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THE

DIALOGUES OF PLATO

Translated into English

WITH ANALYSES AND INTRODUCTIONS

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IN FOUR VOLUMES

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In several of the dialogues of Plato doubts have arisen among his interpreters as to which of the various subjects discussed in them is the main thesis. The speakers have the freedom of conversation; no severe rules of art restrict them, and sometimes we are inclined to think, with one of the dramatis personae in the Theaetetus (p. 177), that the digressions have the greater interest. Yet in the most irregular of the dialogues there is also a certain natural growth or unity; the beginning is not forgotten at the end, and numerous allusions and references are interspersed, which form the loose connecting links of the whole. We must not neglect this unity, but neither must we attempt to confine the Platonic dialogue on the Procrustean bed of a single idea (cp. Introduction to the Phaedrus).

Two tendencies seem to have beset the interpreters of Plato in this matter. First, they have endeavoured to hang the dialogues upon one another by the very slightest threads; and this has led to opposite and contradictory assertions respecting their order and sequence. The mantle of Schleiermacher has descended upon his successors, who have applied his method with the most various results. The value and use of the method has been hardly, if at all, examined either by him or them. Secondly, they have extended almost indefinitely the scope of each separate dialogue; in this way they think that they have escaped all difficulties, not seeing that what they have gained in generality they have lost in truth and distinctness. Metaphysical conceptions easily pass into one another; and the simpler notions of antiquity, which we can only realize by an effort, imperceptibly blend with the more familiar theories of modern philosophers. An eye for proportion is needed (his own art of measuring) in the study of Plato, as well as of other great artists. We may readily admit that the moral antithesis of good and pleasure, or
the intellectual antithesis of knowledge and opinion, being and appearance, are never far off in a Platonic discussion. But because they are in the background, we should not bring them into the foreground, or expect to find them equally in all the dialogues.

There may be some advantage in drawing out a little the main outlines of the building; but the use of this is limited, and may be easily exaggerated. We may give Plato too much system, and alter the natural form and connection of his thoughts. Under the idea that his dialogues are finished works of art, we may find a reason for everything, and lose the highest characteristic of art, which is simplicity. Most great works receive a new light from a new and original mind. But whether these new lights are true or only suggestive, will depend on their agreement with the spirit of Plato, and the amount of direct evidence which can be urged in support of them. When a theory is running away with us, criticism does a friendly office in counselling moderation, and recalling us to the indications of the text.

Like the Phaedrus, the Gorgias has puzzled students of Plato by the appearance of two or more subjects. Under the cover of rhetoric much higher themes are introduced; the world is convinced of falsehood; and the argument expands into a general view of the good and evil of man. First, after an ineffectual attempt to obtain a sound definition of his art from Gorgias, we begin by imagining a universal art of flattery or simulation; this is the genus of which rhetoric is only one, and not the highest species. To flattery is opposed the true and noble art of life which he who possesses seeks always to impart to others, and which at last triumphs, if not in this world, at any rate in another. These two aspects of life and knowledge appear to be the two leading ideas of the dialogue. The true and the false in individuals and states, in the treatment of the soul as well as of the body, are conceived under the forms of true and false art. In the development of this opposition there arise various other questions, such as the two famous paradoxes of Socrates: (1) that to do is worse than to suffer evil; and (2) that when a man has done evil he had better be punished than unpunished; to which may be added (3) a third Socratic paradox, that bad men do what they think best, but not what they desire, for the desire of all is towards the good. That pleasure is to be distinguished from good is proved by the simultaneousness of pleasure and pain, and by the possibility of the bad having in certain cases pleasures as great as those of the good, or even greater. Not
merely rhetoricians, but poets, musicians, and other artists, the whole tribe of statesmen, past as well as present, are included in the class of flatterers. The true and false finally appear before the judgment-seat of the gods below.

The dialogue naturally falls into three divisions, to which the three characters of Gorgias, Polus, and Callicles respectively correspond; the form and tone also change with the stages of the argument. Socrates is deferential towards Gorgias, playful and yet cutting in dealing with the youthful Polus, ironical and sarcastic in the encounter with Callicles: In the first division the question is asked—what is rhetoric? To this there is no answer given, for Gorgias is soon made to contradict himself by Socrates, and the argument is transferred into the hands of the younger Polus, who rushes to the defence of his master. The answer has at last to be given by Socrates himself, but before he can even explain his meaning to Polus, he must enlighten him upon the great subject of shams or flatteries. When Polus finds his favourite art reduced to the level of cookery, he replies that at any rate rhetoricians, like despots, have great power. Socrates denies that they have any real power, and this leads to the three paradoxes already mentioned: Although they are strange to him, Polus is at last convinced of them; at least, they seem to him to follow legitimately from the premises. Thus the second act of the dialogue closes. Then Callicles appears on the scene, at first maintaining that pleasure is good, and that might is right, and that law is nothing but the combination of the many weak against the few strong. When he is confuted he withdraws from the argument, and leaves Socrates to arrive at the conclusion by himself. The conclusion is that there are two kinds of statesmanship, a higher and a lower—that which makes the people better, and that which only flatters them, and exhorts Callicles to choose the higher. The dialogue terminates with a mythus of a final judgment, in which there will be no more flattery or disguise, and no further use for the teaching of rhetoric.

The three principal characters correspond to the parts which are assigned to them in the argument. Gorgias is the great rhetorician, now advanced in years, who goes from city to city displaying his talents, and is celebrated throughout Greece. Like all the Sophists in the dialogues of Plato, he is vain and boastful, yet he also has a certain dignity, and is treated by Socrates with considerable respect. But he is no match for
him in dialectics. All his life long he has been teaching rhetoric, and is still incapable of defining his own art. When his ideas begin to clear up, he is unwilling to admit that rhetoric can be wholly separated from justice and injustice, and this lingering sentiment of morality, or regard for public opinion, enables Socrates to detect him in a contradiction. Like Protagoras, he is described as of a generous nature; he expresses his approbation of Socrates' manner of approaching a question; he is quite 'one of Socrates' sort, ready to be refuted as well as to refute,' and very eager that Callicles and Socrates should have the game out. He knows by experience that rhetoric exercises great influence over other men, but he is unable to explain the puzzle how rhetoric can teach, or rather persuade, without any knowledge of the subjects of discourse.

Polus is an impetuous youth, a runaway 'colt,' as Socrates describes him, who wanted originally to have taken the place of Gorgias under the pretext that he was tired, and avails himself of the earliest opportunity to enter the lists. He is said to be the author of a work on rhetoric (462 C), and is again mentioned in the Phaedrus (267 B), as the inventor of balanced or double forms of speech (cp. 448 C, 467 C; Sym. 185 C). At first he is violent and ill-mannered, and is angry at seeing his master overthrown. But in the judicious hands of Socrates, he is soon restored to good humour, and compelled to assent to the required conclusion. Like Gorgias, he is overthrown because he compromises; he is unwilling to say that to do is fairer or more honourable than to suffer injustice. Though he is fascinated by the power of rhetoric, and dazzled by the splendour of success, he is not insensible to higher arguments. Plato may have felt that there would be an incongruity in a youth maintaining the cause of injustice against the world. He has never heard the other side of the question, and he listens to the paradoxes of Socrates with evident astonishment. He can hardly understand the meaning of Arche- laus being miserable, or of rhetoric being only useful in self-accusation. When the argument with him has fairly run out,

Callicles, in whose house they are assembled, is introduced on the stage: he is with difficulty convinced that Socrates is in earnest; for if these things are true, then, as he says with real emotion, the foundations of society are upside down. Another type of character is represented in him; he is neither sophist nor philosopher, but man of the world, and an accomplished Athenian gentleman. He might be described in modern language as a cynic or materialist, a lover of power and also of pleasure,
and unscrupulous in his means of attaining both. There is no desire on
his part to offer any compromise in the interests of morality; nor is any
concession made by him. Like Thrasymachus in the Republic, though
he is not of the same weak and vulgar class, he consistently maintains
that might is right. His great motive of action is political ambition; in
this he is characteristically Greek. Like Anytus in the Meno, he is the,
enemy of the Sophists; but favours the new art of rhetoric, which he
regards as an excellent weapon of attack and defence. He is a despiser
of mankind as he is of philosophy, and sees in the laws of the state only
a violation of the order of nature, which intended that the stronger should
govern the weaker (cp. Rep. 358–360). Like other men of the world
who are of a speculative turn of mind, he generalizes the bad side of
human nature, and has easily brought down his principles to his practice.
Philosophy and poetry alike supply him with distinctions suited to his
view of human life. He has a good will to Socrates, whose talents he
evidently admires, while he censures the puerile use which he makes of
them. He expresses a keen intellectual interest in the argument. Like
Anytus, again, he has a sympathy with other men of the world; the
Athenian statesmen of former ages, who showed no weakness and made
no mistakes, such as Miltiades, Themistocles, Pericles, are his favourites.
His ideal of human character is a man of great passions and great
powers, which he has developed to the utmost, and which he uses in his
own enjoyment and in the government of others. Had Critias been the
name instead of Callicles, about whom we know nothing from other
sources, the opinions of the man would have seemed to reflect the
history of his life.

And now the combat deepens. In Callicles, far more than in any
sofist or rhetorician, is concentrated the spirit of evil against which
Socrates is contending, the spirit of the world, the spirit of the many
contending against the one wise man, of which the Sophists, as he
describes them in the Republic, are the imitators rather than the authors,
being themselves carried away by the great tide of public opinion.
Socrates approaches his antagonist warily from a distance, with a sort of
irony which touches with a light hand both his personal vices (probably
in allusion to some scandal of the day) and his servility to the populace.
At the same time, he is in most profound earnest, as Chaerophon re-
marks. Callicles soon loses his temper, but the more he is irritated, the
more provoking and matter of fact does Socrates become. A repartee
of his which appears to have been really made to the 'omniscient' Hippias, according to the testimony of Xenophon (Mem. IV. 4, 6, 10), is introduced (490 E). He is called by Callicles a popular declaimer, and certainly shows that he has the power, in the words of Gorgias, of being 'as long as he pleases,' or 'as short as he pleases' (cp. Protag. 336 D). Callicles exhibits great ability in defending himself and attacking Socrates, whom he accuses of trifling and word-splitting; he is scandalized (p. 494) that the legitimate consequences of his own argument should be stated in plain terms; after the manner of men of the world, he wishes to preserve the decencies of life. But he cannot consistently maintain the bad sense of words; and getting confused between the abstract notions of better, superior, stronger, he is easily turned round by Socrates, and only induced to continue the argument by the authority of Gorgias. Once, when Socrates is describing the manner in which the ambitious citizen has to identify himself with the people, he partially recognizes the truth of his words.

The Socrates of the Gorgias is not distinguished by any remarkable personal traits. As in other dialogues, he is the enemy of the Sophists and rhetoricians; and also of the statesmen, whom he regards as another variety of the same species. He is more paradoxical and satirical, and perhaps more unfair, than in any other of Plato's writings. There is something humorous in the situation; the ideal and ironical Socrates is provoked into a kind of extravagance by the worldliness of Callicles, 'fooled to the top of his bent,' although he is at the same time deeply serious. The presentiment of his own fate is hanging over him. He is aware that Socrates, the single real teacher of politics, as he ventures to call himself, cannot safely go to war with the whole world—in the courts of earth he will be condemned, and can only be justified in the world below. Then the position of himself and Callicles will be reversed; all those things unfit for ears polite which Callicles has prophesied as likely to happen to him in this world, the insulting language, the box on the ears, may then fall upon himself. (Compare Rep. 613 D, E, and the similar reversal of the position of the lawyer and the philosopher in the Theaetetus, 173-176.)

There is an interesting allusion to his own behaviour at the trial of the generals after the battle of Arginusae, which he ironically attributes to his ignorance of the manner in which a vote of the assembly should be taken (473 E). This is said to have happened 'last year' (406), and therefore
The dramatic date of the dialogue has been fixed at 405 B.C., when Socrates would already have been an old man. The date is clearly marked, it is scarcely reconcileable with another indication of time, viz. the recent usurpation of Archelaus, which occurred in the year 413 (470 B.C); and still less with the 'recent' death (503 B) of Pericles, which happened twenty-four years previously (429 B.C.), or with the mention of Nicias, who died in 413, and is nevertheless spoken of as a living witness (472 A, B). But we have already had reason to observe, that although there is a general consistency of times and persons in the dialogues of Plato, a precise date is an invention of his commentators.

The conclusion of the dialogue is remarkable. (1) for the truly characteristic declaration of Socrates (p. 509 A) that he is ignorant of the true nature and bearing of these things, while he affirms at the same time that one can maintain any other view without being ridiculous. The profession of ignorance reminds us of the earlier and more exclusively oratic dialogues. But neither in them, nor in the Apology, nor in the Memorabilia of Xenophon, does Socrates express any doubt of the fundamental truths of morality. He evidently regards this 'among the multitude of questions' which agitate human life 'as the principle which alone remains unshaken' (527 B). He does not insist here, any more than in the Phaedo, on the literal truth of the myth, but only on the soundness of the doctrine which is contained in it, that doing wrong is worse than suffering, that a man should seem rather than be, that if he is bad he should be corrected, and that rhetoric should be employed for the maintenance of the right only. The revelation of another life is also a recapitulation of the argument in a figure.

(2) The statement of Socrates is remarkable, that he is the only true politician of his age. In other passages, especially in the Apology, he disclaims being a politician at all. There he is convinced that he or any other good man who attempted to resist the popular will would be put to death before he had done any good to himself or others. Here he anticipates such a fate for himself, from the fact that he is 'the only man of the present day who performs his public duties at all.' The two points of view are not really inconsistent, but the difference between them is worth noticing: Socrates is and is not a public man. Not in the ordinary sense, like Alcibiades or Pericles, but in a higher one; and this will sooner or later entail the same consequences on him. He cannot be private man if he would; neither can he separate morals from politics.
Nor is he unwilling to be a politician, although he foresees the dangers that await him, but he must first become a better and wiser man, for he as well as Callicles is in a state of perplexity and uncertainty (527 D, E). Neither is he quite consistent in the point of view which he maintains in this very dialogue (526 C, D; cp. Rep. 426 C, D).

And now, as Socrates says (506 D), we will 'resume the argument from the beginning.'

Socrates, who is attended by his inseparable disciple Chaerephon, meets Callicles in the streets of Athens. He is informed that he has just missed an exhibition of Gorgias, which he regrets, because he was desirous, not of hearing Gorgias display his rhetoric, but of interrogating him concerning the nature of his art. Callicles proposes that they shall go with him to his own house, where Gorgias is staying. There they find the great rhetorician and his younger friend and disciple Polus.

Soc. Put the question to him, Chaerephon. Ch. What question?

Soc. Who is he?—such a question as would elicit from a man the answer, 'I am a cobbler.' Polus suggests that Gorgias may be tired, and desires to answer for him. 'Who is Gorgias?' asks Chaerephon, imitating the manner of his master Socrates. 'One of the best of men and a proficient in the best and noblest of experimental arts,' etc., replies Polus, in rhetorical and balanced phrases. Socrates is dissatisfied at the length and unmeaningness of the answer; he tells the disconcerted volunteer that he has mistaken the quality for the nature of the art, and remarks to Gorgias, that Polus has learnt how to make a speech, but not how to answer a question. He wishes that Gorgias would answer him. Gorgias is willing enough, and replies to the question asked by Chaerephon,—that he is a rhetorician, and in Homeric language 'boasts himself to be a good one.' At the request of Socrates he promises to be brief; for 'he can be as long as he pleases, and as short as he pleases.' Socrates would have him bestow his length on others, and proceeds to ask him a number of questions, which are answered by him to his own great satisfaction, and with a brevity which excites the admiration of Socrates. The result of the discussion may be summed up as follows:—

Rhetoric treats of discourse; but music and medicine, and other particular arts, are also concerned with discourse; in what way then does rhetoric differ from them? Gorgias draws a distinction between the art
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which deals with words, and the arts, which have to do with external actions. Socrates extends this distinction further, and divides all productive arts into two classes: (a) arts which may be carried on in silence; and (b) arts which have to do with words, or in which words are coextensive with action, such as arithmetic, geometry, rhetoric. But still Gorgias could hardly have meant to say that arithmetic was the same as rhetoric. Even in the arts which are concerned with words there are differences. What then distinguishes rhetoric from the other arts which have to do with words? 'The words which rhetoric uses relate to the best and greatest of human things.' But tell me, Gorgias, what are the best? 'Health first, beauty next, wealth third,' in the words of the old song, or how would you rank them? The arts will come to you in a body, each claiming precedence and saying that her own good is superior to that of the rest—How will you choose between them? 'I should say, Socrates, that the art of persuasion, which gives freedom to all men, and to individuals power in the state, is the greatest good.' But what is the exact nature of this persuasion?—is the persevering retort. You could not describe Zeuxis as a painter, or even as a painter of figures, if there were other painters of figures; neither can you define rhetoric simply as an art of persuasion, because there are other arts which persuade, such as arithmetic, which is an art of persuasion about odd and even numbers. Gorgias is made to see the necessity of a further limitation, and he now defines rhetoric as the art of persuading in the law courts, and in the assembly, about the just and unjust. But still there are two sorts of persuasion: one which gives knowledge, and another which gives belief without knowledge; and knowledge is always true, but belief may be either true or false,—there is therefore a further question: which of the two sorts of persuasion does rhetoric effect in courts of law and assemblies? Plainly that which gives belief and not that which gives knowledge; for no one can impart a real knowledge of such matters to a crowd of persons in a few minutes. And there is another point to be considered:—when the assembly meets to advise about walls or docks or military expeditions, the rhetorician is not taken into counsel, but the architect or the general. How would Gorgias explain this? Not Socrates only, but all who intend to become his disciples (and there are several of them in the company), are eagerly asking:—About what then will rhetoric teach us to persuade or advise the state?
Gorgias illustrates the nature of rhetoric by adducing the example of Themistocles, who persuaded the Athenians to build their docks and walls, and of Pericles, whom Socrates himself remembers to have heard advising them about the middle wall. He adds that he has exercised a similar power over the patients of his brother Herodicus. He could be chosen a physician by the assembly if he pleased, for no physician could compete with a rhetorician in popularity and influence. He could persuade the multitude of anything by the power of his rhetoric; not that the rhetorician ought to abuse this power any more than a boxer should abuse the art of self-defence. Rhetoric is a good thing, but, like all good things, may be unlawfully used. Neither is the teacher of the art to be deemed unjust because his pupils are unjust, and make a bad use of the lessons which they have learned from him.

Socrates would like to know before he replies, whether Gorgias will quarrel with him if he points out a slight inconsistency into which he has fallen, or whether he, like himself, is one who loves to be refuted. Gorgias declares that he is quite one of his sort, but fears that the argument may be tedious to the company. The company cheer, and Chaerephon and Callicles exhort them to proceed. Socrates gently points out the supposed inconsistency into which Gorgias appears to have fallen, and which he is inclined to think may arise out of a misapprehension of his own. The rhetorician has been declared by Gorgias to be more persuasive to the ignorant than the physician, or any other expert. And he is said to be ignorant, and this ignorance of his is regarded by Gorgias as a happy condition, for he has escaped the trouble of learning. But is he as ignorant of just and unjust as he is of medicine or building? Gorgias is compelled to admit that if he did not know them previously he must learn them from his teacher as a part of the art of rhetoric. But he who has learned carpentry is a carpenter, and he who has learned music is a musician, and he who has learned justice is just. The rhetorician then must be a just man, and rhetoric is a just thing. But Gorgias has already admitted the opposite of this, viz. that rhetoric may be abused, and that the rhetorician may act unjustly. How is the inconsistency to be explained?

The fallacy of this argument is twofold; for in the first place, a man may know justice and not be just—here is the old confusion of the arts and the virtues;—nor can any teacher be expected to counteract the effects of natural character; and secondly, a man may have a degree of
justice, but not sufficient to prevent him from ever doing wrong. Polus is naturally exasperated at the sophism, which he is unable to detect, and can only reiterate that of course the rhetorician will admit that he teaches justice (how can he do otherwise when pressed by the interrogations of Socrates?), but he thinks also that great want of manners is shown in bringing the argument to such a pass. Socrates ironically replies, that when old men trip, the young set them on their legs again; and he is quite willing to retract, if he can be shown to be in error, but upon one condition, which is that Polus studies brevity. Polus is in great indignation at not being allowed to use as many words as he pleases in the free state of Athens. Socrates retorts, that yet harder will be his own case, if he is compelled to stay and listen to them. After some altercation they agree (cp. Protag. 338), that Polus shall ask and Socrates answer.

'What is the art of rhetoric?' says Polus. Not an art at all, replies Socrates, but a thing which in your book you affirm to have created art. Polus asks, 'What thing?' and Socrates answers, An experience or routine of making a sort of delight or gratification. 'But is not rhetoric a fine thing?' I have not yet told you what rhetoric is. Will you ask me another question—what is cookery? 'What is cookery?' An experience or routine of making a sort of delight or gratification. Then they are the same, or rather fall under the same class, and rhetoric has still to be distinguished from cookery. 'What is rhetoric?' asks Polus once more. A part of a not very creditable whole, which may be termed flattery, is the reply. 'But what part?' A shadow of a part of politics. This, as might be expected, is wholly unintelligible, both to Gorgias and Polus; and, in order to explain his meaning to them, Socrates draws a distinction between shadows or appearances and realities; e.g. there is real health of body or soul, and the appearance of them; real arts and sciences, and the simulations of them. Now the soul and body have two arts waiting upon them, first the art of politics, which attends on the soul, having a legislative part and a judicial part; and another art attending on the body, which has no generic name, but may also be described as having two divisions, one of which is medicine and the other gymnastic. Corresponding with these four arts or sciences there are four shams or simulations of them, mere experiences, as they may be termed, because they give no reason of their own existence. The art of tiring is the sham or simulation of gymnastic, the art of
cookery of medicine; rhetoric is the simulation of justice, and sophistic of legislation. They may be summed up in an arithmetical formula:—


And,


And this is the true scheme of them, but when measured only by the gratification which they procure, they become jumbled together and return to their aboriginal chaos. Socrates apologizes for the length of his speech, which was necessary for the explanation of the subject, and begs Polus not unnecessarily to retaliate on him.

'Do you mean to say that the rhetoricians are esteemed flatterers?'

They are not esteemed at all. 'Why, have they not great power, and can they not do whatever they desire?' They have no power, and they only do what they think best, and never what they desire; for they never attain the true object of desire, which is the good. 'As if you, Socrates, would not envy the possessor of despotic power, who can imprison, exile, kill any one whom he pleases.' But Socrates replies that he has no wish to put any one to death; he who kills another, even justly, is not to be envied, and he who kills him unjustly is to be pitied; it is better to suffer than to do injustice. He does not consider that going about with a dagger and putting men out of the way, or setting a house on fire, is real power. To this Polus assents, on the ground that such acts would be punished, but he is still of opinion that evil-doers, if they are unpunished, may be happy enough. He appeals to the example of Archelaus, the usurper of Macedonia. Does not Socrates think him happy?—Socrates would like to know more about him; he cannot pronounce even the great king to be happy, unless he knows his mental and moral condition. Polus explains that Archelaus was really a slave, being an illegitimate son of Alcetas, brother of Perdiccas king of Macedon, who, by every species of crime and falsehood, first murdering his uncle and then two of his cousins, obtained the kingdom. This was very wicked, and yet all the world, including Socrates himself, would like to have his place. Socrates dismisses the appeal to numbers; Polus, if he will, may summon all the rich men of Athens, Nicias, Aristocrats, whose splendid offerings fill the temples, the house of Pericles, or any other great family:—This is the kind of evidence which is adduced in courts of justice, where truth depends upon numbers. But Socrates employs proof of another sort; his appeal is to one witness only,—that is to say,
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the person with whom he is speaking; him he will convict out of his own mouth. And he is prepared to show, after his manner, that Archelaus cannot be a wicked man and yet happy.

The evil-doer is deemed happy if he escapes, and miserable if he suffers punishment; but Socrates thinks him less miserable if he suffers than if he escapes. Polus is of opinion that such a paradox as this hardly deserves refutation, and is at any rate sufficiently refuted by the fact. Socrates has only to compare the lot of the successful tyrant who is the envy of the world, and of the wretch who, having been detected in a criminal attempt against the state, is crucified or burnt to death. Socrates replies, that if they are both criminal they are both miserable, but that the unpunished is the more miserable of the two. At this Polus laughs outright, which leads Socrates to remark that laughter is a new species of refutation. Polus replies, that he is already refuted; for if he will take the votes of the company, he will find that no one agrees with him. To this Socrates rejoins, that he is not a public man, and (referring to his own conduct at the trial of the generals, after the battle of Arginusae) is unable to take the suffrages of any company, as he had shown on a recent occasion; he can only deal with one witness at a time, and that is the person with whom he is arguing. But he is certain that every man believes that to do is worse than to suffer evil.

Polus, though he will not admit this, is ready to acknowledge that to do evil is considered the more foul or dishonourable of the two. But what is fair and what is foul; whether the terms are applied to bodies, colours, figures, laws, habits, studies, must they not be defined with reference to pleasure and utility? Polus is very ready to admit this, and is easily persuaded that the fouler of two things must exceed either in pain or hurt. But the doing cannot exceed the suffering of evil in pain, and therefore must exceed in hurt. Thus doing is proved by the testimony of Polus himself to be worse or more hurtful than suffering.

There remains the other question: Is a guilty man better off when he is punished or when he is unpunished? Socrates replies, that what is done justly is suffered justly: if the act is just, the effect is just; if to punish is just, to be punished is just, and therefore fair, and therefore beneficent; and the benefit is that the soul is improved. There are three evils from which a man may suffer, and which affect him in estate, body, and soul;—these are, poverty, disease, injustice; and the foulest of these is injustice, the evil of the soul, because that brings the greatest hurt.
And there are three arts which heal these evils—trading, medicine, justice—and the fairest of these is justice. Happy is he who has never committed injustice, and happy in the second degree he who has been healed by punishment. And therefore the criminal should himself go to the judge as he would to the physician, and purge away his crime. Rhetoric will enable him to display his guilt in proper colours, and to sustain himself and others in enduring the necessary penalty. This is at least a conceivable use of the art, and no other has been discovered by us. And if a man had an enemy, he would desire not to punish him, but that he should go unpunished and become worse and worse (taking care only that he did no injury to himself); in this way he would 'heap coals of fire on his head.'

Here Callicles, who has been listening in silent amazement, asks Chae-rephon whether Socrates is in earnest, and on receiving the assurance that he is, proceeds to ask the same question of Socrates himself. For if such doctrines are true, life must have been turned upside down, and all of us are doing the opposite of what we ought to be doing.

Socrates replies in a style of playful irony, that before men can understand one another they must have some common feeling. And such a community of feeling exists between himself and Callicles, for both of them are lovers, and they have both a pair of loves; the beloved of Callicles are the Athenian Demos and Demos the son of Pyrilampes; the beloved of Socrates are Alcibiades and philosophy. The peculiarity of Callicles is that he can never contradict his loves; he changes as his Demos changes in all his opinions; he watches the countenance of both his loves, and repeats their sentiments, and if any one is surprised at his sayings and doings, the explanation of them is, that he is not a free agent, but must always be imitating his two loves. And this is the explanation of Socrates' peculiarities also. He is always repeating what his mistress, Philosophy, is saying to him, who, unlike his other love, Alcibiades, is ever the same, ever true. Callicles must refute her, or he will never be at unity with himself; and discord in life is far worse than the discord of musical sounds.

Callicles answers, that Gorgias was overthrown because, as Polus said, in compliance with popular prejudice, he had admitted that if his pupil did not know justice the rhetorician must teach him; and Polus has been similarly entangled, because his modesty led him to admit that to suffer is more honourable than to do injustice. By custom 'yes,' but not by
nature, says Callicles. And Socrates is always playing between the two points of view, and putting one in the place of the other. In this very argument, what Polus only meant in a conventional sense has been affirmed by him to be a law of nature. For convention says that ‘injustice is dishonourable,’ but nature says that ‘might is right.’ And we are always taming down the nobler spirits among us to the conventional level. But sometimes a great man will rise up and reassert his original rights, trampling under foot all our formularies, and then the light of natural justice shines forth. As Pindar says, ‘Law, the king of all, does violence with high hand;’ as is proved by the example of Heracles, who drove off the oxen of Geryon and never paid for them.

This is the truth, Socrates, as you will be convinced, if you leave philosophy and pass on to the real business of life. A little philosophy is an excellent thing; too much is the ruin of a man. If a man has not ‘passed his metaphysics’ before he has grown up to manhood, he will never know the world. Philosophers are ridiculous when they take to politics, and I dare say that politicians are equally ridiculous when they take to philosophy: ‘Every man,’ as Euripides says, ‘is fondest of that in which he is best.’ Philosophy is graceful in youth, like the lisp of infancy, and should be cultivated as a part of education; but when a grown-up man lisps or studies philosophy, I should like to beat him. None of those over-refined natures ever come to any good; they avoid the busy haunts of men, and skulk in corners, whispering to a few admiring youths, and never giving utterance to any noble sentiments.

For you, Socrates, I have a regard, and therefore I say to you, as Zethus says to Amphion in the play, that you have ‘a noble soul disguised in a puerile exterior.’ And I would have you consider the danger which you and other philosophers incur. For you would not know how to defend yourself if any one accused you in a law-court,—there you would stand, with gaping mouth and dizzy brain, and might be murdered, robbed, boxed on the ears with impunity. Take my advice, then, and get a little common sense; leave to others these frivolities; walk in the ways of the wealthy and be wise.

Socrates professes to have found in Callicles the philosopher’s touchstone; and he is certain that any opinion in which they both agree must be the very truth. Callicles has all the three qualities which are needed in a critic—knowledge, goodwill, frankness; Gorgias and Polus were too modest, and their modesty made them contradict themselves. But
Callicles is a well-educated man; and he is not too modest to speak out
(of this he has already given proof), and his goodwill is shown both by his
own profession and by his giving the same caution against philosophy to
Socrates, which Socrates remembers hearing him give long ago to his
own clique of friends. He will pledge himself to retract any error into
which he may have fallen, and which Callicles may point out. But he
would like to know first of all what he and Pindar mean by natural
justice. Do they suppose that the rule of justice is the rule of the
stronger or of the better? 'There is no difference.' Then are not the
many superior to the one, and the opinions of the many better? And
their opinion is that justice is equality, and that to do is more dishonour-
able than to suffer wrong. And as they are the superior or stronger,
this opinion of theirs must be in accordance with natural as well as con-
ventional justice. 'Why will you continue splitting words? Have I not
told you that the superior is the better?' But what do you mean by the
better? Tell me that, and please to be a little milder in your language,
if you do not wish to drive me away. 'I mean the worthier, the wiser.'
You mean to say that one man of sense ought to rule over ten thousand
fools? 'Yes, that is my meaning.' Ought the physician then to have
a larger share of meats and drinks? or the weaver to have more coats,
or the cobbler larger shoes, or the farmer the more seed? 'You are
always saying the same things, Socrates.' Yes, and on the same subjects
too; but you are never saying the same things. For, first, you defined
the superior to be the stronger, and then the wiser, and now something
else;—whom do you mean? 'I mean men of political ability, who ought
to govern, and have more than the governed.' Than themselves? 'What
do you mean?' I mean to say that every man is his own governor.
'I see that you mean the temperate. But my doctrine is, that a man
should let his desires grow, and take the means of satisfying them. To
the many this is impossible, and therefore they combine to prevent him.
But if he is a king, and has power, how base would he be in submitting
to them! To invite the common herd to be lord over him, when he
might have the enjoyment of all things! For the truth is, Socrates, that
luxury and self-indulgence are virtue and happiness; all the rest is mere
talk.'

Socrates compliments Callicles on his frankness in saying what other
men only think. According to his view, those who want nothing are not
happy. 'Why,' says Callicles, 'if they were, stones and the dead would
be happy.’ This leads Socrates into a half serious, half comic vein of reflection. ‘Who knows,’ as Euripides says, ‘whether life may not be death, and the body a tomb?’ And this is true. Moreover, the part of the soul in which the desires are situated is a leaky vessel, and some ingenious Sicilian has made an allegory, in which he represents fools as the uninitiated, who are supposed to be carrying water to this vessel, which is full of holes, in a similarly holey sieve, and this sieve is their own soul. This is very fanciful, but nevertheless is a figure of a truth which I want to make you acknowledge, viz. that the life of contentment is better than the life of indulgence. Are you disposed to admit that? ‘Far otherwise.’ Then hear another parable. The life of self-contentment and self-indulgence may be represented respectively by two men, who are filling jars with streams of wine, honey, milk,—the jars of the one are sound, and the jars of the other leaky; the first fills his jars, and has no more trouble with them; the second is always filling them, and would suffer extreme misery if he desisted. Are you of the same opinion still? ‘Yes, Socrates, and that expresses what I mean. For true pleasure is a perpetual stream, flowing in and flowing out. To be hungry and always eating, to be thirsty and always drinking, and to have all the other desires and to satisfy them, that, as I admit, is my idea of happiness.’ And to be itching and always scratching? ‘I do not deny that there may be happiness even in that.’ And to indulge unnatural desires, if they are abundantly satisfied? Callicles is indignant at the introduction of such topics. But he is reminded by Socrates that they are introduced, not by him, but by the maintainer of the identity of pleasure and good. Will Callicles still maintain this? ‘Yes, for the sake of consistency, he will.’ But this does not satisfy Socrates, who fears that he is losing his touchstone. A profession of seriousness on the part of Callicles reassures him, and they proceed with the argument. Pleasure and good are the same, but knowledge and courage are not the same either with pleasure or good, or with one another. Socrates disproves the first of these statements by showing that two opposites cannot coexist, but must alternate with one another—to be well and ill together is impossible. But pleasure and pain are simultaneous, and the cessation of them is simultaneous; e.g. in the case of drinking and thirsting, whereas good and evil are not simultaneous, and do not cease simultaneously, and therefore pleasure cannot be the same as good.

Callicles has already lost his temper, and can only be persuaded to go
on by the interposition of Gorgias. Socrates, having already guarded
against objections by distinguishing courage and knowledge from plea-
sure and good, proceeds:—The good are good by the presence of good,
and the bad are bad by the presence of evil. And the brave and wise
are good, and the cowardly and foolish are bad. And he who feels
pleasure is good, and he who feels pain is bad, and both feel pleasure
and pain in nearly the same degree, and sometimes the bad man or
coward in a greater degree. Therefore the bad man or coward is as
good as the brave or may be even better.

Callicles endeavours now to avert the inevitable absurdity by affirming
that he and all mankind admitted some pleasures to be good and others
bad. The good are the beneficial, and the bad are the hurtful, and we
should choose the one and avoid the other. But this, as Socrates ob-
serves, is a return to the old doctrine of himself and Polus, that all things
should be done for the sake of the good.

Callicles assents to this, and Socrates, finding that they are agreed in
distinguishing pleasure from good, returns to his old division of em-
pirical habits, or shams, or flatteries, which study pleasure only, and the
arts which are concerned with the higher interests of soul and body.
Does Callicles agree to this division? Callicles will agree to anything,
in order that he may get through the argument. Which of the arts
then are flatteries? Flute-playing, harp-playing, choral exhibitions, the
dithyrambs of Cinesias are all equally condemned on the ground that
they give pleasure only; and Meles the harp-player, who was the father
of Cinesias, failed even in that. The stately muse of Tragedy is bent
upon pleasure, and not upon improvement. Poetry in general is only a
rhetorical address to a mixed audience of men, women, and children.
And the orators are very far from speaking with a view to what is best;
their way is to humour the assembly as if they were children.

Callicles replies, that this is only true of some of them; others have a
real regard for their fellow-citizens. Granted: then there are two species
of oratory; the one a flattery, another which has a real regard for the
citizens. But where are the orators among whom you find the latter?
Callicles admits that there are none remaining, but there were such in
the days when Themistocles, Cimon, Miltiades, and the great Pericles
were still alive. Socrates replies that none of these were true artists,
setting before themselves the duty of bringing order out of disorder.
The good man and true orator has a settled design; running through
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his life, to which he conforms all his words and actions; he desires to implant justice and eradicate injustice, to implant all virtue and eradicate all vice in the minds of his citizens. He is the physician who will not allow the sick man to indulge his appetites with a variety of meats and drinks, but insists on his exercising self-restraint. And this is good for the soul, and better than the unrestrained indulgence which Callicles was recently approving.

Here Callicles, who has been with difficulty brought to this point, turns restive, and suggests that Socrates shall answer his own questions. 'Then,' says Socrates, 'one man must do for two;' and though he had hoped to have given Callicles an 'Amphion' in return for his 'Zethus,' he is willing to proceed; at the same time, he hopes that Callicles will correct him, if he falls into error. He recapitulates the advantages which he has already won:—

The pleasant is not the same as the good—Callicles and I are agreed about that,—but pleasure is to be pursued for the sake of the good, and the good is that of which the presence makes us good; we and all things good have acquired some virtue or other. And virtue, whether of body or soul, of things or persons, is not attained by accident, but is due to order and harmonious arrangement. And the soul which has order is better than the soul which is without order, and is therefore temperate and is therefore good, and the intemperate is bad. And he who is temperate is also just and brave and pious, and has attained the perfection of goodness and therefore of happiness, and the intemperate whom you approve is the opposite of all this and is wretched. He therefore who would be happy must pursue temperance and avoid intemperance, and if possible escape the necessity of punishment, but if he have done wrong he must endure punishment. In this way states and individuals should seek to attain harmony, which, as the wise tell us, is the bond of heaven and earth, of gods and men. Callicles has never discovered the power of geometrical proportion in both worlds; he would have men aim at disproportion and excess. But if he be wrong in this, and if self-control is the true secret of happiness, then the paradox that the only use of rhetoric is in self-accusation is true, and Polus was right in saying that to do wrong is worse than to suffer wrong, and Gorgias was right in saying that the rhetorician must be a just man. And you were wrong in taunting me with my defenceless condition, and in saying that I might be accused or put to death or boxed on the ears with impunity. For I may
repeat once more, that to strike is worse than to be stricken—to do than to suffer. All this is now made fast in adamantine bonds. I myself know not the true nature of these things, but I know that no one can deny my words and not be ridiculous. To do wrong is the greatest of evils, and to suffer wrong is the next greatest evil. He who would avoid the last must be a ruler, or the friend of a ruler; and to be the friend he must be the equal of the ruler, and must also resemble him. Under his protection he will suffer no evil, but will he also do no evil? Nay, will he not rather do all the evil which he can and escape? And in this way the greatest of all evils will befall him. 'But this imitator of the tyrant,' rejoins Callicles, 'will kill any one who does not similarly imitate him.' Socrates replies that he is not deaf, and that he has heard that repeated many times, and can only reply, that a bad man will kill a good one. 'Yes, and that is the provoking thing.' Not provoking to a man of sense who is not studying the arts which will preserve him from danger; and this, as you say, is the use of rhetoric in courts of justice. But how many other arts are there which also save men from death, and are yet quite humble in their pretensions—such as the art of swimming, or the art of the pilot? Does not the pilot do men at least as much service as the rhetorician, and yet for the voyage from Aegina to Athens he does not charge more than two obols, and when he disembarks he is quite unassuming in his demeanour? The reason is that he is not certain whether he has done his passengers any good in saving them from death, if one of them is diseased in body, and still more if he is diseased in mind—who can say? The engineer too will often save whole cities, and yet you despise him, and would not allow your son to marry his daughter, or his son to marry yours. But what reason is there in this? For if virtue only means the saving of life, whether your own or another's, you have no right to despise him or any practiser of saving arts. But is not virtue something different from saving and being saved? I would have you rather consider whether you ought not to disregard length of life, and think only how you can live best, leaving all besides to the will of Heaven. For you must not expect to have influence either with the Athenian Demos or with Demos the son of Pyrilampes, unless you become like them. What do you say to this?

'There is some truth in what you are saying, but I do not quite believe you.'

That is because you are in love with Demos. But let us have a little
more conversation. You remember the two processes—one which was
directed to pleasure, the other which was directed to making men as
good as possible. And those who have the care of the city should make
the citizens as good as possible. But who would undertake a public
building, if he had never had a teacher of the art of building, and had
never constructed a building before? or who would undertake the duty
of state-physician, if he had never cured either himself or any one else?
Should we not examine him before we entrusted him with the office?
And as Callicles is about to enter public life, should we not examine him?
Whom has he made better? For we have already admitted that this is the
statesman's proper business. And we must ask the same question about
Pericles, and Cimon, and Miltiades, and Themistocles. Whom did they
make better? Nay, did not Pericles make the citizens worse? For he
gave them pay, and at first he was very popular with them, but at last
they condemned him to death. And yet surely he would be a bad tamer
of animals who, having received them gentle, taught them to kick and
butt; and man is an animal, and Pericles had the charge of man, and he
made him wilder, and more savage and unjust, and therefore he could
not have been a good statesman. The same tale might be repeated
about Cimon, Themistocles, Miltiades. And yet the charioteer who keeps
his seat at first is not thrown out when he gains greater experience and
skill. The inference is, that the statesmen of a past age were no better
than those of our own. They may have been cleverer constructors of
docks and harbours, but they did not improve the character of the citi-
zens. I have told you again and again (and I purposely use the same
images) that the soul, like the body, may be treated in two ways—there
is the meaner and the higher art. And you seemed to understand this
at the time, but when I ask you who were the really good statesmen, you
answer—as if I asked you who were the good trainers, and you answered,
Thearion, the baker, Mithoecus, the author of the Sicilian cookery-book,
Sarambus, the vintner. And you would be affronted if I told you that
these are a parcel of cooks who make men fat only to make them thin.
And those whom they have fattened applaud them, instead of finding
fault with them, and lay the blame of their subsequent disorders on their
physicians. And in this, Callicles, you are like them; you applaud the
statesmen of old time, who pandered to the vices of the citizens, and filled
the city with docks and harbours, but neglected virtue and justice. And
when the fit of illness comes, the citizens in like manner who applaud
Themistocles, Pericles, and others, will lay hold of you and my friend Alcibiades, and you will suffer for the misdeeds of your predecessors. The old story is always being repeated—'after all his services, the ungrateful city banished him, or condemned him to death.' As if the statesman should not have taught the city better! He surely cannot blame the state for having unjustly used him, any more than the sophist or teacher can find fault with his pupils if they cheat him. And the sophist and orator are in the same case; although you admire rhetoric and despise sophistic, whereas sophistic is really the higher of the two. The teacher of the arts takes money, but the teacher of virtue or politics takes no money, because this is the only kind of service which makes the disciple desirous of requiting his teacher.

Socrates concludes by finally asking, to which of the two modes of serving the state Callicles invites him:—'to the inferior and ministerial one,' is the ingenious reply. That is the only way of avoiding death, replies Socrates; and he has heard often enough, and would rather not hear again that the bad man will kill the good. But he thinks that such a fate is very likely reserved for him, because he remarks that he is the only person who teaches the true art of politics. And very probably, as in the case which he described to Polus, he may be the physician who is tried by a jury of children. He cannot say that he has procured the citizens any pleasure, and if any one charges him with perplexing them, or with reviling their elders, he will not be able to make them understand that he has only been actuated by a desire for their good. And therefore there is no saying what his fate may be. 'And do you think that a man who is unable to help himself is in a good condition?' Yes, Callicles, if he have the true self-help, which is never to have said or done any wrong to himself or others. If I had not this kind of self-help, I should be ashamed; but if I die for want of your flattering rhetoric, I should die in peace. For death is no evil, but to go to the world below laden with offences is the worst of evils. In proof of which I will tell you a tale:

In the days of Cronos, men were judged on the day of their death, and when judgment had been given on them they departed—the good to the islands of the blest, the bad to the house of vengeance. But as they were still living, and had their clothes on at the time when they were being judged, there was favouritism, and Zeus, on his coming to the throne, was obliged to alter the mode of procedure, and try them after death, having
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first sent down Prometheus to take away from them the foreknowledge of death. Minos, Rhadamanthus, and Aeacus were appointed to be the judges; Rhadamanthus for Asia, Aeacus for Europe, and Minos was to hold the court of appeal. Now death is the separation of soul and body, but after death they both alike retain their characteristics; the fat man, the dandy, the branded slave, are all distinguishable. Some prince or potentate, perhaps even the great king himself, appears before Rhadamanthus, and he instantly detects him, though he knows not who he is; he sees the scars of perjury and iniquity, and sends him away to the house of torment.

For there are two classes of souls who undergo punishment—the curable and the incurable. The curable are those who are benefited by their punishment; the incurable are such as Archelaus, who benefit others by becoming a warning to them. The latter class are generally kings and potentates; meaner persons, happily for themselves, have not the same power of doing injustice. Sisyphus and Tityus in Homer, and not Thersites, are undergoing everlasting punishment. Not that there is anything to prevent a great man from being a good one, as is shown by the famous example of Aristeides, the son of Lysimachus. But to Rhadamanthus the souls are only known as good or bad; they are stripped of their dignities and preferments; he despatches the bad to Tartarus, labelled either as curable or incurable, and looks up with love and awe in the face of some just one, whom he sends to the islands of the blest. The same is the practice of Aeacus; and Minos overlooks them, holding a golden sceptre, as Odysseus in Homer saw him

"Wielding a sceptre of gold, and giving laws to the dead."

My wish for myself and my fellow-men is, that we may present our souls undefiled to the judge in that day; my desire in life is to be able to meet death. And I exhort you, and retort upon you the reproach which you cast upon me,—that you will stand before the judge, gaping, and with dizzy brain, and any one may box you on the ear, and do you all manner of evil.

Perhaps you think that this is an old wives' fable. But you, who are the three wisest men in Hellas, have nothing better to say, and no one will ever show that to do is better than to suffer evil. A man should study to be, and not merely to seem good. If he is bad, he should become good, and avoid all flattery, whether of the many or of the few.
Follow me, then; and if you are looked down upon, that will do you no harm. And when we have practised virtue we will betake ourselves to politics, but not until we are delivered from the shameful state of ignorance and uncertainty in which we are at present. Let us follow in the way of virtue and justice, and not in the way to which you, Callicles, invite us; for that way is nothing worth.

(1) In the Gorgias, as in nearly all the other dialogues of Plato, we are made aware that formal logic has as yet no existence. The old difficulty of framing a definition recurs. The illusive analogy of the arts and the virtues also continues. The ambiguity of several words, such as nature, custom, the honourable, the good, is not cleared up. The Sophists are still floundering about the distinction of the real and seeming. Figures of speech are made the basis of arguments. The possibility of conceiving a universal art or science, which admits of application to a particular subject-matter, is a difficulty which remains unsolved, and has not altogether ceased to haunt the world at the present day (cp. Charmides, 166 ff.). The defect of clearness is also apparent in Socrates himself, unless we suppose him to be practising on the simplicity of his opponent, or rather perhaps trying an experiment in dialectics. Nothing can be more fallacious than the contradiction which he pretends to have discovered in the answers of Gorgias (see Analysis). The advantages which he gains over Polus are also due to a false antithesis of pleasure and good, and to an erroneous assertion, that an agent and a patient may be described by similar predicates—a mistake which Aristotle partly shares and partly corrects in the Nicomachean Ethics, V. i. 4; xi. 2. Traces of a 'robust sophistry' are likewise discernible in his argument with Callicles (pp. 490, 496, 516).

(2) Although Socrates professes to be convinced by reason only, yet the argument is often a sort of dialectical fiction, by which he conducts himself and others to his own ideal of life and action. And we may sometimes wish that we could have suggested answers to his antagonists, or pointed out to them the rocks which lay concealed under the ambiguous terms good, pleasure, and the like. But it would be as useless to examine his arguments by the requirements of modern logic, as to criticise this ideal from a merely utilitarian point of view. If we say that the ideal is not true as a matter of fact, and that the world will by no means agree that the criminal is happier when punished than when unpunished,
any more than they would agree to the stoical paradox that a man may be happy on the rack, Plato has already admitted the objection which we are urging against him. Neither does he mean to say that Archelaus is tormented by the stings of conscience; or that the sensations of the impaled criminal are more agreeable than of the tyrant drowned in luxurious enjoyment. Neither is he speaking, as in the Protagoras, of virtue as a calculation of pleasure, an opinion which he afterwards repudiates in the Phaedo. What then is his meaning? And what is the value of his method? His meaning we shall be able to illustrate best by parallel notions, which, whether justifiable by logic or not, have always existed among mankind. We must remind the reader that Socrates himself implies that he will be understood or appreciated by very few.

He is speaking not of the consciousness of happiness, but of the idea of happiness. When a martyr dies in a good cause, when a soldier falls in battle, we do not suppose that death or wounds are without pain, or that their physical suffering is always compensated by a mental satisfaction. Still we regard them as happy, and we would a thousand times rather have their death than a shameful life. Nor is this only because we believe that they will obtain an immortality of fame, or that they will have crowns of glory in another world, when their enemies and persecutors will be proportionally tormented. Men are found in a few instances to do what is right, without reference to public opinion or to consequences. And we regard them as happy on this ground only, much as Socrates' friends are described as regarding him in the opening of the Phaedo; or as was said of another, 'they looked upon his face as upon the face of an angel.' We are not concerned to justify this idealism by the standard of utility, or by the rules of logic, but merely to point out the existence of such a sentiment in the better part of human nature.

The idealism of Plato is founded upon this sentiment. He would maintain that in some sense or other truth and right are alone to be sought, and that all other goods are only desirable as means towards these. He is thought to have erred in 'considering the agent only; and making no reference to the happiness of others, as affected by him.' But the happiness of others, or of mankind regarded as an end, is really quite as ideal and almost as paradoxical as Plato's conception of happiness. For the greatest happiness of the greatest number may mean also the greatest pain of the individual which will procure the greatest
pleasure of the greatest number. Ideas of utility, like those of duty and right, may be pushed to unpleasant consequences. Nor can Plato in the Gorgias be deemed purely self-regarding, considering that Socrates expressly mentions the duty of imparting the truth when discovered to others. Nor must we forget that the side of ethics which regards others is by the ancients merged in politics. Both in Plato and Aristotle, as well as in the Stoics, the social principle, though taking another form, is really far more prominent than in most modern treatises on ethics.

The idealizing of suffering is one of the conceptions which have exercised the greatest influence on mankind. Into the theological import of this, or into the consideration of the errors to which the idea may have given rise, we need not now enter. All will agree that the ideal of the Divine Sufferer, whose words the world would not receive, the man of sorrows of whom the Hebrew prophets spoke, has sunk deep into the heart of the human race. It is a similar picture of suffering goodness which Plato desires to pourtray, not without an allusion to the fate of his master Socrates. He is convinced that, somehow or other, such an one must be happy in life or after death. In the Republic, he endeavours to show that his happiness would be assured here in a well-ordered state. But in the actual condition of human things the wise and good would be weak and miserable, like a man fallen among wild beasts, exposed to every sort of wrong and obloquy.

Plato, like other philosophers, is thus led on to the conclusion, that if 'the ways of God' to man are to be 'justified,' the hopes of another life must be included. If the question could have been put to him, whether a man dying in torments was happy still, even if, as he suggests in the Apology, 'death be only a long sleep,' we can hardly tell what would have been his answer? There have been a few, who, quite independently of rewards and punishments or of posthumous reputation, or any other influence of public opinion, have been willing to sacrifice their lives for the good of others. It is difficult to say how far in such cases an unconscious hope of a future life, or a general faith in the victory of good in the world, may have supported the sufferers. But this extreme idealism is not in accordance with the spirit of Plato. He supposes a day of retribution, in which the good are to be rewarded and the wicked punished (522 E). Though, as he says in the Phaedo, no man of sense will maintain that the details of the stories about another world are true, he will insist that something of the kind is true, and will frame his life
with a view to this unknown future. Even in the Republic he introduces a future life as an afterthought, when the superior happiness of the just has been established on what is thought to be an immutable foundation. At the same time he makes a point of determining his main thesis independently of remoter consequences (612 A).

(3) Plato's theory of punishment is partly vindictive, partly corrective. In the Gorgias, as well as in the Phaedo and Republic, a few great criminals, chiefly tyrants, are reserved as examples. But most men have never had the opportunity of attaining this pre-eminence of evil. They are not incurable, and their punishment is intended for their improvement. They are to suffer because they have sinned; like sick men, they must go to the physician and be healed. On this representation of Plato's the criticism has been made, that the analogy of disease and injustice is partial only, and that suffering instead of being improving may be the reverse.

Like the general analogy of the arts and the virtues, the analogy of disease and injustice, or of medicine and justice, is certainly imperfect: But ideas must be given through something; the nature of the mind which is unseen can only be represented under figures derived from visible objects. If these figures are suggestive of some new aspect under which the mind may be considered, we cannot find fault with them for not exactly coinciding with the ideas represented. They partake of the imperfect nature of language, and must not be construed in too strict a manner. That Plato sometimes reasons from them as if they were not figures but realities, is due to the defective logical analysis of his age.

Nor does he distinguish between the suffering which improves and the suffering which only punishes and deters. He applies to the sphere of ethics a conception of punishment which is really derived from criminal law. He does not see that such punishment is only negative, and supplies no principle of moral growth or development. He is not far off the higher notion of an education of man to be begun in this world, and to be continued in other stages of existence, which is further developed in the Republic. And Christian thinkers, who have ventured out of the beaten track in their meditations on the 'last things,' have found a ray of light in his writings. But he has not explained how or in what way punishment is to contribute to the improvement of mankind. He has not followed out the principle which he affirms in the Republic, that 'God is the author of evil only with a view to good,' and that 'they were the
better for being punished." Still his doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments may be compared favourably with that of those who make the everlasting punishment of human beings depend on a brief moment of time, or even on the accident of an accident. And he has escaped the difficulty which has often beset divines, respecting the future destiny of the meaner sort of men (Thersites and the like), who are neither very good nor very bad, by not counting them worthy of eternal damnation.

We do Plato violence in pressing his figures of speech or chains of argument; and not less so in asking questions which were beyond the horizon of his vision, or did not come within the scope of his design. The main purpose of the Gorgias is not to answer questions about a future world, but to place in antagonism the true and false life, and to contrast the judgments and opinions of men with judgment according to the truth. Plato may be accused of representing a superhuman or transcendental virtue, in the description of the just man in the Gorgias, or in the companion portrait of the philosopher in the Theaetetus; and at the same time may be thought to be condemning a state of the world, which always has existed and always will exist among men. But such ideals act powerfully on the imagination of mankind. And such condemnations are not mere paradoxes of philosophers, but the natural rebellion of the higher sense of right in man against the ordinary conditions of human life. The greatest statesmen have fallen very far short of the political ideal, and are therefore justly involved in the general condemnation.

Subordinate to the main purpose of the dialogue are some other questions, which may be briefly considered:—

a. The antithesis of good and pleasure, which as in other dialogues is supposed to consist in the permanent nature of the one compared with the transient and relative nature of the other. Good and pleasure, knowledge and sense, truth and opinion, essence and generation, virtue and pleasure, the real and the apparent, the finite and infinite, harmony or beauty and discord, dialectic and rhetoric or poetry, are so many pairs of opposites, which in Plato easily pass into one another, and are seldom kept perfectly distinct. And we must not forget that Plato's conception of pleasure is the Heraclitean flux transferred to the sphere of human conduct. There is some degree of unfairness in opposing the principle of good, which is objective to the principle of pleasure, which is sub-
jective. For the assertion of the permanence of good is only based on
the assumption of its objective character. Had Plato fixed his mind,
ot on the ideal nature of good, but on the subjective consciousness
of happiness, that would have been found to be as transient and pre-
carious as that of pleasure.

b. The arts or sciences, when pursued without any view to truth, or
the improvement of human life, are called flatteries. They are all alike
dependent upon the opinion of mankind, from which they are derived.
To Plato the whole world appears to be sunk in error, based on self-
interest. To this is opposed the one wise man hardly professing to
have found truth, yet strong in the conviction that a virtuous life is the
only good, whether regarded with reference to this world or to another.
Statesmen, Sophists, rhetoricians, poets, are alike brought up for judg-
ment. They are the parodies of wise men, and their arts are the
parodies of true arts and sciences. All that they call science is merely
the result of that study of the tempers of the Great Beast, which he
described in the Republic.

c. Various other points of contact naturally suggest themselves be-
tween the Gorgias and other dialogues, especially the Republic, the
Philebus, and the Protagoras. There are closer resemblances both of
spirit and language in the Republic than in any other dialogue, the
verbal similarity tending to show that they were written at the same period
of Plato's life. For the Republic supplies that education and training
of which the Gorgias suggests the necessity. The theory of the many
weak combining against the few strong in the formation of society
(which is indeed a partial truth), is similar in both of them, and is
expressed in nearly the same language. The sufferings and fate of the
just man, the powerlessness of evil, and the reversal of the situation in
another life, are also points of similarity. The poets, like the rhetor-
cians, are condemned because they aim at pleasure only, as in the
Republic they are expelled the State, because they are imitators, and
minister to the weaker side of human nature. That poetry is akin to
rhetoric may be compared with the analogous notion, which occurs in
the Protagoras, that the ancient poets were the Sophists of their day.
In some other respects the Protagoras rather offers a contrast than a
parallel. The character of Protagoras may be compared with that of
Gorgias, but the conception of happiness is different in the two dia-
logues; being described in the former, according to the old Socratic
notion as deferred or accumulated pleasure, while in the Gorgias, as in the Phaedo, pleasure and good are distinctly opposed.

This opposition is carried out from a speculative point of view in the Philebus. There neither pleasure nor wisdom are allowed to be the chief good, but pleasure and good are not so completely opposed as in the Gorgias. For innocent pleasures, and such as have no antecedent pains are allowed to rank in the class of goods. The allusion to Gorgias' definition of rhetoric (Philebus, 58 A. B.; cp. Gor. 452 D. E.), as the art of persuasion, and the best of arts, and the art which subjects all things, not by force, but voluntarily, seems to mark a designed connection between the two dialogues. In both the ideas of measure, order, harmony, are the connecting links between the beautiful and the good.

In general spirit and character, that is, in irony and antagonism to public opinion, the Gorgias most nearly resembles the Apology, Crito, and portions of the Republic, and like the Philebus, though from another point of view, may be thought to stand in the same relation to Plato's theory of morals which the Theaetetus bears to his theory of knowledge.

d. A few minor points still remain to be summed up: (1) The extravagant irony in the reason which is assigned for the pilot's modest charge (p. 512); and in the proposed use of rhetoric as an instrument of self-condemnation (p. 480); and in the mighty power of geometrical equality in both worlds (p. 508). (2) The reference of the mythus to the previous discussion should not be overlooked: the fate reserved for incurable criminals such as Archelaus (p. 525); the retaliation of the box on the ears (p. 527); the nakedness of the souls and of the judges who are stript of the clothes or disguises which rhetoric and public opinion have hitherto provided for them (cp. Swift's notion that the universe is a suit of clothes). The fiction seems to have involved Plato in the necessity of supposing that the soul retained a sort of corporeal likeness after death. (3) The appeal to the authority of Homer, who says that Odysseus saw Minos in his court 'holding a golden sceptre,' which gives verisimilitude to the tale.

It is scarcely necessary to repeat that Plato is playing 'both sides of the game,' and that in criticising the characters of Gorgias and Polus, we are not passing any judgment on historical individuals, but only attempting to analyze the 'dramatis personae' as they were conceived by him. Neither is it necessary to remark that Plato is a dramatic writer,
whose real opinions cannot always be assumed to be those which he puts into the mouth of Socrates, or any other speaker who appears to have the best of the argument: or that he is to be criticised as a poet rather than as a mere philosopher: or that he is not to be tried by a modern standard, but interpreted with reference to his place in the history of thought and the opinion of his time.

It has been said that the most characteristic feature of the Gorgias is the assertion of the right of dissent, or private judgment. But this mode of stating the question is really opposed both to the spirit of Plato and of ancient philosophy generally. For Plato is not asserting any abstract right or duty of toleration, or advantage to be derived from freedom of thought; indeed, in some other parts of his writings (e.g. Laws, X.), he has fairly laid himself open to the charge of intolerance. No speculations had as yet arisen respecting the 'liberty of prophesying;' and Plato is not affirming any abstract right of this nature: but he is asserting the duty and right of the one wise and true man to dissent from the folly and falsehood of the many. At the same time he acknowledges the natural result, which he hardly seeks to avert, that he who speaks the truth to a multitude, regardless of consequences, will probably share the fate of Socrates.
Gorgias.

Persons of the dialogue.


Gorgias.  Polus.

Gorgias.

Steph. 447 Callicles. The wise man, as the proverb says, is late for a fray, but not for a feast.

Socrates. And are we late for a feast?

Cal. Yes, and a delightful feast; for Gorgias has been just exhibiting to us many fine things.

Soc. I must throw the blame, Callicles, on my friend Chaerophon here, who would keep us loitering in the Agora.

Chaerophon. Never mind, Socrates—the misfortune of which I have been the cause I will also repair; for Gorgias is a friend of mine, and I will make him repeat the exhibition either now or at some future time.

Cal. What is the matter, Chaerophon—does Socrates want to hear Gorgias?

Chaer. Yes, that was our intention in coming.

Cal. Suppose, then, that you proceed to my house; for Gorgias is staying with me, and he shall exhibit to you.

Soc. Very good, Callicles; but will he answer our questions? for I want to hear from him what is the nature of his art, and what this is which he professes and teaches; he may defer the exhibition, as you suggest, to another time.

Cal. There is nothing like asking him, Socrates; and indeed this is a part of his exhibition, for he was saying only just now, that any one in my house might ask him anything, and that he would answer.
Soc. I am glad to hear that;—will you ask him, Chaerephon?
Chaer. What shall I ask him?
Soc. Ask him who he is.
Chaer. What do you mean?
Soc. I mean such a question as would elicit from him, if he had been a maker of shoes, the answer that he is a cobbler. Do you understand?
Chaer. I understand, and will ask him: Tell me, Gorgias, is this true which I hear from Callicles, that you profess to answer any questions which you are asked?
Gorgias. Quite true, Chaerephon: I was saying as much only just 448 now; and I may say also, that many years have elapsed since any one has asked me a new one.
Chaer. You must be very ready, Gorgias.
Gor. Of that, Chaerephon, you can make trial.
Polus. Yes, indeed, and if you like, Chaerephon, you may make trial of me too, for I think that Gorgias, who has been a long time talking, is tired.
Chaer. And do you, Polus, think that you can answer better than Gorgias?
Pol. What matters that, if I answer well enough for you?
Chaer. Not in the least:—and you shall answer if you like.
Pol. Ask:—
Chaer. My question is this: If Gorgias had the skill of his brother Herodicus, what ought we to call him? Ought he not to have the name which is given to his brother?
Pol. Certainly.
Chaer. Then we should be right in calling him a physician?
Pol. Yes.
Chaer. And if he had the skill of Aristophon the son of Aglaophon, or of his brother Polygnotus, what ought we to call him?
Pol. Clearly, a painter.
Chaer. But now what shall we call him—what is the art in which he is skilled?
Pol. O Chaerephon, there are many arts among mankind which are experimental, and have their origin in experience, for experience makes the days of men to proceed according to art, and inexperience according to chance, and different persons in different ways are proficients in different arts, and the best persons
in the best arts. And our friend Gorgias is one of the best, and the art in which he is a proficient is the noblest.

**Soc.** Polus has been taught how to make a capital speech, Gorgias; but he is not fulfilling the promise which he made to Chaerephon.

**Gor.** What do you mean, Socrates?

**Soc.** I mean that he has not exactly answered the question which he was asked.

**Gor.** Then do you ask him yourself, if you are disposed.

**Soc.** But I would rather ask you, if you are disposed to answer: for I see, from the few words which Polus has uttered, that he has attended more to the art which is called rhetoric than to dialectic.

**Pol.** Why do you say that, Socrates?

**Soc.** Why, Polus, because, when Chaerephon asked you what is the art which Gorgias knows, you praised the art as if you were answering some one who found fault with it, but you never said what the art was.

**Pol.** Why, did I not say that it was the noblest of arts?

**Soc.** Yes, indeed, but that was no answer to the question: nobody asked what was the quality, but what was the nature, of the art, and how we were to call Gorgias. And I would still beg you to tell me, in the same short and excellent manner in which you answered Chaerephon, when he asked you at first what this art is, and what we ought to call Gorgias: Or rather, Gorgias, let me turn to you, and ask the same question,—what is your art, and what are you?

**Gor.** Rhetoric, Socrates, is my art.

**Soc.** Then I am to call you a rhetorician?

**Gor.** Yes, Socrates, and a good one too, if you would call me that which, in Homeric language, 'I boast to be.'

**Soc.** I should wish to do that.

**Gor.** Then pray do.

**Soc.** And are we to say that you make other men rhetoricians?

**Gor.** Yes, that is exactly what I profess to make them, not only at Athens, but in all places.

**Soc.** And will you continue to ask and answer questions, Gorgias, as we are at present doing, and reserve for another occasion the longer mode of speech which Polus was attempting? and will you
keep your promise, and answer shortly the questions which are asked of you?

_Gor._ Some answers, Socrates, are of necessity longer; but I will do my best to make them as short as I can; for a part of my profession is that I can be as short as any one.

_Soc._ That is what is wanted, Gorgias; exhibit the shorter method now, and the longer one at some other time.

_Gor._ Well, I will; and I am sure that you will commend my brevity of speech as unrivalled.

_Soc._ Well, then, as you say that you are a rhetorician, and a maker of rhetoricians, what is the business of rhetoric in the sense in which I might say that the business of weaving is making garments:—might I not?

_Gor._ Yes.

_Soc._ Might I not say, again, that the business of music is the composition of melodies?

_Gor._ Yes.

_Soc._ By Here, Gorgias, I admire the surpassing brevity of your answers.

_Gor._ Yes, Socrates, and I do think that I am good at that.

_Soc._ I am glad to hear it; answer me in like manner about rhetoric:—what is the business of rhetoric?

_Gor._ Discourse.

_Soc._ What sort of discourse, Gorgias?—such discourse as would teach the sick under what treatment they might get well?

_Gor._ No.

_Soc._ Then rhetoric does not treat of all kinds of discourse?

_Gor._ Certainly not.

_Soc._ And yet rhetoric makes men able to speak?

_Gor._ Yes.

_Soc._ And to understand that of which they speak?

_Gor._ To be sure.

_Soc._ But does not the art of medicine, which we were just now mentioning, also make men able to understand and speak about the sick?

_Gor._ Certainly.

_Soc._ Then medicine also treats of discourse?

_Gor._ Yes.

_Soc._ Of discourse concerning diseases?
Gor. Certainly.

Soc. And does not gymnastic also treat of discourse concerning the good or evil condition of the body?

Gor. Very true.

Soc. And the same, Gorgias, is true of the other arts:—all of them treat of discourse concerning the subject of which they are the arts.

Gor. That is evident.

Soc. Then why, if you call rhetoric the art which treats of discourse, and all the other arts treat of discourse, do you not call them arts of rhetoric?

Gor. Because, Socrates, the knowledge of the other arts has only to do with some sort of external action, as of the hand; but there is no such action of the hand in rhetoric which operates and in which the effect is produced through the medium of discourse. And therefore I am justified, as I maintain, in saying that rhetoric treats of discourse.

Soc. I do not know whether I perfectly understand you, but I dare say that I shall find out: please to answer me a question:—you would allow that there are arts?

Gor. Yes.

Soc. And in some of the arts a great deal is done and nothing or very little said; in painting, or statuary, or many other arts, the work may proceed in silence; and these are the arts, with which, as I suppose you would say, rhetoric has no concern?

Gor. You perfectly conceive my meaning, Socrates.

Soc. And there are other arts which work wholly by words, and require either no action or very little, as, for example, the arts of arithmetic, of calculation, of geometry, and of playing draughts; in some of which words are nearly co-extensive with things: and in most of them predominate over things, and their whole efficacy and power is given by words: and I take your meaning to be that rhetoric is one of this sort?

Gor. Exactly.

Soc. And yet I do not believe that you really mean to call any of these arts rhetoric; although the precise expression which you used was, that rhetoric is an art of which the effect is produced through the medium of discourse; and an adversary who wished to be captious might take a fancy to say, 'And so, Gorgias, you call
arithmetic rhetoric.' But I do not think that you would call arithmetic rhetoric, any more than you would call geometry rhetoric.

Gor. You are quite right, Socrates, in your apprehension of my meaning.

Soc. Well, then, let me have now the rest of my answer:—seeing that rhetoric is one of those arts which works mainly by the use of words, and there are other arts which also use words, tell me what is that quality of words by which the effect of rhetoric is given:—I will suppose some one to ask me about any of the arts which I was mentioning just now; he might say, 'Socrates, what is arithmetic?' and I should reply to him, as you replied to me just now, that arithmetic is one of those arts in which the effect is produced by words. And then he would proceed: 'Words about what?' and I should say, Words about odd and even numbers, and how many there are of each. And if he asked again: 'And what is the art of calculation?' I should say, That also is one of the arts which work wholly by words. And if he further said, 'Words about what?' I should say in the Scribe's phrase, 'as aforesaid' of arithmetic, but with a difference, and the difference is that the art of calculation considers the quantities of odd and even numbers, in their relation to one another as well as in themselves. And suppose, again, I were to say that astronomy works altogether by words—he would ask, 'Words about what, Socrates?' and I should answer, that the words of astronomy are about the motions of the stars and sun and moon, and their relative swiftness.

Gor. Very true, Socrates; I admit that.

Soc. And now let us have from you, Gorgias, the truth about rhetoric: which you would admit (would you not?) to be one of those arts which operate and produce all their effects through the medium of words?

Gor. True.

Soc. Tell me, I say, what are the words about? To what class of things do the words which rhetoric uses relate?

Gor. To the greatest, Socrates, and the best of human things.

Soc. That again, Gorgias, is ambiguous; I am still in the dark: for which are the greatest and best of human things? I dare say that you have heard men singing at feasts the old drinking song, in which the singers enumerate the goods of life, first health, beauty next, thirdly, as the poet says, wealth honestly obtained.
**GORGIAS.**

452  **Gor.** Yes, I know the song; but what is your drift?

  **Soc.** I mean to say, that the producers of those things which the
author of the song praises, that is to say, the physician, the trainer,
the money-maker, will at once come to you, and first the physician
will say: 'O Socrates, Gorgias is deceiving you, for not his art is
concerned with the greatest good of men, but mine.' And when
I ask, Who are you that say this? he will reply, 'I am a physician.'
What do you mean? I shall say. Do you mean that your art
produces the greatest good? 'Certainly,' he will answer, 'for
is not health the greatest good? What greater good can men
have, Socrates?' And after him the trainer will come and say,
'I too, Socrates, shall be greatly surprised if Gorgias can show
that his art does more good than I can show of mine.' I shall
say to him, Who are you, my friend, and what is your business?
'I am a trainer,' he will reply, 'and my business is to make men
beautiful and strong in body.' When I have done with the trainer,
there arrives the money-maker, and he, as I expect, will utterly
despise them all. 'Consider, Socrates,' he will say, 'whether
Gorgias or any one else can produce any greater good than wealth.'
Well, you and I say to him, and are you a creator of wealth?
'Yes,' he replies. And who are you? 'A money-maker.' And
do you consider wealth to be the greatest good of man? 'Yes,'
he will reply, 'of course.' And we shall rejoin: Yes; but our
friend Gorgias contends that his art produces a greater good than
yours; and then he will be sure to go on and ask, 'What is this
good? Let Gorgias answer.' Now I want you, Gorgias, to
imagine that this question is asked of you by them and by
me, and to find an answer to us: What is that which, as you
say, is the greatest good of man, and of which you are the
creator?

  **Gor.** That, Socrates, which is truly the greatest good, being that
which gives men freedom in their own persons, and to rulers the
power of ruling over others in their several states.

  **Soc.** And what would you consider this to be?

  **Gor.** I should say the word which persuades the judges in the
courts, or the senators in the council, or the citizens in the
assembly, or at any other political meeting:—if you have the
power of uttering this word, you will have the physician your slave,
and the trainer your slave, and the money-maker of whom you talk
will be found to gather treasures, not for himself, but for you who
are able to speak and persuade the multitude.

Soc. Now I think, Gorgias, that you have very accurately explained
what you conceive to be the art of rhetoric; and you mean to say, if I am not mistaken, that rhetoric is the artificer of persuasion, having this and no other business, and that this is her crown and
end. Do you know any other effect of rhetoric over and above
that of producing persuasion?

Gor. No: the definition seems to me very fair, Socrates; for
persuasion is the crown of rhetoric.

Soc. Then hear me, Gorgias, for I am quite sure that if there
ever was a man who entered on the discussion of a matter from a
pure love of knowing the truth, I am one, and I believe that you
are another.

Gor. What is coming, Socrates?

Soc. I will tell you: I am very well aware that I do not know
what, according to you, is the exact nature, or what are the topics
of that persuasion of which you speak, and which is given by
rhetoric; although I have a suspicion both about the one and
about the other. And I am going to ask—what is this power of
persuasion which is given by rhetoric, and about what? But why,
if I have a suspicion, do I ask instead of telling you? Not for
your sake, but in order that the argument may proceed in such
a manner as is most likely to elicit the truth. And I would have
you observe, that I am right in asking this further question. If I
asked, 'What sort of a painter is Zeuxis?' and you said, 'the
painter of figures,' should I not be right in asking, 'What sort of
figures, and where do you find them?'

Gor. Certainly.

Soc. And the reason for asking this second question would be,
that there are other painters as well, who paint many other figures?

Gor. True.

Soc. But if there had been no one but Zeuxis who painted them,
then you would have answered very well?

Gor. Certainly.

Soc. Now I want to know about rhetoric in the same way;—
is rhetoric the only art which brings persuasion, or do other arts
have the same effect? I mean to say this—Does he who teaches
anything persuade of what he teaches or not?
GORGIAS.

Gor. He persuades, Socrates,—there can be no mistake about that.

Soc. Again, if we take the arts of which we were just now speaking:—do not arithmetic and the arithmeticians teach us the properties of number?

Gor. Certainly.

Soc. And therefore persuade us of them?

Gor. Yes.

Soc. Then arithmetic as well as rhetoric is an artificer of persuasion?

Gor. That is evident.

Soc. And if any one asks us what sort of persuasion, and about what,—we shall answer, of that which teaches the quantity of odd and even; and we shall be in a position to show that all the other arts of which we were just now speaking are artificers of persuasion, and of what kind of persuasion, and about what.

Gor. Very true.

Soc. Then rhetoric is not the only artificer of persuasion?

Gor. True.

Soc. Seeing, then, that not only rhetoric works by persuasion, but that other arts do the same, as in the case of the painter, a question has arisen which is a very fair one: Of what persuasion is rhetoric the artificer, and about what?—is not that a fair way of putting the question?

Gor. I think that is.

Soc. Then, if you approve the question, Gorgias, what is the answer?

Gor. I answer, Socrates, that rhetoric is the art of persuasion in the courts and other assemblies, as I was just now saying, and about the just and unjust.

Soc. And that, Gorgias, was what I was suspecting to be your notion; yet I would not have you wonder if by-and-by I am found repeating a seemingly plain question; for as I was saying, I ask not for your sake, but in order that the argument may proceed consecutively, and that we may not get the habit of anticipating and suspecting the meaning of one another's words, and that you may proceed in your own way.

Gor. I think that you are quite right, Socrates.
Soc. Then let me raise this question; you would say that there is such a thing as 'having learned?'

Gor. Yes.

Soc. And there is also 'having believed?'

Gor. Yes.

Soc. And are the 'having learned' and the 'having believed,' and are learning and belief the same things?

Gor. In my judgment, Socrates, they are not the same.

Soc. And your judgment is right, as you may ascertain in this way:—If a person were to say to you, 'Is there, Gorgias, a false belief as well as a true?'—you would reply, if I am not mistaken, that there is.

Gor. Yes.

Soc. Well, but is there a false knowledge as well as a true?

Gor. No.

Soc. No, indeed; and this again proves that knowledge and belief differ.

Gor. That is true.

Soc. And yet those who have learned as well as those who have believed are persuaded?

Gor. That is as you say.

Soc. Shall we then assume two sorts of persuasion,—one which is the source of belief without knowledge, as the other is of knowledge?

Gor. By all means.

Soc. And which sort of persuasion does rhetoric create in courts of law and other assemblies about the just and unjust, the sort of persuasion which gives belief without knowledge, or that which gives knowledge?

Gor. Clearly, Socrates, that which only gives belief.

Soc. Then rhetoric, as would appear, is the artificer of a persuasion which creates belief about the just and unjust, but gives no instruction about them?

Gor. True.

Soc. And the rhetorician does not instruct the courts of law or other assemblies about just and unjust, but he only creates belief about them; for no one can be supposed to instruct such a vast multitude about such high matters in a short time?

Gor. Certainly not.
Soc. Come, then, and let us see what we really mean about rhetoric; for I do not know what my own meaning is as yet. When the assembly meets to elect a physician or a shipwright or any other craftsman, will the rhetorician be taken into counsel? Surely not. For at every election he ought to be chosen who has the greatest skill; and, again, when walls have to be built or harbours or docks to be constructed, not the rhetorician but the master workman will advise; or when generals have to be chosen and an order of battle arranged, or a position taken, then the military will advise and not the rhetoricians: would you admit that, Gorgias? As you profess to be a rhetorician and a maker of rhetoricians, I shall do well to learn the nature of your art from you. And here let me assure you that I have your interest in view as well as my own. For I dare say that some one or other of the young men present might like to become your pupil, and in fact I see some, and a good many too, who have this wish, but they would be too modest to question you. And therefore when you are interrogated by me, I would have you imagine that you are interrogated by them. 'What is the use of coming to you, Gorgias?' they will say, 'about what will you teach us to advise the state?—about the just and unjust only, or about those other things also which Socrates has just mentioned?' How will you answer them?

Gor. I like your way of leading us on, Socrates, and I will endeavour to reveal to you the whole nature of rhetoric. You must have heard, I think, that the docks and the walls of the Athenians and the plan of the harbour were devised in accordance with the counsels, partly of Themistocles, and partly of Pericles, and not at the suggestion of the builders.

Soc. Certainly, Gorgias, that is what is told of Themistocles, and I myself heard the speech of Pericles when he advised us about the middle wall.

Gor. And you will observe, Socrates, that when a decision has to be given in such matters the rhetoricians are the advisers; they are the men who win their point.

Soc. I had that in my admiring mind, Gorgias, when I asked what is the nature of rhetoric, which always appears to me, when I look at the matter in this way, to be a marvel of greatness.

Gor. A marvel indeed, Socrates, if you only knew how rhetoric comprehends and holds under her sway all the inferior arts. And
I will give you a striking example of this. On several occasions I have been with my brother Herodicus or some other physician to see one of his patients, who would not allow the physician to give him medicine, or apply the knife or hot iron to him; and I have persuaded him to do for me what he would not do for the physician, just by the use of rhetoric. And I say that if a rhetorician and a physician were to go to any city, and there had to argue in the Ecclesia or any other assembly as to which should be elected, the physician would have no chance; but he who could speak would be chosen if he wished, and in a contest with a man of any other profession the rhetorician more than any one would have the power of getting himself chosen, for he can speak more persuasively to the multitude than any of them, and on any subject. Such is the power and quality of rhetoric, Socrates. And yet rhetoric ought to be used like any other competitive art, not against every body,—the rhetorician ought not to abuse his strength any more than a pugilist or pancratist or other master of fence;—because he has powers which are more than a match either for enemy or friend, he ought not therefore to strike, stab, or slay his friends. And suppose a man who has been the pupil of a palestra and is a skilful boxer, and in the fullness of his strength he goes and strikes his father or mother or one of his familiars or friends, that is no reason why the trainer or master of fence should be held in detestation or banished;—surely not. For they taught this art for a good purpose, as an art to be used against enemies and evil doers, in self-defence, not in aggression, and others have perverted their instructions, making a bad use of their strength and their skill. But not on this account are the teachers bad, neither is the art in fault or bad in itself; I should rather say that those who make a bad use of the art are to blame. And the same holds good of rhetoric; for the rhetorician can speak against all men and on any subject, and in general he can persuade the multitude of anything better than any other man, but he ought not on that account to defraud the physician or any other artist of his reputation merely because he has the power; he ought to use rhetoric fairly, as he would also use his combative powers. And if after having become a rhetorician he makes a bad use of his strength and skill, his instructor surely ought not on that account to be held in detestation or banished. For he was intended by his
teacher to make a good use of his instructions, and he abuses them. And therefore he is the person who ought to be held in
detestation, banished, and put to death, and not his instructor.

Soc. You, Gorgias, like myself, have had great experience of
arguments, and you must have observed, I think, that they do not
always terminate to the satisfaction or mutual improvement of the
disputants; but disagreements are apt to arise, and one party will
often deny that the other has spoken truly or clearly; and then
they leave off arguing and begin to quarrel, both parties fancying
that their opponents are only speaking from personal feeling.

And sometimes they will go on abusing one another until the
company at last are quite annoyed at their own condescension in
listening to such fellows. Why do I say this? Why, because I
cannot help feeling that you are now saying what is not quite con-
sistent or accordant with what you were saying at first about
rhetoric. And I am afraid to point this out to you, lest you
should think that I have some animosity against you, and that I
speak, not for the sake of discovering the truth, but from personal
feeling. Now if you are one of my sort, I should like to cross exa-
mine you, but if not I will let you alone. And what is my sort?
you will ask. I am one of those who are very willing to be refuted
if I say anything which is not true, and very willing to refute any
one else who says what is not true, and just as ready to be refuted
as to refute; for I hold that this is the greater gain of the two,
just as the gain is greater of being cured of a very great evil than
of curing the evil in another. For I imagine that there is no evil
which a man can endure so great as an erroneous opinion about
the matters of which we are speaking; and if you claim to be one
of my sort, let us have the discussion out, but if you would rather
have done, no matter;—let us make an end.

Gor. I should say, Socrates, that I am quite the man whom you
indicate; but, perhaps, we ought to consider the audience, for,
before you came, I had already given a long exhibition, and if we
proceed the argument may run on to a great length. And there-
fore I think that we should consider whether we may not be
detaining some part of the company when they are wanting to do
something else.

Chaer. You hear the audience cheering, Gorgias and Socrates,
which shows their desire to listen to you, and for myself, Heaven
forbid that I should have any business which would take me away from so important and interesting a discussion.

Cal. I swear by the gods, Chaerephon, although I have been present at many discussions, that I doubt whether I was ever as much delighted before, and therefore if you go on discoursing all day I shall only be the better pleased.

Soc. I may truly say, Callicles, that I am willing, if Gorgias is.

Gor. After this, Socrates, I should be disgraced if I refused, especially as I have professed to answer all comers; in accordance with the wishes of the company, then, do you begin, and ask of me any question which you like.

Soc. Let me tell you then, Gorgias, what makes me wonder at your words; though I dare say that you may be right, and I may have mistaken your meaning. You say that you can make any man, who will learn of you, a rhetorician?

Gor. Yes.

Soc. Do you mean that you will teach him to gain the ears of the multitude on any subject, and this not by instruction but by persuasion?

Gor. Certainly.

Soc. You were saying, in fact, that the rhetorician will have greater powers of persuasion than the physician even in a matter of health?

Gor. Yes, with the multitude,—that is.

Soc. That is to say, greater with the ignorant; for with those who know he cannot be supposed to have greater powers of persuasion than the physician has.

Gor. Very true.

Soc. And if he is to have more power of persuasion than the physician, he will have greater power than he who knows?

Gor. Certainly.

Soc. Though he is not a physician:—is he?

Gor. No.

Soc. And he who is not a physician is obviously ignorant of what the physician knows?

Gor. That is evident.

Soc. Then, when the rhetorician is more persuasive than the physician, the ignorant is more persuasive with the ignorant than he who has knowledge?—is not that the inference?
Gorgias.

Gor. In the case which is supposed:—yes.

Soc. And the same holds of the relation of rhetoric to all the other arts; the rhetorician need not know the whole truth about them; he has only to discover some way of persuading the ignorant that he has more knowledge than those who know?

Gor. Yes, Socrates, and is not this a great blessing?—not to have learned the other arts, but the art of rhetoric only, and yet to be in no way inferior to the professors of them?

Soc. Whether the rhetorician is or is not inferior on this account is a question which we will hereafter examine if the enquiry is likely to be of any service to us; but I would rather begin by asking, whether he is as ignorant of the just and unjust, base and honourable, good and evil, as he is of medicine and the other arts; I mean to say, does he know anything actually of what is good and evil, base or honourable, just or unjust in them; or has he only a way with the ignorant of persuading them that he not knowing is to be esteemed to know more than another who knows? Or must the pupil know and come to you knowing these things before he can acquire the art of rhetoric? And if he is ignorant, you who are the teacher of rhetoric will not teach him, for that is not your business, but you will make him seem to know them to the multitude, when he does not know them; and seem to be a good man, when he is not. Or will you be wholly unable to teach him rhetoric, unless he knows the truth of these things first?

460 What is to be said, Gorgias, about all this? I swear that I wish you would, as you were saying, reveal to me the power of rhetoric.

Gor. Well, Socrates, I suppose that if the pupil does chance not to know them, he will have to learn of me these things as well.

Soc. Say no more, for there you are right; and so he whom you make a rhetorician must know the nature of the just and unjust, either of his own previous knowledge, or he must be taught by you.

Gor. Certainly.

Soc. Well, and is not he who has learned carpentering a carpenter?

Gor. Yes.

Soc. And he who has learned music a musician?

Gor. Yes.
Soc. And he who has learned medicine is a physician, in like manner? He who has learned anything whatever is that which his knowledge makes him.

Gor. Certainly.

Soc. And in the same way, he who has learned what is just is just?

Gor. To be sure.

Soc. And he who is just may be supposed to do what is just?

Gor. Yes.

Soc. And must not the rhetorician be just, and is not the just man desirous to do what is just?

Gor. That is clearly the inference.

Soc. Then the just man will surely never be willing to do injustice?

Gor. That is certain.

Soc. And according to the argument the rhetorician ought to be a just man?

Gor. Yes.

Soc. And will therefore never be willing to do injustice?

Gor. Clearly not.

Soc. But do you remember saying just now that the trainer is not to be accused or banished if the pugilist makes a wrong use of his pugilistic art; and in like manner, if the rhetorician makes a bad and unjust use of his rhetoric, that is not to be laid to the charge of his instructor, neither is he to be banished, but the wrong-doer himself who made a bad use of his rhetoric is to be banished—was not that said?

Gor. Yes, that was said.

Soc. And now it turns out that this same rhetorician can never have done any injustice.

Gor. True.

Soc. And at the very outset, Gorgias, there was an assertion made, that rhetoric treated of discourse, not about odd and even, but about just and unjust. Is not that true?

Gor. Yes.

Soc. And I thought at the time, when I heard you saying this, that rhetoric, which is always discoursing about justice, could not possibly be an unjust thing. But when you said, shortly afterwards, that the rhetorician might make a bad use of rhetoric, I noted 461
with surprise the inconsistency into which you had fallen; and I said, that if you thought, as I did, that there was a gain in being refuted, there would be an advantage in discussing the question, but if not, I would leave off. And in the course of our examination, as you will see yourself, the rhetorician has been acknowledged to be incapable of making an unjust use of rhetoric, or of willingness to do injustice. By the dog, Gorgias, there will be a great deal of discussion, before we get at the truth of all this.

Polus said: And do you, Socrates, seriously incline to believe what you are now saying about rhetoric? What! because Gorgias was ashamed to deny that the rhetorician knew the just and the honourable and the good, and that he could teach them to any one who came to him ignorant of them, and then out of the admission there may have arisen a contradiction; you, as you always do, having recourse to your favourite mode of interrogation.—For do you suppose that any one will ever say that he does not know, or cannot teach, the nature of justice? The truth is, that there is great want of manners in bringing the argument to such a pass.

Soc. Illustrious Polus, the great reason why we provide ourselves with friends and children is, that when we get old and stumble, a younger generation may be at hand, and set us on our legs again in our words and in our actions: and now, if I and Gorgias are stumbling, there are you a present help to us, as you ought to be; and I for my part engage to retract any error into which you may think that I have fallen—upon one condition:

Pol. What is that?

Soc. That you contract, Polus, the proximity of speech in which you indulged at first.

Pol. What! do you mean that I am not to use as many words as I please?

Soc. Only to think, my friend, that having come on a visit to Athens, which is the most free-spoken state in Hellas, you of all men should be deprived of the power of speech—that is hard indeed. But then look at my case:—should not I be very hardly used, if, when you are making a long oration, and refusing to answer what you are asked, I may not go away, but am compelled to stay and listen to you? I say rather, that if you have a real interest in the argument, or, to repeat my former expression, have any desire to set me on my legs, take back again anything which
you please; and in your turn ask and answer, like myself and Gorgias—refute and be refuted: for I suppose that you would claim to know what Gorgias knows?

_Pol._ Yes.

_Soc._ And you, like him, invite any one to ask you about anything which he likes, and you will know how to answer him?

_Pol._ To be sure.

_Soc._ And now, which will you do, ask or answer?

_Pol._ I will ask; and do you answer me, Socrates, the same question which Gorgias, as you suppose, is unable to answer: What is rhetoric?

_Soc._ Do you mean what sort of an art?

_Pol._ Yes.

_Soc._ Not an art at all, in my opinion, if I am to tell you the truth, Polus.

_Pol._ Then what, in your opinion, is rhetoric?

_Soc._ A thing which, in the treatise that I was lately reading of yours, you affirm to have created art.

_Pol._ What thing?

_Soc._ I should say a sort of routine or experience.

_Pol._ Then does rhetoric seem to you to be a sort of experience?

_Soc._ That is my view, if that is yours.

_Pol._ An experience of what?

_Soc._ An experience of making a sort of delight and gratification.

_Pol._ And if able to gratify others, must not rhetoric be a fine thing?

_Soc._ What are you saying, Polus? Why do you ask me whether rhetoric is a fine thing or not, when I have not as yet told you what rhetoric is?

_Pol._ Why did you not tell me that rhetoric was a sort of experience?

_Soc._ As you are so fond of gratifying others, will you gratify me in a small particular?

_Pol._ I will.

_Soc._ Will you ask me, what sort of an art is cookery?

_Pol._ What sort of an art is cookery?

_Soc._ Not an art at all, Polus.

_Pol._ What then?

_Soc._ I should say a sort of experience.
Pol. Of what? I wish that you would tell me.

Soc. An experience of making a sort of delight and gratification, Polus.

Pol. Then are cookery and rhetoric the same?

Soc. No, they are only different parts of the same profession.

Pol. And what is that?

Soc. I am afraid that the truth may seem discourteous; I should not like Gorgias to imagine that I am ridiculing his profession, and therefore I hesitate to answer. For whether or no this is that art of rhetoric which Gorgias practises I really do not know:—

from what he was just now saying, nothing appeared of what he thought of his art, but the rhetoric which I mean is a part of a not very creditable whole.

Gorgias. A part of what, Socrates? Say what you mean, and never mind me.

Soc. To me then, Gorgias, the whole of which rhetoric is a part appears to be a process, not of art, but the habit of a bold and ready wit, which knows how to behave to the world: this I sum up under the word 'flattery,' and this habit or process appears to me to have many other parts, one of which is cookery, which may seem to be an art, and, as I maintain, is not an art, but only experience and routine:—another part is rhetoric, and the art of tiring and sophistick are two others: thus there are four branches, and four different things answering to them. And Polus may ask, if he likes, for he has not as yet been informed, what part of flattery is rhetoric: he did not see that I had not yet answered him when he proceeded to ask a further question: Whether I do not think rhetoric a fine thing? But I shall not tell him whether rhetoric is a fine thing or not, until I have first answered, 'What is rhetoric?' For that would not be right, Polus; but I shall be happy to answer, if you will ask me, What part of flattery is rhetoric?

Pol. I will ask, and do you answer: What part of flattery is rhetoric?

Soc. Will you understand my answer? Rhetoric, according to my view, is the shadow of a part of politics.

Pol. And noble or ignoble?

Soc. Ignoble, as I should say, if I am compelled to answer, for I call what is bad ignoble:—though I doubt whether you understand what I was saying before.
GORGIAS.

Gor. Indeed, Socrates, I cannot say that I understand myself.

Soc. I do not wonder at that; for I have not as yet explained myself, and our friend Polus, like a young colt as he is, is apt to run away.

Gor. Never mind him, but explain to me what you mean by saying that rhetoric is the shadow of a part of politics.

Soc. I will try, then, to explain my notion of rhetoric, and if I am mistaken, my friend Polus shall refute me. Are there not bodies and souls?

Gor. There are.

Soc. And you would further admit that there is a good condition of either of them?

Gor. Yes.

Soc. Which condition may not be really good, but good only in appearance? I mean to say, that there are many persons who appear to be in good health, and whom only a physician or trainer will discern at first sight not to be in good health.

Gor. True.

Soc. And this applies not only to the body, but also to the soul: in either there may be that which gives the appearance of health and not the reality?

Gor. Yes, certainly.

Soc. And now I will endeavour to explain to you more clearly what I mean: The soul and body being two, have two arts corresponding to them: there is the art of politics attending on the soul; and another art attending on the body, of which I know no specific name, but which may be described as having two divisions, one of which is gymnastic, and the other medicine. And in politics there is a legislative part, which answers to gymnastic, as justice does to medicine; and they run into one another, justice having to do with the same subject as legislation, and medicine with the same subject as gymnastic, yet there is a difference between them. Now, seeing that there are these four arts which are ever ministering to the body and the soul for their highest good; flattery knowing, or rather guessing their natures, has distributed herself into four shams or simulations of them; she puts on the likeness of one or other of them, and pretends to be that which

1 There is an untranslateable play on the name 'Polus,' which means 'a colt.'
she simulates, and has no regard for men's highest interests, but is ever making pleasure the bait of the unwary, and deceiving them into the belief that she is of the highest value to them. Cookery simulates the disguise of medicine, and pretends to know what food is the best for the body; and if the physician and the cook had to enter into a competition in which children were the judges, or men who had no more sense than children, as to which of them best understands the goodness or badness of food, the physician would be starved to death. A flattery I deem this and an ignoble sort of thing, Polus, for to you I am now addressing myself, because it aims at pleasure instead of good. And I do not call this an art at all, but only an experience or routine, because it is unable to explain or to give a reason of the nature of its own applications. And I do not call any irrational thing an art; if you dispute my words, I am prepared to argue in defence of them.

Cookery, then, as I maintain, is the flattery which takes the form of medicine, and the art of tiring, in like manner, takes the form of gymnastic; and is a knavish, false, ignoble, and illiberal art, working deceitfully by the help of lines, and colours, and enamels, and garments, and making men affect a spurious beauty to the neglect of the true beauty which is given by gymnastic.

I would rather not be tedious, and therefore I will only say, after the manner of the geometricians, (for I think that by this time you will be able to follow,) as the art of tiring: gymnastic: cookery: medicine; or rather, as tiring: gymnastic: sophistry: legislation; and as cookery: medicine: rhetoric: justice.

And this, I say, is the natural difference between them, but by reason of their near connection, the sphere and subject of the rhetorician is apt to be confounded with that of the sophist; neither do they know what to make of themselves, nor do other men know what to make of them. For if the body presided over itself, and were not under the guidance of the soul, and the soul did not discern and discriminate between cookery and medicine, but the body was made the judge of them, and the rule of judgment was the bodily delight which was given by them, then the word of Anaxagoras, that word with which you, friend Polus, are so well
acquainted, would come true: chaos would return, and cookery, health, and medicine would mingle in an indiscernible mass. And now I have told you my notion of rhetoric, which is in relation to the soul what cookery is to the body. I may have been inconsistent in making a long speech, when I would not allow you to discourse at length. But I think that I may be excused, as you did not understand me, and could make no use of my shorter answer, and I had to enter into an explanation. And if I show an equal inability to make use of yours, I hope that you will speak at equal length; but if I am able to understand you, let me have the benefit of your brevity, for this is only fair; and now this answer of mine is much at your service.

_Pol._ What do you mean? do you think that rhetoric is flattery?

_Soc._ Nay, I said a part of flattery; if at your age, Polus, you cannot remember, what will you do by-and-by, when you get older?

_Pol._ And are the good rhetoricians meanly regarded in states, under the idea that they are flatterers?

_Soc._ Is that a question or the beginning of a speech?

_Pol._ I am asking a question.

_Soc._ Then my answer is, that they are not regarded at all.

_Pol._ How not regarded? Have they not very great power in states?

_Soc._ Not if you mean to say that power is a good to the possessor?

_Pol._ And I do mean to say that.

_Soc._ Then, in that case, I think that they have the least power of all the citizens.

_Pol._ What! Are they not like tyrants, who kill whom they will, or despoil or exile any one whom they think good?

_Soc._ By the dog, Polus, I cannot make out at each deliverance of yours, whether you are giving an opinion of your own, or asking a question of me.

_Pol._ I am asking a question of you.

_Soc._ Yes, my friend, but you ask two questions at once.

_Pol._ How two questions?

_Soc._ Why, did you not say just now that the rhetoricians are like tyrants, and that they kill whom they will, and despoil or exile any one whom they think good?

_Pol._ I did.
Soc. Well then, I say to you that here are two questions in one, and I will answer both of them. And I tell you, Polus, that rhetoricians and tyrants have the least possible power in states, as I was just now saying; for they do nothing, as I may say, of what they will, but only what they think best.

Pol. And is not that a great power?
Soc. Polus has already denied that.
Pol. Denied? nay, that is what I affirm.
Soc. By the—what do you call him?—not you, for you say that great power is a good to him who has the power.
Pol. I do.
Soc. And would you maintain that if a fool does what appears best to him he does what is good, and would you call this great power?
Pol. I do not say that.
Soc. Then you must prove that the rhetorician is not a fool, and that rhetoric is an art and not a flattery,—that is the way to refute me; but if you leave me unrefuted, then the rhetoricians who do what they think best in states, and the tyrants will be deprived of this power: for you assume that power is a good thing, and yet admit that the power which is exercised without understanding is an evil.

Pol. Yes; I admit that.
Soc. How then can the rhetoricians or the tyrants have great power in states, unless Polus can refute Socrates, and prove to him that they do as they will?
Pol. This fellow—
Soc. I say that they do not do as they will;—now refute me.
Pol. Why, have you not admitted that they do as they think best?
Soc. And that I still admit.
Pol. Then surely they do as they will?
Soc. To that I say ‘No.’
Pol. And yet they do as they think best?
Soc. Ay.
Pol. That, Socrates, is monstrous and absurd.
Soc. Good words, good Polus, as I may say in your own peculiar style; but if you have any questions to ask of me, either prove that I am in error or give the answer yourself.
Pol. Very well, I am willing to answer that I may know what you mean.

Soc. Do men appear to you to will that which they do, or do they will that further object, for the sake of which they do that which they do; for example, when they take medicine at the bidding of a physician, do they will the drinking of the medicine which is painful, or the health for the sake of which they drink?

Pol. Clearly, the health.

Soc. And when men go on a voyage or engage in business, they do not will that which they are doing at the time; for who would desire to take the risk of a voyage or the trouble of business?—But they will to have the wealth, for the sake of which they go on a voyage.

Pol. Certainly.

Soc. And is not this universally true? If a man does something for the sake of something else, he wills not that which he does, but that for the sake of which he does it.

Pol. Yes.

Soc. And are not all things either good or evil, or intermediate and indifferent?

Pol. To be sure, Socrates.

Soc. Wisdom and health and wealth and the like you would call goods, and their opposites evils?

Pol. I should say yes.

Soc. And the things which are neither good nor evil, and which partake sometimes of the nature of good and at other times of evil, or of neither, are such as sitting, walking, running, sailing,—or, again, wood, stones, and the like:—these are the things which you call neither good nor evil?

Pol. Exactly.

Soc. And are these indifferent things done for the sake of the good, or the good for the sake of the indifferent?

Pol. Clearly, the indifferent for the sake of the good.

Soc. When we walk we walk for the sake of the good, and under the idea that the good is better, and when we stand we stand equally for the sake of the good?

Pol. Yes.

Soc. And when we kill a man we kill him or exile him or despoil
him of his goods, because, as we think, that will conduce to our

\textit{Pol.} Certainly.

\textit{Soc.} Men who do these things do them all for the sake of the

\textit{good}?

\textit{Pol.} I admit that.

\textit{Soc.} And did we not admit that in doing something for the sake of something else, we do not will those things which we do, but that further thing for the sake of which we do them?

\textit{Pol.} Most true.

\textit{Soc.} Then we do not will simply to kill a man or to exile him or to despoil him of his goods, but we will to do that which conduces to our good, and if the act is not conducive to our good we do not will it; for we will, as you say, that which is our good, but that which is neither good nor evil, or simply evil, we do not will. Why are you silent, Polus? Am I not right?

\textit{Pol.} Yes, that is true.

\textit{Soc.} Granting this, if any one, whether he be a tyrant or a rhetorician, kills another or exiles another or despoils him of his goods, under the idea that this is for his interests when really not for his interests, he may be said to do what seems best to him?

\textit{Pol.} Yes.

\textit{Soc.} But does he do what he wills if he does what is evil? Why do you not answer?

\textit{Pol.} Well, I suppose he does not.

\textit{Soc.} Then if great power is a good as you allow, will such an one have great power in his state?

\textit{Pol.} He will not.

\textit{Soc.} Then I was right in saying that a man may do what seems good to him in a state, and not have great power, and not do what he wills?

\textit{Pol.} As though you, Socrates, would not like to have the power of doing what seems good to you in the state, rather than not; you would not be jealous when you see one killing or despoiling or imprisoning whom he pleases, Oh no!

\textit{Soc.} Justly or unjustly, do you mean?

\textit{Pol.} In either case is he not equally to be envied?

\textit{Soc.} Have done, Polus!

\textit{Pol.} Why ‘have done’?
Soc. Because you should not envy wretches who are not to be envied, but only pity them.

Pol. And are those of whom I spoke wretches?

Soc. Yes, certainly they are.

Pol. And so you think that he who slays any one whom he pleases, and justly slays him, is pitiable and wretched?

Soc. No, I do not think that of him any more than that he is to be envied.

Pol. Were you not saying just now that he is wretched?

Soc. Yes, my friend, if he killed another unjustly, in which case he is also to be pitied: neither is he to be envied if he killed him justly.

Pol. At any rate you will allow that he who is unjustly put to death is wretched, and to be pitied?

Soc. Not so much, Polus, as he who kills him, and not so much as he who is justly killed.

Pol. How can that be, Socrates?

Soc. That may very well be, inasmuch as doing injustice is the greatest of evils.

Pol. But is that the greatest? Is not suffering injustice a greater evil?

Soc. Certainly not.

Pol. Then would you rather suffer than do injustice?

Soc. I should not like either, but if I must choose between them, I would rather suffer than do.

Pol. Then you would not wish to be a tyrant?

Soc. Not if you mean by tyranny what I mean.

Pol. I mean, as I said before, the power of doing whatever seems good to you in a state, killing, banishing, doing in all things as you like.

Soc. Hear me now, noble friend, and then have your say against me. Suppose that I go into a crowded Agora, and take a dagger under my arm. Polus, I say to you, I have just acquired rare power, and become a tyrant; for if I think that any of these men whom you see ought to be put to death, he is as good as dead; and if I am disposed to break his head or tear his garment, he will have his head broken or his garment torn in an instant. Such is my great power in this city. And if you do not believe me, and I show you the dagger, you would probably reply: Socrates, in that
sort of way any one may have great power: he may burn any
house that he pleases, and the docks and triremes of the Athe-
nians, and all their other vessels, whether public or private—but
this mere doing as you think best is not great power:—what do
you say?

Pol. Certainly not, when displayed in this way.

Soc. But can you tell me why you disapprove of such a power?

Pol. I can.

Soc. Why then?

Pol. Why, because he who did as you say would be certain to
be punished.

Soc. And punishment is an evil?

Pol. Certainly.

Soc. And you would admit once more, illustrious friend, that
great power is a good to a man if his actions turn out to his
advantage, and that this is the meaning of great power, but if not,
then his power is an evil and is no power. Let us look at the
matter in another way: do we not acknowledge that the things of
which we were speaking, the infliction of death, and exile, and the
depprivation of property are sometimes a good and sometimes not
a good?

Pol. Certainly.

Soc. About that you and I may be supposed to agree?

Pol. Yes.

Soc. Tell me, then, when do you say that they are good and
when that they are evil:—how do you determine that?

Pol. I would rather, Socrates, that you should answer as well as
ask this.

Soc. Well, Polus, since you would rather have the answer from
me, I say that they are good when they are just, and evil when
they are unjust.

Pol. Though you are hard of refutation, Socrates, a child may
refute that statement.

Soc. Then I shall be very grateful to the child, and equally grate-
ful to you if you will refute me and deliver me from my foolishness.
And I hope that you will not be weary of serving a friend, but will
refute me.

Pol. Yes, Socrates, and I need not go far or appeal to antiquity;
circumstances, which may be said to have happened only yesterday,
are enough to refute you, and to prove that many men who do wrong are happy.

**Soc.** What circumstances?

**Pol.** You see, I presume, that Archelaus the son of Perdiccas is now the ruler of Macedonia?

**Soc.** At any rate I hear that he is.

**Pol.** And do you think that he is happy or miserable?

**Soc.** I cannot say, Polus, for I have never had any acquaintance with him.

**Pol.** And cannot you tell at once, and without having an acquaintance with him, whether a man is happy?

**Soc.** Indeed I cannot.

**Pol.** Then clearly, Socrates, you would say that you did not even know whether the great king was a happy man?

**Soc.** And I should say the truth; for I do not know how he stands in the matter of education and justice.

**Pol.** What! and does all happiness consist in this?

**Soc.** Yes, indeed, Polus, that is my doctrine; the men and women who are gentle and good are also happy, as I maintain, and the unjust and evil are miserable.

**Pol.** Then, according to your doctrine, the said Archelaus is miserable?

**Soc.** Yes, my friend, if he is wicked he is.

**Pol.** I cannot deny that he is wicked; for he had no title at all to the throne which he now occupies, as he was only the son of a woman who was the slave of Alcetas the brother of Perdiccas, and therefore in strict right he was the slave of Alcetas himself, and if he had meant to do rightly would have remained his slave, and then, according to your doctrine, he would have been happy; but now he is unspeakably miserable, for he has been guilty of the greatest crimes: in the first place he invited his uncle and master, Alcetas, to come to him, under the pretence that he would restore to him the throne which Perdiccas had usurped, and after entertaining him and his son Alexander, who was his own cousin, and nearly of an age with him, and making them drunk, he threw them into a waggon and carried them off by night, and slew them, and got both of them out of the way; and when he had done all this wickedness he never discovered that he was the most miserable of all men, and was very far from repenting; I will tell you how he
showed his remorse; he had a young brother of seven years old, who was the legitimate son of Perdikkas; this was the heir to whom of right the kingdom belonged, but he had no mind to be happy, by bringing him up as he ought, and restoring to him the kingdom; and not long after this he threw him into a well and drowned him, and declared to his mother Cleopatra that he had fallen in, while running after a goose, and had been killed. And now as he is the greatest criminal in all Macedonia he may be supposed to be the most miserable and not the happiest, and I dare say that his misery would not be desired by any Athenian;—and by you least of all—certainly not; he is the last of the Macedonians whose lot you would choose.

_Soc._ I praised you at first, Polus, for being a rhetorician rather than a reasoner. And now, I suppose that this is the sort of argument with which, as you fancy, a child might refute me, and by which I stand refuted when I say that the unjust man is not happy. But, my good friend, where is the refutation? I certainly do not admit a word that you have been saying.

_Pol._ That is because you won't; for you surely must think as I do.

472 _Soc._ Not so, my simple friend, but because you will refute me in the way which rhetoricians fancy to be refutation in courts of law. For there the one party think that they refute the other when they bring forward a number of witnesses of good repute in proof of their allegations, and their adversary has only a single one or none at all. But this kind of proof is of no value where truth is the aim—though a man may sometimes be slandered by a crowd of false witnesses seeming to be somewhat. And now I know that nearly every one, Athenian as well as stranger, will be on your side in this argument, if you like to bring witnesses in disproof of my statement;—you may, if you will, summon Nicias the son of Niceratus, and let his brother, who gave the row of tripods which stand in the temple of Dionysus, come with him; or you may summon Aristocrates, the son of Scellius, who is the giver of that famous offering which is at Delphi; summon, if you will, the whole house of Pericles, or any other great Athenian family whom you choose;—they will all agree with you: I only am left alone and cannot agree, for you do not convince me; you only produce many false witnesses against me, in the hope of
depriving me of my inheritance, which is the truth. But I consider that I shall have proved nothing unless I make you the one willing witness of my words; neither will you, unless you have me as the one witness of yours; no matter about the rest of the world. For there are two ways of refutation, one which is yours and that of the world in general; but mine is of another sort; let us compare them, and see in what they differ. For, indeed, the matters at issue between us are not trifling; to know or not to know happiness and misery—that is the sum of them. And what knowledge can be nobler than this? or what ignorance more disgraceful? And therefore I will begin by asking you about this very point. Do you not think that a man who is unjust and is doing injustice can be happy, seeing that you think Archelaus unjust, and yet happy? Am I not right in supposing that to be your meaning?

Pol. Quite right.

Soc. And I say that this is an impossibility, and here is one point about which we are at issue:—very good. But do you mean to say also that if he meets with retribution and punishment he will still be happy?

Pol. Certainly not; in that case he will be most miserable.

Soc. On the other hand, if the unjust be not punished, then, according to you, he will be happy?

Pol. Yes.

Soc. But in my opinion, Polus, the unjust or doer of unjust actions is miserable in any case,—more miserable, however, if he be not punished and does not meet with retribution, and less miserable if he be punished and meets with retribution at the hands of God and men.

Pol. You are trying, Socrates, to maintain a paradox.

Soc. I shall try to make you agree with me, O my friend, for as a friend I regard you. Now the points of difference between us are these—are they not? I was saying that to do is worse than to suffer injustice?

Pol. Exactly.

Soc. And you said the opposite?

Pol. Yes.

Soc. I said also that the wicked are miserable, and this again you denied?
Pol. Yes, I did, and no mistake.

Soc. But that was only your opinion, Polus.

Pol. Yes, and I am surely right. •

Soc. And you said again that the wrong-doer is happy if he be unpunished?

Pol. Certainly.

Soc. And I say that he is most miserable, and that those who are punished are less miserable—are you going to refute that too?

Pol. That, Socrates, is truly hard of refutation, harder than the other.

Soc. Not hard only, say rather, impossible, Polus; for you can never refute the truth.

Pol. What do you mean? If a man is detected in an unjust attempt to make himself a tyrant, and when detected is racked, mutilated, has his eyes burned out, and after having had all sorts of great injuries inflicted on him, and having seen his wife and children suffer, is at last impaled or tarred and burned, will he be happier than if he escape and become a tyrant, and continue all through life doing what he likes and holding the reins of government, the envy and admiration both of citizens and strangers? Is that the paradox which, as you say, cannot be refuted?

Soc. There, again, you are raising hobgoblins, noble Polus, instead of refuting me, as before you were calling witnesses against me. But please to refresh my memory a little; did you say—‘in an unjust attempt to make himself a tyrant?’

Pol. Yes, I did.

Soc. Then I say that neither of them will be happier than the other,—neither he who unjustly acquires a tyranny, nor he who suffers in the attempt, for of two sufferers one cannot be the happier, but that he who escapes and becomes a tyrant is the more miserable of the two. Do you laugh, Polus? Well, this is a new sort of elenchus,—when any one says anything, instead of refuting him to laugh at him.

Pol. But do you not think, Socrates, that you have been sufficiently refuted, when you say that which no human being will allow? Ask the company.

Soc. O Polus, I am not a public man, and only last year, when my tribe were serving as Prytanes, and the lot fell upon me and I was made a senator, and had to take the votes, there was a laugh.
at me, because I was unable to take them. And as I failed then you must not ask me to count the suffrages of the company now; but if, as I was saying, you have no better argument than numbers, let me have a turn, and do you make trial of the sort of proof which, as I think, ought to be given; for I shall produce one witness only of the truth of my words, and he is the person with whom I am arguing; his suffrage I know how to take; but with the many I have nothing to do, and do not even address myself to them. May I ask then whether you will answer in turn and have your words put to the proof? For I certainly think that I and you and every man do really believe, that to do is a greater evil than to suffer injustice: and not to be punished than to be punished.

Pol. And I should say that neither I nor any man believes this: would you yourself, for example, suffer rather than do injustice?

Soc. Yes, and you, too; I and any man would.

Pol. Quite the reverse; neither you, nor I, nor any man.

Soc. But will you answer?

Pol. Certainly, I will; for I am curious to hear what you are going to say.

Soc. Tell me, then, and you will know, and let us suppose that I am beginning at the beginning: Which of the two, Polus, in your opinion, is the worst—to do injustice or to suffer?

Pol. I should say that suffering was worst.

Soc. And which is the greater disgrace?—Answer.

Pol. To do.

Soc. And the greater disgrace is the greater evil?

Pol. Certainly not.

Soc. I understand you to say, if I am not mistaken, that the honourable is not the same as the good, or the disgraceful as the evil?

Pol. Certainly not.

Soc. And what do you say to this? When you speak of beautiful things, as, for example, bodies, colours, figures, sounds, institutions, do you not call them beautiful in reference to some standard:—bodies, for example, are beautiful in proportion as they are useful, or as the sight of them gives pleasure to the spectators; can you give any other account of personal beauty?

Pol. I cannot.

Soc. And you would speak of everything else—of figures, or
colours, for example, as beautiful, either by reason of the pleasure
which they give, or of their use, or of both?

Pol. Yes, I should.

Soc. And you would call sounds and music beautiful for the same
reason?

Pol. I should.

Soc. Laws and institutions also have no beauty in them except in
as far as they are pleasant or useful or both.

Pol. I think not.

Soc. And may not the same be said of the beauty of knowledge?

Pol. To be sure, Socrates; and I very much approve of your
measuring beauty by the standard of pleasure and utility.

Soc. And deformity or disgrace may be equally measured by the
opposite standard of pain and evil?

Pol. Certainly.

Soc. Then when of two beautiful things one exceeds in beauty,
the excess is to be measured in one or both of these; that is to
say, in pleasure or good or both?

Pol. Very true.

Soc. And of two deformed things, that which exceeds in deforma-
ty or disgrace, exceeds either in pain or evil—does not that
follow?

Pol. Yes.

Soc. But then again, what was that observation which you just now
made, about doing and suffering wrong? Did you not say, that
suffering wrong was more evil, and doing wrong more disgraceful?

Pol. I did say that.

Soc. Then, if doing wrong is more disgraceful than suffering,
the more disgraceful must be more painful and exceed in pain or
in evil or both: is not that the necessary inference?

Pol. Of course.

Soc. First, then, let us consider whether the doing of injustice
exceeds the suffering in pain. Do the injurers suffer more than
the injured?

Pol. No, Socrates; certainly not that.

Soc. Then they do not exceed in pain?

Pol. No.

Soc. But if not in pain, then not in both?

Pol. Certainly not.
Soc. Then they can only exceed in the other?
Pol. Yes.
Soc. That is to say, in evil?
Pol. True.
Soc. Then doing injustice having an excess of evil, will be a greater evil than suffering injustice?
Pol. Clearly.
Soc. But have not you and the world already agreed that to do injustice is more disgraceful than to suffer?
Pol. True.
Soc. And that is now discovered to be more evil?
Pol. True.
Soc. And would you prefer a greater evil or a greater dishonour to a less one? Answer, Polus, and fear not; for you will come to no harm if you nobly give yourself to the healing power of the argument, which is a sort of physician; and either say 'Yes' or 'No' to me.
Pol. I should say not.
Soc. Would any other man?
Pol. Not according to this way of putting the case, Socrates.
Soc. Then I said truly, Polus, that neither you, nor I, nor any man, would rather do than suffer injustice; for to do injustice is the greater evil of the two.
Pol. That is true.
Soc. Then you see, Polus, that when you compare the two kinds of refutations they are quite unlike. All men, with the exception of myself, agree with you; but your assent is enough for me, and I have no need of any other witness; I take your suffrage, and am 476 regardless of the rest. Enough then of this, and let us proceed to the next question; which is, Whether the greatest of evils to a guilty man is to suffer punishment, as you supposed, or whether to escape punishment is not a greater evil, as I supposed. Let us look at the matter in this way:—Would you not say that to suffer punishment is another name for being justly corrected?
Pol. I should.
Soc. And would you not allow that all just things are honourable in as far as they are just? Please to reflect, and tell me your opinion.
Pol. Yes, Socrates, I think that they are.
Soc. Consider, then, this further point:—Where there is an agent, must there not also be a patient?

Pol. I admit that.

Soc. And will not the patient suffer that which the agent does, and will not the suffering have the quality of the action? I mean, for example, that if a man strikes, there must be something which is stricken?

Pol. Yes.

Soc. And if the striker strikes violently or quickly, that which is struck will be struck violently or quickly?

Pol. True.

Soc. And the suffering to him who is stricken is of the same nature as the act of him who strikes?

Pol. Yes.

Soc. And if a man burns, there is something which is burned?

Pol. Certainly.

Soc. And if he burns in excess or with pain, the thing burned will be burned in the same way?

Pol. Truly.

Soc. And if he cuts, the same argument holds—there will be something cut?

Pol. Yes.

Soc. And if the cutting be great or deep or painful, the cut will be of the same nature?

Pol. That is evident.

Soc. Then you would agree generally to the universal proposition which I was just now asserting: that the affection of the patient answers to the act of the agent?

Pol. I admit that.

Soc. Then, as this is admitted, let me ask whether being punished is suffering or acting?

Pol. Suffering, Socrates; there can be no doubt of that.

Soc. And suffering implies an agent?

Pol. Certainly, Socrates; and he is the punisher.

Soc. And he who punishes rightly, punishes justly?

Pol. Yes.

Soc. And therefore he acts justly?

Pol. Justly.

Soc. Then he who is punished and suffers retribution, suffers justly?
Pol. That is evident.
Soc. And that which is just has been admitted to be honourable?
Pol. Certainly.
Soc. Then the punisher does what is honourable, and the punished suffers what is honourable?
Pol. True.
Soc. And if what is honourable, then what is good, for the honourable is either pleasant or useful?
Pol. Certainly.
Soc. Then he who is punished suffers what is good?
Pol. That is true.
Soc. Then he is benefited?
Pol. Yes.
Soc. Do I understand you to mean what I mean by the term 'benefited'? I mean, that his soul is improved, if he be justly punished.
Pol. Surely.
Soc. Then he who is punished is delivered from the evil of his soul?
Pol. Yes.
Soc. And is he not then delivered from the greatest evil? Look at the matter in this way:—In a worldly estate, do you see any greater evil than poverty?
Pol. There is no greater evil.
Soc. Again, in a man's bodily estate, you would say that the evil is weakness and disease and deformity?
Pol. I should.
Soc. And do you not imagine that the soul likewise has some evil of her own?
Pol. Of course.
Soc. And this you would call injustice and ignorance and cowardice, and the like?
Pol. Certainly.
Soc. So then, in mind, body and estate, which are three, you have pointed out three corresponding evils—-injustice, disease, poverty?
Pol. True.
Soc. And which of the evils is the most disgraceful?—Is not the most disgraceful of them injustice, and in general the evil of the soul?
Pol. By far the most.

Soc. And if the most disgraceful, then also the worst?

Pol. How is that, Socrates? I do not understand.

Soc. I mean to say, that what is most disgraceful has been already admitted to be most painful or hurtful, or both.

Pol. Certainly.

Soc. And now injustice and all evil in the soul has been admitted by us to be most disgraceful?

Pol. That has been admitted.

Soc. And most disgraceful either because most painful and causing excessive pain, or most hurtful, or both?

Pol. Certainly.

Soc. And therefore to be unjust and intemperate, and cowardly and ignorant, is more painful than to be poor and sick?

Pol. Nay, Socrates; I should say that does not follow, if you are right.

Soc. Then, if not more painful, as you affirm, the evil of the soul is the most disgraceful of all evils; and the excess of disgrace must be caused by some preternatural greatness, or extraordinary hurtfulness of the evil or both.

Pol. Clearly.

Soc. And that which exceeds most in hurtfulness will be the greatest of evils?

Pol. Yes.

Soc. Then injustice and intemperance, and in general the depravity of the soul, is the greatest evil that there is?

Pol. That is evident.

Soc. Now, what art is there which delivers us from poverty?

Pol. That is evident.

Does not the art of making money?

Pol. Yes.

Soc. And what art frees us from disease? Does not the art of medicine?

Pol. Certainly.

Soc. And what from vice and injustice? If you are not able to answer at once, ask yourself whither we go with the sick, and to whom we take them.

Pol. To the physicians, Socrates.

Soc. And to whom do we go with the unjust and intemperate?

Pol. To the judges, you mean.
Soc. Who are to punish them?
Pol. Yes.
Soc. And do not those who rightly punish others, punish them in accordance with a certain rule of justice?
Pol. That is evident.
Soc. Then the art of money-making frees a man from poverty; medicine from disease; and justice from intemperance and injustice?
Pol. That is clear.
Soc. Which, then, is the best of these three?
Pol. Will you enumerate them?
Soc. Money-making, medicine, and justice.
Pol. Justice, Socrates, far excels the others.
Soc. And justice, if the best, gives the greatest pleasure or advantage or both?
Pol. Yes.
Soc. But is the being healed a pleasant thing, and are those who are being healed pleased?
Pol. I think not.
Soc. Useful, then?
Pol. Yes.
Soc. Why, yes, because giving deliverance from great evils; and this is the advantage of enduring the pain—that you get well.
Pol. Certainly.
Soc. And would he be the happier man in his bodily condition, who is healed, or who never was out of health?
Pol. Clearly he who was never out of health.
Soc. Yes; for (happiness surely does not consist in being delivered from evils, but in never having known them.)
Pol. True.
Soc. And suppose the case of two persons, who have some evil in their bodies, and that one of them is healed and delivered from evil, and another is not healed, but retains the evil—which of them is the most miserable?
Pol. Clearly he who is not healed.
Soc. And was not punishment said by us to be a deliverance from the greatest of evils, which is vice?
Pol. True.
Soc. And justice punishes us, and makes us more just, and is the healer of our vice?

Pol. True.

Soc. He, then, has the first place in the scale of happiness who has never known vice in his soul; for this has been shown to be the greatest of evils.

Pol. Clearly.

Soc. And he has the second place, who is delivered from vice?

Pol. True.

Soc. And this is he who receives admonition and rebuke and punishment?

Pol. Yes.

Soc. Then he lives worst, who has known and has no deliverance from injustice?

Pol. Certainly.

Soc. That is, he who commits the greatest crimes, and who being the most unjust of men, succeeds in escaping rebuke or correction or punishment, which, as you say, is the case of Archelaus, and all your tyrants and rhetoricians and mighty men?

Pol. True.

Soc. May not their way of proceeding, my friend, be compared to the conduct of a person who is afflicted with the worst of diseases and yet contrives not to pay the penalty to the physician for his sins against his constitution, and will not be cured because, like a child, he is afraid of the pain of being burned or cut:—Is not that a parallel case?

Pol. Yes, truly.

Soc. He would seem as if he did not know the nature of health and bodily vigour; and this, Polus, is shown by our previous conclusions, to be the case of those who strive to evade justice, which they see to be painful, but are blind to the advantage which ensues from it, not knowing how far more miserable a companion a diseased soul is than a diseased body; a soul, I say, which is corrupt and unrighteous and unholy. And hence they do all that they can to avoid punishment and to avoid being released from the greatest of evils; they provide themselves with money and friends, and cultivate to the utmost their powers of persuasion. But if we, Polus, are right, do you see what follows, or shall we draw out the consequences in form?
Pol. If you please.

Soc. It follows that injustice, and the doing of injustice, is the greatest of evils?

Pol. That is clear.

Soc. And further, that to suffer punishment is the way to be released from this evil?

Pol. True.

Soc. And not to suffer, is to perpetuate the evil?

Pol. True.

Soc. To do wrong, then, is second only in the scale of evils; but to do wrong and not to be punished, is first and greatest of all?

Pol. That is true.

Soc. Well, and was not this the point in dispute, my friend? You deemed Archelaus happy, because he was a very great criminal and unpunished: I, on the other hand, maintained that he or any other who like him has done wrong and has not been punished, is and ought to be, the most miserable of all men; and that the doer of injustice, whether Archelaus or any other, is more miserable than the sufferer; and he who escapes punishment, more miserable than he who suffers.—Was not that what I said?

Pol. Yes.

Soc. And that has been proved to be true?

Pol. Certainly.

Soc. Well, Polus, but if this is true, where is the great use of rhetoric? If we admit what has been just now said, every man ought in every way to guard himself against doing wrong, for he will thereby suffer great evil?

Pol. True.

Soc. And if he, or any one about whom he cares, does wrong, he ought of his own accord to go where he will be immediately punished; he will run to the judge, as he would to the physician, in order that the disease of injustice may not be rendered chronic and become the incurable cancer of the soul; must we not allow that, Polus, if our former admissions are to stand? and is not that the only inference which is consistent with them?

Pol. That, Socrates, is not to be denied.

Soc. Then rhetoric is of no use to us, Polus, in helping a man to excuse his own injustice, or that of his parents or friends, or children or country; but may be of use, if he hold that instead of
excusing he ought to accuse—himself above all, and in the next
degree, his family, or any of his friends who may be doing wrong,
if he does not want to conceal, but to bring to light the iniquity,
that the wrong-doer may suffer and be healed; and if he would
force himself and others to stand firm, closing their eyes manfully,
and letting the physician cut, as I may say, and burn them, in the
hope of attaining the good and the honourable, not regarding the
pain; but if he have done things worthy of stripes, allowing him-
self to be beaten, or if of bonds to be bound, or if of a fine to be
fined, or if of exile to be exiled, or if of death to die, and being
himself the first to accuse himself and his own relations, and using
rhetoric to this end, that his and their just actions may be made
manifest, and they themselves may be delivered from injustice,
which is the greatest evil.—Shall we admit this or not, Polus?

Pol. To me, Socrates, this appears very strange, though probably
in agreement with your premises.

Soc. Must not the premises be disproven, unless this is to be the
conclusion?

Pol. Yes; that is true.

Soc. And from the opposite point of view, if any one would
harm another, whether he be an enemy or any other; I except
the case in which I am myself suffering injury at the hands of
another, for I must take precautions against that; but supposing
that my enemy injures a third person, then in every sort of way,
by word as well as deed, I should try to prevent his being punished,
or appearing before the judge; and if he appears, I should contrive
that he should escape, and not suffer punishment: if he has stolen
a sum of money, let him keep and spend what he has stolen on
him and his, Regardless of religion and justice; and if he have
done things worthy of death, let him not die, but rather be im-
mortal in his wickedness; or, if this is not possible, let him at any
rate be allowed to live as long as he can. For these purposes,
Polus, rhetoric may be useful, but is of small if of any use to him
who is not intending to commit injustice; at least, there was no
such use discovered by us in the previous discussion.

