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ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΦΑΙΔΩΝ

THE PHAEDO OF PLATO

EDITED

*WITH INTRODUCTION NOTES AND APPENDICES*

BY

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## PREFACE.

SO many editions of the *Phaedo* are already in existence that the appearance of a fresh one would seem to require a word of explanation. The object of the present edition is to assist those who are beginning in earnest the study of Plato's philosophy, and who have advanced far enough to appreciate the peculiar difficulty of his writings. Accordingly my chief aim has been to elucidate the philosophical contents of the dialogue, to indicate as clearly as I was able the consecution of its thought, and to determine its position in the Platonic system. It has therefore been no part of my purpose to enter minutely into points of language for their own sake. But since it is utterly impossible to follow Plato's thought without a thorough mastery of his language, I have not abstained from dealing with such points, so far as seemed necessary for the right understanding of Plato's meaning, or where I thought that they had been insufficiently treated by previous editors. Among existing editions I am most indebted to the notes of

those admirable scholars Wyttenbach and Heindorf. And since I have frequently had occasion to express dissent from the views of Prof. Geddes, I am anxious to take this opportunity of acknowledging the advantage I have derived from his scholarly and lucid commentary.

Finally and above all my thanks are due to my friend Mr Henry Jackson, to whose untiring kindness I owe far more than I can possibly acknowledge: the references to him in the notes very imperfectly indicate how fully he carries out the principle *κρινὰ τὰ τῶν φίλων*.

TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE,  
3 November, 1883.

## INTRODUCTION.

### § I. *Scope of the dialogue.*

A CAREFUL student of the Platonic dialogues can hardly fail to notice a certain peculiarity in their structure: he will observe that for the most part we find not one but several motives underlying the whole composition and artistically interwoven; so that if we put the question, what was Plato's object in writing any one dialogue, the answer can rarely be a simple one. These several motives are indeed formally subordinated to one definite end—for a Platonic λόγος is always ζῆλον συννεστός—but this end is not always, nor indeed often, the most important result of the dialogue or that which Plato had most at heart in its composition. A very good and simple illustration of this is supplied by the *Sophist*. The declared object of that dialogue is to define the sophist (218 B); and this object, amid all the intricacies of the argument, is held steadfastly in view until its final accomplishment, when the sophist is tracked down, captured, and bound hand and foot in the humorously labyrinthine paragraph which closes the Eleate's discourse. But as a means of obtaining this definition Plato employs his method of διαίρεσις; and the extreme elaboration with which this process is worked out, together with the high value which we know Plato set upon it, leaves no doubt that the exposition and illustration of this dialectical method is one of the motives of the dialogue. Thirdly, a point suddenly turns up, quite by accident, as it were, and without the slightest premeditation (236 D): the sophist, on the point of being convicted as a dealer in shams, takes shelter in the old puzzle about μὴ ὄν: which puzzle must be solved before the definition can be accomplished. Now it will be observed that the material and formal importance of these three motives are in reverse order. The definition of the sophist, the formal object of the dialogue, is simply a piece of pungent satire; but the method by which this object is attained is a matter of high interest and significance. By far the most momentous issue, however, is that which turns upon μὴ ὄν: the searching criticism of ὄν and μὴ ὄν, as conceived in various philosophies; the masterly



analysis of the five γένη, which clears up the problem of predication ; the solution of the hitherto hopeless enigma concerning false judgments ; all this constitutes one of the most memorable achievements of the human intellect : a science of logic is now first founded, and philosophy is placed upon a new basis. Yet in form this all-important metaphysical inquiry is merely an accidental difficulty involved in the definition of the sophist, which need not have arisen, had not the sophist turned out to be a sham. We see then how Plato proposes to himself an end mainly for the sake of the means : we may be sure that he cared little about defining the sophist, but very much about the metaphysical questions to which the process of definition was to give rise. Now this indirect way of going about his work is a peculiarity of Plato's which must be steadily kept in mind if we are to have any hope of understanding him at all. Also we must remember that Plato is before all things a metaphysician : ethics, politics, logic, physics are to him so many forms of applied metaphysics ; and if we would rightly follow the current of his thought, it is from a metaphysical source that we must seek to trace it.

Bearing this in mind, let us see what is the result of a similar analysis applied to the structure of the *Phaedo*. Most persons who should be asked to describe this work would probably reply that it was a treatise in which Plato endeavours to prove that soul is immortal ; and this is no doubt a correct account of one motive of the dialogue. But the demonstration of immortality is neither the express purpose nor the most important philosophical result ; it holds a position more nearly corresponding to that of διαίρεσις in the *Sophist*. As to the main subject of the dialogue Plato leaves us in no uncertainty. Sokrates makes two statements, which appear to Kebes to be mutually conflicting : (1) in this life we are under the protection of good and wise gods, (2) the philosopher will be glad to quit this life. Simmias adds that it seems a little unkind of Sokrates to be pleased at leaving his friends. Sokrates admits that it is only fair that he should clear himself on both these charges. Then, after an interruption on the part of Kriton, which is clearly designed to mark that the serious business of the dialogue is now about to begin, Sokrates proceeds in the following words : ' Now I desire to render an account to you my judges and to show that it is reasonable for a man who has passed his life in the true love of wisdom to be of good cheer on the threshold of death and to be hopeful of enjoying the greatest blessings, when he is dead, in the other world. How this may be the case, Simmias and Kebes, I shall try to tell you (63 E).' Thus we see that the leading motive is to

show that the wise and virtuous man will meet death with cheerfulness, on the ground that his lot will be happy in the world of the departed. And, as in the *Sophist*, Plato never once loses sight of this motive from beginning to end of the work. ①

Now let us observe how the other subjects are connected with this. The line of defence adopted by Sokrates is as follows: The philosopher is not concerned with the gratification of bodily appetites nor with the pomps and luxuries of this world; the pleasures of the intellect alone are precious in his sight, and to the pursuit of knowledge and wisdom his whole life is devoted. Such being the case, the body which is his soul's constant companion not only brings him no advantage but is a positive hindrance and annoyance, impeding by its importunate affections the free action of the soul in her search for the truth. Accordingly he accustoms his soul to be as independent of the body as is possible, to withdraw from communion with it, and to act by herself—by processes of pure thought without aid of the senses. But this deliverance of the soul, her purification from all corporeal taint, can never be perfectly accomplished during this earthly life; consequently in this life the perfect fruition of intelligence can never be attained. There is but one thing which separates soul from body altogether; and this is death: death extricates the soul from her corporeal entanglement and sets her free to exert her unfettered powers upon the highest objects of cognition. Death then is the realisation of the philosopher's dream; it is the fulfilment of that intellectual enfranchisement which by a lifelong struggle he has but in some scanty measure attained: how then can he fail to be of good cheer when the hour arrives of his release from the close confines of his bodily prison into the wide pure air of free intellectual life?

Very well, replies Kebes; but you are assuming that the soul continues to exist as a conscious and intelligent being after her separation from the body. How do we know that she is not extinguished at the moment of dissolution? Before we can accept your defence it is absolutely necessary that you should satisfy us on this point. Sokrates freely admits the justice of this criticism and says he will do his best to fill up the lacuna in his theory.

We see then that immortality is a distinctly secondary issue, subordinate to the principal theme of the dialogue. The particular mode in which Sokrates has chosen to defend his main proposition demands a demonstration of the soul's immortality as a necessary condition, and that is all; so far as regards the purposes of this dialogue Plato is concerned to prove the soul immortal only in order to prove that the



(true philosopher will not fear death. It is to be noticed that as soon as ever the demonstration is, or seems to be, accomplished, Sokrates at once proceeds to enlarge on its ethical bearings in relation to the main proposition, 81 A foll., 107 c foll.

Having thus determined two motives, let us see whether an inspection of the pleadings for immortality will disclose any more. Sokrates begins with two arguments which are to be regarded as two halves of one proof. The first is based upon a law of alternation or reciprocity in nature: given two opposite states, all things which have come to be in either state have passed into it from the opposite state; thus what is now better has become so from being worse; and between every such pair of opposites we have transition in either direction, between hotter and colder, greater and less, sleeping and waking, &c. Now the opposite to living is dead: between these two we daily see the process in one direction, from life to death, the other we do not see. But though we see it not, it must exist. For since living souls are continually being born into the world, and since they cannot come out of nothing, clearly they must come from the souls which have quitted this life. These then must exist after their departure from the body; for if they ceased to be, they could not come again into being. Therefore our souls exist after death. The second argument rests upon reminiscence. All sensible objects remind us of certain ideal types, whereof they are likenesses: they are but adumbrations of these types, faintly reflecting them but incapable of representing them with perfect accuracy. We compare these objects with their types and judge that they fall short of them; whence it is evident that at some time we must have had apprehension of the types. Now we cannot possibly have gained this knowledge since our birth; we must then have possessed it before we were born. Therefore our souls possessed intelligent existence before birth. Putting these two arguments together, we find that our souls existed as intelligent beings before we were born and will continue so to exist after we are dead.

Seeing that his young friends are still doubtful whether the conditions for the operation of this law of reciprocity are necessarily satisfied in the case of soul, Sokrates pushes forward to new ground. He urges that if a thing is to be decomposed, it must first have been composed; that which has no parts therefore cannot be subject to dissolution. This is the fundamental distinction between the objects of sense and the objects of intelligence; the former are composite and perpetually suffering resolution into their constituent parts; the latter are simple and therefore indissoluble. Ideas are changeless and eternal, particulars

are ever-changing and transitory. To which of these natures is soul more akin? clearly to the simple and changeless ideas, which are her proper object of cognition, and which she apprehends by virtue of her likeness to them. Moreover she is mistress over the body, being in her divine simplicity far more powerful. Yet even the body is under certain conditions very durable; how much more lasting then shall the soul not be?

Before proceeding let us pause to mark the stress laid on the affinity of the soul to the ideas, for this will presently play an important part.

We may pass over the objection of Simmias with its refutation as being immaterial to the main argument, and proceed at once to the criticism of Kebes on the foregoing theory. It amounts to this: the above reasoning only makes it probable that soul is much more durable than body and may last a very long time; it does not show that she is actually imperishable nor that she has in her own essence an inalienable principle of vitality. This takes us to the very heart of the matter; Sokrates must trace the causes of generation and destruction down to their very roots.

I do not mean in this place to give any analysis of the marvellously subtle reasoning which serves for the final demonstration, but only to call attention to its fundamental principles. After pointing out the inadequacy of all previous and contemporary theories of causation, Sokrates declares the Ideas to be the sole causes of all things and the sole objects of knowledge. The truth of the Ideas is eternally sure, and whatever inference can be certainly drawn from the ideal theory is verily true. Now everything in nature is what it is by virtue of the immanence of some idea informing it: and so intimate is the connexion of particular with idea, that the former can never give admission to an idea incongruous with the latter. Accordingly if we take any pair of opposite and mutually exclusive ideas, a particular informed by such opposite, or by any idea involving such opposite, can never receive the other opposite: we cannot have cold fire or even three. But soul— <sup>v. d.</sup> vital principle—is soul by virtue of the idea of life inherent; therefore she can never admit the opposite to life, which is death; else we should have dead soul, which is no less impossible and irrational than even three. Soul therefore has in her inmost essence a source of life that can never fail her.

A very moderate familiarity with Plato's ways of working will now enable us to see where we are to look for the very heart of the dialogue. The assertion of the Ideas as the causes of existence and the objects of cognition; the affirmation that they constitute the ultimate reality

upon which all sound reasoning must be based—this is the most significant metaphysical result of the *Phaedo*, and this beyond doubt was Plato's dearest purpose in composing it. And yet, so far as form goes, this is only subsidiary to the establishment of a doctrine which has turned out to be necessary to the maintenance of the primary proposition. We saw however in the *Sophist* that the chief formal motive is by no means necessarily Plato's principal end; and again we have to seek the chief end in what is technically but a means.

Such being the three strands intertwined in the thread of which the fabric of the *Phaedo* is woven, let us examine their relations a little more narrowly.

The question of immortality is interesting and important just so far as it is connected with the cognition of the ideas. True knowledge, says Plato, is concerned with the ideas alone, because they are simple, changeless, and abiding: concerning the complex, changeful, and fleeting objects of sense there can be nothing better than opinion. Soul alone, acting by processes of pure thought, can apprehend the ideas, because of her likeness to them: she too is simple and self-identical; and like is known by like. But during her association with the body she never has free play for her own activity: the body with its passions and appetites, its pleasures and pains, its maladies and weaknesses, is ever hampering and hindering the movements of the soul to such a degree that even the wisest of mankind can only in part rise superior to these influences. Consequently the joy of pure and untroubled contemplation can never be tasted by the soul while her union with the body continues; only by release from its harassing companionship can she hope for the full fruition of knowledge. So if her existence is terminated at the dissolution of soul and body, she never can attain true knowledge at all: immortality then is an inevitable condition of the free cognition of the ideas. For this immortality she is justified in hoping by the very affinity to the ideas which enables her to apprehend them; nay she is assured of it by the indwelling idea of life itself which informs her very essence. Thus are immortality and knowledge mutually interdependent. Schleiermacher, who has some excellent remarks on this subject, sums up as follows: 'so ist denn die Ewigkeit der Seele die Bedingung der Möglichkeit alles wahren Erkennens für den Menschen, und wiederum die Wirklichkeit des Erkennens ist der Grund, aus welchem am sichersten und leichtesten die Ewigkeit der Seele eingesehen wird.' In the words of Simmias, εἰς καλόν γε καταφύγει ὁ λόγος εἰς τὸ ὁμοίως εἶναι τήν τε ψυχὴν ἡμῶν πρὶν γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς, καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν, ἣν σὺ νῦν λέγεις.



Such then is the value of immortality, as promising us an existence under conditions more favourable to intellectual activity. I think however Plato intends to turn it to another not unimportant, though minor, use. In the true Platonic system of ethics immortality plays no part. Plato's morality is founded in the very depths of his ontology; for the principle of good and the principle of being are one and the same. It matters nothing whether we live or die: that alone is good which is like the idea of good. But to deduce ethical science from the *αὐτὸ ἀγαθὸν* calls for a most consummate philosopher: for the great mass of mankind it is simply out of the question. So then, since they cannot frame a moral code for themselves because they do not know the idea of the good, the best they can do is to accept one from the philosopher who does know it, as Plato insists in the *Republic*. But the philosopher must hold out some inducement for the people to receive his teaching; and this inducement may be derived from immortality. Sokrates himself says 'if the soul is immortal, she needs our care not only during the period to which we give the name of life, but for all time; and now it is that we see how grave is the danger of neglecting her.' The philosopher will persuade the people to follow his precepts by showing that a life of intelligent virtue is the forerunner of free intellectual enjoyment in the invisible world, but a life of vice can only lead after death to helpless cravings for bodily pleasures which are out of reach. So by deducing immortality from the ideal theory, Plato uses that theory to provide a working code of morals for those who are incapable of rising to the only true and rational virtue.

But while we affirm that the chief result of the *Phaedo* is the establishment of the ideas as the true principles of causation and objects of knowledge, in place of the superficial physical laws and incogitable phenomena which did duty for causes and realities with the Ionian philosophers; and while we recognise that the proof of immortality derives its sole value from its bearing on the cognition of the ideas, we must not leave out of sight the original proposition, that the wise man will cheerfully meet death. This, though overshadowed by the superior interest of the metaphysical issues to which it gives rise, is yet far from unimportant in Plato's sight; and this is what gives artistic unity to the dialogue. As a framework in which to set his vindication of the dignity of the ideas Plato could have chosen nothing better than a description of the cheerful fortitude displayed by a man whose life has been devoted to intellectual research. The lesson which Sokrates inculcates by his precepts and arguments he enforces still more vividly by his living example. From his first pleasant moralising on his own fetter-cramped

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limbs to the last half-conscious injunction to fulfil a pious duty, he shows us the very ideal of that character at which he would have us aim. Never was the Platonic Sokrates more genial and gentle, more ready and subtle in argument, more patient of opposition and skilful in encountering it, never more rich in poetry and imagination, than on that last day of his life. It seems as if Plato had determined to use all the resources at his command in bringing home to us the lesson that in philosophy lies the sovereign charm against the terror of death: he appeals to the intellect by the subtlety of his arguments, to the imagination by his fanciful and beautiful myth, and to the emotions by that death-scene which stands alone in all literature. It is in this way that we may recognise the connexion of the myth and the last scene with the main body of the dialogue. The myth is no mere poetical embellishment, nor does the death-scene share only the unity which belongs to the various stages of one coherent narrative. Both are linked by a deeper unity to the remainder of the work, being by different methods subservient to the same purpose. We see then in the *Phaedo* an affirmation of the ideas as causative and intelligible existences, from which, through the inference of immortality, the ethical deduction is drawn that the philosopher, secure of his well-being in the region of the departed, will meet death with calmness and confidence; and the impression thus conveyed is rendered more vivid by a description of the earth and the underworld and an account of the adventures of the disembodied soul; and finally it is yet more earnestly enforced by a picture of philosophic fortitude taken from actual history. All these elements, argumentative, imaginative, and narrative, are harmonised by Plato in one consummate work of art and jointly directed to one common end.

§ 2. *The relation of the several arguments for immortality.*

How the several arguments are mutually related, and how many proofs of immortality are contained in the *Phaedo*, is a question on which most diverse opinions have been entertained: on one estimate all the proofs are reduced to one, while another reckons as many as seven. I do not propose to criticise these various enumerations, which have been ably treated by Bonitz in his admirable 'Platonische Studien': I shall simply examine the relation of the several arguments, and then from the results thus obtained consider whether they are to be regarded as constituting one or more demonstrations. With



the views of Bonitz in the main I thoroughly agree; but I think it is possible to give a somewhat *préciser* statement than he has done.

First then as concerning the argument of *ἀνταπόδοσις* 70 C—72 E. This seeks to deduce the soul's immortality from a universal law of nature, or rather from two laws. The first is *γένεσις ἐξ ἐναντίων*, which is simply an application of a principle with which we are already familiar in preplatonian philosophy, e.g. the *ὁδὸς ἄνω καὶ κάτω* of Hera-*kleitos*. A *γένεσις* is a process between opposite states; whatever we see at one pole, as the result of a *γένεσις*, has passed over from the other pole. The two poles with which our argument is concerned are *ζῶν* and *τεθνηκός*: *ζῶν* we define as a state of union between soul and body, *τεθνηκός* as a state of separation. We know that the soul passes to the state *τεθνηκός* from the state *ζῶν*, and we deduce from the law of alternations that she passes to the state *ζῶν* from the state *τεθνηκός*. Therefore the soul must have existence in the state *τεθνηκός*, in virtue of our second law, which is that the sum of all things is constant; in Aristotle's words *οὐδὲν γίγνεται ἐκ μὴ ὄντος, πᾶν δ' ἐξ ὄντος*. This principle, which the physicists, as Aristotle goes on to observe, agreed in affirming of matter, is here affirmed of thought by Plato, for whom matter is but a phase of thought. It is this which is the most important element in the present argument, and to which we shall hereafter have occasion to recur. The result we obtain then is that our soul in passing from *ζῶν* to *τεθνηκός* is not annihilated in the process, but retains her existence in the state *τεθνηκός*: in popular language *ἔστιν ἐν Αἴδου*.

The argument from *ἀνάμνησις* 72 E—77 A, in supplementing the former, introduces us to the ideal theory. By an ingenious process of reasoning Plato shows that our soul must have had cognition of the ideas, and that this cognition must have been attained before our present life: our soul then must have been in existence before she was incarcerated in human form and born into this life. The result then is the antenatal existence of the soul.

But, it might be asked, what more do we gain by this argument of *ἀνάμνησις*? For though the only result which Plato expressly draws from *ἀνταπόδοσις* is that the soul exists after death, it would also be a perfectly fair inference that she existed before birth: for the soul that became *ζῶν* at a human birth must previously have been *τεθνηκός*, that is, existent in a state of separation; else we should have *γένεσις ἐκ μὴ ὄντος*. This is true; but *ἀνάμνησις* makes two important contributions: (1) what we have to prove is *ὡς ἔστι τε ἡ ψυχὴ ἐν Αἴδου καὶ δύναμιν*

καὶ φρόνησιν ἔχει: of this only the first half can be deduced from ἀνταπόδοσις, the latter is supplied by ἀνάμνησις, which shows that the soul had cognition of the ideas: ἀνταπόδοσις shows that τεθνηκός is a mode of existence, ἀνάμνησις that it is a state of intelligence: (2) ἀνάμνησις attaches the demonstration of immortality to the theory of ideas, upon which it is finally to be based. Thus we see that the two arguments are mutually complementary.

In fact there is no more surprising feature in the literature to which the *Phaedo* has given occasion than the fact that many scholars, not only in the face of Plato's explicit declaration (77 c), but in the face of plain reason, have accounted these two arguments as two distinct proofs. For if we allow that ἀνταπόδοσις furnishes a proof ὡς ἔστιν ἡ ψυχὴ ἐν Αἴδου, and ἀνάμνησις a proof ὡς δύναμιν καὶ φρόνησιν εἶχε πρὶν γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς, it is self-evident that the two must be combined in order to constitute a proof ὡς ἔστι τε ἡ ψυχὴ ἐν Αἴδου καὶ δύναμιν καὶ φρόνησιν ἔχει. We derive from ἀνταπόδοσις evidence that the soul exists in the same state (τεθνηκός) before birth and after death; from ἀνάμνησις we have evidence that this is a conscious and intelligent state.

So then, whatever number of proofs we may finally decide to exist in the *Phaedo*, it is clear that the two foregoing arguments do not amount to more than one. But even before any objections have been urged, Sokrates proposes to offer further evidence, as though what he has already brought forward were inadequate. Let us see then in what particulars the demonstration seems to be incomplete, in order that we may know what we should expect to be supplied in the sequel.

A severer scrutiny will detect a weakness in each member of the proof. In the first the soul's continued existence is a simple deduction from a natural law, which is assumed to work with invariable uniformity. But we must recollect that the operation of any cause depends upon the conditions under which it acts: by the same law lead falls earthward and vapour streams upward; and it is conceivable that somewhere in the universe there might exist a set of conditions under which the same law might produce exactly the opposite results. Now if in addition to our knowledge of the law we had a perfect and exhaustive acquaintance with the conditions under which it acts in every conceivable instance, we might be certain of its operation in all cases. But as a matter of fact we have not and never can have such an acquaintance with the conditions. An astronomer, from the data before him, calculates that a planet ought to revolve in an orbit of

a certain shape in a certain time : observation, however, shows that the facts do not correspond to the calculation. Then comes another astronomer with a larger telescope and discovers that the irregularity is due to the proximity of another body which was invisible to his predecessor. And if his discovery exhausts the number of influences at work on the planet, he will be able to calculate its orbit with accuracy, but not otherwise. Similarly although the law of alternation may afford a strong presumption that our souls return from the dead, this does not amount to certainty, since we cannot tell that our knowledge of the conditions is complete. The very fact that in this case we are unable to perceive one of the twin processes, which elsewhere are both visible, is enough to awaken our suspicion : we do not know the conditions to which soul is subject after our dissolution, and they may be such as to nullify our calculations. We cannot then be satisfied with simply inferring this immortality of the soul from the uniformity of nature, we must prove that imperishability is a necessary and inseparable attribute of her being<sup>1</sup>.

Such I conceive to be the cause of the dissatisfaction felt with the argument from *ἀνταπόδοσις*. I have dwelt upon it at some length, because, though by no means obvious, it has hitherto, I believe, failed of being noticed. I now pass on to *ἀνάμνησις*.

We have already seen that *ἀνάμνησις* does not by itself prove the imperishability of the soul ; and now since *ἀνταπόδοσις* has proved insufficient to accomplish this satisfactorily, the original defect remains unsupplied. We may have enjoyed apprehension of the ideas before our birth, but it does not follow that we shall exist to apprehend them again after our death. But the point to which I would draw attention is that we have so far failed to make the proper use of the soul's cognition of the ideas : the only conclusion we have drawn is that the soul must have existed to apprehend them ; this is far short of the inference which on Platonic principles is not only justified but pre-emptorily required. What this is, we shall presently see.

<sup>1</sup> That such is the defect of the argument is indicated by Plato himself at 77 D in the words *μη̄ ὡς ἀληθῶς ὁ ἄνεμος αὐτὴν ἐκβαλνουςαν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος διαφυσᾶ καὶ διασκεδάννυσιν, ἀλλῶς τε καὶ ὅταν τύχη τις μη̄ ἐν νηνεμίᾳ, ἀλλ' ἐν μεγάλῳ τινὶ πνεύματι ἀποθνήσκων*. That is to say, our law may be perfectly sound, but there

may yet be disturbing forces, on which we have not calculated, which interfere with its operation : the accident of a tempest at the time of the soul's egress may produce conditions which render the law null and void in the case of that particular soul.



We now perceive what we are to look for in the ensuing argument : (1) the establishment of the soul's immortality upon a necessity of her own nature and no mere external cause, (2) the deduction of the required inference from her cognition of the ideas.

In the argument extending from 78 B to 80 D we have the universe divided into the visible and invisible worlds: the former includes all sensible objects, which are composite, and therefore subject to dissolution and change; the latter contains the ideas, which are incomposite, and therefore changeless and indissoluble. Now the body is visible, and obviously belongs to the class of things which suffer change and dissolution; the soul, being invisible, should naturally seem to belong to the world of real existences, incomposite and indissoluble. This belief is confirmed if we consider the soul's attitude in regard to the sensible and intelligible worlds respectively. When dealing with sensible objects she is filled with bewilderment and strays giddily through the ever-fleeting stream of inconstant phantasms, where she can find no rest for the sole of her foot: but when she turns to the ideal world she feels herself at home; the ideas she can contemplate in serene repose, *seeing that she herself is akin to them*; and she then shares the constancy of the objects of her meditations. Additional confirmation is supplied by the observation that soul commands and body obeys; the former is the function of the divine, the latter of the mortal; therefore we infer that the soul most resembles this divine, deathless, simple, indissoluble, changeless, self-identical essence. Furthermore we know that parts of the body, inferior as it is, or the whole body when embalmed, may last for a practically unlimited time; *a fortiori* then the soul must be still more abiding.

With reference to this argument it is to be observed (1) that it is professedly a sequel to the preceding, *ὅθεν δὲ ἀπελίπομεν ἐπανέλθωμεν* 78 B: (2) that the requisite inference from cognition of the ideas is now expressed in the words I have italicised: (3) that the proof now rests upon the essential nature of the soul. Like knows like: therefore since the soul knows the ideas, she must be like the ideas. But the attributes of the ideas are simplicity, unchangeableness, and imperishability; the soul then must resemble them in these attributes. We are no longer dependent upon an external law, with whose workings we are imperfectly acquainted, to establish the soul's immortality; for we are able to class her with an order of substances to whose essence belongs eternity; and this we are enabled to do by realising that the soul's antenatal cognition of the ideas involves not merely her existence before our birth, but her likeness and affinity to the ideas themselves. Thus by

following to its logical conclusion the train of thought suggested by *ἀνάμνησις*, Plato has raised the theory of immortality from the dim and doubtful twilight of physical speculation to the clear sunshine of metaphysical certainty. This present argument is in fact intended both as a correction and a development of the previous reasoning. We no longer put our trust in the physical law of *γένεσις ἐξ ἐναντίων*, which, although it may be perfectly sound and may afford a strong presumption of the soul's immortality, yet is incapable of offering us the assurance we require; and we have legitimately deduced from *ἀνάμνησις* a result which may serve as a secure ontological basis for our proposition.

But now we are suddenly brought to a stand. The whole edifice which we have been at such pains to erect collapses in a moment before the criticism of Kebes: we have been building it upon sand. There can be no mistake about this: the objection raised by Kebes is utterly destructive of the theory in its present form. Let us put it to the test.

Surveying the demonstration which has last been summarised, we see at the first glance that it is purely tentative and approximate; it does not even pretend to be more than an argument from probability.

