonant, which not, and why. The science of Harmonics is useless for our purpose if otherwise pursued.

530 C ff. With the science of Harmonics we reach the end of Plato's προπαῦδεια. Plato's conception of Harmonics is in all respects analogous to his view of Astronomy. We have seen that the visible movements of the celestial bodies are only imperfect copies of those mathematical movements which true Astronomy seeks to apprehend. In like manner, the audible movements which produce audible consonances are imperfect reproductions of those mathematical movements from which result mathematical consonances, and it is these true consonances which the ἀρμονικὸς should study. The methods of pure mathematics are to be employed in Harmonics as well as in Astronomy, and observation and experiment are forbidden. If we criticise Plato from the standpoint of acoustical science, we must allow that he falls into the same error as before, but the emphasis, however exaggerated, which he lays on the mathematical and theoretical element in Harmonics, is not without importance in the history of the science; and we must remember that the study of Harmonics is valuable to Plato only as a preparation for Dialectic. The poetical affinities of the Platonic science of Harmonics are worthy of remark, though this chapter refrains from any allusion to them. It is altogether in harmony with Plato's theory to hold that 'the soleim and divine harmonies of music, heard or learned,' appeal to us so powerfully because they are one expression of those 'unheard harmonies' which are also expressed in the sister souls of Nature and of Man (Τέμν. 35 A ff.), and although there is much in Browning's Abt Vogler to which Plato would demur, the idea which inspires that noble poem has its philosophical basis in some such theory as Plato here suggests.

"But here is the finger of God, a flash of the will that can,
Existent behind all laws, that made them and lo they are!
And I know not, if, save in this, such gift be allowed to man,
That out of three sounds he frame, not a fourth sound, but a star."
Consider it well: each tone of our scale in itself is nought; it is everywhere in the world—loud, soft, and all is said: Give it to me to use! I mix it with two in my thought; and there! ye have heard and seen: consider and bow the head!

It is perhaps because he believed that the Soul of the Universe no less than that of Man is attuned to these eternal harmonies, as well as for other reasons, that Plato makes his προτειδεία culminate in Harmonics. See also App. II.

530c 18 ἀλλὰ γὰρ κτλ. Socrates means: If you criticise my curriculum (as in ἥ πολλακλάσιον—προστάττει), you are doubtless ready with suggestions of your own: hence I appeal to you: 'what suitable study can you suggest?' 'I cannot,' says Glauco, 'make any suggestion straight off.' ἀλλὰ γὰρ ('however') as in Thaet. 144 B, Synp. 220 E) goes closely with the previous sentence; if it were otherwise, Plato would have added ἤ δὲ ἐγώ or the like. The reading ἀλλὰ γὰρ τι (7 Vind, F, Hermann etc.) can hardly stand; nor is Steinhart's ἀλλὰ γὰρ τι κτλ., or Richards' ἀλλὰ γὰρ <ἀλλο> τι (or ἀλλὰ γὰρ <ἐτι> τι) pleasing or probable. I formerly suggested ἄρα γὰρ τί ἐξεῖς <σὺ> ὑπομνῆσαι κτλ., the other subjects having all been suggested by Socrates and not Glauco, with the partial exception of geometry 526 c; but now believe (with Schneider) that the text is sound.

530 D 22 πρὸς τούτω: "praeter astronomicum forâ s. motus genus" (Stallbaum).

23 ὡς πρὸς ἀστρονομίαν κτλ. ἀστρονομία is forâ βάδον (528 E n.), and appeals to the eye in the same way as ἀπαράξιος φόρα, or movement in accordance with the laws of ἀρμοδία (111 397 b, 398 D, E n.), appeals to the ear. In ἀπαράξιος φόρα the air moves more or less quickly etc., and this accounts for the different pitch etc. of notes: see Tim. 67 b, 80 A ff. and Theo Smyrn. p. 50 Hiller, where this—Platonic—theory of sound is very clearly explained. Cf. also von Jahn Musici Scripores Graeci pp. 130 ff.


530 E 27 κείμενων πευκόμεθα κτλ. Plato does not claim to be a specialist in musical matters: cf. 111 400 A. The words καὶ εἶ τι ἀλλο πρὸς τούτων look like a general acknowledgment of obligation throughout this part of the Republic to the Pythagoreans. See App. II.
50 ἐξήκον κτλ. The ms reading ἔδιπλα gives a weightier and better meaning than ὀλοί, which Richards proposes. For ἐφήκειν Eusebius (Porph. En. xiv. 15. 5) has ἐφήκει, also a rare word: Stephanus conjectured ἐφήκειν. ἐφήκειν is better, though rarer, than either: cf. (with Schneider) ἐφήκειαι in 531 D. The reference in ἀρτι is to 529 A ff.

531 Α 1 τὰς γὰρ ἀκουσμένας κτλ. The intervals reckoned as consonant (σύμφονα) were such as the octave, double octave, fifth and fourth; see on iv 430 E. These the Pythagoreans ‘measure by’ (or ‘against’) ‘one another,’ by comparing the lengths of vibrating strings of the same material, thickness and tension. It is thus found that the octave is 2 : 1, the double octave 4 : 1, the fifth 3 : 2, and the fourth 4 : 3. See Dict. of Ant. 111 p. 193 with Theo Smyrn. pp. 48—51, 56—61 Hiller, and Aristox. Harm. 20 ff. Marquard. Richards proposes ἔτο τῶν ταὐτῶν καὶ ὑμίστω ἀναστρεφθέντα κύκλω. 3 ὅσπερ οἱ ἀστρονομοί. The parallel is exact: as the astronomers studied visible, so the Pythagoreans investigated audible φορὰι (Theo l.c.). To Plato, on the other hand, ἀκονθιώ ἀράτι φανερὴς κρισιμοῦ (Heracl. Fr. 47 Bywater), ‘Heard harmonies are sweet, but those unheard are sweeter.’ See above on 530 C.

3 η τοῦς θεοὺς κτλ. There were two rival schools of musical theory in Greece, viz. “(1) the Pythagorean or mathematical, who identified each interval with a ratio, (2) the ‘musical’ (μουσικήν), who measured all intervals as multiples or fractions of the Tone” (Monro in Dict. Ant. 111 p. 193). Cf. Modes of Anc. Gr. Mus. p. 174. Plato’s criticism was intended to apply to the first school; but Glaucow erroneously understands it of the second.

4 πυκνώματα κτλ. ἄττα (ἰσοίαν) and ὄνυμαζόντες shew that πυκνώματα is a technical term. The word πυκνώματα does not appear to occur elsewhere in this sense, but πυκνὸς was a favourite word with writers of the ‘musical’ school, as may be seen from its constant employment by Aristoxenus. πυκνὸς is thus defined: τὸ ἐκ δύο διαστήματος συνετοῦ ἔτο πυκνὸν διαστήματα περιέχει τῶν καταμετρητῶν διαστήματος ἐκ τὸν διά τεσσάρων (Aristox. Harm. 24, 10 ff. Marquard) i.e. any combination of two intervals which are together less than the interval remaining in the Fourth when the πυκνὸς is subtracted from the Fourth, e.g. two quarter tone intervals, or even two semitone intervals (but not more): see Aristox. l.c. 50. 15 ff. The definition in Bacchius lisc. 20 von Jan ἐκ δύο διαστήματος ἑλάσθων συνετοῖν ἐκ ισότητα γένει is less exact, but not, so far as it goes, inconsistent with that of Aristoxenus. Plato’s πυκνώματα must be “haec ipsa πυκνὰ vel alia parva et tamen composita intervalla,” so called “proprium sonorum in angusto spatio quasi consertorum frequentiam” (Schneider). Cf. πυκνὸς in Lisc. 512 D, καταπυκνόσεις, καταπυκνώσις etc. in Theo 91 and often in Aristoxenus, and see generally Westphal and Rossbach Gr. Harm. etc. pp. 105 ff. It is possible that the musical application of these terms was originally a metaphor borrowed from the art of weaving: for “vestes spathae tecestae, ob densitatem, quam inde consequentur, πυκνώματα dictae ap. Aesch. S. 235 πέτλουα βαρβαρώσα, καὶ πυκνώματι” (Stephanus-Hase s. v. πυκνῶμα, where reference is made also to Hesych. s. v. σπάθημα and a Scholiast on Ar. Ach. 180). I agree with Schneider in doubting whether Cellius’ “frequentamenta” (111. 12, v. 1. 1) are the same as Plato’s πυκνώματα.
5 oion egei tonon ktl.: 'as if they were trying to catch a sound in the neighbourhood.' Cf. Heliod. 17 xinei de evanta ekei tonon and Blaydes on At. Phil. 435 or Stephanus-Hase Thes. s.v. geitovn, where numerous examples of this highly idiomatic phrase are quoted. J. and C.'s translation "from a neighbour's house" is incorrect and pointless: still worse is Westphal's "als ob sie die Intervallgrösse dem Nachbarton ablau schen wollen." The idiom was understood by Ficinus, who translates it by "viciniore loco."

οι μὲν φαινετ' κτλ. Some will have it that they overhear a note between (let us say) Β and Φ, and that this is the smallest interval, and should be the unit of measurement: others say "No! it is not different from Β." Plato (who is all for simplicity in music Laws 812 c) here satirises the μουσικοί, who made the quartotone or διέσις their unit: see Theo 55 diesan de kaloiou exochoo tetapi oipari 'Aristratei to tetartomeron to ton ton, hema de hemitonia, ws elaxiston melofidion diastima, and on the enarabolion ginos generally, which Plato strongly disliked (Theo 56; cf. also Procl. in Tim. 191 E), and in which the diesis played a large part, Dict. of Ant. L.c. and Westphal and Rosbach L.c.

7 ámphiobetontes. We should except ámphiobetontes (so Theo 6) or else fáskontes instead of φαινετ' above. Cobet would emend, but the anacolouthon is not difficult in a writer like Plato: see on vi 488 c, s. and supra 519 B Φ

8 fheeguménon: sc. των χορδων, omitted as in η δια πασων.

ότα κτλ. This bitter epigram was applied by Adrastus to Aristocles (Procl. in Tim. 192 B). The cap fits admirably; for Aristocles was afterwards the leader of the μουσικοί whose principle is here ridiculed. With the expression itself cf. Pliny Eph. vii. 27. 8 sed affirmare animum aequumque practendere.

531 B 8 συ μέν κτλ. Socrates now corrects Glauco's error: see on η τούς theos κτλ. 531 A. τους χρησατος is of course contemptuous. Plato has no sympathy with the μουσικοί.'

9 τοις ταῖς χόρδαις κτλ.: 'who persecute and torture the strings, racking them upon the pegs. But lest my figure become somewhat tedious if I dwell upon the blows delivered with the plectrum, and the accusations brought against the strings, as well as their denials and bragadocio behaviour' etc. The figure (εἰκών) is from torturing and beating slaves, as βασανίζοντας, στρεβλώντας and πληγών shew: even πράγματα παρέχουσα suggests a court of law (cf. Crit. 44 E). The strings are the victims, while the pegs are the pulleys by which they were racked upon the τροχος (see Dict. Ant. s. v. ceculeus). For εἰτ Herwerden proposes υπ' but the strings are racked by the musicians ἐν τοιον the pegs.

II πλήκτρω τε πληγών κτλ. The etymological meaning of πλήκτρων adds point to this part of the comparison.

12 πέρι from its position divides πληγών and κατηγορίας, which refer to the behaviour of the musicians, from ἐξαρηθέσων καὶ ἀλασονέως, in which the behaviour of the strings is described. For the anastrophe of πέρι see Lina de praecipio, usu Plat. pp. 26—30. The angry musician is like the prosecutor, and blames the strings, which in their turn repudiate the charge and swagger away like a stubborn slave however savagely the screw is turned. For a further discussion of this passage see App. XI.
13 ἕκεινοι: i.e. the Pythagoreans, and not the μονακολοί, as Glauco supposed.

§ 531 C 15 τοὺς γὰρ κτλ. It is strange that in spite of οὗ ἔφαμεν νῦν ὅτι κτλ. this should have been so frequently understood as referring to the school satirised by Glauco: see for example Susemihl Gen. Entw. II p. 210. Plato is of course, as Schneider pointed out, speaking about the Pythagoreans who investigated the numbers or ratios of audible consonances: see 531 A n. and RP.7 § 56 C.

16 ἀλλ' οὖκ κτλ. Cf. 530 B. ἀνίασων is undoubtedly present, and not future, here: see on ν 473 C.

17 τῶν ἕμφασιν κτλ. As the true astronomer should study intelligible stars with the mathematical intelligence, using the visible stars only as imperfect παραδείγματα (§ 29 C, D n.), so the true ἀρμονικός must investigate intelligible, and not audible, consonances. In the words of a modern writer, he must "look, not into the tone-world here, but into the world of harmony beyond." Plato holds that certain mathematical numbers are in themselves ἤμφασιν, and others not: see Theo 72—75, where examples of both varieties are given. The numbers or ratios of audible consonances are only particular and imperfect embodiments or expressions of these numbers: they may serve as παραδείγματα, but nothing more. In the Timaeus Plato represents the World-soul as the grandest expression of certain ἕμφασιν ἀρμοιν, so that it is natural enough for him to crown his προταύδεια with the study of mathematical ἔμφασιν, and say that it is 'useful in seeking out the beautiful and good.' It must nevertheless be admitted that Plato's conception of Harmonics as well as of Astronomy is fundamentally different from that of modern science, in spite of the attempts which Bosanquet and others have made to prove their essential harmony. See on 530 C and App. II.

§ 531 C—533 D. The pursuit of these studies, if carried far enough to reveal their mutual relationship, will contribute to the end which we desire; but after all, they are only the prelude to Dialectic. We may compare Dialectic to the prisoner's progress from looking on real animals to beholding the sun, and these preparatory studies to his release and ascent from shadows and images within the cave to shadows of real objects in the world above. Socrates declines to give an account of the method and object of Dialectic; but insists that the Good must be seen, and that Dialectic alone can reveal it, for Dialectic is the only study which ascends on the ruins of its hypotheses to the Idea of Good, leading the soul on high, and using the 'Arts' as handmaidens and helpers in the process of education.

§ 531 D ff. Plato's conception of Dialectic and dialectical science is fully discussed in App. III.

23 ἀλλ' οὖκεια κτλ. Cf. [Epin.] 991 E ff. ταύτα διάγραμμα ἀρμοί τοῦ σύντημα καὶ ἀρμοίνα σύντασιν ἔτασσαν τῆς τοῦ ἀστρῶν περιφορᾶς τὴν ὁμολογίαν πάνω
25 ἀνόητα πονεῖσθαι, εἰ δὲ μή, ἀνόητα. Καὶ ἐγώ, ἐφη, οὗτο μαν-
τεύματι. ἀλλὰ πάμπλωμα ἐργον λέγεις, ὁ Σώκρατες. Τοῦ προομίου,
ἥν ἐγώ, ή τίνος λέγεις; ἡ οὐκ ἰσμεν, ὅτι πάντα ταῦτα προοιμαῖα
ἐστιν αὐτὸν τοῦ νόμου, ὅπειρα μαθεῖν; οὐ γὰρ που δοκοῦσί γε σοὶ
οἱ ταῦτα 1 δεινοὶ διαλεκτικοὶ εἶναι. Οὐ μᾶ τὸν Δί', ἐφη, εἰ μὴ ἐ
30 μάλα γέ τινες ὄλγοι ὅν ἐγὼ ἐντεῦχηκα. 'Ἀλλ' ἦδη, εἰπὼν, μη
dυνατὸ νῦν ὄντες δουναί τε καὶ ἀποδέξασθαι λόγων ἐίσεσθαι
ποτέ τι ᾧ φαινὲν δεῖν εἰδέναι; Ὡδ' αὐτή ἐφη, τοῦτο γε. | Οὐκοῦν, 5321
εἰπὼν, ὁ Πλαίκω, οὗτος ἦδη αὐτὸς ἐστὶν ὁ νόμος, διὸ τὸ διαλέγεσθαι
περαίνει; ὃν καὶ δεῦτον μιμοῖτ' ἂν ἢ τῆς ὧγεως δύναμις, ἥν
ἐλέγουμεν πρὸς αὐτά ἦδη τὰ ἥδα ἐπίχειρειν ἀποβλέπειν καὶ πρὸς
30. μή Π.; ὁ μή Λ., sed οἷ punctis notavit Λ.2. 3. περαίνει μ' παρανε ΑΠΕ.
autà ástrapa te kai teleteivainon ðe pròs auton ton ðiλion; ouτo κai 5 ótan tis tò δiαλέγεται éπιχειρή ðiueν pasòn tòv aiiðhèsoν dià tòv λòγòv ép' autò d èstiv ékastov ðòμàν, kai μη ἀποστή, πρòw B òn autò d èstiv ãgàðhóv I autè νοῆse ÿlêβη, ép' autò γίγνεται τò tòu νòυτον τèλει, ᾠσπερ ékeívoν tòtè épì tò tòv ðòraτòu. Pàntàpasi mèn ouν, ἔφη. ῰i ouν; οὐ δiαλεκτικὴν τάυτην τὴν πορείαν ἰο καλεῖς; Τῇ μην; Ἡ δὲ ἕγε, ἦν δ' εγώ, λύσιν τε ἀπὸ τῶν δεσμῶν καὶ μεταστροφή ἀπὸ τῶν σκίων ἐπὶ τά εἰδώλα καὶ τό φῶς καὶ ἐκ τοῦ καταγείον εἰς τῶν ðiλιων ἐπάνωδος, καὶ ἐκεί πρὸς μὲν τά δζρά τε


5 autà ástrapa. I formerly read autà περίóδοι with Baiter; but there is no MS authority for the article, and this is unnecessary even between autà τά ðiων and autòν τὸν ðiλιον.

ouτo καὶ κτλ.: 'so also whenever by means of dialectic one attempts through discourse of reason' etc. On τοῦ λòγου and ἀνευ πασῶν τῶν αἰσθάνοντων see VI 511 B n. and App. III. Ast's conjecture ðòμαν (see cr. n.) is supported by Clement Stroum. VII 511 B Migne (quoted by Schneider) ἐὰν ἐπιχειρή τίς ἄνευ πασῶν τῶν αἰσθάνοντων διὰ τοῦ λòγου ἐπὶ autò ὑπερ ἐκαστὸν ἄνευ κτλ., and closely corresponds with ἐπιχειρεῖ ἀπομείνειν in the last sentence. There is no occasion for Stallbaum's professional ridicule of Schneider's view: 'quasi vero recte dici potuerit: τò διαλέγεσθαι ἐπιχειρεῖ διὰ τοῦ λòγου ὑπερ ἐπὶ τι! for ouδὲ δὲ λòγον ἀπετέλεται τῇ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι διὰ διώλεται in VI 511 B is an exact parallel. On other views see App. XII.

7. ἐκαστὸν is omitted in A (see cr. n.) and some other MSS. It is however necessary both in itself, and in order to provide a proper contrast with autò δ ἐστιν ἀγάθων. For the process here described see App. III.

532 B 9 tòtè. 516 B. 11 ἡ δὲ γε κτλ. Having described διαλεκτικὴ in terms of the case-simile, Plato now proceeds to describe his προπαθεία in the same way; cf. 515 C, 516 A n. Bosanquet finds a difficulty in ἡ λύσιν— BrowserModule, and thinks it just conceivable that these words describe the training in music and gymnastic and not the προπαθεία (so also Susemihl Gen. Enl., II p. 201). But Plato's language is perfectly definite; and τῶν τεχνῶν ἀσ ἀδίλθομα (532 C) cannot mean anything beyond or except the five studies just described. Nor is this the only passage where the 'turning round' of the prisoners while still in the cave and their gradual ascent are identified with the προπαθεία, or with part of it; see 521 C. Plato means that the enunciation of the soul is a gradual process, and that we are not to expect our mathematical studies to deliver us from δόξα all at once. ἡ λύσις—ἐιδώλα suggests that their first effect will be to loosen our intellectual bonds, and turn us as it were from reflected to original δόξαι—from εἰκαστικὰ τὸ πίστις (VI 511 E, VII 517 A n.). The higher we mount, the less of δόξα we retain, and in the higher stages of the προπαθεία (symbolized by ἐκεῖ—ἀποκατάσχεσθαι) we escape from δόξα altogether. See App. I. 532 B, C 13 καὶ ἐκεῖ κτλ. 'and when there, their inability still to look upon animals and plants and the light of the sun, but upon divine reflections in water and shadows of things real, not, as before, shadows of images thrown by a light which is itself but an image compared with the sun.' Cf. 516 A, B. ἐτί ἀδύναμι is due to Lamblichus: see cr. n. and cf. Bywater in J. Ph. X p. 78. Nagelsbach also conjectured ἐτί ἀδύναμι. The difference between ἐτί and ἐτι in an uncial MS is practically nil. With πρὸς δὲ τά κτλ. the positive counterpart of ἀδύναμι (βλέψω) is to be supplied: cf. Ap. 36 B (where Schanz's insertion of o6 after oI πολλοὶ is inelegant and unnecessary) and Kühner Gr. Gr. II p. 1072. For ἐτι with a verbal noun cf. IV 434 C n. 'Divine' φαντάσματα is a half-technical
καὶ φυτὰ καὶ τὸ τοῦ ἕλιου φῶς ἐτὶ ἄδυναμια βλέπειν,1 πρὸς δὲ 15 τὰ ἐν ὑδάσι φαντάσματα θεῖα καὶ σκιὰς τῶν ὄντων, ἀλλὰ οὐκ εἰδώλων σκιὰς δὲ ἐπέρω τοιούτου φωτὸς ὥς πρὸς ἤλιον κρίνειν ἀποσκιαζόμενας, πᾶσα αὐτὴ ἡ πραγματεία τῶν τεχνῶν, ὡς διήλθομεν, ταῦτα ἔχει τὴν δύναμιν καὶ ἐπαναγιγνή τοῦ βελτίστου ἐν ψυχῇ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ἁριστοῦ ἐν τοῖς οὐσὶ θέαν, ὡσπέρ τότε τοῦ 20 σαφεστάτου ἐν σῶματι πρὸς τὴν τοῦ φανταστῶν ἐν τῷ σωματειδεὶ 1 τε καὶ ὀρατῷ τόπῳ. 'Εγὼ μὲν, ἐφη, ἀποδέχομαι οὐτω. καίτοι D παντάπασι γε μοι δοκεῖ χαλεπὰ μὲν ἀποδέχεσθαι εἶναι, ἄλλων δὲ ἀπὸ τρόπον χαλεπὰ μὴ ἀποδέχεσθαι. ὦμος δὲ—οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ νῦν παροῦντι μοῦνον ἀκούσεως, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀδήλις πολλάκις ἐπανεῖσι—25 ταῦτα θέντες ἔχειν ὡς νῦν λέγεται, ἐπὶ αὐτὸν δὴ τὸν νῦμον ίομεν, καὶ διέλθομεν οὕτως, ὡσπέρ τὸ προοίμιον διηλθομεν. Λέγει οὖν, τίς ὁ τρόπος τῆς τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δυνάμεως, καὶ 1 κατὰ ποιὰ δὴ Ε ἐἰδὴ διεστηκέναι, καὶ τίνες αὐτὸ ὅδοι. αὐτὴ γὰρ ἄν ἡδίν, ὡς ἔοικεν, αἰ πρὸς αὐτὸ ἀγουσε εἰεν, οἱ ἄφικομένων ὡσπέρ ὀδὸν ἀνάπαυλα 30 ἀν εἰ καὶ τέλος τῆς πορείας. Οὐκέτ', ἡν δ' ἐγὼ, ὁ φίλε Γλαύκων,

14. ἐτὶ ἄδυναμα Iamblichus (Villoison Aned. II p. 196): ἐπὶ ἄδυναμα ΑΠΩς· ἐπὶ ἄδυναμα (sit) Ε. 26. διέλθομεν Εγ.: διέλθομεν ΑΠ.  

Platonic phrase for reflections of natural objects produced by natural lights: they are θεία because θεία ἐργα ποίησει (Soph. 266 c, where the whole matter is very clearly explained). Even without the aid of the Sophist, we might deduce the meaning from the antithetical clause ἀλλ' οὐ —ἀποσκιαζόμενας, if we remember that the sun is a θεός (vi 508 a). The adjective is regularly placed after the substantive when two coordinate qualifications have to be expressed (here ἐν τοῖς ὑδάσιν and θεία): cf. iiii 397 δ τῶν ἑπεκούσι μιμητὴν ἄκρατον, ix 573 λ τῶν ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις συνωσιαίς ἁρπών ἀνεμιλών. Other examples are given by Jebb on Soph. O. 7: 1245 and Sandys on Arist. Ath. Pol. 51. 3: cf. also Stallbaum on Phil. 20 b. The present passage explains why Plato was so careful to make the originals in the Cave σκευαστά and ἐδώδα, and not φωτεινά: see on 514 b. Other views of these sentence are discussed in App. XIII. 17 πᾶσα κτλ. The anacoluthon is illustrated by Engelhardt Anac. Pl. Ῥμ. 111 p. 45. 18 ταῦτα τῶν δύναμιν: viz. λόγων ἀπὸ τῶν δεσμῶν κτλ.  

532 D 23 οὗ γὰρ ἐν τῷ νῦν κτλ. We ought not to interpret this as a promise of future dialogues (with Siebeck Unters. z. Phil. d. Griechen p. 118); it is only a way of indicating, before we pass on, that the subject is not exhausted. See on iv 430 c.  

532 E—533 A 30 οὗκετι κτλ. With the general tenour and form of the sentence cf. (with Jackson) Symp. 210 a. I can see no reason for suspecting the text (with Madvig, who proposes εἰ γ' ἐτι, or εἰ σὺ γ' ἐτι, and Badham, who would insert εἰ before οίς τ' ἐτι). Glauco has not without difficulty (517 c) followed Socrates thus far; nor is there anything rude in telling him frankly that he has reached his limit, and even if there were, Socrates does not spare Glauco's feelings (cf. 527 D, 529 a). That his audience would not be able to follow a description of the Good, has already been implied in vi 506 E ff. βουλομένων ἄν, εἰτον, ἐμὲ τ' δύνασθαι αὕτην (the account of the Good itself) ἄποδον οὐ καὶ ύπατος κοιμασθαναι. Here Socrates appears to be a trifle more confident of his own expository powers, though he is careful, as before, to avoid
the appearance of dogmatism and therefore introduces the expressions ως υς μοι φαινεται etc. (cf. τον γε δοκειντος ημαλ. 8.) and προθυμιας (cf. προθυμοφρεμος δε κτλ. vi 506 D). Kroll (Pl. St. pp. 179 ff.) bitterly complains of Socrates for drawing back; and Whewell (Phil. of Discover y p. 436) observes "We may venture to say that it does not appear that he had any answer ready." The dialectical method recommended by Plato in the Republic is doubtless, in its full significance, an unrealised ideal (cf. κυν. ον αξιαν αναπαθητον VI 510 B and του αναπαθητου 511 B), just as the ultimate object of Dialectic, the Idea of Good, will still recede as we approach it. The description which follows merely recapitulates the account already given in Book vi, with a few additional characteristics already familiar in the Socratic school: but the majority of the Platonic dialogues furnish practical illustrations of many essential features in Plato's dialectical method: so that it is possible to form a tolerably clear idea of the kind of answer which the Platonic Socrates might have made in reply to Glauco's invitation. See on the whole subject App. III.

533 A 2 οι δ' εικόνα αν ετι κτλ.: such as we saw before in vi 506 E ff. Glauco's question refers to the method, Socrates' reply to the object, of Dialectic: it is of course impossible to separate the two. On δισχυρισθαι followed by ἵσχυρον see I 336 E n.

4 δει μεν δει κτλ. C. vi 505 E ff., supra 517 C (δει ταυτην ιδειν κτλ.), 519 C, 526 E (δει αυτην παντι τροπη ιδειν). These passages are strongly in favour of δει as against δη (see κρ. n.), which Schneider, Hermann, and Stallbaum remark.

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533 οιδε τ' | ἐσεϊ ἀκολουθείν. ἐπει δ' τ' γε' έμοι οὐδεν ἀν προβημίασ απολέστω, οὐδ' εἰκόνα αν ἔτει οὐ λέγομεν ἱδειν, ἀλλ' αὐτῷ τὸ ἀληθὲς, ὃς δ' Ἰναν μοι φαινεται, εἰ δ' ἰνας ε' μη, οὐκετ' άξιον τοιτο διαχυριςθαι. ἀλλ' Ἰνα τ' μεν δει τοιούτω τι έδειν, ἰσχυριστέον. ἦ γάρ; Τι μην; Οὐκοιν και ὅτι τ' τοιοδέλεσθαι δύναμις μονη αν 5 φηςειν ἐπείρο οντι δν νῦν δη διληθομεν, ἀλλη δε οὐδαμη δυνατ' των; Καὶ τοιτ', ἐφ', αξιον διαχυρισθαι. Τόδε γον' ην δ' εγω, Β οὐδες ήμιν ἀμφισβητήσει λέγομεν, ὡς αυτω τ' ἐκάστου περι ὃ εστιν ἐκάστου ἄλλη τις ἐπειχειρει μέθοδος ὁδο περι παντος. 2. ἀπολέστοι ΑΠ: ἀπολέστοι ΑΠ. 4. δει ut videtur Ficinus: δη codd., exceptis Φ et Mon. C, qui pro μεν δει τοιούτω praecept dei μεν τοιούτω.
10. λαμβάνειν, ἀλλ' αἰ μὲν ἄλλαὶ πᾶσαι τέχναι ἢ πρὸς δόξας ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἐπιθύμιας εἰςίν, ἢ πρὸς γενέσεις τε καὶ συνθέσεις, ἢ πρὸς θεραπείαν τῶν φυσικῶν τε καὶ συνθεμένων ἀπασαὶ τετράφαται, αἴ δὲ λοιπαί, ἃς τοῦ ὄντος τι ἐφαμεν ἐπιλαμβάνεσθαι, γεωμετρίας τε καὶ τὰς ταύτης ἐπομένας, ὅρμων ὡς όινοπρόττουσι καὶ πέρι τὸ

15 ὦν, ὑπαρ δὲ ὀὐδ' υπάρχουσιν αὐτάς ἰδεῖν, ἐως ἄν ὑποθέσεις χρώμεναι ταύτας ἀκινήτους ἔσοι, μὴ δυνάμεναι λόγον διδόναι αὐτῶν. δὲ γὰρ ἄρχή μὲν ὁ μὴ οἴδε, τελευτὴ δὲ καὶ τὰ μεταξὺ εξ οὗ μὴ οἴδεν συμπεπλεκτεῖ, τῆς μιχαλῆς τὴν τοιαύτην ὁμολογίαν ποτὲ ἐπιστήμην γενέσθαι; Οὐδεμία, ἥ δ' ὄσ.

20. Οὐκοῦν, ὃν δ' ἐγώ, ὅ δηλακτικὴ μέθοδος μονή ταύτη πορεύεται, τὰς ὑποθέσεις ἀναρροοῦσα, ἔτ' αὐτὴν τὴν ἄρχην, ἣν

12. ἀπασαὶ II: ἀπασα Α.

10. αἰ μὲν ἄλλαὶ κτλ. Cf. Phil. 55E—58E. Plato is thinking of a threefold classification of arts under κοινής, ποιητική, and ἐπιμελητική or the like (J. and C., comparing Gorg. 463 ff., 501, 502, Soph. 222 E, 265 ff., Pol. 261 ff.).

12. τετράφαται is one of Plato's archaisms: see on I 330 B. Such forms are not found in inscriptions after 410 B.C. (Meisterhans3 p. 166).

13. γεωμετρίας—ταύτῃ. For the syntax cf. VI 511 B n.

533E 14. ὀνειρωττοῦσιν κτλ. Krohn (Pl. St. pp. 175—181) accuses Plato of a sudden volte face in regard to mathematical studies. It is true that the same language is used of δόξα in V 476 C (cf. VII 520 C), but there are dreams and dreams, and we may fairly say that if the προται-

δεία is only a dream in comparison with Dialectic, at least it is one of those dreams which come through the gates of horn.

16. ὁ γὰρ ἄρχη κτλ. See VI 510 C, D nii. ὁμολογαῖν means 'agreement' 'harmony' ('Übereinstimmung" Schneider), viz. of ἄρχη, τελευτῇ and τὰ μεταξὺ, not 'admissions' (as D. and V. translate): cf. ὁμολογομένως I.C.

20. οὐκοῦν κτλ. 'Well then,' said I, 'the method of dialectic alone proceeds by the destruction of hypotheses to the actual first principle, in order to make its results secure.' Dialectic examines and cancels (ἀναιρεῖ) one ὑπόθεσις after another, till in the end it reaches the Idea of Good. Suppose for example that ὀναίρησ is the subject of discussion. Various ὑπόθεσει are proposed, tested, and overthrown.

Out of the ruins of the former ὑπόθεσει we built a new and better one, which must in its turn be thoroughly tested, tried, and perhaps overthrown, before it can serve as a stepping-stone to one which is higher, truer and better: cf. 534 B, C. Now this process of testing, revising, discarding, is not, ideally speaking, complete until we examine the relations of our ὑπόθεσει of ὀναίρησ with all νοῦτα, and in such an examination we apply the same 'hypothesitical method' throughout the whole noetic sphere, testing and correcting all our ὑπόθεσει by one another. In the final stage, which is of course only an ideal, all our ὑπόθεσει become exact counterparts of the Ideas, and we have reached the ἄρχη or Good. Thereafter the results of Dialectic are βεσ-

βαια: see VI 511 B. The earlier steps in this dialectical ascent may be illustrated from many, if not most, of the Platonic dialogues. For ἀναρροοσ cf. Arist. Top. I 6. 120a 6—31, and especially Eth. Eud. II 6. 122a 27 f. κανονικής τῆς ἄρχης πάντα μάλιστα ἄν σταὶ ἀκινήτημα μεταβάλλων, αὕτα δ' αὕτα αὐτὸ μεταβάλλει ἀναρροένου βατέρου ὑπὸ βατέρου, ἀν μὴ τῷ τὴν ὑπόθε-

σιν ἀνέλειν καὶ δι' ἑκείνην διάθησιν. The word is often used in connexion with the Eleatic dialectic, of which Plato's ἦ ἐπὶ ὑπόθεσιν ἀνάλουσ (Alcin. Isag. 7), here described, is a development: see RP7, §§ 95 n. a, 105 A—106, 110—115. For other views on this passage see App. XV; and for a further discussion of the method itself and its permanent value in the history of investigation consult App. III.
533 D 22. Βορβόςρω. The image is taken from Orphic theology: cf. Π 363 D n.

27. ἦ γε τῷ πρόσθεν. VI 511 D, E.

ἐστι Β′, ως κτλ. Cf. Laws 864 A. Plato constantly reminds us that he has no fixed terminology (see Hirmer Entst. u. Konz. d. pl. Pol. p. 647 and Hirzel Der Dialog pp. 246 ff.), and the ancients were well aware of this fact, though modern interpreters of Plato too often forget it; see the references collected by Hermann Gesh. u. Syst., p. 573 n. 169 and D. L. 111 63 (quoted by Hirmer).

533 E—534 E. In conclusion, after pointing out the proportions between the different intellectual states, Socrates declares that the essential feature of Dialectic is its power to grasp the reason or principle of all Being, separating the Idea of Good, for example, from everything else, defining it in words, and scrutinizing the definition by tests, from each and all of which it must emerge triumphantly. Cláudio agrees that such a study is indispensable to the rulers, and that the curriculum is now complete.

533 E, 29. οὐ γὰρ οὖν, ἐφή. See cr. n. The interpolation which follows these words in all MSS except E is discussed in App. XVI.

ἐρέσκει γοῦν Α. 5. ἐπιστήμην Δ'II: ἐπιστήμην Α'3.

534 A, 4. οἱ νόησι—ἐκαθάρισ. That is to say, in the Simile of the Line (see Fig. i on p. 65), (1) CB : AC :: EB : DC and (2) CB : AC :: CE : AD. We have already seen that CE : EB :: AD : DC (VI 509 ν n.). :: componoendo

CE + EB : EB :: AD + DC : DC i.e. CB : EB :: AC :: DC ; :: alternando CB : AC :: EB : DC. This proves (1), and (2) is proved as follows. Since

CE : EB :: AD : DC, :: invertingo EB : CE :: DC : AD; hence componoendo

EB + CE : CE :: DC + AD : AD i.e. CB : CE :: AC :: AD ; :: alternando CB : AC :: CE : AD. I owe this proof to the kindness of a mathematical friend.

5 τὴν δ' ἐφ' οἷς κτλ. Liebhold (who also conjectured καλ ἐκ νόησις for καλ ὑπ' νόησις) makes the extraordinary
νοητον, ἔσωμεν, ὡ Γλαύκων, ἡμᾶς ἡμῶν ἀπολλατασίων λόγων ἐμπλήση ἥ δόσων οἱ παρεληλυθότες. Ἄλλα μην ἔμοι, ἐφι, τὰ γε Ἄλλα, καθ' ὄσαν δύναμαι ἐπεσταί, ἤνδοκεί. Ἡ καὶ διαλεκτικὸν
καλεῖ τὸν λόγον ἐκάστου λαμβάνοντα τῆς οὐσίας; καὶ τὸν μὴ ἐχούσατα, καθ' ὄσαν ἄν μὴ ἐχὶ λόγου αὐτῷ τε καὶ ἀλλῶ διδόματε, κατὰ
tοσοῦτον νοῦν περὶ τούτου ὑπὸ φήσεις ἔχειν;
Πῶς γὰρ ἂν, ἢ δ' ὦ, φάινε; Οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὀσαύον· ὃς ἄν μὴ ἐχὶ διορίσασθαι τῷ λόγῳ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀλλῶν πάντων ἄφελον τὴν τοῦ
ἀγαθοῦ ἱδέαν καὶ ὁδήπερ ἐν μάχῃ διὰ πάντων ἐλέγχων διεξιών, μὴ C
8. ὄσων ἕρπ; ὄσων ΑΠ.

suggestion τὴν δ' ἐφ' οἷς ταῦτ' ἄν διέχει ἀναλογίαν καὶ διάλεξιν ἐκάστου (Philol. 1876 p. 372). The text is of course quite sound and = τὴν δ' δ' ἐφ' οἷς ταῦτα = ἀναλογίαν κτλ.; cf. vi 511 E. I cannot agree with Shorey when he says (Idea of Good etc. p. 235) that Plato “avoids drawing out the proportion ἔδω; objects of διάνοια = ἀκεφαλάτητα etc.; εἰκόνες, because he is aware that the second member is a blank and the fourth is largely fantastic.” Both of these assertions are in my opinion quite wrong, and if they were true, Plato would have refrained from drawing out the proportions between the faculties themselves for exactly the same reasons. See App. I. As it is, we should take Plato at his word. He may well decline to enter on the tedious and unprofitable task of expounding and illustrating in detail the proportions which may be conjectured to obtain between the different objects of our intellectual powers. It would for example lead to no useful result if we tried to establish a proportion between a particular ἔδω, one of the five μαθήματα, a particular object of πλῆθος, and a particular object of ἐλκασία. Such attempts would certainly involve us in an endless amount of talk, and would hardly result in anything but a series of barren and pedantic formulae and subdivisions.

8 ὅσων. See cr. n. ὅσων is read by a large majority of MSS, and the confusion of α and ω is common; see Introd. § 5. The construction (as Schneider points out) is ὅσων λόγων οἱ παρεληλυθότες λόγῳ ἡμᾶς ἐπιτέλησαν; cf. (with Schneider) παρὰ διάθεσιν τοῖς νῦν δοκομήνοις vi 490 A. Madvig's δοσά has little probability, although it avoids a certain awkwardness.

533 B 9 ἡ καὶ διαλεκτικὸν κτλ.
Cf. 533 E n. As far as words go, this definition of Dialectic might almost have come from the historical Socrates, although of course λόγων λαμβάνειν, οὐσία and λόγων διδόματε meant less to him than to Plato.

12 οὐ φήσεις = 'negabis.' οὐ is not here 'nonne.' The interrogation is carried on from the last clause.

14 διορίσασθαι—ἄφελών perhaps suggests the διαλεξιν, which was an essential part of Plato's dialectical method; see App. III. It is noteworthy however that the Republic lays far more stress on ἀναλογηθῇ than on διάλεξις; cf. 537 C, Zeller" i. p. 517 n. and App. III.

534 C 15 ὁδήπερ ἐν μάχῃ κτλ.: 'as it were in a battle, exhausting every elenchus, striving to test his view not by that which seems, but by that which is' etc. For διὰ πάντων—διεξιῶν cf. Thuc. III 45. 2 διεξεληλυθαί γε διὰ πασῶν τῶν ἵμων καὶ Παρτ. 136 E διὰ πάντων διεξίῳν. We apply the ἐλέγχοι ourselves; cf. εἴσελεγζομεν in X 610 A. The ordinary interpretation supposes that the ἐλέγχοι are applied by others ('running the gauntlet of all questionings') J. and C.; but in that case we must take εἴσελεγζομεν as = ἐλέγχοι τού τῶν ἄλλων ἐλέγχων, which is difficult, because ἐλέγχος is most naturally interpreted by ἐλέγχοι just before, and εἴσελεγζομεν certainly means tests or elench which are applied to the theory which the dialectician is himself maintaining; Plato means that the dialectician tests his view of good not by 'seeming' i.e. by what 'seems' (good, bad etc.) to the many, but by the Truth i.e. by that which 'is' in the Platonic sense of οὐσία, viz. the Ideas, such as (let us say) the Ideas of κάλλος, δικαιο
and so forth. The Idea of Good has connexions and relations with all the other Ideas (cf. VI 510 B, 511 B nn.); and our knowledge of these may therefore be used to test the accuracy of our conception of Good. Zeller's II 1 p. 620 n. rightly compares the present passage with Parm. 135 c—136 E: see App. III. It is perhaps unnecessary to notice Liebhold's foolish conjecture ἐνάντιον νόμων for όδαν.

20. ὀνειροπολοῦντα κτλ. 533 c n. 534 B 24 οὖκ ἄν ἓσαις κτλ. : 'you will not suffer to be more irrational quantities, if they are to rule in the city and control the higher issues.' ἄλογοι γραμματαί are irrational magnitudes (cf. Arist. peri ἄτομων γραμμῶν 968b 18), which Greek mathematicians treated "geometrically through a symbolism of irrational lines," as in Euclid Bk. X (Gow Gk Math. p. 78). They are ἄλογοι, ἄρρητοι because "nicht aussprechbar" (Cantor Gesch. d. Math. p. 154 n.), whereas rational lines are ἑξικτή, 'expressible' (cf. Rass de Pl. Math. p. 18). In its application to Glaucus's 'children,' ἄλογοι is active, and means of course μὴ λόγον ἔχοντες δοῦναι (534 b). Has γραμμάτεια also any special application? Probably it has; otherwise the witticism seems unnecessarily far-fetched and frigid, even if we make every allowance for Plato's love of a mathematical jest (cf. Pol. 266 b), as well as for the interest which the subject of irrationalals seems to have excited among the mathematicians of his day (see Theaet. 147 D ff. and Cantor I.c. pp. 182, 191, 203). Lucilius (11 20) has the line "vix vivo homini ac monogrammo" ("a dead alive sketch of an anatomy") Tyrrell Lat. Poetry p. 175), and Cicero mocks at Epicurus' gods as "monogrammos" (N. D. II 59; cf. I 123 homunculi similem deum—liniamentis dumtaxat extremis, non habuit solido—prædictum etc., and other passages in Usener Epicur. p. 234). Perhaps Plato means to suggest that his "airy burgomasters," as Milton calls them, would in such a case be only as it were mere silhouettes ("Schattenrisse" Bertram Bilderspr. Pl. p. 46) of rulers moving blindly to and fro in a sort of dreamland (cf. ἀνορθολογία 534 c and 533 c n.). For other views see App. XVII.

25. τῶν μεγίστων. 528 B n. 27. ἐρωτάτεν τι καὶ ἄπορκίσθειν κτλ. Plato concludes by emphasizing the most conspicuous and characteristic feature of the Socratic method: cf. Crat. 390 c.
XV. Διανομή τούτων, ἦν δ' ἑγώ, τὸ λοιπὸν σοι, τίσιν ταῦτα τὰ μαθήματα δῶσομεν καὶ τίνα τρόπον. Δὴλον, ἐφι. Μέμνησαι οὖν τὴν προτέραν ἐκλογὴν τῶν ἄρχοντων, οίνους ἐξελέξαμεν; Πῶς γὰρ, 5 ἡ δ' οὐς, οὗ; Τὰ μὲν ἀλλὰ τούτων, ἦν δ' ἑγώ, ἐκείνας τὰς φύσεις οἴου δεὼν ἐκλεκτάς εἶναι· τούς τε γὰρ βεβαιοτάτους καὶ τοὺς ἀνδρειοτάτους προαιρετέον καὶ κατὰ δύναμιν τοὺς οὐειδεστάτους· πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ζητήτεον ἡ μὴ μόνον γενναίους τε καὶ βλοσυρόνος τὰ τῆς ἃθη, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῇ τῇ παιδείᾳ τὴς φύσεως πρόοφορα ἐκτέον 10 αὐτοῖς. Ποία δὲ διαστέλλει; Δριμύτητα, ὁ μακάριε, ἐφιν, δει αὐτοῖς πρὸς τὰ μαθήματα ἑπάρχειν καὶ μὴ χαλεπῶς μαθινεῖν· πολὺ γὰρ τοιοῦτοι ἀποδειλώσω φυχαὶ ἐν ἱσχυρὸς μαθήμασιν ἡ ἐν γυμναίσι· οἰκείτερος γὰρ αὐτὰς ὅ τοῦν, ἔδωσ, ἀλλ' οὖ 6. οἴον II: οἴον Α.

535 λ—536 β. It only remains to apprise these studies and prescribe how they are to be pursued. Our pupils must possess not only the qualities of steadfastness and courage etc., but also those other natural qualifications which our peculiar course of training demands. These are now enumerated by Socrates.

535 λ 2 διανομή κτλ. Herwerden needlessly and wantonly inserts σκεπτά after τὸ λοιπὸν.

4 τὴν προτέραν ἐκλογήν, III 412 B ff. 5 ἐκεῖνας τὰς φύσεις κτλ. ‘I would have you suppose that it must be those natures which are to be selected,’ lit. ‘those natures must be to-be-selected.’ Kopcech (de verbalibus Plat. p. 29) confesses himself unable to quote any parallels for the ‘pleonasm.’ We might compare the use of δεὼ in μημοιρωέν αὐτὴν ζητῶμεν δεὼ εἶναι VI 486 D, where see note; but the fact is that δεὼ is not altogether pleonastic in the present passage. Without δεὼ we should translate ‘that it is those natures’ etc. and not ‘that it must be those natures’ etc.; and there is a slight but appreciable difference between the two. Richards would expunge δεὼ or read δὲ, but δὲ is quite unsuitable here. ἐκλεκτάς (which I once proposed, taking the words as=‘ought to have been selected’) is equally unsatisfactory, nor does θεὼ, which might be suggested in place of εἶναι, carry conviction. The text is in my judgment sound.

6 βεβαιοτάτους—ἀνδρειοτάτους. The contrast is between steadfastness and spirit: cf. II 375 A ff. and VI 503 C with Appendix VI to Book VI. eusédstagos has not hitherto been mentioned as a qualification of Plato’s rulers: for VI 494 C cannot be interpreted in such a sense. The word is however certainly genuine: cf. ἀρτιμελεῖς in 536 B.

535 β 8 γενναίοι—τὰ ἃθη: ‘of noble and masculine characters.’ Cf. Theod. 149 A μᾶλα μᾶλα γενναῖα τε καὶ βλοσυρά, Nicostrat. Frag. 35 ed. Kock ἥ τὴν ἀφροδίτην, ὃ ζητή, βλοσυράν γε τὴν ψυχὴν ἔχεις, and Aelian Var. Hist. 12. 21 σεμνὸν ἁμα καὶ βλοσυρὸν δροσα (of Spartan women). In Cf. Rev. XIII p. 10 I have tried to shew that the original meaning of this vigorous and expressive word is ‘hairy,’ ‘shaggy,’ ‘bristling’ (horridus), from which to ‘virile’ the transition is natural enough. Mr L. D. Barnett has since supplied me with an interesting confirmation from Pollux IX 135 (on tragic masks) ὃ δὲ ὁ δλός, εὐθύς, ὑπεργός. αἱ τρίχες τῷ ὀγκῷ προσπετήγασι, ὑφόρει ἀνατανάται, βλοσυρό τὸ εἶδος.

9 ά—πρόσφορα: ‘the natural characteristics suitable for our scheme of education.’ τῆς φύσεως depends on ά, not (as Stallbaum supposes) on τῇ τῇ παιδείᾳ. The following list of qualifications should be compared with that in VI 485 A ff. The difference is slight, but φιλοσοφία as a special attribute is new, and on the other hand some of the secondary moral qualities are not insisted upon here.

12 ἀποδειλώση κτλ. Cf. VI 504 A.
κοινὸς ὅν μετὰ τοῦ σώματος. Ἀλήθη, ἔφη. Καὶ μνήμονα δή καὶ

C ἄρρατον καὶ 1 πάντη πιθοπονοῦ ζητητέον. ἦ τιν τρόπο ὀεὶ τά τε 15
tού σώματος ἐθελήσειν τώδε διαπονεῖν καὶ τοσαυτὴν μάθησιν τε
καὶ μελέτην ἐπιτελεῖν; Οὐδένα, ἢ δ' ὅσ, ἐὰν μή παντάπασι γ' ἢ
eὐφυῆς. Το γοῦν νῦν ἀμάρτημα, ἥν δ' ἐγὼ, καὶ ἡ ἀτιμία φιλοσοφία
dia taúta prospεττωκεν, δ καὶ πρότερον ἐπιτο, ὦτι ό κατ' ἄξιαν
ἀυτῆς ἀποτελεῖ· οὐ γὰρ νόθους ἔδει ἀπεσθαί, ἀλλὰ γυμνῶν. 20

D Πώς; ἔφη. Πρότον μέν, ἐπιτον, πιθοπονία ὅν χολῶν δεὶ εἰναι τάν
ἀγόμενον, τά μεν ἡμίσεα πιθοπονοῦν, τά δ' ἡμίσει ἀπονον· ἐστι δὲ
tούτω, ὅταν τις φιλογνωμασθῇ μεν καὶ φιλόθηρος ἔκατ' καὶ πάντα τά
dia τού σώματος πιθοπονυ, φιλομαθῆς δὲ μῆ, μιθὲ φιλόςκος μηδὲ
ζητητικός, ἀλλ' ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις μυστοπονη· χολῶς δέ καὶ δ' ταῦτα-25
τία τούτοι μεταβεβληκῶς τῶν πιθοπονίαν. Ἀδηθετάται, ἔφη,
λέγεις. Οὐκοῦν καὶ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, ταύτου τούτο

Ε ἀνάπηρον πυχὴν θήσομεν, ἤ ἂν το μέν ἐκούσιον ψεῦδος μησῆ καὶ
χαλεπῶς φέρῃ αὐτή τε καὶ ἔτερους φευδομένους ὑπεραγανάκτη, τό
δ' ἀκούσιον εὐκόλως προσδέχηται καὶ ἀμαθαίνουσαν τὸ ἀλεκομενὲν
30 μῆ ἀγανάκτη, ἀλλ' εὐχερὸς ὡστερ θρηνίαν ὑεῖν ἐν ἀμαθίᾳ μολυνθη-

536 ταί; Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Καὶ πρὸς σωφροσύνην, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, καὶ ἄνδρεαν καὶ μεγαλοπρέπειαν καὶ πάντα τά τῆς ἄρετῆς

28, 29. μαζ—φέρην Α'II: μεσῆ—φέρει Α'.

15 ἄρρατον. The word ἄρρατον, which occurs again in Crat. 407 D, is apparently, like βλοερας, an expressive vulgarism de foro arripitum. There is considerable variety here in the inferior mss, but the evidence of the Scholast places the reading beyond doubt. ἄρρατος is explained by Timaeus (s. v.) as ἄξιορος, στερεός, and with this explanation the Scholast and Lexicographers agree. Some of the ancients derived the word from an obsolete verb ἄρω = ἀρω. Schneider remarks that the a must be long "si verum est quod scholastices Victorianus ad Il. XIII 56 tradidit, pro ἄρρατον alios legisse ἄρρατον." See Stephanus-Hase Thes. s. v.

535 C 17 οἴδενα: 'I think no one will.' Van Pinnsterer's oédvel, as Stallbaum observes, is unnecessary. In written dialogue, as in actual conversation, the answer does not always accommodate itself to the exact form of the question: cf. v. 406 E n.

19 πρότερον κτλ. The reference in πρότερον is to VI 495 c—496 A. In oh

κατ' ἄξιαν αυτῆς ἀποτελεῖ Dümmler sees an allusion to Antisthenes (Antith. p. 34), but see on 535 D, E.

535 D 22 ἄπονον: not μαζόνον, although μαζόνον appears below. Plato loves variety as well as uniformity, and Herwerden should not have proposed to write μαζόνον.

23 φιλοθηρος. Dümmler thinks Plato perhaps means Xenophon, who loved the chase; but it is unlikely that any personal reference is intended either here or in 535 C. See also on 535 E.

25 δ—φιλοπονια: 'whose love of work has taken the opposite direction.'

535 E 29 αὐτής τε καὶ κτλ. See on αὐτῆς τε καὶ—παρακάλει IV 437 D, το δ' ἀκούσιον. See II 382 A—C.

31 θηρίον θεών. Dümmler again recognises the unhappy Antisthenes, remembering, no doubt, the 'city of pigs.' See however on 11 372 D.

536 A 2 μεγαλοπρέπειαν: 'high-mindedness, not (as Jowett) 'magnificence.' See VI 486 A n.
4 τά τοιαύτα. ("das dazu gehörige"
Schneider) is quite general, and means
how so-and-so is in respect of the virtues
just enumerated: cf. VIII 549 D. The
Oxford editors wrongly understand τά
toiauta as τά τῆς ἀρετῆς μέρη.
5 λανθάνουσι κτλ.: "they uncon-
scionably use cripplcs and bastards for any
of these services that happen, as friends
in the one case, and in the other rulers,"
Schneider explains τούτων as "homin
nogeration, hoc est, aliquam ex his,
qua dictae sunt, virtutibus requirentium."
This is perhaps safer than to understand
it merely of the services rendered by
friends and rulers. In either case cf. for
tούτων VIII 543 C n. J. and C. have
rightly noted that "the subject of τόχων
is the same with that of λανθάνουσιν": but
they are mistaken in referring τούτων to
τά τῆς ἀρετῆς μέρη, and in connecting
πρός with χαλόκια τε καὶ νόδους. It
is certain that χρώμεναι is understood with
τόχων, and, if so, πρὸς can belong only
to χρώμεναι. D. and V. are consistently
wrong in the translation of this somewhat
perplexing little clause.

536 B 8 ἀρτιμελεῖς κτλ. For ἀρτι-
μελεῖς cf. 535 A. ἄσχημων is of course the
physical discipline: note the chiasmus.
9 ή τε δίκη κτλ. Cfr. VI 487 A where
οὕτως ἄν ο Μάκιος, ἐφ' ὃ τέ τοιοῦτον
μέμφιοτα similarly concludes the earlier
enumeration of qualities necessary to the
philosophic ruler.
11 καὶ πράξομεν. καὶ (which some
inferior mss omit) is "paullo insolentius
positum, sed ita ut tαναντία πάντα parim
ad civitatis conditionem—partim ad opi-
nionem hominum atque exstimationem
philosophiae, quam sequi errorem istum
opereat, spectare et utranquility contra,
quam dictum optandum sit, casuram
esse siginitet" (Schneider).
13 γελοῖον takes up γέλωσα just
before, hence κατά. My extreme προφυ-
μα, says Socrates in effect, was fitted
to provoke a smile (cf. VI 506 Ν).
ἐν τῷ παρόντι. The reference is to
536 C and VI 495 C—496 Α. After παρ-
όντι Burnet adds <τι>, needlessly: see
on III 388 D.

536 B—537 C After apologis-
ing for his excessive zeal in defence of
Philosophy, Socrates lays down his ordi-
nances. We must select our pupils while
they are young, and put before them in
their boyhood all the preparatory studies,
taking care to avoid compulsion. At the
same time they will be brought on the field
of battle and receive their baptism of fire.
From eighteen to twenty, gymnastic exer-
cises claim their undivided attention. At
twenty, those who have proved themselves
the best will enter on a systematic com-
parative study of mathematics etc., lasting
ten years.

536 C 14 ἐπαίζομεν. Literature is
not life, but 'noble play'—παγκάλης—
παιδίαν—τῶι ἐν λόγοις ὑσταμένων παίζει
(Phaedr. 276 E. Cf. also X 599 Α.Ν.). See
Hirzel der Dialag 1 p. 150, where this
thoroughly Platonic view is admirably
expounded. There is a touch of pathos
in Plato's application of it to his own
dialogues, recalling to my mind, I know
not exactly why, the saying of Isaac
Newton about gathering pebbles by the
shore, as well as Heraclitus' alicè paîs esti paîzôs pêseôv (Fr. 79 Bywater).

15. málloq eûteivámesos. Plato's apolo-
gy is by no means intended to appease the 'bald little tinker' (VI 495 e) and his crew; for he still holds them responsible for the insults levelled at philosophy (toû aîrìos). He is merely apologising, not without a characteristic touch of irony, for an offence against the canons of literary taste. One ought not to turn 'play' into earnest, and, as Longinus remarks, kàv bαxχèivmaû sêphîs anâgkaîou (peri ùfônt 16. 4).

20 prêsvótas êxelégmou. III 412 C. It is quite clear that the prêsvéra ekôlogi is not supplemented but superseded by the provisions now laid down. Cf. VIII 543 D n.

536 D 21 gýrâsákoq ktl. gýrâsákô
s atil pòllà didaskáleusos Solon Fr. 18
Bergk. The line is quoted in [Erast.] 133 c and alluded to again in Lach. 188 B, 189 a.

22 étî ston, which Herwer-
den proposes, is no improvement, but rather the reverse. Plato may be alluding to some proverbial saying, as D. and V. appear to believe, translating thus: "an old man can sooner run than learn."

vênô de ktl. Cf. Eur. I. 7. 132
môxtos yâp oîdeis toûs vêous skêphôs fêre i
and Theoc. 145 B, Sýmp. 175 E.

25 pàstuv oûti ktl. This prelimi-
inary survey is clearly meant to take place in the years during which 'Music' and Gymnastic are chiefly cultivated. See Nettleship Lect. and Rem. II p. 290.

26 oûx ôs ûpànâgikes ktl. We must bear in mind throughout the whole of this subject that Plato is legislating for a select class who naturally love labour and truth. They alone are nature's freemen and must be treated as such in their education, but the compulsory method may be necessary, Plato would say, in order to educate others, so far as others can be educated at all. With the general sense cf. Phaidr. 240 C and Theoc. 472
âp yâp anâgkaîos xrôma'mâneiv êpori.

536 E 31 pàstuvâs: with a play on
pàsidas: cf. infra VIII 545 E and áteçròs
pàstuv—mêta pàstuvâs—mândânes in
Laus 819 B, a passage in which the general idea is that play should be study, whereas here it is that study should be play.

10—2
"Εξεί τὸ λέγεις, ἐφη, λόγον. Οὐκοῦν μνημονεύεις, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι καὶ εἰς τὸν πόλεμον ἐφαμεν τοὺς παιδίας εἶναι ἀκτέων ἐπὶ τῶν ἱππῶν 5 θεωροῦσι, καὶ εάν ποὺ ἀσφαλές ἤ, προσακέτου ἐγγύς καὶ γευστέον αἴματος, ὁστερ τοὺς σκελακας; Μέμηναι, ἐφη. Ἐν τάσι δὴ τοῦτοι, ἥν δ' ἐγώ, τοῖς τε πόνοις καὶ μαθήμασι καὶ φόβοις δς ἄν ἐντρεχέστατος ἀεὶ φαίνεται, εἰς ἄρθμον τια ἐγκριτέον. Ἐν τῶν, ἐφη, ἡμικιά; Ἡνίκα, ἥν δ' ἐγώ, τῶν ἀναγκαίων γνωμασίαν μεθένε- 10 ται. οὕτος γὰρ ὁ χρῶνος, εάν τε δύο εάν τε τρία ἐπὶ γίγνεται, ἀδύνατος τι ἄλλο πράξαι. κότοι γὰρ καὶ ὑπνοι μαθήμασι πολέμου καὶ ἀμα μία καὶ αὖτῃ τοῖς βασανόν ὁυκ ἐλαχίστη, τὸς ἐκαστὸς ἐν τοῖς γνωμασίοις φαίνεται. Πόσ γὰρ ὁυκ; ἐφη. Μετὰ δὴ τοῦτον τοῦ χρῶνον, ἥν δ' ἐγώ, ἐκ τῶν εἰκοσιτῶν ὁι προκριθέντες τιμᾶς τε 15 μείζους τῶν ἄλλων οἴσονται, τά τε ἐχθρῖνα μαθήματα παῖσιν ἐν τῇ C παιδείᾳ γενόμενα τούτους συνακτέον εἰς σύνοψιν οἰκείοιτος ἀλλή- λων τῶν μαθημάτων καὶ τῆς τοῦ ὄντος φύσεως. Μόνη γονοῦ, εἶπεν, ἡ τοιαύτη μάθησις βέβαιος ἐν οἷς ἀν ἐγγίνεται. Καὶ μεγίστῃ ἥ, 3. 8 A'II: ὁ A². 14. εἰκοσιτῶν Schneider secundum eikoseitov (sic) Vind. F.: εἰκοσι ὕπων ΑΠ: εἰκοσι ὕπων Ξγ. 16. παιδείᾳ Ε: παιδείᾳ (sic) Α¹: παιδείᾳ corr. Α²: παιδία vel παιδία Πη γ.

537 A 4 ἐφαμεν. V 467 C-Ε. 8 ἐντρεχέστατος: 'most agile in' ("der rührigste" Schneider). The word is rare, and apparently not elsewhere found in writers of the best period. It occurs in Longinus peri ὅψυς 44. 1 ὁμοιότατον τε καὶ ἐντρέχειν (φόβεις) and Marc. Aur. VI 14: cf. id. VII 66 (ἐντρεχότερον) and I 8 (ἐντρέχειν). For a kindred use of the verb ἐντρέχειν see Hom. II. 19. 385 ei αἱ ἐφαρμοσει (sc. ἐντεκα) καὶ ἐντρέχοι ἀγαλμα γυνα. 537 B 10 οὕτως—ὁ χρῶνος κτλ. The compulsory military or militia service of Athenian youth during their eighteenth and nineteenth years is probably in Plato's mind: see Gilbert Gl. Convit. Ant. E. T. pp. 311—313. 14 προκριθέντες. See on 537 D. 537 C 15 ἐν τῇ παιδείᾳ. It is difficult to decide whether Plato in this instance wrote παιδία, παιδία or παιδία. παιδία is supported by three inferior mss. as well as by A² and the oldest ms of Theo (see Hiller's edition p. 3), and παιδιντας τρέφε in 536 E seems at first sight to favour it. But ἐν τῇ παιδία is different from ἐν παιδίας μέρει, and ought to mean 'in their play'; whereas 536 E does not distinguish between 'study' and 'play' (see note ad loc.). παιδία 'boyhood' has also some ms support, and the existence of the word in Greek is fully proved by Schneider in his elaborate note. But ἐν τῇ παιδίᾳ would be superfluous after παιδία, and on the whole I now prefer the traditional reading παιδείᾳ, which appears to be in a majority of ms.

15 τοῦτοι συνακτόν κτλ. τοῦτοι (sc. τοῖς προκριθένσι) goes with συνακτόν. The propedeutic studies now begin to be pursued no longer χρόνῳ, but systematically and comparatively, so as to reveal the 'kinship of the studies with one another and with the nature of Being': cf. 531 D Ν., and (for the meaning of οἰκείατη) 526 C Ν. Platt would omit τῶν μαθημάτων as a gloss on ἄλλων, but without these words the Greek might mean 'their mutual kinship and the kinship of true being' (with itself). τῶν μαθημάτων is also in Theo (I. c.). For the genitives ἄλλων καὶ τὸς—φόβους, (which D. and V. wrongly connect with σύνοψιν), cf. vi 501 D τῷ φόβῳ αὐτὸν ὀικείαν εἶναι τοῦ ἀρίστου.
νυν δ' ἐγώ, πειρα διαλεκτικής φύσεως καὶ μη. ὁ μὲν γὰρ συνοπτικὸς διαλεκτικός, ὁ δὲ μη οὖ. Ξυνοίομαι, ἡ δ' ὑς. Ταύτα τοῦν, ἦν δ' 20

D ἐγώ, δεῖσαι σε ἑπίσκοποῦνταϊ οὗ ἢν μάλιστα τοιοῦτο ἐν αὐτοῖσ ὁσι καὶ μόνιμοι μὲν ἐν μαθήμασι, μόνιμοι δ' ἐν πολέμῳ καὶ τῶι ἄλλοις νομίμοις, τούτους αὐ, ἐπειδὴν τὰ τριάκοντα ἐτή ἐκβιαίωσιν, ἐκ τῶν προκρίτων προκρινόμενον εἰς μείζονι τε τιμὰς καθιστάναι καὶ σκοπεῖν τῇ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δυνάμει βασανίζοντα, τῖς ὁμάτων καὶ 25 τῆς ἄλλης αἰσθήσεως δυνατὸς μεθέμενοι ἐπι αὐτὸ τὸ ὄν μετ' ἀληθείας ἰέναι. καὶ ἐνταῦθα δὴ πολλῆς φυλακῆς ἐργον, ὡτε ἐταῖρε.

Ε Τι μάλιστα; ἡ δ' ὑς. Οὐκ ἐννοεῖς; ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ νῦν περὶ τὸ δια-

λέγεσθαι κακῶν γνωμὸν ἄσσον γίγνεται; Τὸ ποιον; ἐφη. Παρα-


νομίαις τού, ἐφην ἐγώ, ἐμπίπτομαι. Καὶ μᾶλλα, ἐφη. Θαυμασ-


30 τῶν οὐν τι οίει, εἶπον, πᾶσχεν αὐτοὺς καὶ οὐ ἐχθροφόρεις;

Πη μάλιστα; ἐφη. Οἶον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰ τις ὑποβολαμίοις τραφεῖν

ἐν πολλοῖς μὲν χρήμασι, πολλὸ δὲ καὶ μεγάλο ἥγενε καὶ κόλαξ-

πολλοῖς, αἰνὴ δὲ γενόμενος αἰσθοῦτο, ὅτι οὐ τοῦτο ἐστὶ τῶν φασ-

κόντων γονέων, τοὺς δὲ τῷ ὁμοίω τεγνένσαιτος μη εὐροι, τούτων ἔχεις

23. τοῦτοις φι1: τοῦτοις ᾗΑἸνχσιιγ. 20. κακῶν Π: καλῶν Α. 30. ἐμπίπτομαι Α:2; ἐμπίπτομαι θι1: ἐμπιπτάλαι θιγ.
XVII. Μαντεύομαι ταύταις, εἰπον, μᾶλλον αὐτῶν τιμῶν ἄν τὸν πατέρα καὶ τὴν μητέρα καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους οἰκείους δοκοῦντας ή τοὺς τούτοις κολακεύοντας, καὶ ἦττον μὲν ἂν περιεδείπνιο τινός, ἦττον δὲ παράνομον τι δρᾶσαι ἢ ἐπείνα πεῖν αὐτούς, ἦττον δὲ ἀπειθεῖν τὰ μεγάλα έκείνου ἢ τοῖς κολαξίν, ἐν ὑπ' ἥρων τὸ ἄλληθες μὴ εἰδείν. Εἰκός, ἔφη. Αἰσθάνεται τοίνυν τὸ ὀν, μαντεύομαι αὕτε περὶ μὲν τούτως ἄνειναι ἄν τὸ τιμῶν τε καὶ σπουδάζειν, περὶ δὲ τοὺς κολακεύοντας ἀπειθεῖν τοῖς διὰφεροντος ή πρότερον καὶ ζῆν ἂν ἥδη κατ' έκείνους, ξυνόντα αὐτοῖς ἀπαρακάλημεν, τοῖς έκείνου καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ποιομενών οἰκείοις, εἰ μὴ πάνω εἰς ἐπισκεψῆς μέλειν τὸ μυθέν. Πάντες, ἔφη, λέγεις οἷα περ ἂν γενόστο. ἀλλὰ τῇ πρὸς τοὺς ἀποτελέσεις τῶν λόγων αὐτής φέρει ή τοῖς εἰκόνωι; Τῇδε. ἔστι που ημῖν δόγματα ἐκ παίδων περὶ δικαίων καὶ

13. αἰσθάνεται Α' cum ceteris, excepto M, ubi secundum Rostagno legitur αἰσθάνεται: idem ut videtur corr. Α'.
think it possible enough that the higher education will lead his rulers to criticise the δόγματα of the earlier 'musical' training.

"But if this criticism is only the negative side of the deepening grasp with which a mature and sedfass mind lays hold on reality, no harm, he urges, will be done" (Bosanquet I.c.). We may even go father and say that Dialectic and its ancillary studies are expressly intended to place the Guardians in the same position as the original legislator (VI 497 b) and enable them within limits to modify and reconstruct the authoritative δόγματα of the city (VI 500 E ff.).

538 δ. 26 ἀλλὰν ἑρῶτημα. See IV 434 D n.

27 ἀποκριναμένου. The genitive is defended by Schneider from IX 590 D. ἀποκριναμένου (Ξ and two other ms) is obviously a 'correction.'

28 καὶ πολλάκις κτλ. The whole of this passage should be compared with the account of the genesis of μουσολογία in Phaed. 90 b ff.

538 ε. 33 μήτε—τε. See on IV 430 B.

539 λ. 2 τῶν κολακεύσων is explained by the Oxford editors as 'the life that is flattering him,' with reference to 538 D. It is rather, I think, 'the flattering life' i.e. the life of the κόλαξ (cf. ἀπολαυστικὸς βίος and the like in Arist. Eth. N.ic. 1 2, 1095 b 17 ff). In other words the epithet which properly belongs to the person who lives the life is transferred to the life which he lives. Aristotle reminds us that ὁ δημιουργός καὶ ὁ κόλαξ οἱ αὐτοὶ καὶ ἀνάλογοι (Pol. Δ. 4, 129a 20), and the demagogic life may be taken as one among many illustrations of Plato's meaning, especially as in παράνομοι κτλ. he seems to be thinking of Alcibiades: cf. Thuc. VI 15, 4 and 28. 2. See VI 494 ff. mm. and Bosanquet Companion P. 306.


δ ἐναβομένῳ refers not to the pupils, but to Glauco as legislator, who
'meddles with Dialectic' by introducing the Guardians to it. This appears clearly both from ἐνλαβεῖα and from ἐνετίναι ὁ Πολλης φυλακῆς ἐργον in 537 D. ἐνλαβεῖαν-μένους (Madvig) and ἐνλαβεῖαιν-νοῦ (Bairter) are therefore wrong.

539 B 8 μὴ νέος κτλ. Cf. Arist. Eth. Nic. 1. i. 1095 ν ἐπὶ πολυτρόπος τὸν ὁμοιότητα ἐν ἀνθρώπων. It is clear from the present passage that Plato is largely concerned with moral and religious questions, as Bosanquet (Companion p. 302) and Nettlestone (Lect. and Rem. ii p. 201) remark. See App. III. Grote (III pp. 237-239) has some interesting observations on Plato's exclusion of the young from dialectical debate; but it is scarcely right to say that the Parmenides (135 c—136 E) contradicts Plato's precept in the Republic, for the disputations in the Parmenides are a preliminary exercise (γυμνασία 135 D) to be undertaken before we attempt to define καλῶν τῶν κακῶν καὶ ἀρετῶν καὶ ἐν τῇ ἀκαίρίᾳ τῶν εἰδῶν (135 C).

9 οὐκ ἐγεῖρεται. See on τοῦ τοῦτον. The same phenomenon is similarly described in Phil. 15 D—16 A: cf. also ἄπροσφορον καὶ οὐ διδᾶκά τινος τῶν εἰδών (539 C).

10 ἀντιλογωνιὰ. See on τοῦ τοῦτον. This provision, viz. that they shall not begin Dialectic in youth (539 B), the genus depends on τροφημία (which refers to passages like v 485 ff., 490, 503 c, VII 535 A ff., and not, as J. and C. suggest, on ἐνλαβεῖαν). 24. ὡσ—ἐρχεται. On the construction see III 410 B n. 28 ἐτη—τοῦτο. 537 B. 539 E 29 πέντε βις. Krohn thinks five years very short, compared with the
time allotted to the προπαιδεία, and sus-
tected that we have here a silent confession that there is not so very much to say about the Ideas after all.6 (Pl. St. p. 187). Five years devoted ἐνδείξεως καὶ εὐνύμων to Dialectic exclusively is a good deal; and we may be sure that Plato does not intend his Guardians to neglect the sub-
ject between 35 and 50, although practical duties occupy most of their time. Moreover at 50, Dialectic is resumed, and it is not till then that the Idea of Good is fully apprehended, so that the five years from 30 to 35 were certainly not thought by Plato to exhaust the subject. We must also beware of supposing that there is any break of continuity in the education of the Guardians. The study of each pro-
paedeutic ‘art’ by itself prepares us for seeing all the ‘arts’ in their mutual rela-
tions and interdependence, and the comparative survey of the ‘arts’ in turn prepares us for Dialectic (537 c), nor need the subjects of the προπαιδεία be finally abandoned after we enter on Dialectic. See Appendices II and III.

540 A 3 πεντηκοντοτών. We are told that in Chalcis the magistrates had to be at least 50 years of age: νόμος δὲ ἢν Χαλκείδου μὴ ἄρξαι μηδὲ προσβεβαι νιώσεων εἴτων πεντηκοντα (Heraklidès Fr. Hist. Gr. ii p. 222), but advanced age was rarely a condition of holding office in Greek states. See Whibley Gk. Olig. pp. 148 f.

5 τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς αὐγῆν: ‘the radiant light of the soul.’ αὐγή is highly poetic in this sense: cf. Soph. Ajax 70. There is more than a touch of mysticism in this and similar passages throughout Books vi and vii (cf. especially vi 490 A, B), but it is exaggerated by Krohn (Pl. St. p. 187), who boldly declares that “the only person who correctly understood the later phase of the Republic was Plotinus,” and that “the so-called Platonic Dialectic is a Mis-
verständniss.”
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

15 ὃς δαίμοσιν, εἰ δὲ μή, ὃς εὐδαιμοσί τε καὶ θείοις. Παγκάλους, ἐφή, τοὺς ἄρχοντας, ὧ Σώκρατες, ἀστερ ἀνδριαντοποίως ἀπειργασαί. Καὶ τὰς ἄρχοντας γε, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ὧ Γλαύκου. μηδὲν γὰρ τι οἶον μὲ περὶ ἄνδρον εἰρηκέναι μᾶλλον ἢ εἰρήκα ἢ περὶ γυναικῶν, ὡσι ἀν αὐτῶν ἴκανα τὰς φύσεως εὐγίγνωσαι. Ὁρθῶς, ἐφή, εἰτέρ

20 ὣσα γε πάντοι ἄνδράσας κοινωνήσουσιν, ὡς ἀνθρώπως. Τῇς ὁδοῖς; ἐφήν: ἐνυχχωρεῖτε περὶ τῆς πόλεος τε καὶ πολιτείας μὴ παντάπασιν ἡμᾶς εὐχάς εἰρηκέναι, ἀλλὰ χαλεπὰ μὲν, δυνατὰ δὲ τῇ, καὶ οὐκ ἄλλῃ ἢ εἰρήκαι, ὅταν οἱ ὁς ἀληθῶς φιλόσοφοι δυνάσται, ἢ πλείους ἢ εἰς, εἶν πόλεις γενόμενοι τῶν μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν καταφρονήσωσιν,

25 ἡγήσαμεν ἀνελευθέρους εἶναι καὶ οὐδενὸς ἁξίας, τὸ δὲ ὅρθῳ περὶ πλείους ποιησάμενοι καὶ τὰς ἀπὸ τοῦτο τιμάς, 1 μέγιστον δὲ καὶ Ε ἀναγκαίατον τὸ δίκαιον, καὶ τούτῳ δὴ ὑπηρετοῦτες τε καὶ αὐξώσετε αὐτὸ διασκευορθήσωσται τὴν ἑαυτῶν πόλιν; Πῶς; ἐφή. Ὄσοι μὲν ἃν, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, πρεσβύτεροι τυγχάνωσι δεκτῶν ἐν τῇ

21. ἐνυχχωρείτε Λ'' η: ἐνυχχωρεῖ Τ''Π: ἐνυχχωρεῖ Ε. 29. δεκτῶν Π: δέκ'

ἐτῶν Α.

προσαργῇ in v 461 ε, where the temptation is absent and the mss right. Burnet says that Λ'' has εὐαργῇ. I know not on what authority: I found no trace in the Μ'' of anything except εὐαργῇ.

15 εὐδαιμοσί. If not δαίμοσιν, then εὐδαίμοσιν.

16 ὃς τε καὶ ἀνδριαντοποίου. Jowett seems to find an allusion to the fact that Socrates had been a sculptor; but the same words might have been used if he had not, e.g., (with J. and C.) Π 361 D.


540 D—541 Β: Finally, we repeat, our perfect city is not an idle aspiration, but capable of being realised, when true philosophers become kings and educate the young themselves, after banishing every one above the age of ten. Our account of the perfect city and man is now completed.

540 D 22 εἰκός. V 450 D n.

χαλεπὰ κτλ. See VI 251 C n.

23 ὃ πλεῖον ἢ ἔσ. See on IV 445 D.

540 Β 27 ἀναγκαίατον. They will admit no compulsion save that of Right; Non civilum arbor prava iubentium Non vultus instantis tyranni Mentequaat solida. Contrast VI 492 B—493 D.

59 οὐκ ἔν αν κτλ. Newman (Aristotle's Politics 1 p. 413 n.) thinks this proposal is "a softened version of the sentence which Heraclitus passed on the Ephesians for expelling Hermodorus." (Bywater's Herac. fr. 114), but the parallel is not very close. Plato's καθαρμὸς is sufficiently explained by the precepts which himself lays down in VI 501 Α: see also Pol. 203 D and especially Laws 735 B—736 C, where he gives an interesting survey of the various καθαρμὸς applicable to commonwealths, and 752 β ff. Whether the καθαρμὸς of the Κέραμίτες is itself either possible or adequate is another matter: Grote pronounces it an εἰκόν (Plato III p. 218 n.). An age which had witnessed the δοικισμὸς of Mantinea (Xen. Hell. v 2.7) might well have regarded it as feasible. 'Possible, but difficult' is perhaps the sairest verdict. The purgation, even if successfully applied, might not be sufficient to start the city well, but it would be a useful auxiliary to that "express initiative force, exceptional and belonging to some peculiar crisis," which (according to Grote l.c.) would float the enterprise. Bosanquet raises the question how far the καθαρμὸς is seriously meant. To me it appears to be neither more nor less serious than Plato's treatment of the general question as to the possibility of his ideal city: see on VI 502 C and Hirmer Entsch. u. Komp. d. pl. Pol. p. 538.
30 ἕκτεμψωσιν—θρέψωνται. Stephano-

nus (with some inferior nis authority) reads the future, which Liebhold also would restore; but ἦταν is carried on. Cf. ii 359 B n.

541 A 31 θρέψωνται κτλ. J. and C. accuse Plato of barely considering “how the provision, which he here abruptly intro-

duces, is to be reconciled with what precedes. For how are the children to be taught music and gymnastic when all their elders have been sent away? From what other State are the new teachers to be brought?” Plato is perfectly consistent. The new teachers are οἱ ὁ δὲ ἀληθῶς ψυχή-

σοφοὶ διυνάσται εἰς πόλεις γενόμενοι (540 D: cf. vi 499 B, 502 A ff.), and they rusticate the parents etc. just because their presence makes it impossible to bring up children on the new lines. If ‘their elders’ could teach the young children, it would be unnecessary and wrong to send them into the country. Jowett seems to forget for the moment that Plato is not here speaking of his own city, but of an actual city which he wishes to transform into his καλλίτοις.

4 καὶ οὕτω κτλ. The infinitives still depend on ἔγγυστε. 5 ἐλέγομεν. Liebhold’s λέγομεν is harmless, but unnecessary: cf. διεληλύ-

θαμεν τότε above.

541 B 7 εἰπέρ ποτὲ γίγνοιτο. Cf.

vi 502 C n. 10 εἰπέρ ἐρωτάς refers to Socrates’ question οὖκέν—ἀνδρός; Cf. x 595 C ἄλλ’ ὁ λέγω, ἣττεν. “The present inquiry is, I believe, concluded” (D. and V.) is an erroneous translation.
APPENDICES TO BOOK VII.

I.

ON THE SIMILES OF THE LINE AND THE CAVE.

The famous similitudes in Books VI and VII have claimed the attention of every writer who has seriously attempted to expound the philosophy of Plato. It must suffice to refer generally to Ueberweg-Heinze Grundrisse etc. pp. 167—174: and in particular to Whewell, Philosophy of Discovery, pp. 429—448; Sidgwick, Journal of Philology, pp. 96 ff.; Jackson ib. x pp. 132 ff.; and Shorey On the Idea of Good in Plato's Republic (Chicago Studies in Classical Philology 1 pp. 188—239). The aim of the present Appendix is not polemical, but explanatory, and its scope is limited to an exposition of the difficulties of the subject in a more consecutive and reasoned manner than was possible in the notes.

An interpreter ought in the first instance to confine himself to such express statements, hints, and indications as are furnished by Plato himself in the Republic. The evidence of other Platonic dialogues and of Aristotle is certainly admissible, and may prove extremely useful in supplementing and confirming our results; but it ought not to be appealed to until the testimony of the Republic has been heard.

I will try to conform to these canons of interpretation.

The line is divided into two unequal parts, each of which is sub-

\[ \begin{align*}
\text{ὁρατά} & \text{ σίνε δοκάστα} & \text{νοητά} \\
\text{εἰκόνες} & \text{ξωμ ετ.} & \text{Lower νοητά} & \text{Higher νοητά} \\
A & D & C & E & B
\end{align*} \]

FIG. i. THE LINE.

divided according to the proportions of the original section. Thus (Fig. i.) \( AD : DC :: AC : CB \), and \( CE : EB :: AC : CB \).

\( CB \) represents the νοητόν: and \( AC \) is called sometimes ὅρατον, sometimes δοκάστον.

\( AD \) stands for εἰκόνες, i.e. πρῶτον μὲν τὰς σκιὰς, ἔπειτα τὰ ἐν τοῖς ὑδαί φαντάσματα καὶ ἐν τοῖς οὐσα πυκνά τε καὶ λεῖα καὶ φαντᾶ ἐννέατηκεν,
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καὶ πάν τὸ τοιοῦτον: DC for τὰ περὶ ἡμᾶς ζώα καὶ πάν τὸ φυτευτὸν καὶ τὸ σκεύασμὸν διὸν γένος (509 D—510 A nn.). It is clear, therefore, that if Plato means what he says, the objects represented by AD are distinct from those represented by DC, though they are each of them ὀρατά (δοξαστά).

CE stands for one part of τὸ νοητὸν, EB for the other: see 510 B to μὲν αὐτοῦ—τὸ δ’ αὐτὲν έτερον and 511 C σαφέστερον εἶναι τὸ ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ διαλέγασθαι ἐπιστήμης τοῦ ὑντος τε καὶ νοητοῦ θεωρούμενον ἢ τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν τεχνῶν καλουμένων. Here again, if Plato’s words are to be taken strictly, the objects represented by CE are distinct from those represented by EB. This conclusion is confirmed by 516 A compared with 532 A ff., where the objects of the lower intellectual method are compared with shadows of so-called real things (AD), whereas the higher νοητά correspond to ζώα etc. (DC): cf. 511 E ἐφ’ ὦς ἐστὶν and 534 A.

So far, it will scarcely, I think, be denied that Plato’s language points to a fourfold division, in which there are two main segments, each with two subsections. This view, which had hitherto been generally approved, was attacked by Jackson on the ground that “the introduction of the first segment is unmeaning and worse than unmeaning, on the assumption that ‘the universe is compared to a quadripartite line’” (see Journal of Philology x pp. 132—150). Let us therefore examine the evidence of the Republic on the subsection AD.

AD is part of AC, and AC is called by Plato sometimes δοξαστόν and sometimes ὀρατόν: see 510 A and the other passages cited in my note ad loc. What then is the meaning of δοξαστόν? The word is certainly not synonymous with ὀρατόν, and we are surely bound to interpret its meaning here by the meaning which Plato has already given to it in the Republic. Now according to the explanation of δόξα in v 476 B—480 A, δοξαστὸν includes not only the objects of sight and the other senses, but also, for example, τὰ τῶν πολλῶν πολλὰ νόμιμα καλοῦ τε πέρι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων (479 D, with note ad loc.). It would appear therefore that AC embraces not only ὀρατά, but other δοξαστά also, and that among these δοξαστά are contained inter alia popular canons or opinions on the subject of what is beautiful, ugly, right, wrong etc., as explained in 479 D. If Plato intended us to restrict AC to ὀρατά, it is reasonable to suppose that he would have used the term ὀρατά throughout, instead of employing a word which he has already defined as including not only visibles, but other opinables as well. That visible εἰκόνες of ὀρατά are of little or no metaphysical importance, is doubtless true; but there are other δοξαστά εἰκόνες besides those which are visible, and some of these are by no means destitute of significance and value.

For examples of such εἰκόνες we have not far to seek. Plato himself appears to recognize them in 517 D, 520 C, D (see the notes on these passages, and on 514 A, 517 Α). They include the νόμιμα on subjects of taste, morality, truth etc. expressed or embodied in the works of poets, painters, and artists generally, sophists and rhetoricians, demagogues, statesmen, and others, in so far as these canons and
opinions are copied from τὰ τῶν πολλῶν πολλὰ νόμιμα καλὸν τὲ πέρι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, or from any other opinions and ‘appearances’ whatsoever: see vi 492 a—493 e, iii 401 b ff., 402 b ff. and x 595 b—602 b. Much the same view is held by Nettleship (Lect. and Rem. ii pp. 242—246) and others, although they have not, I think, sufficiently insisted on the fact that Plato stamps this interpretation as legitimate and correct by calling AC δοξαστῶν, and including among δοξαστὰ (in Book v) not only ὁματά but also τὰ τῶν πολλῶν πολλὰ νόμιμα καλὸν τὲ πέρι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων.

If we now look for confirmations in other dialogues, theSophist is ready at hand with its elaborate amount of ἐκκατοστὶκὴ and φανταστικὴ (233 e—236 c, 264 c ff.). The objects with which these two arts are concerned cannot be placed in any segment of the line except AD. In theSophist Plato distinguishes between θεία ποιητικὴ and ἀνθρωπινὴ ποιητικὴ (ήσω τά μὲν φύσει λεγόμενα ποιεῖσθαι θεία τέχνη, τά δέ εκ τοῦτων ὑπ’ ἀνθρώπων ἐνυποτάμενα ἀνθρωπινῆ, καὶ κατὰ τούτον δὴ τὸν λόγον δύο ποιητικῆς γένης, τά μὲν ἀνθρωπινῶν εἶναι, τά δὲ θειῶν 265 e), and between θεία εἰδωλοποιικὴ and ἀνθρωπινὴ εἰδωλοποιικὴ (266 b ff. : see on vii 532 c). Now the works of ἀνθρωπινὴ (as well as θεία) ποιητικὴ are expressly recognized in DC, which includes σκεαστὰ as well as φυσικά. It is therefore reasonable to suppose that AD includes the works of ἀνθρωπινὴ (as well as θεία) εἰδωλοποιικὴ. And the sophistic art is one among several varieties of ἀνθρωπινὴ εἰδωλοποιικὴ, being a subdivision of δοξα-μιμησις. Compare also, for Poetry, Music, and the imitative arts in general, Laws 669 d ff. It may be noted that this is not the only part of theRepublic in which we meet with doctrines and ideas which are more fully developed in theSophist and other dialogues which are now commonly considered to be relatively late: see on v 476 a.

On these grounds I am unable to look upon the first section of the line as in any way otiose or destitute of importance. It would be strange if in an enumeration of the objects of knowledge and opinion Plato should have left no room for the whole domain of ‘imitation,’ with which, in theRepublic and elsewhere, he is continually concerned. In the analogous classification ofPhil. 55 d—58 a μοισική is similarly placed in the lowest of the four divisions: cf. Bosanquet Companions p. 262.

The second division of the line need not detain us long. In so far as it is ὁματῶν, it includes the originals, whether natural or artificial, of the ὁματα ἐκόνες in AD. Regarded in its wider meaning, it embraces all the other δοξαστὰ of which AD presents us with δοξαστὰ ἐκόνες, and doubtless also more; for we need not suppose that everything in DC has its counterpart in AD. The corresponding state of mind is πίστει, or ‘belief’: cf. Tim. 26 c ὁ τι πέρ πρὸς γένεσιν οὐσία, τόυτο πρὸς πίστιν ἄληθεια and Gorg. 454 d ff., from which and other passages it is clear that πίστει (in the widest sense) is the normal attitude of the ἀπαίδευστος towards his δοξαστὰ in general as well as his ἀσθητὰ in particular. The difference between πίστεις and εἰκασία, both of which are here regarded as varieties of δόξα, is a varying quantity; for πίστει may be right or wrong. I think the particular contrast which Plato
has in view is best illustrated by such a case as he himself describes
in x 60 c—602 b, where the maker of a σκέδων is said to have πιάτις
ὁρθῇ, εὐώνυμῳ τοῦ εἰδότι καὶ ἀναγκαζόμενον αὐκοῦν παρὰ τοῦ εἰδότος, whereas
the imitator οὐτε εἰσεται οὐτε ὁρθά δοξάσει, so that his state of mind can
only be εἰκασία. In view of this passage in Book x, we may also (with
Bosanquet, Companion, p. 262) compare Phil. 56 b ff. The arts of
carpentry, ship-building, house-building etc., as well as ‘popular’
ἀρχηγική, μετρητική etc. (56 e—57 d: cf. vii 526 a n.) are placed in
the second lowest category of the Philèbus. They are all of them con-
cerned with objects belonging to the second division of the line, and we
can therefore take it that the intellectual condition of those who profess
and practise these arts is also, according to Plato, πιάτις.
It is about the third division of Plato’s line that the greatest disputes
have raged.
We have already seen that Plato verbally distinguishes between the
contents of ΚΕ and those of EB. It is difficult to conceive why he
should have done so unless he meant them to be really distinct; for the
resources of his language were certainly equal to expressing his real
view, whatever it was. There is moreover an exact correspondence
between the objects of the different psychical affections or states (παθή-
ματα ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ) and the states themselves; and διάνοια, which Plato
regularly uses in connexion with CE (510 D, 511 a, 511 c, 511 d, 511 e,
520 a, 529 D, 533 D, 533 E, 534 A), is expressly distinguished from νοστία
or νος in 511 d. We are, therefore, prepared to find a similar distinc-
tion between the objects of the two mental states. What is the
positive evidence on the subject? That the lower νοστία are the subjects
of Plato’s propaedeutic studies, viz. mathematical numbers, mathematical
plane surfaces, mathematical βάθος, mathematical φοράι βάθων, and
‘consonant’ mathematical numbers, appears from 510 c—e, 511 a, b,
511 c (τεχνών), 525 c—526 a, 527 b, 532 c (τεχνών) 533 d συνεργοῦς καὶ
συμπεριφεροῦσα χρωμένη αἷς δυνάμειν τέχνας τίς ἐπιστήμας μὲν πολλάκις
προετοιμάζει διὰ τὸ ἔθος, δεόνται δὲ ὁμοίατος ἀλλον, ἐναργεστέρον μὲν ἢ
dοξῆς, ἀμοῦρτέρον δὲ ἢ ἐπιστήμης. διάνοιαν δὲ αὐτήν ἐν γε τῷ πρόσθεν ποὺ
ὁμοσύμβα, and 534 A. They are αὐτὰ (see 527 b and cf. 529 c, d n.),
but nevertheless πολλά, i.e. there are many mathematical units etc.
(526 a n.), many mathematical triangles, squares etc., many mathema-
tical cubes etc., many specimens (if the word may be allowed) of
each mathematical φορὰ, many of each particular set of ἐμφάνων ἀριθμοῖ.
Finally these μαθηματικά occupy an intermediate position between
αισθητά (δοξάστα) and Ideas. We learn this (1) from their position in
the line, (2) from the statement that the mathematical intelligence or
dιάνοια, which cognizes them, is μεταξὺ τι δοξῆς τε καὶ τοῦ 511 d,
(3) from the constantly repeated observation that such studies ‘tend
to drag us towards Being’ (i.e. towards EB) etc. 523 A, 525 A, 527 B: cf.
also 525 C, 526 B, (4) from the fact that while αἰσθητά are perishable

1 A hasty perusal of 510 D might lead us to suppose that there is but one
‘mathematical’ square, and even to identify it with the Idea; but see the notes
ad loc.
and πολλά, μαθηματικά are πολλά (526 A) and αἱ ὄντα (527 B), whereas the Idea is αἱ ὄν and ἐν.

Aristotle’s evidence is in complete accord with these statements of Plato himself in the Republic. The relevant passages are cited by Bonitz on Met. A 6. 987b 14 ff. ete ἐν τῷ παρατικῶ τοῦ ἀισθητῶ καὶ τῷ ἐνῷ τῷ μαθηματικῶ τῶν πραγμάτων εἶναι φήσι (sc. Πλάτων) μεταξύ, διαφέροντα τῶν μὲν αισθητῶν τοῖς ἀείδει καὶ αἰκίνητα εἶναι, τῶν δ’ ἐνῶς τῷ μὲν πόλλ’ ἀττά ὁμοία εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἐνὸς αὐτῷ ἐν ἐκαστὸν μόνον. “Tria rerum genera possuisse Platonom, sensibilita mathematica ideas, constanter multis locis reft Aristoteles, cf. 9. 992b 14, B 1. 995b 16, 2. 997b 12, 6. 1002b 12 sqq., Z 2. 1028b 19, K 1. 1059b 4 sqq., Α 1. 1069a 34. Et a sensibilibus quidem rebus differre mathematicas aereterna et immutabiles natura (αικίνητα b 16...), ab ideis autem eo, quod mathematicae quidem res eiusdem formae indefinitae numero sunt, Idea vero quaelibet simpliciter est una, cf. Β 6. 1. 1.: τα μὲν μαθηματικὰ τῶν δεόρω (i.e. τῶν αἰσθητῶν) ἄλλω μὲν τινὶ διαφέρετε, τῷ δὲ πόλλῃ ἀττά ὁμοιοῖς εἶναι ὀδοὺς διαφέρετε. Ἡ τούτη sua natura in medio posita sint mathematica inter sensibilita et ideas (μεταξύ b 16), saepe ea Platonicorum sensu significat hoc ipso vocabulo τὰ μεταξύ, cf. 9. 991b 29, 992b 16, B 2. 997b 21, 13, 998a 7, 6. 1002b 13, 21, K 1. 1. 1., M 2. 1077a 11″ (Bonitz). It may be desirable to quote one of the numerous criticisms which Aristotle makes on Plato’s view of μαθηματικά, because it appears to allude directly to the educational curriculum of the República: ἔτι δὲ εἰ τις παρά τῷ εἶδο καὶ τῷ αἰσθητῷ τὰ μεταξύ βήσεται, πολλὰς ἀπορίας ἐξει. δήλων γὰρ ὡς ὁμοίως γραμμαὶ τε παρ’ αὐτῶς καὶ τὸς αἰσθητὸν ἔσονται καὶ ἐκαστὰ τῶν ἄλλων γενῶν· ὅτα, ἐπείπερ ἡ ἀστρολογία μία τῶν ἔστων, ἔσται τοῖς καὶ ὁμοίως παρ’ τοῖς αἰσθητῶν οὐρανῶν καὶ ἡμίος τέ καὶ σελήνη καὶ τάλλα ὁμοίως τά κατὰ τῶν οὐρανῶν (cf. 539 c, D nn.)—ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ δὲν ἡ ὀπτικὴ πραγματεύεται καὶ ἡ ἐν τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἀρμονίκη (531 c.n.) κτλ. (Met. B 2. 997b 12 ff., cf. M 2. 1076b 11—1077b 14). These words are, in my judgment, an altogether just and relevant criticism on Plato from the standpoint of a man of science, and one with which Plato himself, when he wrote the República, would not have quarrelled.

In spite of this body of evidence, Shorey speaks of “futilissima illa hariolatio de numeris mathematicis inter numeros sensiles et numeros ideales positis” (de Pl. id. doctr. p. 33), refuses to attribute the doctrine to Plato, and is surprised that Zeller should have been led astray. The entire theory, according to the American critic, arose from a mistaken interpretation of 523 D—526 E, where αὐτῶν οἱ ἀριθμοῖ (525 D), he declares, are “nihil aliud quam ideam numerorum, sicut autó τὸ μέγα est ipsius magnitudinis idea” (l.c.). I have stated my view of αὐτῶν τῶν ἀριθμῶν in the notes on 525 D. Here it need only be said that if αὐτῶν τῶν ἀριθμῶν, about which mathematicians converse, means Ideas of numbers, then autó τὸ ἐν (525 D), i.e. the ἐν about which mathematicians converse (526 A), is the Idea of ‘one.’ But Plato speaks of a multiplicity of mathematical units: περὶ πολῶν ἀριθμῶν διαλέγεσθε, ἐν οἷς τὸ ἐν οἷον ὁμαὶ ἄξιοτε ἔστων, ίσον τε ἐκαστὸν πάν παντὶ καὶ οὐδὲ σμικρῶν διαφέρον (526 A). Are we then to suppose that there are many Ideas of ‘one’? It may be added that in his later treatise on ‘The
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Idea of Good in Plato's Republic; Shorey still adheres to his old view.

The explanation which I am advocating has the support of Zeller 111, pp. 679 ff., Trendelenburg Plut. de id. et num. doctr. pp. 70—80, Bonitz Lc. and a majority of scholars. To me it appears fully demonstrated by the evidence of the Republic alone; and Aristotle's testimony is a welcome confirmation from a source which is only second in value to Plato's own writings.

The ontological theories of the Philebus and Timaeus are, I believe, in harmony with the position here assigned to μαθηματικά. In the Republic, τα μαθηματικά are the link between αισθητά and εἴδη, regarded as objects respectively of sensible apprehension and knowledge; in the Philebus and especially the Timaeus, they are the cosmological μεταξύ τι. The αἰτία τῆς μῆκος of the Philebus (23 c ff.) is the Idea, and πέρας in that dialogue is τα μαθηματικά. Professor G. Schneider has pointed out that Plato "machete für alle Erscheinungen der Welt und des Geistes das Mathematische zum Gesetze für die Verwirklichung des Guten," and the Timaeus is an elaborate commentary on his remark. We see the soul and body of the Universe and Man built up by means of the μεταξύ or μαθηματικά of the Republic, όρθωτη ὑστορέω (53 d ff.), Stereometry βάθη (54 b ff.), Astronomy βοραὶ βάθους (36 c ff., 39 a ff., 40 c ff.), and Harmonics the ἡμιφωνοι ἁρμονοι (35 b ff.), according to which the Souls of the world and man are framed. The εἰσόντα καὶ εἰσώντα, τῶν ὄντων ἀεὶ μαθημάτα, τυποθέτα ἀπ’ αὐτῶν τρόπον ταΰ διέφραστον καὶ θαυμαστόν (50 c), which enter into the ἐγκαταστάσεων and leave it accordingly as mortal things arise and perish, are nothing but mathematical forms—the contents of CE.

It is impossible to pursue the subject farther here; but reference may be made to F. Schmitt's Dissertation on die Verschiedenheit d. Ideenlehre in Pl. Rep. u. Phil. (Giessen 1891) and G. Schneider's admirable work on Das Princip d. Maasses in d. Pl. Philos. (Gera 1878), where this interpretation of the Philebus and Timaeus is expounded and justified in detail.

There remains the further question whether these μαθηματικά have, like the Ideas themselves, a real and substantial existence, apart from, as well as in, sensible particulars. Plato speaks of the object of geometrical study as ἀεὶ ὁν, οὐ ποιεῖ τι γεννάμενον καὶ ἀπολλύμενον (527 b n. : cf. 529 c, 530 n.), and in the Timaeus (l.c.) they are εἰσόντα καὶ εἰσώντα. In the passages already referred to, Aristotle states or implies that Plato regarded them as χωρώματα, not merely in thought, but actually, although in Med. B 2. 998 σ 7 ff. he informs us that another interpretation of τὰ μεταξύ was current, according to which they do exist, οὐ μὴν χωρίς γε τῶν αἰσθητῶν, ἀλλ’ εἰ τούτοις. The evidence of the Republic and Timaeus is in my opinion altogether in favour of the view which Aristotle attributes to Plato.

The Platonic theory on this subject will be most easily apprehended if we contrast it with that of a very different school of Philosophy. According to John Stuart Mill "there exist no real things exactly conformable to the definitions" (of geometrical science). "There exist no
points without magnitude; no lines without breadth, nor perfectly straight; no circles with all their radii exactly equal, nor squares with all their angles perfectly right." The “really existent” lines, angles, and figures are those which we apprehend through the senses, and “the definitions, as they are called, must be regarded as some of our first and most obvious generalisations concerning those natural objects” (Logic, Book II ch. 5 §1). To Plato, on the other hand, the “really existent” straight lines are just those of which the definition speaks: whereas visible lines and magnitudes do not exist, but only ‘ become.’ It is the true μαθηματικά described in his definitions of mathematical science which the γεωμετρικός investigates, and if they do not correspond with the forms which we see, so much the worse for Nature! The fault lies not with them nor with the δημιουργός, but with the conditions of finite existence: μεταβαίνει γάρ η τούτων τοῦ κόσμου γένεσιν ἦν ἀνάγκης τε καὶ νοῦν αὐτάσεως ἔγεννηθ (Tim. 48 a).

If the interpretation which I have given is correct, we can at once see why Plato makes the study of μαθηματικά his προσανατολίζει. τὰ μαθηματικά are, objectively and de facto, according to Plato, the ‘golden chain’ between Ideas and particulars, and he who would ascend to Ideas must climb by the ladder which the Architect of the Universe—θεὸς ἄει γεωμετρῶν—has himself provided. Cf. Schneider l.c. P. 54.

If the question is asked ‘What is the element of truth embodied in Plato’s theory of τὰ μαθηματικά as μεταστάσιμ;’ the answer is not far to seek. “All objects in the world,” says Whewell, “which can be made the subjects of our contemplation are subordinate to the conditions of Space, Time, and Number; and on this account, the doctrines of pure mathematics have most numerous and extensive applications in every department of our investigation of nature” (Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, p. 153). It is an admitted fact that “all causes operate according to mathematical laws” (Mill, Logic, Book III, ch 24 §9). The position which Plato assigns to τὰ μαθηματικά as intermediates between Ideas and sensible things is at once an affirmation of this fact and an explanation, from the Platonic point of view, of the reason which underlies it. The supreme Cause of the Universe, according to Plato, is the Idea of Good, of which, in the last analysis, the other Ideas are special determinations, and τὰ μαθηματικά are the instruments by means of which that Idea works in Nature. This and nothing else is the meaning of Plato’s profound and famous text θεὸς ἄει γεωμετρεῖ, on which the bulk of the Timaeus is only an elaborate commentary. Why is it, to take an obvious illustration, that the laws of physical science are habitually expressed in terms of mathematics? Plato’s reply would be: simply because God made use of μαθηματικά in constructing the world, and we must interpret the Universe as God made it. The Laws of Kepler have been described as “three Laws of Divine Working in Nature, discovered by Kepler,” and the description is in full harmony with Plato’s conception. For the rest it should be noted that such a view of μαθηματικά appeals in its broader outlines with peculiar force to the religious and poetical imagination, as is often the case with the
speculative flights of Plato. We may compare not only the lines of
Milton (Paradise Lost, vii 221 ff.)

"Him all his train
Followed in bright procession, to behold
Creation, and the wonders of his might.
Then stayed the fervid wheels, and in his hand
He took the golden compasses, prepared
In God's eternal store, to circumscribe
This Universe, and all created things.
One foot he centred, and the other turned
Round through the vast profundity obscure,
And said, 'Thus far extend, thus far thy bounds;
This be thy just circumference, O world!'";

but also the famous passage in Isaiah xl 12 "Who hath measured the
waters in the hollow of his hand, and meted out heaven with the span,
and comprehended the dust of the earth in a measure, and weighed the
mountains in scales, and the hills in a balance?"

For special discussions on 'The propaedeutic studies of the
Republic' and 'On Plato's Dialectic' see Appendices II and III.

The view which I take of the simile of the Cave and its connexion
with that of the Line is fully explained in the notes on Book vii
It is only necessary to add here that Jowett and Campbell's interpretation
(Vol. ii pp. 14—18, iii pp. 315—317 and elsewhere) appears to me
somewhat seriously wrong in regard to the ἀγάλματα or εἴδωλα of the
allegory, which, according to Campbell, "constitute a lower stage of the
ideal which in Plato's language is alone the real, not the immediately
visible, but the truth of phenomena, the ἐν ἐπὶ πολλῶν ἐκάστων τῶν
αισθητῶν, the instina species, the first intention of the ἐν λογισμῷ ἔξωαρθρω-
μενον" (ii p. 17). Jowett, if I understand him rightly, goes even farther,
and apparently regards some of the propaedeutic studies as symbolized
by the εἴδωλα (iii pp. 316, 317). It seems to me quite clear from the
general proportions of the simile (514 A n.) that the εἴδωλα in the cave
represent nothing beyond the higher ὁρομενα and the higher δοξαστά
(517 A, 532 B, c nnn.), which are emphatically πολλά and not ἐν ἐπὶ πολλῶν,
still less "the world as conceived of by the mathematician" (Jowett),
which might possibly be figured as a φύντασμα θεῖον (532 C n.), but
certainly not as a σκευαστῶν εἴδωλον: τοῦ γαρ ἄεὶ ὅτος ἀ γεωμετρικὴ
γνώσις ἐστιν (527 B).

II.

ON THE PROPAEDEUTIC STUDIES OF THE REPUBLIC.

Plato's higher scheme of education has formed the subject of a
large number of dissertations and articles, besides the attention which
it has received at the hands of commentators and historians of phi-
losophy. The best and ablest discussion of the method and general
principles of the system is still, I think, Nettleship's article in Hellenica
(pp. 135—180), to which the second volume of his Lectures and Remains
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(pp. 238—294) is a welcome supplement. Tannery's articles in the Revue Philosopbique (x pp. 517 ff. and xi pp. 283 ff.) are concerned chiefly with the scientific aspect of Plato's curriculum. The mathematical difficulties have been to a large extent cleared up by historians of mathematics, and other authors of special monographs mentioned in the notes. Theo's treatise περὶ τῶν κατὰ τὸ μαθηματικόν χρησιμῶν εἰς τὴν Πλάτωνος ἀνάγνωσιν, which Dupuis has published and translated (Paris 1892), will be found extremely useful, all the more so that it is largely a compilation from earlier sources.

In this appendix I propose to touch on some questions which could not be adequately treated in the notes.

The novelty of Plato's curriculum lies in the interpretation which he puts upon the subjects prescribed, and in his conception of scientific method, rather than in his selection of studies to be pursued. It will be observed that he confesses his debt to the Pythagoreans (530 e n.), and, as Tannery points out (l.c x pp. 521 ff.: cf. Diels Dov. Gr. 555: 17), there is no reason to doubt that the Pythagoreans made use of a quadrivium embracing (1) ἀριθμητική, (2) μουσική, (3) γεωμετρία, (4) σφαιρική (see Theol. Ar. 4. 19 Ast and Hippolytus in Diels l.c., where the order is (1) <ἀριθμητική>, (2) μουσική, (3) γεωμετρία, (4) ἀστρονομία). See also [Archytas] quoted on 530 d. The allusions in Isocrates (Panath. 26, Antid. 261 ff., 266) to an educational curriculum of this kind may of course be aimed at Plato, but it is, I think, more probable, in view of some passages in the Platonic dialogues, that ἥ ἑφ' ἡμῶν κατασταθείσα παίδεια (Panath. 1.e.) has a wider reference. In Theaet. 145 α Theodorus is said to be γεωμετρικός—καὶ ἀστρονομικὸς καὶ λογιστικὸς τε καὶ μουσικὸς καὶ ὀσα παιδείας (liberal education) ἔχεται, and Theaetetus professes to have learnt from him γεωμετρίας ἀπα—καὶ τῶν περὶ ἀστρονομίαν τε καὶ ἀρμονίας καὶ λογισμοῦ (ib. 145 c, d). The studies in question were called 'Arts,' and Hippias was one of those who professed to teach them under this name, as appears from Prot. 318 e (see 511 c n. and Hipp. Mai. 285 b ff.). From these passages we are justified in drawing the inference that the Pythagorean quadrivium was in some form or another becoming recognized in the early part of the fourth century b.c., and even earlier (cf. Grasberger Erziehung u. Unterr. II p. 340). The addition of Stereometry as a separate and independent branch of study is doubtless due to Plato, as may indeed be inferred from his own remarks (528 b ff.); but stereometrical problems had been handled before his time not only by the Pythagoreans, but also by Anaxagoras and Democritus (528 d, c n.), and were probably reckoned as part of γεωμετρία.

The studies are arranged by Plato in the sequence, Theory of Numbers, Geometry, Stereometry, Astronomy and Harmonics. It is not, of course, to be supposed that each of the earlier subjects is dismissed as soon as its successor comes upon the stage; Plato indeed implies the opposite in 531 c ff. and elsewhere. The order which he prescribes is the order in which the subjects are to be begun. I have touched on the principle underlying the sequence of studies in the notes on 526 c and 528 a. We proceed from number, which is presumably the
first 'increase,' to plane geometry and stereometry, which are concerned respectively with the second and third 'increases,' and thence to φορά βάθους, taking Astronomy, the intellectual counterpart of visible φορά, before Harmonics, which deals with the intellectual counterpart of audible φορά, viz. 'consonant' and 'dissonant' numbers. The general principle plainly is that we should progress from the less to the more complex (Nettleship Lect. and Rem. II p. 269), each successive study adding a fresh element to those which have preceded it and presupposing them all. Plato would not, I think, allow that his intention was 'to arrange the sciences according to their object-matter in a direction from abstract to concrete' (Bosanquet Companion p. 288), for the Platonic sciences of Astronomy and Harmonics are, to say the least, as 'abstract' as the sciences of Number. But inasmuch as a solid concrete thing is after all an embodiment, though only an imperfect embodiment, of mathematical βάθος, Plato's curriculum, so far, and only so far, as it does in reality teach us to understand the visible concrete universe, may, if we are so minded, be held to proceed, in Aristotelian language, from the πρώτηρα φύσει to the πρώτηρα προς ἡμᾶς.

Except in the position ascribed to 'Music' or 'Harmonics,' the order of studies in the Republic agrees with that of the Pythagorean quadrivium. The phraseology of 526c and 528a makes it probable that the principle of the Pythagorean arrangement was the same. 'Second increase' can only mean 'second increase' of the point or unit, the 'first increase' being the line or number. Now the Pythagoreans, as is well known, built up the line out of points, the plane out of lines, and the solid out of planes: see RP.7 § 64. (This is equally true whether we suppose that they consciously or unconsciously regarded the cosmological unit or point as having μέγεθος, though for my own part I agree with Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy pp. 312—315, that they consciously so regarded it, at all events in the earlier and more original form of their theory: see Arist. Met. M 6. 1080b 20, 32 and N 1091a 15 with Phys. Z 1. 231b 24, 10. 241b 3, and other passages cited in Burnet, i.e. p. 315 n.) It may therefore be inferred that the expressions 'second' and 'third increase' are in their origin Pythagorean, and, if so, we cannot doubt that Plato's principle of arrangement agrees on the whole with that of his predecessors.

The position of Harmonics in the Platonic scheme is however a remarkable divergence, especially as the study, according to 531c, is concerned with numbers. In discussing this point Theo, who himself expounds the σύμφωνα ἀριθμοὶ in connexion with ἀριθμητική, distinguishes between three kinds of ἀρμονία, viz. ἡ ἐν ὀργίνοις αἰσθητῆ, ἡ ἐν ἀριθμοῖς νοητῆ, and ἡ ἐν κόσμῳ ἀρμονία (pp. 16, 47 ed. Hilger). Plato's ἀρμονικῇ deals of course with the second of these ἀρμονίαι. The first would have seemed to him educationally useless except by way of illustration, like mathematical diagrams (cf. 527 A, 529 D). ἡ ἐν κόσμῳ ἀρμονία, which is described in x 616 d ff., Tim. 35 b ff. and by Theo 139—147, could not serve this purpose, because it is inaudible. If we take Plato at his word, we are bound to suppose that the Music of the Spheres, though more beautiful and perfect than any audible 'harmonies,' is nevertheless inferior to that which the student of harmonics
VII. (529 c, d with 531 c), because it is produced by the movements of visible and corporeal stars; but it is permissible to suppose that the sublime Pythagorean conception of the Universe as 'God's organ' (Censor. de die nat. 13) may have induced him to crown his προταυδέα with the study of those numerical 'consonances' whose grandest expression in time and space is the harmony of heaven. See also on x 617 B.

The most characteristic and essential feature of the Platonic curriculum is, as I have already remarked, its method: see on 523 B, C, 528 E, 529 C, D, 530 C. Plato himself obviously claims it as new (523 A, 530 C, 530 E ff.), and there can be little doubt that the claim is just. The modern scientific reader cannot fail to be surprised and perhaps shocked by Plato's unconcealed distrust of observation and the use of the senses. In the Theory of Numbers and pure mathematics generally, this is natural and right; but what hope, he will ask, is there for Astronomy if we 'dispense with the starry heavens' (530 B)? And how can Harmonics be advanced if we prohibit all inquiry into οἱ ἐν ταῖσα ταῖσ συμφωνίαις ταῖσ ἀκουσμένας ἀριθμοί (531 C)? It has, indeed, been maintained that 'the discovery of Neptune is a fulfilment of Plato's anticipations' (Bosanquet Companion p. 293), and that 'the mathematical treatment of the analysis of wave forms (see Helmholtz, Popular Lectures, E.T. i 75) seems to be an example of research which would have been after Plato's own heart' (ib. p. 294). There is something to be said in favour of such a view, and Bosanquet and Nettleship plead their case valiantly and well. But was it possible to discover the perturbations of Uranus without observation? And even supposing they had been observed, would Plato, at the time when he wrote 530 A ff., have suspected that they were due to the influence of an unknown planet, and betaken himself to his desk? If Professor Adams' calculations had failed, Plato might have called him ἄτομος for thinking γλυκνηθὰ τε ταῖσ ἀεὶ ὥστοις καὶ οὕδαις οὐδὲν παραλλάττεν and seeking παντὶ τρόπῳ τὴν ἀλήθειαν αὐτῶν λαβῶν, although he would have emphatically approved of the algebra. The fact is that Plato and Professor Adams began at different ends—Plato with problems, Adams with observation. That which is only an orrery to the former (529 D ff.) is to the latter the reality which calls for explanation. It is true, of course, that Plato makes the primary impulse to reflection come from contradictory sense-perceptions (523 A ff.), but as soon as the intellect is fairly roused, the senses are dispensed with as much as possible, because they thwart and debilitating the operations of the mind, rendering its conclusions less scientific and exact (525 D, 529 C, 531 A, 532 A). Nor does this conclusion rest on a few isolated passages, which may well be tinged with exaggeration, owing to Plato's contempt for the empiric sciolism of certain Sophists. The whole of the seventh book breathes a spirit of uncompromising hostility to the senses, and the same attitude is characteristic of many other dialogues, and, in particular, of the Phaedo (65 A—67 B).

The fact is that the Astronomy and Harmonics of the Republic are fundamentally different from the Astronomy and Harmonics of modern, as well as of ancient science. The objects which they investigate are
not sensible phenomena, but intelligible realities occupying an immediate position between sensibles and Ideas, and resembling Ideas much more than they resemble sensibles. Plato's whole conception of these sciences is idealistic; nor need we wonder if some light from the land of Ideas irradiates the path of the pilgrim as he nears the end of his propaedeutic journey. Platonic Science, like Platonic Metaphysics, can of course be arrayed in modern attire; but it may be doubted whether Plato does not lose more than Science, or even the cause of liberal education gains, by having his philosophy called down from heaven to earth. See also Appendix III. The famous words of Goethe, which I have already quoted on 486 A, express the true spirit of Plato's teaching in Books vi and vii, and are a loftier and juster tribute to his genius than any panegyric on his contributions to the cause of science: “Er bewegt sich nach der Höhe, mit Sehnsucht seines Ursprungs wieder theilhaft zu werden. Alles, was er aussert, bezieht sich auf ein ewig Ganzes, Gutes, Wahres, Schönes, dessen Forderung er in jedem Busen aufzuregen strebt. Was er sich im Einzelnen von irdischem Wissen zueignet, schmilzt, ja man kann sagen, verdampft in seiner Methode, in seinem Vortrag” (Farbenlehre Vol. iii p. 141 Weimar 1803).

Plato's error lies in an undue extension of the method of pure mathematics to Astronomy and Harmonics: see on 529 D ff. His theory of these sciences is geometrical, and the heavens are actually compared to a mathematical diagram or orrery. It is not the visible movements of the visible heavens, but the intelligible movements of certain mathematical heavens which the pupil is to investigate. Even apart from his unquenchable idealism, we shall not find it difficult to account for Plato's attitude, if we remember the extraordinary value which he attached to Geometry (see on 526 C), and if we also accept his assurances that the astronomy and acoustics of his day were grossly empirical. It should likewise be borne in mind that his primary aim throughout the whole of this προπαίδεια is to discipline the intellectual powers and prepare the student to enter on the higher dialectic, in which all employment of the senses is rigidly proscribed. The goal is never for a moment lost sight of, and to a large extent affects the method by which the preliminary studies are to be themselves pursued. If his aim had been to make his pupils merely specialists in mathematics or astronomy, he might have taught them these subjects on other lines, but the man who is a mathematical specialist and nothing more is unfitted to be a Guardian, for we cannot allow 'our children' ἀλόγοι ὄντως ὕπερ γραμμάς ἄρχοιτας ἐν τῇ πόλει κυρίου τῶν μεγαλῶν εἶναι (vii 534 D). Plato endeavours to treat the study of mathematics and the mathematical sciences not as an end in itself, but as a means whereby to "revolutionize the whole state of mind" of his pupils; and his vindication of the 'Arts' as the indispensable basis of a liberal training has been justified by history. Even the very name survives in the degrees which our Universities confer (see my article in Cl. Rev. xv p. 220). After Stereometry resumed its place as a department of Geometry, the four Sciences, Arithmetic, Music, Geometry and Astronomy, gradually established themselves as

1 The phrase is applied by Herbert Spencer (Education, p. 86) to the effects of mathematics as an educative discipline, provided the teacher knows how to teach.
the Quadrivium of the Middle Ages, and room was also found for a pale and ghostly shadow of Dialectic in the Trivium (see Grasberger Erzieh. u. Unterricht pp. 235—237). Finally it is clear from some notable passages in his later writings (see on 530 B) that Plato’s feeling about the visible heavens underwent a change as he grew older. In the Laws the very name of ‘planets’ or ‘wanderers’ sounds blasphemous in his ear (§21 C). Such a change of sentiment is characteristic of his later dialogues in general, and in the Laws, perhaps, there is an added touch of the old man’s feeling ‘en εὐφημίως χρη τελευτῶν.’ But Plato may also have felt that his magnificent dream of a starry firmament more beautiful and perfect than the visible sky had served its purpose in the stimulus which it had given to a more theoretical and educative interpretation of physical science within the Academy. See Cantor Gesch. d. Math. pp. 202—216.

But, when all is said and done, the abiding value of Plato’s theory of Education is not affected by his misconception, if such it be, of the sciences of Astronomy and Harmonics. It may be doubted whether any writer has ever held so inspiring and profound a view of the aim and scope of education. Regarding man’s reasoning faculty as the element of God within him, Plato makes it the supreme and only duty of education to foster and develop this element, not by feeding it with dull and lifeless dogma, but by emancipating it from the noxious influences which impede its growth. Nothing is admitted into his scheme except what tends to keep alive humanity’s most precious heritage, the love of truth and knowledge. By nurturing and cherishing this instinct, Education, according to Plato, turns the moral as well as the intellectual nature of man from darkness to light, until he becomes ‘like God as far as it is possible for man to be.’ Nor is the horizon of the educator limited to this life. The soul is but a sojourner on earth, and its union with a particular body only a single episode in a life which reaches through ‘both eternities.’ Plato believes that the teacher can influence the pupil for hereafter as well as for life here, and that the soul which is once smitten with the love of truth may still advance from knowledge to more knowledge throughout unnumbered lives and phases of existence on earth and elsewhere. The sea of knowledge stretches wide, its waves unharvested as ever.

“Nay, come up hither......
Unto the furthest flood-brim look with me;
Then reach on with thy thought till it be drown’d.
Miles and miles distant though the last line be,
And though thy soul sail leagues and leagues beyond,
Still leagues beyond those leagues there is more sea.”

III.

ON PLATO’S DIALECTIC.

Although Socrates professes to decline the invitation of Glauco to expound Dialectic (532 E n.: cf. 506 E), he gives us in Books vi and vii plentiful indications of its method and content, and an editor of
the Republic is bound, I think, to face the task of reconstructing, in its general outlines, the science as it appeared to Plato when he wrote that dialogue. The literature of the subject is immense, as may be seen from the notes in Zeller's vol. ii. pp. 614—632, pp. 643—718: cf. also Lutoslawski Plato's Logic pp. 21—27.

It will be convenient to separate, as far as possible, the discussion of the objects of dialectical study from that of its method. Its supreme object, the Idea of the Good, is treated of in VI 504 E—509 B: VI 510 B, 511 B, C, and VII 531 D—534 E, 537 D—540 B are concerned chiefly with the method, although the objects are occasionally mentioned. Other passages in the Republic which throw light upon Plato's theory will be mentioned in the course of the discussion.

It is hardly necessary to say that Dialectic is concerned with the Ideas. What Plato meant by the 'Ideas', is a question which has been, and in my opinion will always be, much debated. I have explained my general view in the note on v 476 A; and it is only necessary to add here that the Republic, as I interpret it, nowhere indicates that the Ideas are only thoughts, whether of the divine or human mind, and lends no support whatever to any of the "mildere Auslegungen" by means of which certain modern philosophers try to reconcile their own doctrines with those of Plato (see on x 597 B). Each Idea, according to the Republic, is a single independent, separate, self-existing, perfect and eternal essence, forming the objective correlate of our general notion (596 A), which may or may not, and usually does not, reproduce it with accuracy and completeness. Any milder interpretation cannot be reconciled either with Plato's language or with the evidence of Aristotle. It may be well to take as an illustration the view of Lotze. "The truth which Plato intended to teach is no other than that which we have just been expounding, that is to say, the validity of truths as such, apart from the question whether they can be established in relation to any object in the external world, as its mode of being, or not....But the Greek language then, as afterwards, was wanting in an expression for this Validity (Geltung) as a form of Reality not including Being or Existence; and this very expression Being came, often indeed quite harmlessly, but in this instance"—viz. in the interpretation of Plato's Theory of Ideas—"with momentous consequences, to fill the place."...

"The reality of Being, indeed, they"—the Platonic Ideas—"have or have not, according as transient things of sense are clothed with them or not; but that reality which consists in Validity, which is a reality all their own, remains untouched by all this change."... "It seems incredible that the most acute of Plato's disciples, informed by personal intercourse with their master, should have misunderstood him in a point of such

1 Lutoslawski's formidable array of authorities who support the view that the Ideas are "a kind of notions of the human mind" (i.e. 26, 27) is not always accurate, and I suspect that some of the authors whom he cites would disown the interpretation which he puts upon their works. Among others, Shorey is claimed as holding this view, although he expressly repudiates it in the treatise referred to in App. I, and also in his De Plat. idearum doctr. atque mentis humanae notionibus comment., the very treatise which Lutoslawski refers to in support of his assertion; see p. 22, n. 2: "Opinio—ideas Platonicas meras mentis humanae notionesuisse iamduum explosa est."
serious moment as this” (Logic E. T. pp. 441, 444). We may fairly reply that it does not seem, but is, incredible that Aristotle should have been guilty of so gross a blunder. It is far less incredible that Lotze is himself mistaken; nor indeed can I believe that any scholar who is capable of understanding Greek could read Books v—vii of the Republic and still agree with Lotze. “The truth which Plato intended to teach is no other than that which we have just been expounding.” In this we have, I think, the key to a whole school of interpreters of Plato. “Hic liber est, in quo quaecumque earum dogmata quisque: Invenit et pariter dogmata quisque sua.” It is perhaps the highest tribute which can be offered to the strength and vitality of Plato’s influence that successive generations of idealists rejoice to discover themselves anew in him; but only by employing the methods of Procrustes can we force Plato into the habiliments of modern philosophy. Even if it were granted that the transcendence of the Ideas is, philosophically speaking, absurd (see Lotze l.c. p. 440), we cannot too strongly insist that Plato’s thought is steeped in poetical and religious fervour: “Verlangen zum Guten und Göttlichen pulsirt durch alle seine Adern” (Krohn Pl. St. p. 191): and I confess that Plato, without transcendent Ideas to fire the imagination and generate philosophical and even religious enthusiasm, appears to me perhaps an eagle still, but chained. Those critics who deny the transcendence of the Platonic ideas are compelled to discredit the authority of Aristotle, who assures us that the Ideas were νοστραί; but in reality such writers resemble Aristotle far more than Plato, for their eagerness to acquit Plato of such a ‘poetical absurdity’ (Lutoslawski Plato’s Logie, p. 447) springs from the same scientific instinct which made Aristotle attack the doctrine, as in Aristotle’s day they also would assuredly have done. Zeller’s discussions, with the results of which I in the main agree, appear to me both temperate and sound.

It is clear that in the Republic Plato believes in the existence of an Idea corresponding to every class or group of particulars, artificial as well as natural. See on v 476 A and x 596 A ff. If we are mainly concerned in that dialogue with Ideas like Justice and its sister Virtues, the sole and sufficient reason is that the Republic is an ideal city, and the institutions of an ideal city must be regulated chiefly by ethical and political principles: see on vi 484 C and 501 A ff. The totality of Ideas forms an hierarchy reaching in just and well-ordered sequence to the Idea of the Good, of which each individual Idea must be held to be one particular form, aspect, or determination. The hints which the Republic furnishes as to the place of the several Ideas in this hierarchy are enumerated in the notes on vi 510 B, 511 B. On the supremacy of the Good, there is little to add beyond what the notes contain: see on vi 506 E ff. The Idea of the Good transcends Knowledge and is its source and fountain, as well as the ultimate cause of whatsoever shadow of Truth still clings to the lower grades of intellectual apprehension enumerated in the simile of the Line. Itself above and beyond Being,

1 In edition 4, Vol. 11 1, pp. 658—679. See also Krohn Pl. St. pp. 188—192, and Kramm De iis et Platonis a Lotzei judicio defensus Halae 1879. The last-named writer appears to me to have completely refuted Lotze’s interpretation of Plato’s theory of Ideas.
the Good is the author of the other Ideas, and through them of the realities which the mathematician studies: it is also the cause of that image or semblance of reality which remains in the objects comprehended under the name of \( \gamma \varepsilon \nu \varepsilon \nu \varepsilon \). We may therefore call the Idea of Good the ‘Maker and Father of all’ (cf. *Tim.* 28 c), and identify it, in this aspect, as in others, with the supreme God (505 a n.). Its relation to the Universe of Mind and the objects which are apprehended by mind may be expressed by the following diagram, in which the lines \( A'B' \) and \( AB \) are divided according to the proportions of the simile of the Line:
APPENDICES TO BOOK VII.

A further and perhaps still more significant presentation of the Good in the Republic is as the true and ultimate object of all creation—the αὐτὴ τῶν ἀκριβῶν of the whole universe and every part thereof, and consequently at once the regulating law of everything which exists, so far as it exists, both organic and inorganic, and the πρῶτον φίλον for which the whole of Nature, with greater or less degree of consciousness, for ever yearns and strives. See on vi 505 d f. It is, I think, scarcely more than half the truth to say that the Idea of Good, “means, when stripped of its poetic vesture, a rational consistent conception of the greatest possible attainable human happiness, of the ultimate laws of God, nature or man that sanction conduct, and of the consistent application of those laws in legislation, government and education” (Shorey On the Idea of Good etc. p. 239). Man is not the whole of creation, though its highest product; and the Good is the final as well as the efficient cause, not only of human institutions, but also of the rest of nature—the ἀρχή ᾧ τὰ ἐργαταὶ τὸν οὐρανὸς καὶ τὴν φύσις (cf. Arist. Met. A 7. 1072 b 14). The reason why in the Republic Plato deals, not indeed by any means exclusively, but chiefly perhaps, with the bearings of the Good on human life and interests, is because that aspect of the Idea is more relevant than any other for the founder of a city. In the Timaeus Plato completes his account of the Good by tracing its operation in the works of Nature. It helps us to understand the many-sidedness of Plato’s conception if we remember that ‘good’ was a term of wide application among the Greeks in general, and that the Socratic school in particular regarded things as good in proportion as they fulfilled their proper office in the economy of Nature and Society. See 1 353 a—e, v 457 b and the suggestive remarks of Nettleship Lectures and Remains II pp. 221—225.

There remains the further question: How does the Supreme Cause operate in the Universe? or in other words, What is the mode or kind of relationship existing between the Idea of Good and the particular of which it is the cause? The subject is full of difficulties, and it must be premised at the outset that the relation between the eternal and self-existent and the derivative and transient cannot be otherwise expressed than by a metaphor. Cf. A. E. Taylor in Mind N. S. v pp. 309 f. But we are none the less bound to examine the metaphors employed in describing the connexion if we would see how the relationship was figured by Plato in his own mind. If we follow the indications furnished in our dialogue, we may suppose that Plato, when he wrote the Republic, conceived of the matter somewhat in the following way. The Idea of Good is the principle from which the other Ideas derive their existence (vi 509 b ff. nn.), and may therefore be regarded as the ultimate cause of everything which they in their turn produce. The immediate cause accounting for the existence of a particular is the ‘presence’ (παρουσία) of an Idea. Thus for example the cause which enables us to say that Socrates is a just and pious man is the ‘presence’ in Socrates of the Ideas of Justice, Piety, and Man. The Ideas are therefore the immanent causes of particulars, each of which is the meeting-ground of as many Ideas as there are predicables rightfully belonging to it. Thus much may be
inferred from *Republic* v 476 A ff., not to mention other dialogues; but the difficulties attending such a theory of Causation, if it is strictly interpreted, are great and numerous, and in particular the immanence of the Ideas can hardly be reconciled with their self-existence and unity. Plato was well aware of this objection, at all events when he wrote the *Parmenides*¹ (see *Parm*. 130 E—132 B, and Waddell’s edition of that dialogue pp. xliii f. and lxix), but in the *Republic*, whether because he had not yet realised the difficulty, or because he was occupied with other and more fruitful topics, he ignores it altogether. The more poetical and figurative conception of the Idea as a *παραδείγμα*, whereof the particular is an image or likeness or shadow, visible beauty, for example, being only, in the words of Shelley, the “shadow of Beauty unbeheld,” is also found in the *Republic*, as in other dialogues, side by side with the doctrine of *παρωσία*, *μεθείς*, or *κοινωνία*. See on V 476 D and A. E. Taylor in *Mind* l.c. pp. 308—311. This view, like the other, is by no means free from philosophical difficulties, as has been pointed out by, among others, Waddell l.c. pp. li f., and Taylor l.c. pp. 307, 312, but the paradigmatic relation of the Idea to the particular is more in keeping with the Platonism of Books vi and viii than the theory of participation, and it is the form in which the relationship presented itself to Plato in the last of his great metaphysical dialogues, the *Timaeus*. Finally, it should be remarked that in applying his doctrine of causation to sensible or concrete numbers and numerical relations, concrete mathematical figures and the like, Plato introduced a fresh link between the Idea and the particular in the shape of τὰ μαθηματικά. See on this subject App. I to Book vii.

I pass now to the subject of dialectical method, as expounded in the *Republic*. Formally considered, it proceeds, like the Socratic cross-examination, by question and answer (534 D). Dialectic is above all things synoptical, striving everywhere to see the one in the many (531 D, 537 B, c). Hence the coordination of the Sciences is a good preparation for the higher study (ll. cc.: cf. also Zeller⁴ 11 l. 1, p. 616 n. 1). This synoptical faculty is akin to the συναγωγή of the *Phaedrus* and other dialogues (see on 537 c), although the word συναγωγή does not occur with this meaning in the *Republic*. But whereas the dialectic of the *Phaedrus* includes the combination of particular sense-perceptions ἐἰς ἐν λογισμῷ ἐνυμορίμενον (249 B, cf. 265 D), that of the *Republic* aims at combining different Ideas under yet higher and higher Ideas, and all of them finally under the Idea of the Good. Cf. [Archytas] in Mullach *Frag. Phil.* Gr. 1 p. 599 ὅσις ὅν ἀναλῦσαι ὅσος τ’ ἐντ’ πάντα τὰ γένετα ὑπὸ μίαν τε καὶ τὰν αὐτῶν ἀρχὰς, καὶ πάλιν συνθεῖναι τε καὶ συναρχήσασθαι, ὅσις δοκεῖ μοι καὶ συνοίκους ἕμεν καὶ παλαιάθετοσα, ἐν δὲ καλῶν σκοτιῶν εἰρήκειν, ἢς ἡ δυνατός ἑσσεστὶ τῶν θεῶν καταφεύεσθαι καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐν τῷ σύντοιχίμα καὶ τάξει τὰ ἔκειν κατακεχυμενὲς καὶ ταῖσαν τὰν ἄρματιλαν ὑὸν ἐκπορισμένον τῷ νῷ καὶ εὐθείαν ὀρμαθέμεν καὶ

¹ I assume that the theory of Ideas which the Platonic Parmenides criticises is that which appears in the *Republic* and the *Phaedo*. The resemblance is so exact that I cannot see how we can escape from this assumption. Cf. Jackson in *J. of Ph.* xi p. 296. A different view is maintained by Taylor l.c. p. 317.
The principal passages in other dialogues which appear to throw light on Plato's meaning are *Men.* 86 e ff. and *Phaed.* 100 a ff. In the *Meno* Socrates proposes *εἴ ὑποθέσως σκοπεώθαι εἴτε διδάκτων ἐστιν* (sc. ἡ ἀρχή) ἐἴτε ὑποςωθοτι, and proceeds as follows. We will, he says, assume (*ὑποτιθεσθαι*) that Virtue is Knowledge, and see what follows. On this assumption Meno at once admits that Virtue is teachable. Thereupon Socrates says we must examine his original *ὑπόθεσις* of Virtue, viz. that Virtue is Knowledge, and begins the examination by propounding a fresh *ὑπόθεσις*, viz. that Virtue is good. From this second *ὑπόθεσις* he arrives by a series of steps at the conclusion that Virtue is Knowledge and thus proves that Virtue can be taught. We may compare Aristotle's *συλλογισμος ἐς υποθέσεως*, on which see Wallace *Outlines of the Philosophy of Aristotle* pp. 41 f., and Waitz

1 *De Plat. arte dialectica* (1873) p. 48. Łukasiewicz must himself have read this work very superficially before he could have described it as "very superficial" (*Plato's Logic* p. 21 n. 58). The judgment of Peipers, though he frequently disagrees with Oldenberg, is very different: "quaecumque Herm. Oldenberg egregie disputat in commutatione de Platonis arte dialectica" (*Ontol. Plat.* p. 402 n.). So also is that of Zeller* Π. Π. ἡ περαισκον τοις κατά δίκαιo τοίς κατ' ὑπόθεσις* (11 pp. 619, 620 *et al.*). I am far from accepting the whole of Oldenberg's results, but his treatise is anything but superficial, and a large part of it is in my judgment true and admirable.
This method is parallel to that described in Book VI in so far as the original ὑπόθεσις is not left ἀκάτερος (533 c), but itself deduced from something higher. It is not parallel in so far as this ‘higher something’ is itself only a ὑπόθεσις and not an ἀρχή ἀνυπόθετος. Much the same is true of the well-known passage in the Phaedo. That which Socrates ὑποτίθεται is his conception or definition of αἰτία as the presence of the Idea in the particular thing making it what it is (100 b, c). From this he deduces the immortality of the Soul. So far, I agree, in the main, with Jackson (J. of Ph. x p. 149) and Archer-Hind that the δεύτερα πλοῦς of the Phaedo follows the same method as the διάνοια of Book VI, although, as already stated in Appendix I, διανοία in the Republic is, I believe, occupied with τὰ μαθηματικὰ alone. But when in τοῦ δὲ Πλάτων writes ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἔκαθησ αὐτῆς δέοι σε διδόναι λόγον, ὅσοι, ἀν διδοὺς, ἀλλὰ αὐτῷ ὑπόθεσιν ὑποθέσεων, ηὔς τῶν ἀνωθέν βελτιστὴ φαίνετο, ἐως ἕπι τι ἰκανὸν ἐδοσ, he has in mind a possible defence of the original ὑπόθεσις by deducing it, as in the Meno, from some ὑπόθεσις still higher, and the διάνοια of the Republic, quâ διάνοια, never defends its ὑπόθεσις at all (510 c, 533 c), not even by any other hypothesis. There is also in 107 b an express direction to examine the ὑπόθεσις themselves: τὰς ὑπόθεσις τὰς πρῶτας, καὶ εἰ πισταὶ ὑμῖν εἰςίν, ὅμως ἐπισκεπτέας σαφέστερον καὶ ἐὰν αὕτης ἰκανός διέλητε, ὅσα ἐγώμαι ἀκολουθήσετε τῷ λόγῳ, καθ’ ὅσον δυνατὸν μᾶλλον ἀνθρώπω ἐπικολούθησαί καὶ τούτο αὐτῷ σαφές γένηται, οὐδὲν ἐκτίθησε παρατέρω. These two passages of the Phaedo therefore resemble the dialectic of the Republic inasmuch as they contemplate and prescribe an examination of the ὑπόθεσις with which we start. In the first, however, no hope is held out of ever rising above ὑπόθεσις, for ἰκανόν τι is not the unhypothetical Idea, although it may very well happen in any given case to be a ὑπόθεσις, of Good. The exhortation in 107 b is different, and seems to hint at something like the dialectic of VI and VII, for the original ὑπόθεσις cannot be satisfactorily proved (καὶ τοῦτο αὐτῷ σαφὲς γένηται) except by connecting them with the Idea of Good, and this involves an exhaustive survey of the whole field of νοητά such as Plato sketches in the end of Book VI.

It appears, therefore, that the ὑπόθεσις of Dialectic are not, like those of Mathematics, immovable and fixed, and that we may be called upon to render an account of them, nay more, that it is our duty to submit them to examination ourselves. To this extent the Meno and Phaedo, taken together, are in agreement with the Republic on the nature of Dialectic. But by what means is the dialectician to scrutinize his ὑπόθεσις? In what way is he to ascend from ὑπόθεσις to the άνυπόθετον ἀρχή? The passages in the Republic which help us to answer these questions are VI 511 b τὰς ὑπόθεσις ποιοῦμενος οὐκ ἀρχῶς, ἀλλὰ τῷ οὔτι ὑπόθεσις, οὐδὲ ἐπίθεσις ὑπὸ καὶ ὅρμας, VII 533 c η ὑποβεβηκτὴ μέθοδος μόνον ταύτῃ περευται, τὰς ὑπόθεσις ἀναιρεύσα, ἐπιάτων τήν ἀρχὴν, ἦν βεβαιώσαται, and 534 b, c ὅτι ην ἡ ἐχθρεύσαται τῷ λόγῳ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀλλῶν πάντων ἀφελών τοῦ τῶν ἀγαθοῦ ἱδέας, καὶ ὑπερὲ ἐν μὲν ἀρχῇ διὰ πάντων ἐλέγχων διεξείτων µὴ κατὰ δοξάν ἀλλὰ κατ᾽ οὐσίαν προδε- μούμενος ἐλέγχειν, ἐν τοῖς γὰρ ἀπώτω τῷ λόγῳ διαπερεύθηται, οὔτε
VII.

The key to the solution of the difficulty is furnished by the words υποθέσεις αναφοράσα 533 c, and διὰ πάντων ἑλέγχων διειξών 534 c. In my notes on these two phrases I have tried to indicate the general character of the dialectician’s ascent εἰς υποθέσεις ἐπ’ ἀρχήν ἀνπόθετον. He begins by offering a υπόθεσις on the subject to be discussed, and then proceeds to test his υπόθεσις by the conclusions to which it leads. If these conclusions are untenable, the original υπόθεσις is cancelled or annulled (ἀναφερόται), and a new suggestion takes its place, only to suffer the same fate. The process is repeated again and again, until at last we reach an ἀρχή which will withstand every test (ὅτεπερ εν μάχῃ διὰ πάντων ἑλέγχων διειξῶν κτλ. 534 c). Thus each successive υπόθεσις serves as an additional step in the stair by which we ascend, and is useful to the dialectician just because he is willing to leave it and mount higher. Cf. Gomperz, Greek Thinkers, 1 pp. 303—306, where the scientific value and importance of this method is very clearly explained. In the completed Dialectic which Plato adumbrates in Books vi and vii, we are invited to suppose that the whole kingdom of knowables, in the spheres alike of Nature and of Man, has been surveyed and mapped out by this method, of which the intellectual γνωσία of the Parmenides is a kind of example on a lower plane. The result is a number of true and irrefragable ἀρχαί, apprehended not only in their mutual coherence and interdependence, but also in their relationship to the supreme Idea, which is itself, when we have climbed to the summit, no longer a υπόθεσις, but an ἀρχή ἀνπόθετος, because the exhaustive scrutiny of all ὑπότα has demonstrated that the Universe of thought and things is in reality nothing but the expression or embodiment of the Good. See on vi 510 b. If it be urged against Plato that we have no right to assert that the Universe and all its
parts are only the expression of the Good unless and until we have found it to be so by such an exhaustive scrutiny as Plato describes, Plato might reply: ‘True, we have not as yet complete scientific knowledge of this fact; but knowledge is not everything; we have ἀνάμνησις also.’

‘Not in entire forgetfulness
And not in utter nakedness,
But trailing clouds of glory do we come
From God, who is our home.’

The progress of human knowledge from generation to generation will help to demonstrate the supremacy of the Good, of which, by virtue of the θεόν τι ἐν ἡμῖν, we are already well assured.

The later stages in the dialectician’s journey belong to an ideal which human investigation can hardly hope to reach (vi 511 B n.), but, as I have hinted on 533 c, the general character of his progress may be illustrated from many Platonic dialogues. In the Laches, for example, we have several ὑποβέθεια of courage, each of which is treated as a stepping-stone—οὖν ἐπίβασις τε καὶ ὁρμή—on the way to a better and truer conception of the virtue. The first definition given by Laches, that courage is καρπεία τις ψυχῆς, Socrates attacks with the elenchus and overthrows (192 c, d), but a new and better ὑποβέθεια rises on its ruins, viz. that courage is φρόνιμος καρπεία ψυχῆς (192 d). A further application of the Socratic weapon shews that this ὑποβέθεια must also be revised (192 e—193 d), and Nicias suggests a third, defining courage as τὴν τῶν δεινόν καὶ θαρραλέων ἐπιστήμην καὶ ἐν πολέμῳ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀλλοις ἀπασῳ (195 α). In the sequel, this definition is widened into ἡ περὶ πάντων ἀγαθῶν τε καὶ κακῶν καὶ πάντως ἔχωντων ἐπιστήμην (199 c), whereby courage becomes, no longer a specific part of virtue, ἀλλὰ σύμπασα ἀρετή (199 e), and the unity of virtue is affirmed. The final definition is not refuted on its merits, although Socrates declares it to be inconsistent with the position already assigned to courage as one of the parts of virtue. It will be observed that each ὑποβέθεια owes something to its predecessor, that in the progress of the argument courage is brought into connexion with other ὑποβέθειαι, such as τὸ δεινὸν καὶ τὸ θαρραλέον, and that the last ὑποβέθεια is wider and more comprehensive than any which has preceded. A cursory glance at the course of the argument in the Charmides and Euthyphro will provide many illustrations of the process which Plato calls τὸ ἀναφεῖν τὰς ὑποβέθειαι, and a more careful analysis will reveal a gradual advance in both dialogues from the accidental and superficial to the essential and profound. See for the Euthyphro my edition of that dialogue pp. vii—xxii. These distinguishing characteristics of Plato’s method are easiest to trace in his simpler and less elaborate dialogues, but nearly all his writings shew analogous features, and the Republic is itself a conspicuous example of the same method. It is not too much to say that the true unity of the Republic, as of many other dialogues of Plato, consists in a continuous ascent from stage to stage, each successive elevation not only revealing new and wider prospects, but also enabling us to modify, correct and enlarge our apprehension of that which we have seen before.