Call. Tell me, Chaerephon, is Socrates in earnest, or is he
joking about this?

Chaeer. I should say, Callicles, that he is in most profound
earnest; but you may as well ask him.
Cal. By the gods, and I will. Tell me, Socrates, are you in earnest, or only in jest? For if you are in earnest, and what you say is true, is not the whole of human life turned upside down; and are we not doing, as would appear, in everything the opposite of what we ought to be doing?

Soc. O, Callicles, if there were not some community of feeling among mankind, however varying in different persons— I mean to say, if every individual had a private feeling which was not shared by the rest of his species—I do not see how we could ever communicate our impressions to one another. I make this remark because I perceive that you and I have such a common feeling. For we are lovers both, and both of us have two loves apiece: I am the lover of Alcibiades, the son of Cleinias, and of philosophy; and you of the Athenian Demus, and of Demus the fair son of Pyrilampes. Now, I observe that you, with all your cleverness, do not venture to contradict your favourite in any word or opinion of his; but as he changes you change, backwards and forwards. When the Athenian Demus denies anything that you are saying in the assembly, you go over to his opinion; and the same sort of thing happens with Demus, the fair young son of Pyrilampes. For you have not the power to resist the words and ideas of your loves; and if a person were to express surprise at the strangeness of what you are apt to say when under their influence, you would probably reply to him, if you were honest, that you must use the same language as your loves, and that this can only be stopped by their being put to silence. And you may imagine that my words too are like your own, an echo of another, and need not wonder at me; but if you want to stop me, silence philosophy, who is my love, for she is always saying to me, what I am now saying to you, my friend, neither is she capricious like my other love; for the son of Cleinias is inconstant, but philosophy is always true. She is the teacher whose words you heard, and at which you are now wondering;—her you must refute, and either show, as I was saying, that to do injustice and to escape punishment, is not the worst of all evils; for if you leave her word unrefuted, by the dog the god of Egypt, I declare, O Callicles, that Callicles will never be at one with himself, but all his life long in a state of discord. And yet, my friend, I would rather that my lyre should be inharmonious, and that there should be no music in the chorus which
I provided; ay, or that the whole world should be at odds with me, and oppose me, rather than that I myself should be at variance with myself, and contradict myself.

*Cal.* O, Socrates, you are a regular declamer, and are manifestly running riot in the argument. And now you are declaiming in this way because Polus has met with the same evil fate himself which he accused you of bringing upon Gorgias: he said, if I remember rightly, that when Gorgias was asked by you, whether, if some one came to him who wanted to learn rhetoric, and did not know justice, he would teach him justice? And Gorgias in his modesty replied that he would, because he thought that mankind in general would expect this of him, and would be displeased if he said 'No;' in consequence of this admission, Gorgias was compelled to contradict himself, and you were delighted; Polus laughed at you at the time, deservedly, as I think; and now he has himself experienced the same misfortune; I cannot say very much for Polus' wit when he conceded to you, that to do is more dishonourable than to suffer injustice, for this was what led to his being entangled by you; and because he was too modest to say what he thought, he had his mouth stopped. For the truth is, Socrates, that you, who pretend to be engaged in the pursuit of truth, are appealing now to the popular and vulgar notions of right, which are not natural, but only conventional. Custom and nature are generally at variance with one another: and hence, if a person is too modest to say what he thinks, he is compelled to contradict himself; and you, ingeniously seeing the advantage which may be won from this, dishonestly contrive that when a person speaks according to this rule of custom, you slyly ask him a question, which is to be referred to the rule of nature; and if he is talking of the rule of nature, you slip away to custom: as in this very discussion about doing and suffering injustice, when Polus was speaking of the conventionally dishonourable, you pursued his notion of convention from the point of view of nature; for by the rule of nature, that only is the more disgraceful which is the greater evil:—as, for example, to suffer injustice; but by the rule of custom, to do evil is the more disgraceful. For this suffering of injustice is not the part of a man, but of a slave, who indeed had better die than live; for when he is wronged and trampled upon, he is unable to help himself, or any other about whom he cares. The reason, as I
conceive, is that the makers of laws are the many weak; and they make laws and distribute praises and censures with a view to themselves and to their own interests; and they terrify the mightier sort of men, and those who are able to get the better of them, in order that they may not get the better of them; and they say, that dishonesty is shameful and unjust; meaning, when they speak of injustice, the desire to have more than their neighbours, for knowing their own inferiority they are only too glad of equality. And therefore this seeking to have more than the many, is conventionally said to be shameful and unjust, and is called injustice, whereas nature herself intimates that it is just for the better to have more than the worse, the more powerful than the weaker; and in many ways she shows, among men as well as among animals, and indeed among whole cities and races, that justice consists in the superior ruling over and having more than the inferior. For on what principle of justice did Xerxes invade Hellas, or his father the Scythians? (not to speak of numberless other examples.) They, I conceive, act according to nature; yes, and according to the law of nature: not, perhaps, according to that artificial law, which we frame and fashion, taking the best and strongest of us from their youth upwards, and taming them like young lions, and charming them with the sound of the voice, saying to them, that with equality they must be content, and that this is the honourable and the just. But if there were a man who had sufficient force, he would shake off and break through, and escape from all this; he would trample under foot all our formulas and spells and charms, and all our laws, sinning against nature: the slave would rise in rebellion and be lord over us, and the light of natural justice would shine forth. And this I take to be the lesson of Pindar, in the poem in which he says, that

Law is the king of all, mortals as well as immortals;

this, as he says,

Makes might to be right, and does violence with exalted hand; as I infer from the deeds of Heracles, for without buying them,

—I do not remember the exact words, but the meaning is, that he carried off the oxen of Geryon without buying them, and without their being given to him by Geryon, according to the law of natural right, and that the oxen and other possessions of the weaker and inferior properly belong to the stronger and superior. And this
is true, as you may ascertain, if you will leave philosophy and go on to higher things: for philosophy, Socrates, if pursued in moderation and at the proper age, is an elegant accomplishment, but too much philosophy is the ruin of human life. Even if a man has good parts, still, if he carries philosophy into later life, he is necessarily ignorant of all those things which a gentleman and a person of honour ought to know; for he is ignorant of the laws of the State, and of the language which ought to be used in the dealings of man with man, whether private or public, and altogether ignorant of the pleasures and desires of mankind and of human character in general. And people of this sort, when they betake themselves to politics or business, are as ridiculous as I imagine the politicians to be, when they make their appearance in the arena of philosophy. For, as Euripides says,

Every man shines in that and pursues that, and devotes the greatest portion of the day to that in which he most excels;

485 and if he is inferior in anything, he avoids and depreciates that, and praises the other from partiality to himself, and because he thinks that he will thus praise himself. But the right way is to have both: philosophy, as a part of education, is an excellent thing, and there is no disgrace to a man while he is young in pursuing such a study; when, Socrates, he becomes an older man, then the thing is ridiculous, and I feel towards philosophers as I do towards those who lisp and imitate children. For when I see a little child, who is not of an age to speak plainly, lisp ing at his play, that pleases me; there is an appearance of grace and freedom in his utterance, which is natural to his childish years. But when I hear some small creature carefully articulating his words, that offenders me; the sound is disagreeable, and has to my ears the twang of slavery. And when I see a man lisp ing as if he were a child, that appears to me ridiculous and unmanly and worthy of stripes. Now, I have the same feeling about students of philosophy; when I see one of your young men studying philosophy, that I consider to be quite in character, and becoming a man of a liberal education, and him who neglects philosophy I regard as an inferior man, who will never aspire to anything great or noble. But if I see him continuing to study philosophy in later life, and not leaving off, I think that he ought to be beaten, Socrates; for, as I was saying, such an one, even
though he have good natural parts, becomes effeminate. He flies from the busy centre and the market-place, in which, as the poet says, men become distinguished: he creeps into a corner for the rest of his life, and talks in a whisper with three or four admiring youths, but never speaks out like a freeman in a satisfactory manner. Now I, Socrates, am very well inclined towards you, and my feeling may be compared with that of Zethus towards Amphion, in the play of Euripides, of which I was just now speaking: for I am disposed to say to you much what Zethus said to his brother, that you, Socrates, are careless when you ought to be careful; and having a soul so noble, are chiefly remarkable for a puerile exterior; neither in a court of justice could you state a case, or give any probability or proof, nor offer valiant counsel on another's behalf: and you must not be offended, my dear Socrates, for I am speaking out of good-will towards you, if I ask whether you are not ashamed at being in this case? which, indeed, I affirm to be that of all those who will carry the study of philosophy too far. For suppose that some one were to take you, or any one of your sort, off to prison, declaring that you had done wrong when you had done no wrong, you must allow that you would not know what to do:—there you would stand giddy and gaping, and not having a word to say; and when you went up before the Court, even if the accuser were a poor creature and not good for much, you would die if he were disposed to claim the penalty of death. And yet, Socrates, what is the value of an art which converts a man of sense into a fool, who is helpless, powerless, when the danger is greatest, to save either himself or others; while he is being despoiled by his enemies of all his goods, and deprived of his rights of citizenship? being a man, if I may use the expression, who may be boxed on the ears with impunity. Then, my good friend, take my advice, and refute no more; learn 'the arts of business, and acquire the reputation of wisdom,' leaving to others these niceties;—whether they are better described as follies or absurdities, they will only give you poverty for the inmate of your dwelling.

Cease, then, emulating these paltry splitters of words, and emulate only the man of substance and honour, who is well to do.
of the best sort too which I might apply; and if the application showed that my soul had been well cultivated, then I should know that I was in a satisfactory state, and that no other test was needed by me.

**Cal.** What makes you say that, Socrates?

**Soc.** I will tell you; I think that in you I have found the desired touchstone.

**Cal.** Why?

**Soc.** Because I am sure that if you agree with me in any of the opinions which my soul forms, I have at last found the truth indeed. For I consider that if a man is to make a complete trial of the good or evil of the soul, he ought to have three qualities—knowledge, good-will, frankness, which are all possessed by you. Many whom I have known were unable to make the examination, because they were not wise as you are; others are wise, but they will not tell me the truth, because they have not the interest in me which you have; and these two strangers, Gorgias and Polus, are undoubtedly wise men and my very good friends, but they are not frank enough, and they are too modest. Why, their modesty is so great that they are driven to contradict themselves, first one and then the other of them, in the face of a large company, on matters of the highest moment. But you have all the qualities in which these others are deficient, having received an excellent education; to this many Athenians can testify. And I am sure that you are my friend. How do I prove that? I will tell you: I know that you, Callicles, and Tisander of Aphidnae, and Andron the son of Androtion, and Nausicydes of the deme of Cholarges, studied philosophy together: there were four of you, and I once heard you advising with one another as to the extent to which the pursuit should be carried, and the opinion, as I know, which found favour among you was, that the study should not be pushed too much into detail. You were cautioning one another not to be overwise, lest, without your knowing, this should be the ruin of you. And now when I hear you giving the same advice to me which you then gave to your most intimate friends, I have in that a sufficient evidence of your real good-will to me. And of the frankness of your nature and freedom from modesty I am assured by yourself, and the assurance is confirmed by your last speech. Well then, the inference clearly is, that if you and I agree in an argument on any
point, that point will have been sufficiently tested by you and me, and will not require to be referred to any further test. For you cannot have been led to agree with me, either from lack of knowledge or from superfluity of modesty, nor from a desire to deceive me, for you are my friend, as you tell me yourself. And therefore when you and I are agreed, the result will be the attainment of the perfect truth. Now there can be no nobler enquiry, Callicles, than that for which you reprove me,—What ought the character of a man to be, and what his pursuits, and how far he is to go, both in maturer years and in youth? (For be assured of this, that if I err in my own conduct I do not err intentionally, but from my own ignorance.) Do not then desist from advising me, now that you have begun, until I have learned clearly what this is which I am to practise, and how I may acquire it. And if you find me assenting to your words, and hereafter not doing that to which I assented, call me 'dolt,' and 'good-for-nothing,' and deem me unworthy of receiving further instruction. Once more, then, tell me what you and Pindar mean by natural justice: Do you not mean that the superior should take the property of the inferior by force; that the better should rule the worse, the noble have more than the mean? Am I not right in my recollection?

Cal. Yes; that is what I was saying, and what I still maintain.

Soc. And do you mean by the better the same as the superior? for I could not make out what you were saying at the time—whether you meant by the superior the stronger, and that the weaker must obey the stronger, as you seemed to imply when you said that great cities attack small ones in accordance with natural right, because they are superior and stronger, as though the superior and stronger and better were the same; or whether the better may be also the inferior and weaker, and the superior the worse, or whether better is to be defined in the same way as superior:—this is the point which I want to have clearly explained. Are the superior and better and stronger the same or different?

Cal. Well; I tell you plainly that they are the same.

Soc. Then the many are by nature superior to the one, against whom, as you were saying, they make the laws?

Cal. Certainly.

Soc. Then the laws of the many are the laws of the superior?

Cal. Very true.
Soc. Then they are the laws of the better; for the superior are far better, as you were saying?
Cal. Yes.
Soc. Then the laws which are made by them are by nature noble, as they are the superior?
Cal. Yes.
Soc. And are not the many of opinion, as you were lately saying, that justice is equality, and that to do is more disgraceful than to suffer injustice? and that equality and not excess is justice?—is that so or no? Answer, Callicles, and let no modesty be found to come in the way (cp. what is said of Gorgias at p. 482):—I must beg of you to answer, in order that if you agree with me I may be fortified in my judgment by the assent of so competent an authority.
Cal. Yes; that is the opinion of the many.
Soc. Then not only custom but nature also affirms that to do is more disgraceful than to suffer injustice, and that justice is equality, so that you seem to have been wrong in your former assertion, and accusation of me, when you said that nature and custom are opposed, and that I, knowing this, was artfully playing between them, appealing to custom when the argument is about nature, and to nature when the argument is about custom?
Cal. This man always will be talking nonsense. At your age, Socrates, are you not ashamed to be word-catching, and when a man trips in a word, thinking that to be a piece of luck? do you not see—have I not told you already, that by superior I mean better: do you imagine me to say, that if a rabble of slaves and nondescripts, who are of no use except perhaps for their physical strength, gets together, their ipsissima verba are laws?
Soc. Ho! my philosopher, is that your line?
Cal. Certainly.
Soc. I was thinking, Callicles, that something of the kind must have been in your mind, and that is why I repeated the question, what is the superior, because I wanted to know clearly what you meant; for you surely do not think that two men are better than one, or that your slaves are better than you because they are stronger? Then please to begin again, and tell me who the better are, if they are not the stronger; and I will ask you to be a little milder in your instructions, or I shall have to run away from you.
Cal. You are ironical.
Soc. No, by the hero Zethus, Callicles, in whose person you were just now saying (485 A) many ironical things against me, I am not:—tell me, then, whom you mean by the better?

Cal. I mean the more excellent.

Soc. Do you not see that you are yourself repeating words and explaining nothing?—will you tell me whether you mean by the better and superior the wiser, or if not, whom?

Cal. Most assuredly, I do mean the wiser.

Soc. Then according to you, one wise man may often be superior to ten thousand fools, and he ought to rule them, and they ought to be his subjects, and he ought to have more than they should. That is what I believe that you mean (and you must not suppose that I am catching words), if you allow that the one is superior to the ten thousand?

Cal. Yes; that is what I mean, and that is what I conceive to be natural justice—that the better and wiser should rule and have more than the inferior.

Soc. Stop now, and let me ask you what you would say in this case: Let us suppose ourselves to be together as we are now; there are a number of us, and there is a large common store of meats and drinks, and there are all sorts of persons in our company having various degrees of strength and weakness, and one of us, being a physician, is wiser in these matters than all the rest, and he is probably stronger than some and not so strong as others of us—will he not, being wiser, be also better than we are, and our superior in this matter?

Cal. Certainly.

Soc. Either, then, he will have a larger share of the meats and drinks, because he is better, or he will have the distribution of all of them by reason of his authority, but he will not expend or use a larger share of them on his own person, or if he does, he will be punished;—his share will exceed that of some, and be less than that of others, and if he be the weakest of all, he being the best of all will have the smallest share of all, Callicles:—am I not right, my friend?

Cal. You talk about meats and drinks and physicians and other nonsense; I am not speaking of them.

Soc. Well, but do you admit that the wiser is the better? Answer that.
Cal. I do.

Soc. And ought not the better to have a larger share?

Cal. Not of meats and drinks.

Soc. I understand: then, perhaps, of coats, the skilfullest weaver ought to have the largest coat, and the greatest number of them, and go about clothed in the best and finest of them?

Cal. Nonsense about coats.

Soc. Then the skilfullest and wisest in making shoes ought to have the advantage in shoes; the shoemaker, clearly, should walk about in the largest shoes, and have the greatest number of them?

Cal. Shoes! fudge. What nonsense you are talking!

Soc. Or, if that is not your meaning, perhaps you mean to say that the wise and good and true husbandman should actually have a larger share of seeds, and have as much seed as possible for his own especial use?

Cal. How you go on, always talking in the same way, Socrates!

Soc. Yes, Callicles, and not only talking in the same way, but on the same subjects.

Cal. Yes, by Heaven, you are literally always talking of cobblers and fullers and cooks and doctors, as if this had to do with our argument.

Soc. But why will you not tell me in what a man must be superior and wiser in order to claim a larger share; will you neither accept a suggestion, nor offer one?

Cal. I have already told you. In the first place, I mean by the superiors not cobblers or cooks, but wise politicians who understand the administration of a state, and who are not only wise, but also valiant and able to carry out their designs, and not the men to faint from want of soul.

Soc. See now, most excellent Callicles, how different my charge against you is from that which you bring against me, for you reproach me with always saying the same; but I reproach you with never saying the same about the same things, for at one time you were defining the better and the superior as the stronger, then again as the wiser, and now again you bring forward a new notion; the superior and the better are now declared by you to be the more courageous: I wish, my good friend, that you would tell me, once for all, whom you affirm to be the better and superior, and in what particular?
Cal. I have already told you that I mean those who are wise and courageous in the administration of a state; who ought to be the rulers of their states, and ought to have an advantage over their subjects, and this is justice.

Soc. What! my friend, are they to have more than themselves? Cal. How do you mean?

Soc. I mean that every man is his own ruler; but perhaps you think that there is no necessity for him to rule himself; he is only required to rule others?

Cal. What do you mean by his ‘ruling over himself’?

Soc. A simple thing enough; just what is commonly said, that a man should be temperate and master of himself, and ruler of his own pleasures and passions.

Cal. How charming! you mean those fools,—the temperate?

Soc. Certainly:—any one may know that to be my meaning.

Cal. Quite so, Socrates; and they are really fools—for how can a man be happy who is the servant of anything? On the contrary, I plainly assert, that he who would truly live ought to allow his desires to wax to the uttermost, and not to chastise them; but when they have grown to their greatest he should have courage and intelligence to minister to them and to satisfy all his longings. And this I affirm to be natural justice and nobility. But the many cannot do so; and therefore they blame such persons, because they are ashamed of their own inability, which they desire to conceal, and hence they say that intemperance is base. As I was saying before, they enslave the nobler natures, and being unable to satisfy their pleasures, they praise temperance and justice because they are cowards. For if a man had been originally the son of a king, or had a nature capable of acquiring an empire or a tyranny or exclusive power, what could be more truly base or evil than temperance—to a man like him, I say, who might freely be enjoying every good, and has no one to hinder him, and yet has admitted custom and reason and the opinion of other men to be lord over him?—must not he be in a miserable plight whom the reputation of justice and temperance hinders from giving more to his friends than to his enemies, even though he be a ruler in his city? Nay, Socrates, the truth is this (and you profess to be a votary of the

2 Omitting τι ἄρχωντας ἡ ἄρχομένως.
truth)—that luxury and intemperance and licence, if they are duly supported, are happiness and virtue—all the rest is a mere bauble, custom contrary to nature, fond inventions of men nothing worth.

Soc. There is a noble freedom, Callicles, in your way of approaching the argument; for what you say is what the rest of the world think, but are unwilling to say. And I must beg of you not to relax your efforts in order that we may truly know the rule of human life. Tell me, then:—you say, do you not, that in the rightly-developed man the passions ought not to be controlled, but that we should let them grow to the utmost and somehow or other satisfy them, and that this is virtue?

Cal. Yes; that is what I say.

Soc. Then those who want nothing are not truly said to be happy?

Cal. No, indeed, for then stones and the dead would be the happiest of all.

Soc. Yes, and your words may remind us that life is a fearful thing; and I think that Euripides was probably right in saying,

'Who knows if life be not death and death life;'

for I think that we are very likely dead; and I have heard a wise man say that at this very moment we are dead, and that the body is a tomb, and that the part of the soul which is the seat of the desires is liable to be influenced and tossed about in different ways; and about this some ingenious man, probably a Sicilian or Italian, playing with the word, made a tale—he called the soul a vessel (πίθος), meaning a vessel of faith or belief, and the ignorant he called the uninitiated or leaky, and the place in the souls of the uninitiated in which the desires are seated, being the intemperate and incontinent part, he compared to a vessel full of holes, because they can never be satisfied. He is not of your way of thinking, Callicles, for he declares, that of all the souls in Hades, meaning the invisible world (ἀεώς), these uninitiated or leaky persons are the most miserable, and that they carry water to a vessel which is full of holes in a similarly holey colander. The colander, as he declares, is the soul, and the soul which he compares to a colander is the soul of the ignorant, which is full of holes, and therefore incontinent; this is owing to a bad memory and want of faith. These are strange words, but still they show what, if I can, I desire to prove to you; that you should change your mind, and, instead of the intemperate
and insatiate life, you should choose that which is orderly and duly and sufficiently provided for daily needs. Do I make any impression on you, and are you coming over to the opinion that the orderly are happier than the intemperate? Or do I fail to persuade you, and, however many tales I rehearse to you, do you continue of the same opinion still?

Cal. The latter, Socrates, is more like the truth.

Soc. Well, I will tell you another image, which comes out of the same school:—Let me request you to consider how far you would accept this as an account of the two lives of the temperate and intemperate:—There are two men, both of whom have a number of casks, and the one man's casks are sound and full, one of wine, another of honey, and a third of milk; and there are divers others, filled with divers other liquids, and the streams which fill them are few and scanty, and hard to obtain, and to be obtained only with a great deal of toil and difficulty; but when he has once filled them he has no need to feed them any more, and has no further trouble with them or care about them. The other, in like manner, can procure streams, though not without difficulty; but his vessels are leaky and unsound, and night and day he is compelled to be filling them, or if he intermit he is visited with the 494 most fearful pains. Such are their respective lives:—And now would you say that the life of the intemperate is happier than that of the temperate? Do I, or do I not, convince you that the temperate life is better than the life of the intemperate?

Cal. You do not convince me, Socrates, for the one who has filled himself has no longer any pleasure left; and this, as I was just now saying, is the life of a stone: he has neither joy nor sorrow after he is once filled; but the life of pleasure is an ever-flowing stream.

Soc. And if the stream is always flowing in, must there not be a stream always flowing out, and the holes must be large to admit of the discharge?

Cal. Certainly.

Soc. The life, then, of which you are now speaking, is not that of a dead man, or of a stone, but of a cormorant; you mean that he is to be hungering and eating?

Cal. Yes.

Soc. And he is to be thirsting and drinking?
Cal. Yes, that is what I mean; he is to have all his desires about him, and to be able to live happily in the gratification of them.

Soc. Capital, excellent; go on as you have begun, and have no shame; I, too, must disencumber myself of shame: and first, will you tell me whether you include itching and scratching, provided you have enough of scratching, and continue scratching through life, in your notion of happiness?

Cal. What a strange being you are, Socrates! a regular claptrap orator.

Soc. That was the reason, Callicles, why I scared the modesty out of Polus and Gorgias; but your modesty will not be scared, for you are a brave man. And now, answer my question.

Cal. I answer, that the scratcher would live pleasantly.

Soc. And if pleasantly, then also happily?

Cal. To be sure.

Soc. But what if the itching is not confined to the head? Shall I pursue the question? And here, Callicles, I would have you consider how you would reply if consequences are pressed upon you, especially if in the last resort you are asked, whether the life of a catamite is not terrible, foul, miserable? Or would you venture to say, that they too are happy, if they only get enough of what they want?

Cal. Are you not ashamed, Socrates, of introducing such topics into the argument?

Soc. Well, my fine friend, but am I to blame for that, or he who says without any qualification that all who feel pleasure are happy, whatever may be the character of their pleasure, and admits of no distinction of good and bad pleasures? And I would still ask, whether you say that pleasure and good are the same, or whether there is some pleasure which is not a good?

Cal. Well, then, for the sake of consistency, I will say that they are the same.

Soc. You are breaking the original agreement, Callicles, and will no longer be a satisfactory companion in the search after truth, if you say what is contrary to your real opinion.

Cal. Why, that is what you are doing too, Socrates.

Soc. Then we are both doing wrong. Still, my dear friend, I would ask you to consider whether pleasure, from whatever source
derived, is the good; for, if this be true, then the disagreeable consequences which have been shadowed forth must follow, and many others.

Cal. That, Socrates, is only your opinion.

Soc. And do you, Callicles, really maintain this doctrine?

Cal. Indeed I do.

Soc. Then, as you appear to be in earnest, shall I proceed with the argument?

Cal. By all means.

Soc. Well, if you are willing to proceed, determine me this:—There is something, I presume, which you would call knowledge?

Cal. There is.

Soc. And were you not saying just now, that some courage implied knowledge?

Cal. I was.

Soc. And you were speaking of courage and knowledge as two things different from one another?

Cal. Certainly I was.

Soc. And would you say that pleasure and knowledge are the same, or not the same?

Cal. Not the same, O man of wisdom.

Soc. And would you say that courage differed from pleasure?

Cal. Certainly.

Soc. Well, then, let us remember that Callicles, the Acharnian, says that pleasure and good are the same; but that knowledge and courage are not the same, either with one another, or with the good.

Cal. And what does our friend Socrates, of Fox-moor, say to this: does he assent, or not?

Soc. He does not assent; neither will Callicles, when he sees himself truly. You will admit, I suppose, that good and evil fortune are opposed to each other?

Cal. Yes.

Soc. And if they are opposed to each other, then, like health and disease, they exclude one another: a man cannot have them both, or be without them both, at the same time?

Cal. What do you mean?

Soc. Take the case of any bodily affection:—a man may have the complaint in his eyes which is called ophthalmia?
496 Cal. To be sure.
    Soc. He surely cannot have the same eyes at the same time well
    and sound?
    Cal. Certainly not.
    Soc. And when he has got rid of his ophthalmia, has he got rid
    of the health of his eyes too? Is the final result, that he gets rid
    of them both together?
    Cal. Certainly not.
    Soc. That would surely be marvellous and absurd?
    Cal. Very.
    Soc. I suppose that he has them, and gets rid of them in
    turns?
    Cal. Yes.
    Soc. And he may have strength and weakness in the same way,
    by fits?
    Cal. Yes.
    Soc. Or swiftness and slowness?
    Cal. Certainly.
    Soc. And does he have and not have good and happiness, and
    their opposites, evil and misery, in a similar alternation?
    Cal. Certainly he has.
    Soc. If then there be anything which a man has and has not at
    the same time, clearly that cannot be good and evil—do we admit
    that? Please not to answer without consideration.
    Cal. I entirely admit that.
    Soc. Go back now to our former admissions.—Did you say
    that to hunger, I mean the mere state of hunger, was pleasant or
    painful?
    Cal. I said painful, but that to eat when you are hungry is
    pleasant.
    Soc. I know; but still the actual hunger is painful: Is not
    that so?
    Cal. Yes.
    Soc. And thirst, too, is painful?
    Cal. Yes, very.
    Soc. Need I adduce any more instances, or would you admit of
    all wants or desires, that they are painful?
    Cal. That I admit, and therefore you need not adduce any
    more.
Soc. Very good. And you would admit that to drink, when you are thirsty, is pleasant?
Cal. Yes.

Soc. And in the sentence which you have just uttered, the word 'thirsty' implies pain?
Cal. Yes.

Soc. And the word to 'drink' is expressive of pleasure, and of the satisfaction of the want?
Cal. Yes.

Soc. There is pleasure in that you drink?
Cal. Certainly.

Soc. When you are thirsty?
Cal. Yes.

Soc. When in pain?
Cal. Yes.

Soc. Do you see the inference:—that pleasure and pain are simultaneous, when you say that being thirsty, you drink? For are they not simultaneous, and do they not affect at the same time the same part, whether of the soul or the body; for that cannot be supposed to be of any consequence? Is that true, or not?
Cal. True.

Soc. You said also, that no man could have good and evil fortune at the same time?
Cal. Yes, I say that.

Soc. But you admitted, that when in pain a man might also have pleasure?
Cal. That is evident.

Soc. Then pleasure is not the same as good fortune, or pain the same as evil fortune, and therefore the good is not the same as the pleasant?
Cal. I wish I knew, Socrates, what your quibbling means.

Soc. You know, Callicles, but you affect not to know.
Cal. Well, get on, and don't be fooling: exhibit your wisdom in instructing me.

Soc. Does not a man cease from his thirst and from his pleasure in drinking at the same time?
Cal. I do not understand what you are saying.

Gor. Nay, Callicles, answer, if only for our sakes, as we should like to hear the argument out.
Cal. Yes, Gorgias, but I must complain of the habitual trifling of Socrates; he is always arguing about little and unworthy questions.

Gor. What matter? That does you no harm, Callicles; let Socrates argue in his own fashion.

Cal. Well, then, Socrates, you shall ask these narrow and little questions, since Gorgias wishes to have them.

Soc. I envy you, Callicles, for having been initiated in the great mysteries before you were initiated into the little. I thought that was not allowable. But to return to our argument:—Does not a man cease from thirsting and from the pleasure of drinking, at the same moment?

Cal. True.

Soc. Then he ceases from pain and pleasure at the same moment?

Cal. Very true.

Soc. But he does not cease from good and evil at the same moment, as you have admitted.—do you not still admit that?

Cal. Yes, I do; but what is the inference?

Soc. Why, my friend, the inference is that the good is not the same as the pleasant, or the evil the same as the painful, for there is a cessation of pleasure and pain at the same moment; but not of good and evil. How then can pleasure be the same as good, or pain as evil? And I would have you look at the matter in another point of view, which could hardly, I think, have occurred to you when you identified them: Are not the good good because they have good present with them, as the beautiful are those who have beauty present with them?

Cal. Yes.

Soc. And do you call the fools and cowards good men?—that was not what you were saying just now—you were saying that the courageous and the wise are the good—would you not say that?

Cal. Certainly I should.

Soc. And did you never see a foolish child rejoicing?

Cal. Yes, I have.

Soc. And a foolish man too?

Cal. Yes, certainly; but what is your drift?
Soc. Nothing particular, if you will only answer.

Cal. Yes, I have.

Soc. And did you ever see a sensible man rejoicing or sorrowing?

Cal. Yes.

Soc. Which rejoice and sorrow most—the wise or the foolish?

Cal. I should say that there was not much difference between them.

Soc. Well, that will do. And did you ever see a coward in battle?

Cal. To be sure.

Soc. And which appeared to you to rejoice most at the departure of the enemy, the coward or the brave?

Cal. I should say that they both rejoiced, either more than the other; or at any rate, that they rejoiced about equally.

Soc. No matter; then the cowards rejoice?

Cal. Greatly.

Soc. And the foolish, as would appear?

Cal. Yes.

Soc. And are only the cowards pained at the approach of their enemies, or are the brave also pained?

Cal. Both are pained.

Soc. And are they equally pained?

Cal. I should imagine that the cowards are more pained.

Soc. And are they not better pleased at their departure?

Cal. I dare say.

Soc. Then are the foolish and the wise and the cowards and the brave all nearly equally pleased and pained, as you were saying, but the cowards more pleased and pained than the brave?

Cal. Yes.

Soc. But surely the wise and brave are the good, and the foolish and the cowardly are the bad?

Cal. Yes.

Soc. Then are the good and the bad nearly equally pleased and pained?

Cal. Yes.

Soc. Then are the good and bad equally good and equally bad, or have the bad the advantage both in good and evil? [i.e. in having more pleasure and more pain.]

Cal. I really do not know what you mean.
Soc. Why, do you not remember saying that the good were good because good was present with them, and the evil because evil; and that pleasures were goods and pains evils?

Cal. Yes, I do remember that.

Soc. And are not these pleasures or goods present to those who rejoice—if they do rejoice?

Cal. Certainly.

Soc. Then those who rejoice are good by reason of the presence of good?

Cal. Yes.

Soc. And those who are in pain have evil or sorrow present with them?

Cal. Yes.

Soc. And would you say that the evil are evil by reason of the presence of evil, or would you retract this?

Cal. I should agree to that.

Soc. Then those who rejoice are good, and those who are in pain are evil?

Cal. Yes.

Soc. The degrees of good and evil vary with the degrees of pleasure and of pain?

Cal. Yes.

Soc. Have the wise man and the fool, the brave and the coward, joy and pain in nearly equal degrees? or would you say that the coward has more?

Cal. I should say that he has.

Soc. Help me then to draw out the conclusion which follows from our admissions; for twice and thrice over, as they say, good 499 is it to repeat and review what is good. Both the wise man and the brave man we allow to be good?

Cal. Yes.

Soc. And the foolish man and the coward to be evil?

Cal. Certainly.

Soc. And he who has joy is good?

Cal. Yes.

Soc. And he who is in pain is evil?

Cal. Certainly.

Soc. We say further that the good and evil both have joy and pain, and, perhaps, that the evil has more of them?
Cal. Yes.
Soc. Then must we not infer, that the bad man is as good and bad as the good, or, perhaps, even better?—is not this a further inference which follows equally with the preceding from the assertion that the good and the pleasant are the same:—can this be denied, Callicles?
Cal. I have been listening and making admissions to you, Socrates; and I remark that if a person makes any concession to you, even in jest, you fasten upon this like a child. But do you really suppose that I or any other human being denies that some pleasures are good and others bad?
Soc. Alas, Callicles, how unfair you are! you certainly treat me as if I were a child, sometimes saying one thing, and then another, as if you were meaning to deceive me. And yet I thought at first that you were my friend, and would not have deceived me if you could have helped. But I see that I was mistaken; and now I suppose that I must make the best of a bad business, as they said of old, and take what I can get.—Then I may assume that some pleasures are good and others evil, as I understand your present meaning?
Cal. Yes.
Soc. The beneficial are good, and the hurtful are evil?
Cal. To be sure.
Soc. And the beneficial are those which do some good, and the hurtful are those which do some evil?
Cal. Yes.
Soc. Take, for example, the bodily pleasures of eating and drinking, which we were just now mentioning—you mean to say that those which promote health, or any other bodily excellence, are good, and their opposites evil?
Cal. Certainly.
Soc. And in the same way there are good pains and there are evil pains?
Cal. To be sure.
Soc. And ought we not to choose and use the good pleasures and pains?
Cal. Certainly.
Soc. But not the evil?
Cal. That is evident.
Soc. Because, if you remember, Polus and I agreed that all our actions are to be done for the sake of the good;—and will you agree with us in saying, that the good is the end of all our actions, and that all our actions are to be done for the sake of the good, and not the good for the sake of them?—will you give a third vote for that proposition?

Cal. I will.

Soc. Then pleasure as well as all else is for the sake of good, and not good for the sake of pleasure?

Cal. To be sure.

Soc. But can every man choose what pleasures are good and what are evil, or must he have art or knowledge of them in detail?

Cal. He must have art.

Soc. Let me now remind you of what I was saying to Gorgias and Polus; I was saying, as you will not have forgotten, that there were some processes which aim at pleasure, and at pleasure only, and know nothing of good and evil, and there are other processes which know good and evil. And I considered that cookery, which I do not call an art, but only an experience, was of the former class, which is concerned with pleasure, and the art of medicine of the class which is concerned with the good. And now, by the god of friendship, I must beg you, Callicles, not to jest, or to imagine that I am jesting with you; do not answer at random what is not your real opinion;—for you will observe that we are arguing about the way of human life; and what question can be more serious than this to a man who has any sense at all:—whether he should follow after that way of life to which you exhort me, and truly fulfil what you call the manly part of speaking in the assembly, and cultivating rhetoric, and engaging in public affairs, after your manner; or whether he should pursue the life of philosophy, and in what this differs from the other. But perhaps we had better distinguish them first, as I attempted to do before, and when we have done this, and have come to an agreement as to whether these two lives are distinct, we may proceed to consider in what they differ from one another, and which of them we should choose. Perhaps, however, you do not even now understand what I mean?

Cal. No, I do not.

Soc. Then I will explain myself more clearly: seeing that you
and I have agreed that there is such a thing as good, and that there is such a thing as pleasure, and that pleasure is not the same as good, and that the pursuit and process of acquisition of the one, that is, pleasure, is different from the pursuit and process of acquisition of the other, which is good—I wish that you would tell me whether you agree in this or not?

Cal. Yes, I agree.

Soc. Then I will proceed, and ask whether you also agree with me, and whether you think that I spoke the truth in what I further said to Gorgias and Polus—that cookery in my opinion is not an art, but only an experience; and I said of medicine, that this is an art which considers the constitution of the patient, and has principles of action and reasons in each case, but that cookery is not an art, and is wholly in the service of pleasure, and simply looks to that, without regarding either the nature or the reason of the pleasure, or considering or calculating, as one may say, anything at all, being only an experience and routine, which preserves the recollection of the customary means of attaining pleasure. And first, I would have you consider whether this is satisfactorily proven, and then whether there are not other similar processes which have to do with the soul—some of them processes of art, making a provision for the soul's highest interest—others despising this, and, as in the previous case, considering only the pleasure of the soul, and how this may be acquired, but not considering what pleasures are good or bad, and having no other aim but to afford gratification, whether good or bad. In my opinion, Callicles, there are such processes, and this is the sort of thing which I term flattery, whether concerned with the body or the soul, or whenever employed with a view to pleasure, and without any consideration of good and evil. And now I wish that you would tell me whether you agree with us in this notion, or whether you differ:

Cal. I do not differ; on the contrary, I agree; for in that way I shall soonest bring the argument to an end, and shall oblige my friend Gorgias.

Soc. And is this true of one soul, or of two or more?

Cal. Equally true of two or more.

Soc. Then one may delight a whole assembly, and yet have no regard for their true interests?

Cal. Yes.
Soc. Can you tell me the pursuits which delight mankind—or rather, if you would prefer, let me ask, and do you answer, which of them belong to this class, and which of them not? In the first place, what say you of flute-playing? Does not that appear to be an art which seeks only pleasure, Callicles, and thinks of nothing else?

Cal. I assent.

Soc. And is not the same true of all similar arts, as, for example, the art of playing the lyre at festivals?

Cal. Yes.

Soc. And what do you say of the choral art and of dithyrambic poetry?—is not that of the same nature? Do you imagine that Cinesias the son of Meles considers what will tend to the moral improvement of his hearers, or what will give pleasure to the multitude?

Cal. In the case of Cinesias, Socrates, the answer is manifest.

Soc. And what do you say of his father, Meles the harp-player? Did he perform with any view to the good of his hearers? Could he be said to regard even their pleasure, for his singing was an infliction to his audience? And of harp-playing and dithyrambic poetry in general, what would you say? Have they not been invented wholly for the sake of pleasure?

Cal. That is my notion of them.

Soc. And to what does their solemn sister, the wondrous muse of Tragedy, devote herself? Is all her aim and desire only to give pleasure to the spectators, or does she fight against them and refuse to speak of their pleasant vices, and willingly proclaim in word and song truths welcome and unwelcome?—which is her character?

Cal. There can be no doubt, Socrates, that Tragedy has her face turned towards pleasure and gratification.

Soc. And is not that the sort of thing, Callicles, which we were just now describing as flattery?

Cal. Quite true.

Soc. Well now, suppose that we strip all poetry of song and rhythm and metre, there will remain speech?

Cal. To be sure.

Soc. And this speech is addressed to a crowd of people or to a demus?
Cal. Yes.
Soc. Then poetry is a sort of rhetoric?
Cal. True.
Soc. And do not the poets in the theatres seem to you to be rhetoricians?
Cal. Yes.
Soc. Then now we have discovered a sort of rhetoric which is addressed to a demus of men, women, and children, bond and free. And this is not much to our taste, for we have described it as having the nature of flattery.
Cal. Quite true.
Soc. Very good. And what do you say of that other rhetoric which addresses the Athenian assembly and the assemblies of free-men in other states? Do the rhetoricians appear to you always to aim at what is best in their speeches, and to desire only the greatest improvement of the citizens, or are they too bent upon giving them pleasure, forgetting the public good in the thought of their own interest, playing with the people as with children, and trying to amuse them, but never considering whether they are better or worse for this?
Cal. I must distinguish. There are some who have a real care of the public in what they say, and there are others such as you describe.
Soc. I am contented with the admission that rhetoric is of two sorts; one, which is mere flattery and disgraceful declamation; the other, which is noble and aims at the training and improvement of the souls of the citizens, and strives to say what is best, whether welcome or unwelcome, to the audience; but have you ever known such a rhetoric; or if you have, and can point out any rhetorician who is of this stamp, will you tell me who he is?
Cal. But, indeed, I am afraid that I cannot tell you of any such among the orators who are at present living.
Soc. Well, then, can you mention any one of a former generation, who may be said to have improved the Athenians, who found them worse and made them better, from the day that he began to make speeches; for, indeed, I do not know of such a man?
Cal. What! did you never hear that Themistocles was a good man, and Cimon and Miltiades and Pericles, who is just lately dead, and whom you heard yourself?
Soc. Yes, Callicles, they were good men, if, as you said at first, true virtue consists only in the satisfaction of our own desires and those of others; but if not, and if, as we were afterwards compelled to acknowledge, the satisfaction of some desires makes us better and of others worse, and we ought to gratify the one and not the other, and there is an art in distinguishing them,—can you tell me of any of these who did distinguish them?

Cal. No, indeed, I cannot.

Soc. Yet, surely, Callicles, if you look you will find such an one. Suppose that we just calmly consider whether any of them was such as I have described. Will not the good man, who says whatever he says with a view to the best, speak with a reference to some standard and not at random; just as any other artists, whether the painter, the builder, the shipwright, or any other look to their work, and do not select and apply at random what they apply, but keep in view the form of their work? The artist disposes all things in order, and compels the one part to harmonize and accord with the other part, until he has constructed a regular and systematic whole; and this is true of all artists, and in the same way the trainers and physicians, of whom we spoke before, give order and regularity to the body: do you deny that?

Cal. No; I am ready to admit that.

Soc. Then the house in which order and regularity prevail is good; that in which there is disorder, evil?

Cal. Yes.

Soc. And the same is true of a ship?

Cal. Yes.

Soc. And the same may be said of the human body?

Cal. Yes.

Soc. And what would you say of the soul? Will the good soul be that in which disorder is prevalent, or that in which there is harmony and order?

Cal. The latter follows from our previous admissions.

Soc. What is the name which is given to the effect of harmony and order in the body?

Cal. I suppose that you mean health and strength?

Soc. Yes, I do; and what is the name which you would give to the effect of harmony and order in the soul? Try and discover a name for this as well as for the other.
Cal. Why do you not give the name yourself, Socrates?

Soc. Well, if you would rather, I will; and you shall say whether you agree with me, and if not you shall refute and answer me. Healthy, as I conceive, is the name which is given to the regular action of the body, and from this comes health and every other bodily excellence: is that true or not?

Cal. True.

Soc. And to the regular order and action of the soul the name which is given is lawful, and law making men lawful and orderly:—what is this but temperance and justice?—would you not grant that?

Cal. Yes.

Soc. And will not the true rhetorician who has art and virtue have his eye directed upon these, in all the words which he addresses to the souls of men, and in all his actions, both in what he gives and in what he takes away, will not this be his aim? Will he not seek to implant justice in the souls of his citizens and take away injustice—to implant temperance and take away intemperance, to implant every virtue and take away every vice? Do you allow that?

Cal. Yes, I allow that.

Soc. For what use is there, Callicles, in giving to the body of a sick man who is in a bad state of health a quantity of the most delightful food or drink or any other pleasant thing, which may be really as bad for him as if you gave him nothing, or even worse if rightly estimated. Is not that true?

Cal. I will not say no to that.

Soc. For in my opinion there is no profit in a man’s life if his body is in an evil plight, for in that case his life also is evil: am I not right?

Cal. Yes.

Soc. When a man is in health the physicians will generally allow him to eat when he is hungry and drink when he is thirsty, and to satisfy his desires as he likes, but when he is sick they hardly suffer him to satisfy his desires at all: you admit that?

Cal. Yes.

Soc. And does not the same hold of the soul, my good sir? While she is in a bad state and is senseless and intemperate and unjust and unholy, her desires ought to be controlled, and she ought to be
prevented from doing anything that does not tend to her own improvement.

**Cal.** Yes.

**Soc.** And that will be for her true interests?

**Cal.** To be sure.

**Soc.** And controlling her desires is chastising her?

**Cal.** Yes.

**Soc.** Then control or chastisement is better for the soul than intemperance or the absence of control, which you were just now preferring?

**Cal.** I don’t understand you, Socrates, and I wish that you would ask someone who does.

**Soc.** Here is a gentleman who cannot endure to be improved or chastised, as the argument would say.

**Cal.** I do not heed a word of what you are saying, and have only answered thus far out of civility to Gorgias.

**Soc.** What are we to do, then? Shall we break off in the middle?

**Cal.** That I leave to you to determine.

**Soc.** Well, but people say that ‘a tale should have a head and not break off in the middle,’ and I should not like to have the argument wandering about without a head; please then to go on a little longer, and put the head on.

**Cal.** How tyrannical you are, Socrates! I wish that you would have done, or would get someone else to argue with you.

**Soc.** But who else is willing?—I want to finish the argument.

**Cal.** Cannot you finish the argument yourself, either talking straight on, or in question and answer?

**Soc.** Must I then say with Epicharmus, ‘two men spoke before, but now one shall be enough?’ I suppose that there is absolutely no help. And if this is to be the method of procedure, I will first of all remark that not only I but all of us should have an ambition to know what is true and what is false in this matter, for the discovery of the truth is a common good. And now I will proceed to argue according to my own notion. But if any of you think that
agree with him. I am saying this on the supposition that the argument ought to be completed; but if you think otherwise let us leave off and go our ways.

Go. I think, Socrates, that we should not go our ways until you have completed the argument; and this appears to me to be the wish of the rest of the company; I myself should very much like to hear what more you have to say.

So. I too, Gorgias, should have liked to continue the argument with Callicles, and then I might have given him a speech of 'Amphion' in return for his 'Zethus'; but since you, Callicles, are unwilling to continue I hope that you will listen, and if I seem to you to be in error and if you refute me, I shall not be angry with you as you are with me, but I shall inscribe you as the greatest of benefactors on the tablets of my soul.

Ca. My good friend, never mind me, but get on.

So. Listen to me, then, while I recapitulate the argument:—Is the pleasant the same as the good? Not the same. Callicles and I are agreed about that. And is the pleasant to be pursued for the sake of the good? or the good for the sake of the pleasant? The pleasant is to be pursued for the sake of the good. And that is pleasant at the presence of which we are pleased, and that is good at the presence of which we are good? To be sure. And we are good, and all good things whatever are good when some virtue is present in them? That, Callicles, is my conviction. But the virtue of each thing, whether body or soul, instrument or creature, when given to them in the best way comes to them not by chance but as the result of the order and truth and art which are imparted to them: Am I not right? I maintain that I am. And is not the virtue of each thing dependent on order or arrangement? Yes, I say. And that which makes a thing good is the proper order inhering in each thing? That is my view. And is not the soul which has an order of her own better than that which has no order of her own? Certainly. And the soul which has order is orderly? Of course. And that which is orderly is temperate? Yes. Assuredly. And the temperate soul is good? No other answer can I give, Callicles dear; have you any?

Ca. Go on, my good fellow.

So. Then I shall proceed to add, that if the temperate soul is

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the good soul, the soul which is in the opposite condition, that is, the foolish and intemperate, is the bad soul.

Very true.

And will not the temperate man do what is proper, both in relation to gods and men;—for he would not be temperate if he did not do what is proper? Yes, certainly. And in his relation to other men he will do what is just, and in his relation to the gods he will do what is holy; and he who does what is just and holy cannot be other than just and holy? Very true. And he must be courageous, for the duty of a temperate man is not to follow or to avoid what he ought not, but what he ought, whether things or men or pleasures or pains, and patiently to endure when he ought; and therefore, Callicles, the temperate man, being as we have described, also just and courageous and holy, cannot be other than a perfectly good man, nor can the good man do otherwise than well and perfectly whatever he does; and he who does well must of necessity be happy and blessed, and the evil man who does evil, miserable: now this is the intemperate who is the opposite of the temperate, and this is he whom you were applauding. Such is my position which I assert to be true, and if this be true then I affirm that he who desires to be happy must pursue and practise temperance and run away from intemperance as fast as his legs will carry him; let him so order his life as not to need punishment,—this will be best; but if either he or any of his friends, whether private individual or city, are in need of punishment, then justice must be done and he must suffer punishment, if he would be happy. This appears to me to be the aim which a man ought to have in living, and towards which he ought to direct all the energies both of himself and of the state, acting so that he may have temperance and justice present with him and be happy, not suffering his lusts to be unrestrained, and in the never-ending desire to satisfy them leading a robber's life. Such an one is the friend neither of God nor man, for he is incapable of communion, and he who is incapable of communion is also incapable of friendship. Now philosophers tell us, Callicles, that communion and friendship and orderliness and temperance and justice bind together heaven and earth and gods and men, and that this universe is therefore called Cosmos or order, not disorder or misrule, my friend. But although you are a philosopher you seem to me never
to have observed that geometrical equality is mighty, both among
gods and men; you think that you ought to cultivate inequality or
excess, and do not care about geometry.—Well, then, either the
principle that the happy are made happy by the possession of
justice and temperance, and the miserable miserable by the pos-
session of vice, must be refuted, or if this is granted, what are
the consequences? All the consequences which I drew before,
Callicles, and about which you asked me whether I was in earnest
when I said that a man ought to accuse himself and his son and
his friend if he did anything wrong, and that for this end he should
use his rhetoric—all these consequences are true. And that which
you thought that Polus was led to admit out of modesty is also
true, viz. that to do injustice is as much worse than to suffer as it
is more disgraceful; and the other position, which Polus thought
that Gorgias admitted only from modesty, that he who would truly
be a rhetorician ought to be just and have a knowledge of justice—
that has also turned out to be true. Assuming this, let us proceed
to consider whether you are right in throwing in my teeth that I
am unable to help myself or any of my friends or kinsmen, or to
save them in the extremity of danger, or that I am like an outlaw
to whom any one may do what he likes; he may box my ears,
which was a brave saying of yours; or he may take away my
goods or banish me, or even do his worst and kill me, and this, as
you say, is the height of disgrace. My answer to you is one which
has been already often repeated, but may as well be repeated once
more. I tell you, Callicles, that to be boxed on the ears wrong-
fully is not the worst evil that can befall a man, nor to have my
face and purse cut open, but that to smite and slay me and mine
wrongfully is far more disgraceful and more evil; ay, and to despoil
and enslave and pillage, or in any way at all to wrong me and
mine, is far more disgraceful and evil to the doer of the wrong
than to me who am the sufferer. These things, which have been
already set forth in the previous discussion as I now state them,
have been fixed and fastened, if I may use an expression which is
certainly bold, in iron and adamantine bonds, as would appear on
the face of them; and unless you or some other still more enter-
prising hero shall break them, there is no possibility of denying
what I say. For what I am always saying is, that I know not the
truth about these things, and yet of those whom I have known, no
one could say anything else, any more than you can, and not be ridiculous. This has always been my position, and if this position is a true one, and if injustice is the greatest of evils to the doer of injustice, and yet there is if possible a greater than the greatest evils, in an unjust man not suffering retribution, what is that defence without which a man will be truly ridiculous? Must not the defence be one which will avert the greatest of human evils? And will not the worst of all defences be that with which a man is unable to defend himself or his family or his friends? —and next will come that which is unable to avert the next greatest evil; thirdly, that which is unable to avert the third greatest evil; and so of other evils. As is the greatness of evil so is the honour of being able to avert them in their several degrees, and the disgrace of not being able to avert them. Am I not right, Callicles?

Cal. Yes, quite right.

Soc. Seeing then that there are these two evils, the doing injustice and the suffering injustice,—and we affirm that to do injustice is a greater, and to suffer injustice a lesser evil,—how can a man procure such a defence as will give him these two advantages, the one of not doing and the other of not suffering injustice—is power or will such a defence? What I mean to ask is this: Will a man escape injustice, if he has the will to escape, or must he have provided himself with the power?

Cal. He must have provided himself with the power; that is clear.

Soc. And what do you say of doing injustice? Is the will only sufficient, and will that prevent him from doing injustice, or must he have provided himself with power and art, and without them will he be unjust still? Why do you not answer me that, Callicles, above all things? Do you think that Polus and I were right in being driven to the conclusion that no one does wrong voluntarily, but that all do wrong against their will?

Cal. I am not inclined to dispute that, Socrates, because I want you to have done.

Soc. Then, as would appear, power and art have to be provided in order that we may do no injustice?

Cal. Certainly.

Soc. And what is that art which will protect us from suffering injustice, if not wholly, yet as far as possible? I want to know
whether you agree with me; for I think that such an art is the art of one who is either a tyrant or ruler himself, or the equal and companion of the ruling power.

Cal. I think that is excellent, and I hope, Socrates, that you will see how ready I am to praise you when you talk sense.

Soc. Think and tell me whether you would approve this also: To me every man appears to be most the friend of him who is most like him—like to like, as ancient sages say. What do you think of that?

Cal. I approve.

Soc. But when the tyrant is rude and uneducated, if there is any one who is his superior in virtue, he may be expected to fear him, and will never be able to be perfectly friendly with him.

Cal. That is true.

Soc. Neither will he be the friend of any one who is greatly his inferior, for the tyrant will despise him, and will never seriously regard him as a friend.

Cal. That again is true.

Soc. Then the only friend worth mentioning, whom the tyrant can have, will be one who is of the same character, and has the same likes and dislikes, and is at the same time willing to be subject and subservient to him; he is the man who will have power in the state, and no one will injure him with impunity:—Is not that true?

Cal. Yes.

Soc. And if a young man begins to ask how he may become great and formidable, this would seem to be the way; he will accustom himself, from his youth upward, to feel sorrow and joy on the same occasions as his master, and will contrive to be as like him as possible?

Cal. Yes.

Soc. And in this way he will have accomplished, as you say, the end of becoming a great man and not suffering injury?

Cal. Very true.

Soc. But will he also escape from doing injury? Must not the very opposite be true, if he is to be like the tyrant in his injustice, and to have influence with him? Will he not rather contrive to do as much wrong as possible, and not be punished?

Cal. True.
Soc. And as he imitates his master and acquires power his soul will become bad and corrupted, and that will be the greatest evil to him?

Cal. You always contrive somehow or other, Socrates, to invert everything: do you not know that he who imitates the tyrant will, if he has a mind, kill him who does not imitate him and take away his goods?

Soc. Excellent Callicles, I am not deaf, and I have heard that a great many times from you and from Polus and from nearly every man in the city, but I wish that you would hear me too. I dare say that he will kill him if he has a mind—the bad man will kill the good and true.

Cal. And is not that just the provoking thing?

Soc. Nay, not to a man of sense, as the argument shows: do you think that all our cares are to be directed to prolonging life to the uttermost, and to the study of those arts which secure us from danger always; like that art of rhetoric which saved men in courts of law, and which you recommend me to cultivate?

Cal. Yes, truly, and very good advice too.

Soc. Well, my friend, but what do you think of the art of swimming; does that appear to have any great pretensions?

Cal. No, indeed.

Soc. And yet surely swimming saves a man from death, and there are occasions on which he must know how to swim. And if you despise the swimmers, I will tell you of another and greater art, the art of the pilot, which not only saves the souls of men, but also their bodies and properties from the extremity of danger, just like rhetoric. But this art is modest and unpresuming, and has no airs or pretences of doing anything extraordinary, and, in return for the same salvation which is given by the pleader, demands only two obols, if the voyage is from Aegina to Athens, or for the longer voyage from Pontus or Egypt at the utmost two drachmae, for the great benefit of saving the passenger and his wife and children and goods, and disembarking them safely at the Piraeus; and he who is the master of the art, and has done all this, gets out and walks about on the sea-shore by his ship in an unassuming way. For he is a philosopher, you must know, and is aware that there is no certainty as to which of his fellow-passengers he has benefited, and which of them he has injured in
not allowing them to be drowned. He knows that they are just the same when he disembarked them as when they embarked, and not a whit better either in their bodies or in their souls; and he considers that if a man who is afflicted by great and incurable bodily diseases is only to be pitied for having escaped, and is in no way benefited by him in having been kept alive; much more must this be true of one who has great and incurable diseases, not in his body, but in his soul, which is the more honourable part of him; neither is life worth having nor of any profit to him, whether he be saved from the sea, or the law-courts, or any other devourer;—he knows that the bad man had better not live, for he cannot live well.

And this is the reason why the pilot, although he is our saviour, is not usually conceited, any more than the engineer, who is not a whit behind either the general, or the pilot, or any one else, in his saving power, for he sometimes saves whole cities. Is there any comparison between him and the pleader? And yet, Callicles, if he were to talk in your grandiose style, he would bury you under a mountain of words, declaring and insisting that we ought all of us to be engine-makers, and that they are the only realities; he would have plenty to say. Nevertheless you despise him and his art, and sneeringly call him an engine-maker, and you will not allow your daughters to marry his son, or marry your son to his daughters. And yet, on your principle, what justice or reason is there in this? What right have you to despise the engine-maker, and the other whom I was just now mentioning? I know that you will say, 'I am better, and better born.' But if the better is not what I say, and virtue consists only in a man saving himself and his, whatever may be his character, then your censure of the engine-maker, and of the physician, and of the other arts of salvation, is ridiculous. O my friend! I want you to see that the noble and the good may possibly be something different from saving and being saved, and that he who is truly a man ought not to care about living a certain time:—he knows, as women say, that none can escape the day of destiny, and therefore he is not fond of life; he leaves all that with God, and considers in what way he can best spend his appointed term;—whether by assimilating himself to that constitution under which he lives, as you at this moment have to consider, how you may become as like as possible to the
Athenian people, if you intended to be dear to them, and to have power in the state; whereas I want you to think and see whether this is for the interest of either of us;—I would not have us risk that which is dearest on the acquisition of this power, like the Thessalian enchantresses, who, as they say, bring down the moon from heaven at the risk of their own perdition. But if you suppose that any man will show you the art of becoming great in the city, and yet not conforming yourself to the ways of the city, whether for better or worse, then I can only say that you are mistaken, Callicles; for he who would deserve to be the true natural friend of the Athenian Demus, ay, or of Pyrilampes' darling, who is called after them, must be by nature like them, and not an imitator only. He, then, who will make you most like them, will make you as you desire, a statesman and orator: for every man is pleased, when he is spoken to in his own language and spirit, and dislikes any other. But perhaps you, sweet Callicles, may be of another mind. What do you say?

Cal. Somehow or other your words, Socrates, always appear to me to be good words; and yet, like the rest of the world, I am not quite convinced by you.

Soc. The reason is, Callicles, that the love of the Demus which abides in your soul is an adversary to me; but I dare say that if we recur to these same matters, and consider them more thoroughly, you may be convinced for all that. Please, then, to remember that there are two processes of training all things, including body and soul; in the one, as we said, we treat them with a view to pleasure, and in the other with a view to the highest good, and then we do not indulge but resist them: was not that the distinction which we drew?

Cal. Very true.

Soc. And the one which has pleasure in view was just a vulgar flattery:—was not that another of our conclusions?

Cal. I will not deny what you say.

Soc. And the other had in view the greatest improvement of that which is ministered to, whether body or soul?

Cal. Quite true.

Soc. And must we not have the same end in view in the treatment of our city and citizens? Must we not try and make them as good as possible? For we have already discovered that there is no
use in imparting to them any other good, unless the mind of those who are to have the good, whether money, or office, or any other sort of power, be gentle and good. Shall we say that?

**Cal.** Yes, certainly, if you like.

**Soc.** Well, then, if you and I, Callicles, were engaged in the administration of political affairs, and were advising one another to undertake some public work, such as walls, docks, or temples of the largest size, ought we not to examine ourselves, first, as to whether we know or do not know the art of building, and who taught us?—would not that be necessary, Callicles?

**Cal.** True.

**Soc.** In the second place, we should have to consider whether we had ever constructed any private house, either of our own or for our friends, and whether this building was a success or not; and if upon consideration we found that we had had good and eminent masters, and had been successful in building, not only with their assistance, but without them, by our own unaided skill;—in that case prudence would not dissuade us from proceeding to the construction of public works. But if we had no master to show, and no building, or many which were of no worth, then, surely, it would be ridiculous in us to attempt public works, or to advise one another to undertake them. Is not this true?

**Cal.** Certainly.

**Soc.** And does not the same hold in all other cases? If you and I were physicians, and were advising one another that we were competent to practise as state-physicians, should I not ask you, and would you not ask me, Well, but how about Socrates himself, has he good health? and was any one else ever known to be cured by him, whether slave or freeman? And I should make the same enquiries about you. And if we arrived at the conclusion that no one, whether citizen or stranger, man or woman, had ever been any the better for the medical skill of either of us, then, by Heaven, Callicles, what an absurdity to think that we or any human being should be so silly as to set up as a state-physician, and advise others like ourselves to do the same, without having first practised in private, whether successfully or not, and acquired experience of the art. Is not this, as the saying is, to begin with the wine-jar in learning the potter’s art; which is a foolish thing?

**Cal.** True.
Soc. And now, my friend, as you are already beginning to be a public character, and are admonishing and reproaching me for not being one, suppose that we ask a few questions of one another. Tell me, then, Callicles, how about making any of the citizens better? Was there ever a man who was once vicious, or unjust, or intemperate, or foolish, and became by the help of Callicles good and noble? Was there ever such a man, whether citizen or stranger, slave or free-man? Tell me, Callicles, if a person were to ask these questions of you, what would you answer? Whom would you say that you had improved by your conversation? May there not be good deeds of this sort which were done by you as a private person, before you came forward in public? If you have any, will you mention them?

Cal. You are pugnacious, Socrates.

Soc. Nay, I ask you, not out of pugnacity, but because I really want to know in what way you think that affairs should be administered among us—whether, when you come to the administration of them, you have any other aim but the improvement of the citizens? Have we not already admitted many times over that this is the duty of a public man? Nay, we have surely agreed to that, for if you will not answer for yourself I must answer for you. But if this is what the good man ought to effect for the benefit of his own state, allow me to recall to you the names of those whom you were just now mentioning, Pericles, and Cimon, and Miltiades, and Themistocles, and ask whether you still think that they were good citizens.

Cal. I do.

Soc. But if they were good, then clearly each of them must have made the citizens better instead of worse?

Cal. Yes.

Soc. And, therefore, when Pericles first began to speak in the assembly, the Athenians were not so good as when he spoke last?

Cal. Very likely.

Soc. Nay, my friend, ‘likely’ is not the word; for if he was a good citizen, the inference is certain.

Cal. And what difference does that make?

Soc. None; only I should like further to know whether the Athenians are said to have been made better by Pericles, or, on the contrary, to have been corrupted by him; for I hear that he
was the first who gave the people pay, and made them idle and cowardly, and encouraged them in the love of talk and of money.

Cal. You heard that, Socrates, from the laconising set who bruise one another's ears.

Soc. But what I am going to tell you now is not mere hearsay, but well known both to you and me: that at first, Pericles was glorious and his character unimpeached by any verdict of the Athenians—this was during the time when they were not so good—yet afterwards, when they had been made good and gentle by him, at the very end of his life they convicted him of theft, and almost put him to death, clearly under the notion that he was a malefactor.

Cal. Well, but how does that prove Pericles' badness?

Soc. Why, surely, you would say that he was but a bad manager of asses or horses or oxen, who had received them originally neither kicking nor butting nor biting him, and imparted to them all these savage tricks? Would he not be a bad manager of any animals who received them gentle, and made them fiercer than they were when he received them? What do you say to that?

Cal. I will do you the favour of saying 'yes.'

Soc. And will you also do me the favour of saying whether man is an animal?

Cal. Certainly he is.

Soc. And was not Pericles a shepherd of men?

Cal. Yes.

Soc. And if he was a good political shepherd, ought not the animals who were under him, as we were just now acknowledging, to have become more just, and not more unjust?

Cal. Quite true.

Soc. And are not just men gentle, as Homer says?—or are you of another mind?

Cal. I agree.

Soc. And yet he really did make them more savage than he received them, and their savageness was shown towards himself; and this was the last thing which he would have desired.

Cal. Do you want me to agree with you?

Soc. Yes, if I seem to you to speak the truth.

Cal. I will admit what you say.
Soc. And if they were more savage, must they not have been more unjust and inferior?

Cal. Granted.

Soc. Then upon this view, Pericles was not a good statesman?

Cal. That is, upon your view.

Soc. Nay, the view is yours, after what you have admitted. What do you say about Cimon again? Did not the very persons whom he was serving ostracise him, in order that they might not hear his voice for ten years; and they did just the same to Themistocles, adding the penalty of exile; and they voted that Miltiades, the hero of Marathon, should be thrown into the pit of death, and he was only saved by the chief Prytanis. And yet, if they had been really good men, as you say, this would never have happened to them. For the good charioteers are not those who at first keep their place, and then, when they have broken-in their horses, and themselves become better charioteers, are thrown out—that is not the way either in charioteering or in any other sort of occupation.—What do you think?

Cal. I should think not.

Soc. Well, and that proves the original assertion, that no one has ever shown himself a good statesman in this State; and you admitted that this was true of our present statesmen, but not true of former ones, and you preferred them to the others; but they have turned out to be no better than our present ones; so that, if they were rhetoricians, they did not use the true art of rhetoric or of flattery, or they would not have fallen out of favour.

Cal. And yet surely, Socrates, no living man ever came near any one of them in his performances.

Soc. O, my dear friend, I say nothing against them regarded as the serving men of the State; and I do think that they certainly were more serviceable than those who are living now, and better able to gratify the desires of the State; but as to transforming those desires and not allowing them to have their way, and in using their powers whether of persuasion or of force, to the amendment of their fellow-citizens, which is the prime object of the truly good citizen, I do not see that in these respects they were a wit superior to our present statesmen, although I do admit that they were more skilful at providing ships and walls and docks, and all that. You and I have a ridiculous way, for during the
whole time that we are arguing, we are always going round and round to the same point, and constantly misunderstanding one another. If I am not mistaken, you have admitted and acknowledged more than once, that there are two kinds of operations which have to do with the body, and two which have to do with the soul: one of the two is ministerial, and if our bodies are hungry provides food for them, and if they are thirsty gives them drink, or if they are cold supplies them with garments, blankets, shoes, and all that they crave (and let me remark, that I purposely use the same images as before, in order that you may the better understand me). The purveyor of these things may provide them either wholesale or retail, or he may be the maker of any of them,—the baker, or the cook, or the weaver, or the shoemaker, or the currier; and he is naturally thought to be the minister of the body, in his own judgment as well as in the judgment of every one else. For none of them know, that besides all these, there is an art of gymnastic and medicine which is the true minister of the body, and ought to be the mistress of all the others, and to use their results according to the knowledge which she has and they have not, of the real good or bad effects of meats and drinks on the body. And therefore all these other arts, which have to do with the body, are servile and menial and illiberal; and gymnastic and medicine, as they ought to be, are their mistresses. Now, when I say that all this is equally true of the soul, you seem at first to know and understand and assent to my words, and then in a little while afterwards you come, saying, has not the State had good and noble citizens? and when I ask you who they are, you reply, seemingly quite in earnest, as if I had asked who are or have been good trainers, and you replied: Thearion, the baker, Mithoeuces, who wrote the Sicilian cookery-book, Sarambus, the vintner: these are ministers of the body, first-rate in their art; for the first makes admirable loaves, the second excellent dishes, and the third wines;—and to me these appear to be the exact parallel of the statesmen whom you mention. And yet you would not be altogether pleased if I said to you, my friend, you know nothing of gymnastics; those of whom you are speaking to me are only the ministers and purveyors of luxury; who have no good or noble notions of their art, and may very likely be filling and fattening men's bodies and gaining their approval, although the result is
that they lose their original flesh in the long run, and become thinner than they were before; and yet they, in their simplicity, will not blame their entertainers as the authors of this disorder and of the loss of their flesh; but whoever happens to be near them at the time, and offers them advice, when in after years the unhealthy surfeit brings the attendant penalty of disease, is accused and blamed by them, and if they could they would do him some harm; at the same time that they praise the others who are the authors of the evil. And that is exactly what you are now doing, Callicles. You praise the men who feasted the citizens and satisfied their desires, and people say that they have made the city great, not seeing that the ulcerated and swollen condition of the State is to be attributed to these elder statesmen; for they have filled the city full of harbours and docks and walls and revenues, and all that, and have left no room for justice and temperance. And when the crisis of the disorder comes, the people will blame the advisers of the hour, and applaud Themistocles and Cimon and Pericles, who are the real authors of their calamities; and if you are not careful they may assail you and my friend Alcibiades, when they are losing not only their new acquisitions, but also their original possessions; not that you are the authors of these calamities of theirs, although you may perhaps be accessories after the fact. A foolish piece of work is always being made, as I see and am told, now as of old, about our statesmen. When the State regards any of them as malefactors, I observe that there is a great uproar and indignation at the supposed ill treatment of them; after all their valuable services, that they should unjustly perish,—so the tale runs. But this is all a lie; for no statesman ever could be unjustly put to death by the city of which he is the head. The case of the professed statesman is, I believe, very much like that of the professed sophist; for the sophists, although they are wise men, are nevertheless guilty of a strange piece of folly:—when they who profess to be teachers of virtue accuse their disciples, as is often the case, of wronging them, and defrauding them of their pay, and showing no gratitude for their services. But what can be more absurd than that men who have become just and good, and whose injustice has been taken away from them, and who have had justice given them by their teachers, should act unjustly by reason of the injustice which is not in them? Can anything
be more irrational, my friend, than this? You, Callicles, compel me to be a claptrap orator, because you will not answer.

Cal. And you are the man who cannot speak unless there is some one to answer?

Soc. I suppose that I can; at any rate, I am making long speeches now because you refuse to answer me. But I adjure you by the god of friendship, my good sir, do tell me whether there is not a great inconsistency in professing to have made a man good, and that he is good, and then blaming him for being bad?

Cal. Yes, I think that.

Soc. Do you never hear our professors of education saying such things?

Cal. Yes, but why talk of men who are good for nothing?

Soc. I would rather say, why talk of men who profess to be rulers, and declare that they are devoted to the improvement of the city, and, nevertheless, upon occasions, declaim against the utter vileness of the city:—do you think that there is any difference between one and the other? My good friend, as I was saying to Polus, the sophist and the rhetorician are the same, or nearly the same; but you ignorantly fancy that rhetoric is a perfect thing, and sophistry a thing to be despised; whereas the truth is, that sophistry is as much superior to rhetoric as legislation is to the practice of law, or gymnastic to medicine: and I supposed further that the orators and sophists are the only class who cannot find fault with that which they impart to others, as working ill to themselves, without accusing themselves in the same breath of having done no good to those whom they profess to benefit. Is not that true?

Cal. Certainly.

Soc. And if they say truly that they make men better, then they would be the only class who could afford to leave their remuneration to those who have been benefited by them: whereas if a man has been benefited in any other way, if, for example, he has been taught to run by a trainer, he might possibly defraud him of his pay, if the trainer left the matter to him, and made no agreement with him that he should receive money as soon as he had given him the utmost speed; for not because of any deficiency of speed do men act unjustly, but by reason of injustice.

Cal. Very true.
Soc. But he who removes injustice can be in no danger of being treated unjustly: he alone can without risk allow his service to be remunerated at the discretion of others, if he be really able to make them good—am I not right?

Cal. Yes.

Soc. This, then, appears to be the reason why there is no dishonour in a man receiving pay who is called in to advise about building or any other art?

Cal. Yes; this seems to be the reason.

Soc. But when the question is, how a man may become best himself, and best govern his family and state, then to say that you will give no advice gratis is held to be dishonourable?

Cal. True.

Soc. And clearly the reason is, that only such benefits call forth a desire to requite them, and there is evidence that a benefit has been conferred when the benefactor receives a return; otherwise not. Is not that true?

Cal. Yes, that is true.

Soc. Then to which service of the State do you invite me? determine that for me. Am I to be the physician of the State who will strive and struggle to make the Athenians as good as possible; or am I to be the servant and flatterer of the State? Speak out, my good friend, freely and fairly as you did at first and ought to do again, and tell me your entire mind.

Cal. I say then that you should be the servant of the State.

Soc. The flatterer? well, sir, that is a noble invitation.

Cal. Say the Mysian, Socrates, or any other degrading name. For if you refuse, the consequences will be——

Soc. Please not to repeat the old story—that he who likes will kill me and get my money, for then I shall be obliged to reply that he will be a bad man and will kill the good, and that the money will be of no use to him; but that he will wrongly use that which he wrongly took, and if wrongly, basely, and if basely, hurtfully.

Cal. How confident you are, Socrates, that you will never suffer any of these things! you seem to think that you live in another world, and can never be brought into a court of justice, as you may very likely be brought by some miserable and mean person.

Soc. Then I must indeed be a fool, Callicles, if I do not know that in the Athenian State any man may suffer anything. And if
I am brought to trial and incur the dangers of which you speak, he will be a villain who brings me to trial—of that I am very sure, for no good man would accuse the innocent. Nor shall I be surprised if I am put to death. Shall I tell you why I anticipate this?

_Cal._ By all means.

_Soc._ I think that I am the only or almost the only Athenian living who sets his hand to the true art of politics; I am the only politician of my time. Now, seeing that when I speak I speak not with any view of pleasing, and that I look to what is best and not to what is most pleasant, being unwilling to practise those graces which you recommend, I shall have nothing to say in the justice court. And the figure which I used to Polus may be applied to me:—I shall be tried just as a physician would be tried in a court of little boys at the indictment of the cook. What would he reply in such a case, if some one were to accuse him, saying, 'O my boys, many evil things has this man done to you: he is the death of you, especially of the younger ones among you, cutting and burning and starving and suffocating you, until you know not what to do; he gives you the bitterest potions, and compels you to hunger and fast? How unlike the variety of meats and sweets which I procured for you!' What do you suppose that the physician would reply when he found himself in this predicament? For if he told the truth he could only say: 'All this, my boys, I did with a view to health,' and then would there not just be a clamour among such judges? How they would cry out!

_Cal._ I dare say.

_Soc._ Would he not be utterly at a loss for a reply?

_Cal._ He certainly would.

_Soc._ And that is the sort of thing which I too should experience, as I well know, if I were brought before the court. For I should not be able to rehearse to the people the pleasures which I have procured for them, and which, although I am not disposed to envy either the procurers or the enjoyers of them, are deemed by them to be benefits and advantages. And if any one says that I corrupt young men, and perplex their minds, or that I speak evil of old men, and use bitter words towards them, whether in private or public, I may not say the truth:—That all this I do with a view to justice, and out of a regard to your interest, my judges, and to
that only. And therefore there is no saying what may happen to me.

*Cal.* And do you think, Socrates, that a man, who is thus defenceless in a city, is in a good position?

*Soc.* Yes, Callicles, if he have that defence, which you have often admitted that he should have; if he be his own defence, and have never said or done anything wrong, either in respect of gods or men; for that has often been acknowledged by us to be the best sort of defence. And if any one could convict me of inability to defend myself or others after this sort, I should blush for shame, whether I was convicted before many, or before a few, or by myself alone; and if I died for want of this ability, that would indeed grieve me. But if I died because I have no powers of flattery or rhetoric, I am very sure that you would not find me repining at death. For no man but an utter fool and coward is afraid of death itself, but he is afraid of doing wrong. For to go to the world below, having a soul which is like a vessel full of injustice, is the last and worst of all evils. And in proof of this, if you have no objection, I should like to tell you a story.

*Cal.* Very well; as you have made an end of the rest, make an end of this.

523 *Soc.* Listen, then, as story-tellers say, to a very pretty tale, which I dare say that you may be disposed to regard as a fable only, but which, as I believe, is a true tale, for I mean, in what I am going to tell you, to speak the truth. Homer tells us, how Zeus and Poseidon and Pluto divided the empire, which they inherited from their father. Now in the days of Cronos there was this law respecting the destiny of man, which has always existed, and still continues in Heaven, that he who has lived all his life in justice and holiness shall go, when he dies, to the islands of the blest, and dwell there in perfect happiness out of the reach of evil, but that he who has lived unjustly and impiously shall go to the house of vengeance and punishment, which is called Tartarus. And in the time of Cronos, and even later in the reign of Zeus, the judgment was given on the very day on which the men were to die; the judges were alive, and the men were alive; and the consequence was that the judgments were not well given. Then Pluto and the

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3 II. xv. 187 fol.
authorities from the islands of the blest came to Zeus, and said
that the souls found their way to the wrong places. Zeus said:
'I shall put a stop to this; the judgments are not well given, and
the reason is that the judged have their clothes on, for they are
alive; and there are many having evil souls who are apparelled in
fair bodies, or wrapt round in wealth or rank, and when the day of
judgment arrives many witnesses come forward and witness on
their behalf, that they have lived righteously. The judges are
awed by them, and they themselves too have their clothes on
when judging; their eyes and ears and their whole bodies are
interposed as a veil before their own souls. This all stands in the
way; there are the clothes of the judges and the clothes of the
judged.—What is to be done? I will tell you:—In the first place,
I will deprive men of the foreknowledge of death, which they at
present possess; that is a commission, the execution of which I
have already entrusted to Prometheus: in the second place, they
shall be entirely stripped before they are judged, for they shall be
judged when they are dead; and the judge too shall be naked, that
is to say, dead: he with his naked soul shall pierce into the other
naked soul as soon as each man dies, he knows not when, and is
deprived of his kindred, and has left his brave attire in the world
above, and then the judgment will be just. I knew all about this
before you did, and therefore I have made my sons judges; two
from Asia, Minos and Rhadamanthus, and one from Europe,
Aeacus. And these, when they are dead, shall judge in the
meadow where three ways meet, and out of which two roads lead,
one to the islands of the blessed, and the other to Tartarus:
Rhadamanthus shall judge those who come from Asia, and Aeacus
those who come from Europe. And to Minos I shall give the
primacy, and he shall hold a court of appeal, in case either of
the two others are in any doubt:—in this way the judgment
respecting the last journey of men will be as just as possible.'

This is a tale, Callicles, which I have heard and believe, and
from which I draw the following inferences: Death, if I am right,
is in the first place the separation from one another of two things,
soul and body;—this, and nothing else. And after they are sepa-
rated they retain their several characteristics, which are much the
same as in life; the body has the same nature and ways and affec-
tions, all clearly discernible; for example, he who by nature or
training or both, was a tall man while he was alive, will remain as he was, after he is dead; and the fat man will remain fat; and so on: and the dead man, who in life had a fancy to have flowing hair, will have flowing hair. And if he was marked with the whip and had the prints of the scourge, or of wounds in him when he was alive, you might see the same in the dead body; and if his limbs were broken or misshapen when he was alive, the same appearance would be visible in the dead. And in a word, whatever was the habit of the body during life, would be distinguishable after death, either perfectly, or in a great measure and for a time. And I should infer that this is equally true of the soul, Callicles; when the man is stripped of the body, all the natural or acquired affections of the soul are laid open to view.—And when they come to the judge, as those from Asia came to Rhadamanthus, he places them near him and inspects them quite impartially, not knowing whose the soul is: perhaps he may lay hands on the soul of the great king, or of some other king or potentate, who has no soundness in him, but his soul is marked with the whip, and is full of the prints and scars of perjuries, and of wrongs which have been plastered into him by each action, and he is all crooked with falsehood and imposture, and has no straightness, because he has lived without truth. Him Rhadamanthus beholds, full of all deformity and disproportion, which is caused by licence and luxury and insolence and incontinence, and despatches him ignominiously to his prison, and there he undergoes the punishment which he deserves.

Now the proper office of punishment is twofold: he who is rightly punished ought either to become better and profit by it, or he ought to be made an example to his fellows, that they may see what he suffers, and fear and become better; those who are punished by gods and men, and improved, are those whose sins are curable; still the way of improving them, as in this world so also in another, is by pain and suffering; for there is no other way in which they can be delivered from their evil. But they who have been guilty of the worst crimes, and are incurable by reason of their crimes, are made examples; for, as they are incurable, the time has passed at which they can receive any benefit themselves. But others get good when they behold them for ever enduring the most terrible and painful and fearful sufferings as the penalty of their
sins—there they are, hanging up as examples, in the prison-house of the world below, a spectacle and a warning to all unrighteous men who come thither. And among them, as I confidently affirm, will be found Archelaus, if Polus truly reports of him, and any other tyrant who is like him. And most of these fearful examples, as I believe, are taken from the class of tyrants, and kings, and potentates, and public men, for they are the authors of the greatest and most impious crimes, because they have the power. And Homer witnesses to the truth of this; for those whom he has described as suffering everlasting punishment in the world below are always kings and potentates;—there are Tantalus, and Sisyphus, and Tityus. But no one ever described Thersites, or any private person who was a villain, as suffering everlasting punishment because he was incurable. For to do as they did was, as I am inclined to think, not in his power, and he was happier than those who had the power. Yes, Callicles, the very bad men come from the class of those who have power. And yet in that very class there may arise good men, and worthy of all admiration they are, for where there is great power to do wrong, to live and die justly is a hard thing, and greatly to be praised, and few there are who attain this. Such good and true men, however, there have been, and will be again, in this and other states, who have fulfilled their trust righteously; and there is one who is quite famous all over Hellas, Aristides, the son of Lysimachus. But, in general, great men are also bad, my friend.

And, as I was saying, Rhadamanthus, when he gets a soul of this kind, knows nothing about him, neither who he is, nor who his parents are; he knows only that he has got hold of a villain; and seeing this, he stamps him as curable or incurable, and sends him away to Tartarus, whither he goes and receives his recompense. Or, again, he looks with admiration on the soul of some just one who has lived in holiness and truth; he may have been a private man or not; and I should say, Callicles, that he is most likely to have been a philosopher who has done his own work, and not troubled himself with the doings of other men in his lifetime; him Rhadamanthus sends to the islands of the blest. Aeacus does the same; and they both have sceptres, and judge; and Minos is seated, looking on, as Odysseus in Homer declares that he saw him:

'Holding a sceptre of gold, and giving laws to the dead.'
Now I, Callicles, am persuaded of the truth of these things, and I consider how I shall present my soul whole and undefiled before the judge in that day. Renouncing the honours at which the world aims, I desire only to know the truth, and to live as well as I can, and, when the time comes, to die. And, to the utmost of my power, I exhort all other men to do the same. And, in return for your exhortation of me, I exhort you also to take part in the great combat, which is the combat of life, and greater than every other earthly conflict. And I retort your reproach of me, and say, that you will not be able to help yourself when the day of trial and judgment, of which I was speaking, comes upon you; you will go before the judge, the son of Aegina, and when you are in the hands of justice you will gape and your head will swim round, just as mine would in the courts of this world, and very likely some one will shamefully box you on the ears, and put upon you every sort of insult.

Perhaps this may appear to you to be only an old wife's tale, which you contemn. And there might be reason in your contemning such tales, if by searching we could find out anything better or truer: but now you see that you and Polus and Gorgias, who are the three wisest of the Greeks of our day, are not able to show that we ought to live any life which does not profit in another world as well as in this. And of all that has been said, nothing remains unshaken but the saying, that to do injustice is more to be avoided than to suffer injustice, and that the reality and not the appearance of virtue is to be followed above all things, as well in public as in private life; and that when any one has been wrong in anything, he is to be chastised, and that the next best thing to a man being just is that he should become just, and be chastised and punished; also that he should avoid all flattery of himself as well as of others;—of the few as of the many: and rhetoric and any other art should be used by him, and all his actions should be done, always with a view to justice.

Follow me then, and I will lead you where you will be happy in life and after death, as your own argument shows. And never mind if some one despises you as a fool, and insults you, if he has a mind; let him strike you, by Zeus, and do you be of good cheer and do not mind the insulting blow, for you will never come to any harm in the practice of virtue, if you are a really good and
true man. When we have practised virtue in common, we will betake ourselves to politics, if that seems desirable, or we will advise about whatever else may seem good to us, for we shall be better able to judge then. In our present condition we ought not to give ourselves airs, for even on the most important subjects we are always changing our minds; and what a state of education does that imply! Let us, then, take this discourse as our guide, which signifies to us, that the best way of life is to practise justice and every virtue in life and death. This way let us go; and in this exhort all men to follow, not in that way in which you trust and in which you exhort me to follow you; for that way, Callicles, is nothing worth.
INTRODUCTION.

The Philebus appears to be one of the later writings of Plato, in which the style begins to alter, and the dramatic and poetical element has become subordinate to the speculative and philosophical. In the development of abstract ideas great advances have been made on the Protagoras or the Phaedrus, and perhaps even on the Republic. But there is a corresponding diminution of artistic skill, a want of character in the persons, a laboured march in the dialogue, and a degree of confusion and incompleteness in the general design. As in the speeches of Thucydides, the multiplication of abstract ideas seems to interfere with the power of expression. Instead of the grace and ease of the earlier dialogues there occur two or three highly-wrought passages (pp. 15, 16, 63); instead of the ever-flowing play of humour, now appearing, now concealed, but always present, are inserted a few bad jests, as we may venture to term them (23 A, 29 B, 34 D, 43 A, 53 D, E). We may observe also an attempt at artificial ornament (43 E), as well as other defects of style, which remind us of the Laws. The connection at 42 D, E, 43 A, and at 48 A, B, is far from clear. Many points require further explanation: e.g. the reference of pleasure to the indefinite class (31 A), compared with the assertion which almost immediately follows, that pleasure and pain naturally have their seat in the third or mixed class: these two statements are unreconciled. In like manner, the table of goods does not clearly distinguish between the two heads of measure and symmetry; and though a hint is given that the divine mind has the first place (22 C), this is forgotten in the final summing up. The various uses of the word 'mixed,' for the mixed life, the mixed class of elements, the mixture of bodily and mental pleasures, or of pleasure and pain, are a further source of perplexity. Our ignorance of the opinions which Plato is attacking, is also an element of obscurity. Many things in a
controversy might seem relevant, if we knew to what they were intended to refer. But no conjecture will enable us to supply what Plato has not told us; or to explain, from our fragmentary knowledge of them, the relation in which his doctrine stood to the Eleatic Being or the Megarian good, or to the theories of Aristippus or Antisthenes respecting pleasure.

There is little in the characters which is worthy of remark. The Socrates of the Philebus is devoid of any touch of Socratic irony, though here, as in the Phaedrus (235 C), he attributes the flow of his ideas in one passage to a sudden inspiration (25 B, C). The interlocutor Protarchus, the son of Callias, is supposed to begin as a disciple of the partisans of pleasure, but is soon drawn over to the opposite side by the arguments of Socrates. The instincts of youth are easily induced to take the better part. The group of listeners, whose presence is several times alluded to (16 A, B, etc.), are described as all at last agreeing with Socrates. They bear a very faded resemblance to the interested audiences of the Charmides, Lysis, or Protagoras. Other signs of relation to external life in the dialogue, or mention of contemporary things and persons, with the single exception of the allusion to the anonymous enemies of pleasure (44 B, C), and the teachers of the flux (43 A), there are none.

The omission of the doctrine of recollection, derived from a previous state of existence, is a note of progress in the philosophy of Plato. The transcendental theory of pre-existent ideas, which is chiefly discussed by him in the Meno, the Phaedo, and the Phaedrus, has given way to a psychological one. The omission is rendered more significant by his having occasion to speak of memory as the basis of desire. Of the ideas at all, he only treats in the same sceptical spirit which recurs in his criticism of them in the Parmenides (131 ff.) He touches on the same difficulties, and has no answer to give to them. His mode of speaking of the analytical and synthetical processes may be compared with his manner of treating the same subject in the Phaedrus; here he dwells on the importance of dividing the genera into all the species, while in the Phaedrus he conveys the same truth in a figure, when he speaks of carving the whole, which is described under the image of a victim, into parts or members, 'according to their natural articulation, without breaking any of them.' There is also a difference, which may be noted, between the two dialogues. For whereas in the Phaedrus, and also in
the Symposium, the dialectician is described as a sort of enthusiast or lover, in the Philebus, as in all the later writings of Plato, the element of love is wanting; the subject is only introduced, as in the Republic, by way of illustration (cp. 53 D, Rep. V. 474 D, E). The development of the reason, undisturbed by the emotions, is the ideal at which Plato aims in his later dialogues. There is no mystic enthusiasm or rapturous contemplation of ideas. Whether we attribute this change to the greater feebleness of age, or to the development of the quarrel between philosophy and poetry in Plato’s own mind; or perhaps, in some degree, to a carelessness about artistic effect, when his mind was employed about abstract ideas, we can hardly be wrong in assuming, amid such a variety of indications, derived from style as well as subject, that the Philebus belongs to the later period of his life and authorship. And, as in all the later writings of Plato, there are not wanting thoughts and expressions in which he rises to his highest level.

The plan is complicated, or rather, perhaps, the want of plan renders the progress of the dialogue difficult to follow. A few leading ideas seem to emerge: the relation of the one and many, the four original elements, the kinds of pleasure, the kinds of knowledge, the scale of good. These are only partially connected with one another. The dialogue is not rightly entitled ‘concerning pleasure’ or ‘concerning good,’ but should rather be described as treating of the relations of pleasure or knowledge, after they have been duly analysed, to the good. (1) The question is asked: Whether pleasure or wisdom is the chief good, or some nature higher than either? and if the latter, how are pleasure and wisdom related to this higher good? (2) Before we can answer this question, we must know the kinds of pleasure and the kinds of knowledge: (3) But still we may affirm generally, that the combined life of pleasure and wisdom or knowledge has more of the character of the good than either of them when isolated: (4) To determine which of them partakes most of the higher nature, we must know under which of the four unitaries or elements they respectively fall. These are, first, the infinite; secondly, the finite; thirdly, the union of the two; fourthly, the cause of the union. Pleasure is of the first, wisdom or knowledge of the third class, while reason or mind is akin to the fourth or highest.

(5) Pleasures are of two kinds, the mixed and unmixed. Of mixed pleasures there are three classes—(a) those in which both the pleasures and pains are corporeal, as in eating and hunger; (b) those in which
there is a remembered opposite of the actual bodily affection, as when hungry you remember some former repast; \((\gamma)\) those in which the pleasure and pain are both mental. Of unmixed pleasures there are also three classes: \((a)\) those of sight and hearing; \((\beta)\) those of mathematics; \((\gamma)\) those of smell.

\((6)\) The sciences are likewise divided into two classes, of mixed and unmixed, creative and theoretical; and in each of them there is an architectonic element. This in the creative arts is arithmetic and mensuration; and arts like carpentering, which have an exact measure, are to be regarded as higher than music, which for the most part is mere guess-work and imitation. But there is also a higher arithmetic, and a higher mensuration, which is exclusively theoretical; and a dialectical science, which is higher still and the truest and purest knowledge.

\((7)\) We are now able to determine the composition of the perfect life. First, we admit the pure pleasures and the pure sciences. Secondly, the impure sciences, but not the impure pleasures. We have next to discover what element of goodness is contained in this mixture. There are three criteria of goodness—beauty, symmetry, truth. These are clearly more akin to reason than to pleasure, and will enable us to fix the places of both of them in the scale of good. First in the scale is measure; the second place is assigned to symmetry; the third, to reason and wisdom; the fourth, to knowledge and true opinion; the fifth, to pure pleasures; and here the Muse says 'Enough.'

'Bidding farewell to Philebus and Socrates,' we may now proceed to consider the metaphysical conceptions which are presented to us. These are, \((1)\) the paradox of unity and plurality; \((2)\) the table of categories or elements; \((3)\) the kinds of pleasure; \((4)\) the kinds of knowledge; \((5)\) the conception of the good; \((6)\) we may examine the relation of the Philebus to the Republic, and to other dialogues.

I. The paradox of the one and many originated in the restless dialectic of Zeno, who sought to prove the absolute existence of the one by showing the contradictions that are involved in admitting the existence of the many (cp. Parm. 128 ff.) Zeno illustrated the contradiction by well-known examples taken from outward objects. But Socrates seems to intimate that the time had arrived for discarding these hackneyed illustrations; such difficulties had long been solved by common sense (solvitur ambulando), as the mere familiarity with the fact was a suffi-
cient answer to them. He will leave them to Cynics and Eristics; the youth of Athens may discourse of them to their parents. To no rational man could the circumstance that the body is one, but has many members, be any longer a stumbling-block.

Plato's difficulty seems to begin in the region of ideas. He cannot understand how an absolute unity, such as the Eleatic being, can be broken up into a number of individuals, or be in and out of them at once. Philosophy has so deepened or intensified the nature of one or being, by the thoughts of successive generations, that the mind can no longer imagine 'being' as in a state of change or division. To say that the verb of existence is the copula, or that unity is a mere unit, is to us easy; but to the Greek such an analysis involved the same kind of difficulty as the conception of God existing both in and out of the world would to ourselves. Nor was he assisted by the analogy of sensible objects. The sphere of mind was dark and mysterious to him: instead of being illustrated by sense, the greatest light appeared to be thrown on the nature of ideas by the contrast of them with sense.

Both here and in the Parmenides (129 ff.), where similar difficulties are raised, Plato seems prepared to desert his ancient ground. He cannot tell the relation in which abstract ideas stand to one another, and therefore he transfers the one and many out of his transcendental world, and proceeds to lay down practical rules for their application to different branches of knowledge. As in the Republic, he supposes the philosopher to proceed by regular steps, until he arrives at the idea of good; as in the Sophist and Politicus, he insists that in dividing the whole into its parts we should bisect in the middle in the hope of finding species; as in the Phaedrus (see above), he would have 'no limb broken' of the organism of knowledge:—So in the Philebus, he urges the necessity of filling up all the intermediate links which occur (compare Bacon's media axiomata), in the passage from unity to infinity. With him the idea of science may be said to anticipate science; at a time when the sciences were not yet divided, he wants to impress upon us the importance of classification; neither neglecting the many individuals, nor attempting to count them all, but finding the genera and species under which they naturally fall. Here, then, and in the parallel passages of the Phaedrus and of the Sophist, is found the germ of the most fruitful notion of modern science.

At page 15 Plato describes with ludicrous exaggeration the influence
exerted by the one and many on the minds of young men in their first fervour of metaphysical enthusiasm (cp. Rep. 539). But they are none the less an everlasting quality of reason or reasoning which never grows old in us. At first, we have but a confused conception of them, anal-
logous to the eyes blinking at the light in the Republic. To this Plato opposes the revelation from Heaven of the true relations of them, which the same Prometheus, who gave men the light of fire and arithmetic, is supposed to have imparted to us. Plato is speaking at pp. 15, 16 of two things—(1) the crude notion of the one and many, which powerfully affects the ordinary mind when first beginning to think; (2) the same notion when cleared up by the help of dialectic (16 C—E).

To us the problem of the one and many has lost its chief interest and perplexity. We readily acknowledge that a whole has many parts, that the continuous is also the divisible, that in all objects of sense there is a one and many which may be applied by analogy to purely intellectual conceptions. In acknowledging this, we are compelled to admit that two contradictions are true. But the antinomy is so familiar as to be scarcely observed by us. Our sense of the contradiction, like Plato's, only begins in a higher sphere, when we speak of necessity and free-will, of Three Persons and One Substance, and the like. The world of knowl-
edge is always dividing more and more; every truth is at first the enemy of every other truth. Yet without this division there can be no truth; nor any complete truth without the reunion of the parts into a whole. And hence the coexistence of opposites in the unity of the idea is re-
garded by Hegel as the supreme principle of philosophy, and the law of contradiction, which is affirmed by logicians to be an ultimate principle of the human mind, is displaced by another law, which asserts the co-
existence of contradictories as divided elements of the truth. Without entering further into the depths of Hegelianism, we may remark that this and all similar attempts to reconcile antinomies have their origin in the old Platonic problem of the 'One and Many.'

II. 1. The first of Plato's categories or elements is the infinite. This is the negative of measure or limit; the unthinkable, the unknowable; of which nothing can be affirmed; the mixture or chaos which preceded distinct kinds in the creation of the world; the first vague impression of sense; the more or less which refuses to be reduced to rule, having certain affinities with evil, with pleasure, with ignorance, and which in the scale of being is farthest removed from the beautiful and good. To a
Greek of the age of Plato, the idea of an infinite mind would have been an absurdity. He would have insisted that 'the good was of the nature of the finite,' and that the infinite is a mere negative, which is on the level of sensation, and not of thought. He was aware that there was a distinction between the infinitely great and the infinitely small, but he would have equally denied the claim of either to true existence. Of that positive infinity, or infinite reality, which we attribute to God, he had no conception.

The Greek conception of the infinite would be more truly expressed by the indefinite. To us, the notion of infinity is subsequent rather than prior to the finite, expressing not absolute vacancy or negation, but only the removal of limit or restraint, which we suppose to exist after we have already set bounds to thought and matter, and divided them after their kinds. From different points of view, either the finite or infinite may be looked upon respectively both as positive and negative (cp. Omnis determinatio est negatio); and the conception of the one determines that of the other. The Greeks and the moderns seem to be nearly at the opposite poles in their manner of regarding them. And both are surprised when they make the discovery, as Plato has done in the Sophist, how large an element negation forms in the framework of their thoughts.

2, 3. The finite element which mingles with and regulates the infinite is best expressed to us by the word 'law.' It is that which measures all things and assigns them their limit; which preserves them in their natural state, and brings them within the sphere of human cognition. This is described by the terms harmony, health, order, perfection, and the like. All things, in as far as they are good, even pleasures, which are for the most part indefinite, partake of this element. We should be wrong in attributing to Plato the conception of laws of nature derived from observation and experiment. And yet he has as intense a conviction as any modern philosopher that nature did not proceed by chance. But observing that the wonderful construction of number and figure which he had within himself, and which seemed to be prior to himself, explained a part of the phenomena of the external world, he extended their principles to the whole, finding in them both the true type of human life and the order of nature.

Two other points may be noticed respecting the third class. First, that Plato seems to be unconscious of any interval or chasm which separates the finite from the infinite. The one is in various ways and degrees working in the other. Hence he has implicitly answered the difficulty
with which he started, of how the one could remain one and yet be
divided among many individuals, or 'how ideas could be in and out of
themselves,' and the like. Secondly, that in this mixed class we find the
idea of beauty. Good, when exhibited under the aspect of measure or
symmetry, becomes beauty (64 E). And if we translate his language
into corresponding modern terms, we shall not be far wrong in saying
that here, as well as in the Republic, Plato conceives beauty under the
idea of proportion.

4. Last and highest in the list of principles or elements, is the cause
of the union of the finite and infinite, to which Plato ascribes the order of
the world. Reasoning from man to the universe, he argues that as there
is a mind in one, there must be a mind in the other, which he identifies
with the royal mind of Zeus. This is the first cause of whom 'our
ancestors spoke,' as he says, appealing to tradition, in the Philebus as well
as in the Timaeus. Some characteristic differences may here be noted,
which distinguish the ancient from the modern mode of conceiving God!

To Plato, the idea of God is both personal and impersonal. Nor in
ascribing, as appears to us, both these attributes to him, and in speaking
of God both in the masculine and neuter gender, did he seem to himself
as inconsistent. For the difference between the personal and impersonal
was not marked to him as to ourselves. Hence, without any reconcilia-
tion or even remark, in the Republic he speaks at one time of God or
Gods, and at another time of the good. Nor in the Philebus is he careful
to show in what relation the idea of the divine mind stands to the supreme
principle of measure. He seems to pass from the sphere of the subjective
to that of the objective unconsciously to himself.

Again, to us there is a strongly-marked distinction between a first
cause and a final cause. And we should commonly identify a first cause
with God, and the final cause with the world, which is His work. But
Plato, though far from being a Pantheist, or confounding God with the
world, tends to identify the first with the final cause. There can be no
greater difference to us than between a thing and a person, while to
Plato, by the help of various intermediate abstractions, such as end, good,
cause, they appear almost to meet in one, or to be two aspects of the
same.

The four principles are required for the determination of the relative
places of pleasure and wisdom. Plato has been saying that we should
proceed by regular steps from the one to the many. Accordingly, before
assigning the precedence either to good or pleasure, he must first find out and arrange in order the general principles of things. When this has been done, we are able to assign pleasure to the lowest or indefinite class, and knowledge to the third, or highest but one. We may now proceed to divide pleasure and knowledge after their kinds:

III. 1. Plato speaks of pleasure as indefinite, as relative, as a generation, and in all these points of view in a category distinct from good. For again we must repeat, that to the Greek 'the good is of the nature of the finite,' and, like virtue, either is, or is nearly allied to, knowledge. The modern philosopher would remark that the indefinite is equally real with the definite. Health and mental qualities are of all things the most undefined, and yet they are admitted by Plato into his list of goods. For the truth is, that we are able to define objects or ideas, not in so far as they are in the mind, but in so far as they are manifested externally, and can therefore be reduced to rule and measure. If we adopt the test of definiteness, the pleasures of the body are far more capable of being defined than any other pleasures. As in art and knowledge generally we proceed from without inwards, beginning with facts of sense, and passing to the more ideal conceptions of mental pleasure, happiness and the like.

2. Pleasure is depreciated as relative, while good is exalted as absolute. But this distinction seems to arise from an unfair mode of regarding them; the abstract idea of the one is compared with the concrete experience of the other. For all pleasure and all knowledge may be viewed either abstracted from the mind, or in relation to the mind (cp. Arist. Nic. Ethics, X. 3, 4.) The first is an idea only, which may be conceived as absolute and unchangeable, and then the abstract idea of pleasure will be equally unchangeable with that of knowledge. But when we come to view either as phenomena of consciousness, the same defects are incident to both of them. They are equally transient and uncertain; the mind cannot be always in a state of intellectual tension, any more than capable of feeling pleasure always. The knowledge which is at one time clear and distinct, at another seems to fade away, just as the pleasure of health after sickness, or of eating after hunger, soon passes into a neutral state and becomes unconscious. Pleasure and knowledge alike require the stimulus of novelty; change and alternation are necessary for the mind as well as for the body. And in this tendency to change, not any element of evil, but a law of nature, is rather to be acknowledged.
3. In the language of ancient philosophy, the relative character of pleasure is described as generation. This is relative to essence, and from one point of view may be regarded as the Heraclitean flux in contrast with the Eleatic being; from another point of view, as the transient enjoyment of eating and drinking compared with the supposed permanence of intellectual pleasures. To us the distinction is unmeaning, and belongs to a stage of philosophy which has passed away. Plato himself seems to have suspected that the continuance or life of things is quite as much to be attributed to a principle of motion as of rest (cp. Charmides, 159, 160). A later view of pleasure is found in Aristotle, who agrees with Plato in many points: e.g. in his view of pleasure as a restorative to nature; in his distinction between bodily and mental, between necessary and non-necessary pleasures, but is also in advance of him. For he arrives at last at the point of denying that the feeling of pleasure is in the body at all; hence even the bodily pleasures are not to be spoken of as generations, but as accompanied with generation. (Nic. Eth. X. 3, 6.)

4. Plato attempts to identify vicious pleasures with some form of error, and insists that the term false may be applied to them: in this he appears to be carrying out in a confused manner the Socratic doctrine, that virtue is knowledge, vice ignorance. He will allow of no distinction between the pleasures and the erroneous opinions, whether arising out of the illusion of distance or not, on which they are founded. But to this we naturally reply with Protarchus, that the pleasure is what it is, although the calculation may be false, or the after effects painful. It is difficult to acquit Plato, in his own language, of being a tyro in dialectics, when he overlooks such a distinction. Yet, on the other hand, we are hardly fair judges of confusions of thought in those who view things differently from ourselves.

5. There appears also to be an incorrectness in the notion which occurs both here and in the Gorgias, of the simultaneousness of merely bodily pleasures and pains. We may, perhaps, admit, though even this is not free from doubt; that the feeling of pleasurable hope or recollection is, or rather may be, simultaneous with acute bodily suffering. But there is no such coexistence of the pain of thirst with the pleasures of drinking; they are not really simultaneous, for the one expels the other. Nor does Plato seem to have considered that the bodily pleasures, except in certain extreme cases, are unattended with pain. Few philosophers will deny that a degree of pleasure attends eating and drinking; and yet
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surely we might as well speak of the pains of digestion which follow, as of the pains of hunger and thirst which precede them. Plato's conception is derived partly from the extreme case of a man suffering pain from hunger or thirst; partly from the image of a full and empty vessel. But the truth is rather, that while the gratification of our bodily desires constantly affords some degree of pleasure, the antecedent pains are scarcely perceived by us, being almost done away with by use and regularity.

6. The desire to classify pleasures as accompanied or not accompanied by antecedent pains, has led Plato to place under one head the pleasures of smell and sight, as well as those derived from simple sounds of music and from mathematical figures. He would have done better to connect the pleasures of smell through the medium of taste with the bodily appetites to which they seem to minister. The pleasures of sight and sound might then have been regarded as being the expression of ideas. But this higher and truer point of view never appears to have occurred to Plato. He has no distinction between the fine arts and the mechanical; and neither here nor anywhere has he an adequate conception of the beautiful in external things.

7. Plato agrees partially with certain 'surly or fastidious' philosophers, as he terms them, who defined pleasure to be the absence of pain. They are also described as eminent in physics. There is unfortunately no school of Greek philosophy known to us which combined these two characteristics. Antisthenes, who was an enemy of pleasure, was not a physical philosopher; the atomists, who were physical philosophers, were not enemies of pleasure. Yet such a combination of opinions is far from being impossible. Plato's omission to mention them distinctly has created the same uncertainty respecting them which also occurs respecting the friends of the ideas and the materialists in the Sophist.

On the whole, this discussion is one of the least satisfactory in the dialogues of Plato. While the ethical nature of pleasure is scarcely considered, and the merely physical phenomenon imperfectly analysed, too much weight is given to ideas of measure and number as the sole principle of good. The comparison of pleasure and knowledge is really a comparison of two elements, which have no common measure, and which cannot be excluded from each other. Feeling is not opposed to knowledge, and in all consciousness there is an element of both. The most abstract kinds of knowledge are inseparable from some pleasure
or pain which accompanies the acquisition or possession of them: the student is liable to grow weary of them, and soon discovers that continuous mental energy is not granted to men. The most sensual pleasure, on the other hand, is inseparable from the consciousness of pleasure; no man can be happy who, to borrow Plato’s illustration, is leading the life of an oyster. Hence (by his own confession) the main thesis of the dialogue is not worth determining; the real interest lies in the incidental discussion. We can no more separate pleasure from knowledge in the Philebus than we can separate justice from happiness in the Republic.

IV. An interesting account is given in the Philebus of the rank and order of the sciences or arts, which agrees generally with the scheme of knowledge in the 6th Book of the Republic. The chief difference is, that the position of the arts is more exactly defined. They are divided into an empirical part and a scientific part, of which the first is mere guess-work, the second is determined by rule and measure. Of the more empirical arts, music is given as an example; this, although affirmed to be necessary to human life, is depreciated; and no attempt is made, as in the Republic, to base harmony on scientific principles, but a preference is expressed for simple melodies, and flute music, as in the Republic, is especially condemned. According to the standard of mere accuracy, which is that adopted, music is placed lower in the scale than carpentering or building, because the latter are more capable of being reduced to measure.

The theoretical element of the arts may also become a purely abstract science, when separated from matter, and is then said to be pure and unmixed. The distinction which Plato here makes seems to be the same as that between pure and applied mathematics, and may be expressed in the modern formula: science is art theoretical, art is science practical. In the reason which he gives for the superiority of the pure science of number over the mixed or applied, we shall hardly agree with him. He says that the numbers which the philosopher employs are always the same, whereas the numbers which are used in practice represent different sizes or quantities. He does not see that this power of expressing different quantities by the same symbol is the characteristic and not the defect of numbers, and is due to their abstract nature.

Above the other sciences, as in the Republic, towers dialectic, which is the science of eternal being, and has the purest mind and reason. The
lower sciences, including the mathematical, are akin to opinion rather than to reason, and are placed together in the fourth class of goods. The relation in which they stand to dialectic is obscure in the Republic, and is not cleared up in the Philebus.

V. Thus far we have only attained to the vestibule or ante-chamber of the good; for there is a good exceeding knowledge, exceeding essence, which, like Glaucon in the Republic (p. 509) we find a difficulty in apprehending. But the good is now to be exhibited to us in all its aspects and gradations. The relative dignity of pleasure and knowledge has been determined; but they have not yet received their exact position in the scale of goods. Some difficulties occur to us in the enumeration: First, how are we to distinguish the first from the second class of goods; or the second from the third. Secondly, why is there no mention of the supreme mind? Thirdly, the nature of the fourth class. Fourthly, the seeming allusion to a sixth class, which is not further investigated.

Plato seems to proceed in his table of goods, from the more abstract to the less abstract; from the objective to the subjective, until at the lower end of the scale we fairly descend into the region of human action and feeling. To him, the greater the abstraction the greater the truth, and he is always tending to see abstraction within abstraction; like the ideas in the Parmenides, which are always appearing one behind another. Hence we find a difficulty in following him into the sphere of thought which he is seeking to attain. First in his scale of goods, he places measure, which the eternal nature is supposed to have attained: this would be more naturally expressed in modern language as eternal law, and seems to be akin both to the finite and to the mind or cause, which were two of the elements in the former table. Like the supreme nature in the Timaeus, like the ideal beauty in the Symposium or the Phaedrus, or like the ideal good in the Republic, this is the absolute and unapproachable being. But (2) this being is manifested in symmetry and beauty everywhere, in the order of nature and of mind, in the relations of men to one another. For the word 'measure' he now substitutes the word symmetry, as if intending to express measure conceived as relation. (3) He proceeds to regard the good no longer in an eternal or objective form, but as the human reason seeking to attain truth by the aid of dialectics; such at least we naturally infer to be his meaning, when we consider that both here and in the Republic, the sphere of σοφία or
mind is assigned to dialectic. It is remarkable (see above) that this personal conception of mind is here confined to the human mind, and not, as at the commencement of the dialogue, extended to the divine. (4) If we may be allowed to interpret one dialogue of Plato by another, the sciences of figure and number are probably classed with the arts and true opinions, because they proceed from hypotheses; cp. Rep. 511r. (5) The mention of a sixth class is merely due to the quotation from Orpheus: that Plato had no intention of filling up this class either with the necessary pleasures or any other, is evident from the brief recapitulation which follows (67 A), in which he speaks of pleasure as holding the fifth rank.

VI. We will now endeavour to ascertain the relation of the Philebus to the other dialogues. Here appears to commence the polemic against the ideas which is carried farther in the Parmenides and the Sophist. The principle of the one and many is also illustrated by elaborate examples, both in the Sophist and Politicus. Notwithstanding the differences of style, many resemblances may be noticed between the Philebus and Gorgias. The theory of the simultaneousness of pleasure and pain is common to both of them; there is also a common tendency in them to take up arms against pleasure, although the view of the Philebus, which is probably the later of the two dialogues, is the more moderate. At p. 46 A, B, there seems to be an allusion to the passage in the Gorgias (494), in which Socrates dilates on the pleasures of itching and scratching. Nor is there any real discrepancy in the manner in which Gorgias and his art are spoken of in the two dialogues. For Socrates, at p. 58, is far from implying that the art of rhetoric has a real sphere of practical usefulness: he only means that the refutation of the claims of Gorgias is not necessary for his present purpose. He is saying in effect: Admit, if you please, that rhetoric is the greatest and usefulness of sciences. This does not prove that dialectic is not the purest and most exact; and we know from the Sophist and Politicus, that his hostility towards the sophists and rhetoricians was not mitigated in later life.

Reasons have been already given for assigning a late date to the Philebus. That the date is probably later than that of the Republic, may be further argued on the following grounds: 1. The general resemblance to the later dialogues and to the Laws. 2. The more complete account of the nature of good and pleasure. 3. The distinction between
perception, memory, recollection, and opinion (pp. 34, 38) indicates a great progress in psychology; also between understanding and imagination, described under the figure of the scribe and the painter (p. 39.) A superficial notion may arise that Plato probably wrote shorter dialogues, such as the Philebus, the Sophist, and the Politicus, as studies or preparations for longer ones. This view may be natural, but on further reflection is seen to be fallacious; because these three dialogues are found to make an advance upon the metaphysical conceptions of the Republic. And we can more easily suppose that Plato composed shorter writings after longer ones, than suppose that he lost hold of further points of view which he had once attained.

It is more easy to find traces of the Pythagoreans, Eleatics, Megarians, Cynics, and of the ideas of Anaxagoras, in the Philebus, than to say how much is to be ascribed to each of them. Had we fuller records of those old philosophers, we should probably find Plato in the midst of the fray attempting to combine Eleatic and Pythagorean doctrines, and seeking to find a truth beyond either being or number; setting up his own concrete conception of good against the abstract practical good of the Cynics, or the abstract intellectual good of the Megarians; and his own idea of classification against the denial of plurality in unity, which is also attributed to them: warring against the Eristics as destructive of truth, as he had formerly fought against the Sophists, taking up a middle position between the Cynics and Cyrenaics in his doctrine of pleasure, asserting with more consistency than Anaxagoras the existence of an intelligent mind and cause. Of the Heracliteans, whom he is said by Aristotle to have cultivated in his youth, he speaks in the Philebus, as in the Theaetetus and Cratylus, with irony and contempt. But we have not the knowledge which would enable us to pursue further the line of reflection here indicated; nor can we expect to find perfect clearness or order in the first efforts of mankind to understand the working of their own minds. The ideas which they are attempting to analyse, they are also in process of creating; the abstract universals of which they are seeking to adjust the relations have been already excluded by them from the category of relation.

The Philebus, like the Cratylus, is supposed to be the continuation of a previous discussion. An argument respecting the comparative claims of pleasure and wisdom to rank as the chief good has been already
carried on between Philebus and Socrates. The argument is now transferred to Protarchus, the son of Callias (19 B), a noble Athenian youth, sprung from a family which had spent more on the Sophists than all the rest of the world (cp. Apol. 20 A, B; Cratylus, 39r C). Philebus, who appears to be the teacher (16 B, 36 D), and perhaps the lover (53 D), of Protarchus, takes no further part in the discussion beyond asserting in the strongest manner his adherence, under all circumstances, to the cause of pleasure.

Socrates suggests that they shall have a first and second palm of victory. For there may be a good higher than either pleasure or wisdom, and then neither of them will gain the first prize, but whichever of the two is more akin to this higher good will have a right to the second. This is agreed between them, and Socrates opens the game by enlarging on the diverse and multiform nature of pleasure. For there are pleasures of all kinds, good and bad, wise and foolish—pleasures of the temperate as well as of the intemperate. Nay, replies Protarchus, pleasure is pleasure, and therefore in some sense one. Yes, retorts Socrates, pleasure is one, and also many, just as figure is one, and colour is one, and yet there are many colours and many figures. Protarchus is unable to understand this, and insists that, at any rate, all pleasures are good. But how, retorts Socrates, can Protarchus have a right to attribute to them a new predicate, when he cannot deny that they are different? What common property in all of them does he mean to indicate by the term 'good'? If he continues to assert that there is some trivial sense in which pleasure is one, Socrates may retort by saying that knowledge is one, but the result will be that such merely verbal and trivial conceptions, whether of knowledge or pleasure, will ruin the argument, and will prove the incapacity of the two disputants. In order to avoid this danger, he proposes that they shall beat a retreat, and, before they proceed, come to an understanding about the 'high argument' of the one and the many.

Protarchus agrees to this proposal, but he is under the impression that Socrates means to discuss the common question—how an individual can be one, and yet have opposite attributes, such as great and small, light and heavy, or how there can be many members in one body? and the like wonders. Socrates does not see any wonder in that; his difficulty begins with the application of number to abstract ideas, e.g. when we say that man is one, or that good is one. For have these unities of idea
any real existence? Are they always the same? And if the same, how can they be dispersed in others? Or do they remain entire? or both? No answer is given to these difficulties here any more than in the Parmenides, and Socrates passes on to another view of the question without solving them.

We speak of a one and many, which is ever flowing in and about all things, concerning which a young man often runs wild in his first metaphysical enthusiasm, talking about analysis and synthesis to his father and mother and the neighbours, hardly sparing even his dog. This 'one in many' is a revelation of the order of the world, which some Prometheus first made known to our ancestors; and they, who were better men and nearer the gods than we are, have handed down to us. To know how to proceed by regular steps from one to many, and from many to one, is just what makes the difference between eristic and dialectic. And the way of proceeding is to look for one idea or class in all things, and when you have found one to look for more than one, and all that there are, and when you have found them all and regularly divided a particular field of knowledge into classes, you may leave the further analysis of individuals. But you must not pass at once either from unity to infinity, or from infinity to unity. In music, for example, you may begin with the most general notion, but this alone will not make you a musician: you must know also the number and nature of the intervals, and the systems which are framed out of them, and the rhythms of the dance which correspond to them. And when you have a similar knowledge of any other subject, you may be said to know that subject. In language again there are infinite varieties of sound, and some one who was a wise man, or more than man, comprehended them all in the classes of mutes, vowels, and semivowels, and gave to each of them a name, and assigned them to the art of grammar.

'But whither, Socrates, are you going? And what has this to do with the comparative eligibility of pleasure and wisdom?' Socrates replies, that before we can adjust their claims, we want to know the numbers and kinds of both of them. What are they? He is requested to answer that question himself. That he will, if he may be allowed to make one or two preliminary remarks. In the first place, he has a dreamy recollection of hearing that neither pleasure nor knowledge is the highest good, for the good should be perfect and sufficient. But is the life of pleasure perfect and sufficient, when deprived of memory, consciousness,
But, if we are to pursue this argument, we must divide existences into regular classes. (1) There is a finite element of existence, and (2) an infinite, and (3) the union of the two, and (4) the cause of the union. More may be added if they are wanted, but at present we can do without them. And first of the infinite or indefinite class:—That is the class which is denoted by the terms more or less, and is always in a state of comparison. All terms or ideas, which are described by the words 'gently,' 'extremely,' and other comparative expressions, fall under this class. The unlimited class would cease to be, if limited, or reduced to measure by number and quantity. The opposite class to this is the limited or finite, and includes all things which have number and quantity. And there is a third class of generation into essence by the union of the finite and infinite, in which the finite gives law to the infinite;—under this are comprehended health, strength, temperate seasons, harmony, beauty. The goddess of beauty saw the universal wantonness of all things, and gave law and order to be the salvation of the soul. But no effect can be generated without a cause, and therefore there must be a fourth class, which is the cause of this generation; for the cause or agent is not the same as the patient or effect.

And now, having obtained our classes, we may determine in which our conqueror life is to be placed: Clearly in the third or mixed class, in which the finite gives law to the infinite. And in which is pleasure to find a place? As clearly in the infinite or indefinite, which alone, as Protarchus thinks (who seems to confuse the absolute with the superlative), gives to pleasure the character of the absolute good. Yes, retorts Socrates, and also gives to pain the character of absolute evil. Therefore the infinite cannot be that which imparts to pleasure the nature of the good. But where shall we place mind? That is a very serious and awful question, which may be prefaced by another. Is mind or chance the lord of the universe? All philosophers will say the first, and yet, perhaps, they may be only magnifying themselves. And
for this reason I should like to consider the matter a little more deeply, even though some lovers of disorder in the world should ridicule my attempt.

Now the elements earth, air, fire, water, exist in us, and they exist in the cosmos, and in both are combined into a body, and in both are united with a soul. But they are purer and fairer in the cosmos than they are in us, and they come to us from thence. And in like manner the elements of the finite, the infinite, the union of the two, and the cause, are found to exist in us. And if they exist in us, and the three first exist in the world, must not the fourth or cause, which is the noblest of them, exist in the world? And this cause is mind, and in Zeus there is the mind of a king, and other gods. And this cause is wisdom or mind, the royal mind of Zeus, who is the king of all, and has other noble attributes. Observe how well this agrees with the testimony of men of old, who affirmed mind to be the ruler of the universe. And remember that mind belongs to the class which we term the cause, and pleasure to the infinite or indefinite class. We will examine the place and origin of both.

What is the origin of pleasure? Her natural seat is the mixed class, in which health and harmony were placed. Pain is the violation, and pleasure the restoration of limit. There is a natural union of finite and infinite, which in hunger, thirst, heat, cold, is impaired—this is painful, and the return to nature, in which the elements are restored to their normal proportions, is pleasant. Here is our first class of pleasures. And another class of pleasures and pains are hopes and fears; these are in the mind only. And inasmuch as they are free from any actual admixture of pleasure and pains, the examination of them may show us what pleasures and pains are or are not to be desired, and which of them admit elements of the good. But if pleasures and pains consist in the violation and restoration of limit, may there not be a neutral state, in which there is neither dissolution nor restoration? That is a further question, and admitting, as we must, the possibility of such a state, there seems to be no reason why the life of wisdom should not exist in this neutral state, which is, moreover, the state of the gods, who cannot, without indecency, be supposed to feel either joy or sorrow.

The second class of pleasures involves memory. There are pleasures which are extinguished before they reach the soul, and of these there is no consciousness, and therefore no memory. And there are pleasures which the body and soul feel together, and this feeling is termed per-
ception. And memory is the preservation of perception, and reminiscence is the recovery of perception. Now the memory of pleasure is the memory of a state opposite to that which the person who has the desire actually feels, and is therefore in the mind. And there may be also an intermediate state, in which the person desiring is balanced between pleasure and pain, or has two pains, when he is in pain of body as well as in despair of being satisfied. But also he may be quite sure of this, and then he has an actual pain, but a hope and recollection of pleasure. Here arises another question: May not pleasures, like opinions, be true and false? In the sense of being real, both must be admitted to be true: nor can we deny that to both of them qualities may be attributed; for pleasures as well as opinions may be described as good or bad. And though we do not all of us allow that there are true and false pleasures, we all acknowledge that there are some pleasures associated with right opinion, and others with falsehood and ignorance. Let us endeavour to analyze the nature of this association.

Opinion is based on perception, which may be correct or mistaken. You may see a figure at a distance, and say first of all, 'This is a man,' and then say, 'No, this is an image made by the shepherds.' And you may affirm this in a proposition to your companion, or make the remark mentally to yourself. Whether the words are actually spoken or not, on such occasions there is a scribe within who registers them, and a painter who paints the images of them, which he abstracts from sense, in the soul,—at least that is my own notion of the process; and the words and images which are inscribed by them may be either true or false; and they may represent either past, present, or future. And, representing the future, they must also represent the pleasures and pains of anticipation—the visions of gold and other fancies which are never wanting in the mind of man. Now these hopes, as they are termed, are propositions, which are sometimes true, and sometimes false; for the good, who are the friends of the gods, see true pictures of the future, and the bad false ones. And as there may be opinion about things which are not, were not, and will not be, which is opinion still, so there may be pleasure about things which are not, were not, and will not be, which is pleasure still,—that is to say, false pleasure; and only when false can pleasure, like opinion, be vicious. Against this conclusion Protarchus reclaims.

Leaving his denial for the present, Socrates proceeds to show that some pleasures are false from another point of view. In desire, as we
admitted, the body is divided from the soul, and hence pleasures and pains are often simultaneous. And we further admitted that both of them belonged to the infinite class. How, then, can we compare them? Are we not liable, or rather certain, as in the case of sight, to be deceived by distance? Observe, that in this case not only are the pleasures and pains based upon false opinion, but they are themselves false. And there is another illusion: pain has often been said by us to arise out of the derangement—pleasure out of the restoration—of our nature. But are there not also neutral states, which are neither painful nor pleasurable? For even if we admit, with the wise man whom Protarchus loves (and only a wise man could have ever imagined such a notion), that all things are in a perpetual flux, still these changes are often unconscious, and devoid either of pleasure or pain. We assume, then, that there are three states—pleasurable, painful, neutral, which we may embellish a little by calling them gold, silver, and that which is neither.

But there are other philosophers who regard these three states as two only. Their instinctive dislike to pleasure leads them to affirm that pleasure is only the absence of pain. They are noble fellows, and, although we do not wholly agree with them, we may use them as diviners who will indicate to us the right track. They will say, that the nature of anything is best known from the examination of extreme cases, e.g. the nature of hardness from the examination of the hardest things; and that the nature of pleasure will be best understood from an examination of the most intense pleasures. Now these are the pleasures of the body, not of the mind; the pleasures of disease and not of health, the pleasures of the intemperate and not of the temperate. I am speaking, not of the frequency or continuance, but only of the intensity of such pleasures, and this is given them by contrast with the pain of body which precedes them. Their nature is illustrated by the lesser instances of itching and scratching, respecting which I swear that I cannot tell whether they are a pleasure or a pain. These mixed pleasures are of three kinds: (1) pleasures of the body, which arise out of a transition from cold to hot, from bitter to sweet, and the like; (2) pleasures which are partly pains, and arise out of a contrast of bodily and mental feelings, in which sometimes pain predominates, as in scratching or tickling, when the pleasure on the surface contrasts with some internal pain; or pleasures which occur in other kinds of violent excitement;—both are accompanied by all sorts of unutterable feelings—there is a death of delights
in them. (3) There are the mixed pleasures which are in the mind only. For are not love and sorrow as well as anger, sweeter than honey, and also full of pain? Is there not a mixture of feelings in the spectator of tragedy? and of comedy also? 'I do not understand that last.' Well, then, with a view to lighting up the obscurity of these mixed feelings, let me ask whether envy is painful? 'Yes.' And yet the envious man finds something pleasing in the misfortunes of others? 'True.' And ignorance is a misfortune? 'Certainly.' And the ignorant is entirely devoid of self-knowledge; he may fancy himself richer, fairer, better, wiser than he is? 'Yes.' And he may be strong or weak in his ignorant superiority? 'He may.' And if he is strong we fear him, and if he is weak we laugh at him, and yet we envy him, and like to see him suffer? This is the rationale of tragedy and comedy, and equally the rationale of other mixed feelings in the greater drama of human life. Having explained sorrow, fear, anger, envy, I will reserve the analysis of the remainder for another occasion.