In the first place the eternal objects of intelligence are invisible, while the perishable objects of sense are visible; the soul is invisible, and therefore we have assumed that she belongs to the rank of intelligible and eternal existences. But this assumption is unwarrantable. All that is eternal is invisible; but it does not follow that all which is invisible is eternal. We may say that the soul's invisibility affords a certain presumption in favour of her eternity, but nothing more. Secondly, the soul apprehends the ideas, therefore she is like the ideas. True; but we are not justified in concluding that this likeness necessarily includes the attribute of eternity: she may, for aught we know, be sufficiently like the ideas to apprehend them and yet not possess all their properties. Thirdly, the plea that she is like the divine because she rules over the body is still less satisfactory: she may possess many divine qualities without sharing the divine attribute of eternity. Fourthly, when we argue that, since body may last a very long time and since soul is far more potent and permanent than body, soul must last a yet longer time, the conclusion is most inadequate of all. In fact the argument, considered as a proof, breaks down at every point: the most that can be obtained from it is in fact the very inference that Plato draws: *προσῆκει ψυχῇ τὸ παράπαν ἀδιαλύτῳ εἶναι ἢ ἐγγύς τι τούτου*. But this is very different from the certainty we were seeking. Moreover



since, as we saw, this argument corrected, summed up, and developed the previous reasoning, retaining all that was cogent in it and confirming it by fresh evidence, it follows that in losing this we lose all: our whole case utterly collapses. As Kebes justly says, we have shown that the soul must have existed before her present incarnation; we have made out a case of strong probability that she is very durable and may survive many incarnations and dissolutions; but we are no whit the nearer to proving that she is imperishable: we are in fact just where we were. The whole demonstration must be begun over again *ὄσπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς*.

Is then all the discussion up to this point utterly fruitless? Most assuredly not. The case stands, as I conceive, thus. The objection of Kebes divides the debate on immortality into two distinct portions, the former of which is purely preparatory to the latter. It would have been impossible to proceed at once to the actual demonstration, which on Platonic principles is conclusive, without clearing the way and preparing the ground for it by these preliminary investigations. In them we gradually feel our way to the right standpoint from which to attack the question. Starting from the notion of immortality as a consequence of a natural law, we soon make an advance so far as to connect it with the cognition of the idea—*ἀνάμνησις* gives us the germ of the principle which ultimately grows to reasoned certainty; and this nascent conception assumes form and substance in the psychological argument that immediately follows: thus, though we fail to gain the assurance of eternity which we seek, we now see pretty well in what direction to look for it. We do not flee all empty-handed from the ruins of our fallen theory; we carry with us two priceless possessions, first the principle that the sum of existence is constant, next the consciousness that the proof of the soul's immortality must stand or fall with the existence of the ideas. Still what I desire specially to emphasise is that not one of the arguments in the first half of the dialogue is a proof of immortality, and not one of them is intended by Plato to be so. Plato never wastes his words. Had he believed that any of these arguments in the first part demonstrated the soul's immortality, he would have stopped there; the addition of the final argument shews that the former were not conclusive. On the other hand Plato would not have introduced the preliminary arguments, had they not been necessary: they do not indeed directly demonstrate immortality, but they enable us to rise to that stand-point from which the demonstration is possible: they are a necessary propaedeutic for the proof which is based directly on the theory of ideas. The long interval which inter-

venes between the arguments I have been discussing and the ultimate proof serves to mark very clearly that they are to be taken by themselves as forming one division, while the final demonstration itself constitutes the other. Plato generally gives some tolerably plain external mark of his divisions: take, for instance, the criticism of Protagoras in the *Theaetetus*. The earlier objections urged against that philosopher's dogma are highly inconclusive, not to say frivolous; so much so, that Protagoras is at last provoked to put up his head from the shades below and to expostulate with Sokrates for condescending to such a method of controversy. After this the debate assumes quite a different character: the arguments put forward are all of a solid and substantial nature. Now there can in my judgment be no doubt that in that part of the criticism which precedes the remonstrance of Protagoras Plato is expressing merely popular objections, which might be urged, and perhaps had been urged, against the μέτρον ἄνθρωπος from the standpoint of ordinary common sense: these he was unwilling to leave unnoticed, although he was conscious that they did not really invalidate the theory of Protagoras. But in the subsequent portion he is arguing from his own point of view and defining what he considers to be the limitations of the doctrine: while, to mark the distinction, he adopts the artistic device of bidding Protagoras emerge from the shades in order to make his own defence. The case of the *Phaedo* is not an exact parallel: for in the earlier part Plato is not bringing forward arguments which are not his own; the reasoning is sound so far as it goes; and though it does not amount to proof of immortality, it materially expedites the discovery of such a proof. But there is a similar reason for marking off the arguments into two separate divisions; and Plato has taken pains to make a broad and conspicuous line of demarcation<sup>1</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> The extent of this interlude and its varied character will be at once made obvious by a brief summary of its contents. After five chapters of ethical comment, 81 B—84 B, we have a narrative passage, describing how, amid the reverent silence that fell on the company when Sokrates had ceased, Simmias and Kebes were heard conversing apart. Interrogated by Sokrates they confess that they are not satisfied, but do not like to press their objections in his present situation. Sokrates replies with his famous simile of the swans, and exhorts them to

speak out boldly, 84 C—85 D. Then Simmias states his objection, and Kebes follows with his, 85 E—88 B. After this a short conversation between Echekrates and Phaedo is introduced, and the latter, resuming his narrative, describes the effect of these objections on the audience and upon Sokrates; after which follows the philosopher's warning against μισολογία, 88 C—91 C. The refutation of Simmias occupies three chapters more, 91 C—95 A; next Sokrates restates the objection of Kebes, and not till 95 E does he begin the critique of physical speculation which

It remains to say a few words concerning the final proof. This depends directly upon the existence of the ideas as ἀρχαί, or principles of causation. Physical causes explain nothing: at best they are facts, not reasons. For a real cause we must pierce through the phantasmagoria of matter to that invisible essence, of which the sensible universe is the outward expression: we must look for the explanation of each thing in its idea. The whole existence of a particular thing is derived from the inherence of its idea; and so long as the thing exists it can never be severed from its idea, nor admit anything inconsistent with that idea: should it admit such an inconsistent idea, it ceases to be that which it is. Now in most cases this may occur: snow may melt, fire may be quenched; for their indwelling ideas do not involve indestructibility. But with soul this cannot be: informed by the idea of life she can only perish by admitting death; but this would be to admit the opposite of her inherent idea, which is impossible: her extinction would involve a direct contradiction in terms, namely dead vital principle<sup>1</sup>.

This demonstration, which is worked out with a completeness, clearness, and subtlety peculiarly Plato's own, is on Platonic principles perfectly incontrovertible: given the eternal ideas as causes of existence, the eternity of soul is an inevitable inference. But though complete in itself it utilises some of the materials of former arguments: the principle that the eternity of soul is inseparably bound up with the existence of the eternal ideas has been the chief feature of ἀνάμνησις and the psychological argument: in this last proof it is precisely formulated, handled in a new manner, and pushed to its logical conclusion. Secondly, the whole argument has for its ultimate premiss the constancy of the sum total of existence: σχολῆ γὰρ ἂν τι ἄλλο φθορὰν μὴ δέχοιτο, εἴ γε τὸ ἀθάνατον αἰδίδιον ὃν φθορὰν δέξεται. And this we saw to be the fundamental proposition laid down in the argument of ἀνταπόδοσις. Moreover ἀνάμνησις is still valid to prove the existence of the ideas and the soul's intelligent activity apart from the body.

I conceive then that there are in the *Phaedo* three arguments, culminating in a single proof: but that a continuous connexion can be traced through all. The first, consisting of two portions, bases immortality partly on a natural law, partly on the soul's connexion with the ideas: the second, being a development of the first, drops the natural law and lays

is preliminary to the final demonstration starting from 99 E. In all this intermediate portion includes fifteen chapters, forming nearly one-fourth of the dialogue.

<sup>1</sup> A detailed analysis of this demonstration is reserved for the commentary upon the passage in question.



stress solely on the connexion with the ideas, but does not attempt to do more than make out a case of probability: the last takes up the same principle and treats it so as to evolve not a mere probability but a positive demonstration, which ultimately rests upon the law of conservation of energy as laid down in the first argument. So the dialogue proceeds like an advancing tide, each successive wave sweeping higher than the preceding. We must not regard any of the arguments as put forward and then discarded for a stronger; rather the argument is first offered in a tentative form, afterwards developed and corrected, and finally remoulded and brought to its consummation.

In conclusion I must briefly advert to two views which are in my opinion gravely erroneous and misleading. Steinhart treats the ethical passages, founded on the doctrine of immortality, as intended to furnish additional proof of that doctrine. The direct proofs, according to him, are in themselves inadequate, and require a surer foundation in ethics. This is a vicious circle so obvious that criticism is superfluous: we are establishing the soul's immortality in order to justify certain ethical principles, and then we employ these very principles as evidence for the theory whence they are deduced. Moreover this view involves a radical misconception of the purpose and structure of the dialogue.

The second opinion against which I feel bound to protest is that the refutation of the objection raised by Simmias constitutes an argument for immortality. This is propounded by Ueberweg, with whom I am sorry to find Prof. Geddes agreeing. Surely nothing can be more untenable than such a proposition. Simmias suggests that all the facts established by Sokrates concerning soul—viz. that she is invisible, incorporeal, divine, &c.—are compatible with the theory that she is a harmony. Now if soul is a harmony, it is clear that she cannot be immortal: therefore it is absolutely necessary that Sokrates should show that this theory is inconsistent with the conclusions on which they are already agreed. But in disproving this proposition Sokrates does not prove the soul's immortality, nor is he one inch the nearer to proving it. If I wished to ascertain that a certain crystal was not soluble in water, I should gain very little by a chemical analysis which assured me simply that the substance was not saltpetre: and similarly it is no evidence for soul's immortality that she is not identical with one particular thing of which immortality can never be predicated. Even could we make an exhaustive list of all things known to be mortal, and could we prove that soul was not identical with any one of these, we should still not have established her immortality: she might yet be an additional kind of mortal existence, different from the rest. It is therefore illogical to

regard the refutation of the harmonic theory as in any sense an argument for immortality. The proposition of Simmias is one which has some *prima facie* plausibility, and which would be absolutely fatal to the notion of immortality: its confutation is therefore imperative, but contributes nothing, even incidentally, to the main argument: this is in precisely the same position after the overthrow of Simmias as it was before his objection was propounded. The whole episode of harmony, though necessary, is in fact parenthetical. The criticism of Kebes, on the other hand, touches the most vital issue and tends directly to the reconstruction of the argument in that shape wherein alone, as I have tried to show, Plato regards it as a complete and final demonstration that soul is immortal.

### § 3. *Plato's attitude regarding immortality.*

(i) The form in which Plato upholds the soul's immortality next demands our attention: it is of all the most scientific and most philosophical: it is that for which there is the most to be said, and against it the least. His theory predicates eternity of universal soul, and of particular souls metempsychosis. 'The Metempsychosis', says Hume, 'is the only system of this kind that Philosophy can hearken to':<sup>1</sup> and so too thought Plato, who does not deem any other theory worthy of consideration. Universal spirit neither has been nor shall be, but is eternally: particular souls have been without a beginning and shall be for ever. In the infinite lapse of their existence they have passed, it may be, through manifold and diverse incarnations, rising and falling now to higher now to lower spheres of intelligence: but the substance, the conscious personality, is unchanged and unimpaired by all these mutations; and though the shock of each successive embodiment destroys more or less the recollection of what has passed, still each life is haunted by memories of a former existence, ready to be awakened by the sights and sounds that fill our present consciousness.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Essay on the immortality of the Soul.*

<sup>2</sup> In treating of this view which I have termed metempsychosis, it is to be observed that the actual transmigration is only an accident of it. All that is essential is the limitless duration of the soul's existence: her perpetual re-embodiment in various forms is not necessarily involved. If an individual soul can find some permanent and final mode of ex-

istence, the theory would be satisfied as well as by a succession of incarnations. And in fact both in the *Phaedo* and in the *Phaedrus* Plato seems to hold out the hope that a soul that has successfully passed all her probationary trials will attain to a permanent state of the highest intellectual fruition possible for a finite existence.



Thus Plato will have no one-sided immortality: the everlasting life of our soul extends backwards into the infinite past as well as forwards into the endless future. It is just herein that the strength of his position lies: thus he escapes the inextricable perplexities which beset the defenders of other views of immortality. The creational theory perhaps never presented itself to his mind; certainly, if it did, he dismissed it as unworthy to be seriously entertained: it is in fact repugnant to the first principles of his argument. On this view the soul of every being that is newly born into the world is a fresh creation out of nothing; and as all souls previously created exist for ever, the aggregate number of souls is for ever multiplying; that is to say, the quantity of spirit in the universe is continually and ceaselessly on the increase. This is of course directly opposed to the great principles that the sum of force is constant and that generation out of nothing is impossible, which form the groundwork of Plato's arguments for immortality. Once allow that a soul has a beginning, and we lose our only guarantee that it shall not have an end: nay it must have an end, for only that which is without beginning is without end; only the uncreate is imperishable. It is in fact impossible to bring forward any sound arguments for the future existence of the soul which do not also involve its previous existence, its everlasting duration. The creational theory is matter of dogmatic assertion, not of philosophical discussion.

Not only on metaphysical grounds has Plato's conception so great an advantage; but from the standpoint of practical ethics its superiority is equally decided. The fundamental law of Platonic morals is *δράσαντι παθεῖν*. There is indeed no such thing as vengeance in his scheme, but there is an immutable and inexorable sequence of cause and effect. No impunity exists for vice: every act of indulgence is another bar in the soul's prison-house; it drags her from the pure intellectual sphere which is rightfully hers down to the gross and pestilent atmosphere of sensual delight. From this doom none may escape; the consequences of every action are as inevitable as the laws of the universe. If a man sin, he shall pay for his sin in spiritual degradation; repentance avails nothing, reformation alone can slowly recover the lost position. Now within the span of a single life we know that a man often suffers in his latter days for the vices of his youth: how infinitely wider then is the application of this principle, if we regard that single life as but one out of an endless series. As Plato himself says, we have to consider the effects of our actions not only for this life but for all time: our present state is conditioned by causes stretching we know not how far back into the remotest past, and what we do now will influ-

ence our destiny throughout unknown cycles to come. The indestructibility of force comes terribly home to us here. Now it will be observed that in this reference metempsychosis supplies the Platonist with a ready explanation of the apparent injustice which prevails in the ordering of things—an answer to the question, if the gods are good and care for the affairs of men, why is virtue so often afflicted and vice triumphant? An advocate of the creational theory is forced to reply that the balance will be rectified in another life: suffering virtue will be rewarded, and the insolence of vice will be brought low. But such an answer is idle. No future recompense can undo injustice that has once been done: wrong may be redressed but never cancelled—*τῶν πεπραγμένων ἐν δίκῃ τε καὶ παρὰ δίκαν ἀποίητον οὐδ' ἂν χρόνος ὁ πάντων πατήρ δύναιτο θέμεν ἔργων τέλος*. To the Platonist however the solution is easy. No injustice has to be atoned, for none exists. The conditions obtaining at any given time are the inevitable, and therefore perfectly just, result of an infinite series of causes: we must look for the antecedents not in this life only, but in a limitless cycle of prior existences; and what might be unjust relatively to a man's conduct in his present life may be the irresistible effect of his action in some bygone period. It is true that the answer is not complete without reference to ontological and physical principles, which however cannot here be entered upon.

Thus the theory of metempsychosis supplies not only an explanation of this inequality in human affairs but also a most powerful incentive to virtuous action. A man shall be what his deeds and thoughts make him: if he degrade himself by vice, his restoration must be effected, not by some deathbed repentance or compulsory purgation, but by his own laborious endeavour, by living according to the best of his lights in the inferior state to which he has fallen. For Plato never leaves him without hope. The fanciful description of the soul's migrations at the close of the *Timæus* (92 A) represents a definite ethical doctrine. The soul that has swerved from the course of pure intellectual virtue may inhabit forms of bird or beast, or even fish and mollusc, 'when it is defiled with all manner of iniquity and therefore in place of inhaling the fine and clear element of air is condemned to the turbid and gross respiration of water'. Yet even in this most degraded state there is a chance of retrieval: for these vicissitudes are determined *νοῦ καὶ ἀνοίας ἀποβολῇ καὶ κτήσει*. A life well spent according to the conditions of even the lowest rank may enable the soul to rise a step in the next incarnation; and the recovery of the whole intellectual inheritance is always possible. The hopeless reprobation of the incurable criminals described in the myth of the *Phædo* belongs simply to the pictorial presentation:

we find it only when Plato is pressing popular legend into his service; not when he is presenting his own views undisguised by this veil of tradition. I have said that a permanent mode of existence for the soul is not excluded by the Platonic theory. But such permanent mode is only possible when the soul has attained the highest perfection of which she is capable: good may be stable, but evil never.

Among theories then which maintain the personal immortality of particular souls it would seem that Plato's is metaphysically the most defensible and ethically the most fruitful; and while it attaches the heaviest penalties to immorality, it offers the strongest encouragement to any endeavour after improvement. It is not of course contended that this view is exempt from objections and difficulties; merely that these apply with greater force to any other method of defending individual immortality.

(ii) But how far do Plato's arguments tend to prove the immortality of particular souls, as distinct from the eternity of the universal soul? It must, I think, be replied that they go but a very short way indeed. If we examine the several demonstrations, we shall find that what they amount to is that vital principle is indestructible, not that its manifestation in this or that personality is permanent. The result of the argument from ἀνταπόδοσις is that, if all things are not to be brought to nought, the sum of vital essence can suffer no abatement; but it offers no shadow of proof that this constant amount of vitality will continue to be distributed into the same conscious personalities: we know by experience that separate conscious personalities continue to be produced in the world, and therefore we conclude that the vital force which constitutes them cannot perish at the dissolution of soul and body; but we have no right to conclude that these personalities retain their individual consciousness after death. Indeed from this argument we cannot infer that vital force will always continue to exist in the form of particular intelligences: that belongs to another aspect of Plato's metaphysics. Proceeding to ἀνάμνησις, although on a bare literal interpretation Plato's language may imply that the soul existed individually before birth, yet this is not at all involved in the principle of the theory: the particular soul retains the knowledge of truths which are the possession of soul at large, not necessarily of this soul in a former personal existence. A similar examination of the remaining arguments of the *Phaedo* will show that individual immortality is not fairly deducible from any of them. The same applies to the brief but pregnant demonstration in *Phaedrus* 245 c foll. There the case for the eternity of soul is stated with unequalled force and clearness; but it applies to the universal soul alone, and nothing can be



deduced from it regarding the permanence of particular souls. The strikingly subtle argument beginning *Republic* 608 E contains a remarkable expression (611 A), ἐννοεῖς ὅτι αἰεὶ ἂν εἶεν αἱ αὐταί, sc. αἱ ψυχαί. This seems at first sight like an assertion of the continued existence of the same personalities. A closer examination however shows that this is not the case. Plato simply means that if the whole vital force of the universe is distributed into a certain number of souls, no addition to this number is possible, else the sum total of vitality would be increased, which is inadmissible. We cannot draw from that argument the conclusion that this universal vitality must needs be for ever manifested in a given number of souls; and even if it must, that would not necessarily involve continuity of personality. The whole strength of Plato's reasoning is expended in demonstrating the eternity of soul as such: there is nothing to prove that particular souls on their departure from the body are not reabsorbed in the universal spirit, merging their proper consciousness in that common force of nature which is ever manifesting itself anew in the forms of individual life.

(iii) Such being the case, it is not irrelevant to raise the question, did Plato really and literally maintain the personal immortality of particular souls? This certainly would seem to be the teaching of the *Phaedo*, and this is the view of the vast majority of Platonic students: but the contrary opinion is supported by the great authority of Hegel and has recently been defended with much ingenuity by Teichmüller; it is not therefore to be dismissed without ceremony. I will discuss the statements of the two critics separately.

First however I must point out a difficulty under which an editor of the *Phaedo* labours in approaching this question: it does not belong to the treatment of the *Phaedo* at all, but to that of the *Timaeus*; and we can hope to attain a satisfactory solution only after a minute investigation of the profound and difficult metaphysics of the latter dialogue. Such an investigation is obviously out of place here, since ὁ λόγος πάρεργος ὦν πλέον ἂν ἔργον ὦν ἔνεκα λέγεται παράσχοι. At the same time it does not seem desirable to leave the subject altogether unnoticed, and I shall therefore treat it as briefly as I am able.

In his statement of the Platonic philosophy Hegel expressly assigns the permanence of particular souls to the region of the mythical. We think of the soul, he says<sup>1</sup>, as a physical thing possessing divers attributes, one of which is thinking—thinking determined as a thing that can pass away and cease. But with Plato the immortality of the soul is

<sup>1</sup> Hegel's *Werke*, vol. XIV p. 207 foll.

inseparably bound up with the fact that the soul is that which thinks—thought is not a mere attribute of it. We are addicted to thinking of the soul as if it were a thing that could exist without imagination or thought. To Plato, on the other hand, the significance of immortality consists in this, that thought is not an attribute of the soul but its substance—soul is just thought. Thought is the substance of soul as gravity is the substance, not an attribute, of body. Take away gravity, and body is no more; take away thought and soul is no more. Thought is the activity of the universal, which reflects itself into itself and is identified with itself: this self-identity is the unalterable and abiding. Alteration is when one thing becomes another and does not hold fast by itself in the other. Soul on the other hand consists in the retaining itself in the other—in the process of apprehension the soul has to do with external matter, which is other, and yet it retains its self-identity. Immortality has not for Plato the interest it has for us in a religious aspect; it depends upon the nature of thought and its inner freedom. With reference to the *Phaedo* Hegel observes that we have hardly any line of demarcation between the outward representation and the inward idea, but this is far from sinking to the crudity of conception (*Rohheit*), that represents the soul as a thing, and inquires about its duration and existence, as concerning a thing.

Now it appears to me that the foregoing criticism amounts to something like this. Hegel, analysing the conception of immortality, seizes at once upon that which he regards as essential to the Platonic philosophy: this kernel he instantly drags to light, rejecting the husk of 'Vorstellung'. Whether an individual consciousness shall continue to exist as such is to Platonism of no metaphysical importance whatever: what is of importance is to grasp the true nature of eternity. The soul's real immortality lies in the operation of thought: eternity is in the nature of thought and has nothing to do with duration. Such, I conceive, is Hegel's point. Now that the duration of the individual is of no metaphysical importance I am willing to admit: Plato's philosophy in no way involves it. I do not however see that it is thereby excluded; provided the really essential point is maintained, it seems to me that the question of individual duration is an open one for Plato; whether a particular consciousness continues for one life, or for a score, or for an unlimited time, does not appear to affect the question.

Teichmüller however goes further, and declares that Plato could not maintain individual immortality without grave inconsistency; from which premiss he most justly draws the conclusion that Plato did

not maintain it<sup>1</sup>. For I cordially agree with him that any interpretation of Plato which attributes inconsistency to him stands self-condemned. It may be very well for writers of Cicero's philosophical calibre to talk of Plato as 'inconstans'; but when modern historians of philosophy impute to this greatest of philosophers self-contradictions of which the merest novice would be ashamed, one cannot but suspect them of seeking to lighten their own labours at Plato's expense: it is easier to accuse him of inconsistency than to work out his meaning<sup>2</sup>.

Teichmüller's criticism seems to resolve itself mainly into two points: (1) Plato's reasoning applies only to universal, not to particular soul, (2) the admission of individual immortality makes Plato's philosophy into a system of monadism, not monism. The first point has been already conceded; but it is no proof that Plato did not believe in the permanence of individual souls. The second objection, if sustained, I should regard as fatal, holding as I do that Platonism is essentially a monistic system. But I doubt whether it has been proved. The contention is that, if particular souls are eternal, we have as the ontological basis of the system not one universal thought, but a number of distinct and independent substances or forces, resembling the monads of Leibnitz. But in the first place it must be remarked that eternity is not claimed for particular souls: the individual, *qua* individual, cannot possibly be eternal: all that is claimed is the indefinite prolongation of their existence in both directions; but no extent of prolongation is one step nearer eternity<sup>3</sup>. Severance from what we term our body can make no difference; if a particular soul continues her separate existence at all, the conditions of her limitation oblige her to remain in the sphere of *γένεσις*: did she pass to the *νοητὸν* she would necessarily be merged in the universal<sup>4</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> The works of Teichmüller which I have consulted on this subject are '*die platonische Frage*' and '*Studien zur Geschichte der Begriffe*.'

<sup>2</sup> As I shall presently have occasion to remark, Plato's dialogues indubitably show a development in his system. But this development involves no inconsistency, even though the expression of some thoughts needs modification: rather it brings to light the hidden connexion between ideas hitherto unharmonised.

<sup>3</sup> Plato most explicitly recognises this, *Timæus* 37 E ταῦτα δὲ πάντα μέρη χρόνου,

καὶ τό τ' ἦν τό τ' ἔσται χρόνου γεγονότα εἶδη, ἃ δὴ φέρουτες λαμβάνομεν ἐπὶ τῇ αἰδίῳ οὐσίᾳ οὐκ ὀρθῶς. λέγομεν γὰρ δὴ ὡς ἦν ἔστι τε καὶ ἔσται, τῇ δὲ τὸ ἔστι μόνον κατὰ τὸν ἀληθῆ λόγον προσήκει. And again 38 B τὸ μὲν γὰρ παράδειγμα πάντα αἰῶνα ἔστιν ὄν, ὃ δ' αὖ διὰ τέλους τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον γεγονώς τε καὶ ὄν καὶ ἐσόμενος.

<sup>4</sup> Teichmüller's objection seems directed against the existence of a plurality of souls in the intelligible world: cf. *die platonische Frage* p. 23 'Vielheit aber in das intelligible Gebiet zu versetzen, heisst Atomismus, nicht Platonismus.' Very true;



Finite intelligences are for Plato simply manifestations of the universal *νοῦς*: they are not self-existent monads, but evolved from the universal, a mode of whose existence they are. Now if, as we may gather from the *Timæus*, the universal *νοῦς* has this mode of existence in perpetuity, can it matter to Plato's doctrine whether each finite intelligence preserves the same thread of consciousness throughout, or is merged in the universal on the conclusion of a given term of existence? One view may be more probable than the other, but neither seems to me to involve monadism. If souls are to be monads they must be as individuals eternal and self-existing; prolongation of their existence, even in perpetuity, will not suffice.

Moreover, although I am convinced as firmly as any one of Plato's consistency, I hold it for certain that we have represented in the dialogues a regular development of Plato's thought, whereof the *Phædo* does not belong to the latest stage. We cannot therefore bring everything in the *Phædo* into severe conformity with the matured pantheism of the *Timæus*. In the latter it is probable that personal immortality does more or less recede into the region of the mythical: it enters only in an extremely allegorical guise. But while in the matured Platonism all is coherent and consequent, in the still maturing Platonism of the *Phædo* there are to be found views, as we shall see, which Plato afterwards considerably modified: and even were it shown that personal immortality is inadmissible in the *Timæus*, it does not follow that it is so in the *Phædo*.

In the interpretation of a writer so much addicted to figurative speech as Plato there must needs be here and there difference of opinion as to where the line is to be drawn between symbolism and substance: and in this case I cannot but think that Teichmüller has drawn the line too high. And I cannot acquiesce in his naive assumption that the mere fact that a doubt exists is decisive in favour of a non-literal interpretation. The *onus probandi*, I take it, lies with those who do not interpret literally; and in general the proof is not hard to find. We have no hesitation in regarding the creation of the universe by the *δημιουργός* as purely mythical, because a literal acceptance would reduce Platonism to a chaos of nonsense: we pass a similar verdict on the endless punishment of criminals in the *νέκυια* of the *Phædo*, *Republic*, and *Gorgias*, because it is incongruous with the just and benevolent spirit that pervades Plato's ethics, and because it only appears when Plato is clothing his thoughts in a legendary form. In the

but the individual soul, as such, whether its continuance be perpetual or not, does not belong to the 'intelligibles Gebiet' at all.

present case however I do not think the incongruity is made out. Moreover the direct and circumstantial seriousness with which the doctrine of immortality is put forward is totally unlike any of the mythical or figurative representations of Plato's thought elsewhere: Hegel himself observes 'wir treffen hier am wenigsten geschieden die Weise des Vorstellens und des Begriffes;' and certainly if Plato is not here in earnest with individual immortality, he may fairly be charged with having passed from mysticism to mystification.