A. P. II.
APPENDICES TO BOOK VII.

It lies beyond the scope of this Appendix to discuss the origin of Plato's dialectical method, and I must here content myself with saying that although it owes not a little to the Eleatics, still more to Socrates, and something perhaps to geometrical analysis, which Plato is said to have invented (see Hardie in Mind N.S. v p. 180), the full development of the method must be ascribed to Plato himself. Rightly understood and practised, the method is extraordinarily valuable and fruitful, not merely for purposes of education, but as a weapon of scientific discovery. Every teacher who is worthy of the name employs it to kindle and feed the love of knowledge in his pupils. It is the method which an editor of necessity adopts in endeavouring to explain and expound the text of an ancient writer. The conjectural emendations and interpretations by which his pathway is beset are all of them υποθέσεις of more or less value, and the very process of testing and rejecting these υποθέσεις frequently brings to light the true interpretation. An editor, in short, ἀναρεῖ τὰς υποθέσεις, ἐπ' αὐτὴν τὴν ἀρχὴν πορευόμενος, ἵνα βεβαιώσηται, and ought not to rest content until διὰ πάντον ἔλεγχων δεξίων—ἀπτώτι τῷ λόγῳ διαπερνηται (534 c). And that which takes place on a small scale in the exposition of an ancient text is reproduced on a larger scale in the history of investigation and discovery not only in the humanities, but also in natural science. Speaking of the part played by hypotheses in the progress of scientific discovery, Professor Rücker in his Presidential Address at the British Association, 1901, remarks: "The wraths of phlogiston, calorik, luminiferous corpuscles, and a crowd of other phantoms haunt the investigator, and as the grim host vanishes into nothingness he cannot but wonder if his own conceptions of atoms and of the ether

'shall dissolve
And, like this unsubstantial pageant faded,
Leave not a rack behind.'"

But though science, like Bunyan’s hero, has sometimes to pass through the ‘Valley of Humiliation,’ the spectres which meet it there are not really dangerous if they are boldly faced. The fact that mistakes have been made, that theories have been propounded and for a time accepted, which later investigations have disproved, does not necessarily discredit the method adopted. For scientific theories, as in the world around us, there is a survival of the fittest, and Dr James Ward’s unsympathetic account of the blunders of those whose work, after all, has shed glory on the 19th century, might, mutatis mutandis, stand for a description of the history of civilisation. “The story of the progress so far,” he tells us, “is briefly this—divergence between theory and fact one part of the way, the wreckage of abandoned fictions for the rest, with an unattainable goal of phenomenal nihilism, and ultra-physical mechanism beyond” (James Ward, Naturalism and Agnosticism, Vol. i p. 154). “The path of progress,” says Professor Karl Pearson, “is strewn with the wreck of nations. Traces are everywhere to be seen of the hecatombs of inferior races, and of victims who found not the narrow way to the greater perfection. Yet these dead peoples are, in very truth, the stepping-stones on which mankind has arisen to the
higher intellectual and deeper emotional life of to-day” (Karl Pearson, National Life from the Standpoint of Science, p. 62). When hypotheses are mistaken for established and unquestionable truths, the love of knowledge gives place to the love of dogma, and progress is arrested. In Plato’s way of thinking, the path of knowledge is and must be paved out of the ruins of generalisations, if we are to tread firmly on the road to

“That untravelled world whose margin fades
For ever and for ever as we move.”

IV.

VII 515 B. el ón dialeghesbai oloi τε εἰς πρὸς ἀλλήλους, αὖ ταῦτα ἵγει ἀν τὰ παρῴτα τοῦτος νομίζειν ὁνομάζειν, ἄπερ ὀρφεῖν;

ταῦτα appears for ταῦτα in A and some other mss. Instead of παρῳτα, all the mss except Flor. T have παρόντα, while Lambichus (Protrept. 15) and Proclus (in remp. 1 p. 293 Kroll) appear to have read ὅντα.

The following are the principal solutions which have been proposed.

(1) With ταῦτα—τὰ παρῴτα. “Hoc rogat Socrates—an haec, quae viderent, tamquam res præsentis, non tamquam umbras appellare, de præsentibus, non de absentibus loqui sese opinaturi essent?” (Schneider). “Do you not suppose that they would believe that they were naming those things that they actually saw before them?” (J. and C.). This interpretation separates ταῦτα from τὰ παρróżniα, and makes the whole force of τὰ παρوها depend upon its antithesis (‘non de absentibus’), which is not expressed, and difficult to supply. Other objections are urged by Vermehren Plat. Stud. p. 105. Prantl (after Schleiermacher) takes νομίζειν as “für üblich halten” (cf. Laurus 637 E), translating “glaubst du nicht, dass sie es für üblich halten würden, eben die je anwesenden Dinge, welche sie sehen, mit Namen zu nennen?” (So also D. and V.) Prantl’s view has been demolished by Schneider: “non hoc rogat Socrates, an nomina umbris imponenda existimaturi aut re vera imposituri essent, quippe quod citra errorem facere eis liceret.” The progress of the argument, as well as the close parallelism with the next sentence, makes it clear that the prisoners are in error. The same criticism applies to the view of A?, who reads ταῦτα—τὰ παρῴτα, and translates “Nonne censes eos res praeterlatas arbitraturos esse nominandas quas viderent?”

(2) With ταῦτα—τὰ παρ辀τα (Hermann, Stallbaum). Stallbaum translates “nonne putas eas res, quae praetervehentur, isidem nominibus atque quae viderent nominare solituros esse?”, explaining ταῦτα (predicative after ὁνομάζειν) ἄπερ ὀρφεῖ as equivalent to ταῦτα τοῦτος ἄπερ ὀρφεῖ. “Sententia igitur haec est: vincitos illos nonne putas nominam rerum, quis conspicere (conspicere sibi viderentur) ad umbras illarum praetereuntes esse de more translaturos?” But what objects at all except shadows can the prisoners see?
(3) Emendations. (a) Cobet (Mnem. xi p. 173 and V. L.° p. 531) proposes οὗ ταῦτα ύγει αὖ—τὰ παριόντα νομίζειν [νομομάζειν] ἀπερ όρφεν. The word νομομάζειν is rejected also by Baiter, who further changes οὗ ταῦτα to οiếc αὐτὰ, following Vermehren and Madvig: see below. Neither of these critics appears to have noticed that εἰ οὔν διαλέγεσθαι οἷοί τε εἰεν becomes altogether superfluous if νομομάζειν is omitted. For this reason Richards’ insertion of καὶ between νομίζειν and νομομάζειν (Cl. Rev. viii p. 192) is preferable to the suggestion of Cobet. (b) Vermehren, in an elaborate and careful examination of the passage (Plat. Stud. pp. 103—106), argues that the sense required by the context is “dass die Höhlenbewohner die vorüberziehenden Schatten für die Gegenstände selbst nehmen und sie demgemäß benennen würden, gerade wie sie die vernommenen Töne vermöge des Widerhalls den Schattenbildern, nicht aber den sie erzeugenden Originalen zuschreiben würden.” He therefore conjectures ο superClass αὐτὰ—τὰ παριόντα κτλ. “glaubst du nicht, dass sie in ihrer Lage die vorüberziehenden Gegenstände selbst zu benennen meinen würden, die sie—in ihrer Meinung nach—sähen?” According to this view, τὰ παριόντα denotes the real παραφερόμενα: but how could the prisoners suppose themselves to be naming the real παραφερόμενα, of which, ex hypothesì, they know nothing whatever?

The interpretation given in the notes appears to me to give the sense required, without attributing to the prisoners any knowledge from which their situation excludes them. I have not seen it anywhere in print, but I am glad to say that Dr Jackson writes as follows: “So I have long taken this passage. I copy my old note. ‘Read ταῦτα, retain νομομάζειν, and translate: Don’t you think they would suppose the names which they used to belong to the passing objects which they saw before their eyes?’”

V.

VII 519 A, B. τὸ τοῦτο μέντοι, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, τὸ τῆς τοιαύτης φύσεως εἰ ἐκ παιδός εὖθως κοστόμενον περικόπτῃ τὰς τῆς γενέσεως ἐννυγενεῖς ὡσπερ μολυβδίδας, αἱ δὴ ἐδώδας τε καὶ τοιώνων ἧδονας τε καὶ λιχνειας προσφυνεῖς γεγνυμέναι περικάτω στρέφουσι τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ὀψιν.

This passage has been strangely misunderstood by many editors and critics. γενέσεως is taken as ‘birth’ by (among others) Schneider, Stallbaum, Jowett (‘attached to them at their birth’—an impossible construction), although the correct translation (which has recently been reaffirmed by Seymour in Cl. Rev. x p. 325) was already given by Schleiermacher and afterwards by Krohn (Pl. St. p. 161). Others, such as Schneider and D. and V., make the weights adhere to the pleasures of eating etc. It is, however, obvious that they must adhere to that from which they are to be knocked off (περικόπτῃ), and it is τὸ τῆς τοιαύτης φύσεως from which they have to be removed (κοστόμενον περικόπτῃ). Moreover x 611 e—612 a, quoted in the notes, conclusively disproves this view.
As regards the text, τὰ τῆς γενέσεως ἐγγεγενή is read by many editors on the authority of some inferior mss. To me the neuter appears a manifest ‘correction,’ and far less elegant and expressive than the feminine, which has the support (among other mss) of A, II and q. See also on π. 401 C. It is strictly true, according to Plato, that the leader

weights of appetite and self-indulgence are ‘kindred with,’ ‘of the family of’ γένεσις (see especially, in addition to the evidence adduced in the note, ix 585 B—586 B), so that the adjective ought to agree with μολυβδίας.

Instead of the περὶ κάτω of the best mss, Hermann, who is followed by Burnet, reads κάτω, adopting a suggestion of Schneider’s. Schneider himself, with Stallbaum and other editors, chose the reading of q (περὶ τὰ κάτω), which is unexceptionable in point of sense, and which I also once thought right. Longer reflection has however convinced me that Madvig is right in restoring περικάτω. The strongest evidence (other than that of the best mss) in its support is furnished by Photius (see note) and Plutarch. The latter certainly read περικάτω or περὶ κάτω (the reading of A): see de fac. quaæ in orb. lus. app. 943 D ενίας δε (sc. ψυχας) και
tῶν ἐκεί περὶ κάτω τρεπομένας (v.l. τρεπομένας) οἴον εἰς βυθὸν οὕθης ὄρωσι καταγινομένας, an obvious imitation of this passage of Plato. J. and C. object that περικάτω could only mean ‘upside down.’ Such a translation is of course ridiculous here, but it does in point of fact accurately represent the situation. The eye of the soul, according to Plato in this passage, naturally looks up; so that when forced to look down, it is itself, strictly speaking, turned ‘upside down.’ The fact is that περικάτω στρέφειν (τρέπειν) simply means ‘turn round downwards,’ and the translation ‘upside down’ is suitable only when it is applied to goblets (as in Strattis ap. Ath. xi 467 E) and similar objects which can themselves be said to have an ‘up’ and ‘down,’ or perhaps in cases like Lucian Adv. ind. 1 (where Cobet restores περικάτω). The word is discussed by Madvig Adv. Cr. 1 p. 27 and by Cobet Mn. N.S. xi p. 174 and V. L.2 p. 90. It is doubtless better (with Photius) to write περικάτω as one word, than (with A, II, etc.) as two. The analogy of ἐπικάτω, ἐπάνω, ὑπέρανω etc. favours this accentuation: cf. Lobeck Phryn. p. 48. For other instances of prepositions combined with adverbs see Kühner-Gerth Gr. Gr. 11 i, pp. 538—540.

VI.

VII 521 c. τὸτο ὅτι, ὡς οὐκεκ, οὐκ ὀστράκου ἂν εἰς περιστροφή, ἀλλὰ ψυχῆς περισκοπή ἐκ νυκτερινῆς τις ἡμέρας εἰς ἀληθινὴν, τοῦ ὄντος ὄπωσ ἐπανοῦν, ἣν ὅτι φιλοσοφίαν ἀληθή φήσομεν εἶναι.

The proverb ὀστράκου περιστροφή was variously explained by the ancients as (1) ἐπὶ τῶν ταχῶς τι ποιοῦντων: (2) ἐπὶ τῶν εἰμεταβάλων: (3) ἐπὶ τῶν ἐκ κρεπτώνων εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον μεταβαλλόντων: (4) ἐπὶ τῶν ἄνθρωπων καὶ ἀνελπιστῶς ψυχομενόνων: (5) ἐπὶ τῶν διὰ τάξως εἰς φυγῆν ὀρ- µόωντος or the like (Schol. l.c. and on ὀστράκου μετατείρουτος in Phaedr. 241 β). See Leutsch und Schneidewin Paroem. Gr. 1 p. 285 f., 11 p. 84.
The last of these explanations touches on an essential feature of the game, which was itself also (according to Pollux ix 112 and the Scholiast on this sentence of the Republic) called ἀντράκος περιστροφή, but does not fully elucidate the meaning of the phrase when it is used as a proverb. None of the ancient interpretations is exactly suited to the present passage, and it is clear from their number and diversity that the phrase was not clearly understood. As the proverb is believed to have originated with Plato (Leutsch und Schneidewin l.c. 1 p. 285 n.), we are bound to interpret it as the context requires, and Schleiermacher’s solution appears to me to come nearest to the truth: “hier ist mehr zu denken theils an die Flüchtigkeit, mit welcher solche Spiele überhaupt behandelt werden, theils an die Zufälligkeit, mit welcher die Scherbe auf diese oder jene Seite zu fallen scheint” (Translation of the Republic p. 577 n. 372). This view combines the first and second explanations, and is in no way invalidated by the criticisms of Schück (de Schol. ad Pl. civ. pertinentibus p. 31). Plato is perhaps aiming a taunt at the educational theory and practice of contemporary sophists (cf. 518 B n.).

The details of the game itself have been often discussed, and are now tolerably clear. See (besides Graserger quoted in the notes) Blümner Privatall. p. 298 and Förster in Rh. Mus. 1875, pp. 287 ff. The latter was, I believe, the first to point out the allusion in νυκτερινῆς τινος ἤμέρας to ‘νυξ ἤμέρα.’

I think that the placing of a comma after ἄληθινήν restores sense to the latter part of the passage. The reading in the text has the support of A, II, and a great majority of mss; and the comparison with 517 C seems to me conclusive in favour of the view taken in the notes. Hermann and others have pointed out that ἤμέραν should be supplied with ἄληθινήν, but those who take this view have hitherto (with, so far as I know, the single exception of Jackson) connected τοι ὅντος with ἄληθινήν (.IsDBNullαν). It was perhaps on this ground that Schneider peremptorily declined to admit such an explanation. In any case the emphatic opposition between νυκτερινῆς and ἄληθινήν invites us to supply ἤμέραν, and the transition from the metaphor to its interpretation would be too abrupt if ἄληθινήν were connected with ἔπαινοδον. οὗσαν is a further difficulty on this view; and Ε accordingly omitted the word, while Q boldly changes it to ιοὺσας. Schneider, with whom J. and C. are inclined to agree, joins ἄληθινήν with ἔπαινοδον, and argues that οὗσαν is added partly on account of ὅντος, but more “ad augendam veritatis significacionem.” But, as J. and C. remark, οὗσαν still drags, “and ἔπαινοδον gives a feeble antithesis to ἤμέρας.” The passage from the Lasus (728 B) which Schneider quotes in support of his interpretation is not parallel.

Of emendations there has been no lack. ιοὺσας is adopted by Stephanus, Bekker, Ast and Stallbaum, the last of whom construes ιοὺσας ἔπαινοδον by ‘adscendentis’ and supplies ἤμέραν with ἄληθινήν, as Schleiermacher also did. This yields a better sense than the old view, which connected ἄληθινήν with ἔπαινοδον, but is harsh in point of syntax, and ιοὺσας has been demolished on its own merits by Schneider. Hermann read οὗσα ἔπαινοδος, quoting Iamblichus in Villoison’s Aeneid. II p.
194, where ὦσα ἐπάνοδος (not ἐπάνωδος, as J. and C. assert) is found. But the περαγωγῇ ψυχῆς is not itself the ἐπάνοδος, and ὦσα ἐπάνοδος drags unpleasantly.

Cobet's emendation, which is partially adopted by Baiter, changes ὦσαν to ὦσιαν, inserts καὶ before ἐκ νυκτερών, and reads ἐπάνοδος for ἐπάνοδον. But, apart from other objections, τοῦ ὄντος ὦσιάν, in spite of Soph. 262 c, is extremely unpleasing. Jowett and Campbell's otherwise excellent note appears to me fatal to their own as well as to every other solution proposed before they wrote, and overthrows all the emendations except ἀγοῦσα for ὦσαν, which I suggested in 1897. I take this opportunity of withdrawing so hasty a proposal, and restoring the text of the best mss, which I am glad to say that Jackson also defended when in a letter to me some years ago he remarked "I have been in the habit of putting a comma after ἀλήθειαν, and otherwise keeping the reading of A."

VII.

VII 527 D. τὸ δ' ἐστιν οὐ πάνυ φαύλον, ἀλλὰ χαλεπὸν πιστεύοι, ὅτι ἐν τούτῳ τοῖς μαθήμασι ἐκάστου ὁργάνου τῇ ψυχῇ ἐκκαθαρίζεται τῇ καὶ ἀναζωπυρεῖται ἀπολλύμενον καὶ τυφλώμενον ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτυθεμάτων, κρείττον ὡν σωθήναι μυρών ὁμάτων. μόνῳ γὰρ αὐτῷ ἀλήθεια ὀρᾶται.

This eloquent sentence was deservedly famous in antiquity, and is constantly quoted or alluded to by many authors: see the references in Ast, Schneider, Wex (Flech. Jb. 1864 p. 381), and Hiller (on Theo Smyrn. 3).

An attempt has been made by Cobet (Mnem. xi p. 177) to remodel the text in accordance with Theo's citation, which is as follows: τὸ δ' ἐστιν οὐ πάνυ φαύλοις, ἀλλὰ πάσι χαλεπὸν πιστευόμει, ὅτι ἐν τούτοις τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἐκάστου οὗ ὁργάνου τῷ ψυχῇ ἐκκαθαρίζεται καὶ ἀναζωπυρεῖται ὁμία τυφλώμενον καὶ ἀποσβέβειμένον ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτυθεμάτων, κρείττον ὡν σωθήναι μυρών ὁμάτων. μόνῳ γὰρ αὐτῷ ἀλήθεια ὀρᾶται (ed. Hiller p. 3).

Wex (l.c. 1863 pp. 692 ff.) had maintained, strangely enough, that ὁργάνον ψυχῆς would mean something bodily, e.g. the bodily eye; and Cobet accordingly adopts Theo's version ὁὗ ὁργάνω — ὁμία. Neither of these critics appears to have remembered ταύτῃ τῇ ἐνώσει ἐκάστου διάμανεν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ τῷ ὁργάνῳ ὃ καταμαθήθαι ἐκάστος in 518 c, a passage to which, as ἐκάστου shews, this sentence expressly refers. ὁργάνον ψυχῆς was also, as Wex admits, the reading of Plutarch (Conv. Disp. viii 718 e). ἀποσβέβειμένοι, which Cobet substitutes for ἀπολλύμενοι, is in itself good, and may point to an early variant, but ἀπολλύμενοι is supported by the evidence of Plutarch (l.c.) and Alcinous (Isag. c. 27).

Nothing could be a more instructive lesson on the almost utter worthlessness of early citations of Plato for determining the text of the Republic than to compare A's readings in this passage with its reproduction by Theo and Nicomachus (Intr. Ar. 1 3. 7). Even the meanest and most corrupt of our mss is, from the literary point of view, superior; and there is not in these citations a single variant to which any of our mss here lends support.
VIII.

VII 528 c. ἤτει καὶ γών ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἄτιμαζόμενα καὶ κολούμενα, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν ζητοῦτων, λόγον οὐκ ἔχοντων καθ' ὅ τι χρήσιμα, ὧμος πρὸς ἀπαντα ταῦτα βία ὑπὸ χάριτος αὐξάνεται.

I have returned in this edition to the reading of the best mss, which is kept also by Schneider, Hermann, Stallbaum, and J. and C.

The explanation in the notes appears to me required by the grammatical construction, as well as suitable in point of meaning if we remember that the mode in which stereometricians ‘dishonour’ their subject has already been explained. The Many dishonour Stereometry negatively, ὅτι συδεμία πόλεις ἑντιμῶς αὐτὰ ἔχει, and thereby negatively clip or curtail the study, for until it receives public support, it will not attain to its natural and proper growth. The students of stereometry dishonour and curtail their study positively by prosecuting it feebly and in a slight degree, because they do not know its real utility, and (as was said before) have no public encouragement to support them in so difficult a subject. The omission of μὲν before τῶν πολλῶν was apparently a stumbling-block, for it is replaced in Σ and some other mss of second-rate authority. See however I 340 D n. If ὑπὸ μὲν τῶν πολλῶν were read, we should, I think, expect another passive participle to be present in the balancing clause. As it is, δὲ merely marks the formal contrast between οἱ πολλοὶ and οἱ ζητοῦντες.

Schneider understands ζητοῦμεν or the like after χρήσιμα, and takes ὑπὸ τῶν ζητοῦτων with αὐξάνεται. This explanation is too tortuous, nor is δὲ accounted for by calling it “quasi primitiae orationis monumentum.” Stallbaum’s solution is in principle the same as Schneider’s. According to the Oxford editors, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν ζητοῦτων “may depend on some general idea of disadvantage, e.g. κολούμενα understood from the previous clause.” The zeugma is however difficult, and ἄτιμαζόμενα καὶ κολούμενα are just as true of the ζητοῦντες as of the πολλοὶ.

The following emendations have been proposed. (1) ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἄτιμαζόμενα καὶ κολούμενα νῦν τῶν ζητοῦτων (‘dishonoured by the many and curtailed by students’). I formerly accepted this change, which is due to Voegelin, and has the support of Madvig and Baiter. The sense is excellent, but the intrusion of δὲ into all the mss is very difficult to account for satisfactorily. (2) ὑπὸ—κολούμενα, τῶν δὲ ζητοῦτων κτλ. (Cobet). This correction, which (with the addition of μὲν before τῶν πολλῶν) commends itself to a reviewer of my Text of the Republic in Lit. Centralblatt 1898 pp. 296 f., is much too drastic. The same criticism applies to (3) Badham’s ἄτιμαζόμενα, κολούμενα δ’ ὑπὸ κτλ., and also (4) to Liebhold’s ὑπὸ μὲν τῶν πολλῶν.—ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν ζητοῦτων <ἄμελουμενα> κτλ.
IX.

VII. 529 c. κἀν εἰς ὑπίας νέων ἐν γῇ ἦ ἐν θαλάσσῃ μαθῆσῃ.

The ms tradition in this difficult passage points to the existence of two early variants, viz. ὑπίας μὲν and ὑπίας νέων. The former is read by A, Cesenas M, and two other mss.; probably also μὴν (Vind. B) is a corruption of μὲν, and μὴ (Vind. E) of μὴν. ὑπίας νέων has the authority of Π, q and other mss. ναϊὼν and νεωμ, which some mss read, are corruptions of νέων.

No one, so far as I know, has defended μὲν. For the obnoxious particle Madvig proposes ὅ, Richards θεώμενος or κεῖμενος, while J. J. Hartman ejects it altogether. None of these conjectures is in the least degree convincing. By far the best suggestion on these lines is Marin- din's εὐπτικάμενος for εἰς ὑπίας μὲν (Cl. Rev. VIII p. 193 n.): cf. εὐπτικάκενται τῇ κεφαλῇ in Arist. ap. Ath. I 34 b and εὐπτικάκενον ομημα (Schütz's conjecture for ὁμημα) in Aesch. Sept. 577. The active is three times used by Lucian intransitively for throwing the neck or body back (Gall. 12, Heracl. 3, Adv. ind. 21) and once with εὐωτὸν in the same sense (Catapl. 16). But the accidental omission of -ος is not easy to explain in a ms of the ninth century or its progenitors, though natural enough at a later date (see Bast Comm. Pal. p. 772 and Tab. iv 18).

If μὲν and νέων each contain an element of truth (a very improbable supposition), it may be thought that μὲν νάιων is what Plato wrote. But the word is too feeble and pointless.

The editors, except Baiter, unanimously and (I think) rightly, read νέων. A confirmation of this reading is supplied by Pollux VII 138 νέων δ' εἰς ὑπίας μάθημα κολυμβητῶν ἀριστοφάνης εἶπε καὶ Πιλάτων: for it is unlikely that Pollux is thinking of the more artificial passage in Phaedr. 264 a oδὲ ἀπ' ἀρχής ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τελευτῆς ἀνάπαλιν διανεῖ ἑπίκεφαλε τοῦ λόγου. Schneider's translation "und wenn er auch auf dem Rücken schwimmen in Landes- oder in Meeresgewässern lernt" is in harmony with his note "in ca orbis terrarum parte, quae γῇ vocatur, non minus quam in altera natari potest. γῇ non idem est, quod χέραν." But even if we allow that ἐν γῇ may bear this meaning, there must be some more specific reference, or else the phrase is pointless; for there is no object in swimming on one's back in a river with a view to watching the heavens, when the adjoining bank affords a more secure and stedfast post of observation. Stallbaum avoids the difficulty, merely translating "etiamsi (more urinariorum) resupinus natans in terra vol mari discat," with the note "dictio εἰς ὑπίας νέων vol dianeoν ab arte urinariorum petita." J. and C. see in Plato's phrase "a piece of extravagance" and nothing more; but even the extravagance of Plato is never destitute of point. To understand νέων ἐν γῇ as no more than lying on the land (with some older translators, including Ficinus), and to transpose ἐν γῇ and ἐν θαλάσσῃ (with q and Flor. U) are of course wholly illegitimate resources. I have sometimes suspected that εἰς ὑπίας νεων (ἐν γῇ) may be a slang phrase borrowed from the language of Greek athletics: sometimes it has seemed to me to refer to the story of Thales in the well (Theaet. 174 A and cf.
D. L. 1 34). That it has some peculiar and specific meaning I am convinced; and the explanation offered in the notes appears to me far more probable than any other. The Aristophanic instance of ἐξ ὑπτίας νεών does not occur in any of the extant plays. It should be added that ἐπὶ γῆς μὴ πλεῖν was a Pythagorean σύμβολον (Clement Strom. v. 5. 49 A Migne), but I do not think there is any allusion to the maxim here. See also my article in Cl. Rev. xiii p. 11.

X.

VII 529 c, d. ταύτα μὲν τὰ ἐν τῷ ὁδραγῷ ποικίλματα, ἐπείπερ ἐν ὅρατῳ πεποίηκται, κάλλιστα μὲν ἡγεῖσθαι καὶ ἀκριβέστατα τῶν τοιούτων ἔχειν, τῶν δὲ ἀληθινῶν πολὺ ἐνδείκνυται, ἂς τὸ ὅν τάχος καὶ ἡ όντα βραδύτης ἐν τῷ ἀληθινῷ ἀριθμῷ καὶ τὰς τοὺς ἀληθεῖς σχήματις φορᾶς τε πρῶς ἀλληλα ἄφεται καὶ τὰ ἐνίοτα φερεῖ. ἂ δὲ λόγῳ μὲν καὶ διανοήθη ληπτά, ἀφεῖ δ' οὐ.


A large majority of editors and critics approve the ms tradition, but there is no consensus of opinion as to the meaning among those who have seriously attempted to grapple with the unusual difficulties of the sentence.

On grammatical grounds, there should be no doubt that τῶν ἀληθινῶν means τῶν ἀληθινῶν ποικιλμάτων. It is difficult, if not impossible, to understand φορέων after ἀληθινῶν (with Steinhart and Susenmühl), or to take τῶν ἀληθινῶν absolutely in the sense of ‘the true’ sc. system, as Bosanquet desires to do. The accusative ἄς—φορᾶς is believed by Schleiermacher and others to be equivalent to κατὰ τῶν φορᾶς, but the construction, to say the least, is difficult and obscure. Schneider, who as usual is clear and precise, repeats ποικιλμάτων with ἀληθινῶν, and holds that ἄς—φορᾶς κτλ. defines the true ποικίλματα “quasi dicat τῶν ἀληθινῶν ποικιλμάτων, τῶν ἄς τῶν φορῶν ἄς,” etc. This view, which I have adopted in the notes, appears to me unquestionably correct.

Schneider interprets the whole passage as follows:—“quemadmodum—sensibilis coeli varietas eo efficitur, quod stellas in coelo conspicuas alias celerior, alias tardior motus per definita temporis spatia certasque figurās circumagit, qui motus est non verae, sed sensibilis celeritatis tarditatisque et per numeros atque figurās item sensibiles decurrit, ita veram varietatem vera celeritas et tarditas efficiunt eo, quod veras stellas secundum verum numerum verasque figurās movet, qui motus partim ipsarum est, quia celeritas et tarditas motu carere non possunt, partim ad res motas seu veras stellas pertinet, quae tà ἐνότα dicuntur quia celeritas et tarditas cum eis sese coniungentes eas amplexuntur et
continent." It will be observed that Schneider identifies τὰ ἐνώντα with 'verae stellae;' 'die intelligiblen Analogen' of the visible stars (Krohn), and τὸ δὲ τάχος καὶ ἡ οὖσα βραδυτής with 'vera celeritas et tarditas'; whereas, according to my interpretation, τὸ δὲ τάχος καὶ ἡ οὖσα βραδυτής represent the 'verae stellae,' and τὰ ἐνώντα the mathematical ὀντα which they contain, analogous to the sensible γεγομένα which are present in visible stars. Others, such as Steinhart and Susemihl, have actually recognised in τὰ ἐνώντα the visible stars themselves. To the latter view there are many objections, and it may be urged against both Schneider and Steinhart that neither intelligible nor visible stars can reasonably be said ἐνευται τῷ ὁπν ὁμέλει etc. τὰ ἐνώντα is a precise and definite expression which Plato ought not to have employed if he merely meant that 'celeritas et tarditas cum eis' (i.e. according to Schneider 'veris stellis') 'esse coniungentes eas amplitudinur et continent.' The meaning which I have given to τὰ ἐνώντα appears to me the only one which assigns its full and proper connotation to the word.

It has been thought by some critics that τὸ δὲ τάχος καὶ ἡ οὖσα βραδυτής are the self-existent Ideas of Speed and Slowness. Apart from other objections to this view (see Zeller 11 i, p. 607 n. 3), we must insist that the astronomer as such is not yet concerned with the Ideas at all, but only with τὰ μεταχείρια, i.e. τὰ μαθηματικά, which, though πολλά, are nevertheless both οὖσα (hence τὸ δὲ τάχος καὶ ἡ οὖσα βραδυτής) and ἀδιάφορα: see 527 b. u., with App. I and Zeller 11 i, p. 701 n. 1 and Susemihl l.c. p. 209. The whole structure of the sentence in my opinion compels us to find the mathematical analogues of the visible stars not in τὰ ἐνώντα, but in τὸ δὲ τάχος καὶ ἡ οὖσα βραδυτής, and I have tried in the notes to indicate the reason which induced Plato to express his meaning in this particular way.

The text has of course often been called in question. The first to suspect corruption was apparently Ast, who suggested δὲ τὸ δὲ τάχος καὶ ἡ οὖσα βραδυτής <καὶ> ἐν κτλ., and Richards accepts the principle of this proposal, merely substituting ἀς for δὲ. I was myself once inclined to read ἀ ἐν τῷ ἀληθινῷ κτλ., omitting τὸ δὲ τάχος καὶ ἡ οὖσα βραδυτής as well as the final σ of ας, but τὸ δὲ τάχος καὶ ἡ οὖσα βραδυτής is in all the mss and was read by Proclus (in Tim. 244 c and elsewhere), and it is hardly necessary to say that 'emendations' on passages of this kind are peculiarly liable to error. I see no good reason for doubting the accuracy of the mss.

XI.

VII 531 b. ὅπεῖ μὲν, ὃν δ' ἐγὼ, τοὺς χρηστοὺς λέγεις τοὺς ταῖς χρονοῖς πράγματα παρέχοντας καὶ βασινίζοντας, ἐπὶ τῶν καλλότων στρεβλοῦντας ἰὸν δὲ μὴ μακροτέρα ἡ εἰκών γέγονει πληκτροῦ τε πληγών γεγομένων καὶ κατηγοριών πέρι καὶ ἐξαιρήσεως καὶ ἀλαζονείας χρονῶν, παῖδιμαι τής εἰκόνος κτλ.

I take ἡ εἰκών with πέρι in the sense virtually of λέγουσα πέρι. This construction appears to be generally accepted, but there is considerable diversity of opinion as to the meaning of κατηγορίας κτλ. Many inter-
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whom Hermann and Stallbaum, reading καὶ, virtually agree): (2) ἐπι-χειρὶς, <ἀν> ἀνεμ.—ὁμίμα, καὶ μὴ ἀποστῇ (Baiter): (3) ἐπιχειρῶν for ἐπι-χειρὶς (mentioned in J. and C.). The last conjecture is too drastic; of the others, (2) is better than (1), but neither is satisfactory. On the one hand, if ἀνεμ.—ὁμίμα is in the apodosis, it is too prominent, and looks too much like a definition of the dialectical method; on the other hand, Baiter’s remedy seems to imply that it is or may be possible to attempt dialectic without dispensing with πάσαι αἱ αἰσθήσεις. Neither of these objections applies to Ast’s conjecture, which is also more in harmony with the previous sentence than any other emendation.

XIII.

VII 532 b, c. ἡ δὲ γε, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, λύσις τε ἀπὸ τῶν δεσμῶν καὶ μετα-στροφῆ ἀπὸ τῶν σκιών ἐπὶ τα εἰδόλα καὶ τὸ φῶς καὶ ἐκ τοῦ καταγείον εἰς τὸν ἥλιον ἐπάνοδος, καὶ ἐκεὶ πρὸς μὲν τὸ ζωὴ τε καὶ φυτὰ καὶ τὸ τοῦ ἥλιον φῶς ἐπὶ αὐτομαία βλέπειν, πρὸς δὲ τὰ ἐν ὑδάτι φαντάσματα θεία καὶ σκιάς τῶν ὄντων, ἀλλ’ οὐκ εἰδώλων σκιάς δ’ ἐτέρου τοιοῦτον ψυχὸς ὡς πρὸς ἥλιον κρίνειν ἀποσκευασμένα κτλ.

The reading ἐπὶ αὐτομαία has the support of the best mss and is retained by Schneider, Stallbaum, and J. and C., not to mention older editors.

According to Schneider’s explanation (with which the Oxford editors agree), βλέπειν is a substantival infinitive, parallel to ἐπάνοδος, and ἐπὶ αὐτομαία is adverbial (‘with inability’ or the like), while ἐπὶ δύναμεi βλέπειν (or something of the kind) is to be supplied with the contrasting clause. But ἐπὶ αὐτομαία, if taken adverbially with βλέπειν, is an extraordinary phrase, and none of the instances cited—chiefly from the tragedians—by Schneider and J. and C. is comparable to it. Stallbaum makes βλέπειν depend on αὐτομαία (‘bei dem Unvermögen hinzublickern nach’ etc.), and supplies ἐπὶ δύναμει to govern the βλέπειν which has to be supplied in the next clause. This explanation does more justice to the Greek, as far as ἐπὶ αὐτομαία is concerned, but ‘bei dem Unvermögen’ etc. could not be coupled with ἐπάνοδος unless we admit an extremely offensive anacoluthon. Schneider appears to have felt that a nominative was needed, and would have liked to write αὐτομαία (with ὅ and two other mss). This is also Herwerden’s proposal, but ἐπὶ is a great improvement, and fitly reminds us of the continuity of the prisoner’s progress. Other and older emendations, mentioned by Schneider, in which ἐπὶ αὐτομαία is retained, are none of them in the least degree probable, and it may now, I think, be taken as certain that Iamblichus was right.

The words ἐνταῦθα δὲ πρὸς φαντάσματα, which formerly appeared between φαντάσματα and θεία, were rightly rejected by Schneider. They occur in no ms except Ξ, which is the basis of the Aldine and Stephanus’ text. ἐνταῦθα δὲ in this connexion could only mean the region of intelligibles, as Schneider points out; and the whole passage is plunged into confusion if these words are introduced. It is remark-
ABLE THAT HERWERDEN ALONE OF RECENT CRITICS HAS PROPOSED THIS REINSERTION, BEGUILED, PERHAPS, BY THE HOMIOOTOLEUTON, WHICH SCHNEIDER THINKS WAS A DELIBERATE ARTIFICE OF THE FORGER (“QUIS NON GLOSSEMA EX MALE INTELLECTO ADVERBIO ΕΙΘΑ’ VEL UNDELIBET ORIUNDUM ET DE INDUSTRIA HOMEOOTOLEUTON FACTAM AGNOSCAT?”).

THE ADJECTIVE ΘΕΙΑ HAS CAUSED A GREAT DEAL OF DISCUSSION. I ONCE UNHAPPILY PROPOSED TO READ \( \kappaαι 'εν τοις ουσι πυκνα τε και \lambda >\epsilonια, \) COMPARING VI 510 Α. THE CORRECT VIEW WAS POINTED OUT BY SHOREY IN HIS SEVERE THOUGH JUST DENUNCIATION OF MY REMEDY (CL. REV. IV p. 480). SCHNEIDER TAKES ΦΑΙΤΑΣΜΑΤΑ ΘΕΙΑ AS VIRTUALLY ΦΑΙΤΑΣΜΑΤΑ ΘΕΟΥ, SUPPOSING THAT ΦΑΙΤΑΣΜΑΤΑ OF THE SUN ALONE ARE MEANT (CF. 516 B), BUT THIS IS SCARCELY ADEQUATE. AGAINST STALLBAUM, WHO (WITHOUT QUOTING THE SOPHIST) BRACKETED ΘΕΙΑ, RICHTER (FLECK. JB. 1867 p. 145) RIGHTEOUSLY ARGUED THAT THE EPITHET WAS INDISPENSABLE “UМ DEN UNTERSCHIED ZU MARKIEREN ZWISCHEN DEN ΦΑΙΤΑΣΜΑΤΑ UND DEN IM KATSCHEN VORKOMMENDEN ΕΙΙΩΛΑ.” AST’S CONJECTURE ΘΕΙΑ IS NEAT, AND HAS WON DESERVED FAVOUR (SEE E. J. PALMER IN CL. REV. V p. 278 AND APELT IN FLECK. JB. 1891 p. 556, WHERE APELT MAKES THE SAME PROPOSAL INDEPENDENTLY), WHILE MADVIG’S ΑΘΕΙΑ HAS BEEN DESERVEDLY IGNORED. I HAVE NO LONGER ANY DOUBT THAT THE TEXT IS SOUND. SOME MAY FIND A DIFFICULTY BECAUSE THE SOPHIST IS NOW BELIEVED BY MANY TO BE LATER THAN THE REPUBLIC; BUT ΘΕΙΑ IN THIS SENSE MAY HAVE BEEN FAMILIAR IN THE PLATONIC SCHOOL, AND IN ANY CASE (SEE NOTE AD LOC.) THE MEANING CAN BE INFERRED FROM THE CONTEXT, EVEN WITHOUT THE AID OF THE SOPHIST, WHOSE THEORY OF A ΘΕΙΑ AND AN ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΝΗ ΕΙΙΩΛΟΠΟΙΗΚΙ MAY, IF WE THINK FIT, BE VIEWED AS A FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF THE EXPRESSION IN THE REPUBLIC. THERE ARE ALSO OTHER TRACES IN THE REPUBLIC OF DOCTRINES SUPPOSED TO BE ESPECIALLY CHARACTERISTIC OF THE SO-CALLED ‘DEBATE OF DIALOGUES’: SEE APP. VII TO BOOK V. FINALLY, IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT HERWERDEN’S EXCISION OF ΩΚΙΑ AFTER ΕΙΙΩΛΩΝ IS NOT ONLY UNNECESSARY BUT WRONG, BECAUSE ΑΠΟΣΚΟΙΟΜΕΝΑ WOULD THEN BE NOT NATURALLY TAKEN WITH ΩΚΙΑ ΤΩΝ ΟΝΤΩΝ.

XIV.

VII 533 B. τόδε γοῦν, ι’ν δ’ εγώ, οδδεὶς ἡμῖν ἀμφισβητήσει λέγουσιν, ὡς αὐτῶν γε ἐκάστου πέρι, ὅ ἐστιν ἐκαστὸν, ἄλλη τις ἐπιχείρει μέθοδος ὄδο τερι παντὸς λαμβάνει, ἄλλ’ αἱ μὲν ἄλλαι πάσαι κτλ.

THE ORDINARY EXPLANATION OF THIS PASSAGE TAKES ΩΣ WITH ΑΜΦΙΟΒΠΗΤΗΣΕΙ AND NOT WITH ΛΕΓΟΝΤΟΝ, INTERPRETING ΛΑΛΗ AS ‘OTHER THAN DEBATE’ (SCHNEIDER IN ADDIT. P. 58, STALLBAUM AND J. AND C.). BUT IT IS SCARCELY POSSIBLE TO SEPARATE ΩΣ FROM ΛΕΓΟΝΤΟΝ, AND FOR THIS REASON J. J. HARTMAN (WHO UNDERSTAND ΛΑΛΗ IN THE SAME WAY AS SCHNEIDER) CUTS ΛΕΓΟΝΤΟΝ OUT.

IF ΛΕΓΟΝΤΟΝ IS RETAINED, AND CONNECTED, AS IT MUST BE, WITH ΩΣ, EITHER ΛΑΛΗ DOES NOT MEAN ‘OTHER THAN DEBATE,’ OR ELSE WE MUST READ <ΟΙΚ> ΛΑΛΗ. THE LATTER ALTERNATIVE WAS ADOPTED BY STEPHANUS, AST, AND BEKKER, WHOSE APPARATUS CRITICUS STATED BY IMPLICATION THAT ΟΙΚ WAS ACTUALLY WRITTEN IN PARIS A. RECENT EDITORS HAVE RIGHTLY REJECTED ΟΙΚ.
after it was found to have no ms. authority. It is clear, therefore, unless we resort to unjustifiable emendation or excision, that ἄλλη does not mean 'other than dialectic.' The only other possible explanations are (1) other than all the arts spoken of in ἄλλῃ aι μὲν ἄλλαι—ἀὑτῶν, (2) that given in the notes. Against (1) it might be urged that ἄλλη does not easily look forward in a sentence of this kind, and (2) is in every way simpler and more natural, provided we observe that the stress falls on αἱ δὲ λοιπαί rather than on αἱ μὲν ἄλλαι πᾶσαι etc. ('while all the other arts—the remainder' etc.).

XV.

VII 533 c. ὅκοιν, ἃν δ' ἐγώ, ἡ διαλεκτικὴ μέθοδος μόνη ταύτῃ πορεύεται, τὰς ὑποθέσεις ἀναφέρωσα, ἐπὶ αὐτήν τὴν ἄρχην, ἵνα βεβαιώσῃ.

The mss without exception have ἀναφέρωσα, which a majority of editors retain. ἀνάγονσα was read by Canter (Stob. II p. 157), and is found as a correction in one ms of Stobaeus (Ecl. II 2:1 Wachsmuth. I formerly printed ἀναφέρωσα, which Oldenberg (de Pl. arte dial. p. 38 n.) had already (as I have since found) mentioned as possible, though he himself preferred ἀνάγονσα. On an earlier occasion I conjectured ἀνώνοσα (Cl. Rev. iv p. 357), thinking of Symp. 211 b: cf. also Alcin. Isag. 5 and 7. Schneider's ἀναφέρωσα is an excessively rare word, and has met with little favour from critics; but ἀνάγονσα has been approved by various writers, among others Oldenberg (l.c.) and Richards (Cl. Rev. viii p. 194).

Further investigation into Plato's 'hypothetical method' has now convinced me that the reading and punctuation of Paris A represent the truth. See App. III, where the subject is discussed at length.

The expression τὰς ὑποθέσεις ἀναφέρωσα throws a much-needed light on the real nature of the process described here and in vi 511 b, vii 532 a. It is not, as has been asserted, inconsistent with the description of Book vi, for although we demolish our ὑποθέσεως and must do so if we are ever to rise above them, they are none the less τῶ ὑποθέσεις, ὃν ἐπιβάσεως τε καὶ ὀρμαί, without which we cannot even make a start. The path of knowledge is strewn with the wrecks of hasty generalisations, which have served as stepping-stones to students in the very act of their demolition: and in this sense, if in no other, it is true that "Error in the round of time Still fathers Truth."

It is perhaps necessary briefly to advert to some erroneous interpretations of the authoritative text. Steinhart (Einleitung p. 693) translates "die Voraussetzungen aufhebend, um das Princip zu gewinnen," taking ἐπὶ with ἀναφέρωσα: but ἐπὶ cannot be separated from πορεύεται, and such a sense of ἐπὶ in this connexion is harsh and unnatural. Stallbaum's attempt to show that ἀναφέρωσα ἐπὶ can mean 'taking up to' is unsuccessful, for all the parallels which he quotes are cases of ἀναφέρειν ἐπὶ. Finally Jowett and Campbell remark "The hypotheses are done away with; that is, when seen in their relation to
the good they cease to be ὑποθέσεις": but ἀναπείων cannot be thus pared down, and should be taken in its full force as explained in the note.

XVI.

VII 533 E. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν, ἐφ' ἄλλ' ὄν μόνον δηλοὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐξίν σαφήνεια λέγει ἐν ψυχῇ]. Ἀρέσκει ὄν ἐκλ. The words within brackets are printed as they appear in Α. ΠΠ agrees, except that it has ἀλλο (corrected to ἄλλο δ') and ἐξίν (sic). In q and Flor. Υ we find ἄλλο δ' ὄν μόνον δηλοὶ πρὸς τὴν λέγει σαφήνεια (i.e. σαφήνεια) δ' λέγει τὴν ψυχή, and this reading is adopted by Bekker. There is also some slight authority (in addition to ΠΠ') for ἀλλο instead of ἄλλο δ', for σαφήνειαν instead of σαφήνεια, and for λέγειν instead of λέγει.

Jowett and Campbell remain faithful in their allegiance to Α, except that with q they insert δ' before λέγειν. "The words in the text," they remark, "are very possibly genuine and may be rendered—'we only require' (the verb is gathered from οὐ περὶ δύναμας ἀμφισβήτησις) 'an expression which may indicate with a clearness proportioned to the mental condition, that of which it speaks as existing in the mind. For example, διάνοια may not be a very clear or definite expression, but the state of mind which it expresses is also far from clear.' But they do not explain how the words which I have italicised represent the Greek, and few will find themselves able to accept the translation which they offer.

The reading of q is carefully examined by Schneider, who justly characterises it in these words: 'sententia mihi tam absensa videtur, ut eam vix interpolatori mediocri, nendum Platonis tribuere audeam.'

The chief emendations are (1) ἄλλο δ' ὄν μόνον δηλοὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐξίν σαφήνεια <δ'> λέγει τὴν ψυχή (Winckelmann), (2) ἄλλο δ' ὄν μόνον δηλοὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐξίν σαφήνειαν <ἀ'> λέγειν τὴν ψυχήν <ἀρκέσει> (Hermann, and Badham, except that the latter writes ἔχει for λέγειν, and begins the next sentence with Ἀρκέσειν), (3) ἄλλο δ' ὄν νόμαι δηλοὶ πρὸς τὴν λέγειν σαφήνειαν <δ'> λέγει (or ὄν λέγει) τὴν ψυχήν <ἀρκέσει> (Steinhart), (4) ἄλλο ὄν νομα δηλοὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐξίν σαφήνεια, <ἀλλο> λέγει τὴν ψυχή (Richter in Fleck. Jb. 1867, p. 146), (5) ἄλλο δ' ὄν μόνον δηλοὶ τὴν ἐξίν <πῶς ἔχει> σαφήνειας <ἀ'> λέγειν τὴν ψυχή (Bywater), (7) ἄλλο δ' ὄν μόνον δηλοὶ πῶς αὐτῇν ἔχειν σαφήνειας λέγειν τὴν ψυχήν <ἀρκέσει>. Ἀρκέσει (or ἀρκέσκει) γονίν κτλ. (Richards), (8) ἄλλο δ' ὄν μόνον δηλοὶ πῶς τὴν ἐξίν σαφήνεια λέγειν τὴν ψυχήν <ἀρκέσει; Ναὶ >Ἀρκέσει κτλ. (Burnet).

Some of these conjectures are ingenious and scholarly, but none of them, nor any other which I can devise, is altogether satisfactory in point of sense, or diplomatically possible. (The last remark does not apply to Madvig's correction, which is easy enough, but κακὸν κακῷ ιάται and does not attempt to cure πρὸς τὴν ἐξίν σαφήνεια at all.)
The independent reasons for holding the clause to be interpolated are:—(1) it is absent in Ε, which the Aldine edition and Stephanus as usual follow; (2) "in Platonis dialogis quum negationi assensum per formulam où γάρ οὐν praebetur, nusquam assentiens quicquam addit, quod ex contrario petitum negati descriptionem contineat idque per affirmationem cum particula ἀλλὰ definit̄n̄" (Schneider). Little weight need be attached to the first argument, in view of the general character of Ε, but if (as I believe in opposition to Schanz Platonis. etc. p. 81) Ε is sometimes independent of A, it is possible enough that the words were omitted in the ms (or mss) from which Ε was copied in this passage. The second consideration, which Schneider establishes by a vast number of instances, is extremely weighty.

As regards the origin of the gloss Schneider observes (Addit. p. 59) "ceterum primitivam formam et originem glossematis investigatur̄s contulisse ivubavit Platonis verba Leg. i p. 633 A: peri των τῆς ἄλλης ἄρτης εἰτε μερόν εἰτε ἀτ' αὐτὰ καλεῖν χρεών ἐστιν, ὅπλουν μόνον ἡ λέγει, et haec Galeni Εἰσαγωγής διαλεκτικὰς p. 12: οὐδὲν γὰρ πρὸς τὸ παρὸν διαφέρει συμπεπληγμένη λέγειν ἀποφασικῶς ἢ συμπλοκὴν ἀποφασικῶς, ἔχοντος γε σον σκοτον ἐν ἀπάσῃ λέξει τὸ δηλώσαι τοὺς πέλας, ὅ τοι περ ἄν αὐτὸς ἐννοήση." Cf. also Theat. 177 D, E, Soph. 218 B, Hipp. Mai. 296 D. The sentence is evidently an attempt to say that we should be content if the words we use express our meaning clearly. In λέγει (and still more λέγεις) ἐν ψυχῇ we may detect an allusion to the Platonic theory of thought as the conversation of the soul (see on ι 400 B) and perhaps also to the λόγος εὐνάθετος of the Stoics. On this account, and also because of εὖν, I am inclined to attribute the interpolation to some adherent of the Stoic school, of which, in point of style, it is not unworthy.

XVII.

VII 534 D. Ἀλλὰ μὴν τοὺς γε σαυτὸν πᾶδας, οὐς τῷ λόγῳ τρέφεις τε καὶ παιδεύεις, εἴ ποτε ἐργῷ τρέφοις, οὐκ ἂν ἐόσας, ὡς εἴμαι, ἀλόγους ὁταν ὡσπερ γραμμάς, ἀρχονταν ἐν τῇ πόλει κυρίου τῶν μεγίστων εἶναι.

Schneider was the first to discover in this passage a punning reference to mathematical ἄλογοι γραμμαί, as defined by Euclid x Deff. 5—11. The same explanation, although it did not commend itself to Stallbaum, is apparently accepted by the Oxford editors, who aptly quote Theat. 146 A προθυμοῦμενοι ἡμᾶς ποιῆσαι διαλέγεσθαι καὶ φίλους τε καὶ προσηγόρους ἀλληλοὺς γέγινοντο. It is to Theodorus the mathematician that these words are spoken, and Campbell is, I believe, right in thinking that προσηγόροις is quasi-mathematical: cf. viii 546 B πάντα προσηγόρα καὶ ῥητὰ πρὸς ἀλληλα ἀπέφηναν.

It is better, I think, and more pointed to connect ἀλόγους directly with γραμμάς (cf. 519 A τὰς τῆς γενέσεως ἐγγενεῖς ὡσπερ μολυβδᾶς with note ad loc.), than to translate "incapable of reason, like irrational lines" (with Schneider and J. and C.). In order to extract this meaning from the Greek, we must understand γραμμάς as = ἄλογοι γραμμάς, which is doubtless possible, but less natural than the view given in the notes.
J. and C.'s translation also gives to ὁσπερ γραμμάς a certain otiose appearance, as if Plato had deliberately gone out of his way to drag in a mathematical allusion. On this account we may wonder that none of the Dutch critics has hitherto proposed, so far as I know, to excise ὁσπερ γραμμάς.

There is little to be said in favour of the non-mathematical interpretations, though perhaps the following contain an element of truth: "unvernünftig wie Figuren" (Schleiermacher), "unvernünftig wie todte Striche" (Prantl), "lineae penecillo praeformatae" (Stallbaum). γραμμάς has, I think, a non-mathematical as well as mathematical meaning in this place, and the former is fairly expressed by Prantl's "todte Striche." Ast thought of "literae s. scripitiones," remembering the well-known passage about dumb books in Phaedr. 275 ff.; but γραμμάς cannot be thus interpreted. Others have thought of pictures, as for example Stallbaum, who refers to Plut. Lycurg. 10. 3 ὁσπερ γραφήν ἀψιχων καὶ ἀκίνητων, and is inclined to read γραφάς instead of γραμμάς. The correction γεγραμμένον is suggested by Steinhart (Einleitung p. 694) and γράμμα or γραμματ' (with reference to v. 472 b) by Apelt (Fleck. Jb. 1893 p. 556). The eccentric proposal ὅς Φρύγας Μίδας ἄρχοντας is due to Cornarius, who remarks "conjectura est nostra, qua falli possum: sed tolerari poterit donec rector occurrer" (Eclog. p. 101). Stallbaum's conjecture is neat and elegant, but the text is indubitably sound.
H.

I. Εἰπεν ταῦτα μὲν δὴ ὁμολόγηται, ὁ Γαλάκων, τῇ μελλούσῃ

543—545 c. Socrates now returns to the point at which the digression occupying Books V—VII began. There are, as we observed, four leading varieties of States and individuals, in addition to the perfect polity and perfect man. In order of merit they are (1) Timarchy, or the Cretan and Laconian State, (2) Oligarchy, (3) Democracy, (4) Tyranny. All other kinds of commonwealths, such as dynasties etc., lie somewhere between these primary and conspicuous varieties. Furthermore, inasmuch as the specific character of States is determined by that of individuals, there will be five leading types of individual character, embodied respectively in (1) the aristocratic, (2) the timarchical, (3) the oligarchical, (4) the democratical, (5) the tyrannical man. The first of these we have already described; but we must review the others also, in order that, by contrasting the best and worst, we may apprehend the relation between undiluted justice and undiluted injustice in respect of the happiness and misery of their possessors. As before, we will examine the commonwealths first, and afterwards the individuals.

543 A ff. The description of the philosopher and the philosophic city is at last complete, and the argument returns to the point at which the 'digression' began, viz. V 449 A; see note ad loc. Plato has already said repeatedly, and reminds us yet again in 544 A, that the aim of our whole investigation was to decide ἐν δὲ ἀριστος εὐθαμώνειται καὶ δὲ κάσατος ἀθιμωτάτοις, ἢ ἀλλως ἔχω (cf. II 368 θ, 369 Α α). With the character of the perfect man we are now familiar, but we have still to discover and describe τῶν καλῶν, in order that we may institute our comparison and pronounce our verdict. This is the task to which Plato addresses himself in VIII and IX (down to 576 B). The method which he follows resembles that adopted in II 359 B ff.—IV. In the first place, he retains throughout the former analogy between the Soul and the City, and his account of the imperfect man is in every instance preceded by an account of the imperfect State. Secondly, instead of going straight to the mark and giving us a single ready-made sketch of total and complete depravity, Plato draws an elaborate and quasi-historical picture of the gradual descent of the perfect State and the perfect Man through successive phases of ever-growing degeneration down to the lowest depth of wickedness and crime. In the same way, as Nettleship observes (Lect. and Rem. II p. 295), "in describing a perfect state, or certain steps in the process of forming a perfect state," he sometimes wrote "as if one step of that process succeeded another in a historical order." See on II 369 B, 372 D, 373 D et al. The question has often been discussed whether the sequence of polities in VIII and IX was intended to be really historical or not: see for example Zeller II pp. 923—925, Henkel Studien zur Gesch. d. Gr. Lehre v. Staat p. 56 and Krohn Pl. St. pp. 204 ff. Aristotle seems to have understood Plato's account as an attempt to describe the actual facts of Greek history, and severely criticizes it from his usual standpoint in Pol. E 12. 1316 a 1—b 27; but Plato himself must of course have known as well as Aristotle that the historical development of Greek constitutions did not by any means always correspond with his scheme. See Whibley Gr. Olig. pp. 62—88 and Greenidge Gr. Const. Hist. pp. 12—35. The fact is that Aristotle altogether ignores the real object of Plato, which is, as we have seen, to arrive at the worst State and the worst man, and treats him as if he had undertaken to exhibit a full
Liebholf's conjecture 513 sail is an undeserved reflection on Glanvill's powers of memory.

ii. if allum of amphora, which I once suggested (cf. Kryn. iv p. 352), would be more exact, and AΛΛΩΙ and ΑΝΘΩΙ are pretty easily confused in such a case (Cobet f. 1. 5 p. iv 431; cf. Hengeli on Prot. 354 ii). Owing to this, allum can only mean 'the rest of mankind,' and the Guardians are therefore virtually spoken of as a section of living men. This kind of looseness is not uncommon, though here it has no stylistic effect. An alternative view might be to understand allum of the rest of the citizens (see below) and rive as 'in point of fact' or 'in our present discussion'; but this explanation is much less satisfactory, 52 which some inferior MSS. write for ii, does not remove the inaccuracy in allum: nor is ilia allum in IV iv 419 precisely parallel, though it supports the view that allum means 'the rest of mankind.'

22. ἐνθαδήμῳ ἥλιου, vii 281 επιος. Nothing is to remain over at the end of the year (vii 410 b).

c διὰ τοῦτο: v. αἰ. τὸ ἰδίω τοῦ γενέσθαι etc. For the use of the pronoun cf. viii 520 c and infra 582 επιος. Maldwyn's ob rατισ is unnecessary, and 524 161 it means something quite different.

15. ἀλλά γὰρ ἐνδυόμενοι, ἀλλας, but after we finished that subject, let us recall where we digressed to come here, that we may resume the old path." If ad sequentia ἐνθασίατι, ἀπετελέσθημεν per quattuor reson quidem dicta a Glanvill, sed unam sibi non est retractarum esse significant, quod ita sit in memoriam revocandum, ut reliqua viam denuo capessere possint" (Schneider).

The miss occurs between 224 γ (the reading of A), 224 δέ and 224 γε (IV, the last of which readings is adopted by all editors except Schneider, ἀλλά γε, though rare, is, I believe, firmly established in Flaton sec vii 233 b. If it is the situation in this passage exactly, whereas 224 γε does not, if we translate ἐνθασίατι, ἀπετελέσθημεν correctly, and not (with D and ὑπ., powell et al.) 'how that we have concluded the subject,' rατισ is not 525 125—127, but the arrangements of the earlier city of IV, as described in iv 354 b. 51 c and ἀπετελέσθημεν is aortis, and perfect ἀπετελέσθημεν (as Schneider observes) is necessitated by 526 522, otherwise sentences might simply have said ἀλλά γε ἐνθασίατι ἀπετελέσθησαμεν, ἀλλας δειρα ἐκπερασόμεθα. There is moreover no need for so vigorous an exclamation to exercise the memory as would be conveyed by ἀλλά γε ἐνθασίατι, ἀπετελέσθημεν, especially as Glanvill's recollection had left nothing to be desired in t and c above.

17. καθάπερ γάρ εἰς τέφρας (v. 522 b). 224 δέ ἀπελεύθερος ἀπεδέλτηκα "quasi disputaciones de situtae absolutae" (still baum) cf. v 400 a. The miss may be between this reading, and ἀπελεύθερος of ἀπελεύθερος ab 224 a (with which IP and several other MSS. agree) is certainly right.

18. λέγοντες v. vii 419 b. ἀπελεύθερος ἀπεδέλτηκα "quasi disputaciones de situtae absolutae" (still baum) cf. v 400 a. The miss may be between this reading, and ἀπελεύθερος of ἀπελεύθερος ab 224 a (with which IP and several other MSS. agree) is certainly right.

19. λέγοντες v. vii 419 a. ἀπελεύθερος ἀπεδέλτηκα "quasi disputaciones de situtae absolutae" (still baum) cf. v 400 a. The miss may be between this reading, and ἀπελεύθερος of ἀπελεύθερος ab 224 a (with which IP and several other MSS. agree) is certainly right.
Der Dialog pp. 235 ff. Jowett's translation "although, as now appears, you had more excellent things to relate both of State and man" is a definable construction, but unnatural, and certainly not what Plato meant. The passage has been curiously misunderstood by some critics, through inattention to the force of the imperfect participle ἔγω. Herwerden, for example, actually proposes to insert <οδ> before καλλίω. Schneider and Stallbaum translate the sentence correctly.

544 a 3 ἐφησθα κτλ. IV 445 c. On the pronouns ὅποιοι—ἀντίδικοι see II 357 b n. Plato is very careful to make it clear that he does not profess, like Aristotle, to give a complete account of faulty States. From his watch-tower he can descry infinite varieties, but only four on which he needs expatiate. We may take it that these are, in Plato's view, the four most conspicuous landmarks in the history of political degeneration, as well as the most important and clearly-outlined varieties of existing States. Cf. IV 445 c and infra 544 D ἤτε καὶ ἐν οἷς διαφορές τινες κεῖται.

5 ὤν πάντας κτλ. reminds us of the thread which is the clue to the labyrinthine reasoning of the República: cf. 545 a, 548 d and II 368 e n.

7 ἔξω. The optative, for which Ast and Stallbaum needlessly read ἔχει with ἔξω and some other inferior ms., is due to the oratio obliqua: cf. VII 515 d n.

8 ἑρμομένου V 449 a.

544 b 11 ὄστερ παλαιστής. The Scholiast remarks θεσις γὰρ τούτου, δεν πέσουν λεγε—πάλιν ἔγερθεντας ἐφ' ἰδίᾳ σωματικά σχήματι, ὥστε τὴν αὐθεντή εἰπε λάβῃ. Plato, as Stallbaum points out, uses the same figure in Phædr. 236 b: cf. Phil. 13 D, Laws 682 e and ἀντιλαμβανόμενος VI 505 a n.

13 ἐπιθυμοῦ—ἀκούσα: 'I am desirous also on my own account to hear' sc. apart from the half-polemical motive suggested by the figure. Herwerden remarks "locus vix sanus," but it is sound enough, although the English translators ("I shall particularly wish") etc. Jowett miss the meaning.

17 **αὕτη:** *i.e.* 'that of yours,' 'your Cretan and Lacedaemonian constitution.' On their connexion see Arist. *Pol. B* 70c, 1271b 22 ff. with Susemih and Hicks's notes. It is, I think, fanciful to see in αὕτη an allusion to Glauco's sympathies for Sparta, in spite of 548 b below.

**καὶ δευτέρα.** Hermann prints his own conjecture ἀδευτέρα, but the common confusion of και and ἀ (Bast Comm. *Pol.* p. 815) is, I believe, later than the date of Paris A, and the text is free from objection: 'and second in order as in esteem, a constitution fraught with many evils, bearing the name of oligarchy.'

**διάφορος:** not of course 'different' (as Jowett), but 'antagonistic,' *adversaria* (Stallbaum). *Diatopos* 'different' gives a poor sense, and would take the genitive, which Ast erroneously proposed to read. Greek history furnished only too many proofs of the natural feud between democracy and oligarchy; see Greenidge *Gk Const. Hist.* pp. 208 ff. and Gilbert *Gr. Staatsalt.* 11 p. 285 n. 2.

18 **ἐφεξής γνωμάτην.** From this and other indications it would appear on a first perusal that the sequence of commonwealths in VIII and IX is intended by Plato to be not merely logical, but historical also; but there is no question that the political evolution of Greek constitutions was far more complex than would appear from Plato's description. See on 543 A. We must above all things remember that it is in order to furnish a picture of the worst city and the worst man that the whole of this enquiry is undertaken, and Plato is at liberty to adopt whatever mode of presentation is best adapted for the object which he has in view. The form which he does in point of fact select is that of a historical narrative (see on 543 A, 548 b), but the real order of the development which he describes is a 'logical order,' and is primarily determined by psychological, and not by historical considerations. Although there are many points of contact between the development of Greek constitutional history and Plato's arrangement, Plato here employs narration primarily and chiefly as a vehicle or instrument for expressing the results of psychological analysis, and not because he believes that political development always and inevitably follows the same lines. See also on 543 A and infra 544 D.

20 **διαφέρουσα κτλ.** The reading of Ζ—see *cr. n.—is confirmed by ν and two other MSS, as well as by Stobæus (Flor. 43, 115) and Ficinus (*ab his omnibus differentes*). All other MSS appear to have διαφεροῦσα. 'Errori—occasionem pronuntiato non absimilis detide videtur' (Schol. *N.).* The word does not mean 'differs' (as Jowett) but 'excels' (ironically, of course, like ἤ γενναία δή). Father Rickaby has suggested to me that we should read καὶ ἡ πασῶν τούτων διαφέρουσα, ἢ γενναία δή τυπινις, τεταρτον κτλ. The conjecture is an attractive one, both on other grounds and also because it enables us to retain the article which appears before πασῶν (see *cr. n.*) in Α: but it is perhaps safer to follow Ζ.

21 **νόσταμα.** Greek political theory regards tyrants as *nóstamata* τῶν πολέων (Isocr. *Heli. 34*: cf. Henkel l. c. p. 156). ἢ τίνα... Διτ and others write ἢ τίνα (with slight MS support), but τίνα is perfectly good: cf. IX 573 A.

22 **ἐν εἴδει διαφανείς τίνι.** See on 544 A. 544 D 22 **δυναστεία.** *Dynastia* is that form of polity in which the son succeeds the father καὶ ἄριστοι μὴ ὁ νόμος ἀλλ' οἱ ἀρχόντες (Arist. *Pol. D* 5. 1202 b 5 ff.: cf. Laws 680 A, b). Such a *poleis* might be good, but was of course generally bad: see Susemih and Hicks on Arist. *Pol. B* 10. 1272 b 3. Examples are pro-
vided by Thessaly (Thuc. iv 78. 3) and (about 480 B.C.) Thebes (Thuc. iii 62. 3; cf. Gilbert Grie. Staatsalt. ii pp. 10, 46). See Whibley Gk Olig. pp. 124—
136.

υγηταί βασιλείαι: like Carthage (Arist. l.c. 11. 1273a 36 with Susemihl and Hicks p. 349). Herwerden sins through ignorance when he proposes απεται for υγηταί.

23 τουαυτάτενες: such as, for example, αδυναμεία, and the other specific varieties (as Aristotle reckons them) of Plato's typical πολιτεία: see Pol. Ι, Δ, Ζ, passim.

εύροι δ' ἂν κτλ.: whereas Plato confines himself to Greek history throughout VIII and IX.

26 καὶ ανθρώπων κτλ. Cf. IV 445 C, and on the principle here laid down see IV 445 E n. The present passage is a clear and emphatic statement of the psychological basis on which Plato's philosophy of History rests. Political άδικία, like political δικαιοσύνη (IV 443 B n.), is after all no more than εἰδωλον τι: injustice in the true sense is στάσις within the individual soul (IV 444 B), and social and political wrong-doing is but its outward manifestation. The double genitive, which is easy enough (cf. e below and v 449 A n.), has led to the corruption τρόπων τινά in several MSS. Liebhöld also suggests καὶ τρόπων instead of τρόπων. The expression εἶδη τρόπων (specific characters') is treated as a single word, and should be repeated with πολιτείαι: cf. IV 445 C δοῦν πολιτείας τρόποι εἶσαι εἰδῆς εἷστε, τοσοῦτον κινήσεις καὶ ψυχής τρόποι εἶσαι (a passage which proves, I think, that Schneider and Stallbaum are wrong in supplying only εἶδη with δοταρ κτλ).

27 ἐκ δρόμων κτλ. Hom. Od. xix 162 f. ἀλλὰ καὶ ὃς μοι εἰπε τέων γένους, ἀπόθεν εἰσότ' ἵνα γὰρ ἀπὸ δρόμου ἑσσαί παλαιάτου ὄνομά ἀπὸ πέτρας, i.e. you have a ἓνως (cf. Ap. 34 D) and are not miraculously sprung αγενελαγμένοι out of tree or stone, like the fabled men of old (see Preller-Robert Gr. Myth. p. 79 n. 4). In Plato the saying is used much like the German 'es ist doch nicht aus der Luft gefallen' (Schick de scholii p. 32, where the proverb is illustrated).

544 E 29 ἀν κτλ. ὃδ' ἂν was read till Schneider on the authority of Σ; but ἂν (All and a large majority of MSS) is quite satisfactory. "Republicae formae eos dicuntur sequi mores, qui in quavis civitate veluti pondere praegravantes ad se suamque regionem attracterint reliqua" (Schneider, comparing for βέβατα Hdt. vii 130). The word ρέβαντα (Σ and some other MSS) is unattic (Lobeck Phys. p. 738): Plato's form is ρέβεντα e.g. vi 495 B.

33 ορθῶς is more naturally taken with φαμέν (Jowett etc.) than with the adjectives (as Schneider). We rightly call him 'good' etc., because he is διόμος ἀριστοκρατία.
αδ καὶ δημοκρατικόν καὶ τὸν τυραννικόν, ἵνα τὸν ἀδικώτατον ἱδόντες ἀντιδώμεν τὸ δικαιότατον καὶ ἠμῖν τελέα ἡ σκέψις, πῶς ποτὲ ἢ ἄκρατος δικαιοσύνη πρὸς ἄκραταν τὴν ἄκρατον ἔχει εὐδαιμονίας τε τέρι τοῦ ἔχοντος καὶ ἀθλώτητος, ἵνα ἡ Ὀρασιμάχῳ πειθόμενοι

Β διώκωμεν ἢ ἄκραταν ἢ τῷ νῦν προφανεμένῳ λόγῳ δικαιοσύνην; Πανταπάσι μὲν οὖν, ἐφι, οὔτω ποιητέον. Ἀρ' οὖν, ὀστερ ᾅξα-

μεθα ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις πρότερον σκοπεῖν τὰ ἡθῆ ἡ ἐν τοῖς ἰδιωταῖς, ἵνα ἐναργέστερον οὖν, καὶ νῦν οὔτω πρῶτον μὲν τὴν φιλότιμον

σκεπτέον πολιτείαν ὁνόμα γὰρ οὖν ἔχει λεγομένου ἄλλο: ἡ τιμοκρατίαν ἢ τιμαρχίαν αὐτῆς κλητέον. πρὸς δὲ ταύτην τὸν

ς τοιοῦτον ἀνδρα σκεφόμεθα, ἐπειτα ὀλιγαρχία καὶ ἢ ἀνδρα ὀλ-

ιγαρχικόν, αὖθις δὲ εἰς δημοκρατίαν ἀποβλέψαντες θεασόμεθα 15

15 ταύτην Α'/: ταύτη Α'.
II. Ἐρατο σωμάτων, ἢν ὅποδιον ἐν τοῖς πάλιν ἐλθόντες καὶ ἱδώντες, πάλιν εἰς τυραννικὴν ψυχὴν βλέποντες, πειρασμένα περὶ ὧν προθέμεθα ἵκανοι κραταὶ γενόσθαι; Κατὰ λόγον γέ τοῦ ἄν, ἐφη, οὐτός γίγνοστο ἢ τε θέα καὶ ἢ κρίτις.

III. Φέρε τοις Ἐρατοσελήνες, τίνα τρόπον,

days, the duration of a Great Year in the life of the Universe. Expresed in years, the number is 36,000, if we count, as Plato here does, 360 days in the year. The two 'harmonies,' 360° and 4800 × 2700, are the two cycles described in the Politicus, each of which is a Great Year. In the first ὀρθόδοξος prevails, in the second ἀνθρωπονοσ: the World 'waxes' in the first, and 'wanes' in the second, without, however, suffering dissolution. In what sense the whole number 36,000 years, which astronomers sometimes called the Platonius annum in the middle ages, is at once the numerical Cause of Change, and the 'lord of better and worse births,' is pointed out in App. I, Pt ii § 7, and also in the notes on 546c. How far Plato attached a serious value to his Number and the calculations from which he derives it, I have briefly discussed at the end of App. I, Pt ii. Here it must suffice to say that the episode, like many other passages in Plato, is half-serious, and half-playful. The setting of the whole is mythical, for it is only for literary and artistic purposes that Plato pictures his ideal city as historically true: and the meaning of the latter part of the Number is deciphered by the aid of one of Plato's myths. Moreover, the style of the whole passage, though extraordinarily rhetorical and highly-wrought, acquires a touch of fantastic humour from the bewildering parade of mathematical terms, at some of which even Plato's own contemporaries would probably have smiled. On its serious side, the Number affords an interesting example of the application of Number and Mathematics to explain the life of the Universe and Man; and, as I have said in the Appendix, finds its fittest apology in the saying theδὲ ἄλτ γεωμετρεῖ. It is of some importance in the history of philosophy because of its connexion with Pythagorean embryology and physics, and its employment by the Neo- platonists to justify the wildest astrological vagaries. The extreme difficulty of the Greek has made the Platonic
Number a favourite hunting-ground of successive generations of scholars, and the works which have been written on the subject, a few of which are mentioned in the Appendix, are very numerous.


24 κυνηγήματα: an ominous word, used here, as constantly throughout Greek literature, of constitutional changes for the worse.

27 ὁποῖος δὲ ἐκλήκτης. An imitation of Hom. II. xvi 112 ff. ἐπεπέσει νῦν μοι, μοίσαι—ὅπως δὲ πρῶτον πῦρ ἐμπέσει νυσὶν Ἀχαίων. Homer appeals to the Muses at the turning-point of his narrative (see Leaf ad loc.); and Plato, like Milton ("Of man's first disobedience and the fruit of that forbidden tree, sing heavenly Muse"), fitly invokes them at the commencement of his Epic of the Fall of Man. Cf. Tim. 27 C.

28 καὶ φῶμεν κτλ.: 'and shall we say that they speak in the lofty tragic vein, as if it were all earnest, whereas it is only the banter of the Muses playing with us as if we were little children?' Instead of φῶμεν, I once suggested δίχωμεν (cf. Latus 654 A and 677 C), but φῶμεν, which is in all MSS., though less picturesque, may stand. Herder's exclusion of τραγῳδίας καὶ obliterates a tender touch; for there is of course a play on παιδία (cf. vii 536 E n.). The remarks of Proclus in Tim. 300 C ff. on the style of this and similar passages deserve to be quoted: ὃς ἐκ χαρακτῆρ τῶν λόγων ἐστὶν ἑπιθυμητός, διαλάφως τῶν νυκτῶν ἐπὶθύμως, καθάρος τε καὶ σεβάσμος—ἐξηλιαγμένος τε καὶ ὑπέρδειον τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἔννοιαν, ἀξιός τε ὅμως καὶ καταληκτικός καὶ χάριτων ἀνάμνεσις κάλλους τε πλήρης καὶ σύντομος ἀμα καὶ ἀπηκριβωμένος. 'The Muses playing' warns us that there is an element of the mythical and fantastic in what follows, but by no means implies that it is fooling and nothing more. See on 545 C and App. I, Pt ii ad fin.

546 A 2 γεγονόμενος κτλ. This is a universally recognised principle of ancient philosophy, alluded to again by Plato in Tim. 41 A. Cf. Arist. de cael. I 12. 283 B 8 τὸ γὰρ γεγονός καὶ τὸ φάραγνον ἀκολουθοῦσιν ἄλληλοις καὶ ἰδ. 10. 279 B 20 ἀπαντὰ γὰρ τὰ γεγονόμενα καὶ φθείρωμεν φαινεται. That τὸ ἀγένετον is φάραγον and τὸ φάράγον ἀγένετον was also held (cf. Phaedr. 245 D, Arist. l. c. 282 B 30 ff., al.): hence Plato always regards the pre-existence and immortality of the soul as involving one another. γένεσις is here, as usual, ωγγέρας, and φθορὰ διάκρισις. The point of ἐπεὶ—ἐστίν is that the cause of decay is not contained in the ideal city itself—the city would be less than ideal if it were—but springs from a universal law of Nature, to which the city, like everything else, is necessarily subject: see on 545 C and App. I, Pt iii.

4 λύσις δὲ ηδέ κτλ. Here begins Plato's description of the mode of dissolution. οὐ μόνον—ἐναντία, literally trans-
5 καὶ ἐν ἑπταεῖοις ζῴοις φορά καὶ ἁφορία ψυχής τε καὶ σωμάτων γίγνονται, ὅταν περιτροπαὶ ἐκάστους κύκλου περιφέρειας συνάπτοσι, βραχυβίους μὲν βραχυτόρους, ἐναντίους δὲ ἐναντίας· γένους δὲ ἵμετέρων εὐγονίας τε καὶ ἁφορίας, καύτερ ὅτι σοφὸς οὐς ἤγε-Β μόνας πόλεως ἐπαιδεύσασθε, οὐδὲν μᾶλλον λογισμὸν μετ᾽ αἰσθήσεως τοῖς τεῦχονται, ἀλλὰ πάρεισιν αὐτοὺς καὶ γεννήσουσι παῖδας ποτὲ οὐ δεόν. ἦστι δὲ θείον μὲν γεννητρό περίοδος, ἢν ἁρμύος περιλαμβάνει τέλειος, ἀνθρωπείῳ δὲ ἐν ὁ πρώτῳ αὐξήσεως δυνάμειν τε

![Fig. 1.](image)

often as turnings-round join for each species' (of animals, plants etc.) 'circumferences of circles faring a short way for the short-lived, and the reverse for the reverse.' See Fig. 1. Suppose the revolution starts at the fixed point A. The circumference is joined as soon as the revolving wheel reaches A again, and at that point there is φορά ψυχής τε καὶ σώματος, if the seed was sown at A and has come safely to maturity. If the seed was not sown, or, though sown, did not take root or miscarried on the way, there is ἁφορία. The phrase is only a fantastic way of saying ὅταν περίοδοι ἐκάστους ἀποτελε-θῶσιν. The περίφορα of a short-lived species is βραχύτορος and conversely, because short-lived creatures have short periods of gestation, and long-lived creatures long (Aríst. de gen. anim. IV 16. 777a 31 ff., al. See App. I, Pt ii § 2). Soul, viewed merely as the vital principle, is one and the same in every organic creature: hence the singular ψυχή (App. I. c). This explanation. so far as I know, is new, the περίοδος being generally sup- posed to be 'Umfangszeit.' Cf. App. I. c.

546 ι, β 7 γένους δὲ κτλ. The literal translation is: 'Now of your kind' (i.e. mankind: it is the Muses who are speaking), 'clever though the leaders of the city be whom you educated' (the middle of personal interest IV 421 E n.), 'none the more will they by calculation together with perception obtain' (lit. hit the obtaining of) 'good offspring and no offspring, but it will escape them, and the time will come when they will beget children wrongly or inopportune' (cf. παρὰ καρνίν 546 D). In arranging matters connected with marriages and the treatment of children etc., the rulers of our city employ both λογισμὸς and ἀθή-σις. ἀθήσις helps them to decide what couples should be joined, what children should be reared etc.: by λογισμὸς they calculate what number of marriages they should permit ἵνα ὁδόστα διασύνδεσις τῶν αὐτῶν ἁρμύων τῶν ἁρμών (V 460 Α) etc.: see App. I, Pt ii § 2. But however well they use these instruments, the time will come when children are be- gotten ὧν δεόν. The fault lies not with the rulers, but with the inevitable law of Change, which is beginning to affect our city together with the rest of the Uni- verse. ἁφορίας is said, because the rulers must if possible make illicit unions un-productive (V 461 Ο). Possibly the ὧν of εὐγονίας may affect ἁφορίας also: cf. 555 Α n. See also App. I. c.

11 ἦστι δὲ—τέλειος. 'For a divine creature, there is a period comprehended by a number which is final.' The 'divine creature' is the World: it is θεῖον, because it is a God, γεννητόν, because it is created (i.e. has been brought out of chaos into order). Cf. Tim. 30 λ and Proclus in Tim. 89 D. With περιλαμ-βάνει cf. θεάκτης. 148 Α. The ἁρμύως τέλειος is the period expressing the gesta- tion of the Universe, i.e. the time which its creation occupies. For the metaphor cf. the Orphic verses cited by Proclus in Tim. 94 Β and 95 Ε. The number is a final or consummating number because it
καὶ δυναστεύομεναι, τρεῖς ἀποστάσεις, τέτταρας δὲ ὀρούς λαβοῦσαι, ὀμοιούντων τε καὶ ἀνομοιούντων καὶ αὐξάνων καὶ φθινόντων,


12 ἀνθρωπεῖς δὲ—ἀπέφηναν gives us the περίοδος or period of gestation for the human creature: ‘and for a human creature the number is the first in which root-and-square increases, comprehending three distances and four limits, of elements that make like and unlike and wax and wane, render all things conversable and rational with one another.’ The construction is ἀνθρωπεῖς δὲ <γεννητῷ ἐστιν ἄριθμῷ> ἐν ὑ τῇλ, and that is itself short for ἀνθρωπεῖς δὲ <γεννητῷ ἐστιν ἄριθμῳ περὶ λαμβάνει> ἐν ὑ τῇλ. The ‘first’ number is of course the first number after unity, ἀπείθεσι ‘increases’ may in itself mean either ‘additions’ or ‘multiplications.’ δυναμεῖαι refers to ‘roots’ (cf. Eucl. x def.: 11), δυναστεύομεναι to ‘squares’ (Procl. in temp. comm. ed. Kroll ii p. 36. 9—12 et al.), and ‘root-and-square increases’ means either ‘additions of roots to squares’ or ‘multiplications of roots by squares.’ τρεῖς ἀποστάσεις etc. shew that ∆ϕιπλασίων and not additions are meant. The three distances are μήκος, πλάτος and βάθος, and the four ὀροι their attendant limits. Thus in Fig. 2 AB,

![Fig. 2](image)


![Fig. 3](image)

The Pythagorean triangle.

as we are informed by many authorities—Aristotle, Plutarch, Aristides Quintilianus, Proclus and others—Plato made use of in his Number. The antecedent of ὦν ἐν ἐν ἐπτάτοσιν πυθμένη πεπάθει συγγείς is ὀμολογῶν τε καὶ ἀνομολογῶν καὶ ἀπείθεσι καὶ φθινοῦσι, and as ὦν ἐπτάτοσιν πυθμένη means ‘of which 4, 3,’ Plato himself tells us two of the numbers, and the third is also readily suggested by πεπάθει. 3, 4 and 5 are said to ‘make like,’ because, as we shall see, in the latter part of the Number, where the triangle fulfils its office as a κοσμικὸν τρίγωνον (Proclus I. c. p. 45. 21), they produce the ‘harmony’ 3600, and square numbers are ὀμοίως (Iambli. l.c. p. 82): they ‘make unlike’ because they produce
the ‘harmony’ 4000 x 2700, and oblong numbers are ἀνάμοιοι (ib.): they are said to wax and wane in a figurative sense—to wax in the first harmony, which represents in a certain sense the waxing of the Universe, and to wane in the second, which represents its wane. As the elements out of which the Universe is formed, they may be said to grow with its growth, and decline with its decline. The words have also a further meaning as a description of 3, 4, 5 regarded as the ἄρχοντα of everything which exists: see App. I, Pt i § 5. Now the first number in which cubings of 3, 4 and 5 are present is \( 3^3 + 4^2 + 5^2 = 216 \), and Aristides Quintilanus, in the passage where he refers to Plato's number, speaking of the Pythagorean triangle, remarks ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τῶν πλευρῶν ἐκάστην κατὰ βάθος αἴξηθαι (βάθος γὰρ ἡ ἀκατάστατος φύσις) παιδεύσειν ἀν ὅν διακόσια δεκαέξ., ἑστιθημον ἀφένεγγυς τῷ τῶν ἐπιστήμαις (p. 151 Meibom). Aristotle also in Pol. E 12. 1316d 5—8, according to Schneider's interpretation of his words, which I believe to be right, informs us that the whole number of this section is 276: see App. I, Pt iii. On πάντα— ἄλλα see next note. In App. I, Pt ii § 4 I have fully treated of the meaning of all these calculations. The different mathematical terms are discussed in detail ib. Pt i § 1. My explanation of this passage is, as far as I can discover, new, except as regards αἴξηθαι—διανευρυμέναι. Some other views are mentioned in App. I, Pt i § 1 ad fin. inm.

15. πάντα προσήγορα κτλ. Cf. Philol. Fr. 13 Mullach πάντα γνωστὰ καὶ ποταμὸν ἀλλάζω — ἀπεργάζεται. The Pythagoreans asserted that the embryo develops according to the proportions of the ἀρμονία or musical scale. The first stage is complete in 6 days, the second in 8, and 8 : 6 is the ‘fourth’ (διὰ τοσάρφων). The third stage (making flesh) takes 9 days, and 9 : 6 is the ‘fifth’ (διὰ τούτων). In the next 12 days the body is formed: and 12 : 6 is the octave (διὰ πασῶν). Total 6 + 8 + 9 + 12 = 35, and 35 is a ἀρμονία (Plut. de anim. gen. in Tim. 1017 ε). Now 216 = (6 x 35) + 6, so that 216 contains 6 ἀρμονίαι together with 6 ἡ πατρόν ἀρχή i.e. the unit (Except ex Nicom. in v. Jan's Mis. Script. Gr. p. 279), or if you like together with the marriage number 6. For the evidence and further details see App. I, Pt ii § 4.

546 C ὡν ἐπίστρετος πυθμῆν κτλ. In ἄνθρωποι ὅδ—ἀπεργάζοντας the Pythagorean triangle was employed to construct the period of gestation for the microcosm or man: here it is used to construct two periods in the lifetime of the macrocosm or Universe, for that is what Plato means by the two ‘harmonies.’ The translation is: ‘of which, 4, 3 married with 5, yields two harmonies when thrice increased, the one equal an equal number of times, so many times 100, the other of equal length one way, but oblong:—on the one side, of 100 squares of rational diameters of five diminished by one each, or if of irrational diameters, by two: on the other of one hundred cubes of three.’ The antecedent of ὥν is ἀρμονίων τε καὶ ἄνθρωπον καὶ ἀπεργάζοντας ὃς ἔχετο, which I have already interpreted as the numbers 3, 4, 5. Of these numbers (ὡ) the ἐπίστρετος πυθμήν i.e. 3, 4 (cf. Theo Smyrn. p. 80 ed. Hiller, Proclus l. c. ii p. 37 ἐπίστρετος πυθμῆν γ'/ καὶ δ'), is ‘married’ or ‘coupled’ with 5. That is to say, 3, 4, and 5 are multiplied together: whence we get 3 x 4 x 5 = 60. ‘Thrice increased’ is ‘three times multiplied by itself’; and 60 thrice increased is therefore 60 x 60 x 60 x 60. This sum, which is 12,060,000, yields two harmonies. One of the two harmonies is ‘equal an equal number of times, viz. so many times 100,’ in other words, it is a square (cf. Theaet. 147 ε) each of whose sides is a certain number of times 100 (for τοσαύτακες cf. τοσούτων in Alc. i 108 ε), viz. of course 36 times 100, for 60 x 60 x 60 x 60 = 36002. See Fig. 4.

![Fig. 4](image-url)

The other harmony which 60 x 60 x 60 x 60 yields is a rectangle (with προμήκη cf.
πυθμὴν πεμπάδι συζυγεῖς δύο ἀρμονίας παρέχεται τρίς αὐξήθεις,

Theon. 14.8 A), one of whose sides is one hundred cubes of 3, i.e. 2700, and the other the number which Plato describes in ἐκατὸν μὲν—διὸν. What is that number? ἀριθμὸς ἀρτός means (numerical) ‘squares of’ (cf. Procl. l. c. 11 p. 38. 9 et al.): the side in question is therefore 100 squares of—what? Of the rational diameter of 5 etc. Now the ‘rational diameter of 5’ is the nearest rational number to the real diameter of a square whose side is 5 (Theon. l. c. pp. 43 ff. and other authorities). The real diameter of a square whose side is 5 is \(\sqrt{50}\). See Fig. 5. \(AC^2 = 5^2 + 5^2 = 50\) (by Pythagoras’ famous ἑβρημα Eucl. i. 47): \(AC = \sqrt{50}\). And the nearest rational number to \(\sqrt{50}\) is 7: for \(\sqrt{49} = 7\). Consequently 7 is ‘the rational diameter’ of 5. And 100 squares of 7 = 100 \times 49 = 4900. But we are told to diminish the 100 squares by 1 each. Do so: 4900 - (1 \times 100) = 4800. This side is therefore 4800. The words ἀρρήτων δὲ διὸν give us an alternative way of reaching the number 4800. The construction is <ἀπὸ> ἀρρήτων δὲ <διαμέτρων δομέων> διὸν <ἐκάστων> = (or of 100) ‘squares of irrational diameters of 5, wanting 2 each.’ Now the irrational diameter of 5 is \(\sqrt{50}\). Square this and it becomes 50. 100 squares of 50 = 5000. Subtract 2 from each square and you have 5000 - (2 \times 100) = 4800. The two sides of the oblong are therefore 4800 and 2700 (‘one hundred cubes of three’). The area is 4800 \times 2700 = 12,960,000, which is 60 \times 60 \times 60 \times 60. See Fig. 6. Thus the arithmetical meaning of this part of Plato’s Number may be expressed by us as follows:

\[(3 \times 4 \times 5)^4 = 3600^2 = 4800 \times 2700.\]

In this explanation, which is defended at length in App. I, Pt i § 2, the most important novelty is my view of τρίς αὐξήθεις. Most, but not quite all, of the other expressions have been explained in the above way at one time or another, though never, as far as I have noticed, by any single critic. The meaning of εὐπρότεος πυθμὴν was perfectly well known to ancient mathematicians: and Proclus fully understood the ‘rational’ and ‘irrational’ diameters of 5. The full explanation of ἐκατὸν μὲν—πρᾶδος is due to Barozzi, except that he did not multiply the sides. As regards τρίς αὐξήθεις, I believe that I have proved my view in App. I, Pt i § 2 and Pt iii. Here I will only say that just as in the increasing series 1, 60, 3600, 21600 the number 21600 or 60^3 is the ‘third increase’ (τρίτη αὐξήθη) of unity, so in the increasing series 60, 3600, 21600, 12960000, the number 12960000 or (as we express it, but as Plato, to whom ‘power’ means either ‘square’ or ‘root,’ never did or could express it, 60^4) is the third increase of 60.

16 συζυγεῖς. The metaphor is from marriage, and marriage, among the Pythagoreans, was usually expressed by multiplication. Thus 6, which is the product of the first male number 3 and the first female number 2, was called by them marriage. συζυγεία also means ‘multiplied with’ in Proclus l. c. 11 p. 541 (App. I, Pt i § 2).

Σύο ἀρμονίας. The square and oblong may be regarded as ἀρμονία because in them, as in the number 216 above, all things are προσήγορα καὶ ἕτος πρὸς ἀλλα. Thus \(12,960,000 = (35 + 1) \times 360,000\), so that, as 35 is a ἀρμονία, 12,960,000 contains the portentous number of 360,000 ἀρμονίας. 360,000, each ἀρμονία thus having added to it, as before, the unit which is ἑι ἀρχής. The analogy between the Microcosm and the Macrocosm is thus preserved: see on πάντα—ἕτος 546 Β.
above. So much for the arithmetical meaning of the term ἄρμονιας. In App. I, Pt ii § 5 I have given my reasons for connecting the two ἄρμονια with the myth of the Politicus. In that myth we are told how two cycles of equal and vast duration invariably succeed one another in the life of the Universe, a progressive and a regressive cycle. These two cycles are two Great Years, in the first of which ὀμοίωσις prevails and the Universe is fresh and strong, while in the second, in which we are living now, ἀνομοίωσις begins to assert itself and the Universe flags and wanes. Cf. 547 Α.ι. Here the first ἄρμονια, which is a square and therefore ὀμοίως, represents the progressive cycle, the cycle of ὀμοίωσις, and the second ἄρμονια, which is an oblong, and therefore ἀνομοίως (see above on 546 B line 12), stands for the regressive cycle, the cycle of ἀνομοίωσις. If this identification is, as I believe, correct, each ἄρμονια represents a Great Year. The area or number of each harmony, according to Plato, is 12,060,000, and as Plato elsewhere says that the Great Year is measured τῷ τοῦ παντὸς καὶ ὄμολος ὁμοίως κόλλῳ (Tīm. 39 δ), i.e. by the diurnal revolutions of the heavens, we may take this number as denoting days. Converted into years, on the astronomical calculation of 360 days to the year, followed by Plato here and elsewhere, the number becomes 36,000 years, which was known in Ptolemaic astronomy as the magnus Platonius annum. For the evidence on all these points, see App. I, Pt ii §§ 5, 6.

20 ξύμπας δὲ οὗτος κτλ. ‘This whole number, a number measuring the earth, is lord of better and worse births.’ On its arithmetical side, γεωμετρικός means only that the number is reached by means of γεωμετρία and expressed in geometrical figures: but I have no doubt that Plato meant the word to bear another and pro-founder meaning, suitable to the real import of the two harmonies whereof this is the number. The number is τῷ διτι γεωμετρικός, for it measures an aeon of the Universe, of which the Earth is part (cf. 555 Α.Μ. and vi 511 B.ι.): and indeed it is artistically right that the meaning of the two harmonies should be summed up at the climax of the whole in a single pregnant word. How do good and bad births depend upon this number? Because in the early days of our era, when God had but lately left the world, and ἀνομοίωσις and ἀνωμαλία were young, Nature produced better children than οἶν νῦν βροτοὶ εἶναι, Plato in fact invites us to think of his city as having existed soon after the change to the aeon in which we now live, just as throughout Book viii and part of ix the Ideal City is figured in the past. For more on this subject see App. I, Pt ii §§ 5—7. I know not what others will think, but to me it seems that the extraordinary range and elevation of its central ideas make the Platonic number worthy even of a writer who is full of ‘thoughts that wander through eternity.’ The connexion between the Human Child and the Divine, the Microcosm and the Macrocosm, has played no small part in the history of human thought, and the story of a Great Year, with the hope which it affords of the ἀποκατάστασις of all things (Acts 3. 21), has been and is, in its religious setting, the solace and support of many a ‘human child.’

546 δ 22 παρὰ καιρὸν: ‘inopportune,’ ‘improperly’: cf. Pol. 277 Α and οὗ δεόν 546 Β. The phrase does not, as I once thought, imply that Nature has appointed certain periodic times or seasons in the life of men and women when their union will produce good offspring, but refers to unions of wrong couples, superabundance of marriages, and the like: cf. v 489 e ff. The notion that the number of the Great Year is to be
used by the rulers as a means of determining at what time unions should take place, derives no support from the Greek, and ought not to be entertained. In point of fact, the number is not a nuptial but a secular number, being γεωμετρικός ὡς ἄληθως. The expression ‘nuptial number’ is not applied to it either by Plato or by Aristotle, and it is only in later writers that we meet with ὁ τοῦ λεγόμενον γάμον τότο (Nicom. Intro. Ar. p. 144 Ast.), γαμήλιον διάγραμμα (Plat. de Is. et Os. 373 f) and γαμικὸς ἀριθμός (Iambl. in Nic. Ar. p. 82. 21 Pistelli).

23 καταστήσονται. The active καταστήσονται, found in v and two other MSS of little moment, is read by Hermann. Some may prefer it because καταστήσονται is passive just below: but Plato is careless about matters of this kind, and it is better to follow the best MSS.

25 ἡμῶν κτλ.: ‘us they will first begin to neglect when they are Guardians’ (i.e. after they have come εἰς τὰς πατέρων δύναμις), ‘setting too little store by music first, and second by gymnastic.’ Political decay is constantly associated by Plato with neglect of ‘Music’: see on IV 424 c. In place of δεινὸν ἄρμοστερον ὑστεροί, ‘setting too little store by music, first and second by gymnastic,’ Baiter adopts Madvig’s conjecture δεινὸν τε γυμναστικής. At first sight δεινὸν ἄρμοστερον—νεότοι would seem to favour such an alteration, as well as the fact that in the city which comes next in order Gymnastic is more esteemed than Music (548 c). But πρῶτον after ἡμῶν supports the MS tradition, and the decline of the ideal city, which, as we have seen, arises from inevitable organic deterioration, shews itself in a general lowering of vital energy, rather than in the exaltation of any one pursuit at the expense of another. In the Spartan city Gymnastic ranks higher than Music, because Music has fallen from the high position which she formerly occupied, and not because Gymnastic stands higher than before.

27 δεῖν—νέον: ‘and so our children will forget us.’ The Muses are speaking, and the children of Plato’s Muse may well be called the Muses’ children. This is the force of ἡμῖν, which is the reading of Α, Ξ and some other MSS: Π and others have ἡμῖν. Schneider says ‘Μονοια—ἄρμουσι γέγενθαι nullo modo tolerabile est.’ That is true, only ἡμῖν does not go with ἄρμουστερο, but is an ethic dative, and seems to me at least to be full of a strange beauty and pathos. As true Gymnastic educates the soul and not the body (iii 410 c ff.), the neglect of Gymnastic in the ideal city itself contributes to ἄρμουσια.

547 Α 1 τὰ παρ’ ὑμῖν γένη. See III 415 Α ff.

3 ἀνομοίσης καὶ ἀνωμαλία ανάρμοστος. We have already seen that as the second scroll of the World’s life unfolds itself, ἀνομοίσης, ἀνωμαλία, and ἀναρμοστία, with their attendant retinue of sedition, strife and war, make their appearance and wax more and more aggressive, until at last, in the words of the Politics, careful lest the world χειμασθεῖ οὐδὲ ταραχῆς διαλυέτει εἰς τὸν τῆς ἄνομοιότητος διπετεῖν ὑστερον ὑστερον δόν, God takes the helm again and κοσμεῖ τε καὶ ἐπιφάνητον ἀθάνατον αὐτόν καὶ ἀγάρων ἀπεργάζεται (Pol. 273 D f). See on 546 c and App. I, 11 ii § 5. The same insidious enemies, not from any fault of the rulers, but because the part must neces-
sarily suffer with the whole, fasten both on the perfect individual and on the perfect State, and the fall of men and cities, which Plato describes in viii and ix, is one long record of the triumphal progress of anarcho-tyranny, until at last she sits enthroned in the soul and city of the tyrant. The Platonic number is thus the setting in which Plato's 'Philosophy of History' is framed.

5 ταύτης τοι γενεάς. From Homer ii. vi 211 al. ταύτης τοι γενεάς τε και αὐτῶν ἐγέφυρα εἰσά. Plato means of course 'Such, as we must say, is the pedigree of Sodomy, wheresover she arises.' D. and V. are wholly wrong when they translate: "so that we may positively assert that the rise of such a generation will invariably be marked by divisions." 547 b 9 εἰλκέτην κτλ. The logical object of εἰλκέτην and ἢγέτην (in line 13) is τὴν πολιτείαν. For the omission of the object with ἀκχω and ἀγω cf. 560 b, x 604 A, 604 D et al. It is only another way of expressing oneself to say that the verbs are practically intransitive. The sedition which arises is not between rulers and ruled, but between the rulers among themselves, as is clear from 545 η and elsewhere: hence τὸ μὲν σφόνων καὶ χαλκοῦν does not refer to the farmers and artisans, who probably possessed ὀκίαι from the first (111 417 A μ.), but to the section of the rulers who have become σφόνων and χαλκοῦν by the intermittent of different breeds. Cf. the oracle foretelling the destruction of the city ὅταν αὐτήν ὁ σφόνων ὁ χαλκὸς φιλάξῃ (315 415 c). ἧς κτήσεως κτλ. means 'the possession of land and a private dwelling-place as well as of gold and silver,' all of which were forbidden to Plato's rulers. Εἰς κτήσεις ἦς καὶ οἰκίας was a familiar expression to the Greeks, and one of the well-recognised privileges of μέτωκοι at Athens (Gilbert Cr. Statist. ii. p. 293). On the reading χρυσόν see cr. ι. It is usual to read χρυσόν, but ἄργυρον immediately following favours χρυσόν, whose authority is not much inferior to that of χρυσόν. Cf. χρυσόν τε καὶ ἄργυρον 548 A. Herwerden, retaining χρυσόν, would write ἄργυρον instead of ἄργυρον with some MSS of little value: but the reading printed above has much more MS support. His further proposal ἐπὶ χρυσάμου καὶ χρυσοῦν τε καὶ ἄργυρου καὶ γῆς κτήσεως καὶ οἰκίας will not find favour among scholars.

12 φύσις—ψυχάς. They are not rich in worldly possessions, but they have the true riches—the riches of the soul. Cf. the prayer of Socrates in Πράαξ. 379 c πόλεοι δὲ νοῦς οὕτως τὸν σοφίν, and see also on 311 416 E. The usual view, which makes τὰς ψυχάς depend on ἢγέτην (Schneider, J. and C. D. and V., etc.) is surely wrong. Jowett from his translation appears to have caught the meaning.

14 εἰς μέσον ὀμολόγησαν κτλ. The
change is effected, as in the case of the corresponding man (550 b), by a peaceful compromise. In the later stages of political decay, when ἀναγωγή has gathered strength, revolution is attended by civil war (557 a), and the tyrant wades through bloodshed to his throne (565 f ff.).

16 περιοίκους τε καὶ οἰκήτας. We meet with περιοίκους not only in Sparta, of which city Plato is chiefly thinking, but also in Crete, Thessaly and Argos: see Gilbert Gr. Staatsaltt. 111 pp. 16, 74, 220. In each of these States there was also an inferior grade, in Sparta the Helots, in Crete the boules of the Gortynian inscription, sometimes also spoken of as οἰκήτας, in Thessaly the πεντάσται, and in Argos the γυμνῆται or γυμνόται (Gilbert l.c.). It is clear, I think, that in οἰκήτας Plato is thinking of this lowest order. The Spartan Helots had to perform the duties of domestic servants, as appears from Plut. Lyc. et Num. comp. 2, 4 ἦν ἡ περὶ τὰ χρήματα κατασκευὴ δεσμοῦ δοῦλος καὶ Εἰλω- σιν, ύπερ ἡ περὶ τὸ δείπνον, καὶ δύον διακώνη.

17 φυλακῆς αἰτίων: the duty of watching and guarding—σεντιν ἅλθετο— ὁ περιοίκου καὶ οἰκήτας. The institutions and history of Sparta are a sufficient comment on the phrase.

19 οἰκόνων—πολιτείας. Cf. 547 C n. 547 C—548 D So much for the origin of Timarchy. In character, it will resemble Aristocracy on the one hand, and Oligarchy on the other; partly also it will have peculiarities of its own. The aristocratical features of Timarchy are respect for the ruling class and so forth; its own distinctive peculiarity is the love of war and warlike matters; in captivity and anxiety it is like Oligarchy. On the whole Timarchy is a mixture of good and evil; but the one conspicuous feature of this polity is the love of victory and honour.

547 C Plato's description of 'timocracy' is, as he says himself, a sketch (548 D), but one in which hardly any feature of first-rate importance is wholly ignored. He regards 'timocracy' as primarily and essentially the political embodiment of τυμοιδής (548 C), and consequently a sort of half-way house between aristocracy and oligarchy, as τυμοιδής is between λογιστικόν and φιλοχρήματον. It is, however, at the same time a 'mixed' constitution (548 C n.), and partakes in the characteristics of both its neighbours. The portrait of timocracy is drawn in the main from Sparta, as the notes will shew, but it represents the Sparta of the fifth rather than of the fourth century, during which the oligarchical element in the Spartan constitution began to acquire an undue predominance, owing to the temptations of empire and other causes: cf. Isocrit. de Pace 95—103, Plato's sketch may be filled in from the sources enumerated in Hermann-Thunser Gr. Staatsaltt. pp. 176—191, 251—260. The student of Greek history and political science should read Aristotle's account of the Laecdaemonian and Cretan politics (Pol. B 9, 19) in connexion with Plato's description of the timarchical constitution and the timarchical man. See also Schoemann-Lipsius Griech. Alterthümer pp. 196—323.
of polemos ágyonías épimeleisthai, pāsī tois toioutous tīn proterān mīrēsetai; Nai. Tō dē ge fοβείσθαι tois 1 sofōis E ēpī tās ārhkās āγεν, āte oukētī kektēmēnī ἄπλους te kai ātevnēs 30 touis toioutous ἀνδρας ἀλλὰ μεικτος, ēpī dè thymoīdeis te kai ἀπλουστέρους ἀποκλίνειν, touis prós polemon μᾶλλον τεφυκότας ἢ prós eirē̂n, kai tois peri taúta dōlous te kai μηχανας 548 ēντιμος ἔχειν, kai poleμoúsa tōn āei χρόνου διάγεαι, αὐτῆ ἀευτῆς αὐ tā polelā tōn toioutōn ἱδία ἔξει; Nai. 'Επιβυμηται dē ge, 29. kektēmēnī Bekker, fortasse secundum v: kektēmēn Ἀμ ceteris.


26 ἔφιστα. Cf. Hermann-Thumser l.c. pp. 185—191. In Crete, the ēφιστα were maintained at the expense of the State; in Sparta, by the contributions of the ēφιστοι. The former arrangement of course prevailed in the ideal city (ΠΠ 416 B), and as timarchy copies the ideal city in regard to ēφιστα (tīn proterān mīrēsetai below), we may suppose that in the timarchical polity, as conceived by Plato, the Cretan method was observed. Cf. Arist. Pol. B 9. 1271a 28 ff. and see also 551 A, B.

28 τῷ dē ge fοβείσθαι κτλ. The Spartans were notorious for their dislike and distrust of knowledge and intellectual cultivation: see Hipp. Mai. 285 ff. and Arist. Pol. B 9. 1271b 1 ff., with Susemihl and Hicks' notes. For the anachronism τῷ dē ge—tā polelā—ἔξει (548 A) cf. (with Schneider) Latris 931 c, 949 A.

547 E 29 kektēmēnī. See cr. n. Bekker's silence is often untrustworthy, and as he omitted A and Ε as well as ὅ in the list of ms which read kektēmēnī, it is doubtful if even ὅ has the nominate here. kektēmēnī is however very awkward from its position between τὴν προτέραν mīrēsetai and polemōs, and the error is so easy and common that I agree with Bekker and others in rejecting the accusative. See Introd. § 5. In illustration of what Plato says we may contrast Pausanias for example and Lysander with Brasidas and Callicratidas.

The former were sofōi but far from ἄπλοι: the latter thymoīdeis and ἀπλουστέροι. 30 touis toioutous: i.q. touis sofōis. With μεικτος cf. 547 A.

31 ἄπλουστέρους = 'more single-minded.' Since they distrust sofōi de-

5 τιμώτες ἄργωσις: 'passionately adoring.' The adverb was unnecessarily suspected by Herwerden.

6 ταμεία κτλ. In spite of the formal prohibition of gold and silver (Xen. Rep. Lac. 7, 6, Phlt. Lyc. 9, 2, Lyc. 17, 6), an immense amount of gold and silver money was accumulated in private hands throughout Laconia: cf. Aleib. 1 122 E χρωσαν δὲ καὶ ἀργοῖς οὐκ ἐστίν ἐν πάσιν Ἑλληνικῶν δακην ἐκ ἀκαθάριστοι ἄμμοι πολλὰς γὰρ ἣν γενεὰς εἰσῆρχεται μὲν αὐτὸς ἐκ πάντων τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν, πολλὰς δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῶν βαρβάρων, ἔξερχεται δὲ φανατίκης κτλ. and other authorities quoted in Hermann-Thummer p. 253 nn. or Gilbert Gk Const. Ant. E. T. pp. 12, 13.

οἰκείους—κρύφημα refers specifically to the hoarding of specie as practised by Spartan citizens. It may be doubted whether the Thucydidean Pericles was justified even at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war in telling the Athenians that the Spartans possessed οὔτε ἴδια οὔτε εν κωπίω χρυσά (1. 141, 3), in spite of Xenophon Rep. Lac. 7, 6.

7 περιβόλους οἰκήσεων κτλ.: not 'walled houses' (D. and V.) but 'dwellings to encompass them withal, verbal private nests': cf. Theocr. 174 E σηκὼν ἐν ὧραι τὸ τείχος περιβολίσμων and Crat. 400 c. The phrase has a poetical sound and may be taken from the drama, but is more likely to be one of Plato's own poetical flourishes. A Spartan husband could occasionally escape from the rigid discipline of camp-life and take shelter—this is the force of περιβολέας—in his domestic nest: see Plut. Lyc. 15, 4—7. Plato seems to imply that this arrangement encouraged habits of extravagance and luxuriousness in the wives as well as in the husbands; cf. Arist. Pol. B 9. 1260b 22 ὠτα γὰρ (the Spartan wives) ἀκολουθῶσι πρὸς ἀπαθῶς ἀκολουθῶσι καὶ προφερόν. Aristotle's remark is amply borne out by other evidence: see Hermann-Thummer l. c. p. 180 n. 5 and Newman on Arist. l. c.

548 B 8 οἷς θιζομένων ἀλλοι: masculine, not (as D. and V. translate), neuter. The reference is probably intended to include παιδακι as well as others. The Spartan's domestic nest was doubtless occasionally a nest of vice.

12 τῶν νόμων ἀποδιδράσκοντες. The expression is borrowed by Aristote Pol. B 9. 1270b 34, where see Newman's note.

13 τῆς ἀληθινῆς—φιλοσοφίας. Cf. the famous saying φιλοσοφία μεγίστη μονεική in Phed. 61 A.

analysis which is attributed to Archytas may serve as a specimen: δει δη των νομων των καρων κα των πως εκ παιδον σωθην ημεν των άλλων πολιτεισ, και εχει τη διακρατια, εχει τη ολογραφια, εχει τη νομολογια και άρωστοκρατια, δεσποι και εν τη Λακεδαιμον. Τοι μην γαρ βασιλεις τας μοναρχιας, τοι δε γαρ τας άρωστοκρατιας, τοι δε εθνοι τας ολογραφιας, ισημεριστα δε και κυριο τας διακρατιας (Stobaeus Flor. 43. 134). On mixed politics in ancient political science see Henkel l.c. pp. 85 ff., 102, 106 ff., 112, 115 and Greenidge Gr. Const. Hist. pp. 74—121.

17 έν τι μονων. For τι μονων Apelt conjectures τιμορέων: but Plato expresses himself emphatically in case the oligarchical features of the Spartan polity should make us forget that after all it is and must be essentially θυμω-κρατια — the expression of θυμω-ειδες and not φαλοχριματων (547 C. n.).

18 φιλονικία κτλ. Cf. Plut. Ages. 5. 4. Plato is not thinking of ‘divisions in Sparta between the partisans of the ephors and kings’ (as J. and C. suppose), but of the passion ἰπείροχον ἐμεθεν άλλων: for this and not ‘quarrelsomeness’ is the distinctive feature of timarchy. We are in danger of misconceiving the whole position of ‘timarchy’ and the ‘timarchical’ man if φιλονικς (or φιλωνικς) is connected with νικαν instead of with νικη. On the spelling and derivation of the word see IX 581 B. n.


548 B 1—550 C The character of the timarchical man is now described in close analogy with that of the timarchical State (548 D—549 B). In origin (continues Socrates) he was the son of a good father living in an ill-regulated city and obtaining from public life. Drawn by his father’s precepts and example towards the higher life, and by maternal and other influences towards the lower, he finally surrendered himself to the dominion of the intermediate principle in the soul, and this became timarchical.

25 πως τε γενομενος: ‘how did he arise?’ Richards proposes γεγομενος: but the past tense is in harmony with επιστρεφει 545 D, with εικέτηρι, ήγετον, ομολογος 547 B, and indeed with the whole of Plato’s exposition, which is deliberately arrayed in the verse of a historical narrative or epic poem: see on 543 A, 544 C. It appears to be the custom to translate most of the aorists of this kind in Books VIII and IX by the present, but in some cases the effect is much more realistic and picturesque if we make them past, and I think that Plato intended some of these aorists to be understood in that way. The instances in point are 550 B άλλως, παρέδωκε, έγένετο, 550 Ε απειροχώ έκπειται αν, 551 Ε κατεσταθανο, 555 D ήργακα σαν, 560 Α—C οπειρεσα, διαφθόρων, ἐκέχεσαν, κατακοιμήσαν, έγένετο, έκλεισαν, ένεκαν, κατέλαβαν, κατέσχον, 565 B ε' ε' έλευθρωσαν, διώκειν. Except in 550 B, 551 Ε, 555 D, 565 B, and 566 K, in which the aorists are no doubt the so-called gnomic aorist “used in animated language to express general truths” (Goodwin MT. p. 53), each of these tenses is in my opinion correctly translated by a past in English. Plato of course repeatedly employs the
549 B]

ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΣ Η

ε αυτόν Γλαύκωνος τουτού τείνειν ἐνεκά γε φιλονικίας. Ἡσσός, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τοῦτο γε. ἄλλα μοι δοκεῖ τάδε ὦ κατὰ τούτον πεφικέναι. Τὰ ποία: Λύθαδέστερόν τε δεὶ αὐτόν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἦναι καὶ ύποα-μουςότερον, φιλόμουσον δὲ, καὶ φιλήκουσ μὲν, ρητορικὸν δ' οὐδα-549 μὸς. καὶ δουλίοις | μὲν τις ὁν ἄγριος εἴη ὁ τοιοῦτος, ὦ καταφρο-νοῦν δουλῶν, ὦστερ ὁ ἰκανός πεπαιδεμένος, ἐλευθέρους δὲ ἰμερος, ἀρχόντων δὲ σφόδρα ὑπῆκοος, φίλαρχος δὲ καὶ φιλότιμος, οὐκ ὁπό τοῦ λέγειν ἄξιον ἀρχεῖν οὐδ' ἀπὸ τοιοῦτον οὐδενόν, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ ἐργον-τῶν τε πολεμικῶν καὶ τῶν περὶ τὰ πολεμικά, φιλογυμναστής τέ 5 τῶν ὄν καὶ φιλόθηρος. Ἡσσός γὰρ, ἐφ', τοῦτο τὸ ἰθος ἐκείνης τῆς πολιτείας. Οὐκοῦν καὶ χρημάτων, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ τοιοῦτος νέος Β μὲν 1 ὄν καταφρονοι ἄν, ὦσι δὲ πρεσβύτερος γήγνυστο, μάλλον ἄει

1. τις ἐν ο.: τισιν ΠἘγ e ftortasse Α': τις Α'.

present also, not only where he is painting a scene (e.g. 549 B ff., 553 A ff., 555 C ff.), but also when he is describing the actual genesis of a particular sort of commonwealth or individual (e.g. 550 D, 551 A, B al. and many instances of γηγ-νεται), and in such cases the appearance of historical narration is not preserved, for it would be pedantic to view all these presents as merely examples of the praesens historicum. See also on 549 C.

27 φιλονικίας: 'desire to excel.' The translations of 'party-spirit' (D. and V.), 'spirit of contention' (Jowett) are misleading: see 548 C n. On Glauco's φιλονικία see Hist. § 2.

548 E 29 ύποαμουσότερον. It is unnecessary (with Herwerden) to add <μὲν>, although ύποαμουσότερον is contrasted with φιλόμουσον: see on I 340 D.

30 φιλόμουσον. The 'timocratical' man has neglected τῆς ἀληθινῆς Μον-σης τῆς μέτα λόγων τε καὶ φιλοσοφίας (548 B), but he is nevertheless φιλόμου-σον, though somewhat less so than Glauco, whom Socrates calls μονοικός in 111 30 ff. On the Spartan love of music cf. Plut. Lyce. 21 and other evidence in Herrmann-Thumser l.c. p. 178 nn. 5; 6.

φιλήκοον κτλ. This characteristic of the Spartans is well illustrated by J. and C. from Πεπ. Ματ. 285 b ff.: Ἀλλὰ τί μὴ ἔστω ἢ ἡδονὴ σου ἀκροάται καὶ ἐπαινοῦσι (sc. οἱ Δακεδαιμόνοι):—Πεπ τῶν γενῶν—τῶν τῶν ἱρῶν καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώ-πων, καὶ τῶν κατακλίσεων, ός τὸ ἄρχαίον ἐκτίθησαν αἱ πόλεις, καὶ υπλλήβοι πά-σις τῆς ἀρχαϊκολογίας ἠδότα ἀκροάται. Schneider is mistaken in taking οὐδαμὸς with all three adjectives: it belongs only to ρητορικόν. The carefully qualified expression ύποαμουσότερον would be in-constant with calling the Spartan ωδα-μος φιλόμουσον: and φιλήκοον is not used as in VII 535 D, but rather as the anti-thesis to ρητορικόν.


οὗ καταφρονων κτλ. is a subtle psychological touch. Those who have no moral or intellectual right to 'des-pire' inferiors are apt to treat them harshly, in the vain effort to convince themselves of their own superiority. ὁ ἰκανός πεπαιδεμένος uses those below him "as creatures of another place." (All's well that ends well 1 2. 41). Cf. Arist. Eth. Nic. IV 8, 1124b 5. 20 and (for καταφρονον) Thuc. II 62. 4 ἀγήχα μὲν γάρ καὶ ἀπὸ ἀμαθίας εὐθυγείας διέλετο τις εὐγένεια, καταφρονώντας δὲ δὲ ἄν καὶ γνώμῃ πιστεύει τῶν εὐαντίων πράξεων.

3 οὐκ ἀπὸ τοῦ λέγειν κτλ. Cf. Prot. 342 E ff. The Spartans were men of deeds, not words.

5 φιλογυμναστής—φιλόθηρος: as in Sparta; see Herrmann-Thumser l.c. p. 182 nn. 1, 2.

649 B 8 ὡς δὲ πρεσβύτερος κτλ. The life of the timocratical man is an epitome of that of the State, in which,
as actually happened at Sparta, the oligarchical element grows more and more powerful as time goes on (547 C n.).

11 λόγον-κεκραμένου recalls the ἀληθινή Μίσσα of 548 B.

12 σωτήρ ἁρετῆς. Virtue is never secure unless it rests on knowledge, and can render a λόγος of itself: cf. vi 497 C and vii 531 E mii.

549 C 15 εὖντε κτλ. Krohn finds a difficulty in ὁδῷ εὖ πολιτευόμενη, for timarchy is a degeneration of the perfect city (Pl. St. pp. 208 ff., insufficiently refuted by Grimmel de resp. Pl. comp. et util. p. 71). But Plato is here speaking of the origin of the ‘timarchical’ man, not of the ‘timarchical’ State, and the ἀριστοκρατικὸς whose son becomes τιμοκρατικός may be found in any one of the degenerate commonwealths, although he will not rule except ‘in his own city,’ i.e. aristocracy. We must beware of supposing that there is no remnant of good men in depraved States (cf. vi 492 E ff., 496 C ff., IX 591 E ff.). If Plato had here preserved the fiction of a historical narrative and made the τιμοκρατικὸς νεώρις the son of an ἀριστοκρατικὸς in his own ideal city, he could only have attributed his fall to the same law of natural degeneration which subverted the καλλίστος (546 A ff.). As it is, the description is drawn from facts of daily experience and observation, and Plato, as is suggested by the Oxford editors, may well be thinking of some ‘Laconizing youth of Athens,’ perhaps of some member of the Socratic circle. We have already seen that Plato frequently deserts the epic or narrative form of exposition which he has chosen to express his views; see above on 548 D. I formerly printed a comma after πως and a full stop after ἐξειν, but now revert to Stallbaum’s punctuation, because (1) the contrast with καὶ ἔστι μὲν γε κτλ. seems to require a fuller pause after πως, (2) εὖντε-ἐξείν does not explain the γένεσις of the τιμοκρατικός, as it ought to do, if γίγνεται-ἐξείν is all one sentence, (3) Adimantus’ interruption πεί ἡ-γίγνεται, which calls attention in a lively manner to the point which Plato wishes to emphasise, is most easily accounted for on the supposition that εὖντε κτλ. begins a separate sentence: cf. 567 E n. and Soph. O. C. 644 f., with Jebb’s note. νόος ὡς is resumed in νόος (550 λ.), and has no other predicate except ἐμπερ. etc. in 550 B.

17 φεύγοντες κτλ. Cf. vi 496 C ff. and Thead. 173 C ff. φυγάρχα (if the word may be allowed) on the part of the best men was a growing evil in Athenian politics: see Hermann-Thumser l.c. p. 749 n. 4. In a bad State, according to Aristotle (Pol. 1. 4), the good man is apt to be a bad citizen.

549 C, D 19 διὰ κτλ.: ‘whenever, I continued, he listens in the first instance to his mother, who is annoyed because her husband has no place in the government and is on that account belittled among the other wives, and who also sees’ etc. πρῶτον μὲν has nothing to do with ἐπίτητα, but prepares us for καὶ οἱ οἰκεῖοι κτλ. in 549 E. See also on 549 D. Krohn (Pl. St. p. 198) thinks the present sentence inconsistent with the position assigned to women in v; but actual wives εὖ πολλές οὐκ εὖ πολιτευόμενη may be allowed to differ from the perfect products of an
ideal city. Plato’s description is as realistic as anything could well be: he speaks as though ευφυής εν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ παραγενόμενος εν ταῖς καὶ οἰκίαι πράξεωι (IX 577 Α). Socrates and his relations with Xanthippe possibly furnished some details of the picture (so also Müller on p. 749 of his Translation).

549 δ 23 λοιπορόμενος is certainly middle, not passive, as Ast imagined: cf. VI 500 ἄ.

ἐν δικαστηρίῳ. The opposition between ἤδαι and δικαστής δικαίος (cf. Laws 927 Α) is not to the point here, as Vermehren remarks (Plat. Stud. p. 107), but we should not, with that critic, expunge ἐν δικαστηρίῳ. The expression ἄδα in δικαστηρίῳ refers to ἄδα δικαίος: and δικαστήδια to other public gatherings, e.g., as the assembly: cf. Theod. 174 Σ ὅταν ἐν δικαστηρίῳ ή πον ἀλ- λοθεν ἀραγκασθῇ κτλ.

24 ῥιθομός κτλ.: ‘indifferent to everything of the sort’: cf. Xen. Mem. II 9. 1, Theod. 173 Σ, D and (for the vague use of τα τοιαύτα) VII 556 Α.

25 αἰσθάνηται is usually explained as by analcolithon for αἰσθανομένης: but no parallels have been cited, nor are the analcolitha by which Engelhardt (Anac. Pl. Spec. III p. 42) illustrates the sentence in any degree comparable. The sense compels us to regard the subject of αἰσθά- νηται as the mother, but grammatically it can only, as with ἄφω, be the son. I formerly placed αἰσθάνηται after ἄχθο-
550 A 2 ἀκόουε. See cr. n. If we retain ἀκόουε, ὅταν must be carried on from 549 C, in spite of the intervening sentences in 549 E. In that case we should regard Socrates' description (549 C —550 E) as virtually a single sentence ἐνοτε —ἐκείνη, ὅταν —ὡμεῖν, καὶ ἐξίσω—ἐπικονοῦν, τότε δὴ —ἀνήρ, and ignore Adimantus' replies, as well as ὠδήθα ὦν —πατρὸς (549 E). But although ὅταν sometimes extends its influence in this way (VII 540 D—541 A), the interposition of 549 E makes it very difficult to retain the subjunctive here, and I therefore agree with other editors in holding the sentence to be independent. Cf. 553 B n.

6 παρὰ τὰ τῶν ἀλλῶν. Others know his father πάροδωθεν: the son sees him near at hand, comparing his ways of life with those of other men—and consequently understands and appreciates his father more. J. and C. wrongly translate "having a nearer view of his father's ways than of the ways of others." 7 ἐλκόμενος κτλ. describes the στάσις in the soul. Cf. 545 C, D.

550 B 8 ἀρδοῦντος. The metaphor is common: cf. x 606 D and Enthus. 2 D with my note ad loc. So also in Cor. 1 3.

6 ἐγὼ ἐφότερεσα, Ἀπόλλων ἐπότασε. 9 διὰ τὸ κτλ.: 'because he is not naturally a bad man,' lit. 'his nature is not that of a bad man': not 'because he is by birth the son of no bad man.'

10 εἰς τὸ μέσον —ἡδὲ κτλ. A compromise is effected, reminding us of the compromise which converted the aristocratic State into πισταλία: cf. 547 B εἰς μέσον ὄμολογησαν κτλ. The orators ἡθείη, παρέδωκε etc. are past, and should be so translated; see on 548 D.

14 ἔχομεν ἀρά κτλ. Richards thinks this sentence interrogative; but ἀρά rather points the other way.

550 C—551 C Next in order comes Oligarchy or Plutocracy. The change originates in the growth of avarice and cupiditu within the Timarchial State; it is completed as soon as a property qualification for the holding of office has been established by law.

550 C 16 ὑφότονος μετὰ τοῦτο κτλ. As θυμωνίδεσ in Timarchy superseded λογιστικόν, so in Oligarchy φιλοχρημάτων superseded θυμωνίδεσ. The lower 'parts' of soul assert the mastery in turn, as the scale of commonwealth descends (cf. 553 D and 547 C n.); and the continuity is unbroken, for the element of φιλοχρημάτων already displayed an ominous activity in the Spartan State, although it had not yet attained the
sovereign place. Plato's description of Greek oligarchies, if we judge it by the facts of history, probably lays rather too much emphasis on τὸ φιλοχρηματὸς; but it is certainly true that the pursuit of riches was the characteristic feature of ancient oligarchy. See on the whole subject Whibley Greek Oligarchies, and Newman The Politics of Aristotle, pp. xxi—xxxvi, and compare the account which Aristotle gives of the causes producing revolution in what he calls 'aristocracies' (Pol. E 7).

17 τὴν ὑπόθεσιν. See 545 B ff.
20 τὴν ἀπὸ τιμημάτων. By Herodotus (iv 81) διλεγαρχία is used in its strictly etymological sense; and Socrates' own name for that which Plato calls 'oligarchy' was πλουτοκρατία (Men. iv 6. 12). The establishment of a property qualification for full citizenship was the central feature in the programme of the Athenian oligarchical party from 412 B.C. onwards; see (for 411) Thuc. viii 65. 3; 97. 1 and (for 404) Xen. Hell. ii 3. 48, with Hermann-Thumser l.c. pp. 724—734. It is therefore natural enough that Plato should define oligarchy as he does, especially as in his younger days, both personally and through his friends, he was himself connected with the Athenian oligarchical faction (Grote viii p. 30). The term 'oligarchy' retained its Platonic sense after Plato (cf. e.g. Arist. Pol. Π 8. 1266 b 1 ff. ἀναγκαῖον μὲν, δὲν ἄρχον διὰ πλουτὸς ἀν τ' ἐλάττων ἀν τε πλείους, ἐναι ταύτην διλεγαρχίαν κτλ.), though Aristotle recognises also the wider meaning, e.g. in Pol. Ζ 2. 1317 b 39 διλεγαρχία καὶ γένει καὶ πλουτῷ καὶ παθεῖ διεξεται. See especially Whibley Gk. Olig. pp. 15—22.

550 D 22 ὡς μεταβαίνει. The leading features in Plato's narrative are probably taken from the history of Sparta, which had degenerated during his lifetime from a 'timarchy' to what was virtually an oligarchical polity: cf. Noble die Staatslehre Pl. p. 106 and Hermann-Thumser l.c. p. 258. Others have referred to the Solonian constitution and the oligarchical revolutions at Athens in 411 and 404. In neither of these instances was the previous government timarchial, for the rule of the Eupatrids had become an oppressive oligarchy by the time of Solon (Holm Gk. Hist. E. Τ 1 p. 389); but it is likely enough that Plato was thinking of these among other oligarchies and oligarchical movements in some parts of his descriptions: see 551 A B.

24 τὸ τιμημέν—ἰκεῖνον. 548 ΑΗΜ. The oracle spoke truly ἀ διλεγαρχία Σφάραν ὄλει, ἄλλο δὲ οὖδὲν (Tyrtaeus 3. 1).
28 γυναῖκες. See on 548 A.

550 E 29 ἀπειράγαστον. On the
tense see 548 D n. A few mss read ἀπειργάσατο: but ἀλὸς ἄλλον is in partitive apposition to the plural subject, according to the regular idiom: cf. II 369 B, C, IX 581 C n.

32 ἡ οὖς κτλ. Cf. 555 c and especially Laws 743 A ff. ἁγάθων δὲ ὡντα διαφέρουσα καὶ πλοῦσιον εἶναι διαφέρουσα ἄδωνατον (‘how hardly shall a rich man’ etc.). Other parallels are quoted by Spixs Logos Spermatikos p. 74. Cf. also III 416 E n.

ὡστερ κτλ.: ‘as it were inclining always in opposite directions when each is placed in the scale of a balance.’ As the scale containing virtue rises, that containing riches falls, and vice versa. Cf. Hom. II. XXII 209 ff. Madvig’s κείμενον ἕκατερον, though adopted even by J. and C., is questionable Greek, and certainly no improvement. ὡστερ should be taken with ἰδέα τε ὡντα ‘quasi non πλοῦτον ἁρχὴ διετήτευκεν, sed πλοῦτος καὶ ἁρχὴ διετήτευκαν προκεσσέτως (Schneider). There is a kindred figure in 544 E above: ἂν ὡστερ ἰδέα ταῦτα τὰ ἀρισκότα ζε and some other inferior mss have the obvious ‘correction’ ἰδέα τε ὡστεροῦ. Other conjectures are ἰδέα ταῦτα (Liebhold) and ἰδέα ταῦτα (Price), but neither could ever have been changed to ἰδέα τε ὡστεροῦ.

551 A 4. φιλοχρηματισται κτλ. Although Aristotle (Pol. B 12. 1316 b 39 ff.) pronounces it ἄσπον to think that oligarchy arises ὅτι φιλοχρηματισται καὶ χρηματισται ὁ ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς, there is no doubt that the special oligarchy which Plato probably has in view, viz. Sparta in the fourth century B.C., became to all intents and purposes an oligarchy chiefly from this cause, as in fact Aristotle himself recognises ib. 7. 1307 a 34 ff.: cf. also B 9. 1270 a 14 ff. It should also be remembered that Plato’s selection of the αἱρὴ τῆς φθορᾶς is primarily determined by his psychological standpoint: see on 543 A.

5 ἐγένετο. See 548 D n. 7 νόμον τίθεναι κτλ. In Sparta, apparently, matters never went so far as this, although those who were unable to make the statutory contribution to the public mess forfeited their citizenship, according to the laws of Lycurgus, and later abuses swelled the ranks of the ὑπόκλιτοι from this cause: see Arist. Pol. B 9. 1271 a 34 and Hermann-Thurner l.c. pp. 258—260 n. n. The minimum amount of property qualifying for privilege in an oligarchy ‘was of course different in different oligarchical States: cf. Whibley Gk Olig. p. 22.

551 B 8 ὃς μὲν μάλλον κτλ. See again Whibley l.c. pp. 126—132. As an example of a moderate oligarchy (in the Platonic sense) we may take the Solonian constitution, which was, broadly speaking, the ideal of the moderate oligarchs at Athens towards the end of the fifth century (Beloch Att. Pol. p. 74: cf. Thuc. viii 97 2), and is commended by Plato in Laws 698 B ff.
10 ἡ βία κτλ. “To an Athenian, as to ourselves, this would naturally suggest a revolution against a democratic system such as took place at the establishment of the Four Hundred in 411 B.C., or of the Thirty in 404 B.C., and constantly throughout Greece during the Peloponnesian war” (Bosanquet). The remark applies with equal force to πρὸ τοῦτο φοβήσαντες (cf. Thuc. VIII 66. 2), and it can scarcely be doubted that the familiar struggles of oligarchy against democracy in his own as well as other times supplied Plato with this detail of the picture. But the employment of force would be equally necessary in order to transform a timarchy into an oligarchy, owing to the opposition to be apprehended from the impoverished and relatively poorer sections of the timarchs, who would under an oligarchy be formally and for ever excluded from office. The conspiracy of Cinadon partly illustrates Plato’s point; for it was supported by ὑπομισεις, and suppressed by force (Xen. Hell. III 3. 4—11 with Grote IX pp. 70 ff.). Krohn (Pl. St. p. 211) asserts that Plato has already forgotten 545 C. D, where constitutional change was said to originate from στάσις in the ruling class. But the struggle between those timarchs who have, and those who have not, the proposed τίμημα, is in reality στάσις between the rulers, for until timarchy is abrogated by law, the poor, if otherwise qualified, are de iure rulers as well as the rich. In Sparta it would be otherwise, because those who failed to pay their contributions to the ἐνσώμα τα ἐπο τοῖς to be rulers; only Plato’s timarchy is not in this particular a copy of Sparta, but rather resembles Crete (547 D, 551 A mm.). See also on 545 C.

11 κατεστήσαντο κτλ. For the aorist cf. 548 D n. ὡς εστός εἰσεῖν is illustrated on 1 341 B. ἔφασεν refers to 544 C.

551 C—553 A There are many grievous faults in the oligarchical city. It makes wealth instead of knowledge the qualification for ruling, is divided against itself, incapable, in all probability, of waging war, and false to our principle of ‘one man, one work.’ Worst of all, Oligarchy is the first constitution which permits a man to dispose of all his property by sale. From this cause springs up a large impoverished class resembling drones, some stingless and others stinging. The former are only poor, but the latter are criminals who have to be repressed by force.

551 C 16 πρῶτον μὲν: sc. ἀμάρτημα (ἔστιν).

ὁρὸς—ἔστιν: ‘terminus eius qualis sit.’ ὁρὸς is the limit or defining mark which separates it from all the other πολιτείαι: cf. I 331 D. Few will approve of Badham’s conjecture τοῦτο αὐτῷ ὁρὸς αὐτῆς οὖν ἔστι, especially as ὁρὸς echoes ὁρὸν in 531 A. οὖν ἔστιν, ἀδρε: el γὰρ νέων κτλ. (Liebhold) is scarcely less unhappy. The text is above suspicion.

17 el νέων κτλ. The illustration is a favourite one both with Socrates and Plato: cf. Xen. Mem. III 9. 11 and supra VI 488 A ff. mm. There is probably no aposiopesis after ἐπιτρέπω: we should translate ‘Just consider if one were to choose pilots on the census principle and refuse to let a poor man steer though better qualified!’

18 πονηρὰν κτλ. “Adimantus quasi non videre, sed quid videat renuntiare iussus, πονηρὰν, inquit, τὴν ναυτικὰν αὐτοῦ ναυτὶλλουσα sc. ὀρῷ” (Schneider). Cf. VII 535 C m. This explanation is, I think, easier than that of Stallbaum, who prints ἄδρει γάρ’ el νεών κτλ., understand-
ing [after ἐπίτρεπον] τὸ λέγον ἄν περὶ
tοῦτο; or the like, and λέγομεν ἄν
to govern the accusative with infinitive. J.
and C.’s solution is in principle the same
as Stallbaum’s. The text may be corrupt,
but no convincing emendation has hitherto
been offered. The different proposals are
ἐλκός (Ast, Richards) and ἄν εἰν δεος (Lieb-
hold) for ἦ δ’ ὁς: <φαιν ἄν> added after
خدام ὁς (Stephanus): πονηρὰ εἰν ἄν ναυτιλία
αὐτοῖς ναυτιλέσθαι (Ast): πονηρὰ <ἀνάγ-
κη> κτλ. Richards—but it would surely
be better to add the word after ναυτιλια.
I have sometimes fancied that Plato wrote
πονηρὰν, ἦ δ’ ὁς, τὴν ναυτιλίαν αὐτοῖς
ναυτιλέσθαι, taking the accusative as in
apposition to the previous sentence (cf.
in some respects Ἰππ. Μαί. 291 e and
infra 567 c), but, for a reason to be
mentioned presently on 551 b, perhaps
ναυτιλιαν <ἀνάγκη> is right.
19. περὶ ἄλλου κτλ. See cr. n. ἂν
tωσ is retained by Schneider, who takes it
as neuter, and ὕτοιν ὡς as masculine.
The words can hardly be anything ex-
cept a gloss or variant on ὅτοιν: the
corrections ἤτοινος or ἤτοινοι (Ast)
are much less easy and probable. περὶ
governς ἀρχής, on which ἄλλοι ὅτοιν,
which is neuter, depends. Cobet’s περὶ
ἄλλης ὅτοιν ὅτοιν ἀρχής ("about any
other ἀρχή whatsoever") does not suit
with πλὴν πόλεως (i.e. ἄλλοι—not ἄλλης
—ἀτοιν ὅτοιν πόλεος).

551 d 24 ἡ μὴ μιᾶν κτλ. Aristotle

(Pol. E 12. 1316d 6 ff.) urges that this is
equally true of all States where inequality
of property prevails: but Plato would
not allow that it is true of his ideal city,
or even of timarchy except in so far as
timarchy is itself oligarchical (548 A).

ἀνάγκη. See cr. n. The word could
be dispensed with here, and, as all those
mm which are in the habit of writing the
iota subscript at all regularly appear
to have the nominative and not the
dative, it is possible, and even perhaps probable,
that this is the ἀνάγκη which Richards
desiderated in 551 c; see note ad loc.

27. τὸ ἀδύνατον κτλ. The sense of
course is ‘to be—probably—unable’ i.e.
‘that they are in all probability unable.’
Richard says ὅως is ‘flees’; to me it
seems exactly the right word in the right
place. The conjectures ὅος (Badham) and
ἰχόμως (Richards) are each of them for
different reasons very unpleasing, and
even if the passage were corrupt ἰχόμως
is far too violent a change to deserve con-
sideration.

28. ἰχόμως κτλ. In illustration
the Oxford editors cite Thuc. III 27.
The Spartans in particular had regularly
to arm and employ the πυθός; both
Perioeci and Helots, in their wars (see
e.g. Thuc. vii 19, 3), and were conse-
quently sometimes exposed to grave
dangers (Thuc. iv 80).

551 e 29 ἄλλος ὀλγάρχικος:
‘literally oligarchical or masters of few’
(Herren von wenigen, Schneider). Cf. ολιγαρχίας 555 Α. Ν. and (for ὁ άληθῷς) VI 511 Β. Ν. Jowett’s translation “few to fight as they are few to rule” does not bring out the peculiar force of ολιγαρχίας here.


πάλαι. 1V 434 Α. Α. 552 Α. 4 το ἔχειν κτλ. According to some ancient authorities (cited in Hermann-Thumerl I. c. pp. 186 f.), the constitution of Lycurgus absolutely forbade the alienation of a certain minimum of the original κληρος, called the ἀρχαία μοῖρα. The evidence of Plato does not go far, but so far as it does go, it supports this view; for he says that oligarchy is the first polity which permits a citizen πάντα τὰ αὐτῶν ἀποδίδοντα: cf. also Laws 744 D. Aristotle says nothing of the ἀρχαία μοῖρα, and states that a Spartan might legally part with his estate by gift or bequest, although to sell it was ὁ καλὸν (Pol. B 9. 1270 α 19 ff.). The conflict of evidence is discussed by Newman and Susemihl on Arist. I. c.: see also on the other side Hermann-Thumerl I. c. pp. 259 f. In many Greek States besides Sparta it was either illegal, or at least dishonourable, to dispose of the ‘ancient lot’: see Whibley Gk. Olig. pp. 113–115.

552 Β 8 οὐκόν κτλ. Schneider was the first to give this sentence to Adimantus, and ὁρθῶς to Socrates, “qui quum paucorum gubernationem primam illud vitium recipere persuasum habuerat eamque sententiam verbis ὁρα δὴ etc. aperte demonstrasset, suffragante Adimanto rursus in dubium sine causa rem vocare non debet.” Cf. 554 Β. Baiter and others ought not to have reverted to the old arrangement. For οὐκόν—γε see Neil’s edition of the Knights of Aristophanes p. 195.

11 εἰς δὲ: i.e. for χρηματισμὸς, δημοιρία and the other purposes specified in 552 Α. 13 ἐδοκεῖ: sc. ἀλλὸ τι ἀναλωθῆς (Schneider). This explanation, which is, I think, nearer and more pointed than to supply τῶν ἀρχαίων, makes ὅπο —ἀναλωθῆς indispensable. Herwerden was wrong in any case when he bracketed these words.
15 ἐν κηρίῳ κηφήν ἐγγίγνεται, σμήνους νόσημα, οὕτω καὶ τὸν τοιούτον ἐν ὁικίᾳ κηφήνα ἐγγίγνεσθαι, νόσημα πόλεως; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ὁ Σώκρατες. Ὁκινοῦν, ὃ Ἀδείμαντε, τῶν μὲν πτεινοὺς κηφήνας πάντας ἀκέντρους ὁ θεὸς πεποίηκεν, τοὺς δὲ πεζοὺς τούτους ἐνίους μὲν αὐτῶν ἀκέντρους, ἐνίους δὲ δεινὰ κέντρα ἔχοντας; καὶ ἐκ μὲν 20 τῶν ἀκέντρων πτωχοὶ πρὸς τὸ γῆρας τελευτῶσιν, ἐκ δὲ τῶν δικεκέντρωμένων πάντας ὁ θεὸς κέκληματι κακοῦργοι; ἐγήθεσται, ἔφη. Δῆλον ἄρα, ἴν ὁ ἔγο, ἐν πόλει, οὗ ἐν ἑδής πτωχοὺς, ὅτι εἰς τούτῳ τῷ τόπῳ ἀποκεκέντρωμεν κλέπται τε καὶ θαλλαν- πτότομοι καὶ ἱερόσυλοι καὶ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων κακῶν δημιουργοί. 25 Δῆλον, ἔφη. Τί οὖν; ἐν ταῖς διηγηματικές πόλεσι πτωχοὺς οὐχ ὀρᾶς ἔνοτας; Ὁλίγοι τί, ἔφη, πάντας τούς ἐκτὸς τῶν ἀρχιντών. Μὴ οὖν οἰώμεθα, ἔφην ἔγο, καὶ κακοὶ κρίνουσι πολλοὺς ἐν αὐτάις εἶναι κέντρα ἔχοντας, οὐς ἐπιμελεῖα βία κατέχουσιν αἱ 25. δῆλον, ἔφη II: om. A. 27. οἰώμεθα Λ: οἰώμεθα Λ:Π:γ.