Next follow the unmixed pleasures; which, unlike the philosophers of whom I was speaking, I believe to be real. These unmixed pleasures are: (1) The pleasures derived from beauty of form, colour, sound, smell, which are absolutely pure; and in general those which are unalloyed with pain: (2) The pleasures derived from the acquisition of knowledge, which in themselves are pure, but may be attended by an accidental pain of forgetting; this, however, arises from a subsequent act of reflection, which is not to be included in them. At the same time, we must admit that these latter pleasures are the property of a very few. To these unmixed pleasures we ascribe measure, whereas the mixed, which belong to the class of the infinite, are liable to every species of excess. And here several questions arise for consideration:—What is the meaning of pure

1 There appears to be some confusion in this passage. There is no difficulty in seeing that in comedy, as in tragedy, the spectator may view the performance with mixed feelings of pain as well as of pleasure; nor is there any difficulty in understanding that envy is a mixed feeling, which rejoices not without pain at the misfortunes of others, and laughs at their ignorance of themselves. But though both are examples of mixed feelings, of which envy is the simple instance, yet they are composed of different elements. Plato seems to think that he has explained the feeling of the spectator in comedy by a general explanation of mixed feelings, which only applies to comedy in so far as in comedy we laugh at the conceit or weakness of others. Or perhaps he means to say that we sympathise with the performance when imitating the follies and conceit of mankind; and that in explaining certain feelings in the 'drama of human life' he has also explained the manner in which they affect us on the stage.
and impure; of moderate and immoderate? We may answer these questions by an illustration: Purity of white paint consists in the clearness or quality of the white, and this is distinct from the quantity or amount of white paint; a little pure white is fairer than a great deal which is impure. But there is another question:—Pleasure is affirmed by ingenious philosophers to be a generation; they say that there are two natures—one self-existent, the other dependent; the one noble and majestic, the other failing in both these qualities.—‘I do not understand.’ There are lovers and there are loves. ‘Yes, I know, but how do you apply that?’ The argument is in play, and desires to intimate that there are relatives and there are absolutes, and that the relative is for the sake of the absolute; and generation is for the sake of essence. Under relatives I class all things done with a view to generation; and essence is of the class of good. But if essence is of the class of good, generation must be of some other class; and our friends, who affirm that pleasure is a generation, would laugh at the notion that pleasure is a good; and at that other notion, that pleasure is satisfied in generation, which is only the alternative of destruction. Who would prefer such an alternation to the equable life of pure thought? That is one absurdity, and not the only one, to which the friends of pleasure are reduced. For is there not also an absurdity in affirming that good is of the soul only, and at the same time declaring that the best of men, if he be in pain, is bad?

And now, from the consideration of pleasure, we pass to that of knowledge. Let us reflect that there are two kinds of knowledge—the one creative or productive, and the other educational and philosophical. Of the creative arts, there is one part purer or more akin to knowledge than the other. There is an element of guess-work and an element of number and measure in them. In music, for example, especially in flute-playing, the conjectural element prevails; while in carpentry there is more application of rule and measure. Of the creative arts, then, we may make two classes—the less exact and the more exact. And the exacter part of all of them is really arithmetic and mensuration. But arithmetic and mensuration again may be subdivided with reference to their use in the concrete, or their nature in the abstract; as they are applied by carpenters to various magnitudes, or by philosophers to one only. And, borrowing the analogy of pleasure, we may say that the philosophical use of them is purer than the other. Thus we have two
arts of arithmetic, and two of mensuration. And truest of all in the estimation of every rational man is dialectic, or the science of being, which will forget and disown us, if we forget and disown her.

'But, Socrates, I have heard Gorgias say that rhetoric is the greatest and usefulllest of arts; and I should not like to quarrel either with him or you.' Neither is there any inconsistency, Protarchus, with his statement in what I am now saying; for I am not maintaining that dialectic is the greatest or usefulllest, but only the truest of arts; my remark is not quantitative but qualitative, and has reference not to advantage or reputation, but to the love of knowledge and truth, in which Gorgias will not care to compete; these are what we affirm to be possessed in the highest degree by dialectic. And do not let us appeal to Gorgias or Philebus or Socrates, but ask, on behalf of the argument, what are the highest truths which the soul has the power of attaining. And is not this the science which has a firmer grasp of them than any other? For the arts generally are only occupied with matters of opinion, and with the production and action and passion of this sensible world. But the highest truth is that which is eternal and unchangeable. And reason and wisdom are concerned with this; and they are the very claimants, if not for the first, at least for the second place, whom I propose as rivals to pleasure.

And now, having the materials, we may proceed to mix them—first recapitulating the question at issue.

Philebus affirmed pleasure to be the good, and assumed them to be in nature one; I affirmed that they were by nature two, and declared that knowledge was more akin to the good than pleasure. I said that the two together were more eligible than either taken singly; and to this we adhere. Reason intimates, as at first, that we should seek the good not in the unmixed life, but in the mixed.

The cup is ready, waiting to be mingled, and there are two fountains, one of honey, the other of pure water, out of which we may draw the fairest possible mixture. There were pure and impure pleasures—pure and impure sciences. And first, let us take the pure pleasures, and pour them in, not allowing the impure to enter, for that would be dangerous. Next, let us take the pure sciences; but shall we mingle the impure—the art which uses the false rule and the false measure? That we must, if we are any of us to find our way home; man cannot live upon pure mathematics alone. And must I include music, which is
admitted to be guess-work? That you must, if human life is to have any humanity. Well, then, I will open the door and let them all in; they shall mingle in an Homeric meeting of the waters. And now we turn to the pleasures; shall I admit them? Yes; but first of all admit the pure pleasures; secondly, the necessary. And what shall we say about the rest? First, ask the pleasures: they will be too happy to dwell with wisdom. Secondly, ask the arts and sciences: they reply that the excesses of intemperance are the ruin of them; and that they would rather only have the pleasures of health and temperance, which are the handmaidens of virtue. But still we want truth? That is now added; and so the argument is complete, and may be compared to an incorporeal law, holding fair rule over a living body. And now we are at the vestibule of the good, in which there are three chief elements—truth, symmetry, and beauty. These will be the criterion of the comparative claims of pleasures and wisdom.

Which has the greater share of truth? Surely wisdom; for pleasure is the veriest impostor in the world, and the perjuries of lovers have passed into a proverb.

Which of symmetry? Wisdom again; for nothing is more immoderate than pleasure.

Which of beauty? Once more, wisdom; for pleasure is often unseemly, and the greatest pleasures are put out of sight.

Not pleasure, then, ranks first in the scale of good; but measure, and eternal harmony.

Secondly: The symmetrical and beautiful and perfect.
Thirdly: Mind and wisdom.
Fourthly: Sciences and arts.
Fifthly: Painless pleasures.

Of a sixth class, I have no more to say. Thus, pleasure and mind may both renounce the claim to be in the first place. But mind is ten thousand times nearer to the chief good than pleasure. Pleasure ranks fifth and not first, even though all the animals in the world assert the contrary.
PHILEBUS.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.


Steph.  Socrates. Observe, Protarchus, the nature of the position which
you are now going to take from Philebus, and what the other
position is which I maintain, and which, if you do not approve of
what I say, is to be controverted by you. Shall I give a summary
of the two sides?

Protarchus. By all means.

Soc. Philebus was saying that enjoyment and pleasure and delight,
and all that class of feelings, are a good to every living being,
whereas I contend, that not these, but wisdom and knowledge and
memory and their kindred, right opinion and true reasonings, are
better and more desirable for all who are able to partake of them,
and that to all such they are the most advantageous of all things,
both now and ever. Is not that, Philebus, a fair statement of the
two sides of the argument?

Philebus. Nothing can be fairer, Socrates.

Soc. And do you, Protarchus, accept the position which is com-
mitted to you?

Pro. I cannot do otherwise, as our charming friend Philebus has
left the field.

Soc. Certainly, the truth about these matters ought, by all means,
to be ascertained.

Pro. That is certain.

Soc. Shall we further agree——

Pro. To what?
Soc. That we will both try to discover some state and disposition of the soul, which is able to make the life of all men happy; will not that be our aim?

Pro. Yes, that will be our aim.

Soc. And you say that pleasure, and I say that wisdom, is such a state?

Pro. True.

Soc. But what if there be a third state, which is better than either? Then both of us are vanquished—are we not? But if this higher and more lasting state turn out to be more akin to pleasure than to wisdom, then the life of pleasure may still have the advantage over the life of wisdom?

Pro. True.

Soc. Or suppose that this life is more nearly allied to wisdom, then wisdom conquers, and pleasure is defeated;—do you grant that?

Pro. Certainly, that is what I should say.

Soc. And what does Philebus say? for he ought to be consulted.

Phileb. I say, and shall always say, that pleasure is the conqueror; but you must decide for yourself, Protarchus.

Pro. You mean to say, Philebus, that having handed over the argument to me, you have no longer a voice in the matter?

Phileb. That is the truth. But still I should like to clear myself of you, as I hereby call the goddess herself to witness that I now do.

Pro. You may appeal to us, too, as witnesses of your words. And now, Socrates, let us proceed to finish the argument, without caring whether Philebus approves or not.

Soc. Then let us begin with the goddess herself, who, according to Philebus, is called Aphrodite, but he says that her true name is Pleasure.

Pro. Very good.

Soc. My awe, Protarchus, in naming the gods is always beyond all human feeling and expression, and now I would not like to speak of Aphrodite in any way that is not agreeable to her; of her, then, I say nothing. But I know that Pleasure is diverse, and with her, as I said, I begin and consider and ask what her nature is. To hear her name you would imagine that she is one, and yet surely she takes the most various and even unlike forms. For do we not say that the intemperate has pleasure, and that the tem-
perate has pleasure in his very temperance, and that the fool is pleased when he is full of foolish fancies and hopes, and that the wise man has pleasure in his wisdom; and may not he be justly deemed a fool who says that these pairs of pleasures are respectively alike?

Pro. Why, Socrates, they spring from opposite causes, but they are not in themselves opposite, for must not pleasure be of all things most absolutely like pleasure,—that is, like itself?

Soc. Yes, my good friend, just as colour is like colour;—as far as they are colours, there is no difference between them. And yet we all know that black is not only unlike, but even absolutely opposed to white: or again, as figure is like figure,—there is one species of all of them; and yet some figures are absolutely opposed to one another, and there is an infinite diversity of them. And we might find similar examples in many other things; therefore do not rely upon this argument, which would go to prove the unity of the most extreme opposites. And I apprehend that we may also find some opposition among pleasures.

Pro. Very likely; but how will that affect the argument?

Soc. Why, I shall reply, that dissimilar as they are, you apply to them a new predicate, for you say that all pleasant things are good; now no one can argue that pleasure is not pleasure, but he may argue, as we do, that pleasures are oftener bad than good, and still you call them all good (he would say), and at the same time are compelled, if you are pressed, to acknowledge that they are unlike. And he will want to know what is that identical quality existing alike in good and bad pleasures, which makes you designate all of them as good.

Pro. What do you mean, Socrates? Do you think that any one who asserts pleasure to be the good, will even tolerate the notion that some pleasures are good and some bad?

Soc. And yet you will acknowledge that they are different from one another, and even opposite to one another?

Pro. Not in so far as they are pleasures.

Soc. That is the old argument, Protarchus, coming back again; then we are to say that there is no difference in pleasures, but that they are all alike; and the examples which have just been cited do not touch us, and we shall be starting in the argument like the weakest and youngest reasoners?
Pro. What do you mean?

Soc. Why, I mean to say, that if I follow your example, and assert boldly that the two things most unlike are most absolutely alike, I may reason as you are doing, and the result will be that you and I will prove ourselves to be very tyros in the art of disputing; and the argument will vanish and come to nothing. Suppose, then, that we beat a retreat, and if we again put ourselves in the old position, perhaps we may come to an understanding with one another.

Pro. How do you mean?

Soc. Shall I, Protarchus, have the same question asked of me by you?

Pro. What question?

Soc. Ask me whether wisdom and sciences and mind, and those other qualities which I, when asked by you at first, what is the nature of the good, affirmed to be good, are not equally affected by this argument of yours.

Pro. How is that?

Soc. The sciences are a numerous class, and will be found to present great differences. But even if they were opposite as well as different, should I be worthy of the name of dialectician if, in order to escape this, I were to say (as you are saying of pleasure), that there was no difference between one science and another;—that might be a sort of irrational way of saving ourselves from shipwreck, but would not the argument vanish into air like an idle tale?

Pro. I agree that we should save ourselves, but not in that way. And I like the even-handed justice which is applied to both our arguments. Let us assume, then, that there are many and diverse pleasures, and many and different sciences.

Soc. And let us have no concealment, Protarchus, of the differences between my good and yours; but let us bring them to the light in the hope that, in the process of testing them, they may show whether pleasure is to be called the good, or wisdom, or some third quality; for surely we are not now simply contending in order that my opinion or that yours may prevail, but I presume that we ought both of us to be fighting for truth.

Pro. That we ought.
Soc. Then let us establish this principle of differences by a more definite agreement.

Pro. What principle?

Soc. The principle about which all men are always being plagued, and some men sometimes against their will.

Pro. Speak plainer.

Soc. The principle which has just turned up, which is a marvel of nature, for that one should be many or many one, are wonderful propositions; and he who affirms either is very open to attack.

Vro. Do you mean when a person says that I, Protarchus, am by nature one and also many, dividing the single 'me' into many 'me's,' which he opposes as great and small, light and heavy, and in ten thousand other ways?

Soc. Those, Protarchus, are the common and acknowledged wonders about the one and many, which the whole world has agreed to dismiss as childish and obvious and detrimental to the true course of thought; and they would show no more favour to that other puzzle, in which a person divides the limbs or parts of anything, and then confessing that they are all one, says derisively in refutation:—Is not this a miracle? The one is many and infinite, and the many are only one.

Pro. But what, Socrates, are those other marvels which, as you imply, have not yet become acknowledged and proscribed, relating to the same principle?

Soc. When, my boy, the one does not belong to the class of things that are born and perish, as in the instances which we were giving, for in those cases, and when unity is of this concrete nature, there is, as I was saying, a universal consent that no refutation is needed; but when the assertion is made that man is one, or ox is one, or beauty one, or the good one, about these and similar unities a warm controversy arises, when there is any attempt made to divide them.

Pro. Of what nature?

Soc. In the first place, as to whether these unities have a real existence; and then how each individual unity, being always the same, and incapable either of generation or of destruction, but retaining a permanent individuality, can be conceived either as dispersed and multiplied in the infinity of the world of generation, or as still entire and yet contained in others, which latter would
seem to be the greatest impossibility of all, for how can one and
the same thing be at the same time in one and in many things?
These, Protarchus, are the real difficulties, and this is the one and
many to which they relate; they are the source of great perplexity
if ill decided, and if rightly determined are very helpful.

_Pro._ Then, Socrates, let us begin by clearing up these questions.
_Soc._ That is what I should wish.

_Pro._ And I am sure that all my other friends will be glad to hear
them discussed; Philebus is happily reposing, and perhaps we had
better not disturb him with questions.

_Soc._ Good; and where shall we begin this great and comprehen-
sive battle, in which such various points are at issue? Shall we
begin thus?

_Pro._ How shall we begin?

_Soc._ We say that the one and many are identified by the reason-
ing power, and that they run about everywhere together, in and
out of every word which is uttered, as they have done in all time
present as well as past, and this will never cease, and is not now
beginning, but is, as I believe, an everlasting quality of reason, as
such, which never grows old in us. Any young man, when he first
tastes these subtleties, is delighted, and fancies that he has found a
treasure of wisdom; in the first enthusiasm of his joy he sets (not
every stone, but) every thought rolling, now converting the many
into the one, and kneading them together, now unfolding and
dividing them; he puzzles himself first and above all, and then he
proceeds to puzzle his neighbours, whether they are older or
younger, or of his own age—that makes no difference; neither 16
father nor mother does he spare; no human being who has ears is
safe from him, hardly even his dog, and a barbarian would have no
chance with him, if an interpreter could only be found.

_Pro._ Considering, Socrates, how many we are, and that all of us
are young men, is there not a danger that we and Philebus may
conspire and attack you, if you speak evil of us? Yet we under-
stand; and if there is any better way or manner of quietly escaping
out of all this turmoil and perplexity, and arriving at the truth, we
hope that you will guide us into that way, and we will do our best
to follow, for the enquiry in which we are engaged, Socrates, is not
a small one.

_Soc._ Not a small one, my boys, as Philebus calls you, and there
neither is nor ever will be a better than my own favourite way, which has nevertheless already often deserted me in the hour of need.

Pro. Tell us what that is?

Soc. One which may be easily explained, but is by no means easy of application, and is the parent of all the discoveries of the arts.

Pro. Say only what.

Soc. A gift of heaven, which, as I conceive, the gods tossed into the world by the hands of some Prometheus, together with a blaze of fire; and the ancients, who were our betters and nearer the gods than we are, handed down the tradition, that all things which are supposed to exist draw their existence from the one and many, and have the finite and infinite in them as a part of their nature: seeing, then, that such is the order of the world, we too ought in all our investigations to assume that there is one idea of everything; this unity we shall be sure to find, and having found, we may next proceed to look for two, if there be two, or, if not, then for three or some other number, subdividing each of these units, until at last the original one is seen, not only as one and many and infinite, but also in some definite number: the infinite must not be suffered to approach the many until the entire number of the species intermediate between unity and infinity has been found out,—then, and not till then, we may rest from division, and all the remaining individuals may be allowed to pass into infinity. This, as I was saying, is the way of considering and learning and teaching one another, which the gods have handed down to us.

But the wise men of our time are either too quick or too slow in conceiving plurality in unity. Having no method, they make their one and many anyhow, and from unity pass at once to infinity, without thinking of the intermediate steps. And this, I repeat, is what makes the difference between the mere art of disputation and true dialectic.

Pro. I think that I partly understand you, Socrates, but I should like to have a clearer notion.

Soc. I may illustrate my meaning by the letters of the alphabet, Protarchus, which you were made to learn as a child.

Pro. How do they afford an illustration?

Soc. The sound which passes through the lips of each and all of us is one and yet infinite.
Pro. Very true.

Soc. And yet not by knowing either that sound is one or that sound is infinite, are we perfect in the art, but the knowledge of the number and nature of sounds is what makes a man a grammarian.

Pro. Very true.

Soc. And the knowledge which makes a man a musician is of the same kind.

Pro. How is that?

Soc. Sound is one in music as well as in grammar?

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. And there is a grave and acute tone, and a third tone which is equable:—may we affirm so much?

Pro. Yes.

Soc. But you would not be a musician if you knew nothing more than this; though if you did not know this you would know nothing of music.

Phi. Nothing.

Soc. But when you have learned what sounds are grave and what acute, and the number and nature of the intervals and their limits, and the systems which have been compounded out of them, which our fathers discovered, and have handed down to us who are their descendants under the name of harmonies; and the corresponding principles in the movements of the human body, which when measured by numbers ought, as they say, to be called rhythms and measures;—and they tell us that there is a similar principle in every one and many—when, I say, you have learned all this, then, my dear friend, you are perfect; and when you have a similar knowledge and grasp of any other subject, you may be said to understand that. But the infinite multiplicity of individuals [when not classified], and the infinity which there is in each of them, deprive a man of any definite knowledge of them; and he who never looks for number in anything, will not himself be looked for in the number of famous men.

Pro. I think that what Socrates is now saying is excellent, 18 Philebus.

Phi. I think so too, but I wish that I could see how all this bears upon us and upon the argument.

Soc. Philebus is right in asking us that question, O Protarchus.
Pro. Indeed he is, and you must answer him.

Soc. I will; but let me make one little remark first, by way of finish; I was saying, that he who begins with any individual unity, should proceed from that, not to infinity, but to some number, and now I say conversely, that he who begins with infinity should not jump to unity, but he should look about for some number which is always an expression of plurality, and thus out of all end in one. But let us return to the illustration of letters.

Pro. What is that?

Soc. An ancient god or prophet, who, as the Egyptians say, was the god Theuth, observing that sound was infinite, first distinguished in the infinity of sound a number of vowels, and then other letters which had a measure of sound, but were not pure vowels (i.e. the semivowels); these, too, had a definite number; and lastly, he distinguished a third class of letters, which we now call mutes, and he divided these mutes, and also the vowels and semivowels, into the individual sounds, and told the number of them, and gave to each and all of them the name of letters; and observing that none of us could learn any one of them and not learn them all, and in consideration of this common bond, which in a manner united them, he assigned to them all a single art, and this he called the art of grammar.

Phl. The meaning of the illustration I understand, Protarchus, better than the original statement, but there still appears to me to be the same deficiency as before.

Soc. Are you going to ask, Philebus, what this has to do with the argument?

Phl. Yes, that is a question which Protarchus and I have been long asking.

Soc. Then assuredly you have already had the answer to the question which you have been long asking?

Phl. How is that?

Soc. Did we not begin by enquiring into the comparative eligibility of pleasure and wisdom?

Phl. Certainly.

Soc. And we said that they were each of them one?

Phl. True.

Soc. And the precise question which the previous discussion suggests is, how they are one and also many, and not at once infinite,
[i.e. how they have one genus and many species] and what number of species is to be assigned to either of them before they pass into infinity.

**Pro.** That is a very serious question, Philebus, to which Socrates has ingeniously brought us round, and please to consider which of us shall answer him; there may be something ridiculous in my being unable to answer, and therefore imposing the task upon you, when I have undertaken the whole charge of the argument, but if neither of us were able to answer, that would surely be still more ridiculous. Let us consider, then, what we are to do:—Socrates, if I understand him rightly, is asking whether there are not kinds of pleasure, and what is the number and nature of them, and the same of wisdom.

**Soc.** Most true, O son of Callias; and the previous argument showed that if we are not able to tell this of everything that has unity, likeness, sameness, and their opposites, none of us will be of the smallest use in any enquiry.

**Pro.** That seems to be very near the truth, Socrates, and happy would the wise man be if he knew all things, and the next best thing for him would be that he should not be ignorant of himself. Why do I say this at this moment? I will tell you why. You, Socrates, have granted us the favour of this conversation, and are willing to assist us in determining what is the best of human goods. For when Philebus said that pleasure and delight and enjoyment, and all that sort of thing, was the chief good, you answered, not that, but another class of goods; and this we keep repeating again and again, as indeed we ought, in order that we may not forget to examine and compare them. And these goods, which, according to you, as would appear, are to be designated as superior to pleasure, and are the true objects of pursuit, are mind and knowledge and understanding and art, and the like. There was a dispute about this, and we playfully threatened that you should not be allowed to go home until the question was settled, and you agreed, and granted our request. And now, as children say, what has been fairly given cannot be taken away; cease then to fight against us in this way.

**Soc.** In what way?

**Phi.** Do not perplex us, and keep asking questions of us to which at the moment we have no sufficient answer to offer; let us not
imagine that a general puzzling of us all is to be the end of our discussion, but if we are unable to answer, do you answer, as you promised. Consider, then, whether you will yourself determine the question which you have asked about the kinds of pleasure and knowledge, or whether you can and will find some other mode of clearing up our controversy.

Soc. If you say that, I have nothing to fear, for the words 'if you can and will' quite dispel my fear; and, besides this, some god appears to have given me a new memory.

Phi. How is that, and what has he put into your mind?

Soc. I remember to have heard certain discussions about pleasure and wisdom, whether awake or asleep I cannot tell; they were to the effect that neither the one nor the other of them was the good, but some third thing, which was different from them, and better than either. If this be now clearly established, then pleasure will lose the victory, for the good in that case will cease to be identified with her:—Is not that true?

Pro. Yes.

Soc. And there will cease to be any need of distinguishing the kinds of pleasures, as I am inclined to think, but that will appear more clearly as we proceed.

Phi. That is excellent; pray go on as you propose.

Soc. First, then, let us agree on some little points.

Phi. What are they?

Soc. Is the good perfect or imperfect?

Phi. The most perfect, Socrates, of all things.

Soc. And is the good sufficient?

Phi. Yes, certainly, and in a degree surpassing all other things.

Soc. And no one can deny that all percipient beings desire and hunt after good, and are eager to catch and have the good about them, and care not for the attainment of anything of which good is not a part.

Phi. That is undeniable.

Soc. Now let us part off the life of pleasure from the life of wisdom, and pass them in review.

Phi. How do you mean?

Soc. Let there be no wisdom in the life of pleasure, nor any pleasure in the life of wisdom, for if either of them is the chief good,
it cannot be supposed to want anything, but if either is shown to want anything, then it cannot really be the chief good.

*Soc.* Impossible.

*Soc.* Shall we administer the question to them through you?

*Pro.* Very good.

*Soc.* Then answer.

*Pro.* Ask.

*Soc.* Would you choose, Protarchus, to live all your life long in the enjoyment of the greatest pleasures?

*Pro.* Certainly I should.

*Soc.* Would you consider that there was still anything wanting to you if you had perfect pleasure?

*Pro.* Certainly not.

*Soc.* Reflect; would you not want wisdom and intelligence and forethought, and the like? would you not want even sight?

*Pro.* Why should I? Having pleasure I should have all things.

*Soc.* Living thus always, and all your life, you would have the greatest pleasures?

*Pro.* I should.

*Soc.* But if you had neither mind, nor memory, nor knowledge, nor true opinion, you would in the first place be utterly ignorant of whether you were pleased or not, because you would be entirely devoid of sense.

*Pro.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And similarly, if you had no memory you would not recollect that you had ever been pleased, nor would the slightest recollection of present pleasure remain with you, and if you had no true opinion you could have no perception of present pleasures, and if you had no power of calculation you would not be able to calculate on future pleasure, and your life would be the life, not of a man, but of a kind of oyster or 'pulmo marinus.' Can this be imagined otherwise?

*Pro.* No.

*Soc.* But is such a life as this eligible?

*Pro.* I cannot answer you, Socrates; the argument has taken from me the power of speech.

*Soc.* But we must not faint;—and now let us examine in turn the life of mind.

*Pro.* And what is this life of mind?
Soc. I want to know whether any one of us would consent to live, having wisdom and mind and knowledge and memory of all things, but having no fraction of a sense of pleasure or pain, and wholly unaffected by these and the like feelings?

Pro. Neither life, Socrates, appears eligible to me, nor is likely, as I should imagine, to be chosen by any one else.

Soc. What would you say, Protarchus, to both of these in one, or to one that was made out of the union of the two?

Pro. Out of the union, that is, of pleasure with mind and wisdom?

Soc. Yes, that is what I mean.

Pro. There can be no difference of opinion about that; not some but all would surely choose this third rather than either of the other two, and in addition to them.

Soc. But do you see the consequence of that?

Pro. To be sure I do. The consequence is, that two out of the three lives which have been proposed are neither sufficient nor eligible for man nor for animal.

Soc. Then now there can be no doubt that neither of them has the good, for the one which had would certainly have been sufficient and perfect and eligible for every living creature or thing that was able thus to live; and if any of us had chosen any other, he would have chosen contrary to the nature of the truly eligible, and not of his own free will, but either through ignorance or from some unhappy necessity.

Pro. Certainly that seems to be true.

Soc. And now I think that I have sufficiently shown that Philebus' goddess is not to be regarded as identical with the good.

Phi. Neither is your 'mind' the good, Socrates, for that will be open to the same objections.

Soc. Perhaps, Philebus, that may be true of my 'mind,' but not, I think, of the true, which is also the divine mind—that is another story. However, I will not at present claim the first place for mind as against the mixed life, but there is the second place, about which we must come to some understanding, as one of us may assert pleasure and the other mind to be the cause of this mixed life, and thus, though neither of them may be the good, one of them may be imagined to be the cause of the good. And I might proceed further to argue in opposition to Philebus, that the element
which makes this mixed life eligible and good, is more akin and
more similar to mind than to pleasure. And if this is true, plea-
sure cannot be truly said to share either in the first or second
place, and does not, if I may trust my own mind, come even
within the range of the third.

Pro. Truly, Socrates, pleasure appears to have had a terrible
blow; she has fought for the palm, and has been smitten by the argument, and is fallen. I must say that mind was wise in not
making a similar claim, for she would have fallen too; and now,
if pleasure fails in obtaining the second place, she will be terribly
damaged in the eyes of her admirers, for not even to them could
she still appear as fair as before.

Soc. Well, but had we not better leave her now, and not pain
her by applying the question further, and finally detecting her?

Pro. Nonsense, Socrates.

Soc. Why? because I said that we had better not pain pleasure,
and that is an impossibility?

Pro. Yes, and more than that, because you do not seem to be
aware that none of us will let you go home until you have finished
the argument.

Soc. Heavens! Protarchus, that will be a long business, and not
a very easy one. For in going to war for mind, who is aspiring to
the second prize, I ought to have weapons of another make from
those which I used before; some, however, of the old ones may do
again. And must I then finish the argument?

Pro. Of course you must.

Soc. Let us be very careful in laying the foundation.

Pro. What do you mean?

Soc. Let us divide all existing things into two, or rather, if you
do not object, into three classes.

Pro. Upon what principle would you do that?

Soc. Let us take some of our newly-found notions.

Pro. Which of them?

Soc. Were we not saying that God revealed a finite element of
existence, and also an infinite?

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. Let us assume these two principles, and also a third, which
is compounded out of them; but I fear that I am very clumsy at
these processes of division and enumeration.
Vro. What are you saying, my good friend?
Soc. I say that still a fourth class is wanted.
Pro. And what will that be?
Soc. Find the cause of the third or compound, and add this as a fourth class to the three others.
Pro. And would you like to have a fifth class or cause of resolution, as well as composition?
Soc. Not, I think, at present; but if I want a fifth at some future time you shall allow me to have one.
Pro. Certainly.
Soc. Let us begin with the three first; and as we find two out of the three greatly divided and dispersed, let us endeavour to reunite them, and see how in each of them there is a one and many.

Pro. If you would explain to me a little more about them, perhaps I might be able to follow you.
Soc. Well, the two are the same, which I mentioned before; one being the finite, and the other the infinite, and I will first show that the infinite is in a certain sense many, and the finite may be hereafter discussed.
Pro. I agree.
Soc. And now consider well; for the question which I bid you consider is difficult and controverted. When you speak of hotter and colder, can you conceive any limit in those qualities? Does not the more and less, which dwells in their very nature, prevent their having any end? for if they had an end, they would be at an end.
Pro. That is most true.
Soc. Ever, as we say, into the hotter and the colder there enters a more and a less.
Pro. True.
Soc. Then, says the argument, they have never any end, and being endless must also be infinite.
Pro. Yes, Socrates, that is extremely true.
Soc. Yes, my dear Protarchus, and your word 'extremely' suggests to me at the right moment that such expressions as extremely, and also the term gently, equally imply more or less, for whenever they occur they do not allow of the existence of quantity; they are always introducing degrees into actions, instituting a comparison of the more or less violent or more or less gentle, and at each creation of more or less, quantity disappears. For, as I was just now
saying, if quantity and measure did not disappear, but were allowed to intrude in the sphere of more and less and the other comparatives, these last would themselves be driven out of their own domain. When definite quantity was once admitted, there could be no longer a 'hotter' or a 'colder' (for these are always progressing, and are never in one stay); but definite quantity is at rest, and progresses not. Which proves that comparatives, such as the hotter and the colder, are to be ranked in the class of the infinite.

Pro. That certainly has the appearance of truth, Socrates; but these subjects, as you were saying, are difficult to follow at first. I think, however, that if I could hear the argument repeated by you once or twice, there would be a substantial agreement between us.

Soc. Yes, and I will try to meet your wish; but, as I would rather not waste time in tedious particulars, let me know whether I may not assume as a note of the infinite—

Pro. What is the note?

Soc. I want to know whether such things, as appear to us to admit of more or less, or are denoted by the words extremely, gently, exceedingly, and the like, may not be referred to the class of the infinite, which is their unity, for, as was asserted in the previous argument, all things that were divided and dispersed were to be brought together, and have the mark or seal of some one nature corresponding to some one power and quality in them set upon them; do you remember?

Pro. Yes, I remember.

Soc. And all things which do not admit of more or less, but admit their opposites, that is to say, first of all, equality, and the equal, or again, the double, or which exist in any relation of number and measure—all these may, I think, be rightly reckoned in the class of the limit or finite; what do you say to that?

Pro. That is excellent, Socrates.

Soc. And now what shall we say of the third or compound kind?

Pro. That you will also have to tell me, I think.

Soc. Rather God will tell you, if there be any God who will listen to my prayers.

Pro. Offer up a prayer, then, and think.

Soc. I have thought, Protarchus, and I believe that there is a God who has answered my prayer.
Pro. What do you mean by that, and what proof have you to offer?

Soc. I will tell you, and do you listen to my words.

Pro. Proceed.

Soc. Were we not speaking just now of hotter and colder?

Pro. True.

Soc. Add to them drier, wetter, more, less, swifter, slower, greater, smaller, and all that has been already supposed to fall under the unity of more and less.

Pro. In the class of the infinite, that is?

Soc. Yes; mingle now with that the class of the finite.

Pro. What class is that?

Soc. The class which we have now to bring together, as we brought together the infinite, but this has not yet been done, and may be done now just as well; and when both have been brought together, the third will appear.

Pro. Of what class are you speaking, and what do you mean?

Soc. The class of the equal and the double, and any class which puts an end to difference and opposition, and by introducing number makes the differing elements commensurable and harmonious.

Pro. I understand; you seem to me to mean that on the admixture of these elements certain changes take place.

Soc. Yes, that is my meaning.

Pro. Proceed.

Soc. Does not the true adjustment of them give health—in disease, for instance?

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. And whereas the grave and acute, the swift and the slow are infinite or unlimited, does not the addition of them introduce a limit, and perfect the whole frame of music?

Pro. Yes, certainly.

Soc. Or, again, when cold and heat prevail, does not this admixture take away the excess and indefiniteness of them, and make them moderate and harmonious?

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. And from a like admixture come the seasons, and every good that there is in the world?

Pro. Most true.
Soc. I omit to speak of ten thousand other things, such as beauty and health and strength, and of the many beauties and high perfections of the soul; methinks, O my fair Philebus, that the goddess saw the universal wantonness and wickedness of all things, having no limit of pleasure or satiety, and she devised the limit of law and order, tormenting the soul, as you say, Philebus, or, as I affirm, saving the soul.—But what think you, Protarchus?

Pro. I am quite of your mind, Socrates.

Soc. And you will observe that I have spoken of three classes?

Pro. Yes, I think that I understand you: you mean to say that the infinite is one class, and that the finite is a second class of existences; but what you would make the third I am not so certain.

Soc. That is because the number of particulars in the third class overmasters you, my dear friend; but there was not this difficulty with the infinite, which also comprehended many classes, because all of them were sealed with the note of more and less, and therefore appeared one.

Pro. True.

Soc. And the finite or limit had no divisions, and was easily recognised as by nature one?

Pro. Yes.

Soc. Yes, indeed; and when I speak of the third class, understand me to mean any offspring of the union of these two which is a generation into essence, and is effected by the measure which the limit introduces.

Pro. I understand.

Soc. Still there was, as we said, a fourth class which has now to be investigated, and in the investigation of which you must assist, for does not everything which comes into being of necessity come into being through a cause?

Pro. Yes, I think that; for how can there be anything which has no cause?

Soc. And is not the agent the same as the cause in all except name; the agent and the cause may be truly called one?

Pro. Very true.

Soc. And the same may be said of the patient, or effect; we shall find that they too differ, as I was saying, only in name—shall we not?
Pro. We shall.

Soc. The agent or cause always naturally leads, and the patient or effect naturally follows.

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. Then the cause and that which enables the cause to generate are not the same?

Pro. Certainly not.

Soc. Did not the things which were generated, and the things out of which they were produced, furnish all the three classes?

Pro. Yes.

Soc. And the creator or cause of them has been satisfactorily proven to be distinct from them,—and may we not call that a fourth principle?

Pro. By all means.

Soc. And now, having distinguished the four, I think that we had better refresh our memories by recapitulating each of them in order.

Pro. Surely.

Soc. Then the first I will call the infinite or unlimited, and the second the finite or limit, the third a mixed element generated out of them; and I do not think that I shall be far wrong in speaking of the cause of mixture and generation as the fourth.

Pro. Certainly not.

Soc. And now what was the question, and how came we hither? Were we not busy in enquiring whether the second place belonged to pleasure or wisdom:—Is not that true?

Pro. Yes.

Soc. And now that these points have been determined, shall we not be better able to decide about the first and second place, which was the original subject of dispute?

Pro. I dare say.

Soc. We said, if you remember, that the mixed life of pleasure and wisdom was the conqueror?

Pro. True.

Soc. And can we help seeing the class to which this life is to be assigned, and the nature of it?

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. There can be no doubt that this is a part of the third or mixed class; for that is not composed of any two particular
ingredients, but of all the elements of infinity, bound down by
the finite. And of this the conqueror life may be truly called
a part.

Pro. Most true.

Soc. And what shall we say, Philebus, of your life sweet and
simple; in which of the aforesaid classes is that to be placed? Perhaps you will allow me to ask you a question before you
answer?

Pro. Let me hear.

Soc. Have pleasure and pain a limit, or do they belong to the
class which admits of more and less?

Phi. They belong to the class which admits of more, Socrates;
for pleasure would not be the absolute good if she were not infinite
in number and degree.

Soc. No more, Philebus, than pain would be the absolute evil.
And therefore the infinite cannot be that which imparts to plea-
sure anything of the nature of good; though I grant you that she
belongs to the infinite class. But now in which of the aforesaid
classes, O Protarchus and Philebus, may we reverently place
wisdom and knowledge and mind? And let us be careful, for
I think that the danger will be very serious if we err on this
point.

Phi. You magnify, Socrates, the importance of your favourite
god.

Soc. And you, my friend, are also magnifying your goddess; but
still I must beg you to answer the question.

Pro. Socrates is quite right, Philebus, and you should obey
him.

Phi. And did you not, Protarchus, propose to answer in my
place?

Pro. Certainly I did; but I am now in a great strait, and I must
entreat you, Socrates, to be our teacher, and then we shall not say
anything wrong or disrespectful of your favourite.

Soc. I must obey you, O Protarchus; nor is the task which you
impose a difficult one; but have I really, as Philebus says, discon-
certed you with my playful solemnity, in asking the question to
what class mind and knowledge belong?

Pro. You have, indeed, Socrates.

Soc. Yet the answer is easy, as all philosophers are agreed that
mind is the king of heaven and earth; in this way truly they magnify themselves. And perhaps they are right. But still I should like to consider the class of mind, if you do not object, a little more fully.

*Phi.* Take your own course, Socrates, and do not mind the length on our account, as we shall be glad to hear you at any length.

*Soc.* Very good; let us begin then, Protarchus, by asking whether all this which they call the universe is left to the guidance of an irrational and random chance, or, on the contrary, as our fathers have declared, ordered and governed by a marvellous intelligence and wisdom.

*Pro.* Wide asunder are the two assertions, illustrious Socrates, for that which you are now saying is blasphemy; but the other assertion, that mind orders all things, is worthy of the aspect of the world, and of the sun, and of the moon, and of the whole circle of the heavens; and never will I say or think otherwise.

*Soc.* Shall we, then, agree with them of old time in maintaining this doctrine,—nor merely reasserting the notions of others, without risk to ourselves,—but shall we venture also to share in the risk, and bear the reproaches which will await us, when an ingenious individual declares that all is disorder?

*Pro.* That would certainly be my wish.

*Soc.* Then now please to consider the next stage of the argument.

*Pro.* Let me hear.

*Soc.* We see the elements which enter into the nature of the bodies of all animals, fire, water, air, and, as the storm-tossed sailor cries, ‘land ahead,’ in the constitution of the world.

*Pro.* That may be applied to us; for truly the storm gathers over us, and we are at our wit’s end.

*Soc.* Consider now that any one of the elements, as they exist in us, is but a small fraction of them, and of a mean sort, and not in any way pure, or having any power worthy of its nature. One instance will prove this of all of them; there is a fire within us, and in the universe.

*Pro.* True.

*Soc.* And is not our fire small and weak and mean, but the fire in the universe is wonderful in quantity and beauty, and in every power that fire has?
Pro. Most true.
Soc. And is that universal element nourished and generated and ruled by our fire, or is the fire in you and me, and in other animals, dependent on the universal fire?
Pro. That is a question which does not deserve an answer.
Soc. Right; and you would say the same, if I am not mistaken, of the earth which is in animals and the earth which is in the universe, and you would give a similar reply about all the other elements?
Pro. Why, how could any man who gave any other be deemed in his senses?
Soc. I do not think that he could—but now go a step further; when we see those elements of which we have been speaking gathered up in one, do we not call them a body?
Pro. Very true.
Soc. And the same may be said of the cosmos, which for the same reason may be considered as a body, because made up of the same elements.
Pro. Very true.
Soc. But is our body nourished wholly by this body, or is this body nourished by our body, thence deriving and having the qualities of which we were just now speaking?
Pro. That again, Socrates, is a question which does not deserve to be asked.
Soc. Well, will you deign to give me an answer to another question?
Pro. What is that?
Soc. May our body be said to have a soul?
Pro. Clearly.
Soc. And whence comes that soul, my dear Protarchus, unless the body of the universe, which contains elements similar and fairer far, had also a soul? Can there be another source?
Pro. Clearly, Socrates, that is the only source.
Soc. Why, yes, Protarchus; for surely we cannot imagine that of the four elements, the finite, the infinite, the composition of the two, and the cause or fourth element, which enters into all things, giving to our bodies souls, and the art of self-management, and of healing disease, and operating in other ways to heal and organize;—that this last, I say, should be called by all the names of wisdom, and
not imagine that while the other elements equally exist in a larger form, both in the entire heaven, and in great provinces of the heaven, only fairer and purer, in this higher sphere the cause which is the noblest and fairest of all natures has still no existence?

Pro. That would be utterly irrational.

Soc. But if that is not true, should we not be wiser in assenting to that other argument, which says, as we have often repeated, that there is in the universe a mighty infinite and an adequate limit, as well as a cause of no mean power, which orders and arranges years and seasons and months, and may be justly called wisdom and mind?

Pro. Most justly.

Soc. And wisdom and mind cannot exist without soul?

Pro. Certainly not.

Soc. And in the divine nature of Zeus would you not say that there is the soul and mind of a king, and that the power of the cause engenders this? And other gods will have other noble attributes, whereby they love severally to be called.

Pro. Very true.

Soc. Do not then suppose that these words are rashly spoken by us, O Protarchus, for they are in harmony with the testimony of those who said of old time that mind rules the universe.

Pro. True.

Soc. And they furnish an answer to my enquiry; for they imply that mind belongs to that class of the four which is the cause of all, - and I think that you now have my answer.

Pro. I have indeed, and yet I did not know that you had anwered.

Soc. You are merry, Protarchus, and a jest may sometimes pleasantly interrupt earnest.

Pro. Very true.

31 Soc. Then, my friend, I think that we have now pretty clearly set forth the class to which mind belongs and what is the power of mind?

Pro. True.

Soc. And the class of pleasure has also been set forth?

Pro. Yes.

Soc. And let us remember, too, of both of them, that (1) mind was akin to the cause and of this family; (2) and that pleasure is

1 Reading γένος τοῦ πάντων.
infinite and belongs to that class, which neither has, nor ever will have, a beginning, middle, or end of its own.

Pro. I shall not fail to remember.

Soc. And next we must examine the place of each, and the feeling in which they originate, beginning with pleasure, as her class came first in the enquiry; and yet pleasure cannot be adequately examined when separated from pain.

Pro. If this is the road, let us take it.

Soc. I wonder whether you would agree with me about the origin of pleasures.

Pro. What do you mean?

Soc. I mean to say that their natural seat is in the mixed class.

Pro. And would you tell me once more, sweet Socrates, which of the aforesaid classes is the mixed one?

Soc. I will, my fine fellow, to the best of my ability.

Pro. Very good.

Soc. Let us then understand the mixed class to be that which is third in the list of four.

Pro. That which followed the infinite and the finite; and in which you ranked health, and, if I am not mistaken, harmony.

Soc. Capital; and now will you please to give me your best attention?

Pro. Proceed; I am attending.

Soc. I say that when the harmony in animals is relaxed, there is also a relaxation of nature and a generation of pain.

Pro. That is very probable.

Soc. And the restoration of harmony and return to nature is the source of pleasure, if I may be allowed to speak in the fewest and shortest words about matters of the greatest moment.

Pro. I believe that you are right, Socrates; but will you try to be a little plainer?

Soc. I think that every-day phenomena will furnish the easiest explanation.

Pro. What phenomena do you mean?

Soc. I should take the case of hunger, which is a relaxation and a pain.

Pro. True.

Soc. Whereas eating is a replenishment and a pleasure?

Pro. Yes.
Thirst again is a cause of destruction and a pain, but the effect of moisture replenishing the dry place is a pleasure; again, the unnatural separation and dissolution caused by heat is painful, and the natural restoration and refrigeration is pleasant.

Pro. Very true.

And the unnatural congelation of the moisture in the animal is pain, and the natural process of resolution and return of the elements to their original state is pleasure. And would not the general proposition seem to you to hold, that the destroying of the natural union of the finite and infinite, which, as I was observing before, make up the class of living beings, is pain, and that the process and return of all things to their own nature is pleasure?

Pro. Let us assume this; which, as I am disposed to think, is a rough outline of the truth.

Then we may note one class of pleasures and pains arising in these processes which we have described?

Pro. Good.

Let us next assume that in the soul herself, when anticipating these affections, there is a hope of pleasure which is sweet and consoling, and an expectation of pain, fearful and anxious.

Pro. Yes; this is another class of pleasures and pains, which is of the soul only, and is produced by expectation without the body.

Right; and I think that the examination of these two kinds, unalloyed as I suppose them to be, and not compounds of pleasure and pain, will most clearly show whether the whole class of pleasure is to be desired, or whether this entire desirableness is not rather to be attributed to another of the classes which have been mentioned; and whether pleasure and pain, like heat and cold, and other things of this kind, are not sometimes to be desired and sometimes not to be desired, as being not in themselves good, but sometimes and in some instances admitting of the nature of good.

You say most truly that this is the track which the investigation should follow.

Well, then, assuming that pain ensues on the dissolution and pleasure on the restoration of the harmony, let us now ask what will be the condition of animated beings who are neither in process of restoration nor of dissolution. And mind what you are going to say. I ask whether any animal when he is in that condition can possibly have any feeling of pleasure or pain, great or small?
Pro. Certainly not.

Sac. Then there is a third state, over and above that of pleasure and of pain?

Pro. Very true.

Sac. And you must not forget that this will generally affect our judgment of pleasure, and I should like to say a word or two about it.

Pro. What will you say?

Sac. Why, you know that if a man chooses the life of wisdom, there is no reason why he should not live in this neutral state.

Pro. You mean that he may live neither rejoicing nor sorrowing?

Sac. Yes; and if I remember rightly, when the lives were compared, no degree of pleasure, whether great or small, was thought to be necessary to him who chose the life of thought and wisdom.

Pro. Yes, certainly, that was said.

Sac. Then this may be his life; and who knows whether this may not be the most divine of all lives?

Pro. At any rate, the gods cannot be supposed to have either joy or sorrow.

Sac. Certainly, that is not to be supposed—there would be great impropriety in their having either: this, however, is a matter which may hereafter be investigated, if necessary, and imputed to the credit of mind in her contest for the second place, if her right to the first place has to be given up.

Pro. Most true.

Sac. The other class of pleasure, which, as we were saying, is purely mental, originates in memory.

Pro. How is that?

Sac. Memory will have to be first analysed, and this seems to carry us back to perception, if we are ever to have the nature of these feelings properly cleared up.

Pro. How do you mean?

Sac. Let us imagine affections of the body which are extinguished before they reach the soul, which remains unaffected by them; and again, other affections which vibrate through both soul and body, and impart a shock to both of them.

Pro. Let us suppose that.

Sac. And the soul may be said to be forgetful of the first and unforgettable of the second?
Pro. Quite true.

Soc. When I say this, do not suppose that I mean forgetfulness in a literal sense; for forgetfulness is the exit of memory, which in this case has not yet entered; and to speak of the loss of that which is not yet in existence, and never has been, is a contradic-
tion;—you see that?

Pro. Yes.

Soc. Then just be so good as change the terms.

Pro. How shall I change them?

Soc. Instead of the forgetfulness of the soul, when you are describing the state in which she is unaffected by the shocks of the body, say unconsciousness.

Pro. I see.

Soc. And the union or communion of soul and body in one feeling and motion, may be truly called perception?

Pro. Most truly.

Soc. Then now we know the meaning of perception?

Pro. Very true.

Soc. And memory may, I think, be rightly described as the preservation of perception?

Pro. Right.

Soc. But do we not distinguish memory from recollection?

Pro. I think that we do.

Soc. And by recollection is meant the power which the soul has of recovering, when by herself, some feeling which she experienced when in company with the body. You would admit that?

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. And when she has lost the recollection of some perception or knowledge, and recalls this of herself, that recovery is termed recollection and reminiscence?

Pro. Very true.

Soc. Why do I say all this?

Pro. Why?

Soc. Because I want to attain the plainest possible notion of pleasure, and also of desire, as existing in the mind only without the body; and in these states of the mind they seem to be most clearly displayed.

Pro. Then now, Socrates, let us proceed to the next point.

Soc. There are certainly many things relating to the generation
and whole complex of pleasure, which require to be considered; and first, as to the nature of desire.

_Pro_. Ay; let us enquire into that, for we will lose nothing.

_Soc_. Nay, Protarchus, we shall surely lose the puzzle if we find the answer.

_Pro_. That is a fair retort; nevertheless, let us proceed.

_Soc_. Do we not speak of hunger, thirst, and the like, as desires?

_Pro_. Certainly we do.

_Soc_. And yet they are very different; what have we then in view when we call them by this common name?

_Pro_. Indeed, Socrates, the question is not easy to answer, and yet must be answered.

_Soc_. Then let us begin at the same point, and take the same examples.

_Pro_. At what point?

_Soc_. Some one is thirsty.

_Pro_. Yes.

_Soc_. And this means that he is empty?

_Pro_. Of course.

_Soc_. And is not thirst desire?

_Pro_. Yes, of drink.

_Soc_. Would you say of drink, or of replenishment with drink?  

_Pro_. I should say, of replenishment with drink.

_Soc_. Then he who is empty desires, as would appear, the opposite of what he feels; for he is empty, and desires to be full?

_Pro_. That is quite clear.

_Soc_. But how can he who is empty for the first time, attain either by perception or memory any apprehension of replenishment, which he has never yet felt, either now or at any former time?

_Pro_. Impossible.

_Soc_. And yet he who desires, surely desires something?

_Pro_. Of course.

_Soc_. Then he does not desire that which he feels, for he is thirsty, and thirst is emptiness, but he desires replenishment?

_Pro_. True.

_Soc_. There must be something in the thirsty man which in some way apprehends replenishment?

_Pro_. There must.
Soc. And that cannot be the body, for the body is supposed to be emptied?

Pro. Yes.

Soc. The only remaining alternative is that the soul apprehends by the help of memory; and this is clearly the case, for what other way can there be?

Pro. I cannot imagine any other.

Soc. But do you see the consequence of this argument?

Pro. What is the consequence?

Soc. That there is no such thing as desire of the body.

Pro. How is that?

Soc. Why, because the argument shows that the tendency of every animal is to the reverse of his actual state.

Pro. Yes.

Soc. And the impulse which leads him to the opposite of that which he feels, shows that he has a memory of that opposite state.

Pro. True.

Soc. And the argument which proves memory to be the source of this impulse towards the objects of desire, proves also that the impulse and the desire and the ruling principle in every living being have their origin in the soul.

Pro. Most true.

Soc. The argument will not allow that our body either hungers or thirsts or has any similar feeling.

Pro. Quite right.

Soc. Let me make a further observation; the argument appears to me to imply that there is another state of life made up of these affections.

Pro. Of what affections, and of what state of life, are you speaking?

Soc. I am speaking of emptiness and replenishment, and all that relates to the salvation and destruction of living beings, and of the alternations of pain and joy which accompany them in their transitions.

Pro. True.

Soc. And what would you say of the state of life which is intermediate between them?

Pro. What do you mean by 'intermediate?'

Soc. I mean when a person is in actual suffering and yet
remembers the pleasures which, if they would only come, would relieve him; but as yet he has them not. May we not say of him, that he is in an intermediate state?

_Pro._ Certainly.

_Soc._ You would not say that he was wholly pained or wholly pleased?

_Pro._ Nay, he has two pains; in his body there is the actual sensation of pain, and in his soul longing and expectation.

_Soc._ What do you mean, Protarchus, by the two pains? May not a man who is empty have at one time a sure hope of being filled, and at other times be quite in despair?

_Pro._ Yes.

_Soc._ And has he not the pleasure of memory when he is hoping to be filled, and yet in that he is empty is he not at the same time in pain?

_Pro._ Certainly.

_Soc._ Then man and the other animals have at one time both pleasure and pain?

_Pro._ That appears to be the fact.

_Soc._ But when a man is empty and has no hope of being filled, his feeling of pain will be doubled; and the observation of this led you to suppose that the pain would always be doubled?

_Pro._ Very true, Socrates.

_Soc._ Shall we make the enquiry into these feelings the occasion of raising a question?

_Pro._ What question?

_Soc._ Whether we ought to say that these pleasures and pains are true or false? or partly true and partly false?

_Pro._ But how, Socrates, can there be false pleasures and pains?

_Soc._ And how, Protarchus, can there be true and false fears, or true and false expectations, or true and false opinions?

_Pro._ I grant that opinions may be true or false, but not pleasures.

_Soc._ What do you mean? I am afraid that we are raising a very serious enquiry.

_Pro._ There I agree.

_Soc._ And yet, my boy, for you are one of Philebus' boys (cp. 16 A), the real point is, whether the enquiry is relevant to the argument.

_Pro._ Surely.
Soc. No tedious and irrelevant discussion can be allowed; that which is said must be pertinent.

Pro. Right.

Soc. I am always wondering at the question which has now been raised.

Pro. What question?

Soc. Are there not some pleasures false, and others true?

Pro. Impossible.

Soc. Would you say that no one ever seemed to rejoice and yet did not rejoice, or seemed to feel pain and yet did not feel pain, sleeping or waking, mad or moonstruck?

Pro. The universal opinion, Socrates, is that they do.

Soc. And is that a true opinion? Shall we enquire into the truth of it?

Pro. I think that we should enquire.

Soc. Let us then determine more precisely what the question is, which has arisen about pleasure and opinion. Is there such a thing as opinion?

Pro. Yes.

Soc. And such a thing as pleasure?

Pro. Yes.

Soc. And there must be something about which a man has an opinion?

Pro. True.

Soc. And something which gives pleasure?

Pro. Quite correct.

Soc. And whether his opinion is right or wrong, makes no difference; he will still always have an opinion?

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. And he who is pleased, whether he is rightly pleased or not, will always have a real feeling of pleasure?

Pro. Yes; that is also quite true.

Soc. Then, how can opinion be true and false, and pleasure only true; and yet the state of being pleased, or holding an opinion, may be real in both?

Pro. Yes; that is the question.

Soc. You mean that opinion has the attributes of true and false, and hence becomes not merely opinion, but opinion of a certain quality; and this is what you think should be examined?
Pro. Yes.
Soc. And further, we must consider, whether admitting the existence of qualities in some objects, pleasure and pain may not be simple and devoid of quality?
Pro. Clearly.
Soc. But there is no difficulty in seeing that pleasure and pain as well as opinion have qualities, for they are great or small, and have various degrees of intensity; as was indeed said long ago by us.
Pro. Quite true.
Soc. And if there is badness in any of them, Protarchus, then we should speak of a bad opinion or of a bad pleasure?
Pro. Quite true, Socrates.
Soc. And if there is rightness in any of them, should we not speak of a right opinion or right pleasure; and in like manner of the reverse of rightness?
Pro. Certainly.
Soc. And if the thing opined be erroneous, might we not say that the opinion is erroneous, and not rightly opined?
Pro. Certainly.
Soc. And if we see a pleasure or pain which errs in respect of the object of pleasure or pain, do we call that right or good, or by any name which implies good?
Pro. Not if the pleasure is mistaken; that would be impossible.
Soc. And surely pleasure often appears to rest on an opinion which is not true, but false?
Pro. That is quite correct; and in that case, Socrates, we call the opinion false, but no one could call the actual pleasure false.
Soc. How eagerly, Protarchus, do you rush to the defence of pleasure!
Pro. Nay, Socrates, I only say what I hear.
Soc. And is there no difference, my friend, between that pleasure which is associated with right opinion and knowledge, and that which is often found in us associated with falsehood and ignorance?
Pro. There must surely be a very great difference between them.
Soc. Then, now let us proceed to contemplate this difference.
Pro. Lead, and I will follow.
Soc. Well, then, my view is—
Pro. What?
Soc. I ask first of all, whether you would not acknowledge that there is such a thing as false, and that there is such a thing as true opinion?
Pro. There is.
Soc. And pleasure and pain, as I was saying, are often consequent upon them,—upon true and false opinion, that is, I mean.
Pro. Very true.
Soc. And do not opinion and the power of discernment always spring from memory and perception?
Pro. Certainly.
Soc. Might we imagine the process to be something of this sort? An object, let us say, is seen at a distance not very clearly, and the seer wants to determine what this is which he sees.
Pro. Very likely.
Soc. He asks, first of all—'what is this image which is standing by a rock under a tree?' That is the question which he may be supposed to put to himself when he sees such an image.
Pro. True.
Soc. To which he guesses the right answer, and says in a whisper to himself—'this is a man.'
Pro. Very good.
Soc. Or again, he is misled, and then he says—'No, that is a figure made by the shepherds.'
Pro. Yes.
Soc. And if he has a companion, he repeats his thought to him in articulate sounds, and what was before an opinion, has now become a proposition.
Pro. Certainly.
Soc. But if he be alone he keeps the thought in his mind, not unfrequently for a considerable time, as he is walking along.
Pro. Very true.
Soc. Well, now, I wonder whether you would agree in a notion that I have about this?
Pro. What is your notion?
Soc. My notion is that the soul is like a book.
Pro. How is that?
Soc. Memory and perception meet, and they and their attendant
feelings seem to me almost to write down words in the soul, and when the inscribing feeling writes truly, then true opinion and true propositions grow in our souls—but when the scribe within us writes falsely the result is false.

Pro. I quite assent and agree to your statement.

Soc. I must bespeak your favour also for another artist, who is busy at the same time in the chambers of the soul.

Pro. Who is that?

Soc. The painter, who paints the images of the words which the scribe or registrar has already written down.

Pro. But when and how does he do this?

Soc. When abstracting from sight, or some other sense, the opinions which he received or the words which he uttered, he retains the image of them;—that is a very common mental phenomenon.

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. And the images of true opinions and words are true, and of false opinions and words false; are they not?

Pro. They are.

Soc. And if this is true there arises a further question.

Pro. What is that?

Soc. Whether we experience this feeling only in relation to the present and the past, or in relation to the future also?

Pro. I should say in relation to all times alike.

Soc. Have not purely mental pleasures and pains been described already as in some cases anticipations of the bodily ones; from which we may infer that there is an anticipatory pleasure and pain, and this has to do with the future?

Pro. Most true.

Soc. And do all those writings and paintings which a little while ago we were supposing to exist in our minds relate to the past and present only, and not to the future?

Pro. Quite otherwise.

Soc. When you say 'Quite otherwise,' you mean to imply that these writings and paintings are all hopes, and that mankind are filled with hopes in every stage of existence?

Pro. Exactly.

Soc. Answer me another question.

Pro. What question?
Soc. A just and pious and good man is the friend of the gods; is he not?

Pro. Certainly he is.

Soc. And the unjust and the bad man is the reverse?

Pro. True.

Soc. And all men, as we were saying just now, are always filled with hopes?

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. And these hopes, as they are termed, are propositions which exist in the minds of each of us?

Pro. Yes.

Soc. And the fancies of hope are also pictured in us; a man may often have a vision of a heap of gold, and pleasures ensuing, and in the picture there may be a likeness of himself mightily rejoicing over his good fortune.

Pro. True.

Soc. And may we not say that the good being friends of the gods have generally true pictures presented to them, and the bad false pictures?

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. And yet the bad have pleasures painted in their fancy as well as the good; but I presume that they are false pleasures?

Pro. They are.

Soc. The bad then commonly delight in false pleasures, and the good in true pleasures?

Pro. That is most certain.

Soc. Then upon this view there are false pleasures in the souls of men which are a ludicrous imitation of the true, and there are pains also?

Pro. There are.

Soc. And did we not allow that a man who had an opinion at all had a real opinion, but often about things which had no existence either in the past, present, or future?

Pro. Quite true.

Soc. And this was the source of false opinion and opinings; am I not right?

Pro. Yes.

Soc. And must not pleasure and pain be admitted to be analogous states?
**Pro.** How do you mean?

**Soc.** I mean to say that a man must be admitted to have real pleasure who is pleased with anything or anyhow; and he may be pleased about things which neither have nor ever had any real existence, and, more often than not, are never likely to exist.

**Pro.** Yes, Socrates, that is undeniable.

**Soc.** And may not the same be said about fear and anger and the like; are they not often false?

**Pro.** Quite true.

**Soc.** And can opinions be good or bad except in as far as they are true or false?

**Pro.** There is no other way.

**Soc.** Nor can pleasures be conceived to be bad except in as far as they are false?

**Pro.** Nay, Socrates, that is the very opposite of the truth; for no one would call pleasures and pains bad because they are false, but by reason of some other great evil to which they are liable.

**Soc.** Well, of pleasures which are evil and have their origin in evil we will hereafter speak, unless we alter our minds; at present I would rather show from another point of view that there are many false pleasures existing or coming into existence in us, because this may assist us in arriving at a decision.

**Pro.** Very true; that is to say, if there are such.

**Soc.** I think that there are, Protarchus; and this is a question which should certainly be investigated, and not left unsettled by us.

**Pro.** Very good.

**Soc.** Then now, like wrestlers, let us approach to this new argument.

**Pro.** Let us proceed.

**Soc.** We were maintaining a little while since, that when desires, as they are termed, exist in us, then the feelings of the body are divided from the feelings of the soul—you remember that?

**Pro.** Yes, I remember to have heard that.

**Soc.** And the soul was that which was supposed to desire the opposite of the bodily state, and the body was that which caused pleasure or pain by reason of some feeling.

**Pro.** True.

**Soc.** Then now draw the inference.
Pro. Proceed.

Soc. The inference is, that when this takes place pleasures and pains come simultaneously, and opposite feelings of pleasure and pain are experienced together, as has been already shown.

Pro. That is evident.

Soc. And have we not further agreed that pleasure and pain both admit of more and less, and that they are of the class of infinites?

Pro. Certainly, that was said.

Soc. But how can we rightly judge of this? Can we institute a comparison of pleasures and pains as to the degree or violence of them? How is pleasure to be measured against pain, or pain against pain, or pleasure against pleasure? Supposing this to be our aim, how can we rightly judge of them?

Pro. That is certainly the aim of our comparison.

Soc. Well, to return to the case of sight. Does not the near or distant vision of magnitudes darken their true proportion, and make us opine falsely; and do we not find the same happening in the case of pleasures and pains?

Pro. Yes, Socrates, and I should say that this happens in a far greater degree with them.

Soc. Then what we are now saying is the opposite of what we were saying before.

Pro. What was that?

Soc. Then the opinions were true and false, and infected the pleasures and pains with their own falsehood.

Pro. That is most true.

Soc. But now the pleasures are said to be true or false because they are seen at various distances, and subjected to comparison; the pleasures appear to be greater and more vehement when compared with the pains, and the pains when compared with the pleasures.

Pro. That is certainly the case, and for the reason which you mention.

Soc. When abstraction has been made of this appearance of greater and less, you cannot say that the apparent excess is real, or that the corresponding excess of pleasure or pain is real or true.

Pro. Certainly not.

Soc. Next let us see whether in another direction we may not
find pleasures and pains existing and appearing in living beings, which are still more false than these.

_Pro_. What are they, and in what way do you mean?

_Soc_. If I am not mistaken, I have often repeated that pains and afflictions, and aches and uneasiness of all sorts arise out of a corruption of nature caused by coagulations, and dissolutions, and repletions, and evacuations, and also by increase and diminution?

_Pro_. Yes, that has been often said.

_Soc_. And we have also agreed that the restoration of nature is pleasure?

_Pro_. Right.

_Soc_. But now let us suppose a time at which the body experiences none of these changes.

_Pro_. And when is that, Socrates?

_Soc_. That, Protarchus, is not to the point.

_Pro_. Why not, Socrates?

_Soc_. Because your question does not prevent me from repeating mine.

_Pro_. In what form?

_Soc_. Why, Protarchus, admitting that there is no such interval, I may ask what would be the necessary result if there were?

_Pro_. You mean, what would happen if the body were not changed in either way?

_Soc_. Yes.

_Pro_. Why then, Socrates, I should suppose that there would be neither pleasure nor pain.

_Soc_. Very good; but still, if I am not mistaken, you do assert that one of the two must constantly happen, as philosophers say who tell us that all things are ever flowing up and down.

_Pro_. Yes, and their words are of no mean authority.

_Soc_. Of course, for they are no mean authorities themselves; and yet I should like to avoid the brunt of their argument. Shall I tell you how I mean to escape from them? And I hope that you will run away with me.

_Pro_. How is that?

_Soc_. To them we will say, 'that is very good,' but are we, or living things in general, always conscious of what happens to us, for example, of our growth, or the like; on the contrary, are we
not almost wholly unconscious of this and similar phenomena? you must answer for them.

Pro. The latter, certainly.

Soc. Then we were not right in saying, as was just now affirmed, that these upward and downward changes cause pleasures and pains.

Pro. True.

Soc. A better and more unexceptionable way of speaking will be—

Pro. What?

Soc. If we say that the great changes produce pleasures and pains, but that the moderate and lesser ones do not give any at all.

Pro. That, Socrates, is the more correct mode of statement.

Soc. But if this be true, the life of which I was just now speaking will come back again.

Pro. What life?

Soc. The life which I said was devoid either of pain or of joy.

Pro. That is very true.

Soc. Then we may assume that there are three lives, one pleasant, one painful, and the third which is neither; would you not describe them in that way?

Pro. I should describe them just in that way.

Soc. And the negation of pain will not be the same as pleasure.

Pro. Certainly not.

Soc. Then when you hear a person saying, that always to live without pain is the pleasantest of all things, what would you understand him to mean by that statement?

Pro. I think that by pleasure he must mean the negative of pain.

Soc. Let us take any three things; or suppose that we embellish a little by giving them the names of gold, silver, and a third which is neither.

Pro. Very good.

Soc. Now, can that which is neither be either gold or silver?

Pro. Impossible.

Soc. No more can that neutral or middle life be rightly or reasonably regarded or spoken of as pleasant or painful.

Pro. Certainly not.
Soc. And yet, my friend, there are, as we know, persons who say and think this.

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. And do they think that they have pleasure when they are free from pain?

Pro. They say so.

Soc. And they must think or they would not say that they have pleasure.

Pro. I suppose not.

Soc. And yet if pleasure and the negation of pain are of distinct natures, they are wrong in this.

Pro. But they are undoubtedly of distinct natures.

Soc. Then shall we take the view that they are three, as we were just now saying, or two only—the one being a state of pain, which is an evil, and the other a cessation of pain, which is of itself a good, and is designated pleasure?

Pro. But why, Socrates, are we raising this question? I do not see the reason why.

Soc. You, Protarchus, have clearly never heard of certain enemies of our friend Philebus.

Pro. And who may they be?

Soc. Certain who are reputed to be masters in natural philosophy, and who deny the very existence of pleasure.

Pro. Indeed!

Soc. They say that what the school of Philebus calls pleasures are all of them only avoidances of pain.

Pro. And would you, Socrates, have us agree with them?

Soc. Why, no, I would rather use them as a sort of diviners, who are enabled to divine the truth, not by any rules of art, but by an instinctive repugnance and extreme detestation which a noble nature has of the power of pleasure, in which they think that there is nothing sound, and whose seductive influence is declared by them to be witchcraft, and not pleasure. These arguments of theirs you shall first use, not omitting any other grounds of offence which they may have, and after that you shall hear from me what I deem to be true pleasures;—when the nature and power of pleasure have been considered from both points of view, we may compare and judge them.

Pro. True.
Soc. Then let us enter into an alliance with them, and follow the track which their dislike finds. I imagine that they would say something of this sort; they would begin a little higher up, and ask whether, if we wanted to know the nature and qualities of any class, we should be more likely to discover the quality, shall I say of hardness, by looking at the hardest things, or at the least hard? You, Protarchus, shall answer these severe gentlemen who address you in my person.

Pro. By all means, and I have no difficulty in saying to them, that you should look at the hardest things.

Soc. Then if we want to see the true nature of pleasures as a class, we should not look at the most diluted pleasures, but at the most extreme and most vehement?

Pro. In that every one will be ready to agree.

Soc. And the obvious examples of intense pleasure, as has been often repeated, are pleasures of the body?

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. And are they felt by us to be or become greater, when we are sick or when we are in health? And here we must be careful in our answer, and not make a mistake.

Pro. How are we likely to mistake?

Soc. Why, because we might be tempted to answer rashly, 'when we are in health.'

Pro. Yes, that is the natural answer.

Soc. Well, but are not those pleasures the greatest which are attached to the greatest desires?

Pro. That is true.

Soc. And do not people who are in a fever, or any similar illness, feel cold or thirst or other bodily affection more intensely? Am I not right in saying that they have a deeper want and greater pleasure in the satisfaction of their want?

Pro. That is true.

Soc. Well, then, shall we not be right in saying, that if a person would wish to see the greatest pleasures he ought to go and look, not at health, but at disease? And here you must distinguish:—do not imagine that I am asking whether those who are very ill have more pleasure than those who are well, but understand that I am speaking of the greatness of pleasure; I want to know where pleasures are found to be most in excess. For, as I say, we have
to discover what is the nature of pleasure, and the meaning of
those who deny her very existence.

_Pro._ I believe that I understand you.

_Soc._ You shall soon show that, Protarchus, for you shall answer
me; say then whether you see not more but greater and more ex-
cessive pleasures in wantonness or in temperance? and please to
think before you speak.

_Pro._ I understand you, and see that there is great difference
between them; the temperate are restrained by the wise man's
aphorisms of 'never too much,' which is their rule, but excess of
pleasure possesses and excites the minds of fools and wantons until
they are quite mad and become notorious.

_Soc._ Very good, and if this be true, then the greatest pleasures
and pains will clearly be found in some vicious state of soul and
body, and not in the right state.

_Pro._ Certainly.

_Soc._ And ought we not to select some of these for examination, and see what makes them the greatest?

_Pro._ Certainly.

_Soc._ Take the case of the pleasures which arise out of certain
disorders.

_Pro._ What disorders?

_Soc._ The pleasures of unseemly disorders, which our severe friends
utterly detest.

_Pro._ What pleasures?

_Soc._ Such, for example, as the relief of itching and other ailments
by scratching, which is the only remedy required. For what in
Heaven's name is the feeling to be called which is thus produced?
—Pleasure or pain?

_Pro._ Some mixed form of evil, Socrates, I should rather say.

_Soc._ I did not introduce the argument, O Protarchus, with any
special reference to Philebus, but because, without the consideration
of these and similar pleasures, we shall not be able to determine
the point at issue.

_Pro._ Then we had better proceed to analyse this family of
pleasures.

_Soc._ You mean the mixed pleasures, which are partly pains?

_Pro._ Exactly.

_Soc._ There are some mixtures which are of the body, and only in
the body, and others which are of the soul, and only in the soul; while there are other mixtures of pleasures with pains, common both to soul and body, which in their composite state are called sometimes pleasures and sometimes pains.

_Pro._ How is that?

_Soc._ Whenever, in the restoration or in the derangement of nature, a man experiences two opposite feelings; for example, when he is cold and is growing warm, or again, when he is hot and is being cooled, and he wants to have the one and be free from the other;—the sweet has a bitter, as they say, and the two sensations fasten upon him, and cause impatience, and, finally, wild excitement.

_Pro._ That description is very true to nature.

_Soc._ And in these sorts of mixtures the pleasures and pains are sometimes equal, and sometimes one or other of them predominates?

_Pro._ True.

_Soc._ Of the greater pain an example is afforded by scratching and tickling, of which we were speaking, when the fiery and boiling element is within, and the rubbing and motion only relieves the surface, and does not reach the parts affected; then if you put them to the fire, and pass them into an opposite extreme, you may often give the most intense pleasure, or a contrast of pleasures and pains within and on the surface may be produced, which ever way the balance may incline; and this is due to the forcible separation of what is united, and the union of what is separated, causing a juxtaposition of pleasure and pain.

_Pro._ Very true.

_Soc._ Sometimes the element of pleasure prevails in a man, and the slight underfeeling of pain just tickles him, and causes a gentle irritation; or again, the excessive infusion of pleasure creates an excitement in him, and sometimes he will even leap for joy, and display all sorts of colours, attitudes, pantings, and be quite amazed, and utter the most irrational exclamations.

_Pro._ Very true.

_Soc._ He will say of himself, and others will say of him, that he is in a manner dying with these delights; and the more dissipated and good for nothing he is, the more vehemently he pursues them
in every way; and these pleasures he declares to be the greatest; and he reckons him who lives in the most constant enjoyment of them to be the happiest of mankind.

_Pro._ That, Socrates, is a very true description which you have given of these pleasures, as they are regarded by the vulgar.

_Soc._ Yes, Protarchus, quite true of the mixed pleasures, which arise out of the communion of internal and external sensations in the body only; but where the pleasures of the mind mingle with the body the combination takes place in another way—there is a contrast of pleasure and pain, which ends in a coalition between them. I have already remarked, that when a man is empty he desires to be full, and has pleasure in hope and pain in vacuity. But now I must further add what I omitted to remark before, that in all these and similar emotions in which body and mind are opposed (and they are innumerable), pleasure and pain coalesce in one.

_Pro._ I believe that to be quite true.

_Soc._ There still remains one other sort of admixture of pleasures and pains.

_Pro._ What is that?

_Soc._ The union, which, as we were saying, the mind often experiences of purely mental feelings.

_Pro._ What is this union?

_Soc._ Do we not speak of anger, fear, desire, sorrow, love, emulation, envy, and the like, as pains which belong to the soul only?

_Pro._ Yes.

_Soc._ And shall we not find them also full of the most wonderful pleasures? need I remind you of the anger

. . . 'Which stirs even a wise man to violence,
And sweeter is than honey's gentle flow?'

And you remember how pleasures mingle with pains in lamentation and bereavement?

_Pro._ Yes, that is the way of them.

_Soc._ And you remember how at the sight of tragedies the spectators smile through their tears?

_Pro._ Certainly, I do.

2 Reading _περὶ δὲ τῶν ἐν ψυΧῇ σώματι, τὰνάυτα ξυμβάλλεται_.

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Soc. And are you aware that even at a comedy the soul experiences a mixed feeling of pain and pleasure?

Pro. I do not understand that.

Soc. Why, certainly, Protarchus, there is a difficulty in detecting this mixture of feelings at a comedy.

Pro. There is, I think.

Soc. And the greater the difficulty the more desirable is the examination of the case, because the difficulty of examining other cases of mixed pleasures and pains will be diminished.

Pro. Proceed.

Soc. I have just mentioned envy; would you not call that a pain of the soul?

Pro. Yes.

Soc. And yet the envious man finds something in the misfortunes of his neighbours at which he is pleased?

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. And ignorance, and what is termed clownishness, are surely an evil?

Pro. To be sure.

Soc. From these premises learn to know the nature of the ridiculous.

Pro. Explain.

Soc. The ridiculous may be described generally as the name of a state; and is that part of vice in general which is the opposite to the state of which the inscription at Delphi speaks.

Pro. You mean, Socrates, 'know thyself.'

Soc. I do, and the opposite would be, 'know not thyself.'

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. And now, O Protarchus, try to divide this into three.

Pro. How do you mean? for indeed I am afraid that I cannot.

Soc. Do you mean to say that I must make the division for you?

Pro. Yes, and what is more, I entreat that you will.

Soc. Are there not three ways in which ignorance of self may be shown?

Pro. What are they?

Soc. In the first place, about money; the ignorant may fancy himself richer than he is.

Pro. Yes, that is a very common state of mind.

Soc. And still more commonly he may fancy that he is taller or
fairer than he is, or that he has some other advantage of person which he has not really.

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. And yet surely by far the greatest number err about the goods of the mind; they imagine that they are a great deal better than they are.

Pro. Yes, that is by far the commonest delusion.

Soc. And of all the virtues, is not wisdom the one which the mass of mankind are always claiming, and which most arouses in them a spirit of contention and lying conceit of wisdom?

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. And may not all this be truly called an evil condition?

Pro. Very evil.

Soc. And if the division be further pursued, Protarchus, we shall see childish envy, in which is a singular mixture of pleasure and pain.

Pro. How can we make the further division which you suggest?

Soc. All who have this ridiculous conceit of themselves may be divided, like the rest of mankind, into two classes—one of them having power and might; and the other the reverse.

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. Let this, then, be the principle of division; those of them who are weak and unable to revenge themselves, when they are laughed at, may be truly called ridiculous, but those who can defend themselves may be more truly described as strong and formidable, for ignorance in the powerful is hateful and horrible, because hurtful to others both in reality and in fiction, but powerless ignorance may be reckoned, and in truth is, ridiculous.

Pro. That is very true, but I do not as yet see where is the admixture of pleasures and pains.

Soc. Well then, take the case of envy.

Pro. Proceed.

Soc. Is not envy an unrighteous pleasure, and also a pain?

Pro. Most true.

Soc. There is nothing envious or wrong in rejoicing at the misfortunes of enemies?

Pro. Certainly not.

Soc. But is there not injustice in feeling joy instead of sorrow at the sight of our friends' misfortunes?
Certainly.

Soc. For did we not say that ignorance was always an evil?

Pro. True.

Soc. And the vain conceits of our friends about their beauty, wisdom, wealth, of which we made three divisions, are ridiculous if they are weak, and detestable when they are powerful: May we not say, as I was saying before, that our friends who are in this state of mind, when harmless to others, are simply ridiculous?

Pro. They are ridiculous.

Soc. And do we not acknowledge that this ignorance of theirs is a misfortune?

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. And do we feel pain or pleasure in laughing at them?

Pro. Clearly we feel pleasure.

Soc. And was not envy the source of this pleasure which we feel at the misfortunes of friends?

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. Then the argument shows that when we laugh at the folly of our friends, pleasure, in mingling with envy, mingle with pain, for envy has been acknowledged by us to be mental pain, and laughter is pleasant, and we envy and laugh at the same instant.

Pro. True.

Soc. And the argument implies that this combination of pleasure and pain exists not only in lamentations, or in tragedy and comedy, but in the entire drama of human life, and in ten thousand ways.

Pro. I do not see how any one can deny this, Socrates, however eager he may be to assert the opposite opinion.

Soc. I have now exhibited to you the nature of anger, desire, sorrow, fear, love, emulation, envy, and similar emotions, in which, as I was saying, there are to be found examples of the mixture of the two elements so often named; have I not?

Pro. Yes.

Soc. And note, that all the statements hitherto made have had reference only to sorrow and envy and anger.

Pro. I could not fail to notice that.

Soc. But are these all, or are there a great many others remaining?

Pro. Certainly there are many others.

Soc. And why do you suppose that I showed you the admixture
PHILEBUS.

which takes place in comedy? In order that I might easily prove to you the mixed nature of these affections of fear and love and the like; and I thought that when I had given you this as an illustration of them, you would have let me off, and acknowledged at once that the body without the soul, and the soul without the body, as well as the two united, are susceptible of all sorts of admixtures of pleasures and pains, and that further discussion would thus become unnecessary. And now I want to know whether you will let me off; or must I stay here until midnight? I fancy that I may obtain my release without many words;—if I promise that to-morrow I will give you an account of all of them. But at present I would rather sail in another direction, and go to other matters which remain to be settled, preliminary to the judgment which Philebus demands.

Pro. Very good, Socrates, and I hope that you will take your own order in what remains.

Soc. Then after the mixed pleasures the unmixed should have their turn; this is the natural and necessary order.

Pro. Excellent.

Soc. These, in their turn, then, I will now endeavour to explain; for with those who declare that all pleasures are a cessation of pain, I do not agree, but, as I was saying, use them as witnesses of the existence of some pleasures which are imaginary and in no way real, as well as of another sort which have great power and appear in many forms, yet are intermingled with pains, and are partly alleviations of agonies and distresses, both of body and mind.

Pro. Then which are the true pleasures, Socrates, and what is the right conception of them?

Soc. True pleasures are those which are given by beauty of colour and form, and most of those which arise from smells; those of sound, again, and in general those of which the want is painless and unconscious, and the gratification afforded by them palpable to sense, and pleasant and unalloyed with pain.

Pro. Once more, Socrates, I must ask what you mean by this.

Soc. My meaning is certainly not obvious, and I will endeavour to be plainer. I do not mean by the beauty of form such beauty as that of animals or pictures, which the many would suppose to be my meaning; but, says the argument, understand me to mean straight lines and circles, and the plane or solid figures which are
formed out of them by turning-lathes and rulers and measurers of angles; for these I affirm to be not only relatively beautiful, like other things, but they are eternally and absolutely beautiful, and they have peculiar pleasures, quite unlike the pleasures of scratching. And there are colours which are of the same character, and have similar pleasures; now do you understand my meaning?

Pro. I am trying to understand, Socrates, and I hope that you also will try to make the meaning clearer.

Soc. When sounds are smooth and clear, and utter a single pure melody, then I mean to say that they are not relatively but absolutely beautiful, and have a natural pleasure associated with them.

Pro. Yes, that is likewise true.

Soc. The pleasures of smell are of a less ethereal sort, but inasmuch as they have no admixture of necessary pain, I regard this freedom from pain, wherever and in whatever experienced, as the mark of an analogous class. Here then are two kinds of pleasures.

Pro. I understand.

Soc. To these may be added the pleasures of knowledge, if they appear to us to have no hunger of knowledge or pains of hunger preceding them.

Pro. And they have not.

Soc. Well, but are there not pains of forgetfulness, if a man is full of knowledge and his knowledge is lost?

Pro. They are not natural, but there may be times of reflection, when he feels grief at the loss of his knowledge.

Soc. Yes, my friend, but at present we are enumerating only the natural perceptions, and have nothing to do with reflections.

Pro. In that case you are right in saying that the loss of knowledge is not attended with pain.

Soc. These pleasures of knowledge, then, are unmixed with pain; and they are not the pleasures of the many but of a very few.

Pro. That is true.

Soc. And now that we have fairly separated the pure pleasures and those which may be rightly termed impure, let us add to our description of them, that the pleasures which are in excess have no measure, and those which are not in excess have a measure; the great, the excessive, the more or less frequent, and all which are denoted by such terms, we shall be right in referring to the class of the infinite, which is always pouring, with more or less force,
through body and soul alike, and the others we shall refer to the class which has measure.

_pro_. That is most true, Socrates.

_soc_. Still there is something more to be considered.

_pro_. What is that?

_soc_. When you speak of pure and clear, or of excessive and much, or of great and enough, how do they stand in reference to the truth?

_pro_. Why do you ask that question, Socrates?

_soc_. Because, Protarchus, I should wish to test pleasure and knowledge in every possible way, in order that if there be a pure and impure element in them, I may present the pure element for the judgment, and then they will be more easily judged of by you and me and all of us.

_pro_. Most true.

_soc_. We should try to understand what is the nature of the pure classes. And with a view to this let us select a single instance.

_pro_. What instance shall we select?

_soc_. Suppose that we take whiteness first.

_pro_. Very good.

_soc_. How can there be purity in whiteness, and what purity? Is it that which is greatest or most in quantity, or that which is most unadulterated and freest from any admixture of other colours?

_pro_. Clearly that which is most unadulterated.

_soc_. And this, Protarchus, and not the greatest or largest quantity of white, is to be deemed the truest and most beautiful white?

_pro_. Right.

_soc_. And we shall be quite right in saying that a little pure white is whiter and fairer and truer than a great deal that is mixed.

_pro_. Perfectly right.

_soc_. There is no need of adducing many similar examples in illustration of the argument about pleasure; one such is sufficient to prove to us that a small pleasure, if unalloyed with pain, is always pleasanter and truer and fairer than a great or often-repeated one of another kind.

_pro_. Assuredly; and the instance you have given is quite sufficient.

_soc_. But what do you say of another question:—have we not
heard that pleasure is always a generation, and has no true being? Do not certain ingenious philosophers affirm this, and ought not we to be grateful to them?

_Pro._ What do they mean?

_Soc._ Dear Protarchus, I will explain this to you by asking questions.

_Pro._ Ask, and I will answer.

_Soc._ I assume that there are two natures, one self-existent, and the other ever in want of something?

_Pro._ What manner of natures are they?

_Soc._ The first is solemn and majestic, the other inferior.

_Pro._ You speak riddles.

_Soc._ You have seen loves good and gentle, and also brave lovers of them.

_Pro._ I should think so.

_Soc._ Find two other things which are like these two in all points, and parallel to them.

_Pro._ I wish that you would be a little more intelligible.

_Soc._ There is no difficulty, Protarchus; the argument is only in play, and insinuates that some things are for the sake of something else (relatives), and that other things are the ends to which something else subserves (absolutes).

_Pro._ Often have I heard, and yet I hardly understand.

54_Soc._ As the argument proceeds, my boy, I dare say that the meaning will become clearer.

_Pro._ Likely enough.

_Soc._ Here are two new principles.

_Pro._ What are they?

_Soc._ One is the generation of all things, and another is essence.

_Pro._ I readily accept both generation and essence at your hands.

_Soc._ Very right; and would you say that generation is for the sake of essence, or essence for the sake of generation?

_Pro._ You want to know whether that which is called essence is, properly speaking, for the sake of generation?

_Soc._ Yes.

_Pro._ By the gods, I wish that you would repeat your question.

_Soc._ I mean, O my Protarchus, to ask whether you would tell me that ship-building is for the sake of ships, or are ships for the sake
of ship-building? and in all similar cases I should ask the same question.

_Pro._ Why do you not answer yourself, Socrates?

_Soc._ I will answer anything, but I should like you to go halves with me.

_Pro._ Certainly.

_Soc._ My answer is, that all things instrumental, remedial, material, are applied with a view to generation, and that each generation is relative to, or for the sake of, some being or essence, and the whole of generation relative to the whole of essence.

_Pro._ That is very plain.

_Soc._ Then pleasure, being a generation, will surely be for the sake of some essence?

_Pro._ True.

_Soc._ And that for the sake of which something is done must be placed in the class of good, and that which is done for the sake of another thing, in some other class, my good friend.

_Pro._ Most assuredly.

_Soc._ Then pleasure, as being a generation, will be rightly placed in some other class than that of good?

_Pro._ Quite right.

_Soc._ Then, as I said at first, we ought to be very grateful to him who first pointed out that pleasure was a generation only, and had no true being; for he is clearly one who laughs at the notion of pleasure being a good.

_Pro._ That he does.

_Soc._ And he would surely laugh also at those who make generation their highest end.

_Pro._ How is that, and of whom are you speaking?

_Soc._ I am speaking of those who are delighted at the process of generation, which cures them of hunger or thirst or any other deficiency, as if this were pleasure; and they say that they would not wish to live without hunger or thirst and the like, and all the attendant feelings.

_Pro._ That is certainly what they appear to think.

_Soc._ And is not destruction universally admitted to be the opposite of generation?

_Pro._ Certainly.

_Soc._ Then he who chooses this, would choose generation and
destruction rather than that third sort of life, in which, as we were saying, was neither pleasure nor pain, but only the purest possible thought.

Pro. He who asserts that pleasure is a good, falls into great absurdity, Socrates.

Soc. Great, indeed, and there is yet another of them.

Vro. What is that?

Soc. Is there not an absurdity in arguing that there is nothing good or noble in the body, or in anything else, but that good is in the soul only, and that the only good of the soul is pleasure; and that courage or temperance or understanding, or any other good of the soul, is not really a good?—and is there not a further absurdity in our being compelled to say that he who has the feeling of pain and not of pleasure is bad at the time when he is suffering pain, even though he be the best of men; and again, that he who has the feeling of pleasure at the time when he is pleased, is in that degree good?

Pro. Nothing, Socrates, can be more irrational than all this.

Soc. And now, after having subjected pleasure to every sort of test, let us not seem to spare mind and knowledge; let us ring their metal bravely, and see if there be unsoundness in any part, until we have found out what is purest in their natures, and then the truest elements both of pleasure and knowledge may be had up for judgment.

Pro. Right.

Soc. Knowledge, then, has two parts; the one productive, and the other educational?

Pro. True.

Soc. Let us reflect, that in the productive or handicraft arts, one part is more akin to knowledge, and the other less; and the one part may be regarded as the purer, and the other as the less pure.

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. Let us separate the superior or dominant element from the other, in each of them.

Pro. What are they, and how do you separate them?

Soc. I mean to say, that if arithmetic, mensuration, and weighing be taken away from any art, that which remains will not be much.

Pro. Not much, certainly.

Soc. The rest will be only conjecture, and the better use of the
senses, which is given by experience and exercise, in addition to a certain power of guessing, which is commonly called art and is brought to perfection by pains and practice.

Pro. That is very certain.

Soc. Music, for instance, is full of this sort of thing; as is seen in the harmonising of sounds, not by rule, but by conjecture; and this is always the case in flute music, which tries to discover the pitch of notes by a guess, and therefore has a great deal that is uncertain and very little of pure science.

Pro. Most true.

Soc. And the same will be found to hold good of medicine and husbandry, and piloting and generalship.

Pro. Very true.

Soc. The art of the builder, on the other hand, which has a number of measures and instruments, attains from them a greater degree of accuracy than the other arts.

Pro. How is that?

Soc. In ship-building and house-building, and in other branches of the art of carpentering, the builder has his rule, lathe, plummet, level, and a most ingenious sort of corrector or vice.

Pro. Very true, Socrates.

Soc. Then, now let us divide the arts, of which we were speaking, into two kinds; the arts which, like music, are less exact in their results, and those which, like carpentering, are more exact.

Pro. Let us make that division.

Soc. And of this last class, the most exact of all are those which I mentioned at first.

Pro. I see that you mean arithmetic, and the kindred arts of weighing and measuring.

Soc. Certainly, Protarchus, but are not these also distinguishable into two kinds?

Pro. What are the two kinds?

Soc. In the first place, arithmetic is of two kinds; one of which is popular, and the other philosophical.

Pro. How would you distinguish them?

Soc. There is a wide distinction between them, Protarchus; some arithmeticians reckon unequal units; as, for example, two armies, two oxen; making no difference between a very large two and a very small two. And there are others who insist
that every unit in ten thousand must be the same as every other unit.

Pro. There is certainly, as you say, a great difference among the votaries of the science, and there may be reasonably supposed to be two sorts of arithmetic.

Soc. And what would you say of the arts of computation and mensuration, which are used in building and trading,—when we compare them with philosophical geometry and exact calculation, shall we say that they are one or two?

Pro. On the analogy of what has preceded, I should be of opinion that they were two.

Soc. Right; but do you understand why I have discussed the subject?

Pro. I think that I do, but I should like to hear from you.

Soc. The argument has all along been seeking a parallel to pleasure, and true to that original design, has gone on to ask whether one sort of knowledge is purer than another, as one pleasure is purer than another.

Pro. There can be no doubt that this was the design.

Soc. And has not the argument in what has preceded, already shown that the arts have different provinces, and vary in their degree of certainty?

Pro. Very true.

Soc. And in saying this, did not the argument first designate some art by an univocal term, thus making us believe in the unity of art; and then again, as if speaking of two different things, proceed to enquire whether the art as pursued by philosophers, or by non-philosophers, has more of certainty and purity?

Pro. That is the very question which is now being asked.

Soc. And how, Protarchus, shall we answer the enquirer?

Pro. O, Socrates, there is a wonderful difference in the clearness of different sorts of knowledge.

Soc. That will make the answer which is to be given easier.

Pro. Certainly; and let us say in reply, that those arts into which arithmetic enters, far surpass all others; and that of these the arts or sciences which are animated by the pure philosophic impulse, are infinitely superior in accuracy and truth about measures and numbers.

Soc. Then this is your judgment; and this is the answer which,
upon your authority, we will give to all masters of the art of misinterpretation?

_Pro._ What answer?

_Soc._ That there are two arts of arithmetic, and two of mensuration; and also several other arts which in like manner have this double nature, and yet only one name.

_Pro._ Let us boldly return this answer to the masters of whom you speak, Socrates, and good luck to them.

_Soc._ These, then, are what we term the most exact arts or sciences?

_Pro._ Very good.

_Soc._ And yet, Protarchus, dialectic will refuse to acknowledge us, if we do not acknowledge her to have the first place.

_Pro._ And what, then, is dialectic?

_Soc._ Clearly the science which would know all that knowledge of which we are now speaking; for I am sure that all men who have a grain of intelligence will admit that the knowledge which has to do with being and reality, and sameness and unchangeableness, is by far the truest of all. What would you say, and how would you decide, Protarchus, about this?

_Pro._ I have often heard Gorgias maintain, Socrates, that the art of persuasion far surpassed every other; this, as he says, is by far the best of all arts, and to this all things submit, not by compulsion, but of their own free will. Now, I should not like to quarrel either with you or with him.

_Soc._ I understand you to mean that you would like to desert, if you were not ashamed?

_Pro._ As you please.

_Soc._ May I not have led you into a misapprehension?

_Pro._ How is that?

_Soc._ Dear Protarchus, I never asked which was the greatest or best or usefulest of arts or sciences, but which had clearness and accuracy, and the greatest degree of truth, however humble and however little useful an art; that was what I was asking. And as for Gorgias, he will not quarrel with you for admitting this; if you do not deny that his art has the advantage in usefulness and power, you may grant at the same time that the study of which I am speaking, is superior in this particular of absolute truth; as I was saying of white colour, that a little whiteness, if that little
be only pure, is superior to a great mass which is impure. And now, let us give our best attention and look well, not at the comparative use or estimation of the sciences, but at the power or faculty, if there be such, which the soul has of loving the truth, and of doing all things for the sake of the truth; and then we shall be able to determine whether this is the faculty most likely to possess the pure principle of mind and intelligence, or whether there be some other which has higher claims.

Pro. Well, I have been considering, and I can hardly think that any other science or art has a firmer grasp on the truth than this.

Soc. You mean to say that the arts generally which are concerned with human things use opinion, and their diligence is regularly exercised in the investigation of matters of opinion. Even he who supposes himself to be occupied with nature is really occupied with the production and action and passion of this sensible world: Is not this the sort of enquiry on which his life is spent?

Pro. True.

Soc. He is labouring, not after eternal being, but about things which are changing, or will change, or have changed?

Pro. Very true.

Soc. And can we say that any of these things which never are, nor have been, nor will be in the same state, become certain, when judged by the strict rule of truth?

Pro. Impossible.

Soc. How can there be any certainty to us about that which has no fixedness?

Pro. How indeed?

Soc. Then mind and science when employed about them do not attain the highest truth?

Pro. I should imagine not.

Soc. And now let us bid farewell, a long farewell, to you or me or Philebus or Gorgias, and once more make an appeal on behalf of the argument.

Pro. What appeal?

Soc. Let us say that the knowledge which is stable and pure and true and unalloyed, is that which has to do with the things which are eternal and unchangeable and unmixed, or at least with that which is most akin to them, and that all other things are to be placed in a second or inferior class.
. Pro. Very true.

Soc. And of the names expressing cognition, ought not the fairest
to be given to the fairest things?

Pro. That is natural.

Soc. And are not mind and wisdom the names which are to be
honoured most?

Pro. Yes.

Soc. And these names may be said to have their truest and
exactest application when the mind is engaged in the contempla-
tion of true being?

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. And these are the names which I adduced as rivals of pleasure?

Pro. Very true.

Soc. And now, as to the task of mixing pleasure and wisdom,
here are the ingredients or materials, and we may be compared to
artists who have them ready to their hands?

Pro. Yes.

Soc. And now we must begin to mix them?

Pro. By all means.

Soc. But had we not better have a recapitulation and rehearsal
first?

Pro. Of what?

Soc. Of that which I have already mentioned. Well says the
proverb, that we ought to repeat not twice but thrice that which is 60
good.

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. Well, then, by Zeus, I believe that this will be found to be
a pretty fair summary of the argument:

Pro. Let me hear.

Soc. Philebus says that pleasure is the true end of all living
beings, at which all ought to aim, and that this is the chief good of
all, and that the two names 'good' and 'pleasant' are truly a unity
in nature; Socrates, on the other hand, begins by denying this, and
further says, that they are two in nature as in name, and that
wisdom partakes more of the good than pleasure. Is not and was
not that what we were saying, Protarchus?

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. And is not and was not this a further point which was
conceded between us—
Pro. What was the point?

Soc. That the good differs from all other things?

Pro. In what way?

Soc. In that the being who possesses good always everywhere and in all things, has the most perfect sufficiency, and is never in need of anything else.

Pro. Exactly.

Soc. And did we not endeavour to make an ideal division of them into two distinct lives, so that pleasure was wholly excluded from wisdom, and wisdom in like manner had no part whatever in pleasure?

Pro. That we did.

Soc. And did we think that either of them alone would be sufficient?

Pro. Certainly not.

Soc. And if we erred in any point, then let any one who will take up the enquiry again, and assuming memory and wisdom and knowledge and true opinion to belong to the same class, let him consider whether he would desire to possess or acquire, I will not say pleasure, however abundant or intense, if he has no real perception that he is pleased, nor any consciousness of what he feels, nor any memory, however brief, of the feeling, but would he desire to have anything at all, if these were wanting to him? And about wisdom I ask the same question; can you conceive that any one would choose to have all wisdom absolutely devoid of pleasure, rather than having a certain degree of pleasure, or all pleasure devoid of wisdom, rather than having a certain degree of wisdom?

Pro. Certainly not, Socrates; and there is no need to reiterate this any more.

Soc. Then the perfect and universally eligible and entirely good will be neither of them?

Pro. Impossible.

Soc. Then now we must ascertain the nature of the good more or less accurately, in order, as we were saying, that the second place may be duly assigned?

Pro. Right.

Soc. Have we not found a road which leads towards the good?

Pro. What road?

Soc. Supposing that a man had to be found, and you could
discover in what house he lived, would not that be a great step towards the discovery of the man himself?

_Pro._ True.

_Soc._ And now reason intimates to us, as at first, that we should seek the good, not in the unmixed life but in the mixed?

_Pro._ True.

_Soc._ There is far greater hope of finding that which we are seeking in the life which is well mixed than in that which is not?

_Pro._ There is far more.

_Soc._ Then now let us mingle, Protarchus, at the same time offering up a prayer to Dionysus or Hephaestus, or whoever is the god who presides over the ceremony of mixing.

_Pro._ By all means.

_Soc._ Are not we the cup-bearers? and here are two fountains which are flowing at our side: one, which is pleasure, may be likened to a fountain of honey; the other, which is a sober draught in which no wine mingles, is of water pure and healthful; out of these we must seek to make the fairest of all possible mixtures.

_Pro._ Certainly.

_Soc._ But tell me first;—should we be most likely to succeed if we mingled every sort of pleasure with every sort of wisdom?

_Pro._ Perhaps we might.

_Soc._ I should be afraid of the risk, and I think that I can show a safer plan.

_Pro._ What is your plan?

_Soc._ One pleasure was supposed by us to be truer than another, and one art to be more certain than another.

_Pro._ Exactly.

_Soc._ There was also supposed to be a difference in sciences; one science regarding only the transient and perishing, and the other the permanent and imperishable and everlasting and immutable; and when judged by the standard of truth, the latter, as we thought, is truer than the former.

_Pro._ Very true and right.

_Soc._ If, then, we consider which are the truest sections of each, and begin by mingling them, will not the union of them give us the loveliest of lives, or shall we still want some elements of another kind?

_Pro._ I think that you should do as you say.
Soc. Let us suppose a man who has understanding of the essence of justice, and has reason as well as understanding about this and all other things.

Pro. Let us suppose that.

Soc. Will such an one have enough of knowledge if he is acquainted only with the divine circle and sphere, and knows nothing of the human sphere and circle, when he has to use either these or any other figures or rules in the building of a house?

Pro. The knowledge which is only superhuman, Socrates, is ridiculous in man.

Soc. What do you mean? Do you mean that you are to throw into the cup and mingle the impure and uncertain art which uses the false rule and the false circle?

Pro. Yes, that must be done, if any of us is ever to find his way home.

Soc. And must I include music, which, as I was saying just now, is full of guesswork and imitation, and is wanting in purity?

Pro. Yes, I think that you must, if human life is to be at all like a life.

Soc. Well, then, suppose that I give way, and, like a doorkeeper who is pushed and overborne by the mob, I open the door wide, and let knowledge of every sort stream in, and the pure and less pure together mingle?

Pro. I do not know, Socrates, that any great harm would come of having them all, if you have the first sort.

Soc. Well, then, suppose that I let them all flow, like the torrents in Homer, into a sort of poetical 'meeting of the waters?'

Pro. By all means.

Soc. There—I have let them in, and now I must return to the fountain of pleasure. For our plan of first mixing the true portions has not been carried out; the love of all knowledge constrained us to let out all the sciences at once, and before the pleasures.

Pro. Quite true.

Soc. And now the time has come for us to consider about the pleasures also, whether we shall also let them out all at once, or at first only the true ones.

Pro. Let out the true ones first; that will be far the safer course.

Soc. Let them out, then; and now, if there are any necessary
pleasures, as there were arts and sciences necessary, must we not mingle them?

**Pro.** Yes; the necessary pleasures should certainly be allowed to mingle.

**Soc.** And as the knowledge of the arts has been admitted to be innocent and useful always, may I say the same of the pleasures; and if they are all of them always good and innocent for all of us, must not all of them mingle?

**Pro.** What shall we say about them, and how shall we act about them?

**Soc.** Do not ask me, Protarchus, but ask the daughters of pleasure and wisdom themselves, and let them answer about one another.

**Pro.** How?

**Soc.** Tell us, O beloved—shall we call you pleasures or by some other name?—would you rather live with or without wisdom? I am of opinion that they would certainly answer as follows:

**Pro.** How?

**Soc.** They would answer, as we said before, that for any class to be alone and in perfect solitude is not good, nor altogether possible; and that if we are to make comparisons of one class with another and choose, there is no better companion than knowledge of things in general, and the perfect knowledge, if that may be, of our individual selves.

**Pro.** And our answer will be;—In that ye have spoken well.

**Soc.** Very true. And now let us go back and interrogate wisdom and mind;—would you like to have any pleasures in the mixture? And they will reply:—What do you mean by pleasures?

**Pro.** Likely enough.

**Soc.** And we shall take up our parable and say: Do you wish to have the greatest and most vehement pleasures as your companions in addition to the true ones? Why, Socrates, they will say, how can we desire them? seeing that they are the source of ten thousand hindrances to us; they trouble the souls of men, which are our habitation, with their madness; they prevent us from coming to the birth, and are commonly the ruin of our children when they do come to the birth, causing them to be forgotten and unheeded; but the other true and pure pleasures, of which you spoke, know to be of our kindred, and the pleasures which accompany health and temperance, and are in a manner the handmaidens and inseparable
attendants of virtue as of a god,—mingle these and not the others; there would be great want of sense in any one who desires to see the fair and untroubled stream, and to find in the admixture what is the highest good in man and in the universe, and to divine what is the true form of good—there would be great want of sense in his allowing the pleasures, which are always in the company of folly and vice, to mingle with mind in the cup: Is not this a very sensible and suitable reply, which mind has made, both on her own behalf, as well as on that of memory and true opinion, to the question which has been asked of us?

Pro. Most certainly.

Soc. And still there must be something more added, which is a necessary ingredient in every mixture.

Pro. What is that?

Soc. Unless truth enter into the composition, nothing can truly be created or subsist.

Pro. Certainly not.

Soc. Certainly not; and now you and Philebus must tell me whether anything is still wanting in the mixture, for to my way of thinking, the argument is now completed, and may be compared to an incorporeal law, which is going to hold fair rule over a living body.

Pro. I agree, Socrates, in that statement.

Soc. And may we not say truly that we are now at the vestibule of the good, and of the habitation of the good?

Pro. I think that we are.

Soc. What, then, is there in the mixture which is most precious, and which is the principal cause why such a state is universally beloved by all? When we have discovered, we will proceed to ask whether this highest nature is more akin to pleasure or to mind in the universe?

Pro. True; that is what is most necessary for our decision.

Soc. Moreover, there is no difficulty in seeing the cause which renders any mixture either of the highest value or of none at all.

Pro. What do you mean?

Soc. Every man knows that.

Pro. What?

Soc. He knows that any want of measure and symmetry in any mixture must always of necessity be fatal, both to the elements
and the mixture, which is then not a mixture, but only a disorderly jumble disordering the possessor of it.

_Pro._ Most true.

_Soc._ And now the power of the good has retired into the region of the beautiful, for measure and symmetry are everywhere reckoned as beauty and virtue.

_Pro._ True.

_Soc._ Also we said that truth was to form a third with them in the mixture.

_Pro._ Certainly.

_Soc._ Then, if we are not able to hunt the good with one idea only, with three we may take our prey; Beauty, Symmetry, Truth are the three, and these when united we may regard as the cause of the mixture, and the mixture as being good by reason of the admixture of them.

_Pro._ Quite right.

_Soc._ And now, Protarchus, every one may judge well enough whether pleasure or wisdom is more akin to the highest good, and more honourable among gods and men.

_Pro._ There is no doubt, and yet perhaps the argument had better be pursued to the end.

_Soc._ We must take each of them separately in their relation to pleasure and mind, and pronounce upon them; for we ought to see to which of the two they are to be severally assigned as most akin.

_Pro._ You are speaking of beauty, truth, and measure?

_Soc._ Yes, Protarchus, take truth first, and, after a consideration of all three, mind, truth, pleasure, pause awhile and make answer to yourself—as to whether pleasure or mind is more akin to truth.

_Pro._ There is no need to pause, for the difference between them is palpable; pleasure is the veriest impostor in the world; and common belief says that in the pleasures of love, which appear to be the greatest, perjury is excused by the gods; the pleasures are children, who have not yet attained any degree of reason; whereas mind is either the same as truth, or the most like truth, and the truest.

_Soc._ Shall we next consider measure, in like manner, and ask whether pleasure has more of this than wisdom, or wisdom than pleasure?
That is also a question which may be easily investigated; for I imagine that nothing can ever be more immoderate than the transports of pleasure, or more in conformity with measure than mind and knowledge.

Soc. Very good; but there still remains a third thing: has mind a greater share of beauty than pleasure, and is mind or pleasure the fairer of the two?

Pro. Never, Socrates, were mind and wisdom seen or known to be in aught unseemly at any time past, present, or future.

Soc. Right.

Pro. But pleasures, and the greatest pleasures, when some ridiculous or foul effect accompanies them, make us ashamed of the sight of them, and we put them out of sight, and consign them to darkness, under the idea that they ought not to meet the eye of day.

Soc. Then, Protarchus, you will proclaim everywhere by word of mouth to this company, and will send messengers of the tidings far and wide, that pleasure is not the first of possessions, nor yet the second, but that first comes measure, and the measured, and the due, and whatever similar attributes the eternal nature may be deemed to have attained.

Pro. Yes, that seems to be the result of what has been now said.

Soc. The second class is the symmetrical and beautiful and perfect or sufficient, and all that belongs to that family.

Pro. True.

Soc. And if you reckon in the third class mind and wisdom, you will not be far wrong, if I divine aright.

Pro. I dare say.

Soc. And would you not put in the fourth class the goods which we were affirming to appertain specially to the soul—sciences and arts and true opinions as they are termed; these come after the third class, and form the fourth, as they are certainly more akin to good than to pleasure.

Pro. Surely.

Soc. The fifth class are those which are defined by us as painless pleasures, being the pure pleasures of the soul herself, as we termed them,—forms of knowledge (?), which accompany the senses.

Pro. Perhaps.
Soc. And in the sixth generation, as Orpheus says,

'Cease the glory of my song.'

Here, at the sixth award, let our discourse come to an end; all that remains is to put on a sort of crown or head.

Pro. True.

Soc. Then, now offering up a third libation to the saviour Zeus, let us sum up and attest what has been said.

Pro. How is that to be done?

Soc. Philebus asserted that pleasure was always and absolutely the good.

Pro. I understand; the third libation, Socrates, of which you spoke, meant another recapitulation.

Soc. Yes, but listen to the sequel; convinced of what I have just been saying, and feeling indignant at the argument, which is maintained, not by Philebus only, but by thousands of others, I affirmed that mind was far better and far more excellent, as an element of human life, than pleasure.

Pro. True.

Soc. But, suspecting that there were other things which were better still, I said also, that if there was anything better than either, then I would claim the second place for mind over pleasure, and pleasure would lose the second place as well as the first.

Pro. You did.

Soc. Nothing could be more satisfactorily shown than the insufficiency of both of them.

Pro. Very true.

Soc. In this argument the claims both of pleasure and mind to be the absolute good have alike been set aside, because they have both failed in self-sufficiency or adequacy or perfection.

Pro. Most true.

Soc. But, though they must both resign in favour of another, mind is ten thousand times nearer and more akin to the nature of the conqueror than pleasure.

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. And, according to the judgment which has now been given, the power of pleasure will rank fifth.

Pro. True.
Soc. But not first; no, not even if all the oxen and horses and animals in the world in their pursuit of enjoyment this assert; and the many trusting in them, as diviners trust in birds, determine that pleasures make up the good of life, and deem the lusts of animals to be better witnesses than the inspirations of divine philosophy.

Pro. And now, Socrates, we tell you that the truth of what you have been saying is approved by the judgment of all of us.

Soc. And will you let me go?

Pro. There is a little, Socrates, which yet remains, of which I will make bold to remind you, for I am sure that you will not be the first to weary of an argument.
Parmenides.
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The awe with which Plato regarded the character of Parmenides has extended to the dialogue which he calls by his name. There is none of the writings of Plato which has been more copiously illustrated, both in ancient and modern times, and in none of them have the interpreters been more at variance with one another. Nor is this surprising. For the Parmenides is more fragmentary and isolated than any other dialogue, and the design of the writer is not expressly stated. The date is uncertain; the relation to the other writings of Plato is also uncertain; the connection between the two parts is at first sight extremely obscure; and in the latter of the two we are left in doubt as to whether Plato is speaking his own sentiments by the lips of Parmenides, and overthrowing him out of his own mouth, or whether he is propounding consequences which would have been admitted by Zeno and Parmenides themselves. The contradictions which follow from the hypotheses of the one and others have been regarded by some as transcendental mysteries; by others as a mere illustration, taken at random, of a new method. The criticism on his own doctrine of ideas has also been considered, not as a real criticism, but as an exuberance of the metaphysical imagination which enabled Plato to go beyond himself. To the latter part of the dialogue we may certainly apply the words in which he himself describes the earlier philosophers in the Sophist (243 A), 'that they went on their way rather regardless of whether we understood them or not.'

The Parmenides in point of style is one of the best of the Platonic writings; the first portion of the dialogue is in no way defective in ease and grace and dramatic interest; nor in the second part, where there was no room for such qualities, is there any want of clearness or precision. Like the Protagoras, Phaedo, and others, it is a narrated dialogue, com-
bining with the mere recital of the words spoken, the observations of the
reciter on the effect produced by them. Thus we are informed by him
that Zeno and Parmenides were not altogether pleased at the request of
Socrates that they should examine into the nature of the one and many in
the sphere of ideas, although they received his suggestion with approving
smiles. And we are glad to be told that Parmenides was 'aged but well-
favoured,' and that Zeno was 'very good-looking;' also that Parmenides
affected to decline the great argument, on which, as Zeno knew from ex-
perience, he was very willing to enter. The character of Antiphon, the
half-brother of Plato, who had once been inclined to philosophy, but has
now shown the hereditary disposition for horses, is very naturally de-
scribed. He is the sole depositary of the famous dialogue; but, although
he received the strangers like a courteous gentleman, he is impatient of
the trouble of reciting it. As they enter, he has been giving orders to a
bridle-maker; by this slight touch Plato verifies the description of him.
After a little persuasion he is induced to favour the Clazomenians, who
come from a distance, with a rehearsal. Respecting the visit of Zeno
and Parmenides to Athens, we may observe—first, that such a visit is con-
sistent with dates, and may possibly have occurred; secondly, that Plato
is very likely to have invented the meeting ('You, Socrates, can easily
invent Egyptian tales or anything else'); thirdly, that no reliance can be
placed on the circumstance as determining the date of Parmenides and
Zeno.

Many interpreters have regarded the Parmenides as a 'reductio ad
absurdum' of the Eleatic philosophy. But would Plato have been likely
to place this in the mouth of the great Parmenides himself, who appeared
to him, in Homeric language, to be 'venerable and awful,' and to have
a 'most generous depth of mind?' It may be admitted that he has
ascribed to an Eleatic stranger in the Sophist opinions which went beyond
the doctrines of the Eleatics. But the Eleatic stranger expressly criticises
the doctrines in which he had been brought up; he admits that he is
going to 'lay hands on his father Parmenides.' Nothing of this kind is
said of Zeno and Parmenides. How then, without a word of explanation,
could Plato assign to them the refutation of their own tenets?

The conclusion at which we must arrive is that the Parmenides is not
a refutation of the Eleatic philosophy. Nor would such an explanation
afford any satisfactory connection of the first and second parts of the
dialogue. And it is quite inconsistent with Plato's own relation to the
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Eleatics. For of all the pre-Socratic philosophers, he speaks of them with the greatest respect. But he could hardly have passed upon them a more unmeaning slight than to ascribe to their great master tenets the reverse of those which he actually held.

Two preliminary remarks may be made. First, that whatever latitude we may allow to Plato in bringing together by a 'tour de force,' as in the Phaedrus, dissimilar themes, yet he always in some way seeks to find a connection for them. Many threads join together in one the love and dialectic of the Phaedrus. We cannot conceive that the great artist would place in juxtaposition two absolutely divided and incoherent subjects. And hence we are led to make a second remark: viz. that no explanation of the Parmenides can be satisfactory which does not indicate the connection of the first and second parts. To suppose that Plato would first go out of his way to make Parmenides attack the Platonic ideas, and then proceed to a similar but more fatal assault on his own doctrine of Being, appears to be the height of absurdity.

Perhaps there is no passage in Plato showing greater metaphysical power than that in which he assails his own theory of ideas. The arguments are nearly, if not quite, those of Aristotle; they are the objections which naturally occur to a modern student of philosophy. Many persons will be surprised to find Plato criticising the very conceptions which have been supposed in after ages to be peculiarly characteristic of him. How can he have placed himself so completely without them? How can he have ever persisted in them after seeing the fatal objections which might be urged against them? The consideration of this difficulty has led a recent critic, who in general accepts the authorised canon of the Platonic writings, to single out the Parmenides as spurious. The accidental want of external evidence, at first sight, seems to favour this opinion.

In answer, it might be sufficient to say, that no ancient writing of equal length and excellence is known to be spurious. Nor is the silence of Aristotle to be hastily assumed; there is at least a doubt whether his use of the same arguments does not lead to the inference that he knew the work. And, if the Parmenides is spurious, a similar condemnation must be passed on the Theaetetus and Sophist, and therefore on the Politicus (cp. Theaet. 183 E, Soph. 217). But the objection is really fanciful, and rests on the assumption that the doctrine of the ideas was held by Plato throughout his life in the same form. Whereas the truth is, that

^ Uberweg.
the Platonic ideas were in constant process of growth and transmutation; sometimes veiled in poetry and mythology, then again emerging as abstract ideas, in some passages regarded as absolute and eternal, and in others as relative to the human mind, existing in and derived from external objects as well as transcending them. The anamnesis of the ideas is chiefly insisted upon in the mythical portions of the dialogues, and really occupies a very small space in the entire works of Plato. Their transcendental existence is not asserted, and is therefore implicitly denied in the Republic and Philebus; and they are mentioned in the Theaetetus, the Sophist, the Politicus, and the Laws, much as Universals would be spoken of in modern books. Indeed, there are very faint traces of the transcendental doctrine of ideas, that is, of their existence apart from the mind, in any of Plato's writings, with the exception of the Meno, the Phaedrus, and the Phaedo. The stereotyped form which Aristotle has given to them is not found in Plato.

The full discussion of this subject involves a comprehensive survey of the philosophy of Plato, which would be out of place here. But, without digressing further from the immediate subject of the Parmenides, we may remark that Plato is quite serious in his objections to his own doctrines; this is proved by the circumstance that they are not answered by Socrates. The perplexities which surround the one and many in the sphere of the ideas are also alluded to in the Philebus, and no answer is given to them. Nor have they ever been answered, nor can they be answered by any one else, who separates the phenomenal from the real. To suppose that Plato, at a later period of his life, reached a point of view from which he was able to answer them, is a mere groundless assumption. The real progress of Plato's own mind has been partly concealed from us by the dogmatic statements of Aristotle, and also by the degeneracy of his own followers, with whom a doctrine of numbers quickly superseded ideas.

As a preparation for answering some of the difficulties which have been suggested, we may begin by sketching the first portion of the dialogue:

Cephalus, of Clazomenae in Ionia, the birthplace of Anaxagoras, a citizen of no mean city in the history of philosophy, who is the narrator of the dialogue, describes himself as meeting Adeimantus and Glaucon in the Agora at Athens. 'Welcome, Cephalus: can we do anything for you in Athens?' 'Why, yes: I came to ask a favour of you. First, tell me your half-brother's name, which I have forgotten—he was a mere child
when I was last here;—I know his father's, which is Pyrilampes.' 'Yes, and the name of our brother, Antiphon. But why do you ask?' 'On behalf of some countrymen of mine, who are lovers of philosophy; they have heard that Antiphon remembers a conversation of Socrates with Parmenides and Zeno, of which the report came to him from Pythodorus, Zeno's friend.' 'That is quite true.' 'Would he repeat the dialogue to us?' 'Nothing easier; in the days of his youth he made a careful study of the piece; at present, his thoughts have another direction: he takes after his grandfather, and has given up philosophy for horses.'

'We went to look for him, and found him giving instructions to a worker in brass about a bridle. When he had done with him, and had learned from his brother the purpose of our visit, he saluted me as an acquaintance whom he remembered of old, and we asked him to repeat the dialogue. At first, he complained of the trouble, but he soon consented. He told us that Pythodorus described to him the appearance of Parmenides and Zeno; they had come to Athens at the great Panathenaeae the former being at the time about sixty-five years old, aged but well-favoured; Zeno, who was said to have been beloved of Parmenides in the days of his youth, about forty, and very good-looking:—that they lodged with Pythodorus at the Ceramicus outside the wall, whither Socrates, who was at that time a very young man, came to see them: Zeno was reading one of his theses, which he had nearly finished, when Pythodorus entered with Parmenides and Aristoteles, who was afterwards one of the Thirty—(Pythodorus himself had heard them before)—and Socrates was requesting that the first thesis of the treatise might be read again.'

'You mean, Zeno,' said Socrates, 'to argue that the many, if they exist, must be both like and unlike, which is a contradiction; and each division of your argument is intended to elicit a similar absurdity, which may be supposed to follow from the assumption of the existence of the many.' 'That is my meaning.' 'I see,' said Socrates, turning to Parmenides, 'that Zeno is your second self in his writings too; you prove admirably that the all is one: he gives proofs no less convincing that the many are nought. To deceive the world by saying the same thing in entirely different forms, is a strain of art beyond most of us.' 'Yes, Socrates,' said Zeno; 'but though you are as keen as a Spartan hound, you do not quite catch the motive of the piece, which was only intended to protect Parmenides against ridicule by showing that the hypothesis of
the existence of the many involved greater absurdities than the hypothesis of the one. The book was a youthful composition of mine, which was stolen from me, and therefore I had no choice about the publication.'
'I quite believe you,' said Socrates; 'but will you answer me a question? I should like to know, whether you would assume an idea of likeness in the abstract, which is the contradictory of unlikeness in the abstract, by participation in either or both of which, things are like or unlike or partly both. For the same things may very well partake of like and unlike in the concrete, though like and unlike in the abstract are irreconcileable. Nor does there appear to me to be any absurdity in maintaining that the same things may partake of the one and many, though I should be indeed surprised to hear that the absolute one is also many. For example, I, being many, that is to say, having many parts or members, am yet also one, and partake of the one, being one of seven who are here present. (Cp. Philebus 14, 15.) This is not an absurdity, but a truism. But I should be amazed if there were a similar entanglement in the nature of the ideas themselves, nor can I believe that one and many, like and unlike, rest and motion, when once clearly separated, can either be separated again, or reunited.'

Pythodorus said that in his opinion Parmenides and Zeno were not very well pleased at the questions which were raised; nevertheless, they looked at one another and smiled in seeming delight and admiration of Socrates. 'Tell me,' said Parmenides, 'was this your own distinction between the abstract ideas of likeness, unity, and the rest, and the individuals which partake of the ideas?' 'I think that there are such abstract ideas.' 'And would you make abstract ideas of the just, the beautiful, the good?' 'Yes,' he said. 'And of human beings like ourselves, of water, fire, and the like?' 'I am not certain.' 'And would you be undecided also about ideas of which the mention will, perhaps, appear laughable: of hair, mud, filth, and other things which are base and vile?' 'No, Parmenides; visible things like these are, as I believe, only what they appear to be: though I am sometimes disposed to imagine that there is nothing without an idea; but I repress any such notion, from a fear of falling into an abyss of nonsense.' 'You are young, Socrates, and therefore naturally regard the opinions of men; the time will come when philosophy will have a firmer hold of you, and you will not despise even the meanest things. But tell me, is your meaning that things become like by partaking of likeness, great by partaking of
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greatness, just and beautiful by partaking of justice and beauty, and so of other ideas? 'Yes, that is my meaning.' 'And do you suppose the individual to partake of the whole, or of the part?' 'Why not in the whole?' said Socrates. 'Because,' said Parmenides, 'in that case the whole, which is one, will become many.' 'Nay,' said Socrates, 'the whole may be like the day, which is one and in many places: in this way the ideas may be one and also many.' 'In the same sort of way,' said Parmenides, 'as a sail, which is one, may be a cover to many—that is your meaning?' 'Yes.' 'And would you say that each man is covered by the whole sail, or by a part only?' 'By a part.' 'Then the ideas have parts, and the objects partake of a part of them only?' 'That seems to follow.' 'And would you like to say that the ideas are really divisible and yet remain one?' 'Certainly not.' 'Would you venture to affirm that great objects have a portion of greatness transferred to them; or that small or equal objects become small or equal by the addition of a portion of an original smallness or equality greater than the portions which are detached?' 'Impossible.' 'But in what other way can individuals participate in ideas, except those mentioned?' 'That is not an easy question to answer.' 'Is not the way in which you are led to conceive ideas as follows: you see great objects pervaded by a common form or idea of greatness, which you abstract?' 'That is quite true.' 'And supposing you add the idea of greatness thus gained to the class of great objects, a further idea of greatness arises, which makes both great; and this may go on to infinity.' Socrates replies that the ideas may be thoughts in the mind only; in this case, the consequence would no longer follow. 'What?' says Parmenides, 'can there be a thought in the mind which is without an object? Nay, the thought has an object, which is a universal unchanging unity; and what is this but an idea?' 'That is obvious.' 'But if the world partakes in the ideas, and the ideas are thoughts, must not each thing become thought? And can thought ever cease to think?' 'I acknowledge the unmeaningness of this,' says Socrates, 'and would rather have recourse to the explanation that the ideas are types in nature, and that other things partake of them by becoming like them.' 'But to become like them is to be comprehended in the same idea; and the likeness of the idea and the individuals implies another idea of likeness, and another without end.' 'Quite true.' The theory, then, of participation by likeness has to be given up. You have hardly yet, Socrates, found out the real difficulty of maintaining abstract ideas.'
'What difficulty?' 'The greatest of all, perhaps, is this: an opponent will argue that the ideas are not within the range of human knowledge; and you cannot disprove the assertion without a long and laborious demonstration, which he may be unable or unwilling to follow. In the first place, neither you nor any one who maintains the existence of absolute ideas will affirm that they are subjective.' 'That would be a contradiction.' 'True; and therefore any relation in these ideas is a relation which concerns themselves only; and the subjective ideas also, which have a common name with them, are relative to one another only, and have nothing to do either with the higher or absolute ideas, or with the individuals that are named after them.' 'How do you mean?' said Socrates. 'I may illustrate my meaning in this way: one of us has a slave; and the idea of a slave in the abstract is relative to the idea of a master in the abstract; this correspondence of ideas, however, has nothing to do with the particular relation of our slave to us.—Do you see my meaning?' 'Perfectly.' 'And absolute knowledge in the same way corresponds to absolute truth and being, and particular knowledge to particular truth and being.' 'Clearly.' 'And there is a subjective knowledge which is of subjective truth, having many kinds, general and particular. But the ideas themselves are not subjective, and therefore are not within our ken.' 'They are not.' 'Then the beautiful and the good in their own nature are unknown to us?' 'That appears to be the case.' 'There is a worse consequence yet.' 'What is that?' 'I think we must admit that absolute knowledge is the most exact knowledge, which we must therefore attribute to God. But then see what follows: God, having this exact ideal knowledge, can have no knowledge of human things, as we have divided the two spheres, and forbidden any passing from one to the other:—the gods have knowledge and authority in their world only, as we have in ours. Yet, surely, to deprive God of knowledge is monstrous.—These are some of the difficulties which are involved in the assumption of absolute ideas; the learner will find them nearly impossible to understand, and the teacher who has to impart them will require superhuman ability; there will always be a suspicion, either that they have no existence, or are beyond human knowledge.' 'I agree in that,' said Socrates. 'Yet if these difficulties induce you to give up universal ideas, what becomes of the mind? and where are the reasoning and reflecting powers? philosophy is at an end.' 'I certainly do not see my way.' 'I think,' said Parmenides, 'that this arises out of your attempting to
define abstractions, such as the good and the beautiful and the just, before you have had sufficient previous training; I noticed your deficiency when you were talking with Aristoteles, the day before yesterday. Your enthusiasm is a wonderful gift; but I fear that unless you discipline yourself by dialectic while you are young, truth will elude your grasp.' 'And what kind of discipline would you recommend?' 'The training which you heard Zeno practising; at the same time, I admire your saying to him that you did not care to consider the difficulty in reference to visible objects, but only to ideas.' 'Yes; because I think that in visible objects you may easily show any number of inconsistent consequences.' 'Yes; and you should consider, not only the consequences which follow from a given hypothesis, but the consequences also which follow from the denial of the hypothesis. For example, what follows from the assumption of the existence of the many, and the counter-argument of what follows from the denial of the existence of the many: and similarly of likeness and unlikeness, motion, rest, generation, corruption, being and not being. And the consequences must include consequences to the things supposed and to other things, in themselves and in relation to one another, to individuals whom you select, to the many, and to the all; these must be drawn out both on the affirmative and on the negative hypothesis,—that is, if you are to train yourself perfectly to the intelligence of the truth.' 'That seems to be an awful process, and one the nature of which I do not quite understand,' said Socrates; 'will you give me an example?' 'You must not impose such a task on a man of my years,' said Parmenides. 'Then will you, Zeno?' 'Let us rather,' said Zeno, with a smile, 'ask Parmenides, for the undertaking is a serious one, as he truly says; nor could I urge him to make the attempt, except in a select audience, who will understand him.' The whole party joined in the request.