I have made this defence of the literal interpretation not because I consider that the continued existence of the individual is of any real importance in the Platonic system—I should not go so far as to affirm that it was retained to the last—but because, in order that we may follow historically the development of Plato's thought, it is important for us to determine precisely what he means to set forth in each dialogue. And the conclusion which seems to me the soundest is that, although Plato knew very well that neither he nor any one else could demonstrate the immortality of individual souls, yet he was strongly disposed to believe, at least at the time the *Phaedo* was written, that every soul on its separation from the body will not be reabsorbed in the universal, but will survive as a conscious personality, even as it existed before its present incarnation.

#### § 4. *Theory of Soul in the PHAEDO*<sup>1</sup>.

Adopting the view defended in the preceding section, we have next to deal with a question arising from a comparison between the psychology of the *Phaedo* and that of some other Platonic dialogues. Such a comparison will bring to light two points wherein Plato's teaching is at first sight inconsistent and is regarded by Grote and others as distinctly self-contradictory. The object of the present section is to show that no such inconsistency exists.

In the *Phaedo* (*a*) the soul is essentially simple and incomposite; and this simplicity is urged as an argument for her imperishability (compare 80 B with 78 C foll.): (*β*) ἔρωτες ἐπιθυμίαι φόβοι and the like are referred to the body as their origin, whence arising they intrude upon the soul and trouble her contemplations, (66 C). On the other hand (*a*) in certain passages of the *Phaedrus*, *Republic*, and *Timaeus*

<sup>1</sup> The substance of this section appeared in a paper printed in the *Journal of Philology*, vol. x, p. 120, to which I

may refer the reader for a more detailed statement.

the soul is represented not as a simple but as a triple nature, (*Phaedrus* 246 A, *Republic* 439 D, *Timaeus* 69 C): ( $\beta$ ) in the *Philebus* it is expressly declared that all passions have their origin in the soul, body being in itself incapable of giving rise to any sensation; and this position is also consistently maintained in the *Timaeus*, (*Philebus* 35 C, *Timaeus* 64 B, C). The problems we have to solve then are (i) how can we reconcile the simplicity of soul in the *Phaedo* with her tripartite nature in the other three dialogues, and how does the argument for immortality affect the three parts severally? (ii) how can we reconcile the assignment of passions to body in the *Phaedo* with their assignment to soul in the *Philebus*?

(i) Of the first problem only two solutions seem possible, ( $\alpha$ ) that two distinct views were entertained by Plato at different periods, ( $\beta$ ) that the tripartition of the soul is purely metaphorical.

The first alternative cannot be accepted. For reasons which will be discussed hereafter it is impossible to regard the *Phaedo* as belonging to a different period from the *Republic*; and there are good grounds for assigning the *Phaedrus* to the same group. We are bound therefore to expect that these dialogues will agree in all important doctrines.

Moreover there is a remarkable fact to be noticed. The simplicity of  $\psi\chi\eta$ , so far from being a theory peculiar to the *Phaedo*, is one which pervades the whole series of the Platonic dialogues from beginning to end, not even excepting those in which the triform nature appears. This is not only conclusive evidence that we are not dealing with doctrines held at successive periods, but it affords strong presumption that the tripartition of  $\psi\chi\eta$  is a figurative expression.

Let us examine the nature of this tripartition. In the myth of the *Phaedrus* the soul is likened to a car driven by a charioteer and drawn by two winged steeds. Of this pair one is vicious and unruly, the other generous and docile, aiding the charioteer in subduing his refractory companion. This parable is thus explained in the *Republic*. In every soul there are two  $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\delta\eta$  or  $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\rho\eta$ ,  $\lambda\omicron\gamma\iota\sigma\tau\iota\kappa\acute{\omicron}\nu$  and  $\acute{\alpha}\lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\nu$ , the latter being subdivided into  $\theta\upsilon\mu\omicron\sigma\iota\delta\epsilon\varsigma$  and  $\epsilon\pi\iota\theta\upsilon\mu\eta\tau\iota\kappa\acute{\omicron}\nu$ . So we have the soul distinguished into three parts or kinds, rational, emotional, appetitive. We see however that the main division is dual not triple; the three parts are not coordinate but made out by the subdivision of the  $\acute{\alpha}\lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\nu$ : this it will be well to bear in mind.

But if this analysis is to be understood as literally signifying that the soul is composed of three distinct parts, the results are truly bewildering. The entire argument of the *Phaedo* is not merely demolished root and branch, but is shown utterly unmeaning and irrelevant. For



when we dreaded lest the soul on quitting the body should be scattered to the winds and dissolved, we were comforted by the assurance that as she had no parts she could not be divided; simplicity cannot admit dissolution. But now she has three distinct parts, therefore into those parts she can be resolved: and what is to become of them? do they continue to exist separately? or does one of them, or two, or all perish? And what becomes of the soul's likeness to the ideas, in virtue of which she claimed to apprehend them and to belong to the region of the invisible and eternal? All this is swept away at one stroke. If we answer that it is the λογιστικὸν alone with which the argument of the *Phaedo* is concerned, we are shutting our eyes to the fact that there is not a single passage in Plato where the term ψυχή is applied to the highest εἶδος as distinguished from the two lower: nor have we a right so to apply it here. And if the three εἶδη all are classed as ψυχή, it must be in virtue of some common principle: what then is this principle? what is the bond of union, what the differentiation of the three? The fact that we are led into so helpless a maze of perplexity is ample cause for deciding that the literal interpretation is entirely inadmissible.

But the case is still further strengthened by the statement in the *Timæus*. The created gods are described as implanting in a body the human soul, imitating the manner of their own creation by the δημιουργός. The divine element, θεῖον, which they received from the hands of the creator, they placed in the head: this is the λογιστικὸν of the *Republic*. Then, Plato proceeds to tell us, they fashioned another kind of soul, to which he applies the remarkable term θνητόν. This is the abode of vehement passions, pleasure and pain, confidence and fear, wrath and hope and love, and all unreasoning sensations. And lest they should sully the divine principle, they placed this mortal soul in another region of the body: and since it was twofold, they divided the two kinds by a partition, setting the spirited portion in the heart, that it might readily hear and obey the commands of the reason; while the appetitive they set in the belly, that it might care for the nourishment of the body. Here the θνητόν εἶδος corresponds to the ἄλογον of the *Republic* and includes the θυμοειδές and ἐπιθυμητικόν.

If this too is to be understood literally, confusion is tenfold worse confounded. For to the three parts are assigned different habitations in the body; all three therefore have extension in space: yet we know very well that for Plato ψυχή is unextended and immaterial. Again the lower εἶδη are mortal; that is, vital principle can admit destruction: a declaration not only subversive of all the reasoning in the *Phaedo*, but

flatly opposed to the whole of Plato's convictions concerning soul: nay it extinguishes once for all his hope of discovering a sure basis of knowledge; for if the principle of life and thought can under any conditions cease to be, what is there that shall abide? *Θνητὴ ψυχή*, understood literally, is indeed the most absolute contradiction in terms that his vocabulary could furnish. And, as if to bring out this contradiction in the most glaring light, Plato declares (*Phaedrus* 245 D) *πάσα ψυχή ἀθάνατος*, all soul, without reservation, is immortal; and presently we have an elaborate statement of the tripartite nature, that is of a mortal and an immortal soul conjoined.

All this constitutes not merely justification but positive necessity for treating the tripartition of soul as wholly metaphorical; and the interpretation of the metaphor is simple enough. The three *εἶδη* of the soul are not different parts or kinds, but only different modes of the soul's activity under different conditions. The two lower *εἶδη* are consequent upon the conjunction of soul with matter<sup>1</sup>, and their operation ceases at the separation of soul from matter. Soul, as such, is simple, she is pure thought; and her action, which is thinking, is simple. But soul immanent in matter has a complex action; she does not lose, at least in the higher organisms, all the faculty of pure thought; but she has another action consequent on her implication with matter: this action we call perception or sensation. The main division is, as we have seen, dual: *λογιστικὸν* expressing the action of soul by herself, *ἄλογον* has action through the body. The *πάθη* belonging to *ἄλογον* Plato classifies under the heads of *θυμοειδές* and *ἐπιθυμητικόν*. We see too that the terms of the *Timæus*, *θεῖον* and *θηγιόν*, are abundantly justified. Soul is altogether imperishable: but when she enters into relation with body she assumes certain functions which are terminable and which cease when the relation comes to an end. *Θνητόν* then is the name given to soul acting under certain material conditions; and soul may in that sense admit the appellation, not because she ever ceases to exist *qua* soul, but because she ceases to operate *qua* emotional and appetitive soul. Soul exists in her own essence eternally, in her material relations but for a time.

<sup>1</sup> This is indubitable. In the myth of the *Phaedrus* the gods have the three *εἶδη*, but the gods are corporeal (246 D). That they are so is interesting: it shows how fully Plato recognised that the limitations of individual consciousness preclude a purely immaterial existence. The

conditions of individual existence are not necessarily identical with ours; e.g. the gods and superior spirits have *σῶμα*, but not *σῶμα γήινον*; but such an existence involves in some sense materiality: the individual belongs to *γένεσις*.

Soul then is simple and uniform, the one and only principle of life. All forms of life are manifestations of her, from the highest to the lowest; from the activity of the noblest intellect to the faintest vestiges of vegetable growth<sup>1</sup>. The degree of intelligence varies inversely according to the degree of implication with matter. In the highest forms of individual existence thought has free scope for its activity, and the lower modes of consciousness are in due subordination: but as the material bonds grow tighter, the supremacy of thought wanes, and the dominion of sensation and appetite strengthens; finally reason and thought, even the higher modes of sensation, vanish, and nutrition and growth alone remain. But all these organisms are vitalised by one sole principle of life.

We now have reached a standpoint whence it is easy to solve the difficulties which we encountered at the outset. Once recognise that Plato knew of but one kind of soul, and all is smooth. The essential nature of soul is simple, as much in the *Phaedrus*, *Republic*, and *Timaeus* as in the *Phaedo*. Hence it is beside the point to ask which of the three parts is immortal: Plato is seeking to prove that soul herself is eternal, not that certain relations and functions of soul are perpetual. The vital principle which manifests itself in these modes is imperishable, but the modes themselves are temporary and transient.

(ii) The answer to the second question is to be found with no less ease. The whole argument of the *Phaedo*, as we have seen, deals with soul *qua* soul. With this of course bodily appetites have nothing to do: accordingly Plato assigns them to the body, because they only belong to soul in her bodily relation and through this affect her. Nothing would be gained by pursuing the analysis further; rather the course of the discussion would be hampered by the introduction of matter which had no bearing on the question at issue. In the *Philebus* it is different; there it is Plato's business to give a psychological analysis of the passions in question: accordingly they are assigned to soul, which is the only seat of consciousness. Each dialogue is justified from its own standpoint: the *Phaedo* in attributing passions to the body, because they arise from the corporeal relation of soul; the *Philebus* in giving them to the soul, because body, as such, has no consciousness. There only appears to be a discrepancy, because the analysis of the *Phaedo* is in the *Philebus* carried out more thoroughly: these passions belong to body, because without the bodily environment they could not arise; to soul, because it is by soul alone that they can be felt.

<sup>1</sup> See *Timaeus* 77 A foll.



Thus it appears that if we insist upon treating Plato's allegorical language as plain prose, we are lost in helpless perplexity; while by a reasonable interpretation of the metaphor we are released from all difficulty and show Plato's teaching to be perfectly consistent and philosophical. There cannot, I think, be much doubt which method to choose. As Hegel observes, 'wenn er [sc. Plato] von der Seele des Menschen sagt, dass sie einen vernünftigen und unvernünftigen Theil habe: so ist dies ebenso im Allgemeinen zu nehmen: aber Plato behauptet damit nicht, dass die Seele aus zweierlei Substanzen, zweierlei Dingen zusammengesetzt sey.'

I conclude this section with a brief summary borrowed from the paper to which I have already referred.

In *Timæus* 69 C—72 D we have a *θείον εἶδος* and a *θνητὸν εἶδος* of *ψυχή*: of which *θείον* = *λογιστικόν*, *θνητὸν* = *θυμοειδές* + *ἐπιθυμητικόν*. Now *ψυχή*, as such, is *ἀθάνατον*: therefore the word *θνητὸν* can only refer to a particular relation of *ψυχή* and *σῶμα*, or operation of *ψυχή* through *σῶμα*. *Θυμοειδές* therefore and *ἐπιθυμητικόν* are not different parts of *ψυχή*, but only names for different modes of its action through *σῶμα*: thus *θυμοειδές* and *ἐπιθυμητικόν* are *θνητά*, because, when the conjunction between *ψυχή* and *σῶμα* ceases, they cease also.

Thus the apparent discrepancy between the *Phædo* and *Philebus* is reconciled. In the one *ἐπιθυμίαι* are ascribed to *σῶμα*, as arising from conjunction of *ψυχή* and *σῶμα*: in the other they are more accurately ascribed to *ψυχή*, because they are an affection of *ψυχή* through *σῶμα*. Also the argument of the *Phædo* is entirely unaffected by the threefold division. All soul is simple, uniform, and indestructible; but in connexion with body it assumes certain phases which are temporary and only exist in relation to body. Thus though the *ἐπιθυμητικόν* and *θυμοειδές*, as such, are not immortal, because they depend for their continuance upon body, which is mortal; yet the vital principle, which under such conditions assumes these forms, is immortal and continues to exist, though not necessarily in the same mode. For the modes in which vital force acts under temporary conditions are transitory, but the acting force itself is changeless and eternal.

#### § 5. *Position of the PHAEDO in the Platonic System.*

The whole philosophy of Plato is, as I am fully convinced, set forth in his extant dialogues. It is a system which in its final development forms a harmonious and consistent whole, worked out with unflinching

logical precision from its fundamental principles. But we can hardly suppose that this system sprang all at once in its mature completeness, like a new Athene, from its creator's brain. Plato is not indeed wont to write down his ideas before they are well thought out: but when we reflect where he took philosophy up and where he left it, it would seem wonderful indeed if a series of compositions extending over a long life belonged to one and the same stage of thought. Of philosophy, properly so called, Plato is the originator and creator. The earlier Greek thinkers in their struggles up to the light had struck upon divers principles of profound and vital importance: the names of Herakleitos, Parmenides, and Anaxagoras are associated with truths which form the very framework of philosophy. But each of the earlier philosophers dwelt exclusively on his own peculiar principle, till in its isolation a truth became a falsehood; they advanced one aspect of the truth as if it were the whole: those on one side of the shield declared that all is convex; those on the other, all is concave. Philosophy first became possible when there arose a *συνοπτικός ἀνὴρ*, who saw that these truths are complementary, that each is realised in the others. And here I cannot forbear once more to quote a remark of Hegel's: 'We are not to look upon Plato's dialogues as if it were his concern to give expression to sui-dry philosophies, nor must we suppose that his philosophy was an eclectic system constructed out of the former: it rather forms the knot in which these one-sided abstract principles are truly unified in concrete form.....In the Platonic philosophy we see manifold philosophemes of earlier times, but taken up into Plato's principles and therein unified.' Platonism in fact realises by conciliation principles which in their separation were null and void.

From this point of view we should expect to find in Plato's exposition of his system (1) a phase wherein the necessity of such a conciliation is recognised and its accomplishment more or less effected, while at the same time imperfections and gaps yet remain, (2) a phase in which Plato's severe self-criticism has revealed to him the weak points in his earlier theory, and his unparalleled metaphysical insight has suggested to him the remedy. To leap at once from the one-sided crudeness of preplatonian thought to so profound and comprehensive a philosophy as the later Platonism would seem beyond the power even of such a genius as Plato's: there are few indeed who could have reached the intermediate stage. We may expect to see, and I believe we do see in the dialogues evidence of development in Plato's thought, which passes through definite stages, enabling us to distribute the Platonic writings into three distinct

periods, which I shall term the Sokratic, the middle, and the later.

Upon the precise nature of this development an entirely new and most important light has been thrown by Mr Jackson in a masterly series of essays recently published in the *Journal of Philology*, vols. x and xi. His results, so far as he has yet proceeded, I cordially accept in the main; and it is from the standpoint which his researches have empowered us to reach that I now propose to indicate a classification of the Platonic dialogues. I am only concerned to give such a general outline as will enable me to define the period to which I conceive the *Phaedo* to belong; a full analysis would not serve the present purpose.

At the time he first met Sokrates, the unsatisfactory result of previous speculation had in all probability inclined the young Plato, like most of his contemporaries, towards philosophic scepticism. Sokrates gave a new impetus to his thought; it was from him that Plato derived, along with the interrogatory method, the principle which afterwards bore such abundant fruit—the principle that knowledge is of universals. This is the great contribution of the unmetaphysical Sokrates to metaphysics; but it is in the hands of Plato, not of Sokrates, that it attained its true significance. And even with Plato it at first remained barren. In his earlier dialogues Plato exercises the exuberant strength of his growing thought in the Sokratic method of definition: we find abundant promise of the matchless artistic power that is to come, but little or no advance on the position of Sokrates. Such dialogues are the *Euthyphron*, *Charmides*, *Laches*, and others, mostly of small compass and of slight philosophical importance. They culminate in the *Protagoras*, the longest and most brilliant of the series. These dialogues constitute the Sokratic period; in them we do not yet find Plato.

But Plato was a true scholar of Herakleitos: he saw that in things which abide not, but ever fluctuate and fleet away, there can be no stable truth nor basis of knowledge. Knowledge is of that which abides firm and changes not, if there exists such in the universe. And now Plato despairs no longer of finding this existence, he sees it in the principle of universals. But not in the universals as he received them from Sokrates; a change must pass upon them before they will serve his end. Sokrates had said, if we would know a thing we must clear our conception of it from all accidental attributes which may be peculiar to particular specimens of the class: if we would know what is a tree, we must obtain from the completest comparison that



our experience enables us to make an exhaustive catalogue of those attributes which are not peculiar to any particular tree but which are common to all, and lacking any one of which a thing would not be a tree. Thus we shall have framed in our mind the definition or concept of a tree, and now we have such knowledge of it as is attainable. But this concept is simply a thought in our own mind, it has no existence of its own: it is, as Protagoras might tell us, doubly unsubstantial; for it is formed from the impressions produced by an ever-changing object upon a subject that is never constant: the image of a flitting insect in running water is not more shadowy than the perceptions from which our definition is formed. Knowledge demands for its object a constant self-existent verity. This led Plato to the hypostatisation of the universal. In place of a mental concept derived from particulars he gives us an essential idea prior to the particulars, whereof it is the cause. These ideas, being veritably existent, can be objects of true knowledge; and they served Plato as a δεσμός wherewith to mediate between the immovable unity of Parmenides and the limitless plurality of Herakleitos. We cannot, says Plato, clear at one bound the gulf between ἐν and ἄπειρα, between the primal unity and the infinite multitude of particulars; we need, as intermediates, πολλά, i.e. a definite number of classes, proceeding by gradually widening generalisations from the *infimae species* to the all-embracing unity: and each of these classes represents an idea.

This is the stage of the middle Platonism: as yet the ideas are simply hypostatisations of every logical concept. Consequently we find in the *Republic* an idea of every group of objects denoted by a class-name. We have at the top of the scale the αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν, we have ideas of καλὸν δίκαιον, &c., ideas of natural objects, ideas of σκευαστά, beds, tables, &c., ideas of relations, great, small, equal, &c., and ideas of κακὸν ἄδικον and the like. The particulars in every group derive their nature and existence from the immanence, παρουσία, of the idea. The *Republic* is the chief exponent of this phase of Plato's metaphysics: it is also represented by the *Phaedrus*, *Symposium*, and others: its main distinguishing characteristics are the assumption of an idea for every group of particulars, and the inherence of the idea in the particulars, also expressed as the participation, μέθεξις, of the particular in the idea.

But Plato presently finds reason to be dissatisfied with this expression of his theory: the difficulties and deficiencies he sees therein are stated with overwhelming force in the earlier part of the *Parmenides*. The points which chiefly demanded correction were the contents of the

ideal world and the relation between ideas and particulars. The list of ideas is largely reduced, though it is not easy to say precisely to what extent: instead of an idea corresponding to every group of particulars we now have only an idea for every group which is naturally and not artificially determined; thus all ideas of *σκευαστά* are abolished. Next relations are reduced from the rank of ideas to that of universal predicates, or, as Aristotle would say, categories; so that we no longer have ideas of great and small, equal and double, and so forth. Finally ideas of negations are abolished, such as evil, unjust, &c. Therefore one great criterion of the stage to which a dialogue belongs will be the nature of the ideas that are assumed in it.

The second point is no less important, the relation between the ideal and the material world. In the middle period the idea exists (α) transcendently, *ἐν τῇ φύσει*, (β) immanent in the particulars. In the period to which we have now come, the transcendental existence of the idea alone is allowed: the particulars no longer participate in the idea, but are regarded as copies, *μιμήματα*, of the ideal type, *παράδειγμα*. In this way the objections formulated in the *Parmenides* against the earlier account of the relation between idea and particular are avoided. Other characteristics of the later Platonism, as the analysis of *ὄντα* into *πέρας* and *ἄπειρον* in the *Philebus*, and the still subtler analysis of the *Timaeus*, need not detain us here; since the object of the foregoing statement is merely to indicate the development of Plato's system so far as is necessary for fixing the position of the *Phaedo*. The later metaphysic is unfolded in the *Parmenides*, *Sophist*, and *Philebus*, and consummated in the *Timaeus*.

Guided by these landmarks we shall find it no hard matter to determine the bearings of the *Phaedo*. In this dialogue we have an idea of *ἴσον* (74 A), *μέγα* (100 B), *σμικρότης* (100 E), &c. Also we have the idea described as *ἐν ἡμῖν* as well as *ἐν τῇ φύσει* (102 D). That is to say, in the *Phaedo* (1) we see ideas of relations, though ideas of *σκευαστά* do not occur, and (2) the ideas are immanent in particulars. These are two unmistakable marks that the dialogue belongs to the Platonism of the *Republic*.

The metaphysical doctrine of the *Phaedo* is in fact identical with that of the *Republic*, although it is less precisely formulated. The cardinal point in each dialogue is the existence of the ideas as the sole principle of causation and the one object of true knowledge. In the *Phaedo* indeed Plato does not bring out in definite language the subordination of the other ideas to the *αὐτὸ ἀγαθὸν* as the supreme source of all existence. But this is not due to any discordance of theory, but only to

a difference in the immediate object. The supremacy of the *αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν* in the *Phaedo* is plainly indicated in the fact that *τὸ βέλτιστον* is postulated as the ultimate *αἰτία*, to which all other causes are merely subsidiary. Moreover a synthesis of these two dialogues will show us that Plato is working on precisely the same lines which he afterwards follows in the *Philebus* and *Timaeus*. In the *Phaedo* he declares that all things are ordered by *νοῦς* working *ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιστον*. But what is the 'best'? by what standard are we to determine it? The answer is indicated in the *Republic*: the efficient and final causes are indistinguishably blended in the *αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν*. This identification is pregnant with a significance which is not fully brought to light until we come to the *Timaeus*; where, behind the veil of poetical embroidery, we behold the universe as the self-evolution of absolute *νοῦς*, according to the immutable laws of its own nature. The standard of *τὸ βέλτιστον* then lies in the nature of *νοῦς*: and *νοῦς* in operating *ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιστον* is working out its own being. This is why the philosopher must seek to base his morality upon cognition of the *ἀγαθόν* itself; for there is no other standard of excellence than the laws of true Being.

The thoroughly Herakleitean conception of the phenomenal world is also quite in keeping with the *Republic*. In the shadowy realm of the sensible the soul goes astray bewildered and befogged in the whirling eddy of unsubstantial phantoms—*ἀμειννὰ κάρηνα*—that throng around her. In this doubtful region, midway between being and not-being, she can only grope her way under the treacherous guidance of opinion. And here we may note another characteristic of the middle period, in the absence of any really serious attempt to account for the existence or apparent existence of phenomena. Plato does not flatly deny the existence of the visible world, as the Eleatics did; he assigns it a sort of ignominious half-existence: but he gives us no explanation of it beyond such vaguely metaphorical phrases as 'participation in the ideas'. It is not until his latest dialogues that he sets himself resolutely to deal with this problem. He never recedes from his Herakleitean view of phenomena; but he recognises that their appearance is a fact requiring the most thorough investigation.

The position of the *Phaedo* with respect to the vexed question of predication is very interesting. In the earlier days of philosophy, for fault of adequate logical analysis, the perplexity surrounding this subject was so great that thinkers of most opposite tendencies had been forced to deny the possibility of predication altogether—at most identical propositions could be admitted. From the first Plato perceived that there could be no sound logical or metaphysical basis for a dogma which



would render reason useless and language impossible. In *Phaedo* 102 B, we have his earlier view on the subject. Whatever we predicate of an object is predicable of such object by virtue of the immanence of the idea therein; we call it by a name denoting the attribute of the idea: *τούτων τᾶλλα μεταλαμβάνοντα αὐτῶν τούτων τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν ἴσχειν*. In fact when we say 'Simmias is small', this is merely a convenient expression for 'Simmias partakes of the idea of smallness'. Accordingly the two statements 'Simmias is small', 'Simmias is great', though contradictory *ὡς τοῖς ῥήμασι λέγεται*, are not contradictory in fact; for they only signify that Simmias participates in both ideas: in comparing him to Sokrates we designate him by the *ἐπωνυμία* of *μέγεθος*, to Phaedo by that of *σμικρότης*. Moreover the expression 'Simmias is smaller than Phaedo' is only a conventional phrase signifying that the *σμικρότης* in Simmias is smaller than the *μέγεθος* in Phaedo<sup>1</sup>.

Now however superior this conception may be to that of Antisthenes and others who denied predication, it is plain that it does not really touch the vital point. The whole puzzle arose from erroneous notions about *ὄν* and *μὴ ὄν*; the copula *ἐστὶ* was conceived to denote identity and veritable existence, while *οὐκ ἐστὶ* implied absolute negation—abstract non-existence. This is the problem which is handled with such consummate skill in *Sophist* 240 B onwards. But in the *Phaedo* Plato is so far from approaching this question that he does not even betray the slightest consciousness that just herein lies the difficulty; he has in fact evaded, not solved, the *ἀπορία*. Here again the *Phaedo* ranks itself with the *Republic*. In the latter (477 A foll.) we have the division into *ὄν*, *μὴ ὄν*, and *τὸ μεταξύ*, being respectively the objects of *γνώσις*, *ἀγνωσία*, and *δόξα*. In this classification *ὄν* signifies absolute existence, *μὴ ὄν* absolute non-existence, while *τὸ μεταξύ* comprehends all phenomena. Now although a sensible object is declared to be *ἅμα ὄν τε καὶ μὴ ὄν* (478 D), this is simply because it lies *μεταξὺ τοῦ εἰλικρινῶς ὄντος καὶ τοῦ πάντως μὴ ὄντος*—it is an ambiguous semi-reality: but there is no glimmer of the significance in which Plato afterwards declares (*Sophist* 259 B) that it *πολλαχῆ μὲν ἐστὶ, πολλαχῆ δ' οὐκ ἐστὶ*. When the *Sophist* was written, he did not shrink from affirming that *τὸ ὄν, ὅσαπέρ ἐστὶ τὰ ἄλλα, κατὰ τσαῦτα οὐκ ἐστὶν. ἐκείνα γὰρ οὐκ ὄν ἐν μὲν αὐτό ἐστὶν, ἀπέραντα δὲ τὸν ἀριθμὸν τᾶλλα οὐκ ἐστὶν αὐ* (257 A). But in the *Republic* and *Phaedo* there is not the slightest evidence either that Plato had made the logical analysis which led him to this conclusion or that he was alive to the necessity of making it<sup>2</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> A confusion of course arises from the assumption of ideas of relation: but with

this we are not at present concerned.

<sup>2</sup> The difference between Plato's earlier

On this ground also then the *Phaedo* must be classed along with the *Republic* in the middle period. Which of these two dialogues was prior in order of composition is a question which I think is hardly possible to determine. Plato's voice in the *Republic* is clearer, fuller, and more confident. The ontological theory which is somewhat vaguely sketched in the *Phaedo* is in the *Republic* very precisely formulated. But this admits of a double interpretation. We may either suppose that the *Phaedo* contains as it were the first draft of a scheme which is afterwards fully matured; or else that Plato is briefly adverting to a theory which he has already thoroughly expounded. We might point to the more confident tone of the *Republic* with regard to the attainment of knowledge as arguing an advance upon the *Phaedo*: but, it must be remembered, Plato recognises in the *Timæus* that an approximation to knowledge is all for which the human intellect can hope: albeit the *Phaedo* does not strike one as intermediate between the *Republic* and *Timæus* in this respect.