552 C 15 ἐν κηρίῳ: not 'in the hive' (as D. and V.), but 'in a cell.' The drone-cell in which the drone is produced stands to the whole hive as the oikia to the πόλεις. For κηρίον in this sense, see Bonitz Ind. Arist. s.v. τοῦ τοιούτου—κηφήνα. The comparison is frequent in Greek literature from Hesiod onwards (Od. 304 ff.); see Ruhnken on Tim. Lex. s.v. κηφήνας κοθόρρουσα and Blaydes on Ar. Wasps 1114. "We would purge the land of the drones, that rob the bee of her honey" (Perciles Prince of ∆γκρις 11. 59). 20 τελευτῶσιν: i.e. τελευτῶτας εἰςον. 'To the stingless belong those who die paupers in their old age.' πρὸς τὸ γήρας is adverbial as in vi. 498 A. Stallbaum and others understand τελευτῶσιν as only 'tandem Hunt'; but the other view—Schneider's—is better and more natural: cf. Ν. 372 D γηραιοὶ τελευτῶτες and Ἑζυρ. 179 E. 552 D 21 πάντες: sc. εἰσὶν (understood from τελευτῶσιν) rather than γῆ- ροτα (as J. and C. explain). 22 ἐν πόλει κτλ. Compare the melancholy picture of Athens in Isocrates Aρετ. 83 τόσα μὲν οὐδέτερα ἐν τῶν πολιτῶν ἐνεισὶ τῶν ἀνακαινιστήν, οὗτος προσφέροντος τοὺς ἐντυχεῖόν τινα τῶν πόλεως κατήχειν, τόν δὲ πλεῖον εἰσίν οἵ σταυρούσας τῶν ἐφήνων, οἵ δὲ ἐξέχων ἐστιν πολλὰ συγγεγυμνά ἔχουσιν, εἰ μὲν δὲ τῶν κοινῶν φροτίζοντο συνά τούτο σκοπούσιν, ὑπῆρθεν τὸν ἀλ ἀπαράστατον ἡμε- rαν διάζοντως. The Aποσκευή was published about 354 B.C. 26 Ὁλίγοι γε—ἀρχιντῶν. Plato's description may be illustrated from the state of Athens just before Solon's legislation: see Solon Fr. 36 ed. Bergk = Arist. Ath. Pol. 12. 4. The words χρησιμὸν λέγοντας (in line 9 of the fragment) are certainly not, as some have thought, a corruption of χρησιμοὸν φυγότας (as in Aristotle's text), but point to a different recension. χρη- σιμοῦ λέγοντας 'gathering alms' has been suggested (cf. χρησιμοῦ, χρησιμοῦσθαι), and may I think be the original from which the first of the two variants comes. 27 μὴ οὖν οἰώμεθα: 'are we, then, not to suppose?' μή is not 'num,' but the negative and goes with οἰώμεθα: cf. Ν. 337 B μὴ ἀποκρίσεσθαι ὑν προκάτοικοι μῆδεν; and infra 554 B with other examples cited by Stallbaum; see also Kühner Cr. Gr. Π. p. 187. The positive counterpart of this idiom is οἰώμεθα or βούλει οἰώμεθα: and the negative is due to the jussive idea on which the subjunctive logically depends. οἰώμεθα (see cr. n.) is retained by Schneider and others, μή being construed as 'num.' But 'we do not, then, suppose, do we,' overdoes the irony, and Stallbaum's explanation is better in every way. On the interchange of ο and ω in Paris A see Introd. 8 §. 5. 552 E 28 ἐπιμελεῖα (=deliberately,) 'consulto,' is a rare but well-established adverb: see Xen. Cyr. ν 3. 47, Mag. Eq.
VIII. "Ἀρ' οὖν ὁδὲ μάλιστα εἰς ὀλιγαρκίαν ἐκ τοῦ τιμοκρατ-5

tικοῦ ἑκεῖνον μεταβάλλει; Πῶς; "Ὅταν αὐτὸν παῖς γενόμενος

tὸ μὲν πρῶτον ξηλοὶ τε τὸν πατέρα καὶ τὰ ἑκεῖνου ἱχνὶ διώκη,

Β ἑπείτα αὐτὸν ἵδη ἐξαίφνης πταίσαντα 1 ὀσπερ πρὸς ἔρματι πρὸς τῇ

29. ὀλέμβα Α\(^2\): ὀλέμβα Α\(^1\)ΙΠ\(^2\). 5. εἰς Α\(^2\)Π: ομ. Α\(^1\).
Πόλει, καὶ ἐκχέαντα τά τε αὐτοῦ καὶ ἕαυτον, ἡ στρατηγήσαντα ἡ το τιν' ἄλλην μεγάλην ἄρχην ἄρξατα, εἶτα, εἰς δικαστήριον ἐμπεσόντα, βλαστόμενον ὑπὸ συκοφαντῶν ἡ ἀποβανόντα ἡ ἐκπεσόντα ἡ ἀτιμωθέντα καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ἀπασάν ἀποβαλόντα—Εἰκός γ', ἔφη. Ἰδὼν δὲ γε, ὃ φίλε, ταύτα καὶ παθῶν καὶ ἀπολέσας τά ὑντα δείσας, οἶμαι, εὐθὺς ἐπὶ κεφαλὴν ὀδοὶ ἐκ τοῦ θρόνου τοῦ ἐν τῇ ἐαυτῷ 15 ψυχῇ φιλοτιμίαν τε καὶ τὸ θυμοειδὲς ἑκείνο, καὶ ταπεινωθεὶς ὑπὸ σπείρια πρὸς χρηματισμὸν τραπόμενος γλίσχρος καὶ κατὰ σκιρκνὸν φειδόμενος καὶ ἐργαζόμενος χρῆματα ἐξυλλέγεται. ἀρ' οὐκ οἶδε τὸν τοιοῦτο τότε εἰς μὲν τοῦ θρόνον ἑκείνου τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν τε καὶ φιλοχρήματον ἐγκαθίσθαι καὶ μέγαν βασιλέα ποιεῖν ἐν ἐαυτῷ, 20 τιάρας τε καὶ στρεπτοῦσ καὶ ἀκινάκας παραξωνύντα; "Εγὼ ἐφ', ἔφη. Τὸ δὲ γε, οἶμαι, λογιστικὸν τε καὶ θυμοειδὲς χαμαὶ ἐνθὲν D καὶ ἐνθὲν παρακαλίσας ὑπ' ἑκείνο καὶ καταδουλωτάμενος, τὸ μὲν οὐδὲν ἀλλ' ἐὰν λογίζεσθαι οὐδὲ σκοτεῖν ἀλλ' ἡ ὅποθεν εἶ ἐλαττώνων

9. ἡ τιν' Εξ; δὲ τὴν ΑΠ. 18. τὸ Εξ; τὸν ΑΠ. 17. ἐξυλλέγεται Εξ:3; ἐξυλλέγεται ΑΠ q'.

9 ἡ στρατηγήσαντα κτλ. The words ἡ στρατηγήσαντα—ἀποβαλόντα interpret the figure in εξαφέρω παίσαντα—εὐαπτοῦν: 'having either been a Strategus or held some other high office, and then, when brought to trial, been either put to death, or banished, or disfranchised and deprived of all his property, by the damaging evidence of lying informers.' βλαστόμενον ὑπὸ συκοφαντῶν might be taken as subordinate to ἐμπεσόντα, but πρὸς πόλει παίσαντα seems rather to imply that the prosecution is not wholly vexatious, although the evidence turns out to be so. Some misfortune, such as happened for example at the battle of Arginusae (Xen. Hell. 1. 33 ff., 7. 4 ff., with Grote v pp. 411 ff.), arouses a great wave of popular feeling, in consequence of which the general is put upon his trial, and συκοφάνται manage to secure his condemnation (cf. Xen. l.c. 17. 11). Badham and Cobet ignominiously expel βλαστόμενον, apparently for no better reason than that ἐμπεσόντα can be followed by ὑπὸ of the agent (Cobet N. L. p. 752, V. L. 2 p. 54). If the passage is taken as I take it, βλαστόμενον cannot be cancelled without grave inconvenience; and even if βλαστόμενον ὑπὸ συκοφαντῶν be construed with ἐμπεσόντα, its excision is unnecessary. On the mischife wrought by συκοφάνται in Athens see Hermann-Thumser Gr. Staatsalt. p. 660 nn. 2—4.

553 C 17 ἐξυλλέγεται. See cr. n. and 550 A, 553 A nn. ἐξυλλέγεται is impossible after ὀδοὶ, and ὀδοὶ would be very awkward.


553 D 21 χαμαὶ—παρακαλίσας. Plato makes them squat like servile Oriental courtiers. The picture expresses with admirable clearness the psychological basis of Plato’s sequence of polities: see on 547 c and 550 c, and compare the lines of Milton Paradise Lost 1 x 1127 ff. “Understanding ruled not, and the will Heard not her lore; both in subjection now To sensual appetite, who from beneath Usurping, over sovan reason claimed Superior sway.” The poet Gray’s note, though not, I think, correct, is worthy of quotation: “An allusion to those statues or bas-reliefs where some king, or conqueror, is represented with captive nations in chains sitting at his feet; as in that erected to the honour of Justinian, in the Hippodrome at Constantinople.”

22 καὶ καταδουλωτάμενος is excised by J. J. Hartmann: but see v 451 B n.
554 B]

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χρημάτων πλείω ἐσται, τὸ δὲ αὐθεντικόν καὶ τιμᾶν μηδὲν ἄλλο ἢ ἀνθρώπων καὶ πλουσίων, καὶ φιλοτεμεῖσθαι μηδὲ ἐφ' ἐνὶ άλλῳ 25 ἢ ἐπὶ χρημάτων κτῆσει καὶ ἐὰν τὸ ἄλλο εἰς τοῦτο φέρῃ. Οὖκ ἐστὶ άλλη, ἐφη, μεταβολὴ οὕτω ταχεῖα τε καὶ ἱσχυρὰ ἐκ φιλοτήμων οἴον Ε εἰς φιλοχρήματον. Ἡ γοῦν μεταβολὴ αὐτοῦ εἰς ὀμοίων ἀνθρώπος ἐστι τῇ πολιτείᾳ, εἷς ἐς 554 η ὀλυμπρία μετέτητο. Σκοπῶμεν δὴ εἰ ὀμοίος ἀν ἐνί. | Σκοπῶμεν. 30

IX. Οὗκοι πρῶτον μὲν τῷ χρήματα περὶ πλείστων ποιεῖσθαι ὀμοίος ἀν εἰ; Πῶς δ' ὦ; Καὶ μὴν τῷ γε φειδωλὸς εἶναι καὶ ἐργάτης, τὰς ἀναγκαίους ἐπιθυμίας μόνον τῶν παρ᾽ αὐτῷ ἀποτελεῖσθαι, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ἀναλόγως μὴ παρεχόμενοι, ἄλλα δουλεύμενοι 5 τὰς ἀλλὰ ἐπιθυμίας ὑπὲρ ματαιοῖς. Πῶς μὲν οὖν. Αὐχυρός γέ τις ἢς, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ὁ οἷς καὶ ἀπὸ παιστέων περιουσίων ποιοῦμεν, θησαυρο- 

B ποιοὶ ἀνήρ: οὖς δὴ καὶ ἐπανεῖρ τὸ πλήθος. ἦ οὖς οὗτος ἀν εἰ; ὁ τῇ τοιαύτῃ πολιτείᾳ ὀμοίος; Ἐμοὶ γοῦν, ἐφη, δοκεῖ χρήματα γοῦν μᾶλστα ἐντιμα τῇ τε σύλλει καὶ παρὰ τῷ τοιοῦτῳ. Οὐ γὰρ, τοι, ὥμως, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, παίδεα ὅ τοιοῦτος προσεχθείην. Οὐ δοκοῦ, ἐφη: οὐ γὰρ ἂν τυφλὸν ἠμέρῳ τοῦ χαροῦ ἐστήσατο καὶ ἐτίμα μᾶλστα.

12. Ita Schneider. ἐστίσατο. Καὶ ἐτι μᾶλστα εὐ Λ.

24 μηδὲν is written rather than οὐδὲν owing to the infinitives θαυμάζειν καὶ τιμᾶν.
27 ἀλλη: i.e. other than you have just described. Jovett's translation "Of all changes, he said, there is none so speedy or so sure as the conversion of the ambitious youth into the avaricious one" is quite wrong.
553 E 30 ἐθ. Stallbaum and some others place a mark of interrogation after ἐθ: "quod ego non penitus ineptum, sed inter proxime praeecedentem et proxime sequentem interrogationem minus aptum existimò" (Schneider). Cf. 550 c.
554 A—555 B 'In character, the oligarchical man resembles the oligarchical State. He gratifies his 'necessary' desires and no others. He is avareous, niggardly, sordid, and the blind god of wealth is leader of the chorus of his soul. From time to time, as opportunity offers, the drone-like desires within him assert themselves, but for the most part he forcibly represses them through fear of consequences. Thus, although his soul is a prey to sedition, his better desires generally prevail over those which are worse. In public competitions he is usually content to be beaten and save his money.
554 A 4 εργάτης: not simply 'hard-working' (D. and V.), but with reference to illiberalis labor.
ἀναγκαῖος. This form of the feminine recurs in IV 425 D, supra 558 D. 559 A. 561 A (ter) and IX 571 C; but in 558 D we have ἀναγκαία, and ἀναγκαία in 559 B, C. See Schneider on IV 425 D. There is no justification for making ἀναγκαῖος consistently an adjective of either two or three terminations (as suggested by Richards). The full meaning of ἀναγκαῖος ἐπιθύμηα is explained in 558 D ff.
5 τὰ ἀλλα ἀναλόματα "sunt pecuniae in cetera impenedendae, quas hic negatur παρέχεσθαι, de suis prebente" (Schneider). With ἀλλα καὶ ἀλλας 554 C, and with παρεχόμενοι IV 421 D H. The translation 'not affording or allowing himself' (J. and C.) is inaccurate. παρεχόμενοι, which was read, with slight MS authority, before Bekker, has been rightly discarded by later editors.
8 οὐς δή. For the plural cf. (with Stallbaum) Laws 906 D and Eur. Hel. 440 εἴπην περικόμω, ὥσιν οὐκ ἐπιστροφεῖν. See also on I 347 A.
554 B 12 τυφλὸν κτλ. τῶν Πλοῦτων,
οἶμα, φωνεῖ says a Scholiast in the margin of A. See Blaydes on Ar. Plut. 90. Hirmer (Enst. u. Komp. d., Pl. Pol. p. 658 n.) doubts whether the god of Wealth is represented as blind earlier than Aristophanes; but a σκόλιον of Timocreon began ὠφλεῖν σ’ ὠ τυφήλῃ Πολίτε (Schol. on Ar. Ach. 532). With the figure in τοῦ χαρώ cf. vii 490 c and infra 560 e.

ἐνίμα μάλιστα. See cr. n. Schneider’s admirable emendation is now universally accepted: cf. μάλιστα ἐνίμα above and τιμῶν μιθεῖν ἄλλο ή πλοῦτον 553 D. On the corruption see Introd. § 8.

13 κηφηνώδεις κτλ. As oligarchy has ‘drones’ (552 c), so the oligarchical man has ‘drone desires.’ The parallel is worked out with unusual completeness, even for Plato: see on 555 a.

14 μη φώμεν. 552 D n.

554 C 15 κατεχομένας κτλ. Cf. 552 e. ἄλλες = περὶ τὰ ἄλλα: cf. ἄλλα in 554 a. The translation ‘his general habit of carefulness’ (J. and S.) is scarcely right: cf. περὶ τῆς ἄλλης οὐδεὶς τρέμων in D below.

16 αὐτῶν: not κηφηνωδῶν ἐπιθυμῶν, but the plural masculine, in spite of αὑτῷ above (1 347 a n.).

18 ἄστε τώλης κτλ. See ii 359 b n. Socrates would say that the picture which Glauco there draws is only too true of the oligarchical man.

19 τοῦτω δῆλον: ‘clear by this,’ ‘clear from this,’ as in Eur. HIPP. 627 to τοῦτω δήλον and Ar. Plut. 587 (τοῦτο δήλοι). Stallbaum reads τοῦτο with Σ and a majority of the inferior mss; but there is no reason for deserting A and Π. The antecedent to τοῦτω is contained in διὰ τοῦτω—ἄδεικν. From the fact that such a person κακοφυεῖ when he gets the chance, it is clear (says Socrates) that when he εὐδοκίμει δίκαιον δίκαιον he achieves this result only by doing violence to himself.

21 ἐπιείκει κτλ.: ‘by a sort of virtuous self-restraint’ not (as Campbell) ‘by some virtuous element in himself he forcibly restrains.’ βία is a verbal noun as in βία τῶν ἐκθρῶν (566 λ) and the like. τοῖς qualifies ἐπιείκεια: there is no real ἐπιείκεια in this sort of thing: cf. Phaed. 69 A ff.

554 D 24 εὐφρέσεις: see cr. n. The addition of ἐν above the line by Aδ is hardly sufficient to justify εὐφρέσεις, especially as εὐφρέσεις has much more support from the other mss. εὐφρεῖκας has not yet been proved classical (see Jebb on Soph. Αγ. 1144), and Schneider afterwards (Addit. p. 63) retracted his defence of it here. The distance of τοῦτο τώλης from ἄλλους ἐπιθυμεῖν is no real difficulty, especially after ἐπιθυμεῖν ἄλλους just above.

25 τάς τοῦ κηφήνου εὐγνειες κτλ. Cf. vii 519 b, c n. For ἀστασιάσσει see on 545 C: διήλος: like the oligarchical State, which is ‘not one, but two’ (551 D).
554 E 30 ἡμοσομίνης τῆς ψυχῆς. Richards would omit τῆς, but the article (which is in all ms.), implies, I think, that such a soul exists and has already been described, as it has in ἔνα γενόμενον ἐκ πόλλων, σώματος καὶ ἡμοσομίουν IV 443 D, E.

31 ἀναγωγιστῆς γιὰ κτλ. See on 551 E. Susemihl Gen. Est. II p. 232 reminds us of the disinclination on the part of rich Athenians to undertake ἄταναι; see also Herodotus I.c. pp. 657 ff.

555 A 2 τῶν καλῶν; sc. φιλοτιμῶν. In χρήματα τε τὰ τὰ κόμβον its own with the preceding clause, and does not here mean 'both'; σώματω; i.e. φίλον. This interpretation is more idiomatic and forcible than to refer ταύτον to φιλοτιμὸν κτλ.

5 φιλονικῶν κτλ. The ἀληθικός, when competing for μια, is a φιλόνιος ἀνταγωγιστής, because he is afraid to summon his ἀναλωτική ἐπιθυμία 'to fight and strive for victory along with him,' precisely as the oligarchical city was afraid to arm the πληθυν (551 D n.). And just as the oligarchs found themselves ἄνεδος ἀληθικοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ μάχεσθαι (551 B), so the ἀληθικὸς ἀνήκο 'true to his name of oligarch' (ἀληθικός), 'employs but few of his forces in the war, and is usually beaten and keeps his money' ('loses the prize and saves his money') Jowett). The force of ἐπὶ- in ἐμμαχιάζει may perhaps extend to φιλονικὰς (cf. 556 A, κ.) which must not be translated 'rivalry' (with D. and V.), if we see on IX 581 B. ἠτερᾶς καὶ πλουτεῖ ἕνας καὶ ἀμποτιμής on which things can be ἐπίκαινα κατ' ἀλλὰ 'ranged over again against another,' and it is right that in summing up, Plato should emphasise the principle which has determined the form of his exposition from σκέπτεσαν δὲ καὶ ὑπολογίζονται ἐν εἰς (554 A) onwards: see 555 B, D, E, π. For the dative cf. IX 575 C, n.

555 B—557 A Oligarchy is succeeded by Democracy. As dissipated young men in an oligarchical government are permitted and even encouraged to squander their property, a large impoverished class of 'stinging drones' makes its appearance in the city. The rulers take no steps to remedy an evil which increases their own fortunes, and become luxurious and effeminate. In seasons of stress and common danger, the poor discover their own
XI. Δημοκρατίαν δή, ώς ἐνική, μετὰ τοῦτο σκεπτόντων, τίνα τε
10 γίνεσαι τρόπον γενομένη τε ποιών τινα ἔχει, ἣν αὖ τῶν τοῦ τοιούτου
ἀνδρὸς τρόπον γενότες παραστησομέθεν αὐτὸν εἰς κράταν. 'Ομοίως
γοῦν ἂν, ἐφή, ἦμιν αὐτοῦς πορευούμεθα. Οὔκον, ἢν δ’ ἐγὼ, μετα-
βάλλει μὲν τρόπον τινα τοιοῦτε ἐξ ὀλυμπαρίας εἰς δημοκρατίαν, δὴ
ἀπληστίαν του προκειμένου ἀγαθοῦ, τοῦ ὦς πλουσιότατον δεῖν
15 γίγνεσθαι; Πώς δή; "Ατε, οἴμαι, ἀρχούτες ἐν αὐτῇ οἱ ἀρχούντες: Σ
διὰ τὸ πολλά κεκτήσατε, οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν εἰργεῖν νόμοι τῶν νέων ὅσοι
ἀν ἀκόλαστοι γίγνονται, μὴ ἐξεῖναι αὐτοῖς ἀνάλογοι τε καὶ
ἀπολλύναται τα αὐτῶν, ἦν ὄνομενοι τά τῶν τοιούτων καὶ εἰςδανείζο-
ζουτες ἑτὲ πλουσιότεροι καὶ ἐντιμότεροι γίγνονται. Παινός γε
20 μάλλον. Οὔκον δὴν ἦδη τοῦτο ἐν πολλεῖ, ὅτι πλουτὸν τιμᾶν καὶ
σωφροσύνην ἁμα ἱκανός κτᾶσθαι ἐν τοῖς πολίταις ἀδύνατον, | ἀλλ’ 
ἀνάγκη τοῦ ἐτέρου ἀμέλειν ἢ τοῦ ἐτέρου; Ἐπειδής, ἐφῆ, δήλον. 
Παραμελοῦτες δὴ ἐν ταῖς ὀλυμπαρίαις καὶ ἐφειντες ἀκόλασταινε
οὺκ ἀγενεῖς ἐνίοτε ἀνθρώπους πένητας ἡμᾶς ἡγίασαν γενέσθαι.
18. εἰςδανείζοντες Δ’Π: δανείζοντες Αν.

strength and the weakness of the rich, and thereafter it needs but a little impulse to overthrow the rotten fabric. Democracy is established as soon as the introduction of the lot affirms the principle of equality.

555 B 9 δημοκρατίαν δὴ κτλ. We have seen that the dominant feature in the oligarchical State is τὸ φιλοχρήματος, and the present chapter describes how in process of time the polity itself is inevitably overthrown by that very principle. The incidents which prove the immediate cause of revolution are such as may frequently have happened in Greek history: see 556 C, D, E and 557 A α. It is instructive to compare with this chapter Aristotle's a posteriori analysis of the causes of revolution in oligarchical cities (Pol. Ε 6). On the psychological basis of democracy see 557 A α.

11 παραστησιμόθεα κτλ. For the use of παραστησιμόθας Schneider refers to 11 360 E, 361 B and Lucian Λαυρίμου. 17, ἦσοπτε δὴ εἰς τα παραστησιμόθας πολιτείας χρεοῦτα—ἐπειτὰ προστάτες κτλ. 

ἀρμός κτλ. See 543 A α. μετα-

βάλλει=it changes, viz. the πολιτεία. The verb is scarcely impersonal, as the English translators appear to suppose.

14 προκειμένου κτλ. προκειμένου is not "publicly acknowledged" (D. and V.), but 'proposition,' as in τὸ τῆλον τὸ προκει-

μένου. δεῖ (wrongly rejected by J. J. Hartman) 'resumes the notion of προκει-

μένου' (J. and C.). Similar pleonasm occurs in Cris. 44 C, Gorg. 500 C and elsewhere: cf. also εξεῖναι in C below and vii

535 A α.

555 C 15 ἀτε—ἀρχοὺτες κτλ. As in timarchy (550 D ff.), so in oligarchy, it is the love of money which sows the seeds of party strife and political degeneration. Cf. generally 554 A α. and Aristotle Pol. Ε 6. 1305b 39 ff., with his criticism of Plato ibid. 12. 1310b 15 ff.

18 εἰςδανείζοντες: i.e. 'lending money on-the-security-of' (els). Τὸ τα τοι-

ούτων should be taken with the els of εἰςδανείζοντες as well as with ἀνθρώποινι. Cf. Arist. Pol. Ζ 4. 1319b 13 δανείζων εἰς τι μέρος τῆς ὑπαρχόντος ἐκάστος γῆς καὶ Dem. in Aphob. 1:28. The word εἰςδανείζων is a ἀπαξ εἰρήμενον, but we certainly ought not to substitute εἰκαδανείζοντες (suggested by Stephanus) or προδανείζοντες (with Richards).

20 δὴλον ἦδη τοῦτο κτλ. See 550 E α. 555 D 24, οὐκ ἀγενεῖς κτλ. ζε" of no common stamp" etc. (von nicht gemeiner Art. Schneider), not simply 'of noble birth' (as D. and V.). Catiline would
Μάλα γε. Κάθηνται δή, οίμαι, οὕτω εν τῇ πόλει κεκεντρωμένοι 25 τε καὶ ἑξωπλισμένοι, οἱ μὲν ὁφείλοντες χρέα, οἱ δὲ ἁπτομοί γεγονότες, οἱ δὲ ἀμφότερα, μισούντες τε καὶ ἑπιβουλεύοντες τῶν κτησιμένων Ε τὰ αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, νεωτερισμοῦ ἔρωτες. Ἐστί ταῦτα. Οἱ δὲ δὴ χρηματισταὶ ἐγκύψαντες οὐδὲ δοκοῦντες τούτους ὅραν, τῶν λοιπῶν τὸν αἰὲ ὑπείκοντα ἐνενέτας ἀργύριον τυτρόσκοντες καὶ 30 556 τοῦ πατρὸς ἐγκύνων· τόκους πολλαπλασίους κομιζόμενοι πολὺν τῶν κινήματα καὶ πτωχῶν ἐμποιοῦσι τῇ πόλει. Πῶς γὰρ, έφη, οὐ πολὺν; Οὔτε γ' ἐκείνη, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ· τὸ τοιούτου κακῶν ἐκκακομένων ἐθέλουσιν αὐτοῖς, εἰργοῦσι τὰ αὐτῶν ὅτι τις βούλεται τρέπειν, οὔτε τῇδε, ἢν κατὰ ἐτερον νόμον τὰ τοιαῦτα λύεται. 5 Κατὰ δὴ τίνα; 'Οσ μετ' ἐκείνων ἐστὶ δευτέρως καὶ ἀναγκάζων ἀρέτης ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τοὺς πολίτας. ἐὰν γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ κυνίσκον Β τὰ πολλά τις τῶν ἐκουσάτων ἐξιμβολίων προστάτης ἐξιμβαλλέων, χρηματίζομεν μὲν ἢν ἣττον ἀναιδῶς ἐν τῇ πόλει, ἐλάττω δ' ἐν αὐτῇ φύσει τῶν τοιούτων κακῶν, οίων νῦν δὴ εἰπομεν. Καὶ πολὺ 10 have seemed to Plato a case in point (cf. Sallust Cat. 5), and the Catilinarian conspiracy illustrates not inaptly the description which follows (555 B, E). The aorist ἐπισκάπτων is gnomic, as appears from the plural ἐπί ταῖς διήγησισι. 25 κεκεντρωμένου κτλ. See 552 C, D π. Ἐξωπλισμένος does little more than explain the metaphor, mere Platonist: see on V 451 B and cf. καὶ πτωχῶν (wrongly discarded by J. J. Hartman) in 556 A below. 555 E 29 ἐγκύψαντες. τοιαῦτα γὰρ τὰ τῶν ἀγνω χρηματισμῶν καὶ περὶ την διάνοιαν ἐκτόνων σχήματα (Schol. on Ar. Clouds 191). A comparison with IX 586 A κάτω αἰὲ βλέποντες καὶ κεκυφομένες ἐς γῆν suggests that the stoop of the χρηματιστῆς in reality betrays the inherent earthliness of his soul: see on VII 519 A, B and cf. Dante Purg. 19, 70—72. 31 τοῦ πατρὸς κτλ. Cf. VI 507 A π. τόκους is bracketed by Herderben, but τὸν τόκον τε καὶ ἐκτόνων (i.e.) supports it. 556 A 3. οὗτε γε κτλ. καὶ appears before οὕτω in ΗΣς and a majority of MSS, but the reading of A is, I now think, right. We should translate 'At all events, said I, they are unwilling to extinguish this kind of mischief when it is beginning to break into a flame, either by preventing' etc. If they quenched it in its earlier stages, then the πτωχοί would not be πολοί; and πολοί bears the emphasis in both the previous sentences. For this use of γε see 559 B ης., and cf. IX 581 C and (with Schnäider) Isocr. Temig. 153. With εκκακομένως cf. Ar. Peace 1132. D. and V, understand the word of 'cauterizing,' wrongly, as ἀποσβεβηκόνως shows. 4 ὅτη. I formerly, with two inferior MSS, Bekker and Ast, read ὅτι, which is certainly more exact: see the examples cited by Blaydes on Ar. Clouds 858 τὰς τ' ἐμβαθάδας ποι ὑπερφαίνει; The verb βουλεῖται is however treated as but a mere auxiliary, and the relative accommodated to it by a species of attraction, even at the cost of sacrificing something of the peculiar force of τρέων. Translate 'to dispose of one's property as one likes,' 5 ἐπερον νόμον. Plato's language here and in δὲ μετ' ἐκείνων ὅτι δεύτερος seems to imply that such a law would not be altogether a novelty in Greece. According to Theophrastus (πραγ. 97 L Wimmer-Stob. Φλορ. 44·22), it found a place among the laws of Charondas: ἐκ τῆς ποιτείας, μὴ εἶναι δίκην· αὐτὸν γὰρ ἄτιον εἶναι τῆς ἄδικος. Plato makes a similar provision in Laws 742 C, 849 E, 915 E.
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ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ  [556 Β]

γε, ἦ δ' ὄς. Νῦν δὲ γ', ἐφην ἐγ', διὰ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα τοὺς μὲν
dὴ ἀρχομένους οὔτω διαπᾶσιν εἰ τῇ πόλει οἱ ἄρχοντες· σφᾶς δὲ
αὐτοὺς καὶ τοὺς αὐτῶν ἂρ' οὐ τρυφώντας μὲν τοὺς νέους καὶ ἀπόνους
καὶ πρὸς τὰ τοῦ σώματος καὶ πρὸς τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς, μαλακοὺς δὲ
15 καρτερεῖν πρὸς ἡδονᾶς τε καὶ λύπας καὶ ἄργοις· Τῇ μήν·
Αὐτοὺς δὲ πλὴν χρηματισμοῦ τὸν ἄλλων ἡμεληκότας, καὶ οὐδὲν πλείον
ἐπιμελεῖσαν πεποιημένους ἀρέτης ἤ τοὺς πένητας; Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.
Οὔτω δὴ παρεσκευασμένοι ὅταν παραβάλλοοιν ἄλληλους οἱ τε
ἀρχοντες καὶ οἱ ἄρχομενοι ἢ ἐν ὅδων πορείας ἢ ἐν ἄλλαις τισὶ
20 κοινονίαις, ἢ κατὰ θεωρίαν ἢ κατὰ στρατείας, ἢ ἐμπυλοὶ γνωμίμοιον
ὑποστρατίζατοι, ἢ καὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς κινδύνοις ἄλληλους θεωμένοι
μιθαμῇ ταύτη καταφρονώνται οἱ πένητες ὑπὸ τῶν πλουσίων, ἄλλα
tολλάκια ἵναν ἄνηρ πένης, ἢλιομένοις, παραταχθεῖς ἐν μάχῃ
πλουσίων ἐκκαταρισμοτι, τολλάς ἔχοντι σάρκας ἀλλοτρίας, ἴδῃ

556 Β 11 τοὺς μὲν δὴ κτλ. μὲν balances δὲ after σφᾶς, and should not be
taken in the ordinary sense of the
colocation μὲν δὴ: so that there is no
reason to omit δὴ (with Σ and two other
ms) on the ground that μὲν δὴ comes too
late in the sentence. δὴ "prior membro
dilatando inserit et vinculi per μὲν
iniecit nexum relaxans alterum membrum
ut nova interrogatione instructum minus
miremur efficit" (Schneider, comparing
Laws 751 ε').
13 ἂρ οὐ τρυφώντας κτλ. Note the
usual Platonic chiasmus.

556 C, D 18 παραβάλλοοιν: 'come
alongside,' originally perhaps a nautical
expression (J. and C.), as in Arist. de gen.
anim. III ΙΙ. 763 a 31. The usage occurs
again in Lys. 203 b, and tolerably often in
Aristotle.
21 ἡ καὶ κτλ. οὔτω extends its in-
fluence to καταφρονῶνται and ἴδῃ. On
θεωμένοι κτλ. Schneider remarks "post
verba ἄλληλοις θεωμένοι exspectabantur
μιθαμῆ ὢν πρότερον περὶ ἄλληλων διανοϊ-
ωνται, vel tale quid, quod ad utroque se
invicem consciemtes pertineret; cuius
loco statim divisione facta quid iam de
pauperibus divites, de divitiis pauperes
sentiant, infertur. Cuius non inconse-
quientiae, sed breviloquentiae signifacandae
causa supra post θεωμένοι comra—sus-
tuli." The effect is analogous to that
produced by so-called partitive apposition
(IV 431 Α Ν.), of which idiom a somewhat
similar extension occurs in ν 465 C, where
see note. Richards suspects corruption,
proposing to read either (1) θεωμένων and
perhaps also ἡ καὶ or ἡ καὶ <ἐκαί> in-
stead of ἡ καὶ, or (2) simply to insert καὶ
before μιθαμῆ. The second proposal is
near and scholarly; but καὶ was unlikely
to disappear, and Plato's rapidity of
thought and style renders him particularly
liable to grammatical and other irregu-
larities in his more spirited and dramatic
passages: cf. VI 488 C, D, VII 531 A, and
infra 558 A. See also on 549 D above.

556 D 22 ταύτη is emphatic, im-
plying that it is otherwise when danger
does not threaten.
24 πολλὰς κτλ.: 'with quantities of
alien fat about him' (viel fremdes Fleisch
an sich habend, Schneider), 'cumbered
with much fat.' παχοὶς 'blotted' was,
it may be remembered, a nickname
for oligarchs: see Gilbert Gr. Staatsalt.
II p. 275 n. 2 and Neil's edition of Ar.
Knights App. II p. 209. ἀλλοτρίας is 'not
his own,' i.e. no real part of him, and hence
useless, superfluous. As Graser points
out (Spec. advers. in serm. Pl. p. 91), it
is Homer's γραθομίοις ἀλλοτρίωσι (Od.
XX 347) which is the source of this and
other kindred uses of ἀλλοτρίως, e.g. Thuc.
I 70. 6 and Isoc. Paneg. 86. Hermann
thinks the meaning is that he has grown
fat at the expense of others, like the
drone. This explanation is less pointed,
and the drone represents not the rich
oligarch, but the πτωχός (555 ν). With
the feeling of this passage cf. Plut. Αρισθ.
557 A] ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΣ Η 233

άσθματός τε καὶ ἀπορίας μεστόν, ἄρ' οἶει αὐτόν οὖν ἤγείοντο κακία 25
τῇ σφετέρᾳ πλουτείᾳ τοὺς τοιούτους, καὶ ἄλλω ἀλλῳ παραγγέλλειν,
Ε ὅταν ἠδια ἔγγυνησωνται, ὡς ἄνδρες ἡμέτεροι: 1 εἰσὶ γὰρ οὖν ἐνδέχεται γ attentive
οὐδὲν μὲν οὖν, ἐφὶ, ἔγογε, ὡς οὔτω ποιοῦσιν. Ὕποκοι ὁσπερ σῶμα
νοσώδες μικρὰς ῥοπῆς ἔξωθεν δεῖται προσλαβέσθαι πρὸς τὸ κάμπνειν,
ἐνιοτέρος δὲ καὶ ἄνευ τῶν ἔξω στασίας αὐτῷ αὐτόν, οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἣ
κατὰ ταῦτα ἐκείνω διακαμένη πόλεις ἀπὸ σμικρᾶς προφάσεως,
ἔξωθεν ἐπαγομένῃ ἥ τῶν ἑτέρων μὲν ὄλογοροχυμείνης πόλεως συμ-
μαχίαν ἥ τῶν ἑτέρων ἐκ δημοκρατομείνης νοσεῖ τε καὶ αὐτῇ αὕτη
557 μάχεται, ἐνιοτέρος δὲ καὶ ἄνευ τῶν ἔξω στασίας; | Καὶ σφόδρα γε,
Δημοκρατία δὴ, οἴμαι, γνῷται, ὅταν οἱ πέντες νικήσαντες τοὺς
μὲν ἀποκτείνωσι τῶν ἑτέρων, τοὺς δὲ ἐκβάλωσι, τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς ἐξ
ἴσου μεταδόσει πολιτείας τε καὶ ἀρχῶν καὶ ὡς τὸ πολὺ ἀπὸ κλήρων
32. ἐπαγομένων—συμμαχίαν II et in marg. Α²: om. Α¹. 33. νοσεῖ Α²Π:
νοσεῖν Α¹.

Reg. et Imp. 192 D τοῖς πολυτάρκεις ἐπο-
λέως ('Ἑπαμεινώδος) καὶ τινα τοιούτουν
ἀπῆλθε τῆς σφετέρας, εἰτέρων διά μόνις
αὐτοῦ σκέψεως τὴν γαστέρα ἀσπίδας τρεῖς
η ἁπάντες.

27 ἄνδρες—οὖν. 'We have them
at our mercy: for they're good for no-
thing.' ἄνδρες ἡμέτεροι is virtually an
exhortation to rise in revolt: hence παρα-
γελλεῖν. The omission of the article
heightens the dramatic effect: cf. X 617 D.
ἡμέτερος has a colloquial ring ('they are
ours'). A kindred meaning, but without
any colloquial touch, appears in Xen.
Cyri. II 3 2 (quoted by Schneider Addit.
p. 62) ἦς μὲν ἡμεῖς νικῶμεν—δολὸς δὲν ἦ
τε πολέμου ἡμέτερος καὶ τὰ τῶν πολεμίων
ἀσάβα πάντα: cf. also VII 5 73. This
interpretation, which Schneider finally
suggested, has the support of A, II and
other MSS. Baiter's ἄνδρες ἡμέτεροι εἰσὶ
παρ' οὖν ἐνδέχεται a priori to have found considerable favour,
and gives a fair sense, but παρ' οὖν (for
which see Jebb on Soph. Ant. 466) ap-
ppears to me unpleasantly weak. ἄνδρες
ἡμέτεροι εἰσὶν οὖν (ἤ and others) is
intrinsicly better (cf. 562 D), and may be
right, but the intrusion of γάρ in the best
MSS remains a difficulty, and παραγγέλλειν
(as in Baiter's reading) is shorn perhaps
of its full force. It is on the whole easier,
I think, to understand ἡμέτεροι as I do
than to explain the insertion of γάρ in
our two oldest and best MSS.

556 Ε 28 οὐκοῦν ὡσπερ κτλ. Cf.
Soph. Ο. T. 961 μικρὰ παλαιὰ σφυστ
ἐνδέχεται ῥοπῆ. The Platonic simile
is imitated by Arist. Pol. 2 6. 1320b 33 ff.
and may also, as Stallbaum thinks, have
been in Demosthenes' mind when he wrote
Ol. II 21.

32 ἔξωθεν ἐπαγομένων κτλ. A familiar
feature in the history of Greek revolu-
tions: cf. Whibley Gk Olig. p. 51 and
(for examples) Gilbert Gr. Staatsalt. II passim.

557 Λ 4 καὶ ὡς τὸ πολὺ κτλ.: 'and
the magistracies in the city are for the
most part given by lot.' These words,
which depend, of course, on ὡς, explain
ἐξ ίσου—ἀρχῶν, and should be taken in
close connexion with that clause, as Ast
long ago pointed out. The difference in
tense (μεταδοθέω γάρ γνώσται), no less
than the meaning, clearly indicates that
the two clauses do not express two
separate and distinct acts. It is by
means of the lot that ἡσύχασθαι is secured;
and hence democracy is not established
until offices are assigned thereby: cf.
Hdt. III 80 πάλαι μὲν ἀρχήμεν ἀρχεῖ
Arist. Rhet. 1 8. 1365 b 32 δημοκρατία μὲν
πολιτεία ἐν ἧ κλήρῳ διανείμονται τὰς
ἀρχᾶς, with Whibley Gk Olig. p. 35 and
The clause was, strangely enough, condemned
by Hermann. Plato was not likely to
omit all mention of the most character-
istic and necessary factor in the establish-
ment of a democracy, especially as he
introduces the same feature in describing the democratic man (§61 B ἄρχων λαχώνη). J. and C., with Schneider and others, read γέγονεν, for which there is very little ἡς support, remarking that "the subjunctive is inexact, because any words dependent on ὅταν should describe a characteristic of the origin of democracy, not merely a characteristic of democracy." The fact is that the words do explain the origin of democracy by explaining ἵνα τον μεταβοσ κτλ., where the aorist is rightly used of the act by which democracy is established; whereas if we read γέγονεν the clause must be taken by itself, and then it can only express a characteristic of democracy after that constitution is in force, so that its proper place would be in the next chapter. It should be observed that in no ancient democracy that we know of was the lot employed in electing to all magistracies; see Gilbert l.c. II p. 318. For this reason Plato writes ὅταν το πολ. 557 A—558 C The peculiar characteristics of Democracy are liberty and licence. It is of all governments the most manifold and many-coloured, resembling a bazaar of constitutions rather than a single polity. In a democratic city the individual is free to adopt his own policy independently of the State. Little trouble is taken to execute judicial sentences. The people are indulgent to educational defects in their leaders and require nothing beyond a profession of loyalty to the masses. Truly a delightful constitution, full of anarchy and colour, distributing a species of equality to equal and unequal alike! 557 A 8 τίνα δέ ὅν κτλ. The psychological principle of Democracy, as well as of Oligarchy, is τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν. But whereas in Oligarchy everything was subjected to the dominion of one particular desire, viz. the desire of wealth (550 C ν.), Democracy, on the other hand, is the political embodiment of absolute freedom and equality among all desires, unnecessary as well as necessary: see on 558 c. The materials for Plato's picture of democracy are of course taken from Athens more than any other single city. It is an extraordinarily vivid sketch; and indeed Plato's whole account of democracy and the democratic man (557 A—556 C), in spite of manifest exaggerations, brings Athens nearer to us than almost any monument of ancient literature, Aristophanes alone excepted. We can see that Plato was fully alive to the wonderful variety and colour of Athenian life; but even on this ground democracy did not appear to him worthy of praise. Multiplicity and variety are the offspring of that fatal ἀνομωποιος which works ruin alike in the city and the soul (547 A ν.). In other respects, Plato represents democracy as a land of Hedonism, peopled by Aρισταρχί and Waywardness, and darkened by the shadow of the Tyranny to which it must at last succumb. Nearly all the greatest writers of Greek antiquity were on the whole unfavourable to democracy, except of course the Orators: and least of all in Plato could democracy expect a champion. For the other side of the picture, we should of course take Pericles' speech in Thuc. II 35 ff. See Neil's Knights of Aristophanes l.c. vii ff. 558 B 9 δηλον γὰρ κτλ. It is the ἀνήρ rather than the πολιτεία which is the ultimate object of our search; but as the ἀνήρ in a democracy will be δημοκρατικός τις, we cannot understand him until we understand δημοκρατία. Hence the question ποια τις—πολιτεία. Cf. 545 B, C. II ἐλευθερία. Ἐλευθερία was the fundamental υπόθεσις of ancient democracy: υπόθεσις μὲν ὅν τῆς δημοκρατίας πολιτείας ἐλευθερία, says Aristotle Pol. Z. 2. 1317 a 40. Cf. 562 b. It involves, according to Aristotle l.c., two ideas, viz. (1) τὸ ἐν
μέρει ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν, (2) τὸ ἕως ὡς βούληται τις (ib. 1317b 11). Throughout this chapter Plato illustrates the second of these characteristics. Cf. Whibley Gk Olig. pp. 33–35.

παρρησία καὶ ἐξουσία are democratic watchwords; see e.g. Gorg. 461 e, Eur. Hipp. 422, Ion 671 ff. and Thuc. vii. 69 (τὴς ἀπειτήματος πάντων εἰς τὴν διάταξιν ἐξουσίας) with II 37. 2 and infra 557 D, 563 E, Arist. Pol. β 4. 1318b 39 al.

557 C 17 ὅσπερ ἰματών κτλ. For the asyndeton cf. vii 497 b n. ποικιλω = 'many-coloured' is cancelled by Herwerden and J. J. Hartman. The word is in every ms and thoroughly harmonises with Plato's characteristic fulness of style: 'like a many-coloured garment, diversified with every shade of colour.' In itself it is the antithesis of ἀπλοῦς, and symbolical of kaleidoscopic diversity and changefulness, just as in recent years we have heard the expression 'Joseph's coat of many colours' applied to a versatile and distinguished statesman. See also on 561 E. άνθεσις is not 'flowers' (as seems to be generally supposed), but 'dyes,' 'colours' (iv 429 b 11 n.); nor need πεποικιληθη be understood of embroidery: for ποικίλλει means no more than 'to diversify with colours' and implies nothing whatever as to the process: cf. ii 378 c. On the verbal play in ἀνέσις—θεῖς see iii 406 b n. For ἕως δ' ἐγὼ repeated cf. vii 532 a n.

557 D 23 πάντα γένη κτλ. Cf. Lais 681 D πολιτείας αἰχμα—ἐν φι δ' πάντα εἶδο καὶ παθήματα πολιτειῶν καὶ άμα πόλεως ἐμπότιστε γέρνεσθαι. On ἐξουσία see 557 b n.

26 τούτου ἐκλέξασθαι κτλ. Pericles (Thuc. ii 37. 1) regarded the Athenian constitution as a παράδειγμα: Plato humorously describes it as a motley aggregate of παράδειγματα. Democracy is πόλεις παρμολλαί, ἀλλ' ὡς πόλις, the different varieties of individuals living in it representing so many different constitutions. In view of 561 C we may even go farther, and say that every democratic individual is himself a kaleidoscopic succession of polities—χαράκτηρις και σαφρός ἀριστείας (ap. Arist. Eth. Nic. i 11. 1100b 6). Hence, as Plato would hold, the waywardness and instability of democratic policy, constantly reversing to-morrow what it decrees to-day. See Thuc. i 44, ii 65, iii 36 ff., iv 28 and viii 1. Democracy in fact, from Plato's point of view, is the political expression of monarchical Hedonism: cf. 558 A and 561 C un.
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ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

557 E 20 ἀνάγκην. The Athenians gloried in their ἀνεμεμήγα διάστασιν. 
See Thuc. i. 39. i and Lacha 642 c μόνοι γὰρ ἀνέναι ἀνάγκην, αὐτοφύσι, θεία μορφή, ἀληθῶς καί ὅ τι πλαστῶν εἶναι ἄγαθον.
32 μηδὲς αὐτὰ—δικαίως: 'νωρὰν, if any law prevents you from being a magistrate or judge—actually to be both magistrate and judge in spite of the law, if you take it into your own head to be so.' The grammatical construction would naturally be μηδὲ αὐτοῖς (ἀνάγκην εἶναι)—μηδὲν ἦττον καί ἄρχειν καί δικαίως κτλ. This could only mean 'nor any necessity compelling you to act as a magistrate or judge if a law forbids you,' etc. i.e. 'you are not even compelled to follow your own inclination when it goes against the law.'
The sentiment is intelligible, but too extravagant and subtle a piece of satire even for so highly coloured a passage as the present. As it is, Plato starts as if he would write 'νωρὰν—to refrain from being a magistrate or judge,' but by a dramatic anacoluthon expresses the last part of his sentence in a positive form. μηδὲν ἦττον καί ἔμφατι καί καί make it easy to catch the meaning. The corruptions in Λ ΠΙ (see cr. n.) and some other MSS are probably due to assimilation.
558 Α 1 θεσπεία καί ἡθεία is almost a hendiadys: cf. IV 429 G n. Democracy is political hedonism: see on 561 c. Hermann's θεσπεία ὡς θεία is inlegant and even questionable Greek; nor does θεσπεία καί θεία (Stallbaum) merit praise.
2 τι δὲ: η πραότης κτλ.: 'And is the perfect good temper of some who have not been tried exquisite? or have you never seen in such a State, when people have been condemned to death or exile, how none the less they remain and roam about in public, and the culprit saunters round as though unheeded and unseen like some spirit from another world?' They bear the State no malice, and shew their good temper by stopping where they are—for the sentence remains unexecuted. See also App. II.
3 δικαστήρων has been thought to be neuter (Weil Rev. d. Phil. VIII pp. 171 ff.); but although the usage of the word in other passages of Plato (Critias 130 c, Lach 607 e, infra x 614 d, Crit. 50 b, Gorg. 523 c and elsewhere) favours this view, it yields no satisfactory sense, and πραοτης is an attribute of persons rather than of things. The perfect passive—is not the middle—of δικαίω is similarly used of persons in Lysias 21. 18 ἀδίκα δικαία δικασμοι. The circumstances of Socrates' own imprisonment after his condemnation illustrate, though only imperfectly, what is said here, for the Athenians were not careful to prevent him from escaping: see Crit. passim and my Introduction to that dialogue pp. ix f.
4 ἀνθρώπων κτλ. The construction is extremely irregular. Perhaps the simplest and least unsatisfactory solution is to make καταφηματεῶν a genitive absolute and regard μενόνων etc. as attracted by ἀνθρώπων καταφηματεῶν (so also J. and C.). See App. II.
θανάτου η φυγῆς κτλ. For the genitive Kühner (Gr. Gr. II p. 323) compares θανάτου κρίσεως, ἀνάγκης and the like, in which δικαίος is probably understood. The genitive of the penalty seems not to occur elsewhere with καταφημή-
μενόντων τε καὶ ἀναστρεφομένων ἐν μέσῳ, καὶ ὡς ὤστε φροντίζοντος 5 ὀυτὲ ὀρῶντος οὐδενὸς περινοστεὶ ὡστερ ἡρος; Καὶ πολλοὺς γ', Β ἔφη. 'Ἡ δὲ συγγνώμη καὶ οὐδ' | ὑπωστοιον συμκρολογία αὐτῆς, ἀλλὰ καταφρόνησις ὃν ἴμεις ἐλέγομεν σεμνύνοντες, ὅτε τὴν πόλιν ὁκίζομεν, ὡς εἰ μή τις ὑπερβεβλημένην φύσιν ἔχοι, ὦποτ' ἀν γένοιτο ἄνὴρ ἄγαθος, εἰ μή παῖς ὃν εὐθὺς παιζο ἐν καλοῖς καὶ 10 ἐπιτηδευοῦ τα τοιαῦτα πάντα, ὡς μεγαλοπρεπὸς καταπατήσας’ ἀπαντά ταῦτα οὐδὲν φροντίζει, εἰς ὁποῖον ἄν τις ἐπιτηδευμένοις ἑπὶ τὰ πολιτικὰ ἰὸν πράττῃ, ἀλλὰ τιμᾶ, εἰν φῇ μονὸν εὐνοὺς εἶναι

11. καταπατήσας' θ: καταπατήσας ΑΠΕθ', 12. ταῦτα Π: αὐτὰ Α.
558 B 14 γενναία. γενναία—see cr. n.—is much less elegant, in spite of the exclamatory anacolouthon ὡς μεγαλοπρεπῶς κτλ. See on ν 465 ε. Apel strangely suggests ἔφη. Γενναία ταῦτα τε κτλ. (Pluck. Th. for 1893, p. 556):

15 ἀλλὰ ἄδελφα. It is remarkable that Plato says nothing of ἀφρόβατα, which were regarded as an essential feature of advanced democracy: see Arist. Pol. Δ 4. 1292a 10 and Gilbert Beitr. zur innern Gesch. Ath. etc. pp. 79 ff.

558 ιδέη κτλ. True political equality, according to Plato, is γεωμετρική ισότης, which τῷ μὲν—μείζον πλῆγι, τῷ δ’ ἐλάττονι συμφόρτευσα νέμα (Latos 757 c and Gorg. 508 λ): ἀριθμητική ισότης, which is the democratic principle, is a spurious kind of equality, not κατὰ φύσιν: τοῖς γὰρ ἄνδροις τὰ ἰσα ἀνέστη ἥγεσιν ἂν, ἐκ μὴν τυχ-χάνον τοῦ μέτρου (Latos 757 λ). Cf. Isocr. Nicocles 14 and Arist. Pol. Π 9. 1280d 11 f., with other passages cited by Henkel Gr. Lehrn vom Staar p. 154 n. 63.

558 C—559 D We cannot describe the origin of the democratic man, until we explain what we mean by 'necessary' and 'unnecessary' desires. Desires which cannot be eradicated, and desires which we gratify with advantage to ourselves, are called 'necessary'; those of the opposite kind are 'unnecessary.' The oligarchical man is ruled by the former; the latter sway the drone.

558 D 22 βία δὴ κτλ. The description is interrupted by the digression on Desire: hence the anacolouthon.

23 οὐκ ἀναγκαῖοι. See 554 A n.

24 ἔνῳ μὴ σκοτεινός κτλ. It becomes important at this stage to investigate the subject of the Desires, because τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν in the widest sense is the psychological basis of the democratic as well as of the oligarchical character. Plato's complete classification distinguishes between (1) necessary desires, (2) not-necessary, (3) not-necessary and παράφοι (IX 571 f. D). The ἐπιθυμητικός is the embodiment of (1): the δημοκρατικός of (1) and (2) equally (561 A ff.): the τυραννικός of (3). Cf. IX 571 A n. If we translate παράφοι by 'unnatural' (as in view of IX 571 c ff. we are justified in doing: cf. IX 571 B n.), Plato's account becomes almost identical with that of Epicurus, who classified Desires as (1) natural and necessary, (2) natural and not-necessary, (3) neither natural nor necessary. For the authorities see Usener Epitres pp. 78, 294. Cf. also Athen. XII 511 E.

27 ἄν. See cr. n., and for the loss of ἄν before ἄναγκαιαν IV 437 B n.

28 ὡσαὶ—ἡμᾶς. As Aristotle would say, those also are ἄναγκαιαι ὃν ἄνευ
II. η II: η Α.

559 C] ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΣ Η

εφείσθαι ἡμῶν τῇ φύσει ἀνάγκη. ἦ οὖ; Καὶ µιὰλα. Δικαίος
559 δὴ | τοῦτο ἐπ’ αὐτῶν ἐροῦµεν, τὸ ἀναγκαῖον. Δικαίος. Τῇ δὲ; 3ο
αὐ τῇ τοῖς ἀπαλλάξειν ἥν, εἰ µελετῶ ἐκ νέου, καὶ πρὸς οὖθεν ἄγαθὸν ἐνοῦσαι ἐρωτήσω, αἱ δὲ καὶ τούτων, πάσας ταῦτας εἰ µὴ
ἀναγκαῖος φαίµεν εἶναι, ὅρ’ οὖν καλῶς ἡ λέγοµεν; Καλῶς µὲν
οὖν. Προειλοµέθα δὴ τι παράδειγµα ἐκατέρω, αἱ εἰσών, ὡς τοῦτο 5
λάβοµεν αὐτὰς; Οὐκοῦν χρή. Ἡρ’ οὖν οὐχ ἢ τοῦ φαγεῖν µέχρι
Β ὑµεῖας τε καὶ ἐνεξίας καὶ αὐτὸν σίτου τε καὶ ὤφου ἀναγκαῖος ἢ
ἀν εἰ; Οὕµει. Ἡ µὲν γε ποι τοῦ σίτου κατ’ ἀµφότερα ἀναγκαῖα,
ἡ τε ὀφέλιµος ἢ τε παύσαι ζωῆται δυνατή. Ναί. Ἡ δὲ ὄφου, εἰ
τῇ τίνα ἀφελίαν πρὸς ενεξίαν παρέχεται. Πᾶν µὲν οὖν. Τῇ δὲ; 10
ἡ πέρα τούτων καὶ ἀλλοίσιν ἐδεσµάτων ἡ τοιούτων ἐπιθυµία, δυνατή
dε κολαζοµένη ἐκ νέου καὶ παιδευοµένη ἐκ τῶν πολλῶν ἀπαλλάτ-
τεσθαί, καὶ βλαβερά µὲν σώµατι, βλαβερά δὲ ἴσωρᾷ πρὸς τέ
ζφρονισι καὶ τὸ σωφρονεῖ, ἢ ἀρὰ γε ὄρθως οὐκ ἀναγκαία ἢ
καλοῦτο; Ὁρθότατα µὲν οὖν. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀναλοικικά φάµεν 15

τὸ ἀγαθὸν µὴ ἐνδέχεται ἡ εἰναὶ ἡ γενεθλία (Μελ. Δ 5. 1015α 22).
558 ε τοῦτων—ἀνάγκη justifies the
appellation ἀναγκαία. The pronoun
tοῦτων is used somewhat vaguely, and
denotes not the desires themselves, but
their objects. Cf. 543 C n.
29 τῇ φύσε. It follows that no
desires which are necessary can be un-
natural: see Epicurus referred to on
558 D.
559 Α 2 καὶ πρὸς: ‘and which
moreover’ (‘idem est quod καὶ προσέρχεται, ἀν πρατερεῖ, atque insipser’ Stallbaum).
Two kinds of necessary desires were
distinguished viz. (1) αὐτοφρέφαι, (2) ἱθαὶ—ἱµᾶς. Corresponding to this, which
is not of course a mutually exclusive,
division, Plato emphasizes two distinct
features of unnecessary desires: so that
καὶ πρὸς (‘and which moreover,’ or
according to the Greek idiom, ‘and these
moreover’; see on Π 357 b) is altogether
appropriate. Cf. (with Stallbaum) Eut-
thyd. 298 D and Blaydes on Α. Knights
578. Schneider takes πρὸς οὖθεν together
(‘nullius rei habita ratione’), but οὖθεν
cannot easily be separated from ἀγαθὸν,
unless we read <οὖθεν> πρὸς οὖθεν ἄγα-
θὸν, as I formerly suggested. I have no
longer any doubt that Stallbaum’s view
is right. Ast’s conjecture πρὸς οὖθεν’ is
refuted by Schneider.
7 αὐτοῦ σίτου: ‘merely of food,’ as
opposed to e.g. pleasant food, sweet food
(τῶν τοῦρν ὄστοιν in Epicurus: Usener
559 B 8 ἡ µὲν γε κτα. On γε see
556 A n. and Neil’s Appendix on γε in his
edition of Α. Knights p. 192. The
words ἡ τε—ὑπηρήσῃ should be explained
as follows. Hunger, which is the desire
of σίτος, ‘is capable of putting an end to
life’: i.e. it must be gratified (οὐκ ἄν σῶ
t’ εἰµεν ἀποτρέψαι 558 D), or else we die.
On this ground, and also because it is
ἂν φέλοµος (i.e. ἀποτελοµένη ὄφελεῖ ἱµᾶς
558 E), we pronounce it an ἀναγκαία ἐπι-
θυµία. The Greek is terse but not ob-
scure. With παύσαι ἔστω cf. Γοργ. 523 C D and Μένεξ. 241 B. Jowett thinks the
expression ‘very strange’ for ἀπαλλατ-
tεσθαί. It is strictly accurate: the sword
kills, but hunger παῦσαι ἔστω: we merely
‘cease to live.’ Other views on this
passage are discussed in App. ΙΙΙ.
11 ἀλλοίων—ἡ τοῦτων: ‘alias ge-
neris—quam quaes modo diximus’ (Stall-
baum).
559c 16 χρηματιστικάς—χρηματίζων: ‘money-making or productive, because useful in production.’ Plato more suo σφίζεται περὶ τὸ ἄνθροπον (VI 509 D π.).

17 οὕτω δή: they also are ἀναλογικοὶ. Epicurus i.e. describes ἡ τῶν ἀφοροδισίων ἐπιθυμία as φυσική μὲν, ὅπερ ἀνάγκαια δὲ.

18 νῦν δὴ. 552 c ff., 555 e ff.

559 D—562 A Let us now return and explain the genesis of the democratic man. An oligarchical father has a son, whom he brings up on narrow and parsonimous principles. The young man tastes the ‘honey of drones,’ and sedition is engendered within his soul. A struggle ensues, and after perhaps a temporary check the unnecessary desires prevail; but with the help of fortune and advancing years a sort of equality of all desires is finally established; and the man becomes an impartial devotee of pleasure in all its forms—a beautiful and many-coloured creature, ‘everything by starts and nothing long.’

22 πάλιν τοίνυν κτλ. Plato’s description of the genesis of the democratic man is one of the most royal and magnificent pieces of writing in the whole range of literature, whether ancient or modern. Throughout most of this chapter, in the words of Longinus, the style πλούσιωτα καθάπερ τι πέλαγος εἰς ἀναπεπτυμένων κέντρω—μέγεθος (περὶ ὄψας 12. 2), and no better example will ever be discovered of that full tide of lofty thoughts and images and words—a tide ‘too full for sound and foam’—in which the author of the treatise On the Sublime places the essence of ὄψα. We owe to Longinus what is by far the best appreciation of Plato’s hierocratic vein: see especially cc. 33—36, where we can hear more than a mere echo of that sublimity which is itself, according to Longinus, the ‘echo of high-mindedness’ (όψας αὐθαυσίαν ἀπηχθείν ib. 9. 2). For a very different estimate the student may be referred to Dionysius of Halicarnassus (ad Cn. Pomp. Gen. 753—765 Reiske), whose pedantic criticisms make it tolerably plain that a study of the Attic orators does not qualify a man to sit in judgment upon Plato. The present episode is hardly less remarkable for psychological insight than for elevation of style, and the description of the democratic man as the chameleon of human society paints him for all time (561 c ff.). As a representation of actual fact, the picture is doubtless somewhat exaggerated, as usual; but it is extraordinarily vivid and powerful, and shews that the Platonic analogy between the individual and the State may prove in the hands of a master an admirable clue whereby to unravel the workings of the human soul in the individual as well as in the State.

559 D 24 νῦν δὲ κτλ. See 558 c, d. With ἀπαλλάσσως cf. 552 e π.

25 κηφήνων κτλ. It is clear from the summary of this passage in IX 572 c αὐγονεμόμες δὲ κομψιτέραι ἀνθρώπαι καὶ μεστοὶ ὧν ἄρτι δυσθλόμενοι ἐπισθέαντο τῇ κηφήνῳ καὶ ἀθώοι διδόμενοι τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ in the young man’s heart, ἀθώοι “furious,” “wild” (Jebb on Soph. Ajax 221) shews that the drones are of the ‘stinging’ order (553 c ff., 555 d ff.).
559 e 28 ὁλιγαρχίας—δημοκρατίαν. See cr. n. Schneider defends the ms by explaining μεταβολή ὁλιγαρχίας as "ea quae ad ὁλιγαρχίαν pertinet eamque efficit," and referring τῆς ἐν ἑαυτῷ "ad ipsam ὁλιγαρχίαν in adjectivo latentem." δημοκρατίαν he thinks is written for δημοκρατίαι by a sort of attraction. This explanation is much too difficult and obscure. Nor can ὁλιγαρχίας by itself stand for ὁλιγαρχίας πολιτείαι, at all events in this connection. The ms reading can only mean "of the oligarchical change within himself into a democrati-cal," an expression which bears no sense. I formerly wrote ὁλιγαρχίκος τοῦ—δημοκρατίκων, comparing 559 E, 560 A; but it may fairly be objected that the 'oligarchical element' within the man does not change into a democrati-cal: it is the government that changes. For this reason I now prefer my old suggestion (Cl. Rev. iv p. 357), although the corruption of ὁλιγαρχίκος—δημοκρατίκων is perhaps somewhat easier to explain. For the combination of genitives cf. ν 449 η. An alternative solution would be to insert πολιτείαι after ἑαυτῷ. This gives excellent sense, but it is difficult to assign a plausible reason for the loss of πολιτείαι in all our mss. I am unable to resist the conclusion that the text is corrupt, otherwise I should not venture to make any alteration. If Plato did not write the passage as it is printed above, there can be little doubt that πολιτείαι has accidentally disappeared.

29 μετεβάλλει κτλ. See 556 E. τῷ ἐτέρῳ τῶν means of course τῷ ἐτέρῳ εἶδε τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν.

33 τῷ ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὁλιγαρχικῷ: 'the oligarchical element within one,' ἑαυτῷ is 'oneself': cf. iii 407 C μετέτατα πρὸς ἑαυτὸν. ἐν αὐτῷ, which Ast adopted (after Stephanus), would be easier; but I think Plato means to suggest that the oligarchical element present in this νεανίας is a universal feature of the human race. J. and C. think ἑκεῖνῳ and ἑαυτῷ may have changed places—a conjecture which is surely too bold. Schneider, taking ἑαυτῷ as 'himself' and not 'oneself,' compares ἐν αὐτῷ πρὸς αὐτῶν below and ἐν αὐτῷ ἐν ἑαυτῷ in 559 D, E; but here there is nothing corresponding to the αὐτῷ in each of these passages, and ἑαυτῷ cannot therefore be translated in Schneider's way.

560 A ἡ στάσις κτλ. Cf. 556 E, 557 L. On the tense of ὑπεκήρυξε and the other aorists throughout this passage see 548 D n.

4 tives—αἱ μὲν κτλ. Cl. iv 431 A n. The words διεφθάρσαν—ἐξέπεσον correspond to ἐποκτείνως—ἐκβάλως in 557 A. Madvig's διεράτησαν is an unlucky venture.
σών ἐπιθυμιών ἄλλαι ὑποτρεφομέναι ἐξηγεῖται δι᾽ ἀνεπιστημο-
σύνης 1 τροφῆς πατρὸς πολλαί τε καὶ ἵσχυρα ἐγένοντο. Φιλεῖ B
γοῦν, ἐφ᾽, οὕτω γιγνεσθαι. Οὕκοιν εἰλίκυσάν τε πρὸς τὰς αὐτὰς
10 ὀρμίλας, καὶ λάθρα ἐξηγεύμονεν πλῆθος ἐνετέκον. Τῇ μήν;
Τελευτώσα δὴ, οἷς, κατέλαβον τὴν νέον τῆς ψυχῆς ἀκρό-
pολιν, αἰσθῶμεν κενὴν μαθημάτων τε καὶ ἐπιτηδευμάτων καλῶν
καὶ λόγων ἀληθῶν, οὐ δὲ ἄριστοι φιλοτεχνοὶ τε καὶ φύλακες ἐν
ἀνδρῶν 1 θεοφιλῶν εἰς διανοιάς. Καὶ πολὺ γ', ἐφ᾽. Ψυχεῖς δὴ C
15 καὶ ἀλαζόνες, οἷς, λόγοι τε καὶ δόξαι ἀντ᾽ ἐκείνων ἀναδραμόντες
κατέσχον τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον τοῦ τοιούτου. Σφόδρα γ', ἐφ᾽. "Ἀρ'
οὖν οὔ πάλιν τε εἰς ἐκείνους τοὺς Λωστοφάγους ἐλθὼν φανερὸς
κατοικεῖ, καὶ εἰάν παρ᾽ οἰκεῖοι τυς θορυβεῖα τῷ φειδωλῷ αὐτοῦ τῆς
ψυχῆς ἀφικνηται, κληροῦστε οἱ ἀλαζόνες λόγοι ἐκεῖνοι τὰς τοῦ
20 βασιλικοῦ τέχνους ἐν αὐτῷ πύλας οὔτε αὐτὴν τὴν ἐξμαχίαν 1
παράσων οὔτε πρέσβεις πρεσβύτερον λόγοις ἰδιωτῶν εἰσεδέχονται, D

7 ἀνεπιστημοσύνη — πατρὸς: the father is himself ἀναδεικτὸς (552 Ε.Η.), and the ἀναδεικτὸς cannot πανηγεῖα. On the genitives see Β 449 Α.Η.
560 Β 9 τάς αὐτὰς ὀρμίλας κτλ. The reference in τάς αὐτάς is to ἐξηγε-
νήται—δεῦτε 559 D. Ast's conjecture τὰς αὐτὰς ὀρμίλας is wrong in point of
sense. λάθρα ἐξηγεύμονεν: viz. with the desires of the ἀλαζονές: see 559 D.
13 ἐν ἀνδρῶν κτλ. The static cadence is worthy of the theme: cf. τῆν—
tέλειο 560 Ε. and see the remarks of Longinus on rhythm and the arrangement of
words as an element of γφος (περὶ γφος 30 ff.).
560 C 15 ἀναδραμόντες κατάσχον: 'ran up and seized.' ἀναδραμόντες
preserves the metaphor in ἀκρόπολιν (560 Β).
17 εἰς—Δωστόφαγος: 'to those Lot-
tos-eaters' land.' ἐκείνοις refers to κη-
φόροιν 559 D. The figure is strikingly
appropriate, for the λοτσο-flower of sensual
indulgence makes man, who is an ὀρφα-
νὸς φυτὸν (Clem. Alex. Cohert, ad Gent.
96 Α ed. Migne, following Plato Tim.
90 Α), forget 'the imperial palace whence
XV 12. 8 μετὰ Δωστόφαγον γλυκερῆν λυτο-
πάτρην ἱδώθην (with reference to Epicu-
reanism).

φανερὸς κατοικε: no longer λάθρα
(560 Β). He glories in his shame. Her-
werden's κατοικε <ἐκεῖ> in place of κατο-
κεῖ is wholly unnecessary and spoils the
rhythm.
19 τοῦ βασιλικοῦ τέχνου: i.e. the
wall enclosing the ἀκρόπολις (560 Β), where
the soul's king or ruling power inhabits.
560 D 21 οὔτε πρέσβεις κτλ.: 'nor
admit an embassy of wise words spoken
by private persons of maturer years.' The
contrast is between the ἐξμαχία itself,
consisting of the λόγοι of ὁθέτοι, and
'ambassador-words' of ἰδώται, i.e. men
who take no part in public or official
life. Their representations would serve
as ambassadors to those of the ὁθέτοι,
whether the ἰδώται inspire them or not.
It has often been pointed out that Plato
is thinking of Alcibiades in various parts
of this description (see e.g. Steinhardt
Eiweilung pp. 239, 698 n. 238), Suse-
mihl Gen. Entw. II p. 233 and Her-
werden Miem. XIX p. 337); and here, I
believe, he has in mind the efforts of
Socrates to reclaim him. Cf. VI 494 Η.Η.
and especially Συμφ. 215 D ff. For πρε-
σβύτερος with reference to Socrates see
ἀγαθοὶ καὶ πρεσβύτεροι 111 409 Α.Ν.; and
for ἰδώται as applied to him, Apel. 32 E—
33 Β. The order and rhythm, as in ἐν
ἀνδρῶν τοιούτων εἰς διανοιάς above, is in
keeping with the stately and sonorous
eloquence of the whole passage: cf. IX
573 Β. On Badham's conjecture δι᾽ ὅτων
for ἰδώτων see App. IV.
αὐτοὶ τε κρατοῦσι μαχόμενοι, καὶ τὴν μὲν αἰδῶ ἡλιθίοτητα ὑπομα-
ζουσι ὥθουσιν ἐξω ἀτίμως φυγάδα, σωφροσύνην δὲ ἀνανδρίαν
καλοῦντες τε καὶ προπηλακίζουσεν ἐκβαλλοντος, μετριότητα δὲ καὶ
κοσμίω δαπάνην ὦς ἀγροκίαν καὶ ἀνελευθερίαν ὅσαι πεῖθοντες 25
ὑπερορίζουσι μετὰ πολλῶν καὶ ἀνοφελῶν ἐπιθυμίων; Ἐφόδρα γε.
Τούτων δὲ γέ περὶ κενώσατε καὶ καθήραντες τὴν τοῦ κατεχό-
μένου 1 τε ὑπ’ αὐτῶν καὶ τελουμένου φυσικὴ μεγαλούσι τέλεσι, τὸ
μετὰ τοῦτο ἤδη ὑβρίν καὶ ἀναρχίαν καὶ ἀσοτίαν καὶ ἀναίδειαν
λαμπρὰς μετὰ πολλοῦ χρόου κατάγοντων ἐστεφανωμένας, ἐγκομία-
ζουσι καὶ ὑποκορίζουμεν, ὑβρίν μὲν εὐπαιδευμίαν καλοῦντες,
ἀναρχίαν δὲ ἔλευθερίαν, ἀσοτίαν δὲ μεγαλοπρέπειαν, ἀναίδειαν δὲ
ἀνδρείαν. ἂρ’ οὖχ οὕτω πως, ἂν δ’ ἐγώ, νέος ὁν μεταβάλλει ἐκ
tοῦ ἐν ἀναγκαίως ἐπιθυμίαις τρεφομένου τὴν τῶν μὴ ἀναγκαίων
καὶ ἀνοφελῶν ἡδονῶν ἔλευθερώσω τε καὶ ἀνέσω; Καὶ μᾶλα γε,
ἡ δ’ ὃς, ἔναργος. Ζῇ δή, οἵμαι, μετὰ τάστα τοῦ τοιοῦτος οὐδὲν
μᾶλλον εἰς ἀναγκαίους ἡ μὴ ἀναγκαίους ἡδονὰς ἀναλίσκοι καὶ 5
χρήματα καὶ πόσιν καὶ διατριβὰς. ἀλλ’ ἔαν εὐνυχῆς ἦ καὶ μὴ
πέρα ἐκβακχευθῇ, ἀλλὰ τι καὶ πρεβότερος γενομένου τοῦ πολλοῦ 1

561 28 μεγαλοπρέπειαν. See on vi 486 A. 561 2 τοῦ—τρεφομένου. Masculi-
ne, not neuter. τὴν—ἀνέσω. I formerly read εἰς τὴν (with ἩΣ and many other ωσ) in-
stead of τὴν, but now believe that Ἡ is right. "Non est idem, εἰς δημοκρατικῶν
μεταβάλλειν, et τὴν—ἀλευθερώσων μετα-
βάλλειν. Hoc prius, illud posterius, hacc via, ille finis est" (Schneider). If Plato had
written εἰς, it should have been followed by an accusative masculine, con-
trasting with ἐκ τοῦ—τρεφομένου, as in
553 λ έ εἰς δημαρχοῦσιν ἐκ τοῦ τυμαρχοῦκο
ελευθερώσω μεταβάλλει. For the use of μετα-
βάλει cf. (with Schneider) IV 424 C et al.
With the force of ἀνέσω cf. IX 575 A (ἀνεθάντα) and 590 A.
6 εῦνυχῆς ἦ = if he is fortunate 4 is
much better than εὐνυχῆς (Cobet), which
would mean 'if he becomes fortunate.'
Cf. IX 578 c μ.
7 ἀλλὰ τι κτλ.: 'but, owing also in
some measure to the influence of years,
16—2
θορύβου παρελθόντος μέρη τε καταδέχεται τῶν ἐκπεσόντων καὶ Β τοῖς ἐπεισελθούσι μὴ δ' ἐναυτῷ εὔνῳ, εἰς ἵσον δὴ τι καταστήσας 10 τὰς ἡδονὰς διάγει, τῇ παραπτούσῃ ἀλλ' ὥσπερ λαχοῦσῃ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀρχὴν παραδίδουσι, ἦσος ἂν πληροθῇ, καὶ ἀδίκη ἀληθὲς, οὐδεμιᾶν ἀτιμάζουσιν, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἵσον τρέφουν. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Καὶ λόγον γε, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, ἀλληθὲς οὐ προσδεχόμενοι οὐδὲ παριεῖς εἰς τὸ φρούριον, ἐάν τις λέγῃ, ὡς αἱ μὲν εἶνεν τῶν 11 καὶ ἀγαθῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν C ἡδοναί, αἱ δὲ τῶν πονηρῶν, καὶ τὰς μὲν χρή ἐπιτηδεύειν καὶ τιμῶν, τὰς δὲ κολάζειν τε καὶ δουλοῦσθαι', ἀλλ' ἐν πάσι τούτοις ἀνανεῖε τε καὶ ὁμοίας φησιν ἀπάσας εἰναι καὶ τιμητές ἐξ ἵσον Σφόδρα γάρ, ἐφ' ὑστερον διακείμενον τούτο δρά. Οὐκούν, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ διαξῆ τὸ καθ' ἠμέραν οὕτω χαριζομένος τῇ προσπιτούσῃ ἐπι- θυμία, τοτὲ μὲν μεθύων καὶ κατανλοῦμενος, ἀδίκης δὲ υδροποτῶν καὶ κατακραυνόμενος, 1 τοτὲ δ' αὖ γυμναζόμενος, ἐστίν δ' ὁτε ἁργὸν D καὶ πάνων ἁμελῶν, τοτὲ δ' ὡς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διατρίβων· πολλάκις δὲ πολιτεύεται, καὶ ἀναπηροῦν ὁ τι ἀν τιχθ' λέγει τε καὶ πράττει· κἂν τοτέ τινας πολεμικοὺς ἐξήλθη, ταύτῃ φέρεται, ἡ χρηματι- 25 στικοῦσ, ἐπὶ τοῦτ' αὖ. καὶ οὔτε τις τάξις οὔτε ἀνάγκη ἐπέστων αὐτοῦ τῷ βίῳ, ἀλλ' ἣδον τε δὴ καὶ ἐλευθερίον καὶ μακάριον καλῶν τῶν βιῶν τούτων χρῆται αὐτῷ διὰ παντὸς. Παντάπασιν, 1 ἢ δ' ὅσ. E διελήλυθας βίον ἴσονομικόν τινὸς ἄνδρός. Ὅμως δέ γε, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, 9. ἐαυτῷ ξη: ἐαυτῷ ΑΠ. 20. τοτὲ ΠΙ.: τὸ Α.

when the tumult of the soul has mostly passed' etc. Cf. 1 329 C. Plato means that good fortune does something, and growing age the rest.

561 B 9 εἰς ἱσον κτλ. Pleasures are regarded by the δημοκρατίκως ἀρή as individual men are regarded by the δημο- κρατικὴ πολιτεία (557 Α., 558 C ημ.): they are all equal. For ὥσπερ λαχοῦσῃ see on 557 Α. ἐσσ' ἂν πληρῶθη means 'till he' (not 'it,' as D. and V. etc.) 'is filled.' Sensual pleasures πληροῦσιν because they are πληροῦσις: cf. Phil. 35 ηθ. This is the χαράδρων βίος so powerfully described in Gorg. 493 Α—494 D.

13 τὸ φρούριον κτλ. The φρούριον is the ἀκρόπολις of 560 Β. With εἰς τις λέγῃ κτλ. cf. Gorg. 495 Α ηθ.

561 C 19 διαξῆ κτλ. The δημο- κρατικός, like the State of which he is the counterpart, is a living example of the Cyrenaic cult of μονάχρονοι ἡδονή: see 557 Α., δ. ημ. and RP. 207 Β., 211. Stein-
ing every law! For the etymological figure cf. 11 376 b 7.

29 παντοδαπόν τε καὶ—μεστόν.
Richards proposes to write the genitive, remarking "surely the words are parallel to ἴσονῳκόν." Logically they are, but grammatically they need not be, for the life of an ἴσονῳκόν ἀνήρ is of course ἴσονῳκόν.

With πλεῖστον ἢδον cf. πάνω ἢθεὶς πεπουλιμένης 557 C.

καὶ τὸν καλὸν τε κτλ. lit.: 'and that this man is the beautiful and many-coloured man, as the city described above' (was the beautiful and many-coloured city).

"Sunt diversa hominum et civilitatum genera, unum simplex ac rectum, alterum duplex, alius multiplex et varium. Qui primo accensendus est, o ἀπλοῦν, qui alteri, o ἀπλοῦσ, hic vero ὁ καλὸς τε καὶ ποικίλος audit' (Schneider).

Thus understood the article is strictly to the point, and there is no reason for writing τῶν καλῶν τε καὶ ποικίλων with Vind. B and W. H. Thompson. On ποικίλων see 557 C n. It is worthy of remark that Clement interprets Joseph's 'cost of many colours' in the Old Testament as symbolical of desire: εἰ θ' ἀν ἐπιθυμία ποικίλας ἔσομα (Stroum. v 8. 84 c ed. Migne).

30 ἐκεῖνην τὴν πόλιν. See 557 C, with which and 557 D the words δ' πόλλοι κτλ. are also in close correspondence.

562 a 5 γίγνεται = 'profit,' quaerentibus sed offerit' (Schneider). Cf. III 412 c οἱ δὲ γεωργῶν ἀριστοῖ ἢ' οὐ γεωργεῖ κόσμον γίγνοντα, Euthyd. 298 b ὅποιος πατὴρ γίγνεται ἐν κόσμῳ καὶ οὐ κυνᾶς ἀνθρώποι, infra 566 a, IX 576 b and IV 275 b with my note ad loc. 'What,' asks Socrates, 'do we find to be the character of tyranny? As for its origin, it is pretty obvious that tyranny comes from democracy.' For the order of questions cf. 558 c. The words δι' μὲν γὰρ κτλ., when taken in connexion with the preceding question, seem at first sight to suggest that the μεταβολὴ will not be described: but cf. v 406 b, where μὲν γὰρ is used in exactly the same way, and followed by a full account of the topic to which its clause refers. See also App. V.
7 ἃρ’ οὖν κτλ. begins a long description of the ἀρτοκαταρχεῖα τῆς γενεάς: the ἀρτοκαταρχεῖα is not described till 566 D ff. Here again the situation in ν 466 D is nearly, though not quite, analogous: see note ad loc. For other views on this passage consult App. V.

562 B 8 προφθείνω: sc. the citizens of the oligarchical State. Stallbaum reads προφθέιστα, on inferior MS authority; but the plural is easy enough: cf. 550 D.

9 καὶ δι’ ὑπάκου: explained and amplifies δ—ἀγαθον. Wealth is the cause of oligarchy, that ‘on account of’ which it was established: cf. 550 D ff., 551 C, 555 B (τοῦ προκείμενον ἀγαθοῦ). The reading δι’ οὖν (see cr. n.) would make wealth the means or instrument in producing the result, and this it was not, except in the loose sense in which the προκείμενον ἀγαθον is also a means. I formerly conjectured δι’ αὐτός (Cl. Rev. IV p. 357), but αὐτός is unsuitable. For the corruption in the MSS see note on διὰ τοῦτο X 610 D. Jowett wrongly translates καθίστατο by ‘was maintained’.

10 πλοῦτος. See cr. n. The majority of editors reject ὑπέρπλουτος: rightly, for the word is not used except as an adjective. A host of emendations has been suggested, ὁ πέρα πλοῦτος (Richter Fleck. ḹ. 1867 p. 145), ὑπέρπλουτος <πλοῦτος> (Stallbaum), ὑπέρ πλοῦτος (Madvig—but the use of ὑπέρ is not above suspicion), πον πλοῦτος (Campbell), ὑπερπλουτών (apud J. and C.), εὑπερ τι, πλοῦτος (Apelt B. Phil. Woch. 1895 p. 968). Stephanus’ conjecture γίγνεσθαι ὑπέρπλουτον was adopted by Ast. The expression ὑπέρπλουτος πλοῦτος occurs in Joan. Damasc. III 733 A ed. Migne, but in a highly rhetorical passage and without any reference to Plato. It is probably best to read πλοῦτος, with Schneider and Hermann. ὑπέρπλουτος may have originally been a marginal note intended to recall ὑπέρπλουτοι in 552 B.

11 ἀπώλειαν. 555 C—557 A. 13 ἀλεθερίαν. See 557 B. 562 C 14 ἀκούοιας—ἀλεθερίας rings like an echo from some of the panegyrists of Athens: cf. Eur. Ion 669—975 with Menex. 239 A ff. and Thuc. II 37. 2. 15 ἔξει—κάλλιστον (sc. ἡ δημοκρατομένη πόλις) ‘is its fairest possession,’ not ‘it has in the highest perfection,’ (as suggested in J. and C.).

20 προστατοῦντων. See on 565 C. 562 D 22 ἀν μὴ—ἀληθερικοὶ. For a striking example see the account.
παρέχωσι τὴν ἐλευ瑟ίαν, κολάξει αἰτιωμένη ὡς μιαρός τε καὶ ὀλγαρχικός. Δροσίν γάρ, ἐφι, τούτο. Τοὺς δὲ γε, εἰποῦν, τῶν ἀρχόντων κατηκούσις προπηλακίζει ὡς ἠθελοδουλοῦσι τε καὶ οὐδὲν 25 ὄντας, τοὺς δὲ ἀρχόντας μὲν ἀρχόμενοι, ἀρχόμενοι δὲ ἀρχοὺν ὁμοίους ἴδια τε καὶ δημοσία ἐπανει τε καὶ τιμᾶ. ἢρ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη
Ε ἐν τοιαύτῃ τοῖς πόλεις ἐπὶ πᾶν τὸ τῆς ἐλευ瑟ῖας ἴναι; Πῶς γάρ οὗ; Καὶ καταδύσθαι γε, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, ὦ φίλε, εἴς τὰς ἴδιας οἰκίας καὶ τελευτῶν μέχρι τῶν θηρίων τὴν ἀναρχίαν ἐμφυομένην. Πῶς, ἢ δ' 30 ὃς, τὸ τοιούτῳ λέγομεν; Οἷον, ἐφιν, πατέρα μὲν ἐβίζεσθαι παῖδι ὁμοίου γυναῖκας καὶ φοβεῖσθαι τοὺς υἱές, ὦν δὲ πατρὶ, καὶ μήτε ἀναχωνεσθαι μήτε δεδείναι τοὺς γονεῖς, ἵνα δὴ ἐλευ瑟ην γ' μετοικον
563 δὲ ἀστὸ καὶ ἀστόν μετοικὸν ἐξισοποιᾶται, καὶ ξένον ὡσαυτοῦς. Γίγνεται γάρ οὕτως, ἐφι. Ταῦτα τε, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, καὶ σμικρὰ τοιαῦτα ἀλλὰ ἡγίστρει; διδάσκαλος τε ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ φοιτητὰς φοβείσαι καὶ θωπεύει, φοιτηταὶ δὲ δεδασκάλων ὀλγοφοροῦν, οὕτω δὲ καὶ παιδαγωγοῦν, καὶ ὅλοι οἱ μὲν νέοι πρεσβυτέρους ἀπεικόζονται καὶ 5 διαμιλλόνται καὶ ἐν λόγοις καὶ ἐν ἔργοις, οἱ δὲ γέροντες ἐγκαθίσκοντες θηριαίως τοὺς νέους 

Β τοῖς τοῖς νέοις εὐντραπελία σε τε καὶ χαριτεμοῦ σλοῦ ἐμπλυπλᾶνται, μιμοῦμενοι τοὺς νέους, ἵνα δὴ μὴ δοκῶσιν ἀνδρεῖς εἶναι μηδε δεσποτικοὶ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἐφι. Τὸ δὲ γε, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, ἐσχατων, ὦ φίλε, τῆς ἐλευ瑟ῖας τοῦ πλῆθους, ὅσον γίγνεται ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ τοῖς πόλεις, ὅταν δὴ οἱ ἑωνεμένοι καὶ αἱ ἑωνεμέναι μηδὲ ἵττον ἐλευ瑟ηροὶ ὅσι τῶν πριμαμένων. ἐν γυναιξὶ δὲ πρὸς ἀνδρᾶς καὶ ἀνδράσι πρὸς


563 a 6 ἐγκαθίσκετες. V 467 b n. 563 b 9 τὸ δὲ γε κτλ. 'But the extremest amount of freedom which appears in such a city is when' etc. lit. 'the extreme of the amount of freedom' etc. τὸ—ἐσχατων is the subject to something like ἐστιν or γίγνεσθαι understood: cf. such idioms as ἐν τοῖς ἐνεκε ἡρδήν,—ὅτι κτλ. I 330 b, where see note. The sentence is not exclamatory, as some have supposed. With πλῆθος ἐλευ瑟ῆς cf. πολλὴν—τῶν ἐλευ瑟ηρῶν 562 D, and (for πλῆθος) IX 591 E (πλῆθος οὐσιάς), Laus xi 913 D, Theael. 158 D (πλῆθος χρόνου) and Dem. Phil. iv 2. This explanation is that of Schneider, and indubitably right. The English editors and translators make τοῦ πλῆθους depend on ἐλευ瑟ῆς: but "servi servaque non sunt pars τοῦ πλῆθος," and οὖν—πόλεις is not easily either separated from πλῆθος or connected with ἐσχατων. 11 ὅταν—πριμαμένων. Cf. [Xen.] Rep. Ath. 1 I. 10 ff. τῶν δουλῶν δ' αὐτοῖ καὶ τῶν μετοικῶν πλεῖστοι ἐστίν Ἀθηναῖοι ἀκολούθοι, καὶ οὕτω πατάξαι ἔξεστιν αὐτοῖς ὥστε ὑπεκατήσατο σοι ὁ δοῦλος κτλ. In Arist. Pol. E 112 131 b 35 δουλῶν ἄνεσις is said to be a symptom of extreme democracy. 12 ἐν γυναιξὶ κτλ. Arist. i.e. goes farther and speaks of a γυναικεράτεια περὶ τὰς οἰκίας. A German critic characteristically sees an 'admirable' illustration of Plato's remarks in the social life "jenes transatlantischen Staatvereins" (Steinhart Einleitung p. 243). Some have accused
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γνωσαίτις ὅση ἦ ἱσονομία καὶ ἐλευθερία γίγνεται, ὅλην ἐπελαθή- χετὸς εἰπεῖν. Οὐκοῦν καὶ Αἰσχύλον, ἔφη, ἐρώμεν τι τι νῦν ἥλθ' οἰ
15 ἐπὶ στόμα; Πάνω γε, εἰπον. καὶ ἐγγυς οὕτω λέγω. τὸ μὲν
γὰρ τῶν θηρίων τῶν ὑπὸ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ὅσω ἐλευθερωτέρα ἐστὶν
ἐντάθη γα ἐν ἄλλῃ, οὐκ ἂν τις πειθότο ἀπειρος. ἀτεχνὸς γὰρ αἱ
tε κύνες κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν οἰάσοντα αἱ δεσποταί, γίγνονται τὸ ἰδ
καὶ ὑποι καὶ ὅνις πάντα ἐλευθέρως καὶ σέμνως εὐθυμεῖν πορεύεσ-
20 θαι, κατὰ τὰς οὖν ἐμβάλλουτες τῷ ἀεὶ ἀπαντῶντι, ἐὰν μὴ εξίσ-

Plato of already forgetting the liberalism of Book v (Krohn Pl. St. p. 214); but an ideal city is one thing, and a lawless democracy another; and corrumpio optimi, in the relations between the sexes, as in other cases, may well be passima.

563 C 14 ό τι νῦν—στόμα: "what rose to our lips just now, whatever it be," as Aeschylus observes." See Aesch. Frag. 337 Dindorf=334 Nauck. The reference in νῦν, which as in some other places (ΠΙ. 414 B n.) has the meaning of 'just now,' is to 562 Ε καὶ τελευτάν μὲ-
χρι τῶν θηρίων τὴν ἄκρισιν ἐμφαν-

. Nauck restores the fragment of Aeschylus in the form ὅτι μὲν ἠλθ' ἐπὶ στόμα: but the enclitic is unpleasing, and as ὅτι is absent from the other two places where the quotation occurs (Plut. Amat. 763 B, Them. Or. IV 53 B) Aeschylus probably wrote ὅτι μὲν ἠλθ' ἐπὶ στόμα ("just come to my lips") or something of the sort. With the general sense cf. 111 394 D. Similar expressions in Greek literature are collected by Schafer on Dion. Hal. de comp. verb. pp. 12, 13. Jackson ingeniously proposes to connect the present passage with Arist. Eth. Nic. III 2. 1118 9 ff., where he conjectures ὅπως ἐνενόθης σαφὲς ἐκ τούτων αὐτῶν ἢ (for ἢ) οὐκ εἴδοντα ὅτι ἄσπρα ἡν, ὡστεν Ἀισχύλος τὰ μακρά (Proceedings of the Camb. Phil. Soc. XIII 8 and Journal of Philology XXVII p. 110 f.). "Is it possible," he asks "that the phrase ἠλθ' ἐπὶ στόμα is a proverbial survival of the plea urged by Aeschylus in plain prose on the occasion referred to in the Ethics?" I think an Athenian speaking in plain prose would have said ἠθένεν ἐπὶ στόμα οὐ ἐπὶ τὸ στόμα, not ἠλθ' ἐπὶ στόμα. The elision is tragic.

15 οὕτω: i.e. in the spirit of the Aeschylean phrase: the idea occurred to me, and it shall out, though never so extravagant and absurd!

16 ἐλευθερώτερα. For the concord cf.

Phil. 43 ε and Laws 657 δ (Ast).

18 τὴν παροιμίαν. The proverb was ὅπως ἐδοξοῦν, τοιά χά κών (Schoi.), and meant ὅτι ὅσα δεσποταί, τοιαὶ καὶ ἡ ἀτεχνος 'like mistresses, like maid.' Plato takes κών literally: hence ἀτεχνος. See Leutsch und Schnieder Oinoe. Gr. ii p. 44. The traveller in modern Greece will remember the 'democratic dogs' of Peloponnesian villages.

γίγνονται τῇ δι κτλ.: 'aye, and there arise both horses and asses' etc. This explanation—Jowett's—catches the mock-heroic humour of the passage and is at the same time easier grammatically than to supply, with Schneider, ὅπως ὅτι δεσποταί or, with Campbell, ἀτεχνος or the like. There is no ground for suspecting the text as some have done. Plato's humorous description brings vividly before us the anarchical condition of the Athenian streets. Foot-passengers have a poor time of it where the very beasts of burden forsooth are tainted with the spirit of democracy! 'The regulation of traffic,' remarks Bosanquet, perhaps a little sententiously, 'is in some degree a real test of social order.' No doubt this is what Plato means.

20 ἐμβάλλουτες κτλ. See the amusing and characteristic anecdote about Alcibiades' childhood in Plut. Alc. 2. μικρός ὁ ἢ απαίτης ἀστράγαλος ἐν τῷ στενωτῷ, τῆς δὲ βολῆς καθυσκόμει εἰς αὐτὸν ἀμφότερον φόρτιον ἐπετ. πρῖτον μὲν οὖν ἐκέλευ 
νέμασται τῶν ἀγαντόν τὸ ἤγειρον ὑπέ-
πιτε γὰρ ὅ βολή τῇ παράδο τῆς ἀμ-
ξῆς μὴ πειθόμενος δὲ ἀγριολαίοι, ἀλλ' ἐπέγνως, οἷς μὲν ἄλλοι παῖδες δεδοχον, τὸ δ' Ἀλκιδήσης καταβαλῶν ἑπὶ στόμα πρὸ τοῦ ἤγειρον καὶ παρατείνει ἑαυτῶν ἐκέλευσιν οὖσι, εἰ μοιηῆται, διεξελήνην, ὥστε τὸν μὲν ἀνθρώπων ἀναφόρωσε τὸ ἤγειρον ὅταν δεσαντα, τοὺς δ' ἴδεται ἐκπλαγίων καὶ μετὰ βοής συνδραμένων πρὸς αὐτόν.
563 D 21 to émòv γ' — òvar is manifestly proverbial (Schneider). For òvar cf. Charm. 173 A ákoue δή — to émòv òvar and Thracet. 201 E. 

22 átòs γάρ κτλ. 'I frequently experience what you describe when I am on my way to the country,' sc. through the congested streets of Athens. Jowett's 'when I take a country walk' is hardly accurate. The present πορευόμενος should be taken in its full force.

25 kàv òtiov κτλ. If the middle is to be pressed, we must translate: 'if any man applies to himself the very least degree of slavery' etc. That is to say, they are so sensitive that they cannot bear to see any one making himself even a willing slave. In the sacred name of Freedom, Democracy, which is now on the verge of Tyranny, puts freedom down. The sentiment is perhaps a little exaggerated, but otherwise suitable enough: only we should rather have expected Plato to express this meaning by átòs aití προσφέρη. If there were any well-authenticated examples of the middle of προσφέρων used for the active, it would be better to construe προσφέρηται as if it were προσφέρη, and suppose that the slavery is applied to others: but the instances of προσφέρεσθαι = προσφέρεσθαι in Stephanus-Hase s.v. are either dubious or from late authors. The syllable -tau at the end of a line is sometimes abbreviated in uncial MSS (see Bond and Thompson Public. of the Pal. Soc. 1 Plate 106), and this fact lends additional plausibility to W. II. Thompson's conjecture, that we should write προσφέρη for προσφέρήται. I once proposed τισι, and the proposal is approved by a critic in Hermathena xxiiv. p. 252. The citizens become so sensitive that the least degree of pressure applied to any section of them rouses them all. Meantime, as neither of these conjectures is quite convincing,

I have retained the ms reading pro tempore, although I think Thompson's conjecture represents what Plato meant to say.

26 τελευτώντες γάρ κτλ. There is steady deterioration; and the last stage of democracy is the worst. Aristotle holds the same opinion: see Pol. Δ 6. 1293 η τελευταί τῶν χρόνων εφ ταῖς πόλεις γεγενημένη along with 1291-1292 30 —1292 37. οὐδὲ τῶν νόμων κτλ. Cf. Latos 701 B and Xen. Hell. I 7. 12 ff. Such a democracy works by means of ψηφίσματα rather than laws, and is áφα- λογον τῶν μοναρχῶν τῇ τυραννίᾳ (Arist. l.c. Cf. also Gilbert Beiträge zur inn. Gesch. Athens pp. 79 ff.).

563 E—566 D Such is the seed which develops into Tyranny, excessive freedom generating excessive servitude, in accordance with a common law. The drones were more numerous and violent, and ruined the democracy in course of time as once they ruined oligarchy. A democratical State contains three classes of citizens (1) the drones, stinging as well as stingless, (2) the rich who serve as drones' provender, (3) the Demos, with whom the sovereignty lies. The most active members of the drone-fraternity become leaders of the Demos against the rich. By dint of extortion and calumny the propertied classes are at last compelled in self-defence to form an oligarchical party. Hence arise impeachments etc., and the people range themselves under a single Champion. As in the fable he who tasted human flesh became a wolf, so this Champion of the People, as soon as he spills the blood of fellow-citizens, is doomed to become a tyrant. Civil war begins; the Champion is either driven from the city, and returns a full-fledged tyrant, or receives a body-guard to protect him from secret assaults, and thus achieves his end.
PLATONOS

XV. Αὐτή μὲν τοῖς, ἢν δ’ ἐγὼ, ὁ φίλε, ἢ ἄρχη ὑπώσι καλῇ
30 καὶ νεανικῇ, ὀδευ τυραννίς φύεται, ὥς ἐμοι δοκεῖ. Νεανικῇ δήτα,
ἐφή ἀλλὰ τί τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο; Ταῦτον, ἢν δ’ ἐγὼ, ὅπερ ἐν τῇ
δυναρχίᾳ νόσημα ἐγγενομένου ἀπώλεσεν αὐτήν, τούτῳ καὶ ἐν
ταυτῇ πλέον τε καὶ ἑγχυρότερον ἐκ τῆς ἑξουσίας ἐγγενομένου κατα-
dουλοῦται δημοκρατίαν. καὶ τῷ ὀντὶ τὸ ἄγαν τι ποιεῖν μεγάλην
35 φίλει εἰς τονναντίον μεταβολῆν ἀνταποδοδίνον, ἐν ὦραις τε καὶ
ev | φυτοῖ καὶ ἐν σώμασιν, καὶ δή καὶ ἐν πολιτείαις ὑπὸ
ηκιστα. Εἰκός, ἐφή. Ἡ γὰρ ἄγαν ἐλευθερία ἔοικεν ὡς ἀλλο
τι ἢ εἰς ἄγαν δουλεῖαν μεταβάλλει καὶ ἑιδῶτι καὶ πόλει. Εἰκός
γὰρ. Εἰκότως τοινυν, ἔστον, οὐκ ἐξ ἀλλης πολιτείας τυραννίς
καβίσταται ἢ ἐκ δημοκρατίας, ἐξ οἰμαί τής ἀκροτάτης ἐλευθερίας
dουλεία πλέοιτε τε καὶ ἄριστοτάτη. "Εχει γὰρ, ἐφή, λόγον. 'Αλλ’
οὐ τοῦτ’, οἰμαί, ἢν δ’ ἐγὼ, ἡρώτας, ἀλλὰ ποιον νόσημα ἐν δυναρχίᾳ

563 B ff. 29 Αὐτή μὲν τοῦν κτλ. In his account of the genesis of tyranny, as in his description of the tyrant himself, Plato has borrowed several features from the career of the most conspicuous tyrant of his own age, Dionysius I of Syracuse. See on 564 A, and for other historical references 566 B al.

νόημα: viz. the drones, as explained in 564 B (ἕκεν τοίνυν κτλ.).

33 ἐξουσίαν κτλ. See on 557 B. For τῷ ὀντί cf. VI 497 D n.

32 οἰμαί: 32 n. The omission of καὶ δή καὶ κτλ. See cr. n. The omission of καὶ δή was a natural slip, and a majority of mss agree with II. For καὶ δή καὶ with φιλή ημετα following cf. (with Schneider) Soph. 216 B. The present passage brings out very clearly Plato’s conception of the State as a living organism and no mere ‘dead machine.’ See on this subject Bluntschli Theory of the State E. T. pp. 18—24 and cf. 543 A n.

3, 31 ἄγαν δουλείαν. For the omission of the article cf. IV 434 C n. We certainly should not read, with Schaeler, τῷ ἄγαν, or delete ἄγαν with Cobet.

4 οὐκ ἐξ ἀλλης κτλ. In early times, according to Aristotle (Pol. E. 5, 1305a 7 ff.) democracies used to give rise to tyrannies. The tyranny of Dionysius I of Syracuse is a notorious illustration from later history (see Grote c. 81). But tyranny had other origins as well: it constantly appeared for example during the transition from Aristocracy to an oligarchical form of government (Whibley Gk Olig. pp. 72—83). Plato deliberately selects that particular origin which accords with his psychological standpoint. In the decline of an individual soul, ‘lawless’ or unnatural (παράνομος) desires succeed the λογομα in which all desires are treated as equal. Hence tyranny, which is only the political expression of unnatural desire, succeeds democracy in the fall of a State. Granted that Plato thought Athens was still degenerating, he must certainly have expected her, unless the process of decay should be arrested, to end in a tyranny. See also on IX 576 B. With the position of οἰμα cf. 568 C and other examples in Braun de hypost. Plat. II p. 12.

5 ἀκροτάτης. Herwerden (with Flor. T) conjectures ἀκροστάτης: but ἀκρας does not easily admit the superlative, and the word is less suitable here than in the elaborate similitude about the wine of freedom 562 D. For the superlative of ἄκρος cf. v 459 E al.

7 ἡρώτας: ‘you were asking about,’ (dach wahl nicht danach fragtest du, Schneider), viz. when you said τῷ τοῦτο; (563 E). Cf. Crat. 407 C τῶν ἄρχη ἐρώτα (‘ask about Ares’), καὶ τῷ ὀντι—ἀγωνισθάν (563 E—564 A) is a digression, and Adimantus’ question is
ΠΟΛΕΙΤΙΑΣ Η

564 D]

Β τε φυόμενον ταύτων καὶ ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ δουλώταί αὐτὴν. Ἀληθῆ, ἐφή, λέγεις. Ἐκεῖνο τοιοῦτον, ἡφη, ἔλεγον τὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν τε καὶ διαπραγμάτων ἀνδρῶν γένος, τὸ μὲν ἀνρείποταν ἠγούμενον αὐτῶν, τὸ δὲ ἀνανδρότερον ἐπίγονον· οὖς δὴ ἄφωμοιούμεν κηφήσι, τοὺς μὲν κέντρα ἔχουσιν, τοὺς δὲ ἀκέντροις. Καὶ ὀρθῶς γ', ἐφή. Τούτω τοῖς, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, παράττετον ἐν πάσῃ πολιτείᾳ ἐγγυμομένω, οἴνον

C περὶ σῶμα φλέγμα τε καὶ χολή· ἢ δὴ καὶ δεῖ τοῦ ἄγαθον ἀγαθὸν τε καὶ νομοθέτιν πόλεως μὴ ἤτον ἢ σοφὸν μελιττουργὸν πόρρωθεν 15 εὐλαβείσθαι, μάλιστα μὲν ὅποις μὴ ἐγγυμομένῳ, ἢν δὲ ἐγγυμοκρατήσω, ὅπως ὦ τε τάχυστα ἔξων αὐτοῦς τοὺς κηφήνως ἐκτετμήσωσθον. Ναὶ μὰ Δία, ἢ δ' ὃς, πανταπασικε. "Ὅδε τοῖς, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, λάβωμεν, ἢν εὐκρινέστερον ἐδαμεν ὅ βουλόμεθα. Πῶς; Τρικχί διαστησώμεθα τῷ λόγῳ δημοκρατουμένην πόλιν, ὀστέρ οὖν καὶ ἔχει. ἐπ' 20

D μὲν γὰρ ποῦ το τοιοῦτον ἡ γένος ἐν αὐτῇ ἐμφαίνεται δ' ἐξουσίαιν οὐκ ἐλαττων ἢ ἐν τῇ ἀλήχουμεν. "Εστὶν οὖτω. Πολὺ δὲ γὰρ δριμύτερον ἐν ταύτῃ ἢ ἐν εἰκότῃ. Πῶς; 'Εκεῖ μὲν διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐντυμον εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἀπελαύνεσθαι τῶν ἀρχῶν, ἀγομαστὸν καὶ οὐκ

II. ἄφωμοιούμεν Σηθ.; ἄφωμοιούμεν ΑΠ.γ. 15. μελιττουργὸν ΑΠ.Π.; μελιτ- τουργὸν Α'. 17. ἐκτετμήσκεσθαι Α⁺ cum u alissique: ἐκτετμήσθον ΑΠ.Εη q.

not answered until Socrates specifies what particular νόσημα was meant by the allusion in 503 E. J. and C. erroneously refer ἡμοίωτα 10 πῶς—το τοιοῦτον λέγουν; (562 ε.)

564 B 9 ἐκείνῳ κτλ. ‘Well then,’ said I, ‘I was referring to you class’ etc. ἐκείνῳ = ‘already-known’ (in 552 c and later). Ον το μὲν—ἐπομένων see 564 D n.

11 ἄφωμοιούμεν. See cr. n. The present is less suitable, especially with δὴ (=ut seis, Schneider). For the error see Intro. § 5.

13 ταράττετον κτλ. ταράττετον is used absolutely as in Ἰππ. Μην. 373 B Σωκάτης—ἀεὶ ταράττετο ἐν τοῖς λόγοις. Ον φλέγμα τε καὶ χολή the Oxford editors refer to Arist. Probl. 1.29, 862b 27 τῶν κατὰ τῶν ἄνθρωπων ἢ χολή μὲν ἐστὶ θερμῶν, τὸ δὲ φλέγμα ψυχήν, and rightly hold that ‘the hot humour answers to the stiffing, the cold to the stingless drones.’ Cf. Tim. 85 d ff.

564 C 15 μελιττουργὸν is the reading of Σηθ M as well as Η (see cr. n.), and is elsewhere better attested than μελιττουργὸν, which “api magis quam homini convenit” (Schneider).

17 ἔχων has been suspected by W. H. Thompson and Herwerden; but the preposition is occasionally found with this idiom both in poetry and prose (Kühner Gr. Gr. Π. p. 356 and Lina de prob. univ. Plan. p. 33). The half-poetic ἔχων (see on IV 434 E and VII 518 C) suits well with the archaic form αὐτοὶ (ι 330 b n.).


21 το τοιοῦτον γενός: viz. the drones.

564 D ἐξουσίαι. See on 557 B.
25 ερρομένων γίνεται, ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ δὲ τούτῳ ποι τὸ προεστὸς αὐτῆς ἐκτὸς ὀλίγων, καὶ τὸ μὲν δριμύτατον αὐτοῦ λέγει τε καὶ πράττει, τὸ δ' ἄλλο περὶ τὰ βήματα προσέζουν βομβεῖ τε καὶ οὐκ ἀνέχεται τοῦ ἄλλα | λέγοντος, ὅπετε πάντα ἕως τοῦ τοιοῦτος διοικεῖται ἐν Ε ὁ τοιαύτῃ πολιτείᾳ χωρὶς τινῶν ὀλίγων. Μάλα γε, ἢ δ' ἄς. 30' ἄλλο τοῖνυν τοιόν οἰκοτίκηται ἐκ τοῦ πλῆθους. Τὸ ποιοῦ; Χρηματιζόμενον που πάντων οἱ κοσμίωτατοι φύσει ὡς τὸ πολὺ πλουσιότατοι γίγνονται. Εἰκός, Πλεῖστον δή, οἰμά, τοῖς κηφήσι μέλι, καὶ εὐποροῦσαν ἐντεῦθεν βλιττεῖν. Πῶς ὅρα ἄν, ἐφι, παρά 25. προεστός II et nisi fallor A1: προεστὸς A2. 33. βλιττεῖν nos: βλιττεῖν AΠ: βλιττεῖν ΠΠΕ.∂.

25 προεστός refers not only to the ἐς προεστάτης τοῦ δήμος (563 c n.), but to δημαγωγοῖς in general and all who lead the people whether as orators or as officers (Λέγει τε καὶ πράττει). 26 ἐκτὸς ὀλίγων. The leaders in a democracy, says Plato, belong to the class of drones—with a few exceptions. Pericles, for example, was an illustrious exception (Thuc. II 65. 8, 9 and Xen. Symp. 8. 39); and so, according even to Plato himself, was Aristides (Gorg. 526 B). Plato's general attitude towards Athenian demagogues has often been censured; but nearly all the greatest writers of antiquity, except the orators, pronounce the same verdict. 26 τὸ μὲν δριμύτατον—βομβεῖ. Cf. Dem. Ol. II 29 πολυπερευθεν κατὰ συμμορίας. ἤτοι ἄγλυμα ἐκατέρω, καὶ στρατηγὸς ὡς τούτῳ, καὶ οἱ βρόμβουμεν ἔχεον, οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι προσκυνήσας οἱ μὲν ὡς τούτους, οἱ δὲ ὡς ἐκείνους. προσέζων (used of a bee alighting in Arist. Hist. An. VIII 11. 590b 15) and βομβεῖ keep up the figure. 28 τοῦ ἄλλα λέγοντος. Vermehren proposes τού, comparing v 479 A οὐδ' ἄνεγγελέων ἢ τίς—ἵνα and IX 579 A. If Plato had wished to say 'any one,' he would, I think, have written οὐδ' ἄνεγγέν: τοῦ is too weak. The article is generic. 564 E 28 τοῦ τοιοῦτοῦ: the class of drones in general, not simply τὸ δριμύτατον αὐτοῦ. Cf. τὸ τοιοῦτον γένος in C above. 29 χωρὶς τινῶν ὀλίγων is neuter and should be taken with πάντα. The different liturgies etc. would scarcely be performed by the drones; and some departments of civic administration might be in the hands of the few exceptions noted above (ἐκτὸς ὀλίγων D). 30 τοῖνυν is "also": see I 339 E n. 31 χρηματιζόμενον κτλ.: "if all are engaged in making money" etc. πάντων is the whole of which οἱ κοσμίωτατοι form a part; not 'all the citizens of a democracy,' for the aim of democracy is not πλουσίως but ἐλευθερία, and the drones at least are not engaged in money-making. 32 πλεῖστον δή κτλ.: 'thus, I imagine, there is plenty of honey for the drones, and it is most easy to squeeze honey from this source.' My correction βλιττεῖν for βλιττεῖν (see cr. n.) is regarded as certain by a reviewer of my Text of the Republic in Hermathena XXIV p. 252. βλιττεῖ is retained by J. and C.; but there is no authority for the intransitive use of the verb, and βλιττεῖν in the very next sentence is active. Schneider reads βλιττεῖ, which would be a ἄτας ἐρμή. Ruhnken's βλιττεῖαι is unexceptionable in point of sense, and has found much favour. The author of this emendation claims (in his note on Tim. Lex. s.v. βλιττεῖ) that it is confirmed "cum Scholiastae, tum Codicis Parisini auctoritate." But the Paris MS have all either βλιττεῖ or βλιττεῖ; and Bekker's collation of the Scholium is βλιττεῖ: ἄφαιρεν (not ἄφαιρει- ται) τὸ μελι ἀπὸ τῶν κηρίων. Moreover, although the syllable ται was sometimes abbreviated in uncial MS (see on 563 D), it is easier to suppose that the horizontal stroke for final ν was here accidentally omitted, as constantly in the République: see Introd. § 5. For the sense cf. I 343 A n. and on the word βλιττεῖν (i.e. "μη(β)λιττεῖν from μελι) Blaydes on Lr. Knights 794.
34. Plato, see (sic) m: βλόσεις Α: βλόσεις Ξ: βλόσεως ut videtur Π: βλόσεις Π².

35 κηφήνων βοτάνη has a proverbial ring: cf. the proverb κηφήρες μάχθος ἄλλων κατεδώτα (Leutsch u. Schneidein Parod. Gr. II p. 179). The same expression, as Schneider points out Addit. p. 69, is used by Plut. Mor. 42 A with a different meaning.

4 οὖ θαμά κτλ. Under the earliest and best form of democratic government, according to Aristotle, the δήμος consists chiefly of farmers, and ἐκκλησίαι are infrequent, for ὀδα τὸ ἐστάθη κατὰ τὴν κάραν οὔτ' ἀπαντῶν οὔτ' ὀρθῶς δέχεται τῆς σωφρονοῦ τάντας (Pol. 4. 1310b 30 ff., 3. 1318b 11, and Δ 5. 1292b 27). It is a later and degenerate phase when assemblies are multiplied by the payment of ἐκκλησιαστικὸς μαχθὸς and other phases of 'honey' (ib. Δ 6. 1293a 1 ff.). Plato in this passage contributes some hints towards a historical analysis of the evolution of Greek democracy such as we find in Aristotle.


37 διανέμουσας κτλ.: 'while dividing it among the people to retain the lion's share themselves.' The epigram is spoiled if (with Cobet) we read <διά νημα> διανέμουσας. For the sentiment cf. Dem. Ol. 31, Ar. Peace l.c., Knights 46 ff., 792 ff., 1218 ff. and (with J. and C.) Wäsps 655—679.

38 τοὺς ὀφτώς: emphatic, 'with that proviso' (D. and V.).

39 πράττοντες is quite satisfactory: cf. οὔρει τε καὶ πράττει 564 D. Richter should not have proposed ταράττοντες.

36 ὑπὲρ δύνανται κτλ.: 'in any way they can.' Their opportunities of public action in self-defence are limited; hence they form e.g. secret associations and the like. On the tense of ἐσχων see 548 D n., and for the statement itself (αἰτιά—Διήγαρχοι) many passages in Aristophanes, e.g. Wäsps 458 ff. and others quoted by Whibley Pol. Part. in Athens p. 65 n. 3.
565 c 14 τότ' ἡδή—οὖχ ἐκώντες. Isocrates makes a similar complaint (Antid. 318): οὐ τοὺς μὲν εὐδοκοῦντας τοὺς πολιτῶν καὶ μάλιστα δυναμένους ποιήσαι τι τὴν πίλυν ἡγαλίν, ὁλαρχηκὸς ὄνειδος καὶ λακανωμένος, οὐ πρότερον ἐπαύσαιντο (sc. οἱ πατέρες ἡμῶν) πρὸν ἡγακασαν ἤμοιος γενεσθαι ταῖς αἰτίαις ταῖς λεγομέναις περὶ αὐτῶν; Cf. also Arist. Pol. E 5. 1304b 21 ff. Observe how Plato now begins to insist on the inevitable necessity which dogs the footsteps of political decay: see on 566 a and 567 c.

16 ἐσανγελαὶ: 'impeachments,' as e.g. for κατάλωσις τοῦ δήμου. On esangella in Attic legal procedure see Hager Dict. Ant. s.v. and Meier u. Schömann Att. Prot. 1 pp. 312—335.

17 ἀγώνες περὶ ἄλλων: 'trials of one another' (Jowett); lit. 'trials about one another,' i.e. trials in which the individuals chiefly concerned, viz. the defendants, belong to one or other of the two parties in the State. ἄλλως by itself would be better suited to the words ἐσανγελαὶ καὶ κρίσεις, but ἀγώνες ἄλλως is too harsh an expression, and that, I think, is why Plato writes ἀγώνες περὶ ἄλλων. This explanation is in my opinion better than to translate "Processus um Leben und Tod." (Schneider: cf. ἀγώνας—περὶ σφέων αὐτῶν Hdt. VIII 102). Some may think that ἄλλως should replace ἄλλως: but περὶ with the accusative would not express a close enough connexion in this passage.

18 οὐκόν κτλ. So in Ar. Knights 1127 Demos says ἰδοὺ λαμά τρέφει ἐνα προστάτη. The προστάτης τοῦ δήμου in Athens was simply "the leading demagogue, who acted as guardian and representative of the demos, as the ordinary προστάτης did of the metoeces." (Whibley Pol. Part. in Ath. p. 51). He was not a magistrate, although his position was recognised and much sought after. Pericles was certainly προστάτης, and, among his successors, apparently Cleon and others. For the authorities see Whibley l.c. and Gilbert Beltrāge etc. pp. 78 ff. For ἐνα τυχ' Cobet substitutes ἐνα γε τυχ', without sufficient reason: cf. VI 494 D n. To my mind the emphasis on ἐνα is much stronger without γε: and Plato clearly intends to emphasise that word, for it is by the rise of a single champion that tyranny is caused.

565 d 20 ἐκ προστατικῆς βίσης κτλ. Arist. Pol. E 10. 1310b 14 ff. ακεδον γὰρ οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν τυράννων γεγονάκει ἡγαμαγοῦν ὡς εἰπών, ποιεῖτενές ἐκ τοῦ διαβάλλειν τοῦ γνωρίσαν. This was especially true of earlier times, when the orator also held military command (ib. 5. 1305a 7 ff.). See Gilbert Gr. Stat. A. II pp. 280 ff.

21 καὶ οὐκ ἄλλοθεν. If we treat this sentence as a statement of historical fact, Plato expresses himself too strongly; for tyranny sometimes arose in other ways. See however on 564 A and 543 A, 544 C n.n.

23 τῷ μύθῳ. See [Hecat.] Frag. 375 in Müller Frag. Hist. Gr. 1 p. 31 and Pauly, VIII 2. 6. In his note on the latter passage, Frazer collects the ancient legends about werewolves. For the later history of the superstition consult McLennan's

26 ενός is bracketed by Herwerden; but τοῦ in τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου σπλάγχνου proves it genuine. But for ενός Plato must have written τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου σπλάγχνου <τοῦ> ἐν ἄλοις κτλ. The were-wolf superstition was similarly associated with cannibalism in some of its later European forms (M" LENNAN l.c.).


30 ἀνδρός is poetic for ἀνθρώπου: cf. Aesch. Ag. 1020 ἀνδρός μέλαν αἷμα τίς ἐν πάλιν ἡγκαλείατ' ἐπαιδεύων; and often in Pindar (Ol. I 35, 66 etc.).

31 γλυττὴ τε καὶ—ἐγγυνευόμενος. The blood of fellow-citizens is kindred blood: for all are sons of the same fatherland. 'The unholy tongue and lips' is an eloquent amplification of γενόμενοι, in harmony with the story to which Plato has referred in D above. J. and C. seem to me to mar the effect of Plato's eloquence by remarking that 'the tongue and lips which make the slanderous accusation are vividly imagined as actually tasting blood.'

32 ἄνθρωπας κτλ. Cf. Gorg. 466 c τί τέ; οὐχ ὡσπερ οἱ τύμπανοι ἀποκτινωσαῖ τε (sc. οἱ ρήτορες) διὸ ἂν βούλωσται, καὶ ἀφαίρεσθαι χρήματα καὶ ἑκάβλοναν ἐκ τῶν πλεόνων δὲν ἂν δοκῇ αὐτοῖς; Νὴ τὸν κύνα. The unscrupulous mob-orator is a budding tyrant.


2 ἄναγκη—καὶ ἀριστατίκη κτλ. Once more Necessity rings her knell (565 c n.); the instinct of self-preservation makes the final stage inevitable. For the same reason Xenophon remarks (Hier. 7. 12. 13) that a tyrant never dare lay down his power: cf. also Periander in D. L. 1 97 and the pathetic saying καλὸν μὲν εἶναι τὴν τυραννία χωρὶς, οὐκ ἔχεις δὲ ἀπόβασιν (Plut. Sol. 14. 10). See also on 545 c and 547 A.

4 οὖντος κτλ. 'This then,' said I, 'is the man who is guilty of sedition against the holders of property.' ἡγείρεται is not 'becomes' ('the leader of the faction against the rich becomes that person' J. and C.), but 'turns out to be,' 'is' sc. in our argument or picture: cf. 562 a n. οὖντος ἡγείρεται is similarly used at the end of the picture of the tyrannical man in IX 5761. Schneider seems to suppose that στρατιάξων refers to civil war ('"viv et arma civilia") such as is described in what follows, but the incidents just enumerated.
would certainly be called \( \sigma \tau \alpha \iota \varsigma \) by a Greek, and \( \nu \nu \tau o s \) \( \delta \hat{\eta} \)—\( \gamma \hat{\eta} \hat{\rho} \tau \epsilon \tau \alpha i \) points backward rather than forward, as is clear both from \( \delta \hat{\eta} \) and from Aelius\'s reply.

6 \( \epsilon \kappa \tau \epsilon \sigma \omega \nu \kappa \tau \lambda \). He is transformed into a full and finished tyrant in one of two ways: either by being expelled (in course of the \( \sigma \tau \alpha \iota \varsigma \)) and returning \( \beta \iota \tau o n \ \epsilon \chi \theta \acute{r} \omega \nu \), or else in the way described in \( \epsilon \lambda \nu \ \delta \hat{\eta} \)—\( \alpha \pi o t e t e \kappa e l e s \mu \varepsilon \nu o s \) (D). Pisistratus is not a perfect example to illustrate \( \epsilon \kappa \tau \epsilon \sigma \omega \nu \) etc., for he had made himself a tyrant before he was expelled (Arist. Ath. Pol. 14. 3).

566 B 8 διαβάλλοντες τῇ πόλει: ‘by setting the citizens against him’ (J. and C.) rather than ‘by persuading him to the State’ (D. and V.). Cf. vi 498 c and Phaed. 67 e.

βιαλω—\( \lambda \acute{\alpha} \beta \rho \acute{\alpha} \). Cf. Thuc. VIII 65. 2.

10 \( \alpha i \tau \mu \alpha \) τῷ \( \theta \mu \lambda \nu \theta \beta \iota \lambda \rho \iota \). In the case of Theagenes of Megara, Pisistratus, and Dionysius of Syracuse: see Arist. Rhet. I 2. 1357 b 30—33 with Cope ad loc., and (for Dionysius) Grote x pp. 202 ff. and Freeman’s Sicily III p. 558.
succession of wars. *All who expostulate, he 'removes': it is a sad necessity of his situation that he should purge the city of wealth and virtue. To provide against his growing unpopularity, he must increase his standing army by enlisting foreign mercenaries and the slaves of private citizens. These are his 'new citizens' forsooth! Euripides and other tragedians praise tyranny and its retinue: that is why we exclude them from our city. The higher they climb the hill of commonwealths, the more the honour paid to poets flags. As for the tyrant, after exhausting the property of temples and the proscibed, he will compel the Demos that begat him to support his rabble rout. All remonstrance is in vain. The Demos now learns what slavery means—slavery in its most cruel form, where slaves are masters.

566 D ff. 26 διελθμεν δη κτλ. Throughout the whole of this picture, it is tolerably clear that Plato has Dionysius the first of Syracuse in his mind: see on 566 ε, 567 β, ε, 568 α, δ. The reader should compare Aristotle's brief account of the three kinds of 'tyranny in Pol. Α 10. 1295 δ—24. That which Plato describes is of course the worst variety of anεπενθέντοις ἄρχειν τῶν ὁμοίων καὶ βελτίστων πάντων πρὸς τὸ σφέτερον αὐτῆς συμφέρων, ἄλλα μὴ πρὸς τὸ τῶν ἀρχείμενων (ib. 20—21).

27 βροτός: 'creature' (Jowett). The tyrant is something less than human.

29 πάντως ω ταν κτλ. For the grammatical concord cf. ΙV 436 c n. The sense is well illustrated by Stallbaum from Eur. Ι. Α. 337—342, where Menelaus says to Agamemnon: οὐθ' ὃτε ἐποιήσατε ἄρχειν Δαναόιδας πρὸς Πιον,—ὡς ταπεινὸς ἦσθα, πάσης δεξίας προσθηκάγων, καὶ θύρας ἔχων ἀκλήστων τῷ δῆλοι δημοτῶν, καὶ δίδοις πρόσφεραν ἐξῆς πᾶσι, καὶ μίτης θέλω, τοῖς πρῶτοι ἔτην πλασάτω τῷ φιλότιμῳ ἐκ μέσου; Ον οὐλέ followed by τὲ (neque—et) where the stress falls on the affirmative clause (non modo non—sed etiam) see ΙV 430 b n.

566 Ε 31 ἤλευθέρωσε—διείνειμεν: fulfilling the hopes held out by him as προστάτης (566 Α n.). A redistribution of landed property was one of Dionysius' earliest measures after he had established himself in the tyranny (Grote Χ pp. 221 ff.). As Mr Giles points out, such a step would tend to keep up the enthusiasm of the πλῆθος, especially when the tyrant succeeded to an oligarchy which had added field to field by lending on mortgage to the small farmers and selling them up after a bad year. It would be easy enough to carry out, because the tyrant's opponents would have fled the country: cf. 566 c. For the aorists see 548 δ n.

33 πρὸς τοὺς ἐξω ἐχθροῖς κτλ.: 'in his relations to foreign enemies' etc. With the construction of τοὺς μὲν κτλ. cf. ΙΧ 591 ε—592 λ ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τίμας γε—
tων μὲν μεθέλει καὶ γείσεται ἑκών, ἂς ἂν ἠγίστη ἄρχειν αὐτῶν πυρεῖσιν, ἂς ὀδὴν τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν ἔχων, φεύγεται ἑκέντρως καὶ δημοσίᾳ. In both cases the idiom resembles so-called partitive apposition, for which see ΙV 431 a n.

ήγεμόνος δ’ ἰδής ἦ. Εἰκός γε. | Οὐκόν καὶ ὁνεάρματα εἰσέχοντο πρὸς τὸ καθ’ ἡμέραν ἀναγκάζονται εἶναι καὶ ἵπτον αὐτῷ ἐπιβουλεύσι; | Τέλος. Καὶ ἂν γε τινὰ, οἴμαι, ὑποτεύχῃ ἐκείνῃ φρονύματα ἐχοντας μὴ ἐπιτρέψειν αὐτῷ ἄρχειν, 5 ὄποσ ἃν τούτων μετὰ προφάσεως ἀπολίθῃ ἐνδούς τοῖς πολεμίοις; τούτων πάντων ἑνεκα τυράννου ἄει ἀνάγκη πόλεμον παράττειν; Ἀνάγκη. Ταῦτα δὴ ποιοῦντα ἐτοιμὸν μᾶλλον ἀπεχθάνεσθαι τοῖς Β πολίταις; Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; Οὐκόν καὶ τινὰς τοῖς ἐγκαταστασίαν- τοις καὶ ἐν δυνάμει οὐτων παραρτίσασθαι καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ πρὸς 10 ἀλλίους, ἐπιπλήστοτον τοῖς γνωριμοῖς, οὐ δὲ τυχικάνωσιν ἀνδρικότατοι ὄντες; Εἰκός γε. Ὡσ’ ἐπεξαίρεθαι δὴ τούτους πάντας δεὶ τῶν τύραννων, εἰ μέλλει ἄρχειν, ἐὼς ἂν μήτε φίλους μήτ’ ἐχθρῶν λίπη μηθένα ὅτι τοὺ ὀφελοῦ. Τέλος. Ὁξέως ἄρα δὲ ὀρῶν αὐτῶν, τὰς ἀνδρείας, τὰς μεγαλόφρονα, τὶς φρονίμος, τὶς πλούσιος καὶ ὥσ’ 15 οὔτως ἐδδαίμων ἐστὶν, ὅστε τούτους ὑπασίν ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ, εἴη βούλεται εἶνε μή, πολέμιοι εἰναι καὶ ἐπιβουλεύειν, ἐὼς ἂν καθήρῃ τὴν πόλιν. Καλὸν γε, ἐφή, καθαρμόν. Ναὶ, ἂν δὲ ἐγώ, τὸν ἐναντίον ἢ οἱ ἑαυτοὶ τὰ σῶματα· οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὸ χείριστον ἄσφαλ- ροντες λείπουσι τὸ βέλτιστον, ὅ ὅτε τούνατον. Ὅμως ἐοικε γὰρ, 20 αὐτῷ, ἐφή, ἀνάγκη, εἴπερ ἄρξει.

2. τοῦ Ἑρ. τὸ Λ’III; τῶ (sic) Λ’. 13. αὐτῶν Λ’II: ἀστῶν Λ’.

ΕΠΙ. 11. 1313b 28 ff. ἐστὶ δὲ καὶ πόλεμους ὁ τύραννος, ὅπως δ’ ἄσχολο τὸ ὅσι καὶ ἠγεράνθους ἐν χρείᾳ διεκέχον ὄντες. The history of Dionysius the elder is again in point: see Grote x pp. 224—334.


II. 2 πρὸς τῷ. A majority of MSS have πρὸς τῷ, which is also the older reading (see εἰς τοῦ); but εἰς πρὸς τῷ in this sense lacks authority, and is inherently im- probable. Cf. Phaedr. 249 D and IX 585 A, X 604 c, D. H.

ΕΠΙ. 5 ὅπως—πολέμως. sc. πολέμως τῶν καὶ καὶ καί as before. Έστοιμον in line 7 is impersonal—a rare usage, for which cf. Eph. 7 333 A and Eur. H. F. 86.

567 B 11 ὑπεξαίρειν. For the cor- ruption ὑπεξαίρεων (εἰς τ. n.) cf. Xen. Hiero 5 2 διὰ τὸ τοῦ τοῦτον ὑπεξαίρεσθαι (J. G. Schneider’s conjecture for ὑπεξαί- ρεσθαι of the mss). On this passage the poet Gray remarks: “Compare this description with the Hiero of Xenophon: it is in almost every step a picture of the politics and way of life of the elder Dionysius.”

12 ἔστιν μήτε φίλους κτλ. There is no soliloquy or desolation like the tyrant’s: for he is the enemy of the whole human race. See the passages quoted by Nägelsbach Nachtr. TheoL. p. 304.

567 C 17 καλὸν γε—καθαρμὸν. Cf. VII 540 E n. The famous anecdote of Thrasybulus and Periander (Hdt. v 92: cf. Arist. Pol. Γ 13 1284a 26 ff., E 10 1311a 20 ff., also Eur. Suppl. 445—449, where the poet borrows his imagery from the same story) is one instance out of many in Greek history: see Greenidge Grk Const. ΗH. pp. 31 ff.

20 ἀνέγκη: sc. ἐστὶν. J. and C. strangely say that “ἀνέγκη is the subject
568 A]  ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΣ Η  259

D XVIII. Ἐν μακαρία ἁρα, εἴπον ἐγώ, ἀνάγκη δέδεται, ἵνα προστάτει αὐτῷ ἡ μετὰ φαύλων τῶν πολλῶν οἶκειν καὶ ύπὸ τούτων μισοῦμεν ἡ μὴ ζην. Ἐν τοιαύτῃ, η' δ' ὁς. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐχὶ ὅσοι ἄν μᾶλλον τοῖς πολιτάσις ἀπεχάνηται ταῦτα δρῶν, τοσοῦτῳ πλειόνων καὶ πιστοτέρων δορυφόρων δείσεται; Πῶς ἦραν οὖ; 25 Τίνες οὖν οἱ πιστοὶ, καὶ πόθεν αὐτῶν μεταπέμπεται; Αὐτόματοι, ἐφ' ἄλλων ἥξουσι πετόμενοι, εάν τοῖς μεσοῦν διδό. Κηφήνας, Ε ἢ δ' ἐγὼ, νη τὸν κύνα, δοκεῖς αὖ τινὰς μοι λέγειν ἡ ἤμεν τοῖς καὶ παντοδαποῖς. Ἀλληθ' γάρ, ἐφ' ὅκω σοι. Τί δὲ; αὐτόθεν ἢρ' οὖν ἀν ἐθελήσεις—Πῶς; Τοὺς δούλους ἀφελόμενος τοὺς πολιτάς, 30 ἑλευθερίας, τῶν περὶ ἅπαντος δορυφόρον ποιήσασθαι; Σφόδρα γ', ἐφ' ἐπεί τοι καὶ πιστοτάτοις αὐτῷ οὕτως εἰσίν. Ἡ μακαρίουν, 568 ἢ δ' ἐγὼ, λέγεις τυρίνουν χρήμα, εἰ τοιούτοις φίλους τε καὶ | πιστοῖς ἀνδράς χρήσαι τοὺς προτέρους ἐκείνους ἀπολέσαι. Ἀλλὰ μὴν, ἐφ', τοιούτους γε χρήσαι. Καὶ θαυμάζοντι δῆ, εἴπον, οὕτωι οἱ ἑταῖροι αὐτῶν, καὶ ξίνειαιν οἱ νέοι πολίται, οἱ δ' ἐπείκεις μισοῦσι

21. μακαρία Α'II: μακαρία Α'. ἀνάγκη ΙΙ: ἀνάγκη Α. 29. τί δὲ (nullo interrogationis signo) q: τίς δὲ ΑΠΣ.

of éoke." For αὐτῷ ἀνάγκη cf. 568 ε and 1x 579Α. On the force of ἀνάγκη here and just below see 565 ε, 566 λ. 567 D 27 ἢξουσι πετόμενον: 'will wing their way.' banquet propria εἰς τῶν or replace it by μῶν: but insufficient pay would not attract mercenaries.

567 E 28 ξενικοῦς — παντοδαποῖς. The body-guard of foreign mercenaries was a familiar feature in Greek tyrannies: see Xen. Hiero 5. 3 and (for Dionysius in particular) Grote X p. 221.

29 τί δὲ;—ποιήσασθαι: The words from αὐτόθεν τοι καὶ ποιήσασθαι form a single sentence, πως being neglected: cf. τὸ δὲ—γίνεται in 549 C, where see note and Jebb quoted ad loc. αὐτόθεν by its emphatic position already suggests what Socrates is about to say; and Adimantus' interruption, besides its stylistic effect, expresses the anxiety and horror with which the bare idea of such a proceeding would inspire a Greek. "Slaves were normally of non-Greek race; so this is what enlisting a band of negroes would be in the United States to day" (Bosanquet). The best MSS read τίς δὲ αὐτόθεν κτλ., but τίς is indefensible, and retained by no editor. Schneider's τοὺς δὲ αὐτόθεν (with several mss. of inferior authority) seems to me grammatically awkward, as well as lifeless and dull. In Richards' proposal τί δὲ: αὐτόθεν ὢν οὐκ ἐν ἐθελήσεις πως τοὺς δοῦλους et seq., the enclitic πως is singularly weak. J. and C., who print, with Hermann and Stalbaum, τί δὲ; αὐτόθεν—ὠθεῖς; and a full-stop after ποιήσασθαι, supply "some general notion such as ἐλεφαντεύομαι" with ὀθελήσειν "from metapémeietai in the previous sentence"—surely an impossible solution. The punctuation in the text removes, I think, all difficulty, if the words are taken as I take them.

30 τοὺς δοῦλους κτλ. As Dionysius, for example, did (Grote X p. 221 and Freeman's Sicily IV p. 13).

568 A 4 οἱ νέοι πολίται: 'the new citizens,' viz. these quondam slaves et c., not (as D. and V.) 'the young citizens.' It is, in view, for example, of νέοι ἑταῖρος 'new friends' 1x 575 b, quite unnecessary to read οἱ νέοι πολίται (apparently with Pollux III 56; cf. also id. 1x 316), although according to Diodorus xiv 7 Dionysius called his body-guard of emancipated slaves νεοπολίται. See Freeman's Sicily I c.

17—2
5 τε καὶ φεύγουσι; Τί δ’ οὐ μέλλουσιν; Οὐκ ἐτόσος, ἡν δ’ ἐγώ, ἦτε τραγῳδία ὅλος σοφόν δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ ὁ Ἐυριστίδης διαφέρον ἐν αὐτῇ. Τί δὴ; "Ὅτι καὶ τοῦτο πυκνὸς διανολᾶς ἐχόμενοι ἐφθέγξατο, ὡς ἁρὰ σοφοὶ τὺραννοὶ εἰς τὸν σοφὸν συνοπτικόν. καὶ Β’ ἐλεγεν δὴλον ὅτι τούτοις εἶναι τοὺς σοφοὺς, οἰς ἔννοηταν. Καὶ ὡς ἑσθενεῖν καὶ ἀνταρνάσαν, έφη, τὴν τυραννίδα ἐγκαμήται, καὶ έτερα τολλα, καὶ οὕτως καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ποιηταὶ. Τοιγάρτοις, ἐφην, ἂν σοφοὶ ὄντες οἱ τῆς τραγῳδίας ποιηταὶ συγγενικότεροι ἠμῖν τε καὶ ἐκεῖνοι, ὅσοι ἦμων ἔγραμ πολυποιοῦνται, ὅτι αὐτοῖς εἰς τὴν πολιτείαν οὐ παραδεξόμεθα ἄτε τυράννος ἵμητας. Οἴμαι ἔγονε, ἐφη, συγγενικότεροι αὐτῶν συμφωνοι. χαὶ δοισερὲ γε 1 αὐτῶν κυριοί. Εἰς δὲ γε, οἴμαι, τὰς ἄλλας περὶ 15. περιοντες Α᾽ ἐγι: περιοντες ΆΠ. Ἐνδικτερες ρατοκεστί προκειται αὐτοῖς κοιναν.

5 οὐν ἐτοσο κτλ. A highly ironical and sarcastic sentence. It is not without reason that tragedy in general (ὅλος is not 'on the whole' as D. and V. render) is thought σοφόν, and Euripides a mastertragedian (Euripides was notoriously ἄσοφος—see Blaydes on Ar. Clouds 137b): for he gave utterance inter alia to this sapiant remark (for ἐφθέγξατο of an ornacular, would-be-found observation, see on vi 505 c): σοφὸν τύραννον τῶν σοφῶν συνοπτικόν, in which by τῶν σοφῶν' he meant of course οἰς ἔννοητιν (ἄ τύραννοι), the associates of the tyrant, i.e., as, we have seen, a rabble of emancipated slaves and foreign mercenaries. In τραγῳδίᾳ—σοφὸν δοκεῖ εἶναι Plato is also perhaps scoffing at the constant use of σοφὸς in tragedy, especially by Euripides: σοφός is, no doubt, that σοφὸς says! None but a σοφὸς could have written σοφὸ τύραννον τῶν σοφῶν συνοπτικόν. The poet of course really meant that tyrants gain wisdom from the wise men who throng the 'rich man's courts' (vi 489 b n.); but Plato maliciously twists the words into a compliment to tyrants and their rabble rout, and makes them a reason for tabooing tragic poets as τυραννίδος ὑμητάς (v). Cobet would omit τοὺς before σοφῶς: but the article is necessary because τοὺς σοφοὺς represents τῶν σοφῶν of the quotation. As regards the verse itself, it was Sophocles (in his Αἰας Ο Δωρῆτε), and not Euripides, who was the author: see the references in Schneider, with Blaydes on Ar. Theom. 21, Frag. 311 and Dindorf on Soph. Frag. 12 = Nauck frag. 13. Plato's error is repeated in Thucyd. 125 b. and the Scholiast on Ar. Theom. I.c. remarks that Aristophanes and Antisthenes made the same mistake, suggesting that either Aristophanes misled the others (so also Hirmer Entst. u. Komp. d. pl. Pol. p. 658 n. 2), or that the two tragedians wrote the same line independently (so Schneider also thinks). The latter supposition is unlikely. Perhaps the reduplication of the cant Euripidean σοφός is responsible for a kind of error which was easier in antiquity than it would be now. There is little to be said in favour of Dümmler's conjecture (Ακαδημία p. 16), that Antisthenes had quoted the line as from Euripides in an attack on Plato for associating with tyrants (Dionysius I and II), and that Plato, in his hurry to reply, forgets to rectify his assailant's error. Still less should we suppose that Plato's perverse exegesis is meant to caricature Antisthenes' way of expounding poetry.

568 B 10 ἵσθοθον γ ΚΤΛ. Eur. Troad. 1169 τῆ ἰσθοθον τυραννίδος. Isocrates ad Nic. 5 appears to allude to the same verse (Dümmler Chronol. Beiträge p. 32). ἔτερα τολλά: e.g. Phcen. 524 ff., Fragg. 252, 336 Dindorf. In point of fact, however, Euripides blames tyranny at least as often as he praises it: see e.g. Ion 621 ff., Suppl. 439 ff., Fragg. 277, 288, 608 and other passages in Stob. Flor. 49. The elder Dionysius himself had the effrontery or candour to write the line ἢ γὰρ τυραννις ἀδίκας μὴν ἔφη (Stob. Flor. 49. 9, quoted in Freeman's Sicily IV p. 7 n. 1).

13 παραδεξομέθα: not παραδεξομέθα (as Stephanus suggested), in spite of the present συγγενικόκονια, for "civitas ipsa
Iovntes pôleis, xullégonntes toud óchous kalas fwnas kai megálas kai pithanías mithosámenv, eis tuxunídas te kai dhemokratias elkouni tás políteías. Míla ge. Óukou kai proséti tou tôn múthous lamabánoun kai timáontai, múliasta múi, óspser te eikos, úpò tuxáinn, deúteron de úpò dhemokratias. Ósw ò ãn ànóterów 20 D'wson pro tò anántes tôn políteiow, mállou apagoreuei aítow ã tìmì, õspser ùpò õstmatos àdvunatousa poreívesbai. Pánn múi ón dìn.

XIX. 'Alla di, eípon, èustátha mún èxeíheivn. Légonen de pílin ékeino tò tò tuxáinn stratopêdon, tò kalon te kai polú 25 kai poikilòn kai ou'dépote taì'ton, tôiben õrêfetai. Æìlon, éfhi, óti, éin te ierà chrîmata ã ãi ãi tì pôlei, taìta ànalôsei, ótopi potè ãn àei èxarhè, òkai tò tòn àpólmoun, ãlátton éisfforás

22. õspser II: ã õspser A. 28. òkai Baier: om. codd. àpólmoun ã et corr. Λ'2: àpódômwn Λ'1ΠΣ.

to Poetry varies inversely with the merit of the constitution. This is perhaps the severest thing which Plato has yet said against Poetry. The striking metaphor in õspser ùpò õstmatos ktl. is curiously like Dante, as Bosanquet points out.

568 d 26 õrêfetai. Is the verb middle or passive? It is passive in Greek, but that does not decide the question: see on 546 d. If we confine our attention to the single sentence leógemén—õrêfetai, the verb is most readily understood as passive; but ànalôsei in the next sentence favours the view that it is middle. On the whole, I prefer the passive. It is easy to supply the subject of ànalôsei from tò tuxánn.

27 éin te ierà ktl. The elder Dionysius in particular greatly shocked the conscience of Hellas by plundering temples: see Grote X pp. 300, 302 n. 3.

28. òkai tò tòn àpólmoun: 'and the property of his victims': cf. ápallh 567 A, ápallhês 568 A, as well as the kalóerous of 567 B, C. àpólmoun is itself so used in Latostr 568 B. In the indictment of Dionysius I by the Syracusan knight Theodorus (Diodor. XIV 65) occur the words ótous de tà múi ierà sukhis, tòus de tàs ìstow ploutous àma tais tàs ktérmewn õstimaìs àpolômenos tòus oikéctas meðosodeti kata tìs tàs deástouos õvouniès. The sentence exactly illustrates what Plato here says. On the text and other views of this passage see App. VI.
262 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ [568 D

ἀναγκάζων τὸν δήμον εἰσφέρειν. 1 Τι δ' ὅταν δὴ ταῦτα ἐπιλύσῃ; εἰ ἂν 
30 Δῆλον, ἐφη, ὅτι ἐκ τῶν πατρῴων θρέψεται αὐτὸς τε καὶ οἱ συμπόται 
te καὶ ἑταῖροι καὶ ἑταῖραι. Μανθάνω, ἐφην ἐγώ· ὅτι ὁ δήμος, ὁ 
γεννήσας τὸν τύραννον, θρέψει αὐτὸν τε καὶ ἑταῖρους. Πολλὴ 
αὐτῶ, ἐφη, αἰνάγης. Πῶς δὲ λέγεις, εἶπον, ἐὰν τι ἄγανακτῇ τε καὶ 
λέγῃ ὁ δήμος, ὅτι οὔτε δίκαιον τρέφεσθαι ὑπὸ πατρὸς ὅν ἠβδόμα 
35 ἄλλα τουσαντίων ὑπὸ ύσος πατέρα, οὔτε τούτῳ αὐτῶν ἔνεκα ἐγένησέν 
tε καὶ κατέστησεν, ἦνα, ἐπειδή μέγας γένοιτο, τότε 569 
αὐτὸς δούλευσιν τὸς αὐτοῦ δοῦλος τρέφει κεκυνόν τε καὶ τῶν 
dούλων μετὰ ξυγκλίδων ἄλλων, ἀλλ' ἦνα ἀπὸ τῶν πλουσίων 
tε καὶ καλῶν κάγαθων λεγομένων ἐπὶ τῷ πόλει ἐλευθερωθεὶν 
ἐκείνων 5 προστάτως, καὶ νῦν κελεύει αἰτίαν εἰς τῇ πόλεως αὐτῶν 
tε καὶ τῶν ἑταῖρων, ὡσπερ πατὴρ ὄν ἐξ οἰκίας μετὰ ὀχληρῶν 
συμπτῶν ἐξελάνυν; Τινόστατι γε, νὴ Δία, ἢ δ' ὅς, τότε ἢδ' ὁ δήμος, 1' οἶος 
οἶον θέρμα γεννύν ἡσπάζετο τε καὶ πήξεν, καὶ ὅτι ἀσθενεῖστος 
ὁν ἠχυροτέρους εξελαύνει. Πῶς, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, λέγεις; τολμῇ ὑπὶ τὸν 
10 πατέρα βίαζεσθαι, καὶ μὴ πείθηται, τύππειν ὁ τύραννος; Ναὶ,

29. ἐπιλύσῃ ἦναι: ἐπιλύσῃ ΑΠ. 30. συμπόται II: συμπόταιν (sic) Α. 
31. ἐφην ἐγὼ νοῦς; ἐφην δ' ἐγώ ΑΠ: ἐφην ἢν δ' ἐγώ γ. 32. ἑταῖροι II: 
ἐτέρους Α. 33. ἢ μὲν τι; ἢν τε ΑΠΕ. 3. ἀπὸ q; ἀπὸ ΑΠΕ.