Here we have, first of all, an unmistakable attack made by the youthful Socrates on the paradoxes of Zeno. He perfectly understands their drift, as Zeno himself is supposed to acknowledge. But they appear to him, as he says in the Philebus also, to be rather truisms than paradoxes. For every one must acknowledge the obvious fact, that the body being one has many members, and that, in a thousand ways, the like partakes of the unlike, the many of the one. The real difficulty begins with the relations of ideas in themselves, whether of the one and many, or of any other ideas, to one another and to the mind. But this was a problem
which the Eleatic philosophers had never considered; their thoughts had not gone beyond the contradictions of matter, motion, space, and the like.

It was no wonder that Parmenides and Zeno should hear the novel speculations of Socrates with mixed feelings of admiration and displeasure. He was going out of the received circle of disputation into a region in which they could hardly follow him. From the rude idea of being in the abstract, he was about to proceed to universals or general notions. There is no contradiction in material things partaking of the ideas of one and many; neither is there any contradiction in the ideas of one and many, like and unlike, in themselves. But the contradiction arises when we attempt to conceive ideas in their connection, or to ascertain their relation to phenomena. Still he affirms the existence of such ideas; and this is the position which is now in turn submitted to the criticisms of Parmenides.

To appreciate truly the character of these criticisms, we must remember the place held by Parmenides in the history of Greek philosophy. He is the founder of idealism, and also of dialectic, or, in modern phraseology, of metaphysics and logic. Like Plato, he is struggling after something wider and deeper than satisfied the contemporary Pythagoreans. And Plato with a true instinct recognises him as his spiritual father, whom he 'revered and honoured more than all other philosophers together.' He may be supposed to have thought more than he said, or was able to express. And, although he could not, as a matter of fact, have criticised the ideas of Plato without an anachronism, the criticism is appropriately placed in the mouth of the founder of the ideal philosophy.

There was probably a time in the life of Plato when the ethical teaching of Socrates came into conflict with the metaphysical theories of the earlier philosophers, and he sought to supplement the one by the other. The older philosophies were great and awful; and they had the charm of antiquity. Something which found a response in his own mind seemed to have been lost as well as gained in the Socratic dialectic. He felt no incongruity in the veteran Parmenides correcting the youthful Socrates. Two points in his criticism are especially deserving of notice. First of all, Parmenides tries him by the test of consistency. Socrates is willing to assume ideas or principles of the just, the beautiful, the good, and to extend them to man (cp. Phaedo 98); but he is reluctant to admit
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that there are general ideas of hair, mud, filth, etc. There is an ethical universal or idea, but is there also a universal of physics? of the meanest things in the world as well as of the greatest? Parmenides rebukes this want of consistency in Socrates, which he attributes to his youth. As he grows older, philosophy will take a firmer hold of him, and then he will despise neither great things nor small, and he will think less of the opinions of mankind. (Cp. Soph. 227 A.) Here is lightly touched, one of the most familiar principles of modern philosophy, that in the meanest operations of nature, as well as in the noblest, in mud and filth, as well as in the sun and stars, great truths are contained. At the same time, we may note also the transition in the mind of Plato, to which Aristotle refers (Met. i. 6, 2), when, as he says, he transferred the Socratic universal of ethics to the whole of nature.

The other criticism of Parmenides on Socrates attributes to him a want of practice in dialectic. He has observed this deficiency in him when talking to Aristoteles on a previous occasion. Plato seems to imply that there was something more in the dialectic of Zeno than in the mere interrogation of Socrates. Here, again, he may perhaps be describing the process which his own mind went through when he first became more intimately acquainted, whether at Megara or elsewhere, with the Eleatic and Megarian philosophers. Still, Parmenides does not deny to Socrates the credit of having gone beyond them in seeking to apply the paradoxes of Zeno to ideas; and this is the application which he himself makes of them in the latter part of the dialogue. He then proceeds to explain to him the sort of mental gymnastic which he should practise. He should consider not only what would follow from a given hypothesis, but what would follow from the denial of it, to that which is the subject of the hypothesis, and to all other things. There is no trace in the Memorabilia of Xenophon of any such method being attributed to Socrates; nor is the dialectic here spoken of that 'favourite method' of proceeding by regular divisions, which is described in the Phaedrus and Philebus, and of which examples are given in the Politicus and in the Sophist. It is expressly spoken of (p. 135 E) as the method which Socrates had heard Zeno practise in the days of his youth.

The discussion of Socrates with Parmenides is one of the most remarkable passages in Plato. Few writers have ever been able to anticipate 'the criticism of the morrow' on their own favourite notions. But Plato may here be said to anticipate the judgment not only of the
morrow, but of all after-ages on the Platonic ideas. For in some points he touches questions which have not yet received their solution in modern philosophy.

The first difficulty which Parmenides raises respecting the Platonic ideas relates to the manner in which individuals are connected with them. Do individuals partake of the ideas, or do they merely resemble them? Parmenides shows that objections may be urged against either of these modes of conceiving the connection. Things are little by partaking of littleness, great by partaking of greatness, and the like. But they cannot partake of a part of greatness, for that will not make them great, &c.; nor can each object monopolise the whole. The only answer to this is, that 'partaking' is a figure of speech, really corresponding to the processes which a later logic designates by the terms 'abstraction' and 'generalization.' When we have described accurately the methods or forms which the mind employs, we cannot further criticise them, at least we can only criticise them with reference to their fitness as instruments of thought to express facts.

Socrates attempts to support his view of the ideas by the parallel of the day, which is one and in many places; but he is easily driven from this by a counter illustration of Parmenides, who compares the idea of greatness to a sail. He truly explains to Socrates that he has attained the conception of ideas by a process of generalization. At the same time, he points out a difficulty, which appears to be involved—viz. that the process of generalization will go on to infinity. Socrates meets the supposed difficulty by a flash of light, which is indeed the true answer 'that the ideas are in our minds only.' Neither realism is the truth, nor nominalism is the truth, but conceptualism; and conceptualism or any other psychological theory falls very far short of the infinite subtlety of language and thought.

But the realism of ancient philosophy will not admit of this answer, which is vigorously repelled by Parmenides with another half truth of later philosophy, 'Every subject or subjective must have an object.' Here is the great though unconscious truth (shall we say?) or error, which underlay the early Greek philosophy. 'Ideas must have a real existence;' they are not mere forms or opinions, which may be changed arbitrarily by individuals. But the early Greek philosopher never clearly saw that true ideas were only universal facts, and that there might be error in universals as well as in particulars.
Socrates makes one more attempt to defend the Platonic ideas by representing them as paradigms; this is again answered by the 'argumentum ad infinitum.' We may remark, in passing, that the process which is thus described has no real existence. The mind, after having obtained a general idea, does not really go on to form another which includes that, and all the individuals contained under it, and another and another without end. The difficulty belongs in fact to the Megarian age of philosophy, and is due to their illogical logic, and to the general ignorance of the ancients respecting the part played by language in the process of thought. No such perplexity could ever trouble a modern metaphysician, any more than the fallacy of 'calvus' or 'acervus,' or of 'Achilles and the tortoise.' These 'surds' of metaphysics ought to occasion no more difficulty in speculation than a perpetually recurring fraction in arithmetic.

It is otherwise with the objection which follows: How are we to bridge the chasm between phenomena and onta, between gods and men? This is the difficulty of philosophy in all ages: How can we get beyond the circle of our own ideas, or how remaining within them can we have any criterion of a truth beyond and independent of them? Parmenides draws out this difficulty with great clearness. According to him, there are not only one but two chasms: the first, between individuals and the ideas which have a common name; the second, between the ideas in us and the ideas absolute. The first of these two difficulties mankind, as we may say, a little parodying the language of the Philebus, have long agreed to treat as obsolete; the second remains a difficulty for us as well as for the Greeks of the fourth century before Christ, and is the stumbling-block of Kant's critic, and of the Hamiltonian adaptation of Kant, as well as of the Platonic ideas. It has been said that 'you cannot criticise Revelation.' 'Then how do you know what is Revelation, or that there is one at all,' is the immediate rejoinder,—'You know nothing of things in themselves.' 'Then how do you know that there are things in themselves?' In some respects, the difficulty pressed harder upon the Greek than upon ourselves. For conceiving of God more under the attribute of knowledge than we do, he was more under the necessity of separating the divine from the human, as two spheres which had no communication with one another.

It is remarkable that Plato, speaking by the mouth of Parmenides, does not treat even this second class of difficulties as hopeless or
insoluble. He says only that they cannot be explained without a long and laborious demonstration: 'the teacher will require superhuman ability, and the learner will be hard of understanding.' But an attempt must be made to find an answer to them; for, as Socrates and Parmenides both admit, the denial of abstract ideas is the destruction of the mind. We can easily imagine that among the Greek schools of philosophy in the fourth century before Christ a panic might arise from the denial of universals, similar to that which arose in the last century from Hume's denial of our ideas of cause and effect. Men do not at first recognise that thought, like digestion, will go on much the same, notwithstanding any theories which may be entertained respecting the nature of the process. Parmenides attributes the difficulties in which Socrates is involved to a want of comprehensiveness in his mode of reasoning; he should consider every question on the negative as well as the positive hypothesis, with reference to the consequences which flow from the denial as well as from the assertion of a given statement.

The argument which follows is one of the most singular in Plato. It appears to be an imitation, or parody, of the Zenonian dialectic, just as the speeches in the Phaedrus are an imitation of the style of Lysias, or as the derivations in the Cratylus are an imitation, half serious half facetious, of some contemporary Sophist. The interlocutor is not supposed, as in most of the other Platonic dialogues, to take a living part in the argument; he is only required to say 'Yes' and 'No' in the right places. A hint has been already given that the paradoxes of Zeno admitted of a higher application (p. 129, 135 E). This hint is the thread by which Plato connects the two parts of the dialogue.

The paradoxes of Parmenides seem trivial to us, because the words to which they relate have become trivial; their true nature as mere abstract terms is perfectly understood, and we are inclined to regard the treatment of them in Plato as a mere straw-splitting, or legerdemain of words. Yet there was a power in them which fascinated the Neoplatonists for centuries afterwards. Something that they found in them, or brought to them—some echo or anticipation of a great truth or error, exercised a wonderful influence over their minds. To do the Parmenides justice, we should imagine similar ἀποπλαία on themes as sacred to us, as the notions of one or being were to an ancient Eleatic. 'If God is, what follows? if God is not, what follows?' Or again: If God is or is not the world; or if God is or is not many, or has or has not parts, or is or is
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not in the world, or in time; or is or is not finite or infinite. Or if the world is or is not; or has or has not a beginning or end: or is or is not infinite, or infinitely divisible. Or again: if God is or is not identical with his laws; or if man is or is not identical with the laws of nature. We can easily see that here are many subjects for thought, and that from these and similar hypotheses questions of great interest might arise. And we also remark, that the conclusions derived from either of the two alternative propositions might be equally impossible and contradictory.

When we ask what is the object of these paradoxes, some have answered that they are a mere logical puzzle, while others have seen in them an Hegelian propaedeutic of the doctrine of ideas. The first of these views derives support from the manner in which Parmenides speaks of a similar method being applied to all ideas. Yet it is hard to suppose that Plato would have furnished so elaborate an example, not of his own but of the Eleatic dialectic, had he intended only to give an illustration of method. The second view has been often overstated by those who, like Hegel himself, have tended to confuse ancient with modern philosophy. We need not deny that Plato, trained in the school of Cratylus and Heraclitus, may have seen that a contradiction in terms is sometimes the best expression of a truth higher than either (Soph. 255 ff). But his ideal theory is not based on antinomies. The correlation of ideas was the metaphysical difficulty of the age in which he lived; and the Megarian philosophy was a 'reductio ad absurdum' of their isolation. To restore them to their natural connection, and to detect the negative element in them is the aim of Plato in the Sophist. But his view of their connection falls very far short of the Hegelian identity of Being and Not-being. The Being and Not-being of Plato never merge in each other, though he is aware that 'determination is only negation.'

After criticising the hypotheses of others, it may appear presumptuous to add another guess to the many which have been already offered. May we say, in Platonic language, that we still seem to see vestiges of a track which has not yet been taken? It is quite possible that the obscurity of the Parmenides would not have existed to a contemporary student of philosophy, and, like the similar difficulty in the Philebus, is really due to our ignorance of the philosophy of the age. There is an obscure Megarian influence on Plato which cannot wholly be cleared up, and is not much illustrated by the doubtful tradition of his retirement to Megara after the death of Socrates. For Megara was within a walk of
Athens, and Plato might have learned the Megarian doctrines without settling there.

We may begin by remarking that the theses of Parmenides are expressly said to follow the method of Zeno, and that the complex dilemma, though declared to be capable of universal application, is applied in this instance to Zeno's familiar question of the 'one and many.' Here, then, is a double indication of the connection of the Parmenides with the Eleatic school. The old Eleatics had asserted the existence of Being, which they at first regarded as finite, then as infinite, then as neither finite nor infinite, to which some of them had given what Aristotle calls 'a form;' others had ascribed a material nature only. The tendency of their philosophy was to deny to Being all predicates. The Megarians, who succeeded them, expressly affirmed that no predicate could be asserted of any subject; they also converted the idea of Being into that of Good, perhaps with the view of preserving a sort of neutrality or indifference between the mind and things. As if they had said, in the language of modern philosophy: 'Being is not only neither finite nor infinite, neither at rest nor in motion, but neither subjective nor objective.'

This is the track along which Plato is leading us. Zeno had attempted to prove the existence of the one by disproving the existence of the many, and Parmenides seems to aim at proving the existence of the subject by showing the contradictions which follow from the assertion of any predicates. Take the simplest of all notions, 'unity;' you cannot even assert being or time of this without involving a contradiction. But is this sceptical result the final conclusion? Probably no more than of Zeno's denial of the many, or of Parmenides' assault upon the Ideas. To us there seems to be no residuum of this long piece of dialectics. But to the mind of Parmenides and Plato, 'Gott-betrunkene menschen,' there still remained the idea of 'being' or 'good,' which could not be conceived, defined, uttered, but at the same time could not be got rid of. Neither of them would have imagined that their disputation ever touched the Divine Being. (Cp. Phil. 22 C.) The same difficulties about Unity and Being are raised in the Sophist, 250 ff; but there only as preliminary to their final solution.

If this view is correct, the real aim of the hypotheses of Parmenides is to criticise the earlier Eleatic philosophy from the point of view of Zeno or the Megarians. It is the same kind of criticism which Plato has extended to his own doctrine of ideas. Nor is
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there anything inconsistent in attributing to the 'father Parmenides' the last review of the Eleatic doctrines. The latest phases of all philosophies were fathered upon the founder of the school.

Other critics have regarded the final conclusion of the Parmenides either as sceptical or as Heraclitean. In the first case, they assume that Plato means to show the impossibility of any truth. But this is not the spirit of Plato, and could not with propriety be put into the mouth of Parmenides, who, in this very dialogue, is urging Socrates not to doubt everything, but to discipline his mind with a view to the more precise attainment of truth. The same remark applies to the second of the two theories. Plato everywhere ridicules (perhaps unfairly) his Heraclitean contemporaries: and if he had intended to support an Heraclitean thesis, would hardly have chosen Parmenides, the condemnor of the 'undiscerning tribe who say that things both are and are not,' to be the speaker. The last words, or conclusion, may have a Heraclitean sound; but they are arrived at in a different way, and have an entirely different design.

We may now endeavour to thread the mazes of the labyrinth which Parmenides knew so well, and trembled at the thought of them.

The argument falls into two principal divisions: There is the hypothesis that

i. One is.
ii. One is not.

If one is, it is nothing.
If one is not, it is everything.

But is and is not, may be taken in two senses:

Either one is one,
Or, one has being,

from which opposite consequences are deduced,

i. a. If one is one, it is nothing (137 C—142 B).
ii. b. If one has being, it is all things (142 B—157 B).

To which are appended two subordinate consequences:

i. aa. If one has being, all other things are (157 B—159 B).
ii. bb. If one is one, all other things are not (159 B—160 B).

The same distinction is then applied to the negative hypothesis:

ii. a. If one is not one, it is all things (160 B—163 B).
ii. b. If one has not being, it is nothing (163 B—164 B).
Involving two parallel consequences respecting the other or remainder:

ii. aa. If one is not one, other things are all (164 B—165 E).

ii. bb. If one has not being, other things are not (165 E to the end).

'I cannot refuse,' said Parmenides, 'since, as Zeno remarks, we are alone, though I may say with Ibycus, who in his old age fell in love, I, like the old racehorse, tremble at the prospect of the course which I am to run, and which I know so well. But as I must attempt this laborious game, what shall be the subject? Suppose I take my own hypothesis of the one.' 'By all means,' said Zeno. 'And who will answer me? Shall I propose the youngest? he will be the most likely to say what he thinks, and his answers will give me time to breathe.' 'I am the youngest,' said Aristoteles, 'and at your service; proceed with your questions.'—The result may be summed up as follows:

i. a. One is not many, and therefore has no parts, and therefore is not a whole, which is a sum of parts, and therefore has neither beginning, middle, nor end, and is therefore infinite, and therefore without figure, whether circular or rectilinear (because a circular figure has a centre and circumference, and in a rectilinear figure there is a middle which is between the extremes), and therefore is not in place, whether in another which would encircle and touch the one at many points and in many parts; or in itself, because that which is self-containing is also contained, and therefore not one but two. This being premised, let us consider whether one is capable either of motion or rest. Motion is either change of substance, or motion on an axis, or from one place to another. But the one is incapable of change of substance, which implies change from one to another, or of motion on an axis, because the axis has parts around the axis; and any other motion involves change of place. But existence in place has been already shown to be impossible; and still more impossible is becoming in place, which implies partial existence in two places at once, or entire existence neither within nor without the same; but how can this be? And yet more impossible is the becoming, whether as a whole or parts of that which is neither a whole nor parts. The one, then, is incapable of motion. But neither can the one exist in anything, and therefore not in the same, whether itself or some other, and is therefore incapable of rest. Neither is one the same with itself or any other,
or other than itself or any other. For if other than itself, then other than one, and therefore no longer one; and, if the same with other, it would be that other, and other than one. Neither can one while remaining one be other than other; for other, and not one, is the other of any other thing. But if not other by virtue of being one, then not one; and if not itself, not other, or other of anything. Neither will one be the same with itself. For the nature of the same is not that of the one, but a thing which becomes the same with anything does not necessarily become one with it, for that which becomes the same with the many becomes many and not one. And therefore if the one is the same with itself, the one is not one with itself; and therefore one and not one. And therefore one is neither other than other, nor the same with itself. Neither will the one be like or unlike itself or anything else; for likeness is sameness of state, and the one and the same are different. And one having any affection which is other than the one would be more than one. The one, then, cannot be like or have the same affection with itself or another; nor can the one have any other affection, that is, be unlike itself or any other, for that would involve more than one. The one, then, is neither like nor unlike itself or other. This being the case, neither can the one be equal or unequal to itself or anything else. For equality implies sameness of measure, as inequality implies a greater or less number or size of measures. But the one, not having sameness, cannot have sameness of measure; nor a greater or less number of measures, for that would imply parts and multitude; nor one measure only, for that would involve equality with that measure, which has been shown to be impossible. Again, can one be older or younger than itself? or of the same age with itself? That would imply likeness and unlikeness, sameness and difference. Therefore one cannot exist in time, because that which exists in time is ever becoming older and younger than itself, (for older and younger are relative terms, and he who becomes older becomes younger,) and is also of the same age with itself. None of which, or any other expressions of time, whether past, future, or present, can be affirmed of one. One neither is, has been, nor will be. And, as these are the only modes of existence, one exists not, and is not one. But to that which exists not there is no attribute or relation, neither name nor word nor science nor perception nor opinion appertaining. One, then, is neither named, nor uttered, nor imagined, nor known, nor perceived. Is that possible? 'I think not.'
i. b. Let us, however, commence the inquiry again. Assume that one exists, and what new train of consequences will follow? If one is, one partakes of being, which is, and is not the same with one; the words 'being' and 'one' have different meanings. Observe the consequence: In the unity of being or the being of unity are two parts, being and unity, which form one whole. And each of the two parts is also a whole, and involves the other, and may be further subdivided into one and being, and is therefore not one but two; and thus one is never one, and the one being in this way becomes many and infinite. Again, let us conceive of a one to which we attribute existence by an effort of abstraction separately from existence: will this abstract one be one or many? You say one only; let us see. In the first place, this unity has being; and is other than being; and unity and being, if separate, mutually exclude each other: and the very term 'each other' implies that both partake of the nature of other, which is therefore neither one nor being; and whether we take being and other, or being and one, or one and other, in any case we have two things which separately are called either, and together both. And both are two and either of two is severally one, and if one be added to any of the pairs, the sum is three;--as two they are even, as three they are odd numbers; and being two units they exist twice, and therefore are twice two; and being three units, they exist thrice, and therefore are thrice three, and taken together they are twice three and thrice two: they are even numbers multiplied into even, and odd into even, and even into odd numbers; But if one exists, and both odd and even numbers are included in one, must not every number exist? And number is infinite, and therefore existence must be infinite, for every number partakes of being, and every fraction of every number partakes of being; therefore being has the greatest number of parts, and every part, however great or however small, is equally one. But can one be in many places and yet be a whole? If not a whole it must be divided into parts and represented by a number corresponding to the number of the parts. And if so, we were wrong in saying that being has the greatest number of parts; for being is coequal and coextensive with one, and has no more parts than one. One, again, divided by being into parts is many and infinite. And this is true of the abstract one, as well as of the unity of being. But the parts are parts of a whole, and the whole is a limit, and the one is therefore limited as well as infinite; and that which is a whole has beginning,
middle, and end, and a middle is equidistant from the extremes; and one is therefore of a certain rectilinear or circular form, which being a whole includes all the parts which are the whole, and is therefore self-contained. And yet the whole is not in the parts, whether all or some. Not in all, because, if in all, also in one; for, if not in any one, how in all?—not in some, because the more would then be contained in the less. But if not in all, nor in any, nor in some, either nowhere or in other. And if nowhere, nothing; therefore in other. The one as a whole, then, is in other, but regarded as a sum of parts is in itself; and is both in itself and other. This being the case, the one is at once both at rest and in motion: at rest, because resting in itself; in motion, because it is ever in other. And if there is truth in what has preceded, one is the same and not the same with itself and all other. For everything in relation to everything else is either the same with it or other; or if neither the same nor other, then in the relation of part to a whole or whole to a part. But one cannot be a part or whole in relation to one, nor other than one; and is therefore the same with one. Yet this sameness is again contradicted by one being in another place from itself, which is in the same place; this follows from one being in itself and other; one, therefore, is other than itself. But if a thing is other of something, will it not be other of other? And the not one is other of the one, and the one of the not one; therefore one is other of all others. But the same and the other exclude one another, and therefore the other can never be in the same; nor can the other be in anything for ever so short a time, as for that time the other will be in the same. And the other, if never in the same, and never in anything, cannot be either in the one or the not one. And one is not other than not one, either by having the nature of other or by partaking of other. Neither can the not one participate in the one, for it would cease to be not one, and would become one; nor can the not one partake of number, for that also involves unity, and therefore it cannot be a part; and therefore not being other or related to other as a whole to parts or parts to a whole, not one is the same as one. Wherefore the one is the same and also not the same with the others and also with itself; and is therefore like and unlike itself and the others, and just as different from the others as they are from the one, neither more nor less. But if neither more nor less, equally different; and therefore the one and the others are in the same relations. This may be illustrated by the case of names:
when you repeat the same name twice over, you mean the same thing; and when you say that the other is other than the one, or the one other than the other, this very word other (ἄλλος), which is applied to both, also implies sameness. One, then, as being other than other things, and other things as being other than one, are alike in the relation of other; and likeness is similarity of relations. And everything as being other of everything is also like everything. Again, the like is opposed to the unlike, and the other to the same, and the one has been shown to be the same with the other. Now to be the same with the others is the opposite of being other than the others; and the one, as other than the others, has been shown to be like the others; and therefore, being the same, is, by parity of opposites, of the nature of the unlike. One, then, is both like and unlike the others; like, as being other, unlike, as being the same. Again, one, as having the same relations, has no difference of relation, and is therefore not unlike, and therefore like; or, as having different relations, is different and unlike. Thus, one, as being the same and not the same with itself and others, for both these reasons and for either of them is also like and unlike itself and the others. Again, how far can one touch itself and the others? As existing in others, one touches the others; and as existing in itself, touches only itself. But in another point of view, that which touches another must be next in order of place; one, therefore, must be next in order of place to itself, and would therefore be two, and in two places. But one cannot be two, and therefore cannot be in contact with itself. Neither can one touch the other; for that which touches another must touch immediately, without any middle or intermediate term. Two objects are required to make one contact; three objects make two contacts; and all the objects in the world have as many contacts as there are objects, less one. But if one only exists, and not two, there is no contact. And the others are other than one, and have no part in one, and therefore none in number, and therefore two has no existence, and therefore there is no contact. For all which reasons, one has and has not contact with itself and the others.

Once more, Is one equal and unequal to itself and the others? Suppose one and the others to be greater or less than each other or equal to one another, they will not be greater or less or equal in themselves, but by reason of equality or greatness or smallness inhering in them in addition to their own proper nature. Let us begin by assuming smallness to be inherent in unity: in this case the inherence is either in the whole
or in a part. If the first, smallness is either coextensive with the whole, or contains the whole, and, if coextensive with unity, is equal to unity, or if containing unity will be greater than unity. But smallness is thus identified with equality or with greatness, which is impossible. Again, if the inherence be in a part, the same contradiction follows: smallness will be equal to the part or greater than the part; therefore smallness will not inhere in anything, and except the idea of smallness there will be nothing small. Neither will greatness; for greatness is relative to smallness. And there will be no great or small in objects, but only greatness or smallness in relation to each other; therefore the others cannot be greater or less than the one, or in any relation of magnitude to the one; also they can neither exceed nor be exceeded by one another, and are therefore equal to one another. And this will be true also of the one in relation to itself: one will be equal to itself and the others (τὰ ἄλλα). Yet one, as being in itself, must be about itself, containing and contained, and is therefore greater and less than itself. Further, nothing is external to one and the others; and as these must exist in something, they must therefore exist in one another; and as that in which a thing exists is greater than the thing, the inference is that they are both greater and less than one another, because containing and contained in one another. Therefore one is equal to and greater and less than itself or other, having also measures or parts or numbers equal to or greater or less than itself or other.

But does one partake of time? This must be acknowledged, if one partakes of being. For that which is exists in time: but time is ever moving, and therefore one becomes older than itself; and therefore one is and is not older and younger than itself and all other things:—older at each instant of coming into being, and therefore younger, for, as you remember, the older implies the younger, and therefore is older and is younger, for becoming is a progress into the future which cannot leave the past without resting in the present; this is ever the case in all things to which the term 'is' or 'being' can be applied. Yet 'one' being in time is always in the same time with itself, and therefore contemporary with itself, and therefore neither older nor younger than itself. And what are the relations of the one to the others? Are they older or younger than one another? At any rate the others are more than one, and one, being the lesser number, must have been prior to the greater, or many. But on the other hand, one must exist in a manner accordant with its
own nature. Now one has parts, and has therefore a beginning, middle, and end, of which the beginning is first and the end last. And the parts come into existence first, and the whole last, which is therefore younger, and the parts older than one. But, again, the idea of one is implied in each of the parts as much as in the whole, and must be of the same age with them; therefore one is at once older and younger than the parts, and also contemporaneous with the parts, for no part can be a part which is not one. Is this true of becoming as well as being? Thus much may be affirmed, that the same things which are older or younger cannot become older or younger by the addition of equal times. But, on the other hand, one, if older than other things, has existed a longer time than they have. And when equal time is added to a longer and shorter, the relative difference between them is diminished. In this way that which was older becomes younger, and that which was younger becomes older, that is to say, becomes so in relation to the previous state: they ever become and never have become, for then they would be. Thus the one and others are always becoming younger and also older than one another: because they are always differing from one another by a different portion of time. And one, having time and also admitting of the ideas of elder and younger, admits of all time, present, past, and future—was, is, shall be—was becoming, is becoming, will become. And there is a science and opinion and name and definition of the one, as is already implied in the fact of our inquiry.

Yet once more, if one be one and others, and neither one nor others, and also participant of time, must there not be a time at which one as being one partakes of essential being, and a time when one as not being one is deprived of essential being? But these two contradictory states cannot be experienced by the one both together: there must be a time of transition. And the transition is a process of generation and destruction, which intervenes between being and not being, and the one and the others. For the generation of the one is the destruction of the others, and the generation of the others is the destruction of the one. There is separation and aggregation, assimilation and dissimilation, increase, diminution, equalization, a passage from motion to rest, and from rest to motion. But how is this and when do these changes take place? When does motion become rest, or rest motion? The answer to this question will throw a light upon all the others. Nothing can be in motion and at rest at the same time; and therefore the change takes
place 'suddenly'—which is a strange expression, and seems to mean change in no time. Which is true also of all the other changes, which likewise take place in no time.

i. aa. But if one exists, what happens to the others, which in the first place are not one, yet may partake of one in a certain way? The others are other than the one because they have parts (for without parts they would be one), and parts imply a whole to which they belong; otherwise they would be parts of others, that is, of themselves and of all other parts, which is absurd. For a part, if not a part of any one, must be a part of all but this one, and so not a part of every one; and if not a part of every one, not a part of any one, and so of no one; and if of no one, how of all? Therefore a part is neither a part of many nor of all, but of an absolute whole and perfect ideal unity. And if the others have parts, they must partake of the whole, and must be the whole of which the others are the parts. And each part, as the word 'each' implies, is also an absolute unity which is abstracted from the rest. And both the whole and the parts partake of one, for the one is a whole of which the others are parts, and each unit is one part of the whole, and whole and parts as participating in one are other than one, and as being other than one they are therefore many and infinite; for however small a fraction you separate from them is many and not one. Yet the fact of their being parts furnishes them with a limit towards other parts and towards the whole; they are finite and also infinite: finite through participation in the one, infinite in their own nature. And as being finite, they are alike; and as being infinite, they are alike; but as being both finite and also infinite, they are in the highest degree unlike. And all other opposites might without difficulty be shown to unite in them.

i. bb. Once more, leaving all this: Is there not also an opposite series of consequences which is equally true of the others, and may be deduced from the existence of one? There is. One is distinct from the others, and the others from one; for one and the others are all things; and therefore there is no third existence in which they agree. And as they exclude each other, they are not in the relation of whole and parts, nor can the others have any element of unity, and therefore not of multitude, nor of duality, nor of any other number, nor of any other opposition or distinction, such as likeness and unlikeness, some and other, generation and corruption, odd and even. For the others would partake, of one
opposite, and this would be a participation in one; or of two opposites, and this would be a participation in two. Thus if one exists, one is all things, and likewise nothing, in relation to one and to the others.

ii. a. But, again, assume the opposite hypothesis, that one has no existence, and what is the consequence? In the first place, the proposition that one has no existence is clearly opposed to the proposition, that not one has no existence. In the words 'one has no existence' there is an assumption of a known difference, which is implied in the word 'one'; and the subject of every proposition, negative as well as affirmative, is a particular thing, whether the verb of existence is affirmed or denied. If the one then has no existence, there must be a science of the one, or that which has no existence would be unknown; and the non-existent one must be different from other things; moreover, this and that, some and other, may be all attributes of the non-existent one, which, though non-existent, may and must have many attributes, if one is the subject of not being, and not other things, but if both, there is nothing which can be spoken of. Also the non-existent one differs, and is different in kind from the others, and therefore unlike them; and they being other than the one, are unlike one, which is therefore unlike them. But one, being unlike other, must be like itself; for the unlikeness of one to itself is the destruction of the hypothesis of the one; and if like itself, one cannot be equal to the others; for that would suppose existence in the one, and would make others equal to one and like one; both which are impossible, if one does not exist. The non-existent one, then, if not equal is unequal to the others, and inequality implies great and small, and equality is the mean of great and small, and therefore one also partakes of equality. Further, the non-existent one has being; for if you deny the existence of the non-existent, in that case the non-existence of one would be untruly affirmed; but if truly, we affirm being of the non-existent one, for that which is true is. Hence the non-existent one, if remitting aught of the existence of non-existence, becomes existent. For being and not being mutually imply each other. For the true being partakes of the being of being, and of the not being of the being of not being; and not being partakes of the not being of not being, and of the being of being. And therefore the non-existent one participates in existence, and has existence, having also non-existence, and having non-existence has also existence. And the union of being and not being involves change or motion. But how can not-being, which exists nowhere, move
or change, either from one place to another or in the same place? And one, whether existent or non-existent, would cease to be one if experiencing a change of substance. The non-existent one, then, is both in motion and at rest, is changed and unchanged, and created and destroyed, and uncreated and undestroyed.

ii. b. Once more, let us ask the question, If one is not, what happens in regard to one? The expression 'is not' implies negation of existence:—do we mean by this to say that a thing, which is not, in a certain sense is? or do we mean absolutely to deny existence to one? The latter. Then the non-existent one can neither be nor become nor perish nor experience change of substance or place. Neither can greatness, or smallness, or equality, or unlikeness, or likeness either to itself or other, or this or that, or any other relation, or now or hereafter or formerly, or knowledge or opinion or perception or name or anything else be attributed to that which is not.

ii. aa. Once more, if one has no existence, what becomes of the others? In the first place, they are others, and this implies existence and also difference, and difference implies relation, not to the one, which is non-existent, but to one another. And they are others of one another not as units but as infinities, the least of which is also infinity, and capable of infinitesimal division, as in a dream the single image multiplies, and the least things when you approach them, grow large. And they will have no number, but only a semblance of number; and the least portion of them will appear large and manifold in comparison with the infinitesimal fractions into which they may be divided. Further, each aggregate will have the appearance of being equal with the fractions. For in passing from the greater to the less there is an intermediate point, which is equality. Moreover, each separate aggregate in relation to itself and to some other is also infinite; there is a beginning before the beginning, and a middle of the middle, and an end beyond the end, because the infinitesimal division is never arrested by the one. Thus all being is one at a distance, and broken up when near, and like at a distance and unlike when near; and also the aggregates which compose being seem to be like and unlike, in rest and motion, in generation and corruption, in contact and separation, if one has no existence.

ii. bb. Once more, let us inquire, If one has no existence, and the others have existence, what follows? In the first place, the others will not be the one, nor the many, for in that case the one would be con-
tained in them; neither will the many appear to be one or many; because they have no communion or participation in that which is not, nor semblance of that which is not. If one has no existence, the others neither are, nor appear to be one or many, like or unlike, in contact or separation. In short, if one is not, nothing is.

The result of all which is, that whether one is or is not, one and the others, in relation to themselves and to one another, are and are not, and appear and appear not, in all manner of ways.

I. On the first hypothesis we may remark: first, That one is one is an identical proposition, from which we might expect that no further consequences could be deduced. The train of consequences which follows, is inferred by altering the predicate into ‘not many.’ Yet, perhaps, if a strict Eristic had been present, οἰος ἄνηρ εἶ καὶ νῦν παρῆν, he might have affirmed that the not many presented a different aspect of the conception from the one, and was therefore not identical with it. Such a subtlety would be very much in character with the Zenonian dialectic. Secondly, We may note, that the conclusion is really involved in the beginning. For one is conceived as one, in a sense which excludes all predicates. When the meaning of one has been reduced to a point, there is no use in saying that it has neither parts nor magnitude. Thirdly, The conception of the same is, first of all, identified with the one; and then by a further analysis distinguished from, and even opposed to, the one. Fourthly, We may detect notions, which have reappeared in modern philosophy, e.g. the bare abstraction of undefined unity, answering to the Hegelian ‘Seyn,’ or the identity of contradictions ‘that which is older is also younger,’ etc., cp. 152, or the Kantian conception of an a priori synthetical proposition ‘one is.’

II. In the first series of propositions the word ‘is’ is the copula; in the second, the verb of existence. As in the first series, the negative consequence followed from one being affirmed to be equivalent to the not many; so here the affirmative consequence is deduced from one being equivalent to the many.

In the former case, nothing could be predicated of the one, but now everything—multitude, relation, place, time, transition. One is regarded in all the aspects of one, and with a reference to all the consequences which flow, either from the combination or the separation of them. The
notion of transition involves the singular extra temporal conception of: 'suddleness.' This idea of 'suddleness' is a mere fiction, and yet we may observe that similar antinomies have led modern philosophers to deny the reality of time and space. It is not the infinitesimal of time, but the negative of time. By the help of this invention the conception of change, which sorely exercised the minds of early thinkers, seems to be, but is not really at all explained.

The processes by which Parmenides obtains his singular results may be summed up as follows: (1) Compound or correlative ideas which involve each other, such as, one and being, part and whole, one and others, are conceived sometimes in a state of composition, and sometimes of division: (2) The division or distinction is heightened into total opposition: or (3) The idea, which has been already divided, is regarded, like a number, as capable of further infinite subdivision: (4) Mixed states, or processes of transition are viewed only under the form of alternatives or opposites; there are no degrees of sameness, likeness, difference, nor any conception of motion or change: (5) One, being, etc., like space in Zeno's puzzle of Achilles and the tortoise, are regarded sometimes as continuous and sometimes as discrete: (6) In some parts of the argument the abstraction is so rarefied as to become not only fallacious, but even unintelligible, e.g. in the process by which odd numbers are multiplied into even numbers, or even numbers into odd ones (143 E); or in the contradiction which is elicited out of the relative terms older and younger at p. 152.

In all this and in what follows we seem to breathe the spirit of the Megarian philosophy. Plato has gone beyond his Megarian contemporaries; he has split their straws over again, and admitted more than they would have desired. He is indulging the analytical tendencies of his age, which can divide but not combine. To a certain extent he is under the power of these influences himself. And he does not stop to enquire whether the distinctions which he makes are shadowy and fallacious, but 'whither the argument blows' he follows.

III. The negative series of propositions contains the first conception of the negation of a negation. Two minus signs in arithmetic or algebra make a plus. Two negatives destroy each other. This subtle notion is the foundation of the Hegelian logic. The mind must not only admit that determination is negation, but must get through negation into affirmation. Whether this process is real, or in any way an assistance to
thought, or, like some other logical forms, a mere figure of speech transferred from the sphere of mathematics, may be doubted. That Plato and the most subtle philosopher of the nineteenth century should have lighted upon the same notion, is a singular coincidence of ancient and modern thought.

IV. The one and the many or others are reduced to their strictest arithmetical meaning. That one is three or three one, is a proposition which has, perhaps, given rise to more controversy in the world than any other. But no one has ever meant to say that three and one are to be taken in the same sense. Whereas the one and many of the Parmenides have precisely the same meaning; there is no notion of one personality or substance having many attributes or qualities. The truth seems to be rather the opposite of that which Socrates implies at p. 129: There is no contradiction in the concrete, but in the abstract, and the more abstract the idea, the more palpable will be the contradiction. For just as nothing can persuade us that the number one is the number three, so neither can we be persuaded that any abstract idea is identical with its opposite, although they may both inhere together in some external object, or some more comprehensive conception. Ideas, persons, things may be one in one sense and many in another, and may have various degrees of unity and plurality. But in whatever sense and in whatever degree they are one they cease to be many; and in whatever degree or sense they are many they cease to be one.

Two points remain to be considered: 1st, the connection between the first and second parts of the dialogue; 2ndly, the relation of the Parmenides to the other dialogues.

I. In both divisions of the dialogue the principal speaker is the same, and the method pursued by him is also the same, being a criticism on received opinions: first, on the doctrine of ideas; secondly, of being. From the Platonic ideas we naturally proceed to the Eleatic one or being which is the foundation of them. They are the same philosophy in two forms, and the simpler form is the truer and deeper. For the Platonic ideas are mere numerical differences, and the moment we attempt to distinguish between them, their transcendental character is lost; ideas of justice, temperance, and good, are really distinguishable only with reference to their application in the world. If we once ask how they are related to individuals or to the ideas of the divine mind, they are again merged in the aboriginal notion of being. No one can answer
the questions which Parmenides asks of Socrates. And yet these questions are asked with the express acknowledgment that the denial of ideas will be the destruction of the human mind. The true answer to the difficulty here thrown out is the establishment of a rational psychology; and this is a work which is commenced in the Sophist. Plato, in urging the difficulty of his own doctrine of ideas, is far from denying that some doctrine of ideas is necessary, and for this he is paving the way.

In a similar spirit he criticises the Eleatic doctrine of being, not intending to deny ontology, but showing that the old Eleatic notion, and the very name being, is unable to maintain itself against the subtleties of the Megarians. He did not mean to say that Being or Substance had no existence, but he is preparing for the development of his later view, that ideas were capable of relation. The fact that contradictory consequences follow from the existence or non-existence of one or many, does not prove that they have or have not existence, but rather that some different mode of conceiving them is required. Parmenides may still have thought that 'Being was,' just as Kant would have asserted the existence of 'things in themselves,' while denying the transcendental use of the Categories.

Several lesser links also connect the first and second parts of the dialogue: (1) The thesis is the same as that which Zeno has been already discussing: (2) Parmenides has intimated in the first part, that the method of Zeno should, as Socrates desired, be extended to ideas: (3) The difficulty of participating in greatness, smallness, equality is urged against the ideas as well as against the one.

II. The Parmenides is not only a criticism of the Eleatic notion of being, but also of the methods of reasoning then in existence, and in this point of view, as well as in the other, may be regarded as an introduction to the Sophist. Long ago, in the Euthydemus, the vulgar application of the 'both and neither' Eristic had been subjected to a similar criticism, which there takes the form of banter and irony, here of illustration.

The germs of the attack upon the ideas, and the transition to a more rational philosophy, have also been discernible in the Philebus. The perplexity of the one and many has there been confined to the region of ideas, and replaced by a theory of classification; the good arranged in classes is also contrasted with the barren abstraction of the Megarians. The war is carried on against the Eristics in all the later dialogues, sometimes with a playful irony, at other times with a sort of contempt. But
there is no lengthened refutation of them. The Parmenides belongs to that stage of the dialogues of Plato, in which he is partially under their influence, using them as a sort of 'critics or diviners' of the truth of his own, and of the Eleatic theories. In the Theaetetus a similar negative dialectic is employed in the attempt to define science, which after every effort remains undefined still. The same question is revived from the objective side in the Sophist: being and not being are no longer exhibited in opposition, but are now reconciled; and the true nature of not being is discovered and made the basis of the correlation of ideas. Some links are probably missing which might have been supplied if we had trustworthy accounts of Plato's oral teaching.

To sum up: the Parmenides of Plato is a critic, first, of the Platonic ideas, and secondly, of the Eleatic doctrine of being. Neither are absolutely denied. But certain difficulties and consequences are shown in the assumption of either, which prove that the Platonic as well as the Eleatic doctrine must be remodelled. The negation and contradiction which are involved in the conception of the one and many are preliminary to their final adjustment. The Platonic ideas are tested by the interrogative method of Socrates; the Eleatic one or being is tried by the severer and perhaps impossible method of hypothetical consequences, negative and affirmative. In the latter we have an example of the Zenonian or Megarian dialectic, which proceeded not 'by assailing premises but conclusions;' this is worked out and improved by Plato. When primary abstractions are used in every conceivable sense, any or every conclusion may be deduced from them. The words 'one,' 'other,' 'being,' 'like,' 'same,' 'whole,' and their opposites, have slightly different meanings, as they are applied to objects of thought or objects of sense—to number, time, place, and to the higher ideas of the reason;—and out of their different meanings this 'feast' of contradictions 'has been provided.'
PARMENIDES.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES. PARMENIDES.
ZENO. ARISTOTELES.

The dialogue is supposed to be narrated by Antiphon, the half-brother of Adeimantus and Glauccon, to certain Clazomenians.

Steph. 136 We went from our home at Clazomenae to Athens, and met Adeimantus and Glauccon in the Agora. Welcome, said Adeimantus, taking me by the hand; is there anything which we can do for you in Athens?

Why, yes, I said, I am come to ask a favour of you.

What is that? he said.

I want you to tell me the name of your half-brother, which I have forgotten; he was a mere child when I last came hither from Clazomenae, but that was a long time ago; your father's name, if I remember rightly, is Pyrilampes?

Yes, he said, and the name of our brother, Antiphon; but why do you ask?

Let me introduce some countrymen of mine, I said; they are lovers of philosophy, and have heard that Antiphon was in the habit of meeting Pythodorus, the friend of Zeno, and remembers certain arguments which Socrates and Zeno and Parmenides had together, and which Pythodorus had often repeated to him.

That is true.

And could we hear them? I asked.

Nothing easier, he replied; when he was a youth he made a careful study of the pieces; at present his thoughts run in another
direction; like his grandfather, Antiphon, he is devoted to horses. But, if that is what you want, let us go and look for him; he dwells at Melita, which is quite near, and he has only just left us to go home.

Accordingly we went to look for him; he was at home, and in the act of giving a bridle to a blacksmith to be fitted. When he had done with the blacksmith, his brothers told him the purpose of our visit; and he saluted me as an acquaintance whom he remembered from my former visit, and we asked him to repeat the dialogue. At first he was not very willing, and complained of the trouble, but at length he consented. He told us that Pythodorus had described to him the appearance of Parmenides and Zeno; they came to Athens, he said, at the great Panathenae; the former was, at the time of his visit, about 65 years old, very white with age, but well favoured. Zeno was nearly 40 years of age, of a noble figure and fair aspect; and in the days of his youth he was reported to have been beloved of Parmenides. He said that they lodged with Pythodorus in the Ceramicus, outside the wall, whither Socrates and others came to see them; they wanted to hear some writings of Zeno, which had been brought to Athens by them for the first time. He said that Socrates was then very young, and that Zeno read them to him in the absence of Parmenides, and had nearly finished when Pythodorus entered, and with him Parmenides and Aristoteles who was afterwards one of the Thirty; there was not much more to hear, and Pythodorus had heard Zeno repeat them before.

When the recitation was completed, Socrates requested that the first hypothesis of the first discourse might be read over again, and this having been done, he said: What do you mean, Zeno? Is your argument that the existence of many necessarily involves like and unlike, and that this is impossible, for neither can the like be unlike, nor the unlike like; is that your position? Just that, said Zeno. And if the unlike cannot be like, or the like unlike, then neither can the many exist, for that would involve an impossibility. Is the design of your argument throughout to disprove the existence of the many? and is each of your treatises intended to furnish a separate proof of this, there being as many proofs in all as you have composed arguments, of the non-existence of the many? Is that your meaning, or have I misunderstood you?
No, said Zeno; you have quite understood the general drift of the treatise.

I see, Parmenides, said Socrates, that Zeno is your second self in his writings too; he puts what you say in another way, and half deceives us into believing that he is saying what is new. For you, in your compositions, say that the all is one, and of this you adduce excellent proofs; and he, on the other hand, says that the many is naught, and gives many great and convincing evidences of this. To deceive the world, as you have done, by saying the same thing in different ways, one of you affirming and the other denying the many, is a strain of art beyond the reach of most of us.

Yes, Socrates, said Zeno. But although you are as keen as a Spartan hound in pursuing the track, you do not quite apprehend the true motive of the performance, which is not really such an artificial piece of work as you imagine; there was no intention of concealment effecting any grand result—that was a mere accident. For the truth is, that these writings of mine were meant to protect the arguments of Parmenides against those who ridicule him, and urge the many ridiculous and contradictory results which were supposed to follow from the assertion of the one. My answer is addressed to the partizans of the many, and intended to show that greater or more ridiculous consequences follow from their hypothesis of the existence of the many if carried out, than from the hypothesis of the existence of the one. A love of controversy led me to write the book in the days of my youth, and some one stole the writings, and I had therefore no choice about the publication of them; the motive, however, of writing, was not the ambition of an old man, but the pugnacity of a young one. This you do not seem to see, Socrates; though in other respects, as I was saying, your notion is a very just one.

That I understand, said Socrates, and quite accept your account. But tell me, Zeno, do you not further think that there is an idea of likeness in the abstract, and another idea of unlikeness, which is the opposite of likeness, and that in these two, you and I and all other things to which we apply the term many, participate; and that the things which participate in likeness are in that degree and manner like; and that those which participate in unlikeness are in that degree unlike, or both like and
unlike in the degree in which they participate in both? And all things may partake of both opposites, and be like and unlike to themselves, by reason of this participation. Even in that there is nothing wonderful. But if a person could prove the absolute like to become unlike, or the absolute unlike to become like, that, in my opinion, would be a real wonder; not, however, if the things which partake of the ideas experience likeness and unlikeness—there is nothing extraordinary in this. Nor, again, if a person were to show that all is one by partaking of one, and that the same is many by partaking of many, would that be very wonderful? But if he were to show me that the absolute many was one, or the absolute one many, I should be truly amazed. And I should say the same of other things. I should be surprised to hear that the genera and species had opposite qualities in themselves; but if a person wanted to prove of me that I was many and also one, there would be no marvel in that. When he wanted to show that I was many he would say that I have a right and a left side, and a front and a back, and an upper and a lower half, for I cannot deny that I partake of multitude; when, on the other hand, he wants to prove that I am one, he will say, that we who are here assembled are seven, and that I am one and partake of the one, and in saying both he speaks truly. Or if a person shows that the same wood and stones and the like, being many are also one, we admit that he shows the existence of the one and many, but he does not show that the many are one or the one many; he is uttering not a wonder but a truism. If, however, as I was suggesting just now, we were to make an abstraction, I mean of like, unlike, one, many, rest, motion, and similar ideas, and then to show that these in their abstract form admit of admixture and separation, I should greatly wonder at that. This part of the argument appears to be treated by you, Zeno, in a very spirited manner; nevertheless, as I was saying, I should be far more amazed if any one found in the ideas themselves which are conceptions, the same puzzle and entanglement which you have shown to exist in visible objects.

While Socrates was saying this, Pythodorus thought that Parmenides and Zeno were not altogether pleased at the successive steps of the argument; but still they gave the closest attention, and often looked at one another, and smiled as if in admiration
of him. When he had finished, Parmenides expressed these feelings in the following words:—

Socrates, he said, I admire the bent of your mind towards philosophy; tell me now, was this your own distinction between abstract ideas and the things which partake of them? and do you think that there is an idea of likeness apart from the likeness which we possess, or of the one and many, or of the other notions of which Zeno has been speaking?

I think that there are such abstract ideas, said Socrates.

Parmenides proceeded. And would you also make abstract ideas of the just and the beautiful and the good, and of all that class of notions?

Yes, he said, I should.

And would you make an abstract idea of man distinct from us and from all other human creatures, or of fire and water?

I am often undecided, Parmenides, as to whether I ought to include them or not.

And would you feel equally undecided, Socrates, about things the mention of which may provoke a smile?—I mean such things as hair, mud, dirt, or anything else that is foul and base; would you suppose that each of these has an idea distinct from the phenomena with which we come into contact, or not?

Certainly not, said Socrates; visible things like these are such as they appear to us, and I am afraid that there would be an absurdity in assuming any idea of them, although I sometimes get disturbed, and begin to think that there is nothing without an idea; but then again, when I have taken up this position, I run away, because I am afraid that I may fall into a bottomless pit of nonsense, and perish; and I return to the ideas of which I was just now speaking, and busy myself with them.

Yes, Socrates, said Parmenides; that is because you are still young; the time will come when philosophy will have a firmer grasp of you, if I am not mistaken, and then you will not despise even the meanest things; at your age, you are too much disposed to look to the opinions of men. But I should like to know whether you mean that there are certain forms or ideas of which all other things partake, and from which they are named; that similars, for example, become similar, because they partake of similarity; and great things become great, because they partake of greatness;
and that just and beautiful things become just and beautiful, because they partake of justice and beauty?

Yes, certainly, said Socrates, that is my meaning.

And does not each individual partake either of the whole of the idea or of a part of the idea? Is any third way possible?

Impossible, he said.

Then do you think that the whole idea is one, and yet being one, exists in each one of many?

Why not, Parmenides? said Socrates.

Because one and the same existing as a whole in many separate individuals, will thus be in a state of separation from itself.

Nay, replied the other; the idea may be like the day which is one and the same in many places, and yet continuous with itself; in this way each idea may be one and the same in all.

I like your way, Socrates, of dividing one into many; and if I were to spread out a sail and cover a number of men, that, as I suppose, in your way of speaking, would be one and a whole in or on many—that will be the sort of thing which you mean?

I am not sure.

And would you say that the whole sail is over each man, or a part only?

A part only.

Then, Socrates, the ideas themselves will be divisible, and the individuals will have a part only and not the whole existing in them?

That seems to be true.

Then would you like to say, Socrates, that the one idea is really divisible and yet remains one?

Certainly not, he said.

Suppose that you divide greatness, and that of many great things each one is great by having a portion of greatness less than absolute greatness—is that conceivable?

No.

Or will each equal part, by taking some portion of equality less than absolute equality, be equal to some other?

Impossible.

Or suppose one of us to have a portion of smallness; this is but a part of the small, and therefore the small is greater; and while
the absolute small is greater, that to which the part of the small is added, will be smaller and not greater than before.

That is impossible, he said.

Then in what way, Socrates, will all things participate in the ideas, if they are unable to participate in them either as parts or wholes?

Indeed, he said, that is a question which is not easily determined.

Well, said Parmenides, and what do you say of another question? What is that?

I imagine that the way in which you are led to assume the existence of ideas is as follows:—You see a number of great objects, and there seems to you to be one and the same idea of greatness pervading them all; and hence you conceive of a single greatness.

That is true, said Socrates.

And if you go on and allow your mind in like manner to contemplate the idea of greatness and these other greatnesses, and to compare them, will not another idea of greatness arise, which will appear to be the source of them all?

That is true.

Then another abstraction of greatness will appear over and above absolute greatness, and the individuals which partake of it; and then another, which will be the source of that, and then others, and so on; and there will be no longer a single idea of each kind, but an infinite number of them.

But may not the ideas, asked Socrates, be cognitions only, and have no proper existence except in our minds, Parmenides? For in that case there may be single ideas, which do not involve the consequences which were just now mentioned.

And can there be individual cognitions which are cognitions of nothing?

That is impossible, he said.

The cognition must be of something?

Yes.

Of something that is or is not?

Of something that is.

Must it not be of the unity, or single nature, which the cognition recognises as attaching to all?

Yes.
And will not this unity, which is always the same in all, be the idea?

From that, again, there is no escape.

Then, said Parmenides, if you say that other things participate in the ideas, must you not say that everything is made up of thoughts or cognitions, and that all things think; or will you say that being thoughts they are without thought?

But that, said Socrates, is irrational. The more probable view, Parmenides, of these ideas is, that they are patterns fixed in nature, and that other things are like them, and resemblances of them; and that what is meant by the participation of other things in the ideas, is really assimilation to them.

But if, said he, the individual is like the idea, must not the idea also be like the individual, in as far as the individual is a resemblance of the idea? That which is like, cannot be conceived of as other than the like of like.

Impossible.

And when two things are alike, must they not partake of the same idea?

They must.

And will not that of which the two partake, and which makes them alike, be the absolute idea [of likeness]?

Certainly.

Then the idea cannot be like the individual, or the individual like the idea; for if they are alike, some further idea of likeness will always arise, and if that be like anything else, another and another; and new ideas will never cease being created, if the idea resembles that which partakes of it?

Quite true.

The theory, then, that other things participate in the ideas by resemblance, has to be given up, and some other mode of participation devised?

That is true.

Do you see then, Socrates, how great is the difficulty of affirming self-existent ideas?

Yes, indeed.

And, further, let me say that as yet you only understand a small part of the difficulty which is involved in your assumption, that there are ideas of all things, which are distinct from them.
What difficulty? he said.

There are many, but the greatest of all is this:—If an opponent argues that these self-existent ideas, as we term them, cannot be known, no one can prove to him that he is wrong, unless he who is disputing their existence be a man of great genius and cultivation, and is willing to follow a long and laborious demonstration—he will remain unconvinced, and still insist that they cannot be known.

How is that, Parmenides? said Socrates.

In the first place, I think, Socrates, that you, or any one who maintains the existence of absolute ideas, will admit that they cannot exist in us.

Why, then they would be no longer absolute, said Socrates.

That is true, he said; and any relation in the absolute ideas, is a relation which is among themselves only, and has nothing to do with the resemblances, or whatever they are to be termed, which are in our sphere, and the participation in which gives us this or that name. And the subjective notions in our mind, which have the same name with them, are likewise only relative to one another, and not to the ideas which have the same name with them, and belong to themselves, and not to the ideas.

How do you mean? said Socrates.

I may illustrate my meaning in this way, said Parmenides:—A master has a slave; now there is nothing absolute in the relation between them; they are both relations of some man to another man; but there is also an idea of mastership in the abstract, which is relative to the idea of slavery in the abstract; and this abstract nature has nothing to do with us, nor we with the abstract nature; abstract natures have to do with themselves alone, and we with ourselves. Do you see my meaning?

Yes, said Socrates, I quite see your meaning.

And does not knowledge, I mean absolute knowledge, he said, answer to very and absolute truth?

Certainly.

And each kind of absolute knowledge answers to each kind of absolute being?

Yes.

And the knowledge which we have, will answer to the truth which we have; and again, each kind of knowledge which we have, will be a knowledge of each kind of being which we have?
Certainly.
But the ideas themselves, as you admit, we have not, and cannot have?
   No, we cannot.
   And the absolute ideas or species, are known by the absolute idea of knowledge?
   Yes.
   And that is an idea which we have not got?
   No.
   Then none of the ideas are known to us, because we have no share in absolute knowledge?
   They are not.
   Then the ideas of the beautiful, and of the good, and the like, which we imagine to be absolute ideas, are unknown to us?
   That appears to be the case.
   I think that there is a worse consequence still.
   What is that?
   Would you, or would you not, say, that if there is such a thing as absolute knowledge, that must be a far more accurate knowledge than our knowledge, and the same of beauty and other things?
   Yes.
   And if there be anything that has absolute knowledge, there is nothing more likely than God to have this most exact knowledge?
   Certainly.
   But then, will God, having this absolute knowledge, have a knowledge of human things?
   And why not?
   Because, Socrates, said Parmenides, we have admitted that the ideas have no relation to human notions, nor human notions to them; the relations of either are in their respective spheres.
   Yes, that has been admitted.
   And if God has this truest authority, and this most exact knowledge, that authority cannot rule us, nor that knowledge know us, or any human thing; and in like manner, as our authority does not extend to the gods, nor our knowledge know anything which is divine, so by parity of reason they, being gods, are not our masters; neither do they know the things of men.
   Yet, surely, said Socrates, to deprive God of knowledge is monstrous.
These, Socrates, said Parmenides, are a few, and only a few, of the difficulties which are necessarily involved in the hypothesis of the existence of ideas, and the attempt to prove the absoluteness of each of them; he who hears of them will doubt or deny their existence, and will maintain that even if they do exist, they must necessarily be unknown to man, and he will think that there is reason in what he says, and as we were remarking just now, will be wonderfully hard of being convinced; a man must be a man of real ability before he can understand that everything has a class and an absolute essence; and still more remarkable will he be who makes out all these things for himself, and can teach another to analyse them satisfactorily.

I agree with you, Parmenides, said Socrates; and what you say is very much to my mind.

And yet, Socrates, said Parmenides, if a man, fixing his mind on these and the like difficulties, refuses to acknowledge ideas or species of existences, and will not define particular species, he will be at his wit's end; in this way he will utterly destroy the power of reasoning; and that is what you seem to me to have particularly noted.

Very true, he said.

But, then, what is to become of philosophy? What resource is there, if the ideas are unknown?

I certainly do not see my way at present.

Yes, said Parmenides; and I think that this arises, Socrates, out of your attempting to define the beautiful, the just, the good, and the ideas generally, without sufficient previous training. I noticed your deficiency, when I heard you talking here with your friend Aristoteles, the day before yesterday. The impulse that carries you towards philosophy is noble and divine—never doubt that—but there is an art which often seems to be useless, and is called by the vulgar idle talking; in that you must train and exercise yourself; now that you are young, or truth will elude your grasp.

And what is the nature of this exercise, Parmenides, which you would recommend?

That which you heard Zeno practising; at the same time, I give you credit for saying to him that you did not care to solve the perplexity in reference to visible objects, or to consider the
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question in that way; but only in reference to the conceptions of the mind, and to what may be called ideas.

Why, yes, he said, there appears to me to be no difficulty in showing that visible things experience likeness or unlikeness or anything else.

Quite true, he said; but I think that you should go a step further, and consider not only the consequences which flow from a given hypothesis, but the consequences which flow from denying the hypothesis; and the exercise will be still better.

What do you mean? he said.

I mean, for example, that in the case of this very hypothesis of Zeno's about the many, you should inquire not only what will follow either to the many in relation to themselves and to the one, or to the one in relation to itself and the many, on the hypothesis of the existence of the many, but also what will follow to the one and many in their relation to themselves or to one another, on the opposite hypothesis. Or if likeness does or does not exist—what will follow on either of these hypotheses to that which is supposed, and to other things in relation to themselves and to one another, and the same of unlikeness; and you may argue in a similar way about motion and rest, about generation and destruction, and even about existence and non-existence; and in a word, whatever you like to suppose as existing or non-existing, or experiencing any sort of affection. You must look at what follows in relation to the thing supposed, and to any other things which you choose, to the greater number, and to all in like manner; and you must also look at other things in relation to themselves and to anything else which you choose, whether you suppose that they do or do not exist, if you would train yourself perfectly and see the real truth.

That, Parmenides, is a tremendous work of which you speak, and I do not quite understand you; will you yourself frame such an hypothesis, and then I shall apprehend better?

That, Socrates, is a serious task to impose on a man of my years.

Then will you, Zeno? said Socrates.

Zeno answered, with a smile:—I think that we had better ask Parmenides himself; he is quite right in saying that you are hardly aware of the extent of the task which you are imposing on him, and if there were more of us I should not ask him, for
these are not subjects which a man of his age can well speak of before a large audience; most people are not aware that this roundabout progress through all things is the only way in which the mind can attain truth. And therefore, Parmenides, I join in the request of Socrates, that I may hear the process again which I have not heard for a long time.

When Zeno had thus spoken, Pythodorus, according to Antiphon's report of him, said, that he himself and Aristoteles and the whole company entreated Parmenides to give an example of the process. I cannot refuse, said Parmenides; and yet I feel rather like Ibycus, who, when in his old age, against his will, he fell in love, compared himself to an old racehorse, who was about to run in a chariot race, shaking with fear at the course he knew so well—this was his simile of himself. And I also experience a trembling when I remember through what an ocean of words I have to wade at my time of life. But I must indulge you, as Zeno says that I ought, and we are alone. Where shall I begin? And what shall be our first hypothesis, if I am to attempt this laborious pastime? Shall I begin with myself, and take my own hypothesis of the one? and consider the consequences which follow on the supposition either of the existence or of the non-existence of one?

By all means, said Zeno.

And who will answer me? he said. Shall I propose the youngest? He will be the most likely to say what he thinks, and not raise difficulties; and his answers will give me time to breathe.

I am the one whom you mean, Parmenides, said Aristoteles; for I am the youngest, and at your service. Ask, and I will answer.

Parmenides proceeded: i. a. If one is, he said, the one cannot be many?

Impossible.

Then the one cannot have parts, and cannot be a whole?

How is that?

Why, the part would surely be the part of a whole?

Yes.

And that of which no part is wanting, would be a whole?

Certainly.

Then, in either case, one would be made up of parts; both as being a whole, and also as having parts?
Certainly.
And in either case, the one would be many, and not one?
True.
But, surely, one ought to be not many, but one?
Surely.
Then, if one is to remain one, it will not be a whole, and will
not have parts?
No.
And if one has no parts, it will have neither beginning, middle,
nor end; for these would be parts of one?
Right.
But then, again, a beginning and an end are the limits of every-
thing?
Certainly.
Then the one, neither having beginning nor end, is unlimited?
Yes, unlimited.
And therefore formless, as not being able to partake either of
round or straight.
How is that?
Why, the round is that of which all the extreme points are
equidistant from the centre?
Yes.
And the straight is that of which the middle intercepts the
extremes?
True.
Then the one would have parts, and would be many, whether it
partook of a straight or of a round form?
Assuredly.
But having no parts, one will be neither straight nor round?
Right.
Then, being of such a nature, one cannot be in any place, for
it cannot be either in another or in itself.
How is that?
Because, if one be in another, it will be encircled in that other
in which it is contained, and will touch it in many places; but
that which is one and indivisible, and does not partake of a circular
nature, cannot be touched by a circle in many places.
Certainly not.
And one being in itself, will also contain itself, and cannot
be other than one, if in itself; for nothing can be in anything which does not contain it.

Impossible.

But then, is not that which contains other than that which is contained? for the same whole cannot at once be affected actively and passively; and one will thus be no longer one, but two?

True.

Then one cannot be anywhere, either in itself or in another?

No.

Further consider, whether that which is of such a nature can have either rest or motion.

Why not?

Why, because motion is either motion in place or change in self; these are the only kinds of motion.

Yes.

And the one, when changed in itself, cannot possibly be any longer one.

It cannot.

And therefore cannot experience this sort of motion?

Clearly not.

Can the motion of one, then, be in place?

Perhaps.

But if one moved in place, must it not either move round and round in the same place, or from one place to another?

Certainly.

And that which moves round and round in the same place, must go round upon a centre; and that which goes round upon a centre must have other parts which move around the centre; but that which has no centre and no parts cannot possibly be carried round upon a centre?

Impossible.

But perhaps the motion of the one consists in going from one place to another?

Perhaps so, if it moves at all.

And have we not already shown that one cannot be in anything?

Yes.

And still greater is the impossibility of one coming into being in anything?
I do not see how that is.
Why, because anything which comes into being in anything, cannot as yet be in that other thing while still coming into being, nor remain entirely out of it, if already coming into being in it.
Certainly.
And therefore whatever comes into being in another must have parts, and the one part may be in that other, and the other part out of it; but that which has no parts cannot possibly be at the same time a whole, which is either within or without anything.
True.
And how can that which has neither parts, nor a whole, come into being anywhere either as a part or a whole? Is not that a still greater impossibility?
Clearly.
Then one does not change by a change of place, whether by going somewhere and coming into being in something; or again, by going round in the same place; or again, by change in itself?
True.
The one, then, is incapable of any kind of motion?
Incapable.
But neither can the one exist in anything, as we affirm?
Yes, that is affirmed by us.
Then it is never in the same?
Why not?
Because being in the same is being in something which is the same.
Certainly.
But it cannot be in itself, and cannot be in other?
True.
Then one is never the same?
It would seem not.
And that which is never in the same has no rest, and stands not still?
It cannot stand still.
One then, as would seem, is neither standing still nor in motion?
Clearly not.
Neither will one be the same with itself or other; nor again, other than itself, or other.
How is that?
If other than itself it would be other than one, and would not be one.

True.

And if the same with other, it would be that other, and not itself; so that upon this supposition too, it would not have the nature of one, but would be other than one?

It would.

Then it will not be the same with other, or other than itself?

It will not.

Neither will one be other than other, while it remains one; for not the one, but only the other, can be other of other, and nothing else.

True.

Then not by virtue of being one, will one be other?

Certainly not.

But if not by virtue of being one, not by virtue of being itself; and if not by virtue of being itself, not itself, and itself not being other at all, will not be other of anything?

Right.

Neither will one be the same with itself.

Why not?

Because the nature of the one is surely not the nature of the same.

Why is that?

Because when a thing becomes the same with anything, it does not necessarily become one.

Why not?

That which becomes the same with the many, necessarily becomes many and not one.

True.

And yet, if there were no difference between the one and the same, when a thing became the same, it would always become one; and when it became one, the same:

Certainly.

And, therefore, if one be the same with one, it is not one with one, and will therefore be one and also not one.

But that is surely impossible.

And therefore the one can neither be other of other, nor the same with one.
Impossible.
And thus one is neither the same, nor other, in relation to itself or other?
No.
Neither will one be like or unlike itself or other.
Why not?
Because likeness is sameness of affections.
Yes.
And sameness has been shown to be a nature distinct from oneness?
That has been shown.
But if one had any other affection than that of being one, it would be affected in such a way as to be more than one; and that is impossible.
True.
Then one can never have the same affections either as another or as itself?
Clearly not.
Then it cannot be like other, or like itself.
No.
Nor can it be affected so as to be other, for then it would be affected in such a way as to be more than one.
It would.
That which is affected in a manner other than itself or other, will be unlike itself or other, if sameness of affections is likeness.
True.
But the one, as appears, never having affections other than its own, is never unlike itself or other?
Never.
Then the one is never either like or unlike itself or other?
Plainly not.
Then neither can the one, being of this nature, be equal or unequal to itself or other.
How is that?
Why, because that which is equal must be of the same measures or quantities as that to which it is equal.
True.
And if it be less or greater than things which have a common
measure, it will have more measures than the things which are less, and less than the things which are greater?

Yes.

So also in things which have not a common measure, one will be greater than some and less than others.

Certainly.

But how can that which does not partake of sameness, have either the same measures or anything the same?

Impossible.

And not having the same measures, one cannot be equal with itself or other?

Clearly not.

But whether it have fewer or more units of measure, it will have as many parts as units of measure; and thus again one will be no longer one, but will have as many parts as measures.

Right.

But if it were of one unit of measure, it would be equal to that measure; and it has been shown to be incapable of equality.

Clearly.

Then it will neither have one unit of measure, nor many, nor few, nor partake of the same at all, nor be equal to itself or any other; nor be greater or less than itself, or any other?

Certainly.

Well, and does any one suppose that one can be older, or younger than itself, or of the same age with itself?

Why not?

Why, because that which is of the same age with itself or other, must partake of equality or likeness of time; and we said that one did not partake of equality or likeness.

We did say that.

And we also said, that it had no inequality or unlikeness.

Very true.

How then can one being of this nature be either older or younger, or have the same age with any other?

In no way.

Then one cannot be older or younger, or of the same age, with itself or other?

Clearly not.
Then one, being of this nature, cannot exist in time at all; for must not that which exists in time, be always growing older than itself?

Certainly.

And that which is older, must be always older than that which is younger?

True.

Then, that which is older than itself, also becomes at the same time younger than itself; for the elder is only possible in relation to the younger.

What do you mean?

I mean this:—A thing does not become different from another thing, when the difference already exists; the difference of that which is, is,—of that which has become, has become,—of that which will be, will be; but of that which is becoming, there cannot have been or be about to be, or be any difference;—that exists only in the form of becoming.

Certainly.

But, surely, the elder is a difference relative to the younger, and to no other?

True.

Then that which becomes older than itself must also, at the same time, become younger than itself?

Yes.

And yet it cannot become for a longer or for a shorter time than itself, but it must become, and be and have become, and be about to be, the same time with itself?

Yes, that is inevitable.

Then things which are in time, and partake of time, must in every case be of the same age with themselves; and must also become older and younger than themselves?

That must be inferred.

But one has none of those affections?

None of them.

Then it does not partake of time, and is not in any time?

That is what the argument proves.

And yet, does not the word 'was,' and 'has become,' and 'was becoming,' signify a participation of past time?

Certainly.
And does not ‘will be,’ ‘will become,’ ‘will have become,’ signify a participation of future time?
Yes.
And ‘is,’ or ‘becomes,’ signifies a participation of present time?
Certainly.
And if one is absolutely without participation in time, it never has become, or was becoming, or was at any former time, or has now become or is becoming, or is or will become, or will have become or will be hereafter.
Most true.
But are there any modes of being other than these?
There are none.
Then one cannot possibly partake of being?
That is the inference.
Then one is not?
Clearly not.
Then one is not one, for in that case it would be in existence, and thus would partake of being; but if the argument is to be believed, one neither is nor is one?
That appears to be true.
But to that which exists not, there is no attribute or relation?
How can there be?
Then there is no name, nor description, nor knowledge, nor sense, nor conception of one?
Clearly not.
One, then, is neither named, nor uttered, nor conceived, nor known; nor does anything that is, perceive one.
That is the inference.
But can all this be true about one?
I think not.

i. b. Suppose, now, that we once more resume the hypothesis, and enquire whether, on a further review, any new aspect of the question appears.
I shall be very happy to do that.
We say that we have to work out all the consequences that follow, if one exists; is not that what we say?
Yes.
Then we will begin at the beginning:—If one is, can one be, and not partake of being?

Impossible.

Then one will have being, but being will not be the same with one; for if the same, it would not be the being of one; nor would the one have participated in being, for the two propositions—that one is, and that one is one—would have been identical; but our hypothesis is not if one is one, what will follow, but if one is:—am I not right?

Certainly.

And we meant to say, that one has not the same significance as being?

Of course.

And when we put them together, and say 'one is,' that is equivalent to saying, 'partakes of being?'

Quite true.

Once more let us ask, if one exists what will follow? Consider whether this hypothesis does not involve that one is of such a nature as to have parts:

How is that?

Why, in this way:—If being or existence is predicated of existing unity, and unity of united existence, and unity is not the same as being or existence, but only belongs to the same united existence which we have assumed, must not the being or existence of unity be a whole, of which unity and being are the parts?

Certainly.

And is each of these parts—one and being—to be called a part only, or must the word 'part' be relative to the word 'whole'?

The latter.

And that which is one is a whole and has a part?

Certainly.

And does either of these parts of existing unity—that is to say, one or being,—fall away from the other; or can unity have no being, or being no unity?

Impossible.

Then each of the parts has both unity and being, and the smallest part is made up of two parts; and on the same principle, every part whatever has always these two parts; for being always involves unity, and unity being; so that two are always appearing, instead of one.
143 Certainly.
And thus the one which has being or existence, becomes infinite in number?
That appears to be true.
Let us take another direction.
What direction?
We say that one partakes of being, and therefore is?
Yes.
And in this way, the one having being becomes many?
True.
But now, let us take that one which, as we say, partakes of being, and try to imagine it apart from that of which we say that it partakes—will this abstract one be one or many?
One, I think.
Let us see:—Must not the being of one be other than one, if one is not being, and, considered as one, only partakes of being?
Certainly.
If being be one thing, and unity another, neither one, because it is one, can be other than being; nor being, because it is being, other than one; they differ from one another, not by what they are, but because they are other.
Certainly.
So that the other is not the same, either with unity or with being?
Certainly not.
And therefore, whether we take being and other or being and one, or one and other, in each case we take two things, which may be rightly called both.
How is that?
In this way—you may speak of being?
Yes.
And also of one?
Yes.
Then, now we have spoken of either of them?
Yes.
Well, and when I speak of being and one together, I speak of them both?
Certainly.
And if I speak of being and other, or of one and other,—in any case do I not speak of each of them as both?
Yes.
And must not that which is correctly called both, be also two?
Undoubtedly.
And of two units, must not either be one?
Certainly.
Then, if the individuals of the pair are together two, they must be severally one?
Clearly.
And if each of them is one, then by the addition of any one to any pair, the whole becomes three?
Yes.
And the number three is an odd number, and two is an even number?
Of course.
And when there are two units they are posited twice, and when there are three units they are posited thrice; that is, if two is twice one, and three is thrice one?
Certainly.
There are two, and there is twice, and therefore there is twice two; and there are three, and there is thrice, and therefore there is thrice three?
Of course.
If there are three and there is twice, and there are two and there is thrice, then you have twice three and thrice two?
Undoubtedly.
Here, then, we have even numbers multiplied into even ones, and odd into even, and even into odd.
True.
And if this is true, is any number left which is not necessarily 144 included?
Assuredly not.
Then if one exists, number must exist?
Certainly.
But if number exists, then there will be many existences, or rather, an infinite number of them; for is not number infinite in number, and also participant of existence?
Certainly.
And if all number participates in existence, every part of number will also participate?
Yes.

Then existence is distributed over the multitude of things, and is not divided from any existing thing, however small or however great? And, indeed, the very supposition of this is absurd, for how can existence be divided from anything that exists?

In no way.

And it is divided into the greatest and into the smallest, and into all kinds of existence, and is divided more than all things; the divisions of it have no limit.

True.

Then it has the greatest number of parts?

Yes, the greatest number.

Is there any of these parts which is a part of being or existence, and yet not a part?

Impossible.

But even assuming that there is, still that, while existing, must be one thing, and cannot be nothing?

Certainly.

Then unity attaches equally to every part of existence, and does not fail in any part, whether great or small?

True.

But reflect:—Can one be in many places at the same time, and still be a whole?

No; I see the impossibility of that.

And if not a whole, then it is divided; for it cannot be present with all the parts of existence, unless divided.

True.

And that which has parts, will be represented by a number answering to the parts?

Certainly.

Then we were wrong in saying just now, that being was distributed into the greatest number of parts. For it is not distributed into a number greater than one, but equal to one; one is never wanting to existence, or existence to one, but the two are co-extensive and co-equal.

Certainly that is true.

One then, broken up into parts by existence, is many and infinite?

True.
Then not only is the unity of being many, but absolute unity divided by existence, must also be many?

Certainly.

Further, inasmuch as the parts are parts of a whole, the one, as being a whole, will be limited; and are not the parts contained in the whole?

Certainly.

And that which contains, is a limit?

Of course.

Then the united being is one and many, whole and parts, limited and yet infinite in number?

Clearly.

And because limited, also having extremes?

Certainly.

And if a whole, having a beginning and middle and end. For can anything be a whole without these three? And if any one of them is wanting to anything, will that any longer be a whole?

No.

Then one, as appears, will have a beginning, middle, and end?

It will.

But, again, the middle will be equidistant from the extremes; that is the nature of a middle?

Yes.

Then one will partake of a figure, either rectilinear or circular, or a union of the two?

True.

And if this is the case, it will be in itself and in others too.

How is that?

Every part is in the whole, and nothing is outside the whole.

True.

And all the parts are contained in the whole?

Yes.

And all the parts are one, and neither more nor less than all?

No.

Then the whole is the one?

Of course.

But if all the parts are in the whole, and all of them together are the one and the whole, and they are all contained in the whole,
the one will be contained in the one; and thus the one will be in itself.

That is true.

But then, again, the whole is not in the parts—neither in all the parts, nor in some of them. For if it were in all, it would necessarily be in one; and if wanting in any one, could not be in all the parts together;—if this part be one of all, and if the whole is not in this, how can the whole be in them all?

That cannot be.

Nor can the whole be in some of the parts; for if the whole were in some of the parts, the greater would be in the less, which is impossible.

Yes, impossible.

But if the whole is neither in one, nor most, nor all of the parts, it must be in something else, or cease to be anywhere at all?

Certainly.

If it were nowhere, it would be nothing; but being a whole, and not being in itself, it must be in other.

Very true.

The one then, regarded as a whole, is in other; but regarded as a sum of parts, is in itself, and therefore the one must be in itself and also in other.

Certainly.

The one then, being of this nature, is, of necessity, both at rest and in motion?

How is that?

The one is at rest when in itself, for being in one, and not passing out of this, it is in the same, which is itself.

True.

And that which is ever in the same, must be ever at rest?

Certainly.

Well, and must not that, on the contrary, which is ever in other, never be in the same place; and if never in the same place, never at rest; and if not at rest, in motion?

True.

Then the one being always in itself and other, must always be both at rest and in motion?

That is clear.
And one must be the same with itself, and other than itself; and also the same with all other things, and other than all other things; this follows from our previous admissions.

How is that?

Everything in relation to every other thing, is either the same or other; or if neither the same nor other, then in the relation of a part to a whole, or of a whole to a part.

That is clear.

And is one a part of itself?

Certainly not.

Then it cannot be a whole in relation to itself regarded as a part of itself?

Impossible.

But is one other than one?

No.

And therefore not other than itself?

Certainly not.

And if it be neither other than itself, nor a whole, nor a part in relation to itself, must it not be the same with itself?

Certainly.

But then, again, that which is in another place from itself, remaining in the same place with itself, must be other than itself, if it is in another place?

True.

Then one is shown to be at once in itself and in another?

Yes.

Thus then, as appears, one will be other than itself?

True.

Well, then, if a thing be other of something, will it not be other of other?

Certainly.

And will not all things that are not one, be other than the one, and the one other than the not one?

Of course.

Then one will be other than all others?

True.

But, consider:—Are not the absolute same, and the absolute other, opposites to one another?

Of course.
Then will the same ever be in the other, or the other in the same?

They will not.

If then the other is never in the same, there is no existing thing in which the other is during any space of time; for during that space of time, however small, the other would be in the same. Is not that true?

Yes.

And since the other is never in the same, it can never be in any existing thing.

True.

Then the other will never be either in the not one, or in the one?

Certainly not.

Then not by reason of the other is the one other than the not one, or the not one other than the one.

No.

Nor by reason of themselves will they be other than one another, if not partaking of the other.

How can they be?

But if they are not other, either by reason of themselves or other, there will be no possibility of their being other than one another at all.

There will not.

But again, the not one cannot partake of the one; for it would not have been not one, and would have been one.

True.

Nor can the not one partake of number; for if partaking of number, it would not have been not one at all.

It would not.

Again, is the not one a part of one; or rather, would it not in that way partake of one?

It would.

If then, in every point of view, one and not one are distinct; then neither is one a part or a whole of not one, nor is not one a part or a whole of one?

No.

But we were saying that things which are neither parts nor
wholes of one another, nor other than one another, will be the same with one another: That was what we were saying?

Yes.

Then shall we say that the one, being in this relation to the not one, is the same with it?

Let us say that.

The consequence is, that one is the same with itself and others, and also other than itself and others.

That appears to be the inference.

And it will also be like and unlike itself and others?

Perhaps.

Since one was shown to be other than others, others will also be other than one.

Yes.

Other than one in the same degree that one is other than others, and neither more nor less?

True.

And if neither more nor less, then in a like degree?

Yes.

In as far as the state of one is to be other than others, and the state of others in like manner is to be other than one, one is in the same state with the others, and the others with the one.

How do you mean?

I may take as an illustration the case of names: You give a name to a thing?

Yes.

And you may repeat the name once or oftener?

Yes.

And when you repeat the name once, do you not name something of which that is the name? and when oftener, the same; and therefore, whether you utter the same name once or oftener, must you not always speak of the same thing?

Certainly.

And is not 'other' a name given to a thing?

Certainly.

Whenever, then, you use the word 'other,' whether once or oftener, you name that of which it is the name, and to no other do you give the name?
True.
Then when we say that the other is other than the one, and the
one other than the other; in repeating the word 'other' we speak
of that nature to which the name is applied, and of no other?
Quite true.
Then the one which is other than other, and the other which is
other than one, in that the word 'other' is applied to both, will be
in the same state; and that which is in the same state is like?
Yes.
In as far then as one is other than other things, every thing will
be like every other thing, for every thing is the other of every other
thing.
True.
Again, the like is opposed to the unlike?
Yes.
And the other to the same?
True, again.
And the one was also shown to be the same with the other?
Yes.
And to be the same with the others is the opposite of being other
than the others?
Certainly.
And in that it was other it was shown to be alike?
Yes.
And in that it was the same it will be unlike and have an attri-
buté opposed to the assimilating quality which was the other?
Yes.
Then the dissimilating quality will be the same; or, if not the
same, will not be the opposite of the other.
True.
Then one will be both like and unlike others; like in as far as
it is other, and unlike in as far as it is same.
Yes, that is the sort of argument which may be used.
And there is another argument.
What is that?
Being in the same state, one is not in another state, and not
being in another state is not unlike, and not being unlike, is like
or same; but in as far as it is in another state it is of another sort,
and being of another sort is unlike.
True.
Then because one is the same with others and different from others on either of these two grounds, or on both of them, it will be like and unlike others?
Certainly.
And in the same way as being other than itself and the same with itself on either of these two grounds and on both of them, it will be like and unlike itself?
Of course.
Again, how far can one touch or not touch itself and others?—consider that.
I am considering.
One was shown to exist in the whole of itself?
True.
And also in other things?
Yes.
Then in as far as it exists in other things it would touch other things, and in as far as it exists in itself it would touch itself only, and be debarred from touching other things.
Clearly.
Then the inference is that it would touch both?
It would.
But what do you say to this point of view? Must not that which is to touch another be next in place or position to that which it touches?
True.
Then one if it is to touch itself ought to be situated next to itself, and have the place next to the place in which itself is?
It ought.
And that would require that one should be two, and be in two places at once, and this while it is one it will not be.
No.
Then one cannot be two any more than it can touch itself?
It cannot.
Neither can it touch others.
Why not?
The reason is, that whatever touches another is in separation from and must be next to that which it is to touch, and have no third or intermediate.
True.

Two objects, then, are the smallest number which make a contact?

They are.

And if there be a third term added in proximity to them, the terms will be three, and the contacts two?

Yes.

And every additional term makes one additional contact, whence it follows that the contacts are one less in number than the terms; the first two terms exceeded the number of contacts by one, and the whole number of terms exceeds the whole number of contacts in like ratio; and for every one which is afterwards added to the number of terms, one contact is added to the contacts.

True.

Whatever is the whole number of things existing, the contacts are always one less.

True.

But if one only exists, and not two, there is no contact?

Clearly not.

And do we not say that the others being other than the one are not one and have no part in the one?

True.

Then they have no number, if they have no unity in them?

Of course not.

Then the others are not numbered either as one or two, or called by any number?

No.

One, then, alone is one, and there is no two?

Clearly not.

And if there is no two, there is no contact?

No.

Then neither does the one touch the other, nor the other the one, if there is no contact?

Certainly not.

For all which reasons one touches and does not touch itself and others?

True.

Further—is one equal and unequal to itself and others?

How do you mean?
If the one were greater or less than the others, or the others greater or less than the one, they would not be greater or less than one another by virtue of their essences as one or other, but, if in addition to their essences they had equality, they would be equal to one another, or if the one had smallness and the other greatness, or the one had greatness and the other smallness—whichever class had greatness would be greater, and whichever had smallness would be smaller?

Certainly.

And these two forms or ideas, the one of greatness, the other of smallness have existence; for if they had no existence they could not be opposed to one another and exist in things.

They could not.

If, then, smallness exist in the one it will inhere either in the whole or in a part of the whole?

Certainly.

Suppose the first; it will be either coequal and coextensive with the entire unity, or will contain the unity?

Clearly.

And if the smallness be coextensive with unity it will be equal with unity, or if containing unity greater than unity?

Of course.

But can smallness be equal to anything or greater than anything, and have the functions of greatness and equality and not its own functions?

Impossible.

Then smallness cannot inhere in the whole of one, but, if at all, in a part only?

Yes.

And surely not in every part, for then the difficulty of the whole will recur; it will be equal to or greater than any part in which it inhere?

Certainly.

Then smallness will not inhere in anything, whether in a whole or in a part; nor will there be anything small but actual smallness.

True.

Neither will greatness inhere in one, for that in which the greatness inhereed would be other and greater than absolute greatness; and this when the element of absolute smallness is not present,
which, nevertheless, the great in being great, must exceed; this, however, is impossible, seeing that smallness is nowhere present.

True.

But absolute greatness is only greater than absolute smallness, or absolute smallness smaller than absolute greatness.

True.

Then other things are not greater or less than one, as they have neither greatness nor smallness; nor have greatness or smallness any power of exceeding or being exceeded in relation to unity, but only in relation to one another; nor will unity be greater or less than them or others, because having neither greatness nor smallness.

Clearly not.

Then if one is neither greater nor less than others, it cannot either exceed or be exceeded by them?

Certainly not.

And that which neither exceeds nor is exceeded, must be on an equality; and being on an equality, must be equal.

Of course.

And this will be true also of the relation of unity to itself; having neither greatness nor smallness in relation to itself, it will neither exceed nor be exceeded by itself, but will be on an equality and equal to itself.

Certainly.

Then unity will be equal to itself and others?

That is evident.

And yet one, being itself in itself, will also surround and be without itself; and, as containing itself, will be greater than itself; and, as contained in itself, will be less; and will thus be greater and less than itself.

It will.

And nothing can possibly exist which is not included in the one and the other?

Of course not.

But, surely, that which exists must always exist somewhere?

Yes.

But that which exists in something will be less, and will exist in the greater; that is the only way in which one thing can exist in another.
True.

And since there is nothing other than, or separated from the one and the other, and they must exist in something, must they not exist in one another, the one in the other and the other in the one, if they are to exist anywhere?

That is clear.

But in as far as the one exists in others, the others will be greater that the one, and contain the one, which will be less than others, and will be contained in them; and in as far as the others are contained in the one, the one on the same principle will be greater than the others, and the others less than the one.

True.

The one, then, will be equal to and also greater and less than itself and others?

That is clear.

And if it be greater and less than and equal to itself, it will be of equal and more and less measures than itself and others, and if of measures also of parts?

Of course.

And if of equal and more and less measures, it will be in number more or less than itself and others, and likewise equal in number to itself and to others.

How is that?

It will be of a greater number of measures than those things which it exceeds, and of equal and less measures; and of as many parts as measures.

True.

And being greater and less than itself, and equal to itself, it will be of more and fewer measures than itself, and of equal measures with itself; and if of measures also of parts?

Certainly.

And being of equal parts with itself, the number of them will be equal to itself; and as being of more parts, will be greater, and as being of fewer parts, will be less.

Certainly.

And the same will hold of its relation to other things; inasmuch as it is greater, it will be greater in number; and inasmuch as it is less, it will be less in number; and inasmuch as it is equal, it will be equal in number to other things.
Certainly.

Once more, then, as would appear, the one will be equal to and more and less in number than itself or other things.

It will.

Does one also partake of time? And is it and does it become older and younger than itself and others, and partaking of time is it neither younger nor older than itself and other things?

How do you mean?
If one exists, existence must be predicated of it?
Yes.

But is present existence (eπαι) anything but the participation of existence in company with present time, or past existence anything but existence in company with past time, or future existence anything but existence in company with future time?

True.
Then it partakes of time if it partakes of existence?
Certainly.
And is not time always moving forward?
Yes.
Then one is always becoming older than itself, if it moves forward in time?
Certainly.
And do we remember that the older becomes older than that which becomes younger?
Yes, we remember that.
Then as one becomes older than itself, it becomes older than the self which becomes younger?
Certainly.
Thus, then, one becomes older as well as younger than itself?
Yes.

And one becomes older when in becoming, it is at present time, which is between past and future time; for it surely cannot go from the past to the future, and pass over the present?

No.

And does it not cease becoming older, when it arrives at the present; and then it does not become, but is older, for as it moves forward it will never be reached by the present, for that which moves forward touches both the present and the future, letting go
the present and grasping the future, and is in process of becoming between the future and the present.

True.

But if everything that comes into being cannot pass the present, when it reaches the present it ceases to become, and is then whatever it may happen to become.

That is clear.

And so one, when in the process of becoming older it reaches the present, ceases to become, and then is older.

Certainly.

And it is older than that which it was becoming older than, and it was becoming older than itself.

Yes.

And that which is older is older than that which was younger?

True.

Then one is younger than itself, when in the process of becoming older it reaches present time?

Certainly.

And present time is always present with one during all existence; for it always is, whenever it is.

Certainly.

Then one is always becoming older or younger than itself?

Truly.

And is it a longer or an equal time in being or becoming older than itself?

An equal time.

But that which becomes or is for an equal time with itself, is of the same age with itself?

Of course.

And that which is of the same age, is neither older nor younger than itself?

No.

One, then, becoming and being the same time with itself, neither is nor becomes older or younger than itself?

I should say not.

And what are its relations to other things? Is it older or younger than they are?

I cannot tell you that.

You can at least tell me that the others in the plural are more
than one; other in the singular would have been one; but others in the plural have multitude, and are more than one?

True.

A multitude implies a number larger than one?

Of course.
And shall we say that the lesser or the greater number comes, or has come, into existence first?

The lesser.
Then the least is the first? And that is one?

Yes.
Then one came into existence first of all things that have number; but other things have also number, if they are plural and not singular.

They have.

And that which came into existence first, came into existence, as I should imagine, prior to the others, and the others later; and the things which came into existence later, are younger than that which preceded them? And the other things will be younger than the one, and the one older than other things?

True.
What would you say of another question? Can one come into being contrary to its own nature, or is that impossible?

Impossible.

And yet, surely, one was shown to have parts; and if parts, then a beginning, middle and end?

Yes.

And is not a beginning the first part of one itself, and of everything else; and after the beginning, all the other parts follow, until you reach the end?

Certainly.

And all these others we shall affirm to be parts of the whole and the one, which, as soon as the end is reached, has become whole and one?

Yes; that is what we shall say.

But the end comes last, and the one is perfected simultaneously with the end. So that if absolute unity cannot come into being except in accordance with its own nature, its nature will require that it should come into being after the others, simultaneously with the end.
That is evident.
Then one is younger than the others and the others older than one.
That, again, is evident to my apprehension.
Well, and must not a beginning or any other part of one or of anything, if it be a part and not parts, being a part, be also of necessity one?
Certainly.
And will not one come into being together with the part—
together with the first part, and together with the second part,
and will not be wanting in any part which is added, but will reach the last, if the whole unity has been perfected; it will be wanting neither in the middle part, nor in the first, nor in the last, nor in any of them, while the process of generation is going on?
True.
Then one is of the same age with all the others, so that if one is to come into being in a manner not contrary to its nature, it will be neither prior nor posterior to the other, but simultaneous; and according to this argument the one will be neither older nor younger than the others, nor the others than the one, but according to the previous argument the one will be older and younger than the others and the others than the one.
Certainly.
This, then, is the nature and origin of one. But what shall we say about the one becoming older and younger than the others, and the others than the one, and neither older nor younger? Shall we say as of being so also of becoming or otherwise?
I cannot answer.
But I can venture to say, that if one is older or younger than another, it will not become older or younger in a greater degree than at first, for equals added to unequals, whether to time or anything else, leave the difference between them the same as at first.
Of course.
Then being cannot become older or younger than being, if the difference of age is always the same, but it is and has become older and younger, and is not becoming.
True.
And the one then as existing becomes neither older nor younger than the others which are existing.
No.
But consider whether they may not become older and younger in this way.

In what way?
In as much as the one was proven to be older than the others and the others than the one.
And what of that?
If the one is older than the others, it has come into being a longer time than the others.

Yes.
But consider again; if we add equal time to a greater or less time, will the greater differ from the less time by an equal or by a smaller portion of time?

By a smaller portion of time.
Then the difference between the age of the one and the age of the others will not be afterwards so great as at first, but if an equal time be added to both of them they will differ less and less in age?

Yes.
And that which differs in age from some other less than formerly, from being older will become younger in relation to that other?

Yes, younger.
And if the one is younger the others will be older than they were before in relation to the one.

Certainly.
Then that which has become younger becomes older relatively to that which had previously been and become older, but never is older, for the one is always growing on the side of youth and the other on the side of age. And in like manner the older is always in process of becoming younger than the younger; for as they are always going in opposite directions they are becoming the opposite of one another, the younger older than the older, and the older younger than the younger. They cannot, however, have become older, for if they had already become older they would be and not merely become. But as the case is, they are always becoming both older and younger than one another; one becomes younger than the others because it was seen to be older and prior, and the others were older than the one because they became later, and in the
same way the others are in the same relation to the one, because they were seen to be older and prior to the one.

That is clear.

And as nothing becomes older and younger than another, and neither the others become older or younger than the one, nor the one than the others, in that they differ from one another by an equal number, but inasmuch as that which became earlier and later always differs by a different portion—in this point of view the others must be always older and younger than the one, and the one than the others.

Certainly.

For all these reasons, then, the one is and becomes older and younger than itself and others, and neither is nor becomes older or younger than itself or others.

Certainly.

But since one partakes of time, and partakes in becoming elder and younger, must it not also partake of the past, the present, and the future?

Of course.

Then one was and is and will be, and was becoming and is becoming and will become?

Certainly.

And there is and was and will be something which is in relation to it and is possessed by it?

True.

And if we are right in all this, then there is an opinion and science and perception of one?

Quite right.

And one has name and definition, and is named and defined, and all that can appertain to these and similar notions appertains to one.

Certainly, that is true.

Yet once more and for the third time, let us consider: If one is both one and many, such as we have described, and is neither one nor many, and participant of time, in as far as one is, must it not partake of being, and in as far as one is not, not partake of being?

Certainly.

But can it partake of being when not partaking of being, or not partake of being when partaking of being?
Impossible.
Then one partakes and does not partake of being at different times, for that is the only way in which it can partake and not partake of the same.
True.
And is there not also a time at which it assumes being and relinquishes being—for how can it have and not have the same thing unless it receives and also gives it up at some time?
Impossible.
And the receiving of essence is what you would call becoming, or generation?
I should.
And the relinquishment of essence you would call destruction?
I should.
One then, as would appear, is generated and destroyed by taking and giving up essence.
Certainly.
And being one and many and in process of generation and destruction, when it becomes one the being of the many perishes, and when many the being of the one is destroyed?
Certainly.
And becoming one and many, must it not inevitably be separated and aggregated?
That is inevitable.
And whenever it becomes like and unlike it must be assimilated and dissimilated?
Yes.
And when it becomes greater or less or equal it must grow or diminish or become equalised?
True.
And when being in motion it rests, and when being at rest it changes to motion, it can surely be in no time at all?
How can it?
But that a thing which is previously at rest should be afterwards in motion, or previously in motion and afterwards at rest, without experiencing change, is impossible.
Impossible.
And surely there cannot be a time in which a thing can neither be in motion or at rest at once?
There cannot.
But neither can it change without changing.
True.
When then does it change, for it cannot change either when at rest, or when in motion, or when in time?
It cannot.
And has this strange thing in which it is at the time of changing a real existence?
What is that?
The moment. For the moment seems to imply change from one to the other; and it does not change from a continuing state of rest, nor from a continuing state of motion, but there is a singular nature, which we call the moment, placed between rest and motion, and which is not in any time, and into this and out of this that which is in motion changes into rest, and that which is at rest into motion.
That appears to be true.
And one then, if it is in rest and also in motion, will change in either direction, for only in this way can it do both. In changing it changes in a moment, and when it changes it will be in no time, and will not then be either in motion or at rest.
True.
And it will be in the same case in relation to other changes, when one passes from being into destruction, or from not being into becoming—then one is intermediate between certain states of motion and rest, and neither is nor is not, nor becomes nor perishes.
Very true.
And on the same principle, in the passage from one to many and from many to one, one is neither one nor many, neither divided nor united; and in the passage from like to unlike, and from unlike to like, it is neither like nor unlike, neither in a state of assimilation nor of dissimilation; and in the passage from small to great and equal and back again, it will be neither small nor great, nor equal, nor in a state of increase, or diminution, or equalisation.
True.
All these, then, are the affections of the one, if the one exists.
Of course.
i. aa. But if one exists, what will happen to the others—is not that to be considered?

Yes.

Let us show then, if one exists, what will be the affections of that which is other than the one.

Let us show that.

If there be things other than the one, the other things are not the one; for then they could not be other than the one.

Very true.

Nor are the others altogether without the one, but in a certain way they participate in the one.

How is that?

Because the others are other than the one, inasmuch as they have parts, for if they had no parts they would be simply one.

Right.

And parts, as we affirm, have relation to a whole?

That is what we say.

And a whole must necessarily be one made up of many; of which the parts will be parts, for each of the parts is not one part of many, but of a whole.

How do you mean?

If anything were a part of many, and itself one of the many, it would be a part of itself, which is impossible, and it would be a part of each of the others, if a part of all; for if not a part of some one, it will be a part of all the others but this one, and thus will not be a part of each; and if not a part of each, it will not be a part of any one of the many; and not being a part of any, it cannot be a part or anything else of all those things to which it stands in no relation.

That is clear.

Then the part is not one part of many, nor of all, but is relative to a certain single form, which we call a whole, being one perfect unity framed out of all—and of this the part will be a part.

Certainly.

If, then, other things have parts, they will participate in the whole and in the one.

True.

Then the others, which are other than the one, must be a perfect whole, having parts.
Certainly.
And the same argument holds of each part, for the part must participate in the whole; and if each of the parts is a part, that word \textit{each} implies unity, self-existence, and separation from the rest;—that is the idea conveyed by the word \textit{each}.

True.
But when we speak of the part participating in the one, it must clearly be other than the one, for if not, it would have been one itself, and would not merely have participated; but one cannot possibly be other than one.

Impossible.
And the whole and the part necessarily participate in the one; for the one will be a whole, of which the parts will be parts; and again, each unit will be one part of that whole which is the whole of that part.

True.
And will not the things which participate in one, be other than one?

Of course.
And the things which are other than one will be many; for if the things which are other than one were neither one nor more than one, they would be nothing.

True.
But, seeing that the things which participate in one as a part, and in one as a whole, are more than one, must not those things which participate in the one be infinite in number?

How is that?
Let us look at the matter thus:—Is it not a fact that neither being one, nor partaking of one, they yet participate in one at the particular time when they do participate?

Clearly.
Are they not multitudes in which there is no one?

They are.
And if we were to abstract from them in idea the very smallest fraction, must not that least fraction, if it does not partake of one, be a multitude and not one?

Certainly.
And whenever we look at the class of other natures simply, and in themselves, will not whatever we see of them be infinite in number?
Certainly.
And yet, when each several part becomes a part, then the parts are limited in relation to the whole and to each other, and the whole in relation to the parts.
No doubt.
The result to the others flowing from the one is that the union of themselves and the one appears to give a new phenomenon of limitation in relation to one another, whereas in their own nature they have no limit.
That is clear.
Then the others of the one, both as whole or parts, are infinite, and also partake of limit.
Certainly.
Then they are both like and unlike one another and themselves.
How is that?
Inasmuch as they are infinite in their own nature, they are all affected in the same way.
True.
And inasmuch as they all partake of limit, they are all affected in the same way.
Yes.
But inasmuch as their state is both limited and infinite, they are affected in opposite ways.
Yes.
And opposites are the most unlike of things.
Certainly.
Considered, then, in regard to one of their affections, they will be like themselves and one another; considered in reference to both of them, most opposed and most unlike.
That appears to be true.
Then other things are both like and unlike themselves and one another?
True.
And they are the same and also different from one another, and in motion and at rest, and experience every sort of opposite affection, as may be proved without difficulty of them; and, as in the case of the affections aforesaid, has been already proved?
True.
i. bb. Suppose, now, that we leave the further discussion of these matters as evident, and consider again upon the hypothesis of the existence of one, whether the opposite of all this is or is not equally true of the others.

By all means.

Then let us begin again, and ask, If one is, what must be the affections of the others?

Let us ask that.

Is not one distinct from others, and the others from the one?

Why is that?

Why, because there is no third existence which is distinct from either of them; for the expression 'one and the others' includes all things.

Yes, all things.

Then there is no longer anything different from either of them in which the one and the others coexist?

There is not.

Then the one and the others are never in the same?

True.

Then they are separated from each other?

Yes.

And we surely cannot say that what is truly one has parts?

Impossible.

Then one will not be in the others as a whole, nor the parts of one, if it be separated from the others, and has no parts?

Impossible.

Then there is no way in which the many can partake of one, either as a part or as a whole?

It would seem not.

Then there is no way in which the others are one, or have in themselves any unity?

No.

Nor are the others many; for if the others were many, then each part of the others would be one part of the whole; but now the others, if not partaking in any way of the one, are neither one nor many, nor whole, nor part.

True.

Then the others neither are nor contain two or three, if entirely deprived of unity?
True.

Then the others are neither like nor unlike the one, nor do they admit of likeness and unlikeness; for if they were like and unlike, or had in them likeness and unlikeness, the others would have two principles in them opposite to one another.

That is clear.

But that which partakes of nothing could not partake of two things?

Impossible.

Then the others are neither like nor unlike nor both, for if they were like or unlike they would partake of one of those two ideas, and if they were both they would partake of two opposites, and this has been shown to be impossible.

True.

Therefore they are neither the same, nor other, nor in motion, nor at rest, nor in a state of generation, nor of destruction, nor greater, nor less, nor equal, nor subject to any similar affection; for, if they had been capable of experiencing any such affection, they would participate in one and two and three, and odd and even, and in these, as has been proved, they could not participate, seeing that they are altogether and in every way devoid of unity.

Very true.

Therefore if one exists, one is all things, and also nothing, both in relation to itself and to other things.

Certainly.

ii. a. Well, and ought we not to consider next what will be the consequence if one does not exist?

Yes; we ought.

Now what is the meaning of the hypothesis—if one does not exist; and is there any difference between this and the hypothesis—if not one does not exist?

There is a difference, certainly.

Is there a difference only, or rather is there not an entire opposition between the two expressions—if one is not, and if not one is not?

There is an entire opposition between them.

And suppose a person to say:—If greatness is not, if smallness is not, or anything of that sort, would he not imply...
that he means something different by not-being in each case?

To be sure.

And does he not already imply that he means by not-being something distinct from other things, when he says, 'If one is not,' and do we not understand this to be his meaning?

Yes, we do.

In the first place, he speaks of something which is known, and of something which is different from other things, when he says 'one,' whether he predicates of one, being or not-being, for that which is said to be non-existent is known all the same, and is distinguished from other things.

Certainly.

Then I will begin again, and ask: If one does not exist, what are the consequences? In the first place, as would appear, there is a knowledge of one, or the meaning of the words, 'if one does not exist,' would not be known.

True.

Secondly, the others differ from the one, or it would not be described as different from the others?

Certainly.

And besides a knowledge of the one, there must also be a difference of the one; for in speaking of the one as different from the others, we do not speak of a difference in the others, but in the one.

That is clear.

Moreover, the one that exists not, partakes of 'that,' and 'some,' and 'this,' and 'relation to this,' and 'these,' and the like; for the one, or the others than the one, could not have been spoken of, nor could any attribute or relative of the one be or be spoken of, if the one did not partake of 'some,' or of the other attributes just now mentioned.

True.

Being cannot be ascribed to unity, if unity is non-existent; but the non-existent one may or rather must participate in many, if the one only and nothing else is not; if, however, neither the one nor anything else is denied existence, but we are speaking of some other, there is nothing which can be spoken of. But supposing that one and nothing else is not, then it must participate in the predicate 'that,' and in many others.
Certainly.
And it will have unlikeness in relation to the others, for the others being different from the one will be of a different kind.
Certainly.
And are not things of a different kind also other in kind?
Of course.
And are not things other in kind unlike?
They are unlike.
And if they are unlike the one, they will be clearly like that which is unlike?
That is clear.
Then the one may have unlikeness in relation to which the others are unlike?
That would seem to be true.
And if unlikeness to other things is attributed to it, it must have likeness to itself.
How is that?
If there be unlikeness of one to one, then the argument will not refer to something like the one; nor will the hypothesis be relative to the one, but relative to something other than the one?
Certainly.
But that cannot be.
No.
Then one must be like itself?
True.
Again, one is not equal to others; for if it were equal to others, then it would exist and be like others in respect of the equality; but if one has no existence, then it can neither be nor be equal?
Impossible.
But if one is not equal to others neither are others equal to one?
Certainly not.
And things that are not equal are unequal?
True.
And they are unequal by reason of inequality?
Of course.
Then one partakes of inequality, and in respect of this the other things are unequal to one?
That is true.
And inequality implies greatness and smallness?
Yes.
Then, on this supposition, one has greatness and smallness?
That appears to be true.
And greatness and smallness always stand apart from one another?
True.
And is there anything between them?
There is.
And this which is between them is none other than equality?
Yes, equality.
Then that which has greatness and smallness also has equality, which lies between them?
That is clear.
Then the one, which appears not to exist, partakes of greatness and smallness and equality?
That is evident.
Further, it must surely in a sort partake of existence?
How is that?
It must be, as we say, for if not, then we should not say the truth in saying that one is not. But if we say the truth, then clearly we affirm being of one. Am I not right?
Yes.
And since we affirm that we speak truly, we must also be supposed to be saying that which is.
Certainly.
Then, as would appear, the one has no existence, for if it were not to be non-existent, but\(^1\) to admit something of existence into non-existence, it would at once become being.
Quite true.
Then non-existence, if it is to maintain itself, must have the existence of not-being as the bond of not-being, just as existence must have as a bond the non-existence of not-being in order to perfect its own existence; for the truest assertion of being and of not-being is when being partakes of the existence of the existent and of the non-existence of the existence of the non-existent—that is, the perfection of existence; and when the non-existent as

\(^1\) Or, 'to remit something of the existence of not-being.'
non-existent partakes both of the non-existence of not-being and of the existence of being—that is the perfection of non-existence.

Most true.

And if being partakes of not-being, and not-being of being, must not the one also, if it does not exist, partake of existence in order to attain non-existence?

Certainly.

Then one, if it does not exist, has existence?

That is clear.

And non-existence also, if it does not exist?

Of course.

But can anything which is in a certain state not be in that state without changing?

Impossible.

Then everything which is and is not in a certain state, implies change?

Certainly.

And change is motion—we may say that?

Yes, motion.

And the one has been proved to be both being and not-being?

Yes.

And therefore one is and is not in the same state.

Yes.

And thus also the non-existent one has been shown to have motion, because it changes from being to not-being?

That appears to be true.

But surely if it is nowhere among existing things, as is the fact, then, not being in place, it cannot change from one place to another?

Impossible.

Then it cannot move by changing place?

No.

Nor can it turn on the same spot, for it nowhere touches the same, for the same is existence, and that which is non-existent cannot be in any existence?

It cannot.

Then the one, if non-existent, cannot turn in that place in which it is not?
No.
Neither can the one, whether existent or non-existent, change into other than itself, for if one changed from itself, then we should be no longer speaking of one, but of something else?
True.
But if one neither changes in itself, nor turns round in the same place, nor moves in place, can it still be capable of motion?
Impossible.
That which is unmoved must surely be at rest, and that which is at rest must stand?
Certainly.
Then the non-existent one stands, and is also in motion?
That seems to be true.
But if it be in motion it must necessarily experience change of nature, for anything which is moved, in being moved, is no longer in the same state, but in another?
Yes.
Then one, when moved, is changed in nature?
Yes.
And, further, if not moved in any way, it will not be changed in any way?
No.
Then, in so far as the non-existent one is moved, it is changed, but in so far as it is not moved, it is not changed?
Right.
Then the non-existent one is changed and is not changed?
That is clear.
And must not that which is changed become other than it previously was, and pass into another state and perish; but that which is not changed can neither come into being nor perish?
Certainly.
And the non-existent one then, when it is changed, comes into being and perishes; but when not changed, neither comes into being nor perishes; and so the non-existent one comes into being and perishes, and neither comes into being nor perishes?
True.
ii. b. And now, let us again go back to the beginning, and see whether any new consequences will follow.

Let us do as you say.

If one is not, we ask what is to follow in respect of one? That is the question.

Yes.

Do not the words 'is not,' imply negation of existence in that of which we say 'is not'?

Just that.

And when we say that a thing is not, do we mean that it exists in one way and not in another? or do we mean, in a literal sense, that not-being has in no sort or way or kind, participation of being?

In the most literal sense.

Then, not-being cannot be; or in any way participate in being?

It cannot.

And was coming into being, and being destroyed, anything but the receiving of being and the destruction of being?

Nothing but that.

And can that which has no participation in being, either take or lose being?

Impossible.

The non-existent one then cannot have or lose or participate in existence at all?

True.

Then the non-existent one, since it in no way partakes of being, neither perishes nor comes into being?

No.

Then it experiences no change of nature at all; for if it were liable to change, it would come into being and perish.

True.

But if it be not changed, it cannot be moved?

It cannot.

Nor can we say that it stands, if it is not in place anywhere; for that which stands must always be in some place, which is the same?

Of course.

Then we must say, once more, that the non-existent neither stands nor is in motion?
Neither.
Nor is any existing thing related to it; for if it partook of any existence, it would partake of existence?
That is clear.
Neither can smallness, nor greatness, nor equality, be attributed to it?
No.
Neither can likeness or difference be attributed to it, either in relation to itself or other?
Clearly not.
Well, and if it has no attribute or relation, can other things be related to it?
Certainly not.
Nor can other things be like or unlike, or the same, or different from it?
They cannot.
No more can possessive or other relations, or some, or this, or of this, or of or to another, or past or future or present, or knowledge, or opinion, or perception, or idea, or name, or any other existing thing, have any concern with non-existence?
They have none.
Then the non-existent one has and is nothing at all?
That appears to be the conclusion.

ii. aa. Once more; if one has no existence, what becomes of the others? Let us determine that.
Yes; let us determine that.
They must exist, for if they did not exist they could not be spoken of as others?
True.
But if we speak of others, that implies difference—the terms 'other' and 'different' are synonymous?
True.
And in speaking of other, we speak of an other of other, and of a different from the different?
Yes.
Then, if others are supposed to exist, there must be something of which they will be others?
Certainly.
And what can that be?—for if one has no existence, they will not be others of one.
They will not.
Then they will be others of each other; for failing of that, they are the others of nothing.
True.
Then they are each the others of one another, in the plural and not in the singular; for if one does not exist, they cannot be singulars, but every aggregation of them is infinite in number; and even if a person takes that which appears to be the smallest fraction, this, which seemed one, in a moment evanesces into many, as in a dream, and from being very small becomes very great, in comparison with the fractions of it?
Very true.
And in such aggregations the others will be the others of one another, if others exist, and not the one?
Exactly.
And will there not be many aggregations, each appearing to be a unit and not being, if one has no existence?
True.
And there will seem to be a number of them, if each of them is one, and they are many?
Yes, there will.
And there will be odd and even numbers of them, which will also have no reality, if unity has no existence?
No.
And they will appear to have a least fraction; and even these infinitesimals will appear large and manifold in comparison with the littleness of the many fractions into which they are divided?
Certainly.
And each aggregation will be conceived as equal to the many and little; for the transition from the greater to the less could not have been conceived to take place without being conceived to arrive at the middle; and thus arises the appearance of equality.
Yes.
And having neither beginning, middle, nor end, each separate aggregate yet appears to have a limit in relation to itself and other.
How is that?
Because, when a person conceives any of these as appertaining to any aggregate, prior to the beginning another beginning appears, and there is another end, remaining after the end; and in the middle a truer middle within, but smaller, because no unity can be conceived of any of them, if the one exists not.

Very true.
And all being which any one can possibly conceive, must be broken up into fractions, for it cannot be conceived of as an aggregate if deprived of unity?

Certainly.
And when seen indistinctly and at a distance, all being appears to be one; but when seen near and with keen vision, every single thing appears to be infinite, if deprived of the one which is supposed not to exist?

That is most certain.
Then the others must severally appear to be infinite and finite, and one and many, if the others than the one exist and not the one.

They must.
Then will they not appear to be like and unlike?
How is that?
Just as in a picture things appear to be all one to a person standing at a distance, and to be in the same state and alike:

True.
But when you approach them, they appear to be many and different; and from different points of view different in kind, and unlike one another?

True.
And so must the aggregates appear to be like and unlike themselves and each other.

Certainly.
And must they not be the same and yet different from another, and in contact and also in separation, and having every sort of motion, and every sort of rest, and coming into being, and perishing, and neither, and the like, which may be easily detailed, if the many exists without the one?

Most true.
ii. bb. Once more, let us go back to the beginning, and ask if the others exist and not the one, what will follow.

Let us ask that.

In the first place, the others will not be the one?

Impossible.

Nor will they be the many; for if they were many the one would be contained in them. But if no one of them is one, all of them are nought, and therefore they will not be many.

True.

If there be no one in the others, the others are neither many nor one.

They are not.

Nor do they appear either as one or many.

Why is that?

Because the other has no sort or manner or way of communion with any sort of non-existence, nor can any of the non-existent class be united with any of the others; for the non-existent has no parts.

True.

Nor is there an opinion or any representation of not-being in relation to the others, nor is not-being ever in any way attributed to the others.

No.

Then if one exists not, there is no conception of the others, either as one or many; for you cannot conceive the many without the one.

You cannot.

Then if one exists not, the other neither is, nor can be conceived to be, either one or many?

It would seem not.

Nor as like or unlike?

No.

Nor as the same or other, nor in contact or separation, nor in any of those states which we spoke of as apparent;—the other neither is nor appears to be any of these, if the one has no existence?

True.

Then may we not sum up the argument in a word and say—That if one is not, then nothing is?
That is true.
Then let us say this; and further, as seems to be the truth, let us say that, whether one is or is not, one and the others in relation to themselves and one another, all of them, in every way, are and are not, and appear and appear not.
That is most true.
INTRODUCTION.

There are some dialogues of Plato whose place in the series and relation to the other dialogues cannot be determined with any degree of certainty. The Theaetetus, like the Parmenides, has points of similarity both with his earlier and his later writings. The perfection of style, the humour, the dramatic interest, the complexity of structure, the fertility of illustration, the shifting of the points of view, are characteristic of his best period of authorship. The vain search, the negative conclusion, the figure of the midwives, the constant profession of ignorance on the part of Socrates, also bear the stamp of the early dialogues, in which the original Socrates is not yet Platonized. Had we no other indications, we should be disposed to range the Theaetetus with the Apology and the Phaedrus, and perhaps even with the Protagoras and the Laches.

But when we pass from the style to an examination of the subject, we trace a connexion with the later rather than with the earlier dialogues. In the first place there is the connexion, indicated by Plato himself at the end of the dialogue, with the Sophist, to which in many respects the Theaetetus is so little akin. The same persons reappear (1) including the younger Socrates, whose name is just mentioned in the Theaetetus, 147 C; (2) the theory of rest, which at p. 133 D, Socrates has declined to consider, is resumed by the Eleatic Stranger; (3) there is a similar allusion in both dialogues to the meeting of Parmenides and Socrates, Theaet. 183 E, Soph. 217; and (4) the inquiry into not-being in the Sophist supplements the question of false opinion which is raised in the Theaetetus. (Compare also Theaet. 168 A, 210, and Soph. 230 B; Theaet. 174 D, E, and Soph. 227 A; Theaet. 188 E, and Soph. 237 D; Theaet. 179 A, and Soph. 233 B; Theaet. 172 D, Soph. 253 C, for parallel
turns of thought). Secondly, the later date of the dialogue is confirmed by the absence of the doctrine of recollection and of any doctrine of ideas except that which derives them from generalization and from reflection of the mind upon itself. The general character of the Theaetetus is dialectical, and there are traces of the same Megarian influences which appear in the Parmenides, and which later writers, in their matter of fact way, have explained by the residence of Plato at Megara. Socrates disclaims the character of a professional eristic, r64 C, and also, with a sort of ironical admiration, expresses his inability to attain the Megarian precision in the use of terms, 197 A. Yet he too employs a similar sophistical skill in overturning every conceivable theory of knowledge.

The direct indications of a date amount to no more than this: the conversation is said to have taken place when Theaetetus was a youth, and shortly before the death of Socrates. At the time of his own death he is supposed to be a full-grown man. Allowing nine or ten years for the interval between youth and manhood, the dialogue could not have been written earlier than 390, when Plato was about thirty-nine years of age. No more definite date is indicated by the engagement in which Theaetetus is said to have fallen or to have been wounded, and which may have taken place any time during the Corinthian war, between the years 390–387. The later date which has been suggested, 369, when the Athenians and Lacedaemonians disputed the Isthmus with Epaminondas, would make the age of Theaetetus at his death forty-five or forty-six. This a little impairs the beauty of Socrates' remark, 'that he would be a great man if he lived.'

In this uncertainty about the place of the Theaetetus, it seemed better, as in the case of the Republic, Timaeus, Critias, to retain the order in which Plato himself has arranged this and the two companion dialogues. We cannot exclude the possibility which has been already noticed in reference to other works of Plato, that the Theaetetus may not have been all written at one time; or the still greater probability that the Sophist and Politicus, which differ greatly in style, were only appended after a long interval of time. The allusion to Parmenides at 183, compared with Sophist 217, would probably imply that the dialogue which is called by his name was already in existence; unless, indeed, we suppose the passage in which the allusion occurs to have been inserted afterwards. Again, the Theaetetus may be connected with the Gorgias, either dialogue from different points of view containing an analysis of the real and
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apparent (Schleiermacher); and both may be brought into relation with the Apology as illustrating the personal life of Socrates. The Philebus, too, may with equal reason be placed either after or before what, in the language of Thrasyllus, may be called the Second Platonic Trilogy. Both the Parmenides and the Sophist, and still more the Theaetetus, have points of affinity with the Cratylus, in which the principles of rest and motion are again contrasted, and the Sophistical or Protagorean theory of language is opposed to that which is attributed to the disciple of Heraclitus, not to speak of lesser resemblances in thought and language. The Parmenides, again, has been thought by some to hold an intermediate position between the Theaetetus and the Sophist; upon this view, Soph. 250 foll. may be regarded as the answer to the problems about One and Being which have been raised in the Parmenides. Any of these arrangements may suggest new views to the student of Plato; none of them can lay claim to an exclusive probability in its favour.

The Theaetetus is one of the narrated dialogues of Plato, and is the only one which is supposed to have been written down. In a short introductory scene, Euclides and Terpsion are described as meeting before the door of Euclides' house in Megara. This may have been a spot familiar to Plato (for Megara was within a walk of Athens), but no importance can be attached to the accidental introduction of the founder of the Megarian philosophy. The real intention of the preface is to create an interest about the person of Theaetetus, who has just been carried up from the army at Corinth in a dying state. The expectation of his death recalls the promise of his youth, and especially the famous conversation which Socrates had with him when he was quite young, a few days before his own trial and death, as Plato again reminds us at the end of the dialogue. Yet we may observe that Plato has himself forgotten this, when he represents Euclides as from time to time coming to Athens and correcting the copy from Socrates' own mouth. The narrative, having introduced Theaetetus, and having guaranteed the authenticity of the dialogue (cp. Symposium, Phaedo, Parmenides) is then dropped. No further use is made of the device. As Plato himself remarks, who in this as in some other minute points, is imitated by Cicero (De Amicitia, c. 1), the interlocutory words are omitted.

Theaetetus, the hero of the battle of Corinth and of the dialogue, is a disciple of Theodorus, the great geometrician, whose science is thus indicated to be the propaedeutic to philosophy. An interest has been
THEAETETUS.

already excited about him by his approaching death, and now he is introduced to us anew by the praises of his master Theodorus. He is a youthful Socrates, and exhibits the same contrast of the fair soul and the ungainly face and frame, the Silenus mask and the god within, which are described in the Symposium. The picture which Theodorus gives of his courage and patience and intelligence and modesty is verified in the course of the dialogue. His courage is shown by his behaviour in the battle, and his other qualities shine forth as the argument proceeds. Socrates takes an evident delight in 'the wise Theaetetus,' who has more in him than 'many bearded men;' he is quite inspired by his answers. At first the youth is lost in wonder, and is almost too modest to speak (151 E), but, encouraged by Socrates, he rises to the occasion, and grows full of interest and enthusiasm about the great question. Like a youth (162 D) he has not finally made up his mind, and is very ready to follow the lead of Socrates, and to enter into each successive phase of the discussion which turns up. His great dialectical talent is shown in his power of drawing distinctions (163 E), and of foreseeing the consequences of his own answers (154 D). The enquiry about the nature of knowledge is not new to him; long ago he has felt the 'pang of philosophy;' and has experienced the youthful intoxication which is depicted in the Philebus (p. 15). But he has hitherto been unable to make the transition from mathematics to metaphysics. He can form a general conception of square and oblong numbers (p. 148), but he is unable to attain a similar expression of knowledge in the abstract. Yet at length (p. 185), he begins to recognise that there are universal conceptions of being, likeness, sameness, number, which the mind contemplates in herself, and with the help of Socrates is conducted from a theory of sense to a theory of ideas.

There is no reason to doubt that Theaetetus was a real person, whose name survived in the next generation. But neither can any importance be attached to the notices of him in Suidas and Proclus, which are probably based on the mention of him in Plato. According to a confused statement in Suidas, who mentions him twice over as a pupil, first of Socrates and then of Plato, he is said to have written the first work on the Five Solids. But no early authority cites the work, the invention of which may have been easily suggested by the division of roots, which Plato attributes to him, and the allusion to the backward state of solid geometry in the Republic (VII. 528 B). At any rate, there is no occa-
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sion to recall him to life again (Muller) after the battle of Corinth in order that we may allow time for the completion of such a work. Such a supposition entirely destroys the pathetic interest of the introduction.

Theodorus, the geometrician, had once been the friend and disciple of Protagoras, and is reluctantly drawn from his retirement to defend his old master. He is too old to learn Socrates' game of question and answer, and prefers the digressions to the main argument, because he finds them easier to follow. The mathematician, as Socrates says in the Republic, is not capable of giving a reason in the same manner as the dialectician (VII. 531 D, E), and Theodorus could not therefore have been appropriately introduced as the chief respondent. But he may be fairly appealed to, when the honour of his master is at stake. He is the 'guardian of his orphans,' although this is a responsibility which he wishes to throw upon Callias, the friend and patron of all Sophists, declaring that he himself had early 'run away' from philosophy, and was absorbed in mathematics. His extreme dislike to the Heraclitean fanatics, (like the dislike of Theaetetus (155 E) to the repulsive materialists,) and his ready acceptance of the noble words of Socrates (175, 176) are noticeable traits of character.

The Socrates of the Theaetetus is the same as the Socrates of the earlier dialogues. He is the invincible disputant, now advanced in years, of the Protagoras and Symposium; he is still pursuing his divine mission, his 'Herculean labours,' of which he has described the origin in the Apology; and he still hears the voice of his oracle, bidding him receive or not receive the truant souls. There he is supposed to have a mission to convict men of self-conceit; in the Theaetetus he has assigned to him by God the functions of a man-midwife, who delivers men from their errors, and under this character he is present throughout the dialogue. He is the true prophet who has an insight into the natures of men, and can divine their future (142 C); and he knows that sympathy is the secret power which unlocks their thoughts. The hit at Aristides, the son of Lysimachus, who was specially committed to his charge in the Laches, may be remarked by the way. The attempt to discover the definition of knowledge is in accordance with the character of Socrates as he is described in the Memorabilia, asking, what is justice? what is temperance? and the like. But there is no reason to suppose that he would have analysed the nature of perception, or traced the connection of Protagoras and Heraclitus, or have raised the difficulty respecting false opinion. The
humorous illustrations as well as the serious thoughts run through the
dialogue. The snubnosedness of Theaetetus, which is characteristic both
of him and Socrates, and the man-midwifery of Socrates, are not for-
gotten in the closing words. At the end of the dialogue, as in the
Euthyphro, he is expecting to meet Meletus at the porch of the king
Archon, but with the same indifference to the result which is everywhere
displayed by him, he proposes that they shall reassemble on the following
day at the same spot. The day comes, and in the Sophist the three
friends again meet, but no further allusion is made to the trial, and the
principal share in the argument is assigned, not to Socrates, but to an
Eleatic stranger; the youthful Theaetetus also plays a different and less
independent part. And there is no allusion in the Introduction to the
second and third dialogues, which are afterwards appended. There
seems, therefore, reason to think that there is a real change, both in the
characters and in the design.

The dialogue is an enquiry into the nature of knowledge, which is
interrupted by two digressions. The first is, the digression about the
midwives, which is also a leading thought or continuous image, like the
wave in the Republic, appearing and reappearing at intervals. Again
and again we are reminded that the successive conceptions of knowledge
are extracted from Theaetetus, who in his turn truly declares that Socrates
has got a great deal more out of him than ever was in him. Socrates
is never weary of working out the image in humorous details; discern-
ing the symptoms of labour, carrying the child round the hearth, fearing
that Theaetetus will bite him, comparing the argument to a wind-egg,
asserting an hereditary right to the occupation. There is also a serious
side to the image, which is an apt similitude of the Socratic theory of
education (cp. Republic, 518 D, Sophist, 230), and accords with the ironical
spirit in which the wisest of men delights to speak of himself.