The doctrine of ἀνάμνησις, though it does not occur in the *Republic*, is conspicuous in two other dialogues of the middle period, to wit the *Meno* and *Phaedrus*. It is remarkable that this thought, dormant through nearly all the later period, finally reappears, under an altered form, but still easily recognisable, in the *Timæus*.

So much for the metaphysical relations of the *Phaedo*, which enable us with perfect certainty, if we accept the theory of development which I have indicated, to assign it to the middle Platonism; in fact it constitutes, along with the *Republic*, our chief source of information upon the fundamental principles of that period. Its ethical relations are discussed in appendix I, and therefore need not here be dwelt upon: moreover they are of very slight comparative importance for our present purpose. It is absolutely impossible to fix the position of any Platonic dialogue by its ethical contents: the metaphysical significance alone constitutes the very soul of Plato's works; and this is the guide we must follow, if we would determine the order of their development.

### § 6. *Persons of the dialogue.*

(i) ECHEKRATES the Phliasian is mentioned by Diogenes Laertius (VIII 46), along with his countrymen Phanton Diokles and Polymnastos and the Chalkidian Xenophilos, as the last of the Pythagoreans. These

and later views on predication is very clearly brought out by Mr Jackson in his paper on the *Parmenides*, *Journal of Philology*, vol. XI p. 287 foll.

men, according to the same authority, were scholars of Philolaos and Eurytos, and were still alive in the time of Aristoxenos, the musician and Peripatetic, who was a contemporary of Theophrastos. An Echekrates, the son of Phrynion, is mentioned in the 9th Platonic epistle, 358 B, but there is nothing to show whether he is identical with the Echekrates of the *Phaedo*: there was, according to the catalogue given by Iamblichos, a Tarentine Pythagorean of that name; Prof. Geddes suggests that Echekrates may have been an Italian by birth who settled at Phlius; but the Phliasian occurs as a distinct person in Iamblichos' list of Pythagoreans<sup>1</sup>.

Plato's choice of Echekrates as the auditor of Phaedo's narrative is judicious. A hearer was required who should be in sympathy not only with the character and fate of Sokrates, but also with his teaching. The theory of ideas plays the most important part in the arguments ascribed to Sokrates, and none would be so likely as a Pythagorean philosopher to turn a friendly ear to this theory. The Pythagorean doctrine of numbers, as Aristotle tells us, bore a considerable resemblance to Plato's ideal theory: and we may well suppose that a due amount of *σκέψις ἐν τοῖς λόγοις* would render an intelligent Pythagorean a ready recipient of Platonism.

(ii) PHAEDO was a man of much greater note. A native of Elis, he was taken prisoner in the war waged by Sparta and Athens upon his country, B.C. 401. He is said to have been brought as a slave to Athens; but his servitude cannot have been of long duration, since in 399 we find him a member of the Sokratic circle: according to Aulus Gellius (II 18) he was ransomed by Kebes, and, in the words of Diogenes, *τοῦντεῦθεν ἐλευθερίως ἐφιλοσόφει*. He seems to have possessed genuine philosophic ability; and after the death of Sokrates he returned to his own country, where he founded the Elean school; the same which, after its transplantation by Menedemos, became better known as the Eretrian. Nothing definite seems to have been recorded regarding the views of Phaedo; but probably they bore a considerable resemblance to those of Eukleides, with whom he is classed by the satirist Timon in a passage quoted in Diog. Laert. II 107:

ἀλλ' οὐ μοι τούτων φλεδόνων μέλει· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλλου  
οὐδενός, οὐ Φαίδωνος, ὅτις γε μὲν, οὐδ' ἐριδάντεω  
Εὐκλείδου, Μεγαρεῦσιν ὃς ἔμβαλε λύσσαν ἐρισμοῦ.

<sup>1</sup> Echekrates, a Lokrian Pythagorean, one of Plato's teachers, he is obviously a different man. occurs in Cicero *de finibus* v § 87: if Cicero is correct in saying that he was



A tendency to *ἐρισμὸς* certainly characterised his Eretrian successor Menedemos. Phaedo composed dialogues, whereof the names of several are given by Diogenes Laertius II 105: of these however only two are said by Diogenes to be undoubtedly genuine, *Ζώπυρος* and *Σίμων*. A fragment from one of his works is thus translated by Seneca *epist.* XCIV 41: *minuta quaedam animalia, cum mordent, non sentiuntur: adeo tenuis illis et fallens in periculum vis est: tumor indicat morsum, et in ipso tumore nullum vulnus apparet. idem tibi in conversatione virorum sapientium eveniet: non deprehendes, quemadmodum aut quando tibi prosit, profuisse deprehendes.* The neatness of this simile would lead us to suppose that Gellius was justified in the epithet 'admodum elegantes', which he applies to Phaedo's writings.

Phaedo was evidently a special favourite with Sokrates and seems to have been highly esteemed by the other Sokratics: of whom Aischines is said to have composed a dialogue called by his name. The chronology of his life is unknown; at the death of Sokrates however he appears to have been little more than a youth.

(iii) CONCERNING APOLLODOROS of Phaleron we know little beyond what Plato has told us. He was a man of impulsive and passionate temperament, which had gained him the name of *ὁ μανικός* (cf. *Symposium* 173 D), fervently attached to Sokrates, but frequently, it would seem, not very good company to others (*Symp.* I. 1. *σαυτῷ τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀγριαίνεις πλὴν Σωκράτους*). Xenophon refers to him twice: once in *memorabilia* III xi 17, where he is said to be inseparable from Sokrates; and again in the *apology* § 28, where Xenophon again testifies to his strong affection for his master, but stigmatises him as *ἄλλως εὐήθης*. He is of no philosophical importance.

(iv) SIMMIAS was a native of Thebes, where he attended the lectures of the Pythagorean Philolaos. How long he had been a companion of Sokrates is unknown, but both he and his friend Kebes were at the time of their residence in Athens very young men (*νεανίσκων*, 89 A): afterwards he seems to have acquired a considerable reputation. He is mentioned in the *Phaedrus* 242 B: Sokrates vows that no one has caused the production of more *λόγοι*, whether composed by himself or by others, than Phaedrus; always excepting Simmias—*Σιμμίαν γὰρ ἔξαιρῶ λόγον*. In *Crito* 45 B Simmias is said to have brought to Athens a sufficient sum to effect the release of Sokrates. The meagre notice of him in Diogenes Laertius II 124 is merely a catalogue of twenty-three dialogues of which he was said to be the author. In Plutarch *de genio Socratis* § 7 Simmias is made to say that he studied philosophy at Memphis in company with Plato and Ellopion of Peparethos.

This is pretty nearly the sum total of our information concerning him.

(v) Of *KEBES* equally little is known, beyond what we learn from the *Phaedo*. Diogenes says merely Κέβης ὁ Θεβαῖος. καὶ τούτου φέρονται διάλογοι τρεῖς: Πίναξ, Ἐβδόμη, Φρύνιχος. A composition purporting to be the Πίναξ of Kebes is still extant; but there can be no doubt that it is spurious. Xenophon mentions him twice (*mem.* I ii 48, III xi 17), but adds nothing to our knowledge. He, like Simmias, offered to furnish funds to secure the release of Sokrates (*Crito* 45 B). And this is all there is to tell of him.

Yet this Theban pair, little as is known of their lives, will always be full of interest in our eyes, because of the important part they play in this dialogue. They are both alike painted as ardent lovers of philosophy, keen and eager searchers after truth. Both evidently enjoyed the esteem of Plato in a high degree; but the philosopher has succeeded with a few light and subtle touches in thoroughly individualising the two men: we cannot read the *Phaedo* without being conscious of a marked difference in their temperament. Simmias is somewhat dreamy and prone to mysticism; he is intelligent and sympathetic, but not free from vagueness; he is apt to be misled by superficial likenesses, e.g. on the subject of harmony; and he sometimes λανθάνει ἑαυτὸν οὐδὲν εἰκόν, as in 76 D. But the intellect of Kebes is bright and keen as a sword: he has an admirable faculty of seeing the point and making straight towards it; all his criticisms are definite and precise and aimed at the heart of the matter; he possesses the invaluable quality of always knowing exactly what he himself means, and he will not put up with any haziness of thought in others. He is notable for his *πραγματεία*, for tenaciously clinging to the question until it is sifted to the very bottom: he is the hardest of all mortals to convince, yet perfectly open to conviction when once a satisfactory argument has been found. It is always Kebes who at every important point influences the course of the dialogue: he gives the message from Euenos which starts the whole discussion (60 D); he insists on being told why suicide should be unlawful (61 D), and how Sokrates can welcome death without contradicting his own principles (62 C); he points out that the question of the soul's immortality must be raised (70 A); he suggests the theory of ἀνάμνησις (72 E); and finally he brings forward the objection in 87 A, which shows that he has fully grasped the previous argument in all its bearings and perceives exactly what is required for its completion. Thus every important issue turns upon some pertinent remark of Kebes. The chief contribution of Simmias is the discussion

on harmony; which is indeed a theory that must needs be debated, but which, as I have shown, does not affect the position of the demonstration; nor does it show that he has mastered the argument like his clearer-headed companion. Yet, as Sokrates says of him, οὐ φαύλως ἔοικεν ἀπτομένῳ τοῦ λόγου: he is a sincere and zealous lover of truth, and not unworthy to share the immortality which Plato has bestowed at least upon the fame of these two Theban friends.

(vi) Of a personage so well known as KRITON it is needless for me to say much: a few words concerning him will complete this account of the interlocutors. He was the oldest and dearest friend of Sokrates, a man of wealth and position and of high character. His sympathy with Sokrates was probably much more personal than intellectual; Plato's picture of him is as of a sensible and kindly man of the world, looking upon life from the point of view of an honest Athenian gentleman, but without any capacity for philosophy. Indeed, if the anecdote in *Euthydemus* 304 D foll. has any foundation on fact, he may sometimes have remonstrated with his friend for his philosophical eccentricities. Diogenes Laertius however (II 121) gives a list of seventeen dialogues attributed to him, some of which have such ambitious titles as *περὶ τῶν γυνῶναι, τί τὸ ἐπίστασθαι*: we can hardly suppose that they contributed much to the solution of these problems. Diogenes sums up the true interest of the man when he says οὗτος μάλιστα φιλοστοργότατα διετέθη πρὸς Σωκράτην, καὶ οὕτως ἐπεμελείτο αὐτοῦ, ὥστε μηδέποτε λείπειν τι τῶν πρὸς τὴν χρείαν.

(vii) The other companions of Sokrates who were with him at the last, but who do not speak, are Kritobulos, the son of Kriton; Hermogenes, son of Hipponikos, a speaker in the *Cratylus*; Epigenes, son of Antiphon; Aischines, son of Charinos a sausage-seller, or, by another account, of Lysanias; he was a noted Sokratic and the author of eight dialogues (Diog. Laert. II 64); Antisthenes, founder of the Cynics; Ktesippos, a youth introduced in the *Euthydemus*; Menexenos, son of Demophon, who gives his name to a dialogue; Phaidondes, of whom we know only that he was a Theban; Eukleides, founder of the Megarian school; and his friend Terpsion, also a Megarian. Of these all but the last three are Athenians.

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I append a list of editions of the *Phaedo* and other works of which I have made use.

Platonis	Phaedo	ed.	Wytttenbach
”	”	”	Heindorf
”	”	”	Ast
”	”	”	Geddes
”	”	”	W. Wagner
”	”		Stallbaum's edition as remodelled by Wohlrab. This is really a variorum edition, containing notes by most previous editors and by Wohlrab himself.

Platon's *Phaedon* für den Schulgebrauch erklärt von Martin  
Wohlrab.

Schanz's critical edition of the *Phaedo*.

Hirschig's       ”       ”       ”

Schleiermacher's introduction translation and notes.

Plato's *Phaedo* literally translated by E. M. Cope.

Olympiodori *Scholia* in *Phaedonem*.

Hermann Schmidt. *Kritischer Commentar zu Plato's  
Phaedon.*

Bonitz. *Platonische Studien.*

Ast. *Plato's Leben und Schriften.*

Hegel. *Geschichte der Philosophie, Plato.*

Zeller. *Philosophie der Griechen.*

Teichmüller. *Studien zur Geschichte der Begriffe, and  
Die platonische Frage.*

Schanz's critical writings on Plato's text.

Since this in no wise pretends to be a critical edition I have thought it needless to give the mss. readings in full: this would have been merely a reproduction of other men's work. For all who are interested in the text of Plato the edition of Schanz is indispensable; and the readings of other mss. are given by Stallbaum and Bekker. Remembering nevertheless how much it is to the reader's convenience that he should know exactly how far he can trust the text before him, I have drawn attention in the notes to every case in which my reading materially differs from the mss. I have also marked all noteworthy points of difference from two of the editions which are in most common use,

viz. those of Stallbaum and of the Zürich editors. Also, seeing that my text is based upon that of Schanz, I have noted all my departures from his readings. Wherever I have had occasion to refer to the four mss. quoted by him, I have adopted the symbols which he has employed to denote them; these are as follows :

B = Clarkianus sive Oxoniensis sive Bodleianus.

C = Crusianus sive Tubingensis.

D = Venetus 185.

E = Bessarionis liber sive Venetus 184.

Stallbaum and the Zürich edition are denoted by St. and Z. respectively. Where I have deserted Schanz, it has usually been in the direction of a return to the mss. The chief blemish in the text of the *Phaedo* is interpolation, which is not wonderful, considering that few products of Greek philosophy have been read more widely and less intelligently. There are no small number of instances in which words or sentences have indubitably been inserted by some copyist or annotator out of sheer inability to grasp the connexion. But this cannot justify the reckless handling of Hirschig, who cancels or rewrites passages wholesale, for no apparent reason but that they are not such Greek as he would have written himself. The result in many such cases is a deep thankfulness in the reader's soul that Plato, not Hirschig, was the author of the dialogues. Schanz, though a far sounder critic, has, I think, in several cases unduly deferred to Hirschig; and in others has himself bracketed passages without having in my opinion sufficient cause. In matters of orthography I have for the most part followed his guidance. And I cannot conclude without an expression of gratitude for the invaluable work he has given us: indeed only those who have engaged in the task of editing any of the dialogues can fully appreciate the boon which has been bestowed on Platonic students by Martin Schanz.

ΦΑΙΔΩΝ





# ΦΑΙΔΩΝ

[ἡ περὶ ψυχῆς, ἠθικός]

ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ

ΕΧΕΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΦΑΙΔΩΝ, ΑΠΟΛΛΟΔΩΡΟΣ, ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΚΕΒΗΣ,  
ΣΙΜΜΙΑΣ, ΚΡΙΤΩΝ,

Ο ΤΩΝ ΕΝΔΕΚΑ ΤΙΠΗΡΕΤΗΣ

St. p.

57

A I. Αὐτός, ὃ Φαίδων, παρεγένου Σωκράτει ἐκείνη τῇ ἡμέρᾳ, ἢ τὸ φάρμακον ἔπιεν ἐν τῷ δεσμοτηρίῳ, ἢ ἄλλου του ἤκουσας;

ΦΑΙΔ. Αὐτός, ὃ Ἐχέκρατες.

ΕΧ. Τί οὖν δὴ ἐστὶν ἅπαντα εἶπεν ὁ ἀνὴρ πρὸ τοῦ θανάτου; καὶ πῶς ἐτελεύτα; ἠδέως γὰρ ἂν ἐγὼ ἀκούσαιμι. καὶ γὰρ οὔτε τῶν 5 πολιτῶν Φλιασίων οὐδεὶς πάνν τι ἐπιχωριάζει τὰ νῦν Ἀθήναζε, B οὔτε τις ξένος ἀφίικται χρόνου συχνοῦ ἐκείθεν, ὅστις ἂν ἡμῖν σαφές

57 A—59 C, cc. i, ii. Prologue. Echekrates, the Phliasian, begs for information respecting the last moments of Sokrates. Phaedo assents, and, after explaining the circumstances which delayed the execution, gives a list of the friends who were present at that last meeting, where sorrow and gladness were so strangely mingled.

1. αὐτός] Echekrates merely desires to know whether he can depend upon the account of Phaedo as that of an eyewitness: this remark would have been needless, but for the strange comment of Hermogenes the rhetorician: ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἤρετο ὡς θαυμάζων καὶ μακαρίζων τὸν παραγενόμενον, ὁ δὲ ἀπεκρίνατο σεμνυνόμενος καὶ μέγα φρονῶν.

6. Φλιασίων] in apposition to τῶν πολιτῶν. The insertion of τῶν is alto-

gether needless; the article is continually omitted before national names by all Attic writers. Stallbaum compares *Apology* 32 B., *Meno* 70 B.

7. ὅστις ἂν] 'who would have been able to tell us'. In a phrase of this sort I conceive that no definite protasis is in the mind of the writer. I cannot see what is gained by supplying 'si venisset' with Rückert, or 'wenn er gefragt worden wäre' with Wohlrab. The words which follow show that communication between Athens and Phlius did exist, for some Athenian visitor brought the news of Sokrates' death. It seems needless therefore to speculate whether intercourse was suspended by the war with Elis (Stallbaum), which ended in the year Sokrates died; or by the Corinthian war (C. F. Hermann), which began five years

τι ἀγγεῖλαι οἷός τ' ἦν περὶ τούτων, πλήν γε δὴ ὅτι φάρμακον πῖων ἀποθάνουσι τῶν δὲ ἄλλων οὐδὲν εἶχεν φράζειν.

ΦΑΙΔ. Οὐδὲ τὰ περὶ τῆς δίκης ἄρα ἐπύθεσθε ὃν τρόπον 58 ἐγένετο;

5 ΕΧ. Ναί, ταῦτα μὲν ἡμῖν ἠγγειλέ τις, καὶ ἐθαυμάζομεν γε ὅτι πάλαι γενομένης αὐτῆς πολλῶ ὕστερον φαίνεται ἀποθανῶν. τί οὖν ἦν τοῦτο, ὦ Φαίδων;

ΦΑΙΔ. Τύχη τις αὐτῷ, ὦ Ἐχέκρατες, συνέβη· ἔτυχε γὰρ τῆ προτεραιᾶ τῆς δίκης ἢ πρύμνα ἐστεμμένη τοῦ πλοίου ὃ εἰς Δῆλον 10 Ἀθηναῖοι πέμπουσιν.

ΕΧ. Τοῦτο δὲ δὴ τί ἐστίν;

ΦΑΙΔ. Τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τὸ πλοῖον, ὡς φασιν Ἀθηναῖοι, ἐν ᾧ Θησεύς ποτε εἰς Κρήτην τοὺς δις ἑπτὰ ἐκείνους ᾤχετο ἄγων καὶ ἔσωσέ τε 15 καὶ αὐτὸς ἐσώθη. τῷ οὖν Ἀπόλλωνι εὖξαντο, ὡς λέγεται, τότε, εἰ σωθεῖεν, ἐκάστου ἔτους θεωρίαν ἀπάξειν εἰς Δῆλον· ἦν δὴ αἰεὶ καὶ νῦν ἔτι ἐξ ἐκείνου κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν τῷ θεῷ πέμπουσιν. ἐπειδὴν οὖν ἄρξωνται τῆς θεωρίας, νόμος ἐστὶν αὐτοῖς ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ τούτῳ καθαρεύειν τὴν πόλιν καὶ δημοσίᾳ μηδένα ἀποκτινύναι, πρὶν ἂν εἰς Δῆλον τε ἀφίκηται τὸ πλοῖον καὶ πάλιν δεῦρο· τοῦτο δ' ἐνίοτε 20 ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ γίγνεται, ὅταν τύχωσιν ἄνεμοι ἀπολαβόντες αὐτούς. ἀρχὴ δ' ἐστὶ τῆς θεωρίας, ἐπειδὴν ὁ ἱερεὺς τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος στέψη τὴν πρύμναν τοῦ πλοίου· τοῦτο δ' ἔτυχεν, ὡσπερ λέγω, τῆ προτεραιᾶ τῆς δίκης γεγονός. διὰ ταῦτα καὶ πολλὸς χρόνος ἐγένετο τῷ Σωκράτει ἐν τῷ δεσμοτηρίῳ ὃ μεταξὺ τῆς δίκης 25 τε καὶ τοῦ θανάτου.)

II. ΕΧ. Τί δὲ δὴ τὰ περὶ αὐτὸν τὸν θάνατον, ὦ Φαίδων; τί ἦν τὰ λεχθέντα καὶπραχθέντα, καὶ τίνες οἱ παραγεγόμενοι τῶν ἐπιτηδείων τῷ ἀνδρὶ; ἢ οὐκ εἶων οἱ ἄρχοντες παρῆναι, ἀλλ' ἔρημος ἐτελεύτα φίλων;

30 ΦΑΙΔ. Οὐδαμῶς, ἀλλὰ παρῆσάν τινες, καὶ πολλοί γε. D

ΕΧ. Ταῦτα δὴ πάντα προθυμήθητι ὡς σαφέστατα ἡμῖν ἀπαγγεῖλαι, εἰ μὴ τίς σοι ἀσχολία τυγχάνει οὔσα.

ΦΑΙΔ. Ἀλλὰ σχολάζω γε καὶ πειράσομαι ὑμῖν διηγήσασθαι·

afterwards. The events of the last day in prison were of course known but to a small circle.

6. πολλῶ ὕστερον] Thirty days: Xen. mem. IV viii 2.

13. τοὺς δις ἑπτὰ] the seven maidens

and seven youths, according to the legend, who were delivered every nine years to the Minotaur.

18. μηδένα ἀποκτινύναι] So Xenophon *l. l.*



καὶ γὰρ τὸ μεμνήσθαι Σωκράτους καὶ αὐτὸν λέγοντα καὶ ἄλλου ἀκούοντα ἔμοιγε αἰεὶ πάντων ἤδιστον.

ΕΧ. Ἄλλα μὴν, ὦ Φαίδων, καὶ τοὺς ἀκουσομένους γε τοιούτους ἐτέρους ἔχεις ἄλλα πειρῶ ὡς ἂν δύνῃ ἀκριβέστατα διεξελθεῖν πάντα.

Ε ΦΑΙΔ. Καὶ μὴν ἔγωγε θαυμάσια ἔπαθον παραγενόμενος. οὔτε γὰρ ὡς θανάτῳ παρόντα με ἀνδρὸς ἐπιτηδεῖου ἔλεος εἰσῆει εὐδαίμων γὰρ μοι ἀνὴρ ἐφαίνετο, ὦ Ἐχέκρατες, καὶ τοῦ τρόπου καὶ τῶν λόγων, ὡς ἀδεῶς καὶ γενναίως ἐτελεύτα, ὥστε μοι ἐκείνου παρίστασθαι μὴδ' εἰς Ἄιδου ἰόντα ἀνευ θείας μοίρας ἰέναι, ἀλλὰ 10 καὶ ἐκείσε ἀφικόμενον εὖ πράξειν, εἴπερ τις πώποτε καὶ ἄλλος. διὰ δὴ ταῦτα οὐδὲν πάνυ μοι ἔλεεινὸν εἰσῆει, ὡς εἰκὸς ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι παρόντι πένθει· οὔτε αὖ ἡδονὴ ὡς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ἡμῶν ὄντων, ὥσπερ εἰώθειμεν· καὶ γὰρ οἱ λόγοι τοιοῦτοί τινες ἦσαν· ἀλλ' ἀτεχνῶς ἀτοπὸν τί μοι πάθος παρῆν καὶ τίς ἀήθης κρᾶσις ἀπὸ τε 15 τῆς ἡδονῆς συγκεκραμένη ὁμοῦ καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς λύπης, ἐνθυμουμένῳ ὅτι αὐτίκα ἐκείνος ἔμελλε τελευτᾶν. καὶ πάντες οἱ παρόντες σχεδόν τι οὔτω διεκείμεθα, ὅτε μὲν γελῶντες, ἐνίοτε δὲ δακρύνοντες, εἰς δὲ ἡμῶν καὶ διαφερόντως, Ἄπολλόδωρος· οἴσθα γὰρ πού τὸν 20 ἄνδρα καὶ τὸν τρόπον αὐτοῦ.

ΕΧ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΦΑΙΔ. Ἐκεῖνός τε τοίνυν παντάπασιν οὕτως εἶχεν, καὶ αὐτὸς ἔγωγε ἐτεταράγμην καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι. *may 2*

ΕΧ. Ἐτυχον δέ, ὦ Φαίδων, τίνες παραγενόμενοι;

ΦΑΙΔ. Οὗτός τε δὴ ὁ Ἄπολλόδωρος τῶν ἐπιχωρίων παρῆν καὶ 25 ὁ Κριτόβουλος καὶ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἔτι Ἐρμογένης καὶ Ἐπιγένης καὶ Αἰσχίνης καὶ Ἀντισθένης· ἦν δὲ καὶ Κτήσιππος ὁ Παιανιεὺς

3. τοιούτους ἐτέρους] i. e. they take equal pleasure in the recollection of Sokrates: compare below 59 A καὶ γὰρ οἱ λόγοι τοιοῦτοί τινες ἦσαν, referring to ὡς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ἡμῶν ὄντων: and 79 C καὶ αὐτὴ πλανᾶται καὶ διγγυῖά ὥσπερ μεθούσα, ἅτε τοιούτων ἐφαπτομένη.

8. εὐδαίμων γάρ] Here the key-note of the dialogue is struck. Its express object is to show ὡς εἰκότως ἀνὴρ τῷ ὄντι ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διατρίψας τὸν βίον θαρρεῖ μέλλων ἀποθανεῖσθαι: and at the very outset we are introduced to Sokrates as a living illustration of his own belief.

13. παρόντι πένθει] 'as would seem natural for one who was present at a scene of mourning'. For the two datives compare *Phaedrus* 234 C τῷ λόγῳ λαμβάνοντι, 'to one who takes a rational view'.

ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ] The nearest parallel in Plato to this remarkable phrase seems to be *Protagoras* 317 C καίτοι πολλὰ γε ἡδὴ ἔτη εἰμι ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ: cf. *ibid.* 319 C, *Phaedo* 84 A, *Republic* 581 E. But in all these passages the phrase expresses devotion to some particular pursuit; not, as here, the occupation of a certain time.

25. Ἄπολλόδωρος] Compare 117 D.

καὶ Μενέξενος καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς τῶν ἐπιχωρίων Πλάτων δὲ οἶμαι ἠσθένει.

ΕΧ. Ξένοι δέ τινες παρήσαν;

ΦΑΙΔ. Ναί, Σιμμίας τέ γε ὁ Θηβαῖος καὶ Κέβης καὶ Φαι-  
5 δώδης, καὶ Μεγαρόθεν Εὐκλείδης τε καὶ Τερψίων.

ΕΧ. Τί δέ; Ἀρίστιππος καὶ Κλέομβροτος <οὐ> παρεγένοντο;

ΦΑΙΔ. Οὐ δῆτα· ἐν Αἰγίνῃ γὰρ ἐλέγοντο εἶναι.

ΕΧ. Ἄλλος δέ τις παρήν;

10 ΦΑΙΔ. Σχεδόν τι οἶμαι τούτους παραγενέσθαι.