568 E 29 δή. Badham suggests ἦναι, needlessly: cf. 1X 573 E and 574 C (Baiter).
ἐπιλύσῃ κτλ. ἐπιλύσῃ (see cr. n.) 
is retained by Hermann, but the aorist, 
which nearly all the MSS read, is no less 
necessary here than in 1 340 E, 1X 573 E 
and x 601 b. Cf. Heller Corpus Inscriptiones 
pp. 3 ff. On τῶν πατρωρίων see 1X 574 A M. 
31 μανθάνω—ὅτι. A comparison 
with 584 A line 8 and with 496 A line 8 
(see cr. n., ad loc.) shews that ἐφην ἐγώ, 
and not ἢν δ' ἐγώ is in all probability the 
right reading in this place. οὗτος (you 
say so) 'because,' not 'that': see on 1 332 A. 
33 πῶς δὲ λέγεις κτλ. 'How and 
how say you,' quotth I, 'if the Demos be 
somewhat wroth,' etc. I formerly read 
πῶς λέγεις with Ξ and some other inferior 
MSS, but now revert to the best supported 
reading, except that, with G. I print ἢν τι 
for ἢν τέ (see cr. n.). If we read πῶς 
λέγεις, we must take the words as referring 
to παλλὴ αὐτῷ—ἀνάγης: if πῶς δὲ 
λέγεις, the reference will be to the words 
which follow ἠπον, and πῶς δὲ λέγεις 
will then invoke the reply which Adi 
mantus gives below, viz. γνώσσατι γε— 
ἐξελαύνει. It seems to me better in every 
way to make the question refer to the new 
point which is about to be raised by 
Socrates; for the statement that the Demos 
will have to support the tyrant is already 
complete, and needs neither further clu 
ciation nor any expression of surprise. 
A majority of editors read ἢν δὲ for 
潢 τέ. I think that τέ must be wrong 
in any case, unless (with Schneider) we 
postulate an awkward anacoluthon, as 
though Socrates meant to add ἡν τε μὴ. 
The reading of τῆς for τέ enables us to 
retain πῶς δὲ λέγεις, and refer the ques 
tion to what follows: for which reasons 
I now follow γ. 

569 A 3 ἀπὸ is read by Flor. U 
and V as well as γ. Schneider alone 
retains ἢν αὐτῷ, but ἐλευθεροθείνα ἢν 
means only 'be freed by.' It is better to write 
ἀπό than (with Baiter) to excise the pre 
position. For the corruption see Best 

4 καλῶν κάγαθων. See on 1X 489 E. 
5 κελεύει. Baiter's conjecture κελεύ 
is a curious error. κελεύει depends of 
course on ὁτι: in oratio recta the ὁ δήμος 
would say κελεύω σε ἀπίθανον. Cf. δια 
κελεύουσιν in x 614 D and note ad loc.


569 π 13 τὸ λεγόμενον. τῶν κατηνυθέν τῶν εἰς τὸ πῦρ ἐνέπεσον. ἐπὶ τῶν τὰ μικρὰ τῶν δεινῶν φευγόντων, καὶ εἰς μείζονα δένδρα ἐμπιπτότων. (Diogen. VIII 45 in Leutsch u. Schneiderwin Paroem. Gr. i p. 314, where the other authorities are also cited.)

569 C 15 ἀκαίρου. ἀκράτου (H. werden: cf. 562 D) would be grossly incongruous with μεταμπιθάμενος, and is otherwise less suitable here than ἀκαίρου. 16 δούλων is emphatic: ‘the most galling form of slavery’ is slavery to slaves (J. and C.). Cf. 567 ε 9.
APPENDICES TO BOOK VIII.

I.

THE NUMBER.

The famous Number of Plato is notoriously the most difficult passage in his writings. The difficulty lies in the Greek, and not in the calculations, which are, as will be seen, extraordinarily simple, and can be understood by any one who has a rudimentary acquaintance with the multiplication table, and is willing to believe a single proposition of Euclid, viz. i 47. I have explained my conception of the passage as a whole in the note on 545 c: and in this Appendix I propose to investigate and illustrate the entire section in detail with a view to justifying the explanations which I have given throughout the notes.

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It should be mentioned that this Appendix is in a few passages identical with the treatise on The Number of Plato which I published in 1891. During the eleven years which have elapsed since my earlier publication, my views have been considerably modified, especially as regards the interpretation of the words τρεῖς ἀριθμοῖς—φθινόντων and the philosophical significance of the latter part of the Number; and the explanations contained in this Appendix are those which I now believe to be right. I may perhaps be allowed to express my obligations to those scholars who have supplied me with criticisms, whether written or printed, on my former work. The Provost of Oriel’s discussions on my Number of Plato in the Classical Review have been constantly before me while engaged upon this subject. Some of his objections to my earlier theory were sound: others, and these the most important, I believe that I have refuted in the course of the present discussion. I am wholly unable to acquiesce in the praejudicata opinio that “there is no complete solution because there was no consistent meaning in Plato’s mind” (J. of Ph. VIII p. 285), but my revised explanation owes something to Mr Monro’s resolute and sturdy application of the ‘negative’ arm of the elenchus, and I am not less grateful to him for the opportunity which he has given me of shewing (in Parts ii and iii of this Appendix) that the incomplete solution which he himself suggests is one which cannot be attributed either to Plato or Aristotle, without infringing, as it seems to me, the laws alike of logic, arithmetic and Greek.

It will be convenient to quote the passage in full and also, for the sake of facilitating reference, to divide the words with which we are more immediately concerned into five sections, A, B, C, D, E.

1 Mr Archer-Hind’s criticisms in the Cambridge Review for Jan. 28, 1892, have also offended my view on the meaning of the two ἀριθμοί: and I now also agree with him in his suggestion that συνήγεις in εὔτερος πιθυμὲν περιάδος συνήγεις invites us to multiply together the three numbers 3, 4 and 5. The review by Hultsch in Berl. Phil. Woch. 1892 pp. 1256 ff. may also be mentioned. Hultsch agrees with me in making the two numbers 216 and 12,960,000: he was also the first, so far as I know, to see that the sides of the ἀριθμοῖς should be multiplied and not added, and that the rectangle is equal to the square; but in other respects his proposed solution is almost entirely different from mine. It is due to Hultsch and to the reader, that I should give the two solutions side by side, and I now do so.

A. Hultsch’s Solution.

(1) $3^3 \times 3^3 = 216$ (so also Schneider)

(2) $(3 + 4 + 5) \times 36 = 36$

and 36 by somehow or other developing out of itself a square number multiplied by 100, becomes $3600^2$, which is the first harmony. The second is the rectangle whose sides are

$100 \times 7 \sqrt{7 - \frac{1}{4}}$

and

$100 \times 3^3 \sqrt{7 - \frac{1}{4}}$.

For further information the reader should consult Hultsch’s article in Zeitschrift f. Math. etc. 1. c.

B. The solution now proposed.

(1) $3^3 + 4^3 + 5^3 = 216$.

(2) $(3 \times 4 \times 5)^3 = 3600^2 = 4800 \times 2700$.

In the interpretation of Plato’s Greek I am seldom if ever able to agree with Hultsch.
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Φέρε τούτον, ἵνα οὐ, πειρόμεθα λέγειν, τίνα τρόπον τιμοκρατία γένοιτ' 545 C ἄν εἰς ἀριστοκρατίας. ἥ τοῦτο μὲν 1 ἀπλοῦν, ὅτι πᾶσα πολιτεία μεταβάλλει 545 D εἰς αὐτοῦ τούτου ἐνοχῶν ἀρχαῖς, ὅταν ἐν αὐτῷ τούτῳ στάσεις ἐγένεται· ὁμο- νοοῦστος δὲ, καὶ πάντι ὀλίγον ἃ ἁδύνατον κινηθῆναι; "Εστι γαρ οὕτω. Πῶς ὅν τῇ ἕτος, ὧν Γλαύκων, ἡ τῆς ἤνὶ κινηθῆσθαι, καὶ τῇ στασιάσθων οἱ ἐπίκουροι καὶ οἱ ἀρχόντες πρὸς ἀλλήλους ταὶ καὶ πρὸς ἄνωτα, ἡ βούλη, ὥσπερ Ὀμήρος, εὐφώμεθα παῖς Μοῦσαι εἰσεῖν ἤμι, ὅταν δὴ πρὸ τοῦ στάσεις ἐπεσε, καὶ φώμεν αὐτὰς 1 τραγικῶς, ὡς πρὸς παίδας ἠμᾶς παιζόντας καὶ ἔρισκελούσας, ὡς ὑπερβολογμένας λέγει; Πῶς; "Οδὲ πως. χαλεπὸν μὲν κινηθῆναι πόλειν οὕτω ἐνυπάρξει· ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ γεγονεῖ 546 A παῖς φθόγγο ἄτιν, οὐδ' ἡ τοιαύτη ἔστι τούτων ἄπαντα μενεῖ χρόνων, ἀλλὰ λυθῆσαι. Λύσις δὲ ἤδη: οὐ μόνον φυτοὶ ἔργεοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ἐπιγείοις ἐφίους φορά καὶ ἀφορία ψυχῆς καὶ καὶ σωμάτων ἤγγυται, ὅταν περιτριπαλί ἐκατός κύκλων πειρομάς συνάπτωσι, βραχυβίους μὲν βραχυπτορόντος, ἐναντίως δὲ ἑναντίατ' γένοις δὲ ἰσοτρόπων εὐγονίας τα εἰ καὶ ἀφορίας, κατέρ 1 υπερτέρας 546B σοφοὶ οὐδ' ἀγαθόν πόλεις ἐπανάστασε, οὐδὲν μάλλον λογισμόμεν μετ' αἰσθήσεως τείχονται, ἀλλὰ πάρεισιν αὐτοῖς καὶ γεγονόσαι παῖδας ποτὲ οὖ Α δέν. ἦστι δὲ θελω μὲν γεννητο ἐπικείμενοι, ἦν ἀριθμὸς περιλαμβάνει τέλεος,

The sake of clearness I will endeavour as far as possible to confine myself in the first instance to the elucidation of the numbers and numerical processes, regarding the question of the philosophical significance of the Platonic Number for separate treatment in Part ii of this Appendix. But as it is impossible thoroughly to grasp the numbers apart from their meaning, or their meaning apart from the numbers, I may perhaps be allowed to suggest that the student, after he has read a section in Part i, before going on to the succeeding section, should glance at the corresponding division of Part ii. I have added a third Part by way of epilogue, in which Aristotle's criticism of the Platonic Number is fully discussed.

Before we embark on our task, it is desirable to allude to the evidence which there is for believing that Plato made use of the Pythagorean triangle in his Number. The triangle in question, as is well known, is the right-angled triangle whose sides are 3 and 4, whose hypotenuse is consequently 5, and whose area is $\frac{4 \times 3}{2} = 6$. See Fig. 1.

1 See Gou, History of Greek Mathematics, p. 155.
2 By Euclid I.47—a proposition which is said to have been discovered by Pythagoras, and which was certainly familiar to Plato; see Tim. 54 B.
3 $ABC$, the right-angled triangle in which $AC = 3$, and $AB = 4$, is half the
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It will be shewn in Part iii that Aristotle regards the Pythagorean triangle as the basis of the number in the section which I have called B. Besides Aristotle we have the testimony of at least three authors (cited by Schneider\(^1\)), viz. Plutarch (\textit{de Is. et Os.} 373\textit{f}), where he says τῶν τριγώνων τὸ κάλλιστον—ὁ καὶ Πλάτων ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ δοκεῖ προσκεχρήσθαι, τὸ γαμήλιον διάγραμμα συντάττειν.  ἔχει δὲ ἐκεῖνο τὸ τρίγωνον τριῶν τὴν πρὸς ὅρθιας, καὶ τεττάρων τὴν βάσιν πάντες τὴν ὑποτείνουσαν ἵσον ταῖς περιεχούσαις δυναμένην: Proclus (\textit{in Euclid.} p. 428, ed. Friedlein) in these words: τὸ ἐν πολιτείᾳ τρίγωνον, ὡς τὴν ὅρθιαν περιέχουσαι ὡς τε τρία (sc. ἀριθμοὺς) καὶ τὸ τέσσαρα: and Aristides Quintilianus, who (\textit{De Musica}, ed. Melchom p. 152=Jahn p. 90) remarks: αἱ δὲ τὴν ὅρθιαν περιέχουσαι δηλοῦσι τὸν ἐπίτροπον. τοῦτο δὲ καὶ Πλάτων φησίν ἐπίτροπον πυθμένα περιπάτῳ συνυγέντα. To this testimony may now be added Proclus and the authorities whom he quotes in his commentary on the Platonic Number (ed. Kroll ii pp. 1 ff.), in the course of which constant reference is made to the wonderful properties of this κοσμικῶν τρίγωνον, as it was sometimes called (ib. 45. 23).

PART i.

THE ARITHMETICAL SOLUTION\(^2\).

I will take the four divisions B, C, D, E in the order in which they occur. The division which I call A involves no arithmetical calculations, and will be better discussed in Part ii.

§ 1.

ἀνθρωπεῖω δὲ—ἀπέφηναν.

It may be well to give at the outset a translation of this passage. ‘But the number of a human creature is the first number in which root and square increases, having received three distances and four limits, of elements that make both like and unlike and wax and wane, render all things conversable and rational with one another.’

The construction of the words ἀνθρωπεῖω—πρῶτο is ἀνθρωπεῖω δὲ <γενητῷ ἐστὶν ἀριθμὸν> ἐν ὧ πρῶτον, which is itself an abbreviated expression for ἀνθρωπεῖω δὲ <γενητῷ ἐστὶν περιοδὸς ἢν ἀριθμὸς περιλαμβάνειν> ἐν ὧ πρῶτον, as a glance at the preceding clause will shew.

The meaning is: ‘while the number of a human creature is the first

rectangle \(ABDC\), i.e. it is \(\frac{4 \times 3}{2} = 6\). Cf. Theol. Ar. p. 39 ed. Ast, where in a description of the Pythagorean triangle it is expressly pointed out that the area is 6. So also in Proclus \textit{in remp.} ii p. 42 ed. Kroll.

\(^1\) I.e. p. xxxii. Cf. also Lamblichus, \textit{Vit. Pythag.} § 131.

\(^2\) A brief summary o. the results of Part i has already been published by me in \textit{Cl. Rev.} xvi pp. 17—23.
number in which,' and 'the first number' signifies of course the first number which satisfies the conditions about to be described. In the notes on § 3, I have shewn that by 'period' Plato means 'period of gestation': so that the 'number of a human creature' must be a number which measures the time during which the human creature is in the womb. It will be well to bear this in mind throughout the calculations which follow.

I proceed to explain αἰσθήσεις δυνάμειαν τε καὶ δυναστευόμεναι.

The word αἰσθήσεις means 'increases,' and in its arithmetical signification must denote either 'additions' or 'multiplications'. Which of these two meanings the word bears here, Plato himself, as we shall presently see, informs us by means of the clause τρεῖς ἀποστάσεις, τέταρτας δε ὅρους λαβοῦσα.

What is the meaning of δυνάμειαν? It is clear from more than one passage in Plato that the mathematical sense of δύναμις 'be equal when squared to,' i.e. 'be the square root of,' was not yet fully and firmly established in his day. In Theaetetus 147 E—τῶν ἄρθρων πάντα δίχα διελάμβανεν: τὸν μὲν δύναμεν ἵσον ισάκις γέγενε τῷ τετραγώνῳ τὸ σχῆμα ἁπεκακαστεῖς τετράγωνον τε καὶ ἵσον ἴσον προσεῖστομεν—it is a square number which is said to be δυνάμενος (viz. ισάκις γέγενεθαι), while in 148 B—ὁσι μὲν γραμμαί τὸν ἵσον ἴσον καὶ ἐπίπεδον ἁρμήν τετραγώνως μήκος ὁμοία, ὅσι δὲ τὸν ἑτερομήκη, δυνάμεις, ὡς μήκες μὲν οἱ ἐξυμετρῶς ἐκεῖνοι, τοὺς δὲ ἑπίπεδον ὁ δύναται—it is the roots which are δυνάμενα (sc. to produce squares), as in Euclid x def. 11 and αἰ δύναμεναι αὐτὰ ἄλογα. But on comparing these two passages from Plato, we note that, while δυνάμενον is not used absolutely in the sense of a square, but requires to be further explained (viz. by the words ισάκις γέγενεθαι), δύναται, where it is used absolutely, means 'are the roots of.' We infer that δύναμεναι in our passage refers to roots and not to squares. Our inference will be confirmed as we proceed.

We have next to deal with the word δυναστευόμεναι. It is fortunate that Proclus should have expressly alluded to this part of Plato's Number. At the outset of his commentary on the first book of Euclid he endeavours to show that the ἀρχαί of the Universe of things—τῶν ὑστον ἁπάντων—are also the ἀρχαί of Mathematics. One of his examples, that from δυνάμεως, is as follows: καὶ ὅσα κατὰ τὰς δυνάμεως ἀναφέρεται πᾶσιν ὁμοίως προσάγεται τοῖς μαθημασίᾳ τῶν μὲν δυναμέων, τῶν δὲ δυναστευόμενον. καὶ δῆ καὶ ὁ ἐν πολιτείᾳ Σωκράτης ταῖς μούσαις ψυχολογομυμέναις ἀνέθηκε, τὰ κοινά πάντων τῶν μαθηματικῶν λόγων ἐν πέρασιν ὁμοιώμενος περιλαβὼν καὶ προσθηκάμενος ἐν τοῖς εἰρημένοις

2 The word δυνάμεως is here confined to irrational roots, but this is a limitation introduced by Theaetetus. Theaetetus in fact proposes to confine the word δύναμις to surds, and to use μήκος for the rational roots. The usual meaning of δύναμις in Plato's mathematics is 'second increase'; cf. Gow Gk Math. p. 78 n. 1.
3 In Euclidem ed. Friedlein, p. 8.
4 In Eucl. l.c.
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άρθμοις, ἢφ' ὄν δὴ καὶ τὰ μέτρα τῆς τε εἰγονίας καὶ τῆς ἐναντίας πρὸς ταύτην ἀγονίας καταφαίνεται. The first sentence means that 'powers' play a part in every department of Mathematics as well as in Nature and in Life—'some having power, while others are subject to power.' For example 3 is δυνάμεως, because it has power (viz. over 9—to make 9): 9 is δυναστεύομαι, because it is subject to power (viz. of 3—to be made by 3). It will not be denied that δυναστεύομαι is intended by Proclus as the passive of δυνάμαι. Now δύνασαι, said of a root, means δύνασαι τετράγωνον ποιεῖν. The passive of this, said of a square number, is δύνασαι τετράγωνον γίγνεσθαι (δύνασαι ἵσος ἰσόκες γίγνεσθαι in Theaet. 147 E). In the case of the active, it was found possible to drop τετράγωνον ποιεῖν: but if, in the passive, τετράγωνον γίγνεσθαι is discarded, at least the passivity must not be. For this reason δύνασαι becomes δυναστεύεσθαι.

We may therefore take it that δυναστεύομενα in our passage refers to squares. But before interpreting the expression as a whole, it is necessary to discuss a passage of Alexander Aphrodisiensis, which has not unnaturally been quoted in connexion with section B, since it seems to be the only other passage besides those already quoted in which δυναστεύεσθαι occurs in mathematical surroundings. The words are: αὐκίαν δὲ φασιν ὑπὸ τῶν Πυθαγορείων λέγεσθαι τὴν πεντάδα, τοῦτο δὲ ὅτι τῶν ἀρκονών τριγώνων τῶν ἑκόνων ῥητάς τὰς πλευρὰς πρωτόν ἐστι τῶν περιεκουσών ὄρθων γωνίας πλευρῶν ἢ μὲν τριών ἢ δὲ τεττάρων, ἢ δὲ ὑποτελοῦντα πέντε. Εἰτα τοινὶ ὑποτελοῦσα ἰσον δύνασαι ἀμοιβαίως ἀμα, διὰ τούτο ἢ μὲν δυναμένη καλεῖται, αὐτὶ δὲ δυναστεύομενα, καὶ ἐστὶ πέντε. τὴν τε πεντάδα αὐκίαν ἔλεγον ὃς μὴ νικομένη ἀλλ' ἀπτητὼν καὶ κρατώνσαν.

The general drift of the passage is that the Pythagoreans called the number 5 'Invincibility,' because it is the hypotenuse of the first right-angled triangle with rational sides—the one 3, the other 4. As the hypotenuse is equally powerful with both the other sides, it is called δυναμένη, the others δυναστεύομενα. It is αὐκία, because it remains unconquered and prevails. δυναμένη here means 'powerful,' 'prevailing': δυναστεύομενα 'subject to power,' 'prevailed against.' Our sympathies being with the hypotenuse, because the odds are against him, we call him conqueror even although the battle is a drawn one. The only bearing of the passage on our text is this: it uses δυναστεύομενα as a passive of δυναμένη. But whereas, in Proclus, δυναστεύομενα includes 'what can be produced by roots' (i.e. squares), and δυνάμενα 'what can produce squares' (i.e. roots), here δυναμένη means 'equal, or rather greater in power' (viz. the hypotenuse), and δυναστεύομενα 'prevailed against' (viz. the sides). It is evident that the words are used by Alexander

1 Cf. also Proclus in temp. 11 p. 36 τὸ γάρ δυνάμενον πάν πρὸς τὸ δυναστεύομενον ἀπόλλοστα, and ib. p. 5 δύνασαι μὲν γὰρ οἱ πλευροὶ (sc. ἀρθροὶ), δυναστεύονται δὲ οἱ ἐκ τούτων. The use of the passive is like that in τιμοκρατεῖοθαί, δημοκρατεῖοθαί, regno and the like.

2 See e.g. Zeller H 1, p. 858 n., Zeller 1 p. 400 n. 1, and Susemihl Aristotelis Polit. 11 p. 374.


4 Being equal when squared to the sum of the squares of the other two sides.
less in a technical, than in a metaphorical sense, and with no reference to their occurrence in the Platonic Number—to which indeed he makes no reference at all. The interpretation of δυνάμεναι in Plato should be deduced not from Alexander, but from an examination of the passage of Proclus in the light of Theae. 147 ff.

We are now in a position to interpret the highly elaborate and fantastic expression αὐξήσεις δυνάμενα τε καὶ δυναστευόμεναι. The literal translation is ‘root and square increases’ or ‘increasings,’ and the correlation of meaning between the words δυνάμεναι and δυναστευόμεναι—

το γάρ δυνάμενον πᾶν πρὸς τὸ δυναστευόμενον ἀποδίδοσα—requires us to suppose that in a ‘root and square increase’ the ‘root’ in question is the root of the ‘square’ in question, and the ‘square’ in question the square of the ‘root’ in question. When for example x is the ‘root,’ the ‘square’ will be x², and where the ‘square’ is x², the ‘root’ will be x. What then is the meaning of a ‘root and square increase’? If αὐξήσεις means ‘addition’ it will be x + x², if ‘multiplication,’ x × x². And the plural ‘root and square increases’ will refer to more than one instance of the same process, i.e. for example either (1) to x + x², y + y², z + z² or (2) to x × x², y × y², z × z². Whether the αὐξήσεις mean processes of addition or processes of multiplication will presently be seen: meantime it should be noted that the awkwardness of the English expression ‘root and square increases’ is escaped by the Greek idiom, because δυνάμεναι and δυναστευόμεναι are participial adjectives.

I come now to τρεῖς ἀποστάσεις, τέταρτας δὲ ὄρους λαβοῦσαι. The literal translation is ‘having received three distances, and four limits,’ and the meaning will appear from a glance at the following passages.

In Nicomachus Introd. Ar. pp. 143 f. ed. Ast we read τὰ μὲν στερεὰ

1 I have treated the words of Alexander seriously, because there is no a priori reason why the Pythagoreans should not have called ἀνέκδεικτα, or indeed almost anything else in heaven or earth, as readers of the Thelosomomena Arithmetica and other similar treatises will readily admit. But so much confusion has elsewhere arisen from the similarity of vowel in νικ- and νικ- (see on IX 581 B) that I should not be surprised if ἀνεκδεικτα and not ἀνέκδεικτα was in reality the original form: see Theol. Ar. p. 26 ed. Ast: καὶ ἀνεκδεικτὰ προσγραμμένον τὴν περιπάτησιν, οὐ μόνον, ἀπόδειξιν τὸ πέμπτου καὶ κατ’ αὐτό τεταγμένον στοιχείον, ὁ αὐτήρ, κατὰ ταῦτα καὶ ὀυκαίνως έχων διαταγῆς, νείκους καὶ μεταβολής ἐν τοῖς ὑπ’ αὐτῶν ὑπαρχόντων ἀπὸ στελεχῶς μέχρι γῆς, ἀλλ’ ὅτι τὰ πρώτα διαφέροντα καὶ συχνὸς ὅμοιος τὸν ἁρμονόν δύο ἔδη, ἄρτιν καὶ περιπτών, αὐτὸς ὑσεῖλες ἑρμίλοις καὶ συν- θηρησεν κτλ. Megillus is quoted to the same effect a few lines lower down, and Ast in his note adds further references. Zeller9 1 p. 400 n. 1 regards ἀνεκδεικτα as more original than ἀνεκδεικτα.

2 Proclus in remp. 11 p. 36.

3 As it will shortly be found that αὐξήσεις refers to multiplications, I may remark here that Schneider and Donaldson so far agree with me in explaining αὐξήσεις δυναμεῖν τε καὶ δυναστευόμεναι as ‘incrementum per multiplicationem radicis seu lateris et quadrati mutuum factum” (Schneider Ic. III p. 22). But Schneider is mistaken when he makes the whole expression αὐξήσεις—δυναστευόμεναι equivalent to actual or concrete cubes: hoc loco numeros per eiusmodi αὐξήσεις efficatos αὐξήσες obsequiatus dici intelligitur: ii vero cubi sunt.” The Greek word αὐξήσεις means ‘actio ipsa augendi,’ as Schneider himself remarks, and, as will presently appear, there is no occasion to interpret it as anything else. It is of course obvious that the words αὐξήσεις—δυναστευόμεναι are to some extent deliberately and intentionally fantastic: the Muses, we remember, υψηλογοῦσι: but there is also a touch of serious import in the structure of the phrase. See Part II § 4.
diastēmata légetai triχη διαστάτα, tà de épipēda δεχ'...tauta de tis oiékēs safhmeias epilhkeTai en tη Platōnikei swianagwosai kai tōn tòv legeomέnov γάμου τόπον en tη Holiteia apò prosowtov tòv Mouσhν parasiagwmenou'. There are many other statements to the same effect not only in Nicomachus, but also in the Theologumenà Arithmetica, in Theo of Smyrna, and in Iamblichus' commentary on the work of Nicomachus. The distances are sometimes called diastēmata, sometimes diastásieis, and in at least one passage αποστάσεις, as in Plato. The fullest explanation of the matter is in the Introd. Ar. p. 116: πρώτον de diastēmata γραμμὴ λέγεται: γραμμὴ γάρ έστι τό ε' en diastatōn: δύο de diastēmata eπιφάνεια: eπιφάνεια γάρ έστι τό διάχο δiαστατόν: τρία de diastēmata στερεόν: στερεόν γάρ έστι τό triχη διαστατόν, καὶ οὐκ ἔστων οὐδαμῶς ἐπιφέουσι στερεόν, ὁ πλεονὸν τέτευχε διαστημάτων ἂ τριῶν, μήκους, πλάτος καὶ βάθους...ει τ γάρ στερεόν έστιν, τὰς τρεῖς διαστάσεις πάντως έχει, μήκος, πλάτος καὶ βάθος: καὶ ἐμπαλιν ει τ ειχε τας τρεῖς διαστάσεις, ἕκεινο πάντως στερεόν έστω, ὅλο δ οὐδέν. Compare also pp. 117, 123, 128, and Theol. Ar. p. 38, in each of which places diastásieis is used with this meaning, Theo pp. 24 f. ed. Hiller τῶν de anathētōn (sc. aristōn) tòv μὲν ὑπὸ ὅν ἀριθμῶν περιχεμένων καλοῦσαν ἐπιπέδους, ὡς κατά δύο διαστάσεις θεωρουμένως καὶ ὑπὸ μήκους καὶ πλάτους περιχεμένους, τὸν ὑπὸ τριῶν στερεῶς, ὡς καὶ τὴν τρίτην διάστασιν προσειληφότας, Theol. Ar. p. 48, Nicomachus Lc. p. 136 οἱ κύριοι τριχῆ διαστατοί ὄντες καὶ Iamblichus Lc. p. 58. In Theol. Ar. p. 23, the author, in speaking of the number 4, which according to the Pythagoreans πρώτη ἐδείξε την τοῦ στερεοῦ φύσιν: σημεῖον γὰρ, εἶτα γραμμή, εἶτα έπιφάνεια, εἶτα στερεόν, εἶτα σώμα, remarks τὰς—πάσας ἀποστάσεις ἦτοι τὰς τρεῖς ἀπέσητα, ὃν περαιτέρω οὐκέτι εἰσίν. Finally, we may refer to Simplicius in physica IV i, p. 531. 9 ed. Diels σώμα—

to tais treis exon diastaseis and ibid. p. 634. 11 ff., to Aristotle Top. Z 5. 142b 24 'o tòv swmatos orismos, tò exon treis diastaseis, Phys. IV 1. 209a 4 ff. diastēmata mev on exei (sc. tòtòs) tría, μήκος καὶ πλάτος καὶ βάθος, ois d' eiricei soma pain and other passages cited by Bonitz in the Index Arist. sv. diastásieis, and also to Plato himself, who in Laws 894 a has the following sentence: γίγνεται δη πάντων γένεσις, ह्नाक इ तिपादोς आँ; दियो Nous ὡσ ὅταν ἀρχὴ λαβίσας αὐξήν εἰς τὴν δευτέραν ἔδηθε μετάβας καὶ ἀπὸ ταύτης εἰς τὴν πλήθος, καὶ μέχρι τριῶν ἔλθονοι αὐθησαν σχῆ τοῖς αισθανομένους.

From these passages it is clear that the three αποστάσεις of which Plato speaks are μήκος, πλάτος and βάθος. What then ought we to understand by the four ὄροι? In Theol. Ar. p. 16 Αστ we find the words το ζ' ὅλης καὶ εἴδους αἰσθητοῦ, ο ἐστιν ἀποτέλεσμα τριχη διαστατόν, ἐν ἐπτάρμιν ὅροις ἑστιν, and in Iambl. in Nic. p. 93 Pistelli στερεός δε ἐστιν ἀρίθμων τριών διαστήματα παρά τα ἐν ἐπτάρμιν διόπερ, δηλοῦτι τετράρτου ὄρου προσγεγειμένου εν γάρ τέσσαριν

1 The reader will observe that Nicomachus had the Platonic number in his mind when he wrote these words. Cf. Mr Monro in J. of Ph. VIII p. 276 "The Pythagorean writer Nicomachus says (Introd. Arithm. p. 143) that solid figures are called τριχη διαστατα, plane figures δεξια διαστατα, and that this receives full light from the Republic of Plato, kata ton tou legeoménou ýamou topou."
APPENDICES TO BOOK VIII.

The meaning will be easily apprehended from the accompanying figure of a στεφάδος ἀριθμός (Fig. 2), which I borrow from Theo p. 42 ed. Hiller. AB is the μήκος, BC the πλάτος, CD the βάθος (or ύψος or πάχος, as it was sometimes called: see Nicom. l.c. p. 123), and the points A, B, C, D are the four ὀροι (αἱ στυγμαὶ τῶν μεγεθῶν ὀροί Arist. Met. N 5. 1092 b 9): ἐν γὰρ τετσαρον ὀροὶ το τριχὴ διαστάτων, as Tamblichus observes.

From these and other passages to the same effect, I conclude that the three ἀποστάσεις and four ὀροὶ are μήκος, πλάτος, and βάθος, with their attendant limits, that consequently αὐξήσεις refers to multiplications and not to additions, and that the whole expression αὐξήσεις διανύμεναι τε καὶ διωμάτευμεναι, τρεῖς ἀποστάσεις, τέτσαρος δὲ ὀροὺς λαβοῦσαι i.e. 'root and square increases comprehending' three distances and four limits' means cubings and nothing more.

The περίοδος of the ἀνθρώπων γενετῶν is accordingly the first number in which cubings make everything conversable and rational with itself: but what are the numbers to be cubed?

Let us examine the phrase ὀμοιούντων τε καὶ ἀνομοιούντων καὶ αὐξάνοντων καὶ φθινόντων.

In point of construction the genitives might depend, so far as the Greek is concerned, either on (1) ὀροὺς, or (2) on ἀποστάσεις and ὀροὺς combined, or (3) upon αὐξήσεις. Other possibility there is none. As far as concerns the sense, we observe that whereas the meaning of ἀποστάσεις and ὀροὺς is complete—for μήκος, πλάτος and βάθος, with their four ὀροὶ, demand no further specification—that of αὐξήσεις is incomplete, because 'increasings' necessarily imply something to be increased. Now we have not yet been informed what we are invited to increase: and we are therefore compelled to suppose that the information is contained or concealed in ὀμοιούντων τε καὶ ἀνομοιούντων καὶ αὐξάνοντων καὶ φθινόντων. I therefore believe that the genitives depend on αὐξήσεις.

In point of grammatical gender the genitives can only be neuter. ὀμοιούντων, for example, is the genitive of ὀμοιοῦντα i.e. τὰ ὀμοιούντα, the article being dispensed with in accordance with Plato's frequent practice in passages of real or affected elevation. But as Plato is trying to reach a certain number ('the first number in which' etc.), the

1 λαβοῦσαι is literally 'having received.' The completed process ἔχει τρεῖς ἀποστάσεις, 'has three distances' or as we should say 'dimensions': and as each successive ἀποστάσεις is acquired, the process itself is said λαμβάνει ἀποστάσεις. The usage is like that of (προς)εἰληφος in lambl. in Nic. p. 93 (quoted above): cf. also Theo p. 24 and Nicom. l.c. pp. 123, 127.

2 It is the Muses who are speaking, and the article was rarer in their language, as the usage of poetry attests. The intransitive use of αἰδεῖ—tolerably common in Aristotle and later Greek, after poetical words and idioms began to be freely admitted into prose—has a similar stylistic effect. We are bound to suppose that αἰδεῖται and φθινόται are opposed to one another no less than ὀμοιοῦται and ἀνομοιοῦται, and therefore as φθινόται is intransitive, αἰδεῖται must be intransitive too.
objects which are subjected to the processes of cubing cannot themselves be anything but numbers: so that for practical purposes we may regard ὑμικούντων etc. as ὑμικούντων ἀριθμῶν etc.

It is clear, therefore, that ὑμικούντων τε καὶ ἀνομοιούντων καὶ αὐξόντων καὶ ἑβδομάδων stands for the numbers which we have to cube. What then are the numbers that ‘make like and unlike, wax and wane’? The Muses are evidently teasing, and we must be patient with them till they choose to tell us.

Let us look a little farther on. The next half of this sentence begins with δὲ ἑπτάρτους πυθμόν, and ἑπτάρτους πυθμόν, as will presently be shewn (§ 2), means the numbers 4, 3. Now if we take the expression ‘of which, 4, 3’ in its simplest and most natural signification, it means ‘of which numbers, the numbers 4, 3,’ so that the antecedent to δὲ will be some numbers, two of which are the numbers 4 and 3.

Now what is the grammatical antecedent to δὲ? The possibilities—
I use the word in a generous sense—are (1) αἰσχρές—ἀμφατευόμεναι, (2) τρεῖς ἀποστάσεις and τέταρτας ἐκ ὀρων, either or both, (3) πάντα, (4) ὑμικούντων τε καὶ ἀνομοιούντων καὶ αὐξόντων καὶ ἑβδομάδων.

It will be agreed that (2) is scarcely possible, and also, I think, that (3) is unlikely. On grounds of sense neither the first nor the second alternative is suitable. The antecedent to δὲ, on the most natural and simple translation of δὲ ἑπτάρτους πυθμόν, must be, as I have said, ‘some numbers, two of which are the numbers 4 and 3.’ Now αἰσχρές are not ‘numbers,’ but (as Schneider remarks) ‘actiones augendi,’ and the three ἀποστάσεις and four ὀροι are only μῆκος, πλάτος and βάθος with their limits. As for πάντα, so comprehensive a word might certainly include numbers, and numbers, too, in which 4 and 3 are present: but it will be shewn in Part ii § 4 that πάντα has not in point of fact the meaning required, but another and very different meaning.

We conclude therefore that the grammatical antecedent to δὲ is ὑμικούντων τε καὶ ἀνομοιούντων καὶ αὐξόντων καὶ ἑβδομάδων, and I think no one will deny that the relative is most obviously and naturally connected with these words. It follows that ὑμικούντων—ἑβδομάδων are ‘some numbers, two of which are the numbers 4 and 3.’ We have thus obtained two of the numbers which are to be cubed, viz. 4 and 3. It is however clear from the partitive genitive δὲ that 4 and 3 are not the only numbers: there must be at least one more. What the missing number is, Plato does not tell us, but as the numbers 4 and 3 are ‘married with 5’ (περποίησαν αὐξηθεὶς) in the second half of this sentence, and as we are so frequently warned by the ancients of the presence of the Pythagorean triangle throughout this passage, we may fairly suppose that the number we are looking for is the number of the hypotenuse, viz. 5. That this supposition is right, the sequel will shew.

There remains the question ‘Why are the numbers 3, 4, and 5 said to make like and unlike, wax and wane?’ The full explanation of these words belongs to Part ii, and will be given there. But ὑμικούντων τε καὶ ἀνομοιούντων has also an arithmetical meaning in the Platonic number, in addition to its real or philosophical significance, and that meaning should here be explained. The numbers 3, 4, and 5 are said to ‘make like

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and unlike both for other reasons, as will afterwards be pointed out, and also in view of the use which is presently made of them to construct the two harmonies in the latter half of the number. It will be shewn in § 2 that these harmonies are built up out of the numbers 3, 4, and 5, by multiplying them together, and then multiplying the product three times by itself. Nothing is contained in either of the two harmonies except what 3, 4, and 5 supply. It is, in short, the numbers 3, 4, and 5 that make the two harmonies. Now the first harmony, as we shall see, is the square of 3600, and square numbers, according to the ancients, were ὀμοιοί. The second harmony is 4800 × 2700, and oblong numbers were considered ἀνόμοιοι. See Iambli, in Nic. Intr. Ar. p. 82 Pistelli εί δε παλαιοί ταυτός τε και ὀμοίους αὐτοῦς (i.e. τοὺς τετραγώνους) ἔκαλουν διὰ τὴν περὶ τὸς πλευράς τε καὶ γωνίας ὀμοιότητα καὶ ἰσότητα, ἀνόμοιοι δὲ ἐκ τοῦ ἑναίτιον καὶ θατέρου τοῦς ἑτερομήκες, and Nicomachus himself Intr. Ar. pp. 132 ff. Ast1. The numbers 3, 4, and 5 are therefore called ὀμοιοῦτες τε καὶ ἀνόμοιοῦτες in connexion with the arithmetical side of the Platonic Number, because they produce the square and the oblong which express the γεωμετρικός ἀριθμός in its twofold aspect, first as ὀμοιος and afterwards as ἀνόμοιος. This is the arithmetical significance of ὀμοιοίτων τε καὶ ἀνομοίωτων in this passage: but the words have an even wider significance as a description of the Pythagorean ‘cosmic triangle’ (Proclus in temp. ii pp. 45. 23 Kroll): see Part ii § 5. To the same section of Part ii I defer my account of αὐξόντων καὶ φθανόντων, because these words have no technical arithmetical meaning, but merely describe the sides of the Pythagorean triangle in its cosmic and creative aspects.

I accordingly believe that the περίωδος of the ἀνθρώπεων γεννητῶν was obtained by Plato, following of course the Pythagoreans, by adding together the cubes of the three sides of the ‘zoogonic triangle’: $3^3 + 4^3 + 5^3 = 216$. The justification for adding the cubes together is that the numbers are said to be contained in the total (ἐν ζ πρῶτῳ κτλ.).

The result which we have reached is supported by the evidence of Aristotle, who gives us to understand that the total number of this section is 216: see Part iii of this Appendix. It is also in exact correspondence with Aristides Quintilianus, who informs us, in a passage where he alludes expressly to the Platonic Number, that the number 216 is nearly equivalent to ‘the number of the seven months’ child,’ and can be reached by adding together the cubes of the sides of the Pythagorean triangle, precisely as Plato does here: ἄλλον εί καὶ τῶν πλευρῶν ἐκάστην κατὰ βάθος αὐξήσαμεν (βάθος γὰρ ἡ σώματος φύσις) ποιήσαμεν ἐν τὸν διακόσια δεκαέξι, ἰσότηθον ὡντα σύνεγγυς τῷ τῶν ἐπαμήνων (de mus. iii p. 151 Melbom, 89 Jahn).

The words πάντα προσήγορα καὶ ῥητά πρὸς ἀλληλα ἀπέφηναν can be

1 That the habit of calling square numbers ὀμοιοὶ and oblong numbers ἀνόμοιοι was not merely a later development of Pythagoreanism, is expressly stated by Iamblichus (οἳ παλαιοί), and the same inference may be drawn from the Pythagorean συστοιχία (Arist. Met. A 5. 986a 22 ff.), in which τετράγωνων appears on the same side as πέρας, ὑγαθὸν etc., and ἑτερομήκες along with ἄπειρον, κακόν etc.
abundantly illustrated from Pythagorean writings, and will be more conveniently discussed in Part ii.

I conclude\(^1\) that the arithmetical meaning of section B is

\[3^3 + 4^3 + 5^3 = 216.\]

\(^1\) In my former treatise on the Number, I explained section B in a different way (The Number of Plato, pp. 33—35), taking the three \(\alpha\rho\sigma\tau\alpha\varsigma\) as denoting 3, 4, and 5. Except as regards \(\alpha\zeta\zeta\zeta\varsigma\) δινάμεια τε καὶ δυνατένων, the explanation which I now offer is new, so far as I know. That the \(\alpha\rho\sigma\tau\alpha\varsigma\) are length, breadth, and thickness, and that what I formerly supposed them to be, nor anything else except length, breadth, and thickness, seems to me proved by the evidence of Aristotle as well as by the other authorities quoted above, and is in harmony with the passage cited from \(\textit{Laws}\) 894 A. Other attempts at solving the Number have usually supposed that the \(\delta\rho\omicron\omicron\) denote terms in a numerical progression, and \(\alpha\rho\sigma\tau\alpha\varsigma\) the intervals between them. The words \(\delta\rho\omicron\omicron\) and \(\alpha\rho\sigma\tau\alpha\varsigma\) could of course bear such an interpretation: but what can the \(\delta\rho\omicron\omicron\) be? According to Proclus and Hermann, they are 27, 36, 48 and 64; according to Schneider, 8, 12, 18, 27. I cannot see that Plato furnishes any hints to justify us in selecting either of these progressions, and nothing can be made out of them without having recourse to arbitrary calculations for which there is no authority in Plato’s language; whereas it is clear from \(\omega\nu\ \epsilon\pi\tau\iota\rho\iota\omicron\omicron\tau\iota\omicron\nu\pi\omicron\omicron\) that 3 and 4, and at least one other number, which \(\pi\epsilon\mu\omega\\delta\iota\ \sigma\upsilon\gamma\rho\gamma\iota\iota\iota\) suggests is 5, are present in section B. With regard to \(\delta\nu\omicron\oomicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\micr
§ 2.

οὖν ἐπίτρητος πυθμῆν—ἐκατὸν δὲ κύβων τριάδος.

As before, I begin by giving a literal translation. 'Of which the numbers 4, 3, married with 5, furnish two harmonies when thrice increased, the one equal an equal number of times, so many times 100, the other of equal length one way, but oblong—on the one side of 100 squares rising from rational diameters of five diminished by one each, or if from irrational diameters, by two; on the other, of 100 cubes of 3.'

Let us now examine the individual words, beginning with οὖν ἐπίτρητος πυθμῆν.

What is ἐπίτρητος πυθμῆν? About the meaning of this phrase there can no longer be any doubt, if we put any faith in the repeated statements of ancient writers on arithmetic and mathematics. The words denote, as Mr Monro expresses it (CL. REV. i.c.) “the ratio 4 : 3 in its lowest terms (the actual numbers 4 and 3).” See Theo Smyrnæus Expos. rerum math. ad legendum Platonem utilimum pp. 80 ff. ed. Hillel pântων δὲ τῶν κατ’ εἴδου εἰρημένων λόγων οἱ εἰ ἐλαχίστοι καὶ πρῶτισ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἀριθμοὺς ὄντες καθ’ ἐκατὸν πρῶτοι λέγονται τῶν τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων ἐχόντων καὶ πυθμένες τῶν ὀμοιών: οὗν διπλασίων μὲν λόγων πρῶτος καὶ πυθμῆν ὁ τῶν β’ πρῶς ἐν. μετὰ γὰρ τούτων ἐν μείζονι καὶ συνθέτους ἀριθμοῖς λόγων εἰς διπλασίον, ὁ τῶν β’ πρῶς τά β’ καὶ τῶν γ’ πρῶς τά γ’ καὶ ὀμοίως ἐπ’ ἀπερον. τριπλασίον δὲ λόγων πρῶτος καὶ πυθμῆν ὁ τών γ’ πρῶς τά ἐν: οἱ δὲ δεὶ ἐν μείζονι καὶ συνθέτοις ἀριθμοῖς ἐπ’ ἀπερον προάγωσιν. ψιλοτοὺς δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀλλων πολλαπλασίων. ὄμοιος δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐπιμορίαις. ἡμιολίων μὲν λόγων πρῶτος καὶ πυθμῆν ὁ τῶν γ’ πρῶς τά β’, ἐπιτριτῶν δὲ ὁ τῶν β’ πρῶς γ’, καὶ ἐπιτετάρτων ὁ τῶν β’ πρῶς δ’: οἱ δὲ ἐν μείζονι ὄρους καὶ συνθετοῖς πάλιν ἀπερον τὸ πλῆθος. τὸ δ’ αὐτὸ θεωρεῖται καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀλλων. Thus for example 4 : 3 is the πυθμῆν of 5 : 6, 12 : 9, 16 : 12, and so on: and Plato calls it the ἐπίτρητος πυθμῆν because it is the πυθμῆν of all ἐπίτρητοι λόγοι: cf. the expression οὖν ἐπίγοδος πυθμῆν in Theo p. 70. With Theo’s evidence Nicomachus Introd. Ar. ii p. 134 is in exact correspondence, as Mr Monro has shewn (CL. REV. vi pp. 243 f.); and Proclus takes the same view: see his commentary ii p. 37 [ἐστιν οὖν οὖτος] ὁ ἐπίτρητος πυθμῆν γ’ καὶ δ’ We may therefore take it as certain that the ἐπίτρητος πυθμῆν is the numbers 4 and 3, forming two of the three sides of the Pythagorean triangle. οὖν, as we have seen, has for its antecedent ὄμοιον τε καὶ ἀνομοίοντας καὶ ἀναξίων καὶ φθινοπώρων, which we have already identified with the numbers 3, 4, 5.

Of these three numbers, viz. 3, 4, 5, Plato bids us take 3, 4, and ‘couple’ or ‘marry’ them with 5. So far as I can discover, the word συνεξίγνωμη had not either in Plato’s time, or later, any fixed and stereotyped mathematical meaning, and συνεξίγνως in this passage is obviously

1 For πυθμῆν cf. also Iambl. in Nic. Ar. ed. Pistelli pp. 38 ff., 42 f., 47 f., 64, 66 (πυθμῆν ὁ ἐπίτρητος ὁ δ’ πρῶς γ’ ἐστίν), 67 et al. The other explanations which
in the first instance a metaphor from marriage, not inappropriate in connexion with a number which is 'lord of better and worse births': cf. Nicolaus ap. Proclus in remp. ii p. 26 Kroll ὡς ἐν τοῖς ἀρμόισι αἱ ποιά συνώνεῖσι ἀρμοῖος ἣ ἀνυμοῖος ἀπετελοῦσι τοὺς ἐκ αὐτῶν, οὔτω καὶ ἐν τοῖς βίοισ. But how is the metaphor to be interpreted? If συνώνεις has no arithmetical meaning in this passage, the numbers 3, 4, 5 will stand side by side like lonely celibates throughout all time, and the riddle can never be solved. If it has an arithmetical meaning, the reference must be either to addition or to multiplication. We may fairly say that the process of multiplication is at least as readily suggested by Plato's metaphor as the process of addition, and in point of fact the Pythagoreans frequently denoted marriage by the number 6, because, among other reasons, 6 is produced by multiplying together the first male number, i.e. 3, and the first female number¹, i.e. 2. It is therefore permissible to hold (with Schneider and others) that συνώνεις refers to multiplication, and as it has been asserted that "there is no parallel to lead us to take συνώνεις to mean multiplied" (Cf. Rev. l.c. p. 154), I may mention that Proclus uses the word with this meaning².

On this view ἐπίτροτος πυθμύν πεμπάδι συνώνεις cannot mean anything except $4 \times 3 \times 5 = 60$. Every other possibility is excluded. We cannot interpret the phrase as $(4 + 3) \times 5$, for ἐπίτροτος πυθμύν is not $4 \plus 3$, but only $4, 3$, and there is nothing in the Greek to justify the addition, nor yet as $(4 \times 5) + (3 \times 5)$, for here again we introduce a $\plus$ without any warrant from the language. If on the other hand we refuse to connect the numbers in any way whatever, and hold that if ἐπίτροτος πυθμύν means $4, 3$, ἐπίτροτος πυθμύν πεμπάδι συνώνεις means $9, 8$ or $20, 15$ and nothing more, the marriage is either altogether sterile, or else it produces, not a number, but only a ratio: whereas Plato himself expressly describes the issue of his calculations not as a ratio, but as a number (ἐψύμας δὲ διοίτος, ἀρμοῖς γεωμετρικὸς 546c). Those who, like Hultsch, suppose that συνώνεις denotes addition, and make the whole clause equivalent to $3 + 4 + 5$, justly extend the arithmetical process to the two numbers of the ἐπίτροτος πυθμύν: and if multiplication is intended, we are equally justified in multiplying all three numbers together. The 'coupling' of $3, 4, 5$ is simply $3 \times 4 \times 5$.

The words ἐπίτροτος πυθμύν πεμπάδι συνώνεις therefore mean that $3, 4$ and $5$ are to be multiplied together. $3 \times 4 \times 5 = 60$.

1 See Iamb. in Nic. Ar. p. 34. 20 Pistelli. Aristid. Quint. 1 151 Meibom, Clem. Alex. Strom. v 14. 137 B. vii 16. 365 A Migne, and the Theolog. Ar. p. 33 Ast, et al. No doubt the number 5 could also bear the same meaning (see Zeller² 1 p. 390 n.), but I have found many more examples of 6 than of 5.

2 See in remp. ii p. 54. 2 ff. ed. Kroll, ἡ ἀδρήριατος των ἀδρίμων πρὸς αὐτὴν κατὰ τὸν ἀπὸ τῆς περισάδος ἀρμοῖος συνώνεις ποιεῖ τὴν ἀπὸ ἑνὸς ἑνὸς ἐπὶ ἑκάστης περισάδων, i.e. 100 coupled with the number which falls short of it by 5 makes the cycle from birth to birth. That cycle, according to Proclus, is 7500 (ib. p. 38); and 100 x (100 - 25 =) 75 = 7500. It is right to state that this passage had not been fully published when Mr Monro wrote the words quoted above. Cf. also Demetrius ap. Proclus ib. p. 23. 14 ff. The constant employment of ὁ γενομένως ἐξ ἐν Ευκλ. (e.g. vii 16 ff.) to denote numbers produced by multiplication out of other numbers involves the same idea as συνώνεις.
Let us now proceed to τρίς αὐξηθέεις. The literal translation is 'thrice increased,' and, as far as concerns the Greek, the words might refer either to three additions, or to three multiplications, and the addenda, or multipliers, might be either the number which has to be increased, that is, 60, or any other number or numbers whatsoever. But as we have seen that αὔξησεις in section B refers to multiplications and not additions, it is the most natural and obvious course to give αὔξησεις the same meaning here, and as Plato does not specify any multiplier, the simplest inference from his silence is that the multiplier is the same as the multiplicand, that is to say, 60. And \( 60 \times 60 \times 60 = 12,960,000 \).

At this stage it becomes necessary to discuss the arguments which have been advanced in favour of a different explanation of τρίς αὔξησεις, and against the explanation which was first proposed in my Number of Plato pp. 25—28. The discussion will bring to light several points which will, I hope, convince the reader, as they have completely convinced me, that τρίς αὔξησεις means 'three times multiplied by itself,' and cannot possibly mean anything else in the context where it occurs.

By every writer whom I have read, the words are taken as meaning cubed, or else the multiplication of some three factors: Weber, however, as I learn from Mr Monro, saw this much—that the words denote three separate processes of multiplication. I may be permitted to take Mr Monro and Dr Gow as types. The former observes: “The phrase τρίς αὔξησεις may be translated 'raised to the third dimension,' since it may imply either 'solid' numbers (products of three factors) in general, or the cube, which is the solid number par excellence. For the former use, see Rep. 528 B; for the latter, Rep. 587 D. Aristotle paraphrases τρίς αὔξησεις by the words ὅταν δ' τοῦ διαγράμματος ἀριθμὸς τοῦτον γένηται στερεός.” In Dr Gow’s article we read: “στερεός” (sc. in the passage quoted from Aristotle in Part iii of this Appendix) “seems to be equivalent to and explanatory of τρίς αὔξησεις (cf. Plato Rep. VII 528 B.).” That is, they would regard 60 τρίς αὔξησεις—granted that ἐπίτριος πυθμὸν πεπάθη αὐξησεῖς means 60—as equivalent to 60 multiplied twice, and not thrice, by itself. I say 'would regard,' because Dr Gow does take τρίς αὔξησεις as meaning merely the multiplication of three numbers, which in this case, he thinks, are different from one another (viz. 15, 20, 25), but Mr Monro admits, and Dr Gow would not deny, that the three factors may be identical. The fact is αὔξησεις means simply 'multiplied,' and, if the multiplier is not otherwise stated, it can only be the multiplicand.

In support of their explanation these two scholars quote, in the first place, the well-known passage in which Aristotle refers to Plato’s

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1 The phrase cannot however bear Hultsch’s interpretation ‘multiplied by three,’ for a number which is multiplied by 3 does not receive three increases, but only one, or, if we suppose that the increase means addition, two. Thus \( 60 \times 3 \) (one increase of 60) = 180 = 60 + 60 + 60 (two increases of 60). The Greek for ‘multiplied by 3,’ if we choose the verb αὔξανα, would be τριάδα αὔξησεις: cf. τριάδα αὔξησις Nicom. Intr. Ar. p. 127
2 J. of Ph. VIII p. 284.
3 l.c. p. 280.
4 J. of Ph. XII p. 93.
5 l.c. p. 280.
Number (Pol. E 12. 1316a 4 ff.). This passage of the Politics is so important for the correct understanding of the whole of Plato's Number that I have found it necessary to devote a separate division of this Appendix to its explanation. In Part iii I have, as I believe, shewn that the words quoted by Mr Monro do not paraphrase τρίς αὔξησις at all, but tell us what Aristotle believed to be the number of the section which I have called B. I will therefore ask the reader to defer his judgment on the Aristotelian passage till he has read Part iii.

In the second place, the above-named writers refer to Republic vii 528 b and ix 587 d. I cite these two passages in full. The first is as follows: μετὰ ἐπίπεδον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐν περιφορᾷ δὲ ἦν στερεὸν λαβόντες, πρὶν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ λαβέν· ὁρθῶς δὲ ἔχει ἔξος μετὰ δευτέραν αὔξην τρίτην λαμβάνειν. ἐστὶ δὲ τὸν τούτο περί τὴν τῶν κύβων αὔξην καὶ τὸ βάθος μετέχον (528 b). The second runs thus: κατὰ δὲ δύναμιν καὶ τρίτην αὔξην δήλον δὴ ἀπόστασιν ὅπη πλαισίως γίγνεται (587 d).

I have fully commented on these passages where they occur, but it may be convenient once more to recapitulate my explanation of τρίτη αὔξη in each of these places. The first passage is where Plato says that the study of solids by themselves should precede the study of solids ἐν περιφορᾷ, i.e. astronomy: after the second 'increase,' says Plato, we ought to take the third. What does this mean? A point (= unity) has no 'increase': a line (say 3) has one: a rectangle (say 3 x 4) has two (δευτέρα αὔξη): a solid figure (say 3 x 4 x 5) has three. A solid figure is therefore rightly said to be or have τρίτη αὔξη, because your reckoning begins from the point, which has no increase. The second passage deals with a case, not of solids in general, but of cubes. The number in question is 9—which is (says Plato) the distance separating the tyrant from ἀληθῆ γόνη, measured ἀριθμῷ or κατὰ τὸν τοῦ μήκους ἀριθμὸν, i.e. "numero secundum longitudinem, numerus enim omnium quatenus monadibus constat, lineae instar habendus" (Schneider iii p. lxxxv): 'and how far removed the tyrant is according to the square and the third increase, is manifest.' But the third increase of what? Not of 9 (though belonging to 9), for 9 is itself already one increase, viz. of unity—but the third increase of unity in that special case where 9 is its first increase. 'The first increase (viz. of the unit or point) was ὁ τοῦ μήκους ἀριθμός, i.e. in this case (1 x 9 = 9): by the second-and-third increases on the same scale we obtain 9 x 9 (second increase or δύναμις) x 9 (third increase) = 729' (n. ad loc.). Both in 528 b and 587 d it is unity or the point which suffers a third increase: in Plato's number it is not unity, but 60, and that makes all the difference. Cf. Pt iii.

Let us consider for a moment what is the meaning of the Greek word αὔξη or αὔξησις. Aristotle distinguishes γένεσις ἀπὸ αὔξησις in these words: φανερῶν τί—οτί οὐκ ἦστε ἢ αὔξησις μεταβολή ἐκ δυνάμει μεγέθους, ἐφελεξάμεν δὲ μηδὲν ἔχοντος μέγεθος...εἰτε δὲ ἢ γε τοιαύτη μεταβολή οὐκ αὔξησις ἢ ἀλλὰ γενέσις· ἢ γὰρ αὔξησις ἐστὶ τοῦ ἐνυπάρχοντος μεγέθους ἐπίδοσις, ἢ δὲ φοίνικες μείωσις. Compare with this another passage of the same treatise: εἰ μὲν γὰρ τῷ γέγονος τι
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The Greeks did not regard 'ought' as a number and had no symbol for it; see Cantor Vorlesungen zur Gesch. der Mathem. p. 144.

It will be shewn in Pt iii that \( \delta \tau \) is 6.

suggest for the phrase is therefore in harmony both with Greek linguistic usage and with the theories of the school to which above all others Plato confesses his obligations in the domain of mathematics (see on vii 530 D, E and cf. also App. II to Book vii), and no rival interpretation is offered either by Mr Monro, or, so far as I am aware, by any other critic.

Finally, my interpretation of τρίς αύξηθείς has been admitted to be "logical, but it is not" says Mr Monro (Cl. Rev. l.c. p. 154) "in accordance with the usus loquendi, which in this and many similar cases follows the inclusive method of reckoning." In support of this allegation Mr Monro quotes a passage from Euclid ix 8 ἕαν ἀπὸ μονάδος ὑποστολὴν ἀριθμοῦ ἔχεις ἀνάλογον ώς ἐν μὲν τρίτοις ἀπὸ τῆς μονάδος τετράγωνος ἐπτει ακλ., and refers to a similar passage in Archimedes, quoted by Nesselmann, Alg. d. Griechen p. 124 n. 16. "On the latter of these" continues Mr Monro "Nesselmann remarks: 'Es ist bei diesem Satze nur zu bedenken, dass die Griechen bei Angaben von Abständen beide Grenzen mitzählen' (Algebra d. Griechen p. 125, cp. p. 161)." I have no fault to find with Nesselmann, whose remarks are perfectly true and relevant in both the places cited by Mr Monro, and in the fullest harmony, so far as they go, with my explanation of τρίς αύξηθείς. My only objection is to the inference which Mr Monro on his own account draws from this and similar passages in Greek. That inference will claim our attention presently: but first it is necessary to explain what Euclid means.

The meaning is as follows. If, for example, we take the series

\[1, 60, 3600, 216000, \ldots\]

in which \(1 : 60 : : 60 : 3600 : : 3600 : 216000\), then the third number — it will be admitted that ἀριθμὸς is understood with τρίτος—from 1 will be a square. (Here it is of course 60.) The expression 'third number from 1' is doubtless, as Mr Monro thinks, somewhat illogical, for one cannot be the first number from itself: and it is perfectly true that 'this is only one of many examples of the usus loquendi' of the Greek language.

But what inference does Mr Monro draw from the usage in question? Because the third number from one is a square, he seems to infer that the third increase is also a square. This is the only way in which I can interpret the words: "We may feel sure, I think, that the 'third increase' would naturally mean the third term in the increasing series rather than the fourth." (The italics are mine.) Well, the increasing series is 1, 60, 60², and the third term in the series is 60², so that according to Mr Monro's view 60² is a τρίτη αὐξή. This no one believes. 'It is not in accordance with the usus loquendi,' not to speak of logic.

My reviewer's inference from the idiom to which he calls attention is therefore unwarranted and fallacious. The fact is, of course, that the

1 The passage of Archimedes is, as Mr Monro remarks, similar to that from Euclid; and what I say of the one applies equally to the other.

2 That Euclid regards the increasing series as beginning with unity, and not with the second number, is clear from the words with which he begins his demonstration: ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἵστοι ὡς ἡ μονάς πρὸς τὸν Α, οὕτως ὁ Α πρὸς τὸν Β κτλ.
'third increase' meant to the Greeks, as it means to us, the fourth term in the increasing series, and not the third. Thus in the increasing series 1, 60, 3600, 216,000, the fourth term, viz. 216,000 or 60 x 60 x 60, is the 'third increase,' and in the increasing series which is involved in the words ἐν ἐπτίτωτος πυθμὴν περιπάδι συνζυγεῖς τρίς αὐξηθεῖσι, that is to say,

60, 3600, 216,000, 12,960,000,

the 'third increase' is also the fourth term viz. 12,960,000 or 60 x 60 x 60 i.e. 60 τρίς αὐξηθεῖσι. So far am I from interpreting τρίς αὐξηθεῖσι differently from τρίτη αὐξη, as has been asserted by Mr Monro (l.c. p. 154).1

Our conclusion therefore is that ἐν ἐπτίτωτος πυθμὴν περιπάδι συνζυγεῖς τρίς αὐξηθεῖσι means

60 x 60 x 60 = 12,960,000.

This number, according to Plato, 'furnishes two harmonies' (δύο ἀρμονίων παρέχεται). What does Plato mean by 'furnishes'? Does he mean 'furnishes of itself,' or 'furnishes after it has been submitted to various arithmetical operations'? παρέχεται elsewhere bear the meaning 'de suo praebere' (iv 421 D n.), and we are not justified in supplying any new arithmetical processes out of our own imaginations, in the absence of any hint contained in the Greek.2 No such hint is given: so that παρέχεται can only mean 'furnishes of itself.' Now in what sense can a number be said to furnish of itself a square and an oblong? The natural and obvious answer is 'When it can be resolved both into a square and into an oblong.'3

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1 The reason why τρίς αὐξηθεῖσι has been misunderstood so long is due in part to our habit of expressing Plato's mathematics in the technical language of a later generation. Mr Monro for example calls it a paradox to hold 'that τρίς αὐξηθεῖσι means 'raised to the fourth power,' while τρίτη αὐξη denotes the third power' (Cl. Rev. l.c. p. 242). The 'paradox' becomes a truism if we say 'τρίς αὐξηθεῖσι means thrice increased, and τρίτη αὐξη denotes the third increase.' And this is in fact the only admissible way of stating the case. The mathematical terms 'fourth power' and 'third power' were unknown to Plato. 'Power' or δύναμις alone was sometimes used by him with the meaning which we express by 'second power' (Rep. IX 687 D), but he also employs δυτήρα αὐξη to convey that meaning (ib. VII 528 ν), and δύναμις itself actually means 'root' in Thoc. 148 A. See Allman Ch. Geom. p. 208 ν. In the course of my commentary on the Republic I have had occasion to point out some instances in which the interpretation of Plato's philosophy has suffered by the employment of later philosophical formulae and phrases, and it is interesting and instructive to find so conspicuous an example of the same tendency in connexion with his mathematics.

2 It is at this point where all the previous attempts to solve the Number with which I am acquainted have broken down. In order to make their conjectures about the ἐπιστροφὸς πυθμὴν περιπάδι συνζυγεῖς τρίς αὐξηθεῖσι yield the two harmonies, the different writers on the subject have been compelled to interpret παρέχεται κτλ. as 'furnishes two harmonies after it has been submitted to other arithmetical processes,' and as no such processes are indicated by Plato, they have supplied the missing links by a variety of purely imaginative conjectures according to their different interpretations of the ἐπιστροφὸς πυθμῆς etc. and of the harmonies which it provides.

3 A less natural but still possible answer would be 'When it is produced by the sum of a square and an oblong.' But the sequel shows that this alternative is not intended here.
Let us now examine the words in which Plato describes the first harmony. It is, he tells us, 'equal an equal number of times, so many times 100.' But how many times 100? This time the Muses are only pretending to tease: for the answer is already in our hands. 12,960,000 furnishes (i.e., as we have seen, can be resolved into) 360° (Fig. 3), and 360° is 'equal an equal number of times, viz. thirty-six times 100,' so that τοσσαντάκις means 36 times. It should be added that ἵσος ἴσακις is regularly used of a square number by Greek writers on arithmetic, and bears the same meaning in Theæt. 147 E.

Why does Plato add the words ἐκατόν τοσσαντάκις when the square could be just as easily discovered without them? He wishes to call our attention to the fact that each of the sides of the square is a multiple of 100, just as each of the sides of the oblong is also a multiple of 100 (ἐκατόν μὲν ἄρθρων—ἐκατόν δὲ κύβων τριάδος). We are thus encouraged to look for some special significance in his employment of that number. What the significance is will be explained in Part ii § 5. The number 36 had also a profound significance and value in Pythagorean embryology, theory of music, and physics (Part ii § 4), and Plato calls our attention to it all the more pointedly because he represents it as if it were an unknown quantity. In reality it is not unknown, for the antecedent of τοσσαντάκις is easily discovered from the equation which Plato himself has already given us, viz. ₁₂,₉₆₀,₀₀₀ = a square ².

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1 Enclid VII def. 11 τετράγωνος ἄρθρων ἐκατόν ἤ ἴσακις ἴσος.

2 In my Number of Plato p. 21 I explained τοσσαντάκις in substantially the same way. It was urged against my explanation that τοσσαντάκις ought not to refer to a number "discovered by an algebraic process from a subsequent statement" (Cl. Rev. l.c. p. 153. The italics are mine). The words in italics do not apply to the present solution, in which the Number is investigated in the order of the Greek, and not, as on the previous occasion, from the end upwards. I now interpret τοσσαντάκις not by what follows, but by what precedes it, but I still regard the pronounal adverb as meaning 'so many times' i.e. 'a certain number of times.' The usage is just as natural in Greek as in English, and resembles the use of τοσσόν in βλέπων τόδε τοίδε καὶ νῦν καὶ τοσσόν τινς. C: 1088, τοσσόν καὶ τοσσόν in Læw 7210 and τοσσόν in Arist. Pol. 11 12. 1283a8 τοσσόν γὰρ μέγεθος ἐς κρέατον τοσσόν, τοσσόν δὲ ὅπως ὑπεν. In Cl. Rev. l.c. p. 241 I suggested that the whole phrase might be equivalent to τόσον ἴσακις ἐκατόντακις, the word τοσσαντάκις having for its antecedent the square number which τόσον ἴσακις denotes, and I find that Schneider, Donaldson and apparently also Hultsch (II. cc.) understand the expression in this way. In that case the first harmony will be 360° x 100 instead of 3600°, and the total result remains the same. But the symmetry of the passage is impaired if we take this view: for just as in the case of the oblong it is not the area, but the sides which are multiplied by 100 (ἐκατόν μὲν ἄρθρων—ἐκατόν δὲ κύβων τριάδος), so also here the number 100 should multiply the sides, and not the area, of the square. Mr Monro thinks that "the ordinary interpretation of ἐκατον τοσσαντάκις—'a hundred taken that number of times viz. 100 times'—is unassailable" (l.c. p. 153). This view of the word is as old as Proclus (l.c. II p. 37), but is far from universally held, as I have just pointed out. I am by no means sure that Plato would have expressed the area of his square in this way: certainly in Men. 83 C he writes τετράγων γὰρ (not τέταρτα) τετράκις ἴσον ἐκκαλ- δέκα (cf. ib. 82 C, 83 E), describing the
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The first 'harmony' is therefore 3600; what is the second?

Plato describes it in the words τὴν δὲ ἴσομορφη μὲν τῇ, προμῆχη δὲ, ἐκατὸν μὲν ἄρθρων ἀπὸ διαμέτρων ῥητῶν περιμέτρου, ἰσομερῶν ἐνὸς ἐκάστων, ἀρρητῶν δὲ δύον, ἐκατὸν δὲ κύβων τριάδος, 'the other of equal length one way, but oblong; on the one side, of 100 squares of rational diameters of 5, diminished by one each, or if of irrational diameters, by two; on the other, of 100 cubes of 3.'

Let us examine the words one by one. It is clear that τὴν δὲ ἴσομορφη μὲν τῇ, προμῆχη δὲ means that the 'harmony' is expressed by means of a rectangle. "When the sides of the rectangle were expressed in numbers," says Allman, "προμῆχησ was the general term for an oblong," and προμῆχησ is the term employed here. Compare the Platonic definition of an oblong number in Theaet. 148a πλεῖον ἑλάστον ἤ ἑλάστοις πλεονάκις γίγνεται, μείζον δὲ καὶ ἑλάστοι ἀεὶ πλευρὰ αὐτὸν περιλαμβάνει. The sense would have been complete if Plato had merely said τὴν δὲ προμῆχησ, but the addition of ἴσομορφη μὲν τῇ has a stylistic effect: the rectangle, like the square, is also ἴσομορφησ, though only in one direction.

We have now to interpret ἐκατὸν μὲν ἄρθρων ἀπὸ διαμέτρων ῥητῶν περιμέτρου, ἰσομερῶν ἐνὸς ἐκάστων, ἀρρητῶν δὲ δύον. These words express the first of the two sides of the rectangle: cf. Critias 118a πρόμηχες δὲ

square as 'of' its sides, just as he usually describes an oblong (cf. Critias 118a πρόμηχες δὲ πάντα, ἐπὶ μὲν ἄφθαρτα τρισχεῖλαν στάδιων, κατὰ δὲ μέσον ἀπὸ θαλάττης ἀνω δισχεῖλων). If he had wished to say that the first harmony was 100 x 100, we should have expected ἐκατὸν μοράδων τοσούτοις, so as to balance ἐκατὸν μὲν ἄρθρων κτλ. below: or rather ἐκατὸν μοράδων ἑκατοντάκες, for Plato never uses τρία τοσούτακες, τέταρτα τοσούτακες, etc., but always τρία τρίς. τέταρτα τετράκις etc. It is incredible that a nation which had a word for 10,000 times had no word to express 100 times, although Mr Monro suggests that because ἑκατοντάκες does not appear to occur in classical literature, therefore it was unknown in Plato's day (Cl. Rev. l.c. p. 153). Over and above all these considerations, there is the indisputable fact that the harmony which Plato describes in the words λογὴ λοικῆς, ἐκατὸν τοσούτακες must be one which can be 'furnished' or 'yielded' by the ἑκτέριοι πνείματα σύγχροι τρίς αἰσθήσεις: and no theory about the area of that harmony has the smallest claim to be even considered unless it complies with this condition. Mr Monro himself makes no attempt to shew that the number 10,000 can be derived from the subject of παρέχεται, and every writer who has attempted this impossible task has been compelled to resort to purely conjectural and arbitrary processes for which there is not a shadow of justification in Plato's language.

2 Hultsch (Zeitschrift f. Math. etc. l.c. p. 46), who agrees that the words denote a rectangle, changes τῇ into τῇ, but τῇ is not sufficiently precise. The order is of course intended to throw emphasis on τῇ; and at the same time to bring ἴσομορφη as near as possible to λογὴ λοικῆς. τῇ is demonstrative in as τῇ μὲν, τῇ δὲ (Theaet. 148e etc.), and the position of μὲν is as in X 614 b ἐκ μὲν τοῦ ἀπεικόνισεν ἐκ δὲ τοῦ ἐτέρου and elsewhere. The usual theory seems to make τῇ mean the square: 'equal to the former in one dimension' (J. and C.). If Plato had intended such a meaning, he would certainly have written ἐκεῖνη and not τῇ. There should be no question that τῇ is adverbial.

3 The full explanation of this passage is due to Barozzi (see Schneider l.c. p. xxv), but Proclus (l.c. p. 38) understood 'the rational' and 'irrational diameters of five.' Barozzi's only error was that he added, instead of multiplying, the two sides of the oblong. I think Hultsch was the first to see that multiplication is intended, although he interprets the sides of the rectangle wrongly.
In the language of Greek arithmetic ἀριθμὸς ἀπὸ means ‘square of’: see for example Euclid VII 20 ἐὰν τρεῖς ἀριθμοὶ αὐτὸν ἄνω, ὃ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀκρων ἄνω ἠταῖ τῷ ἀπὸ τοῦ μέσου, i.e. for example, in the proportion 2 : 4 : : 4 : 8, the product of 8 and 2 = 4². The same use of ἀπὸ is found in Plato, e.g. Men. 85b ἀπὸ τῆς διαμέτρου ἄν, ὃς σὺ φης, ὃ ταῖς Μένωνος, γίγνοτ’ ἃν τὸ δεξιάσιον χωρίον.

Consequently ἔκατον μὲν ἀριθμὸν ἀπὸ is simply ‘of one hundred squares of.’

What are διάμετροι ῥηταὶ περιπάδος? The rational diameter of 5 is the nearest rational number to the real diameter of a square whose side is five¹, i.e. to \( \sqrt{50} \) by Euclid I 47 (see Fig. 4). Now the nearest rational number to \( \sqrt{50} \) is 7 = \( \sqrt{49} \). Therefore ῥηταῖ διά-


\[ \text{Fig. 4.}\]

We can now interpret the whole expression ἔκατον μὲν ἀριθμὸν ἀπὸ διαμέτρων ῥητῶν περιπάδος, δεομένων ἐνὸς ἐκάστων. It is equivalent to

\[
(7^2 \times 100) - (1 \times 100) = 4900 - 100 = 4800.
\]

The words ἄρρητων δὲ δυῶν merely give another way of arriving at 4800. The translation is: ‘or, if you take irrational diameters of 5,

this is the only passage in Plato where ‘rational diameters’ are mentioned. In Thet. 147 D ff. he merely distinguishes rational from irrational roots or surds: while a careful study of Polit. 266 A shows that the passage is in no way parallel to ours except in the use of διάμετρος. But there is nothing harsh or difficult, from the Greek point of view, in the expression ‘rational diameter.’ The geometrical construction is very simple. See Fig. 5. Let \( AB = \sqrt{50} \), i.e. the irrational diameter of 5, and consequently \( ABDE \) the square of (πτῷ) \( AB = 50 \); we have only to insert in \( ABDE \) the largest square of a rational number which it will contain, say \( AFHG \), and \( AF \) will be the rational diameter of 5, i.e. that part of the diameter of 5 which is rational.

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¹ For evidence of this see Theo Smyr-

naeus, pp. 43ff. Cf. also Proclus in temp. II p. 38, Gow, Ck Math. p. 96 and Cantor Gesch. d. Math. p. 191. This is
wanting 2 each. The construction is \(\alpha \pi \delta \alpha \) ἀρρήτων δὲ \(\delta \iota \alpha \mu \epsilon \tau \rho \omega \nu \delta \epsilon \omega \mu \varepsilon \iota \varepsilon \omega \) δι
<κάκος των>. The meaning, expressed in figures, is: 'or, if you prefer it, of \((\sqrt{50})^2 \times 100 - (2 \times 100) = 5000 - 200 = 4800\), δὲ gives an alternative, as in \(\mu \alpha \lambda \lambda \nu \delta \epsilon \varepsilon \) vel potius.

Consequently one of the two sides of the second harmony is 4800.

The words ἐκάτον δὲ κύβων τριάδος 'on the other hand of 100 cubes of three' give us the second side, viz. \(100 \times 3^2 = 2700\).

The second harmony is therefore

\[4800 \times 2700 \text{ (Fig. 6)} = 12,960,000.\]

And this harmony, like the first, is furnished by \(60 \times 60 \times 60 \times 60\), for \(60 \times 60 \times 60 \times 60 = 12,960,000\).

The reason why the square and the rectangle are each called 'harmonies' will be explained in Part ii § 5.

The arithmetical solution of the Platonic Number is therefore

\[(1) \ 3^2 + 4^3 + 5^3 = 216.\]
\[(2) \ (3 \times 4 \times 5)^4 = 3600^3 = 4800 \times 2700.\]

**PART ii.**

**The meaning of the Platonic Number.**

I will now discuss the whole passage from beginning to end, and elucidate the meaning step by step.

§ 1. *The point of view.*

Our city, says Plato, will be moved, when στάσις appears in the two higher classes. The Muses shall tell us how στάσις entered first. The cause of our city's being moved, they say, is that everything created is liable to destruction. The process of destruction (λύσις) is when the leaders of the city γένους ἵματέρον εὖγοινικας τε καὶ ἄφορίας—οὐδέν μᾶλλον τεῦχονται, ἀλλὰ πάρεσιν αὐτοὺσ καὶ γεννήσουσι παιδίας ποτε οὖν δέον. Whenever, in ignorance of 'better and worse births,' οἱ φύλακες συνοικίζονται νυμφαίς νυμφίων παρὰ καιροῖς, οὐκ εὐφεῖες οὖδε εὐτυχεῖς παιδεῖς ἐσωτερικαὶ (546 D). In the next generation the dissolution has already gone so far that iron breeds with silver, and copper with gold.

Accordingly the λύσις of the ideal State is the begetting of children when children ought not to be begotten, or briefly, the begetting of children out of season, or inopportune.

This is quite in harmony with the stringent rules laid down by Plato in Book v on the subject of marriage and the procreation of children. Thus in 458 D the male and female archons are not allowed ἀτάκτως
APPENDICES TO BOOK VIII.

§ 2. The meaning of the words from χαλεπῶν μὲν to γεννῆσον παῖδος τοτε οὐ δειν.

We have thus obtained the point of view from which the whole passage is to be interpreted. While the cause of change from the best to the second-best commonwealth lies in the perishability of everything which is created, the process which leads to change is the begetting of children inopportunely.

Plato deals first with the process leading to change (λύσις). To plants and animals, he says, cometh production or non-production (a bearing or no bearing) of soul and bodies, whenever revolutions join for each the circumferences of their circles, these circumferences faring a short way for the short-lived, but the reverse for the reverse. That is to say, plants and animals have fixed periods of gestation, which may be represented by circles whose circumferences revolve (Fig. 7). Every time that the fixed point A is reached, there is φορὰ ψυχῆς τε καὶ σωμάτων, if the seed was sown on the last occasion when the same point of the circle was at A, and if it has come, without accident, to maturity: if however the seed was not then sown, or, though sown, has not come to maturity, there is ἀφορία ψυχῆς τε καὶ σωμάτων. The singular ψυχῆς is used because soul, viewed merely as the principle of life, is one in all plants, in all animals, and in both. Why are the circumferences long in the case of long-lived animals, and short in the case of short-lived? Because animals that live long have long periods of gestation, and conversely. Aristotle also takes note of the same general rule: see Probl. x 9, 891b 25 ff., διὰ τι τὰ μὲν ταχυτόκα τῶν ζωῶν ἄττι, τῶν δὲ πολυχρῶν ἡ κύρις; ἢ ὅτι τὰ μακροβιότερα βραδύτεροι πέρικε τελειώθαι; ἵναι δὲ βραδυτόκα τὰ μακρόβια and de gener. anim. iv 10. 777a 31 ff., where the elephant is cited as a well-known case in point.

The meaning of the words from λύσις de ἦντε ἐκ ναυτίας may therefore be summed up in the sentence: In all plants and animals the period of gestation is fixed by nature. Now as man is the animal with whom in the ideal State we are concerned, we are prepared by this exordium for the mention of the period of gestation in the human race. It will come in due time.

1 Cf. Tim. 77 b.
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Plato proceeds to narrow the case down to man: ‘Now as touching your kind (i.e. mankind), clever though the leaders of the city be whom you educated, none the more will they by calculation together with perception obtain’ (literally, hit the obtaining of) ‘good offspring and no offspring, but it will escape them, and the day will come when they will beget children when they ought not.’ Several points in this require to be explained. First: in place of repeating φορά καὶ ἀφορία Plato writes εὐγονίας τε καὶ ἀφορίας, because it is not enough for the prosperity of the ideal State merely to produce children—the children must be good in quality. The word ἀφορίας is full of meaning; it is the duty of the rulers to render, if possible, illicit unions unproductive, πάντα διακελευόμενοι προθυμείσθαι, μάλιστα μὲν μὴ εἰς φῶς ἐκφέρειν κύῳμα μὴ δὲ γ’ ἔι, έαν γέννησαι, έαν δὲ τι βιωθήσαι, οὐδ’ ἔλεναι, ὡς οὐκ ὑσθήσης τροφῆς τῷ τοιοῦτῳ (V 461 c). Second: what is the meaning of λογισμὸς μετ’ αἰσθήμενοι? Nothing very recondite. Both calculation and perception by the senses must be employed by the rulers in arranging the details connected with marriage and the bringing up of children: perception for example in settling what couples are to be brought together (V 459 A ff.), which children should be reared, and which exposed (460 c al.), and calculation in order to determine what number of marriages are needed to keep the population nearly uniform (460 λ), what couples may marry by reason of age (460 ε ff.), and other things too trivial to mention. Plato means that however well the rulers employ the means at their disposal, that is, λογισμὸς and αἰσθήμεις, yet the time will come when mistakes must happen. We are not to blame the rulers of our perfect city, nor yet αἰσθήμεις (with Amelius ap. Procl. l.c. p. 29 and Nettleship Lect. and Rem. ii p. 352): for the real fons et origo mali, as we shall shortly discover, is the Universe, the failure of whose energies is beginning to affect the ideal city, as well as every other portion of the whole. See §§ 5 and 7.

§ 3. The ψεύδος of the θείων γεννητῶν.

We come now to the words ἐστι δὲ θείως μὲν γεννητῷ ψεύδος ᾗν ἄριθμὸς περιλαμβάνει τέλεον. Plato has stated that all ζωὰ have a fixed period of gestation: he now proceeds to deal with the periods of (1) the θείων γεννητῶν and (2) the ἄριθμαρσιοί, beginning with the θείων, on the principle έι Διὸς ἀρχωμενσθά.

Four expressions require to be discussed before we can arrive at Plato’s meaning—viz.: ψεύδος, περιλαμβάνει, ἄριθμος τέλεος, and θείων γεννητῶν.

The word ψεύδος means nothing more than ‘way round.’ One complete revolution of any circle is a ψεύδος: two or more of the same circle, or one (or more) of one circle and one (or more) of another or others, are ψεύδοις. This will not be denied by any one who will take the trouble to study side by side the examples quoted in Ast’s Lexicon of the use of ψεύδος in Plato. In the present passage the ‘way round’ is that described above in the words ὅταν περιτροπαὶ ἐκάστοις κύκλων πειαφορᾶς ἔναπτοσε: the ψεύδος of a θείων γεννητῶν is therefore
fulfilled ὅταν περιτροπή θείω γεννητῶ κύκλων περιμερῶν ἐννάτης. Now it has already been shewn that the words from ὅταν περιτροπαί ἔν τοῖς refer to periods of gestation, so that the περιόδος of a θείων γεννητῶν is the period of gestation which ends in the birth of a divine creature. This is the only possible interpretation of the Greek, nor is the meaning otherwise than appropriate, as will appear when we apprehend what the 'divine creature' is.

The word περιλαμβάνει means 'comprehends.' If a number is represented by a rectangle, its sides, or factors, are said to 'comprehend' it, as in Thaet. 148 a, where the number which μεῖζων καὶ ἐλάττων ἀπτῇ περιλαμβάνει is called a προμήχης ἀριθμός. In the present case, we are dealing, not with a number, but with a περιόδος which is comprehended by a number, and that number περιλαμβάνει περιόδον which gives the time that the revolution takes to accomplish. The period of gestation of a divine creature is therefore expressed by a 'final number."

I will now discuss the words τέλειος ἀριθμός. It is well known that a 'perfect' number meant to Euclid and Greek arithmeticians generally a number which is equal to the sum of its divisors, e.g. 6 = 1 + 2 + 3; 28 = 1 + 2 + 4 + 7 + 14. Although there is no trace of such a meaning in Plato, nor in the fragments of Philolaus⁴, the usage may very well be old; but even among the Pythagoreans numbers are often called 'perfect,' although they are not equivalent to the sum of their factors. The τέλειος ἀριθμός παρ excellence was ἐν according to Philolaus: θεορεῖν δὲ τὰ ἔργα καὶ τὰν ἐστίαν τῶν ἀριθμῶν κατὰν δύναμιν, άτις ἐστιν ἐν τῷ δεκάδι: μεγάλα γὰρ καὶ παντελῆς καὶ παντοεργός καὶ θεῖος καὶ ὀφθαλμός καὶ καιρόπικον ἀρχά καὶ ἁγιών καὶ κοσμήτειρα ἀ δύναμις ἐν τῷ δεκάδος. But ἐν was called by them παντελῆς or τέλειοι simply because, as the basis of their system of calculation, which was a decimal one, it may be regarded as the 'consummating' or 'all-ending' number, the numbers above ten being considered merely repetitions of the first ten. Plato was perfectly at liberty to call any other number τέλειος which 'ends' or 'brings a consummation,' and in point of fact he does so in the Timaeus. In 39 d of that dialogue we find the words: εἰτί δ' ὁμοί συνέν ἦτον κατανοήσαι δυνατώς, ὡς ὦ τέλειος ἀριθμός χρόνου τὸν τέλειον ἐναντίον

¹ For περίοδος in the sense of 'period of gestation,' cf. Aristides Quint. De Musica, p. 143 Meib. τῶν ἐπαμήνων περίοδοι. Many writers on the Number understand by περίοδος 'Umlaufzeit' (e.g. Zeller¹ 111, p. 828 n.): but the word must of course be interpreted by what precedes and follows. I have shewn that 'period of gestation' is the only meaning which harmonises with ὅταν περιτροπαί κτλ. above, and it is the only meaning possible below, where the period of the human creature is described.

² VII def. 23 τέλειος ἀριθμός ἐστιν ὁ τοῖς ἐναντίῳ μέροιν ἐσον ὡς.

³ Some of Philolaus' fragments, whether genuine or not, are at all events, in my opinion, tolerably early.

⁴ e.g. 3 and 9: see the Theolog. Arithm. pp. 13, 58 ed. Ast. The number 3 is on p. 13 said to be τέλειος διαίτητον τῶν ἄλλων, implying that other numbers may also be τέλειοι, though in a less specific sense. Cf. Demme (referred to above) pp. 84 f.

⁵ Frag. 13 in Mullach 11 p. 4.

⁶ See Zeller⁵ 1 p. 398 n. 2, and Aristotle quoted there.

⁷ Cantor in his Vorlesungen zur Gesch. der Math. p. 142 agrees in denying that 'perfect number' here means 'a number equal to the sum of its divisors.'

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πληροὶ τότε, ὅταν ἀπασχῶν τῶν ὄκτω περιοδῶν τὰ πρὸς ἄλληλα ἔμμετρανται τέχνη σχῆ κεφαλῆς τῷ τοῦ ταιωτοῦ καὶ ὁμοίως ἀναμετρηθεῖτα κύκλῳ. It is rightly held that we have here a reference to a Great Year—the period within which all the eight circles revolving around the earth simultaneously reach the point from which they started at the commencement of our cycle. Now if Plato allowed himself to call the number which measures a cycle of the world’s life a ‘final’ or ‘ending’ number, it is clear that he might with equal propriety apply the epithet τέλειος to the number which completes or fulfills (τέλειος) the World’s creation; for the θεῖον γεννητόν, as will presently be shewn, is the World and nothing more. What the particular number is, he does not say: and no one will blame him for his reticence.

There remain the words θεῖον γεννητόν. The ancients explained these words, with perfect justice, as referring to the Universe: οὕραος ἢ κόσμος ἢ καὶ ἄλλο ὀ τί ποτε οὕραος ἢ καὶ ἄλλο ἄνθρωπον (Tim. 28 b). In the Timaeus there is abundant evidence that Plato regarded the World as a divine creature: τοίδε τόν κόσμον, he says, ζωὸν ἐμπυγνόν ἐνυφύνει τῇ ἀλήθεια διὰ τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ γενεσίας πρόνοιας, with which compare the words of Proclus (in Tim. 89 d): ὅταν δὲ ἐμπυγνόν αὐτὸ καὶ ἐνυφύνει ὑμᾶς, θεῖον αὐτὸ καλέστε, ὥσπερ δὲ Πλατών ἐν Πολυτέιρι μὲν θεῖον γεννητόν, ἔνταφα δὲ θεῖον εὐδαιμονία προσετείν τὸν κόσμον ἡτίοισε. The Universe is θεῖον, because it is a God; γεννητόν, because it is created.

The θεῖον γεννητόν is therefore the World, and the words which we have been discussing mean that the time during which the world is in the womb is comprehended by a final or consummating number, the size of which Plato prudently conceals.

1 viz. the circle of the Fixed stars, Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, Mercury, Venus, Sun, Moon: see Arist. Alc. 150 d. There is a good definition of the Great Year in Macrob. Sat. 11. 10.
2 By the “World’s creation” is meant, of course, the development of a κόσμος or ordered universe out of the primeval chaos. Cf. Tim. 30 a. and Pol. 273 b. τολῆς ὡν μετέχον ἀταξία πρῶς εἰς τῶν νῦν κόσμων ἀφαίρεθαι. It ought to be mentioned here that I formerly thought the period of the θεῖον γεννητόν is actually specified by Plato in the sequel, and that it is identical with one of the two harmonies; but the identification cannot be sustained, and I now withdraw it.
3 τέλειος is used with the same meaning in the Theol. Arithm. p. 58 Ast; καλύτεραι διὰ αὐτής (sc. οὐκέτας) τελεσφόροις, τελείοι διὰ τὸ ἀνέκδοτα. See Plutarch Περὶ τῆς ἐν Πυθαγόρει τυχογνώμος 10. 1017 c and the references in Schneider.
4 30 B; cf. 30 D, 32 D, 34 A, 34 B (εὐθαλ.
5 μονα θεῖον αὐτῶν ἔγενησατο) and 37 c.
6 Tim. 28 b ἑγεννησεν ὁ πατὴρ ἡπτὸς τε δοτι καὶ ἄομα ἐχων, πάντα δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα αἰτιὰ, τὰ δ’ αἰτητὰ, δέος περιηγητὸς μετ’ αἰτηθεσίως, γεγονὼν καὶ γεννητὰ ἑγάρῃ. Whether these words are to be taken in their literal meaning or not, it will be allowed that if Plato can call the world γεννητὸν in the Timaeus, he may do so with equal justice in the Republic.
7 In the Orphic verses this identical metaphor is found: see Procl. in Tim. 94 B πάντα γὰρ ἐν ζωῆς μεγάλω τάδε ὅμως κατὰ καὶ ἔναν δ’ ἐνι γαστῆρι αὐτὸν ἐπεφέρει καὶ ἐνι τὸν ταύτα Δίδω πάλιν ἐντὸς ἐτοιχία 1 αἰθέρος εὑρίσκει ἡδ’ ωραοῦ ἀγίαν υἷος κτλ. It is well known that there is a large element of Orphic belief embodied in Pythagoreanism; and if these verses are early or embody an early tradition, the figure which Plato here employs may itself be taken from Pythagorean sources.

The general statement, with which we started, that every living thing has a fixed period of gestation, has now at last been narrowed down to man. The period of gestation for a human creature, says Plato, is the 'first number in which root and square increasings, comprehending three distances and four limits, of elements which make like and unlike and wax and wane, render all things conversable and rational towards one another.'

The arithmetical meaning of this sentence, as we have seen, is $3^3 + 4^3 + 5^3 = 216$, the numbers 3, 4, and 5 denoting the sides of the Pythagorean triangle. In order to apprehend its real significance, it will be necessary to say something about (1) the numbers 3, 4, and 5, (2) the expression ἀνέχεσθαι δυνάμει τέ καὶ δυναστευόμεναι, τρεῖς αποστάσεις, τέταρται δὲ ὄροις, λαβόνωσι, and (3) the whole number 216 together with πώς προσέγγισα καὶ ῥητὰ πρὸς ἀλληλα ἀπέφηναν.

As regards the numbers 3, 4, and 5, I have already alluded to the evidence which there is for holding that Plato made use of the Pythagorean triangle throughout the Number. The oldest testimony, as we shall see in Part iii, is that of Aristotle, and practically all the ancient commentators, as appears from Proclus (I.c. 11 pp. 22 ff.), made the figure in question the starting-point of nearly all their investigations on the subject. That the properties of this triangle were employed by the Pythagoreans to explain and enforce their embryological theories, is also attested from many sources, such as Aristides Quintilianus 111 151 ff. Meibom = 89 ff. Jahn, Proclus I. c. p. 26 ὅτι ἀπὸ τοῦ τριγώνου τοῦτον διέκινεν Πυθαγόρας τὰς τῶν ἐπιμένων καὶ ἐνεπιμένων εὐγονίας καὶ τὰς τῶν ὀκταμήνων πυρώνες, Nicomachus Excerpt. ex Nicom. in von Jan's Mus. Scr. Gr. pp. 278 f., Theol. Ar. p. 40 Asl, and Censorinus de die Nat. 11 (redeo ad propositum, ut doceam quid Pythagoras de numero dierum ad partus pertinuim senserit etc. The authority followed by Censorinus throughout this chapter, and indeed throughout the whole of chapters 4—15, is Varro, as Diels has shewn *Dox. Gr.* pp. 186 ff.). Compare also Plut. peri τῆς ἐν Τιμᾶο ψυχογονίας 12. 1018 B and Diog. Laert. VIII 29. The most exact parallel to the calculation adopted by Plato is found in the passage already quoted from Aristides I. c. p. 89 Jahn: ἀλλ' εἰ καὶ τῶν πλευρῶν ἐκαστήν κατὰ βάθος ανεχεσθείν (βάθος γὰρ ἐς σώματος φύσις), παυάσαυεν ἄν τὸν διακόσια δεκαέξ, ἱσαρίθμων όπτα σύνεγγυς τῷ τῶν ἐπαρίθμην. We may therefore, I think, regard it as certain that Plato is closely following the Pythagoreans when he expresses the period of human gestation in terms of their favourite triangle. In what sense are the numbers 3, 4, 5 said to make like and unlike and wax and wane? As the numbers in question produce not only the number 216, but also the γεωμετρικὸς ἀριθμὸς 12,960,000, we shall be in a better position for dealing with this question after we have interpreted the meaning of the larger as well as of the smaller number. This subject is accordingly reserved for § 5.

The phraseology of ανεχεσθείν δυνάμει τε καὶ δυναστευόμεναι, τρεῖς


1 It should be mentioned that Proclus finds a further astrological meaning in δύναμει τε καὶ δυσαστέτωμεν, interpreting δυνάμειν of the stars that prevail, and δυσαστέτωμεν of the stars which are prevailed against, in τοῖς στοριμάσι ώραι (l.c.111 p.57). Το ὁμοφωτίαν, ἀνομοφωτίαν, αὐξησιν and φθορίων Proclus also attributes an astrological as well as an arithmetical connotation (ib. pp. 57 ff.), but it is most unlikely that these words meant anything of the sort in Plato's time.


3 Cf. Phil. 27 b πρῶτον μὲν τοῖς

APPENDICES TO BOOK VIII.

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Let us now briefly discuss the number 216.

The number 216 is the first number (ἐν ὧ ἐντὸς ὑπάλληλος κτλ.) in which the cubes of 3, 4, 5 occur, and was known to the Pythagoreans as the ψυχογόνοκός κύβος (Anatolius in Theol. Ar. p. 40), because it expresses the period of the seven months' child, counted in days. It is also the cube of the number 6, which the Pythagoreans called the marriage number, owing, as we are told, to the fact that 6 represents the union of the first male number 3 and the first female number 2 (3 × 2 = 6). In other respects also the number 216 maintains its character as a matrimonial and generative force: for it is the cube of the area of the zoogonic triangle and the product of the cubes of the first male and female numbers \((2^3 \times 3^3 = 216)^2\). 216 can likewise be produced by multiplying together the marriage number 6 and 36, and 36 is not only the sum of the Pythagorean τετρακτύς (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8), but an ἀριθμὸς τέλειοι καὶ τῶν ὄρθων ὑπάλληλος ἐν τῷ ἀντίστοις, and also peculiarly important in the growth of the embryo, as will presently be shewn, both on other grounds and because it is the number of the ἐκδικήν. Any one who cares to examine the writings of later Pythagoreanism will discover many other virtues in the number 216: but enough has been said to shew that the number was suited to express the meaning which is here attached to it, that is to say the number of the seven months' child. I will only add, in conclusion, that the number of the ἐνεάμηνον γεννητόν was itself also connected with the smaller number by adding thereto the product of the sides of the triangle: πάλιν δὲ τὰς τρεῖς ἐπὶ ἀλλήλους κατὰ βάθος ποιήσαντες, καὶ τῷ προερήμητω προσβάντες, τῶν τῶν ἐνεαμηνίων συντιθέμεν διακάση ἐβδομῆκοντα ἐξ (Arist. Quint. p. 89 Jahn. 3 \(\times\) 4 \(\times\) 5 + 216 = 276. As 210 and 270 were usually held to express the exact numbers of the two periods, Aristides adds ἐν ἀριθμοῖς δὲ ἐξ περισσότεροι, ἐν μικρῷ ἄν ν ἢν ἐποιμὲν αὐτῶν νυμ. because συντιθέμενοι ἐκ πρώτου περιττοῦ καὶ ἀρίθμων: see p. 73 ed. Jahn).6

We have still to discuss παντα προσιγγόρα καὶ πηγά προς ἀλλήλα ἀπέφηναν. It is curious that these words find an echo in a fragment attributed to Philolaus on the virtue of the number 10. The resemblance may be interpreted as an indication either of the spurious or of the genuine character of the fragments of Philolaus, but I am inclined to think that it is in favour of the authenticity, if not the genuineness, of

\[\text{Math. p. 86, and Sir G. C. Lewis Ancient Astronomy pp. 326 ff.} \]

6 Ancient authorities were not agreed "quoto post conceptionem mense infantes edil solent" (Censor. de die nat. 7, 2). The different views are given by Censorinus l.c., following Varro: cf. also Gellius Noct. Att. III 16, Proclus l.c. ii pp. 33 ff., and Diels Dux. Gr. pp. 427—429.

6 Mullach II p. 4 νῦν δὲ ὡς (sc. ἀριθμοῖς) πολλὰ πολλὰ ἀριθμῶν αὐθέντεις πάντα γνωστὰ καὶ ποτάμωρα ἀλλήλοις κατὰ γνώμονας φύσιν ἀπεργάζεται.
this particular fragment, for it is not unlikely that in a passage so full, as this is of Pythagorean influence there should be some verbal indications of the source whence Plato drew something of his inspiration. However this may be, we are told by Censorinus, whose authority, as we have already seen, is Varro, that the Pythagoreans thought the development of the embryo proceeded according to the proportions of the harmony or octave: eos vero numeros, qui in uno quoque partu aliquid adaequatur mutationis, dum aut semen in sanguinem aut sanguis in carmen aut caro in hominis figuram convertitur, inter se conlatos rationem habere eam quam voces habent quae in musica σύμφωνα vocantur. How they worked the idea will appear from these words: quorum prior ac minor (sc. partus, i.e. the seven months' child, to which they usually assigned a life of 210 days within the womb) senario maxime continetur numero. Nam quod ex semine conceptum est, sex, ut ait (sc. Pythagoras), primis diebus umor est lacteus, dein proximis octo sanguineus: qui octo cum ad primos sex accesserunt, faciunt primam symphoniam διὰ τεσσαρων. (That is, the fourth, which is 8:6 or 4:3.) Tertio gradu novem dies accedunt iam carmen facientes: hi cum sex illis primis collati sescupiam faciunt rationem et secundam symphoniam διὰ πέντε. (That is, the fifth, which is 9:6 or 3:2.) Tum deinceps sequentibus duodecim diebus fit corpus iam formatum: horum quoque ad eodem sex collatio tertiam διὰ τριών reddid symphoniam duplici rationi subiectam. (That is, the octave, which is 12:6 or 2:1.) Now 6 + 8 + 9 + 12 = 35, and as 35 is a ἀρμονία, 210, which is 6 × 35, contains 6 ἀρμονίας. Plato's number is not 210, but 216: but in 216 all these ἀρμονίαι are also present, together with the marriage number 6. The statements of Censorinus are confirmed by other authorities, among whom we may cite Plut. περὶ τῆς ἐν Τιμαῖον ψυχαγωγίας 12. 1017 F., Arist. Quint. p. 85 Jahn, Proclus l.c. 11 pp. 34 f. and Nicomachus Excerpt. ex Nic. p. 279 von Jan. If we search the works of Plato to discover how he himself conceived of the 'harmony' in the development of the child, our quest will be in vain, but it is worthy of remark that the making of Soul in the Timaeus proceeds according to the proportions of the octave, and that the Universe is constituted, as Plato thought, in the

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1 l.c. 9 ad fin.
2 l.c. 11.
3 Plut. περὶ τῆς ἐν Τιμαῖον ψυχαγωγίας 12. 1017 F.
4 It should also be mentioned that Empedocles thought the διάθρωσις began on the thirty-sixth day from conception. For the views of ancient philosophers on embryology in general see Diels Dox. Gr. pp. 417–433. I may here add that Aristides l.c. gives a few fresh points. He tells us that the sum of 1, 2, 3, 4 (in which are involved the ἔσος, δεκακάς, ἡμιόλως, and ἐπίτροπος ratios) added to 35, yields 45, καθώδες μορφοφθαλμα τὰ ἐννεάμυρα: and 45 × 6 = 270, which is the number of a nine months' child. It is also important for our purpose when in speaking of the Pythagorean triangle he notices (p. 89) that the sum of the sides 3 and 4 = 7 (the περίδος, in months, of the ἐπίτροπος), of 4 and 5 = 9, of 3, 4, and 5 = 12 (the number of signs in the zodiac), and that (as we have already noted) the sum of the cubes of the sides = 216, and 216 ÷ (3 × 4 × 5) = 276, which is about the period of the nine months' child.
5 Tim. 35 B. In the Timaeus 44 D ff. the creation of man's body by the created gods is described. It is reasonable to suppose that the embryo was thought by Plato to develop on the same lines as
same way. There can be little doubt that if he speculated on the subject at all, he followed in the path already marked out by the Pythagoreans, framing the Microcosm, as his manner is, on the lines of the Macrocosm.

§ 5. *The meaning of the words from ὅν ἐπίτροτος to κύβων τριάδος.*

The chief question which requires to be discussed in this section is 'What does Plato mean by the two harmonics?' So far as I can see, he does not, in this passage, inform us, and we are therefore justified in trying to discover his meaning from other passages in his works.

From the *Republic* itself we obtain little assistance: but I think that the myth of the *Politics* (Pol. 268 E—274 E) furnishes us with the right solution.

It will be advisable to begin by giving a succinct analysis of the story itself.

At one time, says Plato, God himself accompanies and helps to wheel the revolving world, at another, when the times are fulfilled, he lets it go, and the Universe begins to roll back again spontaneously, ζῶον ὅν καὶ φρόνισιν εἰληφὼς ἐκ τοῦ συναρμόσαντος καὶ ἀρχάς. The reason for the reversal of the world's motion is that the Universe, since it partakes in body, is not exempt from change, but being more nearly so than is aught else corporeal, τὴν ἀνακύκλησιν εἰληφεῖ, ὃ τι συμκρότητά της αὐτοῦ κυμάσεως παράλαβε. Thus Plato declares that the Universe τοτε μὲν ὅπο ἀλλὰς συμποδηγείσθαι θέλεις αἰτίας, τὸ ζῷον πάλιν ἑπικτόμενον καὶ λαμβάνοντα ἀθανασίαν ἐπισκευασθήν παρὰ τοῦ ὁμοουργοῦ, τοτὲ δὲ ὅταν ἀνεθῇ, δὴ ἐαυτῷ αὐτὸν ἰέναι, ἀφεθάντα τοιούτοις ὡς τὸ ἀνάπαλιν πορεύεσθαι πολλάς περιόδων μυριάδας. At present the universe is rolling back (ἀνακύκλησις): in the reign of Cronus it rolled forward. The end of the backward is the beginning of the forward movement, and when the forward ends, the backward begins. The change from either movement to the other, says Plato, ἤγεισθαι δεὶ τῶν περὶ τῶν οὐράνιον γενομένων τροπῶν πασῶν ἐναι μεγάτων καὶ τελεωτάτην τροπήν, and this τελεωτάτη τροπή is marked by wide-spread destruction among animals and men.

When the backward movement ends, and the forward begins, a few men are left surviving, and these suffer change in sympathy with the whole. The old grow middle-aged and young again till at last they dwindle to a point and disappear: fresh generations are born, not from one another, but from the earth: for those that died in the former cycle and were buried within the earth now rise again from the dead and in

those on which the gods first made the human body; and a minute study of the *Timaeus* from this point of view might possibly yield one or two interesting results. In *Tim.* 91 D Plato sums up the development of the embryo in the words μέχρι περ ὅν—冱 εἰς ἄρα ρα τὴν μήτραν ἀντα ὑπὸ συμκρότητα καὶ ἀδιάπλατο

*Σύμφωνα καταστρατεύεται καὶ πάλιν διακρίνεται μεγάλα ἐν τοῖς ἐκθέτουσι καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο εἰς φῶς ἀγαλλίατες ζῶος ἀποτελέσθως γένεσιν.*

1 *Kep.* X 617.
2 *Pol.* 269 C ff.
3 270 Α.
4 271 D, 269 Α.
their turn are born old, grow young, and vanish, ὃσος μὴ θεὸς αὐτῶν εἰς ἄλλην μόραν ἐκόμισεν. In those days, when God ruled the rolling world, and divine shepherds kept their flocks, no creature preyed on any other, nor was there any war or strife. God was himself the shepherd of the earth-born: they had no politeiai nor κτήσεις γυναικῶν καὶ παιδών, being born by resurrection from the ground. The earth, their mother, fed them with abundant fruits, and they toiled not, neither did they spin. Whether they were happier than we depends entirely on whether they used their manifold advantages as means to help them to attain unto wisdom: tradition says they did not.

When the forward movement ended, and μεταβολὴ ἔδει γίνεσθαι καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ γῆνος ἡδὴ πᾶν ἀνόιμοτο γένος, πάσας ἐκάστης τῆς ψυχῆς τὰς γενέσεις ἀποδεδωκών, then the pilot of the Universe ὅσον πηδαλίων σάκος ἀφέμενος εἰς τὴν αὐτῶν περιοπτὴν ἀπόστη. Thereupon began the backward movement. At first there was σωσίας within the world, attended by destruction among all kinds of living things. The few who survive, ceasing to become young, grow old, while those just born from the earth with hoary hair die and return to the earth from which they came. Fresh generations are no longer born from the earth, but even as the world is now left to itself, so also are all its parts, and each race breeds offspring from its kind. After the shock of turning, προελθόντος ἱκανοῦ χρόνου, θορίβων τε καὶ ταραχῆς ἡδῆ πανομενος καὶ τῶν σεσωμάτων, γαλήνης ἐπιλαβόμενος εἰς τῷ ἐνώσε τοῦ ἀλμυροῦ τῶν ἐαυτοῦ κατακοσμούμενος γεί, ἐπίμελεαν καὶ κράτος ἐξον αὐτῶ τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ τε καὶ ἐαυτοῦ, τῆς τοῦ δημιουργοῦ καὶ πατρός ἀπομηνυμενῶν διδαχὴν εἰς δύναμιν. Gradually the Universe became less and less accurate in its movements: τοῦτον δὲ αὐτῷ τὸ σωματειδὲς τῆς συγκράσεως αὐτῶν, τὸ τῆς πάλα τοτὲ φύσεως ἐνυποροῦν, ὅτι παλλής ἦν μετέχον ἀταξίας πρὶν εἰς τῶν νῦν κόσμον ἀφικέσθαι: it is ἡ ἐμπροσθεν ἔξος τοι which is due δει καλέπτα καὶ ἄδεικν ἐν ὅψαρω γίγνεται. As time rolls on, the disorganization increases more and more until the world is at last in danger of perishing with all that it contains. Thereupon God, careful lest his Universe should vanish εἰς τὸν τῆς αὐρωποτήτως ἀπειρον δύνα τοπον, takes the helm again, and reversing the motion of the world, αὐτῶν αὐτῶν καὶ ἀγγέων ἀπεργάζεται.

It would be an interesting enquiry to investigate the sources from which Plato drew the materials for this myth. That it embodies many echoes of the early cosmogonies, there can be no doubt. As I have elsewhere pointed out, an essential feature of the story is already involved in two lines of Hesiod, who, in speaking of the end of the fifth or iron age in which we live, observes

Zeis δ' ὁλέσει καὶ τῶτο γένος μερότων ἀνθρώπων, εὑρ' ἄν γεινόμενοι πολιοκράταφοι τελέθωσεν.

1 273 Ε ff.
2 273 A—B.
3 273 B.
4 273 E.
6 Works and Days 180 f. See also Heraclitus Frag. 78 Bywater φαιν' Ἡρά-κλειτος ταβ' εἶναι ζων καὶ τεθυγηκός, καὶ τὸ ἐγγυροφόρο καὶ τὸ καθεύδον, καὶ νέον καὶ γηραιόν· τάδε γάρ μεταπέσωτα.
Hesiod means that the iron age will end, and consequently a new, and presumably happier, era begin, when men are born grey-haired. We may perhaps regard the grey hairs as a sign that the time is at hand when human creatures, as in Plato’s myth, will all be born with grey hairs (πολικά φύντα Pol. 273€) and pass from age to infancy and fade away. It is tolerably clear that there was a tradition according to which old or grey-haired children were considered to be a sign of the end: for in the Testament cited by James in his account of the Revelation of St Peter, we are warned that when the end is near there shall be ‘children whose appearance shall be as of those advanced in years: for they that are born shall be white-haired.’ But for our present purpose the details of the myth are of less importance and value than the underlying idea of the whole. That idea is that in the life of the Universe there are two recurrent cycles, in one of which peace and uniformity prevail, while in the other discord and dissimilarity gradually assert their sway. It is also, I think, clear that the two cycles are of equal length, for the march of the Universe being regarded as progression and retrogression along one

εκείνα ἐστὶ κάκεινα πάλιν μεταπε- σόντα ταῦτα. The last four words mean that in life changes to ζωή, καθεδόν to ἔγρηγορος, and γηραιόν to νέον as well as reversely: so that the essence of Plato’s story would seem to be present here also, if we are to understand the participle μεταπεσόντα in its full and proper sense. In the happy land of the Meropeans, hard by the river of Pleasure, there are some fabled trees, of whose fruit he that tastes γίνεται κατὰ βραχίο νέοτέρος, τὸ μεν γάρ γήρας ἀπορρίθας, ἐπὶ τὴν ἀκρίνν ὑποστρέφει, εἶτα ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν μαρακών ἱλικιάν ἀναχώρει, εἶτα παῖς γίνεται, εἶτα βρέφος, καὶ ἐπὶ τοίνυπ θεμελιάθη (Theopompus Fr. 76, Müller F. H. G. I p. 290). A careful study of Empedocles’ cosmology will also discover some interesting analogies with the myth of the Politicus.

1 In Hesiod’s description of the golden age, the return of which he seems to hope for after the age of iron has passed away, there are some features which resemble the life of Plato’s γηγενεία: see especially Works and Days 109 ff. The curious expression of Hesiod oiel δὲ πόδας καὶ χειρῶν δυοιοι perhaps receives some light from ἱςυμ. 189 E, and we should remember that ὁμοιόμοιον is the dominant feature in the progressive cycle of the Politicus. It is worth while to compare the whole of the Aristophanic travesty in Plato’s Symposium with the myth of the Politicus, and the latter with Hesiod I.c.

2 p. 57.

3 Professor Ridgeway (Early Age of Greece I p. 628) interprets πολικορφάσι in Hesiod I.c. as ‘fair-haired’ and thinks the line εἰτ’ αὐ γενόμενοι πολικορφάσιοι τελεύτωσον “some sort of oracular utterance referring to fair-haired invaders of some Teutonic stock,” remarking that, according to Hesiod, the children of the Iron Age ‘are born with white hair.’ The exact translation is however ‘when they are hoary-headed at their birth,’ and it is quite clear from θεός δ’ ἀλέσει καὶ τοῦτο γένος μερότων ἀνθρώπων εἰτ’ ἀν κτλ. that the white hairs foreshadow the end of the Iron Age: so that we should look for parallels to the Hesiodic conception in passages which, like the myth of the Politicus, describe the end of one epoch and the beginning of the next, and not to Diod. Sic. v 32. 2. Plato’s πολικά φύντα (Pol. 273 E) is an exact parallel to γενόμενοι πολικορφάσιοι, and the rest of the Platonic myth shews us how we ought to interpret the words of Hesiod.

4 The student of ancient philosophy will naturally recall the cosmological periods of Empedocles: but it would lead us too far to institute a comparison between them and Plato’s story. I may say, however, that the myth appears to me to confirm the view of Burnet, who maintains that we are now living in the second of Empedocles’ periods, that is, “in the period when strife is gradually gaining the upper hand” (Early Gk Phil. p. 249). The fundamental difference between Plato and Empedocles is that in Plato Strife never obtains the victory altogether, for as soon as the Universe is in serious danger, the Deity steps in.
and the same circle, the forward revolution has to traverse the same space as the reverse, and nothing is said of any difference in the speed of the two revolutions. That the cycles occupy a long period of time may be inferred from πολλὰς περιώδους μεριάδας in 270A.

Now what do these two cycles represent? If we are to believe Deuschle, one of them is 'the transcendent realm of Ideas,' the other 'the world of appearances,' and the myth is intended to shew us 'the relations existing between the world of Ideas and that of phenomena, and the dependence of the latter on the former.' It is surely unnecessary to refute a view which requires us to assign a metaphysical significance to the γγγγγείς. Deuschle's interpretation belongs to a style of criticism which always makes Plato sing the same old strain, forgetting that his was a παναρμόνιος ψυχή. To my mind it is quite clear that in the myth of the Politicus, we have before us an astronomical, and not a metaphysical conception. The prelude to the story indicates in what direction we should look for its significance: ἦν τοῦν καὶ ἐπὶ ἐσται τῶν πάλαι λεχθέντων πολλά τε ἄλλα καὶ ὅδ καὶ τὸ περὶ τὴν Ἀτρέως τε καὶ Θεόστοιν λεχθέσαι ἐρυν φάμα—τὸ περὶ τῆς μεταβολῆς δύσεως τε καὶ ἁπατολῆς ἥλιου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀστρων, ως αὐτὰ ὅδε μὲν ἁπατέλλει νῦν, εἰς τῶν τόπων ἔδυο, ἀνέτελλε δ' ἐκ τῶν ἑαυτίου, τότε δὲ δὴ μαρτυρίσας ὧρα τὸ θεό τε Ἀτρεί μετεβαλεν αὐτὸ ἐπὶ τὸ νῦν σχῆμα (268 E f.) : and Plato himself tells us that the myth will explain this astronomical revolution as well as other stories of a far distant past (269 B).

The only possible explanation of the two cycles is that each of them represents a Great Year. The τροπή which ends one cycle and begins another is said by Plato to be τροπῶν πασῶν—μεγίστη καὶ τελεωτάτη τροπή, and the number of the period which culminates in such a τελεωτάτη τροπή is a τέλειος ἄριθμός in precisely the same sense as the number of the Great Year (Tim. 39 D), that is to say, it is a 'final' or 'consummating' number, and ends an epoch in the life of the world. But we must beware of supposing, as I formerly did, that the Great Year which is symbolized by the forward movement expresses the period during which the world is made, or that the world is dissolved when the ἀνακύκλωσις ends: for it is clear from 273 B, C that the creation of the world is prior to both movements, and 273 D shews that the κόσμος, though it may be storm-tossed (χειμομαθεῖς), is never actually wrecked.

The next step in our argument is to connect the two 'harmonies' of the Republic with the two cycles of the Politicus.

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1 In 271 A we find περιφορὰ applied to the forward movement; and in 273 E the word is said of the backward. The life of the Universe is thus pictured as the revolution of a single circle. The plural περιώδος in 269 C and in 270 A refers to the revolutions of the world on its own axis, and is not to the two cycles which Plato describes.

2 Der Plut. Politikes pp. 6 ff.

3 δῶο γὰρ αὐτὰς φυχαὶ λέγονται γενέσθαι παναρμόνιοι Οlymp. Vit. Pl. 6. The reference is to Homer and Plato.

4 The legend about an ἀνακύκλωσις of the sun in the time of Atreus is mentioned also by Euripides Orest. 1001 ff. and El. 726 ff.; and from the second of these passages we can see that the story was by some interpreted as the mythical expression of a permanent change in the movement of the heavens. Cf. also the well-known story of the Egyptian priests in Hdt. 11 142 and see Sir G. C. Lewis Ancient Astronomy pp. 69, 133.
We note, in the first place, that the harmonies are equal to one another, and that they are of vast extent (12,960,000 days). In like manner, the two cycles in the myth are of the same duration and occupy πολλαὶς περιόδων μεροῦσας¹ (Pol. 270 A). Secondly, during the progressive movement which precedes our era, the dominant features are concord and harmony—in one word ὀμοίωτασ: during the second, under which we live, strife and discord, or in one word ἀνομοίωτας, prevail (Pol. 273 A—D). Now the first of the two harmonies, which I take to represent the progressive cycle, is ἵσσων ὑσάκες, ἑκάτων τοσαντάκες, i.e. as we have seen 360²; whereas the second is προμήχης or oblong, the product of two unequal numbers viz. 4800 x 2700: and the Pythagoreans were in the habit of calling square numbers ὁμοῦ, and oblong numbers ἀνόμου: see Iamb. in Nic. p. 82 Pistelli οἱ τοὺς παλαιὸν ταῖς περί ὑμῶν (sc. τοὺς τετραγώνους) ἑκάλουν διὰ τὴν περί τὰς πλευρὰς περὶ καὶ γρονίας ὀμοίωτητα καὶ ὑσότητα, ἀνομοίους δὲ ἐκ τοῦ ἑνιαίον καὶ θατέρου τοὺς ἐτερομήκες². It may also be observed that the harmonies, viewed by themselves, in the connexion where they occur, clearly denote some vast periodic cycles, and none of the cycles recognized in antiquity is so large as 12,960,000 days except the Great Year. That Plato should pass from describing the period of gestation in the human race to an account of the Great Year is natural enough; and the arrangement is the same in Censorinus' de die natili (cc. 5—19), the whole of which, according to Diels³, is taken from Varro. In conclusion I may note that Aristotle himself appears to have connected the Platonic number with the myth of the Politics, and that at all events he regarded the Number as expressing a certain cycle, at the end of which there is a change: see Part iii. My conclusion therefore is that the harmony 3600² measures the cycle of Uniformity, and the harmony 4800 x 2700 the cycle of Dissimilarity described in the Politics.

Let us now see how Plato builds up the two numbers. Each of the two numbers is constructed out of the sides of the Pythagorean triangle 3, 4, 5: for each of them is only (3 x 4 x 5)⁴. We have already met with the triangle as a zoogonic agency, and here it establishes its claim to the title κοσμικῶν, by which, as we are told by Proclus⁵, it was known to

¹ In Tim. 39 D it is said that the Great Year is measured τῷ τοῦ ταύτου καὶ ὑμῖν ὑμῖν κύκλῳ, that is to say, 'by the number of days and nights' it contains, as Mr Archer-Hind points out. Now περιόδων here means the diurnal revolutions of the heavens, which make days and nights; and the 'harmonies' of the Republic are also expressed in days, so that both in the Politics and in the Republic Plato employs the unit of measurement which the Timaeus prescribes in the formal definition of the Great Year.

² It should be mentioned that Proclus also observes the prevalence of τὸ ὁμοῦ in the first harmony, and τὸ ἀνόμου in the second: see Kroll's edition l.c. 11 pp. 52 ff.

But when he proceeds to talk of the first harmony as the ὄος from νοῦτον to νοῦτον, connected with angels et hoc genus omne, and designates the second as the ὄος from γένεως to γένεως, guarded by 'the Ephors of Descent' (οἱ τῶν καθόδων ἔφοροι), and when he further canonizes Prometheus as the προστάτης of both because he stole the fire from Heaven, we can only regret that Plato should ever have been made the vehicle of such vagaries.

³ Diels. Gr. p. 188.

⁴ l.c. 11 p. 45: 23 εἰκότως ἀρα κοσμικῶν τριγώνων εἰςασιν τοῦτο καλεῖ ὁ τὸ ἄλλοι σοφῶν καὶ οἱ τὰ Αγαπτῶν ἱστοροῦντες κτλ. Proclus expounds the appellation by shewing, in some detail how the heavenly
some ancient thinkers, ὡς πάντων τὰς ἀρχὰς ἔχων καὶ περιέχων ἐν ἑαυτῷ. The force of the words ὀμοιοῦντων τε καὶ ἀναμοιοῦντων καὶ ἀνεξόντων καὶ φθινόντων can now be more readily apprehended than before. It has been pointed out in Part i § 1 that the arithmetical application of ὀμοιοῦντων τε καὶ ἀναμοιοῦντων in the Platonic Number is to the making of the like and unlike harmonies, that is, the square and the oblong: what is their philosophical application in this passage? It is that they are the makers of the like and unlike cycles in the world's history, the era in which concord and uniformity prevail, and that in which discord and dissimilarity gradually assert their sway. It will be remembered that we were able to interpret ὀμοιοῦντων τε καὶ ἀναμοιοῦντων as the numbers 3, 4 and 5 by means of the second part of the Platonic Number, viz. ᾧ ἐπίτρετος πυθμών κτλ.; and it is by means of the second part of the Number that we are able also to understand the suitability of these words to describe 3, 4 and 5 in the context where they occur. The period of the 'human creature' is fitly constructed out of the elements which build up the cycles of the 'divine creature': for man is the μικρός, and the Universe the μέγας κόσμος. The words ἀνεξόντων καὶ φθινόντων 'waxing and waning' have also a reference to the two cosmic periods. We may regard the first of the circles as representing the αὔξησις or growth of the Whole, and the second as representing its φθίσις or decline. And if we make the numbers 3, 4 and 5 the cosmic ἀρχαί, and follow the method of Pythagorean physics, the αὔξησις or growth of the Universe is only the 'waxing' of these numbers on a large scale, its φθίσις only their 'decline.' The Universe renews its energy and strength because its elemental forces expand and grow: and when they begin to flag and fail, ἐπὶ διαφθορὰς κύινδυων αὐτῶν τε ἀφικνεῖται καὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ (Pol. 273 D).

Such is the special applicability of ὀμοιοῦντων τε καὶ ἀναμοιοῦντων καὶ ἀνεξόντων καὶ φθινόντων in connexion with the Platonic Number. But these words would have a still more comprehensive meaning in Pythagorean theory, and while we recognize their special fitness as a description of 3, 4 and 5 in the Platonic number, we are bound, I think, to suppose that Plato was conscious of their wider significance, and intended us to think of it too. According to Philolaus ι.ρ. 3 Mullach ἀνάγκα τὰ ἐντά εἴμεν πάντα ἡ περαινοντα ἡ ἀπειρα, ἡ περαινοντο τε καὶ ἀπειρα δέ μόνον οὐ κα η ἐντά: and as δημοιωτῆς belongs to the category of πέρας, and ἀναμοιωτῆς, ἀναμαλία, ἀναρμοστία etc. to that of ἀπειρον, we may express what he means in other words by saying that everything in the Universe is either like or unlike, or both like and unlike. Philolaus continues ἐπεὶ bodies and everything connected with them conform to this triangle and its manifold properties. However extravagant and absurd the particular fancies of Proclus and his authorities may be, the idea which underlies them is Platonic, viz. that τὰ οὐσία are the expression in time and space of mathematical shapes and numbers: see App. I to Book vii.


2 Φιλ. 16 C fl., 23 C fl., and Pol. 273 D ὅν τὸν τῆς ἀναμοιωτητος ἀπειρον ὑπάρχοντα τοῦτο.
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tówn ψαίνεται οὔτ' ἐκ περατών τῶν πάντων ἑώτα οὔτ' ἐξ ἀπείρων πάντων, δήλον τ' ἀρα ὅτι ἐκ περατών τε καὶ ἀπείρων ὁ τε κόσμος καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ συναρμόθη. Thus the sides of the Pythagorean triangle, regarded as the universal ἀρχαί, the ἀρχαὶ not only of the whole, but of each of its parts, including the ἀνθρώπεοι γεννητοί, may well be called in the words of Plato ὑμωνυτά τε καὶ ἀνθρωποντα 'makers of like and unlike': for 'like and unlike' sums up the κόσμος and all within it. They wax when things are made and wane when things are unmade, rising from lines into planes, and from planes into solids, and afterwards fading from solids into planes, and from planes into lines again. This is in perfect harmony with the method of Pythagorean physics, in which, as we have seen already, the plane is made up of lines, and the solid of planes.

So much for the meaning of ὑμωνυτών τε καὶ ἀνθρωποντων καὶ αὐξόνων καὶ ψίνων. If we now proceed to scrutinize the two harmonies in detail, we shall find that many of the factors are full of significance.

We know from the Laws\(^2\) that Plato counted 360 'days' in the year: the Great Year, which is 360\(^2\) or \((360 \times 10)^2 = 360^2 \times 10^2\) days, is therefore the square of the number of days in the ordinary year multiplied by the square of the Pythagorean perfect number 10. We are now able to express the period in years: it is \(1^2 \times 10^4 = 36000\) years. Further, 3600\(^2\) is 360\(^2\) \times 100. Now we know from the Republic\(^4\) that Plato reckoned the duration of human life as 100 years, i.e. \(100 \times 360 = 36000\) days. It follows that a day in the life of the ἀνθρώπεοι γεννητον corresponds to a year in an aeon of the θεων γεννητων. Further, in arriving at the first harmony, Plato is careful, as we have seen, to direct our attention especially to the number 36: each side, he tells us, is so many times 100, i.e. 36 times 100. We have seen on p. 293 that 36 is an exceedingly significant number in many ways: but its special significance here may be that it suggests to us the reason why the number 12,960,000 is called a harmony. We have already found that the number 35 is a ὑμωνία because it contains all the proportions of a

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1 Cf. also Tim. 53 c—56 C, 81 C, D, 89 C. It will be observed that it is the inroads of ἀνυμοίσεως which lead to decay and dissolution in Tim. 81 C, D ὅταν δ' ἡ ῥίζα τῶν τριγώνων χαλά διά τὸ πολλὸν ἀγώναι ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ πρὸς πολλὰ ἡγούμενα, τὰ μὲν τῇ τροφῇ εἰσόντα οὐκέτι δύναται τῶμεν εἰς ὑμωνύμῃ ἐκατοντός, αὐτὰ δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐξωθὶ ἐπιούσιον εὐπτεῖδες διαίρεται: φθινε ἐν πᾶν ἔως ἐν τούτῳ κρατοῦμεν, γὰρ τὰ ὑμωνύματα τὸ πάθος. τέλος δὲ, ἐπειδὴ τῶν περὶ τὸν μνεύων τριγώνων οἱ ξυναρισθηκές μικρὲς ἀντίκεισι δειμαὶ τῷ πούν διατήμαναι, μεθάσαι τοὺς τῆς φύσεως αὐτὰ δειμάναι, ἢ ἐν λυθῆσαι κατὰ φόρους μεν ήδονὴς ἐξίστατο.

2 Vi 758 B. The number of Senators in the Laws is 360: these are to be divided into 12 sections of 30 each, and each section is to administer the State for one month.

The number 60 with its multiples and divisors is the dominant number throughout the Laws. 360 'days' is of course only an ideal division of the year: see § 6. Plato elsewhere recognises (with Philolaus) 36\(\frac{1}{4}\) days (Rep. 1x 587 E, where see note).

3 See note 1 on p. 299.

4 X 615 B, where see note. Sir James Crickton-Browne in an address on old age (see the Times of Oct. 2, 1891), said that "he thought it a good working hypothesis that the natural life of man was 100, and that in so far as it fell short of that, it was 'curtailed of fair proportion.' He would especially exhort medical students to start with a resolution that they would not be content with a duration of life shorter than that either for themselves or for their patients."
\textit{APPENDICES TO BOOK VIII.}

ἀρμονία or scale. Now in 36 we have a harmony plus 1, which is \( \nu \pi\alpha\tau\nu \) ἄρχη (Excerpt. ex Nicom. p. 279 von Jan): so that the Number of the Great Year contains \( \frac{360,000,000}{12} = 360,000 \) ἀρμονίες, plus 360,000 units, each harmony having the \( \nu \pi\alpha\tau\nu \) ἄρχη added to it. In like manner the number 216 contained 6 ἀρμονίαι together with 6 units: so that the larger number is called a harmony for the same reason as the smaller number 216 was said to render πάντα προσηγόρα καὶ ὑπά πρὸς ἄλλα, the analogy between the Microcosm and the Macrocosm could not be more faithfully observed. In the second harmony the number 100 is still predominant. It is ‘of 100 squares of the rational diameter of 3, minus one each, and of 100 cubes of 3.’ Now

\[ 4800 \times 2700 = (480 \times 10) \times (270 \times 10) = (480 \times 270) \times 10. \]

(Just so the first harmony is \( 360^2 \times 10^3 \).) 270 is the Pythagorean period of gestation for a nine months' child, and 480, which = 210 + 270, is the sum of the usually recognised periods of gestation for children born after seven and after nine months.\(^1\) The Great Year of the Universe may therefore be denoted by a rectangle whose sides are respectively the longer period and the sum of the longer and shorter periods of gestation in the race of man, after it has been multiplied by the square of the Pythagorean perfect number 10. As the Universe is a ‘magnus homo,’ and man a ‘brevis mundus’\(^2\), these and similar analogies may well have seemed significant to the Pythagoreans, whom Plato is certainly copying here.

§ 6. The number 36000.

We have thus seen that the harmonies represent two recurrent aeons in the life of the Universe, in which the World waxes and wanes alternately. Before we proceed to discuss ἀρμονία γεωμετρικός, τοιούτου κύρος, ἀμενών τε καὶ χειρόνων γενέτευον, let us briefly explain the system upon which Plato's reckoning is based.

The number 36000 rests upon the Babylonian sexagesimal system,\(^3\) which made 60 the unit, and multiplied it by the factors of itself. This mode of reckoning, which to the present day divides our hour into 60 minutes, and our minute into 60 seconds, was widely spread in very early times, and there are traces of it as far west as Italy. It survived in the Latin use of \textit{sescenti} for an indefinitely large number, and in the period of 6000 years, which was the duration of a dynasty of Etruscan gods. Among the Greeks we find traces of the sexagesimal system as a measure of time as early as Hesiod\(^4\)

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1 Arist. Quint. Ic. Cf. also Thesal. Arith., p. 40 Ast, Cens. 11 and Macrob. Somm. Scip. 16. 15—16. Tannery (Rev. Phil. I p. 179 note) also supposes that in 2700 there is a reference to the nine months' gestation.

2 Macrob. Somm. Scip. 11 12. 11. The same expression is used by Philo; see Zeller\(^3\) Hist. 2, p. 397.

3 Full information on this system will be found in Brandis, \textit{Das Müns- Mass- und Gewichtswesen in Vorderasien}, pp. 7—21, and in Cantor, \textit{Gesch. der Math.}, pp. 67—94.

4 Works and Days 562, 764 et al. It is of course obvious that there must even in Hesiod's time have been some way of making this division correspond with the
and Cleobulus,¹ and Herodotus expressly tells us that the Greeks borrowed from the Babylonians the division of the day into 12 parts.² It is therefore unnecessary to suppose that Plato borrowed his reckoning directly from the Babylonians, even although, if Berosus may be trusted, 3600 years was actually the duration of a Babylonian cycle.³ What it is of importance to note is, that the sexagesimal system was very commonly used in calculating long periods of time, from the notion that the year could be divided into 360 equal parts corresponding to the 360 degrees of the circle yearly traversed by the sun.⁴ Thus among the Indians 360 years was a ‘year of the gods,’ 3600 a ‘cycle of Brihaspati,’ 216000 a ‘cycle of Prajapati,’ 4,320,000 an ‘age of the gods,’ and the ‘kalpa’ 1000 ‘ages of the gods’ or one ‘day of Brahma,’ while twice this number, or 8,640,000,000 years, was a ‘day and a night of Brahma.’⁵

Let us now see how the number 36000 is connected with other Greek cycles.

It does not appear that Anaximander, Anaximenes, Diogenes of Apollonia, or Anaxagoras defined the period during which the world endures, although they held the Universe to be φθινότος.⁶

According to Stobaeus⁷ the Great Year of Heraclitus was 18000 years, that is, one half of Plato’s. Schuster’s conjecture,⁸ that the time from one ἐκπύρωσις to another was reckoned by Heraclitus at 36000 years, 18000 being the ὁδὸς κάτω, and 18000 the ὁδὸς ἀνω, is in harmony with the tone of Heraclitus’ philosophy, and brings Heraclitus very near to Plato,⁹ although no ἐκπύρωσις marked the end of Plato’s year.

The nearest approach to the doctrine of a Great Year in Empedocles is the theory that the wicked δαίμονες are condemned ‘to wander away solar year. See Ideles, Handbuch der Chronologie p. 257 ff., for more evidence on the subject.

¹ If the epigram quoted by Stob. i 240 is genuine.
² Hlt. 11 190. It would appear that for astronomical purposes the Babylonians divided the day into 60 parts; see Cantor l.c. p. 82.
³ I take this from Brandis, Das Münstereif, etc., p. 11. Compare Sir G. C. Lewis’s Ancient Astronomy, pp. 400 ff. The Greek and Egyptian cycle of 365 25 years (ibid. pp. 283, 389) is reached by a similar calculation, viz. by multiplying the number of days in the year (taken as 365 3) by 100. Lewis’s excellent and learned work is a mine of information (see pp. 256 ff.) on the part played by the numbers 60 and 360 in the astronomical reckonings of the ancients.
⁴ Martin, Rev. Archéol. XIII pp. 287 ff.
⁵ Martin, l.c. p. 286. Martin interprets the verses of Hesiod beginning ἐνεάς τοι ἔνεα γενέας λακτύρη κόρων ἄνδρων ἡγείμι τοι (Plut. de def. Or. 415 c) by taking 400 years as the life of the κόρων, and thus assigns 43,200 (= 3600 × 12) years to the phoenix, whose appearance was generally supposed to herald some kind of new era, and 432,000 years to the nympha. 432,000 years was according to the Chaldaean the period from the creation to the deluge.
⁷ I 264. Cens. 18. 11 assigns 10800 (= 30 × 360) years to Heraclitus’ cycle.
⁹ The ὁδὸς κάτω leads to the formation of the world, and the ὁδὸς ἀνω to its dissolution. It is the same way, now up, now down. Just so in the Politicus the περίοδος is the same, now forward, and now backward. Burnett’s attempt to show that Heraclitus did not believe in a periodical ἐκπύρωσις, as he himself confesses, “in direct contradiction with the statements of most writers, ancient and modern,” and appears to me unsuccessful (Early Gk Phil. pp. 160 ff.).
from the blessed for thrice ten thousand seasons. Zeller rightly observes that this in no way determines the duration of the world, since the δαίμονες must have lived before the beginning of their wanderings and will live after they are done.

A comparison with the Great Year of Philolaus will not yield any satisfactory result, because, as we know from Censorinus, he counted 364\(\frac{1}{4}\) days in the year. We can only say that had he counted 360 days in the year, then, according to the method of reckoning which he employs, his great year would have been \(59 \times 360 = 21240\) years, which is \(\frac{59}{100}\) of Plato’s cycle—and Philolaus (as well as Oenopides) recognised a smaller cycle of 59 years.

Aristotle is hostile to the idea of a Great Year, and the only passage which could possibly be otherwise construed is in the first book of the Meteorologica 14 p. 352\(\frac{1}{2}\) 28 ff.; but the most that can be made out of his words is an assertion of the periodical recurrence of partial floods.

Of later authorities, it is enough to mention the Stoics, whose great year was \(365 \times 18000\) years, i.e. \(\frac{266}{5}\) times the great year of Plato, and the astronomer Ptolemy, whose great cycle, like Plato’s, was 36000 years.

It will be seen that the Great Year contained in Plato’s Number was arrived at in the same way as that of many of the other Greek philosophers.

In conclusion, I may now be permitted to draw attention to the fact that the period of 36000 years is sometimes actually called the ‘great Platonic year’ in early astronomical treatises. In Barocius’ Cosmographia 1 p. 6 (Venetiis, 1598) I find these words said of the movement of the ninth heaven: “qui profecto motus complet unam perfectam revolutionem spatio 36000 annorum iuxta Ptolemaei opinionem; iuxta autem Alhategnii, spatio 23760 annorum; iuxta vero Alphonsi, et quorumdam aliorum sententiam, 49000 annorum; quod utique” (i.e. whatever its duration is) “temporis spatium vocant magnum Platonicum annum.” Even more precise is the Sphaera of Johannes de Sacro-Bosco (ed. Burgersdicius, 1639) p. 12: “orbis nonus centenis quibusque annis iuxta Ptolemaeum unum gradum proprio motu conficit, totamque periodum peragit annis 36000 (quod spatium magnus annus appellari solet, aut annus Platonicus), subjectasque sphaeras una secum circumducit.” The work from which this sentence is quoted was a regular text-book of Astronomy till the Copernican theory prevailed over the Ptolemaic: and 36000 years could hardly have come to be called the annus Platonicus in a text-book of Ptolemaic Astronomy unless Ptolemy or some of his predecessors or commentators had understood the Platonic Number, for there is no other passage in Plato which gives the duration of the Great Year. We can even perhaps trace the knowledge of the Number as far back as Hipparchus. The precession of the Equinoxes, which is

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2 Ch. 19. See also Tannery Rev. Phil. xiii pp. 213 ff.
3 Cens. 18. 8: cf. Stob. 1 264.
4 This explains the remark of Censorinus in 18. 11, as Usener has pointed out (Rhein. Mus. xxviii pp. 392 ff.).
5 See Hultsch Zeitschrift f. Math. etc. i.e. p. 57.
in reality caused by the movement of the axis of the Earth round the pole of the Ecliptic, was—so we are told—discovered by Hipparchus, and the period of time during which the equinoctial points make a complete revolution was maintained by that astronomer to be 36000 years (Hultsch in Pauly-Wissowa art. Astronomie p. 1851). It is difficult to believe that Hipparchus was uninfluenced by Plato's number, if indeed the whole theory of a Great Year is not—as I am sometimes inclined to suspect that it is—connected with some pre-Hipparchian notions about the equinoctial περίοδος, the real extent of which is not 36000, but about 26700 years.

§ 7. ἐιμπας δὲ οὗτος—γενέσεων.

'This whole number, a number measuring the earth, is lord of better and worse births.' The number 12,960,000 may fairly be called γεωμετρικός in the ordinary sense of the term, for it is arrived at by mathematical calculations, and expressed in two mathematical figures, the one an oblong, and the other a square. But what Plato chiefly means, as I believe, is that the number in question, since it expresses the duration of an aeon of the World, is τῶ ὄντι γεω-μετρικός (cf. Rep. vi 511 b n.), and measures a period in the lifetime of the Earth. Plato loves to play on the etymological meaning of words, as for example in VIII 555A ὄλγος τῶν ἑαυτοῦ πολεμῶν ὄλγαρχικός τὰ πολλὰ ἱπτάται καὶ πλουτάει, and it is appropriate and right that in a passage where so many of the mathematical terms are symbolic, γεωμετρικός, coming at the climax of the whole, should be symbolic too.¹

In what sense is this number 'lord of better and worse births'? I think the simple and sufficient explanation of Plato's words is that in the early stages of our cycle of 36,000 years, before disintegration and dissimilarity have gone far, γενέσεως are for the most part ἀμέμονες, whereas later they are apt to be χείρων because the Universe is growing χειρων. Good and bad births are consequently determined by this number². See also § 2 above and Part iii, with the notes on 546 c. There is in Plato's theory a suggestion of the view expressed by Lucretius when he wrote:

Tristis item vetulae vitis sator atque vietae
temporis incusat monen caelumque fatigat:
nec tenet omnia paulatim tabescere et ire
ad capulum spatio aetatis decessa vetusto⁴.

I have elsewhere⁴ pointed out that Plato, in order to pave the way

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¹ Cf. Proclus in Tim. 270 e, and 271 a, b. In speaking of the ἀριθμὸς τέλειος of the Great Year, Proclus says ὁ χρόνος μετρεῖ τὴν ὀλγὴν κύριαν καὶ τὸ τέλος αὐτῆς ἐπιστρέφει πρὸς τὴν ἀρχήν διὸ καὶ ὁ ἀριθμὸς ἐπονομάζεται καὶ τέλειος, and again μετρεῖ δ' ὅπως ὁ ὄλος χρόνος ὁ ἐγκόσμος τὴν μίαν ἑηρῆν τοῦ παντός.²

² Proclus, as we should expect, has resort to all manner of astrological explanations of τοιοῦτον κύριος, ἀμεμονές τε καὶ χειρων χείρων γενέσεως: see his in temp. comm. 11 pp. 70 ff. al. I have already said that I can see no justification for reading theories of this kind into Plato.

³ II 1171—1174.

⁴ VIII 543 a n.
for his ‘philosophy of history’ in Books viii and ix, plants his ideal city—only of course ἑωρίας καὶ διδασκαλίας χάριν—in the distant past, and in accordance with this fancy we may picture it as belonging to the early stages of our present era of 36,000 years¹.