The other digression is the famous contrast of the lawyer and phi-
losopher. This is a sort of landing-place or break in the middle of the
dialogue. At the commencement of a great discussion, the reflection
naturally arises, How happy are they who, like the philosopher, have
time, for such discussions (cp. Rep. v. 450). There is no reason for the
introduction of such a digression; nor is a reason always needed, any
more than for the introduction of an episode in a poem, or of a topic
in conversation. That which is given by Socrates is quite sufficient,
viz. that the philosopher may talk and write as he pleases. But though
not very closely connected, neither is the digression out of keeping with the rest of the dialogue. The philosopher naturally desires to pour forth the thoughts which are always present to him, and to discourse of the higher life. The idea of knowledge is hard to be defined, but is realised in the life of philosophy. And the contrast is the favourite antithesis between the world, in the various characters of sophist, lawyer, statesman, speaker, and the philosopher—between opinion and knowledge, between the conventional and the true.

The greater part of the dialogue is devoted to setting up and throwing down definitions of science and knowledge. Proceeding from the lower to the higher by three stages, in which perception, opinion, reasoning, are successively examined, first, we get rid of the confusion of the idea of knowledge and specific kinds of knowledge;—a confusion which has been already noticed in the Lysis, Laches, Meno, and other dialogues. In the infancy of logic, a form of thought has to be invented before the content can be filled up. We cannot define knowledge until the nature of definition has been ascertained. Having succeeded in making this plain, Socrates proceeds to analyse the first definition which Theaetetus proposes: 'Knowledge is sensible perception.' This is speedily identified with the Protagorean saying, 'Man is the measure of all things;' and of this again, the foundation is discovered in the perpetual flux of Heraclitus. The relativity of sensation is then developed at length, and for a moment the definition appears to be accepted. But soon the Protagorean thesis is pronounced to be suicidal; for the adversaries of Protagoras are as good a measure as he is, and they deny his doctrine. He is then supposed to retort that the perception may be true at any given instant. But this is in the end shown to be inconsistent with the Heraclitean foundation, on which the doctrine has been affirmed to rest. For if the Heraclitean flux is extended to every sort of change in every instant of time, how can any thought or word be detained even for an instant? Sensible perception, like everything else, is tumbling to pieces. Nor can Protagoras himself maintain that one man is as good as another in his knowledge of the future; and 'the expedient,' if not 'the just and true,' belongs to the sphere of the future.

II. And so we must ask again, What is knowledge? The comparison of sensations with one another, implies a principle which is above sensation, and which resides in the mind itself. We are thus led to look for knowledge in a higher sphere, and accordingly Theaetetus, when again
questioned, replies that 'knowledge is true opinion.' But how is false opinion possible? The Megarian, or Eristic, spirit within us revives the question, which has been already asked and indirectly answered in the Meno. 'How can a man be ignorant of that which he knows?' No answer is given to this not unanswerable question. The comparison of the mind to a block of wax, or to a decoy of birds, is found wanting.

III. But are we not inverting the natural order in looking for opinion before we have found knowledge? And knowledge is not true opinion, for judges have true opinion but not knowledge. Once more, what is knowledge? The answer is, 'true opinion, with definition or explanation.' But all the different ways in which this statement may be understood are set aside; like the definitions of courage in the Laches, or of friendship in the Lysis, or of temperance in the Charmides. At length we arrive at the conclusion, in which nothing is concluded.

There are two special difficulties which beset the student of the Theaetetus: (1) he is uncertain how far he can trust Plato's account of the theory of Protagoras; and he is also doubtful (2) how far, and in what parts of the dialogue, Plato is expressing his own opinion. The dramatic character of the work renders the answer to both these questions difficult. In reply to the first of them, we have only probabilities to offer. There seem to be three main points which have to be decided: (1) Would Protagoras have identified his own thesis, 'man is the measure of all things,' with the other, 'All knowledge is sensible perception?' (2) Would he have based the relativity of knowledge on the Heraclitean flux? (3) Would he have asserted the absoluteness of sensation at each instant? Of the work of Protagoras on 'truth' we know nothing, with the exception of the two famous fragments, which are cited in this dialogue, 'Man is the measure of all things,' and, 'Whether there are gods or not, I cannot tell.' Nor have we any other trustworthy evidence of the tenets of Protagoras, or of the sense in which his words are used. For later writers, including Aristotle in his Metaphysics, have mixed up the Protagoras of Plato, as they have the Socrates of Plato, with the real person.

Returning then to the Theaetetus, as the only possible source from which an answer to these questions can be obtained, we may remark, that Plato had 'the truth' of Protagoras before him, and frequently refers to the book. He seems to say expressly, that in this book the doctrine of the Heraclitean flux was not to be found, p. 152; 'he told the real
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truth’ (not in the-book, which is so entitled, but) ‘privately to his disciples;’ words which imply, that the connection between the doctrines of Protagoras and Heraclitus was not generally recognised in Greece, but was really discovered or invented by Plato. On the other hand, the doctrine that ‘Man is the measure of all things,’ is expressly identified by Socrates with the other statement, ‘that what appears to each man is to him;’ and a reference is made to the books in which the statement occurs;—this Theaetetus, who has ‘often read the books,’ is supposed to acknowledge (152 A: so Cratylus 385 E). And Protagoras never says that Socrates has misrepresented him on this point: at p. 166 C, he rather seems to imply that the absoluteness of sensation at each instant was to be found in his words (cp. 158 E). He is only indignant at the ‘reductio ad absurdum’ which Socrates devises of his ‘homo mensura;’ and in this complaint his friend Theodorus appears to coincide.

The question may be raised, how far Plato in the Theaetetus could have misrepresented Protagoras without violating the laws of dramatic probability. Could he have pretended to cite from a well-known writing what was not to be found there? But such a shadowy enquiry is not worth pursuing further. We need only remember that, in the criticism which follows, on the thesis of Protagoras, we are criticising the Protagoras of Plato, and not attempting to draw a precise line between his real sentiments and those which Plato has attributed to him.

2. The other difficulty is a more subtle, and also a more important one, because bearing on the general character of the Platonic dialogues. On a first reading of them, we are apt to imagine that the truth is only spoken by Socrates, who is never guilty of a fallacy himself, and is the great detector of the errors and fallacies of others. But this natural presumption is disturbed by the discovery that the Sophists are sometimes in the right and Socrates in the wrong. Like the hero of a novel, he is not to be supposed always to represent the sentiments of the author. There are few modern readers who do not side with Protagoras, rather than with Socrates, in the dialogue which is called by his name. The Cratylus presents a similar difficulty: in his etymologies, or, again, in the Platonic number, we cannot tell how far Socrates is serious, for the Socratic irony will not allow him to distinguish between his real and his assumed wisdom. No one is the superior of the invincible Socrates in argument (except in the first part of the Parmenides, where he is introduced as a youth); but he is by no means supposed to be in
possession of the whole truth. Arguments are often put into his mouth (cp. Introduction to the Gorgias) which must have seemed quite as untenable to Plato as to a modern writer. In this dialogue great part of the answer of Protagoras is just and sound; remarks are made by him on verbal criticism, and on the importance of understanding an opponent’s meaning, which are conceived in the true spirit of philosophy. And the distinction which he is supposed to draw between Eristic and Dialectic (167, 168), is really a criticism of Plato on himself and his own criticism of Protagoras.

The difficulty seems to arise from not attending to the dramatic character of the writings of Plato. There are two, or perhaps many, sides to questions; which are parted among the different speakers. Sometimes one view or aspect of a question is made to predominate over the rest, as in the Gorgias or Sophist; but in other dialogues truth is divided, as in the Laches and Protagoras, and the interest of the piece consists in the contrast of opinions. The confusion caused by the irony of Socrates, who, if he is true to his character, cannot say anything of his own knowledge, is increased by the circumstance that in the Theaetetus and some other dialogues, he is occasionally playing both parts himself, and even charging his own arguments with unfairness. In the Theaetetus he is designedly held back from arriving at a conclusion. For we cannot suppose that Plato conceived a definition of knowledge to be impossible. But this is his manner of approaching and surrounding a question. The lights which he throws on his subject are indirect, and they are not the less real for that. He has no intention of proving a thesis by a cut and dried argument; nor does he imagine that a great philosophical problem can be tied up within the limits of a definition. If he has analysed a proposition or notion, even with the severity of an impossible logic, if half-truths have been compared by him with other half-truths, if he has cleared up or advanced popular ideas, or illustrated a new method, the aim of a Platonic dialogue has been attained.

The writings of Plato belong to an age in which the power of analysis had outrun the means of knowledge; and through a spurious use of dialectic, the distinctions which had been already ‘won from the void and formless infinite,’ seemed to be rapidly returning to their original chaos. The two great speculative philosophies, which a century earlier had so deeply impressed the mind of Hellas, were now degenerating into Eristic. The contemporaries of Plato and Socrates were vainly trying to find new
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combinations of them, or to transfer them from the object to the subject. The Megarians, in their first attempts to attain a severer logic, were making knowledge impossible. (Cp. Theaet. 202.) They were asserting 'the one good under many names,' and, like the Cynics, seem to have denied predication; while the Cynics themselves were depriving virtue of all which made virtue desirable in the eyes of Socrates and Plato. And besides these, we find mention in the later writings of Plato, especially in the Theaetetus, Sophist, and Laws, of certain repulsive godless persons, who will not believe what they 'cannot hold in their hands;' and cannot be approached in argument, because they cannot argue. (Theaet. 155 E; Soph. 246 A). No school of Greek philosophers exactly answers to these persons, in whom Plato may perhaps have blended some features of the atomists with the vulgar materialistic tendencies of mankind in general. (Cp. Introduction to the Sophist.)

And over and above these tenets of conflicting schools, there were difficulties in the stage which the mind had reached, not easily perceptible to us, who live in another cycle of human thought. All times of mental progress are times of confusion; we only see things clearly, or rather seem to see them clearly, when they have been long fixed and defined. In the age of Plato, the limits of the world of imagination and of pure abstraction, of the old world and the new, were not yet fixed. The Greeks, in the fourth century before Christ, had no words for 'subject' and 'object,' and no distinct conception of them; yet they were always hovering about the question involved in them. The analysis of sense, and the analysis of thought, were equally difficult to them; and hopelessly confused by the attempt to solve them, not through an appeal to facts, but from general theories respecting the nature of the universe.

Plato, in the Theaetetus, gathers up the sceptical tendencies of his age, and compares them. But he does not seek to reconstruct out of them a theory of knowledge. The time at which a theory could be framed had not yet arrived. For there was no measure of experience with which the ideas swarming in men's minds could be compared; the meaning of the word 'science' could scarcely be explained to them, except from the mathematical sciences, which alone offered the type of universality and certainty. Philosophy was becoming more and more vacant and abstract, and not only the Platonic ideas and the Eleatic being, but all abstractions seemed to be at variance with sense and at war with one another.
The want of the Greek mind in the fourth century before Christ, was not another theory of rest or motion, or being or atoms, but rather a philosophy which could free the mind from the power of abstractions and alternatives, and show how far rest and how far motion, how far the universal principle of being, and the multitudinous principle of atoms, entered into the composition of the world; which could distinguish between the true and false analogy, and allow the negative as well as the positive, a place in human thought. To such a philosophy Plato, in the Theaetetus, offers many helps and contributions. For he has traced philosophy into mythology, and pointed out the real similarities of opposing phases of thought. He has also shown that extreme abstractions are self-destructive; and, indeed, hardly distinguishable from one another. But his intention is not to unravel the whole subject of knowledge, if this had been possible; and several times in the course of the dialogue, he rejects explanations of knowledge which have germs of truth in them; as, for example, 'the resolution of the compound into the simple;' or, 'right opinion with a mark of difference.'

Terpsion, who has come to Megara from the country, is described as looking in vain for Euclides in the Agora; the latter explains that he had been down to the harbour, and on his way thither had met Theaetetus, who was being carried up from the army to Athens. He was scarcely alive, for he had been badly wounded at the battle of Corinth, and had taken the dysentery, which prevailed in the camp. The mention of his condition suggests the reflection, 'what a loss he will be.' 'Yes,' indeed, replies Euclid; 'only just now I was hearing of his noble conduct in the battle.' 'That I should expect; but why did he not remain at Megara?' 'I wanted him to remain, but he would not; so I went with him as far as Erineum; and as I parted from him, I remembered that Socrates had seen him when he was a youth, and had a remarkable conversation with him, not long before his own death; and he then prophesied of him, that he would be a great man if he lived.' 'How true that has been; how like all that Socrates said! And could you repeat the conversation?' 'Not from memory; but I took notes when I returned home, which I afterwards filled up at leisure, and got Socrates to correct them from time to time, when I came to Athens. Terpsion had long intended to ask for a sight of this writing, of which
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he had already heard. They are both tired, and agree to rest and have the conversation of Socrates read to them by a servant. Here is the roll, Terpion; I need only observe that I have omitted, for the sake of convenience, the interlocutory words, 'said I,' 'said he;' and that Theaetetus, and Theodorus, the geometrician of Cyrene, are the persons with whom Socrates is conversing.

Socrates begins by asking Theodorus whether, in his visit to Athens, he has found any among the Athenian youth who were likely to attain distinction. 'Yes, Socrates, there is one very remarkable youth, with whom I have become acquainted. He is no beauty, and therefore you need not imagine that I am in love with him; and, to say the truth, he is very like you, for he has a snub nose, and projecting eyes, although these features are not so marked in him as in you. He combines the most various qualities, quickness, patience, courage, and he is gentle as well as wise; always silently flowing on, like a river of oil. Look; he is the middle one of those who are coming out of the palestra.'

Socrates, who does not know his name, recognizes the son of Euphronio, who was himself a good man and a rich. He is informed by Theodorus that the youth is named Theaetetus, but the property of his father has disappeared in the hands of trustees; this does not, however, prevent him from adding liberality to his other virtues. At the desire of Socrates, he invites Theaetetus to sit by them.

'Yes,' says Socrates, 'that I may see in you, Theaetetus, the image of my ugly self, as Theodorus declares. Not that his remark is of any importance, for though he is a philosopher he is not a painter, and therefore he is no judge of our faces, though he may be a judge of our minds. And if he were to praise the mental endowments of either of us, in that case the hearer of the eulogy ought to examine into what he says, and the subject should not refuse to be examined.' Theaetetus consents, and is caught in a trap. (Cp. the similar trap which is laid for Theodorus, at p. 166, r68 D.) 'Then, now, Theaetetus, you will have to be examined, for he has been praising you in a style of which I never heard the like.'

'He was only jesting.' 'Nay, that is not his way; and I cannot allow you, on that pretence, to retract the assent which you have already given, or I shall make Theodorus repeat your praises, and swear to them.' Theaetetus, in reply, professes that he is willing to be examined, and Socrates begins by asking him, 'What he learns of Theodorus?' 'He is himself
anxious to learn anything of anybody; and now he has a little question to which he wants Theaetetus or Theodorus (or whichever of the company would not be 'donkey' to the rest) to find an answer.' Without further preface, but at the same time apologising for his eagerness, he asks, 'What is knowledge?' Theodorus is too old to answer questions, and begs him to interrogate Theaetetus, who has the advantage of youth.

Theaetetus replies, that knowledge is what he learns of Theodorus, i.e. geometry and arithmetic; and that there are other kinds of knowledge—shoemaking, carpentering, and the like. But Socrates rejoins, that this answer contains too much and also too little. For although Theaetetus has enumerated some of the kinds of knowledge, he has not explained the common nature of them; as if he had been asked, 'What is clay?' and instead of saying, 'Clay is moistened earth,' he had said, 'There is one clay of image-makers, another of potters, another of oven-makers.' Theaetetus at once divines that Socrates means him to extend to all kinds of knowledge the same process of generalization, which he has already learned to apply to arithmetic. For he has discovered a division of numbers into square numbers, 4, 9, 16, &c., which are composed of equal factors, and represent figures which have equal sides, and oblong numbers, 3, 5, 6, 7, &c., which are composed of unequal factors, and represent figures which have unequal sides. But he has never succeeded in attaining a similar conception of knowledge, though he has often tried; and, when this and similar questions were brought to him from Socrates, has been sorely distressed by them. Socrates explains to him that he is in labour. For men as well as women have pangs of labour; and both at times require the assistance of midwives. And he, Socrates, is a midwife, although this is a secret; he has inherited the art from his mother bold and bluff, and he ushers into light, not children, but the thoughts of men. Like the midwives, he has no children—the God will not allow him to bring anything into the world of his own. He also reminds Theaetetus that the midwives are or ought to be the only matchmakers: (this is the preparation for a biting jest;) for those who reap the fruit are most likely to know on what soil the plants will grow. But the midwives avoid this department of practice, because they have a character to lose, and do not want to be called procuresses. There are some other differences between his own art and that of the midwives, and between the two sorts of pregnancy. For women bring
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forth in due course, never anything but children, whereas the offspring
of the brain are often monstrous and capricious. And there is no
difficulty in discerning the signs of the coming labour in the one case,
but in the other the difficulty is far greater. My patients, he says, are
barren and stolid at first, but after a while they 'round apace,' if the gods
are propitious to them; and this is due not to me but to themselves;
I and the god only assist in bringing their ideas to the birth. Many of
them have left me too soon, and the result has been that they have pro-
duced abortions; or when I have delivered them of children they have
given them an ill bringing up, and have ended by seeing themselves,
as others saw them, to be great fools. Aristides, the son of Lysimachus,
is one of these, and there have been others. The truants often return to
me and beg to be readmitted; and then, if my familiar allows me, which
is not always the case, I receive them, and they begin to grow again.
There come to me also those who have nothing in them, and have no
need of my art; and I am their matchmaker (see above), and marry
them to Prodicus or some other inspired sage who is likely to suit them.
I tell you this long story because I suspect that you are in labour. Come
then to me, who am a midwife, and the son of a midwife, and I will
deliver you. And do not bite me, as the women do, if I abstact your
firstborn; for I am acting out of good will towards you; the God who
is within me is the friend of man, though he will not allow me to dis-
semble the truth. Once more then, Theaetetus, I repeat my old question
—'What is knowledge?' Take courage, and by the help of God you will
discover an answer. 'My answer is, that knowledge is perception.'
That is the theory of Protagoras, who has another way of expressing the
same thing when he says, 'man is the measure of all things.' He was
a very wise man, and we should try to understand him. In order to
illustrate his meaning let me suppose that there is the same wind blowing
in our faces, and one of us may be hot and the other cold. How is
this? Protagoras will reply that the wind is hot to him who is hot, cold
to him who is cold. And 'is' means 'appears,' and when you say
'appears' that means 'he feels.' Thus feeling, appearance, perception,
coincide with being. I suspect, however, that this was only a 'façon
de parler,' which he imposed on the common herd like you and me; he
told 'the truth' (in allusion to the title of his book, which was called 'the
truth') in secret to his disciples. For he was really a votary of that
famous philosophy in which all things are said to be relative; nothing is
great or small, or heavy or light, or one, but all is in motion and mixture and transition and flux and generation, not 'being,' as we ignorantly affirm, but 'becoming.' This has been the doctrine, not of Protagoras only, but of all philosophers, with the single exception of Parmenides; Empedocles, Heraclitus, and others, and all the poets, with Epicharmus, the king of Comedy, and Homer, the king of Tragedy, at their head, have said the same; the latter has these words—

'Ocean, the generation of gods, and mother Tethys.'

And many arguments are used to show, that motion is the source of life, and rest of death; fire and warmth are produced by friction, and living creatures owe their origin to a similar cause; the bodily frame is preserved by exercise and destroyed by indolence; and if the sun ceased to move, 'chaos would come again.' Now apply this doctrine of 'all is motion' to the senses, and first of all to the sense of sight. The colour of white, or any other colour, is neither in the eyes nor out of them, but ever in motion between the object and the eye, and varying in the case of every percipient. All is relative, and, as the followers of Protagoras remark, endless contradictions arise when we deny this; e.g. here are six dice; they are more than four and less than twelve; more and also less—(you would say that, would you not? 'Yes'). And Protagoras will retort: 'But can anything be more or less without addition?'

'I should say "no" if I were not afraid of contradicting my former answer.'

And if you say 'yes' the tongue will escape conviction but not the mind, as Euripides would say? 'True.' The thoroughbred Sophists, who know all that can be known, would have a sparring match over this, but we, who have no professional pride, want only to discover whether our ideas are clear and consistent. And we cannot be wrong in saying, first, that nothing can be greater or less while remaining equal; secondly, that there can be no becoming greater or less without addition or subtraction; thirdly, that, what is and was not, cannot be without having become. But then how is this reconcileable with the case of the dice, and with similar examples?—that is the question. 'I am often perplexed and amazed, Socrates, by these difficulties.' That is because you are a philosopher, and philosophy begins in wonder; Iris is the child of Thaumas. Do you know the original principle on which the doctrine of Protagoras is based? 'No.' Then I will tell you; but we must not let the uninitiated hear, and by
the uninitiated I mean the repulsive people who believe in nothing which they cannot hold to their hands. The brethren whose mysteries I am about to unfold to you are far more ingenious. They maintain that all is motion; and that motion has two forms, action and passion, out of which endless phenomena are created also in two forms—sense and the object of sense—which come to the birth together. The motion has various degrees of swiftness; the slower motions (e.g. touch, taste, &c.) are in and about things near them, and are the authors of birth, but the things which are born of them have a swifter motion (sight, hearing, &c.), and pass rapidly from place to place. The eye and the appropriate object come together, and give birth to whiteness and the sensation of whiteness; the eye is filled with seeing, and becomes not sight but a seeing eye, and the object is filled with whiteness, and becomes not whiteness but white; and no other compound of either with another would have produced the same effect. All sensation is to be resolved into a similar combination of an agent and patient. Of either, taken separately, no idea can be formed, and the agent may become a patient, and the patient an agent. Hence there arises a general reflection that nothing is, but all things become; no name can detain or fix them. Are not these speculations charming, Theaetetus, and very good for a person in your interesting situation? I am offering you specimens of other men’s wisdom, because I have no wisdom of my own, and I want to deliver you of something; and presently we will see whether you have brought forth wind or not. Tell me, then, what do you think of the notion ‘that all things are becoming?’

‘When I hear your arguments, I am marvellously ready to assent.’

But I ought not to conceal from you that there is a serious objection which may be urged against this doctrine of Protagoras. For there are states, such as madness and dreaming, in which perception is false; and half our life is spent in dreaming; and who can say that at this instant we are not dreaming? Even fits of madness are real at the time. But if knowledge is perception, how can we distinguish between the true and the false in such cases? Having stated the objection, I will now state the answer. Protagoras would deny the continuity of phenomena; he would say that what is different is entirely different, and whether active or passive has a different power. There are infinite agents and patients in the world, and these produce in every combination of them a different perception. Take myself as an instance:—Socrates may be ill
or he may be well, and remember that Socrates, with all his accidents, is spoken of. The wine which I `drink when I am well is pleasant to me, but the same wine is unpleasant to me when I am ill. And there is nothing else from which I can receive the same impression, nor can another receive the same impression from the wine. Neither can I and the object of sense become separately what we become together. For the one is relative to the other, but they imply no other relation; although they are relative to one another, the combination of them is absolute at each moment. [In modern language the act of sensation is really indi-
visible, though capable of a mental analysis into subject and object.] My sensation alone is true, and true to me only. And therefore, as Protagoras says, `To myself I am the judge of what is and what is not.' Thus the flux of Homer and Heraclitus, the great Protagorean saying, `that man is the measure of all things,' the doctrine of Theaetetus, `that knowledge is perception,' have all the same meaning. And this is thy new-born child, which by my art I have brought to light; and you must not be angry if instead of rearing your infant we expose him.

`Theaetetus will not be angry; he is very good-natured. But I should like to know, Socrates, whether you mean to say that all this is untrue?'

First reminding you that I am not the bag which contains the arguments, but that I extract them from Theaetetus, shall I tell you what amazes me in your friend Protagoras?

`What may that be?'

I have nothing to say against his doctrine that what appears is; but I do wonder that he did not begin his great work on truth with a declaration that a tadpole, or a pig, or a dog-faced baboon, or any other monster which has sensation, is a measure of all things; then while we were reverencing him as a god he might have produced a magnificent effect by expounding to us that he was no wiser than a tadpole. For if truth is only sensation, and one man's discernment is as good as another's, and every man is his own judge, and everything that he judges is right and true, then what need of Protagoras to be our instructor at a high figure; and why should we be less knowing than he is, or have to go to him, if every man is the measure of all things? My own art of midwifery, and all dialectic, is an enormous folly, if Protagoras' `truth' be indeed truth, and the philosopher is not merely amusing himself by giving oracles out of his book.
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Theodorus thinks that Socrates is unjust to his master, Protagoras; but he is too old and stiff to try a fall with him, and therefore refers him to Theaetetus, who is already driven out of his former opinion by the representation of Socrates.

Socrates then takes up the defence of Protagoras, who is supposed to reply in his own person—Good people, you sit and declaim about the gods, of whose existence or non-existence I have 'nothing to say, or you discourse about man being reduced to the level of the brutes; but no proof do you give of this. And yet surely you and Theodorus had better reflect whether probability is a safe guide. Theodorus would be a bad geometrician if he had nothing better to offer. Theaetetus is affected by the appeal to geometry, and Socrates is induced by him to put the question in a new form. He proceeds as follows:—Should we say that we know what we see and hear, e.g. the sound of words or the sight of letters in a foreign tongue?

'We should say that the figures of the letters, and the pitch of the voice in uttering them, were known to us, but not the meaning of them.'

Excellent; I shall leave that to grow while I ask another question: Is not seeing perceiving? 'Very true.' And he who sees knows? 'Yes.' And he who remembers, remembers that which he sees and knows? 'Very true.' But if he closes his eyes does he not remember? 'He does.' Then he may remember and not see; and if seeing is knowing, he may remember and not know. Is not this a 'reductio ad absurdum' of the hypothesis that knowledge is sensible perception? Yet perhaps we are crowing too soon; and if Protagoras, 'the father of the myth,' had been alive, the result might have been very different. But he is dead, and Theodorus, whom he left guardian of his 'orphan,' has not been very zealous in defending him.

Theodorus objects that Callias is the true guardian; but he hopes that Socrates will come to the rescue. Socrates prefaces his defence by resuming the attack. He asks whether a man can know and not know at the same time? 'Impossible.' Quite possible, if you maintain that seeing is knowing. The confident adversary, suitting the action to the word, shuts one of your eyes; and now, says he, you see and do not see, but do you know and not know? And a fresh opponent darts from his ambush, and transfers to knowledge the terms which are commonly applied to sight. He asks whether you can know near and not at a distance; whether you can have a sharp and also a dull knowledge.
While you are wondering at his incomparable wisdom, he gets you into his power, and you will not escape until you have come to an understanding with him about the money which is to be paid for your release.

But Protagoras has not yet made his defence; and already he may be heard contemptuously replying that he is not responsible for the admissions which were made by a boy, who could not foresee the coming move, and whose admissions had enabled Socrates to raise a laugh against him. But I cannot be fairly charged, he will say, with an answer which I should not have given; for I never maintained that the memory of a feeling is the same as a feeling, or denied that a man might know and not know the same thing at the same time. Or, if you will have extreme precision, I say that man in different relations is many or rather infinite in number. And I challenge you, either to show that his perceptions are not individual, or that if they are, what appears to him is not what is. As to your pigs and baboons, you are yourself a pig, and you make my writings the sport of other swine. But I still affirm that man is the measure of all things, although I admit that one man may be a thousand times better than another, in proportion as he has better impressions. Neither do I deny the existence of wisdom or of the wise man. But I maintain that wisdom is a practical remedial power of turning evil into good, the bitterness of disease into the sweetness of health, and not any greater truth or superiority of knowledge. For the impressions of the sick are as true as the impressions of the healthy; and the sick are as wise as the healthy. Nor can any man be cured of a false opinion, for there is no such thing; but he may be cured of the evil habit which generates in him an evil opinion. This is effected in the body by the drugs of the physician, and in the soul by the words of the Sophist; and the new state or opinion is not truer, but only better than the old. And philosophers are not tadpoles, but physicians and husbandmen, who till the soil and infuse health into animals and plants, and make the good take the place of the evil, both in individuals and states. Wise and good rhetoricians make the good to appear just in states (for that is just which appears just to a state), and in return, they deserve to be well paid. And you, Socrates, whether you please or not, must continue to be a measure. This is my defence, which I must request you to meet fairly. We are professing to reason, and not merely to dispute; and there is a great difference between reasoning and dis-
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putation. For the disputer is always seeking to trip up his opponent; and this is a mode of argument which disgusts men as they grow older, with philosophy. But the reasoner is trying to understand him and to point out his errors to him, whether arising from his own or from his companions' fault; he does not argue from the customary use of names, which the vulgar pervert in all manner of ways. If you are gentle to an adversary he will follow and love you; and if defeated he will lay the blame on himself, and seek to escape from his own prejudices into philosophy. I would recommend you, Socrates, to adopt this humaner method, and to avoid captious and verbal criticisms.

Such, Theodorus, is the very slight help which I am able to afford to your friend; had he been alive, he would have helped himself in far better style.

'You have made a most valorous defence.'

Yes; but did you observe that Protagoras bid me be serious, and complained of our getting up a laugh against him with the aid of a boy? That was an intimation that you must take the place of Theaetetus, who may be wiser than many bearded men, but not wiser than you, Theodorus.

'The rule of the Spartan Palaestra is, strip or depart; but you are like the giant Antaeus, and will not let me depart unless I try a fall with you.'

Yes, that is the nature of my complaint. And many heroes of romance have broken my head; but I am always at this rough game. Please, then, to favour me.

'On the condition of not exceeding a single fall, I consent.'

Socrates now resumes the argument. As he is very desirous of doing justice to Protagoras, he insists on citing his own words,—'What appears to each man is to him.' And how, asks Socrates, are these words reconcilable with the fact that all mankind are agreed in thinking themselves wiser than others in some respects, and inferior to them in others? In the hour of danger they are ready to fall down and worship any one who is their superior in wisdom as if he were a god. And the world is full of men who are asking to be taught and willing to be ruled, and of other men who are willing to rule and teach them. All which implies that men do judge of one another's impressions, and think some wise and others foolish. How will Protagoras answer this? For he cannot say that no one deems another ignorant or mistaken. If you form a judgment, thousands and tens of thousands are ready to maintain the opposite.
The multitude may not and do not agree in Protagoras' own thesis, 'that man is the measure of all things,' and then who is to decide? Must not his 'truth' depend on the number of suffrages, and be more or less true in proportion as he has more or fewer of them? And he must acknowledge further, that they speak truly who deny him to speak truly, which is a famous jest. And if he admits that they speak truly who deny him to speak truly, he must admit that he himself does not speak truly. But his opponents will refuse to admit this of themselves, and he must admit that they are right in their refusal. The conclusion is, that all mankind, including Protagoras himself, will deny that he speaks truly; and his truth will be true neither to himself nor to anybody else.

Theodorus is inclined to think that this is going too far. Socrates ironically replies, that he is not going beyond the truth. But if the old Protagoras could only pop his head out of the world below, he would doubtless give them both a sound basting and be off in a twinkling. Seeing that he is not within call, we must examine the question for ourselves; there are clearly great differences in the understandings of men. Admitting, with Protagoras, that immediate sensations of hot, cold, and the like, are to each one such as they appear, yet this certainly cannot be extended to judgments or opinions. And even if we were to admit further, (and this is the view of some who are not followers of Protagoras,) that right and wrong, holy and unholy, are to each state or individual such as they appear, still Protagoras will not venture to maintain that every man is equally the measure of expediency, or that the thing which seems is expedient to every one. But this is part of a great question. 'Well, Socrates, we have plenty of leisure.' Yes, we have, and, after the manner of philosophers, we are digressing; this is a habit of theirs which is apt to make them ridiculous when they appear in court. 'What do you mean?' I mean to say that a philosopher is a gentleman, but a lawyer is a servant. The one can have his talk out, and wander at will from one subject to another, as the fancy takes him; like ourselves, he may be long or short, as he pleases. But the lawyer is always in a hurry; there is the clepsydra limiting his time, and the brief limiting his topics, and his adversary is standing over him and exacting his rights. He is a servant disputing about a fellow-servant before his master, who holds the cause in his hands; the path never diverges, and often the race is for his life. Such experiences render him keen and shrewd; he learns the arts of flattery, and is perfect in the practice of crooked ways;
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dangers, against which truth and honesty were no sufficient safeguard, came upon him too soon, when the tenderness of youth was unequal to them, and he has resorted to counter-arts of dishonesty and falsehood, and become warped and distorted; without any health or freedom or truth in him he has grown up to manhood, and is or esteems himself to be a master of cunning. Such are the lawyers; will you have the companion picture of philosophers? or will this be too much of a digression?

‘Nay, Socrates, the argument is our servant, and not our master. Where is the spectator or judge, who has a right to control us?’

I will describe the leaders, then; for the inferior sort are not worth the trouble. The lords of philosophy have not learned the way to the dicastery or ecclesia; they are ignorant of the laws and votes of the state, spoken or written; societies, whether political or festive, clubs, and singing maidens do not enter even into their dreams. And the scandals of persons or their ancestors, male and female, they no more know than they can tell the number of pints in the ocean. Neither are they conscious of their own ignorance; for they do not practise singularity in order to gain reputation, but the truth is, that the outer form of them only is residing in the city; the inner man, as Pindar says, is going on a voyage of discovery, measuring as with line and rule the things which are under and in the earth, interrogating the whole of nature, only not condescending to what is near them.

‘What do you mean, Socrates?’

I will illustrate my meaning by the jest of the witty maid-servant, who saw Thales tumbling into a well, and said of him, that he was so eager to know what was going on in heaven, that he could not see what was before his feet. This is applicable to all philosophers. The philosopher is unacquainted with the world; he hardly knows whether his neighbour is a man or an animal. For he is always contemplating the nature of man, and inquiring what such a nature ought to do or suffer different from any other. Hence, on every occasion in private life and public, as I was saying, when he appears in a law-court or anywhere, he is the joke, not only of maid-servants, but of the general herd, tumbling into wells and every sort of disaster; he looks such an awkward, inexperienced creature, unable to say anything personal, when he is abused, in answer to his adversaries (for he knows no evil of any one); and when he hears the praises of others, he cannot help laughing from the bottom of his
soul at their pretensions; and this also gives him a ridiculous appearance. A king or tyrant appears to him to be a kind of swine-herd or cow-herd, milking away at an animal who is much more troublesome and dangerous than cows or sheep; like the cow-herd, he has no time to be educated, and the pen in which he keeps his flock in the mountains is surrounded by a wall. When he hears of large landed properties of ten thousand acres or more, he thinks of the whole earth; or if he is told of the antiquity of a family, he remembers that every one has had myriads of progenitors, rich and poor, Greeks and barbarians, kings and slaves. And he who boasts of his descent from Amphitryon in the twenty-fifth generation, may, if he pleases, add as many more, and double that again, and our philosopher only laughs at his inability to do a larger sum. Such is the man at whom the vulgar scoff; he seems to them as if he could not mind his feet. 'That is very true, Socrates.' But when he tries to draw the quick-witted lawyer out of his pleas and rejoinders to the contemplation of absolute justice or injustice in their own nature, or from the popular praises of wealthy kings to the view of happiness and misery in themselves, of to the reasons why a man should seek after the one and avoid the other, then the situation is reversed;—the little wretch turns giddy, and is ready to fall over the precipice; his utterance becomes thick, and he makes himself ridiculous, not to servant-maids, but to every man of liberal education. Such are the two pictures: the one of the philosopher and gentleman, who may be excused for not having learned how to make up a bed, or cock flatteries; the other a serviceable knave, who hardly knows how to wear his cloak, still less can he awaken harmonious thoughts or hymn virtue's praises.

'If the world, Socrates, were as ready to receive your words as I am, there would be greater peace and less evil among mankind.'

Evil, Theodorus, must ever remain in this world to be the antagonist of good, out of the way of the gods in heaven. Wherefore also we should fly from us to them; and to fly to them is to become like them; and to become like them is to become holy and just and true. But the many live in the old wives' fable of appearances; they think that you should follow virtue in order that you may seem to be good. And yet the truth is, that God is righteous; and of men, he is most like him who is most righteous. To know this is wisdom; and in comparison of this the wisdom of the arts or the seeming wisdom of politicians is mean and common. The unrighteous man is apt to pride himself on his
cunning; he says, 'I am one who ought to live, and not a mere burden of the earth.' But he should reflect that his ignorance makes his condition worse than if he knew. For the penalty of injustice is not death or stripes, but the fatal necessity of becoming more and more unjust. Two patterns of life are set before him; the one blessed and divine, the other godless and wretched; and he is growing more and more like the one and unlike the other. He does not see that if he continues in his cunning, the place of innocence will not receive him after death. And yet if such a man has the courage to hear the argument out, he often becomes dissatisfied with himself, and has no more strength in him than a child.—But we have digressed enough.

'For my part, Socrates, I like the digressions better than the argument, because I understand them better.'

To return. When we left off, the Protagoreans and Heracliteans were maintaining that the ordinances of the State were just, while they lasted. But no one would maintain that the laws of the State were always good or expedient, although this may be the intention of them. For the expedient has to do with the future, about which we are liable to mistake. Now, would Protagoras maintain that man is the measure not only of the present and past, but of the future; and that there is no difference in the judgments of men about the future? Would a private person, for example, be as likely to know when he is going to have a fever, as the physician who attended him? And if they differ in opinion, which of them is likely to be right; or are they both right? Is not a vine-grower a better judge of a vintage which is not yet gathered, or a cook of a dinner which is in preparation, or Protagoras of the probable effect of a speech, than any indifferent person? The last example speaks 'ad hominem.' For Protagoras would never have amassed a fortune if every man could judge of the future for himself. He is, therefore, compelled to admit that he is a measure; but I, who know nothing, am not equally convinced that I am. This is one way of refuting him; and he is refuted also by the authority which he attributes to the opinions of others, who deny his opinions. I am not equally sure that we can disprove the truth of immediate states of feeling. But this leads us to the doctrine of the universal flux, about which a battle-royal is always going on in the cities of Ionia. 'Yes; the Ephesians are downright mad about the flux; they cannot stop to argue with you, but are perpetually moving themselves in obedience to their text-books. Their restlessness is beyond expression,
and if you ask any of them a question, they will not answer, but dart at you some unintelligible saying, and another and another, making no way either themselves or with others; for nothing is fixed in them or their ideas,—they are at war with fixed principles.' I suppose, Theodorus, that you have never seen them in time of peace, when they discourse at leisure to their disciples? 'Disciples! they have none; they are a set of uneducated fanatics, and each of them says of the other that they have no knowledge: we must trust ourselves, and not them for the solution of the problem.' Well, the doctrine is old, being derived from the poets, who speak in a figure of Oceanus and Tethys; the truth was once concealed, but is now revealed by the superior wisdom of a later generation, and made intelligible to the cobbler, who, on hearing that all is in motion, and not some things only, as he ignorantly fancied, may be expected to fall down and worship his teachers. And the opposite doctrine must not be forgotten:—

'That is alone unmoved which is named the Universe,'
as Parmenides affirms. Thus we are in the midst of the fray; both parties are dragging us to their side; and we are not certain which of them are in the right, and if neither, then we shall be in a ridiculous position, having to set up our own opinion against ancient and famous men.

Let us first approach the river-gods, or patrons of the flux.

When they speak of motion, must they not include two kinds of motion, change of place and change of nature?—And all things must be supposed to have both kinds of motion; for if not, the same things would be at rest and in motion, which is absurd. And did we not say, that all sensations of whiteness, heat, and the like, arose out of a relation and motion between the patient and agent; the patient being distinguished from the perception, and the agent not a qualitas, and neither of them having any absolute existence? But now we make the further discovery, that neither white or whiteness, nor any sense or sensation, can be predicated of anything, for they are in a perpetual flux. And therefore we must modify the doctrine of Theaetetus and Protagoras, by asserting further that knowledge is and is not sensation; and of everything we must say equally, that this is and is not, or becomes or becomes not. And still the word 'this' is not quite correct, for language fails in the attempt to express their meaning.

At the close of the discussion, Theodorus claims to be released from the argument, according to his agreement. But Theaetetus insists that
they shall proceed to consider the doctrine of rest. This is declined by
Socrates, who has too much reverence for the great Parmenides lightly
to attack him. We shall find that he returns to the doctrine of rest in
the Sophist; but at present he does not wish to be diverted from his
main purpose, which is, to deliver Theaetetus of his conception of know-
ledge. He proceeds to interrogate him further. When he says, 'That
knowledge is perception, with what does he perceive?' The first answer
is, 'That he perceives sights with the eye, and sounds with the ear.' This
leads Socrates to make the reflection: That nice distinctions of words are
sometimes pedantic, but sometimes necessary; and he proposes in this
case to substitute the word 'through' for 'with.' For the senses are not
like the Trojan warriors in the horse, but have a common sense or centre of
life, from which they spring. This common sense is able to compare them
with one another, and must therefore be distinct from them. (Cp. Rep. vii.
523, 524.) And as there are facts of sense which are perceived through
the organs of the body, there are also mathematical and other abstractions,
such as sameness and difference, likeness and unlikeness, which the soul
perceives by herself. Being is the most universal of these abstractions.
The good and the beautiful are abstractions of another kind, which the
soul views in relation to one another, comparing the past, present, and
future. For example; we know a thing to be hard or soft by the touch,
of which the perception is given at birth to men and animals. But the
essence of hardness or softness, or the fact that this hardness is, and is
the opposite of softness, is slowly learned by reflection and experience.
Mere perception does not reach being, and therefore fails of truth; and
therefore has no share in knowledge. Wherefore knowledge is not per-
ception. But what then is knowledge? The mind, when occupied by
herself with being, is said to have opinion: shall we say that 'knowledge
is true opinion?' But then an old difficulty recurs; we ask ourselves,
'How is false opinion possible?' This difficulty may be stated as
follows:—

Either we know or do not know a thing (for the intermediate pro-
cesses of learning and forgetting, need not at present be considered);
and in thinking or having an opinion, we must either know or not know
that which we think, and we cannot know and be ignorant at the same
time; we cannot confuse one thing which we do not know, with another
thing which we do not know; nor can we think that which we do not
know to be that which we know, or that which we know to be that
which we do not know. And what other case is conceivable, upon the supposition that we either know or do not know all things? To which we can only reply, 'When a man thinks, and thinks that which is not.' But would this hold in any parallel case? Can a man see and see nothing? or hear and hear nothing? or touch and touch nothing? Must he not see, hear, or touch some one existing thing? For if he thinks about nothing he does not think, and thinking about nothing is thinking falsely. And so the path of being is closed against us, as well as the path of knowledge. But may there not be 'heterodoxy,' or transference of opinion;—I mean, may not one thing be supposed to be another? Theaetetus is confident that this must be 'the true falsehood,' when a man puts good for evil, or evil for good. Socrates will not discourage him by attacking the paradoxical expression 'true falsehood,' but passes on. The new notion involves a process of thinking about two things, either together or alternately. And thinking is the conversing of the mind with herself, which is carried on in question and answer, until she no longer doubts, but determines and forms an opinion. And false opinion consists in saying to yourself, that one thing is another. But did you ever say to yourself, that good is evil, or evil good? Even in sleep, did you ever imagine that odd was even? Or did any man in his senses ever fancy that an ox was a horse, or that two are one? You cannot argue that one thing may be another, because other is other in the abstract, when you deny in a particular case that good can be supposed to be evil. He who has both the two things in his mind, cannot misplace them; and he who has only one of them in his mind, cannot misplace them—on either supposition the notion of transference is inconceivable.

But perhaps there may still be a sense in which we can think that which we do not know to be that which we know: e. g. Theaetetus may know Socrates, but at a distance he may mistake another person for him. This process may be conceived by the help of an image. Let us suppose that every man has in his mind a block of wax of various qualities, the gift of Memory, the mother of the Muses; and on this he receives the seal or stamp of those sensations and perceptions which he wishes to remember. That which he succeeds in stamping is remembered and known by him as long as the impression lasts; but that, of which the impression is rubbed out or imperfectly made, is forgotten, and not known. No one can think one thing to be another, when he
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has the memorial or seal of both of these in his soul, and a sensible impression of neither; or when he knows one and does not know the other, or has no memorial or seal of the other; or when he knows neither; or when he perceives both, or one, and not the other, or neither; or when he perceives and knows either one or both, and identifies what he perceives with what he knows (this is still more impossible); or when he neither perceives nor knows one, and does not know or does not perceive the other; or has no perception or knowledge of either—all these cases must be excluded. But he may err when he confuses what he knows or perceives, or what he perceives and does not know, with what he knows, or what he knows and perceives with what he knows and perceives.

Theaetetus is unable to follow these distinctions; which Socrates proceeds to illustrate by examples: first of all remarking, that knowledge may exist without perception, and perception without knowledge. I may know Theodorus and Theaetetus and not see them; I may see them, and not know them. 'That I understand.' But I could not mistake one for the other if I knew you both, and had no perception of either; or if I knew one only, and perceived neither; or if I knew and perceived neither, or in any other of the excluded cases. The only possibility of error is: 1st, when knowing you and Theodorus, and having the impression of both of you on the waxen block—I, seeing you both imperfectly and at a distance, put the shoe on the wrong foot—that is to say, put the impression of sense on the wrong seal or stamp: or 2ndly, when knowing both of you I only see one; or when, seeing and knowing you both, I fail to identify the impression and the object. But there could be no error when perception and knowledge correspond.

The waxen block in the heart of a man's soul, as I may say in the words of Homer, who played upon the word, may be smooth and deep, and large enough, and then the signs are clearly marked and lasting, and do not get confused. But in the 'hairy heart,' as the all-wise poet sings, when the wax is muddy or hard or moist, there is a corresponding confusion and want of retentiveness; in the muddy and impure there is indistinctness, and still more in the hard, for there the impressions have no depth of wax, and in the moist they are too soon effaced. Yet greater is the indistinctness when they are all jolted together in a little soul, which is narrow and has no room. These are the sort of natures which have false opinion; in their hurry and in their slowness they see
and hear and think amiss; and this is falsehood and ignorance. Error, then, is a confusion of thought and sense.

Theaetetus is delighted with this explanation. But Socrates has no sooner found the new solution than he sinks into a fit of despondency. For an objection occurs to him:—May there not be errors where there is no confusion of mind and sense? e.g. in numbers. No one can confuse the man whom he has in his thoughts with the horse which he has in his thoughts, but he may err in the addition of five and seven; and observe that these are purely mental conceptions. Thus we are involved once more in the dilemma of saying, either that there is no such thing as false opinion, or that a man knows what he does not know.

But all this time we have been repeating the words 'know,' 'understand,' and we do not know what knowledge is. 'Why, Socrates, how can you argue at all without using them?' Nay, but the true hero of dialectic would have forbad me to use them until I had explained them. And I must explain them now. The verb 'to know' has two senses, to have and to possess knowledge, and I distinguish 'having' from 'possessing.' A man may possess a garment which he does not wear; or he may have wild birds in an aviary; these in one sense he possesses, and in another he has none of them. Let this aviary be an image of the mind, as the waxen block was; when we are young, the aviary is empty; after a time the birds are put in; for under this figure we may describe different forms of knowledge;—there are some of them in groups, and some single, which are flying about everywhere; and let us suppose a hunt after the science of odd and even, or some other science. The possession of the birds is clearly not the same as the having them in the hand. And the original chase of them is not the same as taking them in the hand when they are already caged.

This distinction between use and possession saves us from the absurdity of supposing that we do not know what we know, because we may know in one sense, i.e. possess, what we do not know in another, i.e. use. But have we not escaped one difficulty only to encounter a greater? For how can the exchange of two kinds of knowledge ever become false opinion? As well might we suppose that ignorance could make a man know, or that blindness could make him see. Theaetetus suggests that in the aviary there may be flying about mock birds, or forms of ignorance, and we put forth our hands and grasp ignorance, when we are intending to grasp knowledge. But how can he who knows
the forms of knowledge and the forms of ignorance imagine one to be
the other? Is there some other form of knowledge which distinguishes
them? and another, and another? Thus we go round and round in a
circle and make no progress.

All this confusion arises out of our attempt to explain false opinion
without having explained knowledge. What then is knowledge? Thae-
etetus once more repeats that knowledge is true opinion. But this seems
to be refuted by the instance of orators and judges. For surely the
orator cannot convey a true knowledge of crimes at which the judges
were not present; he can only persuade them, and the judge may form
a true opinion and truly judge. But if true opinion were knowledge
they could not have judged without knowledge.

Once more. Thaeetetus offers a definition which he has heard:
Knowledge is true opinion accompanied by definition or explanation.
Socrates has had a similar dream, and has further heard that the first
elements are names only, and that definition or explanation begins
when they are combined; the letters are unknown, the syllables or com-
bination are known. But this new hypothesis when tested by the letters
of the alphabet is found to break down. The first syllable of Socrates'
name is SO. But what is SO? Two letters, S and O, a sibilant and
a vowel, of which no further explanation can be given. And how can
any one be ignorant of either of them, and yet know both of them?
There is, however, another alternative:—We may suppose that the syl-
lable has a separate form or idea distinct from the letters or parts. The
all of the parts may not be the whole. Thaeetetus is very much inclined
to adopt this suggestion, but when interrogated by Socrates he is unable
to draw any distinction between the whole and all the parts. And if the
syllables have no parts, then they are those original elements of which there
is no explanation. But how can the syllable be known if the letter remains
unknown? In learning to read as children, we are first taught the letters
and then the syllables. And in music, the notes, which are the letters,
have a much more distinct meaning to us than the combination of them.

Once more, then, we must ask the meaning of the statement, that
'knowledge is right opinion, accompanied by explanation or definition.'
Explanation may mean, (1) the reflection or expression of a man's
thoughts. But every man who is not deaf and dumb is able to express
his thoughts; or (2) the enumeration of the elements of which anything
is composed. A man may have a true opinion about a waggon, but when
he is able to enumerate the hundred planks of Hesiod—then, and not till then, he has knowledge of a waggon. Or he may know the syllables of the name Theaetetus, but not the letters—and not until he knows both can he be said to have knowledge as well as opinion. Again, he may know the syllable 'The' in the name Theaetetus, but he may be mistaken about the same syllable in the name Theodorus, and in learning to read we often make such mistakes. And even if he could write out all the letters and syllables of your name in order, still he would only have right opinion. Yet there may be a third meaning of the definition besides (1) the image or expression of the mind; (2) the enumeration of the elements;—to these may now be added (3) perception of difference.

For example, I may see a man who has eyes, nose, and mouth;—that will not distinguish him from any other man. Or he may have a snub-nose and prominent eyes;—that will not distinguish him from myself and you and others who are like me. But when I see a certain kind of snub-nosedness, then I recognise Theaetetus. And having this sign of difference, I have knowledge. But have I opinion or knowledge of this difference? In the one case I have only opinion; in the other I assume a disputed term—knowledge is right opinion with knowledge of difference.

And so, Theaetetus, knowledge is neither perception nor true opinion, nor yet definition accompanying true opinion. And I have shown that the embryo thoughts of your brain are of no value. Are you still in labour, or have you brought all you have to say about knowledge to the birth? If you have any more thoughts, you will be the better for having got rid of these; or if you have none, you will be the better for not fancying that you know what you do not know. Observe the limits of my art, which, like my mother's, is an art of midwifery; I do not pretend to compare with the good and wise of this and other ages.

And now I go to meet Meletus at the porch of the King Archon; to-morrow I shall hope to see you again, Theodorus, at this place.

I. The saying of Theaetetus, that 'knowledge is sensible perception,' may be assumed to be a current philosophical opinion of the age. 'The ancients,' as Aristotle (De Anim. iii. 3) says, citing a verse of Empedocles, 'affirmed knowledge to be the same as perception.' We may now examine these words, first with reference to their place in the history of philosophy, and secondly, in relation to modern speculations.
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(a) In the age of Socrates the mind was passing from the object to the subject. The same impulse which a century before had led men to form conceptions of the world, now led them to frame general notions of the human faculties and feelings, such as memory, opinion, and the like. The simplest of these is sensation, or sensible perception, by which Plato seems to mean the generalised notion of feelings and impressions of sense, without determining whether they are conscious or not.

The theory that 'knowledge is sensible perception' is the antithesis of that which derives knowledge from the mind (Theaet. 185), or which assumes the existence of ideas independent of the mind (Parm. 134). Yet from their extreme abstraction these theories do not represent the opposite poles of thought in the same way that the corresponding differences would in modern philosophy. The most ideal and the most sensational have a tendency to pass into one another; Heraclitus, like his great successor Hegel, has both aspects. The Eleatic isolation of being and the Megarian or Cynic isolation of individuals are placed in the same class by Plato, Soph. 251 C, D; and the same principle which is the symbol of motion to one mind is the symbol of rest to another. The Atomists, who are sometimes regarded as the Materialists of Plato, denied the reality of sensation. And in the ancient as well as the modern world there were reactions from theory to experience, from ideas to sense. This is a point of view from which the philosophy of sensation presented great attraction to the ancient thinker. Amid the conflict of ideas and the variety of opinions, the impression of sense remained certain and uniform. Hardness, softness, cold, heat, &c. are not absolutely the same to different persons (cp. 171 D), but the art of measuring could at any rate reduce them all to definite natures (Rep. X, 602 D). Thus the doctrine that knowledge is perception supplies or seems to supply a firm standing ground. Like the other notions of the earlier Greek philosophy, it was held in a very simple way, without much-basis of reasoning, and without suggesting the questions which naturally arise in our own minds on the same subject.

(8) The fixedness of impressions of sense furnishes a link of connection between ancient and modern philosophy. The modern thinker often repeats the parallel axiom, 'that all knowledge is experience.' He means to say that the outward and not the inward is both the original source and the final criterion of truth, because the outward can be
observed and analysed; the inward is only known by external results, and is dimly perceived by each man for himself. In what does this differ from the saying of Theaetetus? Chiefly in this—that the modern term 'experience,' while implying a point of departure in sense and a return to sense, also includes all the processes of reasoning and imagination which have intervened. The necessary connection between them by no means affords a measure of the relative degree of importance which is to be ascribed to either element. For the inductive portion of any science may be small, as in mathematics or ethics, compared with that which the mind has attained by reasoning and reflection on a very few facts.

II. The saying that 'all knowledge is sensation' is identified by Plato with the Protagorean thesis that 'man is the measure of all things.' The interpretation which Protagoras himself is supposed to give of these latter words is, 'Things are to me as they appear to me, and to you as they appear to you.' But there remains still an ambiguity both in the text and the explanation which has to be cleared up. Did Protagoras merely mean to assert the relativity of knowledge to the human mind? or did he mean to deny that there is an objective standard of truth?

These two questions have not been always clearly distinguished; the relativity of knowledge has been sometimes confounded with uncertainty. The untutored mind is apt to suppose that objects exist independently of the human faculties, because they really exist independently of the faculties of any individual. In the same way, knowledge appears to be a body of truths stored up in books, which when once ascertained are independent of the discoverer. Further consideration shows us that these truths are not really independent of the mind; there is an adaptation of one to the other, of the eye to the object of sense, of the mind to the conception. There would be no world, if there neither were, nor ever had been any one to perceive the world. A slight effort of reflection enables us to understand this; but no effort of reflection will enable us to pass beyond the limits of our own faculties, or to imagine the relation or adaptation of objects to the mind to be different from that of which we have experience. There are certain laws of language and logic to which we are compelled to conform, and to which our ideas naturally adapt themselves; and we can no more get rid of them than we can cease to be ourselves. The absolute and infinite, whether explained as self-existence, or as the totality of human thought, or as the Divine
nature, if known to us at all, cannot escape from the category of relation.

But because knowledge is subjective or relative to the mind, we are not to suppose that we are therefore deprived of any of the tests or criteria of truth. One man still remains wiser than another, a more accurate observer and relater of facts, a truer measure of the proportions of knowledge. The nature of testimony is not altered, nor the verification of causes by prescribed methods less certain. Again, the truth must often come to a man through others, according to the measure of his capacity and education. But neither does this affect the testimony, whether written or oral, which he knows by experience to be trustworthy. He cannot escape from the laws of his own mind; and he cannot escape from the further accident of being dependent for his knowledge on others. But still this is no reason why he should always be in doubt; of many personal, of many historical and scientific facts he may indeed be absolutely assured. And having such a mass of acknowledged truth in the mathematical and physical, not to speak of the moral sciences, the moderns have certainly no reason to acquiesce in the statement, that truth is appearance only, or that there is no difference between appearance and truth.

The relativity of knowledge is a truism to us, but was a great psychological discovery in the fifth century before Christ. Of this discovery, the first distinct assertion is contained in the thesis of Protagoras. Probably he had no intention either of denying or affirming an objective standard of truth. He did not consider whether man in the higher or man in the lower sense was a 'measure of all things.' Like other great thinkers, he was absorbed with one idea, and that idea was the absoluteness of perception. Like Socrates, he seemed to see that philosophy must be brought back from 'nature' to 'truth,' from the world to man. But he did not stop to analyse whether he meant 'man' in the concrete or man in the abstract; any man or some men, 'quod semper quod ubique,' or individual private judgment. Such an analysis lay beyond his sphere of thought; the age before Socrates had not arrived at these distinctions. Like the Cynics, again, he discarded knowledge in any higher sense than perception. For 'truer' or 'wiser' he substituted the word 'better,' and is not unwilling to admit that both states and individuals are capable of practical improvement. But this improvement does not arise from intellectual enlightenment, nor yet from the exertion
of the will, but from a change of circumstances and impressions; and he who can effect this change in himself or others may be deemed a philosopher. In the mode of effecting this, while agreeing with Socrates and the Cynics in the importance which he attaches to practical life, he is at variance with both of them. To suppose that practice can be divorced from speculation, or that we may do good without caring about truth, is by no means singular, either in philosophy or life. The singularity of this, as of some other (so-called) sophistical doctrines, is the frankness with which they are avowed, instead of being veiled, as in modern times, under ambiguous and convenient phrases.

Plato appears to treat Protagoras much as he himself is treated by Aristotle; that is to say, he does not attempt to understand him from his own point of view. But he entangles him in the meshes of a more advanced logic. To which Protagoras is supposed to reply by Megarian quibbles, which destroy logic, 'Not only man, but each man, and each man at each moment.' In the arguments about sight and memory there is a palpable unfairness which is worthy of the great 'brainless brothers,' Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, and may be compared with the ἐγκαλυμένος ('obvelatus') of Eubulides. For he who sees with one eye only cannot be truly said both to see and not to see; nor is memory, which is liable to forget, the immediate knowledge to which Protagoras applies the term. Theodorus justly charges Socrates with going beyond the truth; and Protagoras has equally right on his side when he protests against Socrates arguing from the common use of words, which 'the vulgar pervert in all manner of ways.'

III. The theory of Protagoras is connected by Aristotle as well as Plato with the flux of Heraclitus. But Aristotle is only following Plato, and Plato, as we have already seen, did not mean to imply that such a connection was admitted by Protagoras himself. His metaphysical genius saw or seemed to see a common tendency in them, just as the modern historian of ancient philosophy might perceive a parallelism between two thinkers of which they were probably unconscious themselves. We must remember throughout that Plato is not speaking of Heraclitus, but of the Heracliteans, who succeeded him; not of the great original ideas of the master, but of the Eristic into which they had degenerated a hundred years later. There is nothing in the fragments of Heraclitus which at all justifies Plato's account of him. His philosophy may be resolved into two elements: first, change; secondly, law or measure pervading the
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change; these he saw everywhere, and often expressed in strange mythological symbols. But he has no analysis of sensible perception such as Plato attributes to him; nor is there any reason to suppose that he pushed his philosophy into that absolute negation in which Heracliteanism was sunk in the age of Plato. He never said that 'change meant every sort of change,' and he expressly distinguished between 'the general and particular understanding.' Like a poet, he surveyed the elements of mythology, nature, thought, which lay before him, and sometimes by the light of genius he saw or seemed to see a mysterious principle working behind them. But as has been the case with other great philosophers, and with Plato and Aristotle themselves, what was really permanent and original could not be understood by the next generation, while a perverted logic carried out his chance expressions with an illogical consistency. His simple and noble thoughts, like those of the great Eleatic, soon degenerated into a mere strife of words. And when thus reduced to mere words, they seem to have exercised a far wider influence in the cities of Ionia (where the people are mad about them) than in the life-time of Heraclitus—a phenomenon which, though at first sight singular, is not without parallel in the history of philosophy and theology.

It is this perverted form of the Heraclitean philosophy, which is supposed to effect the final overthrow of Protagorean sensationalism. For if all things are changing at every moment, in all sorts of ways, then there is nothing fixed or defined at all, and therefore no sensible perception, nor any word by which that or anything else can be described. Of course Protagoras would not have admitted the justice of this argument any more than Heraclitus would have acknowledged the 'ineducated fanatics' who appealed to his writings. He might have said, 'The excellent Socrates has first confused me with Heraclitus, and Heraclitus with his Ephesian successors, and has thus disproved the existence both of knowledge and sensation. But I am not responsible for what I never said, nor will I admit that my common-sense account of knowledge can be overthrown by unintelligible Heraclitean paradoxes.'

IV. Still at the bottom of the arguments there remains a truth, 'that knowledge is something more than sensible perception;'—that alone, would not distinguish man from a tadpole. The absoluteness of sensations at each moment, destroys the very consciousness of sensations (cp. Phileb. 21 D); or the power of comparing them. The senses are.
not mere holes in a 'Trojan horse,' but the organs of a presiding nature, in which they meet. A great advance has been made in psychology when the senses are recognised as organs of sense, and we are admitted to see or feel 'through them' and not 'by them,'—that is a distinction of words which, as Socrates observes, is by no means pedantic. A still further step has been made when the most abstract notions, such as being and not-being, sameness and difference, unity and plurality, are acknowledged to be the creations of the mind herself, working upon the feelings or impressions of sense. In this manner Plato describes the process of acquiring them, in the words (186 D): 'knowledge consists not in the feelings or affections (παθήματι), but in the process of reasoning about them (συλλογισμῷ).’ Here, as in the Parmenides (132 A), he means something not really different from generalization. As in the Sophist, he is laying the foundation of a rational psychology, which is to supersede the Platonic reminiscence of ideas as well as the Eleatic being and the individualism of Megarians and Cynics.

V. Having rejected the doctrine that 'knowledge is perception,' we now proceed to look for a definition of knowledge in the sphere of opinion. But here we are met by a singular difficulty: How is false opinion possible? For we must either know or not know, that which is presented to the mind or sense. We of course should answer at once: No; the alternative is not necessary, for there may be degrees of knowledge; and we may know and have forgotten, or we may be learning, or we may have a general but not a particular knowledge, or we may know but not be able to explain; and many other ways may be imagined in which we know and do not know at the same time. But these answers belong to a later stage of metaphysical discussion; the question seems naturally to arise in the childhood of the human mind, together with the parallel question of not-being. Men had only recently arrived at the notion of opinion; they could not at once define the true and pass beyond into the false. The very word δόξα was full of ambiguity, being sometimes, as in the Eleatic philosophy, applied to the sensible world, and again used in the more ordinary sense of opinion. There is no connection between sensible appearance and probability, and yet both of them met in the word δόξα, and could only with difficulty be disengaged in the mind of the Greek. To this was often added, as at the end of the fifth book of the Republic, the idea of relation, which is equally distinct from either of them; also a fourth notion, the conclusion
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of the dialectical process, the making up of the mind after she has been 'talking to herself' (p. 190).

We are not then surprised that the sphere of opinion and of not-being should be a dusky, half-lighted place (Rep. V. p. 478), belonging neither to the old world of sense and imagination, nor to the new world of reflection and reason. Plato attempts to clear up this darkness. In his accustomed manner he passes from the lower to the higher, without omitting the intermediate stages. This appears to be the reason why he seeks for the definition of knowledge first in the sphere of opinion. Hereafter we shall find that something more than opinion is required.

False opinion is explained by Plato at first as a confusion of mind and sense, which arises when the impression in the mind does not correspond to the impression on the senses. It is obvious that this explanation (supposing the distinction between impressions in the mind and impressions on the senses to be admitted) does not account for all forms of error; and Plato has excluded himself from the consideration of the greater number, by designedly omitting the intermediate processes of learning and forgetting; nor does he include fallacies in the use of language or erroneous inferences. But he is struck by one possibility of error, which is not covered by his theory, viz. errors in arithmetic. For in numbers and calculation there is no combination of thought and sense, and yet errors may often happen. Hence he is led to discard the explanation which might nevertheless have been supposed to hold good (for anything that he says to the contrary) as a rationale of error, in the case of facts derived from sense.

Another attempt is made to explain false opinion by assigning to error a sort of positive existence. But error or ignorance is essentially negative—a not-knowing; if we knew an error, we should be no longer in error. We may veil our difficulty under figures of speech, but these, although telling arguments with the multitude, can never be the real foundation of a system of psychology. The figure of the mind receiving impressions, is one of those images which, whether an assistance to thought or not, have rooted themselves for ever in language. The other figure of the enclosure, is also remarkable as affording the first hint of universal all-pervading ideas, which is further carried out in the Sophist. This is implied in the birds, some in flocks, some solitary, which fly about anywhere and everywhere. Plato discards both figures, as not really solving the question which to us appears so simple: 'How we
make mistakes?’ The failure of the enquiry seems to show that we should return to knowledge, and begin with that; and we may afterwards proceed with a better hope of success, to the examination of opinion.

But is true opinion really distinct from knowledge? That Plato attempts to establish by an argument, which to us appears very singular and unsatisfactory. The existence of true opinion is proved by the rhetoric of the law courts, which cannot give knowledge, but may give true opinion. The rhetorician cannot put the judge or juror in possession of all the facts which prove an act of violence, but he may truly persuade them of the commission of such an act. Here the idea of true opinion seems to be a right conclusion from imperfect knowledge. But the correctness of such an opinion will be purely accidental; and is really the effect of one man, who has the means of knowing, persuading another who has not. Plato would have done better, if he had said that true opinion was a contradiction in terms.

Assuming the distinction between knowledge and opinion, Theaetetus, in answer to Socrates, proceeds to define knowledge:—True opinion, with definite or rational explanation. This Socrates identifies with another and different theory, of those who assert that knowledge first begins with a proposition.

The elements may be perceived by sense, but they are names, and cannot be defined (διομάτων συμπλοκὴ λόγων ὀνόμα). When we assign to them some predicate, they first begin to have a meaning. This seems equivalent to saying, that the individuals of sense become the subject of knowledge when they are regarded as they are in nature in relation to other individuals.

Yet we feel a difficulty in following this hypothesis. For must not opinion be equally expressed in a proposition? The difference between true and false opinion is not the difference between the particular and the universal, but between the true universal and the false. Thought may be as much at fault as sight. When we place individuals under a class, of assign to them attributes, this is not knowledge, but a very rudimentary process of thought; the first generalisation of all, without which language would be impossible. And has Plato kept altogether clear of a confusion, which the analogous word λόγος tends to create, of a proposition and a definition? And is not the confusion increased by the use of the analogous term ‘elements,’ or ‘letters?’ For there is no
real resemblance between the relation of letters to a syllable, and of the terms to a proposition.

Plato, in the spirit of the Megarian philosophy, soon discovers a flaw in the explanation. For how can we know a compound, of which the simple elements are unknown to us? Can two unknowns make a known? Can a whole be something different from the parts? The answer of experience is, that they can; for we may know a compound, which we are unable to analyse into its elements; and all the parts, when united, may be more than all the parts separated: e.g. the number four, or any other number, is more than four units; any chemical compound is more than and different from the simple elements. But ancient philosophy in this, as in many other instances, proceeding by the path of mental analysis, was perplexed by doubts which warred against the plainest facts.

Three attempts to explain the new definition of knowledge, still remain to be considered. They all of them turn on the explanation of λόγος. The first account of the meaning of the word, is the reflection of thought in speech—a sort of nominalism, 'La science est une langue bien faîte.' But anybody who is not dumb can say what he thinks; therefore mere speech cannot be knowledge. And yet we may observe, that there is in this explanation an element of truth which is not recognised by Plato; viz. that truth and thought are inseparable from language, although mere expression in words is not truth. The second explanation of λόγος, is the enumeration of the elementary parts of the complex whole. But this is only definition accompanied with right opinion, and does not yet attain to the certainty of knowledge. Plato does not mention the greater objection, which is, that such an enumeration of particulars is endless; the definition may be based on no principle, and may not assist us at all in gaining a common idea. The third is the best explanation;—the possession of a characteristic mark, which seems to answer to the logical definition by genus and difference. But this, again, is equally necessary for right opinion; and we have already determined, although not on very satisfactory grounds, that knowledge must be distinguished from opinion. A better distinction is drawn between them in the Timaeus (p. 51 E). They might be opposed as philosophy and rhetoric, and as conversant respectively with necessary and contingent matter. But no true idea of the nature of, either of them, or of their relation to one another, could be framed until science obtained a content. The ancient
philosophers in the age of Plato thought of science only as pure abstraction, and to this opinion stood in no relation.

Like Theaetetus, we have attained to no definite result. But an interesting phase of ancient philosophy has passed before us. And the negative result is not to be despised. For on certain subjects, and in certain states of knowledge, the work of negation or clearing out the foundations must go on, perhaps for a generation, before the new structure can begin to rise. Plato saw the necessity of combating the illogical logic of the Megarians and Eristics. For building that corner of the edifice, he makes preparation in the Theaetetus, and completes the work in the Sophist.

Many (1) fine expressions; and (2) remarks full of wisdom; (3) also germs of a metaphysic of the future, are scattered up and down in the dialogue. Such, for example, as (1) the comparison of Theaetetus' progress in learning, to the 'noiseless flow of a river of oil,' the satirical touch, 'flavouring a sauce or fawning speech;' or the remarkable expression, 'full of impure dialectic;' or the lively images under which the argument is described, 'the flood of arguments pouring in,' the fresh discussions 'bursting in like a band of revellers.' As illustrations of the second head, may be cited the remark of Socrates, that 'distinctions of words, although sometimes pedantic, are also necessary;' or the fine touch in the character of the lawyer, 'that dangers came upon him when the tenderness of youth was unequal to them;' or the description of the manner in which the spirit is broken in a wicked man who listens to reproof until he becomes like a child; or the punishment of the wicked, which is not physical suffering, but the perpetual companionship of evil (cp. Gorgias); or the expression, often repeated by Aristotle and others, that 'philosophy begins in wonder, for Iris is the child of Thaumas.' (3) Important metaphysical ideas are: a. the conception of thought, as the mind talking to herself; b. the notion of a common sense, developed further by Aristotle, and the explicit declaration, that the mind gains ideas of being, sameness, number, and the like, from reflection on herself; c. the excellent distinction of Theaetetus (which Socrates, speaking with emphasis, 'leaves to grow'), between seeing the forms or hearing the sounds of words in a foreign language, and understanding the meaning of them, and the distinction of Socrates himself between 'having' and 'possessing' knowledge, in which the answer to the whole discussion appears to be contained.
Euclid and Terpsion meet in front of Euclid's house in Megara; they enter the house, and the dialogue is read to them by a servant.

Euclid. Are you only just arrived from the country, Terpsion?

Terpsion. No, I came some time ago: and I have been in the Agora looking for you, and wondering that I could not find you.

Euclid. Why, I was not in the city at all.

Terpsion. Where then?

Euclid. As I was going down to the harbour, I met Theaetetus; he was being carried up to Athens from the army at Corinth.

Terpsion. Do you mean that he was alive or dead?

Euclid. He was scarcely alive; for he has been badly wounded, and what is worse, the sickness which prevails in the army has fastened upon him.

Terpsion. Is that the dysentery?

Euclid. Yes.

Terpsion. Alas! what a loss he will be!

Euclid. Yes, Terpsion, he is a noble fellow; I heard some one highly praising his behaviour in this very battle.

Terpsion. I do not wonder at that; I should wonder at hearing anything else of him. But why did he go on, instead of stopping at Megara?

Euclid. He wanted to get home, for the fact was that I begged and advised him to remain, but he would not; so I set him on his way,
and turned back, and then I remembered what Socrates had said of him, and thought how remarkably this, like all his predictions, had been fulfilled. I believe that he had seen him a little before his own death, when Theaetetus was a youth, and he had a conversation with him, which he repeated to me when I came to Athens; he was full of admiration of his genius, and said that he would most certainly be a great man, if he lived.

**Terp.** That has certainly proved true; but what was the conversation? can you tell me?

**Euc.** No, indeed, not without preparation; but I took notes as soon as I got home, which I filled up from memory and wrote out at leisure; and whenever I went to Athens, I asked Socrates about any point which I had forgotten, and on my return I made corrections; in this way I have nearly the whole conversation written down.

**Terp.** True; I have heard you say that before, and have always been intending to ask you to show me the writing, but have let the opportunity slip; and now, why not out with the book?—having just come from the country, I should greatly like to rest.

**Euc.** I, too, shall be very glad of a rest, for I went with Theaetetus as far as Erineum. Let us go in, then, and, while we are reposing, the servant shall read to us.

**Terp.** Very good.

**Euc.** Here is the roll, Terpsion; I need only observe that I have introduced Socrates, not as narrating to me, but as actually conversing with the persons whom he mentioned—these were, Theodorus the geometrician (of Cyrene), and Theaetetus. I have omitted, for the sake of convenience, the interlocutory words 'I said,' 'I remarked,' which he used when he spoke of himself, and again, 'he agreed,' or 'disagreed,' in the answer, as the repetition of them would have been troublesome.

**Terp.** That is quite right, Euclid.

**Euc.** And now, boy, you may take the roll and read.

**Euclid's servant reads.**

**Socrates.** If I cared enough about the Cyrenians, Theodorus, I would ask you whether there are any rising geometricians or philosophers in that part of the world. But I am more interested in our Athenian youth, and I would rather know who among them are
likely to do well. I observe them as far as I can myself, and I enquire of any one whom they follow, and I see that a great many of them follow you, in which they are quite right, considering your eminence in geometry and in other ways. I should like to know, if you have met with any one who is good for anything.

Theodorus. Yes, Socrates, there is one very remarkable Athenian youth with whom I have become acquainted, whom I commend to you as well worthy of your attention. If he had been a beauty I should have been afraid to praise him, lest you should suppose that I was in love with him; but he is no beauty, and you must not be offended if I say that he is very like you; for he has a snub nose and projecting eyes, although these features are less marked in him than in you. Seeing, then, that he has no personal attractions, I may freely say, that in all my acquaintance, which is very large, I never knew any one who was his equal in natural gifts: for he has a quickness of apprehension which is almost unrivalled, and he is remarkably gentle, and also the most courageous of men; there is a union of qualities in him such as I have never seen in any other, and should scarcely have thought that the combination was possible; for those who, like him, have quick and ready and retentive wits, have generally also quick tempers; they are ships without ballast, which go darting about, and are mad rather than courageous; and the steadier sort, when they have to face study, are stupid and cannot remember. Whereas he moves surely and smoothly and successfully in the path of knowledge and enquiry; and he is full of gentleness, and always making progress, like the noiseless flow of a river of oil; at his age, it is wonderful.

Soc. That is good news; and whose son is he?

Theod. The name of his father I have forgotten, but the youth himself is the middle one of those who are approaching us; he and his companions have been anointing in the outer court, and now they seem to have finished, and are coming towards us. Look and see whether you know him.

Soc. I know the youth, but I do not know his name; he is the son of Euphranius the Sunian, who was himself an eminent man, and such another as his son is, according to your account of him; I believe that he left a considerable fortune.

Theod. Theaetetus, Socrates, is his name; but I rather think that
the property disappeared in the hands of trustees; notwithstanding which he is wonderfully liberal.

Soc. He must be a fine fellow; tell him to come and sit by me.

Theod. I will. Come hither, Theaetetus, and sit by Socrates.

Soc. By all means, Theaetetus, in order that I may see the reflection of myself in your face, for Theodorus says that we are alike; and yet if each of us held in his hands a lyre, and he said that they were tuned alike, should we at once take his word, or should we ask whether he who said this was a musician?

Theaetetus. We should ask.

Soc. And if we found that he was a musician, we should take his word; and if not, not?

Theaet. True.

Soc. And if this supposed likeness of our faces is a matter of any interest to us, we should enquire whether he who says that we are alike is a painter or not?

Theaet. Certainly we should.

Soc. And is Theodorus a painter?

Theaet. I never heard that he was.

Soc. Is he a geometrician?

Theaet. There can be no doubt about that, Socrates.

Soc. And is he an astronomer and calculator and musician, and in general an educated man?

Theaet. I think that he is.

Soc. If, then, he remarks on the similarity of our persons, either in the way of praise or blame, there is no particular reason why we should attend to him.

Theaet. I should say not.

Soc. But if he praises the virtue or wisdom which are the mental endowments of either of us, then he who heard the praises will naturally desire to have an examination, and he who is praised ought to be willing to exhibit himself.

Theaet. Very true, Socrates.

Soc. Then now is the time, my dear Theaetetus, for you to exhibit and for me to have the examination; for although Theodorus has praised many a citizen and stranger in my hearing, never did I hear him praise any one as he has been praising you.

Theaet. I am glad of that, Socrates; but what if he was only in jest?
Nay, that is not his way; and I cannot allow you to retract your assent on that ground. For if you do, he will have to clear himself on oath, and I am sure that no one will accuse him of false witness; do not then be afraid of standing to your word.

Theaet. I will do as you wish.

Soc. Well, then, I should like to ask what you learn of Theodorus; something of geometry, I suppose?

Theaet. Yes.

Soc. And astronomy and harmony and calculation?

Theaet. I do my best.

Soc. Yes, my boy, and so do I; and my desire is to learn of him, and of anybody who seems to understand these things. And I get on pretty well in general; but there is a little matter which I want you and the company to aid me in investigating. Will you answer me a question: 'Is not learning growing wiser about that which you learn?'

Theaet. Of course.

Soc. And by wisdom the wise are wise?

Theaet. Yes.

Soc. And is that different from knowledge?

Theaet. What is different?

Soc. Wisdom; are not men wise in that which they know?

Theaet. Certainly.

Soc. Then wisdom and knowledge are the same?

Theaet. Yes.

146 Soc. And this is the very difficulty which I can never explain to myself—What is the nature of knowledge? can we tell that? What do you say? which of us will answer first? whoever misses shall sit down, as at a game of ball, and be donkey, as the boys say, to the rest of the company; he who lasts out his competitors in the game without missing, shall be our king, and shall have the right of asking any questions which he likes. Why is there no reply? I hope, Theodorus, that I am not betrayed into rudeness by my love of conversation? I only want to make us talk and be friendly and sociable.

Theod. The reverse of rudeness, Socrates; but I would rather that you would ask one of the young fellows; the truth is, that I am not in the habit of playing at your game of question and answer, and I am too old to acquire the habit; this will suit the young
much better, and they will improve much more than I shall, for youth is always able to improve. Having already made a beginning with him, I would advise you to detain Theaetetus, and interrogate him.

Soc. Do you hear, Theaetetus, what Theodorus says; the philosopher, whom you would not like to disobey, and whose word ought to be a command to a young man, bids me interrogate you. Take courage, then, and nobly say what you think that knowledge is.

Theaet. Well, Socrates, I will answer as you and he bid me; and, if I make a mistake, you will be sure to correct me.

Soc. That we will, if we can.

Theaet. Then, I think that the sciences which I learn from Theodorus, geometry, and those which you just now mentioned, are knowledge; and I would include the art of the cobbler and other craftsmen; these, all and each of them, are knowledge.

Soc. Too much, Theaetetus, too much; the nobility and liberality of your own nature make you give many and diverse things, when I am asking for one simple thing.

Theaet. What do you mean, Socrates?

Soc. Perhaps nothing. I will endeavour, however, to explain what I believe to be my meaning: When you speak of cobbling, you mean the art of making shoes?

Theaet. That is my meaning.

Soc. And when you speak of carpentering, you mean the art of making wooden implements?

Theaet. Yes.

Soc. In both which cases you define the subjects of the two arts?

Theaet. True.

Soc. But that, Theaetetus, was not the question; we wanted to know not the subjects, nor yet the number of the arts or sciences, for we were not going to count them, but we wanted to know the nature of knowledge in the abstract. Am I not right?

Theaet. Perfectly right.

Soc. Take the following example: Suppose that a person were to ask about some very common and obvious thing. Shall I say—What is clay? and we were to answer him, that there is a clay of potters, there is a clay of oven-makers, there is a clay of brick-makers; would not that be ridiculous?
Theaet. Truly.

Soc. In the first place, there would be an absurdity in assuming that he who asked the question would understand from our answer the meaning of the word 'clay,' merely because we added 'of the image-makers,' or of any other workers. For how can a man understand the name of that of which he does not know the nature?

Theaet. To be sure he cannot.

Soc. Then he who does not know what science or knowledge is, has no knowledge of the art or science of making shoes?

Theaet. None.

Soc. Nor of any other science?

Theaet. No.

Soc. And when a man is asked 'what science or knowledge is,' to give as an answer the name of some art or science, is ridiculous; for the question is, 'What is knowledge?' and he replies, 'a knowledge of this and that.'

Theaet. True.

Soc. Moreover, he might answer shortly and simply, but he makes an enormous circuit. For example, when asked about the clay, he might have said simply, that 'clay is moistened earth'—whose clay is not to the point.

Theaet. Yes, Socrates, that appears to be easy, as you state the matter. And, if I am not mistaken, you mean something like what occurred to me and to my friend here, your namesake, Socrates, in a recent discussion.

Soc. What was that, Theaetetus?

Theaet. Theodorus was writing out for us something about roots, such as the roots of three or five feet, showing that in linear measurement (i.e. comparing the sides of the squares), they are incommensurable by the unit; he selected the numbers which are roots, up to seventeen, but he went no farther; and as there are innumerable roots, the notion occurred to us of attempting to include them all under one name or class.

Soc. And did you find such a class?

Theaet. I think that we did; but I should like to have your opinion.

Soc. Let me hear.

Theaet. We divided all numbers into two classes; those which are made up of equal factors multiplying into one another, which
we represented as squares and called squares, or equilateral numbers; — that was one class.

Soc. Very good.

Theaet. The intermediate numbers, such as three and five, and every other number which is made up of unequal factors, either of a greater multiplied by a less, or of a less multiplied by a greater, and when regarded as a figure, is contained in unequal sides; — all these we represented as oblong figures, and called them oblong numbers.

Soc. Capital; and what followed?

Theaet. The lines, or sides, which are the roots of (or whose squares are equal to) the equilateral plane numbers, were called by us lengths or magnitudes; and the lines which are the roots of (or whose squares are equal to) the oblong numbers, were called powers or roots; the reason of this latter name being, that they are commensurable with the lines or sides not in linear measurement, but in the value of their squares; and the same about solids.

Soc. Excellent, my boy; I think that you fully justify the praises of Theodorus, and that he will not be found guilty of false witness.

Theaet. But I am unable, Socrates, to give you a similar answer about knowledge, which is what you appear to want; and therefore Theodorus is a deceiver after all.

Soc. Well, but suppose that you were running a course, and some one said in praise of you, that he had never known any youth who was as good a runner, and afterwards you were beaten in a race by a grown-up man, who was a great runner — would his praise be any the less true?

Theaet. I do not say that.

Soc. And is the discovery of the nature of knowledge really a little matter, as I just now said, or one requiring great skill?

Theaet. Requiring the greatest, as I should say.

Soc. Well, then, be of good cheer; do not say that Theodorus was mistaken about you, but do your best to ascertain the true nature of knowledge, as well as of other things.

Theaet. I am eager enough, Socrates, if that would bring to light the truth.

Soc. Come, you made a good beginning just now; let your own answer about roots be your model, and as you comprehended them
all in one class, try and bring the many sorts of knowledge under one name.

_Theaet._ I can assure you, Socrates, that I have tried very often, when I heard the questions which came from you; but I can neither persuade myself that I have any answer to give, nor hear of any one who answers as you would have me answer; and I cannot get rid of the desire to answer.

_Soc._ These are the pangs of labour, my dear Theaetetus; you have something within you which you are bringing to the birth.

_Theaet._ I do not know, Socrates; I only say what I feel.

_Soc._ And did you never hear, simpleton, that I am the son of a midwife, brave and burly, whose name was Phaenarete?

_Theaet._ Yes, I have heard that.

_Soc._ And that I myself practise midwifery?

_Theaet._ No, I never heard that.

_Soc._ Let me tell you that I do, though, my friend; but you must not reveal the secret, as the world in general have not found me out; and therefore they only say of me, that I am an exceedingly strange being, who drive men to their wits' end; did you ever hear that?

_Theaet._ Yes.

_Soc._ Shall I tell you the reason?

_Theaet._ By all means.

_Soc._ I must make you understand the situation of the midwives, and then you will see my meaning better:—No woman, as you are probably aware, who is still able to conceive and bear, attends other women, but only those who are past bearing.

_Theaet._ Yes, I know.

_Soc._ The reason of this is said to be that Artemis—the goddess of childbirth—is a virgin, and she honours those who are like herself; but she could not allow the barren to be midwives, because human nature cannot know the mystery of an art without experience; and therefore she assigned this office to those who by reason of age are past bearing, honouring them from their likeness to herself.

_Theaet._ That is natural.

_Soc._ And a natural, or rather necessary inference is, that the midwives know better than others who is pregnant and who is not?
Theaet. Very true.

Soc. And by the use of potions and incantations they are able to arouse the pangs and to soothe them at will; they can make those bear who have a difficulty in bearing, and if they choose they can smother the babe in the womb.

Theaet. They can.

Soc. Did you ever remark that they are also most cunning match-makers, and have an entire knowledge of what unions are likely to produce a brave brood?

Theaet. I never heard of this.

Soc. Then let me tell you that this is their greatest pride, more than cutting the umbilical cord. And if you reflect, you will see that the same art which cultivates and gathers in the fruits of the earth, will be most likely to know in what soils the several plants or seeds should be deposited.

Theaet. Yes, the same art.

Soc. And do you suppose that this is otherwise in the case of women?

Theaet. No, that is not likely.

Soc. No, indeed; but the midwives, who are respectable women and have a character to lose, avoid this department of practice, because they are afraid of being called procuresses, which is a name given to those who join together man and woman in an unlawful and unscientific way; and yet the true midwife is also the true and only match-maker.

Theaet. That I understand.

Soc. Such are the midwives, whose work is a very important one, but not so important as mine; for women do not bring into the world at one time real children, and at another time idols which are with difficulty distinguished from them; if they did, then the discernment of the true and false birth would be the crowning achievement of the art of midwifery—you would think that?

Theaet. Yes, I certainly should.

Soc. Well, my art of midwifery is in most respects like theirs; but the difference lies in this—that I attend men and not women, and I practise on their souls when they are in labour, and not on their bodies; and the triumph of my art is in examining whether the thought which the mind of the young man is bringing to the birth is a false idol or a noble and true creation. And like the
midwives, I am barren, and the reproach which is often made against me, that I ask questions of others and have not the wit to answer them myself, is very just; the reason is, that the god compels me to be a midwife, but forbids me to bring forth. And therefore I am not myself wise, nor have I anything which is the invention or offspring of my own soul, but the way is this:—Some of those who converse with me, at first appear to be absolutely dull, yet afterwards, as our acquaintance ripens, if the god is gracious to them, they all of them make astonishing progress; and this not only in their own opinion but in that of others. There is clear proof that they have never learned anything of me, but they have acquired and discovered many noble things of themselves, although the god and I help to deliver them. And the proof is, that many of them in their ignorance, attributing all to themselves and despising me, either of their own accord or at the instigation of others, have gone away sooner than they ought; and the result has been that they have produced abortions by reason of their evil communications, or have lost the children of which I delivered them by an ill bringing up, deeming lies and shadows of more value than the truth; and they have at last ended by seeing themselves, as others see them, to be great fools. Aristides, the son of Lysimachus, is one of this sort, and there are many others. The truants often return to me, and beg that I would converse with them again—they are ready to go down on their knees—and then, if my familiar allows, which is not always the case, I receive them, and they begin to grow again. Dire are the pangs which my art is able to arouse and to allay in those who have intercourse with me, just like the pangs of women in childbirth; night and day they are full of perplexity and travail which is even worse than that of the women. So much for them. And there are others, Theaetetus, who come to me apparently having nothing in them; and as I know that they have no need of my art, I coax them into another union, and by the grace of God I can generally tell who is likely to do them good. Many of them I have given away to Prodicus, and some to other inspired sages. I tell you this long story, friend Theaetetus, because I suspect, as indeed you seem to think yourself, that you are in labour,—great with some conception. Come then to me, who am a midwife and the son of a midwife, and try to answer the question which I will ask you. And if I
abstract and expose your first-born, because I discover upon inspection that the conception which you have formed is a vain shadow, do not quarrel with me on that account, as the manner of women is when their first children are taken from them. For I have actually known some who were ready to bite me when I deprived them of a darling folly; they did not perceive that I acted from goodwill, not knowing that no god is the enemy of man (that was not within the range of their ideas); neither am I their enemy in all this, but religion will never allow me to admit falsehood, or to stifle the truth. Once more, then, Theaetetus, I repeat my old question, 'What is knowledge?' and do not say that you cannot tell; but quit yourself like a man, and by the help of God you will be able to tell.

Theaet. At any rate, Socrates, after such an exhortation I should be ashamed of not trying to do my best. And, according to my present notion, he who knows perceives what he knows, and therefore I should say that knowledge is perception.

Soc. Bravely said, boy; that is the way in which you should express your opinion. And now, suppose that you and I have an examination, and see whether this conception of yours is a true child or a mere wind-egg. And so you say that perception is knowledge?

Theaet. Yes.

Soc. I think that you have delivered yourself of a very important doctrine about knowledge, which is indeed that of Protagoras, who has another way of expressing the same thing when he says, that man is the measure of all things, of the existence of things that are, and of the non-existence of things that are not:—You have read that?

Theaet. Yes, I have read that, again and again.

Soc. Does he not mean to say that things are to you such as they appear to you, and are to me such as they appear to me, for you and I are men?

Theaet. Yes, that is what he says.

Soc. Such a wise man has doubtless a meaning: let us try to understand him; the same wind is blowing, and yet one of us may be cold and the other not, or one may be slightly and the other very cold?

Theaet. Very true.
Soc. Now is the wind, regarded not in relation to us but absolutely, cold or not; or are we to say, with Protagoras, that the wind is cold to him who is cold, and not to him who is not?

Theaet. I suppose the last.

Soc. This is what appears to each of them?

Theaet. Yes.

Soc. And ‘appears to him’ means the same as ‘he perceives’?

Theaet. True.

Soc. Then appearance and perception coincide in this instance of hot and cold, and in similar instances; for things appear, or may be supposed to be, to each one such as he perceives them?

Theaet. Yes.

Soc. Then perception is always of existence, and being the same as knowledge is unerring?

Theaet. That is clear.

Soc. Now, I verily and indeed suspect that Protagoras, who was an almighty wise man, spoke these things in a parable to the common herd, like you and me, but he told the truth, ‘his truth,’ in secret to his own disciples.

Theaet. What do you mean, Socrates?

Soc. I am about to speak of an illustrious philosophy, in which all things are said to be relative; you cannot rightly call anything by any name, such as great or small, or heavy or light, for the great will be small and the heavy light—there is no one or some or any sort of nature, but out of motion and change and admixture all things are becoming, which ‘becoming’ is by us incorrectly called being, but is really becoming, for nothing really is, but all things are becoming. Summon all philosophers—Protagoras, Heracleitus, Empedocles, and the rest of them, one after another, with the exception of Parmenides, and they will agree with you in this. Summon the great masters of either kind of poetry—Epicarmus, the prince of Comedy, and Homer of Tragedy; when the latter sings of

‘Ocean the birth of gods, and mother Tethys,’
does he not mean that all things are the offspring of flux and motion?

Theaet. Yes, that is his meaning.

Soc. And who could take up arms against such a great army, and Homer who is their general, and not be ridiculous?
Theaet. Who indeed, Socrates?

Soc. Yes, Theaetetus; and besides this there are plenty of proofs which will show that motion is the source of that which appears to be and becomes, and rest of not-being and destruction; for fire and warmth, which are supposed to be the parent and nurse of all other things, are born of friction, which is a kind of motion 1; is not that the origin of fire?

Theaet. Yes.

Soc. And the race of animals is generated in the same way?

Theaet. Certainly.

Soc. And is not the bodily habit spoiled by rest and idleness, but preserved for a long time 2 by motion and exercise?

Theaet. True.

Soc. And is not this true of the mental habit also? Is not the soul informed, and improved, and preserved by thought and attention, which are motions; but when at rest, which in the soul means only want of thought and attention, is uninformed, and speedily forgets whatever she has learned?

Theaet. True.

Soc. Then motion is a good, and rest an evil, both of the soul and of the body?

Theaet. True.

Soc. I may affirm, also, that the breathless calm and stillness and the like are wasting and impairing, and wind and storm preserving; and the palmary argument of all, which I strongly urge, is the golden chain in Homer, by which he means the sun, thus indicating that while the sun and the heavens go round, all things human and divine are and are preserved, but if the sun were to be arrested in his course, then all things would be destroyed, and, as the saying is, Chaos would come again.

Theaet. I believe, Socrates, that you have truly explained his meaning.

Soc. Then apply this to perception, my good friend, and first of all to vision; that which you call white colour is not in your eyes, and is not a distinct thing which exists out of them, having no assignable place; for that would imply order and rest, and there would be no process of generation.

Theaet. Then what is colour?

1 Reading τοῦτο δὲ κληρος. 2 Reading ἐπὶ πολύ.
Soc. Let us carry out the principle which has just been affirmed, that nothing is self-existent, and then we shall see that every colour, white, black, and every other colour, arises out of the eye meeting the appropriate motion, and that what we term the substance of each colour is neither the active nor the passive element, but something which passes between them, and is peculiar to each percipient; are you certain that the several colours appear to every animal—say to a dog—as they appear to you?

Theaet. Indeed I am not.

Soc. Or that anything appears the same to you as to another man? Would you not rather question whether you yourself see the same thing at different times, because you are never exactly the same?

Theaet. I should.

Soc. And if that with which I compare myself in size, or which I apprehend, were great or white or hot, it could not without actually changing become different by mere contact with another; nor again, if the apprehending or comparing subject were great or white or hot, could this, when unchanged from within, become changed by any approximation or affection of any other thing. For already, my friend, we see that there are most ridiculous and wonderful contradictions into which we are only too readily falling, as Protagoras and all who take his line of argument would remark.

Theaet. How is that, and what sort of contradictions do you mean?

Soc. A little instance will sufficiently explain my meaning: Here are six dice, which are a third more when compared with four, and fewer by a half than twelve—they are more and also fewer—that cannot be denied either by you or by any one.

Theaet. True.

Soc. Well, then, suppose that Protagoras or some one asks whether anything can become greater or more if not by increasing, how would you answer him, Theaetetus?

Theaet. I should say no, Socrates, if I were to speak my mind in reference to this last question, and if I were not afraid of contradicting my former answer.

Soc. By Herè, well and divinely said, my friend. And if you

3 Reading with the MS. ἄ παραμετρούμεθα.
reply 'yes,' there will be a case for Euripides; 'for our tongue will be unconvinced, but not our mind.'

Theaet. Very true.

Soc. The thoroughbred Sophists, who know all that can be known about the mind, and argue only out of the superfluity of their wits, would have had a regular sparring-match over this. But you and I, who have no professional aims, only desire to see what is the real nature of our ideas, and whether they are consistent with each other or not.

Theaet. Yes, that is what I should wish.

Soc. And I as much as you. And as this is our feeling, and there is no hurry, why should we not gently and patiently review our own thoughts, and examine and see what these appearances in us really are? Concerning which, if I am not mistaken, we shall say:—first, that nothing can be greater or less, either in number or magnitude, while remaining equal to itself—you will allow that?

Theaet. Yes.

Soc. Secondly, that without addition or subtraction there is no increase or diminution of anything, but only equality.

Theaet. Quite true.

Soc. Thirdly, that what once was not and afterwards was, could not be, without becoming or having become.

Theaet. Yes, truly.

Soc. These three axioms, if I am not mistaken, were fighting with one another in our minds in the case of the dice, or, again, in such a case as this—when I say that I, at my age, who neither gain nor lose in height, may this year be taller than you, who are still a youth, and next year not so tall—not that I have lost, but that you have increased: in such a case, I am afterwards what I once was not; and yet I have not become, for I could not have become taller without becoming—that is certain—any more than I could have become less without losing somewhat of my height; and I could give you ten thousand examples of similar contradictions, if we admit them at all. I believe that you understand me, Theaetetus; for I suspect that you have thought of these questions before.

In allusion to the well-known line of Euripides, Hippol. 612:

η γλώσσα άμοσον, η δὲ φρήν άμωσος.
Theaet. Yes, Socrates, and I am amazed when I think of them; indeed I am; and I want to know what is the meaning of them, and there are times when my head quite swims with the contemplation of them.

Soc. I see, my dear Theaetetus, that Theodorus had a true insight into your nature when he said that you were a philosopher, for wonder is the feeling of a philosopher, and philosophy begins in wonder; he was not a bad genealogist who said that Iris the messenger of heaven is the child of Thaumas (wonder). But do you know what is the explanation of this perplexity on the hypothesis which we attribute to Protagoras?

Theaet. Not as yet.

Soc. Then you will be obliged to me if I help you to unearth the hidden truth or wisdom of a famous man or men.

Theaet. Certainly, I shall be very greatly obliged.

Soc. Take a look round, then, and see that none of the uninitiated are listening. Now by the uninitiated I mean the people who believe in nothing but what they can hold fast in their hands, and who will not allow that action and generation and all that is invisible can have any real existence.

Theaet. Yes, indeed, Socrates, they are very stubborn and repulsive mortals.

Soc. Yes, my boy, outer barbarians. Far more ingenious are the brethren whose mysteries I am about to reveal to you. Their principle is, that all is motion, and upon this all the affections of which we were just now speaking are supposed to depend; there is nothing but motion, which has two forms, one active and the other passive, both in endless number, and out of the union and friction of them there is generated a progeny in endless number, having two forms, sense and the object of sense, which are ever breaking forth at the same moment and coming to the birth. The senses are variously named hearing, seeing, smelling; there is the sense of heat, cold, pleasure, pain, desire, fear, and many more which are named, and there are innumerable others which have no name; and there are all sorts of colours of a nature akin to the sight, and of sounds akin to the hearing, and other objects of sense which are akin to the several senses. Do you see, Theaetetus, the bearing of this tale on the preceding argument?

Theaet. Indeed I do not.
Socrates. Then attend, in the hope that there may be an end. The meaning is that all these things are in motion, as I was saying, and that this motion has degrees of swiftness or slowness; and the slower elements have their motions in the same place and about things near them, and thus beget, but the things begotten are quicker, for their motions are from place to place. Apply this to sense:—When the eye and the appropriate object meet together and give birth to whiteness and the sensation of white, which could not have been given by either of them going to any other object, then, while the sight is flowing from the eye and whiteness from the colour-producing element, the eye becomes fulfilled with sight, and sees, and becomes, not sight, but a seeing eye; the object which combines in forming the colour is fulfilled with whiteness, and becomes not whiteness but white, whether wood or stone, or whatever the object may be which happens to be coloured white. And this is true of all sensations, hard, warm, and the like, which are similarly to be regarded, as I was saying before, not as having any absolute existence, but as being all of them generated by motion in their intercourse with one another, according to their kinds; for of the agent and patient, taken singly, as they say, no fixed idea can be framed, for the agent has no existence until united with the patient, and the patient has no existence until united with the agent; and that which unites with anything and is an agent, when meeting with another thing, is converted into a patient. And out of all this, as I said at first, there arises a general reflection, which is, that there is no one or self-existent thing, but everything is becoming and in relation; and being has to be altogether abolished, although custom and ignorance may compel us to retain the use of the word. But philosophers tell us that we are not to allow either the word 'something,' or 'belonging to something,' or 'to me,' or 'this' or 'that,' or any other detaining name to be used; in the language of nature all things are being created and destroyed, coming into being and passing into new forms; nor can any name fix or detain them; he who attempts to fix them is easily refuted. And this should be the way of speaking, not only of particulars but of aggregates; such aggregates as are expressed in the word 'man,' or 'stone,' or any name of an animal or of a class. O Theaetetus, are

6 Omitting ἄρμα.
not these speculations charming? And do you not like the taste of
them?

Theaet. I do not know what to say, Socrates; for, indeed, I
cannot make out whether you are giving your own opinion or
only wanting to draw me out.

Soc. Do you not remember, my friend, that I neither know, nor
pretend to know, anything of myself; I am barren, and attend on
you as a midwife, and this is why I soothe you, and offer you
samples of one philosopher after another, that you may taste them.
And I hope that I may at last help to bring your own opinion into
the light of day; when this has been accomplished, then we will
determine whether what you have brought forth is only a wind-egg
or a real and genuine creation. Therefore, keep up your spirits,
and answer like a man what you think.

Theaet. Ask me.

Soc. Is your opinion that nothing is but what becomes? the
good and the noble, as well as all the other things which we were
mentioning?

Theaet. When I hear you discoursing in this style, I think that
there is a great deal in what you say, and I am very ready to
assent.

Soc. Let us not leave the argument unfinished, then; as there
still remains to be considered an objection which may be raised
about dreams and diseases, in particular about madness, and the
various illusions of hearing and sight, or any other misapprehen-
sion. For you know that in all these cases the theory of the
truth of perception appears to be unmistakably refuted, as in
dreams and illusions we certainly have false perceptions; and far
from saying that"everything is which appears, we should rather
say that nothing is which appears.

Theaet. That is very true, Socrates.

Soc. But then, my boy, how can any one assert that knowledge
is perception, or that things are to each one as they appear?

Theaet. I am afraid to say, Socrates, that I have nothing
to answer, because you rebuked me just now for"saying that;
but I certainly cannot undertake to argue that madmen or
dreamers think truly, when they imagine some of them that
they are gods, and others that they can fly, and are flying in their
sleep.
Soc. Do you know that there is a question which is raised about all these errors, and especially about waking and sleeping?

Theaet. What question?

Soc. A question which I think that you must often have heard persons ask:—How can you prove whether at this moment we are sleeping, and all our thoughts are a dream; or whether we are awake, and talking to one another in the waking state?

Theaet. Indeed, Socrates, I do not know how you can prove that the one is any more true than the other, for all the phenomena correspond; and there is no difficulty in supposing that we have now been talking to one another in our sleep; and when in a dream we seem to be telling thoughts which are only dreams, the resemblance of the two states is quite astonishing.

Soc. You see, then, that there is no difficulty in raising a doubt, since there may even be a doubt whether we are awake or in a dream. And as the time is equally divided in which we are asleep or awake, in either sphere of existence the soul contends that the thoughts which are present to our minds at the time are true; and during one half of our lives we affirm the truth of the one, and, during the other half, of the other; and are equally confident of both.

Theaet. Certainly.

Soc. And may not the same be said of madness and other disorders? the difference is only that the times are not equal.

Theaet. Certainly.

Soc. And are truth or falsehood to be determined by duration of time?

Theaet. That would be in many ways ridiculous.

Soc. But can you certainly determine in any other way which of these opinions is true?

Theaet. I do not think that I can.

Soc. Listen, then, to a statement of the other side of the argument, which is made by the champions of appearance. They would say, as I should imagine:—Can that which is wholly other, have any similar quality or power? and observe, Theaetetus, that the word ‘other’ means not ‘partially,’ but ‘wholly other.’

Theaet. Certainly, that which is wholly other cannot have any thing either potentially or in any way which is the same.

Soc. And must therefore be admitted to be unlike?
Theaet. True.

Soc. If, then, anything happens to become like or unlike itself or another, that which becomes like we call the same—that which becomes unlike, other?

Theaet. Certainly.

Soc. Were we not saying that there are agents many and infinite, and patients many and infinite?

Theaet. Yes.

Soc. And also that different combinations will produce results which are not the same, but different?

Theaet. Certainly.

Soc. Let us take you and me, or anything as an example:—there is Socrates in health, and Socrates sick—Are they like or unlike?

Theaet. You mean to compare Socrates in health as a whole, and Socrates in sickness as a whole?

Soc. Exactly; that is my meaning.

Theaet. I answer, that they are unlike.

Soc. And if unlike, they are other?

Theaet. Certainly.

Soc. And would you not say the same of Socrates sleeping and waking, or in any of the states which we were mentioning?

Theaet. I should.

Soc. All agents whose nature is to act upon others, have a different patient in Socrates, accordingly as he is well or ill?

Theaet. Of course.

Soc. And I, who am the patient, and that which is the agent, will produce something different in each of the two cases?

Theaet. Certainly.

Soc. The wine which I drink when I am in health, appears sweet and pleasant to me?

Theaet. True.

Soc. For, as has been already acknowledged, the patient and agent meet together and produce sweetness and a perception of sweetness, which are in simultaneous motion, and the perception which comes from the patient makes the tongue percipient, and the quality of sweetness which arises out of and is moving about the wine, makes the wine both to be and to appear sweet to the healthy tongue.

Theaet. Certainly; that has been already acknowledged.
But when I am sick, the wine really acts upon me as if I were another and a different person?

Theaet. Yes.

Soc. The combination of the draught of wine, and the Socrates who is sick, produces quite another result; which is the sensation of bitterness in the tongue, and the motion and creation of bitterness in the wine, which becomes not bitterness but bitter; as I myself become not perception but percipient?

Theaet. True.

Soc. There is no other object of which I shall ever have the same perception, for another object would imply another perception, and would make the percipient other and different; nor can that object which affects me meeting another subject, produce the same or become similar, for that too will produce another result from another subject, and become different.

Theaet. True.

Soc. Neither can I for myself, have this sensation, nor the object by or for itself, this quality.

Theaet. Certainly not.

Soc. When I perceive I must become percipient of something—there can be no such thing as perceiving and perceiving nothing; the quality of the object, whether sweet, bitter, or any other quality, must have relation to a perception; there cannot be anything sweet which is sweet to no one.

Theaet. Certainly not.

Soc. Then the inference is, that we [the agent and patient] are or become in relation to one another; there is a law which binds us one to the other, but not to any other existence, nor yet to ourselves; and therefore we can only be bound to one another; so that whether a person says that a thing is or becomes, he must say that it is or becomes to or of or in relation to something else; but he must not say that anything is or becomes absolutely, or allow any one else to say this: that is the conclusion.

Theaet. Very true, Socrates.

Soc. Then, if that which acts upon me has relation to me and to no other, I and no other am the percipient of it?

Theaet. Of course.

Soc. Then my perception is true to me, and is always a part of
my being; and as Protagoras says, to myself I am judge of what is
and what is not to me.

Theaet. That seems to be true.

Soc. How then, if I never err, and if my mind never trips in the
conception of being or becoming, can I fail of knowing that which
I perceive?

Theaet. You cannot.

Soc. Then you were quite right in affirming that knowledge is
only perception; and the meaning turns out to be the same, whether
with Homer and Heracleitus, and all that company, you say that
all is motion and flux, or with the great sage Protagoras, that man
is the measure of all things; or with Theaetetus, that, supposing
all this, perception is knowledge. Am I not right, Theaetetus, and
may I not say that this is your new-born child, of which I have
delivered you—What say you?

Theaet. I cannot but agree, Socrates.

Soc. Then this is the child, however he may turn out, which you
and I have with difficulty brought into the world. And now that
he is born, we must carry him round the hearth and see whether
161 he is worth rearing, or is only a wind-egg and a sham. Is he to be
reared in any case, and not exposed? or will you bear to see an
assault made upon him, and not get into a passion if I take away
your first-born?

Theod. Theaetetus will not be angry, for he is very good-natured.
But I should like to know, Socrates, by heaven I should, whether
you mean to say that all this is untrue?

Soc. You are fond of an argument, Theodorus, and now you
innocently fancy that I am a bag full of arguments, and can
easily pull one out which will prove the reverse of all this. But
you do not see that in reality none of these arguments come from
me; they all come from him who talks with me. I only know
just enough to extract them from the wisdom of another, and to
receive them in a spirit of fairness. And now I shall say nothing
of myself, but shall endeavour to elicit something from our friend.

Theod. Do as you say, Socrates; that will be the best way.

Soc. Shall I tell you, Theodorus, what amazes me in your
acquaintance Protagoras?

Theod. What is that?

Soc. I say nothing against his doctrine, that what appears is to
each one, but I wonder that he did not begin his great work on Truth with a declaration that a pig or a dog-faced baboon, or some other stranger monster which has sensation, is the measure of all things; then, when we were reverencing him as a god, he might have condescended to inform us that he was no wiser than a tadpole, and did not even aspire to be a man—would not this have produced an overpowering effect? For if truth is only sensation, and one man's discernment is as good as another's, and no man has any superior right to determine whether the opinion of any other is true or false, but each man, as we have several times repeated, is to himself the sole judge, and everything that he judges is true and right, why should Protagoras be preferred to the place of wisdom and instruction, and deserve to be well paid, and we poor ignoramuses have to go to him, if each one is the measure of his own wisdom? Must he not be talking 'ad captandum' in all this? I say nothing of the ridiculous predicament in which my own midwifery and the whole art of dialectic is placed; for the attempt to supervise or refute the notions or opinions of others would be a tedious and enormous piece of folly, if to each man they are equally right; and this must be the case if Protagoras' Truth is the real truth, and the philosopher is not merely amusing himself by giving oracles out of the shrine of his book.

Theod. He was a friend of mine, Socrates, as you were saying, and therefore I cannot have him refuted by my lips, nor can I oppose you when I agree with you; please, then, to take Theaetetus again; he seemed to answer you very nicely.

Soc. If you were to go into a Lacedaemonian palestra, Theodorus, would you have a right to look on at the naked wrestlers, some of them making a poor figure, if you did not strip and give them an opportunity of judging of your own form?

Theod. Why not, Socrates, if they would allow me, as I think you will, in consideration of my age and stiffness; let more supple youth try a fall with you, and do not drag me into the gymnasium.

Soc. Your will is my will, Theodorus, as the proverbial philosophers say, and therefore I will return to the sage Theaetetus. Tell me, Theaetetus, in reference to what I was saying, are you not amazed at finding yourself all of a sudden raised to the level of the wisest of men, or indeed of the gods?—for you would
assume the measure of Protagoras to apply to the gods as well as men?

*Theaet.* Certainly I should, and I am amazed, as you say. At first hearing, I was quite satisfied with the doctrine, that whatever appears is to each one, but now the face of things has changed.

*Soc.* Why, my dear boy, you are young, and your ear is quickly caught and your mind influenced by popular arguments. Protagoras, or some one speaking on his behalf, will doubtless say in reply,—Good people, young and old, you meet and harangue, and bring in the gods, the question of whose existence or non-existence I banish from writing or speech, or you talk about the reason of man being degraded to the level of the brutes, which is a telling argument with the multitude, but not one word of proof or demonstration do you offer. All is probability with you, and yet surely you and Theodorus had better reflect whether you are disposed to admit of probability and figures of speech in matters of such importance. He or any other geometrician who argued from probabilities and likelihoods in geometry, would not be worth an ace.

*Theaet.* Neither you nor we, Socrates, would reckon that fair.

*Soc.* Then you and Theodorus mean to say that we must view the matter in some other way?

*Theaet.* Yes, in quite another way.

*Soc.* And the way will be to ask whether sensation is or is not the same as knowledge; for this was the real point of our argument, and with a view to this we raised (did we not?) those many strange questions.

*Theaet.* Certainly.

*Soc.* Shall we say that we know all that which we see and hear? for example, shall we say that not having learned, we do not know the language of foreigners when they speak to us? or shall we say that hearing them, we also know what they are saying? or suppose that we see letters which we do not understand, shall we say that we do not see them? or shall we maintain that, seeing them, we must know them?

*Theaet.* We shall say, Socrates, that we know that which we actually see and hear of them—that is to say, we see and know the figure and colour of the letters, and we hear and know the elevation or depression of the sound of them; but we do not per-
ceive by sight and hearing, or know, that which grammarians and interpreters teach about them.

Soc. Capital, Theaetetus, I shall not dispute that, as I want you to grow; but there is another difficulty coming, which you will also have to repulse.

Theaet. What is that?

Soc. Some one will say,—Can a man who has ever known anything, and still has and preserves a memory of that which he knows, not know that which he remembers at the time when he remembers? I have, I fear, a tedious way of putting a simple question, which is only, whether a man who has learned, and remembers, can fail to know?

Theaet. That, Socrates, would be impossible and absurd.

Soc. Am I dreaming, then? Think: is not seeing perceiving, and is not sight perception?

Theaet. True.

Soc. And if our recent definition holds, every man knows that which he has seen?

Theaet. Yes.

Soc. And you would admit that there is such a thing as memory?

Theaet. Yes.

Soc. And is memory of something or of nothing?

Theaet. Of something, surely.

Soc. Of things learned and perceived, that is?

Theaet. Certainly.

Soc. Often a man remembers that which he has seen?

Theaet. Certainly.

Soc. And if he closed his eyes, would he forget?

Theaet. That, Socrates, would indeed be an absurd thing to affirm.

Soc. And yet that must be affirmed, if the previous argument is to be maintained.

Theaet. How is that? I am not quite sure that I see your meaning, though I have a strong suspicion that you are right. Will you explain how this is?

Soc. As thus: he who sees knows, as we say, that which he sees; for perception and sight and knowledge are supposed to be all the same.

Theaet. Certainly.
Soc. But he who saw, and has knowledge of that which he saw, remembers, when he closes his eyes, that which he no longer sees.

Theaet. True.

Soc. And seeing is knowing, and therefore not seeing is not knowing?

Theaet. That is true.

Soc. Then the inference is, that a man may have attained the knowledge of something, which he may remember and yet not know, because he does not see; and this has been affirmed by us to be an absurdity.

Theaet. That is very true.

Soc. Thus, then, the assertion that knowledge and perception are one, involves a manifest impossibility?

Theaet. Yes.

Soc. Then they must be distinguished?

Theaet. I suppose that they must.

Soc. Once more we shall have to begin, and ask 'What is knowledge?' and yet, Theaetetus, what are we going to do?

Theaet. About what?

Soc. Like a good-for-nothing cock, who, before he has won the victory, walks away from his opponent and crows, we seem to be skipping away from the argument.

Theaet. How is that?

Soc. After the manner of disputers, we drew inferences from words, and were well pleased if in this way we could gain an advantage. And, although professing not to be mere Eristics, but philosophers, I suspect that we have unconsciously fallen into the error of that ingenious class of persons.

Theaet. I do not as yet understand you.

Soc. Then I will try to explain myself: just now we asked the question, whether a man who had learned and remembered could fail to know, and we showed that a person who had seen might remember when he had his eyes shut and could not see, and then he would at the same time remember and not know. But this was an impossibility, and so the Protagorean fable came to nought, and yours also, who maintain that knowledge is the same as perception.

Theaet. True.
THEAETETUS.

Soc. And yet, my friend, I do not suppose that this would have been the result if Protagoras, who was the father of the first of the two brats, had been alive; he would have had a great deal to say for himself. But he is dead, and we insult over his orphan child; and even the guardians whom he left, and of whom Theodorus is one, are unwilling to give any help, and therefore I suppose that I must take up his cause myself, and see justice done.

Theod. Not I, Socrates, but rather Callias, the son of Hipponicus, is guardian of his orphans. I was too soon diverted from the abstractions of dialectic to geometry. Nevertheless, I shall be grateful to you if you assist him.

Soc. Very good, Theodorus; you shall see how I will come to the rescue. If a person does not attend to the meaning of the terms which are commonly used in argument, he may be involved even in greater paradoxes than these. Shall I explain this to you or to Theaetetus?

Theod. To both of us, and let the younger answer; he will incur less disgrace if he is discomforted.

Soc. Then now let me ask the awful question, which is this:—Can a man know and also not know that which he knows?

Theod. How shall we answer that, Theaetetus?

Theaet. That appears to me to be impossible.

Soc. Quite possible, if you maintain that seeing is knowing. When you are caught in a well, as they say, and the self-assured adversary closes one of your eyes with his hand, and asks whether you can see his cloak with the eye which he has closed, how will you answer the inevitable man?

Theaet. I should answer, not with that eye but with the other.

Soc. Then you see and do not see the same thing at the same time?

Theaet. Yes, in a certain sense.

Soc. I do not say anything about that, he will reply; I do not ask ‘in what sense you know,’ but only whether you know that which you do not know. You have been proved to see that which you do not see; and you have already admitted that seeing is knowing, and that not seeing is not knowing: I leave you to draw the inference.

Theaet. Yes; the inference is the contradictory of my assertion.

Soc. Yes, my marvel, and there may be yet worse things in store
for you: an opponent will ask whether you can have a sharp and also
a dull knowledge, and whether you can know near, but not at a
distance, or know the same thing with more or less intensity, and
so on without end. When you took up the position, that sense is
knowledge, the e was lying in wait a light-armed mercenary, who
argues for pay; he will dart from his ambush, and make his assault
upon hearing, smelling, and the other senses;—he will show you
no mercy; and while you are wondering at his enviable wisdom,
he will have got you into his net, out of which you will not escape,
until you have come to an understanding about the sum which is
to be paid for your release. Well, you say, and how will Prota-
goras reinforce his position? Shall I answer for him?

Theaet. By all means.

Soc. After touching on the points which I have mentioned in de-
166 fending him, he will close with us in disdain, and say:—The worthy
Socrates asked a little boy, whether the same man could remember
and not know the same thing, and the boy said no, because he was
frightened, and could not see what was coming, and then Socrates
made a fool of me. The truth is, O most incapable Socrates, that
when you ask questions about any assertion of mine, and the per-
son asked is found tripping, if he has answered as I should have
answered, then I am refuted, but if he answers what I should not
have answered, he is refuted and not I. For do you suppose that
any one would admit the memory of a feeling afterwards to be the
same as the feeling was at the time? Certainly not. Or that he
would hesitate to acknowledge that the same man may know and
not know the same thing at the same time? Or, if he is afraid of
granting this, would he grant that one who has become unlike was
the same as before he became unlike? Or would he admit that a
man is one at all, and not rather many and infinite, as the changes
which take place in him? I speak by the card in order to avoid en-
tanglements of words. But O, my good sir, he will say, come to the
point in a more generous spirit; and either show, if you can, that
our sensations are not relative and individual, or, if you admit that
they are individual, prove that this does not involve the conse-
quence that the appearance becomes, or, if you like to say, is, to
the individual only. As to your talk about pigs and baboons, you are
yourself a pig, and you make my writings the sport of other swine,
which is not right. For I declare that the truth is as I have
written, and that each of us is a measure of existence and of non-
existence. Yet one man may be a thousand times better than
another in proportion as things are and appear different to
him. And I am far from saying that wisdom and the wise man
have no existence; but I say that the wise man is he who makes
the evils which appear and are to a man, into goods which are and
appear to him. And I would beg you not to press my words in the
letter, but to take the meaning of them as I will explain them.
Remember how I said before, that to the sick man his food appears
to be and is bitter, and to the man in health the opposite of bitter.
Now I cannot conceive that one of these men can be or ought to
be made wiser than the other; nor can you assert that the sick
man because he has one impression is foolish, and the healthy man
because he has another is wise; but the one state requires to be
changed into the other, the worse into the better. As in education,
a change of state has to be effected, and the sophist accomplishes
by words the change which the physician works by the aid of
drugs. Not that any one ever made another think truly, who pre-
viously thought falsely. For no one can think what is not, or think
anything different from that which he feels, and which is always true.
But as the inferior habit of mind has thoughts of a kindred nature,
so I conceive that a good mind causes men to have good thoughts;
and these which the inexperienced call true, I maintain to be only
better, and not truer than others. And, O my dear Socrates, I do
not call wise men tadpoles; far otherwise; I say that they are the
physicians of the human body, and the husbandmen of plants—for
the husbandmen also take away the evil and disordered sensations
of plants, and infuse into them good and healthy sensations as well
as true ones; and the wise and good rhetoricians make the good
instead of the evil to seem just to states; for whatever appears to
be just and fair to a state, while sanctioned by a state, is just and
fair to it; but the teacher of wisdom causes the good to take the
place of the evil, both in appearance and in reality. And the
sophist who is able to train his pupils in this spirit is a wise man,
and deserves to be well paid by them. And in this way one man
is wiser than another; and yet no one thinks falsely, and you,
whether you will or not, must endure to be a measure. This is my
argument, which you, Socrates, may, if you please, overthrow by an
opposite argument, or if you like you may put questions to me, (no
intelligent person will object to the method of questions,—quite the reverse.) But I must beg you to put fair questions: for there is great inconsistency in saying that you have a zeal for virtue, and then always behaving unfairly in argument. The unfairness of which I complain is that you never distinguish between mere disputation and dialectic: the disputer may trip up his opponent as often as he likes, and make fun; but the dialectician will be in earnest, and only correct his adversary when necessary, telling him the errors into which he has fallen through his own fault, or that of the company which he has previously kept. If you do this, he will lay the blame of his own confusion and perplexity on himself, and not on you. He will follow and love you, and will hate himself, and escape from himself into philosophy, in order that he may become different and get rid of his former self. But the other mode of arguing, which is practised by the many, will have just the opposite effect upon him; and as he grows older, instead of turning philosopher, he will learn to hate philosophy. I would recommend you, therefore, as I said before, not to encourage yourself in this polemical and controversial temper, but to find out, in a friendly and congenial spirit, what we really mean when we say that all things are in motion, and that what appears is to individuals and states. In this way you will see whether knowledge and sensation are the same or different, but not by arguing, as you are doing, from the customary use of names and words, which the vulgar pervert in all manner of ways, causing infinite perplexity to one another. Such, Theodorus, is the very slight help which I am able to offer to your old friend; had he been living, he would have helped himself in a far grander style.

Theod. You are jesting, Socrates; indeed, your defence of him has been most valorous.

Soc. Thank you, friend; and I hope that you observed Protagoras bidding us be serious, as the text, 'man is the measure of all things,' was a solemn one; and he reproached us with making a boy the medium of discourse, and said that the boy's timidity was made to tell against his argument; he also complained that we made a joke of him.

Theod. Of course I observed that, Socrates.

Soc. Well, and shall we do as he says?

Theod. By all means.

Reading προσηρκεσα.
Soc. But if his wishes are to be regarded, you and I must take up his argument in good earnest, and ask and answer one another, for you see that the rest of us are all boys. That is the only way in which we can escape his imputation, that we are making fun of him, and examining his thesis with boys.

Theod. Well, and is not Theaetetus better able to follow a philosophical enquiry than a great many men who have long beards?

Soc. Yes, Theodorus, but not better than you; and therefore please not to imagine that you are to leave in my exclusive charge the care of your departed friend. At any rate, my good friend, do not shear off until we know whether you are the true measure of diagrams, or whether all men are equally measures and sufficient for themselves in astronomy and geometry, and other branches of knowledge in which you are supposed to excel them.

Theod. He who is your companion, Socrates, will not easily avoid being drawn into an argument; and I am afraid that when I said that you would excuse me, and not like the Lacedaemonians, compel me to strip and fight, I said a stupid thing—I should rather compare you to Scirrhon, who threw travellers from the rocks; for the Lacedaemonian rule is, 'strip or depart,' but your method of proceeding is more after the fashion of Antaeus: you will not allow any one who approaches you to depart until you have stripped him, and he has tried a fall with you in argument.

Soc. I see, Theodorus, that you perfectly apprehend the nature of my complaint; but I am even more pugnacious than the giants of old, for I have met with no end of heroes; many a Heracles, many a Theseus, mighty in words, have broken my head; nevertheless I am always at this rough game, which inspires me like a passion. Please, then, to indulge me with a trial, for your own edification as well as mine.

Theod. I consent; lead me whither you will, for I know that you are like destiny; nor can any man escape from any argument which you may weave for him; but I am not disposed to go further than you suggest.

Soc. That will satisfy me; and now take particular care that we do not again unwittingly expose ourselves to the reproach of talking childishly.

Theod. I will try to avoid that error, as far as I am able.

7 Reading αὐτοῦ τῶν λόγων.
Soc. In the first place, let us return to our old objection, and see whether we were right in blaming and taking offence at Protagoras on the ground that he assumed all to be equal and sufficient in wisdom; although he admitted that there was a better and worse, and that in respect of this, some excelled others, and these, as he said, were the wise.

Theod. That is true.

Soc. Had Protagoras been living and answered for himself, instead of our answering for him, there would have been no need of our reviewing or reinforcing the argument. But as he is not here, and some one may accuse us of speaking without authority on his behalf, had we not better come to a clearer agreement on this head, as a great deal may be at stake?

Theod. That is true.

170 Soc. Then let us obtain from his own statement, in the fewest words possible, the basis of agreement.

Theod. How will you do that?

Soc. In this way:—His words are, that, 'to whom a thing seems, that which seems is.'

Theod. Yes, that is what he says.

Soc. And are not we, Protagoras, uttering the opinion of man, or rather of all mankind, when we say that every man thinks himself wiser than other men in some things, and their inferior in others? And in the hour of danger, when they are in perils of war, or of the sea, or of sickness, do they not look up to their commanders as gods, and expect salvation from them, only because they excel them in knowledge? Is not the world full of men in their several employments, who are looking for teachers and rulers of themselves and of the animals? and there are plenty who think that they are able to teach and able to rule. Now, in all this is implied that ignorance and wisdom exist among them, at least in their own opinion.

Theod. Certainly.

Soc. And wisdom is assumed by them to be truth, and ignorance falsehood?

Theod. Exactly.

Soc. How then, Protagoras, would you have us treat the argument? Shall we say that men have always true opinions, or sometimes true and sometimes false opinions? In either case, the
result is that they have opinions which are not always true, but sometimes true and sometimes false. For tell me, Theodorus, do you suppose that any friend of Protagoras, or you yourself, would contend that no one deems another ignorant or mistaken in his opinion?

Theod. The thing is incredible, Socrates.

Soc. And yet that absurdity is necessarily involved in the thesis, that man is the measure of all things.

Theod. How is that?

Soc. Why, suppose that you determine in your own mind something to be true, and declare your opinion to me; let us assume, as he says, that this is true to you. Now, may not the rest of us be the judges of this opinion or judgment of yours, or do we think that you have always a true opinion? Are there not thousands upon thousands who, whenever you form a judgment, take up arms and have an opposite judgment and opinion, deeming that you judge falsely?

Theod. Yes, indeed, Socrates, thousands and tens of thousands, as Homer says, who give me a world of trouble.

Soc. And will you assert, in that case, that what you say is true to you and false to the ten thousand others?

Theod. That is the only inference.