ΕΧ. Τί οὖν δή; τίνες φῆς ἦσαν οἱ λόγοι;

III. ΦΑΙΔ. Ἐγὼ σοι ἐξ ἀρχῆς πάντα πειράσομαι διηγῆ-  
σασθαι. αἰὲ γὰρ δὴ καὶ τὰς πρόσθεν ἡμέρας εἰώθειμεν φοιτᾶν D  
καὶ ἐγὼ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι παρὰ τὸν Σωκράτη, συλλεγόμενοι ἔωθεν  
15 εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον, ἐν ᾧ καὶ ἡ δίκη ἐγένετο· πλησίον γὰρ ἦν τοῦ  
δεσμοτηρίου. περιεμένομεν οὖν ἐκάστοτε, ἕως ἀνοιχθεῖν τὸ δεσ-  
μοτήριον, διατρίβοντες μετ' ἀλλήλων· ἀνεώγετο γὰρ οὐ πρό-  
ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀνοιχθεῖν, εἰσῆμεν παρὰ τὸν Σωκράτη καὶ τὰ πολλὰ διη-  
μερούμεν μετ' αὐτοῦ. καὶ δὴ καὶ τότε πρωϊότερον συνελέγημεν.  
20 τῇ γὰρ πρωτεραία [ἡμέρα] ἐπειδὴ ἐξήλθομεν ἐκ τοῦ δεσμοτηρίου  
ἔσπερας, ἐπυθόμεθα ὅτι τὸ πλοῖον ἐκ Δήλου ἀφιγμένον εἴη. E  
παρηγγείλαμεν οὖν ἀλλήλοις ἡκειν ὡς πρωϊαίτατα εἰς τὸ εἰωθός.  
καὶ ἦκομεν καὶ ἡμῖν ἐξελθὼν ὁ θυρωρός, ὅσπερ εἰώθει ὑπακοῦναι,  
εἶπεν περιμένειν καὶ μὴ πρότερον παρίεναι, ἕως ἂν αὐτὸς κελεύσῃ

1. Πλάτων δέ] There is but one other passage in which Plato mentions himself, *Apology* 38 B; Πλάτων δὲ ὄδε, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ Κρίτων καὶ Κριτόβουλος καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρος κελεύουσί με τριάκοντα μῶν τιμῆσασθαι, αὐτοὶ δ' ἐγγυᾶσθαι. Forster suggests that the present language implies that Plato's sickness was due to excessive grief. I see nothing however to justify the inference: but doubtless Plato was anxious to explain his absence.

4. Φαιδώνδης] I have retained this form on the analogy of other Theban names and on the authority of Xenophon *mem.* I ii 48: perhaps too the Theban termination *as* should be restored.

6. <οὐ> παρεγένοντο] οὐ is not in the best mss. but is inserted by Schanz

after Cobet. St. and Z. omit it.

8. ἐν Αἰγίνῃ] This has usually been considered to convey a reproach: see Diog. Laert. III 36, cf. II 65.

59 c—60 c, c. iii. On the morning after the return of the sacred vessel from Delos the friends meet earlier than usual at the court-house near the prison. After some delay they are admitted and find Sokrates relieved of his fetters and in company with his wife and child. Xanthippe, unable to control her grief, is led out; and Sokrates chafing his cramped leg falls to moralising on the intimate union of pain and pleasure, which he says would have made a good subject for Aesop.

24. περιμένειν] This reading seems

λίουςι γάρ, ἔφη, οἱ ἔνδεκα Σωκράτη καὶ παραγγέλλουσιν ὅπως  
 ἂν τῆδε τῇ ἡμέρᾳ τελευτήσῃ. οὐ πολλὸν δ' οὖν χρόνον ἐπισχῶν  
 60 ἦκεν καὶ ἐκέλευεν ἡμᾶς εἰσιεῖναι. εἰσελθόντες οὖν κατελαμβάνομεν  
 τὸν μὲν Σωκράτη ἄρτι λελυμένον, τὴν δὲ Ξανθίππη, γιγνώσκεις  
 γάρ, ἔχουσαν τε τὸ παιδίον αὐτοῦ καὶ παρακαθημένην. ὡς οὖν 5  
 εἶδεν ἡμᾶς ἡ Ξανθίππη, ἀνευφήμησέ τε καὶ τοιαυτ' ἄττα εἶπεν,  
 οἶα δὴ εἰώθασιν αἱ γυναῖκες, ὅτι ὦ Σώκρατες, ὕστατον δὴ σε προσ-  
 ερούσι νῦν οἱ ἐπιτήδαιοι καὶ σὺ τούτους. καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης βλέψας  
 εἰς τὸν Κρίτωνα, ὦ Κρίτων, ἔφη, ἀπαγέτω τις αὐτὴν οἴκαδε. καὶ  
 Β ἐκέκινη μὲν ἀπῆγόν τινες τῶν τοῦ Κρίτωνος βοῶσαν τε καὶ κοπτο- 10  
 μένην· ὁ δὲ Σωκράτης ἀνακαθιζόμενος εἰς τὴν κλίνην συνέκαμψέ  
 τε τὸ σκέλος καὶ ἐξέτριψε τῇ χειρὶ, καὶ τρίβων ἅμα, ὡς ἄτοπον,  
 ἔφη, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἔοικέ τι εἶναι τοῦτο, ὃ καλοῦσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἡδύ·  
 ὡς θαυμασίως πέφυκε πρὸς τὸ δοκοῦν ἐναντίον εἶναι, τὸ λυπηρόν,  
 τὸ ἅμα μὲν αὐτῷ μὴ ἐθέλειν παραγίγνεσθαι τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, ἐὰν δὲ 15  
 τις διώκῃ τὸ ἕτερον καὶ λαμβάνῃ, σχεδὸν τι ἀναγκάζεσθαι λαμ-  
 βάνειν καὶ τὸ ἕτερον, ὥσπερ ἐκ μιᾶς κορυφῆς συνημμένῳ δὴ ὄντε.  
 C καὶ μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη, εἰ ἐνεόησεν αὐτὰ Αἴσωπος, μῦθον ἂν συνθεῖναι,

to me certainly right. Bonitz, quoted by Wohlrab, accurately distinguishes between the usages of *περιμένειν* and *ἐπιμένειν* in Plato: the former means 'to await', the latter 'to remain' in a given condition. Cf. below 80 c, and *Theaetetus* 179 E. So far as I am aware, the nearest approach of *ἐπιμένειν* to the meaning of *περιμένειν* is in *Republic* 361 D ὄντων δὲ τοιούτων οὐδὲν ἔτι, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, χαλεπὸν ἐπεξελεθεῖν τῷ λόγῳ, οἷος ἐκάτερον βλος ἐπιμένει. If *ἐπιμένειν* be read with Hermann, we should translate: 'he bade us stay where we were and not come in until he summoned us'.

1. *παραγγέλλουσιν*] I agree with Prof. Geddes in taking these words: 'are giving directions that he may be put to death to-day'; the directions being given to the officers of the prison. If, as is usually done, we take Sokrates to be the object of *παραγγέλλουσιν*, the clause *ὅπως ἂν...τελευτήσῃ* becomes nonsense. Wohlrab (in his Latin edition) has a note which is utterly beyond my comprehension.

5. *τὸ παιδίον*] no doubt his youngest son Menexenos.

15. *τὸ ἅμα μὲν*] The usual reading is τῷ, and this is confirmed by Stobaeus, who cites this passage, *eccl.* I 1104. This would='by refusing'. But τὸ is found in the Bodleian and two other mss. and is abundantly justified by Riddell, *digest of idioms* § 85. I have therefore followed Schanz in retaining it. 'How wondrous is the relation between pleasure and its seeming contrary, pain; that the pair will never come to a man together'.

18. *Αἴσωπος*] It is worth while here to notice the consummate skill with which Plato allows the dialogue to unfold itself as in the natural course of conversation. By this simple reference to Aesop Kebes is reminded that Euenos was anxious to know what was the object of Sokrates in versifying the fables of Aesop. In answering the question Sokrates sends a kindly message to Euenos and bids him follow to Hades as soon as he may. The surprise of Simmias at this message draws



ὡς ὁ θεὸς βουλόμενος αὐτὰ διαλλάξαι πολεμοῦντα, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἐδύνατο, συνῆψεν εἰς ταῦτὸν αὐτοῖς τὰς κορυφάς, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ᾧ ἂν τὸ ἕτερον παραγένηται ἐπακολουθεῖ ὕστερον καὶ τὸ ἕτερον. ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ αὐτῷ μοι ἔοικεν, ἐπειδὴ ὑπὸ τοῦ δεσμοῦ ἦν ἐν τῷ

5 σκέλει τὸ ἀλγεινόν, ἤκειν δὴ φαίνεται ἐπακολουθοῦν τὸ ἡδύ.

IV. Ὁ οὖν Κέβης ὑπολαβὼν Νῆ τὸν Δία, ᾧ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, εὖ γ' ἐποίησας ἀναμνήσας με. περὶ γάρ τοι τῶν ποιημάτων ὧν D πεποίηκας ἐντείνας τοὺς τοῦ Αἰσώπου λόγους καὶ τὸ εἰς τὸν Ἀπόλλω προοίμιον καὶ ἄλλοι τινές με ἤδη ἤρουντο, ἀτὰρ καὶ

10 Εὐήνος πρῶτην, ὃ τί ποτε διανοηθεῖς, ἐπειδὴ δεῦρο ἦλθες, ἐποίησας

from Sokrates an expression of his belief that the true philosopher will meet death gladly in the hope of being happier in Hades than on earth; and in support of this opinion, as we shall see, the whole argument that occupies the remainder of the dialogue is evolved.

3. ἐπακολουθεῖ ὕστερον] In these observations of Sokrates we may find the germ of the Platonic theory of pleasure as a *κατάστασις*. See for instance *Timaeus* 64 C τὸ μὲν παρὰ φύσιν καὶ βίαιον γιγνόμενον ἀθρόον παρ' ἡμῖν πάθος ἀλγεινόν, τὸ δ' εἰς φύσιν ἀπὶ πάλιν ἀθρόον ἡδύ. Cf. *Philebus* 31 D &c. The *καθαραὶ ἡδοναὶ* are exceptions, *Philebus* 51 B; but, so far as concerns physical pleasures, only apparent exceptions, *Timaeus* 65 A.

60 D—61 C, cc. iv, v. *Κέβης*: This reminds me that Euenos and others desire to know what led you to compose verses during your confinement in prison? *Sokrates*: It was not with any thought of rivalling Euenos as a poet, but because I have been frequently warned in a dream to practise 'music'. This I always understood as an encouragement to persevere with philosophy; but in case music in the popular sense might be meant, I thought it well to be on the safe side. So I took the fables of Aesop, because I knew them best, and turned them into verse. Tell this to Euenos and bid him farewell and follow me as soon as he can.

8. ἐντείνας] 'putting into verse'. The

term is used of setting words to music, *Protagoras* 326 B; of putting thought into words, *Philebus* 38 E. The last example seems to me conclusive that the notion of the word is not, as Prof. Geddes considers, derived from stretching a string, but implies fixing in a certain form or position. Cf. *Meno* 87 A, where it is used of inscribing a triangle in a circle.

9. προοίμιον] This word is applied by Thucydides, III 104, to the Homeric hymn to Apollo: such προοίμια were strictly speaking preludes either to a longer poem (*ὄμη*) or to a religious celebration. Specimens of verses attributed to Sokrates are to be found in Diog. Laert. II 42.

10. Εὐήνος] Euenos of Paros was a sophist and poet. From *Apology* 20 B we learn that he taught ἀρετὴ for five minas; from *Phaedrus* 267 A that he was the inventor of new rhetorical figures: τὸν δὲ κάλλιστον Πάριον Εὐήνον εἰς μέσον οὐκ ἄγομεν, ὃς ὑποδήλωσιν τε πρῶτος εὖρε καὶ παρεπαίνους; οἱ δ' αὐτὸν καὶ παραψόγους φασὶν ἐν μέτρῳ λέγειν, μνήμης χάριν σοφὸς γὰρ ἀνὴρ: where see Dr Thompson's note. From both passages we may infer that Plato did not think much of him. The few fragments that remain of his elegiac poems are given in Bergk's *poetae Lyrici*. Bergk however remarks 'quae hic unius Eueni nomine comprehenduntur, rectius duobus attribui videntur'; and the other epigrams, chiefly erotic, given in the Anthology under the name Euenos,

αὐτά, πρότερον οὐδὲν πάποτε ποιήσας. εἰ οὖν τί σοι μέλει τοῦ ἔχειν ἐμὲ Εὐήνω ἀποκρίνασθαι, ὅταν με αὖθις ἐρωτᾷ, εὐ οἶδα γὰρ ὅτι ἐρήσεται, εἰπέ, τί χρὴ λέγειν. Λέγε τοίνυν, ἔφη, αὐτῷ, ὦ Κέβης, τάληθῆ, ὅτι οὐκ ἐκείνω βουλόμενος οὐδὲ τοῖς ποιήμασιν  
 Ε αὐτοῦ ἀντίτεχνος εἶναι ἐποίησα ταῦτα· ἤδεν γὰρ ὡς οὐ ῥάδιον εἶη 5  
 ἀλλ' ἐνυπνίων τινῶν ἀποπειρώμενος τί λέγει, καὶ ἀφοσιούμενος, εἰ πολλάκις ταύτην τὴν μουσικὴν μοι ἐπιτάττοι ποιεῖν. Ἥ ἦν γὰρ δὴ ἅττα τοιάδε· πολλάκις μοι φοιτῶν τὸ αὐτὸ ἐνύπνιον ἐν τῷ παρελθόντι βίῳ, ἄλλοτ' ἐν ἄλλῃ ὄψει φαινόμενον, τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ λέγον, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, μουσικὴν ποιεῖ καὶ ἐργάζου. καὶ ἐγὼ 10  
 ἐν γε τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ ὅπερ ἔπραττον τοῦτο ὑπελάμβανον αὐτό  
 61 μοι παρακελεύεσθαι τε καὶ ἐπικελεύειν, ὥσπερ οἱ τοῖς θεοῦσι διακελευόμενοι, καὶ ἐμοὶ οὕτω τὸ ἐνύπνιον ὅπερ ἔπραττον τοῦτο ἐπικελεύειν, μουσικὴν ποιεῖν, ὡς φιλοσοφίας μὲν οὔσης μεγίστης μουσικῆς, ἐμοῦ δὲ τοῦτο πρᾶττοντος· νῦν δ' ἐπειδὴ ἡ τε δίκη ἐγένετο 15  
 καὶ ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐορτὴ διεκώλυέ με ἀποθνήσκειν, ἔδοξε χρῆναι, εἰ ἄρα πολλάκις μοι προστάττοι τὸ ἐνύπνιον ταύτην τὴν δημῶδη μουσικὴν ποιεῖν, μὴ ἀπειθῆσαι αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ ποιεῖν. ἀσφαλέστερον  
 Β γὰρ εἶναι μὴ ἀπιέναι πρὶν ἀφοσιώσασθαι ποιήσαντα ποιήματα καὶ πειθόμενον τῷ ἐνυπνίῳ. οὕτω δὴ πρῶτον μὲν εἰς τὸν θεόν 20

are undoubtedly the work of different authors.

5. ὡς οὐ ῥάδιον] After ὡς BD give ὅτι, which Schanz brackets and I omit.

7. εἰ πολλάκις] 'if perchance'; as in 61 A.

12. παρακελεύεσθαι τε καὶ ἐπικελεύειν] 'to urge and cheer me on'. Each of the three compounds used by Plato in this passage has its distinct shade of meaning. παρακελεύεσθαι, which is the term frequently applied by Thucydides to a general's address to his soldiers, means 'urge to make an effort'; ἐπικελεύειν, which is a much rarer word and occurs nowhere else in Plato, 'encourage while the effort is being made'; as in Euripides *Electra* 1224. In διακελευόμενοι the preposition has a distributive force: 'as the partisans of different runners cheer on their favourites'. Cf. Herodotus IX 5 διακελευσαμένη δὲ γυνὴ γυναικί.

14. ὡς φιλοσοφίας μὲν οὔσης τῆς με-

γίστης μουσικῆς] Wagner well quotes *Laches* 188 c foll. See also *Latws* 689 D ἡ καλλιστὴ καὶ μεγίστη τῶν ξυμφωνιῶν μεγίστη δικαιοτάτ' ἂν λέγοιτο σοφία. Cf. *Republic* 411 c foll., 548 B διὰ τὸ τῆς ἀληθινῆς Μούσης τῆς μετὰ λόγων τε καὶ φιλοσοφίας ἡμεληκέναι.

17. τὴν δημῶδη μουσικὴν] in the ordinary Greek sense of artistic and literary culture; whereas Sokrates understood by μουσικὴ the philosophic life.

19. ἀφοσιώσασθαι] 'to satisfy my conscience'. This anecdote well displays the simply religious character of Sokrates not without a tinge of superstition. ἀφοσιώσασθαι is to clear oneself from all taint of impiety; cf. *Phaedrus* 242 c; *Philebus* 12 B ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἀφοσιῶμαι, 'I wash my hands of it'.

20. καὶ πειθόμενον] Schanz brackets καί.

εἰς τὸν θεόν] Another mark of Sokrates' old-fashioned piety. Prof.

ἐποίησα, οὐ ἦν ἡ παροῦσα θυσία· μετὰ δὲ τὸν θεόν, ἐννοήσας ὅτι τὸν ποιητὴν δέοι, εἴπερ μέλλοι ποιητῆς εἶναι, ποιεῖν μύθους, ἀλλ' οὐ λόγους, καὶ αὐτὸς οὐκ ἦ μυθολογικός, διὰ ταῦτα δὴ οὖς προχέιρους εἶχον μύθους καὶ ἠπιστάμην τοὺς Αἰσώπου, τούτους ἐποίησα, 5 οἷς πρώτοις ἐνέτυχον.

V. Ταῦτα οὖν, ὦ Κέβης, Εὐήνω φράζε, καὶ ἐρρώσθαι καί, ἂν σωφρονῆ, ἐμὲ διώκειν ὡς τάχιστα. ἄπειμι δέ, ὡς ἔοικε, τήμερον. C κελεύουσι γὰρ Ἀθηναῖοι. καὶ ὁ Σιμμίας, Οἶον παρακελεύει, ἔφη, τοῦτο, ὦ Σώκρατες, Εὐήνω; πολλὰ γὰρ ἦδη ἐντετύχηκα τῷ ἀνδρὶ 10 σχεδὸν οὖν ἐξ ὧν ἐγὼ ἦσθημαι οὐδ' ὀπωστιοῦν σοι ἐκὼν εἶναι

Geddes has some interesting remarks on the special connexion between Sokrates and Apollo, cf. 85 A. I cannot however agree with his suggestion that the *προοίμιον* was a thanksgiving for the thirty days' reprieve; which would be totally inconsistent with the attitude of Sokrates in the face of death: cf. 116 E.

2. μύθους ἀλλ' οὐ λόγους] 'fiction' and not fact'. This distinction is established by *Gorgias* 523 A, ἄκουε δὴ, φασί, μάλα καλοῦ λόγου, ἐν σὺ μὲν ἠγγήσει μῦθον, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ἐγὼ δὲ λόγον· ὡς ἀληθῆ γὰρ ὄντα σοι λέξω ἃ μέλλω λέγειν; then follows the myth about the judgment of souls; cf. *Laws* 872 D. μῦθος is defined by Aphthonios, quoted by Wytténbach, as λόγος ψευδῆς εἰκονίζων ἀλήθειαν. Plutarch, *de gloria Atheniensium* § 4, says that Pindar was rebuked by Korinna, ὡς ἄμουνσον ὄντα καὶ μὴ ποιῶντα μύθους, ὃ τῆς ποιητικῆς ἔργον εἶναι συμβέβηκε; further on he says ὃ δὲ μῦθος εἶναι βούλεται λόγος ψευδῆς ἔοικώς ἀληθινῷ. Compare Aristotle's distinction between *ἱστορία* and *ποίησις*, *poetica* 1451<sup>b</sup> 4, τούτῳ διαφέρει τῷ τὸν μὲν τὰ γενόμενα λέγειν τὸν δὲ οἷα ἂν γένοιτο. Of course λόγος in its wider sense includes *mῦθος*, as we have in 60 D τοὺς τοῦ Αἰσώπου λόγους.

3. οὓς προχέιρους εἶχον] i. e. in his memory; there is no evidence that the fables of Aesop had been published in writing up to this time. Aesop is said to have been a contemporary of Solon; and

the story of his death is told by Plutarch, *de sera numinis vindicta* § 12: there is also an allusion to it in Herodotus II 134.

7. ἐμὲ διώκειν ὡς τάχιστα] This injunction must be considered as modified by the proviso added below, οὐ μέντοι γ' ἕως βιάσεται αὐτόν. Schmidt finds a 'dilogia' in the words, and Prof. Geddes takes the same view. But it appears to me that such a premature reference to the *μελέτη θανάτου* is thoroughly unplatonic. It is futile to omit the words ὡς τάχιστα with Heindorf; in any case they must be implied, else we make Sokrates give Euenos the superfluous advice to die some time or other.

61 C—62 C, cc. v, vi. *Simmias*: Euenos is not likely to take such advice as that. *Sokrates*: Yes he is, if he is a real philosopher; not that he ought to take his own life. *Kebes*: This seems inconsistent; you first say that the philosopher will be glad to die, and then that he may not kill himself: why may he not? *Sokrates*: I only know what I have been told. According to one account we are in custody here and may not make our escape. This is a hard saying; but there is a more obvious reason, that we are the property of the gods, who are as justly indignant if we destroy ourselves as you would be, should one of your slaves do so.



πίσεται. Τί δέ; ἢ δ' ὅς' οὐ φιλόσοφος Εὐήνος; Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας. Ἐθελήσει τοίνυν καὶ Εὐήνος καὶ πᾶς ὅτῳ ἀξίως τούτου τοῦ πράγματος μέτεστιν. οὐ μέντοι ἴσως βιάσεται αὐτόν· οὐ γὰρ φασὶ θεμιτὸν εἶναι. καὶ ἅμα λέγων ταῦτα καθήκε τὰ  
 D σκέλη ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν, καὶ καθεζόμενος οὕτως ἤδη τὰ λοιπὰ διελέγετο. 5  
 ἤρετο οὖν αὐτὸν ὁ Κέβης· Πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ μὴ θεμιτὸν εἶναι ἑαυτὸν βιάζεσθαι, ἐθέλειν δ' ἂν τῷ ἀποθνήσκουσι τὸν φιλόσοφον ἔπεσθαι; Τί δέ, ὦ Κέβης; οὐκ ἀκηκόατε σύ τε καὶ Σιμμίας περὶ τῶν τοιούτων Φιλολάῳ συγγεγονότες; Οὐδέν γε σαφῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες. Ἄλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἐγὼ ἐξ ἀκοῆς περὶ αὐτῶν 10 λέγω· ἃ μὲν οὖν τυγχάνω ἀκηκόως, φθόνος οὐδεὶς λέγειν. καὶ γὰρ E ἴσως καὶ μάλιστα πρέπει μέλλοντα ἐκείσε ἀποδημεῖν διασκοπεῖν τε καὶ μυθολογεῖν περὶ τῆς ἀποδημίας τῆς ἐκεῖ, ποῖαν τιὰ αὐτὴν οἴομεθα εἶναι· τί γὰρ ἂν τις καὶ ποιοῖ ἄλλο ἐν τῷ μέχρι ἡλίου δυσμῶν χρόνῳ;

VI. Κατὰ τί δὴ οὖν ποτε οὐ φασὶ θεμιτὸν εἶναι αὐτὸν ἑαυτὸν ἀποκτινύναι, ὦ Σώκρατες; ἤδη γὰρ ἔγωγε, ὅπερ νῦν δὴ σὺ ἤρου, καὶ Φιλολάου ἤκουσα, ὅτε παρ' ἡμῖν διητᾶτο, ἤδη δὲ καὶ ἄλλων 15

3. τούτου τοῦ πράγματος] Sc. φιλοσοφίας.

4. οὐ γὰρ φασὶ] It is worthy of note that the whole of this rather superficial reasoning against suicide, which is quite outside the main argument of the dialogue, is carefully and repeatedly marked as secondhand. It seems as if Plato wished to avoid any prejudice and misrepresentation which his panegyric of death might bring upon him; while his slight and rapid treatment of this subject would show that he did not feel strongly upon it. That he did not in all cases disapprove suicide is certain: cf. *Laws* 854 C καὶ ἐὰν μὲν σοὶ δρῶντι ταῦτα λωφᾶ τι τὸ νόσημα—εἰ δὲ μή, καλλίω θάνατον σκεψάμενος ἀπαλλάττου τοῦ βίου. Also 873 C ὅς ἂν ἑαυτὸν κτείνῃ, μήτε πόλεως ταξάσης δίκῃ, μήτε περιωδύνῃ ἀφύκτῳ προσπεσούσῃ τύχῃ ἀναγκασθεῖς, μηδὲ ἀσχύνης τινὸς ἀπόρου καὶ ἀβίου μεταλαχῶν, ἀργία δὲ καὶ ἀνανδρίας δειλία ἑαυτῷ δίκην ἀδικον ἐπιθῆ.

9. Φιλολάῳ] From this it is evident that Philolaos spent some time at Thebes,

where Kebes and Simmias attended his lectures. We have absolutely no authentic information about the life of this eminent Pythagorean; and the genuineness of the fragments ascribed to him has, I think, been once for all disposed of by Mr Bywater, *Journal of Philology* vol. I p. 21 foll.

οὐδέν γε σαφῶς] ἔθος ἦν τοῖς Πυθαγορείοις δι' ἀνιγμάτων λέγειν, says Olympiodoros, whom the editors all repeat. I think Plato's meaning is that the arguments of Philolaos against suicide were not conclusive enough to satisfy the *πραγματεία* of Kebes.

12. διασκοπεῖν τε καὶ μυθολογεῖν] This is an accurate description of the conversation that is to come: when reason has done all she can, fancy comes to her aid with a myth.

13. τῆς ἐκεῖ] Schanz brackets these words: Hirschig proposes ἐκείσε.

14. μέχρι ἡλίου δυσμῶν] before which execution was not legal; cf. 116 E.

τινῶν, ὡς οὐ δέοι τοῦτο ποιεῖν· σαφὲς δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν οὐδενὸς  
 πώποτε οὐδὲν ἀκήκοα. Ἄλλὰ προθυμείσθαι χρὴ, ἔφη· τάχα γὰρ 62  
 ἂν καὶ ἀκούσαις. Ἰσως μέντοι θαυμαστὸν σοι φανέεται, εἰ τοῦτο  
 μόνον τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων ἀπλοῦν ἐστὶν καὶ οὐδέποτε τυγχάνει  
 5 τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, ὥσπερ καὶ τᾶλλα, ἐστὶν ὅτε καὶ οἷς βέλτιον τεθνάναι  
 ἢ ζῆν, οἷς δὲ βέλτιον τεθνάναι, θαυμαστὸν ἴσως σοι φανέεται, εἰ  
 τοῦτοις τοῖς ἀνθρώποις μὴ ὅσιον αὐτοὺς ἑαυτοὺς εὖ ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ  
 ἄλλον δεῖ περιμένειν εὐεργέτην. καὶ ὁ Κέβης ἠρέμα ἐπιγελάσας,  
 Ἰττω Ζεὺς, ἔφη, τῇ αὐτοῦ φωνῇ εἰπών.† Καὶ γὰρ ἂν δόξειεν, ἔφη.  
 10 ὁ Σωκράτης, οὕτω γ' εἶναι ἄλογον· οὐ μέντοι ἀλλ' ἴσως γ' ἔχει Β

3. εἰ τοῦτο μόνον] Of this *locus vexatus* I shall first give my own interpretation before mentioning other views that are held upon it. I accept the text precisely as it stands without alteration or omission. The first thing to be done is to fix the meaning of *τοῦτο*. It can hardly be doubted that *τοῦτο* means here exactly what it does in 62 C, ἀλλ' εἰκός, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, τοῦτο γε φαίνεται: where the context clearly requires that *τοῦτο* = μὴ θεμιτὸν εἶναι αὐτὸν ἑαυτὸν ἀποκτινύναι. Taking it in that sense here I should translate: 'perhaps you will be surprised if this question alone of all admits a simple answer—if the same thing does not happen to man in this as in all other cases; I mean that to some men at some time death is better than life: and for whom death is better, you will perhaps think it strange that they may not do themselves a good turn but must wait for some other helper'. I conceive the clause *καὶ οὐδέποτε...ζῆν* to show how it is that the question is not ἀπλοῦν. Unless death were sometimes better than life the question whether suicide were sometimes lawful would never be raised, for no one would dream of committing it. ὥσπερ καὶ τᾶλλα, i.e. as in other cases either of two opposites may be better according to circumstances. The whole sentence amounts to this: you will think it strange if in the case of suicide we can lay down an invariable rule; that there are no persons for whom it is better

to die than live; and if there are, that they may not release themselves from life.

Mr Jackson, in a paper read before the Cambridge Philological Society Dec. 1, 1881, has a most searching examination of this passage. Understanding *τοῦτο* as I do, he is of opinion that the clauses *καὶ οὐδέποτε τυγχάνει...ζῆν* and *θαυμαστὸν ἴσως...ἀνθρώποις* are interpolations. My interpretation, which differs from all those that he criticises, seems to me to meet many of his objections; and though I am far from affirming that he may not be right in rejecting these words, I am loth to do so when I believe they afford a reasonable sense. As regards certain phrases to which he objects, I think *οὐδέποτε* is simply in antithesis to *ἐστὶν ὅτε*; and may we not with Mr Cope translate *τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ* 'mankind', a universal expression which is afterwards qualified by *ἐστὶν οἷς*?