Some may be disposed to ask the question: ‘Did Plato think that these speculations have any serious value?’ I am not sure that an editor is called upon to reply: but it is certain that his reply will convince no one who is not convinced already. According to Prof. Huxley (Life ii p. 426) “Plato was the founder of all the vague and unsound thinking that has burdened philosophy, deserting facts for possibilities, and then, after long and beautiful stories of what might be, telling you he doesn’t quite believe them himself.” The unconscious humour of the words in italics may be allowed to atone for the libel which precedes. Plato does not here tell us that ‘he doesn’t quite believe’ the Number: but he warns us in advance that the Muses are jesting. But as there is often a touch of playfulness when Plato professes to be serious, so there is usually an undercurrent of serious meaning in the frolics of his Muse. De iocis non est disputandum: every reader, according to his nationality and nature, will find his appropriate food for laughter in these pleasant ‘Babylonian numbers.’ The only thing that I venture to assert is that the point of the jest cannot be that it is unintelligible. About the serious side of the episode there is less room for difference of opinion. Plato was profoundly convinced of the truth, which inspires and animates all these calculations, that the Universe and all within it are created and sustained by mathematical laws. The grand old saying, θεὸς ἄι γεωμετρεῖ, is the abiding lesson of the Platonic Number.

PART iii.

In this division of the Appendix I propose, by way of epilogue, fully to explain the passage in which Aristotle refers to and criticises the Platonic Number. The duty cannot be evaded, because it has been alleged that Aristotle explains τρίς αὐξηθεὶς in a different way from that in which the phrase has been explained in Part i of this Appendix². In

¹ If we understand τροπὴ in Arist. Pol. E 12, 131b 17 to refer to the τροπὴ of the Politicus, and press the criticism of Aristotle for all that it is worth, it would seem that Aristotle thought Plato assigns his city to the previous era, before the μεγίστη καὶ τελεστή τροπὴ took place. I do not believe that Aristotle seriously thought anything of the sort, but if he did, he was certainly mistaken. Plato’s ideal city contains of course some features in common with δ ἐπὶ Κρόνου βίος, such as the principle of ‘no property in wives’ (Pol. 271 B), but in other respects the life of the γυγενεῖς is ludicrously unlike the life of Plato’s citizens, and in the Republic we do not hear of any τροπὴ ushering in the change from Aristocracy to the Spartan State.

² Cf. Rev. I.c. pp. 154, 243. Mr Monro’s own explanation of Aristotle’s criticism does not pretend to be exhaustive, and involves, as will presently be shewn, several grave mistakes, even if we treat it as a partial explanation and nothing more. That of Susemihl is more complete but hardly less erroneous: see his Aristoteles’ Politik ii pp. 369—378. Newman’s treatment of the subject is confessedly tentative and incomplete (Vol. iv pp. 481—483).
point of fact, as we shall see, Aristotle's criticism, so far as it goes, is completely in harmony with the results of our investigations.

The words of Aristotle are as follows (Pol. E 12. 1316\{8\} 1—17):

"έν δὲ τῇ πολιτείᾳ λέγεται μὲν περὶ τῶν μεταβολῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ Σωκράτους, οὐ μέντοι λέγεται καλῶς: τῆς τε γὰρ ἁρμότης πολιτείας καὶ πρωτῆς ὁμότης οὐ λέγει τὴν μεταβολὴν ἑδώς. φησί γὰρ αὐτῶν εἶναι τὸ μὴ μένειν μηδέν

άλλ᾽ έν τινὶ περιόδῳ μεταβάλλειν, ἀρχὴν ὁ εἶναι τούτων ὑπὲρ τῆς πυθμήν περιστάδου συζυγίας δύο ἁρμονίας παρέχεται, λέγων ὅταν ὅ τοι διαγράμματος ἀρίθμου τούτου γένεσι περιεχεῖ, ὡς τῆς φύσεως ποτε φύσεως φαινομεν καὶ κράτους τῆς παιδείας, τούτο μὲν οὖν αὐτὸ λέγων ἴσως οὐ κακῶς: ἐνδέχεται γὰρ εἶναι τινας οὓς παιδεύεσθαι καὶ γενισθαι σπουδαίους ἀνδρὰς ἀδύνατον, άλλ᾽ αὐτή τί ἐν ἰδίοις εἰς μεταβολὴ τῆς ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνου λεγομένης ἁρμότης πολιτείας μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν ἅλλων παιδῶν καὶ τῶν γεγομένων πάντων; καὶ διὰ γέ τοῦ χρόνου, δε ὄν λέγει πάντα μεταβάλλειν, καὶ τὰ μὴ ἀμα ἀράμενα γίνονται ἀμα μεταβάλλειν, οἷον εἰ τῇ προτέρᾳ ἡμέρᾳ ἐγένετο τῆς προτῆς, ἀμα ἀρα μεταβάλλειν."

The words from φησί to πάντων concern us first. They mean: 'for he says that the cause of change is the fact that nothing abides, but all things change in a certain cycle of time, and that the beginning of change comes from' (lit. 'is of') 'those' (sc. elements or numbers), 'whereof 4, 3, coupled with 5, furnish two harmonies, meaning, when the number of this diagram is made solid, the theory being that Nature sometimes produces inferior children and children who defy education. In this particular point, indeed, Socrates is probably right: for there may well be persons who cannot be educated and made into good men. But why should this be a change peculiar to the constitution which he calls the best more than to every other constitution and everything that comes into being?'

In this sentence Aristotle distinguishes between Plato's account of the cause of change and his account of the beginning of change. The cause of change, he tells us, is τὸ μὴ μένειν μηδέν, ἀλλὰ ἐν τινὶ περιόδῳ μεταβάλλειν; and the beginning of change is 'when the number of this diagram is made solid.' In the words of Schneider, who was, I think, the first to apprehend the meaning of this passage: "τοῦτων ἀν ἰδεῖν pertinet et sensus verborum talis est: Principium mutationis positum esse in numeris—quorum sesquiteria radix etc. Deinde verba λέγον ὅταν declarant tempus, quo Plato mutationis posuerit." Now what is 'this diagram'? There can be no question—nor is the point disputed—after the evidence already adduced, that the diagram is the Pythagorean triangle, whether we suppose (with Schneider) that the antecedent of τοῦτον is contained in ἔπιτροπος πυθμήν, or, as appears to me most probable, that Aristotle inserted in his manuscript a diagram, to which he refers in τοῦ διαγράμματος τοῦτον. Now the number of a triangle is its size or area expressed in numbers, and the area of the

1 Newman prints a mark of interrogation at the end of this sentence.
3 I have not found the precise expression 'the number of a diagram' in any other Greek writer, but we can easily divine the meaning. It was the custom of the Greeks to express numbers by means of geometrical figures, and the 'number of a diagram' must
Pythagorean triangle, as we have seen, is 6. Make this number solid, as Aristotle bids us do, that is, cube it, and the result is 216. Aristotle therefore informs us that change begins, according to Plato, with the number 216: or in other words, that the number 216 expresses the beginning of change.

Let us next enquire in what sense Aristotle interprets the view which he attributes to Plato, I mean the view that the number 216 is the beginning of change from aristocracy to τιμαρχία. Aristotle’s own words leave us in no doubt upon this subject: for immediately after he has said that change begins with the number 216 (λέγων—στερεός), he adds the explanatory clause ως τῆς φύσεως ποτε φύσισι σφαλέως και κρείττως τῆς παιδείας: ‘the theory being that Nature sometimes produces inferior offspring,’ etc. That is to say, the number 216 is the ἀρχή μεταβολῆς because it is in some way or other connected with the production of offspring. In what way is it so connected? Because of course the περίοδος of the αὐθρώπειων γεννητῶν, according to Plato, is 216 days, and, according to the same authority, change begins with the child in the womb: ὅταν—ἡμὶ οἱ φίλακες συνοικίζωσι νυμφαὶ νυμφίως παρὰ καρύν, οὐκ εὐφνεῖς οὐδὲ εὐτυχεῖς παιδὲς ἔσονται. (546d). Thus it is clear that ὅταν ὁ τοῦ διαγράμματος ἄρθρος τοῦτον γενέται στερεός is Aristotle’s way of stating the period which Plato assigns to the αὐθρώπειων γεννητῶν, viz. 216 days, and Aristotle’s evidence is therefore in harmony with the result at which we arrived in our investigation of the words αὐξήσεως—φθινότων.

If we look at the words of Aristotle a little more closely, we shall see, I think, that he construed the passage exactly as we have done. ‘Plato says that the beginning of change comes from those elements’

of course be the number which the diagram expresses. Thus for example the number of the square whose side is 3 can only be 9: for 9 and no other number is expressed by that square. In Theo p. 39 ed. Hiller the number 9 is actually represented by the diagram a a a, in which the sum a a a of the letters represents the area: and this method of representing the area of figures was earlier than Aristotle, as appears from Μετ. N § 5. 1092b 10 ff. ὅτε Ἑὔρωτον ἔτατε τεῖς ἄρθρων τίνος, οἷον ἢ ἡ ἄνθρωπον, ἢ ἡ Ληθόν, ὥσπερ ὅι τοῦ ἄρθρους ἄγνωτε εἴ τα σχῆμα τρίγωνον καὶ τετράγωνον, οἷον ἄρθρων ταῖς ψήφοις τὰς μορφὰς τῶν φυτῶν. Cf. also Theophr. Ἰρ. 12. 11 ed. Wimmer. In the face of this evidence, which was first adduced by me in Cl. Rev. xvi p. 22, I cannot believe that Mr Monroe will continue to deny that the ‘number of a diagram’ is its area. On a former occasion he remarked: ‘The ‘number of this diagram’—to wit, the Pythagorean triangle—does not seem to me to mean the area, but the linear measurement of the several sides’ (Cl. Rev. Ic. p. 154). If so, then we must suppose that the number of the square diagram which I have just taken from Theo is not 9, but 3 + 3 + 3 = 12; whereas the number 12 is oblong, and not a τετράγωνον ἄρθρον at all. After a reference to IX 587 Δ κατὰ τῶν τοῦ μίκρου ἄρθρου, a phrase which has no bearing on this passage at all (see my note ad loc.), Mr Monroe continues ‘The fact that the three cubes of the sides are together equal to the cube of the next whole number (3² + 3² + 3² = 6³) is surely a strong confirmation of this view.’ (The italics are mine.) I am unable to attach any relevant meaning to this sentence unless it means that we are to cube 3 + 4 + 5 by making it into 3² + 4² + 5². Such a solution of the clause ὅταν ὁ τοῦ διαγράμματος ἄρθρος τοῦτον γενέται στερεός would make it an exact reproduction not only of the whole number, but also of the arithmetical processes which I find in Plato’s αὐξήσεως—φθινότων, but it is of course wholly illegitimate, for the cube of 3 + 4 + 5 is 12³ and not 3² + 4² + 5². I will revert to this point later.
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(viz. the ὰμοιούντων τε καὶ ἀνομοιούντων καὶ αὐξόντων καὶ φθινόντων i.e. 3, 4, 5) 'of which the numbers 4, 3, coupled with 5, furnish two harmonies—meaning (that change begins) when the number of this diagram is cubed.' In Plato the beginning of change does come from 3, 4, 5 because these three numbers are made by him to produce the number 216 (3³ + 4³ + 5³ = 216), which is the ἀρχή μεταβολῆς, as Aristotle points out. The only difference between Aristotle's calculation and Plato's is that Aristotle reaches the number by cubing the area, and not by adding the cubes of the sides, of the Pythagorean triangle, and that is exactly the kind of difference which we should expect; for Aristotle likes to vary his predecessors' ways of expressing their results, and 6³ was known among the Pythagoreans as the ψυχογόνος κύβος: see p. 293. That Aristotle was aware of the way in which Plato himself reached the number is clear enough from his reference in τούτων to the ὰμοιούντων τε καὶ ἀνομοιούντων καὶ αὐξόντων καὶ φθινόντων.

Let us now consider Aristotle's further remarks on Plato's beginning of change. He proceeds to say that Plato is quite right in holding that Nature sometimes produces bad offspring; for there may well be persons who cannot be educated. But this mode of change, urges Aristotle, is not peculiar to the ideal city, for it is found in all the other cities, and in fact in everything which is created (ἄλλα αὐτη—πάντων). The remark is perfectly true: Nature does sometimes produce φαῦλοι and φαύλα in every sphere, among plants and lower animals as well as in every aggregate of human beings. But Plato would of course reply that he had no intention of assigning an ἔδως μεταβολή to his ideal State: there cannot be any ἔδως μεταβολή of a perfect city: for a city which carries within itself the germs of dissolution is for that very reason imperfect. If our city is to decay at all, it must do so from the operation of a law from which there is no escape just because the law is universal throughout the whole domain of Nature, and not peculiar to the city.

Hitherto Aristotle's criticisms have concerned themselves solely with Plato's ἀρχή of change, viz. the number 216, which Aristotle interpreted by the sentence ὡς τῆς φύσεως ποτε φυσικῶς φαῦλος καὶ κράτους τῆς παιδείας. We have seen that he gives a qualified approval to Plato's account of this matter, his only objection being that deterioration in the breed of children is not confined to aristocracy and so cannot be an ἔδως ἀρχῆ μεταβολῆς εἰς ἀριστοκρατίας εἰς τιμωρχίαν. In the next sentence Aristotle directs his remarks against Plato's conception of the Cause of change, viz. τὸ μὴ μέεν μηθὲν, ἀλλ' ἐν τοις περιόδοις μεταβάλλειν. 'And moreover through the time, by reason of which' he says that all

1 I follow Bekker's text, except that (with Susemihl) I read γε for τε. It has been proposed to change τοῦ χρόνου into τῶν χρόνων or, as an alternative, δι' ὅν into δι' ὁν. Neither of these changes would affect my argument; but neither is necessary. "Instrumentalis ac modalis vis praep. δā c. genet. coniunctae interdum prope accedit ad causalem vim praep. δā c. acc., ut de eadem re utrumque usurpatur" (Bonitz Ind. Arist. s.v. δā, where many examples are given). In this case τοῦ χρόνου, like ὅν, denotes the cause, rather than the instrument. Susemihl translates: "und soll denn während desjenigen Zeitalraumes, dessen Eintritt er als Ursache dieser Umwandlung bezeichnet, auch Dasjenige, welches gar nicht zugleich den Anfang seines Entstehens genommen hat, dennoch zugleich diese Umwandlung
things change, those things also which did not begin to come into being at the same time are changed at the same time, for example, if a thing was born *the day before the turning*, it consequently changes at the same time’ (sc. as something born at a different time from it). We have seen that in Plato ‘the time, by reason of which all things change,’ is the γεωμετρικός ἀριθμός, viz. 36000 years. Aristotle’s criticism then amounts to this. In that case, he says, ‘a thing born the day before the end of the cycle changes at the same time as a thing born, let us say, 100 years before the cycle ends: but if you hold that the περίοδος of the whole is the cause of change, it should be fulfilled for each individual thing before it can cause that thing to be changed: so that if you call the περίοδος 36000 years, a thing born in the year 1 should be changed in the year 36000, while another born in the year 2 should be changed in 36001 and so on.’ The τροπή in Aristotle is obviously one of the two secular τροπαί of which Plato speaks in the *Politics* : see 270C,D, 271C, and we note by the way that Aristotle agrees with us in regarding the γεωμετρικός ἀριθμός as the measure of an aeon in the life of the World. See *Part II* § 5. Aristotle’s criticism of Plato’s Cause of Change is perfectly intelligible, but exceedingly perverse and unfair, as is sometimes the case when he is dealing with Plato: for in the Platonic Number, 36000 is the Cause of Change from Aristocracy to Timarchy only in the sense that it measures a secular epoch, marked, as time goes on, by a gradual and ever-increasing deterioration of the Universe and all its parts. Cf. p. 395.

So much for Aristotle’s criticism of Plato. But before I conclude, it is necessary to advert to the rival interpretation of φοστὶ γὰρ—στερεῶς, which has been held by many writers, and which Mr Monroe has advocated in *Cl. Rev. l.c.* pp. 154, 243, as well as in the *Journal of Philology* viii p. 280. According to Mr Monroe “Aristotle paraphrases τρίς αὐξηθεῖς by the words ὅταν ὁ τῶν διαγράμματος ἀριθμὸς τούτου γένηται στερεῶς. By the ‘number of this figure’ he cannot well mean any single number; probably he uses ἀριθμὸς in the sense of ‘linear measurement,’ as opposed to surfaces or solids (cf. *Rep.* p. 587D, where κατὰ τὸν τῶν μήκους ἀριθμὸν is opposed to κατὰ δύναμιν καὶ τρίτην αὐξηθήν). Now the most natural way of raising the Pythagorean triangle to the third dimension is by cubing each of the sides; and this process leads us at once to the remarkable fact that $3^3 + 4^3 + 5^3 = 216 = 6^3$. It is difficult to resist the impression that this is what was in the mind of Plato” (*J. of Phil. l.c.*).

I have dealt with the phrase κατὰ τὸν τῶν μήκους ἀριθμὸν in my note on ix 587D, and need not touch on it again. The other statements will now be discussed in order. The theory which underlies them is, as the reader will observe, that ὅν ἐπὶ τῶν πυθμένων πεμπτάδι συνήγεις—τρίς αὐξηθεῖς in Plato means $3^3 + 4^3 + 5^3 = 216$.

“Aristotle paraphrases τρίς αὐξηθεῖς by the words ὅταν ὁ τῶν διαγράμματος ἀριθμὸς τούτου γένηται στερεῶς.” What proof is offered of this

erleiden?” There is nothing in the Greek to justify us in translating δι’ ὁδο β’ by ‘dessen Eintritt,’ and I can see no reason for making δι’ in δι’ τοῦ χρόνου refer to time.

I am glad to find that Newman also interprets δι’ of agency (“through the influence of time,” l.c. p. 483).
statement? "I do not see," says Mr Monro, "what proof of this is needed beyond placing the two passages together. We have:—

Plato's sentence

ὅν ἐπίτρωτος πυθμήν πεμπάδι συζυγείς δύο ἀρμονίας παρέχεται τρίς αἰείθεις.

Aristotle's quotation and comment

'ὅν ἐπίτρωτος πυθμήν πεμπάδι συζυγείς δύο ἀρμονίας παρέχεται,' λέγων ὅταν ὁ τοῦ διαγράμματος ἀριθμὸς τοῦτον γένηται στερεός."

Stated in this way, the view which Mr Monro supports is superficially engaging and attractive. But it is wholly illegitimate to institute a comparison of this kind between two parts of a sentence, each of which is incomplete in point of sense, and cannot possibly be otherwise than incomplete because they each begin with a relative pronoun—a pronoun, too, of which, so far as I can see, Mr Monro offers no explanation whatsoever. No fair-minded jury would ever accept as evidence of identification the scrap of incomplete and unintelligible testimony on which we are invited to identify τρίς αἰείθεις with Aristotle's γένηται στερεός. They would insist that the evidence should be intelligible in itself and as far as possible complete. Make the evidence in this case intelligible and complete by writing αἰείθεις—ἀπέφηναν before Plato's ὅν, and φησὶ—ἀρχὴν δ' εἶναι τοῦτον before Aristotle's ὅν, and I think a jury of scholars will then pronounce that λέγων ὅταν—γένηται explains ἀρχὴν and not τρίς αἰείθεις, a phrase which Aristotle does not even quote. If it does not explain ἀρχὴν, but Plato's τρίς αἰείθεις, the participle λέγων is not only superfluous but misleading, for ὅταν—γένηται by itself would in that case be sufficient for Aristotle's purpose, and the addition of λέγων would suggest that what he is about to explain has already been named or referred to.

1 Cl. Rev. l.c. p. 243.
2 As it seems to have been suggested that my reason for interpreting the passage in Aristotle as I do is because the other interpretation would be fatal to my view that τρίς αἰείθεις means 'thrice increased' (see Cl. Rev. l.c. p. 154), it is fair to remind the reader that it was Schneider, and not the writer of this Appendix, who first interpreted λέγων ὅταν ὁ τοῦ διαγράμματος ἀριθμὸς τοῦτον γένηται στερεός as explaining the number arrived at in αἰείθεις—ἀπέφηναν, and Schneider was not exposed to the same temptation as myself, for he makes τρίς αἰείθεις mean 'cubed,' like most other writers on the Number. Another objection raised was that my explanation makes "Aristotle's comment refer to words which are not only not quoted by him but are in the sentence preceding the words quoted." (Cl. Rev. l.c. p. 243). In point of fact, I now make Aristotle's comment refer to ἀρχὴν, which is in the text of Aristotle: the other view makes them refer to τρίς αἰείθεις, which is not. A somewhat parallel sentence in English would be "Mr Disraeli says that the root of the mischief is a man "whose egotistical imagination can at all times supply an interminable series of arguments to malign his opponent"—meaning Mr Gladstone." Why then does Aristotle trouble to quote the words ὅν ἐπίτρωτος πυθμήν πεμπάδι συζυγείς δύο ἀρμονίας παρέχεται at all? Because these words, as we have seen, give us Plato's cause—and not merely his ἀρχή—of change, and in the sequel Aristotle is going to criticise the Platonic Cause (καί διὰ γε—ἀμα ἄμα μεταβαλλεῖ), as well as the Platonic beginning, of deterioration. In effect Aristotle says: Plato says the Cause of change
"By the 'number of this figure,'" continues Mr Monro, Aristotle "cannot well mean any single number; probably he uses ᾠδῆμος in the sense of 'linear measurement' as opposed to surfaces or solids... Now the most natural way of raising the Pythagorean triangle to the third dimension is by cubing each of the sides; and this process leads us at once to the remarkable fact that \(3^3 + 4^3 + 5^3 = 216 = 6^3\)."

Mr Monro supposes that the ᾠδῆμος of the Pythagorean triangle is \(3 + 4 + 5\). I have already, as I think, proved that the ᾠδῆμος of a figure is its area, and not the sum of its sides: and here it need only be remarked that ᾠδῆμος cannot possibly stand for ᾠδῆμοι, but must denote a single number. By Mr Monro it is interpreted as three separate numbers, which he proceeds to add together—here again, as it appears to me, without the shadow of a hint from Aristotle himself.

Mr Monro says that "the most natural way of raising the Pythagorean triangle to the third dimension is by cubing each of its sides." I should have thought that a more natural way of effecting this result would be to cube the area; but in point of fact it is not the Pythagorean triangle which Aristotle invites us to make solid: it is the number of the Pythagorean triangle. And if the number of the Pythagorean triangle is, as Mr Monro supposes, \(3 + 4 + 5\), surely the most natural way of making that number solid is by cubing 12, since \(3 + 4 + 5 = 12\). Or are we to suppose that Plato was so ignorant of arithmetic as to believe the cube of \(3 + 4 + 5\) to be \(3^3 + 4^3 + 5^3\)?

Finally, Mr Monro remarks, "It is difficult to resist the impression that this is what was in the mind of Plato." I hope there are other students of Plato besides myself who find it easy to resist an impression which attributes so many inconsequences both to Plato and to Aristotle. I should find it difficult to believe that this was in Plato's mind even if Aristotle categorically assured us that it was: but Aristotle does nothing of the sort, and Schneider's explanation of the words ὅταν ὁ τῶν διαγράμμάτων ᾠδῆμος τούτου γένηται στερεός will now, I hope, be at last admitted to be right.

II.

VIII 558 a. τί δὲ; ἡ πρατής ἐνίων τῶν δικασθέντων οὐ κομψή; ἡ οὐτω εἶδεν ἐν τοιαύτῃ πολιτείᾳ, ἀνθρώπων καταφημισθέντων θανάτου ἡ φυγή, ὡς ἐν ἧτον αὐτῶν μενόντων τε καὶ ἀνατριχιάζοντων ἐν μέσῳ, καὶ ὡς οὔτε φροντίζον τοὺς ὄρθων οὐδένος περινοςτεῖ ὁσπερ ἡμῶν;

This sentence has been much discussed. I will take the different points in order.

is that everything changes in a certain period of time (i.e. as we found, the Great Year), and that the beginning of change comes from the numbers \(3, 4, 5\), out of which he also builds up the numerical expression of the Cause of change etc. This 'beginning of change' is the number \(216\): it comes from \(3, 4, 5\) because \(3^3 + 4^3 + 5^3 = 216\); and the only difference between Aristotle and Plato is that Aristotle, who is interested only in the result, and not in the process, expresses 216 as \(6^3\) and not as \(3^3 + 4^3 + 5^3\). See p. 309.
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Is ἐνίων κτλ. (a) objective or (b) subjective genitive? Does Plato mean lenitas erga damnatos or lenitas damnatorum? Schneider and others hold the former view; the Oxford editors (apparently with Ficinus, Schleiermacher etc.) prefer the latter. In favour of (a), we might refer to vi 500 A, where allusion is made to the proverbial πραοτης of the ἰδίμος. Schneider also remarks, quite justly, that throughout this section it is the characteristics of democracy which Plato is describing, so that the behaviour of criminals would seem to be irrelevant. But surely the description of the placid criminal is only an artistic and highly ironical way of ridiculing the ἀναρχια of the constitution; and it is in the highest degree forced and unnatural on grammatical grounds to explain ἐνίων as an objective genitive. Neither ἡνήκας αὐτών in 11 359 A nor βελη αὐτοῦ in Laws 717 A is an exact parallel, and even if they were, the construction would still remain ambiguous and obscure. The proposal to insert a preposition (κατά Herderen after Stephanus, περί Richards) is the refuge of despair.

I once inclined to believe (with Weil) that δικασθείτων is neuter. But apart from the difficulty mentioned in the notes, the sentence cannot be described as πρίων, if the culprit is condemned to death or exile.

On these grounds we must accept the interpretation manscetudo damnatorium quorundam, as Ficinus translates. A new set of difficulties begins with ἦ οὐτω ἐδές. The words καταψυφθείτων θανάτῳ ἦ σφυγή have often been doubted. Hermann (Ges. Abh. p. 175) makes the plural agree with both substantives taken together; but this solution is inadmissible, because the alternative penalties are mutually exclusive (Kühner Gr. Gr. 11 p. 72). Madvig's καταψυφθείτων appears to me to let too much stress fall upon ἀνθρώπων. I formerly printed θανάτῳ ἦ σφυγή, but the ms have no variant and the text may be sound.

The syntax of ἀνθρώπων—ἀναστρεφομένων is certainly difficult. It is impossible to supply ἐκεῖνη τήν πραοτητα to govern the genitive (with Reisig, quoted in Schneider's note). Few scholars will agree with Schneider in holding that εἶδον αὐτών μενόντων could mean vidi eos manere because oüda θυγάς οὐν is scio me mortalem esse. Kühner (l.c. 11 p. 311) makes the words equivalent to ἦ οὐτω οἴδες—ἀνθρώπων ('in men condemned' etc.)—οὕτα οὐδέν ἦττον ἤεμον τε καὶ ἀναστρεφοντα κτλ., comparing Xen. Mem. 11 1. 11 οὐδες δὲ τῶντε Σωκράτους οὔδεν ἀσβεῖς οὐδὲ ἀνοίστον οὔτε πράττοντος εἴδον οὔτε λέγοντος ἱκουσέν, but the direct object of ἐδέν in Xenophon is the accusative οὐδεν, and there is no such accusative here.

On a general review, it must be admitted that in spite of its picturesqueness the sentence is unusually disjointed even for Plato. As in some other cases, for example 549 D, so here, we seem to miss the finishing touch. The alternative is to suppose that the text was seriously corrupted at an early date. There is no ms variant of any consequence, except περιονοστή ρ καταψυφθείκεις instead of περιονοστή in Ξεν., and that is obviously a gloss. Schneider's conjecture, αὐτώ for αὐτών, is hardly necessary and does not attempt to remedy the graver faults. Herderen formerly proposed ἦ πραοτης <κατ> ἐνίων—γοβον (for οἴδες)—καταψυφθείτων: on a later occasion he made the following changes only:
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καταψηφισθέντος—[καί] ώς—δραν δοκοῦντος (ιορ δρώντω) —περισσοτέρων ὁπερ ἦρως. Richards would read the accusative singular (ἐνθρωπου καταψηφισθέντα etc.) or plural consistently throughout. Such drastic treatment is altogether inadmissible in dealing with the text of Plato. In 1867 Richter suggested ἦπτον ὅποι τῶν μενόντων in place of ἦπτον αὑτῶν μενόντων (Fleck. Jb. for 1867 p. 146). On the same lines is Weil's correction (Rev. d. Phil. viii pp. 171 ff.); ἦ δομεν ἑδεὶς—αὐθρωπουν τῶν καταψηφισθέντων—ουδεν ἦπτον αὐ τῶν—ἐν μέσῳ [καί] ώς κτλ. 'have you never seen how a man who is condemned—sauters about as just as freely as those who remain', etc. This emendation deserves to be considered by those who think the text corrupt, although αὑτῶν <τῶν> would perhaps be easier and more natural than αὐ τῶν: but for my own part, I think it much safer and wiser to leave the text alone.

III.

VIII 559 B. ἦ μὲν γέ που τοῦ σίτου κατ' ἀμφότερα ἀναγκαία, ἦ τε ὄφελμος ἦ τε παύσαι ζώντα δυνατή.

My interpretation of this passage agrees with that of Schneider and Stallbaum.

Hermann (Rhein. Mus. 1846 p. 442) proposed αὐδνάτη, and afterwards, when it was pointed out that αὐδνάτη is not Greek, οὐ δυνατή, which he prints in his text. A similar conjecture (μὴ δυνατή) has forced its way into the text of q and Flor. U. Hermann's conjecture ("and because it cannot be stopped during life") is amply refuted by Schneider (Addit. pp. 66, 67), who observes that although αὐδνατος παύσαι in the sense of 'impossible to stop' is perfectly good Greek, αὐδνατος παύσαι ζώντα in the sense of 'impossible for a living man to stop' is incorrect. The words could only mean 'unable to put a stop to life.' It is, I suppose, for this reason that Baiter proposes παύσαι ζώντα αὐδνατον and Richards ζώντι—οὐ δυνατή, the latter comparing Xen. Anab. iv 1. 24 αὐτὸς οὐ ἐφι ἡγήσεσθαι δυνατὴν καὶ ὑποξυγίους πορεύεσθαι ὁδὸν. Both these emendations are unexceptionable in point of grammar; but there are more serious difficulties, as will presently appear.

Campbell, reading μὴ δυνατή (with q), remarks that "negation is expressed through μὴ rather than οὐ—which Coraes suggested—because the sentence states a condition. The complete expression would be ἀναγκαία (ἀν εἰη) μὴ (ἐστι) δυνατή (τω) παύσαι ζώντα." To me the sentence appears as categorical a statement as it is possible to make, even if we understand ἀν εἰη after ἀναγκαία, and, in spite of ἀναγκαίως ἄν εἰη above, ἐστι is much more naturally supplied. Campbell explains the accusative ζώντα by quoting iv 422 b, c to illustrate "the transition from the dative to the accusative with an infinitive," but there is no 'transition,' where the dative (apparently τω) is only understood.

The reading of Α, Π and a vast majority of mss would never have been suspected except from a desire to find a verbal correspondence between παύσαι ζώντα on the one hand, and οὐκ ἂν οἷον τ' εἶμεν ἀπορρέψαι (558 v), ἡ γέ τις ἀπαλλάξειεν ἄν (559 A) and δυνατή—ἀπαλλάττεσθαι
(559 b) on the other. But in point of fact, the correspondence, on Hermann's view, is not even verbal; for παίσαι ἐπιθυμίαν and αὐτάλαξαί ἐπιθυμίαν are different. The way 'to stop a desire' is to gratify it; the way 'to get rid of a desire' is never to gratify it at all. On the other hand, if we adopt the authoritative text, the correspondence, though not verbal, is real. A desire which is 'capable of putting a stop to life' is precisely one which we cannot ἀποστρέφειν or αὐτάλαξαι, i.e. turn aside, get rid of finally, and for this very reason it is 'necessary,' and we must gratify it. πεινώντα, which Ast reads (cf. Ath. xii 511 ε) is of course absurd. Hunger is not cured by homœopathy.

IV.

VIII 560 C, D. κλήσαντες οἱ ἀλαζόνες λόγοι ἑκάστῳ τὰς τοῦ βασιλικοῦ τείχους ἐν αὐτῷ τίλας οὐτε αὐτὴν τὴν ἐνυμαχίαν παραμὶν οὔτε πρέσβεις πρεσβυτέρων λόγων ἰδιωτῶν εἰσδέχονται.


Neither Badham, nor any other of these scholars except Heller, attempts to shew that ἰδιωτῶν is corrupt. Heller's criticism is as follows: "praeterquam quod ἰδιωτῶν vox inusitatum conlocationem occupavit, quid orationes hominum privatorum, qui" (sic) "tamen legati mittuntur, sibi volunt? An putas presbutteron logous idiotwn ratione habita tou basileikou teichous memorari? Credat Judaeus Apella: ego idioton de-pravatum esse censens Britanni mutationem et facilem et sententiae aptissimam amplerctur" (l.c.). The suggestion contained in 'An putas' etc. is due to Stallbaum. No one else, so far as I know, has adopted it; and it is certainly wrong. But the erroneous interpretation of a single commentator is poor evidence on which to condemn the text.

The explanation in the notes appears to me to solve the two difficulties felt by Heller. Some may be disposed to regard ἰδιωτῶν as contrasting with αὔτην τὴν ἐνυμαχίαν ("nor admit the ambassador-words of elderly men who are not members of the alliance"). But the word ἰδιωτῆς has in itself a wider connotation; and the antithesis would not be strictly accurate, because it is the λόγοι of ὁκείων, and not ὁκείων themselves, who form the alliance. The word ἰδιωτῶν should be taken in its full signification; for οὔτε πρέσβεις provides a sufficient antithesis to οὔτε αὐτήν τὴν ἐνυμαχίαν. Schneider translates "noch nehmen die Reden an, die von einzelnen älteren abgesandt werden," but ἰδιωτῶν is more than 'einzelnem.'

'To δὲ ὄτων there are the following positive objections. (1) All the mss have ἰδιωτῶν. (2) The αλαζόνες λόγοι are personified throughout; and εἰσδέχομαι δὲ ὄτων means 'I admit through my own ears.' Surely the spectacle of αλαζόνες λόγοι admitting other λόγοι through their ears is ludicrous and unmeaning. (3) The words δὲ ὄτων—supposing they
could be referred to the young man’s ears—are not only in themselves superfluous—for by what other avenue could the λόγοι be admitted?—but also a blot on what is otherwise one of Plato’s finest and most artistic similitudes. They compel us to identify the ‘gates of the king’s wall’ with the man’s ears. Apart from questions of literary and artistic propriety, it is enough to point out that the identification is false. We have before us a simile of the soul, and just as the gates of a city’s acropolis are in the city, so the gates of the soul’s acropolis are in the soul. The false λόγοι, who are themselves in possession of the fortress, shut its gates and keep the key of the situation in their own hands; but it does not follow that the young man may not hear the good message with his ears. It is because the wise words are not admitted to the soul’s citadel (λόγον ἄληθῆ—οὐ προσδεχόμενοι οὐδὲ παρείσ εἰς τὸ φρούριον κτλ. 561 Β) that their purpose fails.

To me these arguments appear to prove conclusively that Badham’s emendation gravely disfigures one of the most finished and melodious passages that Plato ever wrote. If any still think differently, I hope they will admit that it is at least unnecessary and unwise to exercise the art of emendation until the text has been proved to be corrupt.

V.

VIII 562 Α. Φρε δή, τίς τρόπος τυραννίδος, ὡ φίλε ἑταῖρε, γίγνεται; ὅτι μὲν γὰρ ἐκ δημοκρατίας μεταβάλλει, σχεδόν δὴλον. Δὴλον. Ἄρουν τρόπον τινὰ τὸν αὐτὸν ἐκ τε διλεγαρχίας δημοκρατία γίγνεται καὶ ἐκ δημοκρατίας τυραννίς; Πῶς;

The explanation which I have given of this passage is due to Schneider. So far as the language is concerned, it is, I think, invulnerable; but we must allow that Ἄρουν—τυραννίς would be easier and more natural if the original question referred to the τρόπος τῆς γενέσεως and not to the τρόπος τῆς πολιτείας.

Jowett and Campbell boldly construe τίς—γίγνεται as ‘τίς τρόπος ἐστι τῆς γενέσεως αὐτοῦ’ (sic); ‘what is the nature of the process in the case of tyranny?’ They cite no parallels, and it is surely inadmissible to do violence to the Greek in this way.

Others have resorted to emendation. Stallbaum thinks of τίνα τρόπον—τυραννίς γίγνεται or (with pardonable hesitation) τίς τρόπος τυραννίδος ὡ, ὡ φίλε ἑταῖρε, γίγνεται; Other suggestions are τίς ἀρχὴ τυραννίδος γίγνεται, or γενέσεως for γίγνεται (Richards). I once conjectured τίς τρόπος τυραννίδος—<καὶ τίνα τρόπον> γίγνεται in view of 555 Β. If we adopt any of these readings, ὅτι μὲν γὰρ etc. means ‘as for the fact that tyranny comes from democracy, that is pretty clear: so that we need only describe the τρόπος τῆς γενέσεως.’

The sense is excellent, but none of the emendations carries conviction, and it is at least doubtful whether the text has suffered corruption. I agree with Krohn (Πλ. Στ. p. 214) and previous editors in adhering to the reading of the mss.
VI.

VIII 568 D. Δῆλος, ἕφι, ὅτι, ἕάν τε ἱερὰ χρήματα ἥ ἐν τῇ πόλει, ταῦτα ἀναλώσει, ὅταν ποτὲ ἂν ἀεὶ ἔξαρκῇ, < καὶ > τὰ τῶν ἀπολομένων, ἐλάττουσ εἰσφορᾶς ἀναγκάζων τὸν δήμον εἰσφέρειν.

The reading of the best mss—ὅτιν ποτὲ ἂν ἀεὶ ἔξαρκῇ τὰ τῶν ἀποδομένων, ἐλάττους κτλ.—is retained by Schneider and Stallbaum. The Oxford editors print ἀποδομένων, but pronounce it wrong. Schneider remarks "quidnī τῶν ἀποδομένων sacerdotes et sacramentum intelligamus, quos tyrannus sacra vendere eamque pecuniam ad se deferre cogat?" and Stallbaum understands the passage in much the same way.

The arguments against this view have been well put by Vermehren. "Abgesehen davon dass es eine ganz unnöthige und Platonfremde Ausführung wäre, wenn für das an sich völlig klare und ausreichende ἀναλίσκειν τὰ ἱερὰ χρήματα noch die Art und Weise der Ausführung dieser Maasregel angegeben würde, begreift sich schwer, wie jener Gedanke aus den Worten hergeleitet werden soll" (Plat. Stud. pp. 108—110). τὰ τῶν ἀποδομένων cannot mean 'the proceeds of sales' but only 'the property of those who sold,' and it is inaccurate or strained to describe the tyrant as spending the sellers' property.

To meet the linguistic difficulty the following emendations have been proposed: (1) τὰ τῶν ἀποδομένων or τὰ ἐκ τῶν ἀποδομένων (Stephanus): (2) τὸ τῶν ἀποδομένων (Hermann, who compares τὸ τῶν παρείσθην and the like): (3) τὰ τῶν ἀποδομένων (Stallbaum): (4) τὰ τῶν πωλημένων (Campbell). The first and third are wrong in point of language, for ἀποδοδοσθαι is not vendi but vendere (see Stephanus-Hase Thes. s.v.). The disputed reading ἀπέδοσαν in Thuc. vi 62. 4 will scarcely be considered evidence. Hermann's eccentric conjecture hardly needs refutation. πωλημένων deserves the praise of ingenuity, but τὰ τῶν πωλημένων cannot surely mean 'the proceeds of what is thus exposed for sale.' ἐκ is needed before τῶν.

Even if these suggestions were linguistically sound, which is not, I think, the case, Vermehren's first objection still holds good. Why should Plato have troubled to explain so simple a process as ἱερὰ χρήματα ἀναλώσαι?

The kind of solution which I have adopted was first suggested by Vermehren. Dübner (Schneider Addit. p. 79) asserts that the α over the δ of ἀποδομένων in A is by the first hand. Possibly; but I think it doubtful. ἀπολομένων is however read by Flor. U as well as by g. The correction in A is certainly old, and ought to carry weight; but in any case the intrinsic merit of ἀπολομένων is very great. τε in εάν τε ἱερὰ χρήματα suggests that some other kind of χρήματα will presently be specified, and it would be strange if Plato had ignored so obvious a source of revenue as the goods of the proscribed (Vermehren l.c. p. 109), in view especially of 567 B, C, as well as the history of tyranny in general.
and Dionysius' tyranny in particular (see note). The change from Δ to Δ is easy in uncial mss. After ἀπολομένων was corrupted to ἀποδο-μένων, it was natural to omit καί, and make τὰ τῶν ἀποδομένων (probably mistaken for passive) subject to ἐυρκῆ. Nothing short of this would give even a semblance of meaning to the passage. The editor of q, who was certainly an intelligent, if too facile, emendator, added καί before ἐποι. I formerly accepted his view: Vermehren adds τε after τά: but Baiter's insertion of καί before τά is not more difficult, and intrinsically, I think, better.
571 A—572 B There remains the tyrannical man. Before beginning to describe his origin and character, we must complete our analysis of desire. Among the unnecessary desires, there is a special class which we call lawless or unnatural. It is these which are apt to be aroused in sleep, after over-indulgence in eating or drinking. But when we retire to rest with Desire and Anger in abeyance, and the rational element within us in full play, our dreams are innocent, and much is revealed to us in visions of the night.

571 B 7 ἐγκαλῷ Σ ἡ ἐγκαλῷ ΑΠ. Π.

571 B VII ἐγκαλῷ. See cr. n. In early Greek script: see Meisterhans Gr. d. Att. Inschr. 2 pp. 106—108. It is strange that Apelt (Berl. Philol. Woch. for 1895 p. 965) should defend ἐγκαλῷ: "soll ich (das Fehlende) noch einklagen" it gives a poor sense. For ἐγκαλῷ see Jebb on Soph. Εἰ. 394, νῦν ἐγκαλῷ. For ἐγκαλῷ (i.e. ἐγκαλῷ) φρονέω. O παράνομοι is more like our 'unnatural' than 'lawless'; cf. Phaedr. 254 a, Eur. Med. 1121 ἐγκαλῷ ἐγκαλοῖν. The psychological foundation of Tyranny, as well as of Oligarchy and Democracy, is Desire; but there are three varieties of Desire, and it is the lowest of these, viz. the Unnecessary and παράνομοι, which Tyranny represents. See VIII 548 D n., and cf. Nettleship Lect. and Rem. 11 pp. 310—314.

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7. ἐγκαλῷ (vel ἐγκαλῷ) ἐν καλῷ Σ ἡ ἐγκαλῷ ΑΠ. Π.
320 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

βελτιώνων ἐπιθυμῶν μετὰ λόγου ἐνίων μὲν ἀνθρώπων ἢ παντά-
πασιν ἀπαλλάττεσθαι ἢ ὀλίγαι λείπεσθαι καὶ ἀσθενείς, τῶν δὲ ἱσχυρότεραι καὶ 1 πλείους. Ἀδεικε δὲ καὶ τίνας, ἐφο, ταύτας; Ὁ
Τάς περὶ τῶν ὑπνῶν, ἤν δ' ἐγώ, ἑγερομένας, ὅταν τὸ μὲν ἄλλο τῆς
15 ψυχῆς οὐδὲν ὅσον λογιστικὸν καὶ ἴμερον καὶ ἄρχον ἐκεῖνον, τὸ δὲ
θηρίωδες τε καὶ ἄγριον ἢ σῶτον ἢ μέθης πλησθέν, σκιρτὰ τε καὶ
ἀποσάμενον τὸν ὑπνόν ζητῆ λέινα καὶ ἀποτιμάλαναι τὰ αὐτοῦ
ἡδῆς. οἷοθ' ὅτι πάντα ἐν τῷ τωστῷ τολμᾷ ποιεῖν, ὡς ἀπὸ πᾶσιν
λευμένου τε καὶ ἀπηλλαγμένου αἰσχύνης καὶ φρονίμεσος. μητρὶ
20 τὸ γὰρ ἐπιχειρεῖν δ' μύγνυσθαι, ὅς οἶδε, οὔδεν ὅκεν ἅλλῳ τῷ ὑπνῷ
ἀνθρώπων καὶ θεῶν καὶ θηρίων, μαίρουντες τῇ ὑπνοῦν, βρώματος τὸ
ἀπέχεσθαι μηδένουσ; καὶ εἶν λόγῳ οὔτε ἀνώιας οὔδεν ἔλειπε δὲν
ἀνασχυντίας. Ἀληθήσατα, ἐφι, λέγεις. "Ὅταν δὲ γε, οἴμαι,
ουκείων τις ἔχει αὐτὸς αὐτὸν καὶ σωφρόνως καὶ εἰς τὸν ὑπνόν
25 ὃ τὸ λογιστικῶν μὲν ἐγείρας ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ἐστιάσας λόγων καλῶν

quet suggests, ignoring or forgetting ἀπαλλάττεσθαι and λείπεσθαι). Cf. ἔγ
gήνηται in 572 A and ἐκάστω ἐστιν 572 B. There is something of 'the ape and tiger' in every human being: see infra 588 c ff. These παράγομεν ἐπιθυμίαι doubtless represent "der verbrecherische Hang der menschlichen Natur" (Krohn Pl. St. p. 216), but we ought not to compare Plato's conception with the doc-
trine of 'original sin,' as Schleiermacher (Platons Staat p. 601) and Sussemlh (Gen. Entw. II p. 238) appear to do. According to Plato, Man is an ὀδράνων
φύων, οὐκ ἔγειροι.

571 C 13 λέγεις δὲ καὶ κτλ. 'And
pray what are these desires?' lit. 'and you
mean by these desires, pray, which?' καὶ "significant accession aliquam pro
interrogantis voluntate necessariam vel
maiorum in modum expetitam" (Schneider,
who compares Polii. 291 A τινὰ αὐτὸν
καὶ λέγεις; Euthydi. 271 A and Heindorf
ad loc.).

14 τὰς περὶ τὸν ὑπνόν κτλ. 'The
cursed thoughts that Nature Gives way
to in repose' (Macheth 11 1 8). We must
however beware of supposing that Plato
regards sleep as the time when the lowest
part is only the vicious, and after acts of self-indulgence, that the beast
within ts pollutes our slumber: cf. Cic.
de div. I 115 and II 119. To translate
ὅταν by 'when' (D. and V.) is therefore
misleading: it means 'as often as.' See
571 D n.

17 λέιν "vix sanum videtur," says
Herwerden. The text is perfectly sound.
Although the man is, as we say, sleeping,
his θηρίωδες 'has shaken off sleep' and
'seeks to go and gratify its instincts.
The theory is that in dreams the part of
the soul concerned is not asleep, but
awake, and goes out to seek the object of
its desire. Cf. 573 A 11.

19 μητρὶ τῇ κτλ. Cf. Soph. O. T. 981 f. πολλὰ γὰρ ἔχει καὶ ἐνεργῶν βρώμων
μητρὶ εὐφυςάσφημα, with Jebb ad loc.

571 D 20 ὃς οἴδει goes closely with
μύγνυσθαι ('intercourse, as it supposes,
with,' etc.). τὸ ὄλυσθον (suggested by
Förster Rhein. Mus. for 1885 p. 631) is
a tasteless conjecture, which confuses
reality and dreamland.
21 μαίρουντες τῇ ὑπνοῖ: such as par-
cicide and other unnatural murders (φόνοι
παράνομοι Phaed. 113 E).


24 αὐτὸς αὐτὸν. The genitive de-
pends on ἕγειροι ἔχει as in ὑπνῶν ἔχον
ἐμαυτῷ Alexis ap. Athen. X 419 c and
other examples quoted by Blaydes on Ar.
Lys. 1125 and Wasp 537.

25 ἐστιάσας κτλ. 'For the metaphor
in ἔστιςας see 1 354 A n. The general meaning of this passage is best illustrated from Tim. 45 ε—46 Α γενομένης δὲ πολ-
λής μὲν ἴσχυς βραχύφυτος ὑπὸν ἐμ-
πίττει, καταλειπθείσων δὲ τῶν κινήσεων μείζων, οἷοι καὶ ἐν οἷοι ἀν ὁ ἄποιον
λείποντα, τοιαῦτα καὶ τοιαῦτα παρέχουσιν ἀφομοιώθητα ἐντὸς—φαντάματα, with
which Aristotle’s theory closely agrees: see Eth. Nic. 113. 110σb 7 ff. and Stewart’s
note. In like manner Zeno recommended his followers to gauge their moral ‘pro-
gress’ (προκόπη) by the nature of their dreams (Frags. 160 ed. Pearson). See
also on 572 A.

26 τὸ ἐπιδυμητικὸν κτλ. In Cic. de
div. 1119 the Nythagorean vein on beans
is attributed to this motive. Plato’s psy-
chology in this passage recalls the myth
of the Phaedrus: cf. especially 253 c—
256 e of that dialogue.

572 A Ι ἄλλα ἀκτα κτλ. The bearing
of this remarkable chapter on the theory
of divination did not escape Cicero, who
has translated, or rather paraphrased, from ὅταν 571 C to ἀπεταί 572 A: see
his de div. 1 60, 61. In Tim. 71 D—
72 B it is not, as here, the best part of
soul which is said to perceive ‘past,
present, or future’ in dreams, but ἡ περι
τὸ ἡπαρ φύσις μορφα τακτικοῦθεν,
the function of λαγομόν being to interpret
the visions seen by the ἐπιθυμητικῶν in
divination (whether ὅπως ou ὑπαρ), ἐν
τῇ χάμαιναι καὶ ὅτω μέλλοντος ἡ παρελθόντος
ἡ παρώντος κακοῦ ἡ ἐγκαίου (ib. 72 A). In
the present passage Plato appeals to the
widespread popular view that the soul
during sleep is freed from the trammels
of the body, foresees the future, and has
access to a region of truth denied, with
few exceptions, to the waking mind:
‘νική φέρει σοινικαί εἰς σομινικαῖ, λαβορίκε
εἴνομεν καὶ εἴς τὸν χαλαρόν καὶ τὸν ἐπαγωγὸν κἀκεῖνην
τῶν ἐν τῷ πάντων’ (571 C—
256 e B). See also 572 A. Ι in
our text.

οτὸν καί οἱ πάντες τοῦ Π. η. om. Α. Ι.

L. Ρ. ΙΙ.
5 ἡσυχασιας. ἡσυχάζω is used transitively only in the aorist: cf. Solon ap. Arist. Ath. Pol. 5. 3. Schleiermacher (Platons Staet p. 601) thinks that Plato recognises here, and in ἐγέλπησ, ἐστίασας, πράθαις, κινήσας etc., a fourth principle or ‘part’ of soul, that viz. which is able to excite or calm the others. Krohn on the other hand sees in this passage a sort of implicit recognition of the ‘ego’ as a separate and distinct entity (Pl. St. p. 217). The latter view is nearer the truth (cf. v 462 c, D nn.); but we ought not to press the words too much: πράθαις ἔτσι εὐτυχεῖ τινι εὐαυτῷ βία κατέχει ἄλλας κακὰς ἐπιθυμίας VIII 554 c, and III 414 B 11.

6 ἐδη. Other examples of this rare form of the dual in Plato are cited by Roepel de dual. usw. Plat. p. 12.

7 μάλαστα: i.e. more than when he retires to sleep in any other condition. It is better, in view especially of the second half of this clause, to understand μάλαστα in this way, than to take the word generally, as if divination by dreams were the best way of grasping truth. Plato would hardly say this, nor indeed would the average Greek. See especially Tim. 71 D 11.

8 παράνομοι. 571 B 11.

572 B—573 C The origin of the tyrannical man is as follows. A democratical father has a son, who is led away by evil associates into every form of lawlessness. When his family comes to the rescue, these tyrant-breeders implant in him a master-passion to act as champion of his drone-desires. The history of the corresponding State repeats itself in the young man’s soul, and the champion Lust becomes a tyrant in due course. We look on Lust, Drink, Madness as tyrants; and the tyrannical man arises when these three tyrants establish their dominion over the soul.

572 B 10 βουλόμεθα. W. H. Thompson’s έβουλόμεθα is unnecessary and even awkward with the present εἶδε just following. The Greek means simply ‘but what we want to notice is this’ etc.

12 καὶ πάνω belongs to μετρίουs (Schneider) rather than to δοκοῦσα (J. and C.): ‘however virtuous we may some of us appear to be.’

15 οὖν ἐφαμεν ἐναι. VIII 561 A—562 A.

ἡν δὲ που κτλ.: ‘he had been, you remember, produced, by having been brought up from early years’ etc. SoCRATES recalls the genesis of the democratical man (described in 558 c, 559 B 7) before recalling his nature (in B below). Ast suggested γεγονὼs <κατ> or γεγονὼs <τo κατ>, taking γεγονὼs of birth. The correct interpretation was pointed out by Schneider.
672 C 18 παιδίας—καλλωπισμοῦ.
Plato is less severe than in VIII 559 D—
562 A. He has since discovered a yet lower
depth than merely democratical desire,
and the democratical man is almost virtue
itself compared with the tyrannical.
19 κομψότερος κτλ. VIII 559 D n.
20 τὸ ἐκέλων εἰδος: ‘their kind of
conduct.’ εἰδος is used almost like τρόποι,
as in Thuc. II 41. 1, VI 77. 2 and VIII 56.
2. Ficinus has mores, but it does not follow
that he read ἔθος, which is less
suitable with ὁμοίας.
672 D 22 κατέστη κτλ. VIII 561 A
—562 A. The words ὁ τίτι quality με-
τρίως: cf. 571 D.
24 οὐτέ ἀνέλειθερον κτλ.: i.e. ‘in the
mean between ἀλεξαρχία and ἄναρχία’
etc. (J. and C., comparing VIII 561 A and
561 ε.) ἐγὼ for ἐγὼ was conjectured by
Ast, on account, no doubt, of ὁ τίτι.
Schneider holds that τίτι refers to the
time “quo primum ingrediens in istam
vivendi rationem optimum factum statuerat
omnibus pariter cupiditatibus obtempe-
rare.” It is difficult to understand ἔθος
otherwise than as the imperfect of re-
capitulation; and I prefer to think that
Plato, in spite of the inconsistency, wrote
ἐγώ rather than ἐγὼ in order to bring the
ὁμοίως before us as a living reality, so
as to prepare for ὁτι τοιούτων—τεθραμμένων.
There is no ms authority for ἐγὼ.
25 περὶ τοῦ τοιούτου: “anlangend den
so beschaffen” (Schneider), “touching
such a person” (D. and V.).
28 τίθει κτλ. The present echoes
τήθη (cf. I 339 D, VII 514 B, 519 B, 527 B,
VIII 564 A al.), and is in itself more ap-
propriate than ὁτι to introduce a succe-
sion of pictures. τοιοῦτοι means ‘further’
(I 339 D n.). The reference in ἀπερ καὶ
—πατέρα is to VIII 559 E ff.
572 E 35 προστάτην κτλ. This
overmastering passion becomes the chami-
pton of the drone-desires, exactly as the
budding tyrant is the προστάτης of
the proletariat: see VIII 564 D, 565 E ff.
With ἔτοιμα διανεμομένων cf. τῶν ἐτοιμών
ἀναλώτης VIII 552 B (J. and C.).
υπόπτερον καὶ μέγαν κηφήνα τινα. ἦ τι ἄλλο οἷον εἶναι τον τῶν
tοιούτων ἔρωτα; Ὑδέν ἔγονε, ἢ δ’ ὦς, ἀλλ’ ή τούτο. Οὐκοῦν
ὕτων περὶ αὐτὸν βομβοῦσαί ἂν ἄλλα ἐπιθυμήσαι, θυμικόματοι τε
5 γέμουσαι καὶ μύρων καὶ στεφάνων καὶ οἴνων καὶ τῶν ἐν ταῖς
tοιαύταις συνούσιαι ἥδοναν ἀνεμέων, ἐπὶ τὸ ἐσχατον αὐξουσαí
tε καὶ τρέφουσαι πόθου κέντρον ἐμποίησασι τῷ κηφήνι, τότε δὴ
dορυφορεῖται τε ὑπὸ μανίας καὶ οἰστρᾶ. 1 οὔτος ὁ προστάτης τῆς Β
ψυχῆς, καὶ εἰάν τινας ἐν αὐτῷ δόξας ἡ ἐπιθυμίας λάβῃ ποιουμένας
10 χρηστὰς καὶ ἔτι ἐπαισχυνομένας, ἀποκτείνει τε καὶ ἐξω ὅθεὶ παρ’
αὐτοῦ, ἐκαὶ ἄν καθῆρῃ σοφροσύνης, μανίας ἐδειπνοῦσθαι ἐπακότου.
Παντελῶς, ἐφι, τυραννικὸν ἁνδρὸς λέγεις γένεσιν. "Ἄρ’ οὖν, ἢ
δ’ ἐγώ, καὶ τὸ πάλαι διὰ τὸ τοιούτων τύραννος ὁ Ἐρως λέγεται;
Κυνυνεύει, ἐφι. Οὐκοῦν, ὁ φίλε, εἰπον, καὶ μεθυσθεὶς ἀνήρ
15 τυραννικὸν τι φρόνιμα 1 ἵσχει; "Ἱσχεῖ γάρ. Καὶ μὴν δ’ γε εἰς
μανόμενος καὶ ὑποκεκυνήκως οὐ μόνον ἄνθρωπον ἀλλὰ καὶ θεόν

10. ἐπαισχυνομένας II: ἐπαισχυνόμενος Α. ἀποκτείνει—ἐνθεὶ ΑΠ: ἀποκτείνη
—ἐνθῆ Α. 11. μανίας II: καὶ μανίας Α.
The litotes in ὑτό-
only euphemistic. ὑποκεικακῶς with this meaning does not apparently occur else-
where in classical Greek; see Stephanus-
Hase Thes. s.v., where the only parallel cited is from a scholium on Soph.Æ. 351 ὑποκεικακάρι μὴ πιστεύωσα. W. H.
Thompson (on Phaedr. 239 D) proposes
παρακεκακήκως, in view of Ar. Frag. 643;
where he approves 'on ms authority' the reading ὑμὲ 
παρακεκακάρι' 179s. In point of fact, however, this reading will not scan, and the Ravena with other ms
has ὑμὲ ὑποκεικακῶς' 179s, although ὑποκεικα-
is not used with the same sense
as here.
οὐ μάνον κτλ. The madman also τυ-
ραννικός τε φρονείσα τις. ἐπίπεις is not
here 'expects' (D. and V.) but 'fancies,' 'imagines' (II 383 b n.).
18 τυραννικός δὲ κτλ. I formerly
printed ὅδε for δὲ (with g and Vermehren
Plat. Stud. p. 112), but now prefer the
reading of the best ms. Plato is testing
his account of the origin of the tyrannical
man by obvious and admitted facts: cf.
(with Schneider) IV 442 E ff. Lust, Drink, and Madness are confessedly tyrants; and we hold that a τυραννικός
ἀνὴρ in the strictest sense of the term
(for ἀκριβῶς cf. I 341 c) is produced
when a man falls under the dominion of
all three. So that our theory accords with everyday experience. μελαγχολικός
is not of course 'passionate' (Jowett),
but 'insane': cf. δ ὡς μανόμενος καὶ ὑπο-
κεκακήκως above.
573 c—576 b In respect of his
character and mode of life, the tyrannical
man plunges into every form of dissi-
pation, and is founded on by ever fresh
desires. His income and property soon disappear; and in order to satisfy his
clamorous lusts, he plunders his father's
estate, not hesitating if need be to lay
violent hands on father and mother. Then
follow sacrilege and theft, and every
variety of crime; for he has now become
in living fact that which once he rarely
was in dreams. Such men, if few in
number, may go abroad and join a
tyrant's bodyguard or remain to swell
the ranks of petty criminals at home;
but if they are numerous, they make the
worst of all their crew into a tyrant over
their fatherland. Tyranny is the goal
and consummation of such a man's de-
sires. Throughout his whole existence,
both before and after he attains the crown
of his ambition, the tyrannical man is
a stranger to freedom and friendship,
faithless and superlatively unrighteous—
in one word, he is the living embodiment
of the monstrous lusts we found in dreams,
and the longer he rules, the worse he
grows.
573 c ff. Plato's τυραννικός is a
monster without a single redeeming
feature of any kind, the incarnation of
unnatural desire, 'bloody, Luxurious,
avaricious, false, deceitful, Sudden, ma-
licious'—"not in the legions Of horrid
hell can come a devil more damned
In evils" (Macbeth Act IV Sc. 3). It
must be admitted that Plato takes a
terrible revenge on Dionysius: see on
577 A.
21 γιγνεται κτλ. 'Such, apparently,
is the origin also of the tyrannical man.'
The stress of the voice falls on τούτος
i.e. τυραννικός (τυραννικός ἀνὴρ in Socrates' last
sentence). καὶ εἶται: we have
now described his origin as well as that
of the others. J. and C. propose ἀνὴρ,
as if Plato meant γιγνεται οὕτω, καὶ
ἔσθε τῶν τούτων. But the character of
the man has still to be described ('δὲ ὅδε τῶν);
hitherto we have been concerned
only with his genesis (γιγνεται μὲν).
Schneider caught the meaning ("so nun
entsteht auch dieser Mann"); but recent
English translators are wrong. For μὲν
Richards conjectures μὲν οὖν (or ὀκεῖν
γιγνεται μὲν as an alternative). The
asylum helps of course to accentuate
the antithesis between γιγνεται and ὅδε.
22 τὸ τῶν παιδίων. pαροιμία πρίκα
τις ἐρωτηθησή τι ὅπο γιγνεσκότος τὸ ἐρω-
thaía; 24. θάλατα II: θάλατα Α. 30. ἐπιλείψις ΑΠΙ: ἐπιλείψις Α².

tythem, αυτός ἄγρων, οὕτως ἀποκρηνήται 'οὐ καὶ ἐμοὶ ἑρείς' (Schol.). Cf. Phil. 25 B.

673 D 23 αὐτοίς: the τυραννικός and his associates.

24. θάλασ. See cf. n. θάλασσα is either an adjective or the name of the Muse. Schneider (who was unaware that Π has θάλασ) retains θάλασ, but his note conclusively proves, I think, that the Attic writers as well as Homer invariably observed the distinction. Stallbaum alone of recent editors reads θάλασ.

ἐταῖρα. "Nullus locus sortient est inter ἑρατά atque κωπών καὶ θάλασσ" says Stallbaum. On this account he prefers ἔταγρα (a conjecture of G. W. Nitzsch), taking the word, strangely enough, for ἰρταναρία. There is not the shadow of a difficulty; cf. Π 373 Ν. and ἔταγρα 574 B below.

ἂν κτλ.: 'in whose breast the tyrant Love indwelling steers all their soul.' The words are tinged with poetical colouring, as often in passages of this kind; cf. VIII 560 D, E al. J. and C. erroneously make ἄν neuter and dependent on ἑρως. The pronoun is construed with τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἑπανα by Shorey (A. J. Ph. XVI p. 237), but in that case o's would have been more natural. The view I take agrees with Schneider's.

26. παραβλαστάνουντων: 'shoot up beside' the master-passion. These desires correspond to τὸ τοῦ τυράννου στρατευτικὸν τὸ καλὸν τε καὶ τὸ ὑγιον καὶ ποικίλον καὶ οὐδὲποτε ταῦτα ἐν τῷ ἡμερομενήν πόλι (VIII 568 D).

28. ἐπιλειποίκιον κτλ. Cf. VIII 568 D.

673 Ε 29 τῆς οὕσεως παραισθέσεως κτλ.: 'encroachments on his capital' etc. (J. and C.), viz. to meet the moneylender's claims. See VIII 555 E. On ἐπιλείψις see VIII 568 E n.

30. ἀνάγκη μὲν κτλ. Bekker reads ἀνάγκη τὰς Μ with g and Flor, U: "recte, si cupiditates ipsi oppositae statuimus. Sed nihil impedit, quò minus alteram necessitatem—quae postea haec consequi particula δη significat, iam hic scriptor obversatam atque hanc illi alti oppositam putemus. Accedit quod si τὰς μὲν ἐπιθυμίας scripsisset, non τοὺς δὲ, sed αὐτοῦς δὲ dicetur quisque videtur" (Schneider). We have no right to change τοὺς to αὐτούς as Stallbaum is faint to do.

31. ἐπιστημονέας is copied, as Ast observes, by Longinus περὶ ὑψος 44. 7.

32. κέντρων. The other desires (as well as the master 'Passion') are compared to goads. For the idiom ἄτερ ὑπὸ κέντρων τῶν κτλ. cf. VIII 553 B n.

33. αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἐρωτος κτλ. is not for τῶν αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἐρωτος κτλ., as Stallbaum seems to hold; for the ἐρως is itself an ἐπιθυμια: see 572 E ff. With δωροφόρος cf. VIII 567 D.
574 A 1 ἀναγκαῖον δη κτλ. The civic parallel is in VIII 568 D ff. φέρειν = 'lif' (in the sinister sense of ἄγειν καὶ φέρειν: cf. Laws 762 A). On the position of ἐπι-
ηγηρόμεναι see VIII 532 c n. The words ἀνάφοινae νεώτερος ὑπο κτλ. correspond to ἀνενομένους τῶν πα-
τρίων (his father's property), not, of course, 'his patrimony': cf. VIII 568 E).
574 B 10 ἀντεχομένων. The middle of ἀντίγραφον in the sense of 'resist' is ex-
treemly rare; but occurs in Arist. H. A. VII 3, 583 a 18, possibly in Xen. de Ven. 6. 6, and occasionally in later Greek: see Stephanus-Hase Thes. s.v. The presence of μαχούμενων makes it unlikely that ἀντεχομένων means 'cleaving to' sc. in the attitude of supplication.
14 οὐκ ἀναγκαῖα. The adjective ἀναγκαῖοι throughout this sentence com-
bines two senses of 'necessary' ) ("superfluous," and "related by the ties of blood.") Bosanquet justly draws attention to the singular pathos and pietas of Plato's words: cf. V 470 D n. For the parallel in the State see VIII 569 B.
574 C 17 πληγαῖς = δοῦναι. See VIII 566 C n.
574 D 21 ἐπιλεῖπῃ. The present has better ms authority, and is intrinsically more appropriate than the aorist: "nam et ei quod sequitur εὑρισκόμενον ἡ magis respondet et eo ipso temporis puncto quo patrimonium deficiere incipit filium istum ad latrocinia et sacrilegia abripi accuratus significat" (Heller Cur. Crit. p. 4). Contrast VIII 568 E n.
23 ἐφάπαξ: "put himself in touch with" (sich in Berührung setzen Schneider). The delicate euphemism is missed by the English translators.
24 ἵπτεροντι νεωκορίης: 'will sweep out a temple.' The euphemism may be
illustrated by Cicero’s jest about Verres, "futurum ut omnia verreret" (Quint. vi 3. 55). Suidas has nekropos. οἶνος αὐτὶ τοῦ ἱεροοὐλητῆς κορέων ἔρωτιν τὸ καλλύνειν, τὸ σαρών (‘sweep’) καὶ ἐκκάλλυνεν. The explanation of the Scholast is less accurate. See also Shick de Scholisi p. 54 and Photius i p. 103 (ed. Porson) ἐφθασεν τοῦ νεκροποσίου εὐφημιστερίως ἀπὶ τοῦ ἱεροοὐλητῆς (as emended by Schneider). L. and S. say that nekrofros does not mean ‘temple-sweeper’ till Philo, but the present passage shows that this meaning is at least as old as Plato.

26 δικαίας. The letters αια are written over an erasure in A, so that the scribe may have originally written δια, which appears in other MSS. The Scholast read δικαίας, as appears from his paraphrase τῶν δοξῶν τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ἄν πᾶλι εἶχεν, and no one, since Bekker, has adopted διας except Stallbaum. τὰ διὰ δικαίας ποιουμένας is indefensible, and χρηστάς in 573 b, to which Plato here refers, proves δικαια right.

ποιουμένας κτλ. ποιουμένας = ‘accounted’: see on vi 498 a. The words ἐκ δικαιών λεγόμενα correspond to viii 567 e. ὅπως is an adverbial accusative: cf. vii 520 c n. The expression ἐν ἐννοίᾳ, though excised by Cobet (V. L. ² p. 52), is quite in keeping with Plato’s usual orationis.

574 e 29 ἐν ἑαυτῷ. So also in 579 c. Herwerden calls for ἐν ἑαυτῷ, which could, of course, only mean ‘in his senses’: see Blaydes on Ar. Wars 642.

30 γενέμους κτλ. γεγένεσες (Richards in Cl. Rev. viii p. 23, following Ste- phanus) is a groundless conjecture. The tyrannical man must have reached this stage before he sticks at nothing. On βράμμωτο see 571 d n.

575 A 2 ἂν αὐτὸς κτλ.: ‘being himself a monarch with sole sway will not only lead the man in whom he dwells as in a city unto every form of daring,’ etc. τε is used ἀνακολουθῶς: see on ii 373 b. The words ἂν αὐτὸς ὁ μόναρχος suggest as the proper supplement of the τε clause something like ‘but will also make him a tyrant too’; and the sentiment appears in a somewhat different form in 575 c, d (where see nn.). So Hoofer (de part. Pl. p. 14) correctly explains the passage. Schneider understands κυβερνῶν or the like (to balance ὅσοι) after πολιν—a most impossible solution, which he himself abandoned afterwards in his translation. Others cancel τε (q and Stallbaum), or suggest ἔχοντα τε καὶ τρέφοντα (Richards). Neither proposal is either necessary or probable. The words ὥσπερ πόλιν have also caused difficulty; and Vind. E offers the ingenious emendation πώλων (sic). Should ὥσπερ πόλιν be connected with τὸν ἔχοντα τε αὐτῶν or with ἔχει;? The latter view has hitherto, I believe, been held; but the introduction of the parallel is very awkward, and, in point of fact, neither ἔρως nor even the tyrant himself was said in Book viii to lead the city into daring deeds (viii 566 d ff., quoted by Stallbaum, is nothing to the point). On the other view ὥσπερ πόλιν is natural and easy: if ὅσοι is a μόναρχος, ὁ ἔχων τὸν ἔχον is the πόλις where he rules. Cf. ἢς ἐν ἐν αὐτοῖς ὥσπερ ἐν πόλει πολιτείαν καταστήσωμεν 590 c.
5 ὑπὸ τῶν—ἐαυτοῦ has been called 'nonsense' by Richards, who conjectures for καὶ ἐαυτῷ either ἐαυτῷ, or καὶ αὐτῶν: Herwerden contents himself with deleting καὶ. The text is assuredly sound; and although Stallbaum is here at fault, Vermeirhen correctly explained the passage as long ago as 1870 (Pl. Stud. pp. 112 ff.). καὶ is ζηομε, and we should translate 'by means of the same dispositions in himself also' ('τῆς durch dieselben Eigenschaften auch seiner selbst' Vermeirhen). τῶν αὐτῶν sc. as those of his evil associates. The history of the State furnishes an exact parallel in the contrast between the foreign mercenaries and the emancipated slaves (viii 567 D, E). Jowett's translation is right, but in his edition he still takes καὶ as 'and.'

575 B 11 κλέπτουσι κτλ. recalls 1 344 B (where see n.) and 348 D. From Xen. Mem. 1 2. 62 and Symp. 4. 36 it would seem that these crimes were commonly cited as instances of ἀδικία in the Socratic school. Cf. also Ar. Theom. 817 ff.

575 C 15 ἐὰν—τοιοῦτοι is bracketed by Herwerden. The words are certainly difficult, if σμικρὰ γε κακά be taken as ironical, for we have no right to render ἐὰν by 'even if': "a small catalogue of evils—(even) if there are only a few such men!" J. and C. But there is no irony. The meaning is 'True, they are small evils, if such men are few in number.' 'Yes,' said I, 'for small is small in comparison with great.' Adimantus' caveat prepares us for ὅταν γάρ ὅπλοι κτλ. below.

16 πονηρία: 'in respect of a city's wretchedness and misery.' For the datives cf. vi 509 D (σαφῆνει καὶ ἀσαφῆ) VII 555 A and infra 576 C. Its union with ἀδικία seems to shew that πονηρία is here 'wretchedness' rather than 'vice,' although the Greeks did not clearly separate the two ideas (see on 1 335 B), and in Plato wickedness is misery.

17 ὅστις ἡκταρ βάλλει: 'are not without sight of.' The proverb means ὅσσι ἐγγύς ἐστιν (Diogen. iii 46). The other sources are given in Leutsch u. Schneiderin Parox. Gr. ii p. 43). Eustathius (in Od. ii 293. 27, quoted by Schneider) argues for the rough breathing ἢκταρ (see cr. u.), on the ground that the word comes from ἰκνοῦοια; but it is clear from his argument, as well as from the other authorities, that ἢκταρ was the regular pronunciation.

ὅταν γάρ ὅπλοι κτλ. The tyrannical man is like the philosopher in one respect. He does not attain to his full development except in a city meet for him. See vi 497 A and Nettleship Lect. and Rem. ii p. 318. With μετὰ δὴ μναμόν ἀνοίας cf. Solon Frag. 11 ed. Bergk.
πόμενοι αυτῶς καὶ αὔσαθωνταί ἐπάκοι τό πλῆθος, τότε οὕτω τέκνοι εἰσὶν
20 οἱ τῶν τύραννων γενεῖστες μετὰ δήμου ἀνοίας, ἐκείνου, ὡς ἃν αὐτῶν
μάλιστα αὐτῶς ἐν αὐτῶ μέγιστον καὶ 1 πλειστόν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τύραννων ἔχει. 
Εἰκότως γ', ἐφ' τυραννικότατος γὰρ ἃν εἶν. 
Οὔκοιν ἐὰν μὲν ἐκόντες υπείκοσων· ἐὰν δὲ μὴ ἐπιτρέπῃ ἡ τόλης, ὥσπερ τότε μητέρα καὶ πατέρα ἐκολάζεν, οὕτω πάλιν τὴν πατρίδα, 
25 ἐὰν οὖς τ' ἢ, κολάσεται ἐπεισαγαγόμενοι νέοις ἑταίρως, καὶ ὑπὸ 
τούτοις δὴ δουλεύονται τὴν πάλαι φίλην μητρίδα τε, Κριτίτες φασί, 
καὶ πατρίδα ἔξι τε καὶ θρέψει. 
καὶ τούτο δὴ τό τέλος ἃν ἐις τής ἐπιθυμίας τοῦ τοιοῦτος ἀνδρός. 1 τοῦτο, ἢ δ' ὃς, πανταπαῖ γε. Ε. 
Οὔκοιν, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, οὐτόι γε τοιοίδε γέγονονται ἱδα καὶ πρὶν ἁρχεῖν; 
30 πρῶτον μὲν οὖς ἃν ἐξουσίαν, ἢ κολάζαν εὖστων ξυνώντες καὶ 
πᾶν ἑτοίμως υπηρετεῖν, ἢ ἔαν τοῦ τι διώνυσι, αὐτοῖς ὑποτεθείσες, πάντα 576 
σχήματα τολμώντες ποιεῖν ὡς οἰκεῖοι, διαπραξάμενοι δὲ ἄλλοτροι; 
Καὶ σφόδρα γε. Ἐν παντὶ ἀρα τῷ βίῳ ἑώ ὕψοι φίλοι μὲν ὑπέστηκεν 
ουδὲνι, ἀλλ' δὲ τοῦ διστῶτες δὴ δουλεύοντες ἄλλως, ἀλευθερίας δὲ 
καὶ φιλίας ἀλήθος τυραννική φύσις ἢ γέγονες. 
Πάνι μὲν οὖν. 
'Αρ' οὖν οὐκ ὅρθως ἃν τοὺς τοιούτους ἀπίστους καλοῖμεν; 
Πῶς δ' οὖ; 
Καὶ μὴν ἀδίκους γε ὡς οὖν τοις μάλιστα, εἰπέρ ὅρθως ἐν 
τοῖς πρόσθεν ὁμολογήσαμεν περὶ δικαιοσύνης, οὖν ἐστὶν. Ἀλλὰ 
μὴν, ἢ δ' ὃς, ὅρθως γε. 
Κεφαλαίωσόμεθα τοῖνυν, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, τὸν 
10 κάκιστον. 
ἔστιν δὲ ποὺ, οὖν ὅπαρ διήλθωμεν, ὃς ἃν ὑπάρ τοιοῦτος 
11. τοῦ τι (vel του τι) Ἐρ: τοιη ΑΠΙ.
576 C]

ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΣ Θ

331

γ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν. Οὐκόνων οὗτος γίγνεται δὲ ἂν τυραννικότατος φύσει ὁν μοναρχήσῃ, καὶ ὅσρο ἂν πλείο χρόνον ἐν τυραννίδι βιῶν, τοσοῦτω μᾶλλον τοιοῦτος. Ἀνάγκη, ἡφη διαδεξάμενος τὸν λόγον ὁ Γλαίκων.

IV. Ἀρ' οὖν, ἤν ήτ' ἐγώ, δὲ ἂν φαίνεται ποιηρότατος, καὶ 15 ἀδικωτάτος ἡ φανήσεται; καὶ δὲ ἂν πλείστον χρόνον καὶ μάλιστα τυραννεύσῃ, μάλιστ' τε καὶ πλείστον χρόνον τοιοῦτος γεγονὼς τῇ ἀληθείᾳ; τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς πολλὰ καὶ δοκεῖ. Ἀνάγκη, ἡφη, ταῦτα
talis est, qualem finximus supra (571 C, D, e) somniumentes (Stallbaum). The Oxford editors, with D. and V., and apparently also Schneider, translate 'He is the man who in reality is such as we imagined him in our dream.' The Greek is perhaps a little simpler if we take this view, but I agree with Bosanquet in preferring Stallbaum's, partly because such a statement could scarcely be called a κεφάλαιον, and partly on account of 574 ὁ οὖν διμῆχις ἐγὼν τινα, ὡσπον τοιοῦτος ἄλιγθομεν—a striking observation which would be at once recalled to Adimantus' mind, although the strong antithesis between τινα and ὡσπον is alone sufficient to suggest the meaning. We expect brevity and compression in a summary description of this kind. For the purposes of grammatical explanation we should supply εἶναι after διμῆχομεν ('as we described a man to be in dreams'). The ellipse is easy because of γ.: for δὲ—γ. is logically antecedent to οὖν—διμῆχομεν.

II οὗτος γίγνεται. οὗτος is in the predicate. For γίγνεται see on VIII 562 Α.

13 διαδεξάμενος κτλ. We have now finished our account of depraved cities and individuals, and the change of interlocutors shows that we are about to enter on a new stage in the discussion: cf. VI 487 Α, 506 Β al. Aristotle blames Plato for not saying what is to follow tyranny (Pol. E 12. 1316α 25 ff.). In reply, Plato would, I think, first point out that he is not required to touch on this subject either by the main thesis of the Republic or by the special aim which he has in view throughout Books VIII and IX (see VIII 543 Α π. Ν.). He might afterwards observe that, since the best hope of founding the perfect city lies in inculcating an absolute ruler or one of his descendants with a love of genuine philosophy (VI 499 B—502 C), the deepest darkness perhaps contained a promise of the dawn. See especially the striking passage in Laws 709 E—712 Α. Aristotle seems to have understood him to mean this (έτη κατ' ἑκείνοις δέ έλ τή πρώτη καὶ τήν ἀρίστην οὕτως γάρ ἂν ἐγνώση συνεχέσε καὶ κύκλοι [I. e.,] and criticises him accordingly from the facts of experience; but the succession of polities in the Republic is not intended to be in all respects, or even primarily and chieflly, historical (VIII 543 Α π.).

576 B—577 Β What shall we say then about the happiness or unhappiness of the individual who is most depraved? As is the city, so will the individual be in point of happiness as well as virtue. And the city in which a tyrant rules is of all cities the worst and most unhappy. What of the tyrannical man? He that has lived with a tyrant, and is himself moreover capable of judging, will best decide. Let us pretend, says Socrates, that we ourselves possess these qualifications.

576 Β ff. We have now discussed δόκαμος, and it only remains to compare him with δόριστος in respect of happiness and misery. The present chapter is introductory to the trial of arguments by means of which Plato proves that the victory rests with δόριστος. His description of the misery of the tyrant is based, as he virtually tells us, on the evidence of his own eyes (577 Α, B Μ.Ν.), but we should of course remember that in such cases we are apt to see what we wish to see, and Plato's description, regarded as a portrait of Dionysius I, though it doubtless possesses a certain historical value, may well be somewhat overdrawn.

576 C 18 τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς κτλ. = 'although the multitude are multitudinous also in their views' expresses the antithesis implied in the emphatic τῇ ἀληθείᾳ.
virtually causal, as it often is when dependent on imperatives or imperatival expressions (here ἀποφανώμεθα): cf. I 336 D, IV 430 E, Symp. 189 B et al. With εἰς δὴν τὴν πόλιν κτλ. cf. IV 421 B ἢ τοῦτο μὲν εἰς τὴν πόλιν δὴν βλέπεται θεάσασθαι καταφέρειν. In other views this clause see App. I. 

577 A 4. τῆς—σχηματιζόνται: 'circumstance and pomp of majesty, which they put on to the world outside.' Cf. προστήσασθαι X 599 A n. and (with Schneider) II 365 C πρόθριψα μὲν καὶ σχῆμα—περιγραπτέων. τῶν τυραννικῶν seems to be usually taken as masculine, in which case it might have been omitted without any loss to the meaning. I think it is the genitive of τὰ τυραννικά: cf. B below εἰς οἷς μάλιστα γνωσθῆ ἦν ὁφθη ηῇ τὰς τραγικῆς σκηνὰς. 

5 A οὖν οἰκείων κτλ. 'If then I should think it right for all of us to listen to the man who is both capable
of judging' etc. The dialogue form is strained almost to breaking in this remarkable sentence. We are all to be silent and listen to Plato himself. Plato might fairly claim from his psychological studies and experience as a teacher, to be daring to the Dionysian sort of frankness and the political reputation (Grote pp. 302 ff.) but it would be frigid to suppose that this was in Plato's mind when he wrote the word 

9 τραγικής σκηνής = "theatrical garb" (D. and V.) again betrays "a feeling of the kinship between the shows of tyranny and those of tragedy" (Bosanquet: cf. VIII 568 A n.). Dionysius I was himself a writer of tragedies, and notoriously jealous—so we are told—of his poetical reputation (Grote pp. 302 ff.) but it would be frigid to suppose that this was in Plato's mind when he wrote the word τραγικής.

αὖ τοῖς was first conjunctly restored by Heindorf (on Soph. 262 A), following Ficinus, instead of the vulgate ἀπὸ τοῖς. It has since been found to be the reading of most of the other MSS as well as Α.

10 κελεύομεν. The singular κελεύομαι (q. Flor. U) is still read by Stallbaum. There is surely no reason why Socrates should not associate Glauco with himself in this hypothetical invitation.

11 ὁρθότατ' αὖ—προκαλεῖ forms the apodosis to what Socrates has said (cf. 582 E), but refers "ad initium potius quam ad exitum orationis Socraticae" (Schneider. Cf. V 406 E n.). Glauco admits most fully the claim that Plato has earned a right to speak with authority on this subject.

12 προσποιησόμεθα κτλ. Plato cannot appear in propria persona, so that it is necessary for Socrates and Glauco to pretend that they also belong to the number of those 'who would be able to judge' and have met with τύραννοι and τυραννοί. The fiction is rendered necessary by the laws of dialogue as ἦν—ἐρωτῶν frankly states. We must beware of supposing that it is Plato who 'pretends': Plato does not pretend, but is τυραννοῦς μὲν κράνω, ᾨσυκηνὸς δὲ εἰ τῷ ἀρτῷ κτλ. (577 A.) Richards objects to αὖ with τυραννοῦ, and it is certainly unusual to find αὖ with an adjective in this way. But as τυραννοῦ can itself take an infinitive, it hardly differs from the participle δυνάμενον, and the suggestions τυραννῶν, or τυραννῶν ἢ τύραννος, or δυνάτων ἤτωτ < ὃτωτ>, are unattractive. I should add in conclusion that nearly all critics are now agreed in holding that Plato throughout the whole of this passage is referring to his own experience of Dionysius I: see for example Susemihl Gen. Entw. II pp. 240, 294 ff., Teichmüller Lit. Fehl. 1 p. 110, Himler Entw. u. Komp. d. Pl. Phil. pp. 667 ff., with Zeller II 413 η. 1. The date of Plato's first visit to the elder Dionysius was in or near 388 B.C. Compare Epfr. VII 324 Α—327 D. Whether this epistle he genuine or not, the visit is abundantly attested, as Zeller proves (i.e. pp. 413—415 η.), and it is strange that J. and C. should still have doubts upon the subject. See also on V 473 D, VI 496 Β, 499 Β and infra 579 Β n. 577 B—580 C Like the city whose counterpart he is, the tyrannical man is in reality a slave, powerless to work his will, penniless and insatiate, full of fear and lamentation. A still greater depth of misery awaits him if he becomes a
tyrant. Imagine the piteous plight of one who is suddenly transplanted into a solitary place where he is at the mercy of his own slaves, and surrounded by free neighbours who make common cause with them! Such is the position of the tyrant, a prisoner in his own palace, tormented by longings which he can never appease. To sum up, he is the supreme embodiment of vice and misery, and the longer he holds sway, the worse he becomes.

Let us now give judgment. In respect of virtue and happiness the different individuals stand as follows: (1) Kingly, (2) Timocratic, (3) Oligarchical, (4) Democratic, (5) Tyrannical. He who is most kind is best and happiest, he who is not a tyrant over himself and city, worst and most miserable,—whether their true character be hidden from men and gods, or not.

577 C ff. The arguments by means of which Plato establishes his conclusion may be briefly described as the political argument, the psychological argument, and the metaphysical argument. The first (577 B—580 C) depends on the resemblance between the soul and the State, the second (580 C—583 A) on the three-fold division of the soul into λογιστικόν, θυμωδικόν, and ἐπιθυμητικόν, the third (583 B—587 B) on Plato’s theory of Reality or Being. Now it is just these three methods of investigation, and these alone, which have been employed in the different parts of the dialogue, the political and psychological in II—IV and VIII—IX, the metaphysical in V—VII; and it is therefore altogether appropriate and right that Plato should bring them together now, and use their united forces ‘in making up the last account’. The sequence of the three arguments follows the usual Platonic way of progression from the exotic to the esoteric, and as the ideal city culminated in metaphysical idealism, so it is a metaphysical argument that crowns our citadel of proof.

577 C 16 καθ’ ἐκαστὸν κτλ. καθ’ ἐκαστὸν = ‘point by point,’ ‘in detail,’ not ‘singly’ (D. and V.), which would be καθ’ ἐκάτερον here, since only two objects of comparison are involved. ἄστρον: sc. ἐκατέρων. viz. the city and the man (J. and C.). Οὐ τιλεν ἐπειν and ὡς ἕτος ἐπειν (‘I might almost say’) see 1341 B 4.

577 D 22 ἀνήρ. See cr. n. I have followed the advice of a reviewer of my Text of the Republic in Hermath. xxiv p. 256 and accepted Campbell’s ἀνήρ. It is difficult to dispense with the article here: cf. τῇ τε πόλει καὶ τοῦ ἄνδρός above.

24 ἀνελευθερίας κτλ. In ἀνελευθερίας there is here a strong suggestion of the etymological meaning (“Unfreiheit,” Schneider). μικρὸν, as J. and C. observe, is introduced to make the parallel between State and individual as complete as possible. From another point of view it might be held that the μυκόρθασον in the tyrannical soul is not σμικρὸν but πολὺ (573 D—576 B).
καὶ ταῦτα αὐτῆς τὰ μέρη δουλεύειν, ἀπερ ἤν ἑπιεικεῖται, μικρὸι 25 ἐκ καὶ τὸ μονοθρήστατον καὶ μανικώτατον δεσπόζειν; 'Ανάγκη, ἐφη. Τί ὄν; δούλην ἢ ἐλευθέρων τὴν τοιαύτην φήσεις εἶναι ψυχήν; Δούλην δὴ ποιού ἐγώγε. Οὐκοῦν ἢ γε ἀν δούλη καὶ τυραννουμένη πόλεις ἥκιστα ποιεῖ ἢ βοῦλεται; Πολὺ γε. Καὶ ἢ 

Ε τυραννουμένη ἁρὰ ἡ ψυχή ἥκιστα τοιαύτη τινὰ βοῦληθῇ; ὡς περὶ 30 ὀλίσχειν νεότητις: ὧτο δὲ ὀστροῦ ἄλθη εἰλκομένη μίας ταραχῆς καὶ μεταμελείας μεστὴ ἐσται. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; Πλούσιαν δὲ ἢ τενομένην ἀνάγκη τὴν τυραννουμένην πόλιν εἶναι; Πενομένην.

578 Καὶ ψυχήν ἁρὰ τυραννικῆν | πενυχράν καὶ ἀπλαστὸν ἀνάγκη ἄλθει εἰναι. ὸντος, ἢ δ' ὄς. Τί δὲ; φόβου γέμειν ἄρ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη τὴν 

tε τοιαύτης πόλιν τὸν τε τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα; Πολλή γε. 'Οδυρμοῦς 
dὲ καὶ στεναγμοῦς καὶ βρήμονας καὶ ἀλητοῦμας οὐ τις τῶν ἄλλων 
πλείους εὑρίσειν; Ὀυδαμῶς. Ἐν ἀνδρὶ δὲ χείλε τὰ ταυτάτα ἐν 5 ἄλλω τινὶ πλείω εἶναι ἢ ἐν τῷ μανικώτῳ ὑπὸ ἐπιθυμῶν τε καὶ 
ἐρωτῶν τούτῳ τῷ τυραννικῷ; Πῶς γὰρ ἄν; ἐφη. Εἰς πάντα δή, 

Β οἴμαι, ταῦτα τε καὶ ἂν τοιαύτα ἀποβλέψας τὴν γε πόλιν τῶν 
πόλεων ἀθλοστάτην ἐκρήσας. Οὐκοῦν ὅρθως; ἐφη. Καὶ μάλα, ἢν 
δ' ἐγώ. ἄλλα περὶ τοῦ ἄνδρος αὐτοῦ του τυραννικοῦ τὸ λέγεις εἰς 
tαυτὰ 10 

3. τε τοιαύτην Ξ: γε τοιαύτην ΑΠ. 4. δὲ Ξ: τε ΑΠ. 8. γε Ξ: 
τε ΑΠ γ'.
tauta apobleptow; Makrê, efh, athlιwτatow einai tov allov aptwton. Toûto, hnv d' evw, ouket' orhsws lêges. Pwês; h d' dos. Oùpo, efhν, oûma, ouûos estin o toioûtos mîlîsta. 'Alla tîs mîn; "Ôde ûsos sou eti dôxei einai tou'tou ùdleiôteros. Pwos;

15 Ov' an, hnv d' evw, tyrapnikiôs oû mî idîwsw thw katawbh, allâ ãûstw̄chh y kai autw upo tînws stymphorîs ekporisêth woste tyraînvw gewnêsthai. Têkmiâroîmai se, efh, ek tov proieîmenvn alôth swlwgei. Nai, hnv d' evw. all' ouk idieswth ãhrh tâ toutauta, all' ev mâla to toioûto lôγo skopetw. peri gár tov megístov h 20 skêsîs, ãghatb Ò te biwv kai kakkw. 'Orhoûtata, h d' dos. Skôtpe de, ei ãrpa tî lêgî. dokei gár moi deîn ënnwîsthai 1 ek tôwde peri Ï autw skopoûntas. 'Ek tíwn; 'Ez ènôs ekástwv toîn idwstov, òsoi plouwstîn eu ðleisîn anvrâpôda pollâ kêtîntai. ou título ñar

19. tò toioûto nòs: tì tòioûtw ÂÎÆxq.
25 ἐκέινον. On the transition from plural to singular see 1 347 A n.
26 τί γάρ κτλ. ‘Why of course, what should they be afraid of?’ sc. in their slaves. τί is not ‘why,’ but ‘what,’ as ὅδεν shews: cf. v 449 B n. Campbell, making τί ‘why,’ translates ὅδεν by ‘Oh, for no reason,’ and refers to Prot. 310 B; but there too ὅδεν is ‘nothing’: see my note ad loc.

578 Ε. 29 εἰ τις θεῶν κτλ. It is a mistake to suppose from this passage that the treatment of slaves in Athens or Greece generally was exceptionally cruel or unkind. Granted the existence of slavery at all, what Plato here says would nearly always be found true, especially where, as in Athens, the slaves belonged for the most part to an alien and inferior race. See Gilbert Gh Const. Ant. E. T. pp. 170—174. Fifty slaves would of course be more than the average number belonging to a single citizen. In Athens, during the fourth century B.C., the slaves were probably little, if at all, more numerous than the free-born population and metoeces (Icoclch Die Bevölk. d. Gr-Rom. Welt p. 99).

33 ὅποσώ. On ὅποσω following πάρω see 1 348 B n.

579 Α. 1 αὐτῶν τῶν δοῦλων. “Quum ingenii desint, a quibus auxilium petat, nonnullis ex servorum ipsum, quos timent, numero adulari cogitum” (Schneider). This explanation, which Vermehren also approves (Pl. Stud. p. 114), exactly meets the case, and there is no reason either to change αὐτῶν to αὐ (with Stephanus) or to delete τῶν δοῦλων (with Ast and Herwerden).

2 οὖν δὲ δειμένοις: ‘when he needn’t.’ He is under no obligation to set them free: why then should he make them a present of their freedom? The innuendo is in Plato’s nearest style. For the language cf. (with Schneider) Plut. Tib. Gracch. 21. 2 διείσασα περὶ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἡ βουλή φορήται μηδὲν δειμένη περὶ αὐτῶν εἰς ἄσιαν. The conjecture οὖν δειμένους (Groen v. Prinsterer Prosop. Plat. p. 211, Ast, and Herwerden, who appeals in vain to Plut. Cato Maior 12. 3, Dem. 11. 9, and Isoc. A rejo. 25) is, as Schneider shews, inept; for if the slaves do not need to be set free, because they are practically free already, “ne ero quidem opus est ut ad eos coe售endos illam aliave incert rationem.”

4 ἄλλον—γείτονας. These free-born neighbours in Plato’s simile represent surrounding independent States, who detest tyranny, and help the tyrant’s subjects. See Newman’s Politics of Aristotle II p. 315.
5 κύκλω κατοικίσεις γείτονας πολλοὺς αὐτῷ, οὐ μὴ ἁνέχομεν, εἴ τις ἄλλος ἄλλου δεσπόζειν ἀξίοι, ἀλλὰ εἴ ποῦ τινα τοιοῦτον λαμβάνοις, ταῖς ἐσχάταις τιμωροῦντο τιμωρίαις; Ἐτὶ ἄν, ἐφη, οἶμαι, μᾶλλον ἐν παντὶ κακοῦ εἴη, κύκλῳ φρουροῦμενος ὑπὸ πάντων Β πολεμίων. Ἀρ’ οὖν οὐκ ἐν τοιούτῳ μὲν δεσμοτηρίῳ δεδέθα ὁ τύραννος, φύει ὃν οὖν διεληλύθαμεν, πολλῶν καὶ παντοδαπῶν φόβων καὶ ἑρώτων μεστόν· λίχῳ δὲ ὑπό αὐτῷ τὴν πυψήν μόνον τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει οὔτε ἀποδημήσαι εξεστιν ουδαμῶς οὔτε θεωρήσαι ὅσων δὴ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἐλεύθεροι ἐπιθυμηταί εἶσιν, καταδεικτικὸς δὲ ἐν τῇ οἴκῃ τὰ πολλὰ ὡς γυνῆ ξῆ, φθονοῦν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πολι- C 15 ταις, ἕαν τις ἔξω ἀποδημῆ καὶ τὶ ἄγαθον ὀρᾶ· Παντάπασιν μὲν οὖν, ἐφη.

VI. Οὐκόν τοῖς τοιοῦτοις κακοῖς πλεῖω καρποῦται ἀνήρ οὐ κακῶς ἐν ἑαυτῷ πολιτεύμενος, δύνω δὴ σὺ ἀθλώτατον ἐκρινασ, τῶν τυραννικών, ὡς μὴ ἰδιωτῆς καταβιθ, ἀλλὰ ἀναγκασθή

5. κατοικίσεις φ; κατοικίσεις νατον κατοικίσεις ΑΠΞ φι. 8. έη Ξ φ; ει έη ΑΠ, σε δι ποντον ηνατιν Α. 18. εαυτο ΑΠ; ταυτο (νιοι) A.

579 B 8 ὑπὸ πάντων πολεμίων: ‘by none but enemies’: cf. πᾶνων ἀγρίων in vi 496 D. The tyrant’s splendid but awful isolation is admirably brought out by Plato: see also on viii 567 B. In this respect Plato’s similitude faithfully reflects the position of Dionysius I in Sicily and indeed, except for the support which Sparta lent him, in the whole Hellenic world. See Grote x p. 506 ff.

9 ἐν τοιούτῳ κτλ. The picture which follows is no doubt also drawn from Dionysius I: see Grote x pp. 344, 328 nπ.

11 Λίχων “is the same with regard to the eye, that liquorishness is to the taste” (Thomas Gray).

12 οὔτε ἀποδημήσαι κτλ. The parallel with Xen. Hiero i. 11 is singularly close. Plato speaks con amore, thinking doubtless of his own sojournings in foreign lands. See Zeller ii pp. 404—414. Neuman de locis Aegypt. in oper. Plat. (1874) discovers many allusions to Plato’s ‘Wanderjahre’ throughout his works.

13 δομῶν θη κτλ. Such as the Olympian games etc.; cf. Xen. l.c. τὰς κούλας παραγγέλων ἔνα τὰ ἄξιοθέτατα δοκεῖ εἶναι ἀθρόων συναγερεσία. Dionysius was represented at Olympia by deputy, as Hermann reminds us (Gesch. u. System p. 116). Cf. Grote x p. 393. The phrase τι ἄγαθον ὅρα, with which the sentence concludes, has a curiously modern sound.

17 οὐκόν κτλ. ‘greater then, by evils such as these, is the profit which is reaped by the individual who’ etc. (“Um so grosse Übel reicher also ist der Mann” Schleiermacher). τοῖς τοιοῦτοις κακοῖς is dative of amount of difference: cf. ii 373 E μείζονος—οὔτε σμικρῷ, ἀλλὰ διὸς στρατοπέδῳ, vi 507 E οὐ σμικρῷ—ἴδει—

timewfrōi and Λατός 848 B (Schneider Addit. p. 72). The passage has been strangely misunderstood, Stephanus suggesting variously <ἐτι> or <πρὸς> τοῖς τοιοῦτος or τῶν τοιοῦτον, and Ast <ἐν> τοῖς τοιοῦτος. Stallbaum comes nearer to the truth in his “per huius modi mala,” but the dative is exactly as in τοιοῦτον πλειον. The view that the dative is merely one of ‘circumstance’—an alternative suggestion in J. and C.—cannot be upheld. See also on 578 C. The reference in ην οὖν δὴ is to 578 B.

19 ὡς µῆ κτλ. I have returned to the text of A, II, and nearly all the ms. οἱ with Stobaeus (Flor. 50, 50) has µῆ ὡς, and so Stallbaum and Baiter read. µῆ ὡς suits better with ἀλλὰ ἀναγκασθῇ, but the irregularity is slight, and, as Schneider observes, the sentence opens as if it were
580 Α] ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΣ Θ 339

υπό τινος τύχης τυραννευσαί, καὶ ἐαυτοῦ ὅν ἀκράτωρ ἄλλων 20 ἐπιχειρήσῃ ἄρχειν: ὅπερ έτι τις κάμυναί σώματι καὶ ἀκράτωρ

τοῦ εαυτοῦ μὴ ἱδωτεύων, ἀλλ' ἀγωνιζόμενος 1 πρὸς ἄλλα σώματα καὶ

μαχόμενος ἀναγκάζοντο διαγένει τῶν βίων. Παντάπασιν, ἐφ', ὁμοιότατα τε καὶ ἀληθεύτατα λέγεις, ο Σώκρατες. Οὐκοῦν, ἵν ὅ 

ὁ δ' ἔγω, ὁ φίλε Γλαύκων, παυτελῶς τὸ πάθος ἄθλιον, καὶ τοῦ ὑπὸ 25 σοῦ κριθέντος χαλεπώτατα ζην χαλεπώτερον ἐτί ζη ὁ τυρανύν; 

Κομιδῆ γ', ἐφ'. Ἡ ἐστίν ἁρὰ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, καὶ εἰ μὴ τῷ δοκεῖ, ὁ τῷ ὑ 

.VideoCapture(134, 339, 768, 572) 

ντὶ τύραννος τῷ ὁντὶ δοῦλος τὰς μεγίστας θωσείας καὶ δουλείας 

καὶ κόλαξ τῶν πονηροτάτων, καὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας οὐδ' ὁπωσοῦ 

ἀποφημίζω, ἀλλ' πλείον ἐπιδεέστατο καὶ πένης τῇ ἀληθείᾳ 30 

φαίνεται, εἴ τις δὲν νυκτὶ ἐπίστηται θεᾶσθαι, καὶ φόβου γέμων 

διὰ παντός τοῦ βίου σφαδασμῶν τε καὶ ὀδύνων πλήρης, 

εἴπερ τῇ τῆς πόλεως διαθέσει ήτα ἀρχεῖ εὐκυκέν. 'Εοικέν δὲ· ἡ γιρ; 

580 Καὶ μάλα, ἐφ'. | Οὐκοῦν καὶ πρὸς τούτοις ἐτί ἀποδόσουμεν τῷ 

αὐτῷ τοῖς πρὸτερον εἴπομεν, ὅτι ἀνάγκη καὶ εἰναὶ καὶ ἐτί 

μᾶλλον λίγον; ἔχεσθαι αὐτῷ ἠ πρὸτερόν διὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν φθονεῖ 

ὑπόστρω, ἀδίκῳ, ἀφίλῳ, ἀνοσίᾳ καὶ πάσης κακίας πανδοκεῖ τε 

καὶ τροφεῖ,

27.  

28. δοῦλος κτλ. I once too rashly placed καὶ κόλαξ after δοῦλος, in order to 

obtain a chiasmus, understanding δουλείας τῶν πονηροτάτων like δοῦλων δουλείας in 

VIII 560 C. Two inferior MSS have δου 

λείας καὶ θωσείας: but the inversion is 

not difficult, because the two notions are 

so closely allied: cf. (with Schneider) 

Euthyd. 302 B ἀπόροι τινα στροφήν ἔβεβην 

ου τε καὶ ἐστρεφήσων (where Schanz's brackets 'nemini nocent').

579 Ε 29 καὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας κτλ. 

Xenophon's Hiero is in effect a diluted commentary on this sentence: cf. also 

Gorg. 574 ε. ff., and especially 

Shakespeare's Macbeth IV 3. 50—99, V 3. 21— 

29. 32 σφαδασμὸν 'convulsive movements' is a rare word. The spelling σφ 

αδασμὸν appears in no MS except Α'; but 

the iota is attested from other sources: see 

Stephanus-Hase Thea. s. v. 

The verb σφαδασμεύσεων (μετὰ σπασμὸν πηδῶν 

Hesych.) denotes any nervous, twitching, 

convulsive motion, outside one's own 

control, the result of excitement, icar, 

pain, disease etc. (Stephanus-Hase l. c.). 

For the sense of this passage cf. 577 ε. ἡ. 

580 Α 2 το τρόπερον κτλ. 

The reference is to VIII 567 and supra 576 Α, 

Β. η τρόπερον might of course have been 

spared, and Herwerden more so cuts it 

out; but the sentence gains in weight by 

the addition.

22—2
5 καὶ ἡ ἀπάντων τοῦτων μᾶλιστα μὲν αὐτῷ δυστυχεῖ εἶναι, ἐπειτα δὲ καὶ τοὺς πλησίον αὐτῷ τοιούτους ἀπεργάζεσθαι. Οὐδεὶς σοι, ἡφα, τῶν νοῦν ἔχοντων ἀντερεῖ. 'Ἰθι δὴ μου, ἡφαν ἑγώ, νῦν ἥδη ὁσπερ ὁ διὰ τὸν κριτής ἀποφαίνεται, καὶ σὺ οὖτω, τὸς πρῶτος Β

580 Α, Β 7 ἡ φημὴ ('nuncdemum') is fully illustrated by Jecht de usu part. φημ in Pl. dialog. pp. 44 f.
8 ὁσπερ ὁ διὰ πάντων κτλ. The comparison is borrowed from the Athenian method of judging in musical or dramatic competitions. According to Petersen, who in his Dorpat program über die Preisträger der Grossen Dionysien zu Athen (1878) has carefully investigated the whole subject, the mode of procedure was as follows. Some time before the festival a number of qualified persons were selected by the βουλευτής in cooperation with the χορηγοί, and their names deposited in 10 urns, one for each φιλό. On the day of the contest, one name was drawn from each urn, and the ten judges thereby constituted, after witnessing the performance, each wrote down in his γραμματέων the order in which he arranged the several competitors. Of these ten judges five were next selected by lot, and the final verdict was given in accordance with the votes already registered by these five. The most important piece of evidence in support of this theory is furnished by Λύσιας 4. 3 ἐξουλήμεν δὲ ἡ μη ἀπολαξεῖν αὐτῷ κριτὴν Διονυσίος, ἵνα ὅλαν ἑνεκός ἐγένετο ἐμοὶ διηλαμβάνομεν, κράτας τὴν ἑμῖν φύλων καὶ νομᾶς, νῦν δὲ ἐγέραμε μὲν πάντα εἰς τὸ γραμματεύον, ἀπελαχε δὲ. In none of the ancient authorities, which are fully cited by Petersen, do we find the expression ὁ διὰ πάντων κριτής: but Petersen thinks the phrase may perhaps denote any one of the surviving five, who had lasted through all the stages, having been originally chosen by the Senate, and afterwards by lot on the two remaining opportunities. The singular number, according to Petersen, is generic, as in Law Λ 659 Α, Β and elsewhere. It is true of course that the matter could not always be brought to an immediate issue in this way; for, to take a single instance, in a case where there were, let us say, three competitors, the votes of the five judges might result in a tie between two competitors for each of the three prizes. Thus we might have:

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In such a case we must, I suppose, believe either that one of the five judges, who will then be ὁ διὰ πάντων κριτής, had a casting vote, or else—and this is the more reasonable view—that C was held to be disqualified for the first prize, and fresh scrutinies began. Petersen’s explanation is accepted in the main by Müller (Griech. Bühnentext. pp. 369—372), and, though to some extent conjectural, appears to me the best available, except in one point. ὁ διὰ πάντων κριτής can hardly be separated from ὁ διὰ πάντων ἀγῶν, a phrase which is quoted from Cratinus’ Ραποτῆς (Fr. 157 Kock), and explained as ὁ ἐκάθορος ἀγων in Bekker’s Anecdota p. 91. 10. The διὰ πάντων κριτής must surely mean the judge of the διὰ πάντων ἁγῶν, and if so, διὰ πάντων should be similarly interpreted in both phrases. In διὰ πάντων ἁγῶν it cannot mean "der durch alle Stadien oder besser durch alle Collegien hindurchgegangen war" (Petersen Λ. c. p. 24), but may possibly mean the last and greatest ἁγῶν, as τὸ διὰ πασῶν is the greatest interval in a scale of one octave. The expression is strangely reminiscent of the musical terms διὰ πεῖτε, διὰ τεττάρων, διὰ πασῶν etc., and in a competition between χοροῖς, it is natural enough that musical analogies should provide a name for the decisive struggle in which the claims of the competitors as it were contend with one another for the final victory. It will be seen that I understand ἁγων in the quotation from Cratinus as referring, not to the actual dramatic or musical representation, but to the final struggle in which the lot arbitrates between the rival claims, the earlier ἁγῶν being presumably that which is decided by the votes of the ten judges: so that the upshot of the whole matter will be that Socrates appeals to Glaucos, as the Archon might to one of the five judges in what we may be forgiven for calling the ‘grand finale,’
calling on him to pronounce tis prwtoi ktl. The word apofoiasetai is probably formal; cf. Laws 659 b and Dio Chrys. quoted by Petersen L. c. p. 7. For a further discussion of this passage see App. II [where see Mr E. Meyrick's suggestion].

560 b 10 πέντε άντις: viz. in all.

12. δισθάλουν κτλ. "in scene ingressi sunt" (Stallbaum). In dramatic and musical contests the victor's name was publicly proclaimed by a herald (see Müller L. c. p. 372 n. 2): hence μακεδω-

σώματα κτλ. pursues the comparison introduced by ὡσπερ ὃ διὰ πάντων κτλ. Cf. also Phil. 56 b πάντα ὅ ἡ φίλασα—υπὸ τοῦ ἀγαθόν πέμπω καὶ παρουσιάζω ὡς ἑαυτοῦ κάτω ὅστις πρώτων κτλ. (the result arrived at in the dialogue). For the verbal play in Ἀρίστων—τῶν ἀριστῶν cf. II 308 a n.

19 560 c εάν τε λαυνάσωσιν κτλ. is said with reference to the challenge in II 367 e.

580 c—583 a A second proof may be founded on our psychological theory. Let us agree to call the three varieties of soul, knowledge-loving, honour-loving, and gain-loving respectively, and let us distinguish three corresponding parts of men and of pleasures. If you ask any three men who represent these different classes, which of the three lives is the most pleasurable, each will pronounce in favour of his own. Which of them is right? The necessary requisites for deciding this, like every other question, are experience, intelligence or wisdom (φιλοσο-

φία), and argument. Now the lover of knowledge is the only one among the three in whom any of these qualifications is present, and he possesses them all. We therefore accept his verdict, and arrange accordingly, placing love of knowledge first, love of honour second, and love of money last.

580 d ff. 21 εἶν δὴ κτλ. After the political follows the psychological argument: see 577 c n.

22 δὲ ἤσι. My correction of δὲ δὲ (the reading of the best mss; see cr. n.) has been generally accepted. The reading δὲ δὲ is intrinsically unsatisfactory, and can only be an attempt to 'emend' δὲ δὲ. See Cl. Rev. XI p. 349.

24 ἰδέατα κτλ. 'it will admit also of another demonstration.' The subject is simply 'our thesis,' as stated just before in the conclusion of the first argument.
25 Τίνα ταύτην; Τήμε. τρίων ούτων τριταί καὶ ἵδοναί μοι ἡλύσονται, ἐνὸσ ἐκάστον μία ἴδια, ἐπιθυμίαι τε ὡςαύτως καὶ ἀρχαί. Πῶς λέγεις; ἐφη. Τὸ μὲν, φαμέν, ἦν ὁ μανθάνει ἀνθρωπος, τὸ δὲ ὃ θυμότατο τὸ δὲ τρίτον διὰ πολυνεῖαν εἰς οὐκ ἐσχομεν ὑπόματι 1 προσεπιέων ἴδιω αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ ὁ μέγιστον καὶ Ε' τρίχυρότατον εἴχεν ἐν αὐτῷ, τούτῳ ἐπονομάσαμεν ἐπιθυμητικὸν γὰρ αὐτὸ κεφάλκαιμεν διὰ σφοδρότητα τῶν περὶ τὴν εὐδοκίαν ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ πόσιν καὶ ἀφροδίσια καὶ ὧν ἄλλα τούτων ἀκόλουθα, καὶ φιλοχρήματον δὴ, ὅτι διὰ χρημάτων μᾶλιστα ἀποτελοῦνται 581 αἱ τοιαῦται ἐπιθυμίαι. Καί ὅρθως γ', ἐφη. Ἀρ' οὖν καὶ τὴν ἑδονήν αὐτῶν καὶ φιλίαν εἰ φαίμεν εἶναι τοῦ κέρδους, μάλιστ' ἀν εἰς ἐν κεφαλαῖον ἀπερειδοείμεθα τῷ ἄγγι, ὥστε τι ἡμῖν αὐτοὺς


(580 c). Cf. (with Stallbaum) ν 453 D ὃς γὰρ εὐθὺς ἔσκει καὶ Phaed. 69 ε τοὺς ἐπὶ πολλού ἄπασταναρέξει (unjustly bracketed by Schanz), where the subject similarly "latet in antegressis." Idiomatic expressions like ἰδιώσει (VI 497 c n.), δείξι etc. belong to a somewhat different category. It is impossible to extract any satisfactory sense out of the passage if (with Schneider alone of all the editors) we retain το ὁ λογιστικά (see cr. n.) or λογιστικὸν, the latter of which occurs before δείξει in many MSS. The Oxford editors, with much probability, suggest that λογιστικὸν is the relic of some such gloss on τριχά as we actually find in Par. K, viz. λογιστικόν. ἐπιθυμητικὸν θυμικὸν (sic).

25 ἵδοναί κτλ. Hitherto in the Repub. the words Pleasure and Desire have, with few exceptions (e.g. 1 328 D, vi 485 D, VIII 554 E el.), had an evil, or at least unmoral, connotation. The view now put forward, viz. that each ‘part’ of soul has its own pleasures and desires differing in point of virtue and vice (cf. vi 505 C) like the ‘parts’ to which they belong, is related not only to the theory of the Φιλοδίος but also to the Aristotelian analysis of pleasure in Eth. Nic. x cc. 3—5.

26 ἴδια. Paris A has ἴδια—see cr. n.—"multo minus concinne" (Schneider). Cf. ἴδιος αὐτῶν infr ea.

27 ὄρχαι κτλ. Any one of the three may hold rule in the soul. The reference in ὑπ' is to IV 436 A ff.

580 E 29 δ μέγιστον κτλ.: viz. ἐπιθυμία. The words τούτῳ ἐπονομάσαμεν mean ‘we gave the name of ἐπιθυμία to this part,’ when we called it ἐπιθυμητικόν (ἐπιθυμητικόν γὰρ κτλ.). Cf. (with Stallbaum) Thaet. 185 C φ τὸ ἐστὸν ἐπονομάζει, Crat. 440 b and elsewhere. J. and C. wrongly understand τούτῳ as instrumental. The variant τούτῳ has little authority and is much inferior; still worse is τούτῳ which Madvig (Adv. Cr. 1 p. 431) 'suscipitur suisse.'

30 ἐπιθυμητικὸν κτλ. IV 439 D. The lowest part of soul was called φιλοχρήματον in IV 436 E et al.; see next note.

581 A 4 δὲ καὶ κεφαλαίον κτλ. Plato recognised three varieties in το ἐπιθυμητικόν, corresponding respectively to the oligarchical, democratic, and tyrannical man (VIII 558 D n.). In the present chapter these varieties again recede into the background. This apparent ‘Inconsequence,’ together with other reasons, led Krohn to suppose that the whole of this proof, as well as the next, was written at a different time from the rest of Books VIII and IX (Pl. St. pp. 221 ff. Cf. Pfleiderer Zur Lösung etc. p. 75. Krohn has since retracted his view: see his Pl. Fr. p. 104f). But the unity of the ἐπιθυμητικὸν οἱ such has never been sacrificed, since each of its varieties are also expressions of desire; and Plato is therefore fully justified in setting it over against φιλόσοφον and φιλοκόμοι. To have compared each of its varieties separately with the two higher principles would have greatly lengthened and complicated Plato’s proof; and he
reserves this point for another mode of treatment at a later opportunity (§ 87 ch.). Why does he select the word φιλοχρηματον (s. φιλοκερδῆς) to denote the epithet serious here? He wishes to find a single word to contrast with φιλόσοφον and φιλόνικον (s. φλόγων). The word epithethenikos itself is excluded, because we have agreed that the φιλόσοφον and φιλόνικον have also epithetwmata of their own (§ 80 d), and, as φιλοχρηματον made its appearance in each of the three forms of epithetum (VIII 551 A, 553 C, 555 A, 558 D, 561 A, 568 D, 572 D), it is the best summary description available. Plato himself claims no more for it, and that is why he says μάλιστα δὲ ἐπὶ ἐν κεφαλαιο ἀπερείδεισθαι. Cf. Grimmel de ruii. Pl. comp. et unit. pp. 73 ff.

7 οὐ—μένοι. See on I 339 b.

581 B 9 φιλόνικον. For the spelling of this word see VIII 548 C n. and my note on Prot. 336 E. The present passage and also 586 C, D below conclusively prove that Plato connected the word with νίκη and not with νίκος, from which indeed it could not be derived without doing violence to the laws of the Greek language (cf. Schanz Vol. vi p. x). Now Plato certainly did not write νίκη, but νίκης: and it is therefore highly improbable that he wrote φιλόνικος. φιλόνικος has also considerable support from the inferior MSS of the Republic. The substitution of ei for long ι became extremely common in imperial times, especially in proper names derived from νίκη (Meisterhans3 p. 49), and even even κωρ and the like are found on late inscriptions (e.g. CIG 1385). In the case of φιλόνικος the error was apparently established by Plutarch's time: see his Ages. 5-4. The meaning 'lover of strife' is often unsuitable in Plato; where it suits, it is secondary and derivative, for the lover of victory must also love strife: non sine pulvere palma. For an exhaustive discussion of the question the student may be referred to Schmidt Ethik d. alten Griechen i pp. 386—391. While admitting that 'φιλόνικος and its derivatives are far more frequent in Attic writers,' Schmidt is inclined to admit the existence of φιλόνικος as a separate word, connected with νίκη as a by-form—so he thinks—of νίκος; but νίκη, at least in classical Greek, is only a conjecture on Aeschylus Ag. 1378 and Eum. 903: and in Plato, at all events, there is, I believe, no case in which φιλόνικος does not give the meaning required by the context.

12 ἡκίστα τούτων: 'less than any of them,' lit. 'least of these' three εἶδος of soul. There is no good reason for suspecting the text; for although strictly speaking the φιλόσοφον can only care for σοφία, the φιλόσοφος, who presently (581 C ff.) takes the place of the φιλόσοφος, is not wholly indifferent to either (582 B, C): he merely cares much less for them than the φιλόνικος and φιλοχρηματος do. τούτων is necessary to bring out the contrast: ἡκίστα alone, proposed by Baiter, or ἡκίστα πάντων (W. H. Thompson) would express too much.

τὰ πρῶτα τριττὰ γένη εἶναι, φιλόσοφον, φιλόνικον, φιλοκερδές; Κομίδη γε. Καὶ ἥδονών δὴ τρία εἰδή, ὑποκείμενα ἐν ἐκάστῳ τούτων: Πάνω γε. Οἶσθ' οὖν, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, ὅτι εἰ 'θέλοις τρεῖς 20 τοιούτους ἀνθρώπους ἐν μέρει ἐκαστον ἀνερτῶν, τῆς τούτων τῶν βιῶν ἥδοστος, τὸν ἐαυτὸν ἐκαστὸς μᾶλιστα ἐγκομιάσεται; ὁ γε χρηματιστικὸς πρὸς 1 τὸ κερδαίνει τὴν τοῦ τιμᾶσθη ἥδονὴν ἢ τὴν D τοῦ μανθάνεις οὐδένος ἁξίων φήσει εἶναι, εἰ μὴ εἰ τι αὐτῶν ἀργύριον ποιεῖ. Ἀληθῆ, ἐφι. Τὶ δὲ τὸ φιλότιμος; ἢν δ' ἐγὼ· οὐ τὴν μὲν 25 ἀπὸ τῶν χρημάτων ἥδονὴν φορτεκὴν τινα ἤγειται, καὶ αὐ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ μανθάνεις, ὃ τι μὴ μάθημα τιμήν φέρει, κατινὸν καὶ φλαυρίαν; Οὔτως, ἐφι, ἐφεῖ. Τὸν δὲ φιλόσοφον, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, τι οἰώμεθα τὰς

18. ὑποκέμενα AΞ: ὑποκέμενον ΑΠ q. 21. γε Hermann cum M: τε Α cum ceteris. 27. τί αἰώμεθα Graser: παώμεθα codd.

γὰρ εἰς μᾶλστα οἱ προσχυτες (sc. βιῶν), δ' τε νῦν εἰρήμενος (i.e. ὁ ἀπολαυστικὸς) καὶ δ' πολιτίκος (i.e. ὁ φιλότιμος here) καὶ τρίτος ὁ θεωρητικὸς. 

λέγομεν κτλ. 'And for this reason we say that the primary classes of men are also three in number' etc. λέγομεν (see cr. n.) is the reading of all except ΑΠq, and Schneider is right, I think, in retaining it, not only because these three γένη have been named before (1v 433 ε), but still more because the classification was apparently a familiar one: see Stewart on Arist. l.c. For the orthographical error see Intro. § 5. I take τριττὰ as predicative: the hyperbaton is not, I think, a difficult one, because the stress of the voice falls on τριττᾰ, and to my ear it sounds more idiomatic than τὰ πρῶτα γένη τριττὰ εἶναι would be. A possible alternative would be to take εἶναι with φιλόσοφον κτλ. ('that the three primary classes of men are lovers of wisdom' etc.), but this is somewhat less natural and satisfactory, in view especially of καὶ ἥδονών κτλ. The words τὰ πρῶτα mean 'the first' or 'original,' as in Aristotle's πρῶτα ἢθ, the Stoic πρῶτα ἀρεταὶ and the like: it would be possible to subdivide each of these primary classes into δεύτερα γένη, τρίτα γένη etc. Jowett, reading λέγωμεν, translates 'we may begin by assuming;' but it is harsh to separate τὰ πρῶτα from γένη, and the adverbial τὰ πρῶτα generally, if not always, refers back to something said or done 'at the beginning.' Cf. Shorey A. J. Ph. xiii p. 366.

18. ὑποκέμενα. The singular ὑποκέμενον (see cr. n.), retained by Schneider and all other editors except Baiter, is questionable Greek. In such cases the adjective, participle, or verb agrees with the whole and not with the part. ὑποκέμενα is little inferior to ὑποκέμενον in authority and the corruption was easy. Cf. viii 559 ε n. 21 τὸν ἐαυτὸν κτλ. Cf. Pind. Frgg. 215 Bergk ἄλλο δ' ἀλλαιον νόμιμα, σφετέραν δ' αἰνεῖ δικαν ἐκαστον καὶ Κοίν. 484 Ε ff. 

δ' γε. See cr. n. Hermann's conjecture is, I now think, right. We may perhaps explain τε as ἀνακόλουθον (cf. 11 373 β n.) and taken up in τὶ δὲ τὸ φιλότιμος; κτλ., but γε is much livelier and better: 'the money-maker, at all events' etc. Cf. viii 556 Α n. If γε is right, we should not, as Hermann does, make the sentence interrogative. 

581 D 23 ἀργύριον ποιεῖ: 'produces money.' τοπεῖ (Badham) is a neat conjecture; but the text is sound: cf. χρηματα τοιεῖν Arist. Pol. A q. 125b 11. 26 καπνὸν καὶ φλαυρίαν. This contemptuous, half-proverbial, use of καπνὸς is illustrated by Blaydes on Ar. Clouds 320.

581 D, E 27 τὸν δὲ φιλόσοφον κτλ. 'But the lover of knowledge, said I, what value shall we suppose that he assigns to the other pleasures compared with that of knowing how the truth stands and always enjoying a kindred sort of pleasure while he learns? Will he not think them very far away?' (viz. from ἥ τοι εἰδέναι
κτλ.). The *χρηματιστικός* considers the pleasures of honour and learning *οδηγός* δίκαι, compared with his own; the *φιλόσοφος* similarly, *μικτάς μεταλλάς*; what then does the *φιλόσοφος* consider his pleasures to be compared with the others? What are his pleasures? Let us see. He either *κνώσος* (i.e. has learnt) the truth in any given instance or is getting to know (i.e. is learning) it; his pleasures are therefore that of knowing and that of learning, i.e. *τουσώτιν τι τής ἱδώνις*, for the pleasures of learning are akin to those of knowing. From each of these pleasures those of gain and fame are far removed.

With the general sense, cf. *Phaed.* 63 D: for the use of *εν εν 1V 420 C, D*; for *τουσώτιν τιν τής ἱδώνις* Xen. *An.* 17. 5 ἐν τοιούτῳ εἶναι τοῦ κοινοῦ προσώπου: and for the position of *τήν ἱδώνις* Bra. *de hyperb.* *Pl.* 11 p. 4, where many examples of similar hyperbata are quoted. The MSS read *ποιμαθεα* (see *et. al.*), but Graser's emendation (in my opinion certainly right). I have taken *τής ἱδώνις* with *τουσώτιν τιν*; others wrongly, as I believe, join it to *οδ* *πάνυ τόρρων.* See on the whole passage *App. III.*

581 B 29 οὐ πάνυ πόρρως: sc. *οὐλομέθα νομίζειν*; as before.

30 *ἀναγκαίας: necessarius, quippe ceteris nihil indigentem nisi necessitas cogeret* (after Stallbaum). Hence *τῷ* ὄντι: see on VI 511 B.

31 *δε εἴδειναι: we should not suppose (όκεσθαι), but be sure of it. Badham's conjecture *δείκνυ* (ad *Euthyd.* p. 58) is wholly needless and inept.

32 *ἀμφισβητοῦνται: are in dispute* (Jowett). For this somewhat irregular use of the passive cf. Cope's *Rhetoeris of Aristotle* I p. 290. It is tempting to make the verb middle (*dispute with one another*), as in *Laws* 957 D, and suppose that the pleasures are personified, as the two lives are in *Prodicus' apologue of Heracles at the cross-roads* (Xen. *Mem.* II 21 ff.). *άυτῶν* in *τίς αυτών* will then mean *τῶν ἱδονῶν*, and not *τῶν ἄρθρων*. But on such a theory, instead of *αὐτὸς δὲ βῖος*, we should rather have had *αὐτολ* of *βίος*; and on the whole it is doubtless better to acquiesce in the ordinary interpretation, which is also more in harmony with *τρίων ὑπον τῶν ἄρθρων* κτλ. below.

582 B 9 τῶν ἐτέρων. *Cum simul utrisque philosophum praecert expe- rentia, quoniam Socrates quis omnium experimentissimus esset voluptatum roga- verat* (viz. in 582 A τρίων ὑπον κτλ.) Schneider. The English translators take τῶν ἐτέρων as 'the other' (Jowett), viz. 'gain'; but that would be τῶ τέρων.
10 ἄρξαμένω· τῷ δὲ φιλοκρείτει, ὅπη πέφυκε τά ὄντα μανθάνωτε, τῆς ἤδονῆς ταύτης, ὅσ γλυκεία ἐστίν, οὐκ ἀνάγκη γεύεσθαι οὐδὲ ἐμπείρο γίγνεσθαι, μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ προθυμομένων οὐ λέγειν. Πολὺ ἄρα, ἦν δἐ ἐγὼ, διαφέρει τοῦ γε φιλοκρείτου ὁ φιλόσοφος ἐμπειρεὶ ἄμφοτέρων τῶν ἤδονῶν. Πολὺ 1 μέντοι. Τί δὲ τοῦ φιλοτιμοῦ; Κ
15 ἄρα μᾶλλον ἀπειρός ἐστι τῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ τιμᾶσθαι ἤδονής ἢ ἐκείνου τῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ φρονεῖν; Ἄλλα τιμή μὲν, ἐφή, ἐαντίπ έχονται έπι δὲ ἐκατός ἀρμήκε, πάσιν αὐτοῖς ἔπεται καὶ γὰρ ὁ πλούσιος ὑπὸ πολλῶν τιμᾶται καὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος καὶ ὁ σοφός. ὡστε ἀπὸ τοῦ τιμᾶσθαι, ὅτι ἤδονής, πάντες τῆς ἤδονῆς ἐμπειροῦ τῆς δὲ τοῦ ὄντος 20 θέας, οἶνω ἤδονήν ἔχει, ἀδύνατον ἄλλῳ γεγενός πλὴν τῷ φιλο-

582 C 14 τί δὲ τοῦ φιλοτιμοῦ; 'and how does he stand in relation to the lover of honour?' Supply διαφέρει ὁ φιλόσοφος, or rather a more general idea of comparison out of διαφέρει· cf. § 85 D and X 597 D. We must beware of translating 'but what of the lover of honour?' (D. and V.), as if τοῦ φιλοτιμοῦ were here equivalent to περὶ τοῦ φιλοτιμοῦ (V 470 A n.). This error caused Groen v. Prinsterer (Proop. Pl. p. 210) to suggest ἄρα μᾶλλον ἐμπειροῦ ἐστι τῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ φρονεῖν ἤδονῆς, ἢ ἐκείνου τῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ τιμᾶσθαι; with which the translation of Davies and Vaughan also agrees. The subject of ἀπειρός ἐστι is of course ὁ φιλόσοφος, and ἐκείνοι means ὁ φιλότιμος.

18 ὁ ἀνδρεῖος represents ὁ φιλότιμος: cf. ἀνδρεία 582 E and πολεμικόν 583 A n. 19 τοῦ ὄντος. The presence of such metaphysical terms in this and the succeeding proof is what chiefly encourages Pfeiderer (Zur Lösung etc. pp. 74 ff.) and some others to maintain that §§ 586—
587 were written at a later period than the rest of this Book, most of which they believe to be earlier than V 471 C—VII inclusive. See also on 581 A. Others with much more reason find in these expressions a strong argument in defence of the structural unity of the Republic; for it would seem that τῆς τοῦ ὄντος θέας and the like presuppose the discussions of Book VII. See Zeller 11 p. 561 n.

582 D 22 κρινεῖ. Bekker's conjecture κρινεῖ is unnecessary.

μετά γε φρονήσεως corresponds to φρονήσει in 582 A. Plato is taking the three requisites in order. The εἰμπειρία of the φιλόσοφος is alone intelligent, and, without φρόνησις, εἰμπειρία is no more than a sort of ἐκείνος τρόπως (Phaed. 260 E: cf. Gorg. 463 B). It is indeed quite true, as Nettleship reminds us (Lect. and Rem. 11 p. 321), that the higher kind of man learns more from the experience which he shares with the lower kind without having to go through nearly the same amount of it.

23 ἄλλα μὲν κτλ. Bosanquet observes that "this is perhaps a good argument to prove that the man of culture is pre-eminently competent to appraise the value of different ideals of life, but it is not a good argument to prove that he is a good judge of degrees of agreeable feeling in lives fundamentally different from his own" (similarly Nettleship l.c. p. 321). True; but that is not the point. Plato is attempting to prove that the φιλό-

σοφος is the best judge, not of 'the degrees of agreeable feeling' experienced, in one particular kind of life, but of the relative pleasure of three different kinds of life, and his reasoning, granted that pleasures can be compared at all, is perfectly legitimate. Each of the three men pronounces his own life not merely
pleasant, but pleasanter than those of the other two: how then are we to decide? Nothing but argument will help us, and the φιλόσοφος is the only one of the triad who possesses that weapon. It should be observed that throughout this part of the discussion Plato takes it for granted that some kinds of pleasure are in point of fact more pleasant than others. At present his object is to discover what these are, but in the argument which is still to come (582 b ff.), he grapples with the metaphysical question—for to him it was a question, not of psychology, but of metaphysics—and attempts to show that pleasures contain more or less of pleasure according as there is in them more or less of truth.

26 ἐφαμεν κτλ. The reference is to 582 A. λόγος means 'rational arguments,' 'reasoning' (cf. vi. 511 b ι.), and τοῦτο is of course τοῦ φιλόσοφου, not τοῦ κρι'-

30 φιλόνικος. See on 581 b.

31 ἀνάγκη. ἐφη κτλ. supplies the apology to ἐπείδη—λόγοι: cf. supra 577 b ι.

583 A ἢ ὁ κριτής κτλ. ὁ κριτής is the φιλόσοφος, as aστού in the next sentence shews. There is therefore no reference to 580 B. For πολεμικός Hesverden proposes φιλόνικος, very arbitrarily: see on 582 C. It is worth noting that the conclusion of this argument incidentally furnishes a further reply to the objection raised by Adimantis in iv 419 Α. ζ., viz. that Plato’s guardians cannot possibly be happy.

583 B—585 A. Our third and crowning proof is as follows. All the pleasures except those of the wise (φρονών) are untrue and impure. We must recognize the existence of three distinct states, viz. Pleasure and Pain, which are positive and opposite, and the Neutral state, which is negative and intermediate. Men frequently identify the intermediate condition with Pleasure; but they are mistaken when they do so, for there are some pleasures, e.g. those of smell, which have a positive character of their own. Now bodily pleasures, so-called, together with the corresponding pleasures of anticipation, are for the most part merely ways of escape from pain, and belong to the neutral
state. They are falsely judged pleasant through juxtaposition and contrast with positive Pain.

533 B ff. 9 ταῦτα μὲν κτλ. The political and psychological λόγοι have registered their votes, and it only remains for us to hear the verdict of the metaphysical, to which Plato characteristically assigns the greatest value (καθο —πτωμάτων below). See on 577 C. Plato's theory of true or pure or false or impure pleasures reappears in the Philebus. Both dialogues teach (1) that Pleasure consists in πλήρωσις, (2) that the majority of bodily pleasures are not pleasures at all, but only λυθ' ἀπαλ- λαγαί, and (3) that there are other—true or pure—pleasures (e.g. smell) which are not preceded or followed by pain. The last generation of scholars mostly placed the República after the Philebus. I am inclined to agree with more recent critics in thinking it earlier (see on VI 506 B and Jackson in Journal of Philology XXV pp. 65—82), but the greater degree of elaboration which marks the treatment of this subject in the Philebus may be and has been accounted for on either hypothesis. Aristotle also touches on the question of Mixed and Unmixed Pleasures in Eth. Nic. VII 12. 1152 b ff, especially 1153 b 35—1153a 7, ib. 15. 1154a 22—3 31 and again in X 2—5, especially 2. 1173a 22—b 20. The present section is further important in the history of ethics for its clear distinction between the μέγα καθαρίας and the two extremes; a distinction already noted by the Cyrenaics (RPl. § 265b) and afterwards adopted by Epi-curus (ib. § 380 ff.).

δύο and δίς refer of course to the two preceding proofs 577 b—580 c and 580 c—583 A. 10 τὸ δὲ τρίτον κτλ. The libations at banquets (according to the Schol. on Phil. 66 D; cf. also Schol. on Charm. 167 A and on Pind. Isthm. 5. 7 with Hesych. s. v. τρίτος κρατῆρι and Pollux vi 15. 100) were offered in the following sequence: (1) to Olympian Zeus and the Olympian gods, (2) to the heroes, (3) to Zeus Soter. Hence the proverb τὸ τρίτον τῷ σωτηρί, with which Plato sometimes introduces the third or culminating stage in an argument, demonstration, or the like (Phil. and Charm. ii. cc., Laws III 692 a, Ἐβρ. VII 340 A). In the present instance there is also an allusion to the Olympic games, as appears from Ὀλυμπικάς ("Olympic-wise"). Stilbaum conjectures that competitors at Olympia were in the habit of making their third libation "non uni tantum Δι οὐσία, sed sicuti consentaneum fut, τῷ σωτηρί τε καὶ τῷ Ὀλυμπικῷ Δι"; but there is no authority for this idea. Is Plato thinking of the πένταθλον, in which it was necessary to win in three (probably leaping, discus-throwing, javelin-throwing) out of the five events in order to obtain the prize (see P. Gardner in J. of H. Studies i p. 217, where the evidence is quoted)? Schneider takes this view: but the words τῶν πτωμάτων below make it clear that the reference is only to wrestling. The point manifestly is, that as in wrestling the third throw decided the contest between two athletes (Schol. on Aesch. Ἐμπ. 593 et al.), so here the δικαιο logos after he has thrice defeated the ὀικός (cf. also Euthyd. 377 C). I think Ὀλυμπιάκας is intended to suggest that the contest between justice and injustice is the greatest of all moral, as the Olympic was of all physical, παλαιότατα: the victors ἵσσουσι τοῦ μακαριστοῦ ἱον θν αἱ Ὀλυμπίται εἰ σὺν μακαριστῶν (V 465 D n.). Compare Pind. Ch. 235 b τῶν τριῶν παλαιώτατων τῶν ὧν ἀγρίθοι Ὀλυμπιάκων εν νενυχθήναι. Pluto adds the epithet τῷ Ὀλυμπικῷ δὲ ζευο: in an Olympic contest Zeus Soter is also in the truest sense Olympian too, although in banquets Zeus Olympius received only the first, and not also the third libation. With similar and even greater emphasis on the word Ὀλυμπικῷ Pindar prays for an Ὀλυμπικός victory for Phylaccidas in the words ἅ ἐν τρίτον σωτηρί παρακλησαί Ὀλυμπικῷ Ἀγιάς κατὰ ἐπίθεσιν μελ- φόντων αὐδᾶς (Isthm. i.c.: see Donaldson ad loc.). 11 οὐδὲ παναλήθης — καθαρά. In what sense is pleasure said by Plato to be pure and true? It is pure when unadulterated by pain, whether antecedent, present or consequent; and there is also perhaps in Plato's use of the epithet 'pure' a relic or hint of the old half-
ceremonial, half-religious idea of ‘pure from taint’: see App. III and Rohde
Psychē II pp. 281 ff. al. But in its
deepest signification the truth or purity of
Pleasure involves the ontological theory that
soul and its sustenance (knowledge etc.)
have more part in Being and Truth
than Body and its food: the spiritual and
not the material is the true. See also on
586 E and especially Nettleship Lect. and
Rem. II pp. 322—327, where the farther
bearings of Plato’s theory are admirably
traced.
12 πλή τῆς τοῦ φρονίμου. Cf. Phaed. 69 B, C.
ἐκθεαγραφήμεν. See on II 365 C.
Bodily pleasure is ἐκθεαγραφήμεν in the
fullest sense of the word, because it de-
pends on contrast and balance of pleasure
with pleasure, and pleasure with pain
(584 λ), just as perspective produces its
effect by the contrast of light and shade
(586 B). Similarly in Phaed. 69 B Plato
hists that the so-called virtue which con-
sists in bartering one body pleasure for
another is σκιάγραφα τίς—καὶ οὐδὲν
ύγις οὖδ’ ἄλλης ἔχονα, and ib. 81 B the
soul is said to be γεγονετέμενη ἦν’
αὐτῶ (sc. τοῦ σώματος) ὥστε τοῖς ἐπιθυ-
μοι καὶ ἡρωναῖ. Cf. also Phil. 44 C αὐτὸ
tοῦτο αὐτής (sc. τῆς ἡρωναῖς) ἐπαγγε-
λικόν γούτεμα, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ἡρωνη ἔχειν. In
each of these passages there is probably
a conscious reminiscence of Orphic doc-
trines: see next note and App. IV.
13 τῶν σοφῶν alludes, I believe, to
Orphic or Pythagorean ascetics, who
preached the doctrine σῶμα σῶμα and
regarded bodily pleasure as essentially
false and impure: see especially Rohde
Psychē II pp. 121—130, and 161—166.
Evidence for this view is given in App.
IV, where the other interpretations are
also discussed.
14 κατοι is hardly ‘et vero’ and
surely (as Kugler takes it de part. vol etc. p. 18, comparing Gorg. 452 E, Theaet.
187 C al.), but rather ‘quamquam’ and
yet’ (sc. ‘strong as were the other two
proofs,’ or the like): “und das ware doch
wohl” Schneider.
583 C 17 τοῦ μητέχαρεν κτλ. This
τρίτη διάθεσις is described in Phil. 32 E
ff.: cf. lb. 42 E ff. and Tim. 64 C ff.
18 μεταξύ κτλ.: ‘something which is
intermediate between these two, a sort of
repose of the soul so far as these are con-
cerned.’ Herferdens is fall to cancel
either μεταξύ or en μέσῳ: but the fulness
of expression is characteristic. See Intro.
§ 5.
19 ἡρωναῖ: whereas ἀπόκ. ἡρων is
καθάρεις 583 E.
20 ἄρ’ οὖ. Three inferior MSS have
ἄρ’ οὖν, which is easier; but ἄρ’ οὖ is much
more lively, and not more abrupt than
c.e.g. πολεμοῦμεν τῷ μετὰ τούτῳ, ὥς 
Πλα-
κων; II 373 E (quoted by Schneider).
The stylistic effect is exactly like Lucre-
tius’ ‘Nonne vides’ etc.: c.e.g. II 163 al.
ἐν οἷς, οταν λυπώνται, τὸ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι καὶ τὴν ἰσχυῖαν τοῦ
tοιοῦτου ἐγκομιάζουσιν ὡς ἠδιστον, οὐ τὸ χαίρειν. Τούτο γὰρ,
ἐφι, τότε ἦδο ἵσως καὶ ἀγαπητὸν γίνεται, ἰσχυῖα. Καὶ οταν
30 παύσηται ἃρα, ἐστον, χαίρου τις, ἢ τὸς ἡδονῆς ἰσχυῖα λυπηρὸν Ε
ἐσται. Ἡσος, ἐφι. 'Ὁ μεταξὺ ἃρα νῦν δὴ ἀμφοτέρων ἐφαμεν
ἐναι, τὴν ἰσχυῖαν, τούτῳ ποτε ἀμφότερα ἐσται, λύπη τε καὶ ἡδονή.
Ἐοικεν. Ἡ καὶ δυνατὸν τὸ μηδέτερα ὃν ἀμφότερα γίνεσθαι;
Οὐ μοι δοκεί. Καὶ μὴν τὸ γε ἢδο ἐν ψυχῇ γινόμενου καὶ τὸ
35 λυπηρὸν κίνησις τις ἀμφοτέρω ἐστον. ἢ οὐ; Ναἰ. | Τὸ δὲ μήτε 584
λυπηρὸν μήτε ἢδο οὐχὶ ἰσχυῖα μέντοι καὶ ἐν μέσῳ τούτων ἐφανὴ
ἀρτι; Ἐφικη γὰρ. Πῶς οὖν ὁρθῶς ἔστι τὸ μὴ ἄλγειν ἢδο ἡρεί-
σθαι ἢ τὸ μὴ χαίρειν ἀνιαρόν; Οὐδαμῶς. Οὐκ ἔστιν ἃρα τούτῳ,
5 ἀλλὰ φαίνεται, ἣν δ’ ἐγὼ, παρὰ τὸ ἄλγειν ἢδο καὶ παρὰ τὸ ἢδον
27. τὸ Α'Π: om. Α1.

583 δ 28 τούτῳ γάρ κτλ. The argument is as follows. While suffering
pain, men are apt to look upon the ἰσχυῖα from pain as the highest pleasure. Per-
haps (suggests Glauco) at such a time the neutral state is in point of fact found
positively pleasant and welcome by them. Socrates proceeds to show (by a reductio
ad absurdist proof) that Glauco's sugges-
tion is untenable. 'In that case,' he argues, ἰσχυῖα from pleasure will in like
manner be positively painful: and thus
the neutral state, which we declared to be
between the two extremes, will upon oc-
casions be both, viz. both pleasure and
pain.' Glauco allows that that which is
neither cannot become both, and Socrates
proceeds: In this instance the 'both' is a
κίνησις, and the 'neither' a ἰσχυῖα, and
lies, as we have seen, between the two: so
that it is wrong to identify the absence of
pain with pleasure or the absence of
pleasure with pain. Hence your sugges-
tion is erroneous: οὐκ έστιν ἃρα τοῦτο,
ἀλλὰ φαίνεται κτλ. See below on
584 Α. The argument is really com-
plete when Glauco says οὐ μοι δοκεί,
but the words καὶ μὴν τὸ γε ἢδο introduces a new reason for refusing to
identify ἰσχυῖα with pleasure or with pain,
by explicitly stating for the first time that
pleasure and pain are each of them a κί
νησις. ἰσχυῖα καὶ κίνησις are mutually
exclusive notions. Cf. Phel. 43 D—44 B,
where the reasoning follows nearly the
same lines. See also next note.

583 ε 32 ἀμφότερα—ἡδονή. Does
Plato mean that the neutral state will
sometimes be both painful and pleasant
at one and the same time,—or only at
one time painful and at another pleasant?
According to Gorg. 497 C ff., in eating
when hungry, drinking when thirsty
etc., we cease from pain and pleasure
simultaneously, so that in such a case
the neutral state will appear to be both
pleasant and painful. But the rest of
the argument does not support this inter-
pretation; and in the corresponding passage
of the Philebus (43 D) we have τὸ ἀμ-
φότερα τούτων εὖ γὰρ ἡμῖν ὡς τὰ ἀτερα
gένοτο ἄν. The simpler view should there-
fore be adopted.

35 κίνησις. In Pleasure the κί
νησις is πλήρωσις, in pain, κένωσις, as is after-
wards pointed out (585 Α n.).

584 Α 2 οὐχί—μέντοι κτλ. See
1 339 B n. It is safer to construe ὅρθως
with ἡξειδοθαι than with έστι (as D. and
V. translate). Cf. Ethikph. 5 Ταῦτα
ὁρθῶς ἢ εἰ ὡς ἡγεῖμην, where ὅρθως belongs
to γινώμενα, or to a γινώμενα
understood.