Soc. And what is to be said of Protagoras himself? If neither he nor the multitude thought, as indeed they do not think, that man is the measure of all things, then the truth of which Protagoras wrote would be true to no one. But if you suppose that he himself thought this, and that the multitude does not agree with him, in the first place you will have to allow that the degree in which his truth is or is not true, depends upon the number of the suffrages.

Theod. That would follow if the truth is supposed to vary with individual opinion.

Soc. And the best of the joke is, that he acknowledges the truth of their opinion who believe his opinion to be false; for in admitting that the opinions of all men are true, in effect he grants that the opinion of his opponents is true.

Theod. Certainly.

Soc. And does he not allow that his own opinion is false, if he admits that the opinion of those who think him false is true?
Theod. That is inevitable.
Soc. But the other side do not admit that they speak falsely.
Theod. They do not.
Soc. And he, as may be inferred from his writings, agrees that this opinion is also true.
Theod. Clearly.
Soc. Then all mankind, including Protagoras, will contend, or rather, I should say that he will allow, when he concedes that his adversary has a true opinion—Protagoras, I say, will himself allow that neither dognor any ordinary man is the measure of anything which he has not learned—am I not right?
Theod. Yes.
Soc. And the truth of Protagoras being doubted by all, will be true neither to himself nor to any one else?
Theod. I think, Socrates, that we are running my old friend too hard.
Soc. But I do not know that we are going beyond the truth. Doubtless, as he is, older, he may be expected to be wiser than we are. And if he could only just get his head out of the world below, he would give both of us a sound basting—me for quibbling, and you for accepting my quibbles, and be off and underground again in a twinkling. But as he is not within call, we must make the best use of our own faculties, such as they are, and say honestly what we think; and one thing which every man thinks is, that there are great differences in the understandings of men.
Theod. In that opinion I quite agree.
Soc. And is there not most likely to be firm ground in that distinction which we drew on behalf of Protagoras, viz. that immediate sensations, such as hot, dry, sweet, are in general only such as they appear, but that if judgments are allowed to differ at all, this certainty of sensation cannot be extended to the knowledge of health or disease, which every woman, child, or living creature is by no means able to cure, neither have they any perception of what is wholesome for themselves; and that in this, if in anything, the difference in different men will appear?
Theod. I quite agree in that.

Again, in politics, while affirming that right and wrong, honourable and disgraceful, holy and unholy, are in reality to each state such as the state thinks and makes lawful, and that in deter-
mining these matters no individual or state is wiser than another, still the followers of Protagoras will not deny that in determining the sphere of expediency one counsellor is better than another, and one state wiser than another; they will scarcely venture to maintain, that what a city deems expedient will always be really expedient. But in the other case, I mean when they speak of justice and injustice, piety and impiety, they are confident that these have no natural or essential basis—the truth is that which is agreed on at the time of the agreement, and as long as the agreement lasts; and this is the philosophy of many who do not altogether go along with Protagoras. Here is a new question offering, Theodorus, which is likely to be still longer than the last.

Theod. Well, Socrates, we have plenty of leisure.

Soc. That is true, and your remark recalls to my mind an observation which I have often made, that those who have passed their days in the pursuit of philosophy are ridiculously at fault when they have to appear and plead in court. How natural is this!

Theod. What do you mean?

Soc. I mean to say, that those who from their youth upwards have been knocking about in the courts and such like places, compared with those who have received a philosophical education, are slaves, and the others are freemen.

Theod. In what is the difference seen?

Soc. In the leisure of which you were speaking, and which a freeman can always command; he has his talk out in peace, and, like ourselves, wanders at will from one subject to another, and from a second to a third, if his fancy prefers a new one, caring not whether his words are many or few; his only aim is to attain the truth. But the lawyer is always in a hurry; there is the water of the clepsydra driving him on, and not allowing him to expatiate at will; and there is his adversary standing over him, enforcing his rights; the affidavit, which in their phraseology is termed the brief, is recited; and from this he must not deviate. He is a servant, and is disputing about a fellow-servant before his master, who is seated, and has the cause in his hands; the trial is never about some indifferent matter, but always concerns himself; and often he has to run for his life. The consequence has been, that he has become keen and shrewd; he has learned how to flatter his master in word and indulge him in deed; but his soul is small and
unrighteous. His slavish condition has deprived him of growth and
uprightness and independence; dangers and fears, which were
too much for his truth and honesty, came upon him in early years,
when the tenderness of youth was unequal to them, and he has
been driven into crooked ways; from the first he has practised
deception and retaliation, and has become stunted and warped.
And so he has passed out of youth into manhood, having no sound-
ness in him; and is now, as he thinks, a master in wisdom. Such
is the lawyer, Theodorus. Will you have the companion picture
of the philosopher, who is of our brotherhood; or shall we return
to the argument? Do not let us abuse the freedom of digression
which we claim.

Theod. Nay, Socrates, let us finish what we were about; for you
truly said that we belong to a brotherhood which is free, and are
not the servants of the argument; but the argument is our servant,
and must wait our leisure. Where is the judge or spectator who
has a right to censure or control us, as he might the poets?

Soc. Then, as this is your wish, I will describe the leaders; for
there is no use in talking about the inferior sort. In the first
place, the lords of philosophy have never, from their youth upwards,
known their way to the Agora, or the dicastery, or the council, or
any other political assembly; they neither see nor hear the laws
or votes of the state written or spoken; the eagerness of political
societies in the attainment of offices—clubs, and banquets, and
revels, and singing-maidens, do not enter even into their dreams.
Whether any event has turned out well or ill in the city, what
disgrace may have descended to any one from his ancestors, male
or female, are matters of which the philosopher no more knows
than he can tell, as they say, how many pints are contained in the
ocean. Neither is he conscious of his ignorance. For he does not
hold aloof in order that he may gain a reputation; but the truth
is, that the outer form of him only is in the city; his mind, disdain-
ing the littlenesses and nothingnesses of human things, is 'flying
all abroad,' as Pindar says, measuring with line and rule the things
which are under and on the earth and above the heaven, interro-
gating the whole nature of each and all, but not condescending to
anything which is within reach.

Theod. What do you mean, Socrates?

Soc. I will illustrate my meaning, Theodorus, by the jest which
the clever, witty Thracian handmaid made about Thales, when he fell into a well as he was looking up at the stars. She said, that he was so eager to know what was going on in heaven, that he could not see what was before his feet. This is a jest which is equally applicable to all philosophers. For the philosopher is wholly unacquainted with his next door neighbour; he is ignorant, not only of what he is doing, but whether he is or is not a human creature; he is searching into the essence of man, and is unwearied in discovering what belongs to such a nature to do or suffer different from any other;—I think that you understand me, Theodorus?

Theod. I do, and what you say is true.

Soc. And thus, my friend, on every occasion, private as well as public, as I said at first, when he appears in a law-court, or in any place in which he has to speak of things which are at his feet and before his eyes, he is the jest, not only of Thracian handmaids but of the general herd, tumbling into wells and every sort of disaster through his inexperience. He looks such an awkward creature, and conveys the impression that he is stupid. When he is reviled, he has nothing personal to say in answer to the civilities of his adversaries, for he knows no scandals of any one, and they do not interest him; and therefore he is laughed at for his sheepishness; and when others are being praised and glorified, he cannot help laughing very sincerely in the simplicity of his heart; and this again makes him look like a fool. When he hears a tyrant or king eulogized, he fancies that he is listening to the praises of some keeper of cattle—a swineherd, or shepherd, or cowherd, who is being praised for the quantity of milk which he squeezes from them; and he remarks that the creature whom they tend, and out of whom they squeeze the wealth, is of a less tractable and more insidious nature. Then, again, he observes that the great man is of necessity as ill-mannered and uneducated as any shepherd—for he has no leisure, and he is surrounded by a wall, which is his mountain-pen. Hearing of enormous landed proprietors of ten thousand acres and more, our philosopher deems this to be a trifle, because he has been accustomed to think of the whole earth; and when they sing the praises of family, and say that some one is a gentleman because he has had seven generations of wealthy ancestors, he thinks that their sentiments only betray the dulness and narrow-
ness of vision of those who utter them, and who are not educated enough to look at the whole, nor to consider that every man has had thousands and thousands of progenitors, and among them have been rich and poor; kings and slaves, Hellenes and barbarians, many times over. And when some one boasts of a catalogue of twenty-five ancestors, and goes back to Heracles, the son of Amphitryon, he cannot understand his poverty of ideas. Why is he unable to calculate that Amphitryon had a twenty-fifth ancestor, who might have been anybody, and was such as fortune made him, and he had a fiftieth, and so on? He is amused at the notion that he cannot do a sum, and thinks that a little arithmetic would have got rid of his senseless vanity. Now, in all these cases our philosopher is derided by the vulgar, partly because he is above them, and also because he is ignorant of what is before him, and always at a loss.

Theod. That is very true, Socrates.

Soc. But, O my friend, when he draws the other into upper air, and gets him out of his pleas and rejoinders into the contemplation of justice and injustice in their own nature and in their difference from one another and from all other things; or from the common-places about the happiness of kings to the consideration of government, and of human happiness and misery in general—what they are, and how a man should seek after the one and avoid the other—when that narrow, keen, little legal mind is called to account about all this, he gives the philosopher his revenge; for dizzied by the height at which he is hanging, and from which he looks into space, which is a strange experience to him, he being dismayed, and lost, and stammering out broken words, is laughed at, not by Thracian handmaidens or any other uneducated persons, for they have no eye for the situation, but by every man who has not been brought up as a slave. Such are the two characters, Theodorus: the one of the philosopher or gentleman, who may be excused for appearing simple and useless when he has to perform some menial office, such as packing up a bag, or flavouring a sauce or fawning speech; the other, of the man who is able to do every kind of service smartly and neatly, but knows not how to wear his cloak like a gentleman; still less does he acquire the music of speech, or hymn the true life which is lived by immortals or men blessed of heaven.

Theod. If you could only persuade everybody, Socrates, as you
do me, of the truth of your words, there would be more peace and fewer evils among men.

Soc. Evils, Theodorus, can never perish; for there must always remain something which is antagonist to good. Of necessity, they hover around this mortal sphere and the earthly nature, having no place among the gods in heaven. Wherefore, also, we ought to fly away thither, and to fly thither is to become like God, as far as this is possible; and to become like him, is to become holy and just and wise. But, O my friend, you cannot easily convince mankind that they should pursue virtue or avoid vice, not for the reasons which the many give, in order, forsooth, that a man may seem to be good;—this is what they are always repeating, and this, in my judgment, is an old wives' fable. Let them hear the truth: In God is no unrighteousness at all—he is altogether righteous; and there is nothing more like him than he of us, who is the most righteous. And the true wisdom of men, and their nothingness and cowardice, are nearly concerned with this. For to know this is true wisdom and manhood, and the ignorance of this is too plainly folly and vice. All other kinds of wisdom or cunning, which seem only, such as the wisdom of politicians, or the wisdom of the arts, are coarse and vulgar. The unrighteous man, or the sayer and doer of unholy things, had far better not yield to the illusion that his roguery is cleverness; for men glory in their shame—they fancy that they hear others saying of them, 'these are not mere good-for-nothing persons, burdens of the earth, but such as men should be who mean to dwell safely in a state.' Let us tell them that they are all the more truly what they do not know that they are; for they do not know the penalty of injustice, which above all things they ought to know—not stripes and death, as they suppose, which evil-doers often escape, but a penalty which cannot be escaped.

Theod. What is that?

Soc. There are two patterns set before them in nature: the one, blessed and divine, the other godless and wretched; and they do not see, in their utter folly and infatuation, that they are growing like the one and unlike the other, by reason of their evil deeds; and the penalty is, that they lead a life answering to the pattern which they resemble. And if we tell them, that unless they depart from their cunning, the place of innocence will not receive them after death; and that here on earth, they will live ever in the
likeness of their own evil selves, and with evil friends—when they hear this they in their superior cunning will seem to be listening to fools.

Theod. Very true, Socrates.

Soc. Too true, my friend, as I well know; there is, however, one peculiarity in their case: when they begin to reason in private about their dislike of philosophy, if they have the courage to hear the argument out, and do not run away, they grow at last strangely discontented with themselves; their rhetoric fades away, and they seem to be no better than children. These, however, are digressions from which we must now desist, or they will overflow, and drown our original argument; to which, if you please, we will now return.

Theod. For my part, Socrates, I would rather have the digressions, for at my age I find them easier to follow; but if you wish, let us go back to the argument.

Soc. Had we not reached the point at which, as we were saying, the partisans of the perpetual flux, and of the identity of being and appearance, were confidently maintaining that the ordinances which the state commanded and thought just, were just to the state which imposed them, while they were in force; this was especially asserted of justice; but as to the good, no one had ever yet had the hardihood to contend that the ordinances which the state thought and enacted to be good, were really good while they lasted;—he who said this, would only be playing with the name ‘good,’ and would not really touch our question?

Theod. True.

Soc. Then I would not have him speak of the name, but of the thing which is intended by the name.

Theod. Very true.

Soc. Whatever name he gives to the thing, he would allow that the good or expedient is the aim of legislation, and that the state as far as possible imposes all laws with a view to the greatest expediency; can legislation have any other aim?

178 Theod. Certainly not.

Soc. But is the aim attained always? may not mistakes often occur?

Theod. Yes, I think that there are mistakes.

Soc. The possibility of error will be more distinctly recognised,
if we put the question in reference to the whole class under which the good or expedient falls. That whole class has to do with the future, and laws are passed under the idea that they will be useful in after time; which, in other words, is the future.

_Theod._ Very true.

_Soc._ Suppose now, that we ask Protagoras, or one of his disciples, a question:—O, Protagoras, we will say to him, Man, as you declare, is the measure of all things—white, heavy, light: there is nothing of this sort of which he is not the judge; for he has the criterion of them in himself, and when he thinks what he feels, he thinks what is, and is true to himself. Is not that what they say?

_Theod._ Yes.

_Soc._ And do you extend your doctrine, Protagoras (as we should proceed to say to him) to the future as well as to the present; and has he the criterion not only of what is but of what will be, and does this always happen to him, as he expected? For example, take the case of heat:—When a private person thinks that he is going to have a fever, and that this kind of heat is coming on, and another person, who is a physician, thinks the contrary, whose opinion is likely to prove right? Or are they both right?—he will have a heat or fever in his own judgment, and not have a fever in the physician's judgment?

_Theod._ That would be ludicrous.

_Soc._ And the vinegrower, if I am not mistaken, is likely to be a better prophet of the sweetness or dryness of the vintage which is not yet gathered, than the musician?

_Theod._ Certainly.

_Soc._ And the musician will be a better judge than the gymnastic-master of the excellence of the music, which the gymnastic-master will himself approve, when he hears the performance?

_Theod._ Of course.

_Soc._ And the cook will be a better judge than the guest, who is not a cook, of the pleasure to be derived from the dinner which is in preparation; for of present or past pleasure we are not now arguing, but of the pleasure which will be and seem to be to each of us in the future; and the question is, who will be the best judge of that; would not you yourself, Protagoras, be a better judge of the topics which are likely to produce an effect upon us in a court than any private individual?
Theod. Certainly, Socrates, he used to profess in the strongest manner that he was the superior of all men in this respect.

Soc. To be sure, friend; for who would have paid a large sum for the privilege of talking to him, if he had really persuaded his visitors that no one, whether prophet or any other, was better able to judge the true or probable event in the future than every man could for himself?

Theod. That is most certain.

Soc. And legislation and expediency are all concerned with the future; and every one will admit that states, in passing laws, must often fail of their highest interests?

Theod. Quite true.

Soc. Then we may fairly argue against your master, that he must admit one man to be wiser than another, and that the wiser is a measure; but I, who know nothing, am not at all obliged to accept the honour which the advocate of Protagoras was just now forcing upon me, whether I would or not, of being a measure of anything.

Theod. That is the way, Socrates, in which his theory is best refuted; although he is also caught in the authority which he assigns to the opinions of others, who palpably give the lie to his own doctrines.

Soc. There are many ways, Theodorus, in which the doctrine that the opinion of every man is true may be refuted; but there is more difficulty in proving that momentary states of feeling, out of which arise sensations and opinions in accordance with them, are also untrue. I may, however, be mistaken, and perhaps they are really unassailable, and those who say that there is evidence of them, and that they are matters of knowledge, may probably be right; in which case our friend Theaetetus has not been far from the mark in identifying perception and knowledge. Here, then, let us approach nearer, as the advocate of Protagoras desires, and give the truth of the universal flux a ring: is the theory sound or not? at any rate, no small war is raging about this way, and there are many combatants.

Theod. No small war, indeed, for in Ionia the sect makes rapid strides; the disciples of Heracleitus are most energetic upholders of the doctrine.

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Soc. Then we are the more bound, my dear Theodorus, to examine the question from the beginning as set forth by themselves.

Theod. Certainly we are. About these speculations of Heracleitus, which, as you say, are as old as Homer, or even older still, the Ephesians themselves, who profess to know them, are downright mad, and you cannot talk with them about them. For, in accordance with their text-books, they are always in motion; but as for dwelling upon an argument or a question, and quietly asking and answering in turn, they are absolutely without the power of doing this; or rather, they have no particle of rest in them, and they are in a state of negation of rest which no words can express. If you ask any of them a question, he will produce, as from a quiver, sayings brief and dark, and shoot them at you; and if you enquire the reason of what he has said, you will be hit by some other new-fangled word, and will make no way with any of them, nor they with one another; for their great care is, not to allow of any settled principle either in their arguments or in their minds, conceiving, as I imagine, that this would be stationary; and they are at war with the stationary, which they would like, if they could, to banish utterly.

Soc. I suppose, Theodorus, that you have only seen them when they were fighting, and have never stayed with them in time of peace, for they are no friends of yours; and their peace doctrines are only communicated by them at leisure, as I imagine, to those disciples of theirs whom they want to make like themselves.

Theod. Disciples! my good sir, they have none; men of this sort are not one another’s disciples, but they grow up anyhow, and get their inspiration anywhere, each of them saying of his neighbour that he knows nothing. From these men, then, as I was going to remark, you will never get a reason, whether with their will or without their will; we must take the question out of their hands, and make the analysis ourselves, as if we were doing a geometrical problem.

Soc. That is very true; but as touching the said problem, have we not heard from the ancients, who concealed their wisdom from the many in poetical figures, that Oceanus and Tethys, the origin of all things, are streams, and that nothing is at rest; and now the moderns, in their superior wisdom, have declared the same
openly, that the cobbler too may hear and learn of them, and no
longer foolishly imagine that some things are at rest and others
in motion—having learned that all is motion, he will duly honour
his teachers? I had almost forgotten the opposite doctrine, Theo-
dorus,

' That is alone unmoved which is named the universe.'

This is the language of Parmenides, Melissus, and their followers,
who stoutly maintain that all being is one and self-contained,
and has no place in which to move. What shall we say, friend,
to all these people; for, advancing step by step, we have imper-
ceptibly got between the combatants, and, unless we can protect
our retreat, we shall pay the penalty of our rashness—like the
players in the palaestra who are caught upon the line, and are
dragged different ways by the two parties. Therefore I think that
we had better begin by considering those whom we first accosted,
'the river-gods,' and, if we find any truth in them, we will pull
ourselves over to their side, and try to get away from the others.
But if the partisans of 'the whole' appear to speak more truly, we
will fly off from the party which would move the immovable to
them. And if we find that neither of them have anything reason-
able to say, we shall be in a ridiculous position, having ourselves
to assert our own poor opinion and reject that of ancient and
famous men. O Theodorus, do you think that there is any use in
proceeding when there is such a risk?

Theod. Nay, Socrates, not to examine thoroughly what the two
parties have to say would be quite intolerable.

Soc. Then examine we must, if you will insist. The first
question which, I fancy, has to be determined, is about motion.
How do they conceive this when they say that all things are in
motion? Do they mean that there is only one, or, as I incline to
think, that there are two kinds of motion? I should like to have
your opinion upon the point, that I may err, if I am to err, in
your company; tell me, then, when a thing changes from one
place to another, or goes round, in the same place, is not that
motion?

Theod. Yes.

Soc. And this may be assumed to be one kind of motion. But
when a thing grows old, or becomes black from being white, or
hard from being soft, or undergoes any other change, while re-
maining in the same place, may not that be properly described as motion of another kind?

_Theod._ That is my view.

_Soc._ Which is certainly the true view. I say, then, that there are these two kinds of motion, 'change,' and 'motion in place.'

_Theod._ You are right.

_Soc._ And now, having made this distinction, let us address ourselves to those who say that all is motion, and ask them whether all things according to them have the two kinds of motion, and are changed as well as move in place, or is one thing moved in both ways, and another only in one way?

_Theod._ Indeed, I do not know what to answer; but I think that they would say 'in both ways only.'

_Soc._ Yes, my friend; for, if not, then manifestly the same things would be in motion and at rest, and there would be no more truth in saying that all things are in motion, than that all things are at rest.

_Theod._ You speak most truly.

_Soc._ And if they are to be in motion, and nothing is to be devoid of motion, they must suppose that all things have always every \( \text{18a} \) sort of motion?

_Theod._ Most true.

_Soc._ Consider this further point: did we not understand them to explain the generation of heat, whiteness, or anything else, in some such manner as this:—were they not saying that each of them is moving between the agent and the patient, together with a perception, and the patient then becomes percipient but not perception, and the agent a quale but not a quality? I suspect that quality may appear a strange term to you, and that you do not understand the word when thus generalised. Then I will take particular cases: I mean to say that the producing power or agent becomes neither heat nor whiteness, but hot and white, and the like of other things. For I must repeat what I said before, that neither the agent nor patient have any absolute existence, but as they come together and generate sensations and objects of sense, the one becomes of a certain quality, and the other is percipient. You remember this?

_Theod._ Of course.

_Soc._ We may leave the rest of their theory unexamined, but we
must not forget to ask them the only question with which we are concerned: Are all things in motion and flux? Is that what you say?

*Theod.* Yes, they will reply.

Soc. And they are moved in both those ways which we distinguished; that is to say, they move and are also changed?

*Theod.* Of course, if the motion is to be perfect.

Soc. If they only moved, and were not changed, we should be able to say what are the kinds of things which are in motion and flux?

*Theod.* Exactly.

Soc. But now, since not even white continues to flow white, and the very whiteness is a flux or change which is passing into another colour, and will not remain white, can the name of any colour be rightly applied to anything?

*Theod.* That is impossible, Socrates, either in the case of this or of any other quality—if while we are using the word the object is escaping in the flux.

Soc. And what would you say of perceptions, such as sight and hearing, or any other kind of perception? Is there any stopping in the act of seeing and hearing?

*Theod.* That is not to be supposed, if all things are in motion.

Soc. Then we must not speak of seeing any more than of not seeing, nor of any perception more than of any non-perception, if all things have every kind of motion?

*Theod.* Certainly not.

Soc. Yet science is perception, as Theaetetus and I were saying.

*Theod.* That was said.

Soc. Then when we were asked what is knowledge, we no more answered what is knowledge than what is not knowledge?

*Theod.* That would seem to be the truth.

Soc. Here, then, is a fine result: we corrected our first answer in our eagerness to prove that nothing is at rest. But if nothing is at rest, every answer upon whatever subject is equally right: you may say that a thing is or is not this; or, if you prefer, 'becomes' this; and if we say 'becomes,' we shall not then hamper them with words expressive of rest.

*Theod.* You are quite right.

Soc. Yes, Theodorus, except in saying 'this' and 'not this.' But
you ought not to use the word 'this' or 'not this,' for there is no motion in 'this' or 'not this;' the maintainers of the doctrine have as yet no words to express themselves, and must get a new language. I know of no word that will suit them, except, perhaps, 'in no way,' which is perfectly indefinite.

Theod. Yes, that manner of speaking is certainly true to their character.

Soc. And so, Theodorus, we have got rid of your friend, and have not yet assented to his doctrine, that every man is the measure of all things—he must be a wise man who is a measure; neither can we allow that knowledge is perception, certainly not on the hypothesis of a perpetual flux, unless our friend Theaetetus is able to convince us.

Theod. Very good, Socrates; and now that the argument about the doctrine of Protagoras has been completed, I am absolved from answering, according to the agreement.

Theaet. Not, Theodorus, until you and Socrates have discussed the doctrine of those who say that all things are at rest, as you were proposing.

Theod. You, Theaetetus, who are a young rogue, must not instigate your elders to a breach of faith, but prepare yourself to answer Socrates in the remainder of the argument.

Theaet. Yes, if he wishes; but I would rather have heard about the doctrine of rest.

Theod. Invite Socrates to an argument—invite horsemen to the open plain; do but ask him, and he will answer.

Soc. Nevertheless, Theodorus, I am afraid that I shall not be able to comply with the request of Theaetetus.

Theod. Not comply! for what reason?

Soc. My reason is that I have a kind of reverence; not so much for Melissus and the others, who say that 'all is one and at rest,' as for the great leader—himself, Parmenides, venerable and awful, as in Homeric language he may be called;—him I should be ashamed to approach in a spirit unworthy of him. I met him when he was an old man, and I was a mere youth, and he appeared to me to have a glorious depth of mind. And I am afraid that we may not understand his language, and may fall short even more of his meaning; and I fear above all that the nature of knowledge, which is the main subject of our discussion, may be thrust out of
sight by the unbidden guests who will come pouring in upon us, if they are permitted—besides, the question which we are now stirring is of immense extent, and will be treated unfairly if only considered by the way; or if treated adequately and at length, will put into the shade the question of science. But neither of these things ought to be allowed, and I must, if I can, by the midwives' art, try to deliver Theaetetus of his conceptions about knowledge.

Theaet. Very well; if you think that, do as you say.

Soc. Once more, Theaetetus, I will ask you to consider the original question: you were saying, were you not, that perception is knowledge?

Theaet. I was.

Soc. And if any one were to ask you: With what does a man see black and white colours? and with what does he hear sharp and flat sounds?—you would say, if I am not mistaken. 'With the eyes and with the ears.'

Theaet. I should.

Soc. The free use of words and phrases, rather than minute precision, is generally characteristic of a liberal education, and the opposite is pedantic; but sometimes this precision is necessary, and I believe that the answer which you have just given is open to the charge of incorrectness; for which is more correct, to say that we see or hear with the eyes and with the ears, or through the eyes and through the ears?

Theaet. I should say, Socrates, 'through,' rather than 'with.'

Soc. Yes, my boy; for no one can suppose that we are Trojan horses, in whom are perched several unconnected senses, not meeting in some one nature, of which they are the instruments, whether you term this soul or not, with which through these we perceive objects of sense.

Theaet. I agree with you in thinking that.

Soc. The reason why I am thus precise is, because I want to know whether we perceive black and white through the eyes indeed, but with one and the same part of ourselves, and again, other qualities through other organs, or whether, if asked the question, you would refer all such perceptions to the body. Perhaps, however, I had better allow you to answer for yourself. Tell me, then, are not the organs through which you perceive warm and hard and light and sweet, organs of the body?
Theaet. Of the body, certainly.

Soc. And you would admit that what you perceive through one faculty you cannot perceive through another; the objects of hearing, for example, cannot be perceived through sight, or the objects of sight through hearing?

Theaet. Of course I shall admit that.

Soc. If you have any thought about both of them, this common perception cannot come to you, either through the one or the other organ?

Theaet. It cannot.

Soc. How about sounds and colours: in the first place, you would admit that they both exist?

Theaet. Yes.

Soc. And that either of them is different from the other, and the same with itself?

Theaet. Certainly.

Soc. And that both are two, and each of them is one?

Theaet. Yes.

Soc. You can further observe whether they are like or unlike one another?

Theaet. I dare say.

Soc. But through what do you perceive all this about them? for you cannot apprehend, either through hearing or through seeing, that which they have in common. Let me give you an illustration:—if I were to ask whether sounds and colours are saline or not (supposing that there were any meaning in such a question), you would be able to tell me what faculty would determine that—not sight nor hearing, as is evident, but something else?

Theaet. Certainly; the faculty of taste.

Soc. Very good; and what power or instrument will determine the general notions which are common, not only to the senses but to all things, and which you call being and not being, and the rest of them, about which I was just now asking—what organs will you assign for the perception of these?

Theaet. You are speaking of being and not being, likeness and unlikeness, sameness and difference; and also of unity and other numbers applied to objects of sense; and you mean to ask, through what bodily organ the soul perceives odd and even numbers and other arithmetical notions:
Soc. You follow me excellently, Theaetetus; that is precisely what I am asking.

Theaet. Indeed, Socrates, I cannot answer; my only notion is, that they have no separate organ, but that the soul perceives the universals of all things by herself.

Soc. You are a beauty, Theaetetus, and not ugly, as Theodorus was saying; for he who utters the beautiful is himself beautiful and good. And besides being beautiful, you have done well in releasing me from a very long discussion, if you are clear that the soul views some things by herself and others through the bodily organs. For that was my own opinion, and I wanted you to agree with me.

Theaet. And that is manifest.

Soc. And to which class would you refer being or essence; for this, of all our notions, is the most universal?

Theaet. I should say, to that class which the soul seeks of herself.

Soc. And would you say this also of like and unlike, some and other?

Theaet. Yes.

Soc. And would you say the same of the noble and base, and of good and evil?

Theaet. Those, as I conceive, are notions whose essences, above all others, the soul contemplates in their relations to one another, comparing within herself things past and present with the future.

Soc. And does she not perceive the hardness of that which is hard by the touch, and the softness of that which is soft equally by the touch?

Theaet. Yes.

Soc. But their existence and what they are, and their opposition to one another, and the essential nature of this opposition, the soul herself endeavours to decide for us; reviewing them and comparing them with one another?

Theaet. Certainly.

Soc. The simple sensations which reach the soul through the body, are given at birth to men and animals by nature, but their reflections on these and on their relations to being and use, are slowly and hardly gained, if they are ever gained, by education and long experience.
Theaet. Assuredly.

Soc. And can a man attain truth who fails of attaining being?

Theaet. Impossible.

Soc. And can he who misses the truth of anything, have a knowledge of that thing?

Theaet. He cannot.

Soc. Then knowledge does not consist in impressions of sense, but in reasoning about them; in that only, and not in the mere impression, truth and being can be attained?

Theaet. Clearly.

Soc. And would you call the two processes by the same name, when there is so great a difference between them?

Theaet. That will not be right.

Soc. And what name would you give to seeing, hearing, smelling, being cold and being hot?

Theaet. I should call all that perceiving—what other name could be given them?

Soc. Perception would be the collective name of them?

Theaet. Certainly.

Soc. Which, as we say, has no part in the attainment of truth any more than of being?

Theaet. Certainly not.

Soc. And therefore cannot have any part in science or knowledge?

Theaet. No.

Soc. Then perception, Theaetetus, can never be the same as knowledge or science?

Theaet. That is evident, Socrates; and knowledge is now most clearly proved to be different from perception.

Soc. But the original aim of our discussion was to find out rather what knowledge is than what it is not; at the same time we have made some progress, for we no longer seek for knowledge in perception at all, but in that other process, however called, in which the mind is alone and engaged with being.

Theaet. That, Socrates, as I conceive, is called thinking.

Soc. You conceive truly. And now, my friend, please to begin again at this point; and having first wiped out of your memory all that has preceded, see if you have now arrived at any clearer view, and once more say what is knowledge.
Theaet. I cannot say, Socrates, that knowledge is all opinion, because there may be a false opinion; but I will venture to say, that knowledge is true opinion; let this then be my answer; and if this in turn is disproved, I must try to find another.

Soc. That is the way in which you ought to answer, Theaetetus, and not in your former hesitating strain, for if we are bold we shall gain one of two advantages; either we shall find that which we seek, or we shall be less likely to think that we know what we do not know—and this surely is no mean reward. And now, what are you saying?—that there are two sorts of opinion, one true and the other false; and you define knowledge to be the true?

Theaet. Yes, that is my present view.

Soc. Is it worth while for us to resume the discussion touching opinion?

Theaet. To what are you referring?

Soc. There is a point which often troubles me, and is a great perplexity to me, both in relation to myself and others. I cannot make out the nature or origin of the mental experience to which I refer.

Theaet. What do you mean?

Soc. How there can be false opinion: that still troubles the eye of my mind, and I cannot determine whether I shall leave the question, or begin over again in a new way.

Theaet. Why not, Socrates, at least if there is any necessity for this? Were not you and Theodorus remarking truly that there is no sort of hurry in these discussions?

Soc. You are right in reminding me, and perhaps there will be no harm in retracing our steps and beginning again. Better a little which is well done, than a great deal imperfectly.

Theaet. Certainly.

Soc. Well, and what is the difficulty? Do we not speak of false opinion, and say that one man holds a false and another a true opinion, as though there were some natural distinction between them?

Theaet. That is what we say.

188 Soc. All things and everything are either known or not known. I leave out of view the intermediate conceptions of forgetting and learning, because they have nothing to do with our present question.
There can be no doubt, Socrates, if you exclude these, that there is no other alternative but knowing or not knowing a thing.

And must not he who has an opinion, have an opinion about something which he knows or does not know?

He must.

He who knows, cannot but know; and he who does not know, cannot know?

Of course.

What shall we say then of false opinion? Does he who has a false opinion think that which he knows to be some other thing which he knows, and knowing both, is he at the same time ignorant of both?

That, Socrates, is impossible.

But perhaps he thinks of something which he does not know as some other thing which he does not know; for example, he knows neither Theaetetus nor Socrates, and yet he fancies that Theaetetus is Socrates, or Socrates Theaetetus?

That can never be.

But surely he cannot suppose that what he does not know is what he knows, or that what he knows is what he does not know?

That would be monstrous.

Where, then, is false opinion? For all things are either known or unknown, and there can be no opinion which is not included under one or the other.

Most true.

Suppose that we remove the question out of the sphere of knowing or not knowing, into that of being and not being.

How do you mean?

May we not suspect that he who thinks of anything which is not, will think what is false, whatever in other respects may be the state of his mind?

That, again, I should imagine to be true, Socrates.

Then suppose some one to say to us, Theaetetus, is this possible? Can any man think that which is not, either as a self-existent substance or a predicate of another? And suppose that we answer, 'Yes, he can, when he thinks that which is not true.'—That will be our answer.

Yes.
Soc. And is the like of this to be found anywhere else?
Theaet. What do you mean?
Soc. Can a man see something and yet see nothing?
Theaet. Impossible.
Soc. But if he sees any one thing, he sees something that exists. Do you suppose that one thing is ever to be found among non-existing things?
Theaet. I do not.
Soc. He, then, who sees anything sees that which is?
Theaet. That is clear.
Soc. And he who hears anything hears some one thing, and hears that which is?
Theaet. Yes.
Soc. And he who touches something touches some one thing, which is one and therefore is?
Theaet. That again is true.
Soc. And does not he who thinks, think some one thing?
Theaet. Certainly.
Soc. And does not he who thinks some one thing, think something which is?
Theaet. I agree.
Soc. Then he who thinks of that which is not, thinks of nothing?
Theaet. Clearly.
Soc. And he who thinks of nothing, does not think at all?
Theaet. That is obvious.
Soc. Then no one can think that which is not, either as a self-existent substance or a predicate of another?
Theaet. Clearly not.
Soc. Then to think falsely is different from thinking that which is not?
Theaet. Yes, different.
Soc. Then false opinion has no existence in us, either in the sphere of being or of knowledge?
Theaet. Certainly not.
Soc. But may not the following be the description of what we express by this name?
Theaet. What?
Soc. May we not suppose that false opinion or thought is a sort of heterodoxy; a person may make an exchange in his mind, and
say that one real object is another real object. For thus he always thinks that which is, but he misplaces the objects of his thought, and missing of what he is considering, he may be truly said to have false opinion.

Theaet. Now you appear to me to have said the exact truth; when a man puts the base in the place of the noble, or the noble in the place of the base, then he has truly false opinion.

Soc. I see, Theaetetus, that your fear has disappeared, and that you are beginning to despise me.

Theaet. Why do you say that?

Soc. You think, if I am not mistaken, that your ‘truly false’ is safe from my censure, and that I shall never ask whether there can be a swift which is slow, or a heavy which is light, or any process of nature which is a contradiction in terms. But I will not insist upon this, because I do not wish to discourage you. And so you are satisfied that false opinion is heterodoxy, or the thought of something else?

Theaet. I am.

Soc. Then upon your view, the mind is able to conceive of one thing as another?

Theaet. True.

Soc. But must not the mind, or thinking power, which does this, have a conception either of both objects or of one of them?

Theaet. Certainly.

Soc. Either together or in succession?

Theaet. Very good.

Soc. And do you mean by thinking the same which I mean?

Theaet. What is that?

Soc. I mean the conversation which the soul holds with herself in considering of anything. I speak of what I scarcely know; but the soul when thinking appears to me to be just talking—asking 190 questions of herself and answering them, affirming and denying. And when she has arrived at a decision, either gradually or by a sudden impulse, and has at last agreed, and does not doubt, this is called her opinion. I say, then, that to form an opinion is to speak, and opinion is a word spoken, I mean, to oneself and in silence, not aloud or to another.

Theaet. True.

Soc. Then when any one thinks of one thing as another, he is saying to himself that one thing is another?
Theaet. Quite true.

Soc. Now recollect whether you have ever said to yourself that the noble is certainly base, or the unjust just; or, take the primary conception of all—have you ever attempted to convince yourself that one thing is another? Nay, even in sleep, did you ever venture to say to yourself that odd is even, or anything of that sort?

Theaet. Never.

Soc. And do you suppose that any other man, either in his senses or out of them, ever seriously tried to persuade himself that an ox is a horse, or that two are one?

Theaet. Certainly not.

Soc. But if thinking is speaking to oneself, no one speaking and thinking of two objects, and apprehending them both in his soul, will say and think that the one is the other of them, and I must add, that you will have to let the word 'other' alone [i.e. not insist that the abstract term 'other,' in Greek ἄρσεν ἄρσεν, is applied equally to both of them. Cp. Par. 147 C.] I mean to say, that no one thinks the noble to be base, or anything of the kind.

Theaet. I will give up the word 'other,' Socrates; and I agree in what you say.

Soc. If a man has both of them in his thoughts, he cannot think that the one of them is the other?

Theaet. True.

Soc. Neither, if he has one of them in his mind and not the other, can he think that the one is the other?

Theaet. True; for we should have to suppose that he apprehends that which is not in his thoughts at all.

Soc. Then no one who knows either both or one of the two objects can think that the one is the other. And therefore, he who maintains that false 'doxy' is heterodoxy is talking nonsense; for neither in this, any more than in the previous way, can false opinion exist in us.

Theaet. No.

Soc. But if, Theaetetus, this is not admitted, then we shall be driven into many strange absurdities.

Theaet. What are they?

Soc. I will not tell you until I have endeavoured to consider the matter in every point of view. For I should be ashamed of us if we were driven in our perplexity to admit the absurd conse-
quences of which I speak. But if we are able to find the solution, and get away from them, we may regard them only as the difficulties of others, and the ridicule will not attach to us. If, however, we utterly fail, then I suppose that we must be humble, and the argument, at whose mercy we are, will trample us under foot, as the sea-sick passenger is trampled upon by the sailor, and do anything to us. Listen, then, while I tell you how I hope to find a way out of our difficulty.

Theaet. Let me hear.

Soc. I think that we were wrong in denying that a man might think what he did not know to be what he knew, but that there is a way in which this deception is possible.

Theaet. You mean to say, as I suspected at the time, that I may know Socrates, and at a distance see some one who is unknown to me, and whom I mistake for him—that is the sort of case to which you refer?

Soc. But has not that position been relinquished by us, as involving the absurdity that we should know and not know the things which we know?

Theaet. True.

Soc. Let us make the assertion, then, in a different form, which may have a favourable issue or may not; but as we are in a great strait, every argument should be turned over and tested. Tell me, then, whether I am right in saying that you may learn a thing which at one time you did not know?

Theaet. Certainly you may.

Soc. And this may happen over and over again?

Theaet. Yes.

Soc. I would have you imagine, then, that there exists in the mind of man a block of wax, which is of different sizes in different men; harder, moister, and having more or less of purity in one than another, and in some of an intermediate quality.

Theaet. I see.

Soc. Let us say that this tablet is a gift of Memory, the mother of the Muses; and that when we wish to remember anything which we have seen, or heard, or thought in our own minds, we hold the wax to the perceptions and thoughts, and in that receive the impression of them as from the seal of a ring; and that we remember and know what is imprinted as long as the image lasts;
but when the image is effaced, or cannot be taken, then we forget
and do not know.

Theaet. Let us imagine that.

Soc. Now, when a person has this knowledge, and is considering
something which he sees or hears, may not false opinion arise
in the following manner?

Theaet. In what manner?

Soc. When he mistakes for what he knows sometimes what he
knows, and sometimes what he does not know. We were wrong
before in denying the possibility of this.

Theaet. And how would you amend the former statement?

Soc. I should begin by making a list of the impossible cases
which must be excluded. No one can think one thing to be
another when he does not perceive either of them, but has the
memorial or seal of both of them in his mind; nor can any mis-
taking of one thing for another occur, when he only knows one,
and does not know, and has no impression of the other; nor can he
think that what he does not know is what he does not know, or
that what he knows is what he does not know; nor that one thing
which he perceives is another thing which he perceives, or that a
thing which he does not perceive is a thing which he perceives;
or that one thing which he does not perceive is another thing
which he does not perceive; or that a thing which he perceives is
a thing which he does not perceive, nor again, can he think that
one thing which he knows and perceives, and of which he has
the impression coinciding with sense, is another thing which he
knows and perceives, and of which he has the impression coin-
ciding with sense;—this last case, if possible, is still more incon-
ceivable than the others; nor can he think that a thing which he
knows is any other thing which he knows and perceives, and of
which he has the memorial coinciding with sense; nor so long
as these agree, can he think that a thing which he perceives is
another thing which he knows and perceives, or that a thing
which he does not know and does not perceive, is the same as
another thing which he does not know and does not perceive; or
that a thing which he does not know is the same as another thing
which he does not know and does not perceive; or that a thing
which he does not perceive is another thing which he does not
know and does not perceive. All these utterly and absolutely
exclude the possibility of false opinion. The only cases, if any, which remain, are the following.

Theaet. What are they? If you tell me, then I may perhaps understand you better; for at present I am unable to follow you.

Soc. A person may think that some things which he knows and perceives, or which he perceives and does not know, are some other things which he knows; or that some things which he knows and perceives, are other things which he knows and perceives.

Theaet. I understand you less than ever now.

Soc. Hear me once more, then:—I, knowing Theodorus, and remembering in my own mind what sort of person he is, and what sort of a person Theaetetus is, at one time see them, and at another time do not see them, and sometimes I touch them, and at another time not, or at one time I may hear them or perceive them in some other way, and at another time not perceive them, but still I remember them, and know them in my own mind.

Theaet. That is quite true.

Soc. Then, first of all, I want you to understand that a man may or may not perceive that which he knows.

Theaet. True.

Soc. And oftentimes a man will not perceive that which he does not know, and oftentimes he will only perceive it.

Theaet. That is true again.

Soc. See whether you can follow me better now: Socrates knows Theodorus and Theaetetus, but he sees neither of them, nor does he perceive them in any other way; he cannot then by any possibility imagine in his own mind that Theaetetus is Theodorus: Am I not right?

Theaet. You are quite right.

Soc. Then that was the first case of which I spoke?

Theaet. Yes.

Soc. The second case was, that I, knowing one of you and not knowing the other, and perceiving neither, can never think that he whom I do not know is he whom I know.

Theaet: True.

Soc. In the third case, not knowing and not perceiving either of you, I cannot think that a person whom I do not know is some one else whom I do not know. I need not again go over the catalogue
of excluded cases, in which I cannot form a false opinion about you and Theodorus, either because I know both or because I am in ignorance of both, or as knowing one and not knowing the other. And the same of perceiving: do you understand me?

_Theaet._ I do.

_Soc._ The only possibility of erroneous opinion is, when knowing you and Theodorus, and having the seal or impression of both of you in the wax block, but seeing you both imperfectly and at a distance, I try to assign the right impression of either of you to the right vision, and fit this into the proper mould: if I succeed in this, recognition will take place; but if I fail and transpose them, putting the shoe on to the wrong foot, that is to say, putting the vision of either of you on to the wrong seal, or seeing you as in a mirror when the sight flows from right to left—then 'heterodoxy' and false opinion ensues.

_Theaet._ Yes, Socrates, that is precisely the sort of thing.

_Soc._ Or again, when I know both of you, and see as well as know one and not the other, and knowledge does not accord with perception—that was a case which you did not understand just now?

_Theaet._ No, I did not.

_Soc._ I meant to say, that when a person knows and perceives one of you, and his knowledge accords with his perception, he will never think him to be some other person, whom he knows and perceives, and the knowledge of whom accords with his perception—we agreed to that?

_Theaet._ Yes.

_Soc._ But there was an omission of the further case, in which, as we say, false opinion may arise, when knowing both, or seeing, or having some other sensible perception of both, I fail in holding the seal over against the corresponding sensation; like a bad archer, I miss and fall wide of the mark—and this is called falsehood.

_Theaet._ Yes, truly.

_Soc._ When, therefore, perception is present to one of the seals or impressions and not to the other, and the mind fits the seal of the absent perception on the one which is present, in any case of this sort the mind is deceived; in a word, if our view is sound, there can be no error or deception about things which a man does
not know and has never perceived, but only in things which are known and perceived; in these alone opinion turns and twists about, and becomes alternately true and false;—true when the seals and impressions of sense meet straight and opposite—false when they go awry and are crooked.

_Theaet._ And is not that, Socrates, nobly said?

_Soc._ Wait a little, and you will be better able to judge; for to think truly is noble, but to be deceived is base.

_Theaet._ Assuredly.

_Soc._ The cause of this, as they say, is in the wax:—When the wax in the soul of any one is deep and abundant, and smooth and perfectly tempered, then the impressions which pass through the senses and sink into the [waxen] heart of the soul, as Homer says in a parable, meaning to indicate the likeness of the soul to wax (κῆρ κηροῦς); these, I say, being pure and clear, and having a sufficient depth of wax, are also lasting, and minds, such as these, easily learn and easily retain, and are not liable to confusion, but have true thoughts, for they have plenty of room, and having clear impressions of things, as we term them, quickly distribute them into their proper places on the block. And such men are called wise. Would you not agree to that?

_Theaet._ Entirely.

_Soc._ But when the heart of any one is shaggy, as the poet who knew everything says, or muddy and of impure wax, or very soft, or very hard, then there is a corresponding defect in the mind—the soft are good at learning, but apt to forget; and the hard are the reverse; the shaggy and rugged and gritty, or those who have an admixture of earth or dung in their composition, have the impressions indistinct, as also the hard, for there is no depth in them; and the soft too are indistinct, for their impressions are easily confused and effaced. Yet greater is the indistinctness when they are all jostled together in a little soul, which has no room. These are the sorts of natures which have false opinion; for when they see or hear or think of anything, they are slow in assigning the right objects to the right impressions—in their stupidity they confuse them, and are apt to see and hear and think amiss—and such men are said to be deceived in their knowledge of objects, and ignorant.

_Theaet._ No man, Socrates, can say anything truer than that.
Soc. Then now we may admit the existence of false opinion in us?

Theaet. Certainly.

Soc. And of true opinion also?

Theaet. Yes.

Soc. We have at length satisfactorily proven that beyond a doubt there are these two sorts of opinion?

Theaet. Undoubtedly.

Soc. Alas, Theaetetus, what a tiresome being is a man who is fond of discourse!

Theaet. What makes you say that?

Soc. Because I am disheartened at my own stupidity and tiresome garrulity; for what other term will describe the habit of a man who is always talking on all sides of a question; whose dulness cannot be convinced, and yet he will not leave off?

Theaet. But what puts you out of heart?

Soc. I am not only out of heart, but in positive despair; for I do not know what to answer if any one were to ask me:—O Socrates, have you indeed discovered that false opinion arises neither in the comparison of the perceptions with one another nor in the thoughts, but in the union of thought and perception? Yes, I shall say, with the complacence of one who thinks that he has made a noble discovery.

Theaet. I do not see anything to disgrace us, Socrates, in this discovery.

Soc. He will say: You mean to assert that the man whom we only think of and do not see, cannot be confused with the horse which we do not see or touch, but only think of and do not perceive? That I believe to be my meaning, I shall reply.

Theaet. Quite right.

Soc. Well, then, he will say, according to that argument, the number eleven, which is only thought, can never be mistaken for twelve, which is only thought. How would you answer that?

Theaet. I should say that a mistake may very likely arise between the eleven or twelve which are seen or handled, but that no similar mistake can arise between the eleven and twelve which are in the mind.

Soc. Well, but do you think that no one ever did put before his own mind five and seven,—I am not saying five or seven men or
horses, but five or seven in the abstract; and these we affirm to be the actual impressions on the waxen block, in which false opinion is held to be impossible—I say, did no man ever ask himself how many are the numbers five and seven when added, and answer that they are eleven, while another man thinks that they are twelve, or would all agree in thinking and saying that they are twelve?

_Theaet._ Certainly not; many would think they are eleven, and in the higher numbers the chance of error is greater still; for I assume that you are speaking of numbers in general.

_Soc._ Exactly; and I want you to consider whether this does not imply that the twelve in the waxen block are supposed to be eleven?

_Theaet._ Yes, that seems to be the case.

_Soc._ Then do we not come back to the old difficulty? For he who falls into this error does think one thing which he knows to be another thing which he knows; but this, as we said, was impossible, and was the very argument by which we were endeavouring to show that false opinion did not exist, because the inevitable consequence would be that the same person would be compelled to know and not to know the same thing at the same time.

_Theaet._ Most true.

_Soc._ Then false opinion cannot be explained as a confusion of thought and sense, for in that case we could not have been mistaken about pure conceptions of thought; and thus we are obliged to say, either that false opinion does not exist, or that a man may not know that which he knows;—which alternative do you choose?

_Theaet._ There is no possibility of choosing either, Socrates.

_Soc._ And yet the argument will scarcely admit of both. But, as we are at our wits' end, suppose that we do a shameless thing?

_Theaet._ What is that?

_Soc._ Let us attempt to explain the verb 'to know.'

_Theaet._ And why is that shameless?

_Soc._ You do not seem to be aware that the whole of our discussion from the very beginning has been a search after knowledge, of which we are assumed not to know the nature.

_Theaet._ I am aware of that.

_Soc._ And when we do not know what knowledge is, to be explaining the verb to 'know'—is not that shameless? The truth is,
Theaetetus, that we have long been infected with logical impurity. Thousands of times have we repeated the words 'we know,' and 'do not know,' and 'we have or have not science or knowledge,' as if when we are ignorant about knowledge we could understand what we were saying; and at this moment mark how we are using the words 'we understand,' 'we are ignorant,' as though we could still employ them if we were deprived of knowledge or science.

Theaet. But if you avoid these expressions, Socrates, how will you ever argue at all?

Soc. Not at all, unless I ceased to be myself. The case would be different if I were a true hero of dialectic; and O that such an one were present, for he would have told us to avoid the use of these terms; at the same time he would not have spared me and my mode of speaking! But, seeing that we are no great wits, shall I venture to say what knowing is? for I think that the attempt may be worth making.

Theaet. Then by all means venture, and no one shall find fault with you for using the forbidden terms.

Soc. You have heard the common explanation of the verb 'to know?'

Theaet. I do not know that I remember at the moment.

Soc. They explain the word 'to know' as meaning 'to have knowledge,'

Theaet. True.

Soc. I should like to make a slight change, and say 'to possess' knowledge.

Theaet. How is that different from the other?

Soc. Perhaps there may be no difference; but still I should like you to hear and help to test my view.

Theaet. I will, if I can.

Soc. I should distinguish 'having' from 'possessing:' for example, a man may buy and keep under his control a garment which he does not wear; and then we should say, not that he has, but that he possesses the garment.

Theaet. That would be right.

Soc. Well, may not a man 'possess' and yet not 'have' knowledge in the sense of which I am speaking? As you may suppose a man to have caught wild birds—doves or any other birds—and to be keeping them in an aviary which he has constructed at home;
and then we might say, in one sense, that he always has them because he possesses them, might we not?

Theaet. Yes.

Soc. And yet, in another sense, he has none of them; but he has power over them, and has them under his hand in an enclosure of his own, and can take and have them whenever he likes;—he can catch any which he likes, and again let them go, and he may do this as often as he pleases.

Theaet. True.

Soc. Once more, then, as in what preceded, we made a sort of waxen figment in the mind, so let us now suppose that in the mind of each man there is an aviary of all sorts of birds—some flocking together apart from the rest, others in small groups, others solitary, flying anywhere and everywhere.

Theaet. Let us imagine that done—and what is to follow?

Soc. We may suppose this receptacle to be empty while we are young, and that the birds are kinds of knowledge; when a man has gotten and detained in the enclosure any of those different kinds of knowledge, then he may be said to have learned or discovered the thing of which that knowledge is: and this is to know.

Theaet. Granted.

Soc. And again, when any one wishes to catch any of these knowledges or sciences, and hold any of them after he has taken them, and again to let them go, consider how he will express that;—will he describe the ‘catching’ of them and the original ‘possession’ in the same words? I will make my meaning clearer by an example:—you admit that there is an art of arithmetic?

Theaet. Very good.

Soc. Conceive this under the form of a hunt after the science of odd and even in general.

Theaet. I follow.

Soc. Having the use of this art, the arithmetician, if I am not mistaken, has the arithmetical sciences under his hand, and can transmit them to another.

Theaet. Yes.

Soc. And he who transmits them may be said to teach them, and he who receives to learn them, and he who has them in possession in the aforesaid aviary may be said to know them.

Theaet. Exactly.
Soc. Attend to what follows: must not the perfect arithmetician know all numbers, for he has the science of all numbers in his mind?

Theaet. True.

Soc. And he can calculate a sum of numbers in his head, or he can reckon up the things around him?

Theaet. Of course he can.

Soc. And to calculate a sum is simply to consider how much such and such a number amounts to?

Theaet. Very true.

Soc. Then he considers as if he did not know that which he does know, for we have already admitted that he knows all numbers;—you have heard of these perplexing questions?

Theaet. I have.

Soc. May we not pursue the image of the doves, and say that the chase after knowledge is of two kinds? one kind is prior to possession and for the sake of possession, and the other for the sake of taking and holding in the hands that which is possessed already. And thus, when a man has learned and known something long ago, he may resume and get hold of his knowledge which he has long ago possessed, but has not at hand in his mind.

Theaet. True.

Soc. That was my reason for asking what is calculation; and how we ought to speak when an arithmetician sets about numbering, or a grammarian about reading? Shall we say, that although he knows, he comes to learn of himself what he knows?

Theaet. That would be too absurd, Socrates.

Soc. Shall we say that he is going to read or number what he does not know, although we have admitted that he knows all letters and all numbers?

Theaet. That, again, would be an absurdity.

Soc. Then shall we say that about names we care nothing?—any one may twist and turn the words ‘knowing’ and ‘learning’ in any way which he likes, but since we have determined that the possession of knowledge is not the having or using knowledge, we do assert that a man cannot not possess that which he possesses; and, therefore, in no case can a man not know that which he knows, but he may get a false opinion about it; for he may have the knowledge, not of this particular thing, but of some other;—
when the various numbers and forms of knowledge are flying about in the aviary, and he takes out of them a particular one for use, and sometimes the wrong one, that is to say, when he thought eleven to be twelve, he got hold of the ring-dove which he had in his mind, when he wanted the pigeon.

Theaet. Yes, that is quite reasonable.

Soc. But when he catches the one which he wants, then he is not deceived, and has an opinion of what is, and thus false and true opinion may exist, and the difficulties which were previously raised disappear. I dare say that you will agree with me in that—will you not?

Theaet. Yes.

Soc. And we are rid of the difficulty of a man’s not knowing what he knows, for we are not driven to the inference that he does not possess what he possesses, whether he is deceived in anything or not. And yet I fear that a greater difficulty is looking in at the window.

Theaet. What is that?

Soc. How can the exchange of one knowledge for another ever become false opinion?

Theaet. How do you mean?

Soc. In the first place, how can a man who has the knowledge of anything be ignorant of that which he knows, not by reason of ignorance, but by reason of his own knowledge? And, again, is it not an extreme absurdity that he should suppose another thing to be this, and this to be another thing;—that, having knowledge present with him in his mind, he should still know nothing and be ignorant of all things?—you might as well argue that ignorance may make a man know, and blindness make him see, as that knowledge can make him ignorant.

Theaet. Perhaps, Socrates, we may have been wrong in making only forms of knowledge our birds: there ought to have been forms of ignorance as well, flying about together in the mind, and he who sought to take one of them may sometimes have caught a form of knowledge, and then a form of ignorance; and thus he will have a false opinion from ignorance, but a true one from knowledge, about the same thing.

Soc. I cannot help praising you, Theaetetus, and yet I must beg you to reconsider your words; let us grant what you say—then, 200
according to you, he who takes ignorance will have a false opinion—am I right?

*Theaet.* Yes.

_Soc._ He will certainly not think that he has a false opinion?

*Theaet.* Of course not.

_Soc._ He will think that his opinion is true, and he will fancy that he knows the things about which he has been deceived?

*Theaet.* Certainly.

_Soc._ Then he will think that he has captured knowledge and not ignorance?

*Theaet.* That is clear.

_Soc._ And thus, after a long journey, we come round to our first perplexity. The accuser will retort upon us:—O my excellent friends, he will say, laughing, if a man knows the form of ignorance and the form of knowledge, can he think that one of them which he knows is the other which he knows? or, if he knows neither of them, can he think that one which he knows not is another which he knows not? or, if he knows one and not the other, can he think that the one which he does not know is the one which he knows? or that the one which he knows is the one which he does not know? or will you tell me that there are other forms of knowledge which distinguish the right and wrong birds, or forms of knowledge and ignorance, and which the owner keeps in some other aviaries or waxen blocks according to your foolish image, and which he may be said to know while he possesses them, even though he have them not at hand in his mind? And thus, in a perpetual circle, you will be compelled to go round and make no progress. What are we to say in reply to this, Theaetetus?

*Theaet.* Indeed, Socrates, I do not know what we are to say.

_Soc._ Are not these reproaches just, and does not the argument truly show that we are wrong in seeking for false opinion until we know what knowledge is; that must be first sought after, and, afterwards, the nature of false opinion?

*Theaet.* I cannot but agree with you, Socrates.

_Soc._ Then, once more, what shall we say that knowledge is?—for we are not going to lose heart as yet.

*Theaet.* Certainly, we will not lose heart, if you do not.

_Soc._ What definition will be most consistent with our former views?
Theaet. I cannot think of any but our old one, Socrates.

Soc. What was that?

Theaet. That knowledge was true opinion; and true opinion is surely unerring, and the results which follow from it are all noble and good.

Soc. He who led the way into the river, Theaetetus, said 'the experiment will show;' and, perhaps, if we go forward in the search, we may stumble upon the thing which we are looking for; but if we stay as we are, nothing will come to light.

Theaet. Very true; let us go forward and try.

Soc. The trail soon comes to an end, for a whole profession is against us.

Theaet. How is that, and what profession do you mean?

Soc. The profession of the great wise ones who are called orators and lawyers; for these persuade men by their art and do not teach them, but make them think whatever they like. Do you imagine that there are any teachers in the world so clever as to be able to convey to others the truth about acts of robbery or violence, of which they were not-eye-witnesses, while a little water is flowing?

Theaet. I certainly do not think that, but I think that they might persuade them.

Soc. And would you not say that persuading them is making them have an opinion?

Theaet. Certainly.

Soc. When, therefore, judges are justly persuaded about matters which you can know only by seeing them, and not in any other way, and when thus judging of them from report they attain a true opinion about them, they judge without knowledge, and yet are rightly persuaded, if they have judged well.

Theaet. Certainly.

Soc. And yet, O my friend, if true opinion in law courts9 and knowledge are the same, the perfect judge could not have judged rightly without knowledge; and therefore I must infer that they are not the same.

Theaet. I remember now, Socrates, what I heard some one say, and had forgotten: he said that true opinion, accompanied with reason, was knowledge, but that the opinion which had no reason was out of the sphere of knowledge; and that things of which

9 Reading κατὰ δίκαιατημα: Campbell.
there is no rational account are not knowable—that was the singular expression which he used—and that things which have a definition or explanation are knowable.

Soc. Excellent; but then, how did he distinguish between things which are and are not 'knowable?' I wish that you would repeat to me what he said, and then I shall know whether you and I have heard the same tale.

Theaet. I do not know whether I can make that out; but if another person would tell me, I think that I could confirm his statement.

Soc. Let me give you, then, a dream in return for a dream:—Methought I had a dream, and I heard in my dream that the primeval letters or elements out of which you and I and all other things are compounded, have no reason or explanation, but are names only, of which not even existence or non-existence can be predicated; you cannot say of them that they are or are not, for that involves the attribute of existence, which must not be added on, if one means to speak only of this or that thing in itself. You may not say itself, or that, or each, or only, or this, or the like; for these go about everywhere and are applied to all things, and are distinct from them; whereas, if the first elements could be described, and had a definition suitable to them, they would be spoken of apart from all else. But none of these primeval elements can be defined; they can only be named, for they have nothing but a name, and the things which are compounded of them, as they are complex, are expressed by a combination of names, for the combination of names is the essence of a proposition. Thus, then, the elements or letters are only objects of perception, and cannot be defined or known; but the combinations or syllables of them are known and expressed and apprehended by true opinion. When, therefore, any one forms the true opinion of anything without definition, you may say that his mind is truly exercised, but has no knowledge; for he who cannot give and receive a definition of a thing, has no knowledge of that thing; but when he adds the definition, he may be all that I have been denying of him, and is perfected in knowledge. Was that the form in which the dream appeared to you?

Theaet. Precisely.

Soc. And you allow and maintain that true opinion, conjoined with definition, is knowledge?
Theaet. Exactly.

Soc. Then may we assume, Theaetetus, that to-day, and in this casual manner, we have discovered a truth which in former times many wise men have grown old and have not found?

Theaet. At any rate, Socrates, I am satisfied with the present statement.

Soc. I dare say—for how can there be knowledge apart from definition and true opinion? And yet there is one point in what has been said which does not satisfy me.

Theaet. What was that?

Soc. That which might be thought to be the most ingenious remark of all:—That the elements or letters are unknown, but the combination or syllables known.

Theaet. And was that wrong?

Soc. We shall soon know; for we have as hostages the instances which the author himself gave.

Theaet. What are these hostages?

Soc. The letters, which are the elements; and the syllables, which are the combinations;—he reasoned, did he not, from the letters of the alphabet?

Theaet. Yes; he did.

Soc. Let us examine them, or rather, examine ourselves:—What was the way in which we learned letters? and, first of all, are we right in saying that syllables have a meaning, but letters have no meaning?

Theaet. I think so.

Soc. I think so, too; for, suppose that some one asks you to spell the first syllable of my name:—Theaetetus, he says, what is ΣΩ?

Theaet. I should reply, Σ and Ω.

Soc. That is the explanation which you would give of the syllable?

Theaet. I should.

Soc. I wish that you would give me a similar explanation of the Σ.

Theaet. But how can any one, Socrates, tell me the elements of an element; I can only reply, that Σ is a consonant, a mere noise, as of the tongue hissing; B, and most other letters, again, have no sound, and are not even noises. Letters may be most truly said to be undefined; and the most distinct of them, which are the seven vowels, have a sound only, but no definition at all.
Soc. Then, I suppose, my friend, that we have been so far right in our idea about science?

Theaet. Yes; I think that we have.

Soc. Well, but have we been right in maintaining that the syllables can be known, but not the letters?

Theaet. I think that we have been right.

Soc. And do we mean by a syllable two letters, or if there are more, all of them, or an idea which arises out of the combination of them?

Theaet. I should say that we mean all the letters.

Soc. Take the case of the two letters S and O, which form the first syllable of my name; must not he who knows the syllable, know both of them?

Theaet. Certainly.

Soc. He knows, that is, the S and O?

Theaet. Yes.

Soc. But can you say that he is ignorant of either of them, and yet knows both?

Theaet. Such a supposition, Socrates, is monstrous and unmeaning.

Soc. But if he cannot know both without knowing each, then if he is ever to know the syllable, he must know the letters first; and thus the fine theory has again taken wings and departed.

Theaet. Well, but that is very sudden.

Soc. Yes, we did not keep watch properly. Perhaps we ought to have maintained that a syllable is not the letters, but rather one single idea framed out of them, having a separate form distinct from them.

Theaet. Quite true; that is much more probable.

Soc. Reflect; we should not weakly give up a great and imposing theory.

Theaet. No, indeed.

Soc. Let us assume then, as we now say, that the syllable is a simple form arising out of the several combinations of harmonious elements—of letters or of any other elements.

Theaet. Very good.

Soc. And it must have no parts.

Theaet. Why is that?

Soc. Because that which has parts must be a whole of all the parts. Or would you say that a whole, although formed...
out of the parts, is a single notion different from all the parts?

*Theaet.* Yes; that is what I should say.

*Soc.* And would you say that all and the whole are the same, or different?

*Theaet.* I am not certain; but, as you like me to answer at once, I shall hazard the reply, that they are different.

*Soc.* I approve of your readiness, Theaetetus, but I must take time to think whether I equally approve of your answer.

*Theaet.* Yes; the answer has to be approved.

*Soc.* According to this new-view, the whole is supposed to differ from all?

*Theaet.* Yes.

*Soc.* Well, but is there any difference between all [in the plural] and the all [in the singular]? Take the case of number:—When we say one, two, three, four, five, six; or when we say twice three, or three times two, or four and two, or three and two and one, are we speaking of the same or of different numbers?

*Theaet.* Of the same.

*Soc.* That is of six?

*Theaet.* Yes.

*Soc.* And in each form of expression we spoke of all the six?

*Theaet.* True.

*Soc.* And do we not speak of one thing, when we speak of all [in the plural]?

*Theaet.* Of course.

*Soc.* And that is six?

*Theaet.* Yes.

*Soc.* Then in predicating the word 'all' of things measured by number, we predicate at the same time a unity of all?

*Theaet.* That is evident.

*Soc.* Again, the number of the acre and the acre are the same; are they not?

*Theaet.* Yes.

*Soc.* And the number of the stadium in like manner is the stadium?

*Theaet.* Yes.

*Soc.* And the army is the number of the army; and in all similar

10 Reading οὐδ' ἄν.
cases, the entire number of anything is the entirety of anything?

Theaet. True.

Soc. And the number of each is the parts of each?
Theaet. Exactly.

Soc. Then, as many things as have parts consist of parts?
Theaet. Clearly.

Soc. But all the parts are admitted to be the all, if the entire number is the all?

Theaet. True.

Soc. Then the whole is not made up of parts, for it would be the all, if consisting of all the parts?

Theaet. That is not to be supposed.

Soc. But is a part a part of anything but the whole?

Theaet. Yes, of the all.

Soc. You make a valiant defence, Theaetetus. And yet is not the all that of which nothing is wanting?

Theaet. Certainly.

Soc. And is not a whole that from which nothing is absent? but that from which anything is absent is neither a whole nor all;—if wanting in anything, both simultaneously lose their entirety of nature.

Theaet. I now think that there is no difference between a whole and all.

Soc. But were we not saying that when a thing has parts, all the parts will be a whole and all?

Theaet. Certainly.

Soc. Then, as I was saying before, must not the alternative be that either the syllable is not the letters, and then the letters are not parts of the syllable, or that the syllable will be the same with the letters, and will therefore be equally known with them?

Theaet. You are right.

Soc. And, in order to avoid this, we supposed it to be different from them?

Theaet. Yes.

Soc. But if letters are not parts of syllables, can you tell me of any other parts of syllables which are not letters?

Theaet. No, indeed, Socrates; for if I admit the existence of parts in a syllable, it would be ridiculous in me to give up letters and seek for other parts.
Soc. Quite true, Theaetetus, and therefore, according to our present view, a syllable must surely be some indivisible form?

Theaet. True.

Soc. But do you remember, my friend, that only a little while ago we admitted and approved the statement, that of the first elements out of which all other things are compounded there could be no definition, because each of them when taken by itself is uncompounded, nor can one rightly attribute to them the words ‘being’ or ‘this,’ because they are alien and foreign words, and for this reason the letters or elements were indefinable and unknown?

Theaet. I remember.

Soc. And is not this also the reason why they are simple and indivisible? I do not see that there is any other.

Theaet. No other reason can be given.

Soc. Then is not the syllable in the same case as the elements or letters, if it has no parts and is one form?

Theaet. To be sure.

Soc. If, then, a syllable is a whole, and has many parts or letters, the letters as well as the syllables must be intelligible and expressible, since all the parts are acknowledged to be the same as the whole?

Theaet. True.

Soc. But if it be one and indivisible, then the syllables and the letters are alike undefined and unknown, and for the same reason?

Theaet. I cannot deny that.

Soc. We cannot, therefore, agree in the opinion of him who says that the syllable can be known and expressed, but not the letters.

Theaet. Certainly not; if we may trust the argument.

Soc. Well, but what do you say of the opposite opinion? when you remember your own experience in learning to read, would you not rather assent to that?

Theaet. What experience?

Soc. Why, that in learning you were kept trying to distinguish the separate letters both by the eye and by the ear, in order that, when you heard them spoken or saw them written, you might not be confused by their sequence.

Theaet. That is very true.

Soc. Is not the art of the musician the power of telling the
string which answers to a particular note; the notes, as every one would allow, are the elements or letters of music?

_Theaet._ Exactly.

_Soc._ Then, if we argue from the letters and syllables which we know to other simples and compounds, we shall say that the letters or simple elements as a class are much more certainly known than the syllables, and much more indispensable to a perfect knowledge of each branch; and if any one says that the syllable is known and the letter unknown, we shall consider that either intentionally or unintentionally he is talking nonsense?

_Theaet._ Exactly.

_Soc._ And there might be given other proofs of this, if I am not mistaken. But do not let us in looking for them lose sight of the question before us, which is the meaning of the statement, that right opinion with rational definition or explanation is the most perfect form of knowledge.

_Theaet._ We must not lose sight of that.

_Soc._ Well, and what is the meaning of the term ‘explanation?’ I think that we have a choice of three meanings.

_Theaet._ What are they?

_Soc._ In the first place, the meaning may be, manifesting one’s thought by the voice with verbs and nouns, imaging the opinion in the stream which flows from the lips, as in a mirror or water. Does not explanation or definition appear to be something of that nature?

_Theaet._ Certainly; he who does that, is said to explain or define.

_Soc._ And every one who is not born deaf or dumb is able to do that, sooner or later—I mean to say, he is able to show forth what he thinks of anything; and all those who have a right opinion about anything will also have right explanation; nor will right opinion be anywhere found to exist apart from knowledge.

_Theaet._ True.

_Soc._ Let us not, therefore, hastily charge him who gave this account of knowledge with uttering an unmeaning word; for perhaps he only intended to say, that when a person was asked what was the nature of anything, he should be able to answer his questioner by giving the elements of the thing.

_Theaet._ As for example, Socrates?
Soc. As, for example, when Hesiod says that a waggon is made up of a hundred planks; now, neither you nor I could describe all of them individually, but if any one asked what is a waggon, we should be content to answer, that a waggon consists of wheels, axle, body, rims, yoke.

Theaet. Certainly.

Soc. And our opponent will probably laugh at this, just as he would laugh at any one professing to be a grammarian and to give a grammatical account of the name of Theaetetus, and yet only telling us the syllables and not the letters of your name—that would be true opinion, and not knowledge; for knowledge is not attained until, combined with true opinion, there is an enumeration of the elements out of which anything is composed.

Theaet. Yes.

Soc. In the same general way, we might also have true opinion about a waggon; but he who can describe the essence by an enumeration of the hundred planks, adds rational explanation to true opinion, and instead of opinion has art and knowledge of the nature of a waggon, in that he attains to a knowledge of the whole through the elements.

Theaet. Is not that your view, Socrates?

Soc. I want to know what is your view, my friend, and whether you admit the resolution of all things into their elements to be a rational explanation of them, and the consideration of them in syllables or larger combinations of them to be irrational; I should like to know whether this is your view, that we may examine it?

Theaet. That is quite my view.

Soc. Well, and do you conceive that a man has knowledge who thinks that the same attribute belongs at one time to one thing, and at another time to another thing, or that the same thing has different attributes at different times?

Theaet. Assuredly not.

Soc. And do you not remember that in your case and in that of others this often occurred in the process of learning to read?

Theaet. You mean that I mistook the letters and misspelt the syllables?

Soc. That is what I mean.

Theaet. Yes, I perfectly remember, and I am very far from supposing that they have knowledge who are in this condition.
Soc. When a person at the time of learning writes the name of Theaetetus, and thinks that he ought to write and does write θ and ε; or, again, meaning to write the name of Theodorus, thinks that he ought to write and does write τ and ε—can we suppose that he knows the first syllables of your two names?

Theaet. We have already admitted that such a one has not yet attained knowledge.

Soc. And in like manner he may enumerate without knowing them, the second and third and fourth syllables of your name?

Theaet. He may.

Soc. And in that case, when he writes out your name, he will write all the letters in order, and will then have right opinion?

Theaet. That is obvious.

Soc. But although we admit that he has right opinion, he will still be without knowledge?

Theaet. Yes.

Soc. And yet he will have right explanation, as well as right opinion, for he knew the order of the letters when he wrote; and this we admit to be right explanation.

Theaet. True.

Soc. Then, my friend, there is such a thing as right opinion united with definition or explanation, which does not as yet attain to the exactness of knowledge?

Theaet. That seems to be true.

Soc. But what have we gained? for this perfect definition of knowledge is a dream only. And yet perhaps we had better not say that at present, for very likely there may be found some one who will prefer the third of the three explanations of the definition of knowledge, one of which, as we said, must be adopted by the definer.

Theaet. You are right in reminding me of that; for there is still one remaining: the first was the image or expression of the mind in sound; and that which has just been mentioned is a way of reaching the whole by an enumeration of the elements. What is the third way?

Soc. There is, further, the popular notion of telling the mark or sign of difference which distinguishes the thing in question from all others.

Theaet. Can you give me any example of such a definition?

Soc. As, for example, in the case of the sun, I think that you
need only know that the sun is the brightest of the heavenly bodies which revolves about the earth.

Theaet. Certainly.

Soc. Understand why I say this: the reason is, as I was saying, that if you get at the difference and distinguishing characteristic of each thing, then, as many persons say, you will get at the definition or explanation of it; but while you lay hold only of the common and not of the characteristic notion, you will only have the definition of those things to which this common quality belongs.

Theaet. I understand, and am of opinion that you are quite right in calling that a definition.

Soc. But he, who having right opinion about anything, can find out the difference which distinguishes it from other things, will know that of which before he had only had an opinion.

Theaet. That is what we are maintaining.

Soc. Nevertheless, Theaetetus, on a nearer view, I find myself quite disappointed in the picture, which at a distance was not so bad.

Theaet. What do you mean?

Soc. I will endeavour to explain: I will suppose myself to have true opinion of you, and if to this I add your definition, then I have knowledge, but if not, opinion only.

Theaet. Yes.

Soc. The definition was assumed to be the interpretation of your difference.

Theaet. True.

Soc. But when I had only opinion, I had no conception of your distinguishing characteristics?

Theaet. I suppose not.

Soc. Then I must have conceived of some general or common nature which no more belonged to you than to another.

Theaet. True.

Soc. Tell me, now; how in that case could I have formed a judgment of you any more than of any one else? Suppose that I knew Theaetetus to be a man who has nose, eyes, and mouth, and every member complete; how could that enable me to distinguish Theaetetus from Theodorus, or from some unknown barbarian?
Theaet. Very true.

Soc. Or if I had further known you, not only as having nose and eyes, but as having a snub nose and prominent eyes, should I have any more notion of you than of myself and of others who resemble me?

Theaet. Certainly not.

Soc. Surely I can have no conception of Theaetetus until the distinction between your snub-nosedness and the snub-nosedness of others, as well as the other peculiarities which distinguish you, have stamped their memorial on my mind, so that when I meet you to-morrow the right impression may be recalled?

Theaet. Most true.

Soc. Then right opinion implies the perception of differences?

Theaet. That is evident.

Soc. What, then, shall we say of adding reason or explanation to right opinion? If the meaning is, that we should form an opinion of the way in which something differs from another thing, the proposal is ridiculous.

Theaet. How so?

Soc. We are required to have a right opinion of the differences which distinguish one thing from another when we have already a right opinion of them, and so we go round and round;—the revolution of the scytal, or pestle, or any other rotatory engine, in the same circles, is nothing to us; and we may be truly described as the blind leading the blind; for to bid us add those things which we already have, in order that we may learn what we already think, is a rare sort of darkness.

Theaet. Tell me, then; what were you going to say just now, when you asked the question?

Soc. If, my boy, the argument, when speaking of adding the definition, had used the word to 'know,' and not merely 'have an opinion' of the difference, this which is the best of all the definitions of knowledge would have come to a pretty end, for to know is surely to get knowledge.

Theaet. True.

Soc. Then when the question is asked, What is knowledge? this fair argument will answer 'right opinion with knowledge,'—knowledge, that is, of difference, for this, as the said argument maintains, is the explanation or definition to be added.
Theaet. That seems to be true.

Soc. But how utterly foolish, when we are asking what is knowledge, that the reply should only be, right opinion with knowledge of difference or of anything. And so, Theaetetus, knowledge is neither sensation nor true opinion, nor yet definition and explanation accompanying true opinion?

Theaet. I suppose not.

Soc. And are you still in labour and travail, my dear friend, or have you brought all that you have to say about knowledge to the birth?

Theaet. I am sure, Socrates, that you have brought a good deal more out of me than ever was in me.

Soc. And does not my art show that you have brought forth wind, and that the offspring of your brain are not worth bringing up?

Theaet. Very true.

Soc. But if, Theaetetus, you have or wish to have any more embryo thoughts, they will be all the better for the present investigation, and if you have none, you will be soberer and humbler and gentler to other men, not fancying that you know what you do not know. These are the limits of my art; I can no further go, nor do I know aught of the things which great and famous men know or have known in this or former ages. The office of a midwife I, like my mother, have received from God; she delivered women, and I deliver men; but they must be young and noble and fair.

And now I have to go to the porch of the King Archon, where I am to meet Meletus. To-morrow morning, Theodorus, I shall hope to see you again at this place.
SOPHIST.
INTRODUCTION.

The dramatic power of the dialogues of Plato appears to diminish as the metaphysical interest of them increases. (Cp. Introd. to the Philebus.) There are no descriptions of time, place or persons, in the Sophist and Politicus; but we are plunged at once into philosophical discussions; the poetical charm has disappeared, and those who have no taste for abstruse metaphysics will greatly prefer the earlier dialogues to the later ones. Plato is conscious of the change, and in the Politicus (p. 286 B), expressly accuses himself of a tediousness in the two dialogues, which he ascribes to his desire of developing the dialectical method. On the other hand, the kindred spirit of Hegel seemed to find in the Sophist the crown and summit of the Platonic philosophy—here was the place at which Plato most nearly approached to the Hegelian identity of Being and not-Being. Nor will the great importance of the two dialogues be doubted by any one who forms a conception of the state of mind and opinion which they are intended to meet. The sophisms of the day were undermining philosophy; the denial of the existence of not-being, and of the connection of ideas, was making truth and falsehood equally impossible. It has been said that Plato would have written differently, if he had been acquainted with the Organon of Aristotle. But could the Organon of Aristotle ever have been written unless the Sophist and Politicus had preceded? The swarm of fallacies which arose in the infancy of mental science, and which was born and bred in the decay of the pre-Socratic philosophies, was not dispelled by Aristotle, but by Socrates and Plato. The summa genera of thought, the nature of the proposition, of definition, of generalization, of synthesis and analysis, of division and cross-division, are clearly described, and the processes of induction and deduction are constantly employed in the dialogues of
Plato. The 'slippery' nature of comparison, the danger of putting words in the place of things, the fallacy of arguing 'a dicto secundum,' and in a circle, are frequently indicated by him. To all these processes of truth and error, Aristotle, in the next generation, gave distinctness; he brought them together in a separate science. But he is not to be regarded as the original inventor of any of the great logical forms, with the exception of the syllogism.

There is little worthy of remark in the characters of the Sophist. The most noticeable point is the final retirement of Socrates from the field of argument, and the substitution for him of an Eleatic stranger, who is described as a pupil of Parmenides and Zeno, and is supposed to have descended from a higher world in order to convict the Socratic circle of error. As in the Timaeus, Plato seems to intimate that he is passing beyond the limits of the teaching of Socrates; and in the Sophist and Politicus, as well as in the Parmenides, he probably means to imply that he is making a closer approach to the schools of Elea and Megara. He had much in common with them, but he must first submit their ideas to criticism and revision. He had once thought, as he says, speaking by the mouth of the Eleatic, that he understood their doctrine of Not-being; but now he does not even comprehend the nature of Being. The friends of ideas (p. 248) are alluded to by him as distant acquaintances, whom he criticises ab extra; we do not recognise at first sight that he is criticising himself. The character of the Eleatic stranger is colourless; he is to a certain extent the reflection of his father and master, Parmenides, who is also the protagonist in the dialogue which is called by his name. Theaetetus himself is not distinguished by the remarkable traits which are attributed to him in the former dialogue. He is no longer under the spell of Socrates, or subject to the operation of his midwifery, though the fiction of question and answer is still maintained; and the necessity of taking Theaetetus along with him, is several times insisted upon by his partner in the discussion. There is a reminiscence of the old Theaetetus in his remark that he will not tire of the argument, and in his conviction, which the Eleatic thinks likely to be permanent, that the course of events is governed by the will of God. Throughout the two dialogues Socrates continues a silent auditor, in the Politicus just reminding us of his presence at the commencement, by a characteristic jest about the statesman and the philosopher, and by an allusion to his namesake, with whom on that ground he claims affinity, as he had
already claimed affinity with Theaetetus, grounded on the likeness of his ugly face. But in neither dialogue, any more than in the Timaeus, does he offer any criticism on the views which are propounded by another.

The style, though wanting in dramatic power, in this respect resembling the Philebus and the Laws, is very clear and accurate, and has several touches of humour and satire. The language is less fanciful and imaginative than that of the earlier dialogues; and there is more of bitterness, as in the Laws, though traces of a similar temper may also be observed in the description of the 'great brute' in the Republic, and in the contrast of the lawyer and philosopher in the Theaetetus. The following are characteristic passages: 'The ancient philosophers, of whom we may say without offence, that they went on their way rather regardless of whether we understood them or not.' Or, again, the picture of the materialists, or earth-born giants, 'who grasped oaks and rocks in their hands,' and must be improved before they can be reasoned with; and the equally humorous delineation of the friends of ideas, who defend themselves from a fastness in the invisible world; or the comparison of the Sophist to a painter or maker (cp. Rep. x.), and the hunt after him in the rich meadow-lands of youth and wealth. Or, again, the light and graceful touch with which the older philosophies are painted (Italian and Sicilian muses), and the fear of the Eleatic that he will be counted a parricide if he ventures to lay hands on his father, Parmenides. Or, once more, the likening of the Eleatic stranger to a god from heaven—all these passages, notwithstanding the decline of the style, retain the impress of the great master of language. But the equally diffused grace is gone; instead of the endless variety of the early dialogues, traces of the rhythmical, monotonous cadence of the Laws begin to appear; and already an approach is made to the technical language of Aristotle, in the frequent use of the words 'essence,' 'power,' 'generation,' 'motion,' 'rest,' 'action,' 'passion,' and the like.

The Sophist, like the Phaedrus, has a double character, and unites two enquiries, which are only in a somewhat forced manner connected with each other. The first is the search after the Sophist, the second is the enquiry into the nature of not-being, which occupies the middle part of the work. For 'not-being' is the hole or division of the dialectical net in which the Sophist has hidden himself. He is the imaginary impersonation of false opinion. But he denies the reality of false opinion; for falsehood is that which is not, and therefore has no existence. At
length the difficulty is solved; the answer, in the language of the Republic, appears tumbling out at our feet. Acknowledging that there is a communion of kinds with kinds, and not merely one being or good having different names, or several isolated ideas or classes incapable of communion, we discover 'not-being' to be the other of 'being.' Transferring this to language and thought, we have no difficulty in apprehending that a proposition may be false as well as true. The Sophist, drawn out of the shelter which Cynic and Megarian paradoxes have temporarily afforded him, is proved to be a dissembler and juggler with words.

The chief points of interest in the Sophist are: (1) the character attributed to the Sophist: (2) the dialectical method: (3) the nature of the puzzle about 'not-being': (4) the battle of the philosophers: (5) the relation of the Sophist to other dialogues.

The Sophist in Plato is the master of the art of illusion; the charlatan, the foreigner, the prince of esprits-faux, the hireling who is not a teacher, and who, from whatever point of view he is regarded, is the opposite of the true teacher. He is the 'evil one,' the ideal representative of all that Plato most disliked in the moral and intellectual tendencies of his own age; the adversary of the almost equally ideal Socrates. He seems to be always growing in the fancy of Plato, now boastful, now eristic, now clothing himself in rags of philosophy, now more akin to the rhetorician or lawyer, now haranguing, now questioning, until the final appearance in the Politicus of his departing shadow in the disguise of a statesman. We are not to suppose that Plato intended by such a description to depict Protagoras or Gorgias, or even Thrasymachus, who all turn out to be 'very good sort of people when we know them,' and all of them part on good terms with Socrates. But he is speaking of a Being as imaginary as the wise man of the Stoics, and whose character varies in different dialogues. Like mythology, Greek philosophy has a tendency to personify ideas. And the Sophist is truly a creation of Plato's in which the falsehood of all mankind is reflected.

A milder tone is adopted towards the Sophists in a well-known passage of the Republic (vi. 492), where they are described as the followers rather than the leaders of the rest of mankind. Plato ridicules the notion that any individuals can corrupt youth to a degree worth speaking of in comparison with the greater influence of public opinion. But there is no real inconsistency between this and other descriptions of the Sophist which occur in the Platonic writings. For Plato is not justifying the
Sophists in the passage just quoted, but only representing their power to be contemptible; they are to be despised rather than feared, and are no worse than the rest of mankind. But a teacher or statesman may be justly condemned, who is on a level with mankind when he ought to be above them. There is another point of view in which this passage should also be considered. The great enemy of Plato is the world, not exactly in the theological sense, yet in one not wholly different—the world as the hater of truth and lover of appearance, occupied in the pursuit of gain and pleasure rather than of knowledge, banded together against the few good and wise men, and devoid of true education. This creature has many heads: rhetoricians, lawyers, statesmen, poets, sophists. But the Sophist is the Proteus who takes the likeness of all of them; all other deceivers have a piece of him in them. And sometimes he is represented as the corrupter of the world; and sometimes the world as the more dangerous corrupter of the two.

Of late years the Sophists have found an enthusiastic defender in the distinguished historian of Greece. He appears to maintain that (1), the term 'Sophist' is not the name of a particular class, and would have been applied indifferently to Socrates and Plato, as well as to Gorgias and Protagoras; (2), that the bad sense was imprinted on the word by the genius of Plato; (3), that the principal Sophists were not the corrupters of youth (for that the Athenian youth were no more corrupted in the time of Demosthenes than in the time of Pericles), but honourable and estimable persons, who supplied a training in literature which was generally wanted in their own age. We will briefly consider how far these statements appear to be justified by facts: and,

About the meaning of the word, there arises an interesting question: (1) Many words are used both in a general and a specific sense, and the two senses are not always clearly distinguished. Sometimes the generic meaning has been narrowed to the specific, while in other cases the specific meaning has been enlarged or altered. Examples of the former class are furnished by some ecclesiastical terms: apostles, prophets, bishops, elders, catholics. Examples of the latter class may also be found in a similar field: Jesuits, puritans, methodists, and the like. Sometimes the meaning is both narrowed and enlarged; and a good or bad sense will subsist side by side with a neutral one. A curious effect is produced on the meaning of a word when the very term which is stigmatised by the world is adopted by the obnoxious or derided class; this
tends to define the meaning.' Or, again, the opposite result is produced, when the world refuses to allow to some sect or body of men the possession of some honourable name which they have assumed.

The term 'Sophist' is one of those words of which the meaning has been both contracted and enlarged. Passages may be quoted from Herodotus and the tragedians, in which the word is used in a neutral sense for a contriver or devisor or inventor, without including any ethical idea of goodness or badness. Poets as well as philosophers were called Sophists in the fifth century before Christ. In Plato himself, the term is applied in the sense of a 'master in art,' without any bad meaning attaching (Sym. 208 C, Men. 85 B). In the later Greek, again, 'sophist' and 'philosopher' became almost indistinguishable. There was no reproach conveyed by the word; the additional association, if any, was only that of rhetorician or teacher. Philosophy had become eclecticism and imitation: in the decline of Greek literature there was no original voice lifted up 'which reached to a thousand years because of the god;' and the two words, like the characters represented by them, tended to pass into one another. Yet even here some differences appeared. For the term 'Sophist' would hardly have been applied to the greater names, such as Plotinus; and would have been more often used of a professor of philosophy in general than of a maintainer of particular tenets.

But the question is, not really whether the word 'Sophist' has all these senses, but whether there is not also a specific bad sense in which the term is applied to certain contemporaries of Socrates. Would an Athenian, as Mr. Grote supposes, in the fifth century before Christ, have included Socrates and Plato, as well as Gorgias and Protagoras, under the specific class of Sophists? To this question we must answer, No: wherever the word is so applied, the application is made either by an enemy of Socrates and Plato, or in a neutral sense. Plato, Xenophon, Isocrates, Aristotle, all give a bad import to the word; and the Sophists are regarded as a separate class in all of them. And in later Greek literature, the distinction is quite marked between the succession of philosophers from Thales to Aristotle, and the Sophists of the age of Socrates, who appeared like meteors for a short time in different parts of Greece. For the purposes of comedy, Socrates may have been identified with the Sophists, and he seems to complain of this in the Apology. But there is no reason to suppose that Socrates, differing by so many outward marks, would really have been confounded in the mind of Anytus, or Callicles,
or of any intelligent Athenian, with the splendid foreigners who from time to time visited Athens or Elis at the Olympic games. The man of genius, the great original thinker, the disinterested seeker after truth, the master of repartee whom no one ever defeated in an argument, was separated, even in the mind of the vulgar Athenian, by an 'interval which no geometry can express,' from the balancer of sentences, the interpreter and reciter of the poets, the divider of the meanings of words, the teacher of rhetoric, the professor of morals and manners.

(2) The use of the term 'Sophist' in the dialogues of Plato also shows that the bad sense was not affixed by his genius, but already current. When Protagoras says, 'I confess that I am a Sophist,' he implies that he professes an art denoted by an obnoxious term; or when the young Hippocrates, with a blush upon his face which is just seen by the light of dawn, admits that he is going to be made 'a Sophist,' these words would lose their point, unless the term had been already discredited. There is nothing surprising in the Sophists having an evil name; that, whether deserved or not, was a natural consequence of their vocation. That they were foreigners, that they made fortunes, that they taught novelties, that they excited the minds of youth, are quite sufficient reasons to account for the opprobrium which attached to them. The genius of Plato could not have stamped the word anew, or have imparted the associations which occur in contemporary writers, such as Xenophon and Isocrates. Changes in the meaning of words can only be made with great difficulty, and not unless they are supported by a strong current of popular feeling. There is nothing improbable in supposing that Plato may have extended and envenomed the meaning, or that he may have done the Sophists the same kind of disservice with posterity which Pascal did to the Jesuits. But the bad sense of the word is not and could not have been invented by him, and is found in the earlier dialogues, e.g. the Protagoras, as well as in the later.

(3) There is no ground for denying that the principal Sophists, Gorgias, Protagoras, Prodicus, Hippias, were good and honourable men. The notion that they were corrupters of the Athenian youth has no real foundation; and partly arises out of the use of the term 'Sophist' in modern times. The truth is, that we know little about them; and the witness of Plato in their favour is probably not much more historical than his witness against them. Of that national decline of genius, unity, political force, which has been sometimes described as the corruption of youth, the
Sophists were one among many signs;—in these respects Athens may have degenerated; but, as Mr. Grote remarks, there is no reason to suspect any greater moral corruption in the age of Demosthenes than in the age of Pericles. The Athenian youth were not corrupted in this sense, and therefore the Sophists could not have corrupted them. It is remarkable, and may be fairly set down to their credit, that Plato nowhere attributes to them that peculiar Greek sympathy with youth, which he ascribes to Parmenides, and which is evidently common in the Socratic circle. Plato delights to exhibit them in a ludicrous point of view, and to show them always at a disadvantage in the company of Socrates. But he has no quarrel with their characters, and does not deny that they are respectable men.

The Sophist, in the dialogue which is called after him, is exhibited in many different lights, and appears and reappears in a variety of forms. There is some want of the higher Platonic art in the Eleatic Stranger eliciting his true character by a laborious process of enquiry, when he had already admitted that he knew quite well the difference between the Sophist and the philosopher, and had often heard the question discussed;—such an anticipation would hardly have occurred in the earlier dialogues. But Plato could not altogether give up his Socratic method, of which another trace may be thought to be discerned in his adoption of a common instance before he proceeds to the greater matter in hand. Yet the example is also chosen in order to damage the 'hooker of men' as much as possible; each step in the pedigree of the angler suggests some injurious reflection about the Sophist. They are both hunters after a living prey, nearly related to tyrants and thieves, and the Sophist is the cousin of the parasite and flatterer. The effect of this is heightened by the accidental manner in which the discovery is made, as the result of a scientific division. His descent in another branch affords the opportunity of more 'unsavoury comparisons.' For he is a retail trader, and his wares are either imported or home-made, like those of other retail traders; his art is thus deprived of the character of a liberal profession. But the most distinguishing characteristic of him is, that he is a disputant, and higgles over an argument. A feature of the Eristic here seems to blend with Plato's usual description of the Sophists, who in the early dialogues, and in the Republic, are frequently depicted as endeavouring to save themselves from disputing with Socrates by making long orations. In this character he parts company from the vain and
impertinent talker in private life, and his differentia is, that he makes, while the other loses money.

But there is another general division under which his art may be also supposed to fall, and that is purification; and from purification is descended education, and the new principle of education is to interrogate men after the manner of Socrates, and make them teach themselves. Here again we catch a glimpse rather of a Socratic or Eristic than of a Sophist in the ordinary sense of the term. And Plato does not on this ground reject the claim of the Sophist to be the true philosopher. One more feature of the Eristic rather than of the Sophist is the tendency of the troublesome animal to run away into the darkness of not-being. Upon the whole, we detect in him a sort of hybrid or double nature, of which, except perhaps in the Euthydemus of Plato, we find no other trace in Greek philosophy; he combines the teacher of virtue with the Eristic; while in his omniscience, in his ignorance of himself, in his arts of deception, and in his lawyer-like habit of writing and speaking about all things, he is still the antithesis of Socrates and of the true teacher.

II. The question has been asked, whether this method of 'abscissio infiniti,' by which the Sophist is taken, is a real and valuable logical process. Modern science feels that this, like other processes of formal logic, presents a very inadequate conception of the actual complex procedure of the mind by which scientific truth is detected and verified. Plato himself seems to be aware that mere division is an unsafe and uncertain weapon. First, in the Politicus, when he says that we should divide in the middle, for in that way we are more likely to attain species; secondly, in the parallel precept of the Philebus, that we should not pass from the most general notions to infinity, but include all the intervening middle principles, until, as he also says in the Politicus, we arrive at the infima species; thirdly, in the Phaedrus, when he says that the dialectician will carve the limbs of truth without mangling them; or, as he repeats once more in the Politicus, if we cannot bisect species, we must carve them as neatly as we can. No better image of nature or truth, as an organic whole, can be conceived than this. So far is Plato from supposing that mere division and subdivision of general notions will guide men into all truth.

Plato does not really mean to say that the Sophist or the Statesman can be caught in this way. But these divisions and subdivisions were favourite logical exercises of the age in which he lived; and while
indulging his dialectical fancy, and making a contribution to logical
method, he delights also to transfix the Eristic Sophist with weapons
borrowed from his own armoury. As we have already seen, the division
gives him the opportunity of making the most damaging reflections on
the Sophist and all his kith and kin, and to exhibit him in the most
discreditable light.

Nor need we seriously consider whether Plato was right in assuming
that no animal so various could be confined within the limits of a single
definition. In the infancy of logic, men sought only to obtain a defini-
tion of an unknown or uncertain term; the after reflection scarcely
occurred to them that the word might have several senses, which shaded
off into one another, and were not capable of being comprehended in
a single notion. There is no trace of this reflection in Plato. But
neither is there any reason to think, even if the reflection had occurred to
him, that he would have been deterred from carrying on the war with
weapons fair or unfair against the outlaw Sophist.

III. The puzzle about 'not-being' appears to us to be one of the most
unreal difficulties of ancient philosophy. We cannot understand the
attitude of mind which could imagine that falsehood had no existence,
if reality was denied to not-being: How could such a question arise at
all, much less become of serious importance? The answer to this, and
to all other difficulties of early Greek philosophy, is to be sought for
in the history of ideas, and the answer is only unsatisfactory because our
knowledge is defective. In the passage from the world of sense and
imagination and common language to that of opinion and reflection the
human mind was exposed to many dangers, and often

'Found no end in wandering mazes lost.'

The discovery of abstractions was the great source of all mental improve-
ment in after ages. But each one of this company of abstractions, if we
may speak in the metaphorical language of Plato, became in turn the
tyrant of the mind, the dominant idea, which would allow no other to
have a share in the throne. This is especially true of the Eleatic philo-
sophy: while the absoluteness of being was asserted in every form of
language, the sensible world and all the phenomena of experience were
comprehended under not-being. Nor did this lead to any difficulty or
perplexity, so long as the mind, lost in the contemplation of being, asked
no more questions, and never thought of applying the categories of being
or not-being to mind or opinion or practical life.
INTRODUCTION.

But the negative as well as the positive idea had sunk deep into the intellect of man. The effect of the paradoxes of Zeno extended far beyond the Eleatic circle. And now an unforeseen consequence began to arise. If the many were not, if all things were names of the one, and nothing could be predicated of any other thing, how could truth be distinguished from falsehood? The Eleatic philosopher would have replied that ‘being was alone true.’ But mankind had got beyond his barren abstractions: they were beginning to analyse, to classify, to define, to ask what is the nature of knowledge, opinion, sensation. Still less could they be content with the description which Achilles gives in Homer of the man whom his soul hates—

δς π' ἄτεροι μὲν κεῦδει εὖι φρεσίν ἄλλο δὲ βάζει.

For their difficulty was not a practical but a metaphysical one; and their conception of falsehood was really impaired and weakened by a metaphysical illusion.

The strength of the illusion seems to lie in the alternative: If we once admit the existence of being and not-being, as two spheres which exclude each other, no being or reality can be ascribed to not-being, and therefore not to falsehood, which is the image or expression of not-being. Falsehood is wholly false; and to speak of true falsehood, as Theaetetus does, is a contradiction in terms. The fallacy to us is ridiculous and transparent; no better than those which Plato satirizes in the Euthydemus. It is a confusion of falsehood and negation, from which Plato himself is not entirely free. Instead of saying, ‘this is not in accordance with facts,’ ‘this is proved by experience to be false,’ and from such examples forming a general notion of falsehood, the mind of the Greek thinker was lost in the mazes of the Eleatic philosophy. And the greater importance which Plato attributes to this fallacy, compared with others, is due to the influence which the Eleatic philosophy exerted over him. He sees clearly to a certain extent; but he has not yet attained a complete mastery over the ideas of his predecessors—they are still ends to him, and not mere instruments of thought. They are too rough-hewn to be harmonised in a single structure, and may be compared to rocks which project or overhang in some ancient city’s walls. There are many such imperfect syncretisms or eclecticisms in the history of philosophy. A modern philosopher, though emancipated from scholastic notions of essence or substance, might still be seriously affected by the abstract idea.
of necessity; though accustomed, like Bacon, to criticise abstract notions, he might not extend his criticism to the syllogism.

The saying or thinking the thing that is not, would be the popular definition of falsehood or error. If we were met by the Sophist's objection, the reply would probably be an appeal to experience. Ten thousands, as Homer would say (μᾶλα μύριοι), tell falsehoods and fall into errors. And this is Plato's reply, both in the Cratylus 429 D and Sophist. 'Theaetetus is flying,' is a sentence in form quite as grammatical as 'Theaetetus is sitting;' the difference between the two sentences is, that the one is true and the other false. But, before making this appeal to common sense, Plato propounds for our consideration a theory of the nature of the negative.

The theory is, that 'not-being is relation.' Not-being is the other of being, and has as many kinds as there are differences in being. This doctrine is the simple converse of the famous proposition of Spinoza, not 'omnis determinatio est negatio,' but 'omnis negatio est determinatio;'—not, all distinction is negation, but, all negation is distinction. Not-being is the unfolding or determining of being, and is a necessary element in all other things that are. We should be careful to observe, first, that Plato does not identify being with not-being; he has no idea of progression by antagonism, or of the Hegelian vibration of moments: he would not have said with Heraclitus, 'All things are and are not, and become and become not.' Secondly, he has lost sight altogether of the other sense of not-being, as the negative of being; although he again and again recognises the validity of the law of contradiction. Thirdly, he seems to confuse falsehood with negation. Nor is he quite consistent in regarding not-being as one class of being, and yet as coextensive with being in general. Before analysing further the topics thus suggested, we will endeavour to trace the manner in which Plato arrived at his conception of not-being.

In all the later dialogues of Plato, the idea of mind or intelligence becomes more and more prominent. That idea which Anaxagoras employed inconsistently in the construction of the world, Plato, in the Philebus, the Sophist, and the Laws, extends to all things; attributing to Providence a care, infinitesimal as well as infinite, of all creation. The divine mind is the leading religious thought of the later works of Plato. The human mind is a sort of reflection of this, having ideas of being, sameness, and the like. At times, they seem to be parted by a great gulf
(Parmenides); at other times they have a common nature, and the light of a common intelligence.

But this ever-growing idea of mind is really irreconcileable with the abstract Pantheism of the Eleatics. To the passionate language of Parmenides, Plato replies in a strain equally passionate:—What! has not being mind? and is not-being capable of being known? and, if this is admitted, then capable of being affected or acted upon?—in motion, then, and yet not wholly incapable of rest. Already, we have been compelled to attribute opposite determinations to being. And the answer to this difficulty may be equally the answer to the difficulty about not-being.

The answer is, that in these and all other determinations of any notion we are attributing to it 'not-being.' We went in search of not-being and seemed to lose being, and now in the hunt after being we recover both. Not-being is a kind of being, and in a sense co-extensive with being. And there are as many divisions of not-being as of being. To every positive idea—'just,' 'beautiful,' and the like, there is a corresponding negative idea—'not just,' 'not beautiful,' and the like.

A doubt may be raised, whether this account of the negative is really the true one? The common logicians would say that the 'not just,' 'not beautiful,' are not really classes at all, but are merged in one great class of the infinite or negative. The conception of Plato, in the days before logic, seems to be more correct than this. For the word 'not' does not altogether annihilate the positive meaning of the word 'just:' at least, it does not prevent our looking for the 'not just' in or about the same class in which we might expect to find the 'just.' 'Not just is not honourable'—is neither a false nor an unmeaning proposition. The reason is that the negative proposition has really passed into an undefined positive. To say that 'not just' has no more meaning than 'not honourable,' that is to say, that the two cannot in any degree be distinguished, is clearly repugnant to the common use of language.

The ordinary logic is also jealous of the explanation of negation as relation, because seeming to take away the principle of contradiction. Plato, as far as we know, is the first philosopher who distinctly enunciated this principle; and though we need not suppose him to have been always consistent with himself, there is no real inconsistency between his explanation of the negative and the principle of contradiction. Neither the Platonic notion of the negative as the principle of difference, nor the Hegelian identity of being and not-being, at all touch the principle of
contradiction. For what is asserted about being and not-being only relates to our most abstract notions, and in no way interferes with the principle of contradiction employed in the concrete. Because not-being is identified with other, or being with not-being, this does not make the proposition 'some have not eaten' any the less a contradiction of 'all have eaten.'

The explanation of the negative given by Plato in the Sophist is a true, but partial one; for the word 'not,' besides the meaning of 'other,' may also imply 'opposition.' And difference or opposition may be either total or partial: the not-beautiful may be other than the beautiful, or in no relation to the beautiful, or a specific class in various degrees opposed to the beautiful. And the negative may be a negation of fact or of thought (οὐδὲ and μηδὲ). Lastly, there are certain ideas, such as 'beginning,' 'becoming,' 'the finite,' 'the abstract,' in which the negative cannot be separated from the positive, and 'being' and 'not-being' are inextricably blended.

Plato restricts the conception of not-being to difference. Man is a rational animal, and is not as many other things as are not included under this definition. He is and is not, and is because he is not. Besides the positive class to which he belongs, there are endless negative classes to which he may be referred. This is certainly intelligible, but useless. The negative class is unmeaning, unless the 'not' is a mere modification of the positive, as in the difference between 'not honourable' and 'dishonourable;' or unless the class is characterised by the absence rather than the presence of a particular quality.

Nor is it easy to see how not-being any more than sameness or otherness is one of the classes of being. They are aspects rather than classes of being. Not-being can only be included in being, as the denial of any particular class of being. If we are to attempt to pursue such airy phantoms at all, the Hegelian identity of being and not-being is a more apt and intelligible expression of the same mental phenomenon. For Plato has not distinguished between the being which is prior to not-being, and the being which is the negation of not-being. (Cf. Par. 162 A, B.)

But he is not thinking of this when he says that being comprehends not-being. Again, we should probably go back for the true explanation to the influence which the Eleatic philosophy exercised over him. Under 'not-being' the Eleatic had included all the realities of the
sensible world. Led by this association and by the common use of language, which has been already noticed, we cannot be much surprised that Plato should have made classes of not-being. It is observable that he does not absolutely deny that there is an opposite of being. That is a question which he is inclined to leave, merely remarking that the opposition, if admissible at all, is not expressed by the term 'not-being.'

On the whole, we must allow that the great service rendered by Plato to psychology in the Sophist, is not his explanation of 'not-being' as difference. With this he certainly laid the ghost of 'not-being;' and we may attribute to him in a measure the credit of anticipating Spinoza and Hegel. But his conception is not clear or consistent; he does not recognise the different senses of the negative, and he confuses the different classes of not-being with the abstract notion. As the pre-Socratic philosopher failed to distinguish between the universal and the true, while he placed the particulars of sense under the false and apparent, so Plato appears to identify negation with falsehood, or is unable to distinguish them. The greater service rendered by him to mental science is the recognition of the communion of classes, which, although based by him on his account of 'not-being;' is independent of this. He clearly saw that the isolation of ideas or classes is the annihilation of reasoning. Thus, after wandering in many diverging paths, we return to common sense. And for this reason we may be inclined to do less than justice to Plato,—because the truth which he attains by a real effort of thought is to us a familiar and unconscious truism, which no one would any longer think either of doubting or examining.

IV. The later dialogues of Plato contain many references to contemporary philosophy. Both in the Theaetetus and in the Sophist he recognises that he is in the midst of a fray; a huge irregular battle everywhere surrounds him (Theaet. 153 A). First, there are the two great philosophies going back into cosmogony and poetry: the philosophy of Heraclitus, supposed to have a poetical origin in Homer, and that of the Eleatics, which in a similar spirit he conceives to be even older than Xenophanes (compare Protagoras, 316 E). Still older were theories of two and three principles, hot and cold, moist and dry, which were ever marrying and given in marriage: in speaking of these, he is probably referring to Pherecydes and the early Ionians. In the philosophy of motion there were different accounts of the relation of plurality and unity, which were supposed to be joined and severed by love and
hate, some maintaining that this process was perpetually going on (Heraclitus); others (Empedocles) that there was an alternation of them. Of the Pythagoreans or of Anaxagoras he makes no distinct mention. His chief opponents are, first, Eristics or Megarians; secondly, the Materialists.

The picture which he gives of both these latter schools is indistinct; and he appears reluctant to mention the names of their teachers. Nor can we easily determine how much is to be assigned to the Cynics, how much to the Megarians, or whether the 'repulsive Materialists' are Cynics or Atomists, or represent some unknown phase of opinion at Athens. To the Cynics and Antisthenes is commonly attributed, on the authority of Aristotle, the denial of predication, while the Megarians are said to have been Nominalists, asserting, the one good under many names, to be the true being of Zeno and the Eleatics, and, like Zeno, employing their negative dialectic in the refutation of opponents. But the later Megarians also denied predication; and this tenet, which is attributed to all of them by Simplicius, is certainly in character with their over-refining philosophy. The 'tyros young and old,' of whom Plato speaks, probably include both. At any rate, we shall be safer in accepting the general description of them which he has given, and in not attempting to draw a precise line between them.

Of these Eristics, whether Cynics or Megarians, several characteristics are found in Plato.

1. They pursue verbal oppositions; 2. They make reasoning impossible by their over-accuracy in the use of language; 3. They deny predication; 4. They go from unity to plurality, without passing through the intermediate stages; 5. They refuse to attribute motion or power to being; 6. They are the enemies of sense;—whether they are the 'friends of ideas' who carry on the polemic against sense, is uncertain; probably under this remarkable expression Plato designates those who more nearly approached himself, and may be criticising an earlier form of his own doctrines. We may observe that (1) he professes only to give us a few opinions out of many which were at that time current in Greece; (2) that he nowhere alludes to the ethical teaching of the Cynics; unless the argument in the Protagoras, that 'the virtues are one and not many,' may be supposed to contain a reference to their views, as well as to those of Socrates; and unless they are the school alluded to in the Philebus, which is described as 'being very skilful in physics, and as
maintaining pleasure to be the absence of pain." That Antisthenes wrote a book called 'Physicus,' is hardly a sufficient reason for describing them as skilful in physics, which appear to have been very alien to the tendency of the Cynics.

The Idealism of the fourth century before Christ in Greece, as in other ages and countries, seems to have provoked a reaction towards Materialism. The maintainers of this doctrine are described in the Theaetetus as repulsive persons, who will not believe what they cannot hold in their hands; and in the Sophist as incapable of argument. They are probably the same who are said in the tenth book of the Laws to attribute the course of events to nature, art, and chance. Who they were, we have no means of determining except from Plato's description of them. His silence respecting the Atomists might lead us to suppose that here we have a trace of them. But the Atomists were not Materialists in the grosser sense of the term, nor were they incapable of reasoning; and Plato would hardly have described a great genius like Democritus in the disdainful terms which he uses of the Materialists. Upon the whole, we must infer that the persons here spoken of are unknown to us, like the many other writers and talkers at Athens and elsewhere, of whose endless activity of mind Aristotle in his Metaphysics has preserved an anonymous memorial.

V. The Sophist is the sequel of the Theaetetus, and is connected with the Parmenides by a direct allusion (cp. Introduction to Theaetetus and Parmenides). In the Theaetetus, we sought to discover the nature of knowledge and false opinion. But the nature of false opinion seemed impenetrable; for we were unable to understand how there could be any reality in not-being. In the Sophist the question is taken up again; the nature of not-being is detected, and there is no longer any metaphysical impediment in the way of admitting the possibility of falsehood. To the Parmenides, the Sophist stands in a less defined and more remote relation. There human thought is in process of disorganization; no absurdity or inconsistency is too great to be elicited from the analysis of the simple ideas of unity or being. In the Sophist the same contradictions are pursued to a certain extent, but only with a view to their resolution. The aim of the dialogue is to show how the few elemental conceptions of the human mind admit of a natural connection in thought and speech, which Megarian or other sophistry vainly attempts to deny.
True to the appointment of the previous day, Theodorus and Theaetetus meet Socrates at the same spot, bringing with them an Eleatic Stranger, whom Theodorus introduces as a true philosopher. Socrates is amazed, and thinks that he must be a god in disguise, who, as Homer would say, has come to earth that he may visit the good and evil among men, and detect the foolishness of Athenian wisdom. At any rate he is a divine person, one of a class who are hardly recognised on earth, in divers forms appearing—now as statesmen, now as sophists, and they are often deemed madmen. Philosopher, statesman, sophist, says Socrates, repeating the words—I should like to ask our Eleatic friend what his countrymen think of them; do they regard them as one, or three?

The Stranger has been already asked this very question by Theodorus and Theaetetus; and he has no difficulty in replying that they are three; but to explain the difference fully, would take time. He is pressed to give the fuller explanation, either in the form of a speech or of question and answer. He prefers the latter, and chooses as his respondent Theaetetus, whom he already knows, and who is recommended to him by Socrates.

We are agreed, he says, about the name Sophist, but we are not equally agreed about his nature. Great subjects should be approached through familiar examples, and, considering that he is a creature not easily caught, I think that, before approaching him, we should try our hand upon some more obvious animal, who may be made the subject of logical experiment; shall we say an angler? 'Very good.'

In the first place, the angler is an artist, and there are two kinds of art;—productive art, which includes husbandry, manufactures, imitations; and acquisitive art, which includes learning, trading, hunting. The angler's is an acquisitive art, and acquisition may be effected either by exchange or by conquest; in the latter case, either by force or craft, and of conquest by craft, there is one kind which pursues inanimate, and another which pursues animate objects; and animate objects may be either land animals or water animals. The hunting of the last is called fishing; and of fishing, one kind uses enclosures, catching the fish in nets and baskets, and another kind uses spears by night and either spears or barbed points by day, and strikes with them; the spears are impelled from above, the barbs are jerked up from beneath into the head and lips of the fish. Thus, by a series of divisions, we have arrived at the definition of the angler's art.
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And now we may endeavour by a similar process to draw the Sophist from his hiding-place. Like the angler, he is an artist, and the resemblance does not end here. For they are both hunters, and hunters of animals; the one of water, and the other of land animals. But at this point they diverge, the one going to the sea and the rivers, and the other to the rivers of wealth and rich meadow-lands, in which generous youth abide. You may hunt tame animals on land, or you may hunt wild animals. And man is a tame animal, and he may be hunted either by force or persuasion;—either by the pirate, man-stealer, soldier, or by the lawyer, orator, talker. The latter use persuasion, and persuasion is either private or public. Of the private practitioners of the art, some bring gifts to those whom they hunt: these are lovers. And others take hire; and some of these flatter, and in return are fed; others profess to teach virtue and receive a round sum. And who are these last? Tell me who? Have we not unearthed the Sophist?

But, 2, he is a many-sided creature, and may still be traced in another line of descent. The acquisitive art had a branch of exchange as well as of hunting, and exchange is either giving or selling; and the seller is either a manufacturer or a merchant; and the merchant either retails or exports; and the exporter may export either food for the body or food for the mind. And of this trade in food for the mind, one kind may be termed the art of display, and another the sale of learning; and learning may be a learning of the arts or of virtue. The seller of the arts may be called an art-seller; the teacher of virtue, a Sophist.

Again, 3, there is a third line, in which a Sophist may be traced. For is he less a Sophist when, instead of exporting his wares to another country, he stays at home, and either buys or manufactures and then retails them?

Or, 4, he may descend from the acquisitive in the combative line, through the pugnacious, the controversial, the disputations; and he will be found at last in the eristic section of the latter, disputing in private for gain about the general principles of right and wrong.

And still there is a track of him which has not yet been followed out by us. Do not our household servants talk of sifting, straining, scouring? And they also speak of carding, warping, and the like: all these are processes of division, but they are of two kinds; while in the last-mentioned, like is divided from like; in the former, the good are separated from the bad. This latter process is termed purification; and again, of
purification, there are two sorts—first of bodies, whether animate or inanimate, there are purifications both internal and external—medicine and gymnastic are the internal purifications of the animate, and bathing the external; and of the inanimate, fulling and cleaning and other humble processes, some of which have ludicrous names. Not that dialectic is a respecter of names or persons, or a despiser of humble occupations; nor does she think much of the greater or less benefits conferred by them. For her aim is knowledge;—she wants to know how the arts are related to one another, and would quite as soon learn the nature of hunting from the vermin-destroyer as from the general. And now she only desires to have a general name, which shall distinguish purifications of the soul from purifications of the body.

Now, purification is the taking away evil; and there are two kinds of evil in the soul; the one answering to disease in the body, and the other to deformity. Disease is the discord or war of opposite principles in the soul; and deformity is the want of symmetry, or failure in the attainment of a mark or measure. The latter arises from ignorance, and no one is voluntarily ignorant; ignorance is only the aberration of the soul moving towards knowledge. And as medicine cures the disease and gymnastic the deformity of the body, so correction cures the injustice and education (which differs among the Hellenes from mere instruction in the arts) cures the ignorance of the soul. Again, ignorance is twofold; simple ignorance, and ignorance which is conceited of knowledge. And education is also twofold; there is the old-fashioned moral training of our forefathers, which was very troublesome and not very successful; and another, of a more subtle nature, which proceeds upon a notion that all ignorance is involuntary. This latter convicts a man out of his own mouth, by pointing out to him his inconsistencies and contradictions; and the consequence is that he quarrels with himself, instead of quarrelling with his neighbours, and is cured of prejudices and obstructions by a mode of treatment which is equally entertaining and effectual. The physician of the soul is aware that his patient will receive no nourishment unless he has been cleared out; and the soul of the great king himself, if he has not undergone this purification, is unclean and impure.

And who are the ministers of the purification? Sophists I may not call them. Yet they bear about the same likeness to Sophists as the dog, who is the gentlest of animals, does to the wolf, who is the fiercest. Comparisons are slippery things; but for the present, let us assume the
resemblance, which may probably be disallowed hereafter. Then, from division comes purification; and from this, mental purification; and from mental purification, instruction; and from instruction, education; and from education, that glorious art of Sophistry, which is engaged in the detection of conceit. I do not think that we have yet found the Sophist, or that his will ultimately prove to be the desired art of education; but neither do I think that he can long escape me, for every way is blocked. Before we make the final assault, let us take breath, and reckon up the many forms which he has assumed: 1, he was the paid hunter of wealth and birth; 2, he was the trader in the goods of the soul; 3, he was the retailer of them; 4, he was the manufacturer of his own learned wares; 5, he was the disputant; and 6, he is the purger away of prejudices; although this latter point is admitted to be doubtful.

Now, there must surely be something wrong in the professor of any art having so many names and kinds of knowledge. Does not the very number of them imply that the nature of his art is not understood? And that we may not be involved in the misunderstanding, let us observe his peculiar characteristic. He is a disputant. He will dispute and teach others to dispute about things visible and invisible—about man, about the gods, about politics, about law, about wrestling, about all things. But can he know all things? 'He cannot.' Then how can he give an answer satisfactory to any one who knows? 'Impossible.' Then what is the trick of his art, and why does he receive money from his admirers? 'Because he is supposed to know all things.' You mean to say that he seems to have a knowledge of them. 'Yes.'

Suppose a person were to say, not that he would dispute about all things, but that he would make all things, you and me, and all other creatures, the earth and the heavens and the gods, and would sell them all for a few pence—this would be a great jest; but not greater than a man saying that he knows all things, and can teach them in a short time, and at a small cost. For all imitation is a jest, and the most graceful form of jest. The painter is able to deceive children, who see his pictures at a distance, into the belief that he can make anything; and the Sophist can steal away the hearts of youths, who are still at a distance from the truth, not through their eyes, but through their ears, by the mummery of words; and they, too, are induced to believe that he knows all things. But as they grow older, and come into contact with realities, they learn by experience to see the true proportions of things.

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The Sophist, then, has not real knowledge; he is only an imitator, or image-maker.

And now, having got him in a corner of the dialectical net, let us divide and subdivide until we catch him. Of imitation there are two kinds: there is the imitation of reality, and the imitation of appearance. The latter may be illustrated by sculpture and painting, which alter the proportions of figures, and use illusions in order to adapt their works to the eye. And the Sophist also uses illusion, and is the imitator of appearance and not of reality. But how can there be an imitation of that which is not? Here arises a difficulty which has always beset the subject of appearances. For the argument is asserting the existence of not-being. And this is what the great Parmenides was all his life denying in prose and also in verse. 'You will never find,' he says, 'that not-being is.' And the words prove themselves! Not-being cannot be attributed to any being; for how can any being be wholly abstracted from being? Again, in every predication there is an attribution of singular or plural. But number is the most real of all things, and cannot be attributed to not-being. Therefore not-being cannot be predicated or expressed; for how can we say 'is not,' 'are not,' without number?

And now arises the greatest difficulty of all. If not-being is inconceivable, how can not-being be refuted? And am I not contradicting myself at this moment, in speaking either in the singular or the plural of that to which I deny either plurality or unity? You, Theaetetus, have the might of youth, and I conjure you to exert yourself, and, if you can, to find an expression of not-being which does not imply being and number. 'But I cannot;' Then the Sophist must be left in his hole. We may call him an image-maker if we please, but he will only say, 'And pray, what is an image?' And we shall reply, 'A reflection in the water, or in a mirror;' and he will say, 'Let us shut our eyes and open our minds; what is the common notion of all images?' 'I should answer, Such another, made in the likeness of the true.' Real or not real? 'Not real; at least, not in a true sense.' And real means 'is,' and not real 'is not' 'Yes.' Then a likeness is really unreal, and essentially not. Here is a complication of being and not-being, in which the many-headed Sophist has entangled us. He will at once point out that he is compelling us to contradict ourselves, by affirming being of not-being. I think that we must give up looking for him in the class of imitators.

But ought we to give him up? 'I should say, certainly not.' Then
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I fear that I must lay hands on my father, Parmenides; but do not think me a parricide; for there is no way except to show that in some sense not-being is; and if this is not admitted, no one can speak of falsehood, or false opinion, or imitation, without falling into a contradiction. You observe how unwilling I am to undertake the task, because I know that I am exposing myself to the charge of inconsistency in asserting not-being. But if I am to make the attempt, I think that I had better begin at the beginning.

Lightly in the days of our youth, Parmenides and others told us tales about the origin of the universe: one spoke of three principles warring and at peace again, marrying and begetting children; another of two principles, hot and cold, dry and moist, which also formed relationships. There were the Eleatics in our part of the world, saying that all things are one; their doctrine begins with Xenophanes, and is even older. Ionian, and, more recently, Sicilian muses speak of a one and many which are held together by enmity and friendship, ever parting, ever meeting. Some of them do not insist on the perpetual strife, but adopt a gentler strain, and speak of alternation only. Whether they are right or not, who can say? But one thing we can say—that they went on their way without much caring whether we understood them or not: tell me, Theaetetus, do you understand what they mean by their combinations and separations of two or more principles? I used to think, when I was young, that I knew all about not-being, and now being is as great a puzzle to me as not-being.

Let us proceed first to the examination of being. Turning to the dualist philosophers, we say to them: Is being a third element besides hot and cold? Or do you identify one of the two elements with being? At any rate, you can hardly avoid resolving them both into one. Let us next interrogate the patrons of the one. To them we say: Are being and one the same? And how can there be two names of one thing? If you admit of two names, that implies two things; or if you identify them, then the name will be either the name of nothing or of itself, i.e. a name. Again, the notion of being is conceived of as a whole—in the words of Parmenides, 'like every way unto a rounded sphere.' And a whole has parts; but that which has parts is not one, for unity has no parts. Is being, then, one, because the parts of being are one, or shall we say that being is not a whole? In the former case, one is made up of parts; and in the latter there is still plurality, viz. being, and a whole which
is apart from being. And being, if not a whole, lacks something of the nature of being, and becomes not-being. Nor can being ever have come into existence, for nothing comes into existence except as a whole; nor can being have number, for that which has number is a whole or sum of number. These are a few of the difficulties which are accumulating one upon another in the consideration of being.

We may proceed now to the less exact sort of philosophers. Some of them drag down everything to earth, and carry on a war like that of the giants, grasping rocks and oaks in their hands. Their adversaries defend themselves warily from an invisible world, and reduce the substances of their opponent to the minutest fractions, until they are lost in generation and flux. The last sort are civil people enough; but the materialists are rude and ignorant of dialectics; they must be taught how to argue before they can answer. Yet, for the sake of the argument, we may assume that they are better than they are, and able to give an account of themselves. They admit the existence of a mortal living creature, which is a body containing a soul and to this they would not refuse to attribute qualities—wisdom, folly, justice and injustice. The soul, as they say, has no visible body, but they do not like to assert of these qualities of the soul, either that they are corporeal, or that they have no existence; at this point they begin to make distinctions. Sons of earth, we say to them, if both visible and invisible qualities exist, what is the common nature which is attributed to them by the term 'being' or 'existence?' And, as they are incapable of answering this question, we may as well reply for them, that 'being is the power of doing or suffering.' Then we turn to the friends of ideas: to them we say, 'you distinguish becoming from being?' 'Yes,' they will reply. 'And in becoming you participate through the bodily senses, and, in being, by thought and the mind?' 'Yes.' And you mean by the word 'participation' a power of doing or suffering? To this they answer (I am acquainted with them, Theae-tetus, and know their ways better than you do), 'that being can neither do nor suffer, though becoming may.' And we rejoin: Does not the soul know? And is not 'being' known? And are not 'knowing' and being 'known' active and passive? That which is known is affected by knowledge, and therefore is in motion. And, indeed, how can we imagine that being is a mere everlasting form, devoid of motion and life or soul; for there can be no thought without soul, nor can soul be devoid of motion. But neither can thought nor mind be devoid of some principle of
rest or stability. And the philosopher must have both when he is defining the nature of being, as children say in their prayers, 'Give us moveables and immoveables.' And yet he is in a difficulty, for motion and rest are contradictions, and he affirms the existence of both of them. When he says that they both are, does he mean that motion is rest, or rest motion? 'No; he means to affirm the existence of some third thing, different from them both, which neither rests nor moves.' But how can there be anything which neither rests nor moves? Here is a second difficulty about being, quite as great as that about not-being. And we may hope that any light which is thrown upon the one may extend to the other.

Leaving them for the present, let us enquire what we mean by giving many names to the same thing, e.g. white, good, tall, to man; out of which tyros old and young derive such a feast of amusement. Their meagre minds refuse to attribute anything to anything; they say that good is good, and man is man; and that to affirm one of the other would be making the many one and the one many. Let us place them in a class with our previous opponents, and interrogate both of them at once. Shall we assume (1) that being and rest and motion, and all other things, are incommunicable with one another; or (2) that they all have indiscriminate communion; or (3) that there is communion of some and not of others? And we will consider the first hypothesis first of all.

If we suppose the universal separation of kinds, all theories alike are swept away; the patrons of a single principle of rest or of motion, or of a plurality of immutable ideas—all alike have the ground cut from under them; and all creators of the universe by theories of composition and division, whether out of or into a finite or infinite number of elemental forms in alternation or continuance, share the same fate. Most ridiculous is the discomfiture which attends the opponents of predication, who have the voice that answers them, like the ventriloquist Eurycles, in their own breast. For they cannot help using the words 'is,' 'apart,' 'from others,' and the like; and their adversaries are thus saved the trouble of refuting them. But (2) if all things have communion with all things, motion will rest, and rest will move; here is a 'reductio ad absurdum.' Two out of the three hypotheses are thus seen to be false; the third (3) remains, which affirms that only certain things communicate with certain other things. In the alphabet and the scale there are some letters and notes which combine with others; and some which do not; and the laws according to
which they combine or are separated are known to the grammarian and musician. And there is a science which teaches not only what notes and letters, but what classes admit of combination with one another, and what not. This is a noble science, on which we have stumbled unawares; in seeking after the Sophist we have found the philosopher. He is the master who discerns one whole or form pervading a scattered multitude, and many such wholes combined under a higher one, and many entirely apart—he is the true dialectician. Like the Sophist, he is hard to recognise, though for the opposite reasons; the Sophist runs away into the obscurity of not-being, the philosopher is dark from excess of light. And now, leaving him, we will return to our pursuit of the Sophist.