Prof. Geddes has an elaborate note, but I am entirely unable to agree with his view. He seems to regard *καὶ οὐδέποτε* as beginning an independent sentence. There is no difficulty about *οὐ* after *θαυμάσιον εἰ*, cf. 97 A.

Schanz places a full stop after *τᾶλλα* and inserts *ἀλλὰ* before *ἐστὶν*. If the text is to be altered, I should prefer Mr Jackson's plan.

7. μὴ ὅσιον] Z. and St. add *ἐστὶν*, which is wanting in B pr. m.

9. Ἰττω Ζεὺς] This little provincialism was doubtless a favourite mode of em-

τινὰ λόγον. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἐν ἀπορρήτοις λεγόμενος περὶ αὐτῶν λόγος ὡς ἔν τιμι φρουρᾷ ἔσμεν οἱ ἄνθρωποι καὶ οὐ δεῖ δὴ ἑαυτὸν ἐκ ταύτης λύειν οὐδ' ἀποδιδράσκειν, μέγας τέ τίς μοι φαίνεται καὶ οὐ ῥάδιος διδεῖν· οὐ μέντοι ἀλλὰ τὸδε γέ μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Κέβης, εὖ λέγεσθαι, τὸ θεοὺς εἶναι ἡμῶν τοὺς ἐπιμελουμένους καὶ ἡμᾶς τοὺς 5 ἀνθρώπους ἐν τῶν κτημάτων τοῖς θεοῖς εἶναι· ἢ σοὶ οὐ δοκεῖ οὕτως;

C "Εμοιγε, φησὶν ὁ Κέβης. Οὐκοῦν, ἦ δ' ὅς, καὶ σὺ ἂν τῶν σαυτοῦ κτημάτων εἴ τι αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ ἀποκτινύοι, μὴ σημήναντός σου ὅτι βούλει αὐτὸ τεθάναι, χαλεπαίνεις ἂν αὐτῷ, καὶ εἴ τινα ἔχοις τιμωρίαν, τιμωροῖο ἄν; Πάνυ γ', ἔφη. Ἴσως τοίνυν ταύτη οὐκ 10 ἄλογον, μὴ πρότερον αὐτὸν ἀποκτινύναι δεῖν, πρὶν ἀνάγκην τινὰ θεὸς ἐπιπέμψῃ, ὥσπερ καὶ τὴν νῦν ἡμῖν παροῦσαν.

VII. Ἄλλ' εἰκός, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, τοῦτό γε φαίνεται. ὁ μέντοι

phasis with Kebes, and well known to his friends as characteristic.

1. ἐν ἀπορρήτοις] The ancient commentators explain that the Orphic traditions are meant. This seems more probable than any reference to the Eleusinian mysteries.

2. ἐν τιμι φρουρᾷ] 'in ward'. We might translate 'on a sort of garrison duty', following Cicero, *Cato maior* 20: vetatque Pythagoras iniussu imperatoris, id est dei, de praesidio et statione vitae decedere. But the common Pythagorean notion was that the body is the soul's prison, whence she may not come forth until her term is fulfilled: compare Athenaeus IV xlv 157 C πρὸς ἣν ὁ Καρνεῖος ἔφη, Εὐξίθεος ὁ πυθαγορικός, ὦ Νίκιον, ὡς φησι Κλέαρχος ὁ περιπατητικός ἐν δευτέρῳ βίῳ, ἔλεγεν ἐνδεδεσθαι τῷ σώματι καὶ τῷ τῆδε βίῳ τὰς ἀπάντων ψυχὰς τιμωρίας χάριν, καὶ διεῖπασθαι τὸν θεὸν ὡς, εἰ μὴ μενοῦσιν ἐπὶ τούτοις ἕως ἂν ἐκὼν αὐτοὺς λύσῃ, πλέοσι καὶ μείζοσι ἐμπεσοῦνται τότε λύμαις. διὸ πάντας εὐλαβουμένους τῆν τῶν κυρίων ἀνάτασιν φοβεῖσθαι τοῦ ζῆν ἐκόντας ἐκβῆναι μόνον τε τὸν ἐν τῷ γήρα θάνατον ἀσπασίως πρόστασθαι, πεπεισμένους τὴν ἀπόλυσιν τῆς ψυχῆς μετὰ τῆς τῶν κυρίων γίνεσθαι γνώμης. Cf. *Phaedrus* 250 C, with Dr Thompson's note; *Cratylus* 400 C, *Gorgias* 493 A.

4. οὐ ῥάδιος διδεῖν] 'not easy to see through'. Sokratic *είρωνεια*: evidently he does not think this theory worth much. Olympiodoros, with perhaps unconscious sarcasm, observes *ἀνάγκη οὖν μῶσαι τὸν μέλλοντα θεάσασθαι αὐτόν*.

6. ἐν τῶν κτημάτων] Cf. *Laws* 90B A ξύμμαχοι δὲ ἡμῖν θεοὶ τε ἅμα καὶ δαίμονες, ἡμεῖς τ' αὖ κτήματα θεῶν καὶ δαιμόνων: also 90B. Elsewhere man is called the plaything of the gods: *Laws* 803 C ἄνθρωπον δέ, ὅπερ εἴπομεν ἐμπροσθεν (644 D, E), θεοῦ τι παίγιον μεμηχανημένον, τοῦτο αὐτοῦ τὸ βέλτιστον γυγόνενα.

11. πρὶν ἀνάγκην] Although ἂν may very easily have dropped out before ἀνάγκην, I have not thought proper to insert it against all the mss. I am not satisfied that Plato could not write πρὶν alone with the subjunctive; and in *Timaeus* 57 B it is not easy to account for the loss of ἂν: λυόμενα οὐ παύεται, πρὶν ἢ παντάπασιν ὠθούμενα καὶ διαλυθέντα ἐκφύγη πρὸς τὸ ξυγγενές, ἢ νικηθέντα, ἐν ἐκ πολλῶν ὁμοιον τῶν κρατήσαντι γενόμενον, αὐτοῦ ξύνουκον μείνη. Cf. *Laws* 873 A.

62 C—63 E, cc. vii, viii. If this be so, replies Kebes, it seems inconsistent to say that the wise man will be glad to die. For only a fool would desire to run away from wise and good masters and guardians, such as the gods are to us.



νῦν δὴ ἔλεγες, τὸ τοὺς φιλοσόφους ῥαδίως ἂν ἐθέλειν ἀποθνήσκειν,  
 ἔοικεν τοῦτο, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀτόπῳ, εἴπερ ὁ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν εὐλόγως D  
 ἔχει, τὸ θεὸν τε εἶναι τὸν ἐπιμελούμενον ἡμῶν καὶ ἡμᾶς ἐκείνου  
 κτήματα εἶναι. τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν τοὺς φρονιμωτάτους ἐκ  
 5 ταύτης τῆς θεραπείας ἀπιόντας, ἐν ᾗ ἐπιστατοῦσιν αὐτῶν οὔπερ  
 ἄριστοὶ εἰσιν τῶν ὄντων ἐπιστάται θεοί, οὐκ ἔχει λόγον. οὐ γάρ  
 πον αὐτὸς γε αὐτοῦ οἶται ἄμεινον ἐπιμελήσεσθαι ἐλεύθερος γενό-  
 μενος· ἀλλ' ἀνόητος μὲν ἄνθρωπος τάχ' ἂν οἰηθείη ταῦτα, φευκτέον  
 εἶναι ἀπὸ τοῦ δεσπότου, καὶ οὐκ ἂν λογιζοίτο ὅτι οὐ δεῖ ἀπὸ γε E  
 10 τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φεύγειν, ἀλλ' ὅ τι μάλιστα παραμένειν, διὸ ἀλογίστως  
 ἂν φεύγοι, ὁ δὲ νοῦν ἔχων ἐπιθυμοῖ που ἂν αἰεὶ εἶναι παρὰ τῷ  
 αὐτοῦ βελτίονι. καίτοι οὕτως, ὦ Σώκρατες, τούναντίον εἶναι εἰκὸς  
 ἢ ὁ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγετο· τοὺς μὲν γὰρ φρονίμους ἀγανακτεῖν ἀποθνή-  
 σκοντας πρέπει, τοὺς δὲ ἄφρονας χαίρειν. ἀκούσας οὖν ὁ Σωκράτης  
 15 ἤσθηναί τε μοι ἔδοξε τῇ τοῦ Κέβητος πραγματείᾳ, καὶ ἐπιβλέψας B3  
 εἰς ἡμᾶς Ἀεὶ τοι, ἔφη, ὁ Κέβης λόγους τινὰς ἀνερευνᾶ, καὶ οὐ πᾶν  
 εὐθέως ἐθέλει πείθεσθαι ὅ τι ἂν τις εἴπῃ. Καὶ ὁ Σιμμίας Ἀλλὰ  
 μὴν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, νῦν γέ μοι δοκεῖ τι καὶ αὐτῷ λέγειν Κέβης·  
 τί γὰρ ἂν βουλόμενοι ἄνδρες σοφοὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς δεσπότας ἀμείνους  
 20 αὐτῶν φεύγοιεν καὶ ῥαδίως ἀπαλλάττοιεν αὐτῶν; καὶ μοι δοκεῖ  
 Κέβης εἰς σὲ τείνειν τὸν λόγον, ὅτι οὕτω ῥαδίως φέρεις καὶ ἡμᾶς  
 ἀπολείπων καὶ ἄρχοντας ἀγαθούς, ὡς αὐτὸς ὁμολογεῖς, θεούς. B

To this Simmias agrees, and upbraids Sokrates for being too ready to leave his friends. Well then, answers Sokrates, since I am thus arraigned, I must try to defend myself before you more persuasively than I did before the jury. As he is beginning his defence he is interrupted by Kriton: the attendant, says he, has been warning me that talking is apt to hinder the operation of the poison. Never mind, replies Sokrates; only let him be prepared to repeat the potion as often as may be required.

3. τὸ θεόν τε εἶναι] Sokrates had used the plural, as Kebes himself does directly afterwards. Plato, when he uses the word popularly, without any metaphysical significance, seems to employ θεός or θεοὶ indifferently.

8. φευκτέον εἶναι ἀπὸ τοῦ δεσπότου]

Schanz brackets these words.

15. πραγματείᾳ] 'insistence'. The word is used in a somewhat unusual manner here. Plato frequently denotes by it a pursuit followed with care and earnestness, generally philosophy, but sometimes the ordinary business of life, as in *Republic* 500 C. Compare πραγματεῖώδη παιδίον, *Parmenides* 137 B.

16. λόγους τινὰς ἀνερευνᾶ] 'he is always hunting for some principle or other'.

19. ἄνδρες σοφοὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς should be taken together.

21. εἰς σὲ τείνειν τὸν λόγον] Olympiodoros remarks, not without acuteness, ἀναφαίνεται ἐντεῦθεν ὅτι τελειώτερος Κέβης Σιμμίου, because Kebes raises a universal question, while Simmias συνάγει ἐπὶ τοῦ Σωκράτους.

Δίκαια, ἔφη, λέγετε. οἶμαι γὰρ ὑμᾶς λέγειν ὅτι χρή με πρὸς ταῦτα ἀπολογήσασθαι ὡσπερ ἐν δικαστηρίῳ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας.

¶ VIII. Φέρε δὴ, ἢ δ' ὅς, πειραθῶ πιθανώτερον πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἀπολογήσασθαι ἢ πρὸς τοὺς δικαστάς. ἐγὼ γάρ, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία 5 τε καὶ Κέβης, εἰ μὲν μὴ ᾧμην ἤξειν πρῶτον μὲν παρὰ θεοὺς ἄλλους σοφοὺς τε καὶ ἀγαθοὺς, ἔπειτα καὶ παρ' ἀνθρώπους τετελετηκότας ἀμείνους τῶν ἐνθάδε, ἠδίκουν ἂν οὐκ ἀγανακτῶν τῷ θανάτῳ· νῦν C δὲ εὖ ἴστε ὅτι παρ' ἄνδρας τε ἐλπίζω ἀφίξεσθαι ἀγαθοὺς· καὶ τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ἂν πάνυ δυσχυρισαίμην ὅτι μέντοι παρὰ θεοὺς 10 δεσπότας πάνυ ἀγαθοὺς ἤξειν, εὖ ἴστε ἔτι, εἴπερ τι ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων, δυσχυρισαίμην ἂν καὶ τοῦτο. ὥστε διὰ ταῦτα οὐχ ὕπως ἀγανακτῶ, ἀλλ' εὐελπίς εἰμι εἶναι τι τοῖς τετελετηκόσι καί, ὡσπερ γε καὶ πάλαι λέγεται, πολλὸν ἀμεινὸν τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ἢ τοῖς 15 κακοῖς. Τί οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, ὦ Σώκρατες; αὐτὸς ἔχων τὴν D διάνοιαν ταύτην ἐν νῷ ἔχεις ἀπιέναι, ἢ καὶν ἡμῖν μεταδοίης; κοινὸν γάρ δὴ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ καὶ ἡμῖν εἶναι ἀγαθὸν τοῦτο, καὶ ἅμα σοι ἀπολογία ἔσται, ἐὰν ἄπερ λέγεις ἡμᾶς πείσης. Ἄλλὰ πειράσομαι, ἔφη. πρῶτον δὲ Κρίτωνα τόνδε σκεψώμεθα, τί ἐστὶν ὃ βούλεσθαι μοι δοκεῖ πάλαι εἰπεῖν. Ἔτι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη ὁ Κρίτων, ἄλλο γε 20 ἢ πάλαι μοι λέγει ὁ μέλλον σοι δώσειν τὸ φάρμακον, ὅτι χρή

6. παρὰ θεοὺς ἄλλους] Sokrates follows the popular distinction between the οὐράνιοι and χθόνιοι θεοί. Mr Cope translates 'in the company not only of Gods wise and good, but next also of men'. I think however the meaning is settled by *Λατος* 958 D τὰ μὲν περὶ τὰ θεῖα νόμιμα τῶν τε ὑπὸ γῆς θεῶν καὶ τῶν τῆδε: and soon afterwards, 959 B, we have exactly the same phrase as here; παρὰ θεοὺς ἄλλους ἀπιέναι δώσοντα λόγον, where θεοὺς ἄλλους can only mean 'other gods'.

9. παρ' ἄνδρας τε] The proper apodosis to the τε has been displaced by the parenthesis καὶ τοῦτο.....δυσχυρισαίμην, which modifies the form of the succeeding clause. The meaning of the parenthesis seems to be that Sokrates does not feel sure enough as to the exact condition of souls after death to make any positive

statement about their association with one another: all he is quite sure of is that, whatever their condition, they are under the care of good and wise gods.

11. ἤξειν] We cannot supply ἐλπίζω, because Sokrates is confident that he will be in the company of gods, not that he hopes to be. But the infinitive construction is carried on from the previous sentence, although the particular force of the governing verb is no longer appropriate. Perhaps however Schanz is right in bracketing ἤξειν.

14. πάλαι λέγεται] in the current traditions of Greek religion.

15. αὐτὸς ἔχων] 'are you minded to depart keeping this persuasion to yourself?'

19. πρῶτον δὲ Κρίτωνα] This little episode serves to mark the conclusion of the introductory matter.

σοι φράζειν ὡς ἐλάχιστα διαλέγεσθαι; φησὶ γὰρ θερμαίνεσθαι μᾶλλον διαλεγόμενους, δεῖν δὲ οὐδὲν τοιοῦτον προσφέρειν τῷ φαρμάκῳ· εἰ δὲ μή, ἐνίοτε ἀναγκάζεσθαι καὶ δις καὶ τρίς πίνειν τοὺς ἑταίρους τοιοῦτον ποιοῦντας. καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, Ἔα, ἔφη, χαίρειν αὐτόν· 5 ἀλλὰ μόνον τὸ ἑαυτοῦ παρασκευαζέτω ὡς καὶ δις δώσων, εἰ δὲ δέη, καὶ τρίς. Ἄλλὰ σχεδὸν μὲν τι ἤδη, ἔφη ὁ Κρίτων· ἀλλὰ μοι [πάλαι] πράγματα παρέχει. Ἔα αὐτόν, ἔφη. ἀλλ' ὑμῖν δὴ τοῖς δικασταῖς βούλομαι ἤδη τὸν λόγον ἀποδοῦναι, ὡς μοι φαίνεται εἰκότως ἀνὴρ τῷ ὄντι ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διατρίψας τὸν βίον θαρρεῖν 10 μέλλων ἀποθανεῖσθαι καὶ εὐελπὶς εἶναι ἐκεῖ μέγιστα οἴσσεσθαι ἀγαθὰ, ἐπειδὴν τελευτήσῃ· πῶς ἂν οὖν δὴ τοῦθ' οὕτως ἔχοι, ὦ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβησ, ἐγὼ πειράσομαι φράσαι.

IX. Κινδυνεύουσι γὰρ ὅσοι τυγχάνουσιν ὀρθῶς ἀπτόμενοι φιλοσοφίας λεληθέναι τοὺς ἄλλους, ὅτι οὐδὲν ἄλλο αὐτοὶ ἐπιτη- 15 δεύουσιν ἢ ἀποθνήσκειν τε καὶ τεθνάναι. εἰ οὖν τοῦτο ἀληθές, ἀτοπον δήπου ἂν εἴη προθυμείσθαι μὲν ἐν παντὶ τῷ βίῳ μηδὲν

5. τὸ ἑαυτοῦ is needlessly bracketed by Schanz.

7. [πάλαι] The mss. are uncertain about this word, which Schanz brackets. Z. and St. retain it.

63 E—64 A. After the interruption Sokrates restates the thesis which he has to defend: that the philosopher will meet death with good courage, in the confident hope that he will enjoy the greatest blessings in the other world.

8. ὡς μοι φαίνεται] At this point the main business of the dialogue begins: all that precedes has been merely preparatory to this thesis, and all that follows is logically evolved in its defence.

64 A—67 B, cc. ix—xi. The philosopher's whole life is nothing else than the study and practice of death; how then shall he be dismayed when that comes for which he has always been striving? This paradox is explained as follows. First we define death as the state of separation of soul and body. Now the philosopher's aim is the attainment of knowledge and wisdom. But the body is for ever thwarting his endeavours; (1)

by its pleasures and appetites, (2) by the intrusion of sensual perceptions, (3) by its weaknesses and maladies. All these hinder the free action of the soul and prevent her from gazing calmly on the truth. Accordingly so long as the soul is in union with the body, she can never attain to perfect wisdom; only death, by setting her free, enables her, if ever, to reach the truth. But the true philosopher will do all he can during life to anticipate this condition: he will withdraw his soul, so far as may be, from all communion with the body: its pleasures and pains he will scorn, its perceptions he will ignore; and so when the hour of release arrives the soul will be pure and unsullied by material taint; she will be fit to enjoy the free life of intelligence that is now before her.

15. ἀποθνήσκειν τε καὶ τεθνάναι] 'dying and being dead'. ἀποθνήσκειν represents the philosophic training, the gradual emancipation of the soul from bodily passions; τεθνάναι the perfected philosophic *εἶς*, the complete independence of soul, so far as is permitted by the conditions of corporeal life.



ἄλλο ἢ τοῦτο, ἤκουτος δὲ δὴ αὐτοῦ ἀγανακτεῖν, ὃ πάλαι προεθυ-  
 μουντό τε καὶ ἐπετήδευον. καὶ ὁ Σιμμίας γελάσας Νῆ τὸν Δία,  
 B ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐ πάνυ γέ με νῦν δὴ γελασεῖοντα ἐποίησας  
 γελάσαι. οἶμαι γὰρ ἂν τοὺς πολλοὺς αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀκούσαντας  
 δοκεῖν εὖ πάνυ εἰρήσθαι εἰς τοὺς φιλοσοφούντας καὶ ξυμφάναι ἂν 5  
 τοὺς μὲν παρ' ἡμῖν ἀνθρώπους καὶ πάνυ, ὅτι τῷ ὄντι οἱ φιλοσο-  
 φούντες θανατώσι καὶ σφᾶς γε οὐ λελήθασιν ὅτι ἄξιοί εἰσιν τοῦτο  
 πάσχειν. Καὶ ἀληθῆ γ' ἂν λέγοιεν, ὦ Σιμμία, πλὴν γε τοῦ σφᾶς  
 μὴ λεληθέναι. λέληθεν γὰρ αὐτοὺς ἢ τε θανατώσι καὶ ἢ ἄξιοί  
εἰσιν θανάτου καὶ οἴου θανάτου οἱ ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλόσοφοι. εἰπωμὲν 10  
 C γὰρ, ἔφη, πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς, χαίρειν εἰπόντες ἐκείνοις· ἡγούμεθά  
 τι τὸν θάνατον εἶναι; Πάνυ γε, ἔφη ὑπολαβὼν ὁ Σιμμίας. Ἄρα,  
 μὴ ἄλλο τι ἢ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλαγὴν; καὶ  
 εἶναι τοῦτο τὸ τεθνάναι, χωρὶς μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπαλλαγὴν  
 αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ τὸ σῶμα γεγονέναι, χωρὶς δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ 15  
 σώματος ἀπαλλαγείσαν αὐτὴν καθ' αὐτὴν εἶναι; Ἄρα μὴ ἄλλο  
 τι [ἢ] ὁ θάνατος ἢ τοῦτο; Οὐκ ἄλλὰ τοῦτο, ἔφη. Σκέψαι δὴ,  
 ὦ ἀγαθέ, ἐὰν ἄρα καὶ σοὶ ξυνδοκῆ ἄπερ ἐμοί. ἐκ γὰρ τούτων  
 D μᾶλλον οἶμαι ἡμᾶς εἴσεσθαι περὶ ὧν σκοποῦμεν. φαίνεται σοι  
 φιλοσόφου ἀνδρὸς εἶναι ἐσπουδακέναι περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς καλουμένας 20  
 τὰς τοιάσδε, οἶον σίτων καὶ ποτῶν; Ἡκιστα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη  
 ὁ Σιμμίας. Τί δέ; τὰς τῶν ἀφροδισίων; Οὐδαμῶς. Τί δέ; τὰς  
 ἄλλας τὰς περὶ τὸ σῶμα θεραπείας δοκεῖ σοι ἐντίμους ἡγεῖσθαι  
 ὁ τοιοῦτος; οἴου ἱματίων διαφερόντων κτήσεις καὶ ὑποδημάτων  
 καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις καλλωπισμοῖς τοὺς περὶ τὸ σῶμα πότερον τιμᾶν 25  
 E δοκεῖ σοι ἢ ἀτιμάζειν, καθ' ὅσον μὴ πολλὴ ἀνάγκη μετέχειν αὐτῶν;  
 Ἄτιμάζειν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ὅ γε ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλόσοφος. Οὐκοῦν

6. τοὺς μὲν παρ' ἡμῖν] In the mouth of Simmias I think these words must refer to the Thebans: cf. *Sophist* 242 D τὸ δὲ παρ' ἡμῖν Ἑλεατικὸν ἔθνος. 'The majority would think what you say of philosophers excellent—my countrymen would give an especially cordial assent'. Simmias is glancing at the proverbial dulness of the Boeotian mind.

7. καὶ σφᾶς] Sc. τοὺς παρ' ἡμῖν.

15. γεγονέναι...εἶναι] Note the significant change of word.

16. ἄρα μὴ ἄλλο τι] If ἢ be right, it can only be a 'deliberative' subjunc-

tive. For in a question we can hardly accept Heindorf's suggestion, 'ante μὴ intelligi potest *dedoikate*'.

20. περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς] Olympiodoros classifies those here mentioned as (1) ἐνεργεῖαι φυσικαὶ καὶ ἀναγκαῖαι, (2) φυσικαὶ μὲν οὐκ ἀναγκαῖαι δέ, (3) οὔτε φυσικαὶ οὔτε ἀναγκαῖαι. This however, as Wyttenbach points out, is an Epicurean distinction: cf. Cicero *de finibus* I xiii § 45, and Diog. Laert. x 149: where the examples do not correspond with the present passage.

ὅλως δοκεῖ σοι, ἔφη, ἢ τοῦ τοιούτου πραγματεία οὐ περὶ τὸ σῶμα εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καθ' ὅσον δύναται ἀφεστάναι αὐτοῦ, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν τετράφθαι; Ἔμοιγε. Ἄρ' οὖν πρῶτον μὲν ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις δηλὸς ἐστὶν ὁ φιλόσοφος ἀπολύων ὅ τι μάλιστα τὴν ψυχὴν 65  
 5 ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ σώματος κοινωνίας διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων; Φαίνεται. Καὶ δοκεῖ γε δῆπου, ὦ Σιμμία, τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ᾧ μὴδὲν ἡδὺ τῶν τοιούτων μὴδὲ μετέχει αὐτῶν, οὐκ ἄξιον εἶναι ζῆν, ἀλλ' ἐγγύς τι τείνειν τοῦ τεθνάναι ὁ μὴδὲν φροντίζων τῶν ἡδονῶν αἰ διὰ τοῦ σώματος εἶσιν. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν ἀληθῆ 10 λέγεις.

Χ. Τί δὲ δὴ περὶ αὐτὴν τὴν τῆς φρονήσεως κτήσιν; πότερον ἐμπόδιον τὸ σῶμα ἢ οὐ, εἴαν τις αὐτὸ ἐν τῇ ζητήσῃ κοινωνὸν συμπαραλαμβάνῃ; οἷον τὸ τοιόνδε λέγω· ἄρα ἔχει ἀλήθειάν τινα Β ὅψις τε καὶ ἀκοή τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἢ τά γε τοιαῦτα καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ 15 ἡμῖν αἰεὶ θρυλοῦσιν, ὅτι οὐτ' ἀκούομεν ἀκριβῆς οὐδὲν οὔτε ὀρώμεν; καίτοι εἰ αὐταὶ τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα αἰσθησέων μὴ ἀκριβεῖς εἶσιν

2. ἀφεστάναι αὐτοῦ] With the whole of these three chapters should be compared *Timaeus* 87 c—90 d. It would be an error to suppose that Plato, with all his contempt for the body, was a friend of asceticism. In the passage of the *Timaeus* above mentioned he says that a due balance should be maintained between soul and body; a vigorous soul ought to have a vigorous body for its vehicle. Accordingly the body should be kept in good health and condition for the sake of the soul: for no less emphatically than in the *Phaedo* he declares that all is to be subordinate to the free exercise of intelligence; see especially 90 A foll.

8. ἐγγύς τι τείνειν] 'verges pretty closely on the state of death', COPE. Here Plato marks the vulgar error already referred to in 64 B λέγηθεν γὰρ αὐτοῦς κ.τ.λ. The majority have no conception of the philosophic τεθνάναι; if one lives without bodily pleasures, they think he may as well be dead. Such is the judgment of Kallikles, *Gorgias* 492 E οἱ λίθοι γὰρ ἀν οὕτω γε καὶ οἱ νεκροὶ εὐδαιμονέστατοι εἶεν. Sokrates retorts that the life of the pleasure-seeker is a πίθου βίος and afterwards

χαραδριοῦ, 494 B. Cf. *Philebus* 21 C.

9. διὰ τοῦ σώματος] This phrase would indicate that there is no real discrepancy between the doctrine of the *Phaedo* and of the *Philebus* on the subject of pleasure. For the preposition διὰ implies 'those pleasures [which the soul feels] by means of the body': see introduction § 4.

14. οἱ ποιηταὶ ἡμῖν αἰεὶ θρυλοῦσιν] e. g. Empedokles 49—53 (Karsten):

ἀλλ' ἄγε, ἄθρει παμπαλάμη πῆ δῆλον  
 ἕκαστον,  
 μήτε τιν' ὄψιν ἔχων πίστει πλέον ἢ κατ'  
 ἀκοήν,  
 μήτ' ἀκοὴν ἐρίδουπον ὑπὲρ τρανώματα  
 γλώσσης,  
 μήτε τι τῶν ἄλλων ὅππη πόρος ἐστὶ  
 νοῆσαι·  
 γυῖων πίστιν ἔρυκε, νόει δ' ἧ δῆλον  
 ἕκαστον.