4 οὐκ ἔστιν κτλ. contradicts Glauco's
suggestion τούτῳ γάρ—ἡσιχα 583 D.
There is no reality about this (as you
suggest): it is only a φάσμα— the neu-
tral state appearing pleasant by the side
of pain, being, in fact, a sort of σκαυγα-
φία, as we said in 583 B. On γορπελα
see 583 B n.
άλγεινόν τότε, ἢ ἴσιχία, καὶ οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς τούτων τῶν φαντασμάτων πρὸς ἡδονής ἀλήθειαν, ἀλλὰ ἱοτεία τις. 'Ως γονύ ὁ λόγος, ἐφη, Ἔ σημαινε. 'Ἰδε τοίνυν, ἐφην ἐγώ, ἢ ἡδονής, αἱ οὐκ ἐκ λυπῶν εἰσίν, ἵνα μὴ πολλάκις οἰδήθης ἐν τῷ παράνυ τούτῳ παρεκνέα, ἡδονής μὲν παύλαν λύπης εἶναι, λύπην δὲ ἡδονής. Ποῦ δὴ, ἐφη, καὶ ποιῶς λέγεις; Πολλαί μὲν, εἴπον, καὶ άλλα, μάλιστα δ' εἰ θέλεις ἐννοήσαι τάς περὶ τάς ὀσμᾶς ἡδονάς. αὐτοὶ γὰρ οὖ προλυπηθέντες ἐξαίφνης ἀμήχανο τὸ μέγεθος ἥγηνεται πανσάμεια το λύπην οὐδεμίαν ἀκαταλείπουσιν. Ἀληθέστατα, ἐφη. Μὴ ἀρα πειθώμεθα καθαρὰν ἡδονήν εἶναι τὴν λύπην ἀπαλλαγήν, μηδὲ λύπην τὴν ἡδονής. Μὴ γάρ. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, εἴπον, αἱ γε διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχήν τείνουσαι καὶ λεγόμεναι ἡδονάς σχεδὸν αἱ πλεῖσται τα καὶ μέγιστα τούτου το εἴδους εἰσί, λυπῶν τινὲς ἀπαλλαγαί. Εἰσὶ γάρ. Οὐκ—

8. ἐφην ἐγὼ ὦτ: ἐφην δ' ἐγὼ ΑΠΕΣ (sed δ panceto notavit Α²): δ' ἐγὼ χ.
οὖν καὶ αἱ πρὸ μελλόντων τοῦτων ἐκ προσδοκίας γνωμόμεναι προήγοισι λέγεις τε καὶ προλυπήσεις κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχουσιν; Κατὰ ταὐτὰ.

Χ. Οὔσθ' οὖν, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, οἷα εἰσίν 1 καὶ δ' μάλιστα ὀλικασίαν; D Τῷ; ἔφη. Νομίζεις τε, εἰπον, ἐν τῇ φύσει εἶναι τὸ μὲν ἀνω, τὸ δὲ κάτω, τὸ δὲ μέσον; Ἕγογε. Οἰεῖ οὖν ἂν τινα ἐκ τοῦ κατὸ φερόμενον πρὸς μέσον ἄλλο τι οἴεσθαι ἢ ἀνω φέρεσθαι; καὶ ἐν 25 μέσῳ στάντα, ἀφορώθη ὁδὴν ἐνυκταὶ, ἀλλοθ' πον ἂν ἡ ἡγεσία εἶναι ἢ ἐν τῷ ἀνω, μὴ ἐωρακότα τὸ ἄλλον ἀνω; Μὰ Δι' οὐκ ἐγογε, ἔφη, ἀλλ' οἶμαι οἴησθαι ἂν τὸν τοιοῦτον. 'Ἀλλ' εἰ πάλιν γ', ἔφην, φέροντο, 1 κάτω τ' ἂν οἴοτο φέρεσθαι καὶ ἡλιθῆς' οἴοτο; Εἴ θάρ όψιν; Οὐκοῦν ταῦτα πάσχοι ἂν πάντα διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐμπειροῖς 30 εἴναι τὸν ἀληθινὸν ἀνω τε ὑποτασσόμεθα κατὰ μέσον καὶ κάτω; Δῆλον δὴ. Θαυμάζοις ἂν οὖν, εἰ καὶ ἀπεφευράληθεις περὶ πολλὸν τε ἄλλων μὴ ὑγιεῖς δόξας ἔχοντι πρὸς τῇ ἡδονῇ καὶ λιπῇ καὶ τῷ μεταξὺ τούτων οὕτω διάκεινται, ὡστε ὅταν μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ λυπηρὸν φέρονται, ἡλιθῆς τε | οἴονται καὶ τῷ ὑπὸ λυπούνται, ὅταν δὲ ὑπὸ 585 λύπης ἐπὶ τὸ μεταξὺ, σφόδρα μὲν οἴονται πρὸς πληρώσει τε καὶ ἡδονή γίγνεσθαι, ὡστε δὲ πρὸς μέλαν φαινὸν ἀποσκοποῦντες

27. Ἀλλ' ἂν οὖν ἂν τινα κτλ. Ομ. ΑΠΕ. 30. κάτω A²: κάτα (sic) Α¹. 3. δὲ q; 62 C hf.

19 προσθήσεις is a Platonic coinage not found elsewhere. The reading προσποθήσεις (Ξ. 2. 2. 1.) held its ground till Bekker; but προσθήσεις had already been conjectured by Floyer Sydenham (Lupton in Cl. Rev. II p. 228).

20 προλυπήσεις: thus for example τὸ πρὸ τῶν λυπηρῶν (sc. ἐπιπλούσεος) is φθείρει καὶ ἀλείφονται (Phil. I. c.). If bodily pleasure is 'mixed,' the same must be true of bodily pain: and so the προλυπήσεις as well as the προσθήσεις of anticipation are 'mixed' (κατὰ ταύτα ἔχοντων). Fear for example (which is προσδοκία κακοῦ) is a 'mixed' pain: see Phil. 47 E. 584 το υπομείνει κτλ. This is the popular conception of 'above' and 'below' held also by most of the philosophers, e.g. Heraclitus, the Pythagoreans, Anaxagoras, the Atomists (RPC. §§ 29, 65 A, 124 B nn., 149 B nn.), and even Aristotle (Phys. IV 4. 211a 24 ff.), and found also in the Phaedo (100 ff.). In the Timaeus, on the other hand, Plato takes a different and more scientific view: φῶς γὰρ δὴ τινας τῶν δυο ἰδεῖται διὰχή τὸ πάν ἐναντίον τῶν μὲν κατώ,—τὸν δ' ἀνω,—οὐκ ἰδέσθαι οὐδὲ ποιεῖν κτλ. (62 C hf.).

It is possible (with Solomon Cl. Rev. III p. 418) to construe the divergence as "an incidental proof of the distance separating the Republic from the Timaeus," especially as the myth in Book X agrees with the view of Above and Below given here: but too much stress should not be laid on the present passage, which is intended only as an illustration and nothing more.

23 ὀιεὶ οὖν ἂν τινα κτλ. Cl. Phaed. 109 C.

584 E 31 εἰ καὶ κτλ.: 'If men also who are ignorant of truth' etc. καὶ sc. like δ μὴ ὑπεροίκος τὸν ἀληθινὸν ἀνω τε ὑποτασσόμεθα in our simile. Three deteriorioris notae MSS have ei kal oí axiosma, and Hermann conjectures oí for kal: but cf. the use of ei kal in x 597 A. The article is not necessary, and ought not to be introduced without better ms authority.

585 A 2 πληρώσει prepares the way for the coming argument, in which Pleasure is viewed as πληρώσει, Pain as κακίαν (cf. Phil. 31 E ff.). So far, we have been told only that they are κακίαν (583 E).

3 ὀμέτερ δὲ κτλ. The equations are of course Black = Pain, Grey = Absence
of Pain, White = Pleasure. Plato's simile is particularly appropriate, because Grey is a mixture of white and black (Tim. 68 C flaw δε λευκού τε καὶ μέλανος sc. κράτει γέμνεται), just as ἄντις ἀπαλλαγή according to this discussion (584 C 4 C.) may be regarded as a mixture of pleasure and pain (584 C, 586 B), or in other words only a 'mixed' pleasure. With the simile itself cf. Arist. Phys. v 1. 224 B 34 τὸ φαινον λευκον πρὸς τό μέλαν καὶ μέλαν πρὸς τὸ λευκὸν and ib. b. 225 B 16 ff. The best MSS omit δὲ after ὡσπέρ, and all the MSS have καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἄλμυτον ὀνώμινo instead of καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἄλμυτον ὀνώμινo (see ed. n.), but it is impossible to believe that they are right. On the text and other views of this passage see App. V. 6 έχουσί. There is slight MS authority for έχει, which Neukirch (in Pl. Pol. quest. phil. i p. 47) and Richter (Fleck. 76, 1867 p. 147) approve. έχει is sound enough: cf. Prot. 315 E ὅνω δ' θαμάζου, εἰ—τούχασε· οὐ.

586 A—586 C Consider the question also in this way. Hunger, thirst etc. are modes of physical depletion; and Ignorance is a form of spiritual emptiness. He who partakes of food, and he who acquires Knowledge or Reason, are each 'filled,' but which of them is the more truly 'filled'? Knowledge and its kindred have more reality and truth than Food etc., Soul than Body: hence the acquisition of knowledge is a true form of replenishment than the other. The resulting Pleasure will therefore be more true. Those who are strangers to wisdom and virtuous know nothing of true delights, but fight with one another for delusive and unsatisfying joys.

585 B 6 έδε γ' οὖν. "In his γε γιαν νταλ καὶ διάφος θι-ισκα εἴδες καὶ ἐπιστήμης καὶ νοῦ καὶ τὸ ἄλκυτον τοῦ ἄληθος κτλ.

585 c ff. 15 ὡδὲ δὲ κρίνει κτλ. The following sentences are among the most perplexing in the whole of the Republic, or indeed in the whole of Plato's writings. That the reading of the MSS is corrupt has been admitted by the majority of critics, and will be proved in App VI, to which I must refer for a full discussion on the text and interpretation of this difficult passage. Here it is possible only to set down what seems to me, after a review of all the conditions of the problem, the least unsatisfactory solution. The emendation in the text, which I printed in my Text of the Republic, has been approved by a critic in Hermathena xxiv p. 252. We have to discover whether food, drink etc. participate in pure Being more than true opinion, knowledge etc.; and the answer is arrived at by the following steps. (1) Which is more—that which is connected with the ever-like, the immaterial and Truth, and which is itself of this nature, and found in something of this nature; or that which is connected with the never-like and mortal, and which is itself of this nature (never-like etc.) and found in something of this nature? That which is connected with the ever-like, says Glaucos, is more. (2) Then does the Being of the never-like (ἀεὶ ὄνομοι) = μὴ ὅπερ ὄνομοι) participate in Being at all more than the Being of Knowledge does? Certainly not (ὦν is strictly illative: if it is true that what is connected with the ever-like is more than what is connected with the never-like, then the Being of the never-like cannot be more than Knowledge is—for Knowledge of course ἔχεται τοῦ ἀεὶ ὄνομοι. Knowledge is in short taken as a type of that which ἔχεται τοῦ ἀεὶ ὄνομοι). (3) Or has the Being of the never-like more part in Truth than Knowledge has? To this also the answer is no: [for that which is connected with the ever-like—and Knowledge is so—is connected also with Truth: see above τὸ τοῦ ἀεὶ ὄνομοι ἔχομεν—καὶ ἀληθείας]. (4) And if it has less part in truth [as it has], it must also have less part in Being. (This deduces from step (3) the conclusion already implied in (2), and also paves the way for ὅσων ὄνομα—μετέχει). (5) Thus—since what is true of Knowledge is true of all the spiritual γνώμη, [and since food etc. are of course only particular examples of the ἀεὶ ὄνομων or never-like], universally (ὅως) those γνώμη which are concerned with the care of the body have less part in Being and Truth than those which are concerned with the care of the soul. For a further discussion of this passage and other suggested solutions and emendations see App VI.

15 τοῦ ἀεὶ ὄνομου κτλ. The whole of this passage presupposes, as Grimmelshausens (de reip. Pl. comp. et unit. pp. 74 ff.), the metaphysical theory of ν—νυ. With τοῦ ἀεὶ ὄνομου see 479 A and 500 c: with ἀδιάντον 485 B (ἐξεικνύσε ἡς ἀδιάντος ἡς ἀδιάντως); and with καὶ ἀληθείας 508 B. The last two words are rejected by Madvig and Baiter on the grounds that (1) we should expect an adjective, (2) καὶ ἀληθείας has no antithesis expressed, whereas ἀεὶ ὄνομοι and ἀδιάντον have: (3) the words unduly anticipate τι δε; ἀληθείας; below. As I understand the passage, the mention of Truth is necessary—see above—just in view of τι δε;' ἀληθείας; and there is little weight in Madvig’s first two arguments.

16 καὶ αὐτὸ κτλ. Is καί here and in καὶ αὐτὸ again below ‘καὶ’ (Schneider) or ‘both’? The first view is perhaps more likely: for it is more in keeping with the somewhat loose structure of the argument throughout this passage, and καὶ in D below (καὶ αὐτὸ) is most probably ‘and.’

16, 18 ἐν τοιούτῳ (bis). The soul is of the nature of τοῦ ἀεὶ ὄνομοι: see vi. 490 B, 508 D, and especially Phaed. 79 A ff.: the body on the other hand is never constant, for like everything material παναινέται ὑπὸ γενέσεως καὶ φθοράς (vi 485 B).
586. A] ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΣ Θ 355

οὖν διαφέρει τὸ τοῦ ἄλλο ὁμοίου. Ἡ οὖν ἄλλο <ἀν> ὁμοίου οὕσια ὁμοία ὁμοία τοῖς μᾶλλον ἢ <ἡ> ἐπιστήμης μετέχει; Ὁ ὅταν ὁμοίως. Τί δ; 29 ἀληθείας; Οὐδὲ τούτο. Εἰ δὲ ἀληθείας ἢ τον, οὐ καὶ ὁμοίας;

D' Ἄναγκη. Οὔκοιν ὅλως τὰ περὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος θεραπείαν γένη τῶν γενῶν αὐ τῶν περὶ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς θεραπείαν ἢ τον ἀληθείας τε καὶ ὁμοίας μετέχει; Πολύ γε. Σώμα δὲ αὐτὸ ψυχῆς οὐκ οὐκ εἰς οὕτως;

"Εγώς. Οὔκοιν τὸ τῶν μᾶλλον ὄντων πληροῦμεν καὶ 25 αὐτὸ μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν ὄντων μᾶλλον πληροῦται ἢ το τῶν ἢ τον ὄντων καὶ αὐτὸ ἢ τὸν ὄν; Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; Εἰ ἀρα τὸ πληροῦσθαι τῶν ψυχῆς προσηκόντων ἢδυ ἔστι, τὸ τῷ ὄντι καὶ τῶν ὄντων πληροῦται;

Ε μενον μᾶλλον μᾶλλον ἢ ὄντως τε καὶ ἀληθετήν ἀληθετήν ἀληθετήν τοῦ ὑδονή ἀληθετήν, τὸ δὲ τῶν ἢττον ὄντων μεταλλαμβάνον ἢττον τε ἢ τῶν ἢττων ὄντων μεταλλαμβάνει καὶ ἀποικοτεράς ἢ τῆς ἡμοίης καὶ ἢττον ἢττος μεταλλαμβάνει. Ἄναγκαιοτότα, ἐφη. Οἱ ἀρχαιολόγοι καὶ ἀρετής ἀπερος, εὐνοχίας δὲ καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἄρα ἐπύκνωσε, κάτω, ὡς οὖκεν, καὶ μέχρι πάλιν πρὸς τὸ μεταξὺ φέρονται τε καὶ τάχυ πλανοῦται διὰ βλου, ὑπερβάντες δὲ τούτο πρὸς τὸ ἢττος ἢ τούτο ὄντος ἢ τούτο ὄντος ὄντος ἢ τούτο ὄντος ἢττος μεταλλαμβάνειν. Plato characteristically amplifies his conclusion, even at the risk of obscuring the relation between it and the preceding step.

19. ἢ οὖν ἄλλο ἀνομίαν κτλ. These words have already been discussed: but it should here be remarked that the insertion of τοῦ before the adjective (Ast, Mädvig etc., both here and in μετάτοτε ὡμοίων above) is not necessary. On the connexion between ἐπιστήμη, οὐσία and ἀλήθεια see especially Theaet. 156 C, D.

585 D 24 σῶμα—οὕτως; 'And don't you think... the same true of the body itself as compared with the soul? For the sense cf. Phaed. 80 B, and with the genitive ψυχῆς 582 C n. In this sentence Bosanquet remarks: "The only way to master this conception in its true light is to consider body and mind not as two things (body and soul) on a level or side by side, but, as daily experience really teaches us, under some such point of view as that of part and whole" (Companion p. 362). This point of view is suggestive, but it is scarcely that of the Republic, in spite of 584 C; and the student will best apprehend Plato's meaning both here and especially in x 608 D ff. if he carry his analysis no further than Plato himself does, and regard soul and body as two distinct and separate entities.

585 E 29 μᾶλλον μᾶλλον. The first μᾶλλον belongs both to τῷ ὄντι (=οὕτως) and to τῶν ὄντων; the second to ὄντως. After the stage of the argument reached in οὔκοιν—ἡττον ὃν, it would have been enough to write here τῷ ὄντι πληροούμενον μᾶλλον μᾶλλον ὄντος—ἀλήθει, τὸ δὲ ἢττον ὄντως πληροούμενον ἀποικοτεράς ἢν—μεταλλαμβάνειν. Plato characteristically amplifies his conclusion, even at the risk of obscuring the relation between it and the preceding step.

586 A 2 κατώ κτλ. refers to the illustration in 584 D ff. The meaning of μέχρι πάλιν is 'as far as back again' sc. to the intermediate point; cf. μέχρι διόριου, μέχρι ἧττον ἡττος, and other instances of the same usage in Stephanus-Hase Thes. s.v. μέχρι and Kühner-Blass Gr. Gr. ii 1 P. 539 f.

3 πλανοῦται. They are like 'wan- derers' who have lost the way: cf. the common use of πλανάσαντας in the New Testament; e.g. Pet. ii 5.5:

τὸ ἀληθής ἀνω refers to 584 D: but
5 αντί οὗν ἐπληρώθησαν, οὐδὲ βεβαίον τε καὶ καθαρὰς ἡδονὰς ἔγευσαντο, ἀλλὰ βοσκημάτων δίκην κἀκεφ αἱ βλέπουσε καὶ κεκυφότες εἰς γῆν καὶ εἰς τραπέζας βόσκουσεν ἀρχαῖομενοι καὶ ὁχέοντες, καὶ ἔνεκα τῆς τούτων πλεονεξίας λακτίζουσε καὶ Β. κυρίττους ἀλλήλους σιδήροις κέρασε τε καὶ ὁπλαὶ ἀποκτινύασεν 10 δι' ἀπλήστιαν, ἢτα οὐχὶ τοῖς οὕσιν οὐδὲ τὸ ὅν οὐδὲ τὸ στέγον ἑαυτῶν πιμπλάντες. Παντελῶς, ἐφή ὁ Γλαύκως, τῶν τῶν πολλῶν, ὁ Σώκρατες, χρησιμοδείκνυς. Α' ὅποι οὐκ ἀνδρικὴ καὶ ἡδοναὶ ἐξενεῖαι μεμημέναι λυπαίς, εἰδώλοις τῆς ἄληθους ἡδονῆς καὶ ἐκσκαραβαμέναις, ὑπὸ τῆς παρ' ἀλλήλας θέσεως ἀποχραιμομέναις, 15 ὁστὲ σφοδροὶ ἐκατέρας φαίνεσθαι καὶ ἐρωτᾶτο ἑαυτῶν λυπῶντας Σ. τοῖς ἀφροσιν ἑντίκειται καὶ περιμαχητῶς εἶναι, ὅπερ πό τῆς Ἔλενης εἰδώλων ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν Τροίᾳ Στησίχορος φησὶ γενέσθαι

the words are intended also to suggest the deeper Platonic use of ‘the true Above,’ where Truth and Pureness dwell: see Phaed. 109 b ff., with vii. 514 a n.

6 βοσκημάτων δίκην κτλ. Cf. Tim. 91 e (the heads etc. of brute beasts are εἰς γῆν ἐλκυμένα in sympathy with their earthly souls) and vii. 519 a, b mm. With κεκυφότες εἰς τραπέζας cf. the description of Syracusan gluttony in the seventh Platonic Epistle 316 b ff. χειραμαμελοι (cf. ii. 372 d) and ἐχειντες are properly used of brute beasts, and therefore suitable after βοσκημάτων δίκην. ἔνεκα τῆς τούτων πλεονεξίας is equivalent to ὡστε τούτων πλέων (sc. than others) ἐχειν.

586 b 9 σίδηροις κτλ. The epithet is significant and should be pronounced with emphasis. The horns and hoofs wherewith these human βοσκήματα ‘kick and butt’ are lethal weapons made of iron. Van Leeuwen’s conjecture σκληροῖς for σίδηροις (Mm. N. S. xcv i 4) only emasculates a fine comparison. J. and C. aptly cite in illustration Aesch. Ag. 1115 ff. ὀπλαὶ may be said ‘with a glance at ὀπλαῖος’ (J. and C.). War springs from the insatiate desires of the flesh (ii. 373 e n.); hence δι’ ἀπλήστιαν.

10 οὐ οὐχὶ—πιμπλάντες explains ἀπλήστιαν. They cannot be ‘filled’ because that part of which themselves which they fill is not the real, not the continent part, and that wherewith they fill it is not the real either. Bosanquet aptly compares “Whoso dranketh of this water shall thirst again.” In οὐδὲ τὸ στέγον Plato doubtless has in mind the story of the Danaids, in which the πίθος τετραμένος was interpreted by certain ‘wise men’—probably preachers of the Orphic-Pythagorean way of life: cf. App. IV—as the bottomless or incontinent part of soul: see Gorg. 493 a ff., especially the words τῶν δ’ αμυνήτων τοῦτο τῷ ψυχῇ, ὥστε ἐπιθυμίας εἴαι, τὸ ἀκόλουθον αὐτῷ καὶ το οὐ στέγαν διπ. τετραμένοις εἰς πώλου, διὰ τὴν ἀπολήριαν ἀπεκάλασας together with Rohde Psyche 1 p. 326—329. Schneider makes a curious error when he says “τὸ στέγον hic corrobor quasi vas animi significaret videatur.”

12 χρησιμοδείκτης refers to the half-oracular style of Socrates’ description: compare for instance σιδηροῖς κέρασε τε καὶ ὀπλαῖοι with the famous ἐξών ὑποεῖος ἐν τειχεῖος in the oracle to the Athenians (Hdt. vii. 144—144: see also id. i. 55 al. for more examples).

14 ἐκσκαραβαμέναις κτλ. See on 583 b. The words ὅποι τῇς—ἀποχραιμομέναι mean ‘taking their colour from juxtaposition.’ The word ἀποχραίην had also a more technical sense (τὰ τὰ χρωσθέντα ἐπιστοιχίαν Tim. lex. Pl. s.v. χραίαν) to which Plato alludes in Laws 679 a.

586 c 16 ῥώπερ κτλ. The many σκαμαχοῖς (vii. 520 c) like the Trojans fighting for Helen’s shadow in the fields of Troy.

17 Στησίχορος κτλ. See Phadc. 243 a and Bergk Poet. Lyr. Gr. 4 iii pp. 214 ff. There is no real ground for supposing (with Teichmüller Lit. Fohd. 1 pp. 113 ff.) that Plato intends an allusion to Isocrates’ Helenia, in spite of περιμάχητος
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περιμάχθην τὸν ἀγροία τοῦ ἄληθος; Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ἐφη, τοιοῦτον τι αὐτὸ εἶναι.

XI. Τί δὲ; περὶ τὸ θυμοειδές ὡς ἔτερα τοιαύτα ἀνάγκη 20 γίγνεσθαι, ὃ ἂν αὐτὸ τοῦτο διαπράττηται, ἢ φθόνῳ διὰ φιλοτιμίαν ἢ βίᾳ διὰ φιλονικίαν ἢ θυμῷ διὰ δυσκολίαν, πληρομονήν τιμῆς 1 τε καὶ νίκης καὶ θυμοῦ διάκων ἅνευ λογισμοῦ τε καὶ νοῦ; Τοιαύτα, ἢ δ' ὅσ', ἀνάγκη καὶ περὶ τοῦτο εἶναι. Τί οὖν; ἢ δ' ἐγώ: θαρροῦντες λέγομεν, ὅτι καὶ περὶ τὸ φιλοκερδῆς καὶ τὸ φιλόνικον ὅσα ἐπιθυμοῦσι 25 εἰσίν, αἱ μὲν ἂν τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ λόγῳ ἐπόμεναι καὶ μετὰ τούτων

21. ἂν Α' Π: om. Α'.
25. λέγομεν Α' Π: λέγομεν Α".

diaprástetai Α' Π: diaprástetai ut videtur Α'.
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τάς ἡδονᾶς διώκουσαί, ὡς ἂν τὸ φράνιμον ἐξηγήται, λαμβάνωσι, τὰς ἀληθεστάτας τε λήψων, ὡς οὖν ταύτας ἀληθεῖς λαβείς, ἢτε ἀληθεία ἐπομένων, καὶ τὰς ἑαυτῶν οἰκείας, εἰπέρ τὸ βέλτιστον Ε
30 ἐκάστος, τοῦτο καὶ οἰκεῖότατον; Ἀλλὰ μὴν, ἐφη, οἰκεῖότατον γε.

Τὸ φιλοσόφῳ ἄρα ἐπομένης ἀπάσης τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ μὴ στασια-
ζούσης ἐκάστῳ τῷ μέρει ὑπάρχει εἰς τὰ τάλλα τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν
καὶ δικαίω εἶναι, καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς τὰς ἑαυτοῦ ἔκαστον καὶ
tὰς βελτίστας καὶ εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν | τὰς ἀληθεστάτας καρπούσας. 587

Κομιδὴ μὲν οὖν. "Ὅταν δὲ ἄρα τῶν ἐτέρων τοι κρατήσῃ, ὑπάρχει
ἀυτῷ μῆτε τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἡδονήν ἐξευρίσκειν τά τέ ἀλλ' ἀναγκαῖοις
ἀλλοτριῶν καὶ μὴ ἁληθή ἡδονὴν διόκειν. Οὕτως, ἐφη. Ὑμνοῦ ἂ
5 πλείστον φιλοσοφίας τε καὶ λόγου αφεστηκεν, μάλιστ' ἄν τοιαύτα
ἐξεργάζοντο; Πολὺ γε. Πλείστον δὲ λόγον ἀφίσταται οὖν ὅπερ
νόμον τε καὶ τάξεων; Δήλον δή. Ἐφάνισαν δὲ πλείστον λὲφο-
τάσαι οὖν αἱ ἐρωτικαὶ τε καὶ τυραννικαὶ ἐπίθυμαι; Πολὺ γε.
Ὡς ἐλείσθον δὲ αἱ βασιλικαὶ τε καὶ κόσμιαι; Ναι. Πλείστον δή,
10 οὖν, ἀληθῶς ἡδονής καὶ οἰκείας ὁ τύραννος ἀφεστήξεω, ὁ δὲ
ὅλιστον. Ἀνάγκη. Καὶ ἀδέστατα ἄρα, εἴπων, ὁ τύραννος
βιώσεται, ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς ήδιστα. Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη. Οἶσθ' οὖν, ή
ἡ ἔρωτ' ὁ ἀδέστερον ἕξι τύραννος βασιλέως; Ἀν εἰπης, ἐφη.


586 Ε 29 τὸ βέλτιστον—οἰκεῖότα-
d ad finem, δέξει δ' ἂν καὶ εἶναι ἐκαστοῦ
tότα (sc. τὸ κράτιστον τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ), εἴπερ
tὸ κόραν καὶ ἔμοιν κτλ. The whole of
the latter portion of that famous chapter,
in which Aristotle comes nearer to the
spirit of Plato than anywhere else through-
out his writings, might be summed up in
the pregnant saying τὸ βέλτιστον ἐκάστῳ,
tότα καὶ οἰκεῖότατον—a saying which
reaches to the very foundations of Plato’s
philosophy: for if that which is best for
each thing, is also most its own—most
truly akin to it, part of its very being,—it
follows that each thing truly is just in
proportion as it is good. In other words
the cause of all existence is the Good;
see on vi 505 D, 509 B.
31 τῷ φιλοσόφῳ κτλ. τῷ φιλοσόφῳ
is of course neuter, and not masculine.
With μῆ στασιαζουσῆς κτλ. cf. IV 444 D—
444 A. Soul attains its true unity (so far
as is possible in this life: see on X 611 B)
when the two lower 'parts' obey the
highest; only then does a man become
εἰς ἐκ πάλλων (IV 443 E n.). δικαία εἰναι:
i.e. according to the definition of Justice
in Book IV l.c.

587 A 3 μῆτε—ἀναγκαίους κτλ.: as
in the eloquent picture of the λογιστικῶν
and the θυμομικές, seeking for pleasures to
lay at the feet of the φιλοχρήστων VIII
553 D, C. Cf. also infra 590 B. For
μῆτε—τε see IV 430 B n.
587 B 10 ὁ δὲ: viz. ὁ βασιλεὺς. It
is unnecessary to insert βασιλεὺς in the
text, as Baiter wishes to do: cf. I 349 D n.
13 ὁσοὶ ἀδέστερον κτλ. Plato loved
to play with mathematics, and in
the following passage he endeavours to give
an arithmetical expression to the plea-
sures of justice and injustice. His motive
in introducing this "hedonistic calculus,"
as Bosanquet calls it, has been much dis-
cussed. The following considerations
deserve attention. (1) On artistic grounds,
now that the argument has been con-
cluded, it is not inappropriate that Justi-
tice and Injustice, represented by the
King and the Tyrant, should as it were be weighed in the balance. The importance of ἄριστος, μετρεῖν, ἑστάται is constantly present in Plato’s mind. See on Χ 602 D. (2) The Pythagoreans were in the habit of expressing virtues and other immaterial ideas in terms of numbers (see Zeller's Πp. 389 ff.), and there is reason to suppose that the number 729 played a part in a Pythagorean calendar (§88 Α. Κ.). Some of the terms employed by Plato, such as τρίτος as, are also in all probability of Pythagorean origin. See App. I to Book ΧΙΙΙ pp. 279 ff. (3) The arithmetical method of calculation enables Plato to set forth in a very striking and dramatic way his οὐν dissent from the popular estimate of the tyrant’s happiness (Schneider). (4) When all is said we must allow that some of the steps are arbitrary, and that Plato’s main object is to reach the significant number 729, so as to indicate that the king has more pleasure than the tyrant every day and every night of his life. There is of course an element of playfulness in the episode, and we need not suppose that Plato set any particular store by his calculations: but neither ought we on the other hand to dismiss the whole reckoning as a meaningless and foolish jest. See also on ΧΙII 545 C.

14 τριών ἡδονῶν κτλ. The three pleasures are those of the king, the timocrat, and the oligarch. The first variety is genuine, the second and third spurious: but the tyrant has ‘crossed the line into the region beyond the spurious,’ i.e. his pleasures represent a still lower depth (see 571 Β. Φ.), being in fact only ἐξελά twice removed of the oligarch’s spurious pleasures (587 C). Schleiermacher made τῶν νόθων depend partly on τὸ ἐπέκεια (‘so is the Tyrann auf die jenseitige der umnächten hinübergestungen’). This view is linguistically defensible (c. Phaed. 112 Β.), and even attractive at first sight; but τῶν νόθων must be interpreted by διὸ τῶν νόθων, and διὸ τῶν νόθων certainly does not include the tyrant’s species of pleasure. The feminine dual ending -αιν (instead of the commoner -αιν) is ‘magis elationis quam vulgaris sermonis’ (Roepel de dual. us. Ψ. p. 6). Cf. IV 422 Β. Η.

587 Α. 16 δορυφόρος ἡδονής. These are described in 573 Β. Η. 17 οὖν should not be taken with εἰσείτω. The hyperbaton is too difficult, and the meaning (‘not even to express it’ I. and C.) weak. We should translate ‘and it isn’t very easy, either, to say,’ etc., taking οὖν as ‘also not,’ a usage illustrated by Riddell Digest ΧΙΙΙ 141. See on οὖν δηλιτείς κτλ. 328 Β.

18 ὁ τυραννός. We might expect ὁ τυραννικός, but throughout the whole of this comparison Plato is content to take the tyrant—who is, we remember, τυραννικῶτας 575 D—as the type of the tyrannical, and the king as the type of the kingly or aristocratic man. See above on 587 Β. and also below 587 Ε. Η.

19 οὖκ οὖν καὶ ἡδονής κτλ. If the tyrant is third from the oligarch, his pleasure will also be, in respect of truth, third from the oligarch’s; i.e. will be an image of an image (τρίτος ἐξελάκατος cf. Χ 597 Β. and 599 Α. Δ.) of the oligarch’s pleasure.

587 D. 21 ἐὰν εἰς ταύταν κτλ. See on IV 445 D.
23 τριπλασίαν ἀρά κτλ. The distance of the tyrant from true pleasure is measured first ἄριθμῷ, i.e. "numero seu secundum longitudinem, numerus enim omnibus quatenus monadibus constat, lineae instar habendus" (Schneider III p. LXXXV). See also for ἄριθμῷ VII 526 c n. and cf. the expression γραμμάτων ἄριθμος in

Nicom. Introd. Ar. p. 117 Ast. Relatively to themselves, we reckoned the oligarch, democrat, and tyrant, as 1, 2, 3; but we have since found that the distance of the oligarch from true pleasure is in reality 3 times 1: hence that of the tyrant must be 3 times 3, as in the line AB. We should doubtless regard the intervening numbers (4, 5, and 7, 8) as indicating different stages in the gradual degeneration of the oligarch into the democrat (559 D ff) and the democrat into the tyrant or tyrannical man (572 D ff). It might seem more natural to make the distance of the tyrant from true pleasure 5 and not 9 (King 1, Timocrat 2, Oligarch 3, Democrat 4, Tyrant 5); but (as Schneider reminds us) the pleasures of the Democrat and Tyrant lie beyond the two spurious pleasures, so that the modulus of progression may reasonably be increased. Plato's chief object is however to reach the number 729, and he could not do so except by making a fresh departure with the oligarch.

24 ἐπίπεδον ἀρά κτλ. The number 9 is ἐπίπεδον, because $3 \times 3$:  eius de τῶν ἄριθμων οἱ μὲν ἐπίπεδον, διὸ μὲν διὸ ἄριθμοι πολλαπλασιαζόνται, οὐδὲ μὴν καὶ πλάτους: τούτων δὲ οἱ μὲν τριγώνοι, οἱ δὲ τετράγωνοι κτλ. (Theo. Smyrn. p. 31 Hiller. Cf. Gow Gk Math. p. 69 and Müller in Hermes 1870 p. 394 n. 1). This explanation, which so far agrees with that of the Scholast, is adopted by the English translators and editors; but Schneider (I.e. and on p. 313 of his translation) holds that ἐπίπεδον κτλ. in-vites us to raise to the second power not 3, but 9—the number which we are presently expected to raise to the third power. The inferential ἀρά seems to me in favour of the Scholast's view, as well as κατὰ τὸν τὸν μήκους ἄριθμον ἰδονής τυραννικής ἀν εἰς. Κομίδη γε. Κατὰ δὲ δύναμιν καὶ τρίτην αὐξῆν δήλον δὴ ἀπόστασιν

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28 metastroçhas: 'conversely' ("umgekehrt") Schneider.

587 Ε 32 ἀμήχανον κτλ. I do not think there can be any doubt that Schneider is right in retaining καταπεθόρκες, which is found in all the best and also in a majority of the inferior MSS. The word has reference to the gigantic and tempestuous numeral ἐνυκαικοικεπτακοσιοκοσιακείασι, which Socrates has by a mighty effort of expiration—γγενεῖ φυσίματι—hurled down upon his hearers' heads. Cf. generally Thes. 180 λ and Ar. Frogs 822—825, καταφορέως "contentionem vocis ad prælornum vocabulum numeri Socrates prolatis admirandam significare potest; nec multum ab hoc abludit illa καταφορὰ, quam oratoribus esse inter accusandum longiorem spiritus productionem ex Hermogene referat vetus lexicon apud Stephanum Thes. T. 111 p. 190 c" (Schneider). See Stephanus—Hase Thes. s.v., and also on καταφορώς, where the words ἀδιδρόσεων τήθειτο τὸν ἀντιλύττωι, ὡν μετὰ ἀδικίας καταφορικὴ χρώμενος λόγῳ σφόδρα πληξῆ τοὺς ἄκοντοις are quoted from Chrysost. Χ p. 386 c. The reading καταπεθόρκας is much less dramatic and appropriate, and has very little MS authority (Σξ, n and two other MSS, in one of which it is only a correction).

588 Α 2 προσήκοντα γε κτλ. 729 is twice 364, and Philolaus counted 364 days, and presumably therefore 364 nights in the year (Censor, de die nat. 19). This explains ἡμέραι καὶ νύκτες. It is not so obvious in what way the number 729 is related to months. On this subject J. and C. remark "12 months in a year: 30 + 1/3 days in a month: 12 x (30 + 1/3) = 364: 2 x 364 = 729." I can see no point in such a calculation. Susemihl on the other hand reminds us that Philolaus believed in a so-called great year of 729 months, and as Plato is following Philolaus in ἡμέραι καὶ νύκτες, we may reasonably suppose that he does so in the rest of the passage, so that καὶ ἡμέραι will be a reference to Philolaus' great year. See Sus. Gen. Entw. II p. 244 n. 3, and on the subject of Philolaus' year of 729 months Zeller 1 p. 428 n. 3. I have as yet found no evidence for supposing that Philolaus went a step farther and postulated a yet greater year of 729 ordinary years, but the words καὶ ἑναυτὸν in Plato make it probable that he did so. On this supposition the full explanation of προσήκοντα—ἑναυτὸν will be

729 days and nights = 1 year.
729 months = 1 great year.
729 years = 1 greatest year.

The general upshot is that the king is happier than the tyrant every day and every night of his life, rather than (as Bosanquet suggests) that "one day of the good life is worth a year of the bad"; "a day in thy courts is better than a thousand."
6. πλέον nos (cf. Meisterhans\(^3\) p. 152): πλέον Α:\(\) πλέον \(\) πλέον \(\) Α\(\)Η.\(\)

12. τὸ τε Α\(\)ΠΙ: τε Α\(\).\(\)

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6 πλέον. See cr. n. πλέον and not πλέον is the classical form, though both πλέον and πλεον were admissible (Meisterhans\(^3\) p. 152). The diphthong ει (in Α\(\) II etc.) may therefore be held to favour the reading πλεον, which I formerly adopted; but the dative is undeniably awkward, and it is better to acquiesce in πλέον: cf. τοσοῦτον ἢδονη μνῆς above.

588 A—589 B We are now in a position to refute the thesis that injustice combined with a reputation for justice is profitable for him who is unjust. The soul may be likened to a composite creature —part bestial, part leonine, part human, —wearing the outward semblance of humanity. He who maintains that injustice profits a man, holds that it is profitable to starve the human element and make strong the rest, and encourage strife and sedition within the soul. The advocate of justice on the other hand asserts that the human element should have the mastery and bring the others into harmony with one another and itself.

588 B 9 ἂν δὲ ποιο λεγόμενον. The reference is to Π 361 A ff. For αὐτῷ C. Schmidt conjectured αὐτῷ, which I too hastily adopted in my edition of the text. Glanck and Adimantus are careful in Book Π to disclaim the views which they expound; and after ἂν δὲ ποιο λεγόμενον it is easy to refer αὐτῷ to the hypothetical person (not necessarily Thrasy-machus in particular: see Π 358 C and 367 A) for whom they speak: cf. οὔ εἰς ὅλην λέγων presently and ὁ περὶ τῶν τουτοῦ λόγου λέγων (Π 360 D), as well as φάσι φοβεῖ λογιζόμενοι (ib. 366 A). See also on 590 Α.\(\)

13 ἔκκωνα πλάσαντες κτλ. Cf. Tim. 69 D—70 E and the picture of the soul in Phaedr. 246 A, 253 D ff. We are told by Clement (Stron. Π 20. 1958 C Migne) that Basilides compared man to a wooden horse, peopled by a host of different spirits. The underlying idea of Plato's similitude is that man is a compound of the mortal and the immortal, standing midway between corruptibility and incorruptibility: θυμῷ καὶ ἀθανάτῳ φόροις μεθόρυμα (Philo de mund. opif. 46). In the noble lines of George Herbert:

“To this life things of sense
Make their pretence:
In th' other Angels have a right by birth:
Man ties them both alone,
And makes them one,
With th' one hand touching heav'n, with
th' other earth.
In soul he mounts and flies,
In flesh he dies.
He wears a stuffe whose thread is coarse and round,
But trimm'd with curious lace,
And should take place
After the trimming, not the stuffe and ground.”

Nettleship (Lett. and Rem. Π p. 333) justly observes “that it was no mere figure of speech with Plato to represent those psychical tendencies in man as animals, for he clearly believed that there was continuity between the different forms in which life appears; that somehow or other souls rose and fell in the scale of being according as they behaved in each form in which they were embodied; and that there was a real identity between certain elements in man’s soul and certain elements in other organic creatures.” See Χ 618 B ff., Phaed. 81 E ff.
589 Α] ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΣ Θ

C Ποιαν τινά; ή δ’ 1 ος. Τῶν τοιούτων τινά, ήν δ’ ἐγώ, οἴαι μυθο- 15 λογοῦνται παλαιαὶ γενέσθαι φύσεις, ἡ τε Χιμαιράς καὶ ἡ Σκέλλης καὶ Κερβέρου, καὶ ἄλλαι τῖνες συχνὰ λέγουνται ξυμπεπυκνιᾶι ἰδέαι πολλαὶ εἰς ἐν γενέσθαι. Λέγουνται γάρ, ἐφη. Πλάττε τοῖνυν μίαν μὲν ἰδέαν θηρίου τοικίλου καὶ πολυκεφάλου, ἴμέρους δὲ θηρίων ἔχοντος κεφαλᾶς κύκλῳ καὶ ἄγριον καὶ δυνατὸν μετα- 20 βάλλειν καὶ φύειν ἐξ αὐτοῦ πάντα ταῦτα. Δεύων πλάστου, ἐφη,

D τὸ ἔργον 1 ὁμοὶ δὲ, ἐπειδὴ ἐὑπλαστότερον κηροῦ καὶ τῶν τοιούτων λόγος, πεπλάσθω. Μίαν δὴ τοῖνυν ἄλλην ἰδέαν λέοντος, μίαν δὲ ἀνθρώπουν πολύ δὲ μέγιστον ἐστώ τὸ πρῶτον καὶ δύοτερον τὸ δεύτερον. Ταῦτα, ἐφη, μίω καὶ πεπλασται. Σύναπτε τοῖνυν 25 αὐτά εἰς ἐν τρία ὄντα, ὥστε τὴν ξυμπεπυκνιαίναι ἀλλήλοις. Συνυπται, ἐφη. Περιπλασοῦν δὴ αὐτοὶς ἔξωθεν ἐνὸς εἰκόνα, τὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώ- 20που, ὥστε τὸ μὴ δυναμεῖν τὰ εὐτός ὁράν, ἀλλὰ 1 τὸ ἐξὸ μονῶν ἐλυτρον ὀρόντε τὸν ζῷον φαίνεσθαι, ἀνθρωπον. Περιπτεπλασται, ἐφη. Λέγωμεν δὴ τὸ λέγοντε, ὡς λυσιτελεί τοῖνυ ἀδικεῖν τῷ 30 ἀνθρώπῳ, δικαία δὲ πράττειν οὐ ξυμφέρει, ὅτι οὐδὲν ἄλλο φησίν ἡ λυσιτελείν αὐτῷ τὸ παντοδαπὸν θηρίον εὐωχουτίν ποιεῖν ἰσχυρὸν καὶ τὸν λέοντα καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸν λέοντα, τῶν δὲ ἀνθρωπον λιμο- κτονείν καὶ ποιεῖν ἀπεθείην, ὥστε ἐλευθαίρειν ὑμᾶς ἐκέινων ὑπότερον ἄγιν, καὶ μηδὲν ἔτερον ἔτερον ἐννεδίειεν μηδὲ φίλον ποιεῖν, ἀλλ’ ἐαν αὐτὰ ἐν αὐτοῖς διάκνεσθαι τε καὶ μαχομένα ἐσθείειν ἀλλήλα. Παντάπασι γάρ, ἐφη, ταύτ’ ἀν λέγοι ὅ τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἐπανών. Ἐνοκόνων

1. ἐκείνων Α’II: ἐκείνων Α’.

588 C 16 Χιμαιράς κτλ. The Scholiast thus explains: ἡ Χιμαιρά τὸ εἴδω ἔστιν 'πρὸς τὰ λέοντα, ὅπερ εἶναι ἡ δράκον, μείζον δὲ Χιμαιρά—Σκύλλα δὲ—πρόσωπον ἔχουσα καὶ στέρα γυναικός, ἐκ λαγώνων δὲ κυνῶν κεφαλᾶς εἶ καὶ πόδας ὄμοιόν—εἴριθε ὑπὸ τοὺς (Κέρβερος) τρεῖς μὲν κυνῶν κεφαλᾶς, ὄφραν δὲ δράκοντος, κατὰ μύτου δὲ πατιένων σέλεως εἴριθε κεφαλᾶς.

17 καὶ ἄλλαι τινὲς κτλ.: c.g. Hippocrates, Gorgeros, Pegasus (Plaec. 229 b.). The relativa is succeeded by an independent sentence, as often (II 257 b n.).

19 θηρίου—πολυκεφάλου. Cf. Plae. 230 A θηρίου—Τεφώνος πολυκεφάλως καὶ κάλλους ἐπιτειχυμένος, Tīm. 70 ε (the ἐπιθυμητικόν as a ὑρώμα ἄγρων) and Arist. Pol. I 16. 1287a 30 ἡ τε γάρ ἐπιθυμητικαί τοιχών (vix. θηρίου). For the epi-

588 D 24 μέγιστον—τὸ πρῶτον. The ἐπιθυμητικόν is the largest part of soul: see IV 442 A and II 379 C n.

25 σύναπτε τοῖνυν κτλ. Krohn finds fault with Plato for failing to preserve the essential unity of the individual throughout this comparison (IV. St. p. 229). But, according to Plato, the true unity of the individual is realised only through the subjection of the two lower 'parts' of soul to the highest (580 ε κ.). And this subjection is described in 589 Α,Β.
5 αδ ό τά δίκαια λέγων λυσιτελείν φαίη ἃν δείν ταῦτα πράττειν καὶ
tαῦτα λέγειν, ὅθεν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ὃ ἐντὸς ἀνθρώπου ἐσται ἐγκρατε-
στατος καὶ τοῦ πολυκεφάλου θρέμματος ἐπιμελησταί, ὥσπερ Β

γεωργὸς τά μὲν ήμερα τρέφων καὶ τιθασεῶν, τά δὲ ἀγριὰ ἁπο-
κωλύνων φύεθαι, ξύμμαχον ποιησάμενος τήν τῶν λέοντος φύσιν, το
καὶ κοινῆ πάντων κηδόμενος, φιλα ποιησάμενος ἄλληλοις τε καὶ
ἀυτῶ, οὕτω θρέψεις; Κομιδὴ γὰρ αδ λέγει ταῦτα ὁ τὸ δίκαιον
ἐπαινών. Κατὰ πάντα τρόπου δὴ ὃ μὲν τά δίκαια ἐγκυμοίαξὼ
ἀληθῆ ἃν λέγῃ, ὃ δὲ τά άδικα ψευδότο. πρὸς τε γὰρ ἡδονήν Σ
καὶ πρὸς εὐδοξίαν καὶ ὁσφέλιαν σκοπουμένῳ ὃ μὲν ἐπαινήσει τοῦ
δικαίου ἀληθεύει, ὃ δὲ ψέκτησι οὐδὲν ὑγίες οὐδὲ εἰδὼς ψέγει ὃ τι
ψέγει. Οὐ μοι δοκεῖ, ἢ ὅς, οὐδαμῆ γε. Πεθύμων τοίνυν αὐτῶν
πρᾶς, οὐ γὰρ ἐκὼν ἀμερτάνει, ἐρωτῶντες: ὁ μακάριε, οὐ καὶ τά
καλὰ καὶ αἰσχρὰ νόμιμα διὰ τά τοιαύτ᾽ ἃν φαίμεν γεγονέναι; τά
μὲν καλὰ τά υπὸ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, μᾶλλον δὲ ἵνας τά υπὸ τῷ θεῷ

13. ἀληθῆ ἃν Π: ἀληθεῖαν Α.

589 α 6 τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. "The geni-
tive," say the Oxford editors, "may be
governed by ἐγκρατεστατος or may be
taken partitive with ὃ ἐντὸς ἀνθρώπως." The
former is the correct view. Stephanus suggested ἐγκρατεστερος: but "quum
tra sint quae de imperio contendant,
superalius is recte habet" (Schneider). ὃ
ἐντὸς ἀνθρώπως has been compared with
Paul's ὃ σου ἀνθρώπως in Rom. 7. 22: cf.
also Eph. 3. 16.

589 β 7 ἐπιμελησταί. The sub-
ject is of course still ὃ ἐντὸς ἀνθρώπως,
and therefore no comma should be placed
after ἐγκρατεστατος. Jowett's translation
"He should watch over" etc. is very
misleading.

ὡσπερ γεωργὸς clearly belongs to
the following clause, not, as supposed by
Stallbaum and the other editors except
Schneider, to that which goes before. Cf.
IV 419 A n. For the illustration cf.
Euthyph. 2 D.

9 ξύμμαχον κτλ. The βυθοείδῆς is
the natural ally of the λογιστικῶν: see
IV 440 E ff.

589 B—591 A The panegyrist of
Justice is thus victorious on every count.
His opponent will surrender when he un-
derstands that Virtue subjects the bestial
to the human, may rather to the element of
God within us, while of Vice the opposite
is true. Shall it profit a man to take
gold unjustly and make his soul a slave?
We may also define intemperance, self-
will, discontent, cowardice, servility and
meanness, and the vulgarity which we
associate with mechanical pursuits, in
terms of our comparison. The better must
rule the worse —such is our principle, and
it is in harmony with the aims both of law
and of the government of children.

589 C 15 οδοῖν υγίες. We ought
not to supply λέγει: for οδοῖν υγίες ψέγει
is itself idiomatic for οδοῖν υγίες ψέγων
λέγει (Schneider).

17 οὐ γὰρ ἐκὼν ἀμερτάνει: according
to the usual Socratic view: see III 382 A n.

589 D 19 μᾶλλον δὲ—δει. "Both
Plato and Aristotle thought that there was
in human nature a certain imperfect
presence of God, and that it was this
divine presence, however small, which
made it specifically human nature" (Net-
VI 501 B n. with Tim. 90 A ff. (man is a
φύτον οὐκ ἔγγενος, ἀλλ' οὐράνον) and
Arist. Eth. N. i. 7. 1177 b 30 ff. The
doctrine of a δεῖν τι ἐν ἤμαν was by no
means new to Greek philosophical and
religious thought (see Kohde Psychê 11
pp. 121, 184 ff., 207 ff.), but Plato gave it
a far deeper meaning than it ever had be-
fore.
will speak for the champions of Injustice in their surrender as well as in their attack.

6 τῶν δεινῶν, τῶν μέγα κτλ. 'Socrates quasi monstrum conspicatus, quod τῶν δεινῶν θρέμμα appellaturus erat, denuo descriptionem eius incipit et per asyndeton horridulam orationem facit' (Schneider). The asyndeton has a highly rhetorical effect: see the remarks of Longinus on rhetorical asyndeton combined with ἀναφορά and διατύπωσις ('vivid description') in his περὶ Ὑφέους 20. Jowett and Campbell understand τῶν δεινῶν substantively ('the dangerous thing, viz. that great beast')—a most improbable view, as it appears to me. On the other hand, Stallbaum, writing τῶν δεινῶν τῶν μέγα κτλ. without any comma, compares Crat. 398 B ἐν τῇ τῇ ἀρχαι τῇ ἡμετέρῃ φωνῇ and other passages, none of which is parallel except (in some respects) Soph. Ο. Κ. 806 κἀγὼ τῶν ἐκτρέψων, τῶν τροχηλατῶν | παῖν ὦ ὑφή, and there a comma is required. We certainly should not (with Stephanus and Ast) read τῶν δεινῶν καὶ τῶν μέγα κτλ.

590 B 8 οφέωδες. The serpentine element has not hitherto been mentioned, but (as Schleiermacher points out, Platons
αὐξηταί καὶ συντείνονται ἀναμορφῶσις; Πάνω μὲν οὖν. Τρυφῆ δὲ καὶ μαλθακία οὐκ ἔπι τῇ αὐτοῦ τοῦτον χαλίσει τε καὶ αὐξήσει πρέπει, ὅταν ἐν αὐτῷ δειλίαν ἐμποτὶ; Τί μή; Κολακεία δὲ καὶ ἀνελευθερία οὐχ ὅταν τις τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο, τὸ θυμοειδὲς, ὅπο τῷ ὀχλόδει θηρίῳ ποιῆ καὶ ἕνεκα χρημάτων καὶ τῆς ἐκείνου ἀπληστίας προτηλαικίζομεν ἐθήξῃ ἐκ νέοι ἀντὶ λέοντος πῖθηκον 15 γίγνεσθαι; Καὶ μᾶλα, ἐφή. Βαναυσία δὲ καὶ χειροτεχνία διὰ τί, οἴει, ὁνειδὸς φέρει; ἦ δέ ἄλλο τε φήσομεν ἦ ὅταν τις ἀσθενεῖς φύσει ἔχῃ τὸ τοῦ βελτίστου εἰδός, ὡστε μὴ ἂν δύνασθαι ἄρχειν τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ θρεμάτων, ἄλλα θεραπεύειν ἑκείνα, καὶ τὰ θεσπεματα αὐτῶν μόνον δύναται μαθῆναι; Ἕσοικεν, ἐφή. Οὐκὼν ἵνα καὶ ὁ τοιοῦτος ὕπο ὁμοίου ἄρχηται ὀνυπερ ὁ βελτίστος, διὸν αὐτῶν φαμεν δεῖν εἶναι ἑκείνου 20 τοῦ βελτίστου, ἔχοντος ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ θείου ἄρχον, οὐκ ἐπὶ βλάβῃ τῇ τοῦ διόλου οἴουμεν δεῖν ἄρχεσθαι αὐτῶν, ὀσπερ Ἐρασύμαχος φητο τοὺς ἄρχομένους, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀμείων ὁν παντὶ ὑπὸ θείου καὶ φρονίμου ἄρχεσθαι, μάλιστα μὲν

_Stat p. 609_ may well be included in τὰ περὶ τοῦ λέοντος 588 E. It symbolizes some meaner forms of the θυμοειδεῖς which cannot well be attributed to the king of beasts, e.g. ὄνοικλα (III 411 C), perfidioseness etc. Cf. Theogn. 601 f. ἐρε, θεοῖν τ' ἐχθρή καὶ ἀνθρώπους ἀπίστε | ψυχρὸν δὲ ἐν κόλπῳ πωλικόν εἶχεν ὁ φιν. Clement (Strom. IV 3, 1225 B Migne) is thinking of the Old Testament when he says ὅπο ὁ ἀπατῶν, but the idea is also Greek. It should also be remarked that expansions and amplifications like the addition of ὀφείλεις in this passage are characteristic of the style of Plato: cf. for example Theat. 147 A, B and 161 C. The emendation ὀχλάως, which Nettleship appears to favour (Lect. and Remains II p. 335), is excessively weak, and would moreover refer not to the θυμοειδεῖς, but to the ἐπιθυμηταῖς (cf. τῷ ὀχλάως θηρίῳ below). It seems to me clear both from λεονταῖς and from αὐτοῦ τοῦτον below that at present Plato is thinking only of the θυμοειδεῖς and its degenerate kinds. We must therefore beware of referring ὀφείλεις to τοὺς φιλο-δόνους, τοὺς γαστρὶ καὶ αἰδώνος δουλεύοντας (Clement's interpretation of Matt. 3. 7: see Strom. IV 16, 1308 A).

9 τρυφῆ δὲ καὶ μαλθακία κτλ. Cf. III 411 A, B. On πῖθηκον see x 620 C n. 690 C 15 Βαναυσία. See on VI 495 D. 19 δύνηται has been suspected by Stephanus, Ast, and Herwerden. The word could well be spared, but, as it is in all the MSS, was read by Stobaeus (Flor. 9. 67) and is not in itself an error, we are hardly justified in resorting to excision. The subjunctive depends of course on ὅταν, and καὶ connects δύνηται with ἐχθρ. By reading τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ (not αὐτῷ) θρεμάτων, and making τὸ τοῦ βελτίστου εἰδός the subject of δύνασθαι and θερα-πεύειν, Schneider makes it rather easier to refer δύνηται ὅταν τις: but on the whole it is more natural to retain αὐτῷ and make the subject of δύνασθαι the same as that of δύνηται, viz. the individual himself. Even at the cost of a little awkwardness, Plato prefers to make the sentiment expressed by καὶ τὰ θυσεύματα —μαθᾶνεις co-ordinate with, rather than a consequence of, ὅταν τις ἀσθενεῖς κτλ. For the imagery of the sentence cf. (with J. and C.) VI 493 A ff. ῾ἐνα καὶ κτλ. is Plato's justification for assigning the farmers and artisans to a dependent position in his city. For the syntax of ὑπὸ ὁμοίου—ὁσπερ see III 402 A n. 590 D 23 ὀσπερ Ἐρασύμαχος φητο. See I 343 A ff. 24 μάλιστα μὲν κτλ. A profounder and truly Platonic form of Hesiod's famous
saying oitos μὲν πανάρσεται οὗτος οὗτος πάντα τὸ κακόν, ἐν αὐτῷ ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα τὸ κακόν, ἐν αὐτῷ ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα τὸ κακόν, ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα τὸ κακόν, ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα τὸ κακόν, ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα τὸ κακόν, ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα τὸ κακόν, ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα τὸ κακόν, ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα τὸ κακόν, ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα τὸ κακόν, ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα τὸ κακόν, ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα τὸ κακόν, ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα τὸ κακόν, ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα τὸ κακόν, ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα τὸ κακόν, ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα τὸ κακόν, ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα τὸ κακόν, ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα τὸ κακόν, ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα τὸ κακόν, ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα τὸ κακόν, ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα τὸ κακόν, ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα τὸ κακόν, ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα τὸ κακόν, ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα τὸ κακόν, ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα τὸ κακόν, ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα τὸ κακόν, ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα τὸ κακόν, ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα τὸ κακόν, ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα τὸ κακόν, ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα τὸ κακόν, ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα τὸ κακόν, ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα τὸ κακόν, ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα τὸ κακόν, ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα τὸ κακόν, ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα τὸ κακόν, ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα τὸ κακόν, ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα τὸ κακόν, ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα τὸ κακόν, ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα τὸ κακόν, ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα τὸ κακόν, ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα τὸ κακόν, ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα τὸ κακόν, ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα τὸ κακόν, ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα τὸ κακόν, ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα τὸ κακόν, ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα τὸ κακόν, ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα τὸ κακόν, ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα τὸ κακόν, ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα τὸ κακόν, ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα τὸ κακόν, ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα τὸ κακόν, ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα τὸ κακόν, ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα τὸ κακόν, ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα τὸ κακόν, ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα τὸ κακόν, ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα τὸ κακόν, ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα τὸ κακόν, ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα τὸ κακόν, ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα τὸ κακόν, ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα τὸ κακόν, ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα τὸ κακόν, ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα τὸ κακόν, ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα τὸ κακόν, ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα τὸ κακόν, ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα τὸ κακόν, ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα τὸ κακόν, ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα τὸ κακόν, ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα τὸ κακόν, ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα τὸ κακόν, ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα τὸ κακόν, ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα τὸ κακόν, ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα τὸ κακόν, ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα τὸ κακόν, ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα τὸ κακόν, ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα τὸ κακόν, ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα τὸ κακόν, ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα τὸ κακόν, ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα τὸ κακόν, ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα τὸ κακόν, ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα τὸ κακόν, ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα τὸ κακόν, ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα τὸ κακόν, ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα τὸ κακόν, ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα τὸ κακό

Law is that the better should rule the worse, and we may fairly appeal to the witness of Law on such a subject, for Law does not, as Thrasymachus argued (I 343 c), hold a brief for δρόμων, but is the ally of every class and individual in the city without exception, πάοι τοις ἐν τῇ πόλει ἡμών. Law is "the ally of everybody in the community without distinction, because the ally of that which is best in him" (Nettleship Lect. and Rem. II p. 336).

591 A 2 ἀντικαταστήσωμεν κτλ.: se, as a counterpart or substitute for our own βελτιστον (τῷ παρ' ἡμῖν τοιοῦτο), by which he has hitherto been guided. Madvig's conjecture ὅτι καταστάσωμεν is both unnecessary and inelegant. On the singular αὐτῷ in spite of the plural πάσων see 1 347 A n.

591 A—592 B It is also better for him who is guilty of injustice to be detected and punished than to escape. The wise man will honour those studies which promote the welfare of his soul, and the same great object will be his guiding principle in all that appertains to the body and its state, as well as to the acquisition of riches and honours. Will he take part in political life? Perhaps not in the land of his birth, but in his own true city assuredly he will. It may be that the perfect city is an ensemble laid up in Heaven for him who would plant a city in his soul.

ἀδικεῖν—ποιεῖν. It is more natural and better in point of literary effect to make the infinitives coordinate (with the English translators) than to suppose (with Schneider) that ἐί—ἐί is 'either—or' and ἀκολασταίνειν and τῇ αἰσχρῇ ποιεῖν intended as different species of the genus ἀδικεῖα.
mēn ēstai, pleiō de ἥρματα ἢ ἄλλην τινά δύναμιν κεκτήσεται; Ὀδορήμη, ἢ ὥς. Πη δὲ ἀδίκουντα λαυθάειν καὶ μη διδόναι δίκην 
λευτελιῶν; ἢ οὐχί ὁ μὲν λαυθάνων ἢ τοῦ ἰπποτηροῦ ἐγγενέται, 
τοῦ δὲ μη λαυθάνουτος καὶ κολαζομένου τὸ μὲν θηριόδες κομίζεται 
καὶ ἰμεροῦται, τὸ δὲ ἰμερον ἑλευθεροῦται, καὶ ὅλη ἢ 
ψυχή εἰς τὴν βελτίστην φύσιν καθισταμένη τιμωτέραν ἐξελαμβάνει, 
σωφροσύνην τε καὶ δικαιοσύνην μετά φρονήμος κτωμένη, ἢ σῶμα 
ισχύν τε καὶ κάλλος μετὰ υγείας λαμβάνον, τοσούτῳ ὅσπερ 
ψυχή σώματος τιμωτέρα; Παντάπασιν μὲν οὖν, ἐφί. 
Οὐκοῦν 
ὅ γε νοῦν ἔχων πάντα ἢ τά αὐτοῦ εἰς τοῦτο ἐξυνεῖνας 
βιώσαται, 
πρῶτον μὲν τά μαθήματα τιμῶν, ἢ τοιαύτην αὐτοῦ τὴν 
ψυχήν ἀπεργάσεται, τά δὲ ἀλλὰ ἀτιμάζουσ; 
Δήλον, ἐφί. "Ἐπειτά γ', 
εἰπώ, τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἐξελαμβάνει καὶ τροφῆν υἱῶν ὅπως τῇ 
θηριόδει καὶ ἀλόγῳ ἡδονῇ ἐπιτρέψαις ἐνταῦθα τετραμένους ἔξεσέ, 
ἀλλ' οὐδέ 
πρὸς υγείας βλέπων οὔδε τοῦτο προσβεβευόν. ὅπως ἰσχυρὸς ἢ ὑγείη 
ἤ καλὸς ἐσταὶ, ἐάν μὴ καὶ σωφρονήσεις μέλλῃ ἀπ' αὐτῶν, ἢ ἀλλ' 
ἀεί τὴν ἐν τῷ σώματι ἀρμονίαν τῆς ἐν τῇ ψυχῆ ἐνεκαι 
ἐξυμφωνίας.

8. ἐπὶ ποιητρότερος Α'Ξι.: ἐπίποιητότερος Α'Π. 17. ἀπεργάσεται Π.: ἀπερ 
γάσται Α. 19. ζησεῖ Σ.: ζησεὶ Λ'-ζῆσα (τεί)Π.: ζῆσθι Α'ρ.

7 τῇ δ' ἀδίκουντα κτλ. It was maintained in II 361 Α'ς, 365 Βς that 
Injustice could evade detection and 
punishment. So much the worse, says 
Socrates, for the sinner, who thereby 
forfeits his only chance of reformation, 
since Punishment is the appointed cure 
for Vice. It may be doubted whether so 
human a view altogether corresponded 
to the actual administration of the 
Athenian or any other State; but to an ideal 
ist like Plato 'is' means 'should be,' 
and in so far as human laws fulfil their 
true function by reflecting the divine 
ordinances, we may truly say that punishment 
is remedial. See on the whole subject 
II 38ο Β'ς.

591 Κ 17 ἀπεργάσεται κτλ. Editors rightly abandon the present 
ἀπεργάσεται (see cr. n.) as indefensible. ζῆσει is 
condemned by Cobet (F. L.² p. 61ο) 
as an interpolation, but some verb is 
needed, and Cobet himself allows that 
"ζῆσαι apud Atticos semel et iterum com 
paret" (e.g. v 465 D, Ar. Plit. 263 and 
Fr. 498 Dindorf). ζῆσει (see cr. n.) can 
hardly be maintained in Plato, though 
not, apparently, unknown in Ionice: see 
Kühner-Blass Gr. Gr. 1 2, p. 436. The 
erroneous ζῆσθι is clearly due to a misun 
derstanding of οὐχ ὅτως (non modo non).

591 D 21 ἀλλ' ἀεί κτλ. With the 
sentiments cf. ΙΙΙ 41ο Α'ς, 49ο Β'ς. On 
φαινεται see cr. n. If we retain φαινεται, as 
I formerly did, with J. and C., Schneider 
and the early editions, the conjunctive is 
parallel to the future ἐσταί, both depend 
ing on ὅτως: cf. (with Schneider) Tim. 
18 ε μηχανάζωι κληρον τινι, ὅτως— 
ζησάσαι, καὶ μὴ τα αὐτὰ ἡθοποιηθήσῃ 
ἀφ' ὅτως. A few additional examples are 
cited by Kühner Gr. Gr. ΙΙ p. 893 n. 5. 
In this instance, however, φαινεται is 
particularly awkward, and may easily be 
a corruption of φαινεται, under the influ 
ence of the preceding ἐνά. ὑ ἔχεινο, 
which doubtless springs from the same 
misunderstanding which produced the 
corruption ζῆσθι for ζῆσαι in C. φαινεται 
is adopted also by Ast, Stallbaum, and a 
reviewer of my Text of the Republic in 
Hermathena xxiv p. 256. We must 
understand the clause as still under the 
government of ὅτως, and not as indepen 
dent; otherwise the verb becomes otiose, 
as it is in fact regarded by Hermann, 
Stallbaum and Bäder, all of whom 
bracket it.
Λάμπνοις φανείται. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἐφή, ἐάντερ μέλλῃ 
tῇ ἀληθείᾳ μουσικὸς εἶναι. Οὐκοῦν, ἐστιν, καὶ τῆν ἐν 
tῇ τῶν χρημάτων κτίσει ξύνταξιν τε καὶ ἐξεργασίαν; καὶ τὸν ὄγκον τοῦ 25 
πλῆθους οὐκ ἐκπληκτῶμεν ὑπὸ τοῦ τῶν πολλῶν μακαρισμοῦ 
ἀπειροῦν αὔξησει, ἀπέραντα κακὰ ἐξῶν; Οὐκ οἴομαι, ἐφή. Ἀλλ' 
Ε ἀποβλέπων γε, ἐστιν, 1 πρὸς τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ πολιτείᾳ καὶ φυλάττων, 
μὴ τι παρακινή αὐτοῦ τὸν ἔκει διὰ πλῆθος σοισία ἢ δι' ὀλυγότητα, 
οὕτως κυβερνῶν προσθέσει καὶ ἀναλώσει τῆς σοισίας καθ' ὀσον ἄν 30 
οἶοι τ' ἦ. Κομιδὴ μὲν οὖν, ἐφή. Ἀλλα μὴν καὶ τιμᾶς γε, εἰς 
592 τούτων ἀποβλέπων, τῶν μὲν μεθέξει καὶ γευστεῖ τικοῖς, ὡς ἂν 
ἤγηται ἀμείων αὐτῶν ποιήσεις, ὡς ἂν λύσει τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν 
ἐξίν, φεύγεται ἱδία καὶ δημοσία. Οὐκ ἄρα, ἐφή, τά γε πολιτικά 
ἔθελεσί συμπάσσει, ἐάντερ τούτου κίνηται. Νὴ τῶν κύνων, ἦν δ' 
έγω, ἐν γε τῇ ἐαντού πόλει καὶ μᾶλλα, οὐ μεντοί ισως ἐν γε τῇ 5 
pατρίδι, ἐὰν μὴ θεία τῆς ξυμβή τύχη. Μανθάνω, ἐφή: ἐν ἦ 
νῦν δύσθεομεν οἰκίζοντες πόλει λόγιν, τῇ ἐν λόγως κειμένην: ἐπεὶ τῆς 
Β γε 1 οὐδαμοῦ οἶμαι αὑτὴν εἶναι. Ἀλλ', ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐν οὐρανῷ ἵσως 
23. φανείται Iamblichus (Protrept. 90): φανεύτη ΑΠΞ: φαίνοντος. 29. πλῆ 
θος ΑΞ ξγ: πλῆθος ΑΠΙ.
himself’ ("sich selbst begründen") Schnei
der, and so also Bosanquet); cf. vi 496 C—497 A. έαυτόν κατοκίζειν is a pregnant
and powerful phrase, which involves not
only the idea of the τοῦ σ. πολιτείαν εν ἕμο
(cf. 590 e, 591 e, x 605 b, 608 b), but also perhaps a hint that the παρά-
dειγμα εν οὐρανῷ is as it were the μετρό-
pολις from which our souls should be
colonised. Jowett and Campbell under-
stand ἕαν after έαυτόν κατοκίζειν, while
Richards thinks Plato may have written
έαυτον <εὐθέτε> or <εἰς αὐτὸν> κατο-
kίζειν: but the word παράδειγμα, as well
as τῆς θεουλομένης ὀρᾶν καὶ ὄροντι, shews that
the heavenly city is regarded as a model
for the soul rather than as the place in
which the soul should be planted. The
conjectures εὑτό (sc. τὸ παράδειγμα) κατο-
kίζειν and ὄροντε πρός (sc. εἰς) αὐτὸ κατο-
kίζειν (Herderen) do not merit refutation.
What does Plato mean by εν οὐρανῷ?
It is surely something more than "harm-
lose, popular-theological Redeweise"
(Pfeiderer zur Lehre etc. p. 33).
The poet Gray (who aptly reminds us of Di-
genes Laërtius' epitaph on Plato τῶν ἑυδο
ἵνα την πόλιν εὐαυτόν ἔκτεσε, καὶ δαπάν
νεὐράοντος ΗΗΗΗΙΙΙΙΙΙΙΙΙ. 45) remarks: "εν οὐ-
ρανῳ, that is, in the idea of the divinity;
see the beginning of the following book."
Apparently he understood the words of
the Heaven of Ideas, a view which has,
with various modifications and qualifica-
tions, found favour also with other critics
(see Steinhart Einleitung p. 25, 4 and cf.
Susemidh Gen. Entw. p. 248 ff. Pro-
clus in Tim. 269 E seems to interpret the
παράδειγμα as τῆν εν οὐρανῷ πολιτείαν
τῆς ψυχῆς ἡς, but Plato is manifestly speak-
ing of the πολιτεία τῆς πόλεως). Others
have taken εν οὐρανῷ of the 'Weltall' or
Macrocosm, as if the Universe itself were
one great ideal city, after whose pattern
we should regulate the City of the Soul
(see Steinhart I. c. and p. 270 with Tim.
47 B, 90 D); but, as Schneider points out,
we can hardly reconcile such an interpre-
tation with vii 529 C—530 C, and ἕαν
κατακεῖται is also against it. The sentenc
may be compared with Pol. 297 C, Laws
713 B ff. and especially 739 D, E, where
the polity of the Ρομπλίκης is thus de-
scribed: η μὲν δὴ τοιαύτη πόλις, εἰτὲ πο
θεοὶ ἡ πάθεις θεῶν αὐτῆς οἰκοῦσι
πλείους ἐν ὑπάρχειν εὐφραίνω-
μενον κατοκίζοντι διὸ δὴ παράδειγμα. γε
πολιτείας οὐκ ἀλλ' χρή σκοπεῖν, ἀλλ'
ἐξουσίων ταύτη τῆν ὅτι μάλλον τοιαύτη
ζητεῖν κατά δόμαιν. We might employ
this passage to explain εν οὐρανῷ τοῦ παρά-
dειγμα, but its tone is less elevated
and impressive, and in particular it does
not help us to understand τῆς θεουλομένης
ὁρᾶν καὶ ὄροντι. Plato’s language is ex-
traordinarily suggestive, and I confess
that to me, as apparently to Susemidh (I. c.
p. 249), these words suggest, not indeed
the doctrine of Anamnesis in all its bear-
ings, but something of the half-religious,
half-poetical atmosphere with which
Plato invests that doctrine in the Phae-
drus. The mysterious and haunting phrase
εν οὐρανῷ παράδειγμα recalls the
'Imperial palace whence we came,' and
the whole sentence reminds us once
again of that profound and inspiring
document ἐν οὐρανῷ φιλοτιμοῦντον, οὐκ
ἐγγείον, which, as I have often pointed
out, underlies so much of Platonism.
The sister-doctrine of Immortality seems
also to be implied, and from this point
of view the Christian parallels are highly
remarkable and significant: see for ex-
ample Phil. 3. 20 ἡμῶν γὰρ τὸ πολι-
tείματα εν οὐρανοῖς ὑπάρχει, and many other
passages in the New Testament, e.g.
Hebr. 11. 16, 12, 23, 13, 14: 1 Pet. 1. 1, 2. iii. 13. I do not venture to assert that
Plato consciously and deliberately thought
of Anamnesis and Immortality when he
wrote εν οὐρανῷ etc., but the words are
steeped in the fragrance of these beliefs;
and to regard the reference to heaven
"as a mere passing figure of speech"
(Bosanquet) seems to me to do
less than justice to the wonderful
depth and fervour of this passage.
10 τα γάρ ταύτης κτλ. See Nettle-
ship Lect. and Rem. II p. 338 and Theaeit.
173 C ff., quoted by him. Interpreted
strictly and by themselves, the words of
Plato would mean only that the philoso-
pher will abstain from public and politi-

cal life except when some 'divine chance'
enables him to exercise his true voca-
tion. But taken in connexion with εν οὐρανῶν
κατοκίζοντι they mean more. In founding
the city within himself after the likeness
of the heavenly city the philosopher is in
Politeias θ.

γάρ ταύτης μόνης ἀν πράξειν, ἄλλης δὲ οὐδεμᾶς. Εἰκὸς γ', ἐφη.

télos politeías θ'.

reality a true πολιτικός, because he is thereby faithful to the principles of the true and perfect State: even while he lives, he is already in a sense a citizen of Heaven, for the Kingdom of Heaven is reproduced within him. In existing cities the truest politicians are sometimes those who abstain from politics altogether, according to Gorg. 521 D ff. I agree with Steinhart (Einleitung p. 254) and Christ (Gr. Literaturgesch. p. 348 n. 6) that Plato now speaks much less hopefully than before of the prospects of realising his ideal city upon earth: see on v. 470 e, vi 499 c and 502 c. It is possible to force some of the earlier allu-
sions into a sort of harmony with the words of this passage (see for example Hirmer Entst. u. Komp. d. Pl. Pol. pp. 637 ff.); but we cannot help feeling that the tone and atmosphere are very different. Steinhart (l.c. p. 703 n. 264) traces the difference to Plato's disappointed hopes of the younger Dionysius. The conjecture is interesting, but even without this stimulus Plato may well have come to feel that his καλλιτόνος is hardly of this world (cf. Laws 713 B), and that its true value lies in the religious, political, and moral ideals which it holds before mankind.
APPENDICES TO BOOK IX.

I.

IX 576 d, e. ἀλλ' εἰδαμονίας τε αὖ καὶ ἀθλιότητος ωσαύτως ἢ ἄλλος κρίνεις; καὶ μὴ ἐκπλήκτωμέθα πρὸς τὸν τύραννον ἐνα ὠντα βλέποντες, μηδ' εἴ τινες ὅλγοι περὶ ἐκείνου, ἀλλ' ὁς χρῆ ὅλην τὴν πόλιν εἰσελθόντας θεάσασθαι, καταδύντες εἰς ἀπασχολητο καὶ ἱδώντες, οὕτω δόξαν ἀποφαίνωμέθα.

The difficult clause ὁς, χρῆ—θεάσασθαι has hardly received sufficient attention at the hands of editors. There is no variant of any consequence in the mss.

The chief trouble lies in determining the precise force of ὁς χρῆ.
Is ὁς (1) 'sicut,' introducing an analogy, or (2) simply 'ut,' i.e. 'as,' or (3) a causal particle?

The first of these views is apparently held by Schleiermacher and Schneider. The former translates "sonderlich wie man sich eine Stadt ganz beschauen muss, wenn man hineinkommt, so lass uns überall herumsteigen und zusehn und dann unsere Meinung abgehen." Schneider's version is "sonderlich so wie man den gesamten Staat zu sehen in ihn hineingehen muss, in das innere des ganzen eindringen, und wenn wir ihn gesehen haben, unsere Meinung aussprechen." Schleiermacher seems to suppose that there is a comparison between what is necessary in order to see the sights of a town, and what is necessary in order to pronounce judgment on the τυραννομενή πόλις: in either case we must get 'inside' the city. This explanation is attractive, and can be made very plausible; but (a) we should expect ὁσπερ in place of ὁς: (b) the present χρῆ suggests something which is our duty here and now, rather than what would be necessary in a hypothetical case: (c) the antithesis between seeing with the eye, and seeing with the mind, is not sufficiently brought out by merely setting θεάσασθαι over against ἱδώντες: and (d) it is not natural that the illustration should be confined to the tyrant's city, as it manifestly is by the words ὅλην τὴν πόλιν. For these reasons I cannot bring myself to agree with Schleiermacher, alluring as his view is.

The second explanation gives a thoroughly natural and easy meaning to ὁς χρῆ. But how are we to explain the remainder of the clause, ὅλην—θεάσασθαι? We cannot, surely, supply θεωσάμενοι (with J. and C.) before ὁς, nor would the resulting sense be satisfactory if we could. Two explanations may be suggested. We may suppose, on the one hand, that ὅλην—θεάσασθαι is merely explanatory of ὁς χρῆ ("as is right,"
viz. that we should go into and see the whole city, ‘let us’ etc.). It is however, an objection to this theory that it makes ὀλην—θεάσασθαι almost entirely otiose, and Jowett, in point of fact, practically omits the words from his translation (“let us go as we ought into every corner of the city and look all about”). On the other hand, it may be argued that ὃς χωρ', though in itself, strictly speaking, parenthetical, is allowed to affect the construction in much the same way as ὃς οἶμαι, ὃς ἐοικεν sometimes are (see for example Soph. Ῥαχ. 1238 ἀνὴρ ὦδ', ὃς ἐοικεν, ὃν νεμεῖν ἔμοι κτλ. with note on 1 347 A). But there is apparently no other example of this kind of attraction on so extensive a scale, and ὀλην—θεάσασθαι is still nearly, if not quite, superfluous.

The view that ὃς is causal presents the fewest difficulties, and for that reason I have adopted it in the notes. It is held also by Ast and Davies and Vaughan. The text may be corrupt, but it has not, so far as I know, been hitherto suspected. If ἀλλὰ were read before καταδύντες and not before ὃς, all difficulty would disappear. ‘Do not let us be dazzled by looking at the tyrant, who is but one man among many, or at a few persons in his retinue, for it is the entire city which we must go in and view; but let us’ etc. The corruption, however, is not easy to explain, and it is safer and wiser to follow the mss.

II.

IX 580 A, B. ἢδε δῆ μοι, ἐφην ἐγώ, νῦν ἥδη ὦσπερ διὰ πάντων κριτῆς ἀφοβάνεται, καὶ σὺ οὖτω, τίς πρῶτος κατὰ τὴν σὴν δοξὴν εὐδαμονία καὶ τίς δεύτερος, καὶ τοῦς ἄλλους ἐξῆς πέντε οὕτως κρίνει, βασιλικῶν, τιμοκρατικῶν, ὀλυσαρχικῶν, δημοκρατικῶν, τυραννικῶν.

The general meaning of this passage is clear, but it is difficult to determine the exact force of διὰ πάντων κριτῆς. There is no reason to suspect the text, although the phrase is apparently not found elsewhere; nor would Orelli’s conjecture ὄφοσάντων deserve to be accepted, even if διὰ πάντων were corrupt.

In the program cited in the notes, Petersen has collected and discussed most of the available literary evidence on the Athenian method of judging in dramatic and musical contests. None of the passages quoted by him throw any direct light upon the words διὰ πάντων: but it is possible to construct from these passages a reasonable theory of the whole subject, in which διὰ πάντων κριτῆς receives what is at least a plausible explanation. I have adopted the substance of Petersen’s theory in the notes, but not his view of the particular phrase διὰ πάντων κριτῆς.

The other prima facie evidence, which Petersen does not discuss, is as follows:


Hesychius: διὰ πάντων κριτῆς. Βορθὸς φησὶ ἐν τοῖς περὶ Πλάτωνος, ὅτι ὁ νομοθέτης ἐκέλευσε τούς κρίνοντες γράφειν τὰ κεφάλαια ἐκα-στον.
APPENDICES TO BOOK IX.

CIG 1585, 1586, 1719, 1720.


The remark of Boehthu preserved by Hesychius merely alludes to the regulation that the judges were to make use of a γραμματείον. This is abundantly attested from other sources (see Müller Griech. Bühnentxt. p. 371 n. 2), and does not, so far as I can see, help us to interpret διὰ πάντων. Cratinus’ fragment, on the other hand, is important; for it shows that there was a διὰ πάντων ἀγών before the time of Plato.

The first of the inscriptions, CIG 1585, gives a list of victors in a musical contest at Thespiae, ending with διὰ πάντων (sc. ἐπικα) Ἐυμάρων Ἀλεξάνδρου Θεσπιεύς, who is also mentioned at the beginning as the author of the successful προσόδων. The second inscription, found on Mt Helicon, is similar; and in CIG 1719 and 1720, both of which were discovered at Delphi, we meet with διὰ πάντων—though in 1719 πάντων has to be supplied by Boehck—and ὁ διὰ πάντων, in the sense of ὁ διὰ πάντων ἀγών (as in the inscription from Nysa). According to Boehck on CIG 1585, ὁ διὰ πάντων (νικῶν) is “victor inter victores,” the winner of the prize given for the one best production of all the successful pieces in the different kinds, like the prize for the ‘best animal in the yard’ at an agricultural show; and this interpretation is supported by the fact that the winner of the διὰ πάντων in that inscription has already secured the prize for the προσόδων. A less probable theory understands τῶν ἀγωνισμάτων rather than τῶν ἀγωνιστῶν after διὰ πάντων, and takes ὁ διὰ πάντων νικῶν as “wer in mehreren Productionen zwar nicht den Sieg errungen hatte, aber doch ihm am nächsten gekommen war”; such a person “verdiente seiner Vielseitigkeit wegen schon einen Preis” (Kayser quoted in Grasberger Erziehung u. Unterricht u. p. 15). It will be observed that neither explanation makes the διὰ πάντων ἀγών a competition involving distinct and separate performances of its own.

As the διὰ πάντων ἀγών must necessarily have been decided last, and always, I think, comes at the end of the list of victories, the usage of the inscriptions is not inconsistent with the explanation of διὰ πάντων ἀγών as ὁ ἐσχάτος, given in Bekker’s Anecdota l.c. And, since it is obvious that if the Greeks could use the expressions ὁ διὰ πάντων νικῶν and ὁ διὰ πάντων ἀγών, they may well have spoken of the judge in the διὰ πάντων as ὁ διὰ πάντων κριτής, it may seem that a satisfactory explanation of the Platonic phrase is possible by the aid of the Inscriptions.

But neither Kayser’s nor Boehck’s interpretation of the insessional use of διὰ πάντων is in the least degree suited to the situation in the Republic. Glauco is invited to arrange the competitors in order of merit, and not merely to decide which is first; nor are the βασιλικός, τιμοκρατικός, ὀλυμπιακὸς etc. in any sense competitors in different departments, like the πυθαγόρης, μαθημάτης etc. of the Inscriptions; they are all from beginning to end candidates in one and the same contest for one
and the same prize. The hypothesis proposed by Kayser is still less
opposite: for Plato’s βασιλικός is anything but ‘many-sided,’ and has
never been beaten in any contest at all.
For these reasons I cannot see that the Inscriptions hitherto dis-
covered give us any real assistance in attempting to elucidate the
sentence of Plato, and it should be further remarked that they are all
of them as late as the days of the Empire. There is nothing relevant
to our purpose in the large collection of inscriptions contained in Reisch
de musicis Graecorum certaminibus (1885).
It may be well to mention some of the different views which have
been held by Platonic scholars on this difficult phrase. Ficinus
translates “quemadmodum iudex omnia circumspiciens de singulis
iudicat”; Schleiermacher “wie, wer in irgend einer Sache über alle
durchweg richten soll, sein Urtheil abgibt,” confessing however (Platons
Staat p. 603) that he finds the sentence obscure; Schneider “der
Richter, der über alle entscheidet,” i.e. “der welcher das Urtheil fällt,
wen Alle in einem musikalischen Wettstreit um den Preis
kämpfen, ihre Leistungen vollendet haben” (p. 312 of his Trans-
lation); Prantl “der Alles umfassende Richter”; Müller “der Richter,
der das Ganze zusammenfassend sein Urtheil abgibt,” i.e. “der ver-
ständige Richtende, der bei Abgabe seiner Stimme nicht einzelnes,
sondern den ganzen Thatsbestand ins Auge fasst”; Jowett “as the
general umpire in theatrical contests”; and Davies and Vaughan “the
judge who passes sentence after going through the whole case.” In
most of these versions διὰ πάντων is construed as if it were not a
technical expression at all, but merely equivalent to διὰ πάντων διεξελθὼν
or the like (cf. vii 534 c). To me, on the other hand, it seems
that ὁ διὰ πάντων κριτῆς is an essential part of Plato’s comparison, and
would at once suggest to Plato’s readers some particular judge or judges
in musical or dramatic competitions. Jowett and Campbell think
the words may mean: (1) the judge who decides the prizes of all
the different kinds of contests; (2) or all the prizes, e.g. first, second,
third in the same contest; (3) the judge who gave the final decision in
some musical pentathlon. I have already given my grounds for
rejecting the first suggestion; the second makes διὰ πάντων practically
otiose, for it is obvious that all the prizes in the same contest must be
awarded by the same authority; the third is more reasonable, although
I cannot agree that “πέντε ὁντας conveys an allusion to the pentathlon.”
The words πέντε ὁντας refer of course to the competitors, βασιλικόν etc.,
and not to five different subjects of competition.
Sir Richard Jebb suggests another view, which appears to me
deserving of consideration. He writes as follows:—
“A clue to the sense of διὰ πάντων here is given by those phrases
in which διὰ with the genitive denotes the range of a comparison or a
competition: e.g., Iliad xii 104 ἐπρέπε καὶ διὰ πάντων (‘among all’):
Herod. i 25 θέσις ἐξιον διὰ πάντων τῶν ἀναθημάτων: id. vi 63 εἰδοκιμέοντι
διὰ πάντων. The phrase ὁ διὰ πάντων ἄγριον may be a terse expression
(‘the contest from among all’=‘the contest of those selected from
among all’ or ‘distinguished among all’) for that contest in which the
competitors were οἱ διὰ τῶν εὐδοκημόσαντες, those who had done best among all the competitors,—having vanquished their respective opponents in the preliminary contests. ὁ διὰ τῶν ἀγών would thus be what the old interpreter calls it, ὁ ἔσχατος, the final contest. For example, in the dithyrambic ἀγόν at Athens there were ten choruses, one for each tribe. We will suppose that these ten competed, to begin with, in pairs. Then ὁ διὰ τῶν ἀγών would be the final contest between the five choruses left in after the preliminary contests. ὁ διὰ τῶν κριτῶν would be any one of the (five) judges in ὁ διὰ τῶν ἀγών. It seems possible that the illustration from the final decision in the contest of dithyrambic choruses may have struck Plato as having a special fitness because five competitors are in question here.”

III.

IX 581 D E. τὸν δὲ φιλόσοφον, ἢν ὃ ἐγώ, τί οἰκόμεθα τὰς ἄλλας ἡδονὰς νομίζειν πρὸς τὴν τοῦ εἶδάναι τάλατας ὅταν ἐχει καὶ ἐν τοιούτῳ τυχεί ἐστὶν καὶ ἡ οἰκοῦσα τῆς ἡδονῆς; οὐ πάνιν πόρρω, καὶ καλεῖς τῷ ὄντι ἀναγκαῖος, ὡς οἴδαι τῶν ἄλλων δεόμενον, εἰ μὴ ἀνάγκη ἢν;

In this difficult passage all the mss have ποιόμεθα instead of τί οἰκόμεθα. In other respects the text which I have printed agrees with A and II; nor is there any important variant in the inferior mss, except νομίζειν ὀδώρ (for νομίζειν) in Ξ and a few of its congeners.

ποιόμεθα was read by Schneider, whose translation is as follows:—

“Von dem Wissenschaftliebenden aber, sagte ich, sollen wir nicht glauben dass er die andern Annahmlichkeiten in Vergleich mit der das Wahre wie es ist, zu erkennen und immer lernend auf solche Weise beschäftigt zu sein für sehr entfernt vom angenehmen hält und sie in der That nothwendige nennt, als der der andern nicht begehen würde, wenn es nicht nothwendig wäre?” Schleiermacher had already taken the passage in this way, except that he fell into error over οὐ πάνιν πόρρω. The objections to Schneider’s view have been pointed out by Stallbaum and others. They are briefly these: (1) ποιεῖται by itself cannot mean ‘existimare,’ ‘statuere’; (2) ποιομέθα τὰς ἄλλας νομίζειν—τῆς ἡδονῆς οὐ πάνιν πόρρω is not equivalent to ἢρ’ οὐ ποιομέθα—τὰς ἄλλας νομίζειν—τῆς ἡδονῆς πάνιν πόρρω, which is that which Schneider translates. See also Graser Spec. advers. in serm. Pl. pp. 19—23. Jowett attempts to evade the second of these objections by translating “may we suppose that the philosopher regards the other pleasures in regard to the pleasure of knowing the truth, and in that pursuit abiding always, not so very far from the Heaven of pleasure, and that he calls” etc., and making τῆς ἡδονῆς οὐ πάνιν πόρρω slightly ironical, as if “intended to express that the philosopher has in knowledge the true pleasure.” This explanation is, to say the least, obscure; if I understand it rightly, ‘regards’ means ‘values,’ and ποιεῖται τι πρὸς τι surely cannot mean ‘to value one thing in regard to another.’

In his published translation Jowett had acquiesced in Graser’s τί
which a large majority of critics have approved (Müller, Prantl, Hermann, Baiter, Madvig, Campbell). This emendation, which is easy enough, τι and π being nearly identical in uncial, removes all difficulty in the earlier part of the sentence, and is much neater than Stallbaum’s μὴ οἰωμέθα. It is also an argument against μὴ οἰωμέθα that it requires us to read νομίζειν οὖδέν for νομίζειν: while, on the other hand, as soon as τι οἰωμέθα was corrupted into ποιωμέθα, the οὐδέν which we find in Ξ etc. may have been introduced into the text to go with πρὸς in the sense of ‘nothing’ (i.e. ‘of no account’) ‘in comparison with’ etc., exactly as in τι οἰωμέθα τὰς ἄλλας ἡδονὰς νομίζειν πρὸς of the original uncorrupted text.

Critics have also differed widely about the words μανθάνοντα—πόρρα. Does the sentence contain two questions or only one? Of those who accept the conjecture τι οἰωμέθα, Graser and Müller suppose that there is only a single question. The former (L.C.) bids us construe τῆς ἡδονῆς κτλ. as “quo in studio a voluptate tam prope abest, ut illas etiam revera necessarias appellet,” etc., taking καὶ καλεῖν for ὀστε καὶ καλεῖν. The latter invites us to carry on the τῶν τοῦ εἶδέναι not only to εἶναι (to which of course it also belongs), but even to καλεῖν. Each of these explanations is equally unsatisfactory in point of meaning and of grammar.

Those who hold that there are two questions have hitherto made the first end with μανθάνοντα (Prantl, Hermann, Baiter, Campbell). According to their view, the meaning is ‘And what, are we to suppose, is the philosopher’s estimate of the other pleasures in comparison with that of knowing the truth as it is, and being evermore engaged in such an intellectual pursuit? Must we not think that he accounts them far removed from true pleasure?’ etc. (Campbell). To this there are two objections. τῆς ἡδονῆς is not by itself commensurate with ‘true pleasure,’ either here, or (as Shorey seems to hold A. J. Ph. xvi p. 250) in Phil. 44 c (γούστεμα, οὐχ ἡδονήν): and in any case (though this consideration is less weighty) it should follow rather than precede οὐ πάντι πόρρῳ. The first objection is met by Campbell’s conjecture τῆς αληθείας, or by τῆς <ἀληθείας> ἡδονῆς. There is, however, no sign of corruption, except the three dots placed over τῆς ἡδονῆς by a later hand in Α, and that is insufficient, although Baiter brackets the offending words. Madvig (Adv. Crit. 1 p. 431) would emend to τὸν δὲ φιλοσοφοῦ—τι οἰωμέθα—πρὸς τὴν—μανθάνοντα ἡδονήν, observing quite truly that “reliquae ἡδοναί non videntur philosopho τῆς ἡδονῆς (universae) πάντως πόρρω, sed longe ab ea, quam ipse percipiat.” The solution which I propose in the notes has some affinity in point of meaning with that of Madvig, but requires no alteration of the text. It seems to me to be free from all the difficulties which are inherent in the above explanations.

[In 1918, Mr E. Meyrick suggested the following interpretation: "An ordinary κριτῆς has to award, say, three prizes to ten competitors; he therefore selects the first, second, and third prizewinners, and leaves the rest undiscriminated. The ὁμ πάντων κριτῆς goes right through all the competitors, placing all in order, down to the last, as in a school class, from first to tenth. This is exactly the meaning required by the context. In reading...I was struck by the felicitous expression of the Greek, and the absence of a correspondingly convenient phrase in English." A. M. Adam.]
IV.

IX 583 b. άθροι ο̣ν̣ δι̣ ο̣ν̣δ̣ε̣ παναληθής έστιν ή τῶν ἀλλων ἧδονή πλήν τῆς τοῦ φρονίμου ο̣ν̣δ̣ε̣ καθαρά, ἀλλ' ἐσκιαγραφηµένη τις, ως ἐγὼ δοκῶ μοι τῶν σοφῶν τινὸς ἀκηκοέναι.

Who are τῶν σοφῶν? Stallbaum's answer is "Verba òς òς òς òς — ἀκηκοέναι, nisi fallor, ad Philebum ipsius Platonis referenda sunt."

Apart altogether from the disputed question as to the priority of the Philebus, it is very unlikely that Plato should refer to himself as τίς τῶν σοφῶν, and none of the other passages where such a phrase occurs lends any support to this explanation. Schleiermacher (Platons Staat p. 604), Sussemlh (Gen. Entw. II p. 242), and Zeller\(^4\) (III p. 548 n. 2), hold that the entire argument presupposes the Philebus, but do not discuss the words τῶν σοφῶν τινὸς. It is tolerably clear, as Schneider points out on p. 312 of his translation, that τῶν σοφῶν τινὸς is one of those who in Phil. 44 b ff. are said to consider the so-called pleasures of the body merely λυπῶν ἀποφυγαὶ. The passage in question is as follows:

Σω. Ὀντὸς γὰρ τοὺς πολεµίωςς Φιλήβου τοῦδε, ὦ Πρῶταρχε, οὐ µανθίνεις. Πρω. Δέγεις δὲ αὐτοῦς τίς; Σω. Καὶ µάλα δεινός λεγοµένως τὰ περὶ φύσιν, οὐ τὸ παράπαν ἤδονας οὐ φασιν εἶναι. Πρω. Τί µήν; Σω. Λυπῶν ταύτας εἶναι πάσας ἀποφυγας, ας τῶν οἱ περὶ Φιλήβου ἦδονας ἐπονοµάζονται. Πρω. Τούτων οὖν ἡµὰς πότερα πειθεσθαι ἐξωµονεῦς, ἥ τῶς, ὁ Σωκράτης; Σω. Οὔκ, ἀλλ' ὦστερ µάντεις προσχηθοῖσαι ταύτας, µαντειοµένος οὐ τέχνη ἀλλὰ τινὶ δυσχερεῖς φύσεως οὐκ ἁγιονύς, λαῖν µεµονηκότων τὴν τῆς ἦδονῆς δύναµιν καὶ γενοµοκάτων οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς, ὦστε καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο αὐτής τὸ ἐπαγωγον γοητέµα, οὐχ ἦδονη εἶναι κτλ.

Schneider's identification, so far as it goes, has been generally accepted by recent critics; and the parallels are too close to admit of doubt: note in particular γοητέµα as compared with ἐσκιαγραφηµένη. But there is little agreement on the question who these haters of pleasure are; and they have been variously explained as: (1) Antisthenes and the Cynics (Urban üb. die Erzählungen d. Phil. d. Antisthenes in d. Pl. Schriften p. 28 and Zeller\(^4\) II p. 306 n. 6); (2) "probably Pythagorising friends" of Plato's, "who, adopting a ritual of extreme rigour, distinguished themselves by the violence of their antipathies towards τὰς ἦδονας τῶν ἀσχοµόνων" (Grote Plato II p. 610 n., and to somewhat the same effect also Prantl in his Translation of the Republic p. 422 n. 311); (3) Democritus and his adherents (Hirzel. Unters. zu Cicero's philos. Schriften, i pp. 141—152, and Natorp in Arch. f. Gesch. d. Phil. III pp. 522—528, and in Die Ethika d. Demokritos pp. 164—179). The respectful tone in which Plato, both in the Philebus and in the Republic, mentions the authors of these anti-hedonistic theories does not permit us to suppose that Antisthenes is intended. It is moreover inconsistent with the grossness which pervaded the Cynic philosophy to suppose that they looked upon the unseemly pleasures as delusive and false; nor was Antisthenes in any sense of the term δεινὸς λεγόµενος τὰ περὶ φύσιν.
These reasons, which are to my mind conclusive, are urged by Grote, and supplemented with great ability by Natorp.

I agree with von Arnim, who in his review of Natorp (Gött. gel. Anz. for 1894 p. 889) emphatically rejects the attempted identification of these pleasure-haters with Democritus and his followers. The founder of Hedonism could surely never have totally denied the existence of pleasure (τὸ παράπαν ἣδονα ὦ φασιν εἶναι Phil. Lc.); and Plato (in spite of Hirzel l.c. pp. 146 ff.) was not likely to treat the Arch-materialist with so much consideration and respect. Natorp’s elaborate comparison of Democritus’ ethical fragments with the writings of Plato involves many highly speculative combinations, and the two writers seldom if ever touch one another except in moral and political common-places and maxims for which parallels can readily be quoted from the other remains of pre-Socratic literature.

There are, I think, strong positive reasons for holding, in virtual agreement with Grote, that Plato has in view preachers of the Orphic-Pythagorean moral and religious school.

In the first place, we find other passages in which Plato alludes to this class of moralists as σοφοί. They were Plato’s precursors in asserting the doctrine of individual immortality and transmigration; and in the Μενο (81 a aff.) Plato refers to them in this connexion by the words ἀκόμα γὰρ ἄνδρων τε καὶ γυναικῶν σοφῶν περὶ τὰ θεῖα πράγματα κτλ. The famous passage of the Νεώτια (492 e ff.) where the Orphic-Pythagorean view of the body as a tomb—σώμα σήμα—is expounded, begins ὅπερ ἢδὴ τον ἔγωγε καὶ ήκουσα τῶν σοφῶν, ὥς νῦν ἥμεις τέθηκαμεν, καὶ τὸ μὲν σώμα ἐστὶν ἡμῖν σήμα κτλ. It is even possible that oi σοφοί was a recognised way of describing—sometimes not without irony—the representatives of the Orphic brotherhood. Dieterich in his Νεώτια (pp. 124, 133) cites in support of this contention Sophocles El. 62 ἢδη γὰρ εἶδον πολλάκις καὶ τοῦς σοφοὺς | λόγω μάτιν θυγαςκοτας, and Euripides Hēl. 513 f. λόγους γὰρ ἔστιν οὐκ ἐρῶν, σοφῶν δέ ἔστοι, | δευτέρας ἀνάγκης οὐκ ἐσχόμεν πλέον. The sages who reappeared after they were supposed to have died—Pythagoras, Zalmoxis, Aristeas etc.—are generally connected with the Orphic cult (Rohde Psyche 22 pp. 28 ff. 90 ff.), and the power of Ἀνάγκη was a characteristic feature in the same creed (Dieterich l.c.). Another place in which σοφοί has the same reference, according to Dieterich, is Aesch. P. V. 936 οἱ προεκνοῦντες τὴν Ἀδράστειαν σοφοῖ. The goddess Adrasteia plays a large part in the Orphic theology (cf. Thompson on Pl. Phaedr. 248 c), and Aeschylus’ line certainly gains additional point if we agree with Dieterich, although in this particular instance I cannot regard the reference as proved. Miss Harrison has supplied me with two other passages to the same effect, one in Eur. Ion 1139 ὥς λέγοντων οἱ σοφοί, where the allusion is to some numerical measurements according to which a ritual tent has to be built, and another in Eur. Fr. 938 Dindorf καὶ γάια μήτερ, Ἐστίν δέ σ’ οἱ σοφοί βροτῶν καλοῦν. In the last of these instances οἱ σοφοὶ undoubtedly means the Pythagoreans; see Pl. Phaedr. 247 a and Thompson ad loc.

Secondly, the conception of the unreality and ‘impurity’ of bodily
pleasure has the closest affinity with the doctrine of the Phaedo. It is
implied in the Phaedo, as it is here (οὐδὲ παναληθής), that the pleasures
of sense are not, strictly speaking, pleasures at all (τούτο δὲ καλούσων οἱ
ἀνθρώποι ἡδονή, ὅτι τὸς ἡδονᾶς καλούμένας τὸς τοιάδε, οἷον στιόν
καὶ ποτῶν κτλ. 64 D: cf. also 69 B and 81 B quoted in the notes); and
just as sensual pleasure is here declared to be 'impure' (οὐδὲ καθαρᾶ),
so also the Phaedo constantly insists on the need of purification
(καθαρωμας) from the body and its lusts (66 A—68 B, 69 B, C, 80 E ff., 82 D,
108 B, 114 C). Now it is precisely these and such-like views on sin, the
relation of body and soul, etc., which formed the kernel of the Orphic-
Pythagorean morality (Rohde l.c. II pp. 121—136, 160—170), and
Plato himself does not desire to conceal the source from which he
derived his inspiration (see Crat. 400 C and other evidence in Stallbaum-
Wohlrab on Phaed. 62 B and Rohde l.c. II pp. 265—295). See also on
IX 586 B.

The words δεινοὶ λεγομένοι τὰ περὶ φύσιν in the Philebus seem to
shew that Plato is there thinking in particular of certain pythagorising
Orphics. The Pythagoreans "might well be termed δεινοὶ περὶ φύσιν.
They paid much attention to the interpretation of nature, though they
did so according to a numerical and geometrical symbolism" (Grote l.c.).
The expression 'symbolism' is however incorrect, if—as I think with
Burnet Early Greek Phil. pp. 312 ff.—the Pythagorean numbers, at all
events in the original form of the theory, were spatial, in which case
dεινοὶ τὰ περὶ φύσιν is even more appropriate as a description of the
Pythagoreans). In the present passage there is nothing (beyond the
parallel with the Philebus) to indicate any special reference to Pythago-
reans, although, as Rohde has shewn, the moral and religious teaching
of Orphics and Pythagoreans was for all practical purposes the same.

V.

IX 584 E—585 A. In this difficult passage the reading of Paris A and
all the best MSS is ὁσπερ πρὸς μέλαιν φαιόν ἀποκοποῦντες ἀπειρία λευκόν,
καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἀλυσυν ὑπολήπτην ἀδορώντας ἀπειρία ἡδονῆς ἀπατώνται;

In the text I have followed Schneider in reading, with q and
Flor. U, ὁσπερ <δὲ> instead of ὁσπερ, and Schleiermacher in printing
τὸ ἀλυσυν ὑπολήπτην πρὸς τὸ ἀλυσυν ὑπολήπτην for πρὸς τὸ ἀλυσυν ὑπολήπτην, which is in all
the MSS.

I will deal first with ὁσπερ—ἀπειρία λευκόν. The structure of the
clause proves that it is mainly intended to balance and illustrate καὶ—
ἀπειρία ἡδονῆς. That being the case, is it possible to dispense with δὲ
after ὁσπερ, for which the authority is very slight?

In his In Plat. Pol. quaed. philol. I pp. 46 ff. Neukirch remarks
"verba ὁσπερ πρὸς—λευκόν, descriptentia cos, quibuscum illi, de quibus
in antecedentibus sermo est, comparantur, ita accedunt, quasi absolvent
comparationem; quam ut magis perspicuam et perfectam exhibeat,
addit praeterea scriptor καὶ πρὸς—ἀπατώνται, nullam iam habens
rationem eorum, quae ante ὁσπερ posita sunt," comparing (for the use
of ὑσπερ) ΙΙΙ 413 D, IV 432 D, E, VIII 557 C, X 625 B, 611 C, D and Phaed. 600 E—61 A. Hermann also agrees with Neukirch in excluding δὲ. It is certainly true that ὑσπερ cum asyndeto may be thus used (see on vi 497 B), but insomuch as ἀπατωται furnishes the antithesis to σφόδρα μὲν οὖν ὑσπερ, we cannot here dispense with δὲ. With Schneider and the other editors, I am therefore reluctantly obliged to desert the best ms in this passage.

There is less unanimity among critics about καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἀλυτον οὖν λύπην. As the words stand in the ms, Painlessness is equated with Black, Pain with Grey, and Pleasure with White. In point of fact, however, Black should correspond to Pain, and Grey to Painlessness. The second hand in q tried to avoid the difficulty by advising the transposition of μέλαν and φαιόν, and so Jowett translates, "they, not knowing pleasure, err in contrasting pain with the absence of pain, which is like contrasting black with grey instead of white" etc. But ἀπειρίᾳ λευκοῦ is not 'instead of white'; and, as Schneider observed, q² is certainly wrong, for however ignorant you are of white, you do not mistake black when contrasted with grey. Schneider himself, followed by Stallbaum and the other editors, is content to obey the ms "quia per codices mutare non licet." His explanation, like that of Stallbaum ("res eodem reedit, sive dolor iuxta doloris vacuitatem, sive doloris vacuitas iuxta dolorem spectari dicatur"), is fatal to the balance of the two clauses ὑσπερ—λευκοῦ and καὶ—ἡδωνῆς; nor is it permissible, with the Oxford editors, to defend the ms reading by calling that a chiasmus which in reality involves an erroneous identification.

For these reasons, the ms are, I believe, wrong. There is little to choose between Schleiermacher's two conjectures τὸ ἀλυτον οὖν πρὸς λύπην and πρὸς λύπην οὖν τὸ ἀλυτον, the second of which was afterwards repeated by W. H. Thompson (J. of Ph. v p. 218). With Richards (Cl. Rev. viii p. 294), I rather prefer the first, chiefly on account of the chiasmus.

VI.

IX 585C. Ἡ οὖν ἓν ὁμοίου οὐσία οὐσίας τε μᾶλλον ἡ ἐπιστήμης μετέχει; Οἴδιμος. Τί δ' ἀληθείας; Οὐδὲ τούτο. Εἰ δὲ ἀληθείας ὑττον, οὐ καὶ οὐσίας; Ἀνάγκη κτλ.

Such is the text of all the best ms. There is nothing in any of the others to indicate the presence of corruption, for the variants μὴ ἓν ὁμοίου (v Flor. R) and τοῦ μᾶλτοτο ὁμοίου (q) and a Florentine ms are obviously only attempts at emendation.

The traditional reading is maintained by Schneider and the Oxford editors. Ongrammatical grounds it is clear (1) that Τί δ' ἀληθείας; Οὐδὲ τούτο stands for Τί δ'; <ἡ ἓν ὁμοίου οὐσία> ἀληθείας <τε μᾶλλον ἡ ἐπιστήμης μετέχει>; Οὐδὲ τούτο: also (2) that Εἰ δὲ ἀληθείας ὑττον stands for Εἰ δὲ ἀληθείας ὑττον <μετέχει ἡ ἓν ὁμοίου οὐσία>. We have no right (with Schneider) to explain Τί δ' ἀληθείας as Τί δ', <ἡ> ἀληθείας, or to understand only <μετέχει τε> after Εἰ δὲ ἀληθείας ὑττον.
Jowett and Campbell do not explain the construction, but apparently regard the introduction of ἐπιστήμη as otiose and irrelevant. "For the sake of his" (Plato’s) "argument it would have been sufficient to obtain the admission that truth and essence go together: that the pleasures of the body, being less true, are also less real." It appears to me quite clear that the mention of ἐπιστήμη plays an important part in the argument. Surely it must refer to, and be interpreted by, ἐπιστήμη as already mentioned in τὸ δῆξις τε ἀληθῶς εἶδος καὶ ἐπιστήμης κτλ.

Is it possible to reconcile the grammatical construction of the ms text with such an interpretation of ἐπιστήμης? Let us try.

The Being of the ever-like, as appears from Glaucos’ πολὺ διαφέρει τὸ τοῦ ἀέι ὄμοιον taken in connexion with the previous sentence, has more Being and more Truth, than the Being of the never-like has. If therefore the Being of the ever-like has as much part in Knowledge as it has in Being and in Truth (ἡ οὖν—Οὕδε τούτο), we may infer (since μετοχὴ is reciprocal) that Knowledge also has more part in Being and in Truth than has the Being of the never-like. (The inference is just, but Plato does not draw it, and his way of expressing himself certainly does not invite us to do so. If we could make ἡ ἐπιστήμης = ἡ ἐπιστήμης οὐσία, which is barely possible, or if we read ἡ <ἡ> ἐπιστήμης sc. οὐσία, or ἐπιστήμη instead of ἐπιστήμης, this explanation becomes easier in itself, and the inference is also easier to draw.) But the words ἐκ δὲ ἀληθείας ἴττον, οὐ καὶ οὐσίας; present an insuperable difficulty. They cannot be made to suit with this interpretation unless we make the subject of ἴττον <μετέχει> either (a) ἐπιστήμη (or ἡ ἐπιστήμης οὐσία), or else (b) τὸ μορφέτα ὅμοιον (or τὰ ὅνων σῶν κτλ.); and the only possible grammatical subject, so far as I can see, is ἡ ἀέι ὄμοιον οὐσία.

For these and other reasons, some of which are urged by Vermehren Plat. Stud. pp. 114 ff., the text must, I fear, be pronounced corrupt.

The emendation which I have ventured to print supposes that the error lies in the subject of μετέχει. By reading ἀέι ἀναμοιον (= μορφέτα ὄμοιον) instead of ἀέι ὄμοιον, and ἡ ἐπιστήμης sc. οὐσία instead of ἐπιστήμης, it is possible to introduce the necessary contrast in respect of Being and Truth between the never-like (to which such γένη as food etc. belong), and Knowledge, which belongs to the ever-like. R. G. Bury’s emendation proceeds upon essentially the same principle. After an acute analysis of this passage (Cl. Rev. xiii pp. 289 ff.) he proposes to write: ἡ οὖν ἀέι ὄμοιον σὺνα μᾶλλον ἡ ἐπιστήμη μετέχει; This suggestion regarded in itself is more attractive than that which I have adopted: for it contrasts the particular, instead of the general, with the particular, and thus makes ὀλως doubtfully appropriate. But on the one hand, throughout the whole of this argument Plato uses the word μετέχει only in connexion with Being and Truth: whereas Bury connects it with the ‘ever-like’; and on the other hand it is extremely unlikely that ἡ οὖν ἀέι ὄμοιον σύνη—ἐπιστήμη should ever have been corrupted into ἡ οὖν ἀέι ὄμοιον οὐσία σὺνα τε—ἐπιστήμης. Bury’s explanation of the error involves one dictography and four subsequent adaptations or ‘corrections.’ If we were dealing only with an emended ms like q, such a restoration might
be possible—probable it could not even then be called: but I doubt if there is a single instance in which it can be shewn that Paris Α has suffered to this extent in this particular way. I should however be only too glad to accept a convincing emendation on the lines indicated by Bury, and I have spent no small amount of time in trying to devise one, without attaining any more satisfactory result than that which he has reached. Possibly ἀεὶ ὁμοίον has replaced a word denoting some particular kind of food.

Meantime the reading given in the text, though less pointed, appears to me less improbable. ἀεὶ ἀνομοίον, which gives the same sense as ζ′ οὗ τοῦ μηδέποτε ὁμοίου, might readily pass into ἀεὶ ὁμοίου under the influence of ἀεὶ ὁμοίου just before; and the addition of <ἠ> after ἥ is scarcely a change.

The other conjectures are these: (1) ἡ οὖν ἀνομοίον οὐσία οὐσίας τι μᾶλλον ἡ ἐπιστήμης μετέχει; (Hermann, followed by Müller): (2) ἡ δὲ τοῦ ἀνομοίου κτλ.; (Stallbaum, who adds “nolumus tamen in re incerta quidquam in oratione Platonis, qualem codd. plurimi optimique exhibent, immutare”): (3) ἡ γοῦν ἀνομοῖος οὐσία ὁμοίας τι μᾶλλον ἐπιστήμης μετέχει; “Hat denn zum Wenigsten das ungleiche Wesen einen grösseren Antheil am Wissen als das gleiche? Keineswegs. Und wie, an der Wahrheit? Auch das nicht. Wenn aber einen minderen an der Wahrheit, weil am Wissen, dann nicht auch am Sein? Nothwendig” (Vermehren l.c.). (4) Madvig (and after him Baiter) postulates an extensive lacuna. He first ejects καὶ ἀληθείας just before, and after writing with Ast τὸ <τοῦ> μηδέποτε ὁμοίου, continues as follows: Ἡ οὖν <τοῦ> ἀεὶ ὁμοίου οὐσία οὐσίας τι μᾶλλον ἡ ἐπιστήμης μετέχει; Οὐδαμῶς. Τί δεί, ἀληθείας; Οὐδε τούτο. <Ἡ δὲ τοῦ ἀνομοίου οὐκ ἐπιστήμης ἤττον μετέχει ἡ ἡ τοῦ ὁμοίου; Πώς γαρ οὐ; Εἰ δὲ ἐπιστήμης, καὶ ἀληθείας; Καὶ τούτο.> The possibility of a lacuna must be allowed, as well as the counter-possibility that ἡ οὖν—ἀνάγκη is a clumsy attempt (modelled perhaps on Theaet. 186 c, d) on the part of some scribe to shew that Being and Truth go together, so that where there is less of the one, there is also less of the other; but neither solution is probable. It will be observed that all these attempts at correction agree in working in ἀνόμοιον (in some form or other) as the subject to μετέχει, although they are, I think, wrong in leaving ἐπιστήμης as it stands. It may be added that the brief account of Plato's third argument in Proclus Comment. 11 p. 82 ed. Kroll is of no use in trying to interpret or emend this difficult sentence.
I. Καὶ ὡς, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγὼ, πολλὰ μὲν καὶ ἄλλα περὶ αὐτῆς ἐννοοῦ, 595 ὡσ παντὸς ἄρα μᾶλλον ὀρθῶς φιλίζομεν τὴν πόλιν, εὐχ ἠκιστα δὲ

595 a—597 e On a retrospect of our city, says Socrates, we can now see even more clearly than before that we did right in excluding imitative Poetry. What is Imitation? Examine it in the light of the Ideas, and you will find that it is the production of images or appearances which are third in order from Reality and Truth. There are, for example, three beds: (1) that which is in Nature, made, as we may say, by God: (2) that which the carpenter manufactures: (3) that which is the product of the painter’s art. The first is, and must be, one: for there cannot be two Ideas of the bed. We have thus two makers in connexion with the notion of bed: (1) a Nature-maker (φύσης γραφέων), who is God; (2) a manufacturer (ὁμοιωρυγαγιμενος), viz. the carpenter. There is also (3) an imitator, i.e. the painter. Imitation is therefore concerned with a product third in sequence from Nature, and the tragic poet, among other imitators, is third from Royalty and Truth.

595 a ff. Book X falls into two divisions, the first (595 a—608 b) dealing with Poetry, the second (608 c—631 d) with Immortality and the rewards of Justice both here and hereafter. The second half of the Book forms a welcome supplement to Plato’s treatment of the main thesis of the Republic (see on 608 c); but the first division is of the nature of an episode, and might have been omitted without injury to the artistic unity of the dialogue (cf. Hirmer Entst. u. Komp. d. pl. Pol. p. 623). It is in no sense, as supposed by Schleiermacher (Einleitung p. 55) and apparently also by Hilzel (der Dialog p. 237 n.), a fulfilment of the promise held out in 111, 391 c; nor ought we to construe τοιοῦ τῶν δὲ καὶ πλέας ὑπὸ τῶν 111, 394 D as a hint that the subject of Poetry is to be resumed: see note ad loc. Why then is the episode introduced at all? The chorizontists (such as Siebeck Unters. zur Phil. d. Griech. pp. 142 ff., Pfeiderer zur Lösung etc. p. 34 and Brandt zur Entwicklung d. Pl. Lehre d. Seeleuteilen p. 27), relying partly on the tone of the exordium, partly on ἀπελευθεροῦσα 607 b, assert that Plato is replying to certain comic poets (Pfeiderer), or to Antisthenes (Brandt), who had presumably fallen soul of Plato’s treatment of Poetry in Books II and III. Cf. also Zeller 4 II p. 556 n. 2. But apart altogether from the question whether the Republic was issued en bloc or piecemeal, there is no actual evidence to support the presumption on which this theory rests (cf. 598 D, 607 B nn.). The Platonic dialogue, like actual conversation, is at liberty to recall, modify, and expand the results of a discussion apparently finished (cf. Hirzel l.c. pp. 228—230, 236); and we have already had an incidental recurrence to the subject of Poetry in VIII 568 a—d. Granted that Plato wished to justify his exclusion of the Muses by metaphysical and psychological as well as moral and pedagogic arguments, the beginning of Book X is his best, and indeed, as Hirmer shews (I.c. p. 623), his only opportunity: see on 595 b. He may well have wished to do so: for his dethronement of the great educator of Greece (606 b) would be sure to arouse wide-spread hostility, and Plato almost seems to feel that it needs further justification even to himself (595 B n.). Cf. Hirmer l.c. pp. 624—628 and see also on 598 D, 607 B.

The student will find an excellent and exhaustive account of Plato’s theory of Aesthetics in Walter Gesch. d. Aesthetik im Altertum (1893) pp. 168—476. His attitude towards Poetry and Poets is
very fully discussed by Reber Platon u. die Poesie (1864), Heine de rat. quaes Platoniv cum poet. Gr. interredit, etc. (1880), and more recently by Finsler Platon u. die Arist. Poetik (1900) and Stählin Die Stellung d. Poesie in d. plat. Phil. (1901). Following on the path marked out by Belger in his dissertation de Arist. etiam in arte poetica Platonis discip. (1872), Finsler has succeeded in showing that Aristotle’s debt to Plato in his Theory of Poetry is far greater than is commonly supposed: and although the treatment of Poetry in Book X of the Republic must be confessed to be inadequate and unjust, Plato himself, as Walter and Stählin have recognised, furnishes us elsewhere with the materials for constructing a truer and more generous theory. See also on 568 E. It may be added that a study of the Poetics of Aristotle side by side with 595 A—608 B will enable the student to understand both Plato and Aristotle better than if he confines himself to either alone. See also Butcher Aristotle’s Theory of Poetry and Fine Art, pp. 115 ff.

595 A 3 ἐνθυμηθεὶς περὶ ποιῆσεως. 11 377 B—III 403 C.

τὸ μετάκριμα—μυθική. See III 394 B—398 B. Plato speaks as if he had tabooed all mimetic poetry, but it is clear from III 396 E compared with 397 D, 398 B and 401 B—402 C that he did not condemn poetic and artistic imitation as such, but would have admitted it were the model imitated was good. See also on 593 C, 607 A, 608 A infra. 595 B 5 ἐνθυμηθεὶς—εἶδην. ὡς, viz. in Book IV and also throughout VIII and IX. The psychological theory of these books is laid under contribution in 602 C E.: see note ad loc. It may seem strange that Plato makes no reference to the metaphysical doctrine of V—VII, since he derives his first argument (596 A—601 B) from the theory of Ideas: but it was unnecessary for him to refer to it in this connexion, because the theory is itself expressly re-ennunciated (ἐδοκεῖ γὰρ ποιεῖν τὰ 596 A) before the argument begins. 6 ἢ ἐφιστάται: ‘between ourselves.’ Cf. ἐν πάντα τὰ ποιεῖν, tragedy and other forms of μυθική ποίησις: not (as Schleiermacher) “wie sich die Dinge in der Wirklichkeit verhalten.” A knowledge of the real character of dramatic Poetry is the only antidote against its evil influence. On τυχαί ἢντα see 1 337 B H.

11 καίτοι φιλία γε—λέγειν. Plato speaks with real feeling: no one who had so much of the poet in him—could be insensible to Homer’s charm, and nearly every dialogue of Plato bears evidence of the affectionate admiration in which he held the ‘first of tragic poets.’ See Heine de rat. quaes Platoniv cum poetis Graec. interredit pp. 8—15. The ancients classed Plato and Homer together: δόο γὰρ αὐτὰ φυσικ λέγονται γενέσθαι παραρ-μόνην, says Olympiodorus (vitr. Pl. 6): and Longinus remarks that all Greek writers Plato was Ὀμηρικώκας—ἀπό τοῦ Ὀμηρικοῦ κείνου ράματος εἰς αὐτὸν μιαρὰς ὁδοὶ παρατροπῆς ἀπόχετεναμένους (περὶ ὁψιν 13. 3). See also the admirable remarks on Plato’s imitation of Homer in James Geddes’s essay On the Composition and Manner of Writing of the Ancients pp. 180—200, and Proclus’ much less sound and instructive article ὁτι διὰ παρὰς τῆς ἐανοτὸς συγγραφῆς Ὀμηροῦ φιλιτῆς ἐστιν ὡς Πλάτων ταῖς τε λεκτικαῖς ἀρεταῖς καὶ ταῖς πραματικαῖς in his 11.
There is a touch of something like filial love and piety in what Plato says of Homer in this passage, and we may well believe that he did not part company with the friend of his childhood without pain. From the way in which Plato here speaks, it looks as if he feared that his heart might after all get the better of him (cf. infra 605 C, D, 606 B, 607 C ff.), and consequently tried by new and deeper arguments to provide an 'antidote' (φάρμακον, or ἐπίφυσι 608 A) for himself as well as others (so also Hirmer l.c. p. 626). 695 C 13 τῶν καλῶν κτλ. καλῶν is of course ironical. For the sense cf. 598 D, 602 B, 607 A, Theaet. 152 E οἱ ἀκραὶ τῆς ποιήσεως ἑκάτερα, καμώμια μὲν ἑπισχάρια, τραγωδίας δὲ Ὀμηρος κακος, 153 A, with Arist. Poet. 4. 1448 B 35 ff., 5. 1449 B 16 ff. It will be remembered that Aeschylus called his dramas τεμένεα τῶν Ὀμηροῦ μεταλλων ἐπισκόπων (Αθην. VIII 347 B). Herderwen, quite without reason, so far as I can see, brackets τῶν πραγμάτων. It is an und kind of Aristotle to purloin this sentiment in order to introduce his attack on Plato's theory of Ideas in Ἐιδ. Νικ. 1 4. 1096 B 11 ff., and Plato might well complain, in the words of Aeschylus, τάδα ὀνὶ ὑπ’ ἄλλων, ἀλλὰ τοῖς αὐτῶν περισσο. To read ἄρη for ἄρη, as has been proposed, would make a general statement particular, and spoil the antithesis between ἄρη and ἄλογα. The reference in δ ἄλογα is to ἄρη in line 11 above: cf. VII 541 B. 16 μιμήσιν κτλ. In ΙΙΙ 302 C ff., μιμήσις, in its application to Poetry, was regarded primarily as a form of style or Aτίσειν, viz. the imitative or dramatic) (the narrative, and in this sense it included tragedy, comedy, and the strictly dramatic part of epic and other poetry (394 C). But even in Book ΙΙΙ μιμησις and its cognate notions have sometimes a wider application (e.g. 401 B—402 C). The following discussion tries to define the essential meaning of μιμησις in general by its relation to the Theory of Ideas. It should be noted that Poetry and Art were admitted to be μιμησις in Plato's day: cf. Λαυς 668 B τούτο γε τὰς ἀν ὄντων Ὀμηρος ὁμοίως περὶ τῆς μουσικῆς, δι’ τὰ πάντα τὰ περὶ αὐτὴν ἐξή ποιήματα μιμησις τε καὶ ἀνεικασία, with Xen. Mem. ΙΙΙ 10, 1—8, Plato Crat. 424 D, 430 B (τὰ ψυγαφήματα —μιμήματα—πραγμάτων τινῶν, 434 A, Soph. 266 D), Prot. 312 D, Critias 107 B et al. See also on ΙΙΙ 392 C and cf. Stählin Poetic in d. plat. Phil. p. 25. On the contrast between Plato's view of Imitation in Book Χ and that of Aristotle in his Poetics, see Butcher Theory of Poetry2 etc. pp. 115—152. Walter has justly remarked (Gesch. d. Aesthetik im Altertum p. 442) that μιμησις, with its question-keeping connotation, was in many ways an unfortunate word by which to describe the essence of Art, though in view of what Aristotle made of it, I should not go so far as to say that 'Imitation is an unproductive principle, and dries up aesthetic life' (ib.). If Poetry, and not painting and Statuary, had determined the Greek view of Art, we should probably hear more of Creation (ποίησις), and less of Imitation, in ancient discussions on aesthetics; and it is difficult not to regret that Plato did not select a new and more fruitful point of view. See also on 598 A, B. 19 ἐπὶ τολμᾶ κτλ. is neither arrogant nor rude, if we realise the situation: see on ΙΙΙ 532 E.
596 α 5 ἐκ τῆς εἰσῳδον κτλ. As in ν 476 α (see note ad loc.), so here, Plato does not try to prove the Ideal Theory, but treats Glauco as already a loyal Platonist. The account which Plato here gives of his Ideas has been widely canvassed from many different points of view. Bosanquet (Comparatio pp. 381 ff.) appears to me to err by interpreting it throughout only in terms of modern life and thought. Others refuse to regard it as serious, in view of the inherent difficulties, and because of Aristotle's remark δή δὴ ὑπὸ κακῶς ὡς Πλάτων ἐφη δὴ εἴην ὑπὸσα φόρει Met. A 4. 1070 ε 181. cf. also A 907 β 3 ff. with Bonitz's note. Others, again, like Krohn (Pl. St. pp. 242 ff.), hold that the Ideal Theory in bk x is inconsistent with the theory expounded in ν—vii, where we do not hear of Ideas corresponding to concrete and artificial objects, but only of Ideas of qualities (such as Justice) and the like. In reply to the last school of critics, we may point out that Plato is not bound to give an exhaustive account of the Ideal theory whenever he has occasion to make use of it. On the previous occasion he confined himself to Ideas of the virtues etc., because they only were relevant to his immediate purpose (see on ν 476 α and cf. Grimmelt de reip. Pl. comp. et unit. pp. 81 ff., Himper I.C. pp. 646 ff. and Dümmler zuv Comp. d. Pl. St. p. 14), and it is exactly the same reason which makes him cite Ideas of concrete and artificial objects in book x. The view that Plato should not be taken seriously is as old as Proclus, who (in Tim. 164 F) observes ὃ γὰρ κατὰ τινὰ ἰδέαν ἐκ τεκμήριου ποιεῖ ἵππος, ἐὰν καὶ δοκεῖ τούτῳ λέγει ὃ ἐν Πελείτει Ζωρατί, ἀλλ' ἤκε μὲν τὰ εἰρημένα παράδειγματος εἰρήματα χάριν καὶ ὡς πριν αὐτῶν τῶν ἰδεῶν, but, apart from other considerations, the recurrence of the same form of the theory in other dialogues (see on 266 b, c) justifies us in taking Plato here also at his word. The history of the controversy is ably reviewed by Dr Beckmann (Num Plato artistaeorum idearum Latinrum, Bonn 1889), with whom and with Zeller (pp. 666, 701 al.) I agree in believing this passage of the Ideal theory on one of its main sides. ἰδεις γὰρ τοις κτλ.: 'for we are, as you know, in the habit of assuming a certain idea—always one idea—in connexion with each group of particular to which we apply the same name': lit. 'an Idea, one each' i.e. each being one. There cannot be two or more Ideas of Bed for example: cf. 597 c. Unnecessary trouble has been raised about the translation of this sentence by Krohn (Pl. St. p. 246), whose version 'in Bezug auf jedes der vielen Dingnehmen wir je eine Einheit als idées τι αν.' is both strained and inaccurate. For the statement itself cf. ν 476 α, 479 α, b, e, 480 α, ν 493 b and ν 507 b α. Plato might have written any of the foregoing passages without believing in Ideas of anything beyond qualities and attributes: but that he did believe in other Ideas also is evident not only from Book x, but also from Phil. 15 α, 16 C, D and many other places quoted by Zeller Π II p. 701 α. 18 τολλαὶ ποιο εἰσὶν κλαίναι κτλ. Why does Plato select examples of artificial objects, when the Painter can equally well paint the features of Nature, as is virtually allowed in c? One reason is that otherwise he could not have constructed the descending scale theis, κλωστικον, ἀναγραφός 597 α ff. Had he selected e.g. mountains, it would be difficult to specify the middle term. Moreover in Soph. 266 β ff. we have a distinction drawn between theis and ἀνθρωπίνη εἰρήματος, the first producing likenesses of natural objects by natural agencies, the

25—2
second likenesses of abstract objects by artificial means, and Painting is there also classified under the second head: τί δὲ τὴν ἡμετέραν τέχνην; ἃρ' οὐκ αὐτήμεν οἷον αὐτὴν διόδῳμον φήμην ποιεῖν, γραφήκεν δὲ τῷ ἐστίνα, ὅποι ὁμορραγοῦν ἐπηρεασμένη; (266 c). Inasmuch as κεναστά are elsewhere credited with less reality than φυσεύτα (see on ν 532 ii, c μμ.), the choice of these examples is also specially appropriate to Plato's main object, that is, to the depreciation of imitative art.

596 B 9 ἄλλα ἰδεῖα κτλ. For ideas of κεναστά cf. especially Crat. 389Α—390Α, a passage which forms an admirable commentary on this. The anecdote about Plato and Diogenes in D. L. vi 53 (Πλατωνὸς περὶ ἰδεῶν διαλεγόμενος, καὶ δομά- λοστος τραπεζήτης καὶ κυνόθητη κτλ.) is pointless since Plato believed in ἐπὶ τῶν κεναστῶν.

II οὐκοῦν—κατὰ ταύτα. Cf. Crat. 389 Α ff. τοιοῦτον ἀ κενής τῆς κερκίδας ποιεῖ; ἢ οὖν πρὸς τοιοῦτον τὸ πέροκε κερκιζῶν; Πάνυ γε. Τί δὲ; ἢ καταγη ἀυτὴς ἡ κερκὶς ποιοῦσθι, πότερον πάλιν ποιεῖται ἄλλη πρὸς τὴν καταγήν κενής, πρὸς ἐκεῖνον, ὡς ἐκεῖνον ὡς ἐκεῖνον. Οὕτω ἐκεῖνον ὡς ἐκεῖνον ὡς ἐκεῖνον. Οὕτω ἐκεῖνον ὡς ἐκεῖνον. Οὕτω ἐκεῖνον ὡς ἐκεῖνον. Οὕτω ἐκεῖνον. The Idea is conceived as a paradigm: cf. vi 500 E—501 C and see on ν 470 D. Borrowing the ontology of the Philebus, we might say that the carpenter has an ἰσημερόν of wood, into which he introduces πέρας after the model of the Idea of Bed or atria, thereby manufacturing a μετέχνης or material bed (Schmitt die Verschiedenheit d. Ideenlehre in Phl. Rep. u. Phil. p. 25 n. 69). We are not en-tided (in view of 597 B and the phraseology of the present passage) to take ἰδεῖα merely as the plan or form of bed in the mind of the carpenter: the Ideas of κεναστά must be credited with the same attributes—transcendence, self-existence, etc.—as appertain to those of abstract qualities and φυσεύτα (see on ν 476 λ.), although the difficulties which such a view involves are undeniably greater in the one case than in the other. If we put ourselves in Plato's position—and Socrates is here speaking as one Platonist to another (εἰσόθημεν λέγειν)—it becomes correct to say that the carpenter is looking at the Idea rather than at his own νοῦμα, for the νοῇμα is nought apart from its object, the νοῇμα (cf. ν 476 E μ.), i.e. the self-existent Idea of Bed, without which all the νοῇματα in the world would be powerless to generate a bed because it is the αὐτὸ δ ἐστὶ κλίνη, and no mere νοῇμα, which is the true and essential cause of all material χειροτέχνης. See also on 597 B.

596 C 15 καὶ τόνδε—δημιουργῶν: i.e. καὶ τόνδε τῶν δημιουργῶν τῶν καλεῖς, sc. as well as τὴν ἡμετέραν τέχνην τῶν δημιουργῶν (Pl. Stat. p. 118): for Plato is leading up to 597 B ὥσπερ δόλος δὴ, κληματισμοῦ, θεὸς, τρεῖς οὕτω ἐπισταται τρισα ἐδεικνύειν, and he again calls the painter a δημιουργὸς in δ and ἐ: also χειροτέχνης just below.

16 ὅς—χειροτέχνης. Cf. Soph. 233 B—234 C, where the same conception is worked out in almost exactly the same way.

17 τάχα here means 'soon,' and not 'perhaps': cf. with Schneider Crat. 410 E.
μάλλον φόσος. ο αυτός γάρ ούτως χειροτέχνης ου μόνον πάντα
οίς τε σκεφτ' ποιήσαι, αλλά καὶ τὰ εκ τῆς γῆς φυσεῖα ἀπαντά
ποιεῖ καὶ ξῶα πάντα ἐργάζεται, τά τε ἄλλα καὶ ἐαυτόν, καὶ πρὸς 20
τούτως γῆν καὶ οὐρανῶν καὶ θεοὺς καὶ πάντα τά ἐν οὐρανῷ καὶ τά
De ἀυτῷ ὑπὸ γῆς ἀπαντὰ ἐργάζεται. Πάνω θαυμαστών, 1 ἔφη,
λέγεις σοφιστήν. Ἀπίστεις; ἢν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ μοι εἴπε, τὸ παράπαν
οὐκ ἂν σοι δοκεῖ εἴναι τοιούτους δημιουργοὺς, ἢ τινὶ μὲν τρόπῳ
γενέσθαι ἂν τούτων ἀπαντῶν ποιητής, τινὶ δὲ οὐκ ἂν; ἢ οὐκ 25
αἰσθάνει, ὅτι καὶ αυτὸς οὗ τ' εἴης πάντα ταῦτα ποιήσαι τρόπῳ
γέ τινι; Καὶ τίς, ἔφη, ὁ πρότος οὐτός; Οὐ χαλεπός, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ,
άλλα πολλαχῶ καὶ ταχὺ δημιουργοῦμενος· τάχιστα δὲ ποι, εἰ
'θέλεις λαβῶν κάτοπτρον περιφερέρεια πανταχ'· ταχὺ μὲν ἔλεγον
Εἰ ποιήσεις καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ, ταχὺ δὲ γῆν, ταχὺ δὲ σαυτόν τε 30
καὶ τάλλα ξίδια καὶ σκεφτ' καὶ φυτά καὶ πάντα ὄσα νῦν δὴ ἐλέγετο.
Ναὶ, ἔφη, φανόμενα, οὐ μέντοι οὕτα γέ ποι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ. Καλῶς,
ἡν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ εἰς δέον έρχει τῷ λόγῳ, τῶν τοιούτων γάρ, οὖμαι,
δημιουργοὺς καὶ τοῖς ζωγράφοις ἐστίν. ἢ γάρ; Πῶς γάρ οὖ; 'Ἀλλά
21. πάντα Α'/II: punctis notavit Α².

20 καὶ έαυτόν presents no difficulty: cf. ταχὺ δὲ σαυτόν in E below. It is difficult to imagine why Liebhold proposed τά κατ' έπαυσιν (Philolog. for 1880 p. 168). Perhaps he thought the δημιουργοσ was ὁ θεός, an extraordinary error, which Peipers and others (see Zeller 111 p. 711 n. 4) perpetrated, making God his own creator, and drawing some profound and far-reaching metaphorical lessons from their mistake.

καὶ πρὸς τούτως κτλ. Soph. I.c. καὶ πρὸς γε βαλάττες [καὶ γῆς] καὶ οὐρανῶν καὶ θεῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων θεματῶν. The words in brackets occur only in Σ, and were possibly introduced from this passage.

21 πάντα has two (not, as Baiter asserts, five) dots over it in Α, but is in all the MSS and should not (with Baiter) be bracketed. It is important, in view of 598 c ff, to insist that there is nothing which the Painter and Poet cannot 'make': hence the emphasis.

22 εν 'Αιδοῦ should also of course be kept, though cancelled by Herwerden. Polygnotus' famous picture of τὰ εν 'Αιδοῦ at Delphi may serve as an illustration (Paus. x 28—31).
38 οὐ—μέντοι. I 339 B n. ἄρτι refers to 596 B.

597 A 7 ὁ καὶ τὸ τοῦτο κτλ.: sc. as well as the κλίνη made by the painter.

597 B 9 ἐπὶ αὐτῶν τούτων κτλ. For ἐπὶ see on ν 475 A. τούτων in τὸν μιμητὴν τούτων ("hunc, quem quaerimus" Schneider) was found by Düchner to be the reading of A as well as the rest of Bekker’s ms, and Schneider restores it in his Addit. p. 77.

10 οὐκ οὐκ κτλ. For γλυκόντας see on VIII 583 A. With ἐν τῇ φώςει cf. infra 597 C, 598 A, Phaed. 103 B and Parm. 132 D τα μὲν εἰδη ταύτα ὠστε παραδείγματα ἐστάναι ἐν τῇ φώςει. Each of these passages brings ἡ φώςει into connexion with the Ideas: cf. also ν 476 B, VI 501 B, Crat. 389 B B. and infra 597 D, B. In the phrase ἐν τῇ φώςει, the expression ἡ φώςει means ‘Nature’ i.e. rerum natura (cf. R. G. Bury in Cl. Rev. VIII p. 299), but for Plato rerum natura, strictly interpreted, is the Ideal World. Plato’s nomenclature is in harmony with the traditional usage of Greek philosophy, for “in Greek philosophical language, φώς always means that which is primary, fundamental, and persistent, as opposed to that which is secondary, derivative, and transient” (Burnet Early Greek Phil. p. 11). Now in Platonism the primary, fundamental, persistent, is the ἐδῶς: and hence the φώςει or ‘nature’ of anything means its Idea (e.g. Phaedr. 254 ή μνήμη πρῶς τὴν τοῦ κάλλους φώσιν ἑρέξθη), and the φώςει or nature of all things (rerum natura) becomes an expression for the World of Ideas ("regio idearum, ὁ νοοτός τόπος" Schneider). Bosanquet would like to render φώσις by ‘evolution’, “without understanding any definite theory of origins.” Such a translation would be, in my judgment, not only gravely misleading, but linguistically wrong; for ἐν τῇ φώςει ὁμα cannot mean ‘which evolution has produced’: the force of ἐν must be local—figuratively so, of course—exactly as in ὃς ὁπερ παραδείγματα ὑποταί ἐν τῇ φώςει referred to above. So also J. B. Mayor in Cl. Rev. X p. 121. To Krohn, φώςει appears to be “die allgemeine Gesetzlichkeit des Universums, die dem οὐσιογράφος die Musterbilder liefert” (Pl. St. p. 249). This is nearer the truth, but we must not surrender the self-existence of the Ideas. See also on 597 D.

11 ἦν—θεοί ἐγράφασθαι. “Occurrur, ut videtur, quasi ex improviso Platonis, Deum Idearum autorem appellare,” says Pansch (de de Platonis p. 45), truly enough, in the restricted sense that we ought to lay no stress on this passage by
"if God had made" etc. (D. and V.), but 'if he should make' etc., referring to the future, in harmony with obvre μὴ φύσεως. The words δῶ γὰρ μιᾶς mean "no more than two," "auch nur zwei" (Schneider). Even two (not to speak of more) would involve a fresh idea. Cf. Tim. 31 a to γάρ perεῖξαν πάντα ὑπὸ σε νοητά ψαλμ, μὲθ' εὐεργος δότατον οὐκ ἄν ἄντι εὔφωνον οὐκ γάρ ἄν τετραεῖς οὐκ ἄν ἄντι εὐεργος, καὶ εἰ ὄν ἄν εὐεργος κλίνη ἔκειναι, ἂλλ' οὐχ οἷον διό. Ὀρθῶς, ἐφη. Ταύτα δή, οἴμαι, εἰδώς ὁ θεός, Βουλό- 
D menos εἶναι οὖν κλίνης ποιήτης, οὖν κλίνης, κλίνης τινός, μηδὲ κλίνου τις, μιᾶν φύσεως αὐτήν ἐφύσει. "Εοικεν. 19. δὴ Αἴσχ.: δὲ vel δ' ἈΠα. 

itself as evidence for the origin of the Ideas. But, if God and the Idea of Good are the same (see on VI 505 A ff.), Plato is merely saying in philosophical language what he formerly said in philosophical, when he derived the ψεία of all other Ideas from the Idea of Good (VI 509 B). See Krohn Pl. St. p. 242, where the same explanation is given, and Zeller 411 p. 666. It is not, I think, quite correct to dismiss δής as merely "eine mythische Ausdrucksweise" (Hirmer Entstehung u. Komp. etc. p. 647), and Sussemuhl (Einleitung p. 261) is certainly wrong when he takes it to mean 'a god.' The sentence has been much discussed in connexion with the theory that Plato's Ideas are 'thoughts of God': see for example Hermann de loco Plat. de rep. VI 505.51. p. 5 with Bonitz's reply Dis- put. Pl. duns p. 33 and Hermann's re- joinder Vindic. disp. de idea boni pp. 39 ff., and cf. Zeller 1. c. pp. 664—670. I have already said in App. III to Book VII that Plato himself says nothing to show that he viewed his Ideas in this light; and it is only by reading into his words much more than they are naturally fitted to convey, that the present passage can be made to support the identification. 597 C 19 ἐν δὲ κτλ.: not of course 'if God had made' etc. (D. and V.), but 'if he should make' etc., referring to the future, in harmony with obvre μὴ φύσεως. The words δῶ γὰρ μιᾶς mean 'no more than two,' "auch nur zwei" (Schneider). Even two (not to speak of more) would involve a fresh idea. Cf. Tim. 31 a to γάρ perεῖξαν πάντα ὑπὸ σε νοητά ψαλμ, μὲθ' εὐεργος δότατον οὐκ ἄν ἄντι εὔφωνον οὐκ γάρ ἄν τετραεῖς οὐκ ἄν τετραεῖς οὐκ γάρ ἄν τετραεῖς ἔκειναι, καὶ εἰ ὄν ἄν εὐεργος κλίνη ἔκειναι, ἂλλ' οὐχ οἷον διό. Ὀρθῶς, ἐφη. Ταύτα δή, οἴμαι, εἰδώς ὁ θεός, Βουλό- 
D menos εἶναι οὖν κλίνης ποιήτης, οὖν κλίνης, κλίνης τινός, μηδὲ κλίνου τις, μιᾶν φύσεως αὐτήν ἐφύσει. "Εοικεν. 19. δὴ Αἴσχ.: δὲ vel δ' ἈΠα.
more elegant. It seems to me certain that φῶς in this passage refers to the essential nature (i.e. the Idea) of the thing in question. Schleiermacher, Schneider, and Müller, to judge from their translations, held the same view. The English translators render the second φῶς 'by creation' (D. and V.) or 'by the natural process of creation' (Jowett), but apart from other objections, φῶς surely cannot bear a sense so very different from that which it has at the beginning of the argument: see 597 ν., where reference is made also to Bosanquet's ingenious, but, as I believe, wholly mistaken view.