Agreeing in the truth of the third hypothesis, that some things have communion and others not, and that some may have communion with all, let us examine the most important kinds which are capable of admixture; and in this way we may perhaps find out a sense in which not-being may be affirmed to have being. Now the highest kinds are being, rest, motion; and of these, rest and motion exclude each other, but both of them are included in being; and again, they are the same with themselves and the other of each other. What is the meaning of these words, 'same' and 'other'? Are there two more kinds to be added to the three others? For sameness cannot be either rest or motion, because predicated both of rest and motion; nor yet being, because if being were attributed to both of them we should attribute sameness to both of them. Nor can other be identified with being; for then other, which is relative, would have the absoluteness of being. Therefore we must assume a fifth principle, which is universal, and runs through all things, for all things are the others of others. Thus there are five principles: (1) being, (2) motion, which is not, (3) rest, and because participating both in the same and other, is and is not the (4) same with itself, and is (5) other than the other. And motion is not being, but partakes of being, and therefore is and is not in the most absolute sense. Thus we have discovered that not-being is the principle of the other which runs through all things, being not excepted. And 'being' is one thing, and 'not-being' includes and is all other things. And not-being is not the opposite of being, but only the other. Knowledge has many branches, and the other or difference has as many, each of which is described by prefixing the word 'not' to some kind of knowledge. The not-beautiful is as real
as the beautiful, the not-just as the just. And the essence of the not-beautiful is to be separated from and opposed to a certain kind of existence which is termed beautiful. And this opposition and negation is the not-being of which we are in search, and is one kind of being. Thus, in spite of Parmenides, we have not only discovered the existence, but also the nature of not-being—that nature we have found to be relation. In the communion of different kinds, being and other mutually interpenetrate; other is, but is other than being, and other than each and all of the remaining kinds, and therefore in an infinity of ways 'is not.' And the argument has shown that the pursuit of contradictions is childish and useless, and the very opposite of that higher spirit which criticises the words of another according to the natural meaning of them. Nothing can be more unphilosophical than the denial of all communion of kinds. And we are fortunate in having established such a communion for another reason, because in continuing the hunt after the Sophist we have to examine the nature of discourse, and there could be no discourse if there were no communion. For the Sophist, although he can no longer deny the existence of not-being, may still affirm that not-being cannot enter into discourse, and as he was arguing before that there could be no such thing as falsehood, because there was no such thing as not-being, he may continue to argue that there is no such thing as the art of likeness-making and phantastic, because not-being has no place in language. Hence arises the necessity of examining speech, opinion, and imagination.

And first concerning speech; let us ask the same question about words which we have already answered about the kinds of being and the letters of the alphabet. To what extent do they admit of combination? Some words have a meaning when combined, and others have no meaning. One class of words describe action, another class agents: walks, runs, sleeps are examples of the first; stag, horse, lion of the second. But no combination of words can be formed without a verb and a noun, e.g. a man learns; the simplest sentence is composed of two words, and one of these must be a subject. For example, in the sentence, 'Theaetetus sits,' which is not very long, Theaetetus is the subject, or in the sentence 'Theaetetus flies,' Theaetetus is again the subject. And those two sentences differ in quality, for the first says of you that which is true, and the second says of you that which is not true, or, in other words, attributes to you things which are not as though
they were. This is false discourse in the shortest form. And thus not only speech, but thought and opinion and imagination are proved to be both true and false. For thought is only the process of silent speech; and opinion is only silent assent or denial which follows this, and imagination is only the expression of this in some form of sense. All of these are akin to speech, and therefore, like speech, admit of true and false. And we have discovered false opinion, which is an encouraging sign of our probable success in the rest of the enquiry.

Then now let us return to our old division of likeness-making and phantastic. When we were going to place the Sophist in one of them, a doubt arose whether there could be such a thing as a likeness, because there was no such thing as falsehood. At length falsehood has been discovered by us, and we have acknowledged that the Sophist is to be discovered in the class of imitators. All art was divided originally by us into two branches—productive and acquisitive. And now we may divide both on a different principle into the creations or imitations which are of human, and those which are of divine, origin. For we must admit that the world and ourselves and the animals did not come into existence by chance, or the spontaneous working of nature, but by divine reason and knowledge. And there are not only divine creations but divine imitations, such as apparitions and shadows and reflections, which are equally the work of a divine mind. And there are human creations and human imitations too, the art of building and the art of drawing a house. Nor must we forget that likeness-making may be an imitation of realities or an imitation of falsehoods, which last has been called by us phantastic. And this phantastic may be again divided into imitation by the help of instruments, and impersonations. And the latter may be either dissembling or unconscious, either with or without knowledge. A man cannot imitate you, Theaetetus, without knowing you, but he can imitate the form of justice or virtue if he have a sentiment or opinion about them. Not being well provided with names, the former I will venture to call the imitation of science, and the latter the imitation of opinion.

The latter is our present concern, for the Sophist has no claims to science or knowledge. But the imitator, who has only opinion, may be divided into two classes—the simple imitator, who thinks that he knows, and the dissembler, who knows and disguises his ignorance. And the last may be either a maker of long speeches, or of shorter speeches which compel
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the person conversing to contradict himself. The maker of longer
speeches is the popular orator; the maker of the shorter is the Sophist,
whose art may be traced as being the

contradictious

dissembling

without knowledge

human and not divine

juggling with words

phantastic or unreal

art of likeness-making.
Sophist.

Persons of the dialogue.

Theodorus. Theaetetus. Socrates.

An Eleatic Stranger, whom Theodorus and Theaetetus bring with them.

Steph. Theodorus. Here we are, as in duty bound, Socrates, according to the agreement of yesterday, bringing with us a stranger from Elea, who is the follower of Parmenides and Zeno, and a great philosopher.

Socrates. Is he not rather a god, Theodorus, who comes to us in the disguise of a stranger? For Homer says that all the gods, and especially the god of strangers, are companions of the meek and just, and visit the good and evil among men. And may not your companion be one of those higher powers, an elenchtic god, who, seeing our deficiencies in philosophy, has come to visit our words and detect our errors?

Theod. Nay, Socrates, that is not his character; he is not one of the disputatious sort; he is too good for that. And, in my opinion, he is not a god at all; but I do call him divine, for of all philosophers I should affirm this.

Soc. Very true indeed, my friend; and they are certainly as hard to be discerned as the gods. For the true philosophers, who are not merely made up for the occasion, appear in various forms unrecognised by the ignorance of men, and they walk to and fro in cities, as Homer says, looking from above upon human life; and some think nothing of them, and others can never think enough; and sometimes they appear as statesmen, and sometimes as sophists; and
then, again, they seem to be no better than madmen. I should like to ask our Eleatic friend, if he would tell us, what is thought and said in his country of these matters:

_Theod._ Of what matters?

_Soc._ I want to ask him about the Sophist, statesman, philosopher.

_Theod._ What do you specially want to ask about them?

_Soc._ I want to know whether his countrymen regard them as one or two, or whether, as there are three names, there are not also three classes to which they assign them?

_Theod._ I dare say that the Stranger will not object to discuss them? what say you, Stranger?

_Stranger._ I am far from objecting, Theodorus, nor have I any difficulty in replying that they regard them as three. But to define precisely the nature of each of them, is anything but a slight or easy task.

_Theod._ You have happened to light, Socrates, almost on the very question which we were asking our friend before we came hither, and he excused himself to us, as he does now to you; although he admitted that the question had been well discussed, and that he remembered the answer.

_Soc._ Then do not, Stranger, deny us the first favour which we ask of you: I am sure that you will not, and therefore I shall only beg you to say whether you commonly prefer to speak at length on the subject which you want to explain to another, or to proceed by the method of questions. I remember hearing Parmenides use the latter of the two methods, when I was a young man, and he was far advanced in years, in a very noble discussion.

_Str._ I prefer to talk with another when he responds pleasantly, and is light in hand; if not, I would rather have my own say.

_Soc._ Any one of the present company will respond kindly to you, and you can choose whom you like of them; I should recommend you to take a young person—Theaetetus, for example—unless you have a preference for some one else.

_Str._ I feel ashamed, Socrates, at just coming into a new society, instead of quietly conversing, to be spinning out a long oration, which, even if addressed to another, would seem to be a kind of display. For the true answer will be a very long one, and a great deal longer than might be expected from the question. At the
same time, I fear that I may seem ungracious if I refuse your courteous request, especially after what you have said. For I certainly cannot object to your proposal, that Theaetetus should respond, having already myself conversed with him, and having your recommendation of him.

Theaetetus. But are you sure, Stranger, that this will be quite as acceptable to the rest of the company, as Socrates supposes?

Str. You hear them applaud us, Theaetetus; after that, there is nothing more to be said. And so I am to argue with you, and if you tire of the argument, you may complain of your friends and not of me.

Theaet. I do not think that I shall tire, and if I do, I shall get my friend, young Socrates, the namesake of the other Socrates, to help; he is about my own age, and my partner at the gymnasium, and is constantly accustomed to work with me.

Str. Very good; you can decide about that for yourself as we proceed. And now let us draw together and begin our inquiry into the nature of the Sophist, first of the three: I should like you to make him out and bring him to light in an argument; at present, we are only agreed about the name. I dare say that we may both of us have the thing in our minds, but we ought always to come to an understanding about the thing in terms of a definition, and not merely about the name minus the definition. Now the tribe of Sophists which we are investigating is not easily caught or defined, and mankind have been agreed of old, that if great subjects are to be adequately treated, they must practise on simpler and easier matters before they aspire to the greatest of all, and as I know that the tribe of Sophists is troublesome and hard to be caught, I should recommend that we first practise the method of discovery in something easier, unless you can suggest any better plan.

Theaet. Indeed I cannot.

Str. Then suppose that we take some slight thing as a pattern of the greater?

Theaet. Good.

Str. What is there which is well known and not great, and is yet as susceptible of definition as any larger thing? Shall I say an angler? He is familiar to all of us, and not a very interesting or important person.

Theaet. True.
Str. I suspect that he will supply us with a definition and process of enquiry just such as we want.

Theaet. Very true.

Str. Let us begin by asking whether he is a man having or not having art, but having some other power.

Theaet. He is clearly a man of art.

Str. And there are two kinds of arts?

Theaet. How is that?

Str. There is agriculture, and the tending of mortal creatures; and the art of constructing or moulding vessels, as we term them, and there is the art of imitation: all these may be properly called by a single name.

Theaet. What do you mean? And what is the name?

Str. He who brings into existence something that did not exist before is said to be a producer, and that which is brought into existence is said to be produced.

Theaet. True.

Str. And all the arts which were just now mentioned are characterised by this power of producing?

Theaet. They are.

Str. Then let us sum them up under the name of productive art.

Theaet. Very good.

Str. Next follows the whole class of learning and acquiring knowledge, together with trade, fighting, hunting; since none of these produces anything, but is only engaged in conquering by word or deed, or in preventing others from conquering things which exist and have been already produced—in each and all of these branches there appears to be an art which may be called acquisitive.

Theaet. Yes, that is the proper name.

Str. Seeing, then, that all arts are either acquisitive or productive, in which class shall we place the art of the angler?

Theaet. Clearly in the acquisitive class.

Str. And the acquisitive may be subdivided into two parts: there is voluntary exchange, which is effected by gifts, hire, purchase; and the other part of acquisitive, which takes by force of word or deed, may be termed forcible exchange?

Theaet. That is implied in what has been said.

Str. And may not this forcible exchange be again subdivided?
Theaet. How?

Str. Open force may be called fighting, and secret force may have the general name of hunting?

Theaet. Yes.

Str. And there will be a want of discrimination in not further dividing the art of hunting.

Theaet. How would you make the division?

Str. Into the hunting of living and of lifeless prey.

Theaet. Yes, if both kinds exist.

Str. Of course they exist; the hunting after lifeless things having no special name, except in the case of diving, and such small matters may be omitted; the hunting after living things may be called animal hunting.

Theaet. Yes.

Str. And animal hunting may be truly said to have two divisions, land animal hunting, which has many kinds and names, and the other the hunting after animals who swim—water animal hunting?

Theaet. True.

Str. And of swimming animals, one class lives on the wing and the other in the water?

Theaet. Certainly.

Str. Fowling is the general term under which the hunting of all birds is included.

Theaet. True.

Str. The hunting of the water animals has the general name of fishing.

Theaet. Yes.

Str. And shall we not divide this sort of hunting also into two principal kinds?

Theaet. What are they?

Str. There is one kind which takes them in nets, the other which takes them by a blow.

Theaet. What do you mean, and how do you distinguish them?

Str. As to the first kind—since all that surrounds and encloses anything to prevent egress, may be rightly called an enclosure—

Theaet. Very true.

Str. For which reason twig baskets, casting-nets, nooses, creels, and the like may all be termed 'enclosures?'

Theaet. True.
Str. And therefore this first kind of hunting may be called by us hunting with enclosures, or something of that sort?

Theaet. Yes.

Str. The other kind, which is practised with hooks and three-pronged spears, when summed up under one name, may be called striking, unless you, Theaetetus, can find some better name?

Theaet. No matter about the name—that will do very well.

Str. There is one mode of striking, which is done at night, and by the light of a fire, and is called by the hunters themselves firing, or spearing by firelight.

Theaet. True.

Str. And the fishing by day is called by the general name of 'fishing with barbs,' since the spears, too, are barbed at the point.

Theaet. Yes, that is the term.

Str. Of this barb-fishing, that which strikes the fish who is below from above is called spearing, because this is the way in which the three-pronged spears are used.

Theaet. Yes, that is a term which is employed.

Str. Then there is only one kind remaining.

Theaet. What is that?

Str. When the blow which is given by the hook is not as with the spear fixed in any part of the prey, but about the head and mouth, the movement is from below upwards, and the fish is drawn out with reeds and rods:—What is the right name of that, Theaetetus?

Theaet. I suspect that we have now discovered the object of our search.

Str. Then now you and I have come to an understanding not only about the name of the angler's art, but about the definition of the thing. One half of all art was acquisitive—half of the acquisitive was conquest or taking by force, half of this was hunting, and half of the hunting was hunting animals, half of this was hunting water animals—of this again, the under half was fishing, half of fishing was striking; the first half of this was fishing with a barb, and one half of this being the kind which strikes with a hook and draws the fish from below upwards, is the kind which we are now seeking, and which is hence denoted angling (ἀπαλιεντική, ἀνασπᾶσθαι).
*Theaet.* All that has been satisfactorily discussed.

*Str.* And now, having this pattern, let us endeavour to find out what a Sophist is.

*Theaet.* By all means.

*Str.* The first question about the angler was, whether he was a man of art or a private individual?

*Theaet.* True.

*Str.* And shall we call our new friend a private individual, or a thorough master of his art?

*Theaet.* Certainly not a private individual, for the name, as you were saying, must express the nature.

*Str.* He must be supposed to have some art.

*Theaet.* And what art is that?

*Str.* By heaven, they are cousins! that never occurred to us.

*Theaet.* Who are cousins?

*Str.* The angler and the Sophist.

*Theaet.* How is that?

*Str.* They both appear to me to be hunters.

*Theaet.* How the Sophist? Of the other we have spoken.

*Str.* You remember our division of hunting, into hunting after swimming animals and walking animals?

*Theaet.* Yes.

*Str.* And you remember that we subdivided the swimming and left the walking animals, saying that there were many kinds of them?

*Theaet.* Certainly.

*Str.* Thus far, then, the Sophist and the angler, starting from the art of acquiring, take the same road?

*Theaet.* True.

*Str.* Their paths diverge when they have reached the art of animal hunting; the one going to the sea-shore, and to the rivers and to the lakes, and angling for the animals which are in them?

*Theaet.* Very true.

*Str.* While the other goes to land and water of another sort—rivers of wealth and rich meadow-lands of generous youth; and he also is intending to take the animals which are in them.

*Theaet.* What do you mean?

*Str.* Of hunting on land there are two principal divisions.

*Theaet.* What are they?
Str. One is the hunting of tame, and the other of wild animals.
Theaet. But are tame animals ever hunted?
Str. Yes, if you include man under tame animals. But if you like you may say that there are no tame animals, or that, if there are, man is not among them; or you may say that man is a tame animal and is not hunted—you shall decide which of these alternatives you prefer.
Theaet. I would rather say that man is a tame animal, and I will admit that he is hunted.
Str. Then let us divide the hunting of tame animals into two parts.
Theaet. How shall we make the division?
Str. Let us define piracy, man-stealing, tyranny, the whole military art—one and all as a hunting by force.
Theaet. Very good.
Str. But the art of the lawyer, of the popular orator, and the art of conversation may be called in one word the art of persuasion.
Theaet. True.
Str. And of persuasion, there may be said to be two kinds?
Theaet. What are they?
Str. One is private, and the other public.
Theaet. Yes: each of them forms a class.
Str. And of private hunting, one sort receives hire, and the other brings gifts.
Theaet. I do not understand you.
Str. You never observed the manner in which lovers hunt?
Theaet. In what particular?
Str. In that, besides other means, they lavish gifts on those whom they hunt.
Theaet. Most true.
Str. Let us admit this, then, to be the amatory art.
Theaet. Certainly.
Str. But that sort of hireling whose conversation is pleasing and who baits his hook with pleasure and only exacts his maintenance as the price of his flattery, we should all, if I am not mistaken, describe as possessing an art of sweetening, or making things pleasant.
Theaet. Certainly.
Str. And that sort, which professes to form acquaintances only
for the sake of virtue, and demands payment in money, may be fairly called by another name.

*Theaet.* To be sure.

*Str.* And what is that name? Will you tell me?

*Theaet.* There is no difficulty; I believe that we have discovered the Sophist; this, as I conceive, is his proper name.

*Str.* Then now, Theaetetus, his art may be traced as a branch of the appropriative, acquisitive family—which hunts living animals, land animals, tame animals—which hunts man, which hunts private individuals—for hire, taking money in exchange—having the semblance of education; and this is termed Sophistry, and is a hunt after the souls of rich young men of good repute—that is the conclusion.*

*Theaet.* Very true.

*Str.* Let us take another branch of his genealogy; for he is a professor of a great and many-sided art; and in what has preceded he appears to present another aspect, besides that of which we are speaking.

*Theaet.* How is that?

*Str.* There were two sorts of acquisitive art; the one concerned with hunting, the other with exchange.

*Theaet.* There were.

*Str.* And of the art of exchange there are two divisions, the one of giving, and the other of selling.

*Theaet.* Let us assume that.

*Str.* Further, we will suppose that the art of selling is divided into two parts.

*Theaet.* How is that?

*Str.* There is one part which is distinguished as the sale of a man's own productions; another, which is the exchange of the works of others.

*Theaet.* Certainly.

*Str.* And is not that part of exchange which takes place in the city, being about half of the whole, termed retailing?

*Theaet.* Yes.

*Str.* And that which exchanges the goods of one city for those of another by selling and buying is the exchange of the merchant?

*Theaet.* To be sure.

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1 Omitting χειρωτικῆς and πεζοθηρίας.
Str. And this exchange of the merchant is partly an exchange of food for the use of the body, and partly of the food of the soul which is bartered and received in exchange for money.

Theaet. What do you mean?

Str. You want to know what is the meaning of food for the soul; the other kind you understand.

Theaet. Yes.

Str. Take music in general and painting and marionette playing and many other things, which are purchased in one city, and carried away and sold in another—wares of the soul which are hawked about either for the sake of instruction or amusement;—may not he who takes them about and sells them, be quite as truly called a merchant as he who sells meats and drinks?

Theaet. To be sure he may.

Str. And would you not call by the same name him who goes about from city to city, buying knowledge from all quarters and bringing with him his wares to sell?

Theaet. Certainly I should.

Str. Of this merchandise of the soul, may not one part be fairly termed the art of display? And there is another which is certainly not less ridiculous, but being a trade in learning must be called by some name germane to the matter?

Theaet. Certainly.

Str. There should be two names for them, one descriptive of the sale of the knowledge of virtue, the other of the sale of other kinds of knowledge.

Theaet. Of course.

Str. The name of art seller corresponds well enough to the one, and I hope that you will tell me the name of the other.

Theaet. He must be the Sophist, whom we are seeking; no other name can possibly be right.

Str. No other; and so this trader in virtue again turns out to be our friend the Sophist, whose art may now be traced a second time, through the art of acquisition—exchange—buying and selling,—by the merchant, not forgetting that there is a merchandise of the soul which is concerned with speech and knowledge.

Theaet. Certainly.

Str. And there may be a third reappearance of him;—for he may have settled down in a city, and partly fabricate as well as buy
these same wares, intending to live by selling them, and he would still be called a Sophist?

_Sophist._ Certainly.

_Theaet._ Then that part of the acquisitive art which exchanges, and of exchange which either sells a man's own productions or retails those of others, as the case may be, and in either way sells knowledge, you would still term Sophistry?

_Theaet._ Whither the argument leads I must follow.

_Theaet._ What is that?

_Theaet._ In the acquisitive there was a subdivision of the combative or fighting art.

_Theaet._ There was.

_Theaet._ Perhaps we had better divide that.

_Theaet._ What shall be the divisions?

_Theaet._ There shall be one division of the competitive, and the other of the pugnacious.

_Theaet._ Very good.

_Theaet._ That part of the pugnacious which is a contest of bodily strength may be properly called by some such name as violent.

_Theaet._ True.

_Theaet._ And when the war is one of words, that may be termed controversy?

_Theaet._ Yes.

_Theaet._ And controversy may be of two kinds.

_Theaet._ How is that?

_Theaet._ When long speeches are answered by long speeches, and there is public discussion about the just and unjust, that is forensic controversy.

_Theaet._ Yes.

_Theaet._ And there is a private sort of controversy, which is cut up into questions and answers, and this is commonly called disputation?

_Theaet._ Yes, that is the name.

_Theaet._ And of disputation, that sort which is only a discussion about contracts, and is carried on at random, and without rules of art, is recognised by dialectic to be a distinct class, but has hitherto had no distinctive name, and does not deserve to receive one at our hands.
Theaet. No; for the different species are too minute and heterogeneous.

Str. But that which proceeds by rules of art to dispute about justice and injustice, and about things in general, have we not been accustomed to call argumentation (Eristic)?

Theaet. Certainly.

Str. And of argumentation, one sort wastes money, and the other makes money.

Theaet. Very true.

Str. Then now let us endeavour to give each of these two classes a name.

Theaet. Let us do that.

Str. I should say that the habit which leads a man to neglect his own affairs for the pleasure of conversation, of which the style is far from being equally agreeable to the majority of his hearers, may, in my opinion, be fairly termed loquacity.

Theaet. Yes, that is the name which is given.

Soc. But who is the other, who makes money out of private disputation? Try and tell me that.

Theaet. I must be right in saying that he is the wonderful Sophist, of whom we are in pursuit, and who reappears again for the fourth time.

Str. Yes, and with a fresh pedigree, for he is the money-making species of the Eristic—disputatious, controversial, pugnacious, combative, acquisitive family, as the argument has proven.

Theaet. Certainly.

Str. How true was the observation that he was a many-sided animal, and not to be caught with one hand, as they say!

Theaet. Then you must catch him with two.

Str. Yes, that is what we must do, as far as we can. And now let us pursue another track: You are aware that there are certain menial occupations which have names among servants?

Theaet. Yes, there are many such; which of them do you mean?

Str. I mean such as sifting, straining, winnowing, threshing.²

Theaet. Certainly.

Str. And beside these there are a great many more, such as carding, combing, adjusting the warp and the woof; and there are thousands of others.

² Reading δίψων, a conjecture of Professor Campbell's.
Theaet. Of what are they to be patterns, and what are we going to do with them all?

Str. I think that in all of these there is implied a notion of division.

Theaet. Yes.

Str. Then if, as I was saying, there is one art which includes all of them, ought not that art to have one name?

Theaet. And what is the name of the art?

Str. The art of discerning.

Theaet. Very good.

Str. Think whether you cannot divide this.

Theaet. I should have to think a long while first.

Str. In all the previously named processes either like has been separated from like or the better from the worse.

Theaet. That is obvious.

Str. I know no name for the first kind of separation; of the second, which throws away the worse and preserves the better, I do know a name.

Theaet. What is that?

Str. Every discernment or separation of that kind, as I perceive upon reflection, is called a purification.

Theaet. Yes, that is the usual expression.

Str. And any one may see that purification is of two kinds.

Theaet. I dare say, if there were time to reflect; but I do not see at this moment.

Str. There are many purifications of bodies which may with propriety be comprehended under a single name.

Theaet. What are they, and what is the word in which they may be summed up?

Str. There is the purification of living bodies in their inward and in their outward parts, of which the former is duly effected by medicine and gymnastic, the latter by the less dignified art of the bath-man; and there is the purification of inanimate substances—to this the arts of fulling and other furbishing attend in a number of minute particulars, and have a variety of names which are thought ridiculous.

Theaet. Very true.

Str. There can be no doubt that they are thought ridiculous, Theaetetus; but then the dialectical art never considers whether
the benefit to be derived from the potion is greater or less than that to be derived from the sponge, and has no more interest in the one than in the other; her endeavour is to know what is and is not kindred in all arts, with a view to the acquisition of intelligence; and having this in view, she honours them all alike, and when she makes comparisons, she counts one of them not a whit more ridiculous than another; nor does she esteem him who adduces as his example of hunting, the general's art, at all more decorous than another who cites that of the vermin-destroyer, but only as the greater pretender of the two. And as to the question which you were asking about the name which was to comprehend all these arts of purification, whether of animate or inanimate substances, the spirit of dialectic is in no wise particular about fine words, if she may be only allowed to have a general name for all other purifications, binding them up together and separating them off from the purification of the soul or intellect. For this is the purification at which she wants to arrive, and this we should understand to be her aim.

_Theaet._ Yes, I understand; and I agree that there are two sorts of purification, and that one of them is concerned with the soul, and that there is another which is concerned with the body.

_Str._ Excellent; and now attend to what I am going to say, and try to divide the term again.

_Theaet._ Whatever line of division you suggest, I will endeavour to follow you.

_Str._ Do we admit that virtue is distinct from vice in the soul?

_Theaet._ Certainly.

_Str._ And purification was leaving the good and casting out whatever is bad?

_Theaet._ True.

_Str._ Then any taking away of evil from the soul may be properly called purification?

_Theaet._ Yes.

_Str._ And in the soul there are two kinds of evil.

_Theaet._ What are they?

_Str._ The one may be compared to disease in the body, the other to deformity.

_Theaet._ I do not understand.

_Str._ Perhaps you have never reflected that disease and discord are the same.
Theaet. To this, again, I know not what I should reply.
Str. Do you not conceive discord to be a corruption of kindred elements originating in some disagreement?
Theaet. Just that.
Str. And is deformity anything but the want of measure, which is always unsightly?
Theaet. Exactly.
Str. And do we not see that opinion is opposed to desire, pleasure to anger, reason to pain, and that all similar elements are opposed to one another in the souls of bad men?
Theaet. Certainly.
Str. And yet they must all be akin?
Theaet. Of course.
Str. Then we shall be right in calling vice a discord and disease of the soul?
Theaet. Most true.
Str. And when things having motion, and aiming at an appointed mark, continually miss their aim and glance aside, shall we say that this is the effect of symmetry among them, or of the want of symmetry?
Theaet. Clearly of the want of symmetry.
Str. But surely we know that no soul is voluntarily ignorant of anything?
Theaet. Certainly not.
Str. And what is ignorance but the aberration of a mind which is bent on truth, and in which the process of understanding is perverted?
Theaet. True.
Str. Then we are to regard an unintelligent soul as deformed and devoid of symmetry?
Theaet. Very true.
Str. Then there are these two kinds of evil in the soul—the one which is generally called vice, and is recognised as disease?
Theaet. Yes.
Str. And there is the other, which they call ignorance, and which they do not like to admit to be vice, because having no existence except in the soul.  

3 Or, 'although there is no other vice in the soul but this.'
Theaet. I certainly admit what I at first disputed—that there are two kinds of vice in the soul, and that we ought to consider cowardice, intemperance, injustice, and all other vices, to be disease in the soul, and the state of ignorance, which has many kinds, to be deformity.

Str. And in the body are there not two arts which have to do with the two bodily states?

Theaet. What are they?

Str. There is gymnastic, which has to do with deformity, and medicine, which has to do with disease.

Theaet. True.

Str. And where there is insolence and injustice and cowardice, is not correction the art which is most required?

Theaet. That certainly appears to be the opinion of mankind.

Str. Again, where there is any sort of ignorance, may not instruction be said to be the best remedy?

Theaet. True.

Str. Of the art of instruction, shall we say that there is one or more kinds? Are there not two principal ones? Think.

Theaet. I will.

Str. I think that I can see how we are most likely to arrive at the answer to this.

Theaet. How?

Str. If we could discover a line which divides ignorance into two halves, we should then find the divisions of instruction; for if ignorance is twofold, that would clearly imply that the art of instruction is also twofold, and answers to the two divisions of ignorance.

Theaet. Well, and do you see what you are looking for?

Str. I do seem to myself to see one very large and bad sort of ignorance which is quite separate, and may be weighed in the scale against all other parts of ignorance put together.

Theaet. What is that?

Str. When a person thinks that he knows and does not know; this appears to be the great source of all the errors of the intellect.

Theaet. True.

Str. And this, if I am not mistaken, is the kind of ignorance which specially earns the title of want of sense.

* Omitting δική.
Theaet. True.

Str. What name, then, shall be given to that sort of instruction which gets rid of this?

Theaet. The instruction of which you speak, Stranger, is not the teaching of handicraft arts, but is what in our part of the world has been termed education by us.

Str. Yes, Theaetetus, and by all Hellenes. But we have still to consider whether education admits of any further division.

Theaet. That has to be considered.

Str. I think that there is a point at which such a division is possible.

Theaet. At what point?

Str. Of education, one method appears to be rougher, and there is another which is smoother.

Theaet. How are we to distinguish the two?

Str. There is the time-honoured mode which our fathers commonly practised towards their sons, and which is still adopted by many—either of roughly reproving their errors, or of gently advising them, which may be called by the general term of admonition.

Theaet. True.

Str. But whereas some appear to have arrived at the conclusion that all ignorance is involuntary, and that no one who thinks himself wise is willing to learn any of those things, in which he is conscious of his own cleverness, and that the admonitory sort of instruction gives much trouble and does little good—

Theaet. There they are quite right:

Str. Accordingly, they endeavour to eradicate the spirit of conceit in another way.

Theaet. What way is that?

Str. They cross-examine a man as to what he is saying, when he thinks that he is saying something and is saying nothing; he is easily convicted of inconsistency in his opinions; these they collect, and placing them side by side, show that they contradict one another about the same things, in relation to the same things, and in the same respect. He seeing this is angry with himself, and grows gentle towards others, and thus is entirely delivered from great prejudices and harsh notions, in a way which is most entertaining to hear, and produces the most lasting good effect on the person who is the subject of the operation. For as the physician considers
that the body will receive no benefit from taking food until the internal obstacles have been removed, so the instructor of the soul is conscious that his patient will receive no benefit from the applications of knowledge until he is refuted, and from refutation learns modesty; he must be cleared out, and learn to think that he knows only what he knows, and no more.

_Theaet._ That is certainly the best and most temperate state.

_Str._ For all these reasons, Theaetetus, we must admit that refutation is the greatest and chiefest of purifications, and he who has not been refuted, though he be the great King himself, is in the highest degree impure; he is uninstructed and deformed in those things in which he who would be truly blessed ought to be pure and fair.

_Theaet._ Very true.

_Str._ And who are the ministers of this art? I am afraid to say the Sophists.

_Theaet._ Why?

_Str._ Lest we should assign them too high an honour.

_Theaet._ Yet the description just given has a certain likeness to the Sophist.

_Str._ Yes, the same sort of likeness which a wolf, who is the fiercest of animals, has to a dog, who is the gentlest. But he who would not be found tripping, ought to be very careful in the matter of likenesses, for they are most slippery things; nevertheless, let us assume that the Sophists are the men. I say this provisionally, for I think that the line which divides them will be very marked when they really have to maintain their position.

_Theaet._ Very likely.

_Str._ Let us grant, then, that of the discerning art comes purification, of purification mental purification, of mental purification instruction is a portion, and of instruction education, and of education, that refutation of vain conceit which has been discovered in the course of the argument, and let us call that the noble art of Sophistry.

_Theaet._ Let us say that; and yet, considering the number of forms in which he has presented himself, I greatly doubt, after all, how I can with any truth or certainty describe the Sophist.

_Str._ You naturally feel perplexed; and yet I think that he must be still more perplexed in his attempt to escape us, for as the proverb
SOPHIST.

Says, when every way is blocked, there is no escape; now, then, is the time of all others to set upon him.

Theaet. True.

Str. First let us wait a moment and recover breath, and while we are reposing, let us reckon up in how many forms he has appeared. In the first place, he was discovered to be a paid hunter after wealth and youth.

Theaet. Yes.

Str. In the second place, he was a merchant or trader in the goods of the soul.

Theaet. Certainly.

Str. In the third place, he has turned out to be a retailer of the same sort of wares.

Theaet. Yes; and in the fourth place, he sold us the learned wares which he himself manufactured.

Str. Quite right; I will try and remember the fifth myself, and I believe that I shall be right in saying, fifthly, that he is a hero of dispute, having distinctly the character of a disputant.

Theaet. True.

Str. The sixth point was doubtful, and yet we at last agreed that he was a purger of souls, who cleared away notions obstructive to knowledge.

Theaet. Very true.

232 Str. Do you not see that when the professor of any art has one name and many kinds of knowledge, there must be something wrong; the multiplicity of names which is applied to him shows that the common principle to which all these branches of knowledge are tending, is not understood?

Theaet. I should imagine that this is the case.

Str: At any rate we will understand him, and no indolence shall stand in the way of that. Let us begin again, then, and re-examine some of our statements concerning the Sophist; there was one thing which appeared to me especially characteristic of him.

Theaet. What was that?

Str. We were saying of him, if I am not mistaken, that he was a disputer?

Theaet. We were.

Str. And is he not also a teacher of the art of disputation to others?
Theaet. Certainly he is.

Str. And about what does he say that he teaches men to dispute? To begin at the beginning; does he make them able to dispute about divine things, which are invisible to men in general?

Theaet. Yes; that is what is said.

Str. And what do you say of the visible things of heaven and earth and the like?

Theaet. Certainly he disputes, and teaches to dispute about them.

Str. Then, again, in private conversation, when any universal assertion is made about generation and essence, we know that they are tremendous argufiers, and are able to impart their own skill to others.

Theaet. Undoubtedly.

Str. And do they not profess to make men able to dispute about law and about politics in general?

Theaet. Why, they would have no disciples worth speaking of, if they did not make these professions.

Str. In all and every art, what the craftsman ought to answer on each occasion is written down and popularised, and he who likes may read.

Theaet. I suppose that you refer to the precepts of Protagoras about wrestling and the other arts?

Str. Yes, my friend, and about a good many other things. In a word, is not the art of disputation a power of disputing about all things?

Theaet. Certainly, there does not seem to be much which is left out.

Str. But, my dear friend, do you suppose this possible? for perhaps your young eyes may see things which to our duller sight do not appear.

Theaet. To what are you referring? for I do not think that I understand your present question.

Str. I ask whether a man can understand all things.

Theaet. That would be too great a happiness for man.

Str. But how can any one who is ignorant give a satisfactory answer to him who knows?

Theaet. He cannot.
Str. Then why has the sophistical art such a mysterious power?

Theaet. To what do you refer?

Str. How do they make young men believe in their own supreme and universal wisdom? For if they neither answered nor were thought to answer rightly, or when they answered were deemed no wiser for their controversial skill, then, to quote your own observation, no one would give them money or be willing to learn their art.

Theaet. They certainly would not.

Str. But, as the case stands, they are willing.

Theaet. Yes, they are.

Str. And the reason, I imagine, is that they are supposed to have knowledge of those things about which they dispute.

Theaet. Certainly.

Str. And they dispute about all things?

Theaet. True.

Str. And, to their disciples, they appear to be all-wise?

Theaet. Certainly.

Str. And they are not; for that was shown to be impossible.

Theaet. Impossible, of course.

Str. Then the Sophist has been shown to have conjectural or apparent knowledge only of all things, and not the truth?

Theaet. Certainly; that seems to be the exact fact about him.

Str. Let us now take an illustration, which will still more clearly explain his nature.

Theaet. What is that?

Str. I will tell you, and you shall answer me, giving your very closest attention. Suppose that a person were to profess, not that he could speak or answer, but that he knew how to make and do all things, by a single art.

Theaet. What do you mean by making all things?

Str. I see that you do not understand the very first word that I utter, for you do not understand the meaning of 'all.'

Theaet. No, I do not.

Str. Under all things, I include you and me, and also animals and trees.

Theaet. What do you mean?

Str. Suppose a person to say that he will make you and me, and all creatures.
Theaet. What do you mean by 'making'? He cannot be a husbandman;—and you have said that he is a maker of animals.

Str. Yes; and I say that he is also the maker of the sea, and the earth, and the heavens, and the gods, and of all other things; and, further, that he can make them in no time, and sell them for a few pence.

Theaet. That must be a jest.

Str. And when a man says that he knows all things, and can teach them to another at a small cost, and in a short time, is not that to be regarded as a jest?

Theaet. Certainly.

Str. And is there any more graceful or artistic form of jest than imitation?

Theaet. Certainly not; and imitation is a very comprehensive term, which includes under one class the most diverse sorts of things.

Str. We know, of course, that he who professes by one art to make all things is really a painter, and by the painter's art makes resemblances of them which have the same name with them; and he can deceive the less intelligent sort of young children, to whom he shows his pictures at a distance, into the belief that he has the absolute power of making whatever he likes.

Theaet. Certainly.

Str. And may there not be supposed to be an imitative art of reasoning? Is there any impossibility in stealing the hearts of youths through their ears, when they are still at a distance from the truth, by showing them fictitious arguments, and making them think that they are true, and that the speaker is the wisest of men in all things?

Theaet. Yes; why should there not be another similar art?

Str. But as time goes on, and they advance in years, and come more into contact with realities, and have learned by sad experience to see and feel the truth of things, are they not compelled to change many opinions which they had, and the great appears small to them, and the easy difficult, and all their seeming speculations are overturned by the facts of life?

Theaet. That is my view, as far as I can judge, although, at my age, I may be one of those who see things at a distance only.

Str. And the wish of all of us, who are your friends, is and
always will be to bring you as near to the truth as we can without
the experience. And now I should like you to tell me, whether
the Sophist is not visibly a magician and imitator of true being;
or are we still disposed to think that he may have a true know-
ledge of the various matters about which he disputes?

Theaet. But how is that possible, Stranger? Is there any doubt,
after what has been said, that he is to be located in one of the
divisions of children’s play?

Str. Then we must place him in the class of magicians and
mimics.

Theaet. Certainly we must.

Str. And now our business is not to let the animal out, for we
have got him in a sort of dialectical net, and there is one thing
which he certainly will not escape:

Theaet. What is that?

Str. The inference that he is a juggler.

Theaet. That is quite my own opinion of him.

Str. Then, I should like as soon as possible to divide the image-
making art, and go down into the net, and, if the Sophist does not
run away from us, to seize him and deliver him over to reason,
who is the lord of the hunt, and announce the capture of him;
and if he creeps into the recesses of the imitative art, and secretes
himself in one of them, to divide again and follow him up, until
in some subsection of imitation he is caught. For our method
of tackling each and all is one which neither he nor any other
creature will ever escape in triumph.

Theaet. That is good, and let us do as you say.

Str. Well, then, pursuing the same method as before, I think
that I can discern two divisions of the imitative art, but I am not
quite able to see in which of them the desired form is to be
found.

Theaet. Will you tell me first what are the two divisions of
which you are speaking?

Str. One is the art of likeness-making;—generally a likeness is
made by producing a copy which is executed according to the pro-
portions of the original, similar in length and breadth and depth,
and also having colours answering to the several parts.

Theaet. But is not this always the case in imitation?

Str. Not always; in works either of sculpture or of painting,
which are of any magnitude, there is a certain degree of deception; for if the true proportions were given, the upper part, which is farther off, would appear to be out of proportion in comparison with the lower, which is nearer; and so our artists give up the truth in their images and make only the proportions which appear to be beautiful, disregarding the real ones.

Theaet. Quite true.

Str. And that which being other is also like, may we not fairly call a likeness or image?

Theaet. Yes.

Str. And may we not call that part of the imitative art which is concerned with making such images the art of likeness-making?

Theaet. Let that be the name.

Str. And what shall we call that resemblance of the beautiful, which is due to the unfavourable position of the spectator, but if a person had the power of seeing the great works of which I was speaking as they truly are, would appear unlike even that to which it professes to be like? May we not call this an appearance, since it appears only and is not really like?

Theaet. Certainly.

Str. There is a great deal of this in painting, and in all imitation?

Theaet. Of course.

Str. And may we not fairly call that sort of art, which produces an appearance and not an image, phantastic art?

Theaet. That is very fair.

Str. Then there are two kinds of image-making—the art of making likenesses and phantastic, or the art of making appearances?

Theaet. True.

Str. I was doubtful before in which of them I should place the Sophist, nor am I even now able to see clearly; verily he is a wonderful being who has the art of making himself invisible. And now in the cleverest manner he has got into an impossible place.

Theaet. That is true.

Str. Do you speak advisedly, or are you carried away by the habit of saying 'Yes' into giving a hasty assent?

Theaet. Why do you say that?
Str. My good sir, we are engaged in a very difficult speculation—there can be no doubt of that; for how a thing can appear and seem and not be, or how a man can say a thing which is not true, has always been and still remains a very perplexing question;—Can he say or think that falsehood really exists, and avoid contradiction? Indeed, Theaetetus, there is great difficulty about that.

Theaet. Why?

Str. In using the word I had the audacity to assert the existence of not-being, for that is implied in the possibility of falsehood. But, my boy, in the days when I was a boy, the great Parmenides protested against this, and to the end of his life he continued to inculcate the same lesson—always repeating both in verse and out of verse:

'Keep your mind from this way of enquiry, for never will you show that not-being is.'

This is his testimony, which is confirmed by the words themselves, if you will fairly examine them. Would you object to begin with the consideration of this?

Theaet. Never mind about me; I am only desirous that you should carry on the argument in the best way, and that you should take me with you.

Str. True; and now say, do we venture to utter that forbidden word, 'not-being'?

Theaet. Certainly we do.

Str. Seriously then, and considering the question neither in strife nor play; suppose that one of his disciples is asked 'to what is the term "not-being" to be applied;' could we say how and to what he would apply the term, and what answer he would make to the enquirer?

Theaet. That is a difficult question, which to a person like myself is quite unanswerable.

Str. Well, there is no difficulty in seeing that the predicate 'not-being' is not applicable to any being.

Theaet. Certainly not.

Str. And if not to any being, then, not to something.

Theaet. Of course not.

Str. This is also plain, that in speaking of something we speak of being, for to speak of an abstract something naked and isolated from all being is impossible.
Theaet. Impossible.
Str. You mean by assenting to imply that he who says something must say some one thing?
Theaet. Yes.
Str. Some (ᵲ) in the singular you would say is the sign of one, some in the dual (ᵲᵲ) of two, some in the plural of many (ᵲᵲᵲ).
Theaet. Exactly.
Str. Then he who says ‘not something’ must absolutely say nothing.
Theaet. Most assuredly.
Str. And he who says ‘nothing,’ is not to be described as speaking; and therefore he who says ‘not-being’ does not speak at all.
Theaet. The difficulty of the argument can no further go.
Str. Not yet, my friend, is the time for such a word; for there still remains, of all perplexities the first and greatest, touching the very foundation of the matter.
Theaet. What do you mean? Do not be afraid to speak.
Str. To that which is, may be attributed some other thing which is?
Theaet. Certainly.
Str. But can anything which is, be attributed to that which is not?
Theaet. Impossible.
Str. And all number is to be reckoned among things which are?
Theaet. Yes, surely number, if anything, has a real existence.
Str. Then we must not attempt to attribute to not-being number either in the singular or plural?
Theaet. The argument implies that we should be wrong in doing that.
Str. But how can a man either express or even conceive not-being or nonentities without number?
Theaet. Tell me where is the difficulty.
Str. When we speak of nonentities or not-being [μὴ ὀντα] in the plural, are we not attributing plurality to not-being?
Theaet. Certainly.
Str. But, on the other hand, when we say not-being in the singular, do we not attribute unity?
Theaet. Manifestly.
Str. Nevertheless, we maintain that you may not and ought not to attribute being to not-being?

Theaet. Most true.

Soc. Do you see, then, that not-being in the abstract is inconceivable, unutterable, unspeakable, indescribable?

Theaet. Quite true.

Str. And was I wrong in saying just now that the difficulty which was coming is the greatest of all?

Theaet. What! is there a greater still behind?

Str. Well, I am surprised that you do not see the difficulty in which he who would refute the notion of not-being is involved. For the very words which I used imply that he is compelled to contradict himself as soon as he makes the attempt.

Theaet. What do you mean? Speak more clearly.

Str. Do not expect clearness from me. For I, who maintain that not-being has no part either in the one or many, just now spoke and am still speaking of not-being as one. For I say not-being,—do you understand?

Theaet. Yes.

Str. And a little while ago I said that not-being was unutterable, unspeakable, indescribable.

Theaet. I follow in a manner.

Str. When I said 'was,' did I not contradict what I said before?

Theaet. That is evident.

Str. And in using the singular verb, did I not speak of not-being as one?

Theaet. Yes.

Str. And when I spoke of not-being as indescribable and unspeakable and unutterable, in using each of these words in the singular, did I not refer to not-being as one?

Theaet. Certainly.

Str. And yet we say that, strictly speaking, it should not be defined either as one or many, and should—not be called 'it,' for even the mere use of the word 'it' would imply a form of unity.

Theaet. Quite true.

Str. How, then, can any one put any faith in me? For I am at a loss, as I have ever been found to be, in the refutation of not-being. And therefore, as I was saying, you had better not trust
to the correctness of my way of speaking about not-being; but let us try the question on you.

_Theaet._ What do you mean?

_Str._ Like a generous youth, as you are, do you use your utmost efforts to speak of not-being according to reason, without implying either existence or unity or plurality.

_Theaet._ It would be a strange boldness in me which would make the attempt when I see you thus discomforted.

_Str._ Well, let us say no more of ourselves; but this we must say, that until we find some one or other who can accomplish this feat, the rascal Sophist will not be got out of his dark hole.

_Theaet._ That certainly appears to be the case.

_Str._ And if we say to him that he has some art of making appearances, he will at once adopt this line of argument, tying our words behind our backs, and when we call him an image-maker he will say, 'Pray what do you mean by an image?' and I should like to know, Theaetetus, how we can possibly answer the younger's question?

_Theaet._ We shall doubtless tell him of the images which are reflected in water or in mirrors; also of sculptures, pictures, and other duplicates.

_Str._ I see, Theaetetus, that you have never made the acquaintance of the Sophist.

_Theaet._ Why do you say that?

_Str._ He will make believe that his eyes are shut, or that he has none.

_Theaet._ What do you mean?

_Str._ When you tell him of something existing in a mirror, or of statues, and address him as though he had eyes, he will laugh at your words, and will pretend that he knows nothing of mirrors and streams, or of sight at all; he will say that he is asking about an idea.

_Theaet._ What is that?

_Str._ The common notion which pervades these many objects, which you call by one name, and speak of as one when you pronounce the word 'image.' How will you maintain your ground against him?

_Theaet._ How can I describe an image except as such another made in the likeness of the true?
Str. When you say such another do you mean another real thing, or what do you mean by 'such?'
Theaet. Certainly not another real thing, but only a resemblance.

Str. And you mean by true or real that which really is?
Theaet. Yes.
Str. And the not true or not real is that which is the opposite of the true or real?
Theaet. Exactly.
Str. A resemblance, then, is not real if, as you say, not true?
Theaet. Yes, it is in a certain sense real.
Str. But you mean to say not in a true sense?
Theaet. No, only real in being a likeness.
Str. Then what we call a likeness is really unreal, and essentially not.
Theaet. In what a strange complication of being and not-being we are involved!
Str. Strange, I should think so. See how, by the help of this reciprocation of opposites, the many-headed Sophist has contrived to make us admit the existence of not-being, much against our will.
Theaet. Yes, indeed, I see.
Str. The difficulty is how to define his art without falling into a contradiction.
Theaet. How do you mean? And where does the danger lie?
Str. When we say that he deceives us with an illusion, and that his art is illusory, shall we say that our soul is led by his arts to think falsely, or what shall we say?
Theaet. There is nothing else that we can say.
Str. Again, false opinion is that form of opinion which thinks the opposite of the truth:—You would grant that?
Theaet. Certainly.
Str. You mean to say that false opinion thinks what is not?
Theaet. Of course.
Str. Does false opinion hold that things which are not are not, or that in a certain sense they are?
Theaet. Things that are not must be imagined to exist in a certain sense, if any degree of falsehood is to be admitted.
Str. And does not false opinion also think that things which most certainly are, are not?
Theaet. Yes.
Str. And this, again, is falsehood?
Theaet. Yes, that is falsehood.

Str. And in like manner, a false proposition will be considered to be one which asserts the non-existence of things which are, and the existence of things which are not.
Theaet. There is no other way in which falsehood can be conceived.

Str. There is not; but the Sophist will deny these statements. And, indeed, how can any rational man assent to them, seeing that the very expressions, which we have just used, were before acknowledged by us to be unutterable, unspeakable, indescribable, inconceivable? Do you see his point?

Theaet. Of course he will say that we are contradicting ourselves when we hazard the assertion, that falsehood exists in opinion and in words; for in maintaining this, we are compelled over and over again to assert being of not-being, which we have admitted just now to be an utter impossibility.

Str. Quite right; but I think that we had better now hold a consultation as to what we ought to do about the Sophist; for if we persist in looking for him in the class of false workers and magicians, you see that the handles for objection and the difficulties which will arise are very numerous and obvious.

Theaet. Very true.

Str. We have gone through a very small portion of them, and they are really infinite.

Theaet. If that is the case, we cannot possibly take the Sophist.

Str. Shall we give him up after all, because our hearts are faint?

Theaet. I should say that we ought not, if we can get the slightest hold of him.

Str. Will you, then, forgive me, and, as your words imply, be contented if I slightly flinch from the grasp of such a sturdy argument?

Theaet. Certainly, I will.

Str. There is also another request which I have to make.

Theaet. What is that?

Str. That you will promise not to regard me as a parricide.
Theaet. Why do you say that?

Str. I mean to say that, in self-defence, I must test the philosophy of my father Parmenides, and try to prove by main force that in a certain sense not-being is, and that being is not.

Theaet. Some attempt of the kind is clearly needed.

Str. Yes, a blind man, as they say, might see that, and, unless a decision on this point is obtained, no one when he speaks of false words, or false opinion, or idols, or images, or imitations, or apparitions, or about the arts which are concerned with them, can avoid falling into ridiculous contradictions.

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Theaet. Most true.

Str. And therefore I must venture to lay hands on my father’s argument; for, if I am to be scrupulous, I must entirely give the matter up.

Theaet. Nothing in the world should ever induce us to do that.

Str. I have a third little excuse which I wish to offer.

Theaet. What is that?

Soc. You heard me say what I have always felt and still feel—that I have no heart for this argument?

Theaet. I did.

Str. I tremble at the thought of what I have said, and expect that you will deem me mad, when you hear of my sudden changes and shiftings; let me therefore observe to you, that I am proceeding with the argument entirely out of regard for you.

Theaet. You certainly need not fear my bad opinion, or that I shall impute any impropriety to you, if you attempt to establish your refutation; take heart, therefore, and proceed.

Str. And where shall I begin the perilous enterprise? I think that the road which I had better take is—

Theaet. Which?—Let me hear.

Str. I think that we had better, first of all, consider the points which at present are regarded as self-evident, lest we should have fallen into some confusion about them, and be too ready to assent to one another, fancying that we have the means of judging.

Theaet. Say more clearly what you mean.

Str. I think that Parmenides, and all who undertook to determine the number and nature of existence, talked to us in rather a light and easy strain.

Theaet. How did they talk to us?
Str. As if we had been children, to whom they repeated each their own particular mythus or story;—one said that there were three principles at one time warring in a manner with one another, and then at peace again; and they were married and begat children, and brought them up; and another spoke of two principles,—a moist and dry, or hot and cold, which he brought together and gave in marriage to one another. The Eleatics in our part of the world say that all things are many in name, but in nature one; this is their mythus, which begins with Xenophanes, and is even older. Then there are Ionian, and in more recent times Sicilian muses, who have conceived the thought that to unite the two principles is safer; and they say that being is one and many, which are held together by enmity and friendship, ever parting, ever meeting, as the more potent masters of harmony assert, while the gentler ones do not insist on the perpetual strife and peace, but admit a relaxation and alternation of them; peace and friendship sometimes prevailing under the sway of Aphrodite, and then again diversity and war, by reason of a principle of strife. Whether any of them spoke the truth in all this is hard to determine; antiquity and famous men should have reverence, and not be liable to such insinuations. Yet one thing may be said of them without offence:

Theaet. What is that?

Str. That they went on their several ways with a good deal of disdain of people like ourselves; they did not care whether they took us with them, or left us behind them.

Theaet. How do you mean?

Str. I mean to say, that when they talk of one, two, or more elements, which are or have become or are becoming, or again of heat mingling with cold, and in some other part of their works assume separations and combinations of them,—tell me, Theaetetus, do you understand what they mean by these expressions? When I was a younger man, I used to fancy that I understood quite well what was meant by the term ‘not-being,’ which is our present subject of dispute; and now you see in what a perplexity we are landed.

Theaet. I see.

Str. And very likely we have been getting into the same difficulty about ‘being,’ and yet may fancy that when anybody utters the
word, we understand him and are in no difficulty, although we still admit that we are ignorant of not-being, when the truth is, that we are equally ignorant of both.

_Theaet._ I dare say.

_Str._ And the same may be said of all the subjects of the previous discussion.

_Theaet._ True.

_Str._ Most of them may be deferred for the present; but we had better now consider the chief captain and leader of them.

_Theaet._ I suppose that you are speaking of being, and you want to take this first, and discover what they mean who use the word?

_Str._ You follow close at my heels, Theaetetus. For the right method, I conceive, will be to call into our presence and interrogate the dialectic philosophers. To them we will say, 'O ye, who speak of hot and cold, or of any other two principles of which the universe consists, what term is this which you apply to both of them, and what do you mean when you say that both and each of them are? How are we to understand the word "are"? Are we to suppose that there is a third principle over and above the other two, and that there are three in all, and not two, according to your notions? For clearly you cannot say that one of the two principles is being, and yet attribute being equally to both of them; for, whichever of the two is identified with being, they would be one and not two.'

_Theaet._ Very true.

_Str._ You mean, then, to call the sum of both of them 'being'?

_Theaet._ I suppose so.

_Str._ Then, friends, we shall reply to them, the answer to that is plainly that the two will thus be resolved into one.

_Theaet._ Most true.

_Str._ Since, then, we are in a difficulty, please to tell us what you mean, when you speak of being; for there can be no doubt that you always from the first understood your own meaning, whereas we once thought that we understood you, but now we are in a great strait. Please to begin by explaining this matter to us, and let us no longer fancy that we understand you, when we entirely misunderstand you. There will be no impropriety in our thus enquiring either of the dualists or of the pluralists?

_Theaet._ Certainly not.
Str. And what about the assertors of the all and one—must we not endeavour to ascertain from them what they mean by 'being'?

Theaet. By all means.

Str. Then let us ask a question of them:—One, you say, alone is?

Yes, they will reply.

Theaet. True.

Str. And, again, being is?

Theaet. Yes.

Str. And is being the same as one, and do you apply two names to the same thing?

Theaet. What will be their answer to that, Stranger?

Str. It is clear, Theaetetus, that he who asserts the unity of being will find a difficulty in answering this or any other question.

Theaet. How is that?

Str. To admit of two names, and to affirm that there is nothing but unity, is surely ridiculous?

Theaet. Certainly.

Str. And equally irrational to admit that a name has any real existence?

Theaet. How is that?

Str. If the name is distinguished from the thing, that supposes two things.

Theaet. Yes.

Str. And yet he who identifies the name with the thing will be compelled to say that the name is of nothing, or if he says that the name is of something, then the name will be the name of a name, and of nothing else.

Theaet. True.

Str. The one in the same way will be only one of one, and although absolute unity, will be of a mere name.

Theaet. Certainly.

Str. And would they say that the whole is other than the one being, or the same with it?

Theaet. To be sure they will and do say that.

Str. If the one is a whole, as Parmenides sings,—

'Every way like the fullness of a well-formed sphere,
Equally balanced from the centre on every side,
And must needs be neither greater nor less,
Neither on this side nor on that——'

5 Reading ἔξου.
then being has a centre and extremes, and, having these, must also have parts.

Theaet. True.

Str. And that which has parts may have the attribute of unity in all the parts, and in this way being all and a whole, may be one?

Theaet. Certainly.

Str. But that of which this is the condition cannot be absolute unity?

Theaet. How is that?

Str. Because, according to right reason, that which is absolutely one ought to be affirmed to be indivisible.

Theaet. Certainly.

Str. But this indivisible, if made up of parts, will contradict reason.

Theaet. I understand.

Str. Shall we say that being is one and a whole only as having the attribute of unity? Or shall we say that being is not a whole at all?

Theaet. That is a hard alternative to offer.

Str. Most true; for being having in a certain sense the attribute of unity, is yet proved not to be the same as unity, and the all is therefore more than one.

Theaet. Yes.

Str. And yet if being be not a whole in having the attribute of one, and there be such a thing as an absolute whole, then being lacks something of the nature of being?

Theaet. Certainly.

Str. Upon this view, again, being having a defect of being, will become not-being?

Theaet. True.

Str. And, again, the all becomes more than one, for being and the whole will each have their separate nature.

Theaet. Yes.

Str. But if the whole does not exist at all, all the previous difficulties remain the same, and there will be the further difficulty, that besides having no existence, being can never have come into existence.

Theaet. Why is that?

Str. Because that which comes into existence always comes into
existence as a whole, so that he who does not give whole a place among existences, cannot speak either of essence or generation as being.

Theaet. Yes, that certainly appears to be true.

Str. Again; how can that which is not a whole have any quantity? For that which is of a certain quantity must necessarily be of that quantity taken as a whole.

Theaet. Exactly.

Str. And there will be innumerable other points, each of them involving infinite perplexity to him who says that being is either one or two.

Theaet. The difficulties which are already appearing prove this; for one objection connects with another, and they are always increasing in difficulty and eliciting fresh doubts about what has preceded.

Str. We are far from having exhausted the more exact thinkers who treat of being and not-being. But let us be content to leave them, and proceed to view those who speak less precisely; and we shall find as the result of all, that the nature of being is quite as difficult to comprehend as that of not-being.

Theaet. Then now we are to go to the others.

Str. There appears to be a sort of war of Giants and Gods going on amongst them; they are fighting about the nature of essence.

Theaet. How is that?

Str. Some of them are dragging down all things from heaven and from the unseen to earth, and seem determined to grasp in their hands rocks and oaks; of these they lay hold, and are obstinate in maintaining, that the things only which can be touched or handled have being or essence, because they define being and body as one, and if any one says that what is not a body exists they altogether despise him, and will hear of nothing but body.

Theaet. I have often met with such men, and terrible fellows they are.

Str. And that is the reason why their opponents cautiously defend themselves from above, out of an unseen world, mightily contending that true essence consists of certain intelligible and incorporeal ideas; the bodies of the materialists, which are maintained by them to be the very truth, they break up into little bits by their arguments, and affirm them to be generation and not
essence. O, Theaetetus, there is an endless war which is always raging between these two armies on this ground.

*Str.* Let us ask each of them, in turn, to give an account of that which they call essence.

*Theaet.* True.

*Str.* With those who make being to consist in ideas, there will be less difficulty, for they are civil people enough; but there will be very great difficulty, or rather an absolute impossibility, in arguing with those who drag everything down to matter. I will tell you what I think that we must do.

*Theaet.* What is that?

*Str.* Let us, if we can, really improve them; but if this is not possible, let us imagine them to be better than they are, and more willing to answer in accordance with the rules of argument, and then their opinion will be more worth having; for that which better men acknowledge has more weight than that which is acknowledged by inferior men. And we are no respecters of persons, but seekers of the truth.

*Theaet.* Very good.

*Str.* Then now, on the supposition that they are improved, let us ask them to state their views, and do you interpret them.

*Theaet.* That shall be done.

*Str.* Let them say whether they would admit that there is such a thing as a mortal animal.

*Theaet.* Of course they would.

*Str.* And do they not acknowledge this to be a body having a soul?

*Theaet.* Certainly they do.

*Str.* Meaning to say that the soul is an existence?

*Theaet.* True.

*Str.* And do they not say that one soul is just, and another unjust, and that one soul is wise, and another foolish?

*Theaet.* Certainly.

*Str.* And that the just and wise soul becomes just and wise by the possession and presence of justice, and the opposite by the opposite?

*Theaet.* Yes, they would admit that also.

*Str.* But surely that which may be present or may be absent will be admitted by them to exist?
Theaet. Certainly, they will allow that.

Str. And, allowing that these qualities of virtue, justice, and the like all exist, as well as the soul in which they inhere, do they affirm any of them to be visible and tangible, or are they all invisible?

Theaet. None of them surely are invisible.

Str. And would they say that they are corporeal?

Theaet. They would distinguish; the soul would be said by them to have a body; but as to the other qualities of justice, wisdom, and the like, about which you asked, they would not venture either to deny their existence, or to maintain that they were all corporeal.

Str. Verily, Theaetetus, I perceive a great improvement in them; the real aborigines, children of the dragon's teeth, would have been deterred by no shame at all, but would have obstinately asserted that nothing had any existence which they were not able to hold in their hands.

Theaet. That is pretty much their idea.

Str. Let us push the question; for if they will admit that any, even the smallest particle of existence, is incorporeal, that is enough; they must then say what that nature is which is common to both the corporeal and incorporeal, which they have in their mind's eye when they say of both of them that they 'exist.' Perhaps they may be in a difficulty; and if this is the case, there is a possibility that they may accept a suggestion of ours respecting the nature of essence, having nothing of their own to offer.

Theaet. What is the suggestion? Tell us, and we shall soon discover.

Str. My suggestion would be, that anything which possesses any sort of power to affect another, or to be affected by another even for a moment, however trifling the cause and however slight and momentary the effect, has real existence; and I hold that the definition of being is simply power.

Theaet. They accept your suggestion, having nothing better of their own to offer.

Str. Very good; perhaps we, as well as they, may one day change our mind; but, for the present, this may be regarded as the understanding which is established with them.

Theaet. That is settled.
Str. Let us now go to the friends of ideas; of their opinions, too, you shall be the interpreter.

Theaet. I will.

Str. To them we say—You would distinguish essence from generation.

Theaet. Yes; they reply.

Str. And you would allow that we participate in generation with the body, and by perception; but we participate with the soul by thought in true essence, and essence you would affirm to be always the same and immutable, whereas generation varies.

Theaet. Yes; that is what we should affirm.

Str. Well, fair sirs, we say to them, what is this participation which you assert of both? Do you agree with our recent definition?

Theaet. What definition?

Str. We said that participation is an active or passive energy, which arises out of a certain power of elements meeting with one another. Perhaps your ears, Theaetetus, may fail to catch their answer, which I recognise because I am accustomed to them.

Theaet. And what is their answer?

Str. They deny, the truth of what we were just now saying to the aborigines respecting essence.

Theaet. What was that?

Str. Any power of doing or suffering in relation to the least thing was held by us to be the definition of existence:

Theaet. True.

Str. They deny this, and say that the power of doing or suffering is confined to generation, and that neither power has anything to do with being.

Theaet. Is there not something in that?

Str. To that our reply will be, that we want to ascertain from them distinctly, whether they admit that the soul knows, and that being or essence is known.

Theaet. That is what they certainly say.

Str. And is knowing and being known, doing or suffering or both, or is the one doing and the other suffering, or has neither any share in either?

Theaet. Clearly, neither has any share in either; for if they say anything else, they would contradict themselves.
Str. I understand so much, at least, that if to know is active, then, of course, to be known is passive—And on this view being, as being known, is acted upon by knowledge, and is therefore in motion, for that which is in a state of rest cannot be acted upon as we affirm.

Theaet. True.

Str. And, O heavens, can we ever be made to believe that motion and life and soul and mind are not present with absolute being? Can we imagine being to be devoid of life and mind, and to remain in awful unmeaningness an everlasting fixture?

Theaet. That would be a terrible admission, Stranger.

Str. But shall we say that being has mind and not life?

Theaet. How can that be?

Str. Or both, but that there is no soul in which they exist?

Theaet. And how else can they exist?

Str. Or that being has mind and life and soul, and although endowed with soul remains entirely unmoved?

Theaet. All three suppositions appear to me to be irrational.

Str. Under being, then, we must include motion, and that which is moved.

Theaet. Certainly.

Str. Then, Theaetetus, our inference is, that if there is no motion, neither is there any mind anywhere, or about anything or belonging to any one.

Theaet. Quite true.

Str. And yet this equally follows, if we grant that all things are in motion—upon this view too mind has no existence.

Theaet. How is that?

Str. Do you think that sameness and permanence and relation to the same could exist not having rest?

Theaet. Certainly not.

Str. Do you suppose that without them mind could exist, or could come into existence anywhere?

Theaet. No.

Str. And surely contend we must in every possible way against him who would annihilate knowledge and reason and mind, and yet ventures to dogmatise in any way.

Theaet. Very true.

Str. Then the philosopher, who has the truest reverence for
being, cannot possibly accept the notion of those, who say that the whole is at rest, either in one or many forms; and he will be equally deaf to those who assert universal motion, but according to the children's prayer about all things movable and immovable, he would like to have both of them: Being, and the all would be affirmed by him to consist of both.

_Theaet._ Most true.

_Str._ And now, do we not seem to have gained a fair notion of being?

_Theaet._ Yes truly.

_Str._ Alas, Theaetetus, methinks that we are now only beginning to see the real difficulty of the enquiry about being.

_Theaet._ What do you mean?

_Str._ O my friend, do you not see that nothing can exceed our ignorance, and yet we fancy that we are saying something good?

_Theaet._ I certainly thought that we were; and I do not at all understand what you mean by this desponding tone.

_Theaet._ What were they? Will you recall them to my mind?

_Str._ To be sure I will, and I will remind you of them, by putting the questions to you as I did to them, and then we shall get on.

_Theaet._ True.

_Str._ Would you not say that rest and motion are in the most entire opposition to one another?

_Theaet._ Of course.

_Str._ And yet you would say that both and either of them equally exist.

_Theaet._ Yes, I maintain that.

_Str._ And when you say that both or either of them exist, do you mean to say that both or either of them are in motion?

_Theaet._ Certainly not.

_Str._ Or do you mean that they are both at rest, when you say that they exist?

_Theaet._ Of course not.

_Str._ Then you conceive of being as some third and distinct nature, under which rest and motion are included; and, observing that they both participate in existence, you declare that they are.
Theaet. I suspect that we must conceive of being as some third thing, when we say that rest and motion are.

Str. Then being is not the combination of rest and motion, but something different from them.

Theaet. That seems to be true.

Str. Being, then, according to its own nature, is neither in motion nor at rest.

Theaet. That is very much the truth.

Str. Where, then, is he to look for help who would attain any clear or fixed notion of being in his own mind?

Theaet. Where, indeed?

Str. I do not think that he can look anywhere; for that which is not in motion must be at rest, and again, that which is not at rest must be in motion, but being is placed outside of both these classes. Is this possible?

Theaet. Utterly impossible.

Str. Here, then, is another thing which we ought to bear in mind.

Theaet. What?

Str. That when we were asked to what we were to assign the appellation of not-being we were in the greatest difficulty:—do you remember?

Theaet. To be sure.

Str. And are we not now in as great a difficulty about being?

Theaet. I should say, Stranger, that we are in one which, if possible, is even greater.

Str. Then let us acknowledge the difficulty, and as being and not-being are involved in a like perplexity, there may be hope that when the one appears more or less distinctly, the other will equally appear; and if we are able to see neither, there may still be a chance of steering our way in between them, without any great discredit.

Theaet. Very good.

Str. Let us enquire, then, how we come to predicate many names of the same thing.

Theaet. Give an example.

Str. I mean that we speak of man, for example, under many names—that we attribute to him colours and forms and magnitudes and virtues and vices, in all of which and in ten thousand other cases, we not only speak of him as a man, but also as good,
and having numberless other attributes; and in the same way anything else which we originally supposed to be one is described by us as many, and under many names.

Theaet. That is true.

Str. And thus we provide a rich feast for tyros, whether young or old; for there is nothing easier than to argue that the one cannot be many, or the many one; and they are fond of denying that a man is good; but man, they insist, is man and good is good. I dare say that you have met with persons who take an interest in such matters—they are often elderly men, whose meagre sense is thrown into amazement by these discoveries of theirs, which they regard as the highest form of wisdom.

Theaet. Certainly, I have.

Str. Then, not to exclude any one who has ever speculated at all upon the nature of being, let us put our questions to them as well as to our former friends.

Theaet. What question?

Str. Shall we refuse to attribute being to motion and rest or anything to anything; but assume that they do not mingle, and are incapable of participating in one another? Or shall we gather all into one class of things communicable with one another? Or are some things communicable and others not?—Which of these alternatives, Theaetetus, will they prefer?

Theaet. I have nothing to answer on their behalf. Suppose that you take the several cases in turn, and see what are the consequences which follow from each of them.

Str. Very good, and first let us assume them to say that nothing is capable of participating in anything else; in that case rest and motion cannot participate in being at all.

Theaet. They cannot.

Str. Would either of them exist if devoid of participation in being?

Theaet. No.

Str. Then by this admission everything is instantly overturned, as well the doctrine of universal motion as of universal rest, and also the doctrine of those who distribute being into immutable and everlasting kinds, for all these imply a notion of being, some affirming that there is a 'being' of motion, and others that there is a 'being' of rest.
Theaet. Certainly.

Str. Again, those who would at one time compound, and at another resolve all things, whether making them into one and out of one creating infinity, or dividing them into finite elements, and compounding them out of these; whether they suppose the processes of creation to be successive or continuous, would be talking nonsense in all this if there were no admixture.

Theaet. True.

Str. Most ridiculous of all will be the men themselves, who forbid us to call anything, because participating in some affection from another, by the name of that other.

Theaet. Why so?

Str. Why, because they are compelled to use the words 'to be,' 'apart,' 'from others,' 'in itself,' and ten thousand more, which they cannot give up, but must make the connecting links of discourse; and therefore they do not require to be refuted by others, but their enemy, as the saying is, inhabits the same house with them; like the wonderful ventriloquist, Eurycles, they are always carrying about with them the still small voice of their own destruction in their bellies.

Theaet. That is a very exact illustration of them.

Str. And now, shall we suppose that all things have the power of communion with one another—what will follow from this?

Theaet. Even I can answer that supposition.

Str. How?

Theaet. Why, if all things have communion with all, this implies that rest has motion, and motion has rest.

Str. Than which surely nothing can be a greater absurdity?

Theaet. Of course.

Str. Then only the third hypothesis remains.

Theaet. True.

Str. But, surely, either all things have communion with all, or nothing with any other thing; or some things communicate with some things and others not.

Theaet. Certainly.

Str. And two out of these three suppositions are proved to be impossible.

Theaet. Yes.
Str. Every one then, who desires to answer truly, will adopt the third or remaining one, of the communion of some with some.

Theaet. Quite true.

Str. This communion of some with some may be illustrated by the case of letters; for some letters do not fit each other, but others do.

Theaet. Of course.

Str. And the vowels, especially, are a sort of bond which pervades all the other letters, so that without a vowel one consonant cannot be joined to another.

Theaet. True.

Str. But does every one know what letters will unite with what? Or is art required in order to know?

Theaet. Art is required.

Str. What art?

Theaet. The art of grammar.

Str. And is not this also true of sounds sharp and flat?—Is not he who has the art to know what sounds mingle, a musician, and he who does not know, not a musician?

Theaet. Yes.

Str. And we shall find this to be generally true of art or the absence of art.

Theaet. Of course.

Str. And as classes are admitted by us in like manner to be some of them capable and others incapable of admixture, must not he who would rightly show what kinds will unite and what will not, proceed rationally by the help of some science? And will he not ask whether there are any universal classes which bind them all together and make them capable of admixture; and others, again, which are necessary in all division?

Theaet. To be sure he will require science, and perhaps the very greatest of all sciences.

Str. And what is the name of this science? Have we not unintentionally fallen upon a gentle art, and in looking for the Sophist have entertained the philosopher unawares?

Theaet. What do you mean?

Str. Should we not say that the division according to classes, which neither makes the same other, nor makes other the same, is the business of the dialectical science?
Theaet. That is what we should say.

Str. Then, surely, he who can divide rightly, is able to see clearly one form pervading many individuals, which lie apart, and many different forms contained under one higher form; and again, one comprehensive form pervading many such wholes, and many others, existing only in separation and isolation. This is the knowledge of classes which determines where they can have communion with one another and where not.

Theaet. Quite true.

Str. And the art of dialectic would be attributed by you only to the true and pure philosopher?

Theaet. Who but he can be worthy?

Str. This is the region in which we shall always discover the philosopher, both now and hereafter; like the Sophist, he is not easily discovered, but for a different reason.

Theaet. What is that?

Str. The Sophist runs away into the darkness of not-being, in which he has learned by habit to feel about, and cannot be discovered himself because of the darkness of the place. Is not that true?

Theaet. Yes; that is what I think.

Str. And the philosopher, always holding converse through reason with the idea of being, is also dark from excess of light; for the eyes of the soul of the multitude are unable to endure the vision of the divine.

Theaet. Yes; that is quite as true as the other.

Str. Well, the philosopher may hereafter be more fully considered by us, if we are disposed; but the Sophist plainly must not be allowed to escape until we have had a good look at him.

Theaet. Very good.

Str. Since, then, we are agreed that some classes have a communion with one another, and others not, and some have communion with a few and others with many, and that there is no reason why some should not have universal communion with all, let us now pursue the enquiry, not in relation to all the ideas, lest the multitude of them should confuse us, but let us select a few of those which are reckoned to be the principal ones, and consider their several natures and their capacity of communion with one another, in order that if we are not able to apprehend with perfect
clearness the notions of being and not-being, we may at least reason about them, as far as the method of the present enquiry permits, and see whether we may be allowed to assert the reality of not-being, and yet escape unscathed.

Theaet. That is what we must do.

Str. The most important of all the genera are those which we were just now mentioning—being and rest and motion.

Theaet. They are by far the most important.

Str. And two of these are, as we affirm, incapable of communion with one another.

Theaet. No doubt.

Str. Whereas being surely has communion with both of them, for both of them exist?

Theaet. Of course.

Str. That makes up three of them.

Theaet. To be sure.

Str. And each of them is other than the two others, and the same with itself.

Theaet. True.

Str. But then, again, what is the meaning of these two words, ‘same’ and ‘other?’ Are they two new kinds other than the three, and yet always of necessity holding communion with them, and are we to have five kinds instead of three, or when we speak of the same and other, are we unconsciously speaking of one of the three first kinds?

Theaet. Very likely.

Str. But, surely, motion and rest are neither the other nor the same.

Theaet. How is that?

Str. Whatever we attribute to motion and rest in common, cannot be either of them.

Theaet. Why not?

Str. Because motion would be at rest and rest in motion, for either of them, being predicated of both, will compel the other to change into the opposite of its own nature, because partaking of its opposite.

Theaet. Quite true.

Str. Yet they surely both partake of the same and of the other?

Theaet. Yes.
Str. Then we must not assert that motion, any more than rest, is either the same or the other.

Theaet. No; we must not.

Str. But are we to conceive that being and the same are identical?

Theaet. Possibly.

Str. But if they are identical, then again in saying that motion and rest have being, we should also be saying that they are the same.

Theaet. And that surely cannot be.

Str. Then being and the same cannot be one.

Theaet. Scarcely.

Str. Then we may suppose the same to be a fourth class, which is now to be added to the three others.

Theaet. Quite true.

Str. And shall we call 'the other' a fifth class? Or shall we say that being and other are two names of the same class?

Theaet. Very likely.

Str. But you would agree, if I am not mistaken, that existences are relative as well as absolute.

Theaet. Certainly.

Str. And the other is always relative of other.

Theaet. True.

Str. But this would not be the case unless being and the other entirely differed; for, if the other, like being, were absolute as well as relative, then there would have been a kind of other which was not other of other. And now we find that what is other must of necessity be in relation to some other.

Theaet. That is the true state of the case.

Str. Then we must admit the 'other' as the fifth of our selected classes.

Theaet. Yes.

Str. And the fifth class pervades all classes, for they all differ from one another, not by reason of their own nature, but because they partake of the idea of the other.

Theaet. Quite true.

Str. Then let us now put the case with reference to each of the five.

Theaet. How?
Str. First there is motion, which we affirm to be the absolute ‘other’ of rest: that is what we should say.

Theaet. True.

Str. And therefore is not rest.

Theaet. Certainly not.

Str. And yet is, because partaking of being.

Theaet. True.

Str. Again, motion is other than the same?

Theaet. Quite true.

Str. And is therefore not the same.

Theaet. Certainly not.

Str. Yet, surely, motion is the same, because all things partake of the same.

Theaet. True.

Str. Then we must admit, and not object to say, that motion is the same and is not the same, for we do not apply the terms ‘same’ and ‘not the same,’ in the same sense; but we call it the same in relation to itself, because partaking of the same; and not the same, because having communion with the other, and being thereby separated from the same, and becoming not that but other, and therefore rightly spoken of as not the same.

Theaet. Quite true.

Str. And if absolute motion in any point of view partook of rest, there would be no absurdity in calling motion stationary.

Theaet. Right,—that is, on the supposition that some classes mingle with one another, and others not.

Str. That we begin by affirming, and that has been already clearly proved to be according to nature.

Theaet. Of course.

Str. Let us proceed, then. May we not say that motion is other than the other, having been also proved by us to be other than the same and other than rest?

Theaet. That is certain.

Str. Then, according to this view, motion is other and also not other?

Theaet. True.

Str. What is the next step? Shall we say that motion is other than the three and not other than the fourth, as we agreed that there are five classes, which we had undertaken to consider?
Theaet. Surely we cannot suppose that the number is less than appeared just now.

Str. Then we may fearlessly assert that motion is other than being.

Theaet. There is no reason for fear at all.

Str. The plain result is that motion, in partaking of being, is and also is not?

Theaet. Nothing can be plainer.

Str. Then not-being is of necessity attributed to motion and to every other class; for the nature of the other entering into them all, makes each of them other than being, and so not-being; and therefore of all of them, in like manner, we may say that they are not; and again, inasmuch as they partake of being, that they are.

Theaet. That appears to be true.

Str. Every class, then, has plurality of being and infinity of not-being.

Theaet. That seems to be true.

Str. Then being itself may be said to be other than the other kinds.

Theaet. Certainly.

Str. And we infer that being is not, just as many other things as there are; which are infinite in number.

Theaet. That is pretty much the truth.

Str. Neither must we object to this, since the nature of classes is that they participate in one another; and if any one denies our present statement [viz. that being is not, etc.], let him disprove our former arguments [i.e. respecting the communion of ideas], and then we will listen to his inferences.

Theaet. That is very fair.

Str. Let me ask you to consider another matter.

Theaet. What is that?

Str. When we speak of not-being, we speak not of something opposed to being, but only different.

Theaet. How is that?

Str. When we speak of something as not great, does the expression seem to you to imply what is little any more than what is equal?

Theaet. Certainly not.

Str. The negative particles, ὄχι and μή, when prefixed to words, do not necessarily imply opposition, but only difference from the
words, or more correctly from the things represented by the words which follow them.

_Theaet._ Quite true.

_Str._ Let us remark a further point for our mutual consideration.

_Theaet._ What is that?

_Str._ The nature of the other appears to me to be divided into fractions like knowledge.

_Theaet._ How is that?

_Str._ Knowledge is one; and yet the various parts of knowledge have each of them a particular name, and hence there are many arts and sciences.

_Theaet._ Quite true.

_Str._ And the other is one and yet has many parts.

_Theaet._ Very likely, but will you tell me how that is?

_Str._ There is some part of the other which is opposed to the beautiful.

_Theaet._ There is.

_Str._ Shall we say that this has or has not a name?

_Theaet._ That it has; for that which we call not-beautiful is the other of the nature of the beautiful.

_Str._ And now tell me something else.

_Theaet._ What?

_Str._ Is not this not-beautiful a nature parted off, and belonging to a particular class, and, again, opposed to a particular class of being?

_Theaet._ True.

_Str._ Then the not-beautiful is the contrast of being with being?

_Theaet._ Very true.

_Str._ But upon this view, is the beautiful a more real and the not-beautiful a less real existence?

_Theaet._ Not at all.

258 _Str._ And the not-great may be said to exist, equally with the great?

_Theaet._ Yes.

_Str._ And, in the same way, the just must be placed in the same category with the not-just; and one cannot be said to have any more existence than the other.

_Theaet._ Certainly.
Str. The same may be said of other things; seeing that the nature of the other has a real existence, the parts of this nature must equally be supposed to exist.

Theaet. Of course.

Str. Then, as would appear, the opposition of the part of the nature of the other, and of the part of the nature of being, to one another is, if I may venture to say the word, as truly essence as being itself, and signifies not the opposite of being, but only other of being.

Theaet. That is most evident.

Str. What then shall we call this?

Theaet. Clearly, not-being; and this is the very nature which the Sophist compelled us to examine.

Str. And has not this, as you were saying, as real an existence as any other class? May I not say with confidence that not-being has an assured nature of its own? Just as the great is great and the beautiful is beautiful, and the not-great is not great, and the not beautiful is not-beautiful, in the same manner not-being is not-being, and is to be reckoned one among many classes of being. Do you, Theaetetus, feel any doubt of this?

Theaet. None whatever.

Str. Do you observe that our scepticism has carried us far beyond the range of Parmenides' prohibition?

Theaet. In what?

Str. We have advanced to a further point, and shown him more than he forbad us to investigate.

Theaet. How is that?

Str. Why because he says—

'Not-being never is, and do thou keep thy thoughts from this way of enquiry.'

Theaet. Yes, that is what he says.

Str. Whereas, we have not only shown that things which are not exist, but we have also shown what form of being not-being is; for we have shown that the nature of the other exists, and is distributed over all things in their mutual relations, and when each part of the other is contrasted with being, that is precisely what we have ventured to call not-being.

Theaet. And surely, Stranger, in saying that we were quite right.

Str. Let not any one say, then, that while affirming the existence
of not-being, we still assert the opposition of not-being to being, for we have long ago given up speaking of an opposite of being;—that may or may not be, and may or may not be capable of definition.

But as touching our present account of not-being, let a man refute that, and convince us that we are in error, or, so long as he cannot, he too must say, as we are saying, that there is a communion of classes, and that being, and difference or other, traverse all things and mutually interpenetrate, so that the other partakes of being, and is, by reason of this participation, and yet is not that of which it partakes, but other, and being other than being, is clearly and manifestly not-being. And again, being, through partaking of the other, becomes a class other than the remaining classes, and being other than all of them, is not each one of them, and is not all the rest, so that there are thousands upon thousands of cases in which being is not as well as is, and all other things whether regarded individually, or collectively in many respects are, and in many respects, are not.

Theaet. True.

Str. And he who is sceptical of these sort of oppositions, must think how he can find something better to say; or if he sees a puzzle, and his pleasure is to drag words this way and that, the argument will prove to him, that he is not making a worthy use of his faculties; for there is no charm in such puzzles, and there is no difficulty in them; but we can tell him of something else in the pursuit of which there is a great charm and also a difficulty.

Theaet. What is that?

Str. A thing of which I have already spoken;—letting alone these puzzles as involving no difficulty, he should be able to follow and criticise in detail every argument, and when a man says that the same is in a manner other, or that other is the same, to understand and refute him from his own point of view, and in the same respect in which he asserts either of these affections. But to show that somehow and in some sense the same is other, or the other same, or the great small, or the like unlike; and to delight in always thus bringing forward oppositions in argument, is no true refutation, but only proves that he who uses such arguments is a neophyte who has got but a little way in the investigation of truth.

Theaet. To be sure.

Str. For certainly, my friend, the attempt to separate all exist-
ences from one another is not only tasteless but also illiterate and unphilosophical.

_Theaet._ Why is that?

_Str._ The attempt at universal separation is the final annihilation of all reason; for only by the union of conceptions with one another do we attain to discourse of reason.

_Theaet._ True.

_Str._ And, observe that we were only just in time in making a resistance to such separatists, and compelling them to make the admission that other did mingle with other.

_Theaet._ With what view?

_Str._ With the view of asserting the existence of discourse among our classes of being, for if we were deprived of this we should be deprived of philosophy, which would be the greatest of calamities; and not only so, but the necessity for determining the nature of discourse presses upon us at this moment; while if discourse were entirely taken from us, we should be no longer able to discourse at all; and this would be the case if we admitted that there was no admixture of natures at all.

_Theaet._ Very true. But I do not understand why at this moment we must determine the nature of discourse.

_Str._ Perhaps you will see more clearly by the help of the following explanation.

_Theaet._ What explanation?

_Str._ Not-being has been acknowledged by us to be one among many classes of being, diffused over all being.

_Theaet._ True.

_Str._ And thence arises the question, whether not-being mingles with opinion and language.

_Theaet._ How is that?

_Str._ If not-being has no part in the proposition, then all things must be true; but if not-being has a part, then false opinion and false speech are possible, for to think or to say what is not—that is falsehood, which thus arises in the region of thought and in speech.

_Theaet._ That is quite true.

_Str._ And if there is falsehood there is deceit.

_Theaet._ Yes.

_Str._ And if there is deceit, then all things must be full of idols and images and fancies.
Theaet. To be sure.

Str. Into that country the Sophist, as we said, made his escape, and, when he had got there, denied the very possibility of falsehood; no one, he argued, either conceived or uttered falsehood, inasmuch as not-being did not in any way partake of being.

Theaet. True.

Str. At this stage of the argument, not-being having been shown to partake of being, he will probably not continue fighting in this direction, but he will say that some ideas partake of not-being, and some not, and that language and opinion are of the non-partaking class; and he will still deny the existence of the image-making and phantastic art, in which we have placed him, because, as he will say, opinion and language do not partake of non-being, and unless this participation subsists, there can be no such thing as falsehood. And, with the view of meeting this evasion, we must begin by enquiring into the nature of language, opinion, and phantasy, in order that when we find them we may find also that they have communion with not-being, and, having made out the connection of them, we may then prove the reality of falsehood; there we will imprison the Sophist, if he can be there detained, or, if not, we will let him go free and look for him in another class.

Theaet. Certainly, Stranger, there appears to be truth in what was said about the Sophist at first, that he was of a class not easily caught, for he seems to have abundance of defences, and whenever he throws up one of them, this has to be stormed before he can be reached himself. And even now, we have hardly got through his first defence, which is the non-existence of not-being; and here is another, for we have still to show that falsehood is concerned with language and opinion, and there will be another and another, and never any end.

Str. Any one, Theactetus, who is able to advance even a little ought to be of good cheer, for what would he who is dispirited under these circumstances do in others in which he may be making no progress at all, or may even be undergoing a repulse? Such a faint heart, as the proverb says, will never take a city: but now that we have succeeded thus far, the citadel is ours, and what remains is easier.

Theaet. Very true.

Str. Then let us first of all obtain a conception of language and
opinion, as I was saying, in order that we may understand more clearly whether not-being has any concern with them, or whether they are both always true, and neither of them ever false.

_Theaet._ True.

_Str._ Then, now, let us speak of names, as before we were speaking of ideas and letters; for that is the direction in which the answer may be expected.

_Theaet._ And what is the question at issue about names?

_Str._ The question at issue is whether all names may be connected with one another, or none, or only some of them.

_Theaet._ Clearly the last is true.

_Str._ I understand you to say that words which have a meaning in their sequence may be connected, but that words which have no meaning in their sequence cannot be connected?

_Theaet._ What do you mean by this?

_Str._ What I thought that you intended when you gave your assent, for there are two sorts of intimation of being which are given by the voice.

_Theaet._ How is that?

_Str._ One of them is called nouns, and the other verbs.

_Theaet._ Describe them.

_Str._ That which denotes action we call a verb.

_Theaet._ True.

_Str._ And the other, which is an articulate mark set on those who do the actions, we call a noun.

_Theaet._ Quite true.

_Str._ The succession of nouns only is not a sentence, any more than of verbs without nouns.

_Theaet._ I do not understand this.

_Str._ I see that when you gave your assent you had something else in your mind. But what I intended to say was, that a mere succession of nouns or of verbs is not discourse.

_Theaet._ What do you mean?

_Str._ I mean that words like 'walks,' 'runs,' 'sleeps,' or any other words which denote action, however many of them you string together, do not make discourse.

_Theaet._ Of course not.

_Str._ Or, again, when you say 'lion,' 'stag,' 'horse,' or any other words which denote agents—neither in this way of stringing words
together do you attain to discourse; for there is no expression of action or inaction, or of the truth of existence or non-existence indicated by the sounds, until verbs are mingled with nouns; then the words fit, and the first combination of them forms language, and is the simplest and least of all discourse.

Theaet. How is that, again?

Str. When any one says 'man learns,' should you not say that this is the simplest and least of sentences?

Theaet. Yes.

Str. Yes, for he now arrives at the point of giving an intimation about something which is, or is becoming, or has become, or will be. And he not only names, but he does something, by connecting verbs with nouns; and therefore we say that he discourses, and to this connection of words we give the name of discourse.

Theaet. True.

Str. And as there are some things which fit one another, and other things which do not fit, so there are some vocal signs which do, and others which do not, combine and form discourse.

Theaet. Quite true.

Str. There is another small matter.

Theaet. What is that?

Str. A sentence must and cannot help having a subject.

Theaet. True.

Str. And must be of a certain quality.

Theaet. Certainly.

Str. And now let us give our best attention.

Theaet. By all means.

Str. I will repeat a sentence to you in which an action is combined with an agent, by the help of a noun and a verb, and you shall tell me of whom the sentence speaks.

Theaet. That I will, to the best of my power.

Str. 'Theaetetus sits:' that is not a very long sentence.

Theaet. Not very.

Str. Of whom does the sentence speak, and who is the subject? that is what you have to tell.

Theaet. Of me, and I am the subject.

Str. Or this sentence, again—

Theaet. What sentence?

Str. 'Theaetetus, with whom I am now speaking, is flying.'
Theaet. That also is a sentence which will be admitted by every one to speak of me, and to apply to me.

Str. We agreed that every sentence must necessarily have a certain quality.

Theaet. Yes.

Str. And what is the quality of each of these two sentences?

Theaet. The one, as I imagine, is false, and the other true.

Str. The true one says what is true about you?

Theaet. Yes.

Str. And the false one says what is other than true?

Theaet. Yes.

Str. And therefore speaks of things which are not as though they were?

Theaet. True.

Str. And says of you things really other than what are; for, as we were saying, in regard to each thing, there is much that is and much that is not.

Theaet. Quite true.

Str. The second of the two sentences which related to you was in the shortest form that was consistent with our definition.

Theaet. That was certainly said just now by us to be the shortest.

Str. And, in the second place, it was related to a subject?

Theaet. True.

Str. Who must be you, and cannot be anybody else?

Theaet. Unquestionably.

Str. And this would be no sentence if there were no subject, for, as we proved, a sentence which has no subject is impossible.

Theaet. Quite true.

Str. When other, then, is asserted of you as the same, and not-being as being, that combination of nouns and verbs is truly false discourse, and no mistake.

Theaet. Most true.

Str. And therefore thought, opinion, and phantasy are now proved to exist in our minds both as true and false.

Theaet. How is that?

Str. You will know better if you first gain a knowledge of what they are, and in what they severally differ from one another.

Theaet. Give me the knowledge which you would wish me to gain.
Str. Is not thought the same as speech, with this exception: thought is the unuttered conversation of the soul with herself?
Theaet. Quite true.
Str. But the stream of thought which flows through the lips and is audible is called speech?
Theaet. True.
Str. And we know that in speech there is affirmation and denial?
Theaet. Yes, that we know.
Str. When the affirmation or denial takes place silently and in the mind only, what would you call that but opinion?
Theaet. There can be no other name.
Str. And when this state of opinion is presented, not simply, but in some form of sense, ought you not to call that phantasy?
Theaet. Certainly.
Str. And seeing that language is true and false, and that thought is the conversation of the soul with herself, and opinion is the end of thinking, and phantasy or imagination is the union of sense and opinion, the inference is that these also, as they are akin to language, should have an element of false as well as true?
Theaet. Certainly.
Str. Do you perceive, then, that false opinion and speech have been discovered sooner than we expected?—For just now we feared that we were aiming at an end which would never be attained.
Theaet. I perceive.
Str. Then let us not be discouraged about the future; but now that this point has been brought to light, let us go back to our previous classification.
Theaet. What classification?
Str. We divided image-making into two sorts; the one likeness-making, the other phantastic.
Theaet. True.
Str. And we said that we were uncertain in which we should place the Sophist?
Theaet. That was so.
Str. And the twilight heightened into darkness in our minds, when the assertion was made, that there was no such thing as likeness, or image, or apparition, because there was no such thing as falsehood.
Theaet. True.

Str. And now, since there has been shown to be false speech and false opinion, imitations of real existences are possible, and out of this condition of the mind, an art of deception may arise.

Theaet. That is possible.

Str. And we have already admitted, in what preceded, that the Sophist was lurking in one of the divisions of the likeness-making art.

Theaet. Yes.

Str. Let me, then, renew the attempt, and divide the proposed class, always proceeding from left to right, and clinging to that which holds the Sophist, until we have stripped him of all his common properties, and reached his difference or peculiar, and he stands confessed as he is in his true nature, first by ourselves and then by kindred dialectical spirits.

Theaet. Very good.

Str. You may remember that all art was originally divided by us into productive and acquisitive.

Theaet. Yes.

Str. And the Sophist was flitting before us in the acquisitive class, in the subdivision of hunting, and of contests, and of merchandize, and other similar classes.

Theaet. Very true.

Str. But now that the imitative art has enclosed him, it is clear that we must begin by dividing the original art of production; for imitation is a kind of production—of images, however, as we affirm, and not of real things.

Theaet. Quite true.

Str. In the first place, there are two kinds of production.

Theaet. What are they?

Str. One of them is human and the other divine.

Theaet. I do not follow.

Str. Every power, as you may remember our saying originally, which is the cause of things afterwards existing which did not exist before, was defined by us as productive.

Theaet. I remember.

Str. Looking, now, at the world and all the animals and plants which grow upon the earth from seeds and roots, and at inanimate substances which form within the earth, fusile or non-fusile, shall
we say that they come into existence—not having existed previously—in any way but by the creation of God, or shall we agree with vulgar opinion about them?

THEAET. What is that?

STRA. The opinion that nature brings them into being from some spontaneous and unintelligent cause. Shall we say this, or that they come from God, and are created by divine reason and knowledge?

THEAET. I dare say that, owing to my youth, I often waver in my view, but as I see that you incline to refer them to God, at present I defer to your authority.

STRA. That is nobly said, Theaetetus, and if I thought that you were one of those who would hereafter change your mind, I would have gently argued with you, and forced you to assent, but as I perceive that your nature tends towards that to which, as you say, you are already inclined, and needs no argument of mine to draw you, I will leave time to do the rest for you. Let me suppose, then, that things which are made by nature are the work of divine art, and that things which are made by man out of these are works of human art. And so there are two kinds of making and production, the one human and the other divine.

THEAET. True.

STRA. Then, now, subdivide each of the two sections which we have already.

THEAET. How do you mean?

STRA. I mean to say that you should make a vertical division of production or invention, as you have already made a lateral one.

THEAET. I will suppose that.

STRA. Then, now, there are in all four parts or segments—two of them have reference to us and are human, and two of them have reference to the gods and are divine.

THEAET. True.

STRA. And, again, in the division which was supposed to be made in the other way, one part is self-making, but the remaining parts may be called image-making, and again, in like manner, the productive art is divided into two parts.

THEAET. Tell me the divisions once more.

STRA. I suppose that we, and the other animals, and the elements
—fire, water, and the like—are known by us to be the realities which are the creation and work of God.

Theaet. True.

Str. And there are images of them, which are not them, but which follow them; and these are also the creation of divine skill.

Theaet. What are they?

Str. The appearances which spring up of themselves in sleep or by day, such as the shadow which arises from intercepting the light of the fire, or when the light belonging to things bright and smooth meeting in one, upon their surface, with the light external to them, makes an image which is the reverse of that given by our ordinary sight.

Theaet. Yes; and the images as well as the creation are equally the work of a divine mind.

Str. And what shall we say of human art? Do we not make a house by the art of building, and then, by the art of drawing another house, which is a sort of dream created by man for those who are awake?

Theaet. Quite true.

Str. And in other works of human art there are two divisions, the one of creation, the other of image-making?

Theaet. Now I begin to understand, and am ready to suppose that there are two kinds of production, and each of them twofold; in the vertical division there is a divine and human production; in the lateral there are realities and similitudes.

Str. And let us not forget that of the image-making class there is one part which is imitative and the other phantastic, if it should be shown that falsehood is a reality and belongs to the class of real being.

Theaet. Yes.

Str. And this appeared to be the case; and therefore now, without hesitation, we shall number the different kinds as two.

Theaet. True.

Str. Then, now, let us divide the phantastic art.

Theaet. Where shall we make the division?

Str. There is one kind which is produced by instruments, and another in which the creator of the apparition is himself the instrument.

Theaet. What do you mean?
Str. When any one makes himself appear like another in his figure or in his voice, imitation is the name for this part of the phantastic art.

Theaet. Yes.

Str. Let this, then, be named the art of mimicry, and this the province assigned to it; as for the other division, we are weary and will give that up, leaving to some one else the duty of making and naming the class.

Theaet. Let us do as you say—assign a sphere to the one and leave the other.

Str. There is a further distinction, Theaetetus, which is worthy of our consideration, and for a reason which I will tell you.

Theaet. Let me hear.

Str. There are some who imitate, knowing what they imitate, and some who do not know. And what line of distinction can there possibly be greater than that which divides ignorance from knowledge?

Theaet. There can be no greater.

Str. Was not the sort of imitation of which we spoke just now the imitation of those who know? He who imitates you would surely know you and your figure?

Theaet. He would.

Str. And what would you say of the figure or form of justice or of virtue in general? Are we not well aware that many who, having no knowledge, have nevertheless a sort of opinion of this, endeavour to make their sentiment or opinion appear to be a reality in them, which they embody as far as they can in their words and actions?

Theaet. Yes, that is very common.

Str. And do they always fail in their attempt to be thought just, when they are not? Is not the very opposite rather true?

Theaet. The very opposite.

Str. Such an one, then, should be described as an imitator who is to be distinguished from the other, as he who is ignorant is distinguished from him who knows?

Theaet. True.

Str. Can we find a suitable name for each of them? This is clearly not an easy task; for among the ancients there was some confusion of ideas, which prevented their rightly dividing genera
into species, and no one ever attempted to divide them; wherefore there is no great abundance of names, and yet, for the sake of distinction, I will make bold to call the imitation which coexists with opinion, the imitation of appearance—that which coexists with science a sort of scientific or historical imitation.

Theaet. Granted.

Str. The former is our present concern, for the Sophist was classed with imitators indeed, but not among those who have knowledge.

Theaet. Very true.

Str. Let us, then, examine our imitator of appearance, and see whether he is sound or whether there is any cleft in him.

Theaet. Let us examine him.

Str. Indeed, there is a very considerable cleft in him; for if you unfold him you find that one of the two classes of imitators is a simple being, who thinks that he knows that which he only fancies; the other sort has knocked about among arguments, until he suspects and fears that he is ignorant of that which to the many he pretends to know.

Theaet. There are certainly these two kinds which you describe. Shall we regard one as the simple imitator—the other as the dissembling or ironical imitator?

Theaet. That is good.

Str. And shall we further speak of the members of this latter class as one, or as two?

Theaet. Say yourself.

Str. Upon consideration, then, they appear to me to be two; there is the dissembler, who harangues a multitude in public in a long speech, and the dissembler, who in private and in short speeches compels the person who is conversing with him to contradict himself.

Theaet. What you say is most true.

Str. And who is the maker of the longer speeches? Is he the statesman or the popular orator?

Theaet. The latter.

Str. And what shall we call the other? Is he the philosopher or the Sophist?

Theaet. The philosopher he cannot be, as upon our view he is ignorant; but since he is an imitator of the wise he will have a
name which is formed by an adaptation of the word σοφός. What
shall we name him? I am pretty sure that I cannot be mistaken
in terming him the true and very Sophist.

Str. Shall we bind up his name as we did before, making a chain
from one end to the other?

Theaet. By all means.

Str. He, then⁶, who traces the pedigree of his art as follows:—
He who, belonging to the conscious or dissembling section of the
art of making contradictions, is an imitator of appearance, and
has divided off from the phantastical branch of the art of image-
making the juggling of words, which is a creation human, and not
divine—any one who affirms that the real Sophist is of this blood
and lineage will say the very truth.

Theaet. That is most certain.

⁶ Reading τῶν ὅθ.

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In the Phaedrus, the Republic, the Philebus, the Parmenides, and the Sophist, we have observed the tendency of Plato to combine two or more subjects or different aspects of the same subject in a single dialogue. And in his later writings we have remarked a decline of style, and of dramatic power; the characters excite little or no interest, and the digressions are apt to overlay the main thesis; there is not the 'callida junctura' of an artistic whole. Both the serious discussions and the jests are sometimes out of place. The invincible Socrates is withdrawn from view; and new foes begin to appear under old names. Plato is now chiefly concerned, not with the original Sophist, but with the sophistry of the schools of philosophy, who are making reasoning impossible; and is driven by them out of the regions of transcendental speculation back into the path of common sense. A logical or psychological phase takes the place of the doctrine of ideas in his mind. He is constantly dwelling on the importance of regular classification, and of not putting words in the place of things. He has banished the poets, and is beginning to use a technical language. He is bitter and satirical, and seems to be sadly conscious of the realities of human life. Yet the ideal glory of the Platonic philosophy is not extinguished. He is still looking for a city in which kings are either philosophers or gods. (Cp. Laws, 713.)

The Politicus exemplifies these remarks more than any of the preceding dialogues. The idea of the king or statesman and the illustration of method are connected, not like the love and rhetoric of the Phaedrus, by 'little invisible pegs,' but in a confused and inartistic manner, which fails to produce any impression of a whole on the mind of the reader. Plato apologises for his tediousness, and acknowledges that the improvement of his audience has been his only aim in some of his digressions.
His own image may be used as a motto of his style; like an inexpert statuary (p. 277), he has made the figure or outline too large, and is unable to give the proper colours or proportions; he is always making mistakes and correcting them—this appears to be his way of drawing attention to common dialectical errors. The Eleatic stranger, here, as in the Sophist, has no appropriate character, and appears only as the expositor of a political ideal, in the delineation of which he is frequently interrupted by purely logical illustrations. The younger Socrates resembles his namesake in nothing but a name. The dramatic character is so completely forgotten, that a special reference is twice made to discussions in the Sophist; and this, perhaps, is the strongest ground which can be urged for doubting the genuineness of the work. But, when we remember that a similar allusion is made in the Laws (p. 739) to the Republic, we see that the entire disregard of dramatic propriety is not always a sufficient reason for doubting the genuineness of a Platonic writing (see infra).

The search after the Statesman which is carried on, like that of the Sophist, by the method of dichotomy, gives an opportunity for many humorous and satirical remarks. As in the Philebus, several of the jests are mannered and laboured: for example, the turn of the words with which the dialogue opens; or the clumsy joke about man being an animal, who has a power of two-feet—both which are suggested by the presence of Theodorus, the geometrician. There is political as well as logical insight in refusing to admit the division of mankind into Hellenes and Barbarians: 'if a crane could speak, he would in like manner oppose men and animals to cranes.' The pride of the Hellene is further humbled, by being compared to a Phrygian or Lydian. Plato glories in this impartiality of the dialectical method, which places birds in juxtaposition with men, and the king side by side with the bird-catcher; king or vermin-destroyer are objects of equal interest to science. There are other passages which show that the irony of Socrates was a lesson which Plato was not slow in learning—as, for example, the passing remark, that 'the kings and statesmen of our day are in their breeding and education very like their subjects;' or the anticipation that the rivals of the king will be found in the class of servants; or the imposing attitude of the priests, who are the established interpreters of the will of heaven, authorised by law. Nothing is more bitter in all his writings than his comparison of the contemporary politicians to lions, centaurs, satyrs, and
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other animals of a feebler sort, who are ever changing their forms and natures. But, as in the Philebus and the Sophist, the play of humour and the charm of poetry have departed, never to return.

Still the Politicus contains a higher and more ideal conception of politics than any other of Plato's writings. The city, of which there is a pattern in heaven (Rep. IX.), is here described as a Paradisiacal state of human society. In the truest sense of all, the ruler is not man but God; and such a government existed in a former cycle of human history, and may exist again when the gods resume their care of mankind. In a secondary sense, the true form of government is that which has scientific rulers, who are irresponsible to their subjects. Not power but knowledge is the characteristic of a king or royal person. And the rule of a man is better and higher than law, because he is more able to deal with the infinite complexity of human affairs. But mankind, in despair of finding a true ruler, are willing to acquiesce in any law or custom which will save them from the caprice of individuals. They are ready to accept any of the six forms of government which prevail in the world. To the Greek, nomos was a sacred word, but the political idealism of Plato soars into a region beyond; for the laws he would substitute the intelligent will of the legislator. Education is originally to implant in men's minds a sense of truth and justice, which is the divine bond of states, and the legislator is to contrive human bonds, by which dissimilar natures may be united in marriage and supply the deficiencies of one another. As in the Republic, the government of philosophers, the causes of the perversion of states, the regulation of marriages, are still the political problems with which Plato's mind is occupied. He treats them more slightly, partly because the dialogue is shorter, and also because the discussion of them is perpetually crossed by the other interest of dialectic, which has begun to absorb him.

The plan of the Politicus or Statesman may be briefly sketched as follows: (1) By a process of division and subdivision we discover the true herdsman or king of men. But before we can rightly distinguish him from his rivals, we must view him, (2) as he is presented to us in a famous ancient tale: this will enable us to distinguish the divine from the human herdsman or shepherd: (3) and besides our fable, we must have an example; for this purpose we will select the art of weaving, which will have to be distinguished from the kindred arts; and then, following this pattern, we will separate the king from his subordinates or...
competitors: (4) But are we not exceeding all due limits; and is there not a measure of all arts and sciences, to which the art of discourse must conform? There is; but before we can apply this measure, we must know what is the aim of discourse: and our discourse only aims at the dialectical improvement of ourselves and others.—Having made our apology, we return once more to the king or statesman, and proceed to contrast him with pretenders in the same line with him, under their various forms of government: (5) His characteristic is, that he alone has science, which is superior to law and written enactments; these spring out of the necessities of mankind, when they are in despair of finding the true king: (6) The sciences which are most akin to the royal are the sciences of the general, the judge, the orator, which minister to him, but even these are subordinate to him: (7) Fixed principles are implanted by education, and the king or statesman completes the political web by marrying together dissimilar natures, the courageous and the temperate, the bold and the gentle, who are the warp and the woof of society.

The outline may be filled up as follows:

I have reason to thank you, Theodorus, for the acquaintance of Theaetetus and the Stranger. Theod. And you will have three times greater reason to thank me when they have delineated the Statesman and philosopher, as well as the Sophist. Soc. Does the great geometrician apply the same measure to all three? Are they not divided by an interval which no geometrical ratio can express? Theod. By the god Ammon, Socrates, you are right; and I am glad to see that you have not forgotten your geometry. But before I retaliate, I must request the Stranger to finish the argument. . . . The Stranger suggests that Theaetetus shall be allowed to rest, and that Socrates the younger shall respond in his place; Theodorus agrees to this, and Socrates remarks that the name of the one and the face of the other give him a right to claim relationship with them. They propose to take the Statesman after the Sophist; his path they must determine, and part off all other ways, stamping upon them a single negative form (cp. Soph. 257).

The Stranger begins the enquiry by making a division of the arts and sciences into theoretical and practical—the one concerned exclusively
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with knowledge, and the other with action; arithmetic and the mathematical sciences are examples of the one, and carpentering and handi- craft arts of the other (cp. Philebus, 55 ff.). Under which of the two shall we place the Statesman? Or rather, shall we not first ask, whether the king, statesman, master, householder, practise one art or many? The adviser of a physician may be said to have medical science, and the adviser of a king to have royal science. Hence the Statesman, even if he be a private person, is a king, and there is one science, the science of exercising authority, which embraces all these names and functions. And this science is akin to knowledge rather than to action. For a king rules not with his hands, but with his mind.

But theoretical science may be a science either of judging, like arithmetic, or of ruling and superintending, like that of the architect or master-builder. And the science of a king is of the latter nature—his is an underived and uncontrolled power; and by this he is distinguished from heralds, prophets, and other inferior officers. He is the wholesale dealer in command, and the herald, prophet, etc. retail his commands to others. Again, a ruler is concerned with the production of some object, and objects may be divided into living and lifeless, and rulers into the rulers of living and lifeless objects. And the king is not like the master-builder, concerned with lifeless matter, but has the task of managing living animals. And the tending of living animals may be either a tending of individuals, or a managing of herds. And the Statesman is not a groom, but a herdsman, and his art may be called either the art of managing the herd, or the art of common management:—Which do you prefer? 'No matter.' Very good, Socrates, and if you are not too particular about words you will be all the richer some day in true wisdom. How could you subdivide the herdsman's art? 'I should say, that there is one management of men, and another of beasts.' Very good, but you are in too great a hurry to get to man. All divisions which are rightly made should cut through the middle; if you attend to this rule, you will be more likely to arrive at classes. 'I do not understand the nature of my mistake.' Your division was like a division of the human race into Hellenes and barbarians, or into Lydians and Phrygians, and all other nations; or like a division of number into ten thousand and all other numbers, instead of dividing number into odd and even, or the human race into male and female. And I should like you to observe further, that though I maintain a class to be a part, there is no similar necessity.
for a part to be a class. But to return to your division, you spoke of
men and animals as two classes—the second of which you comprehended
under the general name of beasts. Now suppose that an intelligent
 crane were to make a division of animals;—he would put cranes into a
class by themselves for their special glory, and jumble together all others,
including man in the class of beasts. That is a sort of error which we
can only escape by a more regular subdivision. The whole class of
animals has been already subdivided by us into wild and tame, but poli-
tical science is only concerned with tame animals in flocks; and we
forgotten this in our hurry to arrive at man, and found by experience, as
the proverb says, that 'the more haste the worse speed.'

And now let us begin again at the art of managing herds. You have
probably heard of the fish-preserves in the Nile and in the ponds of the
great king, and of the nurseries of geese and cranes in Thessaly. There
appears then to be a new division into the rearing or management of
land-herds or of water-herds:—I need not say with which the king is con-
cerned. And land-herds may be divided into walking and flying; and
every idiot knows that the political animal is a pedestrian. At this point
we may take a longer or a shorter road, and as we 'are already near the
end, I see no harm in taking the longer, which is the way of mesotomy,
and accords with the principle which we were laying down. The tame,
walking, herding animal, may be divided into two classes—the horned
and the hornless, and the king is concerned with the hornless; and
these again may be subdivided into animals having or not having cloven
feet, or, mixing or not mixing the breed; and the king or statesman has
the care of animals which have not cloven feet, and which do not mix
the breed. And now, if we omit dogs, who can hardly be said to herd,
I think that we have only two species left which remain undivided: and
how are we to divide them? To geometricians, like you and Theaetetus,
I can have no difficulty in explaining that man is a diameter, having a
power of two feet; and the power of other animals being the double of
two feet, may be said to be the diameter of our diameter. There is
another excellent jest which I spy in these divisions. Men and birds
are both bipeds, and human beings are running a race with the airiest
and freest of creation, in which they are far behind their competitors;—
this is a great joke, and there is a still better in the juxta-position of the
bird-taker and the king, who may be seen scampering after them.
For, as we were remarking in the Sophist, the dialectical method is no
responder of persons. But we might have proceeded, as I was saying, by another and a shorter road. Then we should have begun by dividing land animals into bipeds and quadrupeds, and bipeds into winged and wingless; and we might have taken the Statesman and set him over the ‘bipes implume,’ and put the reins of government into his hands.

Here let us sum up:—The science of pure knowledge had a part which was the science of command, and this had a part which was a science of wholesale command; and this again was divided into the management of animals, and subdivided into the management of animals in herds, and again into land animals, and these into hornless, and these into bipeds; and so at last we arrived at man, and found the political and royal science. And yet we have not clearly distinguished the political shepherd from his rivals. No one would think of usurping the prerogatives of the ordinary shepherd, who on all hands is admitted to be the trainer, matchmaker, doctor, musician of his flock. But this is otherwise with the royal shepherd, who has numberless competitors, from whom he must be distinguished; there are merchants, husbandmen, physicians, who will all claim to be shepherds. I think that we can best distinguish him by having recourse to a famous old tradition, which may amuse as well as instruct us; the narrative is perfectly true, although the scepticism of mankind is prone to doubt the tales of old. You have heard what happened in the quarrel of Atreus and Thyestes? ‘You mean about the golden lamb?’ No, not that; but another part of the story, which tells how the sun and stars once arose in the west and set in the east, and that the god reversed their motion, as a witness to the right of Atreus. ‘There is such a story.’ And no doubt you have heard of the empire of Cronos and of the earthborn men? The origin of these and the like stories is to be found in the tale which I am about to narrate.

There was a time when God went round with the world, but at the completion of a certain cycle he let go; and the world, of necessity, turned back, and went round the other way. For divine things alone are unchangeable; but the earth and heavens, although endowed with many glories, have a body, and are therefore liable to perturbation. In the case of the world, the perturbation is very slight, and amounts only to a reversal of motion. For the lord of moving things is alone selfmoved; neither can piety allow that he goes at one time in one direction and at another time in another; or that God has given the universe opposite,
motions; or that there are two gods contending for preeminence in the motion of the world. But the truth is, that there are two cycles of the world, and in one of them the universe is governed by an immediate Providence, and receives life and immortality, and in the other is let go again, and has a reverse action during infinite ages. This new action is spontaneous, and is maintained by exquisite perfection of balance—the greatest of bodies moving on the smallest pivot. All changes in the heaven affect the animal world, and this being the greatest of them, has been most destructive to men and animals. Few of them survived; and on these a mighty change passed. For their life was reversed like the motion of the world, and first of all coming to a stand then quickly returned to youth and beauty. The white locks of the aged became black; the cheeks of the bearded man were restored to their youth and fineness; the young men grew softer and smaller, and reduced to the condition of children in mind as well as body, began to vanish away; and the bodies of those who had died by violence, in a few moments underwent a parallel change and disappeared. In that cycle of existence there was no such thing as the procreation of animals from one another, but they were born of the earth, and of this our ancestors, who came into being immediately after the end of the first cycle and at the beginning of the second, have preserved the recollection. Such traditions are often now unduly discredited, and yet they may be proved by internal evidence. For observe how consistent the narrative is; as the old returned to youth, so the dead returned to life; the wheel of their existence having been reversed, they rose again in the opposite order: a few only were reserved by God for another destiny. Such was the origin of the earthborn men.

'And is this cycle, of which you are speaking, the reign of Cronos, or our present state of existence?' No, Socrates, that blessed and spontaneous life belongs not to this, but to the previous state, in which God was the governor of the whole world, and there were other gods who ruled over parts of the world, as is still the case in certain places. They were shepherds of men and animals, each of them sufficing for those of whom he had the care. And there was no violence among them, or war, or devouring of one another. I have spoken of this spontaneous life, because in those days God ruled over man; he was to man what man now is to the animals. Under his government there were no estates, or private possessions, or families; but the earth produced a sufficiency of all things, and men were born out of the earth, having no traditions
of the past; and as the temperature of the seasons was mild, they took no thought for raiment, and had no beds, but lived and dwelt in the open air.

Such was the life of Cronos, and the life of Zeus is our own. Tell me, which is the happier of the two? Or rather, shall I tell you that this depends on how the children of Cronos used their time? If having this boundless leisure, and the power of discoursing not only with one another but with the animals, they had employed these advantages with a view to philosophy, gathering from every nature some addition to their store of knowledge;—or again, if they had merely eaten and drunk, and told stories to one another, and to the beasts; in either case, I say, there would be no difficulty in answering the question. But as nobody knows which they did, the question must remain unanswered. And here is the point of my tale. In the fullness of time, when the earthborn men had all passed away, the ruler of the universe let go the helm, and became a spectator; and destiny and passion swayed the world. At the same instant all the inferior deities gave up their hold; the whole universe rebounded, and there was a great earthquake, and utter ruin of all manner of animals. After a while the tumult ceased, and the universal creature settled down in his accustomed course, having authority over all other creatures, and following the instructions of his God and Father, at first more precisely, afterwards with less exactness. The reason of the falling off was the disengagement of a former chaos; 'a muddy vesture of decay' was a part of his original nature, out of which he was brought by his Creator, under whose immediate guidance while he remained in that former cycle, the evil was minimised and the good increased to the utmost. And in the beginning of the new cycle all was well enough, but as time went on, discord entered in; at length the good was minimised and the evil everywhere diffused, and there was a danger of universal ruin. Then the Creator, seeing the world in great straits, and fearing that chaos and infinity would come again, in his tender care again placed himself at the helm and restored order, and made the world immortal and imperishable. Once more the cycle of life and generation was reversed; the infants grew into young men, and the young men became greyheaded; no longer did the animals spring out of the earth; the parts of the world, like the whole, were in future to be self-created.

At first the case of men was very helpless and pitiable; for they were alone among the wild beasts, and had to carry on the struggle for
existence without arts or knowledge, and had no food, and did not know how to get any. That was the time when Prometheus brought them fire, Hephaestus and Athene gave them arts, and other gods brought them seeds and plants; and out of these human life was framed, for men, like the universe, were left to themselves, and ordered their own ways; living in one cycle after one manner, and in another cycle after another manner.

Enough of the myth, which may show us two errors of which we were guilty in our account of the king. The first and grand error was in choosing a god, who belongs to the other cycle, instead of a man for our king; there was a lesser error also in our failure to define the nature of the royal functions. The myth gave us only the image of a divine shepherd, whereas the statesmen and kings of our own day very much resemble their subjects in education and breeding. On retracing our steps we find that we gave too narrow a designation to the art which was concerned with the feeding of animals in flocks. This would apply to all shepherds, with the exception of the Statesman; but if we say managing or tending animals, the term would include him as well. Having remodelled the name, we may subdivide as before, first separating the human from the divine shepherd or manager. Then we may subdivide the human art of governing into the government of willing and unwilling subjects—royalty and tyranny—which are the extreme opposites of one another, although we in our simplicity have hitherto confounded them.

And yet the figure of the king is still defective. We have taken up a lump of fable, and have used more than we needed. Like statuaries, we have overdone the features, and shall lose time in reducing them. Or our mythus may be compared to a picture, which is well drawn in outline, but is not yet enlivened by colour. And to intelligent persons language is, or ought to be, a better instrument of description than any picture. 'But what, Stranger, is the deficiency of which you speak?' No great thing can be made clear without an example; every man seems to know all things in a dream, and to know nothing when he is awake. And the nature of example can only be illustrated by an example. Children are taught to read by placing the letters which they do not know side by side with those which they know, until they learn to recognise them in all their combinations. Example comes into use when we identify something unknown with that which is known, and
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form a common notion of both of them. Like the child who is learning his letters, the soul recognises some of the first elements of things; and then again is at fault and unable to recognise them when they are translated into the difficult language of facts. Let us, then, take an example, which will illustrate the nature of example, and will also assist us in distinguishing the nature of the political science, and separating the true king from his rivals by the light of an humble instance, which we may hereafter transfer to the king.

I will select the example of weaving, or, more precisely, weaving of wool. In the first place, all possessions are either productive or preventive; of the preventive sort are spells and antidotes, divine and human, and also defences, and defences are either arms or screens, and screens are veils and also defences against heat and cold, and defences against heat and cold are shutters and coverings, and coverings are blankets or garments, and garments are in one piece or in many; and of these latter, some are pierced and others are fastened, and of these again some are made of fibres of plants and some of hair, and of these some are cemented with water and earth, and some are fastened with their own material;—these are called clothes, and are made by the art of clothing, from which the art of weaving differs only in name, as the political differs from the royal science. Thus we have drawn several distinctions, but as yet have not distinguished the weaving of garments from the kindred and co-operative arts. For the first process to which the material is subjected is the opposite of weaving—I mean carding. And the art of carding, and the whole art of the fuller and the mender, are concerned with the treatment and production of clothes, as well as the art of weaving. Again, there are the arts which make the weaver's tools. And if we say that the weaver's art is the greatest and noblest of those which have to do with woollen garments,—this, although true, is not sufficiently distinct; because these other arts require to be cleared away. Let us proceed, then, by regular steps:—There are causal or principal, and co-operative or subordinate arts. To the causal class belong the arts of washing and mending, of carding and spinning the threads, and the other arts of working in wool; these are chiefly of two kinds, falling under the two great categories of composition and division. Carding is of the latter sort. But our concern is chiefly with that part of the art of wool-working which composes, and of which one kind twists and the other interlaces the threads, whether the firmer texture of the warp
or the looser texture of the woof. These are adapted to each other, and the orderly composition of them forms a woollen garment. And the art which presides over these operations is the art of weaving.

But why did we go through all this, instead of saying at once that weaving is the art of entwining the warp and the woof? In order that our labour may not seem to be in vain, I must explain the whole nature of excess and defect. There are two arts of measuring—one is concerned with relative size, and the other has reference to a standard of what is meet. The difference between good and evil is the difference between a mean or measure and excess or defect. All things require to be compared, not only with one another, but with the mean, and without this there would be no beauty and no art, whether the art of the statesman or the art of weaving, or any other; for all these arts guard against excess or defect, not as imaginary, but as real evils. This we must endeavour to prove, if the arts are to exist, just as we endeavoured to show in the Sophist that not-being had an existence; and the proof of this will be a harder piece of work than that was. At present I am content with the indirect proof that the existence of such a standard is necessary to the existence of the arts. Standard or measure, which we are now applying to the arts, may be some day required with a view to the demonstration of absolute truth.

We may now divide this art of measurement into two parts; placing in the one part all the arts which measure the relative size or number of objects, and in the other all those which depend upon a mean or standard. Many accomplished men say that the art of measurement is universal, and is not restricted to the arts; but these persons are unaccustomed to distinguish classes, and jumble together in one the 'more' and the 'too much,' which are very different things. Whereas the right way is to find the difference of classes, and to comprehend the things which have any affinity under the same class.

I will make one more observation by the way. When a pupil at a school is asked the letters which make up a particular word, is he not asked with a view to his knowing the same letters in all words? And our enquiry about the Statesman in like manner is intended not only to improve our knowledge of politics, but of philosophy generally. Still less would any one analyze the nature of weaving for its own sake. There is no difficulty in exhibiting sensible images, but the greatest and noblest truths have no outward form adapted to the eye of sense,
and are only revealed in thought. And all that we are now saying is said for the sake of them. I make these remarks, because I want you to get rid of any impression, that our discussion about weaving and about the reversal of the universe, or the other discussion about the Sophist and not-being, were tedious and irrelevant. Please to observe that they can only be fairly judged when compared with what is meet; and yet not with what is meet for producing pleasure, nor even meet for making discoveries, but for the great end of developing the dialectical method and sharpening the wits of the auditors. He who censures us, should prove that, if our words had been fewer, they would have been better calculated to make us dialecticians.

And now let us return to our king or statesman, and transfer to him the example of weaving. The royal art has been separated from that of other herdsmen, but not from the causal and co-operative arts which exist in states; these do not admit of dichotomy, and therefore they must be carved neatly, like the limbs of a victim, not into more parts than are necessary. And first we have a large class, (1) of instruments, which includes almost everything in the world; from these may be parted off (2) vessels which are framed for the preservation of things, moist or dry, in the fire or out of the fire. The royal or political art has nothing to do with these, any more than with the arts of making, (3) vehicles, or (4) defences, whether dresses, or arms, or walls, or (5) ornaments, whether pictures or other playthings, as they may be fitly called, for they have no serious use. Then (6) there are the arts which furnish gold, silver, wood, bark, and other materials which should have been put first; these, again, have no concern with the kingly science; any more than the arts, (7) which provide food and nourishment for the human body, and which furnish occupation to the husbandman, huntsman, doctor, cook, and the like, but not to the king or statesman. Besides these seven classes, there are small things, such as coins, seals, stamps, which may with a little violence be comprehended in the class of implements or ornaments. Under the preceding seven heads every species of property may be, arranged with the exception of animals,—but these have been already included in the art of tending herds. There remains only the class of slaves or ministers, among whom I expect that the real rivals of the king will be discovered. I am not speaking of the veritable slave bought with money, nor of the hireling who lets himself out for service, nor of the trader or merchant, who at best can only lay claim to economical and not to royal science,
Nor am I referring to government officials, such as heralds and scribes, for these are only the servants of the rulers, and not the rulers themselves. I admit that there may be something strange in any servants pretending to be masters, but I hardly think that I could have been wrong in supposing that the principal claimants to the throne will be of this class. Let us try once more: There are diviners and priests, who are full of pride and prerogative; these, as the law declares, know how to give gifts to the gods which gain a corresponding amount of blessings for men, and in many parts of Hellas the duty of performing solemn sacrifices is assigned to the chief magistrate, as at Athens, to the king Archon. At last, then, we have found a trace of those whom we were seeking. But still they are only servants and ministers.