Cf. 108:

τὴν συ νόψ δέρκεν, μῆδ' ὀμμασιν ἦσο  
 τεθηπῶς,

also the line of Epicharmos:

νοῦς ὀρῆ καὶ νοῦς ἀκούει· τὰλλα κωφὰ  
 καὶ τυφλά.

μηδὲ σαφεῖς, σχολῇ αἶ γέ ἄλλαι· πᾶσαι γάρ που τούτων φαν-  
 λότεραι εἰσιν ἢ σοὶ οὐ δοκοῦσιν; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Πότε οὖν,  
 ἢ δ' ὅς, ἢ ψυχὴ τῆς ἀληθείας ἄπτεται; ὅταν μὲν γὰρ μετὰ τοῦ  
 σώματος ἐπιχειρῇ τι σκοπεῖν, δήλου ὅτι τότε ἐξαπατᾶται ὑπ'  
 C αὐτοῦ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐκ ἐν τῷ λογίζεσθαι, εἴπερ που 5  
 ἄλλοθι, κατάδηλον αὐτῇ γίγνεται τι τῶν ὄντων; Ναί. Λογίζεται  
 δέ γέ που τότε κάλλιστα, ὅταν αὐτὴν τούτων μηδὲν παραλυπῇ,  
 μήτε ἀκοῇ μήτε ὄψις μήτε ἀληθειῶν μηδέ τις ἡδονή, ἀλλ' ὅ τι  
 μάλιστα αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν γίγνηται ἐῶσα χαίρειν τὸ σῶμα, καὶ  
 καθ' ὅσον δύναται μὴ κοινωνοῦσα αὐτῷ μηδ' ἀπτομένη ὀρέγεται 10  
 τοῦ ὄντος. Ἔστι ταῦτα. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἢ τοῦ φιλοσόφου  
 D ψυχὴ μάλιστα ἀτιμάζει τὸ σῶμα καὶ φεύγει ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, ζητεῖ δὲ  
 αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν γίγνεσθαι; Φαίνεται. Τί δὲ δὴ τὰ τοιάδε, ὦ  
Σιμμία; φαιμέν τι εἶναι δίκαιον αὐτὸ ἢ οὐδέν; Φαιμέν μέντοι νῆ  
Δία. Καὶ καλόν γέ τι καὶ ἀγαθόν; Πῶς δ' οὐ; Ἦδη οὖν πώποτε 15  
 τι τῶν τοιούτων τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς εἶδες; Οὐδαμῶς, ἢ δ' ὅς. Ἄλλ'  
 ἄλλη τινὶ αἰσθήσει τῶν διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἐφήψω αὐτῶν; λέγω δὲ  
 περὶ πάντων, οἷον μεγέθους πέρι, ὑγιείας, ἰσχύος, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων  
 E ἐνὶ λόγῳ ἀπάντων τῆς οὐσίας, ὃ τυγχάνει ἕκαστον ὄν' ἀρα διὰ  
 τοῦ σώματος αὐτῶν τὸ ἀληθέστατον θεωρεῖται, ἢ ᾧδε ἔχει' ὅς ἂν 20  
 μάλιστα ἡμῶν καὶ ἀκριβέστατα παρασκευάσῃται αὐτὸ ἕκαστον  
 διανοηθῆναι περὶ οὐ σκοπεῖ, οὗτος ἂν ἐγγύτατα ἴοι τοῦ γινῶναι  
 ἕκαστον; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Ἄρ' οὖν ἐκείνος ἂν τοῦτο ποιήσει

1. **φανλότεραι]** Sight is distinguished as the noblest of the senses in *Timaeus* 47 A ὄψις δὴ κατὰ τὸν ἐμὸν λόγον αἰτία τῆς μεγίστης ὠφελείας γέγονεν ἡμῖν: hearing comes next, 47 C, D. Cf. *Phaedrus* 250 D ὄψις γὰρ ἡμῖν δευτάτη τῶν διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἔρχεται αἰσθήσεων.

7. **παραλυπῇ]** 'annoys by its intrusion': this sense of *παρὰ* is not uncommon in Plato: cf. below 66 D *παραπύπτον*; *Timaeus* 50 E *παρεμφαῖνον*.

8. **μηδέ τις ἡδονή]** This is the reading of the Bodleian, and seems to me right. ἀληθειῶν μηδέ τις ἡδονή all belong to the last *μήτε*. Z. has *μήτε τις*.

10. **ὀρέγεται]** 'reaches after'.

15. **καλόν γέ τι καὶ ἀγαθόν]** Here the αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν seems placed on the same level as the other ideas. This however

is merely because for the present purpose Plato is not concerned to differentiate it: the criticism of Anaxagoras, 98 C foll., shows that in the *Phaedo* the αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν must occupy the same position as in the *Republic*. In the *Republic* itself ἀγαθόν is several times apparently classed with the inferior ideas, e. g. 476 A.

18. **μεγέθους πέρι]** Here is the first decisive indication that the *Phaedo* belongs to the middle phase of Platonism, along with the *Republic*. For *μέγεθος* is τῶν πρὸς τι, ὧν οὐ φαμεν εἶναι καθ' αὐτὸ γένος. (Arist. *metaph.* I ix.)

22. **διανοηθῆναι]** is opposed to *αἰσθάνεσθαι*: 'to apprehend intellectually the essence of each object of his investigation'.



καθαρώτατα, ὅστις ὅ τι μάλιστα αὐτῇ τῇ διανοίᾳ ἴοι ἐφ' ἕκαστον, μήτε τὴν ὄψιν παρατιθέμενος ἐν τῷ διανοεῖσθαι μήτε τινὰ ἄλλην αἴσθησιν ἐφέλκων μηδεμίαν μετὰ τοῦ λογισμοῦ, ἀλλ' αὐτῇ καθ' 66 αὐτὴν εἰλικρινεῖ τῇ διανοίᾳ χρώμενος αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ εἰλικρινές 5 ἕκαστον ἐπιχειροῖ θηρεύειν τῶν ὄντων, ἀπαλλαγείς ὅ τι μάλιστα ἐφθαλμῶν τε καὶ ὄτων καὶ ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ξύμπαντος τοῦ σώματος, ὡς ταράττοντος καὶ οὐκ ἐόντος τὴν ψυχὴν κτήσασθαι ἀλήθειάν τε καὶ φρόνησιν, ὅταν κοινωνῇ, ἀρ' οὐχ οὗτός ἐστιν, ὃ Σιμμία, εἶπερ τις καὶ ἄλλος, ὁ τευξόμενος τοῦ ὄντος; Ὑπερφυῶς, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, 10 ὡς ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.

XI. Οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ἐκ πάντων τούτων παρίστασθαι B δόξαν τοιάνδε τινὰ τοῖς γνησίως φιλοσόφοις, ὥστε καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους τοιαῦτα ἄττα λέγειν, ὅτι κινδυνεύει τοι ὥσπερ ἀτραπὸς τις

1. αὐτῇ τῇ διανοίᾳ] The distinction of the *Republic* between νοῦς and διάνοια is not drawn here, since for our present purpose it is unnecessary.

7. ἀλήθειάν τε καὶ φρόνησιν] ἀλήθεια is objective truth, φρόνησις the mental πάθημα which apprehends it; cf. *Republic* 511 B.

13. ὥσπερ ἀτραπὸς] Olympiodoros insists that this refers to a Pythagorean maxim φεύγειν τὰς λεωφόρους, whereby he has largely contributed to the perplexity of this passage. I believe ἀτραπὸς properly means not so much a byway as a short cut: what then is this short cut? We are here drawing an inference ἐκ πάντων τούτων, i. e. from the various considerations which induce the philosopher to withdraw his soul from communion with the body. Now to this state of separation, towards which the philosopher struggles during life by a long and tedious process, there is but one short cut, namely death; which therefore I hold with Schleiermacher is meant by the ἀτραπὸς. So far then we get a perfectly good sense: 'the inference which genuine philosophers will draw from the foregoing considerations is this: it seems that death is a short cut to the goal of our life's endeavour'. But what of μετὰ τοῦ λόγου ἐν τῇ σκέψει which in the mss. follow

ἐκφέρειν? The unmeaning superfluity and intolerable clumsiness of this addition surely ought not to be laid to the charge of Plato. A glance at the notes of the various editors is enough to show the hopelessness of extracting any sense from the phrase as it stands in the texts. Again, as I think, the acuteness of Schleiermacher has solved the difficulty. If, as he proposes, we place the words after ἐχωμεν, they are perfectly appropriate and restore the balance of the sentence, which will then run 'it seems that a kind of short cut brings us to our goal; because, so long as we have the body as a partner with the reason in our search for truth, and our soul is mixed up with this plague, we shall never fully attain the object of our desires'. Cf. 65 E μήτε τὴν ὄψιν παρατιθέμενος ἐν τῷ διανοεῖσθαι μήτε τινὰ ἄλλην αἴσθησιν ἐφέλκων μηδεμίαν μετὰ τοῦ λογισμοῦ. As evidence of confusion in the mss. it may be noted that the position of ἡμᾶς varies; on which account Hermann brackets it. Possibly we should translate τοῦ λόγου 'our theory', not 'reason', because in the latter sense Plato usually says μετὰ λόγου, not μετὰ τοῦ λόγου: cf. *Timaeus* 28 A, *Protagoras* 324 B. But in *Timaeus* 70 A we have τοῦ λόγου κατήκοον. I still feel doubtful whether some words have not fallen out:

ἐκφέρειν ἡμᾶς, ὅτι, ἕως ἂν τὸ σῶμα ἔχωμεν μετὰ τοῦ λόγου ἐν τῇ σκέψει, καὶ συμπεφυρμένη ἢ ἡμῶν ἢ ψυχῇ μετὰ τοιοῦτου κακοῦ, οὐ μὴ ποτε κτησώμεθα ἱκανῶς οὐ ἐπιθυμοῦμεν· φαμέν δὲ τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ ἀληθές. μυρίας μὲν γὰρ ἡμῖν ἀσχολίας παρέχει τὸ σῶμα  
 C διὰ τὴν ἀναγκαίαν τροφήν· ἔτι δὲ ἂν τινες νόσοι προσπέσωσιν, 5 ἐμποδίζουσιν ἡμῶν τὴν τοῦ ὄντος θήραν. ἐρώτων δὲ καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ φόβων καὶ εἰδώλων παντοδαπῶν καὶ φλυαρίας ἐμπίπλησιν ἡμᾶς πολλῆς, ὥστε τὸ λεγόμενον ὡς ἀληθῶς τῷ ὄντι ὑπ' αὐτοῦ οὐδὲ φρονῆσαι ἡμῖν ἐγγίγνεται οὐδέποτε οὐδέν. καὶ γὰρ πολέμους καὶ στάσεις καὶ μάχας οὐδὲν ἄλλο παρέχει ἢ τὸ σῶμα καὶ αἱ 10 τούτου ἐπιθυμῖαι. διὰ γὰρ τὴν τῶν χρημάτων κτήσιν πάντες οἱ πόλεμοι γίγνονται, τὰ δὲ χρήματα ἀναγκαζόμεθα κτᾶσθαι διὰ τὸ  
 D σῶμα, δουλεύοντες τῇ τούτου θεραπείᾳ· καὶ ἐκ τούτου ἀσχολίαν ἄγομεν φιλοσοφίας περὶ διὰ πάντα ταῦτα. τὸ δ' ἔσχατον πάντων ὅτι, εἰάν τις ἡμῖν καὶ σχολὴ γένηται ἀπ' αὐτοῦ καὶ τραπώμεθα 15 πρὸς τὸ σκοπεῖν τι, ἐν ταῖς ζητήσεσιν αὐτῶν πανταχοῦ παραπίπτου θόρυβον παρέχει καὶ ταραχὴν καὶ ἐκπλήττει, ὥστε μὴ δύνασθαι ὑπ' αὐτοῦ καθορᾶν τὰληθές, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι ἡμῖν δέδεικται ὅτι, εἰ μέλλομέν ποτε καθαρῶς τι εἶσεσθαι, ἀπαλλακτέον αὐτοῦ καὶ αὐτῇ  
 E τῇ ψυχῇ θεατέον αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα· καὶ τότε, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἡμῖν 20 ἔσται οὐ ἐπιθυμοῦμέν τε καὶ φαμέν ἐρασταὶ εἶναι, φρονήσεως, ἐπειδὴν τελευτήσωμεν, ὡς ὁ λόγος σημαίνει, ζῶσιν δὲ οὐ· εἰ γὰρ μὴ οἷόν τε μετὰ τοῦ σώματος μηδὲν καθαρῶς γινῶναι, δυοῖν θάτερον, ἢ οὐδαμοῦ ἔστιν κτήσασθαι τὸ εἰδέναι ἢ τελευτήσασιν· τότε γὰρ  
 67 αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν ἢ ψυχῇ ἔσται χωρὶς τοῦ σώματος, πρότερον δ' 25 οὐ. ἰ καὶ ἐν ᾧ ἂν ζῶμεν, οὕτως, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐγγυτάτω ἐσόμεθα τοῦ εἰδέναι, εἰάν ὅ τι μάλιστα μηδὲν ὀμιλώμεν τῷ σώματι μηδὲ κοινω-  
 νῶμεν, ὅ τι μὴ πᾶσα ἀνάγκη, μηδὲ ἀναπιμπλώμεθα τῆς τούτου

ἀτραπὸς seems to require definition; and possibly the misplaced phrase extruded something like ὁ θάνατος after ἐκφέρειν. For the use of ἐκφέρειν Heindorf quotes Soph. *Ai.* 7: and somewhat similar is the use of the passive in *Cratylus* 386 A.

5. διὰ τὴν ἀναγκαίαν τροφήν] Compare *Timaeus* 43 B—44 A.

9. οὐδὲ φρονῆσαι] This, as indicated by τὸ λεγόμενον, was no doubt a common phrase, to which Plato has given a turn of his own. Wytttenbach observes 'nondum satis cognitum, ὡς ἀληθῶς et item τῷ ὄντι

citatis locis addi'. He might have added that Plato uses these words when he is giving the popular phrase a deeper meaning, as here and in *Phaedrus* 256 B τῶν τριῶν παλαισμάτων τῶν ὡς ἀληθῶς Ὀλυμπιακῶν.

11. διὰ γὰρ τὴν τῶν χρημάτων κτήσιν] cf. *Republic* 373 D.

20. αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα] 'the realities of things', i. e. the ideas. For this use of πράγματα compare 99 D βλέπων πρὸς τὰ πράγματα.

φύσεως, ἀλλὰ καθαρεύομεν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, ἕως ἂν ὁ θεὸς ἀπολύσῃ ἡμᾶς·<sup>1</sup> καὶ οὕτω μὲν καθαροὶ ἀπαλλαττόμενοι τῆς τοῦ σώματος ἀφροσύνης, ὡς τὸ εἰκός, μετὰ τοιούτων τε ἐσόμεθα καὶ γνωσόμεθα δι' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν πᾶν τὸ εἰλικρινές. [τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἴσως τὸ ἀλη- B  
5 θές.] μὴ καθαρῶ γὰρ καθαρῶ ἐφάπτεσθαι μὴ οὐ θεμιτὸν ἦ·  
τοιαῦτα οἶμαι, ὦ Συμμία, ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πρὸς ἀλλήλους λέγειν  
τε καὶ δοξάζειν πάντας τοὺς ὀρθῶς φιλομαθεῖς· ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι  
οὕτως; Παντός γε μᾶλλον, ὦ Σώκρατες.

1 XII. Οὐκοῦν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, εἰ ταῦτα ἀληθῆ, ὦ ἑταῖρε,  
10 πολλῇ ἐλπίς ἀφικομένῳ οἱ ἐγὼ πορεύομαι, ἐκεῖ ἰκανῶς, εἴπερ που  
ἄλλοθι, κτήσασθαι τοῦτο οὐ ἔνεκα ἢ πολλῇ πραγματεία ἡμῶν  
ἐν τῷ παρελθόντι βίῳ γέγονεν, ὥστε ἢ γε ἀποδημία ἢ νῦν μοι  
προσ τεταγμένη μετὰ ἀγαθῆς ἐλπίδος γίγνεται καὶ ἄλλῳ ἀνδρὶ, C  
ὃς ἡγεῖται οἱ παρεσκευάσθαι τὴν διάνοιαν ὥσπερ κεκαθαρμένην.  
15 Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Συμμίας. Κάθαρσις δὲ εἶναι ἄρα οὐ τοῦτο  
ξυμβαίνει, ὅπερ πάλαι ἐν τῷ λόγῳ λέγεται, τὸ χωρίζειν ὃ τι  
μάλιστα ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ ἐθίσει αὐτὴν καθ' αὐτὴν  
πανταχόθεν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος συναγείρεσθαι τε καὶ ἀθροίζεσθαι, καὶ  
οἰκεῖν κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν καὶ ἐν τῷ νῦν παρόντι καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔπειτα  
20 μόνῃ καθ' αὐτὴν, ἐκλυομένην ὥσπερ δεσμῶν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος; D  
Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν τοῦτό γε θάνατος ὀνομάζεται, λύσις  
καὶ χωρισμὸς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ σώματος; Παντάπασι γε, ἢ δ' ὅς. Λύειν  
δέ γε αὐτὴν, ὡς φαμεν, προθυμοῦνται ἀεὶ μάλιστα καὶ μόνοι οἱ  
φιλοσοφούντες ὀρθῶς, καὶ τὸ μελέτημα αὐτὸ τοῦτό ἐστὶν τῶν φιλο-

1. ὁ θεός] Z. and St. add αὐτός.

3. μετὰ τοιούτων] sc. καθαρῶν. I take this to be neuter; i. e. the contents of the ideal world. Cf. *Phaedrus* 249 C πρὸς γὰρ ἐκείνους ἀεὶ ἐστὶ μνήμη πρὸς ὅσπερ θεὸς ὦν θεὸς ἐστὶ.

4. [τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἴσως τὸ ἀληθές] I have bracketed these words, which I believe to be a mere gloss on εἰλικρινές, derived from 66 B φαμὲν δὲ τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ ἀληθές.

5. μὴ καθαρῶ] 'for I doubt it is not lawful for the impure to reach the pure'.

67 B—68 B, c. xii. So then he will meet death with a good heart who has purified his soul by withdrawing her from

contact with the body and accustoming her to dwell apart by herself; for death is the consummation of her release from body. Were it not strange if the wise man shrank from that which all his life long he sought; freedom from his foe the body, and fruition of wisdom his love? Shall a man meet death gladly in hope of reunion with some earthly love, and for the sake of his divine love shall he fear to die?

20. ἐκλυομένην] notice the present: 'working out her deliverance'.

ὥσπερ δεσμῶν] Z. has ἐκ δεσμῶν.

23. μάλιστα καὶ μόνοι] 'chiefly, nay only, the philosophers'.



σώφον, λύσις καὶ χωρισμὸς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ σώματος, ἢ οὐ; Φαίνεται. Οὐκοῦν, ὅπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ ἔλεγον, γελοῖον ἂν εἴη ἀνδρα παρασκευάζουθ' E ἑαυτὸν ἐν τῷ βίῳ ὅτι ἐγγυτάτω ὄντα τοῦ τεθνάναι οὕτω ζῆν, κάπειθ' ἦκοντος αὐτῷ τούτου ἀγανακτεῖν; [οὐ γελοῖον;] Πῶς δ' οὐ; Τῷ ὄντι ἄρα, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία, οἱ ὀρθῶς φιλοσοφοῦντες 5 ἀποθνήσκειν μελετῶσι, καὶ τὸ τεθνάναι ἦκιστα αὐτοῖς ἀνθρώπων φοβερὸν. ἐκ τῶνδε δὲ σκόπει. εἰ γὰρ διαβέβληται μὲν πανταχῇ τῷ σώματι, αὐτὴν δὲ καθ' αὐτὴν ἐπιθυμοῦσι τὴν ψυχὴν ἔχειν, τούτου δὴ γιγνομένου εἰ φοβοῦντο καὶ ἀγανακτοῖεν, οὐ πολλὴ ἂν ἀλογία εἴη, εἰ μὴ ἄσμενοι ἐκείσε ἴοιεν, οἱ ἀφικομένοις ἐλπίς ἐστίν 10 οὐ διὰ βίου ἤρων τυχεῖν—ἤρων δὲ φρονήσεως—ὃ τε διεβέβλητο, τούτου ἀπηλλάχθαι συνόντος αὐτοῖς; ἢ ἀνθρωπίνων μὲν παιδικῶν καὶ γυναικῶν καὶ υἱῶν ἀποθανόντων πολλοὶ δὴ ἐκόντες ἠθέλησαν εἰς Ἄιδου ἐλθεῖν, ὑπὸ ταύτης ἀγόμενοι τῆς ἐλπίδος, τῆς τοῦ ὄψε- Lest I do  
Lest I do σθαί τε ἐκεῖ ὧν ἐπεθύμουν καὶ συνέσεσθαι φρονήσεως δὲ ἄρα 15 τις τῷ ὄντι ἐρῶν, καὶ λαβὼν σφόδρα τὴν αὐτὴν ταύτην ἐλπίδα, μηδαμοῦ ἄλλοθι ἐντεύξεσθαι αὐτῇ ἀξίως λόγου ἢ ἐν Ἄιδου, ἀγα- B νακτῆσει τε ἀποθνήσκων καὶ οὐχ ἄσμενος εἰσιν αὐτόσε; οἴεσθαί γε χρῆ, ἐὰν τῷ ὄντι γε ἦ, ὦ εταῖρε, φιλόσοφος· σφόδρα γὰρ αὐτῷ ταῦτα δόξει, μηδαμοῦ ἄλλοθι καθαρῶς ἐντεύξεσθαι φρονήσει ἀλλ' 20 ἢ ἐκεῖ. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, ὅπερ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, οὐ πολλὴ ἂν ἀλογία εἴη, εἰ φοβοῦτο τὸν θάνατον ὁ τοιοῦτος; Πολλὴ μέντοι νῆ Δία, ἢ δ' ὄς.

XIII. Οὐκοῦν ἰκανόν σοι τεκμήριον, ἔφη, τοῦτο ἀνδρὸς ὄν ἂν

9. τούτου δῆ] mss. δέ, corr. Madvig. I follow Schanz in adopting δῆ, since the vulgate gives a somewhat ill-balanced sentence: thus we may translate, 'if they are at feud with the body on every issue and desire to keep the soul to herself, then, should they fear and fret on the attainment of this object, were it not the height of perversity, not to go thither with gladness, where on their arrival they hope to possess that which they loved all their life long?' Z. and St. retain δέ.

21. ὅπερ ἄρτι ἔλεγον] referring to οὐ πολλὴ ἂν ἀλογία εἴη.

68 B—69 E, c. xiii. Therefore the philosopher alone is truly brave and temperate. The courage and temperance of

the multitude is spurious: for they endure evils only to avoid greater evils, they forego pleasures only that they may enjoy greater pleasures; thus fear is the source of their courage, indulgence the source of their temperance. But the fount of all real virtue is wisdom: this is the only true currency; virtues that arise from balancing pleasure against pleasure and pain against pain, apart from wisdom, are worthless and slavish. Virtue is the purification of the soul; the true philosopher is he whose soul is purified and initiated into the holy mysteries of wisdom, and he it is who shall dwell with the gods in the other world. Such is the defence of Sokrates.

ἴδης ἀγανακτοῦντα μέλλοντα ἀποθανεῖσθαι, ὅτι οὐκ ἄρ' ἦν φιλόσοφος, ἀλλὰ τις φιλοσώματος; ὁ αὐτὸς δέ που οὗτος τυγχάνει ὦν C καὶ φιλοχρήματος καὶ φιλότιμος, ἣτοι τὰ ἕτερα τούτων ἢ ἀμφοτέρα. Πάνυ, ἔφη, ἔχει οὕτως ὡς λέγεις. Ἄρ' οὖν, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία, οὐ καὶ 5 ἡ ἰνομαζομένη ἀνδρεία τοῖς οὕτω διακειμένοις μάλιστα προσήκει; Πάντως δήπου, ἔφη. ( Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη, ἣν καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ ἰνομάζουσι σωφροσύνην, τὸ περὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας μὴ ἐπτοῖσθαι, ἀλλ' ὀλιγώρως ἔχει καὶ κοσμίως, ἄρ' οὐ τούτοις μόνοις προσήκει, τοῖς μάλιστα τοῦ σώματος ὀλιγορούσιν τε καὶ ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ζῶσιν; D 10 Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη. ) Εἰ γὰρ ἐθέλεις, ἣ δ' ὅς, ἐννοῆσαι τὴν γε τῶν ἄλλων ἀνδρείαν τε καὶ σωφροσύνην, δόξει σοι εἶναι ἄτοπος. Πῶς δὲ, ὦ Σώκρατες; Οἶσθα, ἣ δ' ὅς, ὅτι τὸν θάνατον ἡγούνται πάντες οἱ ἄλλοι τῶν μεγάλων κακῶν; Καὶ μάλ' ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν φόβῳ μειζόνων κακῶν ὑπομένουσιν αὐτῶν οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι τὸν θάνατον, ὅταν ὑπομένω- 15 σιν; Ἔστι ταῦτα. Τῷ δεδιέναι ἄρα καὶ δέει ἀνδρεῖοι εἶσι πάντες πλὴν οἱ φιλόσοφοι. καίτοι ἄλογόν γε δέει τινὰ καὶ δειλία ἀνδρείον εἶναι. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Τί δὲ οἱ κόσμιοι αὐτῶν; οὐ ταῦτόν τοῦτο E πεπόνθασιν ἀκολασία τινὲ σωφρονές εἰσιν; καίτοι φαμέν γε ἀδύνατον εἶναι, ἀλλ' ὅμως αὐτοῖς συμβαίνει τούτῳ ὅμοιον τὸ πάθος 20 τὸ περὶ ταύτην τὴν εὐθήτη σωφροσύνην; φοβούμενοι γὰρ ἐτέρων ἡδονῶν στερηθῆναι καὶ ἐπιθυμοῦντες ἐκείνων, ἄλλων ἀπέχονται ὑπ' ἄλλων κρατούμενοι. καίτοι καλοῦσί γε ἀκολασίαν τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν 69 ἡδονῶν ἄρχεσθαι; ἀλλ' ὅμως συμβαίνει αὐτοῖς κρατουμένοις ὑφ' ἡδονῶν κρατεῖν ἄλλων ἡδονῶν. τοῦτο δ' ὅμοιον ἐστὶν ᾧ νῦν δὴ 25 ἐλέγετο, τῷ τρόπον τινὰ δι' ἀκολασίαν αὐτοὺς σεσωφρονίσθαι. Ἔοικε γάρ. ὦ μακάριε Σιμμία, μὴ γὰρ οὐχ αὕτη ἦ ἡ ὀρθὴ πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀλλαγὴ, ἡδονὰς πρὸς ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας πρὸς λύπας καὶ φόβον πρὸς φόβον καταλλάττεσθαι, καὶ μείζω πρὸς ἐλάττω, ὥσπερ

3. φιλοχρήματος καὶ φιλότιμος] Cf. 82 C: these correspond to the ὀλιγαρχικὸς καὶ τιμοκρατικὸς ἀνὴρ of *Republic* IX.

5. ἡ ἰνομαζομένη ἀνδρεία] The philosopher faces death with calmness and abstains from bodily indulgence; therefore he is courageous and temperate even in the popular sense, although his courage and temperance arise from a widely different source to that of the vulgar. τοῖς οὕτω διακειμένοις, i. e. the character described in the preceding chapter, τοῖς τῷ

σώματι διαβεβλημένοις.

10. ἐθέλεις] Z. has ἐθελήσεις.

15. τῷ δεδιέναι ἄρα καὶ δέει] Schanz well compares 78 B τῷ μὲν συντεθέντι τε καὶ συνθέντῳ.

24. ἄλλων ἡδονῶν] Schanz brackets ἄλλων, which, he says, is omitted in the citation of this passage by Iamblichos. I think however it is wanted.

26. πρὸς ἀρετήν] 'in respect to virtue': the preposition is not used in quite the same sense as in the words that follow.