29 τί αὐτὸν κλίνης κτλ. : For the genitive cf. IX 582 C, 585 D, infra 597 E and (with J. and C.) ὅμηρος 204 D τί τῶν καλῶν ἐστώς ὁ Ἐρως; 597 Ε 30 μιμητής oυ ἑκατὸν δημιουργοῦ. Τhere is (1) the φυτουργός, (2) the δημιουργός, (3) the imitator of 'bed.' The two former are each of them (in the wider sense) δημιουργοῦ of 'bed.' It will be noticed that 'bed' is treated pro tempore (from βούλει αὐν ὡς ὑμαλογικάνμεν) as a single undifferentiated notion, because the contrast is shifted from the three beds to those among them in their production. At 598 Α ἐστὶ δὲ μαί κτλ. Plato again differentiates the notion, in order to make it clear that the Painter imitates only the material, and not the Ideal, bed.

31 τὸν τοῦ τρίτου κτλ. The genitive is like τί αὐτὸν κλίνης κτλ. above. I do not think we ought (with J. and C.) to supply δημιουργοῦ.

32 τοῦτο ἀρα-μιμηταί. Since the tragic poet is an imitator, he too will be τοῦ τρίτου γεννήματος ἀπὸ τῆς φύσεως, or in other words, τρίτος τις ἀπὸ βασιλέως κτλ. Baiter's text is misleading because he prints no comma after μιμητής ἐστι. That Tragedy is a branch of μιμησίς, was universally allowed: see above on 595 Σ. Plato's procedure in reasoning from Painting to Poetry (cf. infra 598 C, 601 Α, 603 Β and 605 Α) may be illustrated by Simonides' remark that 'Poetry is vocal Painting,' as 'Painting is silent Poetry' (ὁ Συμινδης τὴν μεν γραφάμαν ποίησαν σωφρόνως προσαγορεύει, τὴν δὲ ποίησαν γραφάμαν καλοῦσαν Plut., de gloria Ath. 346 Β)—a saying which Lessing appropriately cites in the preface to his Laocoön.

33 τρίτος τις κτλ. : 'as it were third from King and Truth.' The metaphor is a genealogical one (cf. III 391 Α Πηλέως, σωφρονεστάτον τε καὶ τρίτον ἀπὸ Διός), and the King corresponds of course to the φυτουργός or God. On the one hand we have (1) God, (2) the τέκτον, (3) the μιμητής; on the other (1) the αὐτὸ δέ ἐστι κλίνη, (2) a material κλίνη, (3) a picture of a material κλίνη: and just as the picture is τὸ τρίτον γεγέννημα ἀπὸ τῆς φύσεως, so the imitator is 'third in descent' (τρίτος — περιφυκός) and consequently two degrees removed from δ θεός. The propriety of the term βασιλεῖας will be seen if we translate Plato's theological phraseology into its philosophical equivalent. When he tells us that God constructs the Idea of Bed, he means that the Idea of Good is the source of that Idea (597 ν.), and the Idea of Good is King of the Ideal World; see VI 509 D. This is the application of the phrase: but it is possible enough that the expression itself was half-proverbial in Plato's time, and referred originally to the person who stood next but one in order of succession to the Persian throne. See App. I. The general sense is well illustrated by J. and C. from Dante In-
598 A]  

**POLITEIAS I**  

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μιμηται. Κινδυνεύει. Τὸν μὲν δὴ μιμητὴν ὠμολογήκαμεν· εἰπὲν 598 δὲ μοι | περὶ τοῦ ζωγράφου τὸδε οὔτε ἐκεῖνο αὐτὸ τὸ ἐν τῇ φύσει ἔκαστον δοκεῖ σοι ἐπιχειρεῖν μιμεῖσθαι ἢ τὰ τῶν δημιουργῶν ἔργα; Τὰ τῶν δημιουργῶν, ἐφη. "Δρα οία ἐστίν ἣ οία φαίνεται;"

ferno ii. 105 Si che vostr' arte a Dio quasi è nipote, i.e. Art is Nature's daughter, as Nature is God's: 'so that your art is as it were the grandchild of God.' It should be noticed that the drift of Plato's meaning can be expressed in terms of the simile of the line. The aŭtv δὲ ἐστιν κληρὴν, for example, belongs to EB (see Fig. i on p. 65), the material κληρὴν to DC, and the picture of a lied to the realm of ἐκβολή, that is to say AD. Similarly we may suppose that the state of mind of the carpenter is πιστῖς, and that of the Painter ἐκδοσια. See below on 601 B and cf. App. I to Book vii. Other views of the phrase τρίτος τιν ἀπὸ βασιλέως are discussed in App. I.

598 A—598 D  Moreover it is not the Idea which is copied by the Painter, but only the manufactured objects, and even of these he copies only one particular aspect or appearance. Hence Imitation is far removed indeed from the Truth; and only a simulacrum will be begotten by it.

598 A I πότερα ἐκείνο—ἐφη. In holding that the Art of Painting imitates only τὰ τῶν δημιουργῶν ἔργα, Plato degrades it to the level of photography, and the painter himself to a mere mechanical copyist, whose intelligence does not rise above ἐκδοσια (in the sense of vi 51 E: see note ad loc. and App. I to Book vii). Yet the highest art has in every age claimed to portray, not the so-called actual, but the Ideal: see for example Arist. *Ipfel.* 25. 6 and 17: "It may be impossible that there should be men such as Zeuxis painted. 'Yes,' we say, 'but the impossible is the higher thing; for the ideal type must surpass the reality'" (Butcher's translation), and the recent development of this idea by W. J. Courthope, *Life in Poetry and Law in Taste* pp. 152, 165, 196 ff., and passim. In the present passage, Plato bases his unfavourable verdict on what must be admitted to be a narrow and scholastic interpretation of his own ontology, but in view of Books ii and iii as well as 602 C—607 A below, we can hardly doubt that his attitude was determined in the first instance by educational rather than by metaphysical considerations, and that throughout the whole of Book x he was thinking less of the inherent possibilities of Art, than of actual Greek Art and Poetry considered as the exponents of a moral and religious creed which Plato himself emphatically disowns. See also on 607 A. In any case, the objections which he here urges do not touch the real essence of any form of Art except pure and unadulterated realism. Elsewhere throughout the Platonic writings there are not wanting indications of a juster estimate of the artistic faculty and its possibilities (see for example III 401 B—403 c, and especially v 472 D, and cf. Walter Gesch. d. Ästhetik in Allerlum pp. 141 ff., 459 ff. and Stahlin *Stellung d. Poesie d. Plat. Phil.* pp. 56—65), and the sympathetic student of Plato will find it easy to construct a nobler and more generous theory of Aesthetic Art out of the doctrine of Ideas together with its corollaries of ἀνάμνησις and pre-existence. It is also a historical fact that Plato's own conception of a transcendent self-existing Beauty, ἀν καὶ οὐκ ἀποκληθήσῃ, οὐκ ἀπεταλθησον, οὐκ αὐτάνθησον ἐπειδὴ εἰς τὸ μὲν κἀκιν, τῷ δὲ ἀλογρόῳ, οἷον τὸ μὲν, τὸτε δὲ οὐ, οἷον πρὸς τὸν κἀκιν, πρὸς δὲ τὸ ἀλογρός (Symh. 211 A), has proved an inexhaustible fountain of inspiration to some of the greatest artists, notably, for instance, in connexion with the Platonic Academy at Florence in the days of Michae1 Angelo: see Symonds, *Renaissance in Italy* ii pp. 205, 207, 247, 323 ff. Those who have caught the spirit of Plato's teaching will agree with me when I say that the famous lines of Wordsworth on King's College Chapel "They dreamt not of a perishable home, Who thus could build," are more truly and characteristically Platonic than Plato's attack upon poetry and painting in this passage.

3. ἔρα οία ἐστιν κτλ. The painter, as Bosanquet reminds us, operates in two dimensions, and so cannot copy the material bed "in its solid completeness, but
only his partial view of it" i.e. the bed as it appeared to him from one point of view, a particular φάντασμα of bed. His work, in fact, is ekphrasis ( II 365 c n.). It will follow that Painting is a stage lower than 'third from truth,' but Plato does not press the point, and in 599 a and δ Poetry—the sister art to Painting—remains as before only τρώγλα από τῆς ἀληθείας. See also on μυητική in b below.

598 b 8 πεποίηται is passive, not middle, as J. and C. strangely imagine. Cf. 605 a ο ὁ μυητικός ποητής—ον πρόσ το τοιοῦτον τῆς ψυχῆς πέφυκε τα καὶ ἡ σοφία αὐτοῦ τοῦτο αρέσκει τέτηγεν.
9 το δὲ: not of course in the metaphysical sense, but in the sense in which e.g. the material bed 'is' as opposed to its φάντασμα, which only φαίνεται, and which is all that the painter copies. An apologist of Art might fairly reply to Plato that in another and profounder sense it is just because Art does 'imitate' the φάντασμα and not the material reality that her creations frequently possess a measure of ideality and truth beyond and above what Plato assigns to them here. Cf. Butcher, Aristotle's Theory of Poetry etc. pp. 127 ff., 157—162. For the construction see on III 407 b.

11 ἡ μυητική. In this particular instance the inference from Painting to the whole of imitative art is hardly to be justified: for Sculpture, which is certainly, in the Greek way of thinking, a branch of μυητική, cannot be said to copy only a φάντασμα of the material object to the same extent that Painting does. See however Soph. 235 E, 236 a.

12 διὰ τούτου—εἰδολον: 'what enables it to manufacture all things is that it lays hold of but a little part of each, and even that is unsubstantial.' πάντα ἀπεργάζεται recalls 596 c—E, while preparing us at the same time for πάντα ἐπισταμένον τὰ δημιουργίας κτλ. below in c. In σμικρὰ τι ἐκάστον ἐφάπτεται the construction is like ἐπισταμένοιον—τοι- των τῶν τῆς αρετῆς μορίων oι μὲν ἄλλα, οἱ δὲ ἄλλα (Prot. 339 e). For εἰδολον Herderwen conjectures εἰδωλον: but the word refers to φαντάσματοι above and must therefore be in apposition to the part and not the whole. The particular 'appearance' of a bed which a painter copies is properly regarded as only a little 'part' of it.

14 περὶ ὀφεινὸς—τῶν τεχνῶν: 'although he does not understand about the arts of any one of them.' According to this explanation, which is that of Prantl, περὶ governs τῶν τεχνῶν and περὶ has for its antecedent κεπτότομον, τέκτων κτλ. The plural τῶν τεχνῶν is a trifling irregularity, due to the introduction of τῶν ἄλλως δημιουργύως, in the absence of which Plato would doubtless have written περὶ ὀφεινότερον τῶν ἵπταν τῆς τεχνῆς. For the distance between περὶ and its noun cf. VIII 551 c περὶ ἄλλου οὕτως ἔφεσαν ἄρχεσα, Prot. 319 b ἐν περὶ τῶν τῆς πόλεως διοικήσεως (if Sauppe is right in construing περὶ with διοικήσεως). Latinos διὸ oὐκ ἐδιανοοῦσα περὶ τῶν ὀφημάτων ὑπὲρ γραφής γίγνεσθαι ταῖς πόλεσιν, Tim. 40 c τα περὶ θεῶν ὀρατῶν καὶ γεγονητῶν εἰρημένα φῶσεως ἐγένετο τέλος, and other examples in Lina de praecip. iur. Plat. pp. 17 f. It is certainly wrong to translate the text by 'without knowing anything about these arts,' and we have no right to resort to such emendations as οὗτον τῶν ἵπταν τῶν
C 1 οὖν δὲν τοῦτων ἐπαίων τῶν τεχυνῶν: ἀλλὰ ὁμοιοί παῖδις τε καὶ 15 ἀφρόνας ἀνθρώπως, εἰ ἀγαθός εἰς ἐξογράφος, γράφας ἀν τέκτονα καὶ πόρρωθεν ἐπιδεικνύς ἐξαπατώ ἄν τοῦ δοκεῖν ὡς ἀληθῶς τέκτονα εἶναι. Τί δ' οὖ; 'Ἀλλὰ γάρ, οἴμαι, ὁ φίλε, τόδε δεὶ περὶ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων διανοεῖσθαι· ἐπειδὰν τις ἡμῶν ἀπαγγέλλῃ περί του, ὡς ἐνετυχεὶν ἀνθρώπων πᾶσας ἐπισταμένως τὰς δημιουργίας καὶ 20 Δ τάλλα πάιτα, ὅσα εἰς ἐκαστὸς οὖν, οὖν 1 2 ὅ τι οὐχὶ ἀκριβέστερον ὅτου ἐπισταμένως, ὑπολαμβάνεις δεῖ τῷ τοιοῦτῳ, ὅτι εὐθείας τις ἀνθρώπος, καὶ, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐντυχὼν γονίτω τινι καὶ μιμητῇ ἐξηπατήθη, ὥστε ἐδοξῆν αὐτῷ πάσσοφος 4 εἶναι, διὰ τὸ αὐτὸς μὴ οἷος τ' εἶναι

24. πάσσοφος Αί1 q1: πᾶς σοφὸς Α' 1 Π: πάνσοφος Σq2.

τεχυνῶν (Aστ.) οἵ ὄνεαν περὶ τοῦτων οἵ τοιούτων περὶ οὖν ἐπαίων τῶν τεχυνῶν (Richards). Ι now believe that Prantl's view, with which Stallbaum also agrees, is correct, and therefore withdraw my former conjecture τεχυνων. That τεχυνων is sound appears also from αὐτὸς το ὁφ' ἐπαίων περὶ οἰκο uomo in βοι.

598c 16 γραφείς—τέκτοναίναι. The same idea recurs in Soph. 234 β. The subject of δοκεῖν (ἀριστί) is παῖδις τε καὶ ἀφρόνας ἀνθρώπους (Schneider). This is better than to make δοκεῖν = videri and supply τὸ ἐξωγραφημένον (with J. and C.).

598d 22 ὑπολαμβάνεις δεῖ τῷ τοιοῦτῳ: 'we must reply to'—(or 'retort upon') 'such a person': cf. (with J. B. Mayor in Cl. Rec. x p. 110) Prot. 320 c τολλοὶ οἴνον αὐτῷ ὑπελαβον κτλ. The antecedent of τοιοῦτος is τις. The words have been strangely misinterpreted by Schneider ('bei dem muss man annehmen etc.), J. and C. ('we must understand by such a statement') and others, forgetful of the parallel expression in the Protagoras. Vernemich actually goes so far as to conjecture τῷ τοιοῦτῳ (Plat. Stat. p. 119).

23 γονίτων. Cl. Soph. 234 c.

24 δίᾳ το αὐτὸς κτλ. In agreement with Dümmer (Antisth. pp. 23 ff.), Stählin (Stellung d. Poesic etc. p. 26) takes this as a specific reference to Antisthenes. Antisthenes, in the first place, denied the Ideal theory and held that there could be no knowledge except of particulars: so that Plato might well insinuate that he was incapable of distinguishing knowledge from ignorance: cf. v 476 D h. In the second place, Antisthenes was a champion of Homer, and discovered a sort of moral philosophy in his works (see Frag. 24—28 in Winckelmann Antisth. Frag. and Zeller 11 pp. 330 ff.). On the strength of these two facts Stählin has evolved the ingenious theory that Plato's motive throughout this part of the discussion is a purely polemical one, and that he did not seriously consider Poetry only 'third from Royalty and Truth.' Plato, thinks Stählin, says in effect: 'Antisthenes holds that poets have knowledge of and copy particulars; but there is no knowledge of particulars, and particulars are copies of Ideas, so that on Antisthenes' own showing Poets are igno rant, and Poetry is thrice removed from Truth; whereas Antisthenes thinks Homer was omniscient.' The dagger is only lath: for Antisthenes was not an Idealist. Yet it is tolerably clear that Plato is refuting a view of poetry which found enthusiastic advocates in his own time, and Antisthenes may have been one of these, though the evidence falls far short of proof (see next note); but the purpose of this investigation is certainly not polemical and nothing more, and in spite of other passages in which Plato takes a more generous view of Poetry (see on 598 e), there is no good reason to suppose that his hostility is otherwise than serious here. See also on line 28.

598d—601b We hear it said that tragedians, including Homer, have knowledge of that whereof they write; but it is not so. No one would seriously give himself to the production of copies if he could make originals. If the poet possessed true knowledge of what he imitates, he would rather do great deeds than sing of them; and Homer rendered no services to his fellow men in the sphere of action,
### PLATONOS [598 D]

25 ἐπιστήμην καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνην καὶ μύησιν ἐξετάσαι. Ἀληθεύστατα, ἐφη.

III. Οὐκοῦν, ἢν δὴ ἐγὼ, μετὰ τὸ τοῦτο ἐπισκεπτέον τὴν τε τραγῳδίαν καὶ τὸν ἡγεμόνα αὐτῆς Ὀμηροῦ, ἐπειδὴ τινῶν ἀκούομεν, ὅτι οὕτω τέσσαρα μὲν τέχνας ἐπίστανται, πάντα δὲ τὰ ἀνθρώπεια Ε 30 τὰ πρὸς ἀρετὴν καὶ κακίαν καὶ τὰ γε θεία· ἀνάγκη γὰρ τὸν ἁγαθὸν ποιητήν, εἰ μέλλει περὶ ὧν ἄν ποιῆ καλὸς ποιῆσειν, εἰδότα ἄρα ποιεῖν, ἢ μὴ οἷον τε εἶναι ποιεῖν. δεῖ δὲ ἐπισκέψασθαι, πότερον

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Invention, or even education, as the neglect he suffered in his own lifetime abundantly proves. The fact is that the Poet writes without knowledge. His productions are but images of images, and owe all their charm to their poetic setting.

598 D 28 τὸν ἡγεμόνα αὐτῆς Ὀμηρον κτλ. See 595 C u. In τυφών Dümmler and Stählin (ll. cc.) again recognise Antishiennes, but although Antishiennes seems to have believed in Homer, there is no evidence that he was a champion of Tragedy (note δὴ οὕτωι κτλ.); and he was certainly not the only person in whose eyes Homer was regarded as at once a universal genius and the educator of the whole of Greece. It is not necessary to suppose that Plato has any individual person in his mind: there must have been many such apologists of Homer and dramatic poetry in Plato's day, and Plato as usual individualizes the type. See for instance the Ion of Plato and Ar. Fros. 1008 ff. It will, no doubt, help us to appreciate Plato's attitude towards Poetry if we remember that she was the de facto rival of Philosophy, and that (as Munk observes, die nat. Ordnung d. Plat. Schr. pp. 313 ff.) the République is in a certain sense a demand that Philosophy shall take the place which Poetry had hitherto filled in educational theory and practice: see especially the address to poets in Ῥατος S17 A ff. ὁ ἀριστοὶ—τῶν ξένων, ἡμεῖς ἐγἐμν τραγῳδίαν αὐτὸι ποιηταὶ κατὰ δύναμιν ὅτι καλλιτεχνὴ ἀμα καὶ ἀριστοτῆς' πάσα ὤν ἡ ἡ ποιεῖται ἐνεπιστήμη μίμησις τοῦ καλλίστου καὶ ἀριστοῦ βίου, ὅ δὴ φασὶν ἡμεῖς γε ὄντως εἶναι τραγῳδίαν τὴν ἀλήθεσταν. ποιηταὶ μὲν ὄν ἡμεῖς, ποιηταὶ δὲ καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐγἐμν τῶν αὐτῶν, ὅτι αὐτήν ἀντίκεχοι τι καὶ ἀνταγωνιστὰ τοῦ καλλίστου ὀφάματος κτλ. Cf. also infra 600 A u. But it is surely absurd to suppose that Plato was actuated by any feeling of personal jealousy towards Homer, and aspired to supplant him in the admiration of his countrymen: there is no envy in the choir divine' (Phaedr. 247 A). There is something almost pathetic in Dionysius' inability to understand and appreciate Plato when he assures us with monotonous and feeble iteration that 'there was, there really was in Plato's nature, with all its excellences, something of vainglory. He shewed this particularly in his jealousy of Homer, whom he expels from his imaginary commonwealth after crowning him with a garland and anointing him with myrrh' (Letter to Pompeius § 756, translated by Roberts).

598 E 30 ἀνάγκη—ποιεῖν. The saying is attributed by Wilamowitz (Phil. Unters. IV p. 285) to Sophocles himself, on what authority he does not say. Is he thinking of Athen. 1 22 2 μεθέων δὲ ἐποίησας τὰ τραγῳδίας Αἰσχυλοῦ, ὃς φιλεῖ Χαμαίλων. Σοφοκλῆς γὰρ ἀνεπίλημπτον αὐτὸῖ δὴ εἰ καὶ τὰ δόντα ποιεῖ, ἐλλ' οὗκ εἰδῶς γε; In any case the reference ought not to be thus limited, nor ought we to suppose (with Dümmler and Stählin, ll. cc.) that Antishiennes alone is intended, for Plato seems to be alluding to a tolerably widespread view and one which was freely represented in Apologies of Poetry. Understood in its full significance, the theory of Poetry which Plato is here combating requires us to believe that a poet who can represent a general, a pilot etc., knows the art of generalship, pilottage etc. (cf. 599 C ff.), and we are told that Sophocles was actually made στρατηγὸς because of his Anitigone (see the Argument ascribed to Aristophanes the grammarian). If we realise the part which Poetry, and especially the poetry of Homer, played in Greek education, and remember that Aristophanes makes Homer the teacher of τάξεις, ἄρτας, ὀπλεοὺς ἀνθρῶπων, it is by no means extra-
vagant to suppose that such views were actually maintained in Plato's time, though Pericles for example had a different criterion of strategic ability when he told Sophocles that he 'knew how to write poetry, but not how to command an army' (Περικλῆς ποιεῖ μὲ ἑφη, στρατηγεῖ ὃ ὥς ἐπιλατασθῇ Athen. XIII 604 D). Cf. Ion 540 b–542 B and Stählin Stellung d. Poesie etc. p. 23 n. 3. 'The public,' remarks Stählin, 'whose views Plato here combats, allowed the authority of the poets to extend even to the domain of the particular arts. It was Plato who broke through this magic circle which surrounded Poetry.' Aristole followed in the same path, refusing to allow that a mistake in respect of some particular art is necessarily a flaw in the poetry: see Poet. 25. 1460 b 20 ff., 33 ff. Plato himself, of course, holds that poets are destitute of scientific knowledge, and compose their poems of σοφία, ἀλλὰ φόαι τινὶ καὶ ἐνθυσάμενοι Αρ. 22 C; cf. also Phaedr. 245 A, Ion 533 D ff., Laws 719 c and Men. 99 c. The true poet, according to Plato, is a seer: knowledge he has none, but instead of it intuition, enthusiasm and inspiration: he is in short ἐνθεός, because ἐπίπον ὄν καὶ κατεχόμενος ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ (Men. l.c.). This view of Poetry is of course earlier than Plato: we meet with something like it in a striking fragment of Democritus ap. Dio Chrys. LIII 274 (quoted by Stählin l.c. p. 12) 'Οἱ μετὰ σωφρόνες λαχῶς θεα-τούσι ἐπίπον κόσμων ἐκτήτυπα παντοῦ, and Pindar likes to represent himself as the inspired mouthpiece of the Muses and Apollo. We cannot attain to a correct conception of Plato's aesthetic unless we are careful to remember that, although he refused to allow that the poet has knowledge, he did not deny him genius and inspiration. See also on 598 B supra.

32 πότερον μυθηταί κτλ.: 'whether these men whom they have met are imitators, by whom they have been deceived' etc. μυθηταί is of course predicative, and that is why τούτοι has no article. We certainly ought not (with Richards) to change τούτοι into τοιούτου. Cf. IV 436 D n.

599 A I τριτά—δυτός: 'are three stages removed from Truth.' One of Schneider's MSS has τριτά (sic), and Herwerden conjectures τρίτα, comparing τρι- τος ἀπὸ τῆς ἀληθείας in D. Possibly Proclus also read τρίτα: see the critical note in Kroll's edition of the in temp. I p. 203. 22. If the numeral is an adjective agreeing with ἔργα, we must certainly read τρίτα, but it may be an accusative of extent, i. q. τρία ἀπέχουσα. I therefore think it safer to retain the MS reading, especially as τριτά was more likely to be corrupted into τρίτα than conversely.

2 φαντάσματα—ποιούσιν. 596 E.

3 ἦ τι καὶ κτλ.: 'or whether again there is something in what they say.' ἦ καὶ is sometimes thus used instead of ἦ, from a feeling that it introduces something additional, viz. an additional alternative. Cf. (with Schneider) Hom. Il. 11 238 and Pl. Laws 744 A. The force of ἦ καί in Ap. 27 E, Phaedr. 269 A and infra 602 D, 605 D is nearly, but not quite, the same.

6 ἕπι—δημιουργία depends on σπου-δάζεσιν, rather than on ἀφέναια. The word σπουδάζειν is emphatic: he might occasionally παλεῖν ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις, but he would never make it the serious business of his life: cf. infra 602 B, VII 536 C n. and Phaedr. 276 C ff. The whole of this passage reminds us very strongly of the depreciatory estimate of written books in the Phaedrus. Cf. 599 B n.

7 τοῦτο—ἐξοντα: 'set this in the forefront of his life as his best possession,'
in accordance with the maximum τα καλά τρέφει εξω in Pind. Pyth. 3. 83, προστιθασθαί is used like προστάσιος (II. 577 A, and προστηθασθαι in VII. 531 B) is not very different. Others (Schneider, Stallbaum, etc.) think προστιθεσθαί κτλ. means 'to set before his life' as an aim or goal. In itself, this rendering is unexceptionable; but it does not suit with ὃς βέλτιστον ἔχων. The word ἔχων cannot be equivalent to ἰγνοθεσθαι 'considering' (in spite of the exceptional phrase εἶναι ἔχων VII. 528 B n.).; nor is it easy to accept the version of Schneider "und dieses als das beste war er könnte." The emphasis requires us to take ἔχων in its full sense ('als das beste wasser habe') Schleiermacher. Stallbaum conjectures ὃς βέλτιστον ἔχων, but the text is sound. For βέλτιστον instead of το βέλτιστον cf. (with Schneider) μεγαλον ἀγαθον in 330 D.

599 Β 9 το τοὺς ἐργοὺς, ἔπι for εν is called for by Herverden, but cf. Λαος 834 B τα εποιδότα—τα τε εν τῇ τροφῇ καὶ τας περὶ ἀγαπαν αὐτῶν. In ἐργος there is combined the twofold sense of 'deeds' and 'originals') (μιμήματα: the originals of dramatic μιμήμα is actions (603 C n.).

11 καὶ εἰσαῖ—ἐγκομίαζον. He would rather be Achilles than Homer. There is another side of the question, represented by Pindar's ἓβαμα δ' ἐργατῶν ἱκανοτέρων βοηθεῖ (Nem. 4, 6), and by Plato himself very forcibly in Symp. 200 D, and it is certainly unfair to insinuate that no one would write good poems if he were capable of doing great deeds. Some of Plato's expressions in this passage almost suggest the tone of a man of letters pinning for a life of action: cf. VI 196 D nn. 13 ἀφήλη: not simply to the agent himself: cf. σφᾶς ὀφθαλμή 599 E.

599 C 15 ἔρωταντες κτλ. Cf. Ion 537 E ff., Ἀρ. 22 A—C. τοὺς ἑγκομίους are of course the Asclepiadai: see on 111 405 D.

599 D 24 ὀφθαλμάματα κτλ. See 597 E f. From ἀλλα καὶ βέλτιστος we may infer that "the actual law-giver, in Plato's view, is second from reality" (Bosanquet).

26 τις τῶν τόκων κτλ. Contrast Symp. 200 C ff. where Homer and Hesiod
are linked with Lycurgus, Solon, καὶ ἄλλοι ἄλλωσι πολλαχος ἁπάντες, καὶ ἐν Ἑλληνικαῖς καὶ ἐν βαρβάροις, πολλα καὶ καλά ἀποφήμαιναν ἐργα, γεννηθαντες παντοίαν ἄρετον.

599 e 28 σὲ δὲ τίς κτλ. Yet it is a genuinely Greek sentiment that 'Poets are the unacknowledged'—a Greek would have said 'acknowledged'—'legislators of the world.' (Shelley).

29 Χαρώνδαν κτλ. Charondas, of Catana in Sicily, the legislator of the Chalcidian colonies in Italy and Sicily, is not elsewhere mentioned by Plato, though frequently by Aristotle: see Susemihl and Hicks on Arist. Pol. A 2. 125a 14. The date of Charondas is probably the sixth century B.C.; see Niese in Pauly-Wissowa art. Charondas, where the authorities relating to this early legislator are cited and reviewed. It is worth noting, in view of 'Ἰταλία' here and elsewhere in Plato (Law 777 C, Tim. 20 A; cf. also Laws 659 b), that an argument against the genuineness of the seventh Platonic Epistle has been derived from the fact that it mentions Italy (320 b, 339 b): see Herrmann, Gesch. ii. System. P. 591 B. 123. 31 Ομηρίδων: 'votaries of Homer,' 'Homer's devotees.' So the word is rightly explained by Heine (de rat. quae Pl. i. c. poet. Gr. inter edit pp. 18—21), and also by Jebb (Homer p. 78). Cf. Ομήρου ἔπαινα τις 606 E and the use of 'Ομηρίδων in Iou 550 E, Phaedr. 252 B. The original meaning of 'Ομηρίδων is discussed by Jebb l.c.

αλλά δὴ like ἀλλα γάρ = 'at enim' (Π 365 c n.).

600 A 3 εἰς τὰ ἑργα should be connected with σοφὸς. The omission of εἰς in A1 (see cr. n.) is apparently accidental, for it occurs in all other MSS.


8 ἄδυν τις—βίου Ὀμηρίκην. Yet in another and wider sense Homer was the founder of a 'way of life,' and the Ὀμηρίκη which Plato so strongly condemns in Books II and III, was in fact the Ὀμηρίς 'Ἑλληνική' (Keber Platon u. die Vöste p. 25). From this point of view Plato's antagonism to Homer is only a symptom of his profound dissent from much that we are accustomed to regard as essentially characteristic of the Greek view of life. See on v 470 E and Bohne Wie gelangt P. zur Anstellung s. Staatsideale, etc. p. 38.
600 B 10 Πυθαγόρειον τρόπον—τού βίου. The aim of the Πυθαγόρειον βίος was πίστευεν θεός, and the rules of abstinence etc. by which its notaries sought to 'follow God' made them conspicuous (διαφωτιζόμενοι et al.) and exceptional among the Greeks. See Rohde Psyche 211 pp. 159—171.

12 ο γὰρ Κρεώφυλος κτλ. Κρεώφιλος was read before Ast on slight MS authority, and gives an excellent sense to τοῦ ουσίατος—φανερώς: but Κρεώφιλος is confirmed by all the best MSS, as well as by Callimachus (Eph. 6 ap. Strabo XIV 638 Κρεώφιλον πάντων ειτά κτλ.) and others: see Pape-Benseler s.v. Plato speaks of him as Homer's friend or disciple (for ἐταύρος this meaning here: cf. ἐταυροῦς in C and Soph. 216 A ἐταύρος—τῶν ἀμφὶ Πανευρίῳ κτλ. with Bonitz Ind. Arist. s.v.): others, including the Scholast, say he was his son-in-law. The Epic poem Οἰχαλνας ἄδωρεις was ascribed to Creophylus by Callimachus (I.c.): but according to another tradition, Creophylus received the poem from Homer himself in return for hospitality (Suidas s.v. Κρεώφιλος).

13 τοῦ οὖσιατος—ἐξή. Cf. Cic. de repub. III Frag. 38 Nobbe Sordanplus ille vitio multo quam nomine ipsa deformior (as if Σαρδανόν διὰ λόγον). Κρεώφιλος (from κρέας and φίλον: 'Carngena' 'Fleischgeburt,' suggests Schneider) is an ἦνων γέλοιον πρὸς ποιεῖται: for Beef suggests anything but culture. "I am a great eater of beef, and I believe that does harm to my wits." (Twelfth Night 1.3.90). The Greeks had the same feeling: cf. Plato's remarks on the effects of over-much feeding and athletics in III 411 C—ἐ μοδόλογος ἰδί, ἀδικοί, τοιούτως γίγνεται καὶ ἀνισούς, and Euphrides Frag. 284 Dindorf, with the comic fragment παχεία γαστρὴ λεπτῶν οὐ τίκτει νόον. Plato means that the proof of the pudding is in the eating: Homer must have been a poor teacher if his disciples (including Creophylus) learnt so little. Had he taught them successfully they would have proved their παιδεία by treating their master more respectfully: cf. Corg. 519 C, D, where we are told that if teachers of δικαιοσοφία do not get paid by their pupils, it only shews that they have failed to teach their subject and therefore deserve no fees. Λέγεται—ἐξή means 'for it is said that he was much neglected even in his own age, when he was alive,' whereas it is precisely during his lifetime that he would have been most respected if he had taught to any purpose: witness the enthusiasm aroused by Protagoras, Proclus and other teachers! Thus understood, ὅτε ἐξή has a strong rhetorical emphasis and ought not to be discarded (with Cobet, Baiter, and Herwerden). For ἐκείνων after ἀδρου referring to the same person cf. vii 538 B and Riddell Digest of Platonic Idioms p. 143 § 49. If we adopt Ast's conjecture and read ἐντ' ἀδροῦ ἐκείνω, the passage gains a little in point, because ἀδροῦ ἐκείνω will then refer to Creophylus: but it is difficult to make the subject of ἐξή different from the antecedent of ἀδροῦ ἐκείνω, and on the whole I no longer think there is any good reason for deserting the MSS.

600 C 16 ἀλλ' οἱ κτλ. For ἀλλ' thus used cf. Men. 93 C with Heindorf on Theaet. 147 B.

20 Πρωταγόρας μὲν ἀρὰ κτλ. With
ό Κéis και ἀλλοί πάμπολλοι δύνανται τοῖς ἔρ' ἕαυτῶν παριστάναι.

1. ἐξηγηγοῦμενοι, ὡς οὐτε οἰκίαν οὐτε πόλιν τὴν αὐτῶν διοικεῖν ὁ λι' ἐσονται, εὖν μὴ σφείς αὐτῶν ἐπιστατῆσωσι τῆς παιδείας, καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτη τῇ σοφίᾳ οὕτω σφόδρα φιλοῦνται, ὡστε μούνον οὐκ ἔτι τὰς κεφαλὰς περιφέρουν αὐτοὺς οἱ ἐπιτρόποι. Ὁμιρὸν δ' ἀρα 25 οἱ ἐπ' ἐκείνου, εἴπερ οἶος τ' ἦν πρὸς ἀρετὴν ὑνισάναι ἀνθρώποις, ἦ Ἅσιόδου βασιλεῖς ἀν περιστὰσι εἰσὶν, καὶ οὐχὶ μᾶλλον ἄν αὐτῶν ἀντείχοντο ἢ τοῦ χρυσοῦ καὶ ἴμαγκαζο παρὰ σφέσιν οἴκοι.

Ε ἐίναι, ἐ εἰ μὴ ἔπειθον, αὐτοὶ ἂν ἐπαιδεύγωσον ὁπ' ἡσα, ἐως ἰκανός παιδείας μεταλάβοιες; Παντάπασι, ἐφι, δοκεῖς μοι, ο β' Ἀστάρατες, ἀληθὲς λέγειν. Οὐκών τιθῶµεν ἀπὸ Ὀμίρου ἀρξαμένους.

21. Κéis Α²: Κίος καὶ Κίος Α'Πι. 23. ἐπιστατῆσαιν τοῦ ἐπιστατῆσως Α''π: ἐπιστατῶν τοῦ viddet tur Α'. Β. υνιαιναι Μatthiaeus. ι δνιαιναι (sic) Α''π: ι δνιαιναι (sic) Α''π: ι δνιαιναι. Σ. 27. περιστάσαι Α'Π' (sic).}
πάντας τοῦς ποιητικοὺς μιμητάς εἰδώλων ἀρετής εἶναι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, περὶ δὲ ποιοῦσιν, τῆς δὲ ἀληθείας οὐχ ὑπετεθαί, ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγομεν, ὁ ζωγράφος σκυτότομον ποιήσει δοκοῦστα ἐγώ, αὐτὸς τὲ οὐκ ἐπαίτων περὶ σκυτοτομίας καὶ τοὺς μὴ ἐπαίτων-601 σιν, ἐκ τῶν χρωμάτων δὲ καὶ σχημάτων θεωροῦσι; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

Οὕτω δὴ, οἶμαι, καὶ τὸν ποιητικὸν φήσιμον χρώματα ἀπὸ ἐκάστον τῶν τεχνῶν τοὺς ὀνόμασι καὶ ῥήμασιν ἐπιχρωματίζει, 5 αὐτὸν οὐκ ἐπαίτοντα ἀλλ’ ἢ μιμεῖσθαι, ὡστε ἐτέρους τοιούτους ἐκ τῶν λόγων θεωροῦσι δοκεῖν, εάν τε περὶ σκυτοτομίας τις λέγῃ ἐν μέτρῳ καὶ ρυθμῷ καὶ ἁρμονίᾳ, πάνυ εὖ δοκεῖν λέγεσθαι, εάν τε 1 περὶ στρατηγίας εάν τε περὶ ἄλλου ὅτων· οὕτω φύσει αὐτὰ ταύτα μεγάλην τινὰ κήλησιν ἔχειν. ἐπεὶ γυμνωθέντα γε τῶν τῆς

5. αὐτῶν—ἐτέρους II et in marg. A² (ubi tamen ἀλλὰ πρὸ ἀλλὰ ἢ κ. ct. tòς πρὸ ἐτέρους); om. Α¹. 6, 7. ἐν μέτρῳ—Λέγεομαι II et in marg. A²: om. Α¹.

32 πάντας τοὺς ποιητικοὺς: see on 595 c.

μιμητάς εἰδώλων: 'imitators of images.' The words can scarcely mean 'forgers of resemblances,' 'imitative makers of shadows,' as suggested by J. and C., in spite of 599 d εἰδώλου δημοφιλίας καὶ τοῦ εἰδώλου ποιήσεως in 601 b. The images which the poet manufactures are in fact images of images, according to both 598 b and 596 b ff.: cf. 602 a n.

34 νῦν ἐπη. 598 b, c.

ὁ ζωγράφος κτλ.: 'the painter will make what seems to be a shoemaker, in the eyes of those who understand as little about shoemaking as he does himself, but judge by colour and form.' The daive is the dative of person judging, and does not directly depend on δοκούνται εἰναι, though doubtless affected by it. This explanation is better, I think, than to construe τοῖς μὴ ἐπαίτοις either directly with δοκεῖν (so Vermehren Pl. St. p. 130, comparing ὥστε ἐτέροις—δοκεῖν below), or with ποιοῦσε ("und für diejenigen, die auch nichts verstehen." Schneider).

601 Α 4 τοὺς ὀνόμασι καὶ ῥήμασιν.

The dative is instrumental.

δοκεῖν—δοκεῖν. The repetition "parttim perspicuïtatis studio, partim sermonis familiaris negligentiae cuidam tribuenda videtur" Schneider, who cites in illustration Laws 859 d, where there is a similar repetition of εἰναι. Other parallels will be found in Engelhardt Anac. Pl. Spec. III p. 44.

7 ρυθμὸ καὶ ἁρμονία κτλ. Rhythm and Pitch are the two elements of Music: see III 398 d n. The words αὐτὰ ταύτα mean 'just these,' and no more: viz. Metre and Music. For the sense cf. (with Ast) Isocrates Enag. 8—10.

601 Β 9 ἔχειν. ἔχει was read till Bekker, apparently without any ms authority. The influence of φήσιμον is still felt.

ἐπεὶ γυμνωθέντα—παλέσται. Cf. Isocr. l.c. II ἴν γὰρ τίς τῶν ποιημάτων τῶν εἰδοκοιμουτέων τὰ μὲν ὀνόματα καὶ τὰς διανοίας καταλέγει, τὸ δὲ μέτρον διαλύει, φανερά τω διεσθέα αὐτῆς τῆς διάθεσις ὑπὸ ἑκάστου μνημείου καὶ τῶν σύμφων τῶν συμφωνίων, ἤ ἄνευ μέτρου ὢς ιδιωτὴς. A cursory inspection of these passages of Plato might lead one to suppose that he defined poetry as no more than λόγος ἔχων μέτρων, but we can see from other passages in his writings that it was not the μέτρων, but the μύθος which appeared to him to be the most essential part of poetry (e.g. Phaed. 61 β ἐννοεῖς δὴ τῶν ποιημάτων δεόν, εἰπέρ μενοὶ ποιητήν εἶναι, ποιεῖν μύθοις ἀλλ' ὡς λόγους: cf. Arist. Poet. 9. 1451 b 29 τῶν ποιημάτων μάλα τῶν μύθων εἶναι ἄδικον τῶν μέτρων. See also Walter Gesch. d. Aesthetik im Allt. pp. 460, 463). Whether Plato would have spoken of a prose romance as a poem, is another question, and the passages to which I have referred make it unlikely that he would have done so. Aristotle seems to attach less importance than
Plato to the metrical form: see Poet. 1. 1447b 17 ff. oedén δ' και δύστας ὁμήρου καὶ Ἑμημηδηλίου πλῆν τὸ μέτρον διὸ τῶν μὲν ποιητὴν δίκαιον καλεῖς, τῶν δὲ φασιο-
λογῶν μᾶλλον ἡ ποιητὴν κτλ. and ib. 9. 1451b 2 ff.: but it is doubtful whether even Aristotle could have said with Sir Philip Sidney 'One may be a poet without versifying,' although he would certainly not quarrel with the converse statement that 'one may be a versifier without poetry.' See on the whole subject Butcher Aristotle's Theory of Poetry etc. pp. 143 ff. and Courthope Life in Poetry etc. pp. 68 ff.

10 τεθεασάι γάρ ποι. An example is afforded by 111 393b ff., but the reference is more general.
12 οὖσα—προλατη. Aristotle cites this as an example of an ἐκλογή (Rhet. 111 4. 1465b 36 ff.).

601 Β—602 Β The condition of Imitative art in respect of knowledge may be apprehended in the following way. In connexion with every object we can distinguish three arts, that which uses, that which makes, and that which imitates it. The user alone has knowledge of the object; the maker, when the user instructs him, has correct opinion; but neither knowledge nor correct opinion can be attributed to the imitator. He merely copies what appears to be beautiful to the ignorant multitude.

601 Β 14 ης δέ, τόδε ἀφρές κτλ. Plato has already proved that Imitation is 'third from Truth' εἰς τὴς εἰσφθείας μεθόδου (506 Α), i.e. from the ontological standpoint provided by his own Ideal Theory. The following argument takes up a different standpoint, according to which knowledge is defined as ἐμπειρα or practical familiarity (601 c.d, 602 Α).

The attitude assumed throughout this section resembles in some respects that of the historical Socrates (601 b.d.). Can the two points of view be reconciled? Bosanquet makes an interesting attempt to do so (pp. 379, 380 ff.), but his misconception (as it seems to me) of Plato's Ideas renders his conclusions less valuable than they might otherwise have been. Krohn (Pl. St. p. 255) professes himself unable to effect a reconciliation. We must admit that Plato himself does not, as a matter of fact, endeavour in this passage to connect the two arguments. Had he chosen to make the effort, I think a careful study of Euthyd. 285 e—290 D and Crat. 390 B—E will shew on what lines he might have proceeded (see on ὑπωρευσάτων in 601 D), but it is safer to suppose that he has shifted his ground, and is applying a new and less strictly scientific μέθοδος to shew that the Imitator is third from knowledge, as Imitation is from truth.

601 c 16 ἡμισεως—ρῆσιν. See on 601 E. ἡμισεως or ἡμισεος, in whichever way accented, is surely a full adverb, and not "the genitive used adverbially" (J. and C.) like ὅλων, πολλος, etc., although there is good authority for the genitive in κόρων from ἡμισος (see Lobeck Phryn. p. 247). Stephanus preferred ἡμισεως: but the adverb follows the accent of the genitive plural ἡμισεως, and ἡμισεως ἐπιρρήμα. Πλάτων Παλατιαίς κτλ. (Antall. in Bekk. Anecd. 98. 30)—a note which certainly refers to this passage; see Introd. § 4—supports the ms accentuation (Schneider). Liebhold's conjecture εἰς μιμήσεως needs no refutation.
21 ἐπιστάτας. See on ἐμπειρότατον in D below.

601 D 24 οὐκούν ἀρετὴ—πειράκος.
The historical Socrates was in the habit of testing the beauty, excellence etc. of an object by the degree in which it fulfilled its function or purpose: see especially Xen. Symp. 5. 4 ff. together with other passages cited by Kroll Pl. St. p. 369. Plato himself adopts the same standard in 1 352 E—353 E and elsewhere.

27 ἐμπειρότατον. Throughout the whole of this argument it is held that he who uses, e.g. an instrument, has knowledge of it (ἐπιστάται C, εἰδώς and εἰδώτι E, εἰδότος and ἐπιστήμην etc. 602 A), and Plato says nothing to make us attach any metaphysical signification to the word 'knowledge,' which he often employs throughout his writings without any suggestion of the Ideas (e.g. II 374 D, IV 422 C).

There is no doubt a certain sense in which—if we have regard to Crat. 390 B ff. and Euthyd. 288 E ff.—ὁ χρώμενος has, not indeed scientific knowledge of the Idea, but something analogous thereto. Dialectic, which is the scientific Knowledge of Ideas, is κατ' ἐξοχήν the χρωμένην ἐπιστήμην, the Science which alone knows in what respect each thing is good and useful, and uses things accordingly (cf. Euthyd. 290 C, Crat. 390 C), proving itself thereby the royal or kingly science (v 355 A n.). Thus the man who uses a single instrument correctly occupies the same relative position in regard to that object which the dialectician occupies in regard to the totality of things, and is, in his own small way, a king compared with the maker and imitator of the instrument. Cf. Bosanquet p. 390. But if Plato had intended us to pursue this vein, he would, I think, have furnished us with some hints in the course of the argument itself. See also on 601 B.

28 οἷα—χρήματι: 'what are the good or bad points of the instrument he uses when he uses it,' lit. 'what good or bad things that which he uses does'—we cannot like the Greeks say 'makes'—'in use.' This interpretation, which is Schleiermacher's ('"wie sich das war es gebraucht gut oder schlecht zeigt in Gebrauch.'), seems to me the natural and obvious meaning of the Greek. In agreement, apparently, with Schneider's version, Campbell proposes "what specimens of that which he (the user) employs, the maker makes that are good or bad in actual use," remarking that "the correlation of singular and plural arises from the collocation of particular and universal. The instrument (sing.) is good in some cases, but bad in others (plur.)." Campbell's solution has the advantage of referring τοιούτῳ 'to ποιήσι, and corresponds more exactly with χρήσιν καὶ ποιήσιν ἀδιάλειπτῳ in E. The grammatical difficulty is however, I think, insuperable. If the subject to τοιούτῳ must be ποιήσι, it would even be easier to make ὁ χρῆματι = τοιούτῳ ὁ δὲ χρῆματι—a rare form of attraction illustrated on v 465 D: but there is a certain elegance in applying τοιούτῳ also to the instrument, which is in its way a 'maker too' and one by whose ἐργα the other maker must be guided. Herwerden remarks "expectabant potius οἷα ἄγαθα ἤ κακὰ (sc. ἐντὸ) ἐν τῇ χρησὶ ἡν (i.e. τῶν οὗ) κτλ." It is well that his expectations have been disappointed.
29 ἐξαγγέλλει. Bekker and others write ἐξαγγέληει both here and in E below. The present echoes άγγελον γέγενσαι, and I agree with Schneider that change is needless, in spite of ἐπιτάξει and ὑπηρε-
30 οὗ ἐν ὑπηρετοὺς κτλ. I take this clause as a sort of parenthetical adjunc-
tor or characterisation of ἀδύνατον: 'thus the flutemaker informs the flute-
maker about his flutes—the persons who are his servants in the art of fluteplay-
ning and he will give orders how they should be made, and the flutemaker will serve him.' The liberty is great, but hardly greater than Plato allows himself else-
where in the Republic: cf. ιιι 411 c ἄρα χάλαξαν οὖν καὶ ὄργλην ἄν ὀθωμειοῦν ἐξενήμηται, δυσκολίας ἐμπλεοι, IV 426 c ὡς ἀποθαναμένους, διὰ τὸ τοῦτο ὅρα, VI 496 c, D, ι 347 A. H.: and the break afforded by the interposition of this clause makes the difference of tense between ἐξαγγέλλει and ἐπιτάξει seem easy and natural. To the ordinary interpretation, which makes ἀδύνατον the antecedent to οὗ ἐν, it is a serious and I think fatal objection that the verb ὑπηρετεῖν is used immediately afterwards of the flutemaker in a way which seems to imply that it has been used of him before: and it is also very strange and unnatural to speak of flutes as ὑπηρετοῦν ἐν τῷ αὐλῆιν. Jowett's translation "which of his flutes is satis-
factorily to the performer," though Schleier-
macher, Schneider and Prantl take much the same view, cannot be fairly extracted
from οἷς ἐν ὑπηρετοῦσιν. Many inferior MSS read οἷα for οἷς: and Richards con-
jectures οἷα ποιεῖν or οἷς ὑπητεῖν, but the change is much too great. I once suggested ὑπέρεχαν for ὑπηρετοῦσιν, but now believe the foregoing interpretation to be right.
601 Ε 32 ἐξαγγέλλει. See on ἐγαγ-
γέλει in D above.
πιστεύων. In the language of the
Line, his state of mind is πίστις (cf. πίστις ὅρθην below): see App. I to Book vii.
In 596 b on the other hand the δημιουργός πρὸς τὴν ἱδέαν βλέπει. Plato does not try to reconcile the two points of view (601 D. H.): but he might say that the objective reality of that which guides the δημιουργός is always the Idea, whether he acts on his own initiative or under the direction of another. See on 596 b. It should be noted that Poetry and the other imitative arts are placed higher, and not lower, than δημιουργία in Phaedr. 234 E. Here, however, Plato's purpose is a narrower one, viz. by means of an illustration derived from the mechanical arts to complete the proof—hitherto only ἡμισκον ἠμέλεια 601 c—that the Imitator does not ἐδώκας ποιεῖν, as many assert (598 e), but is in reality third from knowledge.
602 A 3 δοξάν ὅρθην. See IV 430 b. H.
5 οὕτω—πιστεύω. The word ἐκα-
σία, though not here used, represents the Imitator's state of mind: see on VI 511 E and App. I to Book vii.
7 οὗ ἐν τῇ ποιήσει μιμητικὸς. Stall-
baum remarks "cave unam poesim intelli-
perὶ ὧν ἂν ποίησα. Οὐ πάντως. 'Αλλ' ὦν ὅθεν ὑμᾶς γε μιμήσεται, Β' οὔν εἰδὼς περὶ ἐκάστου, ὅτι ποιητὴν ἢ χρηστὸν. ἄλλο, ὡς έοικεν, Ιοίον φαίνεται καλὸν εἶναι τοῖς πολλοῖς καὶ καὶ μηδὲν εἰδόσων, τούτῳ μιμήσεται. Τί γὰρ ἄλλο; Ταῦτα μὲν δὴ, ὡς ἂν φαίνεται, ἐπιεικῶς ἥμαι διωμολόγηται, τόν τε μιμητικόν μηδὲν εἶδένει ἄξιον λόγον περὶ ὧν μιμεῖται, ἄλλα εἶναι παιδιάν τινα καὶ οὐ σπουδὴν τὴν μίμησιν, τοὺς τε τῆς τραγικῆς ποίησεως ἀπομένους ἐν ἴαμβείοις 15 καὶ ἐν ἐπεσί πάντας εἶναι μιμητικοὺς ὡς οίον τε μᾶλιστα. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.

V. | Πρὸς Διώς, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, τὸ δὲ δὴ μιμεῖσθαι τούτῳ οὐ περὶ τρίτων μὲν τά ἐστιν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀληθείας; ἢ γὰρ; Ναι. Πρὸς δὲ

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Plato is here content, in view of his immediate purpose, with a twofold division of soul into (1) a rational and (2) an irrational, ἀλῆγμον (604 d, 605 b), or lower element. But the resemblance between the two theories is greater than the difference, for (a) the λογικῶν is common to both, and (2) on its moral side the irrational element appears sometimes as the ἐπίθυμητον (606 D καὶ περὶ ἀφροδισίων — καὶ περὶ πάντων τῶν ἐπιθυμητῶν κτλ.), sometimes as a degenerate form of the θυμανίδες (604 E, 605 A : cf. θυμοῦ 606 D). What is new is the assignment to the ἀλῆγμον of a certain quasi-intellectual power — viz. the power of forming false opinions (603 A, 605 C); but there was no occasion to raise this point in the earlier psychology, which was intended as a foundation for Plato's theory of the virtues. It becomes necessary to touch upon the question now, because imitative art aims at producing false opinions, and Plato accordingly assigns them to the ἀλῆγμον.

602 c 17 πρὸς Διως κτλ. The logical sequence is "iam vero haec imitatione non solum adhibita est, sed etiam naturali animi nostro partem adfecta" (Schneider). There is a certain awkwardness in making the transitional sentence interrogative in form, but the extreme animation carries it through. We cannot (with Stephanus) cancel οὖν and print a colon after ἀληθείας, for the interrogation is attested by πρὸς Διως.

18 μὲν τί. μὲν οὖν of course balances δὲ in πρὸς δὲ κτλ., and μὲνοι (Stallbaum with some deterioris notae miss) is not so good.
δὴ ποιόν τί ἐστίν τῶν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἔχον τὴν δύναμιν, ἢν ἔχει; Τοῦ ποιόν τινὸς πέρι λέγεις; Τοῦ τοιούτου, ταυτὸν που ἢμιν 20 μέγεθος ἐγγύθεν τε καὶ πόρρωθεν διὰ τῆς ὅψεως οὐκ ἦσον φαίνεται. Οὐ γὰρ. Καὶ ταυτά καμπύλα τε καὶ εὐθεὰ ἐν ὑδατὶ τε θεωμένοι καὶ ἐξω, καὶ κοιλά τε δὴ καὶ ἐξέχονται διὰ τὴν περὶ τὰ χρώματα D αὐθ πλαίσιον τῆς ὅψεως, καὶ πᾶσα τις 1 ταραχῇ δὴλῃ ἢμὶν εὐδοξὰ αὐτὴ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ. Δ ὃ δὴ ἢμῶν τῷ παθήματι τῆς φύσεως ἡ σκια- 25 γραφία ἐπιθεμένη γοητείας οὐδὲν ἀπολείπεται, καὶ ἡ θαυματοποιία καὶ αἱ ἀλλαὶ πολλαὶ τοιαύτα μηχανᾶι. Ἀληθῆ. Ἀρ’ οὖν οὐ το Μετρεῖν καὶ ἀριθμεῖν καὶ ιστάναι θοβηθεῖαι χαριέσταται πρὸς αὐτὰ ἐφανήσατο, ὡστε μὴ ἁρχεῖν ἐν ἢμὶν τὸ φανόμενον μείζων ἢ ἐλάττων ἡ πλέον ἢ βαρύτερον, ἀλλὰ τὸ λογισάμενον καὶ μετρήσαν ἡ καὶ 30 Ε στῆσαι: Πῶς γὰρ οὖν; 1 Ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦτο γε τοῦ λογιστικοῦ ἀν εἴη τοῦ ἐν ψυχῇ ἔργῳ. Τούτων γὰρ οὖν. Τούτω δὲ πολλακίς μετρῆσαι καὶ σημαίνοντι, μείζων ἀττα εἶναι ἢ ἐλάττων ἐτέρων ἢ ἑστάντια φαίνεται ἀμα περὶ ταυτά. Ναί. Οὐκὸν

19. Ιτα A¹: ab A² τοί super ποιώ, τὸ pro τῶν scripta legitim. Pro τῶν, quod praeabet etiam q sed omisi Σ, legitur in II τῆ. 25. αὐθ II: αὐθ Ἀ.

22 καὶ ταυτά καμπύλα τα κτλ. Nettleship (Lect. and Rem. II p. 349 u. 2) reminds us that images in water were among Plato’s examples of τὰ ἐφ’ ὄς εἰκάσα ἐστίν in Book VI 510 A; but, as Jackson points out, Plato is here thinking of reflection, and not of refraction.

24 πᾶσα τις—ψυχῇ. "πᾶσα cum αὐθη coningendum et per attractionem pro πάν τοῦτο dictum videtur. τις nomi- ni praeposition est ut Gepp. p. 522 D αὐθή γὰρ τις βοήθεια δαιῳ πολλάκις ἢμὶν ἡμὸλογηθάγα κρατῆτη εἶναι" Schneider. For other examples of this sort of attraction see Riddell Digest p. 203 § 201. Conjecture is not necessary; but if it were, we could not acquiesce either in αὐθη for αὐθή (Richter Fleck. Ἰβ. 1867 p. 147, with one ms.), or even, I think, in πᾶσα for πᾶσα (Richards). B. D. Turner in his edition of Book X thinks we may translate "and this weakness (πᾶσα, as it is afterwards specified) is manifested in our souls as every species of confusion." This solution gives an awkward sense, and is grammatically less easy than Schneider's.

602 D 26 γοητείας οὐδὲν ἀπολείπεται: 'leaves no magic art untried.'


29 ἐφανήσαν: 'were discovered; were invented!' = ἐνεργήσαν: cf. φανήνα VII 528 D. The meaning is not 'were found by us to be' etc., as Liebhold supposes (Fleck. Ἰβ. 1884 p. 522), and even Koehn, who actually thinks ἐφανήσαν may possibly contain a reference to some 'lost fragment' of the Republic (Pl. St. p. 252). Grimmel, in his reply to Koehn, takes nearly the right view (de comp. et unit. etc. p. 90 u.).

τὸ φαινόμενον—βαρύτερον. 'The apparently larger' rules in us when we believe the nearer and smaller of two objects to be larger than a more distant object which measurement shows to be larger. Similarly in the other cases. There is no good reason for adding ἡ κοινήτερον after βαρύτερον, as Madvig proposes to do: cf. IV 433 D ἡ.

30 τὸ λογισάμενον κτλ.: 'that which has counted' etc. For ἡ καί = 'or if you like' see on 599 A.

602 E 31 τοῦτο γε κτλ.: sc. τὸ λογισάμενον κτλ. In λογιστικοῦ there is a glance at the etymology of the word: cf. VII 525 B ἡ.

32 τοῦτο δὲ—ἀμα περὶ ταυτά κτλ.
'And to this principle, when it has measured and signifies that some given objects are greater or less than or equal to some others, the contrary appearances are often presented in connexion with the same objects at the same time,' τάντατα is 'the contrary,' i.e. not 'opposite appearances' in general, but the contrary (in any given instance) of the impression formed without the aid of measurement: cf. τάντατα in v 453 C, Euthyph. 6 A et al. The object A, for example, which is nearer and smaller, appears larger than B; but the λογιστικῶν discovers after measurement that A is smaller and reports accordingly. We have thus two contrary coexisting impressions of the same object. One of the two impressions belongs to the λογιστικῶν: does the other also? No, because, as shewn in iv 436 B—C, it is impossible for the same faculty to hold contrary opinions simultaneously in relation to the same objects. Hence the part of soul which δοξάζει παρὰ τὰ μέτρα is not the same as that which δοξάζει κατὰ τὰ μέτρα (i.e. the λογιστικῶν). And as the part which believes λογισμὸς (viz. the λογιστικῶν, cf. 604 D, 605 B) is the best, that which opposes it will be τῶν φαύλων τὶ ἐν ἡμῖν. J. and C. follow Schneider in translating τῷ αὐτῷ as instrumental ('with the same faculty to form opposite opinions at the same time'); but it is much more natural to make it the dative with infinitive after ἀδίκατον, in view especially of τὸ—δοξάζον τῆς ψυχῆς immediately following. Rightly understood, iv 436 B is also in favour of taking τῷ αὐτῷ in this way. For other views of this difficult passage see App. Π. 603 A 5 έλεγον: viz. in πρὸς Δίκης—ἐχει 602 C, although Socrates reads more into πρὸς δὲ δὴ ποιῶν—ἐχει than the mere words by themselves convey. 603 B 7 τῷ ἐν ἡμῖν κτλ. See on 602 C.

9 φαύλη—μμημτική. Cf. vi 406 A.

11 ἢ καὶ ἢ. See cr. ἢ. "Inter ἢ et κα καθὲ καὶ ἢ excidere potuit" (Schneider).

603 B—605 C If we examine Poetry on its own merits, apart from the sister-art of Painting, we observe that Poetry imitates action. Now in action we often fluctuate between two impulses. When a great calamity befalls us, we are tempted to give way to grief, before the eyes of others; but Law bids us refrain, and try to cure the wound instead of hugging it. That which is best within us readily obeys; whereas the part that tempts us to dwell upon our sorrows is irrational, indolent, cowardly. Yet it is just this peevish, querulous side of human nature which most lends itself to imitation, and whose portrayal in dramatic art the vulgar most readily understand. Poetry is thus the counterpart of Painting; its products are low in point of truth, and it feeds our lower nature. We exclude the Poet from our city on both grounds.

603 B 12 μὴ τοῖνυν κτλ. In 605 A Plato seems to think that his procedure
in arguing from Painting to Poetry (597 E n.) needs a word of explanation and defence. The following argument incidentally furnishes such a defence by deducing from an independent treatment of Poetry the conclusions to which we have already been led by τὸ ἔκδος ἐκ τῆς γραφής.

603 c 15 ὅδε ἕτη προθύμεθα: 'let us put it before us in this way.' The object is easily supplied, and in other respects προτίθεσθαι is used as in Ἡ 375 ν, Phil. 36 ν and elsewhere: so that there is no good reason for suspecting the text. τυποθύμεθα (Richards) has a different and less suitable meaning.

16 πράττωντας κτλ. Cf. Aristotle's definition of tragedy as μῆνὶς πράξεως κτλ. (Poet. 6, 1449) 24 and Plato Laws 817 A ff. See also Stahlin Stellung d. Poesie etc. pp. 35 f.

19 μὴ τι—ταῦτα; 'It was nothing beyond this, was it?' I have adopted Ast's conjecture (see cr. n.), which Schneider also favours, in preference to omitting ἄνω with καὶ and two other MSS, Stallbaum, and l'abé. The imperfect may be a reminiscence of ὅ 399 Α—C. The different usages of μὴ with the subjunctive have not yet been thoroughly explained (see Cl. Rev. x pp. 150—153, 239—244), but it seems clear that μὴ cannot in interrogative sentences with the 3rd person subjunctive mean 'nun,' and the meaning 'perhaps' (as in μὴ ἀληθές ἦ) is unsuitable. The only exact parallel to this idiom in Plato is Parm. 163 D where Heindorf similarly restores ἦ, apparently with Waddell's approval. See however on the other hand Goodwin MT. p. 93.
though supported by most MSS and retained by Bekker and others, cannot, I think, be right. "Nescias to cum νίν construendum, an per se pro τοῦτο accipienda sit. Hoc communi, illud Platonicae loquenti consuetudini repugnat. Contra tōde offensione caret, et quoniam nexus inter haec et superiora intercedens paullo ante particula δε post νιν significatam est, δη—abesse posse videtur" (Schneider).

2 ἀντιτενεῖν. See cr. n. Schneider and the more conservative editors keep the present; but it is much more difficult to defend such a difference in tense with τε—καλ than for example in 601 D. Cf. I 342 A H. Stobaeus (Flor. 124, 43) has μάχεσθαι τε καὶ ἀντιτενεῖν, which may be right.

3 μάνος is bracketed by Cobet (V. L. p. 361) and others. Cf. however Polit. 307 Ε ἀντίκαθιμον μάνοι and other examples in Ast Lex. Plat. s.v. μάνος.

5 ποιησαί κτλ. Richards would write ποιησά, but ποιησαί is much more forcible. The words ά—δρόωντα mean ‘which he would not like any one to see him do’: not ‘which he would not choose to see another doing’ (J. and C.). Cf. ἀ εἰ τις αὐτοῦ ἀκοῦσαι αἰσχύνοντ᾽ ἂν. It should be remembered throughout this passage that violent demonstrations of grief did not offend the Greek sense of propriety so much as they offend ours: cf. Bosanquet Companion p. 396.

604 B 8 αὐτὸ τὸ πάθος: "the affliction itself" (D. and V.): "das Leiden selbst" (Schneider), objectively understood: not "perturbatio" (Ficinus) or "Leidenschaft" (Schleiermacher). See Krohn Pl. St. p. 256.

10 δοὺ is of course neuter, but δόν τιν (ṣ Flor. U) hardly makes the gender clearer and ought not to be preferred.

ἐν αὐτῷ. See cr. n. αὐτῷ, which Schneider and others retain, has a great preponderance of MS authority, but is not sufficiently precise: for the two principles do not merely belong to the man, but are in him: cf. 603 B. This kind of error is a common one in Paris A: see Intro. § 5. Morgenstern's conjecture αὐτῷ, which Burnet adopts, would refer "ad proxime commemorata πάθος et λόγον, quae diversa et duo esse Socrates iam supra posuit, non nunc demum colligit" (Schneider). φαμεν need not be parenthetical: for εἰναι can be omitted as well as ἐστί, and its presence would have been awkward here, on account of the εἰναι to which δόο is subject. See Schanz Nov. Comm. Pl. pp. 33 f.

11 τῷ νόμῳ. Richards proposes τῷ λόγῳ in view of λόγος καὶ νόμος above and λογισμὸν 604 D. This conjecture would introduce a false and unpleasing contrast between τῷ λόγῳ and ὁ νόμος. The repetition of ὁ νόμος is for emphasis.

C probaion τὸ χαλεπῶς φέροντι, οὔτε τι τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων Α' αξίων 15 ὅν μεγάλης σπουδῆς, ὃ τε δεῖ ἐν αὐτοῖς ὃ τι τάχιστα παραγιγνεσθαι ἦμαν, τούτῳ ἐμποδῶν υγινόμενον τοῦ λυπεσθαί. Τάνι, η δ' ὅσ, λέγεις; Ὁ βουλευεσθαί, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, περὶ τὸ γεγονός καὶ ὡσπερ ἐν πτώσει κύβων πρὸς τὰ πεπτωκότα τίθεσθαι τὰ αὐτοῦ πράγ-ματα, ὅπη ὁ λόγος αἰρεῖ βελτιστον ἁν ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ μὴ προσπταί-20 σαντας καθάπερ παῖδας ἐχομένους τοῦ πληγέντος ἐν τῷ βοῶν διατρίβεσθε, ἀλλὰ ἐς ἐδίβην τὴν ψυχῆν ὃ τι τάχιστα γίγνεσθαι 

D' πρὸς τῷ ἱάσθαν τε καὶ ἑπανορθῆναι τὸ πεσόν τε καὶ νοσῆσαι, ἱατρικὴ βρηκὼν ἀφανίζοντα. Ὄρθοτάτα γοὺς ἂν τίς, ἔφη, πρὸς τὰς τύχας ὦτω προσφέροιτο. Ὅμοιον, φαμέ, τὸ μὲν βελτιστὸν 25 τοῦτο τὸ λογισμὸ εἴθελε έπεσθαί. Δῆλον δή. Τὸ δὲ πρὸς τὰς ἀναμνήσεις τε τοῦ πάθους καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ὄδυρμοις ἁγών καὶ ἀπλή-

15 οὔτε τι κτλ. The sentiment is repeated and expanded in Latus 803 b ff. 

604 C 20 ὁ λόγος αἰρεῖ. Cf. in 440 b and infra 607 b. The origin of this frequent phrase is, I think, to be sought in this legal rather than, as Schneider supposes, in the military meaning of αἰρεῖ. Cf. "voluptatem—convictam superiore libro" in Cic. de Fin. 111 i. Badham (on Phil. 35 d) strangely conjectures that the figure is "borrowed from the draught-board." 


31. αὐτὸ Ξγ et in marg. Α: om. ΑΠ. 

German editors retain. Cf. VIII 567 A. 

πεσόν. The conjecture πτωτάν (Herwerden Mm. xix p. 340) is worse than unnecessary. ἀφανίζοντα agrees of course with the subject of ἔχειν, which is singular, in spite of προσπαίτασας. We need not (with Apelt Obs. Cr. p. 12) write ἀφανίζοντα or ἀφανίζοντα; see on I 347 Λ. 

24. ἱατρικὴ κτλ. Stallbaum reads τῷ βρηκὼν with ι (see cr. n.). "In dictione poetica articulum etiam minus desidero" (Schneider). The article would be comparatively tame. 

26. τοῦτο τῷ λογισμῷ means the λο- 

γισμὸς expressed in λέγει ποὺ ὁ νόμος (Β) —ἀφανίζοντα (Δ). Stallbaum was the first to restore λογισμῷ (from AΠ et.) for the λογισμῷ of inferior MSS. 

604 E 30 ἔχει κτλ. ἔχει=ἐνδέχετο, as often. The Euripidean drama forcibly illustrates what Plato here says, τὸ ἀγανακτητικὸν may be regarded as a degenerate variety of the ñωμοκός: cf. III 411 Α—C and supra 602 Α. n.
32. **μιμούμενον** P: **μιμοθήκη** A. 3. **τε Α¹**: γε Α² (sed corr. τε a manu recenti) cum ΠΞ η. 11. **ποίων Α¹ΙΙ**: ποίων Α². 13. **φθείρη Α²Σ**: φθείρη Α¹ΙΙ: φθείρα q.

32 **μιμούμενον**. See *cr. n.* **μιμοθήκη**; if it could be taken as passive, would be better and more pointed; but there is apparently no other example of the present participle of this verb used passively, and we are hardly justified in reasoning from the perfect (*μιμοθήκην Crat. 425 D*) etc. to the present. Schneider thinks **μιμοθήκη** may be active, 'the imitator' being said instead of 'the imitation' ("nor is it easy to understand one who tries to imitate him" J. and C.). But we cannot help feeling that *εὐπτεῖ* as well as *πέροκιο* ought to agree with *ήθος*. I therefore follow Stallbaum in preferring the genitive absolute **μιμούμενον**, which has the authority of *q* and several other MSS in addition to P.

**άλλως τε–εὐπτεῖ* *εὐπτεῖ* (cf. V 492 B). **605 A** 3 **πέροκιο τε–πέροκιον**. It is easy to carry on the negative if we read *τε* and not *γε*, which is in all MSS except Α¹. **πέροκιον πρὸς**, like *πεπόθηκα* πρὸς in 598 b, is here said of the relation of Art to that which it imitates, as appears from **άλλως πρὸς–εὐπτεῖ* *εὐπτεῖ*. The word **πεπόθηκα** means 'is framed' or 'constructed,' i.e. *πεπόθηκα* (598 B): cf. VII 530 D. The infinitive is the old datival infinitive of purpose 'constructed for pleasing,' to please; see Goodwin *M. F.* pp. 207, 310 f. Various unnecessary and unpleasing conjectures have been proposed: the addition of *οἴ* before *τούτων* (Stephanus), *η* *σοφία* *αὐτῶ* *τούτων* *ἀρέσκει* *πέροκεν* (Cornarius *Ecl.* p. 102): the transposition of *πέροκοι* and *πέποθηκα* (Valckenaer on *Europ. Phoen.* 923): and οἱ *τούτων* *ἀρέσκει* *πεπόθηκα* (Richter in *Flick. Jb.* 1867 p. 147).

4 **εἰ μελλεῖ—τοῖς πολλοῖς**. See on vi 493 B and cf. Reber *P. u. die Poesie* pp. 54–59. 5 **οὐκόν δικαίως—εὐφράσι*. See on 603 B.

**605 B** 12 **μοχθήροις—πολίων κτλ.** *τοῦ* is not required before *μοχθήροις* any more than *τούτων* after *παλ* (Herwerden's conjectures in *Lin. XIX* p. 340). With *πολιτείαν—ψυχὴ* cf. 1X 590 b and X 608 b.
megálá ἡγουμένω, τοτε δὲ σμικρά, εἰδωλα εἰδωλοποιοῦντα, τού δὲ ἄλθους πόρρω πάνιν ἀφεστῶτα. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.

VII. Οὐ μέντοι ἔν τι γε μέγιστον καταγρηκάμεν αὐτῆς. τὸ γὰρ καὶ τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς ἰκανὴν εἶναι λοβάσθαι, ἐκτὸς πάνιν τινῶν 20 ὀλίγων, πάντεινοιν τού. Τί δὲ οὐ μέλλει, εἴπε γε ὑνα αὐτὸ; Ἀκούν σκοτεῖ. οἱ γὰρ ποτέ βέλτιστοι ἡμῶν ἀκρώμονοι Ὑμήρου

D ἢ ἄλλου τινος τῶν τραγῳδοποιοῦν 1 μιμουμένου τινά τῶν ἤρωων ἐν πένθει δύναται καὶ μακρὰν ῥήσις ἀποτελοῦντα ἐν τοῖς ὀδυρμοῖς ἢ καὶ ἄλλατις τε καὶ κοπτομένους, οἰσθ' ὅτι χαιρόμεν τε καὶ εὐδότες 25 ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ἐπόμεθα συμπαύσχοντες καὶ σπουδάζοντες ἐπανοίγειν

17. εἰδωλοποιοῦντα ὁ: εἰδωλοποιοῦντι Αἴθ.φ.1.

605 C. 17 εἰδωλα εἰδωλοποιοῦντα κτλ. See cr. n. εἰδωλοποιοῦντα seems also to have been the reading of the first hand in Vind. Π. The dative εἰδωλοποιοῦντα is retained by Schneider, who makes it agree with τῷ ἄνθος and regards ἄφεστον as neuter plural. This interpretation, though grammatically tenable, is otherwise unsatisfactory. Plato (in 605 A) has just correlated Poetry with Painting because Poetry also (a) produces φάσσα πρὸς ἄλλην and (b) consorts with φαθεῖ τῇ γυνῇ. On both grounds, he concludes, Poetry must be proscribed: for (b) τοῦτο ἐγείρει—τοτε δὲ σμικρά, and (a) εἰδωλα εἰδωλοποιοῦντα. The chaotic sequence is usual in Plato. If we read εἰδωλοποιοῦντα, Plato assigns only one of his two main reasons for the exclusion of Poetry, viz. (b), and the correspondence between this and the preceding sentence disappears. On this account Stallbaum and others are, I believe, right in restoring the accusative, and making ἄφεστον, as well as εἰδωλοποιοῦντα, agree with τῶν μακρύς ποιητήν. The error—an easy one after ἀδιαγόρωσκοι and ἡγουμένω—affected ἄφεστον also in at least one MS, for Σ has ἀψοετῶν.

605 C.—607 A. But the most serious count in our indictment is that Poetry is capable of corrupting, with few exceptions, even men of character and virtue. Tragedy stirs in us just those emotions which we are ashamed to indulge when suffering misfortunes of our own, and the consequence is that we succumb more readily in the hour of trial. The same may be said, mutatis mutandis, of comedy also. We shall therefore decline to model our lives after Homer, and refuse to surrender our city to the rule of Pleasure.

605 C. 19 οὖν. That is, τῆς ποιησεως. Cf. VI.503 οὖν.

605 D. 23 τοῖς τῶν ἤρωον κτλ. Cf. III.387 D. In ῥήσι—κοπτομένου the contrast is between a ῥήσις or set speech, spoken and not sung, “quales multae in tragoidias, Euripidis praeassertim” (Casaubon apud Stallbaum), and κομικ, which are sung. Hence ἢ καὶ—κοπτομένου, ‘or if you like singing and beating the breast,’ is perfectly accurate, and we ought not to change καὶ ἄλλαντα into κλάδοντας ο ἄλλαντας (with Ast, Cobet, Balte) or ἄλλαντα into ἄλλοντας (with Winckelmann). For ἢ καὶ cf. 599 a. n. The readings τοῖς—ἄλλασ—ἀποτελεῖται in g and some other MSS are only attempts to obliterate the common irregularity of a singular (ποιης etc.) passing into a plural: see on II.347 a. Richards ‘suspects’ that Plato wrote μιμουμένον—ἀποτελεῖται κλάδοντας—κοπτομένου. The conjecture is as unnecessary as it is bold.

25 χαίρομεν κτλ. Pity, according to Aristotle, as well as Plato, is aroused by Tragedy: see Poet. 6.1440b 27. With συμπαύσχοντας κτλ. cf. Arist. Pol. Θ 5.1340b 12 ἔτι δὲ ἀκροβυσκοῦν τῶν μιμήσεων γίνομαι πάντες συμπαύσεις, and with ἐπανοίγει: διὰ τῆς Λαύς 500 D ὡς ἐν διακρόσει μάλαστα τῇ θυσίᾳ παραχρήμα ποιῆσαι πέλαγος, οὕτω τὰ μικρήσα ὅρηιν, Phil. 48 ο αὐτοῦ τραγικάς θεωρήσεις, ὅταν ἢ ἄλλας κλάδοντας κλάδων καὶ Ιον 535 f. See also on 606 B and III.395 D.
It is unreasonable to take pleasure in and praise such exhibitions; for the appetite to which they minister is one which in the case of our own individual misfortunes we are careful to repress. Jackson points out that παί ("gainez recht" Schneider) assests to what Glauco has just said, viz. οὐκ εὐλογηθέντας, and does not mean παί, εὐλογηθέντας, as J. and C. suppose, taking παί as the equivalent of the French si.

2 κατεξώμενον τότε: viz. ὅταν αὐτὲν τοιν ἡμῶν κῆδος γένησαι (605 D).

5 τότε ἐστιν τοῦτο κτλ.: 'is on those occasions the part of our nature which the poets satisfy and please.' τότε is the subject, and repeats τὸ βία κατεξώμενον κτλ., while τὸ—καίρον is in the predicate. A difficulty has been felt because τότε now refers to poetical exhibitions, whereas the other τότε had a different reference; but the emphatic place of the second adverb seems to place it in opposition to the first, and mistake is made impossible by the presence in the one case of ἐν ταῖς οἰκείαις συμφοραῖς, in the other of ὑπὸ τῶν ποιη-
tών. Cf. also the double reference of αὐ—αὐ in 606 c.

Madvig conjectures αὐτ' ἐστιν τοῦτο, Richards τοῦτ' ἐστιν αὐτό. I once read τοῦτο ἐστιν with q and Flor. U., but there is not sufficient reason for deserting the best MSS. On the theory of Tragedy involved in this sentence see 606 B n.

7 τοῦ βρηκοῦντος τοῦτον. See on τὸ ἀγανακτικὸν 604 E.

606 B 8 αὐτόν. "Plato passes from the rational part of soul to the man himself" J. and C. Hence καταφρονῆσαι below. The antithesis with ἄλλος ἀνήρ makes the meaning clear; and a similar transition occurs, as Schneider points out, in vi 486 A; see also note ad loc.

II καταφρονήσατε—ποιήσατε. He cannot bring himself to despise the whole poem; yet that is the only safe thing to do. From this point of view Plato's own καταφρονήσατε ὅπη τῆς ποιήσασας is in itself the strongest testimony to the hold which Poetry had on him. See on 595 B.

12 ἀπολαύειν—οἰκεία. Cf. III 395 c ff. and Latus 656 B.
606 C] ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΙ I 415

ἀνύψη ἀπὸ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων εἰς τὰ οἰκεῖα: θρέψαντα γὰρ ἐν ἔκει
νοις ἵσχυρὸν τὸ ἐλεωνὸν οὗ ράδιον ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῦ πάθει κα
tέχειν.

C Ἀλθέστατα, ἐφη. Ἄρ’ οὐχ ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἡ
ελοίου, ὁτι αὐτὸς αἰσχύνοι γελοτοποιών, ἐν μιμήσει δὲ κω
ῳδικῇ ἢ καὶ ἰδία ἀκοῦντο σφόδρα χαρῆς καὶ μῆ μισῆς ὡς πο
νηρᾶ, ταὐτὸν ποιεῖς ὅπερ ἐν τοῖς ἔλεοις; ὁ γὰρ τὸ λόγῳ αὐτέ
χεις ἐν αὐτῷ βουλμένου γελοτοποιῶν, φοβούμενος δοξαν βο
μολοχίας, τότ’ αὖ ἀνύψη καὶ ἐκεὶ νεανίκου ποιήσας ἐλα
thες πολλάκις ἐν τοῖς οἰκείοις 20

16. ἄν Schneider: ἄν codd. 17. μη μισῆς Α: μιμήσες (sic) Π et nisi fallor
   Α'': μιμήση Σ: οὗ μιμήσεις q. 20. ἀνύψη Σ: ἄν ἐνής Α: ἀνίπης II.

13 θρέψαντα—κατέχειν. Plato and Aristotle agree in holding that Pity is
one of the principal emotions to which Tragedy ministers. The point at which
they part company is where they begin to discuss the effect produced upon human
life and conduct by the indulgence of this emotion in the mimicry of the stage.
According to Plato, the emotion grows by what it feeds upon, and becomes more
and more troublesome and deleterious in real life, the more we indulge it at the
theatre: according to Aristotle, tragedy effects the 'purging' of pity and its
kindred emotions and tends to free us from their dominion in matters of more
serious moment (Poet. 6. 1449 b 27 et al.). Aristotle hopes to effect by means of
theatrical stimulation what Plato would attain by starving the emotions even in
play. It is obvious that the Aristotelian theory of the drama was in this im
portant respect developed in direct and conscious antagonism to the Platonic, to
which, in other particulars, it owes much: see Finsler Platon u. die Arist. Poetik
pp. 66 ff. I think it may fairly be argued that Plato's view is not less true to
experience than that of Aristotle; for a spectacle which 'purges' the ἐλευφόρο,
in one man may strengthen it in another and make him more than ever inclined
to self-pity. On the contrast between the Platonic and Aristotelian views see
Butcher Aristotle's Theory of Poetry etc. pp. 237—268, especially 241 ff., and for
Aristotle's debt to Plato in his definition of tragedy consult the excellent essay of

14 ἐλευφόρον. ἐλευφόρος and not ἐλευφός is the Platonic form of this word: see
Schanz Phaedo p. vii.

606 C 15 ἄρ’ οὖχ κτλ. Cf. III 388 e.

16 ὅτι κτλ.: lit. 'that whatever jests
you would be ashamed to make yourself,
but which you are mightily pleased to
hear in comic representations, or it may
be in private life, and do not hate as
bad, you do the same thing' etc. 'Whatever'
is treated as equivalent to 'if any': see
Kühner Gr. Gr. II p. 945. I have
followed Schneider in writing ἄν or ἄν
instead of ἄν (see cr. n.), although he
gives no other instance where ἄν appears
to do double duty in this fashion. The
usage, however, ought not on that account
to be pronounced impossible; for cases
in which a single relative pronoun forms,
as here, the object of two opposing
clauses, one representing a hypothetical,
the other an actual situation, are ex-
tremely rare. We should also remember
that ὅς is occasionally used instead of ὅς
ἄν with the subjunctive, even in classical
prose, according to the best MSS: e.g.
Laws 737 b: see also Kühner Gr. Gr. II
p. 206. A sentence like the present is
made easier by the mere existence of
such an exceptional liberty of style. For
the corruption of ἄν to ἄν cf. (with
Schneider) Gorg. 486 e. All other
attempts at emendation—and they are
numerous—involve too much change:
see App. III.

17 ἢδη: i.e. "intra privatos parce
et ab iis, qui artem non profinetur"
(Schneider). The word has been held to
refer to writings in prose: but see on II
363 E.

18 ἄν κατέχεις. ἄν is "item, ut antea
θρηνοῦσι" (Stallbaum). Madvig's con-
jecture ἄν should not be adopted. The
second ἄν (τότ’ ἄ) points the contrast
between κατέχεις and ἀνύψη: cf. 606 A n.
εξενέχθησε τότε κωμόδοστοις γενόσθαι. Καὶ μάλα, ἐφι. | Καὶ περὶ δ' ἀφροδισιῶν δὴ καὶ θυμοῦ καὶ περὶ πάντων τῶν ἐπιθυμητικῶν τε καὶ λυπηρῶν καὶ ἱδέων ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ἀ δὴ φαμεν πάση πράξει ἦμιν ἐπεσθαὶ, ὅτε τοιαῦτα ἡμᾶς ἡ ποιητική μέμησις ἐργάζεται; τρέφει
25 γὰρ ταῦτα ἄρδονσα, δῶν αὐξημέναι, καὶ ἠρχοντα ἡμῖν καθίστησαν, δῶν ἀρχέσθαι αὐτά, ἱνα βελτίωσε τε καὶ εὐδαιμονέστεροι αὐτὶ χειρώνων καὶ ἀδελτέρων γεγονόμεθα. Οὐκ ἔχω ἄλλος φάναι, ἢ δ' ὦς. Οὐκοῦν, εἴπον, ὦ Πλαῖνκων, ἦταν ὁ Ὀμηρὸς ἐπαυνέταις ἐντύχθης λέγοντι, ὡς τὴν Ἑλλάδα πεπαιδευκένων οὐτὸς ὁ ποιητὴς
30 καὶ πρὸς διοίκησιν τε καὶ παίδευσιν τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων πραγμάτων ἄξιος αναλαβόντι μαθήματι τε καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο τὸν ποιητὴν πάντα τὸν αὐτὸν βίον κατακεκυκάσαμενον ξην, | φίλειν μὲν χρη καὶ 607 ασπάζεσθαι ός ὑπαίτις βελτίστοις εἰς ὣσον δύναται, καὶ συγχωρεῖν ὁ Ὀμηρὸς ποιητικότατον εἶναι καὶ πρῶτον τῶν τραγοδιστῶν, εἰδέναι δὲ, ὅτι ὅσον μόνον ὄμοιος θεοῦ καὶ ἐγκόμια τοῖς ἄγαθοῖς ποιήσεως παραδεκτέοι εἰς πόλιν: εἰ δὲ τὴν ἡδυσμένην Μοῦσαν

606 D 21 καὶ περὶ ἄφροδισιῶν κτλ. Cf. III 389 D ff., and (for the psychological theory of this passage) supra 602 c n. δτ, which depends on δ' αὐτὸν λέγων, is easy enough if we retain δτ in c: cf. VI 510 D ωκοῦν καὶ δτι κτλ. and infra 613 D καὶ αὖ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄδικων δτι κτλ. Otherwise δτι becomes extremely difficult, although Stallbaum and Neukirch (in IV. Pol. quæst. phil. i. p. 49) think that ὁ αὐτὸς λέγοντι may even then be supplied. The word was originally suspected by Ast and bracketed by Baiter. Madvig conjectures ότι, and Richards would replace δτι τοιαῦτα ὡς πέρι τοιαῦτα or ως τὰ αὖτα (understood interrogatively).

The recurrence of δτι is, however, the strongest evidence in favour of its genuineness both here and above. See App. III. The pronoun τοιαῦτα takes its meaning from ἀφροδισιῶν etc. The note of interrogation after ἑργάζεται was added by Schneider. On ὅροσα see VII 550 b n.

606 E 28 Ὅμηρος ἐπαυνέταις. Dümmler and Stählin suppose that Plato has Antisthenes in his mind: but see on 598 d. 31 ἄξιοσ. Campbell was the first to point out that ἄξιοσ, and not ἄξιον, is the reading of Paris A. There is no ms authority for any kind for ἄξιον, and it is intrinsically much inferior.

607 A 3 πρῶτον τῶν τραγῳδο-ποίων. See on 595 c. 4 ὄμοιος—ἄγαθος. In Lat. 801 e — 802 a the same exceptions are allowed. Even religious hymns would fall under the heading of μυσης, according to Plato's definition of the term: so that it is once more clear that his real quarry is not with Imitation as such, but only with Imitation of the false and immoral. See on 595 a. For the construction cf. (with Stallbaum) Symh. 194 D τῶν ἐγκομι-"mυων τῷ Ἐρώτα. In pp. 55—59 of his Stellung d. Poesie in der plat. Phil. Stählin gives an interesting sketch of the kind of Poetry which Plato would have admitted in the Republic. 5 ἡδυσμένης. The same word is used by Aristotle in a narrower sense, with specific reference to what he considers the ἡδυσμα or seasoning of poetry, viz. metre and melody: see Butter Aristotle's Theory of Poetry etc. p. 116 n. 1. Here ἡδυσμένη points the way to ἡδων; and for that reason 'pleasant' is a more suitable translation than 'honeyed' (Jowett) or 'highly-seasoned' (D. and V.), although the epithet also suggests a comparison with cookery (cf. ἄνων ἠδών Θεατ. 175 e). For the sentiment cf. III 398 a f. αὐτὸ δ' ἂν τῷ αὐτὸτρέφει καὶ ἄδεστέρῳ ποιήσῃ χρόμεθα κτλ.
παραδέξει ἐν μέλεσιν ἡ ἐπεσιν, ἦδονή σοι καὶ λύπη ἐν τῇ πόλει
βασιλέωσετον ἀντὶ νόμου τε καὶ τοῦ κοινῆς ἀεὶ δόξαντος εἶναι
βελτίστον λόγου. 'Ἀληθέστατα, ἐφη. 1

B VIII. Ταῦτα δὲ, ἐφη, ἀπολογογήθω ἡμῖν ἀναμηνεύσειν
περὶ ποιήσεως, ὅτι εἰκότως ἀρα τότε αὐτὴν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἀπε-

9. ἀπολογογήθω ζηγ: ἀπολογογήθω ΑΠ. 13. ποιητίκη ΑΠ: μιμητικὴ
corr. Α3.

7 τοῦ κοινῆ—λόγου: 'the principle which the community shall in every
instance have pronounced to be the best.' See 604 B—D, where one example of
such a λόγος is provided. For λόγος in this sense cf. (with Schneider) Crit. 46 B
ἔγν—ἀεὶ τούτοις όσο τῶν ἐμῶν μηδένι
ἐλλο πειθοῦσι τὸ λόγῳ, δέ ἐν μοι λογι-
ζομένῳ βελτίστος φανέρη. In his second
edition Ast wished to place a comma
after βελτίστου ('that which has ever been
judged best by all, viz. reason'). This
interpretation lends a certain weight and
dignity to the clause; but the other is
easier and more natural. Cf. Shorey in
A. J. Ph. xiii pp. 364 ff. Plato else-
where provides against what he takes to be
the antinomy tendency of Poetry by
enacting that the Poet shall παρὰ τὰ τῆς
πόλεως νόμων καὶ δίκαια ἢ καλὰ ἢ ἄγαθα
μηδὲν ποιεῖν αὖλο, and submit all his
works to a state censorship (Laws 801 c, 31),
although in a striking passage of the
Politeia (399 b, 3) he himself
insists that freedom is the very life
of poetry and every other art. See Reber
Platon u. die Poesie p. 71.

607 B—608 B The quarrel between
Philosophy and Poetry is nothing new;
but, for our own part, we are willing to let
Poetry return, as soon as she is proved to
be not merely pleasant, but profitable. Till
then, we shall use our argument as a charm
to protect ourselves against her fascina-
tions; for the issue at stake is greater than
it appears.

607 B 9 ἀπολογογήθω κτλ. See
cr. n. The reading ἀπολογογήθω—
enumerata sunt or, according to Her-
mann, singulatim expulitam sunt—though
retained by Hermann and Bäbler, is much
less appropriate than ἀπολογεῖθω; for
the whole of the preceding episode is an
ἀπολογία or defence of Plato's attitude to-
wards Poetry in Books II and 111 (595 A n.).
ἀπολογογήθω is also more in accordance
with ὅτι εἰκότως ἀπεστέλλομεν: and the
words ὅ γαρ λόγος ἡμῖν ἔρει "non tam
eorum sunt, qui ius suum esseque, quam
qui excusare se valuerunt" (Schneider).
The corruption, which recurs infra 607 D
in II, is by no means rare: see Stephanus-
Hase s.v. ἀπολογεῖθωμαι. See also on ν
490 A. Ὡ γὰρ λόγος ἡμῖν ἔρει see
604 C n. προσερτῶμεν ἃν αὐτὴ = 'let us
tell her also.' With this use of προσε-
τευ, see cf. II 375 E n.

13 παλαιὰ—ποιητικὴ. There are
few traces of this "ancient feud" in the
extant fragments of early Greek poetry.
Pindar furnishes one, Fr. 209 ed. Bergk,
ἀτελὴ σοφία καρπῶν δρέπων (said of the
φυσιολογίτες; see above on ν 457 ii).
The early philosophers on the other hand
were constantly falling foul of Homer,
Hesiod and the poets generally on theo-
logical and moral grounds: see for exam-
ple Heracleitus Fr. 35, 43, 111, 119
Bywater, and Xenophanes and Empe-
docles in RP.7 §§ 82, 83, 140 A—140 D.
The attitude of Pythagoras was equally
hostile, if we may trust Hieronymus ap.
D. L. viii 21. Even those philosophers
who defended Homer did not venture to
take him at his word, but had resort to
the allegorical method of interpretation
(II 378 D n.). The antagonism between
Philosophy and Poetry—the latter "im-
mortalising in imperishable creations the
traditional faith, the former, just on
account of that faith, condemning those
creations" Krohn (P. S. p. 261)—was
appreciated in its true historical signifi-
cance by those Christian apologists who,
cite Clement, make philosophy προπα-
del to Christianity—ἐπαιδαγωγεί γάρ καί

A. P. II.
λακέρυξα πρὸς δεσπόταν κύων ἐκείνη κραυγῶσα, καὶ
15 μέγας ἐν ἀφρόνων κενεάγοραίσι, καὶ οἱ τῶν λίαν σοφῶν

1 ὄχλος κράτων, καὶ οἱ λεπτῶς μεριμνῶντες οὗτοι ἠρα πένυται, ὡς ἄλλα μυρία σημεία παλαιάς ἐναντίοντες τούτων ὀμοι διὲ


5—κράτων: 'the rabble-route of all-too-sapient heads.' I have combined Herwerden’s conjecture ΛΙΑ for ΔΙΑ with my own suggestion κράτων (from κράτος) instead of κράτων (Cf. Rev. x p. 103).

τῶν λίαν σοφῶν ὄχλος | κράτων looks like a tragic fragment, and a comparison with

Med. 395 εἰμὶ δ᾽ ὑμῖν ὅμοι σοφὴ καὶ Περ. 518, Εἰ. 295 γωνίαν ἔχειν τοὺς σοφίς λίαν σοφή, suggests that the author is Euripides: cf. also viii 568 A n.

The head stands for the whole personality, as in the familiar use of κάρα and κεφαλῆ in Tragedy and elsewhere (παίδας ἐφισίων κεφαλῆς Αἰδέ προφαίειν II. 11. 55 ἡ μαρκή κεφαλῆ αὕτη Dem. Cor. 155 et al.; see Blaydes on Ar. Ach. 385); and a learned poet like Euripides might the more readily have described philosophers by this feature, because the head, and not the heart or midriff, was believed to be the seat of intelligence not only by Hippocrates but also by many of the philosophers themselves, including Pythagoras, Alcmaeo, Democritus and Plato: see Diels Dox. Gr. pp. 391 b 3, 391 b 5, 392 a 2, 427 b 8, Zeller 1 p. 148 and Gomperz, Greek Thinkers 1 pp. 148, 313. There are also, I think, traces of a similar view even in popular beliefs: see for example Ar. Clouds 175 f. οὐκ ἐχθῆ διὸς αὐτῷ ποτὲ ἐν αἷς ἑκατον ἦναῖς. Τι διὰ; τὸν ἑγκέφαλον ὅπερ σαφέστατα μοι δοκεῖ. For other views of this passage see App. IV.

407 c 16 οἱ λεπτῶς—πένυται: 'the subtle thinkers, how that they are beggars after all.' This quotation is probably from comedy, which abounds in references to μεμφοφορωτικά, λεπτόλογα etc. (cf. Ar. Clouds 101, 153 al.), and constantly ridicules the poverty and destitution of οἱ σοφοὶ; see the passages quoted in my edition of the Apology, p. viii f. There is nothing in the language to justify Schneider in attributing the fragment to a lyrical poet. A MS note in my copy of Schneider cites the pro-verb λεπτὴν πλέκειν λεγομένων τι ἐπὶ τῶν πενήτων from Photius (p. 215. 12).
608 Α]

ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΣ 1

εἰρήσθω, ότι ἡμεῖς γε, εἰ τινα ἔχου λόγον εἰπεῖν ἢ πρὸς ἢδονὴν ποιητικὴ καὶ ἡ μύρῃς, ὥσ χρή αὐτὴν εἶναι ἐν πολλὲς εὐνομομένην, ἀσμεὺς ἂν καταδεχομέθα, ὡς ἐνυπόμενον ἢ ἡμῖν αὐτοὺς κηλουμένοις 20 ὑπ’ αὐτὴς· ἀλλὰ γὰρ τὸ δοκοῦν ἀληθὲς οὐχ ὅσιον προδίδοναι.

Δ ἡ γὰρ, ὁ φίλε, οὐ κηλεῖ ὑπ’ αὐτῆς καὶ σὺ, καὶ μάλιστα ἢ ὅταν δὲ Ὀμήρου θεωρήσῃ αὐτὴν; Πολὺ γε. Ὁδόκοι δικαία ἐστὶν οὗτος κατέναι, ἀπολογησαμένη ἐν μέλει ἢ τινὶ ἄλλῳ μέτρῳ; Πάνω μὲν οὖν. Δοίμεν δὲ γε πόνον ἄν καί τοῖς προστάταις αὐτῆς, ὅσοι μὴ 25 ποιητικοί, φιλοποιηταί δὲ, ἀνεί μέτρον λόγον ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς εἰπεῖν, ὥς οὐ μόνον ἤδεια, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὀφελίμῳ πρὸς τὰς πολιτείας καὶ τῶν βίων τῶν ἀνδροτυπίων ἔστιν· καὶ εὐμενῶς ἀκουσόμεθα. κερδανοῦμεν

Σ γὰρ πού, ἐὰν μὴ μόνον ἦδεια ἢ φαυλὴ ἀλλὰ καὶ ὀφελίμη. Πῶς δ’ οὐ μελλομεν, ἐφι, κερδανεῖν; Εἰ δὲ γε μὴ, ὁ φίλε ἔταφε, ὄσπερ 30 οἱ ποτὲ τοῦ ἐρασθέντες, ἐὰν ἡγίσσουσαι μὴ ὀφελίμοιν εἰπεῖν τὸν ἔρωτα, βία μὲν, ὅμως δὲ ἀπέχονται, καὶ ἡμεῖς οὐτοί, διὰ τῶν ἐγγεγονότα μὲν ἔρωτα τίς τοιαύτης ποιήσεως ὑπὸ τῆς τῶν καλῶν

608 πολιτείων τρόφης | εἰνοὶ μὲν ἐσόμεθα φαυλήναι αὐτή ὡς βελτίστην καὶ ἀληθεστάτην, ἐώς δ’ ἂν μὴ οἷα τ’ ἢ ἀπολογησασθαι, ἀκροασόμεθ’ αὐτής ἐπάδυτοι ἢμῖν αὐτοῖς τούτον τὸν λόγον, ὅν λέγομεν, καὶ ταύτη τήν ἐρωθή, εὐλαβοῦμεν πάλιν ἐμπεθείν εἰς τῶν παιδικῶν τε καὶ τῶν πολλῶν ἔρωτα. ἀκροασόμεθα δ’ οὖν, ὡς 5


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20 καταδεχόμεθα. καταδέχεσθαι is 'to receive home from exile': cf. κατέναι below. δεχόμεθα, which Baiter reads on insufficient authority, is much less expressive and appropriate.

ἐνυπόμενοι γε κτλ. See on 595 B.

607 δ 24 ἀπολογησαμένη. Plato is hardly likely to let Poetry return on the promise of an εἰς post facto ἀπολογία: she must surely make good her defence before the decree of banishment can be repealed. Hence ἀπολογησαμένη, which Schneider and the Oxford editors adopt, is right as against the ἀπολογησαμένη of Α2 and a few inferior MSS (followed by Bekker and others).

607 E 30 el δι γε κτλ. The words from γε μὴ το φανήσατι have been found on one of the Oxyrhynchus Papyri, without any difference from the text of Α except οὖθω for οὖτως and ἐγγεγονότα for ἐγγεγονότα (Grenfell and Hunt, Vol. I. P. 52).

33. τῶν καλῶν πολιτείων. Ε has κακῶν λοι καλῶν, oblivious of the irony.

608 Α 5 ἀκροασάμεθα δ’ οὖν κτλ. 'We shall listen, I say, in the conviction that this kind of poetry should not be taken seriously' etc. A majority of MSS, including Α and Π, read αἰσθάμεθα instead of ἀκροασάμεθα (see cr. n.).: but the present αἰσθαματικός was not used in classical Greek, as Stallbaum successfully proves in his elaborate note (cf. also Kühner-Blass Gr. Gr. 1. 2. p. 334.), and if it were, the meaning would still be unsuitable. Neither of the two variants, αἰσθάμεθα and εἰσόμεθα has any great MS authority, or is at all likely to be right. I formerly adopted Madvig's conjecture φανήσατι, which is in harmony with the Greek tendency to drop the preposition in repeating the

27—2
idea of a compound verb (ἐπάδοντες and ἐπώδυν, but φασμέβα, and suits the situation fairly well, if we regard ὡς ὁ σπουδαστέων—dedici as virtually embodying the ἐπώδυν of which Plato speaks and depending directly on φασμέβα (we will say over to ourselves that etc.). φασμέβα is both a better and an easier remedy than Stallbaum’s ἀλθανθείμεθα, but the objections to it are that it involves the rejection of ὡς, for the ‘participial clause ἐναθειμενοί—ἐρωτα is hardly enough to justify the resumptive δ’ ὡς” (J. and C.), and also the rejection of ὡς after ἐναθειμενοι αὐτῷ (with Stallbaum and Baier). For the omission of ὡς, we have the authority of II and several MSS besides: but ὡς is in all the MSS except v and Flor. RT. (Vind. F has ὡς.) The suggestion ἀμεθείμεθα, which Campbell appears disposed to make, has little probability. ἀκροαθείμεθα seems to me to give exactly the meaning which we require without involving any further change in the reading of the best MSS. I have printed my conjecture because I think it more probable than any other; but it involves too much departure from the MSS to be considered certain. For the sentiment cf. 595 B n.

δ τῇ τοιαύτῃ ποιήσει: viz. the ἤδον-

μέμεν Μοίδα of 607 α. The emphasis on τῇ τοιαύτῃ implies that there is another sort of Poetry which Plato would not exclude. See on 595 α and 607 α.

εὐλαβητέον—δ. ὡς is omitted by Stallbaum and Baier (with v and two Florentine MSS). The word must, I think, be rejected, if we read αἰδοθείμεθα, αἰδαθείμεθα, or φασμέβα: for with each of these verbs ὡς—dedici must be regarded as the direct object of the verb: but with the reading ἀκροαθείμεθα there is no difficulty about ὡς. The meaning is ‘We will listen, I say, in the belief that such poetry etc., and that the listener must be on his guard against it’ etc.

608 B s τῆς ἐν αὐτῷ ποιεῖται. See 605 B n.

οὕτε—οὕτε γε. Cf. VI 499 B n.

608 C, D. The greatest rewards of virtue have still to be described. We will first prove that the soul is immortal.

608 C 15 καὶ μὴ κτλ. The main thesis of the Republic—that Justice alone and by itself is better than Injustice alone and by itself—was finally demonstrated in Book IX. But Justice and Injustice do also, in point of fact, involve consequences: and it is necessary to take these into account, if we are to make the comparison between Virtue and Vice in all respects perfect and complete. Cf. 612 B n.

17 τῶν εἰρημέων. Nettleship (Lect. and Rem. II p. 355) thinks τῶν εἰρημέων can only refer to ‘the rewards of justice on earth,’ in which case we must suppose that this passage and the argument for Immortality which it introduces were written by Plato after 612 a—613 E, where he describes the rewards of virtue and vice while we are still alive. But there is no
608 D] ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΣ 1


reason why τῶν εἰρημένων should not, like ἔκεινος in 612 B, refer to what Plato in 614 A calls ‘those goods which Justice by herself supplied’ (ἔκεινος τῶν ἁγαθῶν οὐς αὐτὴ παρέχετο ἤ δικαιοσύνη): and it is much more natural to assign this meaning to τῶν εἰρημένων than to suppose ‘that Plato had two plans in his mind as to how to finish the Republic.’ I can find no sufficient evidence to justify any such idea.


608 D 22 οἷοί έγόγοι: sc. ύπερ τοῦ παντὸς δεῖ εἰσποτάκειαι. Cf. I 336 E n. and App. ad loc.

οὗ ἡθοδοσία κτλ. ‘Have you not observed’ etc. The light and airy tone with which Plato introduces this momentous topic has often been remarked upon; and we can hardly help feeling that οὗίν γὰρ χαλεπὸν is too audacious to be taken seriously, in spite of Plato’s immoveable conviction of the immortality of the soul (see on vi 498 D). The doctrine itself had of course long been an article of the Orphic and Pythagorean creeds (see Rohde Psyche ii pp. 1 ff. and Laudowicz Ἰταλεσιστήν η. Seele u. Seelenwund. in Gr. Phil. pp. 1—29), and we must not suppose (with Thomas Gray) that it is the novelty of the idea which occasions Glauco’s wonder. Glauco regards the originally half-theological doctrine of the immortality of the Soul with the same sort of well-bred incredulity which it inspired in most of Plato’s contemporaries (cf. vi 498 D with i 330 D, E and Phaed. 69 E, 70 A, 80 D), and is astonished that a well-balanced mind should treat it seriously as a philosophical dogma capable of being established by rational argument.

25 εἰ μὴ ἁδικῶ γε. See on iv 430 D.

608 D—611 A Everything, which suffers destruction, is destroyed by its own peculiar evil or disease, and that which cannot be destroyed thereby is indestructible. Now the evil which is peculiar to the soul is vice, and vice is powerless to slay the soul. We must beware of supposing that the soul is destroyed by bodily disease, unless it can be proved that bodily disease engenders within the soul its own specific evil; and if any one has the boldness to assert that the souls of the dying do actually become more vicious, he must be prepared to shew that vice, alone and by itself, is fatal to its possessor, which is far from being true. Vice would lose its terror if death were the end of all things. We conclude that the soul is immortal, since neither its own nor any alien evil can destroy it.

608 D ff. Socrates has already expressed his belief in the immortality of the soul in vi 498 D: cf. also ib. 496 E and i 330 D, E. The proof which Plato gives here has been widely discussed and severely, though often unfairly and unintelligently, criticised by many critics, to some of whom reference is made in the
course of the notes. Plato does not stop to
define what he means by 'soul,' nor
different senses in which he employs
the word 'death,' and the consequence is
that superficial inspection of his reasoning
often sees a fallacy where there is
only an ellipse. The best preparation
for a study of this argument is a careful
examination of the proofs in the Phaedo,
to which Plato himself appears expressly
to allude in 611 b; see note ad loc. It
will be easier to understand the reasoning
of Plato if we bear in mind the following
considerations. (1) The duality of soul and
body is assumed throughout the whole
discussion. (2) It is the individual immortality of the soul which Plato wishes
to prove. (In his excellent monograph
Unsterblichkeitslehre Plato's, Halle, 1878,
Bertram appears to me to have conclusively
and once for all established this point as against Teichmüller Die Plujat,
Fr., pp. 1—23. Cf. Simson Der Begriff
d. Seele bei Plato pp. 126—143). (3) The
conception of soul as the principle of life,
though not expressly enunciated here, is
present to Plato's mind (609 D n.).
The question whether immortality (in the
fullest sense of the term) belongs to the
entire soul, or only to part of it, is not
raised in the course of the proof itself,
but from 611 b—612 a, it would seem
that the logosikón alone is indestructible
(611 b n.). At each successive incar-
nation the logosikón is defined υπὸ τῆς
tou sômatos koinonías, and (according to
Phaed. 81 b ff.) the pollution frequently adheres even after death, causing the soul
to seek re-incarnation. The ultimate
aim is apparently to be delivered from
bodily existence altogether, and live αὐνεν
sωμάτων τὸ παράπα τον ἑαυτα χρόνον
(Phaed. 114 c), but even then the
soul would not—so at least I think—seem
to Plato to lose its essential individuality
and become absorbed. See on the whole
subject Simson l.c. pp. 144—154 and cf.
611 b n.

608 E 31 κακῶν—λέγεις; Richards
would add έιδον or οἷκεῖον after λέγεις,
comparing (for έιδον) 610 b, (for οἷκεῖον) 609 c, 610 E. It is easy to under-
stand εἰδεί: 'do you say that each thing
has a particular evil and a particular good?'
609 A 5 διήλωσαν καὶ ἀπόλεσαν.
Throughout this argument, as throughout the
Phaedo, destruction means dissolution
(διῆλωσα). 6 τὸ ἐξεμφύτουν κτλ.
The words ἐκάστου and ἀπόλεις are bracketed by
Herderen, quite undeservedly. For the
statement itself see on 609 E.
ὅτι τοῦ πεφυκότος οὖνς ὀλεθρος οὐκ ἦν; Ὑπωτος, ἐφη, εἰκὸς.
Τι οὖν; ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ψυχή ἄρ' οὖν ἑστιν ὁ ποιεῖ αὐτὴν κακὰν; Καὶ
C μᾶλλα, ἐφη· ἂ ν νῦν δὴ δύσμεν πάντα, ἀδίκα τε καὶ ἀκολούθη καὶ
dείλη καί ἀμαθία. Ἡ οὖν τι ποτῶν αὐτὴν διάλυει τε καὶ ἀπολ-15
λυνε, καὶ ἐννοεῖ μὴ ἑξεπατηθῶμεν οἴηθεντες τοῦ ἀδικον ἁνθρωπον
cαὶ ἀνέιτον, ὅταν ληφθῇ ἀδικών, τότε ἀπολολέναι ὑπὸ τῆς ἀδίκιας,
πονηρίας οὐσίας ψυχῆς. ἀλλ' ἄδε ποιεῖ· ωσπερ σῶμα ἡ σώματος
πονηρία νόσος οὐσία τίκης καὶ δισκύπ καὶ ἄγει εἰς τὸ μήδε σῶμα
εἰναι, καὶ ἂ ν νῦν δὴ ἐλεγομεν ἃπαντα ὑπὸ τῆς οἰκείας κακίας τὸν
20 Προσκαθήσθαι καὶ ἐνείναι διαφθείρουσι ἐν τῷ μή εἰναι ἀφικείναι
—οὖν οὐτων; Ναί. ἰθι δή, καὶ ψυχὴν κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον
σκόπει. ἀρα ἐνοὺσα εἰν αὐτὴ ἀδίκα καὶ ἢ ἅλλα κακία τὸ ἐνείναι καὶ
προσκαθήσθαι φθείρει αὐτὴν καὶ μαραίνει, ἐως ἃν εἰς τό θάνατον
ἀγανώθει τοῦ σώματος χωρίσῃ; Οὐδαμῶς, ἐφη, τούτῳ γε. Ἀλλὰ 25
13· 14 ψυχὴ—νῦν II et in marg. A²: om. A¹. 15· η II: η A.
21· ἐνείναι ΑΗ: διάδει ut videtur corr. A².
To explain his position, Plato builds his argument in the form of a dialogue between Socrates and the young person, generating new ideas during the discussion. One of the main points is that the soul is immortal and that the body is the seat of the soul. The dialogue explores the nature of the soul and its relationship with the body.

Chu's specific argument is based on the principle of the indemonstrable. In his philosophy, Chu relies on the essential (Eöd) for the immortality of the soul as established in the Phaedo (60C ff., Zeller, I. p. 879). The soul's immortality is a fact that is self-evident, and it is not necessary to prove it. The dialogue explores the implications of this idea for our understanding of the nature of reality and the role of the soul in the human experience.
ένεκα τούτων μηδὲν μάλλον ποτε ψυχήν ἀπόλλυσθαι, πρὶν ἂν τις ἀποδείξῃ, ὡς διὰ ταῦτα τὰ παθήματα τοῦ σώματος αὐτῇ ἐκείνῃ ἀδικωτέρα καὶ ἀνοσιωτέρα γίγνεται· ἀλλοτρίον δὲ κακοῦ ἐν ἄλλῳ γεγονόμενον, τοῦ δὲ ἰδίου ἐκάστῳ μὴ ἐγγυνομένου, μήτε ψυχήν μήτε ὁ άλλο μηδὲν ἄνωμεν φαίνει τινὰ ἀπόλλυσθαι. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ἐφ' ἐν τούτῳ γε οὐδεὶς ποτε δεδέξει, ὡς τῶν ἀποθνησκόντων ἀδικώτεροι αἰ ν ψυχαί διὰ τῶν βάθων γίγνονται. Εἰς δὲ γε τις, ἐφ' ἐν τούτῳ γεγονόσεως ὁμώς τοῦ λόγου τολμά ἰέναι καὶ λέγειν, ὅσον ποιητήρεσι καὶ ἀδικωτέροις γίγνεται ὁ ἀποθνησκως, ἦν δὴ μὴ ἀναγκαίζεται ἄθανάτους τῶν ψυχῶν ὁμολογεῖν, ἀξίωσομένον τὸν, εἰ ἀληθῆ λέγει το ταῦτα σο σε λέγων, τῆν ἀδικίαν εἶναι θανάσιμον τῷ ἐχομείς ὡσπερ νόσον, καὶ Ἰν τ'] αὐτοῦ τούτου ἀποκτείνωντος τῇ ἕαυτῳ φύσει ἀποθνησκεῖν τοὺς λαμβανόντας αὐτό τοῦ, τοὺς μὲν μάλιστα βάθτον, τοὺς δ' ἤττον σχολαίτερον, ἀλλὰ μὴ ὡσπερ νῦν διὰ τούτο Ἰν ἄλλων δίκην ἐπι τείκνων ἀποθνησκοῦντοι οἱ ἀδικοὶ. Μά Δ', ἢ δ' οὖς, οὐκ ἀρα 25 πάνδειων φανεῖται ἡ ἀδικία, εἰ θανάσιμον ἐστι τῷ λαμβάνοντι.
is content merely to suggest this argument: neither here nor elsewhere does he place it in the forefront of his dialectical proof of immortality. 610 E 29 καὶ μάλα ἱστικόν κτλ. Glauco is thinking of the extreme activity and vitality sometimes displayed by the more aggressive kind of villain. A good example is furnished by the career of Dionysius I of Syracuse. With ἄγρυπνον Stallbaum compares "ut ingulatum homines surgunt de nocte latrones" (Hor. Ep. 1 2. 32)—an instance on a small and petty scale of the sort of thing which is in Plato's mind.

611 A—612 A It follows that the number of souls is always constant, each of them retaining its individuality throughout. We have hitherto represented soul as a composite substance; but the composite cannot easily be immortal; and if we would see the soul as it really is, we must view it apart from the body and those material accretions with which in human life it is clogged and encumbered. Then and only then shall we be able to see its true nature.

611 A 4 ἀδιν οὐκ ἄν αὐτὰλ: 'it will always be the same souls that are in existence.' αὐτὰλ is the subject, not the predicate (as Teichmüller translates Plat. Fr. p. 7). Although οὐκ ἄρα—πλεον justifies ἄδιν ἄν εἰναι αὐτὰλ only in so far as concerns the total number of souls, αὐτὰλ by itself means more than this, and implies the personal identity of each individual soul throughout all the vicissitudes of its endless existence. The conviction that the life of each particular soul is a continuous sequence of cause and effect stretching from eternity to eternity was firmly held by Plato, and he briefly reminds us of it here because the theory of future rewards and punishments, which he will presently describe, rests on that hypothesis and no other. For the history of this belief before the time of Plato see Rohde Psyche 2 pp. 134—136. 5 οὕτων—ἄδινατα. All things are either mortal or immortal: hence the immortal, if increased at all, must be so at the expense of the mortal, which will accordingly in course of time be exhausted. Cf. Phaed. 70 C—72 E, especially 72 B ff., where a similar train of reasoning is employed to prove ἐκ τῶν τεθνήτων τῶν ἄνατας γένεσιν καὶ τὰς τῶν τεθνήτων ψυχὰς εἶναι.

611 B 8 τῇ ἀληθιστᾶτῃ φύσει κτλ. In its true and essential nature soul is akin to the simple and incomplete: see Phaed. 78 B—81 A.
καὶ ἀνυμοίστητος τε καὶ διαφορᾶς γέμεων αὐτὸ πρὸς αὐτὸ. Πῶς ἂν λέγεις; ἐφ᾽. Οὐ τέρτον, ἢν δὲ ἐγώ, ἄδιον εἰσὶν σύνθετον τε ἐκ πολλῶν καὶ μὴ τῇ καλλίστῃ κεχρημένων συνθέσει, ὡς νῦν ἡμῖν εὔφαν ἡ ψυχή. Ὅψηνι μεῖν τοῖνυν ἅθανατον ψυχή, καὶ ὁ ἀρτι λάγος καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀναγκάσεων ἀν᾽ οὗν δ᾽ ἐστὶν ὑπὸ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, οὐ λειτουργεῖν δεῖ αὐτὸ θεάσασθαι ὑπὸ τῇ τῆς τοῦ 15 σώματος κοινωνίας καὶ ἄλλων κακῶν, ὧσπερ νῦν ἡμεῖς θεώμεθα, ἀλλ᾽ οὗν ἐστὶν καθαρὸν ἀνομάμενον, τοιοῦτον ἰκανόν λογισμὸν διαθετέων, καὶ πολὺ κάλλιον αὐτὸ εὑρήσει καὶ ἐναργείστερον διακοινο- σίας τε καὶ ἀδικίας διόψεται καὶ πάντα ἢ νῦν διήλθομεν. νῦν δὲ εἰσπέμεν μὲν ἀληθῆ περὶ αὐτοῦ, οὗν ἐν τῷ παρόντι φαίνεται. 20

17, 18. διαθετέων Ση: διαθετέον ΑΠ. 19. ἀ ΑΠ: om. Α."
21 τῶν θαλάττων Γλαύκων. Glaucus, who had originally been a fisherman himself, when transmuted into a sea-god, became a patron god of sailors and fishermen. See Roscher Lex. d. Myth. s.v. and Frazer on Paus. ix 22. 7.

611 D 23 τὰ τε παλαιὰ—ἀλλὰ δὲ. For τε followed by δὲ cf. II 367 c n. ἐκεκλάσθαι. See cr. n. The reading ἐκεκλάσθαι is found only in one inferior ms besides Δ. It is rather less suitable in point of meaning, and "quum ἐκκλᾶν perrarum, klāv usum tritum sit, duorum codicum gratia vulgatum mutare durum videtur" (Schneider).

28 εἰς τὴν φιλοσοφίαν αὐτῆς. Cf. Phaed. 79 D ὅταν δὲ γε αὐτὴ καθ’ αὐτὴν σκοτὴν ἔκεις, ἐκείνη ὅστις ἐστὶν τὸ καθαρὸν τε καὶ ἄνατον τό οὖν, οὕτως συνεχής ὁ παρά τε ἐκείνου τὸ γένεται, ὅτι καὶ καθ’ αὐτὴν γένεται καὶ ἐξ ἐκείνης, καὶ πεπάντα τε τοῖς πλάσιοις καὶ περὶ ἐκείνης ἐκα τάτα ὄντως ἔχει, ἀπὸ τούτων ἐφαπτόμενη.

611 E 29 ἐγγενής—ὅτι. Cf. Phaed. 79Α ff., especially 80 A, B and Laws 899 D, 959 B, 771 Β. Here we have yet another expression of the profound conviction which inspires the teaching of Plato, that man is an ἀνθρώπος φιλικός, ὁδὸν ἐγγενής. Herwerden would omit τὸ before ὅτι, but the article adds emphasis by making ὅτι διδάκτη τούτον look like a different category from 'the divine and immortal,' which is treated as a unity. Cf. I 334 ε. B.

30 οἷα ἄν γένοιτο—ἐπιστομένη. In the light of 641 B, C we may suppose that when the soul altogether follows after the divine it shakes itself clear of the body and the lower parts of soul associated therewith, and appears in its true unity as pure λογιστικόν. Cf. Grimmelt Lc. p. 94 and 608 D n.

31 τοῦ πόντου—ὁστίν. The imagery, which is of course suggested by the comparison with Glaucus of the sea, reminds us of Phaed. 109 Β—110 Β.

32 περικρονθεῖσα is used with exactly the same meaning and construction as περικροτήτη in VII 519 Β. The word is particularly appropriate here, because it might well be used of striking a vessel of any kind in order to shake off the integuments with which it has become incrusted in the depths of the sea. Cf. also the metaphorical use of circumcisio in Cic. de Fin. 1 44. παρακρονθεῖσα (Morgenstern) gives a wrong meaning, and περικρονθεῖσα, which Liebhold suggests, is tame and inadequate.

πέτρας—ὁστρα is bracketed by Herwerden and Richards, the latter proposing as an alternative to insert καὶ before ὅτι. The image is scarcely bolder than τὰς τὴς γενεσίους ἐγγενεις ὅστερ μεταβολῆς in VII 519 Α, and the comparison with Glaucus easily carries it through. 'Stripped of stones and shell-fish—the numerous and wild accretions of earth and stone which in consequence of these "happy" feastings as they are called have fastened themselves about her in her present state, because it is on
earth that she feasts." Liebhold's conjecture γὴν ἐστιωμένη and Madvig's γὴν ἐστιωμένη or γὴν ἐστιωμένη may be taken as indications of how far these critics are qualified to deal with the text of Plato. Plato means of course that the soul which feeds on earth becomes the earth, earthly. Man is an ὀφθαλμόν φυτών (Tim. 90 A) and should draw his sustenance from Heaven. The best commentary on the whole passage is vii 519 A, B, with the extracts from the Phaedo cited ad loc.: cf. also IX 586 A, B nn. For the 'happy feastings' see on IV 421 B.

612 A 3 ἐθέ—δως. For this formula cf. Phaed. 100 D and Laws 890 B. Plato seems clearly to imply that soul in its true nature is μονοειδής, although he refrains from dogmatising on the subject here. See on 611 B.

612 A—613 E Now that we have proved Justice to be in itself, apart from all consequences, best for the soul, we may safely dwell on the rewards of Virtue both in life and after death. We revoke the concession which, for the sake of the argument, we formerly made, and restore to Justice the appreciation which in point of fact she does receive from gods and men. The just are dear to the gods and the special object of their providence, but it is otherwise with the unjust. Among men too, Injustice, though for a time it may rain well, breaks down before the race is finished; whereas Justice reaches the goal and wins the crown. The honours and prizes which Glaucós claimed for successful Injustice fall to Justice, and it is the unjust who suffer the insults and torments which he foretold for the just.

612 A, B 7 οὐκόνων κτλ. 'Well then,' said I, 'did we not in our discourse clear away the imputations against Justice and abstain from bringing forward the wages' etc. Jackson is inclined—perhaps rightly—to make the sentence categoric and not interrogative. In τὰ ἄλλα ἀπελυσάμεθα the word ἄλλα refers to the other points raised by Thrasymachus (I 337 A ff.), Glaucós and Adi- mantus (II 358 E ff.), besides the complaint that Justice is usually recommended not on its own merits, but for the sake of its results (II 362 E ff.). For ἀπελυσάμεθα cf. VI 490 E ἀπολύμενοι τὴν τῆς φιλομαθίας διαβολὴν, Αρ. 37 B, Phaedr. 267 D, Arist. Rhet. III 14. 1415b 37, 15. 1416a 5 al. Other explanations of this difficult word and the variant ἀπεδυσάμεθα are discussed in App. V. Instead of ἐπηρέακαμεν, I formerly read (with Cobet, Baiter and J. and C.) ἐπηρέασαμεν. The scribe of Paris A (see cr. n.) seems to have had both readings before him, but to have finally decided in favour of ἐπηρέακαμεν, which is in exact correspondence with μισθοῦς δὲ καὶ δόξας πάρει άλλως ἔπαινει πι 367 D. All the other MSS read ἐπηρέακαμεν except Par. K, which has ἐπηρέασαμεν. ἐπηρέακαμεν should probably be preferred, both on account of the MS evidence, and still more because the aorist seems necessary to balance ἀπελυσάμεθα and ἔπομεν. There is no special reason why the word ἔπαινει in πι 367 D should be echoed here: and it is not employed of Homer and Hesiod in πι 363 A, to which φότα refers. For the connexion cf. (with J. and C.) Pol. 307 A, where some MSS Ρεάδο ἐπηρέακαμεν, and others ἐπηρέακαμεν.
11 τον Γύγου δακτυλίων. II 359 C n.
12 'Αδός κυνήν. See II. v 844 f. αὐτάρ 'Αδός | δίνω 'Αδός κυνήν, μή μον τὸν ἄνθρωπον Ἀρχή, with Leaf ad loc. Leaf observes that 'the name 'Αδός here evidently preserves something of its original sense, the Invisible ('Αδός).' For other examples of the proverb see Blaydes on Arist. Ach. 396.
13 νὸν ἢ ἐντείκηθον. We may without prejudice consider the question of rewards, now that we have judged virtue and vice upon their merits; and it is even necessary to do so, if we are to take account of all the circumstances of the case. See on 608 c.
πρὸς ἐκείνους: sc. τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὡς αὐτὴ παράξενη ἡ δικαιοσύνη, as it is more fully expressed in 614 a.
612 C 19 ἠγάσθη—κρυβαίνει represents the general substance, though not the precise form, of the demands put forward by Glaucio and Adimitas in II 361 a—d., 367 e. The reference is no more inexact than other cross-references in the République (see on 502 d a.), and Siebeck is hardly justified in suggesting that Plato's recollection of Book II had grown faint by the time he wrote Book X (Untersuch. zur Phil. d. Griechen p. 144). The reading ἠγάσθη (see cr. n.) has some little support from the inferior ms as well as from A. It is defensible in itself, and (as Campbell observes) 'agrees better with δύσωκα and δοῦλον and with ἀπαίτω in the following sentence.' But ἠγάσθη is on the whole more natural with δοῦλον εἶναι and ought probably to be retained. An unfortunate misprint in my edition of the Text of the République (1897) assigns to II the reading ἠγαπάθη (stie), and the error is repeated by Burnet in his apparatus criticus. In reality II has ἠγάσθη.

καὶ εἰ. See on III 408 b.
612 D 22 ἐπειδὴ τοῖν τοῖς κτλ. See cr. n. The reading in the text has the approval of Schneider and others. It involves less departure from II and A than either (a) ἐπειδή τοῖς κεκραμένοι εἰσίν, ὡς δ' εἰσί, πάλιν ἀπαίτω κτλ. (Hermann), or (b) ἐπειδὴ τοῖς, ὡς δ' εἰσί, κεκραμένοι εἰσίν, ἐγὼ πάλιν (Ast, Stalbaum), or (c) ἐπειδὴ τοῖς, ὡς δ' εἰσί, κεκραμένοι εἰσί, πάλιν ἀπαίτω κτλ. (Daiter, J. and C., Burnet). There is no authority for (c) except a marginal annotation in A, although Burnet erroneously attributes this reading to Vind. F and Stobaeus. See (for Vind. F) Schneider's note and (for Stobaeus) Flor. 1 p. 402. 22 f. Hense. To (a) and (c) it may also be objected that the contrast between Socrates on the one hand, and Glaucio and Adimitas on the other, requires the presence of ἐ OSI as the subject to ἀπαίτω; and in (c) the jingle ὡς δ' ἐστὶ—ἐστὶ πάλιν ἰδιοῦν 'valde insuave est' (Schneider).
24 ἡμᾶς. The reading ἡμᾶς, which Stalbaum adopts, has little authority,
autēs dōkeiσthai οὕτω, ἵνα καὶ τὰ νυκτηρία κομίσηται, ὅ ἀπὸ τοῦ 25
dokeiν κτωμένη δίδωσι τοὺς ἔχουσιν αὐτὴν, ἐπεείδη καὶ τὰ ἀπὸ τοῦ
einai ἀγαθὰ διδοῦσαι ἐφάνη καὶ οὐκ ἐξαπατῶσα τοὺς τῷ ὅμητ
Ε λαμβάνουτας αὐτὴν. 1 Δίκαια, ἐφή, αἰτεῖ. Οὐκοῦν, ἢν ὐ ἐγώ,
πρῶτον μὲν τούτῳ ἀποδώσετε, ὥστε θεοῦ γε οὐ λαυδάνει ἐκάτερος
αὐτῶν οὗς ἔστιν; Ὄποδοσομεν, ἐφή. Εἰ δὲ μὴ λαυδάνετον, ὃ 30
μὲν θεοφιλῆς ἂν εἴη, ὃ δὲ θεομισῆς, ὃπερ καὶ κατ' ἄρχας ὥμολο-
γοῦμεν. Ἐστει ταῦτα. Τοῦ δὲ θεοφιλεῖ οὐχ ὥμολογισομεν, ὃσα
613 ἐγε ἀπὸ θεῶν | γίγνεται, πάντα γίγνεσθαι ὡς οἶνον τε ἄριστα, εἰ μὴ
ti ἀναγκαῖον αὐτῷ κακῶν ἐκ προτέρας ἀμαρτίας ὑπῆρξεν; Πάνω
μὲν οὖν εἶν. Οὕτως ἄρα ὑποληπτένοι περὶ τοῦ δικαίου ἀνδρός, εἶν τ' ἐν
πειλα γίγνεται εἶναὶ τ' ἐν νόσοις ἣ τινι ἄλλοι τῶν δοκοῦντων
κακῶν, ὡς τούτῳ ταῦτα εἰς ἀγαθὸν τὶ τελευτήσει ξωντι ἦ καὶ 5
ἀποθανοῦτο. οὐ γὰρ δὴ ὑπὸ γε θεῶν ποτὲ ἀμελεῖται, ὃς ἂν προβυ-
μεσθὰν ἐθέλη δίκαιος γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἐπιτηδεύων ἄρετὴν εἰς ὅσον
B δυνατὸν ἀνθρώπῳ ὅμοιοοῦσαθαθεό. Εἰκός γ', ἐφή, τὸν ταιοῦτὸν μῆ
ἀμελεῖτασ ὑπὸ τοῦ ὅμοιον. Οὐκοῦν περὶ τοῦ ἄδικου τάναντια
touτων δει διανοεῖτασ; Σφόδρα γε. Τὰ μὲν δὴ παρὰ θεῶν ιο
tοιαυτ' ἂν εἴη νυκτηρία το τι δικαίο. Κατὰ γοῦν ἐμὺν δόξαν, ἐφή. Τί
dε, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, παρ' ἀνθρώπων; ἢρ' οὐχ ὅδε ἐχει, εἰ δεῖ τὸ ἄν
τιθέναι; οὐχ οἱ μὲν δεινοὶ τε καὶ ἄδικοι δρόσων ὅπερ οἱ ὅμοις,
ὡς ἂν θέωσιν εὐ ἀπὸ τῶν κατω, ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν ἄνω μῆ; τὸ μὲν

32. In verbis ἐστι ταῦτα desinit II.

and is a needless change, for “Socrates ipse adhuc una cum reliquis justitiam
male audire et deos hominesque secus de ea statuere τοῦ λόγου ἔτηκα posuerat”
(Schneider).

25 dοκεῖσθαι. Cf. vi 490 λ.
612 E 31 κατ' ἀρχάς ὥμολογούμεν. I 352 B.
613 A 7 προτέρας ἀμαρτίας = 'former sin' means the sins committed in a previous
existence. Hence the imperfect ὑπῆρξεν ('was' means from the first,' i.e. from the
moment of his birth).
6 οὗ γὰρ δὴ ὑπὸ γε θεῶν κτλ. Cf. (with Morgenstern de Plat. rep. comment.
7 εἰς ὅσον δυνατόν—θεό. ὁμοιότατος
θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν is the ethical end for
man: see Theaet. 176 B—177 A, and cf.
ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΣ I 431
II 383 C, VI 500 C, D, 501 B, C, and Latos 716 B—D together with the μελετὴ ἀνα-
των of the Phaedo and the old Pythago-
rean maxims ἐπον θεώ, ὁμολογεῖν τῷ θεῷ.
Cf. also Rohde Psyche² pp. 163, 285—
287.
613 B 14 ὅσοι δὲν—μη κτλ. : "who
run well from the lower end of the course
to the upper, but not from the upper to the
lower" etc. (J. and C.). Plato is
thinking of the ὀλισθιος, and calls the out-
ward and homeward journeys respectively ἄνω τῶν κατώ and ἀπὸ τῶν ἄνω.
We must suppose, although there seems to be
no other authority for the supposition,
that the end from which the competitors
started was spoken of as 'down' and the
other end as 'up.' Schneider suggests
that the outward limit may have stood
higher, but Greek stadia seem always to

15 πρῶτον ὀξέως ἀποπρέσῳ, τελευτῶντες δὲ | καταγέλαστοι γέγονο- 
ται, τὰ ὁστα ἐπὶ τῶν ὁμοῦ ἔχοντες καὶ ἀστεφάνωτοι ἀποτρέχοντες. 
οἱ δὲ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ δρομικοὶ εἰς τέλος ἐλθόντες τὰ τε ἄθλα λαμβά-
νουσι καὶ στεφανοῦνται. οὐ χάρις καὶ περὶ τῶν δικαιῶν τὸ πολὺ 
συμβαῖνει; πρὸς τέλος ἐκάστης πράξεως καὶ ὦμιλλας καὶ τοῦ βίου 
20 εὐδοκίμουσι τε καὶ τὰ ἄθλα παρὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων φέρονται; Καὶ 
μᾶλα. Ἀνέβη ἄρα λέγοντος ἐμὸν περὶ τούτων ἄπερ αὐτὸς ἔλεγες 
περὶ τῶν ἄδικων; ἐρώ γὰρ δὴ, ὅτι οἱ | μὲν δικαιοί, ἑπείδαι προ-
δότεροι ἑγενότα, ἐν τῇ αὐτῶν πόλης ἄρχουσι τε, ἄν βουλοῦνται, 
τὰς ἀρχὰς, ἑρμοῦσι τε ὅποθεν ἄν βουλοῦνται, ἐκδιδάσκει τε εἰς οὐδὲ 
25 ἀν ἐθέλοις καὶ πάντα, ἀ σὺ περὶ ἑκείνων, ἐγὼ γὰρ λέγω περὶ 
τῶν ὅτι, καὶ αὐτὴν περὶ τῶν ἄδικων, ὅτι οἱ πολλοὶ αὐτῶν, καὶ ένα 
νέος ὄντες λάθωσιν, ἐπὶ τέλους του τρόπου ἀρετήνες καταγελαστο-
 eius, καὶ γέραντες γηγορόμενοι ἄβλου προσπλακίζονται ὑπὸ ἔξων 
τε καὶ ἀστών, μαστιγούμενοι καὶ ὅ| ἄγροικα ἐθέσθη σὺ εἶναι, 
30 ἀληθῆ λέγων. πάντα ἑκείνα οὖν καὶ ἐμὸν ἀκηκοέναι ὡς πάσχου-

30. λέγων Λεόντα: λέγων ἐτὰ στρεβλώσωται (στρεβλόσωσιν ὁ) καὶ ἐκαυνθήσονται

codd. Ἐπὶ λέγων γρ λέγοντα in marg. Λ."
5. ekateros Ξ': ekateros ΑΣ'.
Republic bears the unmistakable impress of Plato's own genius in its artistic finish no less than in its religious and moral teaching.

έκαστός. See cr. n. The accusative appears to be in all MSS except v K and Z.

6 άκοσαί is doubted by Stephanus, and bracketed by Ast, Stallbaum, and Baiter. There is nothing offensive in the repetition άκοσαί-άκοσαί (cf. vi 511 E n.), and the second άκοσαί is welcome, if not necessary, as defining the exact nature of the debt ('due to hear,' i.e. 'due to be heard,' like καλὸς θεών and the like). "The debt which has been incurred in words" (Δ ἀκοσάσατο ἐν τῷ λόγῳ 612 C) "has to be paid in words" (J. and C.). ιτὸ depends on ὀφειλόμενα rather than on ἀκοσαί. J. and C. take άκοσαί as = 'to have related concerning them,' comparing άκοσαί συμφάτομα vi 496 A and Λυγ. 207 A; but it is more natural to give the word the same meaning it bears just before.

614 B 8 Ἀλκινοῦ—ἀπόλογον. Books IX—XII of the Odyssey were known as Ἀλκινοῦ ἀπόλογος the 'tales to Alcinous': see Ael. Vit. Hist. XIII 14 Ἀλκινοῦ ἀπόλογου [καὶ] Κυλλόσεων καὶ Νέκυου τὰ τὰς Κύρης. Cf. Arist. Poet. 16. 1455 2 and K hod. III 116. 1417 13, from which it appears that the whole four books were also called collectively ὁ Ἀλκινοῦ ἀπόλογος. There is doubtless an allusion, as the Oxford editors remark, to the νεκύοι of Od. xi, which is itself one of the 'tales to Alcinous'; but the expression has also a proverbial application, being used of a long and tedious story (τὰ τῶν φληγράκτων καὶ μακρῶν ἀποικατώντων λόγων Suidas s.v. Ἀπόλογος Ἀλκινοῦ. Other authorities will be found in Leutsch u. Schmeidewin Parosem. Gr. I p. 210, II p. 13). For the paronomasia Ἀλκινοῦ—ἀλκινοῦ see Riddell Digest § 323.

614 C τόπον τινά δαμόνων κτλ.
The situation may be seen from the accompanying plan. AB is the τόπος
dαμόνων or λειμών (614 E) in which the
judges sit. BC, AC' represent the two
ways by which the souls when they are
judged depart to receive their rewards or
punishments. DA and D'B are the two
ways by which the souls return to the
meadow to be reincarnated, after their
period of reward or punishment is com-
plete. (Aust makes a grave error when he
writes "duo ostia, alterum, per quod
anime descendunt in corporea, alterum,
per quod e vita redundat." None of the
four χάσματα represent the way by which
the souls arrive at the meadow immedi-
ately after they leave the body.) The τόπος or
λειμών appears also in the Phaedo and the
Gorgias: εἰς δὴ τίνα τόπον, οὗ δὲ τοῦ
vulgaris διαδικασμένος εἰς "Αίδου
πορευέσθαι (Phaed. 107 D); οὗτοι οὖν—
dικάσουσιν ἐν τῷ λειμών (Gorg. 524 A).
Ettig l.c. p. 306 is inclined to derive the
idea from Homer's ἀσφόδελος λειμών.
We find traces of a λειμών also in Empé-
doeles v. 23 Karsten ἄπα ἄν λειμών (aparently of the Earth) τε καὶ σκότος
πλάσκωσι, and in Orphic fragments
(e.g. Fr. 154 Abel); cf. also Plat. de
fac. orb. Lümne 943 c ἐν τῷ πρωτάτῳ
tοῦ ἀεώτος ἄδειον καλοῦσθαι, οὖν,
ἐπειδὴ διαδικάσειαν, τοὺς μὲν δικαίους κελεύειν πορεύεσθαι τὴν εἰς

16. ἄλλα Ζγ: ἄλλα Α.

15 χάσματα. Roepen (de dual. usw.
Plat. p. 29) would read χάσματε ("id est,
ut me monuit Usenerus, χάσματ ἔχομεν,
a librario male suppletum"). The dual is
also found in 9 and Flor. U; but there
is hardly sufficient ground for deserting
the best MSS: cf. 111 395 A ἄ to μεμαθα
ἀρτί τούτω ἐκάλεσε; Lach. 187 A οἷος δὲ αὐτοί
eφέτεια γέγονέ (so Β) τοῦ τουτου, and
other passages in Roepen l.c. Proclus
also has χάσματα ἐχομένων (L.c. p. 136. 17).
With the two ways (BC, AC') by which
the souls depart after judgment cf. Gorg.
524 A ἐν τῇ τριβῇ ἐξ ἃς φέρετι τῶν δῶι,
ἤ μὲν ἐς μακάρων νήσους, ἢ δὲ ἐς τάρταρον:
also Phaedr. 249 A. The 'two ways'
were a familiar feature in Orphic-Pythagorean
pictures of the other world: for
illustrations see Dieterich l.c. pp. 191 ff.
and Rohde Psych. 11 p. 220 n. 4.

17 ἔσεξαν. The way to the abode of
the blest was generally figured as ἔσεξαν: see Rohde l.c. and Dieterich l.c.
p. 85 n. 2, where Dieterich quotes from
an Inscription found in a grave in the district of
Thurii χαίρε χαίρε δεξιάν ὁδοφορόν Λειμώνας τε ἱερὸν κατὰ π'
ἄλσας Φερεφελλας. The whole of this
Inscription, according to Dieterich, be-

28—2
trays Orphic and Pythagorean influences. Cf. 617 c n. The other features (ἀνω, ἐν τῷ πρῶτῳ, εἰς ἄριστον τε καὶ κάτω, ἐν τῷ ὁπισθεν) are also in keeping with Pythagorean notions: see Arist. Frag. 195 (1513b 24 ff.) τὸ οὖν δεξιόν καὶ ἄνω καὶ ἐμπρόσθεν ἀγαθόν ἐκλάνει, τὸ δὲ ἄριστον καὶ κάτω καὶ ὁπισθεν κακόν ἔλεγον, ὥστε Ἀριστοτέλης ἀμφίσησεν ἐν τῇ τῶν Πυθαγορείου ἀρεσκόμενων συναγωγῇ.

18 διὰ τοῦ ὀφρανοῦ. Presumably they passed through the heavens to the outer surface of the heavenly sphere, as described in Phaedr. 247 b ff. Cf. also Proclus l.c. p. 160. 19 ff. πολλὰ δὲ ἐπερεύθησαν αὐτὸν καί ὄφραν συμπεριποίησαν τοῖς ὀφρανοῖς θεῶν κτλ.—clearly a reminiscence of Phaedr. 246 E ff.

614 c, ὑσσημα κτλ. Cf. Gorg. 526 β. κάτω is fully explained in the myth of the Phaedr. 111 c—114 c. Cf. infra 615 a.

20 πάντων ὤν ἐπεραζόν from its correspondence with τῶν δεικνυμένων above suggests that our own actions are our doom.

22 καὶ διακαλέοντως ἦν and that they exhorted' corresponds of course to καὶ διακαλεθήθαι of the oratio recta. Stallbaum's explanation ("optativus ponitur loco accusativi cum infinitivo") is untenable; nor is there any good reason for suspecting the text or writing διακαλεθησαί with Eusebius (Frag. Εὐσ. Εν. Χ. 35. 5) and others. The optative is much more dramatic and realistic. Cf. viii 569 έ. η.

23 ταύτη μὲν is explained by καθ' ἐκάτερον—γῆς i.e. (see the figure on p. 435) BC and AC'. Cornarius conjectured καθ' ἐπεραν μὲν τὸ χάραμα, but ἐκάτερον is much more elegant, and forms a better balance with κατὰ δὲ τῶν ἐπεραν (viz. D'B and DA).

25 ἐκ τῆς γῆς is not of course 'from earth' (D. and V.), but 'out of the earth' ('aus der Erde' Schneider). They have suffered punishment ἐν τῇ ἐπεραὶ ἐν τῆς πορελα (615 A) 'in their sojourn underground' i.e. in the bowels of the Earth, as explained at length in Phaed. 111 E—114 b.

614 e 28 τοῦ λειμανθα. 'Articulus locum quasi fama celebratum designat' Schneider. See on 614 c.

615 B

VI 748 ff. has omnes, ubi mille rotam volvere per annos | Letheanum ad fluvium deus evocat agmine magno. There is little doubt that both Virgil and Plato took the period of 1000 years from some Orphic or Pythagorean source; see Dieterich i.e. pp. 116 ff. It will be observed that the thousand years do not, in the Republic, include the lifetime of the soul on earth, which Plato estimates at 1000 years (615 B). In the Phaedrus on the other hand the entire interval from birth to birth is reckoned at 1000 years (249 A ff., compared with 248 D, E).