And who are these who next come into view in various forms of men and animals and other monsters appearing—lions and centaurs and satyrs—who are these? I did not know them at first, for every one looks strange when he is unexpected. But now I recognise the politician and his troop, the chief of Sophists, the most accomplished of wizards, who must be carefully distinguished from the true king or statesman. And here I will interpose a question: What are the true forms of government? Are they not three?—monarchy, oligarchy, and democracy; and the distinctions of freedom and compulsion, law and no law, poverty and riches expand these three into six. Monarchy may be divided into royalty and tyranny; oligarchy into aristocracy and plutocracy; and in democracy there is law and no law, two things expressed by one word. But are any of these governments worthy of the name? Is not government a science, and are we to suppose that scientific government is secured by the rulers being many or few, rich or poor, or by the rule being compulsory or voluntary? Can the many attain to science? In no Hellenic city are there fifty good draught players, and certainly there are not as many kings, for by kings we mean all those who are possessed of the political science. A true government must therefore be the government of one, or of a few. And they may govern us either with or without law, and whether they are poor or rich, and however they govern, provided they govern on some scientific principle,—that makes no difference. And as the physician may cure us with our will, or against our will, and by any mode of treatment, burning, bleeding, lowering, fattening, if he only proceeds scientifically; so the true governor may reduce or fatten or bleed the body corporate, while he acts according to the
rules of wisdom, and with a view to the good of the state, whether according to law or without law.

'I do not like that notion, that there can be good government without law.'

I must explain: Law-making certainly is the business of a king; and yet the best thing of all is, not that the law should rule, but that the king should rule, for the varieties of circumstances are endless, and no simple or universal rule can suit them all, or last for ever. The law is just an ignorant brute of a tyrant, who insists always on his commands being fulfilled, under all circumstances. 'Then why have we laws at all?' I will answer that question by asking you whether the training master gives a different discipline to each of his pupils, or whether he has a general rule of diet and exercise which is suited to the constitutions of the majority? 'The latter.' The legislator, too, is obliged to lay down general laws, and cannot enact what is exactly suitable to each particular case. He cannot be sitting at every man's side all his life, and prescribe for him the minute particulars of his duty, and therefore he is compelled to impose on himself and others the restriction of a written law. Let me suppose now, that a physician or trainer, having left directions for his patients or pupils, goes into a far country, and comes back sooner than he intended; owing to some unexpected change in the weather, the patient or pupil seems to require a different mode of treatment: Would he persist in his old commands, under the idea that all others are noxious and heterodox? Viewed in the light of science, would not such regulations be ridiculous? And if the legislator, or another like him, comes back from a far country, is he to be prohibited from altering his own laws? The common people say: let a man persuade the city first, and then let him impose new laws. But is a physician only to cure his patients by persuasion, and not by force? Is he a worse physician who uses a little gentle violence in effecting the cure? Or shall we say, that the violence is just, if exercised by a rich man, and unjust, if by a poor man? May not any man, rich or poor, with or without law, and whether the citizens like or not, do what is for their good? The pilot saves the lives of his citizens, not by laying down rules, but by making his art a law, and, like him, the true governor has a strength of art which is superior to the law. This is scientific government, and all others are imitations only. Yet no great number of persons can attain to this science. And hence follows an important result. The best course of politicians is to assert
the inviolability of the law, which, though not the best thing possible, is best for the imperfect condition of man. I will explain my meaning by an illustration:

Suppose that mankind, indignant at the rogueries and caprices of physicians and pilots, call together an assembly, in which all who like may speak, the skilled as well as the unskilled, and that in their assembly they make decrees for regulating the practice of navigation and medicine which are to be binding on these professions for all time. Suppose that they elect annually by vote, or lot, those to whom authority in each department is to be delegated. And let us further imagine, that when the term of their magistracy has expired, the magistrates appointed by them are summoned before an ignorant and unprofessional court, and may be condemned or punished for breaking the regulations. They even go a step further, and enact, that he who is found enquiring into the truth of navigation and medicine, and is seeking to be wise above what is written, shall be called no artist, but a dreamer or prating Sophist or corrupter of youth; and if he try to persuade others to investigate those sciences in a manner contrary to the law, he shall be punished with the utmost severity:—like rules might be extended to any art or science:—what would be the consequence of this?

‘The arts would utterly perish, and human life, which is bad enough already, would become intolerable.’

But suppose, once more, that we were to appoint some one as the guardian of the law, who was both ignorant and interested, and who perverted the law; would not this be a still worse evil than the other? ‘Certainly.’ For the laws are based on some experience and wisdom. Hence the better course is, that they should be observed, although this is not the best thing of all, but only the second best. And whoever, having skill, should try to improve them, would act in the spirit of the law-giver. But then, as we have seen, no great number of men, whether poor or rich, is capable of making laws. And so, the nearest approach which we can make to true government is, when men do nothing contrary to their national customs. When the rich preserve their customs and maintain the law, this is called aristocracy, or if they neglect the law, oligarchy. When an individual rules according to law, whether by the help of science or opinion, this is called monarchy, and when he has royal science he is called a king, but when he rules in spite of law, and is blind with ignorance and passion, he is called a tyrant. These forms
of government exist, because men despair of the true king ever appearing among them; if he were to appear, they would joyfully hand over to him the reins of government. But, as there is no natural ruler of the hive, they meet together and make laws. And do we wonder, when the foundations of politics are in the letter only, that many evils should arise? Ought we not rather to admire the strength of the political bond? For cities have endured time out of mind, though many of them have shipwrecked, and some are like ships foundering, because their pilots are absolutely ignorant of the science which they profess.

Let us next ask, which of these untrue forms of government is the least bad, and which of them is the worst? I said at the beginning, that each of the three forms of government, royalty, aristocracy, and democracy, might be divided into two, so that the whole number of them, including the best, will be seven. Under monarchy we have already distinguished royalty and tyranny; of oligarchy there were two kinds, aristocracy and plutocracy, and democracy may be divided on a similar principle, for there is a democracy which observes, and a democracy which neglects, the laws. The government of one is the best and the worst—the government of a few is less bad and less good—the government of the many is the least bad and least good of them all, being the best of all lawless governments, and the least good of all lawful ones. But the rulers of all these states, unless they have knowledge, are maintainers of idols, and themselves idols—wizards, and also Sophists; for the term 'Sophist' is rightly transferred to them.

And now enough of centaurs and satyrs: the play is ended, and they may quit the political stage. Still there remain some other and better elements, which adulterate the royal science, and must be drawn off in the refiner's fire before the gold can be left pure. The arts of the general, the judge, and the orator, will have to be distinguished from the royal art; when that has been accomplished, the nature of the king will be unalloyed. Now there are inferior sciences, such as music, and others; and there is a superior science, which determines whether music is to be learnt or not, and this is different from them, and the governor of them. The science which determines whether we are to use persuasion, or not, is higher than the art of persuasion; the science which determines whether we are to go to war, is higher than the art of the general. The science which makes the laws, is higher than that which
only administers them. And the science which has authority over the rest, is the science of the king or statesman.

Once more we will endeavour to view this royal science by the light of our example. We may compare the state to a web, and I will show you how the different threads are drawn into one. You would admit (would you not?) that there are parts of virtue (although this position is sometimes assailed by Eristias), and one part of virtue is temperance, and another courage. These are two principles which are in a manner antagonists of one another; and they pervade all nature; the whole class of the good and beautiful is included under them. The latter may be subdivided into two lesser classes: one of these is described by us in terms expressive of motion or energy, and the other in terms expressive of rest and quietness. We say, how manly! how vigorous! how ready! and we say also, how calm, how temperate, how dignified. This opposition of terms is extended by us to all actions, to the tones of the voice, the notes of music, the workings of the mind, the characters of men. The two classes both have their exaggerations; and the exaggerations of the one are termed 'hardness,' 'violence,' 'madness;' of the other 'cowardice,' or 'sluggishness.' And if we pursue the enquiry, we find that these opposite characters are naturally at variance, and can hardly be reconciled. In lesser matters the antagonism between them is ludicrous, but in the State may be the occasion of grave disorders, and may disturb the whole course of human life. For the orderly class are always wanting to be at peace, and hence they pass imperceptibly into the condition of slaves; and the courageous sort are always wanting to go to war, even when the odds are against them, and are soon destroyed by their enemies. But the true art of government, first preparing the material by education, weaves the two elements into one, maintaining authority over the carders of the wool, and selecting the proper subsidiary arts which are necessary for making the web. The royal science is queen of educators, and begins by choosing the natures which she is to train, punishing with death and exterminating those who are violently carried away to atheism and injustice, and enslaving those who are wallowing in the mire of ignorance. The rest of the citizens she blends into one, combining the stronger element of courage, which we may call the warp, with the softer element of temperance, which we may imagine to be the woof. These she binds together, first taking the eternal elements of the honourable, the good, and the just, and fastening them with a divine cord, and
then fastening the animal elements with a human cord. The good legislator can implant by education the higher principles; and where these exist there is no difficulty in implanting the lesser human bonds, by which the State is held together; these are the laws of intermarriage, and of union for the sake of offspring. Most persons in their marriages seek after wealth or power; or they are clannish, and choose those who are like themselves,—the temperate marrying the temperate, and the courageous the courageous. The two classes thrive and flourish at first, but they soon degenerate; the one become mad, and the other feeble and useless. This would not have been the case, if they had both originally held the same notions about the honourable and the good; for then they never would have allowed the temperate natures to be separated from the courageous, but they would have bound them together by common honours and reputations, by intermarriage, and by the choice of rulers who combine both qualities. The temperate are careful and just, but are wanting in the power of action; the courageous fall short of them in justice, but are superior to them in action: and no State can prosper in which either of these qualities are wanting. The noblest and best of all webs or states is that which the royal science weaves, combining the two sorts of natures in a single texture, and in this enfolding freeman and slave and every other social element, and presiding over them all.

'You have made, Stranger, a very perfect image of the king and the statesman.'

The principal subjects in the Politicus may be conveniently embraced under four or five heads:—(1) the myth; (2) the dialectical interest; (3) the political aspects of the dialogue; (4) the relation of the work to the other writings of Plato; lastly, we may briefly consider the genuineness of the Sophist and Politicus, which can hardly be assumed without proof, since the two dialogues have been questioned by three such eminent Platonic scholars as Socher, Schaarschmidt, and recently by Uberweg.

1. The hand of the master is clearly visible in the myth. First in the connection with mythology;—he wins a kind of verisimilitude for this as for his other myths, by adopting received traditions, of which he pretends
to find an explanation in his own larger conception (cp. Introduction to Critias). The young Socrates has heard of the sun rising in the west and setting in the east, and of the earth-born men; but he has never heard the origin of these remarkable phenomena. Nor is Plato, here or elsewhere, wanting in denunciations of the incredulity of 'this latter age,' on which the lovers of the marvellous have always delighted to enlarge. And he is not without express testimony to the truth of his narrative;—such testimony as, in the Timaeus, the first men gave of the names of the gods ('they must surely have known their own ancestors'). For the first generation of the new cycle, who lived near the time, are supposed to have preserved a recollection of a previous one. He also appeals to internal evidence; viz. the perfect coherence of the tale, though he is very well aware, as he says in the Cratylus (436 C, D), that there may be consistency in error as well as in truth. The gravity and minuteness with which some particulars are related also lend an artful aid. The profound interest and ready assent of the young Socrates, who is not too old to be amused 'with a tale which a child would love to hear,' are a further assistance. To those who were naturally inclined to believe that the fortunes of mankind are influenced by the stars, or who maintained that some one principle, like the principle of the same and the other in the Timaeus, pervades all things in the world, the reversal of the motion of the heavens seemed necessarily to produce a reversal of the order of human life. The spheres of knowledge, which to us appear wide asunder as the poles, astronomy and medicine, were naturally connected in the minds of early thinkers, because there was little or nothing in the space between them. Thus there is a sort of basis of philosophy, on which the improbabilities of the tale may be said to rest. These are some of the devices by which Plato, like a modern novelist, seeks to familiarize the marvellous.

The myth, like that of the Timaeus and Critias, is rather historical than poetical; in this respect corresponding to the general change in the later writings of Plato, when compared with the earlier ones. It is hardly a myth in the sense in which the term might be applied to the myth of the Phaedrus, the Republic, the Phaedo, or the Gorgias, but may be more aptly compared with the didactic tale in which Protagoras describes the fortunes of primitive man, or with the description of the gradual rise of a new society in the third book of the Laws. Some discrepancies may be observed between the mythology of the Politicus and the Timaeus,
and between the Timaeus and the Republic. But there is no reason to expect that all Plato's visions of a former, any more than of a future, state of existence, should conform exactly to the same pattern. We do not find perfect consistency in his philosophy; and still less have we any right to demand this of him in his use of mythology and figures of speech. And we observe that while employing all the resources of a writer of fiction to give credibility to his tales, he is not disposed to insist upon their literal truth. Rather, as in the Phaedo, he says, 'something of the kind is true;' or, as in the Gorgias, 'this you will think a myth, but I believe to be a truth;' or, as in the Politicus, he describes his work as a 'tolerably credible tale;' or as a 'mass of mythology,' which was introduced in order to teach certain lessons.

The greater interest of the myth consists in the philosophical lessons which Plato presents to us in this veiled form. Here, as in the tale of Er, the son of Armenius, he touches upon the question of freedom and necessity, both in relation to God and nature. For at first the universe is governed by the immediate providence of God,—this is the golden age,—but after a while the wheel is reversed, and man is left to himself. Like other theologians and philosophers, Plato relegates his explanation of the problem to a transcendent world; he speaks of what in modern language might be termed 'impossibilities in the nature of things,' hindering God from continuing immanent in the world. But there is some inconsistency; for the 'letting go' is spoken of as a divine act, and is at the same time attributed to the necessary imperfection of matter; there is also a numerical necessity for the successive births of souls. At first, man and the world retain their divine instincts, but gradually degenerate. As in the Book of Genesis, the first fall of man is succeeded by a second; the misery and wickedness of the world increase continually. The reason of this further decline is supposed to be the disorganisation of matter: the latent seeds of a former chaos are disengaged, and envelope all things. The condition of man becomes more and more miserable; he is perpetually waging an unequal warfare with the beasts. At length he obtains such a measure of education and help as is necessary for his existence. He is aided by God, but not wholly inspired or controlled by him; he has received from Athene and Hephaestus a knowledge of the arts; other gods give him seeds and plants; and out of these human life is reconstructed. He now eats bread in the sweat of his brow, and has dominion over the animals; subjected to the conditions of his nature,
and yet able to cope with them by divine help. Thus Plato may be said to represent in a figure—(1) the state of innocence; (2) the fall of man; (3) the still deeper decline into barbarism; (4) the restoration of man by the partial interference of God, and the natural growth of the arts and of civilised society. Two lesser features of this description should not pass unnoticed, (1) the primitive men are supposed to be created out of the earth, and not after the ordinary manner of human generation—half the causes of moral evil are in this way removed; (2) the arts are attributed to a divine revelation: thus the greatest difficulty in the history of pre-historic man is solved. Though no one knew better than Plato that the introduction of the gods is not a reason, but an excuse for not giving a reason (Cratylus, 426), yet, considering, that more than two thousand years later, mankind are still discussing these problems, we may be satisfied to find in Plato a statement of the difficulties which arise in conceiving the relation of man to God and nature, without expecting to obtain from him a solution of them. In such a tale, as in the Phaedrus, various aspects of the ideas were doubtless indicated to Plato's own mind, as the corresponding theological problems are to us. The immanence of things in the ideas, or the partial separation of them, and the self-motion of the supreme idea, are probably the forms in which he would have interpreted his own parable.

He touches upon another question of great interest—the consciousness of evil—what in the Jewish Scriptures is called 'eating of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil.' At the end of the narrative, 272 B, the Eleatic asks his companion, whether this life of innocence, or that which men live at present, is the better of the two. He wants to distinguish between the mere animal life of innocence, the 'city of pigs,' at the mention of which Glaucon, in the Republic, revolts, and the higher life of reason and philosophy. But as no one can determine what prevailed in the world before the Fall, the question must remain unanswered. Similar questions have occupied the minds of theologians in later ages; but they can hardly be said to have found an answer. Professor Campbell well observes, that the general spirit of the myth may be summed up in the words of the Lysis: 'If evil were annihilated, should we hunger any more, or thirst any more, or have any similar sensations? Yet perhaps the question what will or will not be is a foolish one, for who can tell?' As in the Theaetetus evil is supposed to continue,—here, as the consequence of a former state of the world, a sort of mephitic vapour exal
ancient chaos,—there, as involved in the possibility of good, and incident to the mixed state of man.

Once more (and this is the point of connection with the rest of the dialogue), the myth is intended to bring out the difference between the ideal and the actual state of man. In all ages of the world, men have dreamed of a state of perfection, which has been, and is to be, but never is, and seems to disappear under the necessary conditions of human society. The uselessness, the danger, the true value of such political ideals have often been discussed; youth is too ready to believe in them; age to disparage them. Plato's 'prudens quaestio' respecting the comparative happiness of men in this and in a former cycle of existence is intended to elicit this contrast between the golden age and 'the life of Zeus' which is our own. To confuse the divine and human, or hastily apply one to the other, is a 'tremendous error.' Of the ideal or divine government of the world we can form no true or adequate conception; and this our mixed state of life, in which we are partly left to ourselves, but not wholly deserted by God, may contain some higher elements of good and knowledge than could have existed in the days of innocence under the rule of Cronos. So we may venture slightly to enlarge a Platonic thought which admits of a further application to Christian theology. Here are suggested also the distinctions between God causing and permitting evil, and between his more and less immediate government of the world.

II. The dialectical interest of the Politicus seems to contend in Plato's mind with the political; the dialogue might have been designated by two equally descriptive titles—either the 'Statesman,' or, 'Concerning Method.' Dialectic, which in the earlier writings of Plato is almost exclusively confined to the Socratic question and answer, is now wholly occupied with classification; there is nothing in which he takes greater delight than in processes of division (cp. Phaedr. 266 B); he pursues them to a length out of proportion to his main subject, and appears to value them as a dialectical exercise, and for their own sake. A poetical vision of some order or hierarchy of ideas or sciences has already been floating before us in the Symposium and the Republic. And in the Phaedrus this aspect of dialectic is further sketched out, and the art of rhetoric is based on the division of the characters of mankind into their several classes. The same love of divisions is apparent in the Gorgias. But in a well-known passage of the Philebus occurs the first criticism on the nature of classi-
fication. There we are exhorted not to fall into the common error of passing from unity to infinity, but to find the intermediate classes; and we are reminded that in any process of generalisation, there may be more than one class to which individuals may be referred, and that we must carry on the process of division until we have arrived at the infima species.

These precepts are not forgotten, either in the Sophist or in the Politicus. The Sophist contains four examples of division, carried on by regular steps, until in four different lines of descent we detect the Sophist. In the Politicus the king or statesman is discovered by a similar process; and we have a summary, probably made for the first time, of possessions appropriated by the labour of man, which are distributed into seven classes. We are warned against preferring the shorter to the longer method;—if we divide in the middle, we are most likely to light upon species; at the same time, the important remark is made, that 'a part is not to be confounded with a class.' Having discovered the genus under which the king falls, we proceed to distinguish him from the collateral species. To assist our imagination in making this separation, we require an example. The higher ideas, of which we have a dreamy knowledge, can only be represented by images taken from the external world. But, first of all, the nature of example is explained by an example. The child is taught to read by comparing the letters in words which he knows with the same letters in unknown combinations; and this is the sort of process which we are about to attempt. As a parallel to the king we select the worker in wool, and compare the art of weaving with the royal science, trying to separate either of them from the inferior classes to which they are akin. This has the incidental advantage, that weaving and the web furnish us with a figure of speech, which we can afterwards transfer to the State.

There are two uses of examples or images—in the first place, they suggest thoughts—secondly, they give them a distinct form. In the infancy of philosophy, as in childhood, the language of pictures is natural to man: truth in the abstract is hardly won, and only by use familiarised to the mind. Examples are akin to analogies, and have a reflex influence on thought; they not only people the vacant mind, but they suggest new directions of enquiry. Plato seems to be conscious of the suggestiveness of imagery; the general analogy of the arts is constantly employed by him as well as the comparison of particular arts—
weaving, the refining of gold, the learning to read, music, statuary, painting, medicine, the art of the pilot—all of which occur in this dialogue alone: though he is also aware that 'comparisons are slippery things,' and may often give a false clearness to ideas. A division of sciences has been made in the Philebus, into practical and speculative, and into more or less speculative. To this a new class is now added, of master-arts, or sciences, which control inferior ones. Besides the supreme science of dialectic, 'which will forget us, if we forget her,' another master-science for the first time appears in view—the science of government, which fixes the limits of all the rest. This conception of the political or royal science, as, from another point of view, the science of sciences, which holds sway over the rest, is not originally found in Aristotle, but in Plato.

The doctrine that virtue and art are in a mean, which is familiarised to us by the study of the Nicomachean Ethics, is also first distinctly stated in the Politicus of Plato. The too much and the too little are in restless motion: they must be fixed by a mean, which is also a standard external to them. The art of measuring or finding a mean between excess and defect, like the principle of division in the Phaedrus, receives a particular application to the art of discourse. The excessive length of a discourse may be blamed; but who can say what is excess, unless he is furnished with a measure or standard? Measure is the life of the arts; and may some day be discovered to be the single ultimate principle in which all the sciences are contained. Other forms of thought may be noted—the distinction between causal and co-operative arts, which may be compared with the distinction between primary and co-operative causes in the Timaeus, 46 D, or between cause and condition in the Phaedo, 99; the passing mention of economical science; the opposition of rest and motion, which is found in all nature; the general conception of two great arts of composition and division, in which are contained weaving, politics, dialectic; and in connection with the conception of a mean, the two arts of measuring.

In the Theaetetus, Plato remarks that precision in the use of terms, though sometimes pedantic, is sometimes necessary. Here he makes the opposite reflection, that there may be a philosophical disregard of words. The evil of mere verbal oppositions, the requirement of an impossible accuracy in the use of terms, the error of supposing that philosophy was to be found in language, the danger of word-catching,
have frequently been discussed by him in the previous dialogues, but nowhere has the spirit of modern inductive philosophy been more happily described than in the words of the Politicus:—'If you think more about things, and less about words, you will be richer as you grow older in wisdom.' A similar spirit is discernible in the remarkable expressions: 'the difficult language of facts;' and 'the interrogation of every nature, in order to obtain the particular contribution of each to the store of knowledge.'

III. The political aspects of the dialogue are closely connected with the dialectical. As in the Cratylus, the legislator has 'the dialectician standing on his right hand;' so in the Politicus, the king or statesman is the dialectician, who, although he may be in a private station, is still a king. Whether he has the power or not, is a mere accident; or rather he has the power, for what ought to be is (was ist vernunftlich das ist wirklich); and he ought to be and is the true governor of mankind. There is a reflection in this idealism of the Socratic 'virtue is knowledge;' and, without idealism, we may remark that knowledge is a great part of power. Plato does not trouble himself to construct a machinery by which 'philosophers shall be made kings,' as in the Republic: he merely holds up the ideal, and affirms that in some sense science is really supreme over human life.

He is struck by the observation 'quam parva sapientiâ regitur mundus;' and is touched with a feeling of the ills which afflict states. The condition of Megara before and during the Peloponnesian War, of Athens under the thirty and afterwards, of Syracuse and the other Sicilian cities, in their alternations of democratic excess and tyranny, might naturally suggest such reflections. Some states he sees already shipwrecked, others foundering for want of a pilot; and he wonders not at their destruction, but at their endurance. For they ought to have perished long ago, if they had depended on the wisdom of their rulers. The mingled pathos and satire of this remark is characteristic of Plato's later style.

The king is the personification of political science. And yet he is something more than this,—the perfectly good and wise tyrant of the Laws (IV. 710), whose will is better than any law. He is the special providence, who is always interfering with and regulating all things. Such a conception has sometimes been entertained by modern theologians, and by Plato himself, of the Supreme Being. But whether applied to Divine or to human governors the conception is faulty for two reasons, neither of
which are noticed by Plato, first, because all good government supposes a degree of co-operation in the ruler and his subjects,—an 'education in politics' as well as in moral virtues; secondly, because government, whether Divine or human, implies that the subject has a previous knowledge of the rules under which he is living. There is a fallacy, too, in comparing unchangeable laws with a personal governor. For the law need not necessarily be an 'ignorant and brutal tyrant,' but gentle and humane, capable of being altered in the spirit of the legislator, and of being administered so as to meet the cases of individuals. Not only in fact, but in idea, both elements must remain—the fixed law and the living will; the written word and the spirit; the principles of right and duty; and the applications of them at particular times, or to particular characters.

There are two sides from which positive laws may be attacked: either from the side of nature, which rises up and rebels against them in the spirit of Callicles in the Gorgias: or from the side of idealism, which attempts to soar above them; and this is the spirit of Plato in the Politicus. But he soon falls, like Icarus, and is content to walk instead of flying; that is, to accommodate himself to the actual state of human things. Mankind have long been in despair of finding the true ruler; and therefore are ready to acquiesce in any of the five or six received forms of government as better than none. And the best thing which they can do (though only the second best in reality), is to reduce the ideal state to the conditions of actual life. Thus in the Politicus, as in the Laws, we have three forms of government, which we may venture to term, (1) the ideal; (2) the practical; (3) the sophistical—what ought to be, what might be, what is. And thus Plato seems to stumble, almost by accident, on the notion of a constitutional monarchy, or of a monarchy ruling by laws.

The divine foundations of a State are to be laid deep in education: Rep. 423; and at the same time some little violence may be used in exterminating natures, which are incapable of education: cp. Laws, X. Plato is strongly of opinion that the legislator, like the physician, may do men good against their will: cp. Gorgias, 522 ff. The human bonds of states are formed by the intermarriage of dispositions adapted to supply the defects of each other. As in the Republic, Plato has observed that there are opposite natures in the world, the strong and the gentle, the courageous and the temperate, which, borrowing an expression derived
from the image of weaving, he calls the warp and the woof of human society. To interlace these is the crowning achievement of political science. In the Protagoras, Socrates was maintaining that there was only one virtue, and not many: now Plato is inclined to think that there are not only parallel, but opposite virtues, and seems to see a similar opposition pervading all art and nature. But he is satisfied with laying down the principle; and does not inform us by what steps this union of opposite natures is to be effected.

In the loose framework of a single dialogue, Plato has thus combined two distinct subjects, politics and method. Yet they are not so far apart as they appear: in his own mind there was a secret link of connection between them. For the philosopher or dialectician is also the only true king or statesman. In the execution of his plan, Plato has invented or distinguished several important forms of thought, and made incidentally many valuable remarks. But we cannot agree in the concluding observation of the young Socrates, 'that he has given a perfect picture of the king and of the statesman.'

IV. The Politicus is naturally connected with the Sophist. At first sight we are surprised to find that the Eleatic stranger discourses to us, not only concerning the nature of being and not-being, but concerning the king and statesman. We perceive, however, that there is no inappropriateness in his maintaining the character of chief speaker, when we remember the close connection which is assumed by Plato to exist between politics and dialectic. In both dialogues the Proteus Sophist is exhibited, first, in the disguise of an Eristic, secondly, of a false statesman. There are several lesser features which the two dialogues have in common. The style and the situations of the speakers are very similar; there is the same love of division, and in both of them the mind of the writer is greatly occupied about method; to which he had probably intended to return in the projected 'Philosopher.'

The Politicus stands midway between the Republic and the Laws, and is also related to the Timaeus. The mythical or cosmical element reminds us of the Timaeus, the ideal of the Republic. A previous chaos in which the elements as yet were not, is hinted at both in the Timaeus and Politicus. The same ingenious arts of giving verisimilitude to a fiction are practised in both dialogues, and in both, as well as in the myth at the end of the Republic, Plato touches on the subject of necessity and free-will. The words in which he describes the miseries of states seem to
be an amplification of the 'cities will never cease from ill' of the Republic. The point of view in both is the same; and the differences not really important, e.g. in the myth, or in the account of the different kinds of states. But the treatment of the subject in the Politicus is fragmentary, and the shorter and later work, as might be expected, is less finished, and less worked out in detail. The idea of measure and the arrangement of the sciences, supply connecting links both with the Republic and the Philebus.

More than any of the preceding dialogues, the Politicus seems to approximate in thought and language to the Laws. There is the same decline and tendency to monotony in style; and in the Laws is contained the pattern of that second best form of government, which, after all, is admitted to be the only attainable one in this world. 'The 'gentle violence,' the marriage of dissimilar natures, the figure of the warp and the woof, are also found in the Laws. Both expressly recognise the conception of a first or ideal state; which has receded into an invisible heaven. Nor does the account of the origin and growth of society really differ in them, if we make allowance for the mythic character of the narrative in the Politicus. The virtuous tyrant is common to both of them; and the Eleatic Stranger takes up a position similar to that of the Athenian Stranger in the Laws.

V. There would have been little disposition to doubt the genuineness of the Sophist and Politicus, if they had been compared with the Laws rather than with the Republic, and the Laws had been received, as they ought to be, on the authority of Aristotle, as an undoubted work of Plato. The detailed consideration of the genuineness and order of the Platonic dialogues has been reserved for another place: a few of the reasons for defending the Sophist and Politicus may be here given.

1. The excellence, importance, and metaphysical originality of the two dialogues: no works at once so good and of such length, are known to have proceeded from the hands of a forger.

2. The resemblances in them to other dialogues of Plato, are such as might be expected to be found in works of the same author, and not in those of an imitator; being too subtle and minute to have been invented by another. The similar passages and turns of thought are generally inferior to the parallel passages in his earlier writings; and we might à priori have expected that, if altered, they would have been improved. But the comparison of the Laws proves that this repetition of his own
thoughts and words in an inferior form, is characteristic of Plato's later style.

3. The close connection of them with the Theaetetus, Parmenides, and Philebus, involves the fate of these dialogues, as well as of the two suspected ones.

4. The suspicion of them seems mainly to rest on a presumption, that in Plato's writings we may expect to find an uniform type of doctrine and opinion. But however we arrange the order, or narrow the circle of the dialogues, we must admit that they exhibit a growth and progress in the mind of Plato. And the appearance of change or progress is not to be regarded as impugning the genuineness of any particular writings, but may be even an argument in their favour. If we suppose the Sophist and Politicus to stand halfway between the Republic and the Laws, and in near connection with the Theaetetus, the Parmenides, the Philebus, the arguments against them derived from differences of thought and style will disappear. There is no such interval between the Republic or Phaedrus and the two suspected dialogues, as that which separates all the earlier writings of Plato from the Laws. And the Theaetetus, Parmenides, and Philebus, supply links, by which, however different from them, they may be reunited with the great body of the Platonic writings.
S T A T E S M A N.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

Theodorus.  
The Eleatic Stranger.  
Socrates.  
Young Socrates.

Ph. Socrates. I owe you many thanks, indeed, Theodorus, for the acquaintance both of Theaetetus and of the Stranger.

Theodorus. And in a little while, Socrates, you will owe me three times as many; when they have completed for you the delineation of the Statesman and of the philosopher, as well as of the Sophist.

Soc. Sophist, statesman, philosopher! O, my dear Theodorus, do my ears truly witness that this is the estimate formed of them by the great calculator and geometrician?

Theod. What do you mean, Socrates?

Soc. I mean that you rate them all at the same value, whereas they are really separated by an interval, which no geometrical ratio can express.

Theod. By Ammon, the god of Cyrene, Socrates, that is a very fair hit; and shows that you have not forgotten your geometry. I will retaliate on you at some other time, but I must now ask the Stranger, who will not, I hope, tire of his goodness to us, to proceed either with the Statesman or with the philosopher, whichever he prefers.

Str. That is my duty, Theodorus; having begun I must go on, and not leave the work unfinished. But what shall be done with Theaetetus?

Theod. In what respect do you mean?

Str. Shall we relieve him, and take his companion, the Young Socrates, instead of him? What do you advise?
Theod. Let the other be taken instead of him, as you propose. The young always do better when they have intervals of rest.

Soc. I think, Stranger, that both of them may be said to be in some way related to me; for the one bears my name and style, and the other, as you affirm, has the cut of my ugly face (cp. Theaet. 258 143 E). And as they are my relations, I ought to prove that they are akin to me in mind by argument. I myself argued with Theaetetus yesterday, and I have just been listening to his answers; my namesake I have not yet heard, and fully intend to examine him. But there is no hurry about this; to-day let him answer you.

Str. Very good. Young Socrates, do you hear what the elder Socrates is proposing?

Young Socrates. I do.

Str. And do you agree?


Str. As you do not object, still less can I. After the Sophist, then, I think that the Statesman naturally follows next in the order of enquiry. And please to say, Whether he, too, should be ranked among those who have science?

Y. Soc. Yes.

Str. Then the sciences must be divided as before?

Y. Soc. I dare say.

Str. But yet the division will not be the same?

Y. Soc. How then?

Str. They will be divided at some other point.

Y. Soc. Yes.

Str. Where, now, shall we discover the path of the Statesman? We must find and separate off, and set a seal upon this, and we will set the mark of another class upon all diverging paths. Thus the soul will conceive of all kinds of knowledge under two classes.

T. Soc. I think, that to find this path is your business, Stranger, and not mine.

Str. Yes, Socrates, and the path must be yours as well as mine, when once discovered.

Y. Soc. Very good.

Str. Well, and are not arithmetic and certain other kindred arts, mere abstract knowledge, wholly separated from action?

Y. Soc. That is true.
Statesman.

Str. But the knowledge of which the art of carpentering, or the other handicraft arts are possessed, seems to reside in the operation; they bring into existence simultaneously the bodies which are produced by them.


Str. Then let us divide sciences in general into those which are practical and those which are purely intellectual.

T. Soc. Let us suppose these to be the two principal divisions of the whole of science, which is one.

Str. And is he whom we variously term ‘statesman,’ ‘king,’ ‘master,’ or ‘householder,’ one and the same; or are there so many different sciences or arts which correspond to these names? Or rather, allow me to put the matter in this way.

T. Soc. Let me hear.

Str. If any one who is in a private station has the skill to advise one of the public physicians, must not he also be called a physician?

T. Soc. Yes.

Str. And if any one who is in a private station has the art to advise the ruler of a country, must not he be said to have the knowledge which the ruler ought to have?

T. Soc. True.

Str. But surely the science of a true king is royal science?

T. Soc. Yes.

Str. And will not he who possesses this knowledge, whether he happens to be a ruler or a private man, when regarded only in reference to his art, be truly called ‘royal’?

T. Soc. He certainly ought to be.

Str. And surely the householder and master are the same?

T. Soc. Of course.

Str. Again, a large household may be compared to a small State:—will they differ at all, as far as government is concerned?

T. Soc. They will not.

Str. Then, returning to the point which we were just now discussing, do we not clearly see that there will be one science of all of them; and this science may be either royal or political or economical; we will not quarrel with any one about the name.

T. Soc. Certainly not.

Str. This, too, is evident, that the king cannot do much with
his hands, or with his whole body, towards the maintenance of his empire, compared with what he does by the intelligence and strength of his soul.

*T. Soc.* That is evident.

*Str.* Then, shall we say that the king has a greater affinity to knowledge than to manual arts or to practical life in general?

*T. Soc.* Certainly he has.

*Str.* Then we may put all together as one and the same—statesmanship and the statesman—kingship and the king.

*T. Soc.* That is obvious.

*Str.* And now we shall only be proceeding in due order, if we divide the sphere of knowledge?


*Str.* Think whether you can find any joint or parting in knowledge.


*Str.* Such as this;—you may remember that we made an art of calculation?

*T. Soc.* Yes.

*Str.* Which was, unmistakeably, one of the arts of knowledge?


*Str.* And which knew the differences of numbers, and would form a judgment on them, and had no other function?


*Str.* Just as the architect does not work himself, but is the ruler of workmen?

*T. Soc.* Yes.

*Str.* He contributes knowledge, but not manual labour?


*Str.* And may therefore be justly said to share in theoretical science?

*T. Soc.* Quite true.

*Str.* But he ought not, when he has formed a judgment, to regard his functions as at an end, like the calculator;—he must assign to the individual workmen their appropriate task until they have completed their work?


*Str.* Do not this class of sciences, as well as arithmetic and the other kindred arts, belong to pure knowledge; and is not the
difference between them, that the one sort has the power of judging only, and the other of ruling as well?

*T. Soc.* That is evident.

*Str.* May we not truly say, that of all knowledge, there are two divisions—one which rules, and the other which judges?

*T. Soc.* That is my view.

*Str.* And surely, when men have anything to do in common, that they should be of one mind is a pleasant thing?


*Str.* Then while we ourselves are of one mind, we need not mind about the views of others?

*T. Soc.* Of course not.

*Str.* And now, in which of these divisions shall we place the king?—Does he judge as a sort of spectator? Or shall we assign to him the art of rule or command—the word ruler implies this?

*T. Soc.* The latter, clearly.

*Str.* Then we must see whether there is any mark of division in the art of command. I am inclined to think that there is a division similar to that of manufacturer and retail dealer, which distinguishes the king from the herald.

*T. Soc.* How is that?

*Str.* Why, does not the retailer receive and sell over again the productions of others, which have been sold before?

*T. Soc.* Certainly he does.

*Str.* And is not the herald under command, and does he not receive orders, and in his turn order others?


*Str.* Then shall we mingle the kingly art in the same class with the art of the interpreter, boatswain, prophet, herald, and the numerous other arts which exercise command; or, as in the preceding comparison we spoke of manufacturers, or sellers for themselves and retailers,—seeing, too, that the class of supreme rulers, or rulers for themselves, is almost nameless—shall we make a word following the same analogy, and refer kings to a supreme or ruling for self science, leaving the rest to receive a name from some one else? For we are seeking the ruler; and our enquiry is not concerned with him who is not a ruler.


*Str.* Thus a very fair distinction has been attained between the
man who gives his own commands, and him who gives another's; and now let us see if the supreme power will allow of any further division.

_T. Soc._ By all means.

_Str._ I think that there is; and please to assist me in making the division.

_T. Soc._ At what point?

_Str._ May not all rulers be supposed to command for the sake of producing something?

_T. Soc._ Certainly.

_Str._ Nor is there any difficulty in dividing objects of production into two classes.

_T. Soc._ How would you divide them?

_Str._ Of the whole class, some have life and some are without life.

_T. Soc._ True.

_Str._ And by the help of these differences there may be a subdivision, if we please, of the section of knowledge which commands.

_T. Soc._ How is that?

_Str._ There may be a division into command of the production of lifeless and of living objects; and in this way the whole will be divided.

_T. Soc._ Certainly.

_Str._ That division, then, is complete; and now we may leave one half, and take up the other; that other half may also be exhaustively divided.

_T. Soc._ Which half do you mean?

_Str._ Of course that which exercises command about animals. For, surely, the royal science is not like that of a master-workman, a science presiding over lifeless objects;—the king has a nobler function, which is the management and control of living beings.

_T. Soc._ True.

_Str._ And the breeding and tending of living beings may be observed to be sometimes a tending of the individual; in other cases, a common care of creatures in flocks?

_T. Soc._ True.

_Str._ But the statesman is not a tender of individuals—not the
driver or groom of a single ox or horse; he is rather to be compared with the keeper of a drove of horses or oxen.

T. Soc. That seems to be a true remark.

Str. Shall we call this art of tending many animals together, the art of managing a herd, or the art of common management?

T. Soc. No matter;—whichever may happen to occur to us in the course of conversation.

Str. That seems to be a true remark.

T. Soc. I will try;—there appears to me to be one management of men and another of beasts.

Str. You have certainly divided them in a most straightforward and manly style; but you have fallen into an error which hereafter, I think that we had better avoid.

T. Soc. What is that?

Str. I think that we had better not cut off a small portion which is not a species, from many larger portions; the part should be a species. To separate off at once the subject of investigation, is a most excellent plan, if only the separation be rightly made; and you were under the impression that you were right, because you saw that you would come to man; and this led you to hasten the steps. But you should not chip off too small a piece, my friend; the safer way is to cut through the middle; and this is also the more likely way of finding classes. Attention to this principle makes all the difference in a process of enquiry.

T. Soc. What do you mean, Stranger?

Str. I will endeavour to speak more plainly, Socrates, out of regard for your intelligent nature; and, although I cannot at present entirely explain myself, I will try to make some advance, and to be a little clearer.

T. Soc. What was the error of which, as you say, we were guilty in our division?

Str. The error was just as if some one who wanted to divide the human race, were to divide them after the fashion which
prevails in this part of the world; here they cut off the Hellenes as one species, and all the other species of mankind, which are innumerable, and have no connection or common language, they include under the single name of 'barbarians,' and because they have one name they are supposed to be of one species also. Or suppose that in dividing numbers you were to cut off ten thousand from all the rest, and make of them one species, and comprehending the rest under another separate name, you might say that here too was a single class, because you had given it a single name. Whereas you would make a much better and more equal and artistic classification of numbers, if you divided them into odd and even; or of the human species, if you divided them into male and female; and only separated off Lydians or Phrygians, or any other tribe, and arrayed them against the rest of the world, when you could no longer make a division into parts which were also classes.

Y. Soc. Very true; but I wish that this distinction between a part and a class could still be made somewhat plainer.

Str. O, Socrates, best of men, that is not a question to be lightly answered. We have already digressed further from our original intention than we ought, and you would have us wander still further away. But we ought now to return to our subject; and hereafter, when there is a leisure hour, we may follow up the other track; at the same time, I wish you to guard against imagining that you ever heard me declare—

Y. Soc. What?

Str. That a class and a part are distinct.

Y. Soc. What did I hear, then?

Str. That a class is necessarily a part, but there is no similar necessity that a part should be a class; that is the sense which I should always wish you to attribute to my words, Socrates.

Y. Soc. Good.

Str. There is another thing which I should like to know.

Y. Soc. What is that?

Str. The point at which we digressed; for, if I am not mistaken, the exact place was, at the question, Where you would divide the management of herds, to which you appeared rather too ready to answer that there were two species of animals; man being one, and all other animals making up the other.

Y. Soc. True.
Str. I thought that in taking away a part, you imagined that the remainder equally formed a part, because you were able to call them by the common name of brutes.

Y. Soc. That is also quite true.

Str. Suppose now, O most courageous of dialecticians, that some wise and understanding creature, such as a crane appears to be, were, in imitation of you, to make a similar division, and set up cranes against all other animals to their own special glorification, at the same time jumbling together all the others, including man, under the appellation of brutes,—that would be the sort of error which we must try to avoid.

Y. Soc. How can we be safe?

Str. If we take a part only and not the whole, we shall be less likely to fall into that error.

Y. Soc. We certainly must not take the whole.

Str. Yes, that was the source of an error in our former division.

Y. Soc. What was that?

Str. You remember how that part of the art of knowledge which was concerned with command, had to do with the rearing of live stock,—that is to say, with animals in herds?

Y. Soc. Yes.

Str. In that case, all animals had been already divided into tame and wild; those whose nature could be tamed were called tame, and those which could not be tamed were called wild.

Y. Soc. True.

Str. And the political science of which we are in search, is and ever was concerned with tame animals, and is also confined to gregarious animals.

Y. Soc. Yes.

Str. But then we ought not to divide, as we did then, having an eye to all. Neither let us be in too great haste to arrive quickly at the political science; for this has already made us suffer the penalty of which the proverb speaks.

Y. Soc. Suffer what?

Str. Suffer the penalty of too much haste, which is too little speed.

Y. Soc. And well for us too, Stranger.

Str. Granted. But let us begin again, and endeavour to divide the rearing of animals in common; for, probably, if the argument
proceeds by regular steps, that will accomplish your object better than hasty anticipation. Tell me, then—

_T. Soc._ What?

_Str._ Did you ever hear, as you very likely may, for I do not suppose that you ever actually visited them, of the preserves of fishes in the Nile, and in the ponds of the great king; and you may have seen similar preserves in wells at home.

_T. Soc._ Yes, to be sure, I have seen them, and I have often heard the others described.

_Str._ And you may have heard also, and are assured by report, although you have not been in those parts, of the nurseries of geese and cranes which exist in the plains of Thessaly?

_T. Soc._ Certainly.

_Str._ I asked you, because here is a new division of herds, into land herds and water herds.

_T. Soc._ There is.

_Str._ And do you agree that we ought to divide the art of rearing herds in common into two corresponding parts, the one the rearing of the watery, and the other of the land herds?

_T. Soc._ I do.

_Str._ There is surely no need to ask which of these two contains the royal art, for that is evident to everybody.

_T. Soc._ Certainly.

_Str._ Any one can divide the herds which feed on dry land?

_T. Soc._ How would you divide them?

_Str._ I should distinguish between flying and walking.

_T. Soc._ Most true.

_Str._ And an idiot might know that the political animal is a pedestrian—you will allow that?

_T. Soc._ Certainly.

_Str._ The art of managing the walking animal has to be further divided, just as you might halve an even number.

_T. Soc._ That is true.

_Str._ Let me note that here appear in view two ways to that part or class to which the argument is going,—the one a speedier way, which cuts off a small portion from a large; the other, which agrees better with the principle which we were laying down, is the way of dividing in the middle; but this is longer. We can take either of them, whichever we please.
T. Soc. Cannot we have both ways?

Str. Together? What a thing to ask! but, if you take them in turn, you clearly may.

T. Soc. Then I should like to take them in turn.

Str. There will be no difficulty, as we are near the end; if we had been at the beginning, or in the middle, I should have demurred to your request; but now, in accordance with your desire, let us begin with the longer way; while we are fresh, we shall get on better. And now attend to the division.

T. Soc. Let me hear.

Str. The tame walking herding animals are distributed by nature into two classes.

T. Soc. How is that?

Str. The one grows horns; and the other is without horns.

T. Soc. That is evident.

Str. Suppose that you divide the science which manages pedestrian animals into two corresponding parts, and define them; for if you wish to name them, the complexity will be too great.

T. Soc. How must I speak of them, then?

Str. In this way: let the science of rearing pedestrian animals be divided into two parts, and one part assigned to the horned class, and the other to the class which has no horns.

T. Soc. I will suppose all that, which has been made abundantly evident.

Str. The king is clearly the shepherd of the polled herd, who have no horns.

T. Soc. That is evident.

Str. Shall we break up this hornless herd into sections, and see which falls to the king?

T. Soc. By all means.

Str. Shall we distinguish them by their having or not having cloven feet, or by their mixing or not mixing the breed? You know what I mean.

T. Soc. What?

Str. I mean that the nature of horses and asses is to breed from one another.

T. Soc. Yes.

Str. But the remainder of the smooth herd of tame animals will not mix the breed.
T. Soc. Very true.
Str. And of which has the Statesman charge, of the mixed or of the unmixed?
T. Soc. Clearly of the unmixed.
Str. I suppose that we must divide this again as before.
T. Soc. That we must.
Str. And now every tame and herding animal has been divided into portions, with the exception of two species; for I hardly think that dogs ought to be reckoned among herding animals.
T. Soc. Certainly not; but how shall we divide the two remaining species?
Str. There is a measure of difference which may be appropriately employed by you and Theaetetus, who are geometricians.
T. Soc. What is that?
Str. The diameter; and, again, the diameter of a diameter.
T. Soc. What do you mean?
Str. How does man walk, but as a diameter whose power is two feet?
T. Soc. To be sure.
Str. And the power of the remaining kind, being the power of twice two feet, may be said to be the diameter of our diameter?
T. Soc. Certainly; and now I think that I pretty nearly understand you.
Str. I descry, Socrates, another famous jest in these divisions.
T. Soc. What is that?
Str. Human beings have come out in the same class with the airiest and freest of creation, and are in a race with them.
T. Soc. I remark that very singular result.
Str. And would you not expect that, being the slowest, they will arrive last?
T. Soc. Indeed I should.
Str. And there is a still more ridiculous consequence, that the king is running about with the herd, and in unequal race with the bird-taker, who of all mankind is most of an adept at the airy life.

1 The diameter of one foot square = \(\sqrt{2}\) square feet.
2 The diameter of two square feet = the root or side of four square feet.
3 Plato is not introducing a new class, but only making a reflection on the two kinds of bipeds. Others refer the passage to pigs and a pig-driver.

Str. Then here, Socrates, is still clearer evidence of the truth of what was said in the discussion about the Sophist.

T. Soc. What was that?

Str. That the dialectical method is no respecter of persons, and cares not for great or small, but always arrives in her own way at the truest result.

T. Soc. That seems to be the fact.

Str. And now, I will not wait for you to ask me, but will of my own accord take you the shorter road to the definition of a king.

T. Soc. By all means.

Str. I say that we should have begun by dividing pedestrian into biped and quadruped, and as the winged herd, and that alone, comes out in the same class with man, we should divide bipeds into those which have wings and have no wings, and when that is divided, and the art of the management of mankind is brought to light, the time will have come to produce our Statesman and ruler, and place him as charioteer in the State, and hand over to him the reins, for that is his proper science and vocation.

267 T. Soc. Very good; you have paid me the debt; I mean, that you have completed the argument, and I suppose that you added the digression by way of interest.

Str. Then now, let us go back to the beginning, and join the links, which together make the definition of the name of the Statesman’s art.

T. Soc. By all means.

Str. The science of pure knowledge originally had a part which was the science of rule or command, and from this was derived another part, which was called that of command for self, and illustrated by the analogy of wholesale dealing; an important section of this was the rearing or management of living animals, and this again was further limited by the management of them in herds, and again in herds of pedestrian animals,—of pedestrian animals who are without horns; here, again, was an important line of demarcation. He who desires to comprehend the right-hand section of this latter class under a single name, must make three folds; he will speak of a science of (1) the shepherding, (2) of animals, (3) who do not mix the breed. The only further subdivision is the art of man-herding,—this has to do with bipeds,
and is what we were seeking after, and have now found, being at once the royal and political.

*T. Soc.* To be sure we have.

*Str.* And do you think, Socrates, that we really have found, as you say, the desired end?

*T. Soc.* What is the end?

*Str.* Do you think I mean that we have really fulfilled our intention; there has been a sort of discussion, and yet the investigation seems to me not to be perfectly worked out.

*T. Soc.* I do not understand.

*Str.* I will try to make the thought which is at this moment present in my mind, clearer to us both.

*T. Soc.* Let me hear.

*Str.* There were many arts of shepherding, and one of them was the political, which had the charge of one particular herd?

*T. Soc.* There were.

*Str.* And this the argument defined to be the art of rearing not horses or other animals, but the art of rearing man in common?


*Str.* Note, however, a difference which distinguishes the king from all other shepherds.

*T. Soc.* To what do you refer?

*Str.* I want to ask, whether any of the other herdsmen has a rival who assumes that he is joint-manager of the herd?

*T. Soc.* What do you mean?

*Str.* I mean to say that merchants, husbandmen, providers of food, and also training-masters and physicians, will all contend with the herdsmen of humanity, whom we call Statesmen, declaring that they themselves have the care of rearing mankind, and that they rear not only the common herd, but also the rulers themselves.

*T. Soc.* Is there not truth in that?

*Str.* I dare say that there is, and we will consider their claim. But what I mean is, that no one will raise a similar claim as against the shepherd, who is allowed on all hands to be the sole and only feeder and physician of his flock; he is also their matchmaker and accoucheur; no one else knows that department of

*Reading εἴ τις τῶν ἄλλων τῇ.
science. And he is their merry-maker and musician, and no one can console and soothe his own flock better than he can, either with the tones of his voice or with instruments, as far as their nature is susceptible of such influences. And the same may be said of herdsmen in general.

T. Soc. Very true.

Str. But if this is true, can the argument about the king also be true and unimpeachable? Could we have been right in selecting him out of ten thousand other claimants, as the shepherd and rearer of the human flock?

T. Soc. Surely not.

Str. And if not, have we not reason to apprehend, that although we may have described a sort of royal form, we have not as yet accurately worked out the true image of the Statesman? and that we cannot reveal him as he truly is in his own nature, until we have disengaged and separated him from those who hang about him and claim to share in his prerogatives?

T. Soc. Very true.

Str. And that, Socrates, is what we must do, if we mean not to bring dishonour on the argument.

T. Soc. We must certainly keep up the credit of the argument.

Str. Then let us make a new beginning, and travel by a different road.

T. Soc. What road?

Str. I think that we may have a little amusement; there is a famous tale, of which a good portion may with advantage be interwoven, and then we may resume our series of divisions, and proceed along that path until we arrive at the summit or desired end. Shall we do as I say?

T. Soc. By all means.

Str. Listen, then, to a tale which a child would love to hear, and you are not too old to be amused as a child.

T. Soc. Let me hear.

Str. There did really happen, and will again happen, like many other events of which ancient tradition has preserved the record, the portent which is traditionally said to have occurred in the quarrel of Atreus and Thyestes. You remember what that was?

T. Soc. I suppose that you mean the token of the golden lamb?

Str. No, not that; but another part of the story, which tells
how the sun and the stars rose in the west, and set in the east, and that the god reversed their motion, and gave them that which they have at present as a testimony to the right of Atreus.

*T. Soc.* Yes; that is certainly related.

*Str.* Again, we have been often told of the kingdom of Cronos.

*T. Soc.* Yes, very often.

*Str.* Did you ever hear that the men of former times were earth-born, and not begotten of one another?

*T. Soc.* Yes, that is also an old tradition.

*Str.* All these stories, and ten thousand others which are still more wonderful, have a common origin; many of them have been lost in the lapse of ages, or exist only as fragments; but the origin of them is what no one has told, and may as well be told now; for the tale is suited to throw light on the nature of the king.

*T. Soc.* Very good; and I hope that you will give the whole story, and leave out nothing.

*Str.* Listen, then. There is a time when God goes round with the world, which he himself guides and helps to roll; and there is a time, on the completion of a certain cycle, when he lets go, and the world being a living creature, and having originally received intelligence from its author and creator, turns about and revolves in the opposite direction.

*T. Soc.* Why is that?

*Str.* Why, because only the most divine things of all are unchangeable, and body is not included in this class. Heaven and the universe, as we have termed them, although they have been endowed by the Creator with many glories, partake of a bodily nature, and therefore cannot be entirely free from perturbations. But the heavenly motion is, as far as possible, single and in the same place, and in relation to the same; and is therefore only subject to a reversal, which is the least alteration possible. For the lord of all moving things is alone able to move of himself; and to think that he can go at one time in one direction and at another time in another, is unlawful. Hence we must not say that the world is either self-moved always, or that the universe is made to go round by God in two opposite courses; or that two Gods, having intelligence, oppose one another in the movement of the world. But as I have already said (and this is the only remaining alternative) the world is guided by an accompanying divine power
and receives life and immortality by the appointment of the
Creator, and then, when let go again, moves spontaneously, being
let go at such a time as to have, during infinite cycles of years, a
reverse movement: this is due to exquisite perfection of balance,
and the size of the universe; which is the greatest of bodies, and
turns on the smallest pivot.

T. Soc. All that description seems to be very reasonable indeed.

Str. Let us now reflect upon what has been said, and try to
comprehend the nature of this great mythological wonder, which
has been called by us, and assuredly is, the cause of the other
wonders.

T. Soc. To what are you referring?

Str. To the reversal of the motion of the universe.

T. Soc. How was that the cause of the others?

Str. Of all changes in the heavens, this is to be deemed the
greatest and mightiest.

T. Soc. I should imagine that.

Str. And may be supposed to have resulted in the greatest
changes to the human beings who were the inhabitants of the
world at the time.

T. Soc. That, again, is not unlikely.

Str. And animals, as we know, are seriously affected by great
changes of many different kinds happening together.

T. Soc. Very true.

Str. Hence there necessarily occurred a great destruction of them,
which extended also to the life of man; few survivors of the race
were left, and those who remained became the subjects of several
novel and remarkable phenomena, and of one in particular, which
is simultaneous with the revulsion, and took place at the time
when the transition was made to the cycle opposite to that in
which we live.

T. Soc. What was that?

Str. The life of all animals first came to a stand, and the mortal
nature ceased to be or look older, and was then reversed and
grew young and delicate; the white locks of the aged darkened
again, and the cheeks of the bearded man became smooth, and he
was restored to his original youth; the bodies of the young grew
finer and smaller, continually by day and night returning and
becoming assimilated to the nature of a newly-born child in mind.
as well as body; in the succeeding stage they wasted away and wholly disappeared. And the bodies of those who had died by violence quickly passed through the like changes, and in a few days were no more seen.

T. Soc. Then how, Stranger, were the animals created in those 271 days; and in what way were they begotten of one another?

Str. It is evident, Socrates, that there was no such thing in the then order of nature as the procreation of animals from one another; the primeval race, who were given back from the earth, was the one then in existence; and of this tradition, which is now-a-days often unduly discredited, our ancestors, who came into existence immediately after the end of the first period and at the beginning of this, are the heralds to us. For mark how consistent the sequel of the tale is; after the return of age to youth, follows the return of the dead, who are lying in the earth, to life; the wheel of their existence has been turned back, and they come together and rise and live in the opposite order, unless God has carried any of them away to some other lot. And these are the so-called earth-born men who, according to the tradition, of necessity came into existence, and this is the explanation of the term.

T. Soc. Certainly that is quite consistent with what has preceded; but let me interrupt you to ask whether the life which you said existed in the reign of Cronos was in that cycle of the world, or in this? For the change in the course of the stars and the sun might certainly have occurred in either.

Str. I see that you enter into my meaning;—no, that blessed and spontaneous life does not belong to the present cycle of the world, but to the previous one, in which God superintended the whole revolution of the universe; and the parts of the universe were distributed under the rule of certain inferior deities, which is the way in some places still. There were demigods, who were the shepherds of the various species and herds of animals, and each one was in all respects sufficient for those of whom he was the shepherd; neither was there any violence, or devouring of one another, or war or quarrel among them; and I might tell of ten thousand other blessings, which belonged to that dispensation. Now, the reason why the old fable speaks of the spontaneous life of man is as follows. In those days God himself was their shepherd, and ruled over them, just as man, who is by comparison a divine being,
still rules over the animals. Under him there were no governments or separate possessions of women and children. For all men rose again from the earth, having no memory of any past events; and they had no property or families, but the earth gave them abundance of fruits, which grew on trees and shrubs unbidden, and were not planted by the hand of man. And they dwelt naked, and mostly in the open air, for the temperature of their seasons was mild; and they had no beds, but lay on soft couches of grass, which grew plentifully out of the earth. Such was the life of man in the days of Cronos, Socrates; the character of our present life, which is said to be under Zeus, you know from your own experience. Can you, and will you, determine which of them you deem the happier?

_T. Soc._ I cannot.

_Str._ Then shall I determine for you as well as I can?

_T. Soc._ By all means.

_Str._ Suppose that the children of Cronos, having this boundless leisure, and the power of holding intercourse, not only with men but with the animal creation, had used all these advantages with a view to philosophy, conversing with the animals as well as with one another, and learning of every nature which was gifted with any special power, and was able to contribute some special experience to the store of wisdom, there would be no difficulty in determining which was the happier. Or, again, if they had merely eaten and drunk until they were full, and told stories to one another, and to the animals—such stories as are now told of them—in this case also, as I should imagine, the answer would be easy. But as there is no satisfactory reporter of the desires and thoughts of those times, I think that we must leave the question unanswered, and go at once to the point of the tale, and then we will proceed on our journey. In the fulness of time, when the change was to take place, and the earth-born race had all perished, and every soul had fallen into the earth and been sown her appointed number of times, the governor of the universe let the helm go, and retired to his place of view; and then Fate and innate desire reversed the motion of the world. Then, also, all the other deities who share the rule of the supreme power, being informed of what was happening, let go the parts of the world of which they were severally the guardians. And the world turning round with a
sudden shock, having received an opposite impulse at both ends, was shaken by a mighty earthquake, producing a new destruction of all manner of animals. After a while the tumult and confusion and earthquake ceased, and the universal creature, once more at peace, attained to a calm, and settled down into his own orderly and accustomed course, having the charge and rule of himself and of all other creatures, and remembering and executing the instructions of the Father and Creator of the world, more particularly at first, but afterwards with less exactness. The reason of the falling off was the admixture of matter in the world; this was inherent in the primal nature, which was full of disorder, until attaining to the present cosmos or order. From God, the constructor, the world indeed received every good, but from a previous state came elements of violence and injustice, which, thence derived, were implanted in the animals. While the world was producing animals in unison with God, the evil was small, and great the good which worked within, but in the process of separation from him, when the world was let go, at first all proceeded well enough; then, as time went on, there was more and more forgetting, and the old discord again entered in and got the better, and burst forth; and at last small was the good, and great was the admixture of the elements of evil, and there was a danger of universal ruin of the world and the things in the world. Wherefore God, the orderer of all, seeing that the world was in great straits, fearing that all might be dissolved in the storm, and go to the place of chaos and infinity, again seated himself at the helm; and reversing the elements which had fallen into dissolution and disorder when left to themselves in the previous cycle, he set them in order and restored them, and made the world imperishable and immortal. And this is the whole tale, of which the first part will suffice to illustrate the nature of the king. For when the world returned to the present cycle of generation, the age of man again stood still, and another change was the result. The small creatures which had almost disappeared grew in stature, and the newly-born children of the earth became grey and died and sank into the earth again. All things changed, imitating and following the 274 condition of the universe, and agreeing with that in their mode of conception and generation and nurture; for no animal was any longer allowed to come into being in the earth through the agency.
of other creative beings, but as the world was ordained to be the
lord of his own progress, in like manner the parts were ordained
to grow and generate and give nourishment, as far as they could,
of themselves, impelled by a similar movement. And so we have
arrived at the real end of this discourse; for although there might
be much to tell of the lower animals, and of the reasons and
causes of their changes, about men there is not much, and that
little is more to the purpose. Deprived of the care of God, who
had possessed and tended them when, in process of time, most
of the animals who were by nature intractable had grown wild,
they were left helpless and defenceless, and were torn in pieces by
them; moreover, in the first ages they carried on the struggle for
existence without arts or resources; the food which once grew
spontaneously had failed, and they knew not how to procure any
more, because no necessity had hitherto compelled them. For all
these reasons they were in a great strait; wherefore, also the gifts
spoken of in the old tradition were imparted to them by the gods,
together with the indispensable knowledge and information of
their uses; fire was given to us by Prometheus, the arts by
Hephaestus and his fellow-worker (Athene), seeds and plants by
others. Out of these human life was framed; since the care of
the Gods, as I was saying, had now failed men, and they had
to order their course of life for themselves, and were their own
masters, just like the universal creature, whom they imitate and
follow, ever living and being born into the world, at one time
after this manner, at another time after another manner. Enough
of the story, which may be of use in showing us how greatly we
erred in the delineation of the king and the statesman in our
previous discourse.

_T. Soc._ What was this great error of which you speak?

_Str._ There were two; the first a lesser one, the other was an
error on a much larger and grander scale.

_T. Soc._ How was that?

_Str._ Because when we were asked about a king and statesman of
the present cycle and generation, we told of a shepherd who be-
longed to the other cycle, and of one who was a god when he
ought to have been a man; and this was a great error. Again, in
so far as we declared him to be the ruler of the entire State, without
explaining the nature of his rule, this was not the whole truth, nor
clearly expressed, but still was true, and therefore this error was not so great as the last.

_T. Soc._ Very good.

_Str._ Only when we have defined the nature of his office can we expect truly to describe the statesman.

_T. Soc._ Certainly.

_Str._ And that was the reason why the mythus was introduced, in order to show, not only that all others are rivals of the true shepherd who is the object of our search, but in order that we might have a clearer view of him who is alone worthy to receive this appellation, because he alone of shepherds and herdsmen, according to the image which we have employed, has the care of human beings.

_T. Soc._ Very true.

_Str._ And I cannot help thinking, Socrates, that the form of the divine Shepherd is above even that of a king; whereas the statesmen who are now on earth seem to be much more like their subjects in character, and much more nearly to partake of their breeding and education.

_T. Soc._ Certainly.

_Str._ Still they must be investigated all the same, whether, like the divine Shepherd, they are above their subjects or on a level with them.

_T. Soc._ Of course.

_Str._ To resume:—Do you remember that we spoke of a supreme art which had the charge of animals, not singly but in common, which we called the art of the herdsman?

_T. Soc._ Yes, I remember.

_Str._ There, somewhere, lay our error; for we never included or mentioned the Statesman; and we did not observe that he had no place in our nomenclature.

_T. Soc._ How was that?

_Str._ All herdsmen feed their herds, but this is not a suitable term to apply to the Statesman, who should have a more general name.

_T. Soc._ True, if there be such a name.

_Str._ Why, is not care of herds a more general name? For this implies no feeding, or any special duty; if we say either tending the herds, or managing the herds, or having the care of them, that
will include all, and then we may wrap up the Statesman with the
rest, as the argument seems to require.

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**Y. Soc.** Quite right; but how shall we take the next step in the
division?

**Str.** As before we divided the art of feeding herds into winged
and wingless, horned and hornless, mixing or not mixing the
breed, so we may divide by these same differences the tending of
herds, comprehending in one word both the life which now is, and
the rule of Cronos.

**Y. Soc.** That is clear; but I still ask, what next?

**Str.** If the word had been 'managing' herds, instead of feeding
or rearing them, no one would have argued that there was no
management of them in the case of the politician, although it was
justly contended, that there was no human art of feeding them
which was worthy of the name, or at least, if there were, many
other arts had more right to the name than any king.

**Y. Soc.** True.

**Str.** But no other art or science will claim or have a better or
greater right than the royal science to exercise superintendence
over all human society and men in general.

**Y. Soc.** Quite true.

**Str.** In the next place, Socrates, we must surely notice that a
great error was committed at the end of our analysis.

**Y. Soc.** What was that?

**Str.** Why, supposing that there is such an art as the art of rearing
or nourishing bipeds, there was no reason why we should call
this the royal or political art, as though there were no more to be
said.

**Y. Soc.** Certainly not.

**Str.** Our first duty was to remodel the name, so as to have the
notion of care rather than of feeding, and then to divide, for there
may be still considerable divisions.

**Y. Soc.** How can they be made?

**Str.** First, by separating the divine shepherd from the human
guardian or manager.

**Y. Soc.** True.

**Str.** And the art of management which is assigned to man
would again have to be subdivided.

**Y. Soc.** On what principle?
Str. On the principle of voluntary and compulsory.

Y. Soc. Why?

Str. Because, if I am not mistaken, there has been an error here; for our simplicity led us to rank them together, whereas they are utterly different, and their modes of government are different.

Y. Soc. True.

Str. Then, now, as I said, let us make the correction and divide human care into two parts, on the principle of voluntary and compulsory.

Y. Soc. Certainly.

Str. And if we call the management of the violent tyranny, and the voluntary management of voluntary bipeds politics, may we not further assert that he who has this latter art of management is the true king and statesman?

Y. Soc. I think, Stranger, that we have now completed the account of the Statesman.

Str. Would that we had, Socrates, but I have to satisfy myself as well as you; and in my judgment the figure of the king is not yet perfected; like statuaries who, in their too great haste, having overdone the several parts of their work, lose time in correcting them, so too we, partly out of haste, partly out of a magnanimous desire to detect our former error, and also because we imagined that a king required grand illustrations, have taken up a marvellous lump of fable, and have been obliged to use more than was necessary. This made us discourse at large, and, nevertheless, the story never came to an end. And our discussion might be compared to a picture of some living being which had been fairly drawn in outline, but had not yet attained the life and clearness which is given by the blending of colours. Now to intelligent persons a living being is more truly delineated by language and discourse than by any painting or work of art; to the other sort in works of art.

Y. Soc. Very true; but what is this imperfection which still remains? I wish that you would tell me.

Str. The higher ideas, my dear friend, can hardly be set forth except through the medium of examples; every man seems to know all things in a kind of dream, and then again to know nothing when he awakes.

Y. Soc. What does this mean?
Str. I fear that I have been unfortunate in my attempt to describe our experience of knowledge.

T. Soc. Why do you say that?

Str. Why, because my 'example' requires the assistance of another example.

T. Soc. Proceed, I shall be interested to hear.

Str. I will proceed, finding, as I do, such a ready listener in you: when children are beginning to know their letters——

T. Soc. What are you going to say?

Str. That they easily recognise the several letters in very short and easy syllables, and are able to tell you them correctly.

278 T. Soc. Certainly.

Str. Whereas in other syllables they do not recognise them, and think and speak falsely of them.

T. Soc. Very true.

Str. Will not the best and easiest way of guiding them to the letters which they do not as yet know, be to refer them to the same letters in the words which they know, and to compare these with the letters which as yet they do not know, and show them that they are the same, and have the same character in the different combinations, until the letters, which they do not know, have been all placed side by side with the letters which they do know? in this way they have examples, and are made to learn that every letter in every combination is pronounced always either as the same or not the same.


Str. Are not examples formed in this manner? We take that which is the same with something in some other separate thing, and when this is rightly conceived and compared with the first, out of the comparison there arises one true notion, which includes both of them.

T. Soc. Exactly.

Str. Can we wonder, then, that the soul has the same uncertainty about the alphabet of things, and sometimes and in some cases is firmly fixed by the truth, and then, again, in other cases is all abroad; having somehow or other a correct notion of certain combinations; but when they are translated into the long and difficult language of facts, is again ignorant of them?

T. Soc. There is nothing wonderful in that.
Str. Could any one, my friend, who begins with false opinion ever expect to attain wisdom, or to arrive even at a small portion of truth?

Y. Soc. That is hardly possible.

Str. Then, if this be as you say, you and I will not be far wrong in trying to see in a small and partial instance the nature of example in general; that lesser instance we shall transfer to the similar nature of the king, and to the royal class which is the greatest of all, and by the help of example endeavour to recognise scientifically his occupation; and then the dream will become a reality to us.

Y. Soc. Very true.

Str. Then, once more, let us resume the previous argument, and as there were innumerable rivals of the royal race who claim to have the care of states, let us part them all off, and leave him alone; and, as I was saying, a model or example of this process has first to be framed.

Y. Soc. Exactly.

Str. What model is there which is small, and yet has any analogy with the political occupation? Suppose, Socrates, that if we have no other example at hand, we choose weaving, or, more precisely, weaving of wool—this will be quite enough, without taking the whole of weaving, to illustrate our meaning?

Y. Soc. Certainly.

Str. Why should we not apply to weaving the same processes of division and subdivision which we have already applied to other classes; going as rapidly as we can through all the steps until we come to that which is needed for our purpose?

Y. Soc. How do you mean?

Str. I shall answer that by actually performing the process.

Y. Soc. Very good.

Str. All things which we create or possess are either creative or preventive; of the preventive class are spells and antidotes, divine and human, and also defences; and defences are either military weapons or protections; and protections are veils, and also defences against heat and cold; and defences against heat and cold are shelters and coverings; and coverings are blankets and garments; and garments are some of them in one piece, and others of them are made out of several pieces; and of these latter some
are pierced, others are fastened and not pierced; and of the not pierced, some are made of the sinews of plants, and some of hair; and of these, again, some are cemented with water and earth, and others have fastenings of their own material. And these last defences and coverings which are formed out of the fastenings of their own material are called clothes, and the art which super-intends them is called, from the nature of the operation, the art of clothing, just as before the art of the Statesman was derived from the State; and may we not say that the art of weaving, at least that large portion of this art which was concerned with the making of clothes (cp. 279 B), differs only in name from this art of clothing, in the same way that, in the previous case, the royal science differed from the political?

_T. Soc._ Most true.

_Str._ In the next place, let us make the reflection, that the art which we term the weaving of garments, and which an incompetent person might fancy to have been sufficiently described, has been separated off from several others which are of the same family, but not from the co-operative arts.

_T. Soc._ And what arts are of the same family?

_Str._ I see that I have not taken you with me. I think, therefore, that we had better go back and begin at the end once more. We just now parted off from clothing the making of blankets, which differ from clothes in that one is put under and the other is put around: and this is what I termed the family relationship.

_T. Soc._ I understand.

_Str._ And we have subtracted the manufacture of all articles made of flax and cords, and all that which we just now metaphorically termed the sinews of plants, and we have also separated off the process of felting and the putting together of materials by piercing and sewing, of which the most important part is the cobbler's art.

_T. Soc._ Precisely.

_Str._ Then we separated off the currier's art, which prepared coverings in entire pieces, and subtracted the various arts of sheltering which are employed in building, and in general in carpentering, the art of making water-tight, and all such arts as furnish impediments to thieving and acts of violence, and are
concerned with making the lids of boxes and the fixing of doors, being divisions of the art of joining; and we also cut off the manufacture of arms, which is a section of the great and manifold art of making defences; and we originally began by parting off the whole of the magic art which is concerned with antidotes, and have left, as would appear, the very art of which we were in search, which is an art of protection against winter cold, and fabricates woollen defences, and has the name of weaving.

_T. Soc._ Very true.

_Str._ Yes, my boy, but that is not all, for the first process to which the material is subjected is the opposite of weaving.

_T. Soc._ How is that?

_Str._ Weaving is a sort of uniting?

_T. Soc._ Yes.

_Str._ But the first process is a separation of the clotted and matted fibres?

_T. Soc._ What do you mean?

_Str._ I mean the work of the carder's art; for we cannot say that carding is weaving, or that the carder is a weaver.

_T. Soc._ Certainly not.

_Str._ Again, if a person were to say that the art of making the warp and the woof was the art of weaving, he would say what was unmeaning and false.

_T. Soc._ To be sure.

_Str._ Shall we say that the whole art of the fuller or of the mender has nothing to do with the care and treatment of clothes, or are we to regard all these as arts of weaving?

_T. Soc._ Certainly not.

_Str._ And yet surely all these arts will maintain that they are concerned with the treatment and production of clothes; and will dispute the exclusive prerogative of weaving, and though assigning a large sphere to that, will still reserve a considerable field for themselves.

_T. Soc._ Very true.

_Str._ Besides these, there are the arts which make tools for the weaver's use, and which will claim to be co-operators in every work of the weaver.

_T. Soc._ Most true.
Str. Well, then, suppose that we define weaving, or rather that part of weaving which has been selected by us, to be the greatest and noblest of arts which are concerned with woollen garments; will that do? Is not this, although true, wanting in clearness and completeness, for do not all those other arts require to be first cleared away?

T. Soc. True.

Str. Then the next thing will be to separate them, in order that the argument may proceed by regular steps. Let us consider, in the first place, that there are two kinds of arts, which have to do with all processes?

T. Soc. What are they?

Str. The one is the conditional or co-operative, the other the principal cause.

T. Soc. What do you mean?

Str. The arts which do not manufacture the actual thing, but which furnish the necessary tools for the manufacture, and without which the several arts could not fulfil their appointed work, I call co-operative, but those which make the things themselves I call causal.

T. Soc. That is very reasonable.

Str. The arts which make spindles, shuttles, and other instruments of the production of clothes, I call co-operative, and those which treat and fabricate the things themselves, causal.

T. Soc. Very true.

Str. To the causal class belong the arts of washing and mending, and the preparatory arts; these may be all comprehended under the art of the fuller, which is a division of the larger sphere of the art of adornment.


Str. Another art has to do with carding and spinning threads, and the various arts of manufacturing a woollen garment; and this is just the common art which is called working in wool.

T. Soc. To be sure.

Str. Of the wool-working, again, there are two divisions, and both these are parts of two arts at once.

T. Soc. How is that?

Str. Carding and one half of the use of the shuttle, and the other processes which separate the composite, may be all said to form
a part of the art of working in wool; and there are two greater arts of universal application—the art of composition and the art of division.

Y. Soc. Yes.

Str. To the latter belongs carding, and the other processes of which I was speaking; the art of discernment or division in wool and yarn, which is effected in one manner with the shuttle and in another with the hands, is variously described under all the names which I just now mentioned.

Y. Soc. Very true.

Str. Again, let us take some process of wool-working which is a portion of the art of composition, and, dismissing the elements of division which we found there, make two halves, one on the principle of composition, and the other on the principle of division.

Y. Soc. Let that be done.

Str. And once more, Socrates, you must divide the part, which belongs at once both to wool-working and composition, if we are ever to discover satisfactorily the aforesaid art of weaving.

Y. Soc. That will be requisite.

Str. Yes, certainly, and let us call one part of the art the art of twisting threads, the other the art of combining them.

Y. Soc. Do I understand you, in speaking of twisting, to be referring to the warp?

Str. Yes, and to the woof also; how, if not by twisting, is the woof made?

Y. Soc. There is no other way.

Str. Then suppose that you define the warp and the woof, for I think that the definition will be of use to you.

Y. Soc. How shall I define them?

Str. As thus: A piece of carded wool which is drawn out lengthwise and breadthwise is said to be pulled out.

Y. Soc. Yes.

Str. And the wool thus prepared, which is twisted by the spindle, and made into a firm thread, is called the warp, and the art which regulates these operations may be called the art of spinning the warp.

Y. Soc. True.

Str. And the threads of which the texture is looser having a softness proportioned to the intertexture of the warp and relative to
the degree of force to be used in dressing the cloth,—the threads which are thus spun are called the woof, and the art which is set over them may be called the art of spinning the woof.

* T. Soc. Very true.

* Str. And, now, there can be no mistake about the division of weaving which we have undertaken to define. For when that part of the art of composition which is employed in working of wool forms a texture by the orderly combination of warp and woof, the entire web is called by us a woollen garment, and the art which presides over this is the art of weaving.

* T. Soc. Very true.

* Str. But why did we not say at once that weaving is the art of entwining warp and woof, instead of making a long and useless circuit?

* T. Soc. I thought, Stranger, that there was nothing useless in what was said.

* Str. Likely enough, but you may not always think the same; and in case any feeling of dissatisfaction should hereafter arise in your mind, let me lay down a principle which will apply to arguments in general.

* T. Soc. Proceed.

* Str. Let us begin by considering the whole nature of excess and defect, and then we shall have a rational ground on which we may praise or blame the too great length or conciseness of speeches in discussions of this kind.

* T. Soc. That is what is required.

* Str. The points on which I think that we ought to dwell are the following:—

* T. Soc. What are they?

* Str. The points that I mean are length and shortness, excess and defect, with all of which the art of measurement is conversant.

* T. Soc. Yes.

* Str. And the art of measurement has to be divided into two parts, with a view to our present purpose.

* T. Soc. Where would you make the division?

* Str. As thus: I would make two parts, one which has to do with relative size; and there is another, without which the existence of production would be impossible.

* T. Soc. How do you mean?
Str. Does not the greater in the order of nature appear to you to be only relative to the less, and the less only relative to the greater?

Y. Soc. Yes.

Str. Well, but is there not also a greater and less exceeding and exceeded by the principle of the mean, both in words and deeds, and is not this a reality, and does not the chief difference between good and bad men consist in this?

Y. Soc. That is plain.

Str. Then we must suppose that the great and small exist and are discerned in both these ways, and not, as we were saying before, only relatively to one another, but there must also be another comparison of them with the mean or ideal standard; would you like to hear the reason of this?

Y. Soc. Certainly.

Str. If we assume the greater to exist only in relation to the less, there will never be any comparison of either with the mean.

Y. Soc. True.

Str. And would not this doctrine be the ruin of all the arts and their creations; would not the art of the Statesman and the aforesaid art of weaving disappear? For all these arts are on the watch against excess and defect, not as unrealities, but as real evils, which occasion a difficulty in action; and the excellence or beauty of every work of art is due to this observance of measure.

Y. Soc. Certainly.

Str. But if the science of the Statesman disappears, there will be no possibility of finding out the royal science.

Y. Soc. Very true.

Str. Well, then, as in the Sophist we extorted the inference that not-being had an existence, because this was the point at which the argument eluded our grasp, so in this we must endeavour to show that the greater and less are not only to be measured with one another, but also have to do with the production of the mean; for if this is not admitted, neither a statesman nor any other man of action can be an undisputed master of his science.

Y. Soc. Yes, we must certainly do again what we did then.

Str. But this, Socrates, is a greater work than that was; and you will not have forgotten the length of that. I think, however, that we may fairly assume something of this sort:—
T. Soc. What?

Str. That we shall some day require this notion of a standard with a view to the demonstration of absolute truth; meanwhile, in our present enquiry, we derive a grand support from this argument, which has well established, that the very existence of the arts must be held to depend on the possibility of measuring more or less, not only with one another, but also with a view to the attainment of the mean;—if there are arts, there is a standard of measure, and if there is a standard of measure, there are arts; but if either is wanting, there is neither.

T. Soc. True; and what is the next step?

Str. The next step clearly is to divide the art of measurement into two parts, and place in the one part all the arts which measure number, length, depth, breadth, swiftness, with their opposites; and to have another part in which they are measured with the mean, and the fit, and the opportune, and the due, and with all those words, in short, which denote a mean or standard removed from the extremes.

T. Soc. Here are two vast divisions, embracing two very different spheres.

Str. There are many accomplished men, Socrates, who say that the art of measurement is universal, and has to do with all things. And that is what we are now saying, and there is certainly a sense in which all things that are within the province of art partake of measure. But these persons, from not being accustomed to distinguish classes according to their real forms, jumble together relation to other and to a mean, which are widely different things, under the idea that they are the same, and fall into the converse error of dividing other things not according to their real parts. Whereas the right way is, when a man once sees the unity of things, to go on with the enquiry and not desist until he has found all the differences which exist in distinct classes, nor should he rest satisfied in the contemplation of the innumerable diversities of kinds until he has comprehended all that have any affinity to each other within the sphere of a single class, notion, or essence. Thus much of excess and defect, and of the art of measurement in general; we have only to keep in mind that the two divisions of the art have been discovered, and not to forget what they are.

Reading ταχύτητας.
Y. Soc. We will not forget.

Str. And now that this discussion is completed, let us go on to another question, which will embrace not this argument only but arguments in general.

Y. Soc. What is this new question?

Str. Suppose that some one should put this question to us: Whether, when one of the pupils at a school is asked what letters make up a name,—he is asked in order to improve his grammatical knowledge of the particular word, or of all words?

Y. Soc. Clearly, in order that he may have a better knowledge of all words.

Str. And is our enquiry about the 'Statesman intended only to improve our knowledge of politics, or our knowledge of philosophy generally?

Y. Soc. Clearly, as in the former example, the purpose is general.

Str. Still less would any rational man seek to analyze the notion of weaving for its own sake. But people seem to forget that some things have sensible images, which may be easily shown, when any one desires to exhibit any of them or explain them to an enquirer, without any trouble or argument; while the greatest and noblest truths have no outward image of themselves visible to man, which he who wishes to satisfy the longing soul of the enquirer can adapt to the eye of sense, and therefore we ought to practise ourselves in the idea of them; for immaterial things, which are the highest and greatest, are shown only in thought and idea, and in no other way, and all that we are saying is said for the sake of them; moreover, there is always less difficulty in fixing the mind on small matters than on great.

Y. Soc. Very good.

Str. Let us keep in mind the bearing of all this.

Y. Soc. What is the bearing?

Str. I wanted to get rid of any impression of tediousness which we may have experienced in the discussion about weaving, and the reversal of the universe, and in the discussion concerning the Sophist and the essence of not-being. I know that they were felt to be too long and irrelevant. I reproached myself with this, and all that I have now said is only designed to prevent the recurrence of any such disagreeables for the future.
Y. Soc. Very good. Will you proceed?

Str. Then I would like to observe that you and I, remembering what has been said, would praise or blame the shortness of discussions, not by comparing them with one another, but according to a standard of measure, having in view what is fitting, which, as we were saying, must be borne in mind.

Y. Soc. Very true.

Str. And yet, not everything is to be judged even with a view to what is fitting in all respects; for we do not want such a length as is suited to give pleasure—that is a secondary matter; and again, the ease or rapidity with which an enquiry is attained, is not, as reason informs us, to be the first, but rather the second object; our first and highest object is to assert the great method of division according to species,—whether the discourse be shorter or longer is not to the point. No offence should be taken at length, but the longer and shorter are to be employed indifferently, according as either of them is better calculated to sharpen the wits of the auditors. Reason would also say to him who censures the length of discourses and cannot away with their circumlocution, that he should not at once lay them aside or censure them as tedious, but he should also prove that if they had been shorter they would have made those who took part in them better dialecticians, and more capable of expressing the truth of things—about any other praise and blame, he need not trouble himself; he need not be supposed to hear them. But we have had enough of this, as you will probably agree with me in thinking. Let us return to our Statesman, and apply to his case the aforesaid example of weaving.

Y. Soc. Very good;—let us do as you say.

Str. The art of the king has been separated from the similar arts of shepherds, and, indeed, from all those which have to do with herds at all. There still remain, however, those causal or co-operative arts which are immediately concerned with States, and which must first be distinguished from one another.

Y. Soc. Very good.

Str. You know that these arts cannot easily be divided into two halves; the reason of this will be evident as we go forward.

Y. Soc. We had better go forward.

Str. Then we must carve them like a victim into members or
limbs if we cannot bisect them. For we certainly should divide everything into as few parts as possible.

*Y. Soc.* How is that to be accomplished in this case?

*Str.* As in the example of weaving, all those arts which furnished the tools of weaving were regarded by us as co-operative.

*Y. Soc.* Yes.

*Str.* So now, and with still more reason, all arts which make any implement in a State, whether great or small, may be regarded by us as co-operative, for without them neither State nor Statesman could exist; and yet we are disinclined to say that any of them is the work of the kingly art.

*Y. Soc.* No, indeed.

*Str.* The task of separating this class from others is not an easy one; for there is plausibility in saying that anything in the world is the instrument of doing something. But there is another class of possessions in a city, of which I have something to say.

*Y. Soc.* What class is that?

*Str.* A class which may be described as not having this power; that is to say, not like an instrument, designed for production, but for the preservation of that which is produced.

*Y. Soc.* What is that?

*Str.* The class of vessels, as they are comprehensively termed, which are framed for the preservation of things moist and dry, in the fire or out of the fire; this is a very large class, and has, if I am not mistaken, literally nothing to do with the royal art.

*Y. Soc.* Certainly not.

*Str.* There is a third class also to be discovered, different from these and very extensive, moving or resting on land or water, honourable and also dishonourable, which have a name descriptive of sitting, because always intended to be a seat for something.

*Y. Soc.* What is that?

*Str.* A vehicle, which is certainly not the work of the Statesman, but of the carpenter, potter, and brassfounder.

*Y. Soc.* I understand.

*Str.* And is there not a fourth class which is again different, and in which most of the things formerly mentioned are contained?—Every kind of dress, most sorts of arms, walls and enclosures, whether of earth or stone, and ten thousand other things; all of
which being made for the sake of defence, may be truly called
defences, and are for the most part to be regarded as the work of
the builder or of the weaver, rather than of the Statesman?

Y. Soc. Certainly.

Str. Shall we add a fifth class, of ornamentation and drawing,
and of the imitations produced by drawing and music, which are
designed for amusement only, and may be fairly comprehended
under one name?

Y. Soc. What is that?

Str. Plaything is the name.

Y. Soc. Certainly.

Str. That is a name which may be fitly predicated of all of them,
for none of these things have a serious purpose—amusement is the
aim of them all.

Y. Soc. That also I think that I understand tolerably well.

Str. Then, again, that which provides materials for all these,
out of which and in which the arts already mentioned fabricate
their works,—this manifold class, I say, which is the creation and
offspring of many other arts, may I not rank sixth?

Y. Soc. What do you mean?

Str. I am speaking of gold, silver, and other metals, and all that
wood-cutting and every other sort of cutting provides for the art of
carpentry and plaiting; and there is the process of barking and
stripping the cuticle of plants, and the currier’s art, which strips
off the skins of animals, and other similar arts which manufacture
corks and papyri and cords, and provide for the manufacture of
composite species out of simple kinds—the whole class may be
termed the simple and original possession of man, and with this
the kingly science has no concern at all.

Y. Soc. True.

Str. The provision of food and of all other things which mingle
their particles with the particles of the human body, and minister
to the body, may form a seventh class, which may be called by the
general term of nourishment, unless you have any better name to
offer. This, however, appertains rather to the husbandman, hunts-
man, trainer, doctor, cook, and is not to be assigned to the States-
man’s art.

Y. Soc. Certainly not.

Str. These seven classes include nearly every description of
property, with the exception of tame animals. Consider;—there was the original material, which ought to have been placed first; next came instruments, vessels, vehicles, defences, playthings, nourishment; small things, which may be included under any of these, as for example—coins, seals and stamps, are omitted, for they have not in them the quality of any larger kind which comprehends them; but some of them may, with a little forcing, be placed among ornaments, and others may be made to harmonize with the class of implements. The art of herding, which has been already divided into parts, will include all property in animals except slaves.

Y. Soc. Very true.

Str. The class of slaves and ministers only remains, and, I suspect, that in this the real aspirants for the throne, who are the rivals of the king in the formation of the political web, will be discovered; just as spinners, carders, and the rest of them, were the rivals of the weaver; all the rest were termed co-operators, and have been already got rid of among the occupations already mentioned, and separated, from the royal and political science.

Y. Soc. I agree in that.

Str. Let us go a little nearer, in order that we may be more certain of the complexion of this remaining class.

Y. Soc. That is what has to be done.

Str. We shall find that the greatest servants, and those who appear to us from our present point of view to be most truly servants, are in a case and condition which is the reverse of what we anticipated.

Y. Soc. Who are they?

Str. Those who are purchased, and who are unmistakeably slaves—they certainly do not claim royal science.

Y. Soc. Certainly not.

Str. Again, freemen who of their own accord become the servants of the other classes in a State, and who exchange and equalise the products of husbandry and the other arts, some sitting in the market-place, others going from city to city by land or sea, and giving money in exchange for money or for other productions—the money-changer, the merchant, the ship-owner, the retailer, will not put in any claim to statecraft or politics.

Y. Soc. No; unless, indeed, to commercial politics.

Str. But surely men whom we see acting as hirelings and serfs,
and too happy to turn their hand to anything, will not profess to share in royal science.

T. Soc. Certainly not.

Str. But what would you say of some other serviceable officials?

T. Soc. Who are they, and what services do they perform?

Str. There are heralds and scribes, perfected by practice, and divers others who have great skill in various sorts of business connected with the government of states—what shall we call them?

T. Soc. They are the officials, and servants of the rulers, as you just now called them, not themselves rulers.

Str. There may be something strange in any servant pretending to be a ruler, and yet I do not think that I could have been dreaming when I imagined that the principal claimants belonged to the class of servants.

T. Soc. Very true.

Str. Well, let us draw nearer, and try the claims of others who have not yet been sifted: in the first place, there are diviners, who have a portion of servile or ministerial science, and are thought to be the interpreters of the gods to men.

T. Soc. True.

Str. There are also priests who, as the law declares, know how to give the gods gifts from men in the form of sacrifices, which are acceptable to them, and to ask for us a return of blessings from them. Now both these are branches of the servile or ministerial art.

T. Soc. Yes, that is clear.

Str. And here I think that we seem to be getting on the right track; for the priest and the diviner also are full of pride and prerogative—this is due to the greatness of their employments; and in Egypt, the king himself is not allowed to reign, unless he have priestly powers, and if he should be one of another class, and have obtained the throne by violence, he must get enrolled in the priesthood. In many parts of Hellas, the duty of offering the most solemn propitiatory sacrifices is assigned to the highest magistracies, and here, at Athens, the most solemn and national of the ancient sacrifices are supposed to be celebrated by the King Archon of the year.

T. Soc. Precisely.

Str. But who are these elected kings and priests who now come into view with a crowd of retainers, as the former class disappears and the scene changes?
T. Soc. Whom do you mean?

Str. They are strange beings.

T. Soc. Well, what of them?

Str. They seemed to be a sort of nondescripts, when I first caught sight of them just now, in various forms, of men and animals and mythological monsters appearing, fierce and strong or cunning and weak; many of them are like lions and centaurs, and many more like satyrs and the weak and versatile sort of animals;—Protean shapes ever changing their form and nature; and now, Socrates, I begin to see who they are.

T. Soc. Who are they? You seem to be gazing on some strange vision.

Str. Yes; every one looks strange when you do not know him; and at first sight, coming suddenly upon him, I did not recognise the politician and his troop.

T. Soc. Who is he?

Str. The chief of sophists and most accomplished of wizards, who must at any cost be separated from the true king or Statesman, if we are ever to see daylight in the present enquiry.

T. Soc. That certainly is not a hope to be lightly renounced.

Str. Nay, never, if I can help; and, first, let me ask you a question.

T. Soc. What are you going to ask?

Str. Is not monarchy a recognised form of government?

T. Soc. Yes.

Str. And, after monarchy, next in order comes the government of the few?

T. Soc. Of course.

Str. Is not the third form of government the rule of the multitude, which is called by the name of democracy?


Str. And do not these three expand in a manner into five, producing out of themselves two other names?

T. Soc. What are they?

Str. There is a criterion of voluntary and involuntary, poverty and riches, law and the absence of law, which men apply to them; the two first they subdivide accordingly, and ascribe to monarchy two forms and two corresponding names, royalty and tyranny.

T. Soc. Very true.
Str. And the government of the few they distinguish by the names of aristocracy and oligarchy.

Y. Soc. Certainly.

Str. Democracy alone, whether respecting the laws or not, and whether the multitude rule over the men of property with their consent or against their consent, always has the same name.

Y. Soc. True.

Str. But do you suppose that any of these forms of government which are distinguished by these characteristics of the one, the few, or the many, of poverty or wealth, of compulsion or freedom, of written or unwritten law, is a right one?

Y. Soc. Why not?

Str. Think a little; and let me take you with me.

Y. Soc. In what direction?

Str. Shall we abide by what we said at first, or shall we retract our words?

Y. Soc. To what do you refer?

Str. If I am not mistaken, we said that royal power was a science?

Y. Soc. Yes.

Str. And a science of a peculiar kind, which was selected out of the rest as having at once a judicial and commanding nature?

Y. Soc. Yes.

Str. And there was one kind of command of lifeless things and another of living animals; and so we proceeded in the division step by step up to this point, not losing the idea of science, but unable as yet to determine the nature of the science?

Y. Soc. True.

Str. Hence we are led to observe that the several forms of government cannot be defined by the words few or many, voluntary or compulsory, poverty or riches; but some notion of science must enter in, if we are to be consistent with what has preceded.

Y. Soc. And we must be consistent.

Str. Well, then, in which of these various forms of States may the science of government, which is among the greatest and most difficult of all sciences, be supposed to reside? That we must discover, and then we shall see who are the false politicians who win popularity and pretend to be politicians and are not, and separate them from the wise king.
T. Soc. That, as the argument has already intimated, is our duty.

Str. Do you think that the multitude in a State can attain political science?

T. Soc. Impossible.

Str. But, perhaps, in a city of a thousand men, there would be a hundred, or say fifty, who could?

T. Soc. In that case political science would certainly be the easiest of all sciences; there could not be found in a city of that number as many really good draught-players, judging by the standard of the rest of Hellas, and there would certainly not be as many kings. For kings we may truly call those who possess royal science, whether they rule or not, as was shown in the previous argument.

Str. Thank you for reminding me; and the consequence is that any true form of government can only be supposed to be the government of one, two, or, at any rate, of a few.


Str. And these, whether they rule with the will, or against the will, of their subjects, with written laws or without written laws, and whether they are poor or rich, and whatever be the nature of their rule, must be supposed, according to our present view, to rule on some scientific principle; just as the physician, whether he cures us against our will or with our will, and whatever be his mode of treatment,—bleeding, burning, or the infliction of some other pain; whether he practises out of a book or not out of a book, and whether he be rich or poor, whether he purges or reduces in some other way, or even fattens his patients, is a physician all the same, while he exercises authority over them according to rules of art, if he only does them good and heals and saves them. And this is the only proper test of the art of medicine, or of any other art of command.

T. Soc. Quite true.

Str. Then that can be the only true form of government in which the governors are found to possess true science, and are not mere pretenders, whether they rule according to law or without law, over willing or unwilling subjects, and are rich or poor themselves,—none of these things can properly be included in the notion of the ruler.
And whether with a view to the public good they purge the State by killing some, or exiling some; whether they lower or increase the body corporate, by sending out or receiving into the hive swarms of citizens, while they act according to the rules of wisdom and justice, whether with or without laws, if they use their power in order as far as possible to make their city better, then the city over which they rule, and which has these characteristics, may be described as the only true State. All other governments are not genuine or real, but only imitations of this, and some of them are better and some of them are worse; the better are said to be well governed, but they are mere imitations like the others.

I agree, Stranger, in the greater part of what you say; but as to their ruling without laws—this is a hard saying.

I was just going to ask, Socrates, whether you objected to any of my statements; and now I see that this notion of there being good government without laws will require some further consideration.

Certainly.

There can be no doubt that legislation is in a manner the business of a king, and yet the best thing of all is not that the law should rule, but that a man should rule, supposing him to have wisdom and royal power. Do you see why this is?

Why?

Because the law cannot comprehend exactly what is noblest or most just, or at once ordain what is best, for all. The differences of men and actions, and the endless irregular movements of human things, do not admit of any universal and simple rule. No art can lay down any rule which will last for ever—that we must admit.

Certainly.

But this the law seeks to accomplish; like an obstinate and ignorant tyrant, who will not allow anything to be done contrary to his appointment, or any question to be asked—not even in sudden changes of circumstances, when something happens to be better than what he commanded for some one.

True; that is just the way in which the law treats us.

A perfectly simple principle can never be applied to a state of things which is the reverse of simple.

True.
Str. Then if the law is not the perfection of right, why are we compelled to make laws at all? The reason of this has to be investigated.


Str. Let me ask, whether you have not meetings for gymnastic exercises in your city, such as there are in other cities at which men compete in running, wrestling, and the like?

T. Soc. Yes; they are very common among us.

Str. And what are the rules which those who are in authority impose on the pupils at such meetings? Can you remember?

T. Soc. What do you mean?

Str. The training-masters do not issue minute rules for individuals, or give every individual what is exactly suited to his constitution; they think that they ought to go more roughly to work, and give a general rule of what will benefit the constitutions of the majority.


Str. And therefore they assign equal amounts of exercise to them all; they send them forth together, and let them rest together from their running, wrestling, or whatever the bodily exercise may be which they prescribe for them.

T. Soc. True.

Str. Let us consider further, that the legislator who has to preside over the herd, and to enforce justice in their dealings with one another, will not be able, in enacting for the general good, to provide exactly what is suitable for each particular case.

T. Soc. That is to be expected.

Str. He will lay down laws in a general form for the majority, roughly meeting the cases of individuals; and some of them he will deliver in writing, and others will be unwritten; and these last will be traditional customs of the country.

T. Soc. That will be right.

Str. Yes; that will be right, for how can he sit at every man’s side all through his life, and prescribe for him the exact particulars of his duty? No one who really had the royal science, if he had been able to do this, would have imposed upon himself the restriction of having a written code of laws.

T. Soc. That is the inference, from what has now been said.

Str. And yet more, my good friend, from what is going to be said.
Y. Soc. What is that?

Str. Let us put to ourselves the case of a physician, or trainer, who is about to go into a far country, and is expecting to be a long time away from his patients; he leaves written instructions for the patients or pupils, under the idea that they will not be remembered unless they are written down.

Y. Soc. True.

Str. But what would you say, if he came back sooner than he intended, and, owing to an unexpected change of the winds or other heavenly influences,—some other remedies happened to be better for them,—would he not venture to suggest those other remedies, although differing from his former prescription? Would he persist in observing the original law, neither himself giving any new commandments, nor the patient daring to do otherwise than was prescribed, under the idea that this course only was healthy and medicinal, all others noxious and heterodox? Viewed in the light of science and true art, would not all such regulations be utterly ridiculous?

Y. Soc. Quite true.

Str. And if he who gave laws, written or unwritten, determining what was good or bad, honourable or dishonourable, just or unjust to the tribes of men who herd in their several cities, and are governed in accordance with them; if, I say, the wise legislator were suddenly to come again, or another in his likeness, is he to be prohibited from changing them;—would not this prohibition be in reality quite as ridiculous as the other?

Y. Soc. Certainly.

Str. Do you know a saying of the common people about this, which is plausible?

Y. Soc. I do not recall what you mean at the moment.

Str. They say, that if any one knows how the ancient laws may be improved, he must first persuade his own State of the improvement, and then he may legislate, but not otherwise.

Y. Soc. And are they not right in that?

Str. Perhaps. But what if he does use some gentle violence for their good, what is this violence to be called? Or rather, before you answer, let me ask the same question in reference to our previous instances.

Y. Soc. What do you mean?
Str. Suppose that a skilful physician had a patient, of whatever
sex or age, whom he compels against his will to do something
which is contrary to the written rules, what is this compulsion to
be called? Would you ever dream of calling it a violation of
the art, or breach of the laws of health? Nothing could be more
unjust than for the patient to whom such a gentle violence is
applied, to charge the physician who practises the violence with
wanting skill or aggravating his disease.

T. Soc. That is most true.

Str. In the political art, the error is not called disease but evil,
or disgrace, or injustice.

T. Soc. Quite true.

Str. And when the citizen, contrary to the letter of the law, is
compelled to do what is juster and better and nobler than he did
before, and this sort of violence is blamed, the last and most
absurd thing which he could say, is that he has incurred disgrace
or evil or injustice, at the hands of the legislator who uses the
violence.

T. Soc. That is very true.

Str. And shall we say that the violence, if exercised by a rich
man, is just, and if by a poor man, unjust? May not any man,
rich or poor, with or without written laws, with the will of the
citizens or against the will of the citizens, do what is for their
interest? Is not this the true principle of government, in accord-
ance with which the wise and good man will order the affairs of
his subjects? As the pilot watches over the interests of the ship, 297
or of the crew, and preserves the lives of his fellow-sailors, not by
laying down rules, but by making his art a law—even so, and in
the self-same way, may there not be a true form of polity created
by those who are able to govern in a similar spirit, and who show
a strength of art which is superior to the law? Nor can wise
rulers ever err while they regard the one great rule of distributing
justice to the citizens with intelligence and art, and are able to
preserve, and, so far as that is possible, to improve them.

T. Soc. No one can deny what has been said.

Str. Neither, if you consider, can any one deny the other
statement.

T. Soc. What was that?

Str. That no great number of persons, whoever they may be,
can have political knowledge, or order a State wisely, but that the
ture government is to be found in a small body, or in an indi-
vidual, and that other States are but imitations, as has been
already said, some for the better and some for the worse, but all
of them imitations of this one.

T. Soc. What is the meaning of this? I must acknowledge that I
did not understand at the time what you said about the imitations.

Str. And yet the mere suggestion of the notion thus thrown out,
even if the error which men now commit [of not keeping the law]
be no further investigated, is highly important.

T. Soc. What do you mean?

Str. The idea which has to be grasped by us is not easy or
familiar; but what I mean to say, may be expressed in this way:—
Supposing this, of which I have been speaking, to be the true form
of government, then the others must use the written laws of this;
which will be their salvation, if they will only do what is now
approved by common consent, although not the best thing in the
world:

T. Soc. What is that?

Str. That no citizen should do anything contrary to the laws,
and that any infringement of them should be punished with death
and the most extreme penalties; and this is very right and good
when regarded as the second best thing, if you depart from the
first, of which I was just now speaking. And let me explain that
which I call the second.

T. Soc. By all means.

Str. I must again have recourse to my favourite images; through
them, and them alone, can I describe kings and rulers.

T. Soc. What images?

Str. The noble pilot and the wise physician, who 'is worth many
another man'—in the similitude of these let us endeavour to
discover some image of the king.

T. Soc. What sort of an image?

Str. Well, such as this:—Every man will reflect that he suffers
strange things at their hands; the one class saves any whom he
wishes to save, and many whom he wishes to injure he injures—
cutting or burning them, and at the same time requiring them to
bring him payments, which are a sort of tribute, of which a very
small part is spent upon the sick man, and the greater part is
consumed by them and their domestics; and the finale is, that they receive money from the relations of the sick man or some enemy of his, and put him out of the way. And the captains of ships are guilty of numberless evil deeds of the same kind; they play false and run away at the moment of sailing, and they wreck their vessels and cast away freight and lives; not to speak of other rogueries. Now suppose that we, bearing all this in mind, were to determine, after consideration, that neither of these arts shall any longer be allowed to exercise absolute control either over freemen or over slaves, but that we will summon an assembly either of all the people, or of the rich only, and that anybody who likes, whatever may be his calling, or even if he have no calling, may offer an opinion either about ships or about diseases; whether, as to the manner in which physic or surgical instruments are to be applied to the patient, or about the vessels and the nautical instruments which are required in navigation, and to meet the dangers of winds and waves which are incidental to the voyage—the chance of encountering pirates; and what is to be done with the old-fashioned galleys, if they have to fight with others of a similar build; and that, whatever shall be decreed by the multitude on these points, upon the advice of persons skilled or unskilled, shall be written down on triangular tablets and columns, or embalmed unwritten as national customs; and that in all future time vessels shall be navigated and remedies administered to the patient after this fashion:

T. Soc. That is certainly a strange notion.

Str. Suppose further, that the admirals and physicians are appointed annually, either out of the rich, or out of the whole people, and that they are elected by lot, and that after their election they navigate vessels and heal the sick according to the written rules.

T. Soc. That would be still more impracticable.

Str. Hear what follows:—When the year of office has expired, the admiral or physician has to come before a court of review, in which the judges are either selected from the wealthy classes or chosen by lot out of the whole people; and anybody who pleases may accuse them, and he will lay to their charge, that during the past year they have not navigated their vessels or healed their patients, according to the letter of the law or according to the
ancient customs of their ancestors; and if either of them is condemned, there must be persons to fix what he is to suffer or pay.

*T. Soc.* He who is willing to take a command under such conditions, deserves to suffer any penalty.

*Str.* Yet once more, we shall have to enact, that if any one is detected enquiring into sailing and navigation or health, or into the true nature of medicine, or about the winds, or other conditions of the atmosphere, contrary to the written rules, and has any ingenious notions about such matters, he is not to be called a pilot or physician, but a cloudy talking sophist;—also a corruptor of the young, who would persuade them to follow the art of medicine or piloting in an unlawful manner, as their own masters, and the masters of the patients or ships; and any one who is qualified by law may inform against him, and indict him in some court, and then if he is found to be corrupting any, whether young or old, he is to be punished with the utmost rigour of the law; for no one should presume to be wiser than the laws; and as touching healing and health and piloting and navigation, the nature of them is known to all, for anybody may learn the written laws and the national customs. If such were the mode of procedure, Socrates, about these sciences and about generalship, and any branch of hunting, or about painting or imitation in general, or carpentry, or any sort of manufacture, or husbandry, or planting, or if we were to see an art of rearing horses, or tending herds, or divination, or any ministerial service, or draught-playing, or any science conversant with number, whether simple or square or cube, or comprising motion,—I say, if all these things were done in this way according to written regulation, and not according to art, what would be the result?

*T. Soc.* All the arts would utterly perish, and could never be recovered, because enquiry would be unlawful. And human life, which is bad enough already, would then become utterly unendurable.

300 *Str.* But what, if while compelling all these operations to be regulated by written law, we were to appoint as the guardian of the laws some one elected by lot, and he caring nothing about the laws, were to act contrary to them from motives of interest or favour, and without knowledge,—would not this be a still worse evil than the former?
Y. Soc. Very true.

Str. To go against the laws, which are based upon long experience, and the wisdom of counsellors who have persuaded the multitude to pass them, would be a far greater and more ruinous error than any adherence to written law?

Y. Soc. Certainly.

Str. Therefore, as there is a danger of this, the next best thing in legislating is to have the laws observed alike by one and all.

Y. Soc. True.

Str. The laws would be copies of the true particulars of action as far as they admit of being written down from the lips of those who have knowledge?

Y. Soc. Certainly they would.

Str. And as we were saying, he who has knowledge and is a true Statesman, will do many things by his art without regard to the laws, when he is of opinion that something other than that which he has written down and enjoined to be observed during his absence would be better.

Y. Soc. Yes, that was what we said.

Str. And any individual or State, which has fixed laws, would only be acting like the true Statesman, in acting contrary to the laws with a view to something better?

Y. Soc. Certainly.

Str. If they had no knowledge of what they were doing, they would imitate the truth, and they would always imitate ill; but if they had knowledge, the imitation would be the actual truth, and an imitation no longer.

Y. Soc. Quite true.

Str. And the principle that no number of men are able to acquire a knowledge of any art, has been already admitted by us.

Y. Soc. Yes, that has been admitted.

Str. Then the royal or political art, if there be such an art, will never be attained either by the wealthy or by the other mob.

Y. Soc. Impossible.

Str. Then the nearest approach which these lower forms of government can ever make to the true government of the one scientific ruler, is to do nothing contrary to their own written laws and national customs.

Y. Soc. Very good.
Str. When the rich imitate the true form, such a government is called aristocracy; and when they are regardless of the laws, oligarchy.

Y. Soc. That appears to be the truth.

Str. Or again, when an individual rules according to law in imitation of him who knows, we call him a king; and if he rules according to law, we give him the same name, whether he rules with opinion or with knowledge.

Y. Soc. That we do.

Str. And when an individual truly possessing knowledge rules, his name will surely be the same—he will be called a king; and thus the five names of governments, as they are now reckoned, become one.

Y. Soc. That is true.

Str. And when an individual ruler governs neither by law nor by custom, but pretends that he is a man of science and can only act for the best by violating the laws, while in reality this imitation of science is under the direction of appetite and ignorance, may not such an one be called a tyrant?

Y. Soc. Certainly.

Str. And this we believe to be the origin of the tyrant and the king, of oligarchies, and aristocracies, and democracies; because men are offended at the one monarch, and can never be made to believe that any one can be worthy of such authority, or can unite the will and the power in the spirit of virtue and knowledge to do justly and holily to all; they fancy that this despot would wrong and harm and slay whom he pleased of us; for if there could be such a despot as we describe, they would acknowledge that we ought to be too glad to have him, and that he alone would be the happy ruler of a true and perfect State.

Y. Soc. Certainly.

Str. But then, as the State is not like a beehive, and has no natural head who is the recognized superior in body and mind, mankind are obliged to meet and make laws, and endeavour to approach as nearly as they can to the true form of government.

Y. Soc. True.

Str. And when the foundation of politics is in the letter only and in custom, and knowledge is divorced from action, can we wonder, Socrates, at the miseries that there are, and always will be, in States? Any other art, built on such a foundation, would
be undermined,—there can be no doubt of that. Ought we not rather to wonder at the strength of the political bond? For States have endured all this, time out of mind, and yet some of them still remain and are not overthrown, though many of them, like ships foundering at sea, are perishing and have perished, and will hereafter perish, through the incapacity of their pilots and crews, who have the worst sort of ignorance of the highest truths—I mean to say, that they are wholly unacquainted with politics, of which, above all other sciences, they believe themselves to have acquired the most perfect knowledge.


*Str.* Then the question comes:—which of these untrue forms of government is the least oppressive to live under, though they are all oppressive; and which is the worst of them? Here is a consideration which is beside our present enquiry, but which we have all of us to keep in view in all our actions.

*T. Soc.* Certainly we must keep that in view.

*Str.* You may say that of the three forms, the same is at once the hardest and the easiest.

*T. Soc.* What do you mean?

*Str.* I mean that there are three forms of government, as I said at the beginning of this discussion—monarchy, the rule of the few, and the rule of the many.


*Str.* If we divide each of these we shall have six, from which the true one may be distinguished as a seventh.

*T. Soc.* How would you make the distinction?

*Str.* Monarchy divides into royalty and tyranny; the rule of the few into aristocracy, which has an auspicious name, and oligarchy; and democracy or the rule of the many, which before was one, must now be divided.

*T. Soc.* On what principle of division?

*Str.* On the same principle as before, although the name is equivocal. For the distinction of ruling with law or without law, applies to this as well as to the rest.

*T. Soc.* Yes.

*Str.* When we were looking for the true State, there was no use in this division, as we showed before. But now that this has been separated off, and we spoke of the others as the best which
we had, the principle of law and the absence of law will bisect them all:

T. Soc. That would seem to follow, from what has been said.

Str. Then monarchy, when bound by good prescriptions or laws, is the best, and when lawless is the most bitter and oppressive to the subject?

T. Soc. True.

Str. The government of the few, which is intermediate between that of the one and many, is also intermediate in good and evil; but the government of the many is in every respect weak and unable to do either any great good or any great evil, when compared with the others, because the offices are too much subdivided and too many hold them. And this therefore is the worst of all lawful governments, and the best of all lawless ones. If they are all without the restraints of law, democracy is the form in which to live is best; if they are well ordered, then this is the last which you should choose, as royalty is the best, with the exception of the seventh, for that excels them all, and is among States what God is among men.

T. Soc. That appears to be true, and we must choose that above all.

Str. The members of all the other States, with the exception of that which has knowledge, may be set aside as being not Statesmen but partizans,—upholders of the most monstrous idols, and themselves idols; and, being the greatest imitators and magicians, are also the worst of sophists.

T. Soc. The term Sophist appears to have been most correctly transferred to the politicians, as they are called.

Str. And so the satyric drama has been played out; and now the troop of centaurs and satyrs, however unwilling to leave the political stage, have taken their departure.

T. Soc. So I perceive.

Str. There are, however, natures more nearly akin to the king, and more unintelligible; the difficulty of analysing these is far greater, and may be compared to the process of refining gold.

T. Soc. How is that?

Str. The workmen begin the process of refining by sifting away the earth and stones and the like; they then draw off in the fire, which is the only way of abstracting them, the more precious
elements of copper, silver, and sometimes of steel, which have an
affinity to gold; these are at last refined away by the use of tests,
and the gold is left quite pure.

Y. Soc. Yes, that is the way in which we are told that these
things are done.

Str. In like manner, all alien and uncongenial matter has been
separated from political science; and what is precious and of a
kindred nature has been left; there remain the nobler arts of the
general and the judge, and the higher sort of oratory which per-
suades men to do justice, and which assists in guiding the helm of
States; and some way must be found of taking them away,
leaving him whom we seek alone and unalloyed.

Y. Soc. That is clearly what has to be attempted.

Str. If the attempt is all that is wanting, he shall certainly be
brought to light; and I think that the illustration of music may
assist in exhibiting him. Please to answer me a question.

Y. Soc. What question?

Str. There is such a thing as learning music or other handicraft
art?

Y. Soc. There is.

Str. And is there any other and further science which has to do
with judging what sciences are and are not to be learned;—what
do you say to that?

Y. Soc. Our reply will be that there is.

Str. And is this science to be acknowledged as different from the
other?

Y. Soc. Yes.

Str. And ought no science to be either superior or servant, or
ought this science to be the overseer and governor of all the
others?

Y. Soc. The latter.

Str. You mean to say that the science which judges whether we
ought to learn or not, must be superior to the science which is
learned or which teaches?

Y. Soc. Far superior.

Str. And the science which determines whether we ought to
persuade or not, must be superior to the science which is able to
persuade?

Y. Soc. Of course.
Str. Very good; and to what science do we assign the power of persuading a multitude by a flattering tale and not by teaching?

Y. Soc. That, I think, must clearly be assigned to rhetoric.

Str. And to what science do we give the power of determining whether we are to use persuasion or force in relation to any particular thing or person, or whether the use of them is to be allowed at all?

Y. Soc. To that science which governs the arts of speech and persuasion.

Str. And that, if I am not mistaken, will be politics?

Y. Soc. Very good.

Str. Rhetoric seems to be quickly distinguished from politics, as a different species, which is the handmaiden of the other.

Y. Soc. Yes.

Str. But what would you think of another sort of power or science?

Y. Soc. What science?

Str. The science which has to do with military operations against our enemies—is that to be regarded as a science or not?

Y. Soc. How can generalship and military tactics be regarded as other than a science?

Str. And is the art which is able and knows how to advise when we are to go to war, or to make peace, the same as this or different?

Y. Soc. If we are to be consistent, we must say different.

Str. And we must also suppose that this rules the other, if we are not to give up our former notion?

Y. Soc. True.

Str. And, considering how great and terrible the whole art of war is, can we imagine any superior art but the truly royal?

Y. Soc. None but that.

Str. The art of the general is only ministerial, and therefore not political?

Y. Soc. Exactly.

Str. Once more let us consider the nature of the righteous judge.

Y. Soc. Very good.

Str. Does he do anything but decide the dealings of men with one another to be just or unjust in accordance with the standard
which he receives from the king and legislator,—showing his own peculiar virtue only in this, that he is not perverted by gifts, or fears, or pity, or any sort of love or hatred, into deciding the suits of men with one another contrary to the appointment of the legislator.

T. Soc. No; his office is such as you describe.

Str. Then the inference is that the power of the judge is not royal, but only the power of a guardian of the law which ministers to the royal power?

T. Soc. True.

Str. The review of all these sciences shows that none of them is political or royal. For the truly royal ought not to act, but to rule over those who are able to act, and to take the initiative; the king ought to know when to begin, and to seize the opportunities of action, whilst others execute his orders.

T. Soc. True.

Str. And, therefore, the arts which we have described, as they have no authority over themselves or one another, but are each of them concerned with some special action of their own, have, as they ought to have, special names corresponding to their several actions.

T. Soc. That seems to be true.

Str. And that common science which is over them all, and guards the laws, and all things that there are in the State, and truly weaves them all into one, if we would describe under a name characteristic of this common nature, most truly we may call politics.

T. Soc. By all means.

Str. Then, now that we have discovered the various classes in a State, shall I analyze politics after the pattern which weaving supplied?

T. Soc. I greatly wish that you would.

Str. Then I must describe the nature of the royal web, and show how the various threads are drawn into one.

T. Soc. That is clear.

Str. A task has to be accomplished, which, although difficult, appears to be necessary.

T. Soc. Certainly, the attempt must be made.

Str. To assume that one part of virtue differs in kind from
another, is a position easily assailable by contentious disputants, who appeal to common opinion.

T. Soc. I do not understand.

Str. Let me put the matter in another way: I suppose that you would think courage one part of virtue?

T. Soc. Certainly I should.

Str. And you would think that temperance is different from courage; and that would also be a part of virtue?

T. Soc. True.

Str. I shall venture to put forward a strange theory about them.

T. Soc. What is that?

Str. That they are two principles which are full of hatred and antagonism to one another, and pervade a great part of nature.

T. Soc. That is strange.

Str. Certainly, for all the parts of virtue are commonly said to be friendly to one another.

T. Soc. Yes.

Str. Then let us carefully investigate whether this is universally true, or whether there are not parts of virtue which are at war with their kindred in some respect.

T. Soc. Tell me how we shall consider that question.

Str. We must extend the question to all those things which we consider beautiful and at the same time place in two opposite classes.

T. Soc. Explain; what are they?

Str. Acuteness and quickness, whether in body or soul or speech, and in the imitations of them which painting and poetry supply, you must have often praised, and have observed others to praise them.


Str. And do you remember the terms in which they are praised?

T. Soc. I do not.

Str. I wonder whether I can explain to you in words the thought which I have in my mind.

T. Soc. Why not?

Str. You fancy that this is all so easy: Well, let us consider these notions with reference to the opposite classes of action under which they fall: When we praise quickness and energy and acuteness, whether of mind or body or speech, we express our praise of
the quality which we admire by one word, and that one word is manliness or courage.

*T. Soc.* How is that?

*Str.* We speak of an action as energetic and manly, quick and manly, and vigorous and manly; this is the common epithet which we apply to all persons of this class.


*Str.* And do we not often praise the quiet strain of action also?

*T. Soc.* To be sure.

*Str.* And do we not then say the opposite of what we said of the other?

*T. Soc.* How do you mean?

*Str.* In speaking of the mind, we say how calm! how temperate! These are the terms in which we describe the working of the intellect; and again we speak of actions as deliberate and gentle, and of the voice as smooth and deep, and of all rhythmical movement and of music in general as having a proper solemnity. To all these we attribute not courage, but a name indicative of order.


*Str.* But when, on the other hand, either of these is out of place, the names of either are changed into terms of censure.

*T. Soc.* How is that?

*Str.* Too great sharpness or quickness or hardness, is termed violence or madness; too great slowness or gentleness, is called cowardice or sluggishness; and we may observe, that these qualities, and in general the temperance of one class of characters and the manliness of another, are arrayed as enemies on opposite sides, and do not mingle with one another in their respective actions; and if we pursue the enquiry, we shall find that the men who have these qualities are at variance with one another.

*T. Soc.* How do you mean?

*Str.* In the instance which I mentioned, and very likely in many others, there are some things which they praise as being like themselves, and other things which they blame as belonging to the opposite characters—and out of this many quarrels and occasions of quarrels arise among them.


*Str.* The difference between the two classes is amusing enough
at times; but when affecting really important matters, becomes a most utterly hateful disorder in the State.

_T. Soc._ What part of the State is thus affected?  

_Str._ The whole course of life suffers from the disorder. For the orderly class are always ready to lead a peaceful life, and do their own business; this is their way of living with all men at home, and they are equally ready to keep the peace with foreign States. And on account of this fondness of theirs for peace, which is often out of season where their influence prevails, they become by degrees unwarlike, and bring up their young men to be like themselves; they are at the command of others; and hence in a few years they and their children and the whole city, often pass imperceptibly from the condition of freemen into that of slaves.

_T. Soc._ That is a hard, cruel fate.

_Str._ What now is the case with the more courageous natures? Are they not always inciting their country to go to war, owing to their excessive love of the military life—their enemies are many and mighty—and if they do not ruin their cities they enslave and subject them to their enemies.

_T. Soc._ That, again, is true.

_Str._ Must we not admit, then, that these two classes are always in the greatest antipathy and antagonism to one another?

_T. Soc._ We cannot deny that.

_Str._ Have we not found, as we said at first, that considerable portions of virtue are at variance with one another, and give rise to a similar opposition in the characters who are endowed with them?

_T. Soc._ That is true.

_Str._ Let us consider a further point.

_T. Soc._ What is that?

_Str._ I want to know, whether any constructive art will make any, even the smallest thing, out of bad and good materials indifferently, if this can be avoided? whether all art does not rather reject the bad as far as possible, and accept the good and fit materials, and out of these like and unlike elements, gathering all into one, work out some form or idea?

_T. Soc._ To be sure.

_Str._ Then the true natural art of statesmanship will never allow any State to be formed by a combination of good and bad men, if
this can be avoided; but will begin by testing human natures in play, and after testing them, will entrust them to proper teachers who are her ministers—she will herself give orders, and maintain authority, like weaving, which continually gives orders and maintains authority over the carders and all the others who prepare the material for the work; showing to the subsidiary arts, the works which she deems necessary for making the web.

Y. Soc. Quite true.

Str. In like manner, the royal science appears to me to be the mistress of all careful educators and instructors, and having this queenly power, will not allow any of them to train characters unsuited to the political constitution which she desires to create, but such as are suitable only. Other natures, which have no part in manliness and temperance, or any other virtuous inclination, and, from the necessity of an evil nature, are violently carried away to godlessness and injustice and violence, she exterminates by death, and punishes them by exile and the greatest of disgraces.

r. Soc. That is commonly said.

Str. But those who are wallowing in ignorance and baseness she bows under the yoke of slavery.

Y. Soc. Quite right.

Str. The rest of the citizens, of whom, if they have education, something noble may be made, and who are capable of social science, the kingly art blends and weaves together; taking on the one hand those whose natures tend rather to courage, which is the stronger element and may be regarded as the warp, and on the other hand those which incline to order and gentleness, and which are represented in the figure as spun thick and soft, after the manner of the woof—these, which are naturally opposed, she seeks to bind and weave together in the following manner—

Y. Soc. In what manner?

Str. First of all, she takes the eternal element and binds that with a kindred, that is, with a divine cord, and then the element of life, and binds that with human cords.

Y. Soc. Of this, again, I do not understand the meaning.

Str. The meaning is, that the opinion about the honourable and the just and good and their opposites, which is true and assured, is a divine principle, and when implanted in our souls, is implanted, as I affirm, in an heaven-born race.
T. Soc. Yes; that is a right view.

Str. Only the Statesman and the good legislator having the inspiration of the royal muse, can implant this in those who have rightly received education, and whom we were just now describing.

Y. Soc. Likely enough.

Str. But he who is unable to do this, shall not be characterized by us in the names which we are now examining.

Y. Soc. Very right.

Str. And the courageous soul when attaining this truth, becomes civilized, and rendered more capable of partaking of justice; but when not partaking, is inclined to brutality. Is not that true?

Y. Soc. Certainly.

Str. And again, the peaceful and orderly nature, if participating in these opinions, becomes temperate and wise, as far as there can be wisdom in States, but not having this, is justly styled silly.

Y. Soc. Quite true.

Str. Can we say that the connection or bond, which unites the evil with one another or with the good, is everlasting, or that there is any science which would seriously allow a bond to be applied to such materials?

Y. Soc. Impossible.

Str. But in those which were originally noble natures, and have been trained accordingly—in those only may we not say that the bond of union is implanted by law, and that this is the medicine which art prescribes for them, and the divine bond, which, as I was saying, heals and unites dissimilar and contrary parts of virtue?

Y. Soc. Very true.

Str. Where this divine bond exists there is no difficulty in imagining, or when you have imagined, in creating the other human bonds.

Y. Soc. How is that, and of what bonds do you speak?

Str. Those of intermarriage, and those which are formed between States by giving and taking children in marriage, as well as by private betrothals and espousals. For many persons form unions of an improper kind, with a view to the procreation of children.

Y. Soc. In what way?

Str. They seek after wealth and power, which in matrimony are objects not worthy even of a serious censure.
T. Soc. There is no need to consider them at all.

Str. More reason is there to consider the practice of those who make family their chief aim, and to indicate their error.

T. Soc. Yes, that is reasonable.

Str. They act on no principle at all; they seek their ease and receive with open arms those who are like themselves, and hate those who are unlike them; and are wholly under the influence of their feelings of dislike.

T. Soc. How is that?

Str. The quiet orderly class seek for natures like their own, and as far as they can they marry and give in marriage exclusively in this class, and the courageous do the same; they seek natures like their own, whereas they should both do precisely the opposite.

T. Soc. How and why is that?

Str. Because courage, when untempered by the gentler nature during many generations, may at first bloom and strengthen, but at last bursts forth into every sort of madness.

T. Soc. Like enough.

Str. And then, again, the soul which is over-full of modesty and has no element of courage in many successive generations, is apt to grow very indolent, and at last to become utterly paralyzed and useless.

T. Soc. That, again, is quite likely.

Str. It was of these bonds I said that there would be no difficulty in creating them, if only both classes originally held the same opinion about the honourable and good;—indeed, in this single word, the whole process of royal weaving is comprised—never to allow temperate natures to be separated from the brave, but to weave them together, like the warp and the woof, by common sentiments and honours and opinions, and by the giving of pledges to one another; and out of them forming one smooth and even web, to entrust to them the offices of State.

T. Soc. How do you mean?

Str. Where one officer only is needed, you must choose a ruler who has both these qualities—when many, you must mingle some of each, for the temperate ruler is very careful and just and safe, but is wanting in thoroughness and go.

T. Soc. Certainly, that is very true.

Str. The character of the courageous, on the other hand, falls
short of the former in justice and caution, but has the power of action in a remarkable degree, and where either of these two qualities is wanting, there cities cannot altogether prosper either publicly or privately.

Y. Soc. Certainly they cannot.

Str. This then, according to our view, is the perfection of the web of political action. There is a direct intertexture of the brave and temperate natures, when the kingly science has drawn the two sorts of lives into communion by unanimity and kindness; and having completed the noblest and best of all webs of which a common life admits, and enveloping therein all other inhabitants of cities, whether slaves or freemen, binds them in one fabric and governs and presides over them, omitting no element of a city's happiness.

Y. Soc. You have completed, Stranger, a very perfect image of the king and of the Statesman.