3 ευπαθείας — καλλος suggests the beatific visions of the Phaedrus (247 A ff.).

4 πολλοὶ χρόνου: sc. ἐστι, as in Latus IV 708 D χρόνου πολλοῦ καὶ παγχάλεστον (Stallbaum). It is, worse than needless to insert δὲ (with Liebholt) after χρόνου.

5 ἓσα—ήδικησαν. In Plato, as in Dante, doing wrong to others is the great sin.

7 τοῦτο δὲ εἶναι κτλ. 'that is,' said he, 'once in every hundred years.' τοῦτο δὲ εἶναι ('namely') explains ὑπὲρ ἐκάστος δεκάδος. This view is simpler and more idiomata than (with Schneider) to make τοῦτο = τὸ δίκην δοῦναι ἐν μέρει ὑπὲρ ἐκάστου.

616 B 8 ὡς τοσοῦτον. The same duration of human life is postulated also in Phaedr. 248 D ff., but retribution in that dialogue appears to be εὐνάκις, and not δικήσις as here; cf. 256 E with 248 E. The number 100 is the square of the Pythagorean 'perfect' number 10, so that Pythagorean influence is doubtless at work again. See App. I to Book viii p. 301, and cf. 614 B ff. It should also be remarked that the Greeks, like other races, had many stories to tell of the μακρβίοι of early days, and the 'Naturvolker' of historic times were also credited with preternaturally long lives: see the evidence collected by Rohde Greek. Roman pp. 218, 236, 247 nn.

9 καί οίον κτλ.: 'and for example if etc. κομίκαντο depends of course on ἔθα. Plato somewhat awkwardly co-ordinates his illustration with the principle itself (ἐθα—ἐκτίσεως): but there is not sufficient ground for expunging καί (with 2, Stephanus and others).


12 καὶ αὕ—κομίκαντο. It is not at first sight clear whether this applies to those who have come ἐκ τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ, or to those who, though condemned on the whole account, have done some good actions in their lives, and occasionally shown themselves just and pious. The latter view is supported by Phaed. 113 D ἐκεί (in Acheron) οἰκονεῖ τε καὶ καθαυρο-
𝑒ὐθος γενόμενος ἐν ὁμοίωσιν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις 16
τῶν δὲ αὐτὸχερος Ast: αὐτὸχερας codd.

μεν οὖν τῶν τα ἀδικημάτων δίδυται δίκαι

πλατώνος [615 β]
eὐρογειαίσις εὐρογειηκότες καὶ δίκαιαι καὶ ὅσιοι γεγονότες εἰς
κατὰ ταυτὰ τὴν ἀξίαν κοιμήσων. τῶν δὲ εὐθος γενομένων καὶ εἰς
dὲ ἀνθρώπους ἅσβεσίας καὶ εὐπορίας καὶ γονέας καὶ αὐτόχερως
φῶνον μεῖζον ἐτί τούς μισθοὺς διηγείτο. ἐφ' ἂν δὲ παραγενε-

15 ὡς ἀδραίοις, ὥσπερ ἀνθρώποις καὶ ἀνθρώπων.

οὐδὲ ἡ ἀρετή ὁμοίωσις ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς ἡγεμόνες

20 ἡ ἔλεγε. ἐφ' οὖν τὸν ἐρωτομένον εἰσεῖσων, οὐχ ἡκεί, φάναι, οὔδ' ἂν ἤξει δεῦρο.

16. αὐτόχερως Ast: αὐτόχερας codd.
XIV. Ἐθεασάμεθα γὰρ οὖν δὴ καὶ τοῦτο τῶν δεινῶν θεαμάτων. ἐπειδὴ ἐγγὺς τοῦ στομίου ἦμεν μέλλοντες ἀνίεναι καὶ τάλα 25 πάντα πεποιηθέντα, ἐκείνων τε κατείδρομεν ἐξαιτίης καὶ ἄλλους σχεδὸν τις τῶν πολλῶν τυράννους: ἦσαν δὲ καὶ ἰδιώται. 

屣 petty, τοὺς μεν διαλαβόντες ἤγον, τὸν δὲ 616 Ἀρδαίον καὶ ἄλλους συμποδίσαντες χείρας τε καὶ πόδας | καὶ

32. διαλαβόντες ἴγ γ ν. Ἰδία λαβόντες ἴγ.Σ.

but has a solemn, half-tragic or poetical effect. There is the usual supply of emendations, such as οὖδ᾽ αὐτῆς (Madvig) οὖδ᾽ ἀνήξει (Herwerden), οὐδὲ μὴ ἢ ἦν (Cobet), οὐδὲ δὴ ἦν (Richards); but the idiom is sufficiently well established (see on ν. 492), and, as Turner remarks, the variant ἦν (in Ξ and three other MSS) is itself also evidence in favour of ἦν.


Ἱσίαν δὲ καὶ κτλ.: not “erat vero etiam aliquid privatum ex eorum numero, qui magna perpetraverat facinora” (Stallbaum), but “erat vero etiam nonnulli privatum et quidem de genere magnorum peccatorum” (after Schneider). With ἦσαν cf. Phaed. 59 B ἢ ἐν δὲ καὶ Κτῆσιππος and Prot. 315A.


29 άνάτως ἐχόντων. Cf. Phaed. 113 E ὧν ἀνά των ἄνατων ἐχει διὰ τῶν ἀκρατημάτων κτλ. See on II 380 B.

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31 ἄνδρες—ἄρχοι κτλ. These are the
κεφαλήν, καταβαλόντες καὶ ἐκδείραντες, ἐίλκον παρὰ τὴν ὄδον ἐκτὸς ἐπὶ ἀσταλαθῶν κνάπτοντες καὶ τοὺς ἀεὶ παραυσι σημαίνοντες, ὃν ἐνεκά τε καὶ ὅτι εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον ἐμπεσοῦμενοι ἀγιοῦντο. 5 ἐνθα δὴ φόβων ἐφή πολλῶν καὶ παντοδαπῶν σφίσι τε γεγονότων τοῦτον ὑπερβάλλειν, μὴ γένοιτο ἐκάστῳ τῷ φθείρῳ, ὅτε ἀναβαινοῖ, καὶ ἀσμενόστατα ἐκαστον σνηγήσαντος ἀναβήναι. καὶ τὰς μὲν δὴ δίκας τε καὶ τιμωρίας τοιαύτας τινὰς εἶναι καὶ αὐτὰς εὐεργεσίας B

3. κνάπτοντες Ση: κνάπτοντες Α: κνάπτονται satis trito errore pro κνάπτοντες q1. 4. ὅτι εἰς Ση: εἰς δ', τι Α. 6. τοῦτον Α2 (addito ω super posterius o a manu rec.) et q: τοῦτων Α1Σ.

616 Α 3 ἐκτός: i.e. outside the στόμων. It seems to me quite clear from this passage that the δαιμόνιον τόπος is not in the aether, as Proclus appears to suppose (I.c. pp. 118 ff.), but somewhere on the true surface of the earth as described in Phaed. 190 e ff.

ἐπὶ ἀσταλαθῶν κνάπτοντες. ἐπὶ κνά- φους ἐδιαφέρει τὸ γάρ πρότερον οἱ γραφεῖς ἀκάνθων σωφρ. συντρέφου- τες, τὰ μᾶλτα ἐπὶ τοῦ σωφρ. ἐκατατον ὃ δὲ σωφρ. ἐλέγετο γράφος. ὃν Κρόνιος τὸν ἔθικον περιέχανα ταῖς ἀκάνθαις καὶ ὑποτ. ἔθεδερεν (Hesychius, with reference to Pind. Π. 92). In the Apocalypsis of Peter ν. 3ο we read of χιλικες δέτεροι ἐξων καὶ παρτός ὅζελλον, πεπαρμένον, καὶ γυναῖκες καὶ ἀνδρες ῥάκη ῥαπαρά ἐνδε- δυμένου ἐκλιποντα ὅπ' αὐτών καλαμώμενοι. The form κνάπτοντες appears in A (see cr. n.) and several ms, but κνάπτων is a by-form of γνάπτων and means not 'card' but 'bend' (Stephanus-Hase s.v.).

tοῖς ἀεὶ παραῦσι κτλ. According to Norden I.c. p. 393 the idea that incaurible sinners serve as παραβαίνεια in Hades is probably Orphic or Pythagorean. It meets us also in Pindar (Pyth. 2. 21 ff., of Ixion) and in Verg. Aen. vi 618 ff. Phlegyasique miscarremon omnes Admonet, et magna testatur voce per umbras 'Dis- cite iustitiam moniti, et non tenmere divos.' The fullest exposition of the theory is to be found in Gorg. 525 Β—D.

4 ὅν ἐνεκά τε κτλ. The words ταῦτα ὑπομένους, which Schneider still retains after ἐνεκά τε, have scarcely any ms support and are an obvious gloss. The construction is ὅν ἐνεκά τε ἀγιοῦτο καὶ ὅτι εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον ἐμπεσοῦμενον ἀγιοῦτο. ὅτι εἰς. See cr. n. I formerly, with Hermann and Baiter, read εἰς δ τι, regarding τὸν Τάρταρον as a gloss. But there is reason in Richards' remark that of or ὅτι would be more natural than εἰς δ τι: and in any case it is hardly likely that Plato would have omitted to specify the destination of these sinners by its name. Cf. Phaed. 113 Β (quoted above on 615 Β) and (for Plato's conception of Tartarus) ib. 112 Α ff.

5 ἐφι: sc. δ ἐρωτώμενος (615 Β), as before.

σφίων: i.e. to δ ἐρωτώμενος and his comrades.

6 τοῦτον ὑπερβάλλειν. The words τοῦτον, which Σ and other ms add after ὑπερβάλλειν, may be genuine, but as they are absent from Α, η and several ms besides, it is perhaps safer to omit them. 7 καὶ τὰς μὲν κτλ. At this point Er's own narrative is resumed.

616 Β 8 τὰς εὐεργεσίας: 'the blessings which they received.' This clearly refers, as Proclus also believed (I.c. p. 185), to the souls ἐν τῇ ὑπὸ γῆς δορύναι. See on 615 Β, and compare Matthew Arnold's well known poem 'Saint Brandan.'

616 Β—617 Δ After spending seven days in the meadow, the souls that had returned from the journey of a thousand years rose up and departed, accompanied by Er. On the fourth day they reached a place from which they beheld a straight light, like a pillar, stretching through all Heaven and Earth, and after a day's journey they saw at the middle of this light the extremes of the chains of Heaven, and stretching from these extremes the spindle of Necessity with its eight concentric whirls, the circles of whose rings as they revolve carry with them severally the fixed stars and all the planets in their order. On each of the eight whirls is perched a Siren, uttering a single note, the eight notes thus produced result-
ing in a single ‘harmony’ or mode. Meanwhile the three Fates, as they assist in the revolutions, keep singing to the Sirens’ music, Lachesis himning the past, Clotho the present, and Atropos the future.

616 B ff. The astronomical difficulties in this part of the Republic have occasioned a great deal of controversy and discussion. Besides the various editions and translations of the Republic in English and German, and the commentaries of Proclus and Theophrastus, the writers whom I have chiefly studied are Grote (Plato on the Earth’s Rotation), Boeckh (Kleine Schriften III pp. 266–320), Donaldson (Transactions of the Cambridge Philosophical Society, x pp. 305–316), Susemihl (Gen. Enut. II pp. 273–278), Krolin (Pl. St. pp. 278–289) and Zeller's I pp. 434 f. nn. Donaldson’s article, to which Dr. Jackson first called my attention, although it lacks consistency and clearness, and passes over many difficulties, contains the germ of what I now believe to be the correct theory of the straight light. But nothing that has hitherto been published on the subject at once gives a full and satisfactory explanation of the difficulties, and it is only through the kind cooperation of Professor Cook Wilson that I have at last been able to form a definite view as to the meaning and solution of this extremely complicated problem. From 616 B to the middle of 617 B my commentary is mainly based on the exhaustive criticisms and investigations which he has sent to me.

The general scope and purpose of the astronomical part of the myth would seem to be to set before the souls a picture of the ‘harmonies and revolutions of the Universe’ in conformity with which it is their highest duty and privilege to live. Cf. Tim. 90 C, of the θεόν ἡμών ἑτέροις ἔνωσις εἰς κυψείς αἱ τῶν πατρότητος διανοόμει καὶ περιφέρονται ταύταις δὴ ἑυφυσίων ἐκαστοῖς δὲ τὰς περὶ τὴν γένεσιν ἐν τῇ κηφήνᾳ διεφθαρμένας ἡμῶν περιδόξους ἐξωθούντα διὰ τὸ καταμιμηθέν οὐκ ὅτι τοῦ πατρότος ἐπὶ καὶ περιφέρεσι τῷ κατανυσίμῳ τῷ κατανυσίμῳ ἐν ἑξάωματι κατὰ τὴν ἀρχαίαν φύσιν συμβαίνει βεβαιότατον τὸ πρὸς τὸν πατρότα καὶ τὸν ἑπείτη φῶς. It will facilitate the study of the details if we observe in advance that Plato’s description falls into two well-marked divisions or sections, viz. from ἄφωνες θεσμοί τεταρτάλους down to τὴν περιφέρειαν (616 B, c), and from ἐκ δὲ τῶν ἄκρων (616 c) to the end of the myth. In the first section we have a representation of the outermost or sidereal sphere, girdled by a circle of light, which is prolonged through the poles into a column or shaft of light spanning the Universe from pole to pole and symbolizing to all appearances the cosmic axis. See on line 14 below. In the second section the scene is shifted, and we are introduced to a new picture of the celestial system, including the fixed stars, but without the encompassing girdle of light, assimilated to the poetical and suggestive figure of Necessity and her spindle, the shaft of which again represents the axis of the Universe. The details are fully discussed in the notes, where it is shewn that the two parts of the description cannot from their very nature be combined into a coherent and consistent whole, and that in consequence of their essential inconsistency Plato’s passing attempt to reconcile them inevitably fails. See on 616 B c and App. VI.

If the question is asked, ‘Does Plato’s description embody a serious astronomical theory of the visible heaven and its machinery?’ what answer should be returned? The following remarks will indicate the kind of reply which seems to be in harmony both with Plato’s general attitude on astronomical questions and with the special peculiarities of the myth before us. (1) The visible heavens, according to the Republic, are not the object of true Astronomy. The true Astronomer is concerned with τὸ τὸν πατήσα φωσίν οὖσα ἡ γῆ ἡ βραδύτης ἐν τῷ ἄληθεν ἀριστερὸν καὶ τάσις τῶν ἀληθεῖς σχηματισμοὶ φοραί τῷ πρὸς ἄλληλα φέρεται καὶ πᾶς οὐντα φέρει (VII 529 D). See note ad loc.). We may therefore expect imagination and idealism to play a large part in Plato’s astronomical pictures, more especially when they form part of a myth. (2) The greater portion of this passage is in reality a similitude representing the celestial system under the figure of the spindle of Necessity.
Now it is clear that Plato deliberately sacrificed the reality of the sidereal sphere when he found it inconsistent with the figure which he had chosen (see on κύκλοις κτλ. 616 D). And if he could concede so much to his comparison, the question arises, 'Are we justified in regarding any of the machinery as seriously expressing Plato's real conception of the mechanism of the heavens?' It will be found on reflection that the only satisfactory and safe reply is that all the machinery, including the material whorls and axis of the spindle, is poetical throughout. This does not of course exclude the supposition that some of the details of Plato's imagery are borrowed from earlier astronomical fancies, and it is highly probable that here, as elsewhere in the myth, he takes something from the Pythagoreans; see on 616 C, D, 617 B. (3) The entire description should in all probability be regarded as "essentially a symbolic representation and not an attempt at scientific explanation" (Cook Wilson). But 'a symbolic representation should stand in some relation to the thing signified,' and in this case all we can reasonably infer from Plato's symbolism is that, according to his belief, the Earth is in the middle: the Sun, Moon and Planets revolve round the Earth at different distances from the centre and with different velocities, participating in the general movement of the heavens and at the same time having a contrary movement of their own. As for the fixed stars, it would seem from the first part of Plato's description that he supposed them to be fixed in the outermost sphere of the Universe, round which he plainly supposes that the circle of the Milky Way extends. See also on 616 C, 617 A.

616 B 11 καὶ ἀφικνεόταται κτλ. 'And on the fourth day they arrived at a point from which they descried extending from above through all the heaven and earth a straight light, like a pillar, resembling the rainbow more than anything else, but brighter and purer.' The souls see the light for the first time on the fourth day after they begin their march, and consequently on the eleventh day from Er's arrival at the meadow. The remaining incidents occupy one day, and it is on the twelfth that Er revives (διδεκατάιοι—ἀνέβηκα 614 B). See on ἐνδυμα 621 E. As far as the Greek is concerned, ἐνδυμα may be construed either with καθοράω or with τεταμένον. In the former case, we should probably have to suppose (with Boeckh I. c. p. 299) that Er's point of view is outside the Universe; but it will be shewn in Appendix VI that there are serious difficulties in the way of this supposition, and the second alternative is to be preferred. It has already been remarked that Plato in all probability thinks of the λεύκων as somewhere on the true surface of the Earth described by him in the myth of the Phaedo (614 C n.), and it is apparently along this surface that the souls progress until they come in view of the light. As regards the shape and position of the light, Plato's language is clear and precise. The light is 'straight, like a pillar,' and 'stretched through all the heaven and earth.' The only natural interpretation of these words is that a column or shaft of light spans the entire Universe, like the diameter of a circle, and passes through the centre of the Earth, which, according to Plato, is situated in the middle of the whole (Phaed. 108 Ε ff., Tim. 40 B). With διὰ παντὸς—τεταμένον we may compare Tim. 40 B τὸν διὰ παντὸς πᾶλον τεταμένον (of the axis of the Universe). The words μάλωτα τῇ ἱμάδι προσφερέσσα refer, not of course to the shape, but to the colour of the light, as appears from λαμπρότερον δὲ καὶ καθαρότερον. The correction of προσφερή to προσφερές in A (see εἰς B n.) is late, but προσφερές is intrinsically a better reading, and might easily have been altered to προσφέρῃ under the influence of κίονα. In defence of προσφέρῃ Schneider cites ἀπαχτετεμένου in VI 485 D, but the two cases are not exactly parallel: see note ad loc. Other views on this passage are discussed in App. VI.

13 εἰς δ' ἀφικνεόταται κτλ. 'At this light they arrived after a day's march forward, and there, at the middle of the light,' etc.
Instead of προελθόντας, A and other mss have προελθόντα (see cr. n.), which Schneider defends by saying that the nominative refers not to all the party, but only to Er and his immediate companions. But even in that case the accusative would be more correct, and in point of fact it is clear from what follows that Er is accompanied throughout by all the souls about to be born again. A few other mss besides 4 have the accusative. If the light is ‘straight, like a pillar,’ and stretches ‘through all the heaven and earth,’ it follows that as the Earth is in the middle of the Universe, the ‘middle of the light’ will be at the centre of the Earth. See fig. I on p. 443. No other interpretation of κατά μέσον τὸ φῶς is either natural or easy: see App. VI.

It would seem therefore that at the end of the fourth day after leaving the meadow the souls are at the central point both of the Universe and of the Earth, as is maintained by, among others, Schneider and Donaldson (I.e. p. 307); and this view is also in harmony with some of the most important features in the remaining part of the narrative; see on 617 B, 621 A, B.

14 καὶ ἴδειν αὐτὸθε κτη, ‘and there, at the middle of the light, they saw, extended from heaven, the extremities of its chains; for this light divides the heavens, holding together all the revolving firmament, like the undergirders of men of war.’ The pronoun αὐτὸθε is ambiguous, and as far as concerns the grammar might be referred either to τοῦ οὐρανοῦ or to τὸ φῶς. If we choose the former alternative, αὐτὸθε will be an objective genitive, denoting that which is bound; if the latter, the meaning, as Professor Cook Wilson points out, is ‘its chains,’ ‘its hands,’ i.e. ‘the chains of which the light consists,’ for in the next clause the light is said to be a chain (ὑπόθεμος). The second of these views is on grammatical grounds somewhat more natural than the first; but whichever alternative we adopt, it is clear from the explanatory clause εἶναι γὰρ—περιφορᾶς, not only that the chains are the binding chains of heaven, but also that it is the light itself, and nothing else, which fulfils the function of binding the Universe together (εἶναι γὰρ τοῦτο τὸ φῶς ἑξοπλισμὸν τοῦ οὐρανοῦ). In what way the light performs this office, Plato indicates by the much-disputed words ὅλον τὰ υπόθεμα τῶν τριάδων. The evidence on the subject of the ‘undergirders’ of ancient men of war has been collected and discussed by Boeckh Urkunden über d. Secwesen des Alam. Staates pp. 133—138; see also J. Smith Voyage and Shipwreck of St Paul pp. 210—215 and Breusing Nautik d. Alten pp. 170—184. It may be taken as established that the υπόθεμα were ropes and not planks, as some of the ancient commentators supposed (e.g. Proclus in remin. II p. 200. 25, a Scholion quoted by Kroll l.c. II p. 381, and Suidas s.v. υπόθεμα, who follows a scholium on Ar. Knights 279), and also that they were fastened round the outside of the vessel; but on the question whether the υπόθεμα ran round the ship in a horizontal direction, or were passed under the hull, there is more room for difference of opinion. The former view is maintained by Boeckh and Breusing, the latter by J. Smith (i.e. pp. 108 f., 115, 210—215), who reminds us that a similar process, known by the name of ‘frapping,’ is still occasionally resorted to in the case of wooden ships during a storm at sea (pp. 108 f.). The evidence bearing on this matter has recently been investigated by Professor Cook Wilson (see Report of the Proceedings of the Oxford Philological Society for Hilary Term 1902 in Cl. Rev. XVI p. 234), who will shortly publish a detailed discussion of the whole subject. In the meantime he writes to me as follows:—‘After careful reading of all the passages quoted by the authorities I feel sure (what one might infer a priori from the mechanical conditions) that this method’ [i.e. frapping] ‘was known to the ancients, and was the method used in an emergency at sea, e.g. in St Paul’s ship. I conjecture also that these undergirders first had the name υπόθεμα, and that if the belts or girdles supposed by Boeckh had this name, it was transferred to them from the true undergirders, which were probably the first and primitive form and remained in use always, even after the trireme belts had been invented.’ The evidence in short, points to two kinds of υπόθεμα (Cl.
Rev. 1.c.), the first employed occasionally under exceptional circumstances, and passing under the hull of the vessel, the second (see Boeckh l.c. p. 137) forming part of the regular equipment of a warship, attached before she went to sea, and running horizontally round the hull. The second variety is clearly represented on a bronze relief of the forepart of a war vessel, said to date from Roman imperial times, and now in the Berlin Museum. The sketch of the relief on p. 443, fig. ii, is from a photograph in the possession of Professor Cook Wilson. There is also a (somewhat inaccurate) drawing of the relief in Beger Thesauri regii el electoralis Brandenburgici Vol. II p. 406. (Some writers, and among them J. Smith, have maintained that the longitudinal bands in Beger's picture are only ornaments, and not ropes; but it is quite clear from the photograph that they are really ropes and serve as ὑποξώματα of the horizontal kind.)

To which of the two varieties does Plato here allude? The words ὅπως τὰ ὑποξώματα τῶν τριηρῶν, ὡσποδέον τοιχῶν τῶν περιφορῶν, seem clearly to regard the ὑποξώματα as permanent σκέπη of warships, holding the hull together in ordinary circumstances, and not merely resources to be employed in times of difficulty and danger; and since the light whose action the ὑποξώματα serve to illustrate is (in Plato's view) an essential part of the Universe, the illustration is better and more pointed if the ὑποξώματα are also of the more permanent sort. It may also be noted that if Plato had meant the undergirders which pass under the keel he would probably have written ὑποξώματα τῶν ἑρώων, and not ὑποξώματα τῶν τριηρῶν, for the vertical ὑποξώματα were not confined to triremes. For these reasons it would seem that Plato has in view such ὑποξώματα as are described by Boeckh, viz. girdles running round the hull from stern to stem outside the vessel.

It is clear, therefore, that the light not only passes through the centre of the Universe, but also, since it holds the heavens together, like the undergirders of men of war, round the outer surface of the heavenly sphere.

I have tried to represent the kind of picture in Plato's mind by fig. i on p. 443. The sphere of the heavens—represented by the circle di, which is a section of the heavenly sphere—is virtually compared to a ship. The North pole, which is at b, corresponds to the stem, and the South pole, which is at c, to the stern of the vessel. The circular light cab's corresponds to the ὑποξώματα, cab being that part of the light which corresponds to the ὑποξώματα on the port side, and cab the portion which corresponds to the ὑποξώματα on the starboard side. As the light in Plato's description passes through the centre of the Universe as well as round its exterior, the comparison of the light to horizontal ὑποξώματα would be all the more apposite if we might suppose that these ὑποξώματα were brought inside from stem to stern lengthwise and parallel to the ship's length, in a manner corresponding to the position of the straight part of the 'binding light.' But for this supposition there is no evidence, and it is clear from fig. ii that the lower ὑποξώματα at least could not have been brought inside, for they are below the water line. We must accordingly suppose that the comparison with ὑποξώματα extends only to that part of the light which surrounds the surface of the heavenly sphere. That the ends of the light are brought inside the sphere in Plato's picture is clear from the fact that the light stretches 'through all the heaven and earth' as well as round the Universe, and also because the souls see the 'ends of its chains' or bands at the middle of the light itself, which is also the centre of the Universe and Earth. We may presume that the ἄκρα τῶν δεσμῶν meet together at the centre, so that bc forms one continuous pillar of light stretching from pole to pole. See fig. i on p. 443.

The light was interpreted by some ancient commentators as the axis of the Universe, or a cylinder of aetherial fire surrounding the axis (Theo p. 143 Hiller, Suidas and Photius s.v. τεταμένων φῶς: cf. also Proclus in remp. 11 p. 199. 31 ff.), by others as the γαλαξίας κύκλος or Milky Way: see Proclus l.c. pp. 130. 4, 194. 19 ff. and Cicero de rep. vi 16. According to the view given above, the column of light follows the direction of the axis of the Universe, if, as we may reasonably
suppose, $b$ is the pole, and although Plato nowhere actually calls it the axis, we may fairly suppose that this is what it symbolises. I have found no parallel in ancient astronomical theories to this conception of a light stretching from pole to pole. The curved part of the light is no doubt suggested by the Milky Way, which was regarded by the Pythagoreans as either identical with, or an emanation from the circle of fire which, according to them, held the Universe together (Zeller 1 p. 435 n. 2). I have sometimes thought that the soul with which in the Timaeus the Creator wrapped the body of the Universe without has reference also to the Milky Way as girdling the World; for the Pythagoreans called the γαλαξίας κύκλος the ποταμός ψυχών. Plato’s words are (Tim. 34 B) ψυχών δὲ εἰς τὸ μέσον αὐτῶν δὲν διὰ παράπος τε ἐπτείνε μὲν καὶ ἔπεσε πολὺ πόσιν τὸ σῶμα αὐτῆς περικάλυπτε. The parallel is certainly noteworthy, although περικάλυπτε in the Timaeus rather points to a complete envelopment of the heavens, and διὰ παράπος to the universal diffusion of the world-soul throughout the Universe.

616 C 17 ἐκ δὲ τῶν ἀκρῶν κτλ.: 'and from the extremities they saw extended the spindle of Necessity, by which all the revolving spheres are turned. The shaft and hook thereof are made of adamant, and the whorl partly of adamant, and partly of other materials.' With this sentence we pass to the second part of Plato’s description, in which he tries to depict the movements of the celestial bodies by a new image—that of Necessity and her spindle. Regarded in itself, this image is tolerably clear and coherent, if we are willing to allow a large admixture of supernatural mechanics; but Plato fails to shew how it is to be reconciled with what has just preceded, and no one has hitherto succeeded in effecting the reconciliation, without doing violence to the Greek. See on 616 D, E and App. VI. The rapid imagination of the writer has already escaped from the earlier picture and fallen under the spell of a new conception, and we shall best apprehend his meaning if we consider what the peculiar nature of that conception demands. The ordinary spindle was shaped somewhat as in figure iii on p. 444, in which $a$ $b$ is the shaft, and $c$ the whorl. (There is no hook in the figure: but its position would of course be at $a$.) The fibres were attached to the hook and twisted into a thread by the revolutions communicated to the spindle by the finger and thumb; see Blümner Technologie etc. i pp. 109—129, from whom the figure is borrowed. It is essential to the notion of a spindle that the hook should be fastened to the fibres which are to be spun. For this reason Plato finds it necessary, in using the similitude of a spindle, to attach the hook (ἀγκιστρον) to something which may correspond to the fibres; and he accordingly fastens it to the ends of the chains of light depending from the heavens in his previous image, at the point where these ends meet the ends from below, κατὰ μέσον τὸ φῶς. If we treat this construction as a piece of serious mechanics, Plato’s device is open to many obvious criticisms. In fastening the spindle to the ἄκρα τῶν δεσμῶν from above, he forgets or ignores the ends from below. It will further be observed that he says nothing about the direction of the spindle: it is merely ‘stretched from the ends’ of the chains. We shall presently see that the shaft of the spindle symbolises the axis of the Universe, so that—if we are to connect the two images in Plato’s mind—it is natural to suppose that the spindle extends downwards, following the line of the light. Here again there are difficulties, the most serious of which perhaps is that, as the axis of the Universe must go through the earth, the effect of attaching the spindle ‘at the middle of the light’ will be to depress the earth itself below the centre of the whole. But it should be remembered that Plato’s object in this passage is not to furnish a scientific account of the celestial mechanism: see below on 616 D, E, 617 A. We are dealing with a work of literature and not of science, and the machinery of a myth ought not to be rigorously scrutinized from the scientific point of view. Inconsistencies of this kind are found to be inseparable from such poetical representations of the Universe. In the present case they arise chiefly from the juxtaposition of two essentially irreconcilable conceptions—that of a sphere girdled and traversed by light, and that of Necessity and her spindle. See on 616 D, E. For the rest, it should
be noted that adamant symbolises the stable and immovable (cf. Proclus l.c. II 209. 22), and is the appropriate material for the ἡλακάτη, since in Plato’s picture the ἡλακάτη stands for the axis of the whole. ἡλακάτη is not elsewhere found in the sense of the shaft of a spindle: ordinarily it means ‘distaff.’ See on 616 D, E below. Plato does not inform us in what way the whorl is composed of the outermost circle, which is the circle of τούτων (Tim. 36 c), is composed of adamant, the others, which form collectively the circle of δάκτων are made, either in whole or in part, of less durable stuff. Herwerden rejects the preposition before ἀδὰμαντος, without any reason that I can see.

616 C, D 21 την δε του σφυνύλου φυσιν κτλ. The whorl of Necessity’s spindle is a composite structure, consisting of eight concentric hemispheres, fitted into one another like a nest of boxes: see below on 616 E. The adverb διαμετρὶς should be construed with εὐγεφύρεννον.

616 D, E 27 κύκλους κτλ.: lit. ‘shewing their rims as circles above’ (‘so dass sie ihre Ränder oben als Kreise zeigen’—Schneider). Cf. 616 E τον των χειλων κόκλων. The translation “each concentric circle shewing its rim above the next outer” (D. and V.) betrays a complete misapprehension of the whole passage. Donaldson (l.c.) gives the sense correctly: “shewing their rims on the surface like so many circles.” The words νότον—ἐλαχισταν mean “forming a single whorl, with a continuous surface, round the shaft, which is driven right through the middle of the eighth,” not “and on their lower side all together forming one continuous whorl” (Jowett). Νότον is regularly thus used of the upper surface of an object: cf. for example Phaedr. 247 B Eξω πορευεθήσασθαι ἐστήσαν ἐπι τοῦ τοῦ ὄσον νότον. It is important to observe that there is no interval between the different lips: cf. Proclus l.c. II 216. 15 ff. Η συνέχεια της ἐναρμόσεως διὰ τοῦ μη παραμετατείπτων κενῶν συνεχεῖ ποιεῖ το ἐκ πάντων νότων ἐνόομον νότον ἀπὸ κυρτῆς ἐς κυρτῆς διήκον, ἀπὸ τῆς ἐχάργας ἐπὶ τὴν προσάτην, and see on 616 E below. On ἡλακάτην Proclus remarks ἐδε διὰ διαμετρῆς ἐλαλάσθαι διὰ πάντων φοινικὸς τὴν ἡλακάτην, σύνοψις καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν ἐξέφρασε, δε ἢν ἡλακάτην τὸν ἄξονα προειρήκει, καὶ ὅτι παρὰ τὸ ἐλαλάσθαι (l.c. p. 214. 26 ff.). As the usual meaning of ἡλακάτης is “distaff” and not the shaft of a spindle, I think it not unlikely that Proclus is right in this suggestion. For other verbal plays in the myth cf. 620 E n.

In the rings of the different whorls are set the fixed stars and planets in the following order, beginning from the outside (see figure iv on p. 441):

In the first. The fixed stars.
   second. Saturn.
   third. Jupiter.
   fourth. Mars.
   fifth. Mercury.
   sixth. Venus.
   seventh. The Sun.
   eighth. The Moon.

Cf. Tim. 38 C f., where also, as here, Plato is following the Pythagorean order of planets: see Zeller’s 1 pp. 426 f. and (on the whole subject of ancient arrangements of the planets) Hultsch in Pauly-Wissowa, art. Astronomic and Schaubach Gr. Astron. pp. 398 ff. Some later authorities make Plato place Venus before
Mercury (see for example Diels Doxeogr. Gr. p. 345), but the order which I have given is in accord with [Epin.] 986 C— 987 C, and with the views represented by Proclus Lc. p. 219. 3 ff.

This conception of close-fitting concentric whorls, carrying the heavenly bodies in their rims or ‘lips,’ appears to be unique in ancient astronomy. How was Plato led to devise so original an idea? Possibly in this way. It would seem that the Pythagoreans had already developed the astronomical doctrine of Anaximander into a theory of celestial spheres, maintaining that the stars were “fastened in transparent circles or spheres, and turned round by the revolution of these circles on their axes” (Zeller* I p. 415). In order to suit his image of the spindle and whorl, Plato apparently takes these Pythagorean spheres, and cuts them in half, producing a series of hemispheric cups or whorls, in the circular ‘lips’ of which the celestial bodies are fastened or bound (ἐνδομένα, says Theo 150. 14 Hiller: cf. also Proclus Lc. 219. 24).

So far as the Sun, Moon and Planets are concerned, the resulting picture is clear and intelligible, but it is impossible to conceive of the fixed stars as occupying the ‘lip’ of one of the hemispherical whorls in the way in which the Sun for example may be supposed to do so. Whatever view we hold of the rest of the picture, it is likely that in this particular at least Plato himself did not think his comparison adequate to exhibit the phenomena: for in C above he has already represented the outermost heavens, in which dwell the fixed stars, not as the lip of a hemispherical shell or hollow, but as an actual sphere (πάσαν σωφεῖς τήν περιπολάν). (The inconsistency is noteworthy as shewing that the two images employed by Plato are fundamentally irreconcilable. See on 616 C.) By this and other indications we may be led to suspect that the whole theory of hemispherical whorls is only a device rendered necessary by Plato’s similitude. If he had any opinion on the subject at all, he may have accepted the Pythagorean doctrine of spheres; but no conclusion on this matter can be drawn from the Republic. Cf. 617 A n.

According to this reading, which was known to Proclus (Lc. pp. 218 ff.) and is found in all our MSS without any important variation except the omission of ἐκτὸς (line 31) in Var. 0, the order of the different whorls in respect of breadth of rim, beginning with the broadest, is as follows:—

1. Whorl of Fixed Stars (first)  
2. „ Venus (sixth)  
3. „ Mars (fourth)  
4. „ Moon (eighth)  
5. „ Sun (seventh)  
6. „ Mercury (fifth)  
7. „ Jupiter (third)  
8. „ Saturn (second).

See fig. iv on p. 444. (This figure, which is a simplified form of a drawing in Professor Campbell’s Plato’s Republic, published by Murray 1902, is intended to illustrate the upper surface of the whorl of Necessity’s spindle. The small disc in the centre represents a section of the shaft, and the order of breadths of rim is indicated by the arabic numerals.) What does Plato mean us to understand by the different degrees of breadth of rim? On this subject I formerly wrote:—“The simple and natural explanation is that the breadth of the rims represents the size of the different planets. Each rim must of necessity be broad enough to contain the planet which resides in it, and no reason can be conceived why it should be any broader” (Cl. Rev. xv p. 392). In maintaining this view, I supposed that the surfaces of the different whorls were separated from one another by an interval representing the distances between the several planets, interpreting νωτον in 616 E (with Jowett) as the lower and not the upper side of the entire whorl. But, as Professor Cook Wilson points out, the Greek does not allow of this interpretation, for ἀρμωτέων, καθ’ ἑαυτον ἐὰν ἀλλίους ἀρματόντες, and νωτον σωφεῖς ἐνὸς σφουνδολον ἀπεραζομένους περὶ τὴν ἡλικάτην (616 D, E) show conclusively that the individual whorls are fitted closely into one another like a nest of boxes, their upper surfaces forming one continuous plane. Cf. Proclus
l. c. 216. 8 μηδὲνος γὰρ ὄντος κενοῦ μεταξὸς τῶν ἐνημοομένων σφωνόδιων κτλ. From this it follows that, if the breadth of a rim is equal to the diameter of its planet, “planets in the same part of their orbit will touch one another, and if we carry out the principle to the centre whorl, the moon will be always touching the earth. Moreover the outer planet will be continually grazing a fixed star” (Cook Wilson). These considerations are fatal to the view which I advocated; and I take this opportunity of retraction. The theory which has most in its favour, as I now see, is that “the breadth of the rims is intended to signify the supposed distances of the orbits from each other” (Jowett and Campbell). “It would be extraordinary,” writes Professor Cook Wilson, “that Plato in representing the heavenly system by his whorls should not have represented somehow the distances between the orbits of the heavenly bodies, and the obvious way to do this was by making the thickness of the spheres to which they are attached, or (as he prefers whorls on account of the distaff of Necessity), the breadth of the rims of the whorls, symbolize these different distances.” On this view the natural position of the planet will be “close to the outer edge of its rim, and touching the outer surface of its hemisphere.” For a further discussion of this subject see App. VI.

The reading in the text is described by Proclus (l. c. II pp. 218–222) as δευτέρα καὶ νεότερα, κρατοῦσα δὲ ἐν τοῖς κεκολισμένοις (κεκολισμένοις, conjectures Piræ) αὐτογράφοις. Proclus tells us that there was also another reading, προτέρα καὶ ἄρχωντερα, which we can see from his description to have been as follows:—

τοῦ μὲν ὄντος τε καὶ ἐξωτάτων σφωνόδιων πλατύτατον τὸν τοῦ χείλους κύκλον ἔχειν, τὸν δὲ τοῦ ἐβδομοῦ δευτέρου, τρίτον δὲ τὸν τοῦ τετάρτου, τέταρτον δὲ τὸν τοῦ ὄγδου, πέμπτον δὲ τὸν τοῦ ἐβδομοῦ, ἔκτον δὲ τὸν τοῦ πέμπτου, ἑβδομον δὲ τὸν τοῦ τρίτου, ὄγδον δὲ τὸν τοῦ δευτέρου. καὶ τὸν μὲν τοῦ μεγίστου ποικίλον, 35 τὸν δὲ τοῦ ἐβδομοῦ λαμπρότατον, τὸν δὲ τοῦ ὄγδου τὸ χρῶμα ἄπο τοῦ ἐβδομοῦ ἕχει | προσλάμποντος, τὸν δὲ τοῦ δευτέρου καὶ 617 πέμπτου παραπλῆσια ἀλλήλως, ξαθότερα ἐκείνω, τρίτον δὲ λευκότατον χρῶμα ἕχει, τέταρτον δὲ ὑπέρθρον, δευτέρου δὲ λευκότητι τὸν ἐκτόν. κυκλεύσθαι δὲ ἡ στρεφομενον τὸν ἀτρακτον

ποικίλον. The epithet ποικίλον means “spangled,” rather than “exhibiting a variety of colours” (D. and V.). The reference is to the heavens ‘stellis ardentibus aptum’: cf. Proclus l. c. 222. 29 φορὶ ποικίλον μὲν εἶναι τὸν τοῦ μεγίστου διὰ τὴν τῶν ἀπλανῶν ἀστέρων ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ κύκλῳ ποικίλαν and v. 529 C. n.

35 τὸν δὲ τοῦ ἐβδομοῦ κτλ. The attributes which belong to the planets are poetically transferred to the rims which they inhabit.

τὸν δὲ τοῦ ὄγδου. We infer that Plato believed the moon to be an opaque body fastened in the eighth rim and lightened by the Sun. The discovery that the moon shines with borrowed light was ascribed to Anaximenes (Zeller 3 p. 248).

617 Ἡ 1 τὸν δὲ τοῦ δευτέρου καὶ πέμπτου κτλ. The second and fifth are Saturn and Mercury, or Φανίων and Στριβῶν, as they were sometimes called, with reference to their brightness or colour. See the de mundo 2. 392a 23 ff. Yellow, according to Plato, is a mixture of white and red (Tim. 68 B). The third (τρίτον δὲ) or Jupiter was known also as Φανίων, and the fourth, or Mars, as Πυράνεις. Venus, which is the sixth, and comes next to Jupiter in whiteness, had the name Φωσφόρος (de mundo l. c.). Cf. [E]min.] 986 ε. ff. and Diels Dax. Gr. 344.

4 κυκλεύσθαι δὲ δὴ κτλ. Cf. Tim. 36 C. d. The whorl of the fixed stars revolves from East to West, bearing with
it in its revolution the other seven whirls. In this way Plato portrays the apparent daily revolution of the stars and planets. In order to represent the movements of the Sun, Moon and planets in their own particular orbits, Plato says that each of the seven inner whirls is all the while pursuing on its own account a motion in the opposite direction, viz. from West to East. The revolving whirls in the words of Proclus, ‘carry round the stars’ (περιάγωσι τῶν ἀστέρων l.c. p. 226. 12) which are situated in their rims.

Would the mechanism of Plato’s picture really produce the movements which it is intended to portray? The question may be interesting, but is irrelevant. Imaginary machines have imaginary properties; and Plato himself invokes the assistance of supernatural beings to carry on the movements (617 c). The important point to keep in mind, as Professor Cook Wilson observes, is that "Plato has realised that the apparent phenomena are what we call a composition of movements (or velocities). This composition of movements he is not attempting to explain, by giving the sort of machinery which he thought really produced it, but he is endeavouring to make us understand what the movements are (not how they originate), by putting the objects concerned in an imaginary machine, the movements of which we can represent to the senses, and which would produce such movements in the objects as they actually have." For similar reasons it is impossible to draw any inference from this passage as to the question whether Plato believed in the daily revolution of the earth. In the Timaeus, according to Grote (Plato on the Earth’s Rotation, pp. 13 ff.), the cosmical axis is “a solid cylinder revolving or turning round, and causing thereby the revolution of the circumference or the sidereal sphere,” and necessarily also carrying round with itself the Earth, which is massed or globed round the axis of the whole (εἰλικρίνεια περὶ τὸν διὰ πάντοτε πόλον τεταμένον Tim. 40 b. ‘Massed’ or ‘packed’ is Boeckh’s interpretation of εἰλικρίνεια, with which Grote also agrees; but whether the word really bears this meaning, is another question, which we need not here discuss.) In support of his explanation of the passage in the Timaeus, Grote appeals to the myth of the Republic; and the appeal would be justified if Plato’s figure of Necessity’s spindle were intended to explain the cause, and not merely to represent the form, of the celestial motions. As it is, the Republic does not warrant any conclusion either way. Cf. 616 D, E n.

7 τάχυστα μὲν κτλ. Cf. Tim. 38 c, D, 39 c, 40 b and [Epin.] 986 E ff.

617 B 8 ἔμα αἰλήθειας. Πλάτων καὶ οἱ μαθηματικοὶ ἵσον ὅτι τὸν ἡλίου, τὸν ἐσωφρόνον (Venus), Στραβώνα (Mercury): see Diels Dox. Gr. 346 and cf. Tim. 36 D, [Epin.] 986 E and Proclus l.c. 226. 21. Plato’s language certainly means that these three bodies travel at the same pace, and if their speed is the same, obviously they cannot complete their orbits in the same period. But it is doubtful whether the contradiction was present to Plato’s mind, and Proclus may be right in holding that Plato was really thinking of the periods of the planets (l.c. and in Tim. 259 c). See also on 617 B below.

τρίτων δὲ κτλ. See c. n. The article, which was first rejected by Schleiermacher, is probably a ditigraphical mistake. Schneider, Hermann and Baiter retain it, despite the ambiguity.

9 ἐπανακυκλομένου. The revolution, relatively to that of the whole, is retrograde; hence ἐπανακυκλομένου.

11 Ἀνάγκης γίνασιν. Plato means us to imagine Necessity as seated in the centre of the Universe. The notion is
probably Pythagorean; for Parmenides, who attaches himself to the Pythagoreans in this part of his system (Zeller 1 p. 572), speaks of a central 'Ἀνάγκη' as the cause of all movement and birth: see Diels *Dox. Gr.* 335. 12 ff. τῶν δὲ συμμονῶν (sc. στεφάνων) τὴν μεσαίτατην ἄτοις τοιάδε πάσης κινήσεως καὶ γενεσιον ὑπάρχειν, ἡπτών καὶ δαιμων κυβερνητών καὶ κληρονόμων ἐπορεύεται δύσει τε καὶ ἀνάγκη, and Zeller l.c. 577 n. 3. (Zeller identifies this Ἀνάγκη with the central fire of the Pythagoreans.) The same school seem also to have held that 'Ἀνάγκη surrounds and holds the world together (Diels l.c. 321), and Zeller thinks it is this external 'Ἀνάγκη of which Plato here avails himself (l.c. p. 434 n. 3). But it is quite certain that Plato’s Ἀνάγκη is in the middle: see on 616 B and 621 A, B. The interpretation of Plato’s symbolism of course is that necessity and law spin the threads of life—the life of the universe as well as that of man. ἐν τοῖς τῷ Ἀνάγκης γύναιν is an echo of θεῶν ἐν γυναικὶ γίνεται and the like: cf. Proclus l.c. 227. 12.

έπεὶ δὲ τῶν κύκλων κτλ. ἑβηκόντα means ‘is perched.’ Proclus more suo assures us that the Sirens are ψευδεῖν νωρίτερ ἄνωθεν (l.c. 238. 6), but they are of course only a poetic fiction to express the ‘music of the spheres.’ Cf. *Merchant of Venice* v i. “There’s not the smallest orb which thou beholdst, But in his motion like an angel sings.” Plato goes beyond Shakespeare, setting the angels on the orbs and making them sing. Cf. Milton *Arcades* 63 ff. “the celestial Sirens’ harmony That sit upon the nine”—in Plato there are only eight—“infolded Spheres.” The seven planets by their movements were supposed by the Pythagoreans to give forth sounds corresponding to the notes of the Heptachord. This was probably the original form of the ‘Music of the Spheres.’ Later, it was held that the circle of the fixed stars had also a note of its own, and a ‘harmony’ or mode (see on 111 398 E ff.) resulted like that of the Octachord. The underlying idea of the doctrine of the ‘Music of the Spheres’ was well expressed by Dorylaus when he said the Universe was the ‘organum Dei’ (Censor. de die natali 13; cf. also Milton *Ode on the Nativity*

"And bid the bass of heaven’s deep organ blow"). See also next note.

12 φωνή μίαν, ἕνα τόνον: ‘a single sound, a single musical note.’ "Additum ἐν τὸνον per exepexesis est" (Stallbaum). Cf. Proclus l.c. 236. 27 ff. η μὲν γὰρ μιᾷ φωνῇ ὁλῷ τῆς ἀμετάβολης τοῦ τῆς ἐνεργείας εἴδους εἰς ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο μέλος ὑπάρχειν, ὡς ἐκάστης Σειρήνος δὲ τὴν αὐτήν λείψαν φωνήν ὁ δὲ εἰς τόνον τὴν ποιάν φωνήν ἐδηλώσαν εἰς ἐνός ἀτίλλησιν φθόγγον τελωναίαν παρά γὰρ τὴν τάσιν καὶ οἱ φθόγγοι καλείται τόνοι. There is also perhaps a slight rhetorical effect, though less than in τὸ δεύτερον, τὸ μέγα ἸΧ 590 A. The reading ἕνα τόνον is confirmed by Plut. de anim. procr. 620 C and Proclus in *Tim.* 250 C and in *rep.* l.c. et al. It is difficult to understand ἄνα τόνον, which Hermann and Baiter read, following y and a few inferior MSS. ἄνα τόνον could hardly mean ‘one note each,’ as Hermann supposes. With regard to the ἄρμονια itself, the pitch of the several notes will of course be determined by the speed of the different whorls (cf. VII 530 D ff.), so that if we express the notes by the names of the circles which produce them, the ἄρμονια will be—

Circle of the Fixed Stars (νῆης)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Moon</th>
<th>Venus</th>
<th>Mercury</th>
<th>Mars</th>
<th>Jupiter</th>
<th>Saturn</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

It is clear that Plato is thinking of a sort of mode (ἐν πασὶ δὲ ὀκτὼ ὀνομαὶ ἄρμονιαν εὐφωμικῶν), but if we understand ἄνα ἀλήθεια strictly, there will only be six notes, because Mercury, Venus and the Sun will each have the same note. Difficulties of this sort might have troubled the later Pythagoreans, but scarcely Plato, least of all in an imaginative picture of this kind. We note however that according to Plato the speed of the planets—except in the case of the Sun, Venus and Mercury—diminishes in proportion to their distance from the Earth. Now we may reasonably suppose that Plato thought the more distant planets took longer to complete their orbit than those which are nearer, so that
it is by no means improbable that in speaking of the speed of the planetary movements, Plato really had in his mind the time occupied by the orbital periods and not the rate of progression of the planets themselves. See also above on ἀλλας ἀλλας. In that case the octave will be complete, because in order to complete their orbits in the same time, the Sun, Venus and Mercury will have to travel at different rates of speed. Later writers knew all about the Music of the Spheres, and a choir of eight Neo-Pythagoreans would have had no difficulty in rendering it on a small scale: see for example von Jan’s Mus. Ser. Gr. pp. 241 ff., 271 ff., 418 f. Cf. also Zeller’s 1 pp. 429—434.

617 C 15 Μοίρας, λευχειμονούσας. Ettig l.c. p. 309 n. 3 thinks this an Orphic trait, comparing 253 Abel Μοίρας—λευχοστόλους.

16 ἐπὶ τῶν κεφαλῶν. These words are bracketed by Herder, on the ground that περὶ τὰς κεφαλὰς would alone be good Greek, an opinion which few scholars will share.

17 Λάξευσιν μὲν κτλ. Lachesis is the Fate of the Past, Clotho of the Present, and Atropos of the Future: cf. Latos 950 c, where Plato approves of the ancient tradition Λάξευσιν μὲν τὴν πρῶτην εἶναι, Κλωδώ de τὴν δευτέραν, τὴν Ἀτροπον de τρίτην and Proclus l.c. 244. 20 ff. The positions of Lachesis and Atropos were sometimes interchanged, as for example in [Arist.] de mundō 7. 401 b 18 ff. τέτακται de κατὰ μὲν τὸ γεγονὸς μιὰ τῶν Μοίρων, Ἀτροπος, ἐπὶ τὰ παρελθόντα πάντα ἀπρεπτά ἔστω, κατὰ de τὸ μέλλον Λάξευσις (ἐὰν πάντα γιαρ ἢ κατὰ φύσιν μὲνει λῆμεν), κατὰ de τὸ ἐνεστὸς Κλωδώ, συμπεριούντα τὰ καὶ κλωδώνικα ἐκτὸς τα ὀκεῖα: cf. also Proclus l.c. 244.

19 τῇ δεξιᾷ χείρι. The right hand is reserved for the outermost whorl, or circle of the Same, which is the more honourable, and it self, according to Tim. 30 C, moves ἐπὶ δεξιά: the left for the less honourable circle of the Other, which moves ἐπὶ ἀριστερά (ib.). Pythagorean influence is doubtless at work again here: cf. 614 c n. ἀνεπιστρεφένει: “cum matre simul vertere” (Ficinus).

20 τῇ ἐξ ἐπεριφοράν κτλ. The Circle of the Same may be taken as the type of that which ‘is’: hence it is entrusted to Clotho, the Fate of τὰ ὕπτα. The course of the Planets or ‘wandering’ stars are symbolic of the unknown and (as it seems to us) uncertain Future, so that they are appropriately given to the Fate of the Future, i.e. Atropos. διαλείπουσαν χρό-

617 C 21 τῇ de Δάξευσιν κτλ.: ‘while Lachesis lays hold of either in turn, the one with the one hand, the other with the other’ (‘abwechselnd den einen mit der einen, den andern mit der andern angreifend’ Schneider). She turns the circle of the Same with her right hand, the others—here treated as a single περιφορά as in Tim. 30 C—with her left. The translation “laying hold of either in turn, first with one hand and then with the other” (Jowett) is not, I think, what Plato means: for it would seem from what is said of Clotho and Lachesis that the right hand is appropriated to the circle of the Same, the left to that of the Other: see on 617 C. The words ἐν μέρει—’if my view is right—belong only to ἐκατέρας ἐφάπτεσθαι and not also to ἐκατέρα τῇ χείρι. As the fate
Past, Lachesis fitly contributes to both revolutions: for on the Past depends both the Present and the Future. A similar lesson is conveyed by representing the lots and samples of lives as lying in the lap of Lachesis: cf. also 620A κατὰ συνθέσεων—αἰρῆσθαι and 620 E νῦν.

617 D—619 A As soon as they arrived upon the scene, the souls were called upon to choose new lives. The order of choosing was determined by lot; but there were many more samples of lives than lots, and every soul was made responsible for its own choice. The moment of choice is the supreme crisis of our fate, and it behooves us to spare no effort to epitomize ourselves for resisting the attractions of wealth and power, and selecting the better life, that is, the life of virtue.

27 'Ανάγκης κτλ. Proclus remarks on the style of this speech deserve attention: παντάκοι μὲν ὁ Πλατών ὑπὸ ἀναμένοντα διέφθασεν νοερῶν ὡσεὶς ἐπιτίθετο διότι ἐνέθετο θεαμάτων ὡσεὶς ἐκ καὶ τῶν κρίσισιν ἡμῶν ἀπευθυνότα, σοφὸς ἐνθάδε προσέκου καὶ τῶν φυσικῶν μορίων μετέτα, βίατα διέφκ τέτερ βέλη νόμων καὶ ψυχήν ὑπερ-βάδων συνεφορμότας διὰ αὐτοῦ τῆς ἐρευνήα ταῖς νοήμονι ἀκαλλωτοχείς συνεσπευμένοι μὲν χρῆται φύλεταισιν, ἀποδεικνύα διὰ ἀπ' ἀλλ' ἀλλ' ἀλλ' ἀλλ' διαπείρα τῶν ἀπώ- λετων μοιμοίων βεβ' τῆς φύσης ἄτ' ἄλλων ἐν ἄλλα πᾶσάς οἷα καὶ διὰ τῶν ἑγαίητα τῶν τῶν προφήτης λόγον, ἐν ἐκλασεῖν μὲν ἀπετροχαίρα γνώματα εὐλαβείον, ἀσύνετα διὰ τ' ἄρα πλείονοι φυ- λετάμεοι, συντρέψα δὲ τ' κώλα ταῖς αἰνή- μασι παραπλησίων (I. c. 269). The omission of articles and other adjectives and impressiveness: cf. VII 518 A ap."
618 A] ΠΟΛΕΙΤΙΑΣ 1

Εἰ δαίμον λήγεται, ἀλλ' ύμεις δαίμονα αἰρήσεσθε. πρῶτος δὲ ὁ λαχῶν πρῶτος αἰρείσθω βλον, ὁ συνεῖσται εἰς ἀνάγκης. ἀρετή 30 δὲ αδεσποτον ήν τιμῶν καὶ ἀτιμάζων πλέον καὶ ἐπιτον αὐτῆς ἐκαστος ἐξει. αἰτία ἐλομένου θεός ἀναιτίος. ταῦτα εἰπόντα ἔγιναι ἐπὶ πάντας τοὺς κλήρους, τὸν δὲ παρ' αὐτὸν πεσόντα ἐκαστον ἐναιρεῖσθαι, πλὴν οὐ. ἐν οὐκ ἔαν. τὸ δὲ ἀνελομένῳ 618 δήλον εἶναι, ὅποστος εἰλήχει. μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο αὖθις τὰ τῶν βίων 35 παραδείγματα εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν σφῶν θεῦναι ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν, πολὺ


29 πρῶτος—βλον. See on 618 A πολὺ πλείω τῶν παράνομων.

30 εἰς ἀνάγκης. The choice, though free, is irreconcilable: ἐνέκοψε γὰρ καὶ ἄλλοι βίων γὺν, ἄλλα πρὸ τῆς αἰρέσους, μετὰ δὲ τὴν αἰρέσιν ἀδυνάτων (Proclus l.c. 275).

Ἀρετὴ δὲ αδεσποτον. "Mortals that would follow, Love Virtue, she alone is free" (Milton Comus 1018 f.). On Platonist principles, a thing is in so far as it is good (VI 509 B ff.), so that our true individuality is something more or less than that which is the best and highest part of our nature: cf. the words of Aristotle, who in Eth. Nic. X 7. 1178a 2 πλατωνίεις as follows: δόξεις δ' ἀν καὶ ἕκαστος τούτο (i.e. τὸ κράτιστον τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ), εἰπὸ τὸ κύριον καὶ ἀμείων. We therefore attain our fullest development and enjoy our only true liberty as individuals by becoming servants of Virtue. In the words of Goethe, "Das Gesetz nur kann uns Freiheit geben." Proclus' comment, though true and instructive as far as it goes, does not exhaust the significance of Plato's saying: αδεσποτον δὲ τὴν ἀρετήν, ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν μόνων, ἀλλ' διὰ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐλευθέραν ἀποτελεῖ τῶν πικρατάτων ἄνθρωπών, οἷς ἡ δολεροσκούσα τῶν ἀγαθῶν στρέφει πάντων (l.c. 276. 5 ff. Cf. also Pl. Rep. 1 320 c an especially Xen. Mem. IV 5. 3—5). The germ of the Platonic doctrine of moral freedom is to be found in the Socratic αἰδῆς ἐκὼν τοπὴς (see on IX 577 D, E): for its sequel, we should look to the Stoic theory of the freedom of the wise man (ἐλευθέρους τοὺς στοιχεῖας ἄνω Zeno ap. D. L. vni 33): see especially Epictetus Gnom. Epit. Slob. 31 ed. Schenkl ἐλευθερία καὶ δολερία, τὸ μὲν ἀρετῆς δόμα, τὸ δὲ κακίας and the chapter πρὸ τοῦ ἐλευθερίας ib. Dissert. IV 1.

32 αἰτία—ἀναιτίος. Cf. II 379 B ff. and Tim. 42 D. The whole of Lachesis' speech is frequently quoted or referred to by later Greek writers (see the references in Schneider's note), and these words in particular became a kind of rallying-cry among the champions of the freedom of the will in the early Christian era (Dietrich Nek. p. 115 n.). A bust of Plato found at Tibur and dating from the first century B.C. bears the inscription αἰτία ἐλομένω (sic). Θεὸς ἀναιτίος, together with ψυχὴ τάσα ἀδύνατον (from Phaedr. 245 c). See Kaibel IGIS 1196 quoted by Dietrich I.c. With the sentiment itself cf. Laws 504 B—D.

618 A 2 πολὺ πλείω τῶν παράνομων. Cf. 619 B, 620 c. The combination of κλήρωσις and αἰρέσις, which appears also in Phaedr. 249 b, is according to Thompson "a mythical mode of reconciling freedom and necessity—choice being left free under limiting conditions."

I think the introduction of the lot is rather intended to account for the conspicuous inequalities between different men in respect of accidents of birth, fortune and the other ἀδύναμα προγενέσθαι (to use a Stoic term). Ceteris paribus, a soul would presumably select a μέτριος κεκατομμυρισμός βίων: where it does not, we may suppose, in general, that the κλήρωσις compelled it to choose late. Cf. Plot. Ennead. 11 3. 15 οἱ κλήροι τίνες; —τὸ εἰσάλλεν εἰς τὸν τὸ σῶμα καὶ τοῦδε γονέων καὶ ἐν τοῦτο τότες γίνεσθαι, καὶ ὅλως, ὡς εἰσομένε, τά ἔξω. This interpretation is supported also by the case of Odysseus below (620 c). See also on 619 D.
πλεία τῶν παρόντων εἶναι δὲ παντοδαπά τοιούτων βίους καὶ δὴ καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἀπαντᾶται. τυραννίδας τε γὰρ
5 ἐν αὐτοῖς εἶναι, τὰς μὲν διατελεῖς, τὰς δὲ καὶ μεταξὺ διαθειρομένας καὶ εἰς πενίας τε καὶ φυγάς καὶ εἰς πτωχείας τελευτάσας· εἶναι
dὲ καὶ δοκίμων ἀνδρῶν βίους, τοὺς μὲν ἐπὶ εἰδέσιν καὶ κατὰ κάλλη
καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἵσχυν τε καὶ ἀγανίαν, τοὺς δὲ ἐπὶ γένεσιν καὶ προ-
γόνων ἀρεταίς, καὶ ἀδοκίμων κατὰ ταυτὰ ὀσαύσσον δὲ καὶ γνώι-
10 κων. Ψυχής δὲ τάξιν οὖν εὐείς, διὰ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ἔχειν ἄλλον
ἐλομένην βίον ἄλλοις γίγνεσθαι· τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ἄλληλοις τε καὶ
πλούσιοι καὶ πενίαις, τὰ δὲ νόσοις, τὰ δὲ ὑμείαις μεμιχθαί, τὰ δὲ
καὶ μεσὸν τοῦτον. ἔνθα δὴ, ὅσ οἰκεῖν, ὁ φίλε Πλάκουν, ὁ πάς
κύδωνος ἀνθρώπως, καὶ διὰ ταύτα μάλιστα ἐπιμελητήν, ὅποις
15 ἐκαστὸς ἡμῶν τῶν ἄλλων μαθημάτων ἀμελήσας τοῦτον τοῦ μαθῆ-
ματος καὶ ζητήσει καὶ μαθήτης ἔσται, εάν ποιεῖν οίον τῇ ἡ μαθείν

3 ξών τε γὰρ κτλ. Did Plato seriously believe in the transmigration of the soul? Teichmüller summarily dismisses the entire theory as unplatonistic (Did Plat. Frage pp. 1—10), while Susemihl, in harmony with certain ancient writers (see the references in Simson Der Briefgr. d. Seile bei Platon p. 152 h.), takes Plato at his word so far as concerns the passage of the soul into new human bodies, but refuses to allow that he could have believed in transmigration into the forms of the lower animals (Genet. Enzyk. ii p. 272). Plato's language is however quite explicit, and there is the less reason for resorting to an allegorical interpretation, because the doctrine was already familiar in Greek philosophical and religious thought (see F. Ludwig Wessen u. Ursprung d. Lehre v. d. Präexistenz d. Seele etc. pp. 12—29 and Rohde Psyche ii pp. 162 ff.), and is itself in general conformity with Plato's own conception of immortality. The doctrine of transmigration meets us frequently in Plato's dialogues, e.g. in Men. 81 A ff.; Phaed. 81 E ff.; 113 S; Phaedr. 249 B; Tim. 42 B ff.; cf. 61 D ff. Most if not all of these passages have a mythical colouring, and should therefore be read in the light of the caveat which Plato subjoins to the eschatological myth of the Phaedo: τὸ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα διαχωρισθῶσαί αὐτὸς ἔχειν, ὡς ἑνώ διελθήσατα, οὐ πρέπει νῦν ἐχοντι ἀνδρί· ἰδί μέντοι ἡ ταύτ' ἐστιν
ἡ ἄνοια· ἐτά τὰς ψυχὰς ἡμῶν—ἐπειπερ ἄδαιτον γε ἡ ψυχὴ φαί-
νεται οὖσα, τοῦτο καὶ πρέπει μοι δοκεῖ καὶ ἄξον κυνεύοντα, ὅμιλον ἤπη (114 B). That soul is immortal, Plato is firmly convinced; and transmigration he regards as probable, to say the least. Cf. 608 B n.

5 διατελεῖς. This word, for which Cobet proposes δα ταύτως, is extremely rare in classical Greek, occurring only here and in Soph. Ο.C. 1514.

6 εὶς πενίας κτλ. “Expectue εἰς φυγάς τε καὶ πενίας καὶ εἰς πτωχείας ταύτα.” (Herwerden). The text may well stand. Plato contrasts poverty and exile (πενίας τε καὶ φυγάς) with bigotry, presumably at home (καὶ εἰς πτωχείας).

618 B 10 ψυχής δὲ ταύτ· γίγνεσθαι. Cf. Hom. Od. XVIII 136 f. τοὺς γὰρ νόσους ἑπικαθορίων ἀνθρώπων | ὅσον εἰπ' ἡμοι ἄγριγο θηρᾶν ἀνδρῶν ταῦτα τε, ΧΒ 3221, and Empedocles 319 f. Karsten δοσον γ' ἄλλους μετέφρασεν, τούσον ἄρ ποτα ἄριστοι καὶ τὸ φρονέων ἄλλου παριστάτω μεν ἐπικαθοριών μετ' ἐν την οὐκ εἶναι ἄριστοι μετέφρασεν. Καρστέν ad loc. See also on 1 335 B.

11 τα ἄλλα: sc. except ψυχής ταύτων. In τα ἄλλα are included κάλλος, προτύπων ἀρεταί etc.

13 μεσόν τοῦτων: i.e. μεσότοιν εἶναι τούτων, viz., πλούσιοι καὶ πενίαις, νόσου καὶ ὑμείας. Cf. 619 A τον μέσον των τοῦτων βίων.

618 C 15 τοῦ μηθήματος and μαθέων καὶ ἐξερευνῶν are bracketed by Herwerden. The emphatic pleonasm is thoroughly Platonic. Cf. V 472 C et al.
καὶ ἐξεύρειν, τὸς αὐτὸν ποιῆσει δυνατὸν καὶ ἐπιστήμωνα, βίον καὶ χρηστὸν καὶ πονηρὸν διαγραφώσκοντα, τὸν βελτίων ἐκ τῶν δυνατῶν ἀεὶ πανταχόοις αἱρεῖσθαι, ἀναλογιζόμενον πάντα τὰ νῦν ὑπὲρ τῆν νέαν πρὸς ἀρετὴν, καὶ ξυνιστέμενα ἀλλήλοις καὶ διαιρούμενα, πρὸς ἀρετὴν βίοιν 20 ἑκάστην τοῦ πῶς ἔχει, καὶ εἰδέναι τί κάλλος πενία ἡ πλούτων κραδέν καὶ μετὰ ποιὰς τινὰς ψυχῆς ἐξεις κακῶν ὁ ἀγαθὸν ἐργάζεται, καὶ τί εὐφέ

619 νοι καὶ τοῦ ἀμείνον βίον χείρω 1 μὲν καλοῦντα δι αὐτὴν ἐκεῖσε ἀξιὸν, εἰς τὸ ἀδίκοστέραν γινεῖσθαι, ἀμείνον δὲ ὅστις εἰς τὸ δικαίοστέραν. τὰ δὲ ἀλλὰ πάντα χαίρειν ἐάσει ἐσώρακαμεν γὰρ, 30 ὅτι ζωντες τὰ καὶ τελευτᾶσαντες αὐτὴν κρατιστή αἴρεσις. ὧδαμαντί

XVI. Καὶ δὴ οὖν καὶ τότε ὁ ἐκεῖθεν ἀγγελὸς ἡγγελεῖ τὸν μὲν προφήτην οὕτως εἰπεῖν· καὶ τελευταῖος ἐπιστῶν, εἴνυ νῦ ἐλομένῳ, 10

21 καὶ εἰδέναι Ξ.: εἰδέναι Α. 10. νῦ Λ. Δ.: ομ. Α.λ."
II συντόνως ζωντί: according to the motto (άπλοίς και) άπειν (vIII 547Ε). συντόνως ζωντίων, which Herderen conjectured, appears in q and Flor. U: but the reading of A is far more characteristic and significant.

619 B—620 D Many were the instances of hasty and foolish choices: and many the changes resulting both from choice and from the action of the lot. He who is ever faithful to the life of true philosophy, and whose lot does not fall out among the last, will be happy throughout all time. The spectacle was indeed one fitted to move pity, smiles, and wonder. In most cases, the souls chose in conformity with their previous lives—Orpheus, for example, selecting the life of a swan, Ajax that of a lion, and so on. It chanced that Odysseus had drawn the last lot of all, and after long search he found and joyously laid hold of the peaceful life of a private individual, for he was wearied of all his labours. There were changes from beasts to men, and from men to beasts, and every form of permutation.

619 C 21 ἔθει ἀνευ φιλοσοφίας κτλ. Cf. Phaed. 82 Α. Ε. οἱ τὴν ὅρμησιν καὶ πολιτικὴν ἀρετὴν ἐπιτηδεύσκεις, ἢν δὴ καλοῦσι σοφοφοὺς τε καὶ δικαιοσύνην, ἐξ ἔνδοις τε καὶ μελέτης γεγονόνacons anευ φιλο-

—σοφίας τε καὶ νοῦ, and see also on vi 500 D, 506C. It is interesting to observe that philisophic virtue is not a sine qua non for admission to the Platonic heaven. Throughout the whole myth, rewards and punishments are distributed for good and bad actions rather than for knowledge and ignorance (cf. 615 B ff.); and correct opinion or 'Orthodoxy,' in Plato's sense of the word, provided the lines have fallen to it in pleasant places, may well have been both blameless and beneficent on earth. But in the moment of supremest peril (618 B), when we have to choose another life, it is Knowledge, and not 'Orthodoxy,' that prevails. In the Phaedo 1c. Plato says that the 'orthodox' probably enter as before εἰς τοιούτως—πολιτικῶς τε καὶ ἡμερῶν γένος, ἢ τοὺς μελέτων ἢ σφηκῶν, ἢ μυροβάλων, ἢ καὶ εἰς τούτων γε πάλιν τὸ ἀνθρώπινον γένος, καὶ γίνεσθαι εξ αὐτῶν ἀνδρας μετριότεροι.

619 D 22 ὅδε καὶ εἶπεν: not "according to Er's account" (D. and V.), but 'as one might say,' 'broadly speaking,' i.e. ὡς ἔπος εἶπεν. Cf. Laws 659 Ε (εἰς-

27 καὶ διὰ—τὸν ἀσφαλέ, although Richards asserts that "etia has no meaning, unless there was an of preceding." 620 A 2 κατά συνήθειαν κτλ. Cf. Phaed. 81 E ff. ἐνδοῦντα δὲ, ἀποτελεῖ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους νόμον. See also on 618 A and following note. 28 ἐπί κτλ. The connexion of ideas is: The fortune of the lot, and our individual choice, are the two influences that affect our destiny: for if our lot is reasonably early and we choose as befits philosophers, it will be well with us. ἐπί "redhit ratium ant dictorum" (Schneider). The sense is surely both plain and satisfactory, although Richards asserts that "etia has no meaning, unless there was an of preceding."
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

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βίον' εἶναι δὲ τὴν Ἀιαντὸς τοῦ Τελαμονίου, φεύγουσαν ἀνθρωπον το γενέσθαι, μεμημένην τῆς τῶν ὁπλῶν κρίσεως. τὴν δ' ἐπὶ τούτῳ 'Αγαμέμνονες ἔχθρα δὲ καὶ ταύτην τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου γένους διὰ τὰ πάθη ἀετοῦ διαλλάξαι βίον. ἐν μέσοις δὲ λαχοῦσαν τὴν Ἀταλάντης ψυχήν, κατιδοῦσαν μεγάλας τιμὰς ἀθλητοῦ ἀνδρός, οὐ δύνασθαι παρελθεῖν, ἀλλὰ λαβεῖν. μετὰ δὲ τὰ ταύτην ἵδειν τὴν 'Επειοῦ C 15 τοῦ Πανοπέως εἰς τεχνικῆς γνωϊκὸς ιδιώταν φύσιν πόρρω δ' ἐν ὑστάτως ἵδειν τὴν τοῦ γελοτοπονίου Θεσρίτου πίθηκον ἐνυδαμένην. κατὰ τύχην δὲ τὴν 'Οδυσσέας, λαχοῦσαν πασῶν υστάτην, αἰρησιμεμένην λέναι, μυνήμη δὲ τῶν προτέρων πῶν φιλοτιμίας λεοφηνυκίαι ζητεῖν περιούσαν χρόνον πολὺν βίον ἀνδρός ἰδίωτον ἀπράγμονος καί μόρις εὐρείν κειμενόν ποι καὶ παρημελημένον ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων καὶ εἴπειν 1 ἰδοῦν, ὅτι τὰ αὐτὰ ἀν ἐπράξεν καὶ πρῶτα λαχῶσα, καὶ ἀσμένην ἐλέσθαι. καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων δὴ θηρίων

from these passages that some of the ancient sources found a subtle significance in εἰκοστὴν: but the particular number is probably only a circumstantial detail intended to add verisimilitude to the narrative. See also on 614 b. Herderwen conjectures ωσαίτικ, ὡτὶ τὸ <εἰκοστὸν...> εἰκοστὴν δὲ κτλ., and inserts between εἰκός and εἰκοστὴν the words καί ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων—μύρισθαι from 620 D. There is however nothing to indicate that the text has suffered dislocation: see on 620 D below.

Λέστων βίον. Elittig (Acheanitica I.c. p. 310) explains the choice of Ajax by referring to Tim. 91 e τὸ δ' ἀκ πεισόν καὶ θρόδη γέγονεν έκ τῶν μὴν προσχρωμένων φιλοσοφίας, but the conspicuous feature in Ajax was θυσίας, and that is why he selects the life which typifies τὰ θυσίας: see ix 588 E. Cf. Proclus I.c. 316. 31 ff. ἡ μὲν Ἀλκατος ψυχή πάσαν δηλοὶ ἐνε ψάρει αὐτῆς μὲν πλεονάσαν δὲ κατὰ τὸν θυσίαν διὰ δὴ τοῦτον πλησίον ψυχῆς του, καὶ διὰ ταύτην ἐνυδαμένην εἰς αὐτῶν μὲν ψύχων, ἄλογον δὲ. Empedocles, we are as told, held τὴν ἀράτην εἶναι μετακομίσι τῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, εἶ μὲν εἰς ζῶον ἡ λίκε χαίναυτός μεταγενός, λέστων γέγονεν, εἰ δὲ εἰς φυτοῦ, δάφνην (Ael. Hist. An. XII 7): see Karsten on vv. 382 ff. of the περὶ φύσεων.

620 C 16 Θεσρίτου. Thersites is the type of the ποιητὴς ἰδιώτης in Cor. 515 e. Here, as often in later Greek writers, he stands for the buffoon (παγ- γέλους ἀνθρωπὸς διάστροφος τὸ σώµα καὶ λεοφηνυκίαι Lucian adv. ind. 7). Cf. also Soph. Phil. 442 ff., Theopomp. Fr. 262 in Müller Fr. Hist. Gr. 1 p. 323 and Pythag. Similar. 32 in Mullach Fr. Phil. Gr. 1 p. 489, in the last of which passages Thersites and Achilles stand for two opposite types. The different varieties of lives which are illustrated in this passage (μονοικός, παλαικός, βασιλικός, γυμναστικός, τεχνικός, μωσικός) appear also (as Proclus observes l.c. 316. 25 ff.) in Phaedr. 248 b, e. See also Empedocles vv. 384—386 and Karsten ad loc.

πίθηκον. Cf. IX 590 b. 19 ἀπράγμονος. Enaeibus (Praes. Ev. XIII 16. 11) has καὶ ἀπράγμονος, which occurs also in one of the Vatican mss. Cobet would alter ἀπράγμονος to ἀπράγμονων. The text is quite satisfactory: οὐτὰ δ' ἰδιώτων is virtually a single word: cf. ἀφάνε—σοφαίντες Prot. 312 c, ὠπὶ ἀνδρὸς θυτί οὐδὲ θυτι πρεσβύτην πατέρα Εκθερή. 15 Λ. ἀνήρ ματίς, ἀνὴρ νοεῖς, ἀνήρ νοεῖς ἀνήρ νοεῖς ἀνήρ νοεῖς and the like. “Sunt idem vasali praepos: Ulysses anima vitam ἀνδρὸς ἰδιώτων e numero τῶν ἀπραγμών quaeerebat” (Schneider).

620 D 22 καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων—μύρισθαι. See on 620 b. Herderwen’s transposition is the less defensible because the words καὶ πάσας μικρὲς μύρισθαι form an appropriate ending to this part of the picture.
...
5 Ἀμέλητα ποταμόν. Cf. Virg. Æn. vi 714 f. Letheai ad fluminis undam Scevros latices, et longa oblivia potant. Many other parallels are quoted by Dieterich Ἀεί. pp. 90—94. As the πεδίων Ἀθῆς has its counterpart in the πεδίων Ἀλκείας, so also we find traces in Greek legend of a ὑδρὸς Μνημοσύνης as well as the ὑδρὸς Λήσης (Paus. i 39. 8).

7 τοὺς δὲ—μέτρον is missing in g and several other ms. “Fortasse supercurvacæa adeoque inexact haec videbatur alicui, qui statim quelibet postquam bibisset omnia obliviscens videtur. Sed obliviosis vis et pertinacia varia est. Qui nimiim bibit, in perpetuum obliviscitur, qui moderates, discere aliquando suum recordando scientiam repetere potest” (Schneider). μάθησις, we remember, is ἀναμνήσις (Phaed. 76 a: cf. also 75 d and 76 d). It is likely enough that the Platonic doctrine of ἀναμνήσις was suggested by earlier Pythagorean beliefs of the same kind (Dieterich l.c. p. 122: cf. also Rohde i.c. p. 186 n.)

621 B 8 ἐπιλαμβάνεσθαι. There is no good reason for transferring this place to the clause αὐτὸς—πειρᾶς as Herwerden wishes to do. In treating of this passage, Proclus quotes an interesting fragment of Aristotle's dialogue 'On the Soul' (l.c. 349. 17 ff. = Rose 1480d 5 ff.): φησὶ γὰρ ὅν πάντῃ (sc. ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης) καὶ αὐτὸς ἐκ μὲν ὑγείας εἰς νόσον ὁδειότατα ὅπερ ἠσχέν τινας καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν γραμμάτων ὑπ' ἐμα- μάθησεν, ἐκ νόσου δὲ εἰς ὑγείαν ὠστᾶ καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν γραμμάτων ἐν ἑμα- μάθησεν, ἐκ νόσου δὲ εἰς ὑγείαν ὠστᾶ καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν γραμμάτων ἐν ἑμα- μάθησεν.  

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πιείν· ὅπῃ μέντοι καὶ ὅπως εἰς τὸ σῶμα ἀφίκετο, οὐκ εἰδέναι, ἀλλ' ἐξαίφνης ἀναβλέψας ἰδεῖν ἔωθεν αὐτὸν κείμενον ἐπὶ τῇ πυρᾷ.
καὶ οὖτως, ὦ Γλαύκων, μύθος ἐσώθη καὶ οὐκ ἀπώλετο, καὶ ᾗ ἡμᾶς ἀν σῶσειν, ἀν πειθόμεθα αὐτῷ, καὶ τὸν τῆς Δήθης ποταμὸν εὔ διαβησόμεθα καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν οὐ μιανθήσομεθα. ἀλλ' ἂν ἐμοὶ πειθόμεθα, νομίζοντες ἀδιάνταν ψυχήν καὶ δυνατήν πάντα μὲν κακὰ ἀνέχεσαι, πάντα δὲ ἀγαθά, τῆς ἄνω ὄδοις ἀεὶ ἐξόμεθα καὶ δικαιοσύνην μετὰ φρονήσεως παντὶ τρόπῳ ἐπιτεθεύσομεν, ἵνα καὶ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς φίλοι όμεν καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς, αὐτοῦ τε μένοντες ἐνθάδε, καὶ ἐπειδὴ τὰ ἄθλα ἀυτῆς κομίζωμεθα, ὡστερ οἱ νυκτηροὶ περιαγειρόμενοι, καὶ ἐνθάδε καὶ ἐν τῇ χιλιετεὶ πορείᾳ, ἤν διεληλύθαμεν,
ev πράττωμεν.

τέλος πολιτείας 1.


13 ἔωθεν. ἄνωθεν (see cr. n.), which appears also in ν, is approved by Richards, but adds nothing to the meaning. ἔωθεν is of course the morning of the twelfth day as μέσας νύκτας above was the midnight of the eleventh: cf. ἀκοθεκατοὶ—ἀνδρὶ 611 b. and 616 b n.
nελίμενον. See cr. n. ἤθη is inappropriate in itself, and has little authority besides Ἀ.
14. μύθος—οὐκ ἀπώλετο. A Scholastic remarks: τοῖς μὲν ὑπὸ πολλοὶ προστίθεναι τοὺς μύθοις ἔδω ἢν, ὅτι μύθος ἀπώλετο, διεκινήθην τουλάχιστον ὥστε ἡ μύθοι λέγονται μὴ ἰδα, καὶ ἦν ἐρήμηθην καὶ οὐκ εἶχον. (Cf. Theol. 164 d and Phil. 14 Λ.) Πλάτων δὲ τοιναύταν πανταχοῦ σώζεσθαι τε καὶ σύχειν φησίν τοὺς μύθους τοὺς παρ' αὐτῷ, μᾶλλα γε εἴκοσι τῶν γὰρ ὅτιν εἰσὶν ἐκκηρύτην, καὶ ὥστεν διὰ τοῦτο. (The Scholium is from Proclus I.c. 354. 24 ff.). Plato means that the story of Er is οἰκ. ἐναρ, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ ἐσθὼν. A similar play on the proverb occurs also in Latoe 645 Β.
621 c 15 ἀν σώσειν. Cf. ΠΙ. 417 Α. ἡ. The suggestion ὅτι σώσει (Richards) is unnecessary: see Kühner Gr. Gr. II p. 977 b.
621 c, d 20 αὐτοῦ τε—ἐν πράττωμεν. I agree with Richards in taking τε as 'both,' not 'and,' and the καὶ before ἐνθάδε as 'and,' not 'both.' Schneider holds the opposite view, urging that 'qui praemia virtutis reportat, cum inter re—portandum et sibi et diis amicum esse oporet. Eo igitur tempore sibi disisque amicus ut sit, contendere non magis potest, quam ut vincat, quum palmam fert victoriae.' This is true enough, but a similar objection may be made against Schneider's own solution, which makes Plato say ἵνα, ἐπειδὰν—κομίζωμεθα—ἐν πράττωμεν: and, with Schneider's construction, the repetition καὶ ἐνθάδε is also, as Richards says, 'very weak.' Beginning as if he would say 'both here and hereafter' Plato elaborates the 'hereafter' into ἐπειδὰν—κομίζωμεθα, not without some sacrifice of logical coherence.
22 περιαγειρόμενοι: ὁ. ὑπ. περιοῦντες καὶ ἀγειρόμενοι. Cf. Tim. Lex. Plat. s.v. περιαγειρόμενοι νυκτηροί and Ruhnken's note. ἐπαγερμός was the name for this kind of 'stips collectio.' The poet Gray proposed περιαγειρόμενοι, but the text is sound. For the imagery from the games see on ν 465 δ. Ν.
23 διεληλύθομεν. Ι. and C. think there is 'a playful suggestion of our having made the pilgrimage ourselves.' I do not believe Plato means more than merely 'we have described.'
24 ἐν πράττωμεν. On ὁν πράττωμεν see the third Platonic epistle ad init. and Bernays Lucian u. die Kynter pp. 3, 88. The Républic fitly ends with an adaptation of Plato's favourite phrase of salutation and farewell.
APPENDICES TO BOOK X.

I.

X 597 ε. τοῦτο ἢμα ἔσται καὶ ὁ τραγῳδοποιός, ἐπειρ μυθητὴς ἔστι, τρῖτος τις ἀπὸ βασιλέως καὶ τῆς ἀληθείας περικός, καὶ πάντες οἱ ἄλλοι μυθηταί.

Schleiermacher and Stallbaum offer no explanation of the difficult phrase τρῖτος ἀπὸ βασιλέως. The words are translated by Prantl “in dritter Linie vom Königlichen,” and explained by Müller as third, counting from the man “der nach seiner Befähigung, seiner Vorbildung und seinem Beruf vor Allen im Besitze der Ideen ist.” According to Schneider the King is “der im neunten Buche als Besitzer der wahren Lust dargestellte Gerechte, der hier als wahrhaft seiender der Wahrheit selbst gleich gesetzt wird” (Translation p. 314). Jowett and Campbell remark “God is here represented as a King. The word is borrowed from the language of the ninth book in which the imperfect shadow of the king is δημοκρατικός, ἀληθικός, as here of God the shadows are ξυγράφος, κλωστοῖς etc.” Other suggestions are that the phrase means “third in descent from the sovereign” (D. and V.), that the τρῖτος τις ἀπὸ βασιλέως is a sort of stage king (“tragic mimicry, as exhibited in the stage king, is at a third remove from the king and the truth, i.e. from the ideal king” J. B. Mayor in Cl. Rev. X pp. 112, 245), and finally, that there is a reference to “the Oriental degrees of rank. The painter is not even like the vizier, or the immediate heir to the throne, δεύτερος ἀπὸ βασιλέως” (Campbell in Cl. Rev. X p. 246). It will be seen that there is little agreement of opinion as to the precise significance of this remarkable expression.

As regards the application of the phrase, it is quite clear, in the first place, that βασιλέως is intended to correspond to God. In the descending scale of ‘makers’ we have (1) the φυτουργός, who is God, (2) the δημιουργός, and (3) the μυθητής: so that the μυθητής is τρῖτος ἀπὸ φυτουργοῦ. Since Plato calls him τρῖτος ἀπὸ βασιλέως, we are bound to identify the βασιλέως with the φυτουργός, unless we suppose that the expression is lacking both in propriety and point. There are also other passages in Plato where God is spoken of as a King, e.g. Crot. 396 A, Laws 904 a. In the second place, it is equally clear that τρῖτος ἀπὸ implies that the imitator is removed by two degrees from ‘the King.’ Compare Stobaeus Elog. I 178 p. 78 Wachsmuth Ἑποδιώνος τρίτην ἀπὸ Δίος (sc. τῆς εἰμαρμένης· πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τὸν Δία, δεύτερον δὲ τὴν φύσιν, τρίτην δὲ
A careful study of the words employed by Plato will moreover lead us to suppose that the figure is that of a genealogical tree. Thus we have

1. God
2. Carpenter correlating with
3. Painter

and just as the picture of a bed is a τρίτον γεννήμα απὸ τῆς φώσεως, so the Painter is τρίτος απὸ βασιλέως πεφυκώς, that is, ‘third in descent from the Painter.’ For these reasons the supposed allusion to the βασιλεία of IX 587 b ff. cannot, in my opinion, be admitted: nor indeed would such an allusion be appropriate on other grounds, for there is no kind of analogy between the μμηνής and the διάγωκός, who in 587 c is said to be τρίτος απὸ τοῦ βασιλείου. The translation of Davies and Vaughan ‘third in descent from the King’ is correct, and the meaning of the phrase is exactly reproduced in the passage cited from Dante in the notes. In illustration of the word βασιλέως we should quote, not IX 587 b, but vi 509 d, where the Idea of Good, or God (vi 505 λ n.), is said to be the king of the intelligible sphere. We have already seen that the Idea of Good is the maker of all the other Ideas, and among them of the αὐτὸ δ ἐστι κλίψῃ (vi 509 b n., x 597 b n.), which according to the present passage is constructed by God. Compare Philo de mund. οphinx. § 23 πρὸς τὴν ἀκραν ἄφιδα παραπημφθεὶς τῶν νοητῶν ἐπ’ αὐτῶν ἑναι δοκεῖ τὸν μέγαν βασιλέα and ib. § 50.

So much for the application of the phrase and its propriety as used by Plato here. As regards its origin, Campbell’s suggestion is in my opinion not improbable, provided we suppose that the allusion is to the third in descent from the king. Although the expression does not appear to be found elsewhere in Greek literature, except with more or less explicit reference to this passage of the Republic, the words sound half-proverbial, and the omission of the article with βασιλέως suggests, though it does not necessitate, a reference to the Persian monarchy. Cf. Menex. 241 D, 244 D, 245 B, 246 λ and Alc. 1 123 B, C, E al. The conjecture of Campbell derives some additional probability from the favourite Stoic comparison between προηγεμένα and those who stand next to the King in honour and esteem, although the Stoic comparison does not involve the idea of any genealogical connexion: see Cic. de finibus III 52 ut enim, inquit (Zeno), nemo dicit in regia regem ipsum quasi productum esse ad dignitatem—id est enim προηγεμένον—sed eos qui in aliquo honore sunt, quorum ordo proxime accedit, ut secundus sit, ad regnum principatum, sic in vita non ea, quae primario loco sunt, sed ea quae secundum locum obtinent, προηγεμένα, id est producta, nominentur, with other passages quoted by Pearson Fragments of Zeno and Cleanthes p. 171. Cf. also Philo vi p. 190 (Lipsiae 1828) νννι δὲ υπὸ τῆς τῶν ἦω περιανασθείνεται λαμπρότητος, ἀτε νοητῶν φῶς ἰδεῖν ἀδυνατώτες, πλαζόμενοι διετέλεσαν τὸν αἰῶνα. πρὸς μὲν τὸν βασιλέα λογισμόν φθίσαι μὴ δυναθέντες, ἀχρὶ δὲ τῶν προηγεμένων μόλις ἀφικνομένου καὶ τοὺς ἐπὶ θύρας ἀρετῆς, πλούτων τε καὶ δόξαν καὶ ὑγίειαν καὶ τὰ συγγενή τεθαυμακότες προσέκινου (προσεκίνου).
II.

X 602 E. Τούτῳ δὲ πολλάκις μετρήσαντι καὶ σημαίνοντι μείζω ἀττά εἶναι ἢ ἐλάττων ἐτερὰ ἐτέρῳ ἢ ἴσα ταῦτα φαίνεται ἀρα περὶ ταῦτα.

This is the text of A, to which Schneider and all succeeding editors adhere. The variants τότῳ for τούτῳ, δῆ for δὲ have little authority, and give us no assistance. The view which I have given in the notes assumes that ταῦτα means the opposite of τὸ φαίνομενον μείζων ἢ ἐλάττων κτλ. in d above. The article is significant; otherwise Plato would hardly, I think, have added it here and omitted it immediately afterwards in ἐναντία. I formerly thought it necessary either to excise the first ἀρα περὶ ταῦτα, or else to add after φαίνεται the words <οὕτε ἐναντία φαίνεται>, in order to make the reference in ταῦτα still more clear; but if ταῦτα is understood as the same objects about which we already have the false impression, the difficulty disappears.

It may be urged that σημαίνοντι represents the λογιστικῶν as the vehicle of a communication to the soul, and not as itself forming a judgment. Plato himself, however, appears to fluctuate between the two points of view; and the reason is that according to his own psychological theory τὸ λογιστικὸν is not merely τὸ μετρόν, but the part of soul which κατὰ τὰ μέτρα δοξάζει,—μέτρω τε καὶ λογισμῷ πιστεύει (603 A. See also 605 B, c).

Schneider translates as follows: "huius autem partis ope saepenumero menso aliqui, quum illa (pars) maioram quaedam vel minora vel paria esse significat, contraria simul de iisdem videntur." The sense is satisfactory, except that we should have expected Plato to attribute the measurement to the λογιστικῶν itself (in harmony with τούτῳ—ἐργον), instead of to the individual making use of the λογιστικῶν. But it is grammatically impossible to sever τούτῳ from μετρήσαντι and connect it again with σημαίνοντι, while if (with Müller) we make σημαίνοντι also refer to the individual, we offend against the plain and obvious meaning of the word (cf. vii 524 A).

By Jowett and Campbell τούτῳ is rightly made to agree with the participles, but wrongly separated from φαίνεται. "The dative"—say they—"is in a loose construction with the whole sentence, like a genitive absolute, and is not to be taken with φαίνεται. It would not be in accordance with Plato's use of language, or with the context in what follows, to speak of the contradictions of sense as having anything to do with the rational element of the soul." True; but Plato does not so speak of them, if my view of ταῦτα is right. He merely says that the rational element takes the opposite view of an object from that which is at the same moment entertained by the irrational element. Nor can the dative be employed with the force of a genitive absolute, as is virtually the case according to Jowett and Campbell's explanation.

Two other interpretations have been proposed. According to Stallbaum, the λογιστικῶν is divided into two parts, one of which τῷ λογισμῷ πιστεύει, while the other is led astray. Hence it is possible—he thinks—
for Plato to speak of the λογιστικόν as having contrary impressions at one and the same time. But we cannot possibly identify τὸ παρὰ τὰ μέτρα δοξάζων τῆς ψυχῆς with part of the λογιστικόν: the main purpose of the argument, indeed, is to prove it totally distinct therefrom. Cf. Schultess Plat. Forsch. pp. 42—45. Davies and Vaughan translate “But when this element, after frequent measuring, informs us that one thing is greater or less than or equal to, another thing, it is contradicted at the same moment by the appearance which the same things present.” This explanation, which appears to be unique, wrongly joins πολλάκις with μετρήσαντι and is certainly fallacious in other respects also.

Schleiermacher suspected corruption, and read τῷ δὲ for τοῖτῳ δέ, translating “Wenn einer aber auch noch so sehr gemessen hat, und nun bestimmt” etc., but σημαίνειν is not ‘bestimmen.’ The conjecture τοῖτον—μετρήσαντος—σημαίνοντος—due to Richards—removes all difficulty, on the assumption that τάναττα means—as it is capable of meaning—the same as ἐναντία i.e. ‘opposites’ and nothing more. I cannot, however, but think such a change far too drastic; and it is reasonable to suppose that the article in τάναττα means something. The text may of course be corrupt—I do not believe it is—but, if so, it still awaits the healing hand.

III.

Χ 606 c. Ἀρ’ ὅχι ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ τοῦ γελοίου, ὅτι, ἀν αὐτὸς ἀσχίζων γελοτοποιῶν, ἐν μιμήσει δὲ κωμῳδίᾳ ἥ καὶ ἰδία ἄκοινοι σφόδρα χαρῆς καὶ μὴ μισῆς ὥς πονηρά, ταῦταν ποιεῖται ὥπερ ἐν τοῖς ἔλεοις;

All the mss have ἄν in place of ἄν. There are several other variants in II and the inferior mss, but all of them useless for purposes of interpretation or emendation.

That the text has suffered corruption is admitted by all editors, and nearly all critics. By writing ὃ τι ἄν, and transferring the mark of interrogation from ἄλογος to γελοίου, it is possible to make sense of the passage, if we are willing to allow the common change from ὃ τι singular to πονηρά plural. Cf. Neukirch in Pl. Pol. quaed. phil. 1 p. 48. But the double use of ἄν remains; and ὅτι (not ὃ τι) is proved to be genuine by ὅτι τοῦτο—ἐργαζότατοι in D below; see note ad loc.

The following emendations, which are all of them later than Schneider, appear to me inadmissible on other grounds, and also because they involve the change of ὅτι. (1) ἄρ’ ὅχι—γελοίοι, ὅ τι ἄν—γελοστοποιῶν; ἐν μιμήσει δὲ—ἄκοινον <ἄν> σφόδρα κτλ. (Stallbaum): (2) ἄρ’ ὅχι—γελοίοι; ὅταν, ἄν—γελοστοποιῶν ἐν μιμήσει δὴ κτλ. (Madvig, Baiter): (3) ἄρ’ ὅχι—γελοίοι; ὅταν τι ἄν αὐτὸς—γελοστοποιῶν, ἐν μιμήσει δὲ κτλ. (proposed by me in Cl. Rev. iv p. 3577): (4) ἄρ’ ὅχι—γελοίοι; ὅ τι ἄν—αἰσχύνη κτλ. (D. and V. with Stephanus). Hermann conjectures (5) ἄρ’ ὅχι—γελοίοι, ὅτι, ἄν—γελοστοποιῶν ἐν μιμήσει δὴ—ἄκοινον <лейν> σφόδρα κτλ., but this has little probability. Although they print the emendation of Schneider, the Oxford editors remark that the simplest change is to
read (6) ἄρ' οὖχ—γελοίων, ὅτι ἂν <ἀ> αὐτὸς αἰσχύνου <ἂν>, ἐν μιμήσει δὴ κτλ. The last suggestion is an ingenious one, and improves both sense and grammar; but the threefold error (omission of ἂ and ἂν and cor-
ruption of δὴ to δὲ) is hardly probable, and the sentence becomes very cumbrous. It should be remarked that the absence of μὲν after αὐτὸς is no reason for suspecting δὲ: see on I 340 D al. (7) Turner's conjecture ἄρ' οὖχ—γελοίου, ὅτι ἂν <ἐὰν> αὐτὸς—ἐν μιμήσει δὴ κτλ. is in
principle the same as that of Jowett and Campbell. I have sometimes thought that ποιεῖ should be substituted for ποιεῖς (‘that jests, which etc.,
have the same effect as’ etc.), in view of ὅτι τοιαῦτα ἡμᾶς ἡ ποιητικὴ μίμησις ἐργαὶζεται in d. (It should be observed that Ξ and some other mss read ποιεῖν.) ποιεῖς is however supported by ἐν τοῖς ἐλέουσ as well as by the explanatory δ' γὰρ—γενέσθαι. If the difficulty about ἂν is held to be insurmountable, one might suggest ἂν <ἐὰν> αὐτὸς αἰσχύνου κτλ., regarding ἂν as virtually a single word; but to this and all the other
 Corrections hitherto offered I still prefer Schneider’s solution.

IV.

Χ 607 b. ὁ τῶν λίαν σοφῶν ὄχλος κράτων.

The reading of the two best mss (A and II) is ὁ τῶν Δία (or rather δία) σοφῶν ὄχλος κρατῶν. Most of the inferior mss read δία σοφῶν, but a few have διασοφῶν (sic).

Those who adhere to Paris A offer one of the two following interpretations: either (1) “der Gottweisen herrschendes Volk” (Schleiermacher, Stallbaum etc.), or else (2) “the crowd of philosophers over-mastering Jove” (J. and C., with Schneider). To the first solution it may be objected that κρατῶν remains obscure, that Δία σοφῶν ‘wise as to Zeus’ is a difficult construction, and that the sentiment itself—unless we suppose it ironical—is rather a compliment to philosophy than otherwise.

Schneider construes κρατῶν with Δία, supposing that the object of the poet’s invective is, as before, “sapientia Jovi adversaria et ἄθεος. The order of the words, he thinks may be excused, “in lyrico poeta, quum etiam Plato Legg. L. vii 824 A ἡ τῶν διαπαύματα πόνων ἔχουσα dicere ausus sit.” To me, as to many others, the harshness appears too great, even for poetry: it is certainly much greater than ὅδων τῇ προτεραιῇ τῶν τινα Δυδων and the like in Herodotus (1 84 al.). The text of the passage in the Laws has been disputed. If it is sound, we ought perhaps to print a comma after τῶν, and take the article not with πόνων, but with the following participle χειρουμένων.

There is, as usual, no lack of emendations. Sydenham (see C. Rev. ii p. 229) altered ὁ τῶν to ὅτων, with what purpose it is difficult to see. The suggestion ὁ καὶ τῶν Δία σοφῶν ὄχλος κρατῶν (Bywater) keeps both Δία and κρατῶν. Others retain κρατῶν, but not Δία, proposing instead of Δία σοφῶν either διασοφῶν (C. Schmidt, Hermann etc. —but the word lacks authority), or ἀκροσοφῶν (a conjecture of Bergk’s, afterwards apparently withdrawn: see his Poët. Lyr. Gr. 4 iii p. 731),
or ἱδία σοφῶν (Hermann Gesch. u. Syst. p. 309 n. 305), or λίαν σοφῶν (Herwerden, Richards). If we read λίαν σοφῶν and leave κρατῶν alone, the participle is very obscure, and Richards hints at the possibility of κρατῆν. I have also thought of κράζων (‘the croaking rabble of the overwise’).

The view which is taken in the notes has been objected to on the ground that ‘like caput, κάρα and κεφαλή cannot be, or rather never are, in classical Greek, used for the seat of intelligence—for the ‘head’ of modern parlance—the reason being that popular opinion among the Greeks and Romans connected intelligence with the heart or midriff, not, as among us, with the head’ (Hermath. xxiv 255). I think that I have answered this objection in my commentary, but, if any one thinks differently, I would recommend as a δεύτερος πλοῦς that he should provisionally restore the ms reading and interpret it in Schneider’s way.

V.

X 612 A. Οὐκοίν, ἃν δ’ ἔγο, τὰ τε ἄλλα ἀπελυσάμεθα ἐν τῷ λόγῳ, καὶ οὐ τοὺς μυθοὺς οἷος τὰς δόξας δικαιοσύνης ἐπηγέγκαμεν κτλ.

ἀπελυσάμεθα is the reading of Stobaeus (Flor. 9. 66) and all the mss except four, viz. ΣΦΜ and Cesenas M. These have ἀπεδυσάμεθα.

ἀπεδυσάμεθα can hardly be right. The form is rare in Attic, though tolerably common in later Greek: nor is it by any means obvious what ἀπεδυσάμεθα would signify in this connexion. The usual translation is ‘we divested ourselves of’ (as in τὴν γυναῖκα ἀποδυσάμενος Clem. Alex. Str. v 8. 84 C Migne), and γυμνωστέος ὅτι πάντων πλὴν δικαιοσύνης (II 361 C) is quoted in its support. But (as Schneider points out) Socrates could hardly have identified himself with the just man in this way, and, even if he did, to what does τὰ ἄλλα refer? What are ‘the other things’ of which he divests himself in addition to μυθοὺς καὶ δόξας δικαιοσύνης? To this question no satisfactory answer appears to be possible: none, at least, has yet been given.

Schneider himself reads ἀπεδυσάμεθα, but gives a very different explanation, holding that τὰ ἄλλα means the description of τὰ ἐν τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ βίῳ πάθη τε καὶ εἴδη ψυχῆς in the preceding books, and apparently taking ἀπεδυσάμεθα as ‘we have exposed to view.’ For ἀπεδυσάμεθα in this sense we might compare ἀπεδυσάμεν in Charm. 154 E: but the middle remains a difficulty.

If ἀπελυσάμεθα on the other hand is sound, it must, I think, be explained as in the notes. The view of the Oxford editors is not very different. Ast’s translation ‘se liberare’ ‘defungi’ can scarcely be justified on linguistic grounds, and ‘addito τὰ ἄλλα minus convenit’ (Schneider), for it was no part of Socrates’ obligation to dwell on the wages of virtue: quite the contrary, in fact. No one is likely to accept the extremely subtle and difficult explanation of Richter (Fleck. JB. 1867 p. 149) ‘haben wir nicht das Übrige durch unsere Darstellung erlost—nämlich von den Banden, welche die Materialisten der Tugend auferlegen—ohne Lösegeld hinzubringen?’ The possibility of cor-
rupture must be allowed, but the conjecture ἀπεωσάμεθα (Richards, comparing 11 366 ά τά δ’ εἰς ἀδικάς κέρδη ἀπωσάμεθα) is otherwise unsatisfactory, and fails, like ἀπεδωσάμεθα, to explain τά ἄλλα. Some may think of ἀπελογισάμεθα. It is best, however, to follow the MSS, in the absence of any convincing emendation.

VI. 1

X 616 b—617 b. Ἐπειδῆ δὲ τοῖς ἐν τῷ λειμώνι down to ἐφάπτεσθαι.

With the exception of the ‘older and earlier’ reading described by Proclus (see pp. 475 ff. below), there is hardly a trace in this passage of any variant affecting the sense.

A few emendations have been proposed. Thus Schleiermacher conjectures τά ἄκρα αὐτοῦ ἐκ τῶν δεσμῶν, taking τά ἄκρα αὐτοῦ as ‘the poles of heaven,’ and the chains as the Milky Way (Translation p. 621), while Krohn suggests φῶς εὑρῷ for φῶς εὑρίθ, and the transposition of ἀπετερ κίνων to follow ἀπρακτον (Pl. St. p. 283). It is hardly necessary to say that alterations of this kind are in my judgment totally inadmissible: they only reveal the weakness of the interpretation which necessitates them.

The only safe principle of interpretation in this, as in other similar passages of Plato, is to adhere to the natural meaning of the Greek, and abstain from wrestling or rewriting the language in support of any preconceived view about the consistency and coherence of the picture as a whole.

I now think it clear that Boeckh’s interpretation is irreconcilable with the language employed by Plato. The article in which Boeckh developed his views most fully was originally published in reply to Grote’s pamphlet entitled Plato’s Doctrine respecting the Rotation of the Earth (1860), and is reprinted in his Kleine Schriften III pp. 294—320. The essential features of Boeckh’s view, which Zeller 4 434, 435 nn. in the main accepts, are as follows.

The Straight Light is the Milky Way, running round the outer surface of the Heavens, like the undergirders of a trireme. To the question, Why is the light said to be ‘straight like a pillar,’ when it is in reality circular?, Boeckh replies that it appears to be straight from the standpoint of the souls. Er and his companions are, according to Boeckh, outside the world, somewhere beyond the North Pole, and see only the nearer half-circle of the Milky Way: “ein Halbring erscheint aber in der Entfernung dem, welcher ihn von aussen in der selben Ebene stehend sieht, als eine gerade Säule” (l.c. p. 306). What is the meaning of διὰ παντὸς τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καὶ γῆς τεταμένον? Boeckh’s explanation is that the light “verbreite sich durch den ganzen Himmel und die Erde, d. h. über die Erde, wenn man will mit einem leichten Zeugma, durch welches διὰ auch den Genitiv γῆς regiert: wiewohl ein

1 This Appendix is the result of prolonged discussions with Professor Cook Wilson, and freely reproduces nearly all his most important arguments.
Zeugma anzunehmen nicht einmal nöthig ist, wenn man nur das δας auf Verbreitung, nicht auf Durchdringung bezieht" (ib. p. 305). The middle of the light is accordingly in Boeckh's opinion at the Pole, and it is from the Pole outwards that 'the extremities of heaven's chains'—αὐτῶν he refers to οὐρανῶν—'are extended.' The 'chains of heaven' include not only the light itself, but also two other great circles, viz. the equinoctial and solstitial colures (ib. p. 307). To the ends of these chains is attached the spindle of Necessity, which extends downwards from the North Pole, its shaft representing the axis of the Universe. The meaning to be attached to the breadth of rim in the various whirls of Necessity's spindle is not discussed by Boeckh.

Such, in its main outline, is Boeckh's explanation. It will be observed that he endeavours to combine into a single harmonious whole the two figures employed by Plato—the sphere surrounded by a circle of light, and the spindle of Necessity. But he makes no attempt to shew how the outermost whorl, in which the fixed stars are placed, can coexist along with the revolving sphere (πάρσαν—τὴν περιφορὰν 616 c), so that the fundamental inconsistency of the two images still remains; and even if we should allow, which is far from being the case, that in other respects Boeckh provides us with a single coherent picture, he "does violence to the language" (as Cook Wilson remarks) "at nearly every step." The light, says Plato, is straight, like a pillar. According to Boeckh, it is not straight, but curved: only it appears straight if seen from a certain point of view. If this was Plato's meaning, why should he not have put it into words? No one will deny that the natural meaning of the words he does employ is that the light not merely appears, but is straight; and he could have had no object in thus leading us on a false scent. Nor is there any indication to make us suppose that the Souls are outside the World. On the contrary, it is tolerably clear that the λειμών from which they start upon their four days' journey (616 b) is on the ideal surface of the Earth (614 c n.), and the natural inference is that they march along that surface until they come within view of the light (616 b n.). If they travelled upwards to the supracelestial regions, they would have to pass through the very ring of light which Boeckh makes them see for the first time not from below, but from above. That the Souls are in the middle of the Earth, and therefore of the World, at the end of the fourth day after they have left the meadow, is clear from 617 D, 620 E, 621 A, B (φέρεσθαι ἄνω εἰς τὴν γένεσιν), and it is at the end of the fourth day that they reach the middle of the light (616 b). The conclusion is inevitable that the middle of the light is in the centre of the Universe, and nowhere else. Not less arbitrary and forced is the explanation which Boeckh gives of δας παντὸς τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καὶ γῆς τεταμένον. The phrase τεταμέν δας surely means to 'stretch through' and not to 'stretch over,' and the plain meaning of the Greek is confirmed by the close parallel in Tim. 40 B τὸν δας παντὸς πόλων τεταμένων. Other objections might be mentioned, but enough has been said to show that Boeckh's explanation cannot be fairly evolved from the language of Plato, to which, indeed, it is sometimes in direct contradiction.
APPENDICES TO BOOK X.

Of the other views, that of K. E. Ch. Schneider, the editor and translator of the Republic, has met with some acceptance, and appears to be favoured, in part, at least, by Jowett and Campbell. The straight light, in Schneider's opinion, stands for the axis of the World, or a cylinder enclosing it. From the comparison of the light to ὑποξώματα, Schneider is inclined to infer that the ὑποξώμαta stretched from stem to stern inside the vessel; but the evidence would seem to be conclusive that the ὑποξώμαta were applied outside. The chains of heaven he thus describes: "ad medium axem, h. e. ad centrum terrae ideumque mundi (cf. ἀνω p. 621 b) pertinentia vincula—ab extremis sphaeis radiorum instar ad fusum Necessitatis circa centrum stantem porrecta et utrinque nexa, quorum vinculorum ope vertente fusio totus mundus cum omnibus sphaeiris convertatur." Apparently he distinguishes between the light and the chains, although Plato clearly means them to be identical: κατὰ μέσον τὸ φῶς ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ τὰ ἀκρα αὐτοῦ τῶν δεσμῶν τεταρτεία: εἶναι γὰρ τοῦτο τὸ φῶς ἕνυδεσμὸν τοῦ οὐρανοῦ. On the subject of the breadth of rims Schneider has no view: "über die Breite fehlt noch der befriedigende Auschluss, und es ist leichter zu sagen, was sie nicht bedeuten kann, als was sie bedeutet" (Translation p. 316).

In the notes, the breadth of rims has been taken to mean the distances between the planets. Against this interpretation it might be urged that a wholly different account of these distances is given in the Timaeus. In Tim. 36 D Plato writes: μίαν γὰρ αὐτήν (i.e. τὴν ταῦτα καὶ ὅμοιον περιφοράν) ἀσχιστὸν εἶσε, τὴν δ' ἐντὸς σχίσας ἐξακού ἐπτά κύκλως ἀνύσους κατὰ τὴν τοῦ διπλασίου καὶ τριπλασίου διάστασιν εἰκότην, οὔσον ἐκατέρων τριῶν κτλ. What he means (according to Zeller' 11 p. 779 n.) is that if the distance of the Moon from the Earth is counted as 1, the distances of the other planets from the Earth will be:—Sun 2, Venus 3, Mercury 4, Mars 8, Jupiter 9, Saturn 27. (Cf. Macrobius in somn. Scip. II 3. 14, where it is said that the 'Platonici' used 'dupla et tripla intervalla' in such a way as to produce these distances: Moon 1, Sun 2, Venus 2 × 3 = 6, Mercury 6 × 4 = 24, Mars 24 × 9 = 216, Jupiter 216 × 8 = 1728, Saturn 1728 × 27 = 46656.) Thus according to the Timaeus the Moon, Sun, Venus and Mercury will be at the same distances from one another, Mercury will be as far from Mars as the Earth from Mercury, Mars and Jupiter will be as near together as the Sun and Moon, and the distance between Jupiter and Saturn will be enormously greater than that which divides any other pair of planets. Between this scale of distances and Plato's arrangement of the whorls according to the breadth of their 'lips' in the Republic, there is no kind of affinity: the rim of Saturn's whorl, for example, if it measures his distance from Jupiter, ought to be the broadest of all the rims, instead of being, as Plato here says it is, the narrowest.

In spite of the interval of time which may be supposed to separate the Timaeus from the Republic, this discrepancy might fairly cause a difficulty if it could be shewn that Plato's representation of the distances between the planets in these two dialogues was based upon empirical data or observation. But in point of fact, in both dialogues
the principle of Plato's arrangement is a certain a priori numerical relation, which has nothing to do with facts or probabilities. In the Timaeus Plato starts from the two Pythagorean πετρακτοις, viz. 1, 2, 4, 8 and 1, 3, 9, 27, and arbitrarily disposes the planets in accordance with these numbers. His method resembles that of the τῶν ὄντων ἀστρονομικὸς inasmuch as he 'dispenses with the starry heavens' (vii 530 B n.) and regulates the distances by certain 'mathematical numbers,' which he finds ready to his hand. (See App. II to Book vii, p. 166.) The method which he follows in this passage of the Republic is analogous, although the actual numbers are different. In a note contributed to Jowett and Campbell's commentary, Mr W. A. Craigie first drew attention to the fact that a numerical principle underlies Plato's order of arrangement of the planets in respect not only of their distances from one another, but also of their colours and velocities, and Professor Cook Wilson has corrected and explained Mr Craigie's law in Cl. Rev. xvi pp. 292 f. The law is that each of the three enumerations is "based on combinations which rest on the number 9" (Craigie l.c.).

Let us take first the 'breadth of the lips' of the whorls, i.e. (according to our theory) the distances of the several orbits from one another.

A. "If we write down" (I quote from Cook Wilson's article) "the numbers which express the order of the whorls, and, under each, set the number which its rim has in the order of breadth, and then join 'those σφῶνυλαί whose united numbers produce a sum of 9, we have a symmetrical figure with its centre between the 4th and 5th,' thus:—

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of σφῶνυλαί</th>
<th>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Order of width of rim</td>
<td>1 8 7 3 6 2 5 4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B. Next, take the order of the colours.

"If we write down the numbers of the whorls in the order in which Plato mentions them when describing their colours we get:—

| 1 7 8 2 5 3 4 6 |

and there is here also a symmetry of arrangement with regard to the centre (and the centres of the two halves)."

C. Finally, let us consider the order of velocities.

The figure given by Cook Wilson is:—

| 1 8 (7) (6) 4 3 2 |

= 9 = 9 x 2 = 9.

In this figure the order of velocities is observed; "the group 1 + 8 (= 9) is correlative to the group 4 + 3 + 2 (= 9)," and the number 9 occurs twice in the central group, the members of which, being equal in respect of velocity, "may be considered to have no order."
"If we ask what was the reason of this curious arrangement," continues Professor Cook Wilson, "a not improbable answer seems to be that it was to effect a kind of equable distribution of the magnitudes along the series of the whorls. Now if this were so it would be best not merely to arrange two correlative pairs, as 7 and 2, 8 and 1, symmetrically with regard to the centre, but to make the order in magnitude of the numbers of one pair the reverse of that of the other. Thus in

\[ 7 \quad 1 \quad 8 \quad 2 \]

the distribution is more equable than in

\[ 7 \quad 8 \quad 1 \quad 2, \]

for in the latter we have the two larger numbers on the same side of the centre. Similarly the arrangement

\[ 7 \quad 2 \quad \text{centre} \quad 1 \quad 8 \]

is more equable than

\[ 7 \quad 2 \quad \text{centre} \quad 8 \quad 1, \]

and

\[ 7 \quad 1 \quad 2 \quad 8 \]

than

\[ 7 \quad 8 \quad 2 \quad 1. \]

A glance at diagrams A and B will shew that in respect of the breadths of the rims and their respective colours "this rule of equable distribution is exactly carried out, and the order in magnitude of the numbers in one pair is the reverse of the order in its correlative pair.... In the case of the colours there is an addition to the equableness of the distribution in so far as the sum of the numbers in the first half is equal to the sum of the numbers in the second half."

If this arrangement were found in only one of the three groups, we might reasonably judge it to be merely accidental; but the possibility of accident is almost excluded when we see that the rule is accurately observed in two cases out of the three, and also, with some unessential modifications, in the third. We must therefore suppose that Plato's representation of the planetary distances in the Republic deliberately follows an a priori principle of symmetry and number, selected chiefly in view of the particular image to which he here assimilates the celestial motions, and suggestive of the balance and equilibrium which ought to prevail in the celestial system. In the Timaeus his procedure is essentially the same, but there he accommodates the actual distances to the numerical fancies of the Pythagoreans. The discrepancy between the two dialogues in this particular ceases to surprise us as soon as we realise the way in which Plato went to work (cf. Book vii App. II pp. 166 f.), and in criticising Plato's physical theories generally, we should above all things bear in mind the warning which he himself
throws out in the *Timaeus*: ἔων οὖν πολλὰ πολλῶν εἰπότων περὶ θεῶν καὶ τῆς τοῦ πιστῶς γενέσεως, μὴ δυνατοὶ γεγονόμεθα πάντη πάντως αὐτοὺς ἐαυτοὺς ὤμολογουμένους λόγους καὶ ἀπηκριβωμένους ἀποδοῦναι, μὴ θαυμάσῃ τις. ἀλλ' ἐων αὰρ μοῦνος ἦττον παρεγόμεθα εἰκότας, ἀγαπῶν χρῆ, μεμημένον ὡς ὁ λέγων ἐγὼ ὑμεῖς τε οἱ κρατᾶτε φύσιν ἀνθρωπίνην ἐγγομεῖν, ὡστε περὶ τούτων τὸν εἰκότα μῦθον ἀποδεχομένους πρέπει τούτῳ μὴδεν ἑτὶ πέρα ἐχεῖν (29 C, D).

It remains to discuss the alternative reading of 616 E preserved for us by Proclus.

The parts of his commentary which chiefly concern us as are follows:

(1) διίη δ' ἐστὶν ἡ γραφὴ τῆς ταύτης τὰ βάθη διοριζοῦσις λέξεως. καὶ ἣ μὲν προτέρα καὶ ἀρχαιότερα τοῖς μεγεθέσιν ἀκολουθεῖ τοῖς καθ' ἐκατόννυμα σφαιραῖς ἀστέρων, τῆς μὲν μείζονα περιεχούσης μείζον τὸ βάθος λέγοντα, τῆς δὲ ἐλάσσονα ἐλασσοῦν. οὗν μετὰ τὸν ἐξωτάτων σφόνδυλον, ὃς ἐστὶν ὃ τῆς ἀπλανοῦ—μετὰ τούτον δ' οὖν τὸν ἀπλανή κύκλον πλατύτατον ὀστα—τοῦ τοῦ Ἐρμαικοῦ σφόνδυλον τῶν λοιπῶν ἐξώδομα ὅστα τῷ πλατέι διαφέρει—ἐπείτα <τὸν> τοῦ σεληνιακοῦ—καὶ ἐπὶ τούτῳ τοῦ τῆς Ἀφροδίτης—καὶ ἐπὶ τούτῳ τοῦ τοῦ Ἀρείκου—καὶ ἐπὶ τούτῳ τοῦ τοῦ Δίων σφόνδυλον καὶ ἐξεῖς τοῦ τοῦ Κρονίου, καὶ τελευταίαν εἶναι τὸν τοῦ Ἐρμαικοῦ καὶ ἀπλός κατὰ τὰ μεγεθή τῶν ἀστέρων καὶ τῶν σφόνδυλων ἔχει τὸ πλάτος. ἦ δὲ δευτέρα καὶ νευτέρα, κρατοῦσα δὲ εἰνεὶ τοῖς κεκολασμένοις (κεκολασμένως coniecit Pitra) αὐτογράφοις μετὰ τὸν ἐξωτάτῳ σφόνδυλῳ κτλ. (Kroll 11. 218. 1 ff. The reading which Proclus proceeds to describe is that found in our mss.)

(2) καὶ ἑσοῦ καὶ ὄτως λέγοντες (i.e. the adherents of the ‘newer’ text) ἐξελθαν εἰς τὰ ἀπόγεια καὶ περιέγει κατήματα τῶν ἀστέρων, καὶ ἔμε καὶ ἐπειν σφαιρὰ τὴν διαφοράν εὑρον, ἐπὶ τούτῳ τὸ βάθος ἑξεντὸ πλεόν τῶν σφαιρῶν—ἐπεὶ δὲ τὴν προτέραν εἶπε τὴν δευτέραν ἐγκρίνοι τις γραφῆν, οὐ πάντα συμβούναι τοῖς τοῖς μετὰ ταύτα τηρήσαν μᾶλλον δὲ ὁμοίη ἢ μὲν δευτέρα συμβάλει τῇ τοῖς ἀνελεύθουσας ἐπαγγεύουσα, ἢ δὲ προτέρα τὸ αὐτοφάαι ἔχεια, τοῖς μεγεθέσις ἀποδιδοὺσαν τῶν ἐνδεχομένων εἰνεὶ τοῖς σφαιραῖς ἀστέρων εἰνεὶ τοῖς τοῦ βάθους διαφοράς, πλὴν ὅτι τῆς σελήνης ἢ Ἀφροδίτη μείζων, εἰ καὶ τὸ φαιόνικον ἀπ' ἐναντίας ἔχει. παντελῶς τοῖς κατ᾽ ἐκείνον τοῦ τοῦ χροόνον ἀστροφόμωμον τοῖς φαιομένοις ἀκολουθητάντων ὡς τοῦ εἰκὸς καὶ ταύτῃ καὶ τὰ βάθη διαστημάτων ἀπ' ἀλλήλων (ib. 219. 11 ff.).

(3) τῶν μὲν προερημένων γραφῶν ἡ προτέρα, καθαύτη ἐπιτομεῖ, εἰς τὰ μεγεθή τῶν περιεχομένων ἐν τοῖς πλάτεσιν ἀστέρων βλέπει καὶ οὐδὲ τοῦ τοῦ μεγεθή διώρισεν ως τοὺς ύποτον ἔθελεν. ἢ δὲ τῶν μετὰ ταύτα τηρήσας τοῖς ἀπογεῖοις αὐτῶν ἐγκρίνοι καὶ περιεγεῖοι ἐς ἀνάβον τοῖς πλάτοις τῶν σφονδυλῶν, οὐδὲ τοῦ ύποτον τῆς τούτων καταλύσεως ἱκανός πιεσθείσης (ib. 221. 28 ff.).

From the first of these extracts we are enabled to reconstruct what Proclus calls the ‘older reading.’ The text of which he speaks must have run:

τὸν μὲν οὖν πρῶτον τε καὶ ἐξωτάτω σφονδυλίῳ πλατύτατον τοῦ τοῦ χείλους κύκλον ἔχειν, τὸν δὲ τὸν ἐβδόμον δεύτερον, τρίτων δὲ τὸν τοῦ υγδού, τέταρτον δὲ τὸν τούτῃ, πέμπτων δὲ τὸν τοῦ τετάρτου, ἐκτῶν δὲ τὸν τοῦ τρίτου, ἐβδομον δὲ τὸν τοῦ δευτέρου, ύγδον δὲ τὸν τοῦ
πέμπτων. (See my article in Cl Rev. xv pp. 391 ff.) According to this reading the order of the whorls, in respect of breadth of rim, will be:

The whorl of the Fixed Stars (no. 1)

" " " Sun (no. 7)
" " " Moon (no. 8)
" " " Venus (no. 6)
" " " Mars (no. 4)
" " " Jupiter (no. 3)
" " " Saturn (no. 2)
" " " Mercury (no. 5).

It will be convenient to discuss, first the meaning, and afterwards the value, of this ‘older’ text.

What, then, is the interpretation?

We note, in the first place, that the order in which the planetary whorls are arranged according to breadth of rim (Sun, Moon, Venus, etc.) corresponds with tolerable exactness to the order of the planets in respect of apparent size, and that the lip of the outermost whorl may be the broadest because of the number as well as the magnitude of the stars which it contains (cf. Proclus l.c. 218. 6 ff. ὁ τῆς ἀπλανοῦς, περιέχουν τοσοῦτον πλῆθος ἀστρῶν κατασταρμένον κατὰ τῶν ἀστῶν τὸ βάθος, ὅν ἐκατον ἀποδείκνυσιν ὁ λόγος μείξονα τῆς γῆς). Secondly, it is clear from what Proclus himself says that the order of breadth of whorl-lips in this ‘older’ text was really supposed to depend upon the size of the ἀναδεμένων ἀστέρες (τοῖς μεγάλεσι ἁκολούθκα τῶν καθ' ἐκάστην σφαίραν ἀστέρων 218. 2 et al.).

In these circumstances our first impulse is to suppose that the planetary lips are just broad enough to accommodate their planets and no broader, so that the breadth will be in each case exactly equal to the diameter of the planet. In this way I interpreted Proclus ‘older’ text in Cl. Rev. xv pp. 391 ff.

But there are strong reasons in favour of supposing (with Cook Wilson) that the advocates of this text in antiquity did not make the breadth of the whorl-surfaces equal, but only proportionate, to the sizes of the planets. Of the ‘earlier’ reading Proclus remarks (l.c. Π 219. 23) ἢ δὲ προτέρα τῶν ἀστρωφεῖς ἔχει. Now it was perfectly understood by Proclus that the surfaces of the whorls are contiguous (Π 216. 8 ff.), and knowing this, he can hardly have failed to recognise that if the planets fill the entire rims, they will sometimes touch one another, and the Moon and the Earth will always be in contact. This arrangement is certainly not ‘natural,’ and we are led to suspect that Proclus had in mind another interpretation of the ‘older’ reading when he used this epithet, and one in which the orbital distances of the planets would be somehow represented. Now in discussing this subject, Proclus nowhere says that the rims are exactly equal in breadth to the sizes of the planets, and his language is always consistent with the theory that the relationship is one of proportion and nothing more (τοῖς μεγάλεσιν ἁκολούθει 218. 2, εἰς τὰ μεγέθη τῶν περιεχόμενων ἐν τοῖς πλάτεσιν ἀστέρων βλέπει ib. 221. 29 et al.). Such a theory might well be
described as 'natural,' for it provides for the orbital distances on a
principle which is reasonable enough in such a priori physics. "The
principle," writes Professor Cook Wilson, "would be a sort of equable
distribution of planetary mass, allowing the greater body more space.
It would come to allowing the same average of linear dimension of
planetary mass to each unit of distance between orbits throughout the
system."

Another argument in support of this interpretation of Proclus' 'older'
text may be derived from the treatise of Theo. Theo has our text of
Plato (see on this subject p. 479 below), and introduces his quotation
of the passage in these words: ὑδλοὶ δὲ τὴν τάξην τῶν σφαιρῶν διὰ τε
τοῦ μεγέθους τῶν ἄστρων ἐκάστου καὶ διὰ τοῦ χρώματος ἐκάστου καὶ
It is clear from this sentence that Theo inferred the size of the different
bodies from the breadth of the lips, so that he must have made the
breads of the planetary whor-lips either equal or proportional to the
diameters of the planets. That he interpreted them as equal is very
unlikely, for he had before his mind in this part of his work the con-
ception of orbital distances (see e.g. 141. 6), and could hardly have
failed to remark on so extraordinary a peculiarity as the absence of any
provision for representing those distances, if he really supposed that
Plato had not represented them. It is the more improbable that Theo
should have passed over in silence so strange a feature because he wrote
at a time when the prevailing doctrine was that of a system of spheres
whose radii were orbital distances from the centre (i.e. the Earth), and
shews himself acquainted with this doctrine in other portions of his
commentary, e.g. on pp. 181 ff. The more natural supposition there-
fore is that Theo, like Proclus, regarded the relationship between the
breadth of the lips and the size of the planets as one of proportion and
not of equality.

Finally, this interpretation of the 'older' reading throws light on
some passages of Proclus' commentary which are otherwise obscure.
In 219. 27 ff. παντελῶς τῶν κατ' ἐκεῖνον τῶν χρόνων κτλ. (quoted above
at the end of the second extract) Proclus implies that the astronomers
of Plato's time made the depths of the planetary spheres dependent on
the apparent sizes of the planets. Whether the implication itself is true
or not, it is unlikely that Proclus would have imputed to any astronomers
the complete neglect of orbital intervals, and the only interpretation of
the 'older' reading which allows for these intervals is to make the
breadth of the lips proportionate to the sizes of the planets. And in
219. 11 ff. (καὶ ἡ ἁπλὴν καὶ οὕτως λέγουσι κτλ.) Proclus suggests that the
'older' reading was altered to our text in order to represent the differ-
ences between the planets in respect of apogee and perigee. The
suggestion seems clearly to imply that he found the orbital distances
of the planets represented in the 'older reading,' for "if the χελαία were
only equal to the diameters of the planets, how could it be relevant to
widen them to allow for apogee and perigee? Clearly it could only be
relevant to the correction of a magnitude already representing differences
of orbital distances" (Cook Wilson).
These considerations make it highly probable, if they do not absolutely prove, that Proclus' 'older reading' was understood to make the breadth of the different whorl-surfaces proportionate, and not equal, to the diameters of the planets.

We have now to consider the value and authority of this reading as compared with the text of our MSS.

The one reading is described by Proclus as προτέρα καὶ ἄρχαυστέρα, the other—that which I have adopted—as δευτέρα καὶ νεώτερα, κρατοῦσα δὲ ἐν τοῖς κεκωλισμένοις ἀντιγράφοις.

The word κεκωλισμένοις, which is a ἀπαξ εἰρημένον, can refer only to the arrangement of the MS in κόλα to facilitate study and reading aloud: see Dziaetko in Pauly-Wissowa III p. 960. 27 and Birt Ant. Buchwesen pp. 180 ff. But as there seems to be no other evidence of the division of Plato's dialogues into κόλα (see Birt l.c.), Pitra's conjecture κεκωλισμένοις 'castigatis' 'corrected' 'edited' may be right.

If Proclus wrote κεκωλισμένοις, it would seem that a recension of Plato's text was made about his time, and the 'newer' reading deliberately adopted in place of that which had hitherto held the field. As this 'newer' reading is found in all our MSS, we might even suppose that this recension originated the Archetype, from which according to Schanz (Stud. zur Gesch. d. Plat. Textes pp. 23—45), our MSS are all descended, and which Schanz places not earlier than 400 A.D. But even if we should grant all these hypotheses, it by no means follows that the 'older' reading is that which Plato wrote. Against the possibility that the reading of our MSS was a deliberate emendation on the part of the editors has to be set the rival possibility that it rested upon the authority of MSS which were judged by them to be more trustworthy than the authorities for the vulgate text. We have no evidence as to the critical principles followed by the authors of the recension—if recension there was; and in the absence of such evidence, the question between the two readings must be determined by the internal probabilities.

The balance of probability is in favour of the reading of our MSS, as will appear from the following considerations.

In the first place, our text was felt to be the lectio difficilior. This appears from the fact that Proclus found it difficult to discern a principle in the 'newer' reading (καὶ ἵσως οἱ οὐτοὶ λέγοντες κτλ.), whereas the 'older' seemed to him easy and natural (ἡ δὲ προτέρα τὸ αὐτοφυεῖς ἐχεῖ).

Secondly, it is clear that, whichever text was the original one, it must have been altered into the other by deliberate emendation in order to satisfy some astronomical preconception. And it is much easier to conjecture why the 'newer' reading should have been changed into the 'older' than conversely.

Suppose, on the one hand, that the 'older' reading represents the truth. Why was it emended into our text? The motive cannot have been in order to reconcile the account of the planetary distances in the Republic with that which we find in the Timaeus; for the 'newer' reading makes the discrepancy between the two dialogues as great as
before. Or was it, as Proclus suggests, to make provision for the apogee and perigee of the planets? This is also improbable, because even a careless reader of the Republic (and, we may add, of the Timaeus) would hardly fail to see that Plato's general conception of the celestial motions leaves no room for apogee and perigee; and on this account so violent a dislocation, even if it were once made, would be very unlikely to establish itself.

If we suppose, on the other hand, that our text is that which Plato himself wrote, a plausible account can be given of the origin of the 'older' reading. The theory that the breadths of the rims should be proportioned to the size of the planets was considered to be natural \( \eta \ \delta \ \pi \rho \omega \tau \varepsilon \rho \alpha \tau \omega \ \alpha \nu \tau \rho \phi \nu \varepsilon \ \zeta \chi \varepsilon \iota \), whereas the existing text appeared difficult and perplexing; and hence the 'emendation.' Of this hypothesis we have strong prima facie confirmation in the treatise of Theo, who retains what (according to our supposition) was the original text, that of our mss, and nevertheless explains the breadths as depending on the size of the planets. Theo's evidence thus supplies the missing link. The next step would be to alter the text in conformity with the explanation given (though not necessarily originated) by Theo: for if Theo's explanation was once accepted, it would soon be felt that the order of magnitude of the heavenly bodies in the received text was absurd. The corruption may therefore be assigned with probability to the time between Theo and Proclus.

An advocate of Proclus' 'older' reading must on the other hand suppose that Theo's citation of Plato (p. 145 Hiller) has been tampered with. This is of course possible, but much less probable than the rival view.

Finally, the strongest argument in favour of our text is that it conforms to the numerical principle explained above (see pp. 473 f.).

It is highly probable that any alteration of the original text would violate this principle, and in Proclus' 'older' reading it is violated, for the order of breadth in the \( \pi \rho \omega \tau \varepsilon \rho \alpha \gamma \rho \alpha \phi \eta \) is

\[ 1 \ 7 \ 8 \ 6 \ 4 \ 3 \ 2 \ 5. \]

And it is in the last degree improbable that an emendation of the 'older reading' would obey the 'rule of nines' which holds good in the enumeration both of the colours and of the velocities of the heavenly bodies. As our text does obey this law, the probabilities are that it is no emendation, but proceeds from Plato himself.
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a for ai: φαίμεν f. φαίμεν
α and ai: ἄρα f. ἄρα
γ and τ: τῷ f. τῇ I 152, 220, 578 A, 605 A
γ for τ: γε f. τε I 262, 220, 120, 326, 578 B, 581 C, II 451; ἔγειρε f. ἔγειρε II 25
γ and τ: τῷ f. τῇ I 24, 58, 120, 326, 578 B, 581 C, II 451; ἔγειρε f. ἔγειρε II 25
γ for λ: λευργός f. λευργός (? I 421 A
δ for α: ἀδεῦτε f. ἀδεῦτε I 61, combined with dittography, ῥάδιον f. ῥάδιον I 94, with ligature, ῥάδιον F. δέδον I 99
δ for λ: ἀστολόμων f. ἀστολομέων
II 261, δέ f. λαῦν 607 B; ἀπεθανώσται f. ἀπεκλείσει 612 A
ε for ai: ἐπετρέποντα f. ἐπετρέποντα
I 133, 254, II 262; οὗτο f. οὗτοι 357 C; ἐρεί f. ἐρεί II 411
ε and ai: εἰ f. ἐρήμουσα f. ἐρήμουσα I 133; κατηγορεῖται f. κατηγορεῖται 453 E; κατων f. κατων II 185

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o for ω (ψ): τοῦ αὐτῷ f. τῷ αὐτῷ I 307; τῷ f. τῷ II 258, 411; τούτῳ 380 E.

ο and ω (ψ)

π for τ: ποτε f. τότε I 279

π for τι: ἐπί f. έπι 532 B, C; ποιῶμεθα f. τι οἴδαμεθα 581 D.

πι for τι: εἰποντοράτερος f. έπί πον- ράτερος III 368

στ for τ: διαστάσεις f. διατάσεις I 179; ἐκατόν f. ἐκατόν II 208.

Omission of one of two identical letters or syllables:

ἄλλος τυχός οὖν f. ἄλλου οὔτος υἱόν I 240; βαλλόντος f. βάλλοντος I 321; γενόσται f. γενν.- 461 A; ἐτί μάλιστα f. ἐτί μάλιστα II 227; μελετουργός f. μελετηρ- 564 C; ἐναρέθει f. ἐναρεθεί 540 C; περίκτους f. περικτείν II 260, cf. 401; τοῦ f. τοῦτον 610 D, τρίτα f. τρίτην 599 A.

Omission of words with like ending is not infrequent in Paris A. Instances of, in Paris A or other mss of the Rep.:—

I 67, 80, 87, 102, 104, 115, 119, 123, 162, 164, 355 f. (καὶ καλὸν and καὶ καλὸν αὐτῷ), 603 B (καὶ ἣ); perhaps also I 56 (πράξεως οὐδὲν) and 439 A, I 271 (καὶ τυχός). The omission of single words may also be sometimes due to homoioteleuton, e.g. τι I 96, ἢτι I 108, λέκτια I 113, οἱ I 142, τάδε I 219, οὖν I 227, ἥ I 240, II 355, τῶν I 308, τό I 322, εἰ I 338, τῇ II 116, ἐν 604 B, αὐτῷ II 411, ἐν 608 A.

Omission of words without homoioteleuton:—

I 131, 263 (46 letters), II 49 (41 letters), II 224 (δῆλον, ἐφι). of single words without hom., e.g. ἐχεῖν I 71, ἔφη I 76, 275, 522 A, εἶχεν I 88, ἦμα I 143, μή I 149, 285, ἕκαστον II 137, ὥσπερ I 182, μη II 457. For the occasional omission of articles, conjunctions, particles, prepositions and pronouns, see the critical notes.

Words not included in the above lists, erroneously substituted for other words, whether by accident or design:—

ἄγων for ἄγαθον 522 A. ἀρόσται f. ἀναρόσται 198 B.

αἰσθανόμεθα f. ἀκροασθανόμεθα (?) 608 A.

αἰφνίτες f. αἰφνίτες I 157.

ἀκολουθήσει f. ἀκολουθήσει I 38.

ἀκρατάτητις f. ἀκρατάτητις 564 A.

ἀκραχυλοῦ f. ἀκραχυλοῦ I 187.

ἀλλά f. ἀλλά I 245.

ἀλλοι f. ἀλλοί II 48.

ἀλλοραῖοι f. ἀλλοι II 106.

ἀμφιθηρίες f. ἀμφιθηρίες II 44.

ἀν αὐτον I 277.

ἀναλαμβάνοντα f. ἀναλαμβάνοντα 490 A.

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ἀνέθετο f. ἅθετο 621 B.

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δέ γε f. δέ I 14.

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δία τοῦ f. διανοοῦ II 83.

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Readings adopted in the text of this edition, but not found in any of the collated MSS of the Republic:

**Reading adopted**

### I
333 E ἔμποιησας (Schneider)
337 E αὐτῷ [εἴν] (Bremi)
349 B οὖδὲ τής <πράξεως τῆς> δικαίας (Adam)

### II
358 E οὖν τε τι (Adam)
359 A δοκεῖν (Ast)
361 C ὑπὲρ (Eusebius)
364 C περὶ (Madvig)
377 B τύπων (H. Richards)

### III
387 C ποιεῖ (Hertz)
387 E δύορατα, φέρει (Stallbaum)
388 C θ΄ τε (Leaf)
390 A παρὰ πλεία (Adam)
391 E οἱ ζηρόδ (Bekker)
392 B ήπιόμεν (Stallbaum)
396 E ἀπλής διγγυήσεως (Adam)
398 A οὔτε (Adam)
401 C τίς προσβάλη (Adam)
407 C ἔφη (Adam)
407 E ὅτι τοιοῦτος ἢν· καὶ οἱ παῖδες αὐτῶν (Schneider)

### Reading of Paris A

έμποιησα
αὐτῷ εἴν
οὐδὲ τῆς δικαίας
ti ón te
δοκεῖ
ὑπὲρ
περὶ
diδώτες
tύπος
ποιεῖ ὡς οὐτα
δύορατα, φέρει
ὅτε
παραπλείαι
Ζηρόδ
ἐξηγομέν
ἀλλής διγγυήσεως
οὐκ
ti προσβάλη
ἔφη
καὶ οἱ παῖδες αὐτῶν ὅτι τοιοῦτος ἢν

**Notes**

Noted in Index I under the headings of the several prepositions.


Proclus on the style of Plato 545 D, 595 B, 617 D

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Reading adopted

IV 428 D ὑπων ἤν (Ast)  ὑπων
429 C αὐτῆς (Adam)  αὐτῆς
430 C μύμιμον (Stobæus)  νύμιμον
431 C παισι (H. Wolf)  πάσι
432 C μετρίος (H. Richards)  μετρίους
432 D Ιoplevel (Adam)  Ιoplevel
437 B ἀν ἀλλήλουs (Baiter)  ἀλλήλουs
437 D ἐν ἐλγυρ (Cornarius)  ἐν ἐλγυρ
439 B πράττει (Ast)  πράττει
439 C ἐγγύγηται (Schneider)  ἐγγύγηται
440 D ἦ (Ast)  ἦ
442 A προστηθετον (Bekker)  προστηθετον
443 C ϕειλε (Ast)  ϕειλε

V 454 C λατρικών (Adam)  λατρικών τὸν ψυχὸν ὑντα
457 B γαλωνόu (J. G. S. Schneider)  γαλωνον σοφιάς
459 C ἡγομεθα (Adam)  ἡγομεθα εὑνα
460 B το εἰναι (Adam)  το εἰναι
461 B αὐθομοις (Eusebius)  αὐθομοις
461 C μηδὲ ἐν (Cobet)  μηδὲ γ' ἐν (μηδὲ γ' ἐν Δ3)
462 C τῷ αὐτῷ (Wyttenbach)  τῷ αὑτῷ
468 A ἔλοντε (J. van Leeuwen)  ἔλοντε
477 B αὐτήν τὴν (C. Schmidt)  τὴν αὐτήν
478 A δοαζεῖ (Adam)  δοαζεῖν

VI 493 B ἐκαςτα (van Prinsterer)  ἐκαστα
494 B παισιν (de Geer)  παϊν
499 B κατηκού (Schleiermacher)  κατηκοῦ
500 A τ' ου (Baiter)  τοι
501 B φήτει (Adam)  φήτει
503 C ἐπεται καὶ νεανικοι ται καὶ μεγαλοπρεπεις τας διανοιας (Adam)  ἐπεται καὶ νεανικοι τα μεγαλοπρεπεις τας διανοιας

... φεσθαι (Adam)  φεσθαι

VII 504 A ἑθος (Orelli)  ἑθος
505 B ἕθη (Ast)  ἕθη
507 B και (Adam)  και
508 E γιγωσκομενην (Adam)  γιγωσκομενην
510 B ἔστερον (Ast)  ἔστερον το
514 E αὐτου (Hirschig)  αὐτου
516 E ἄν απάλωσ (Baiter)  ἄν απάλωσ
517 A καὶ ἀποκτυννουα, ἀποκτείνειαν ἄν (Adam)  καὶ ἀποκτείνειν, ἀποκτυννουα των

... δραμα (Ast)  δραμα

VIII 532 A ορμαν (Ast)  ορμαν
532 B ἐτι ἀδιναμια (Iamblichus)  ἐτι ἀδιναμια
533 A δει (? Ficinus)  δει
537 B ἐκοσητῶν (Schneider)  ἐκοσῃ ἐτων
547 B τω δ' αὑ, το (Schneider)  το δ' αὑτο
547 E κεκτημενη (Bekker, ? with ν)  κεκτημενην
551 C όπουν (Ficinus)  όπουν ἡ τινος
554 D ἄναγκη (Ast)  ἄναγκη
554 B ἐστησατο καὶ ετίμα μάλιστα. (Schneider)  ἐστησατο. Καὶ ετίμα μάλιστα ευ
559 E διλεγαρχίας — δημοκρατίαν (Adam)  διλεγαρχίας—δημοκρατίκην
562 B δ (Adam)  εў
564 C βιλτετ (Adam)  βιλτετε
568 D και τα (Baiter)  τα
568 E ἐφην εγω (Adam)  ἐφην δ' εγω
Reading adopted

IX 577 D ἄνρα (Campbell)
578 C τῷ τοιοῦτῳ (Adam)
580 D δὲ ἵνα (Adam)
581 D τι ὀφθήκη (Greser)
585 A τὸ ἀλτητὸν οὖτω πρὸς λύπην (Schleiermacher)
585 C ἥτις ἐπιστήμη (Adam)
587 A πλεύς (Adam)
591 D φαίνεται (Lamblichus)
600 D οὐνάναι (Matthiäus)
603 C ἦν (Ast)
604 D λατρεία τρηθητικῶν (Stobæus)
606 C ἃς (Schneider)
607 B λᾶν (Hieronwerden)
608 A ἄκροαζεμένα (Adam)
610 A ὀφθάλματα (Stephanus)
615 C αὐτόχειρας (Ast)

Recurrence of the same word at the end of two successive clauses (e.g. ἐλατηρεῖον, — ἐλατηρεῖον)

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