νομίσματα, ἀλλ' ἢ ἐκείνο μόνον τὸ νόμισμα ὀρθόν, ἀντὶ οὗ δει  
 B ἅπαντα ταῦτα καταλλάττεσθαι, φρόνησις, καὶ τούτου μὲν πάντα  
 καὶ μετὰ τούτου ὠνούμενά τε καὶ πιπρασκόμενα τῷ ὄντι ἢ καὶ  
 ἀνδρεία καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ δικαιοσύνη· καὶ ξυλληβδην ἀληθῆς ἀρετῆ  
 ἢ μετὰ φρονήσεως, καὶ προσγιγνομένων καὶ ἀπογιγνομένων καὶ 5  
 ἡδονῶν καὶ φόβων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων τῶν τοιούτων· χωρι-  
 ζόμενα δὲ φρονήσεως ἀλλαπτόμενα ἀντὶ ἀλλήλων μὴ σκιαγρα-  
 φία τις ἢ ἡ τοιαύτη ἀρετῆ καὶ τῷ ὄντι ἀνδραποδώδης τε καὶ

2. καὶ τούτου μὲν] 'and that all that is bought for this and with this—that and that alone is in reality, whether it be fortitude or temperance or justice; and in a word that true virtue only exists when accompanied by wisdom'. COPE. μετὰ τούτου = 'along with this': it is the presence of φρόνησις which gives all virtue its value. If we press the metaphor too hard, it breaks down; for money is of value only for the sake of what it can buy. Plato however merely means that φρόνησις is the only true currency; all else is base coin.

4. ἀληθῆς ἀρετῆ ἢ] I have followed Schanz, after Heindorf, in adding ἢ after ἀρετῆ, although it is not in B, and is not absolutely required. But the ἢ of CD is in favour of it, and it certainly improves the sentence. St. omits it.

5. μετὰ φρονήσεως] The true nature of the philosophic ἀρετῆ can only be understood by studying the latter part of the sixth book of the *Republic*. φρόνησις is cognition of the truth, that is, of the αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν. Plato found his escape from utilitarianism by identifying the source of morality with the source of existence; his ethics are the outcome of his ontology. All things are good in so far as they are like the idea of the good; therefore to him that would be really good knowledge of the idea is indispensable. With the conception of ἀνδρεία in this passage compare the definition in *Republic* 442 B καὶ ἀνδρείων δῆ, οἶμαι, τούτῳ τῷ μέρει καλοῦμεν ἕνα ἕκαστον, ὅταν αὐτοῦ τὸ θυμοειδὲς διασώζῃ διὰ τε λυπῶν καὶ ἡδονῶν τὸ ὑπὸ

τοῦ λόγου παραγγελλέν δεινὸν καὶ μή.

7. σκιαγραφία] 'a rough sketch'. σκιαγραφία was a kind of painting meant to produce its effect at a distance and not to be inspected close at hand: see *Theaetetus* 208 E ἐπειδὴ ἐγγυὸς ὥσπερ σκιαγραφήματος γέγονα τοῦ λεγομένου, ξινήμι οὐδὲ σμικρὸν ἕως δὲ ἀφεστήκη πρῶρων ἐφαινετό τι μοι λέγεσθαι. Also *Parmenides* 165 C οὐδὲν ἐσκιαγραφημένα ἀποστάντι μὲν ἐν πάντα φαινόμενα ταῦτον φαίνεσθαι πεπονθέναι καὶ ὅμοια εἶναι. πάνυ γε, προσελθόντι δὲ γε πολλὰ καὶ ἕτερα καὶ τῷ τοῦ ἑτέρου φαντάσματι ἑτεροῖα καὶ ἀνόμοια εἶναι οἷς. Compare *Republic* 523 B. From Aristotle *rhetoric* III xii 1414<sup>a</sup> 8 it seems to have been a sort of scene-painting, as Mr Cope translates it: ἡ μὲν οὖν δημηγορικὴ λέξις καὶ παντελῶς ἔοικε τῇ σκιαγραφίᾳ: ὅσῳ γὰρ ἂν πλείων ἢ ὁ ὄχλος, πορρωτέρω ἢ θέα, διδὲ τὰ ἀκριβῆ περιέργα καὶ χεῖρω φαίνεται ἐν ἀμφοτέροις. Cf. *metaph.* Δ cxix 1024<sup>b</sup> 23 τὰ δὲ ὅσα ἐστὶ μὲν ὄντα, πέφυκε μέντοι φαίνεσθαι ἢ μὴ οἷά ἐστιν ἢ ἂ μὴ ἐστίν, οἷον ἡ σκιαγραφία καὶ τὰ ἐνύπνια· ταῦτα γὰρ ἐστὶ μὲν τι, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς ἐμποιεῖ τὴν φαντασίαν. The meaning therefore is that on a superficial view the popular virtue seems identical with the philosophic, but on closer examination is found to fall far short of it.

8. ἀνδραποδώδης] cf. *Republic* 430 B δοκεῖ μοι τὴν ὀρθὴν δόξαν περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων ἄνευ παιδείας γεγυυῖαν τὴν τε θηριώδη καὶ ἀνδραποδώδη οὔτε πάνυ νόμιμον ἡγεῖσθαι ἄλλο τέ τι ἢ ἀνδρείαν καλεῖν. Olympiodoros says καλεῖ δὲ ὁ Πλάτων τὰς μὲν φυσικὰς ἀρετὰς ἀνδραποδώδεις, ὡς καὶ ἀν-



οὐδὲν ὑγιές οὐδ' ἀληθές ἔχη, τὸ δ' ἀληθές τῶ ὄντι ἢ κάθαρσις τις C  
 τῶν τοιούτων πάντων, καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἀνδρεία  
 καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ φρόνησις μὴ καθαρμός τις ἦ. καὶ κινδυνεύουσι καὶ  
 οἱ τὰς τελετὰς ἡμῖν οὗτοι καταστήσαντες οὐ φαῦλοι εἶναι, ἀλλὰ  
 5 τῶ ὄντι πάλαι αἰνίττεσθαι ὅτι ὅς ἂν ἀμύητος καὶ ἀτέλεστος εἰς  
 "Αἶδου ἀφίκηται, ἐν βορβόρῳ κείσεται, ὁ δὲ κεκαθαρμένος τε καὶ  
 τετελεσμένος ἐκείσε ἀφικόμενος μετὰ θεῶν οἰκήσει. εἰσὶν γὰρ δὴ,  
 ὡς φασὶν οἱ περὶ τὰς τελετὰς, ναρθηκοφόροι μὲν πολλοί, βάκχοι  
 δέ τε παῦροι· οὗτοι δ' εἰσὶν κατὰ τὴν ἐμὴν δόξαν οὐκ ἄλλοι ἢ οἱ D  
 10 πεφιλοσοφηκότες ὀρθῶς. ὦν δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ κατὰ γε τὸ δυνατόν οὐδὲν  
 ἀπέλιπον ἐν τῶ βίῳ, ἀλλὰ παντὶ τρόπῳ προῦθυμήθην γενέσθαι· εἰ  
 δ' ὀρθῶς προῦθυμήθην καὶ τι ἠνύσαμεν, ἐκείσε ἐλθόντες τὸ σαφές  
 εἰσόμεθα, ἂν θεὸς ἐθέλῃ, ὀλίγον ὕστερον, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ. ταῦτ' οὖν  
 ἐγὼ, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, ἀπολογουμαι, ὡς εἰκότως ὑμᾶς  
 15 τε ἀπολείπων καὶ τοὺς ἐνθάδε δεσπότης οὐ χαλεπῶς φέρω οὐδ'  
 ἀγανακτῶ, ἠγούμενος κάκει οὐδὲν ἦττον ἢ ἐνθάδε δεσπότης τε E  
 ἀγαθοῖς ἐντεύξεσθαι καὶ ἐταίροις [τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς ἀπιστίαν παρέ-  
 χει]· εἴ τι οὖν ὑμῖν πιθανώτερός εἰμι ἐν τῇ ἀπολογίᾳ ἢ τοῖς  
 Ἀθηναίων δικασταῖς, εὖ ἂν ἔχοι.

δραπόδος δυναμένης ὑπάρχειν, τὰς δὲ ἠθικὰς  
 σκιαγραφίας· τὸ ὅτι γὰρ μόνον ἔχουσι, σκιά δὲ  
 τὸ ὅτι τοῦ διότι. The distinction between  
 ἠθικαὶ and φυσικαὶ however is not made  
 in the present passage. For a discussion  
 of this whole subject of popular virtue see  
 appendix I.

1. οὐδὲν ὑγιές] After this some mss.  
 insert εἶναι, which Schanz retains within  
 brackets. It is obviously wrong and  
 ought not to cumber the text.

τὸ δ' ἀληθές] 'but the reality is actu-  
 ally a process of purification from all  
 such things, and temperance and justice  
 and wisdom itself are a completed purifi-  
 cation'. τῶν τοιούτων, i. e. the worldly  
 considerations on which the δημοτικὴ  
 ἀρετὴ is based. κάθαρσις is explained  
 above in 67 C; καθαρμός is a completed  
 κάθαρσις. τὸ ἀληθές is opposed to σκια-  
 γραφία.

4. τὰς τελετὰς] It seems probable,  
 as Stallbaum says, that the Orphic tradi-  
 tions are in Plato's mind, not the Eleu-

siyan mysteries. The line πολλοὶ μὲν  
 ναρθηκοφόροι βάκχοι δέ τε παῦροι is said  
 by Olympiodoros to be Orphic. Plato is  
 fond of borrowing terms of ritual, as in  
*Phaedrus* 250 C, *Laws* 759 C, *Timaeus*  
 44 C.

6. ἐν βορβόρῳ] cf. *Republic* 363 D  
 τοὺς δὲ ἀνοσίους αὐτὰ καὶ ἀδίκους εἰς πηλὸν  
 τινα κατορύττουσιν ἐν "Αἶδου.

10. ὦν] 'of whose number'.

12. ἠνύσαμεν] I have retained the  
 reading of the best mss., which also  
 seems to give the best sense: 'if I have  
 been right in my desire to join the com-  
 pany of philosophers, and if we (οἱ πεφι-  
 λοσοφηκότες) have profited aught by our  
 philosophy'. In this way we avoid any  
 harshness in the change from singular to  
 plural. Schanz and Z. give ἠνυσάμεν.

17. [τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς ἀπιστίαν παρέ-  
 χει] Ast is undoubtedly right in bracket-  
 ing these words, which are utterly point-  
 less, and clearly interpolated from 70 A.

69 E—70 C, c. xiv. All this were very



εἴη, ὡς ἀδολεσχῶ καὶ οὐ περὶ προσηκόντων τοὺς λόγους ποιούμαι. εἰ οὖν δοκεῖ, χρὴ διασκοπεῖσθαι.

> XV. Σκεψάμεθα δὲ αὐτὸ τῆδέ πη, εἴτ' ἄρα ἐν Ἄιδου εἰσὶν αἱ ψυχαὶ τελευτησάντων τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἴτε καὶ οὐ. παλαιὸς μὲν οὖν ἔστι τις λόγος, οὗ μεμνήμεθα, ὡς εἰσὶν ἐνθένδε ἀφικόμεναι ἐκεῖ, καὶ πάλιν γε δεῦρο ἀφικνούνται καὶ γίγνονται ἐκ τῶν τεθνεάτων καὶ εἰ τοῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει, πάλιν γίγνεσθαι ἐκ τῶν ἀποθανόντων τοὺς ζῶντας, ἄλλο τι ἢ εἶεν ἂν αἱ ψυχαὶ ἡμῶν ἐκεῖ; οὐ γὰρ ἂν που πάλιν ἐγίγνοντο μὴ οὔσαι, καὶ τοῦτο ἱκανὸν τεκμήριον τοῦ

made by the comedians upon Sokrates: cf. especially the reference to the *Clouds* in 19 C.

1. ἀδολεσχῶ] Eupolis, quoted by Olympiodoros, calls Sokrates τὸν πτωχὸν ἀδολέσχην, and no doubt it was a favourite epithet with the comic poets. Plato has adopted the word, apparently in sheer defiance; and wherever ἀδολεσχέιν, ἀδολέσχη, ἀδολεσχία occur in the dialogues, we may be sure the term is applied to the genuine philosopher. A very notable instance is *Sophist* 225 D, where in seeking the sophist we stumble upon somebody very like Sokrates: compare too *Theaetetus* 195 B, C, *Phaedrus* 269 E (where see Dr Thompson's admirable note), *Cratylus* 401 B, *Parmenides* 135 D, *Republic* 488 E, *Politicus* 299 B. The strict meaning of the word is fairly given in οὐ περὶ προσηκόντων τοὺς λόγους ποιούμαι.

70 C—72 D, cc. xv—xvii. Tradition says that the souls of the dead come back from Hades and live again on earth. That this belief is reasonable we may argue in the following way. All nature shows the generation of opposite from opposite; thus greater arises from less, worse from better, swifter from slower. And between each of such pairs of opposites there are two processes, one in either direction; as between greater and less are increase and decrease, and similar processes between every other pair. Therefore since life and death are such a pair of opposites, we shall expect to find

two similar processes between the living and the dead. We see one such process take place before our eyes; the living pass over to the dead: if then nature's work is not here left incomplete, there must be the other process that we do not see, and the dead pass over to the living. A yet stronger confirmation is this: did all things travel in one direction and were there no return, in the end all living things would die and remain dead, and life would be swallowed up in death. But if it be true that souls return again from the dead, they must be somewhere after their departure from the body; for certainly if they perished utterly, they could return again no more.

We have here one half of the first stage of the argument, which is complemented by the inference from reminiscence that follows. It is true, this argument of ἀναπόδοσις implies the antenatal existence of the soul, but it is used mainly as evidence of her existence after death. Note also that it proves ὡς ἔστιν ἡ ψυχὴ ἐν Ἄιδου, not ὡς δύναμις καὶ φρόνησις ἔχει.

4. παλαιὸς μὲν οὖν ἔστι τις λόγος] Herodotus II 123 states that the Egyptians believed in the immortality and transmigration of the soul, and adds: τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ εἰσὶ οἱ Ἑλλήνων ἐχρήσαντο, οἱ μὲν πρότερον οἱ δὲ ὕστερον, ὡς ἰδίῳ ἑωυτῶν ἐόντι τῶν ἐγὼ εἰδῶς τὰ οὐνόματα οὐ γράφω. He doubtless refers, as Grote says, to the Orphic and Pythagorean sects; to whom may be added Empedokles.



ταῦτ' εἶναι, εἰ τῷ ὄντι φανερόν γίγνοιτο ὅτι οὐδαμῶθεν ἄλλοθεν γίνονται οἱ ζῶντες ἢ ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων· εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔστι τοῦτο, ἄλλου ἂν του δέοι λόγου. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης. Μὴ τοίνυν κατ' ἀνθρώπων, ἢ δ' ὅς, σκόπει μόνου τοῦτο, εἰ βούλει ῥᾶον μαθεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ ζῴων πάντων καὶ φυτῶν, καὶ ξυλλήβδην ὅσαπερ ἔχει γένεσι, περὶ πάντων ἴδωμεν, ἄρ' οὕτως γίγνεται πάντα, οὐκ ἄλλοθεν ἢ ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων τὰ ἐναντία, ὅσοις τυγχάνει ὄν τοιοῦτόν τι, οἷον τὸ καλὸν τῷ αἰσχυρῷ ἐναντίον που καὶ δίκαιον ἀδίκῳ, καὶ ἄλλα δὴ μυρία οὕτως ἔχει. τοῦτο οὖν σκεψώμεθα, ἄρα ἀναγκαῖον, ὅσοις ἔστι τι ἐναντίον, μηδαμῶθεν ἄλλοθεν αὐτὸ γίγνεσθαι ἢ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτῷ ἐναντίου. οἷον ὅταν μεῖζόν τι γίγνηται, ἀνάγκη

5. ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ ζῴων πάντων καὶ φυτῶν] It is true, as Olympiodoros remarks, that we cannot from this particular sentence infer τὸν Πλάτωνα πᾶσαν ψυχὴν ἀθανατίζειν. But since Olymp. implies that Plato did not hold all soul to be immortal, it may be as well to point out that he did; cf. *Phaedrus* 245 C. Moreover a glance at any passage treating of metempsychosis (e. g. *Phaedrus* 249 B) will show us that Plato was not so irrational as to deny immortality to the souls of beasts, while conceding it to those of men; and *Timaeus* 77 A foll. proves that he was not so unscientific as to draw a hard and fast line between animal and vegetable life.

In the present passage Plato appeals to the uniformity of nature. If the presence of a given condition in any of the γιγνώμενα is the result of a γένεσις, it must be a γένεσις from the opposite condition, where such an opposite exists: if a thing has become cold it must have been warm and so forth. We observe moreover that in all instances there exist γενέσεις in both directions, whence we infer that alternation is a law of nature. And since we see that this law is in force in all cases which fall under our experience, it is fair to assume that it is in force in all cases where our experience fails us. Accordingly when between a pair of opposites we observe one γένεσις

occurring, while the other γένεσις is from the nature of things beyond our observation, we may infer that the latter also occurs though we cannot perceive it.

11. τοῦ αὐτῷ ἐναντίου] I see no necessity to read αὐτῷ with Z. from Baiter's conjecture.

μεῖζόν] The use of the comparative throughout denotes that the condition is the result of a γένεσις. We shall presently see the application of this. The positive, in such terms as μέγα—σικκρόν, ταχύ—βραδύ, though these all express relations, implies no self-regarding relation. We must therefore use the comparative to denote a relation between two successive conditions of the same object. But any positive which necessarily implied a relation of one and the same object to itself in another condition would answer just the same purpose as the comparative. Such a positive we actually find in the word τεθνηκός, which logically implies ζῶν as a previous condition of the object. Therefore whatever generalisation we establish between μεῖζον—ἐλαττον, θάπτον—βραδύτερον &c., holds good also of ζῶν and τεθνηκός. And since we affirm that between every pair of these comparatives two γενέσεις take place, therefore between ζῶν and τεθνηκός, besides the γένεσις that we see, viz. ἀποθνήσκειν, there must be another γένεσις that we do not see, viz. ἀναβιώσκεισθαι;

που ἐξ ἐλάττονος ὄντος πρότερον ἔπειτα μείζον γίγνεσθαι; *Ναί.*  
 Οὐκοῦν κὰν ἔλαττον γίγνηται, ἐκ μείζονος ὄντος πρότερον ὕστερον 71  
 ἔλαττον γενήσεται; "Ἔστιν οὕτω, ἔφη. Καὶ μὴν ἐξ ἰσχυροτέρου  
 τὸ ἀσθενέστερον καὶ ἐκ βραδυτέρου τὸ θάττον; Πάνυ γε. Τί  
 5 δέ; ἂν τι χεῖρον γίγνηται, οὐκ ἐξ ἀμείνουτος, καὶ ἂν δικαιότερον,  
 ἐξ ἀδικωτέρου; Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; Ἰκανῶς οὖν, ἔφη, ἔχομεν τοῦτο, ὅτι  
 πάντα οὕτω γίγνεται, ἐξ ἐναντίων τὰ ἐναντία πράγματα; Πάνυ γε.  
 Τί δ' αὖ; ἔστι τι καὶ τοιούδε ἐν αὐτοῖς, οἷον μεταξὺ ἀμφοτέρων  
 πάντων τῶν ἐναντίων δυοῖν ὄντων δύο γενέσεις, ἀπὸ μὲν τοῦ  
 10 ἐτέρου ἐπὶ τὸ ἕτερον, ἀπὸ δ' αὖ τοῦ ἐτέρου πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ ἕτερον B  
 μείζονος μὲν πράγματος καὶ ἐλάττονος μεταξὺ αὐξήσις καὶ φθίσις,  
 καὶ καλοῦμεν οὕτω τὸ μὲν αὐξάνεσθαι, τὸ δὲ φθίνειν; *Ναί,* ἔφη.  
 Οὐκοῦν καὶ διακρίνεσθαι καὶ συγκρίνεσθαι, καὶ ψύχεσθαι καὶ  
 θερμαίνεσθαι, καὶ πάντα οὕτω, κὰν εἰ μὴ χρώμεθα τοῖς ὀνόμασιν  
 15 ἐνιαχοῦ, ἀλλ' ἔργῳ γοῦν πανταχοῦ οὕτως ἔχειν ἀναγκαῖον, γίγνε-  
 σθαί τε αὐτὰ ἐξ ἀλλήλων γενέσιν τε εἶναι ἐξ ἑκατέρου εἰς ἀλλήλα;  
 Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἦ δ' ὅς.

XVI. Τί οὖν; ἔφη, τῷ ζῆν ἔστι τι ἐναντίον, ὥσπερ τῷ ἐγρη- C  
 γορέναι τὸ καθεύδειν; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Τί; Τὸ τεθνάναι, ἔφη.  
 20 Οὐκοῦν ἐξ ἀλλήλων τε γίγνεται ταῦτα, εἴπερ ἐναντία ἐστίν, καὶ  
 αἱ γενέσεις εἰσὶν αὐτοῖν μεταξὺ δύο δυοῖν ὄντων; Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;  
 Τὴν μὲν τοίνυν ἑτέραν συζυγίαν ὦν νῦν διῆ ἔλεγον ἐγὼ σοι, ἔφη,  
 ἐρῶ, ὁ Σωκράτης, καὶ αὐτὴν καὶ τὰς γενέσεις· σὺ δέ μοι τὴν ἑτέραν.  
 λέγω δὲ τὸ μὲν καθεύδειν, τὸ δὲ ἐγρηγορέναι, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ καθεύδειν  
 25 τὸ ἐγρηγορέναι γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἐγρηγορέναι τὸ καθεύδειν, καὶ D  
 τὰς γενέσεις αὐτοῖν τὴν μὲν καταδαρθάνειν εἶναι, τὴν δ' ἀνεγεί-  
 ρεσθαι. ἰκανῶς σοι, ἔφη, ἦ οὐ; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Λέγε δὴ μοι καὶ  
 σὺ, ἔφη, οὕτω περὶ ζωῆς καὶ θανάτου. οὐκ ἐναντίον μὲν φῆς τῷ  
 ζῆν τὸ τεθνάναι εἶναι; "Ἐγὼ γε. Γίγνεσθαι δὲ ἐξ ἀλλήλων; *Ναί.*  
 30 Ἐξ οὖν τοῦ ζῶντος τί τὸ γυγνόμενον; Τὸ τεθνηκός, ἔφη. Τί δέ,

if we are to suppose that the operation of nature is uniform. The comparatives in fact show under what circumstances γενέσεις take place, i.e. between opposite conditions of the same thing.

14. κὰν εἰ μὴ] i.e. the processes exist, even in those cases where we have no names to describe them. The argument is that were there no alternation of processes we should have all things at last

stationary on one side or the other.

16. ἐξ ἑκατέρου] Schanz brackets these words: they are not indeed necessary but the pleonasm seems to me Platonic, and their omission seriously impairs the rhythm.

22. ἐγὼ σοι, ἔφη, ἐρῶ] Sokrates pursues the same plan in 105 B foll. καὶ μὴ μοι δ' ἂν ἐρωτῶ ἀποκρίνον, ἀλλὰ μιμούμενος ἐμέ.

ἡ δ' ὅς, ἐκ τοῦ τεθνεώτος; Ἀναγκαῖον, ἔφη, ὁμολογεῖν ὅτι τὸ ζῶν.  
 Ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων ἄρα, ὦ Κέβης, τὰ ζῶντά τε καὶ οἱ ζῶντες  
 E γίνονται; Φαίνεται, ἔφη. Εἰσὶν ἄρα, ἔφη, αἱ ψυχαὶ ἡμῶν ἐν  
 Ἄιδου. Ἔοικεν. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τοῖν γεγεσέοις τοῖν περὶ ταῦτα ἡ  
 γ' ἑτέρα σαφὴς οὔσα τυγχάνει; τὸ γὰρ ἀποθνήσκειν σαφὲς δῆπου, 5  
 ἡ οὐ; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Πῶς οὖν, ἡ δ' ὅς, ποιήσομεν; οὐκ  
 ἀνταποδώσομεν τὴν ἐναντίαν γένεσιν, ἀλλὰ ταύτη χωλὴ ἔσται  
 ἡ φύσις; ἡ ἀνάγκη ἀποδοῦναι τῷ ἀποθνήσκειν ἐναντίαν τινὰ  
 γένεσιν; Πάντως που, ἔφη. Τίνα ταύτην; Τὸ ἀναβιώσκεισθαι.  
 Οὐκοῦν, ἡ δ' ὅς, εἴπερ ἔστι τὸ ἀναβιώσκεισθαι, ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων 10  
 72 ἀν εἴη γένεσις εἰς τοὺς ζῶντας αὕτη, τὸ ἀναβιώσκεισθαι; Πάνυ γε.  
 Ὁμολογεῖται ἄρα ἡμῖν καὶ ταύτη τοὺς ζῶντας ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων  
 γεγιμέναι οὐδὲν ἦττον ἢ τοὺς τεθνεώτας ἐκ τῶν ζώντων· τούτου  
 δὲ ὄντος ἰκανόν που ἐδόκει τεκμήριον εἶναι ὅτι ἀναγκαῖον τὰς τῶν  
 τεθνεώτων ψυχὰς εἶναι που, ὅθεν δὴ πάλιν γίγνεσθαι. Δοκεῖ 15  
 μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐκ τῶν ὁμολογημένων ἀναγκαῖον οὕτως  
 ἔχειν.

XVII. Ἴδὲ τοίνυν οὕτως, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, ὅτι οὐδ' ἀδίκως  
 ὁμολογήκαμεν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ. εἰ γὰρ μὴ αἰεὶ ἀνταποδοιή τὰ

2. ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων] It is necessary to remember the exact sense of the two opposites, according to the definition given in 64 C καὶ εἶναι τοῦτο τὸ τεθνεῖναι, χωρὶς μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπαλλαγὴν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ τὸ σῶμα γεγενῆναι, χωρὶς δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλαγείσαν αὐτὴν καθ' αὐτὴν εἶναι. ζῶν then is applied to soul and body united, τεθνηκὸς to soul and body asunder. A very similar use of the word ζῶν is to be found in Soph. Oed. Col. 999, οἷς ἐγὼ οὐδὲ τὴν πατρός | ψυχὴν ἄν ὀμῶι ζῶσαν ἀντειπεῖν ἐμὸι. The soul of Laios is certainly not regarded as extinct, therefore ζῶσαν can only mean 'if it returned' to bodily life'.

12. καὶ ταύτη] i.e. by demonstration as well as by tradition; cf. 70 C.

14. ἐδόκει] 70 D.

18. ἰδὲ τοίνυν οὕτως] In this chapter we have a statement of the fundamental principle on which not only the foregoing argument but all Plato's reasoning in

favour of immortality is based; viz. that the sum total of spirit is a constant quantity. Plato has seized upon this principle of 'conservation of energy' as the only rational method of defending the indestructibility of soul: he has applied to spirit the axiom which previous philosophers laid down for matter; as Anaxagoras expresses it, γινώσκειν χρήσθαι πάντα οὐδὲν ἐλάσσω ἔστιν οὐδὲ πλέω· οὐ γὰρ ἀνυστὸν πάντων πλέω εἶναι, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἴσα αἰεῖ. Similarly the πύκνωσις καὶ ἀραιωσις of Anaximenes, the ὁδὸς ἄνω καὶ κάτω of Herakleitos, the σύγκρισις καὶ διάκρισις of Empedokles, all implied that γένεσις was not creation out of nothing but a passing from one form into another. Cf. Aristotle *metaph.* K vi 1062<sup>b</sup> 23 τὸ γὰρ μὴθὲν ἐκ μὴ ὄντος γίγνεσθαι πᾶν δ' ἐξ ὄντος, σχεδὸν πάντων ἔστι κοινὸν δόγμα τῶν περὶ φύσεως.

19. εἰ γὰρ μὴ αἰεὶ] 'for if there were not a perpetual correspondence between the two in generation, just as if they re-



ἕτερα τοῖς ἑτέροις γιγνόμενα ὡσπερὲν κύκλω περιούντα, ἀλλ' εὐθείᾳ<sup>B</sup>  
 τις εἴη ἢ γένεσις ἐκ τοῦ ἑτέρου μόνον εἰς τὸ καταντικρὺ καὶ μὴ  
 ἀνακάμπτοι πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ ἕτερον μηδὲ καμπὴν ποιοῖτο, οἷσθ' ὅτι  
 πάντα τελευτώντα τὸ αὐτὸ σχῆμα ἂν σχοίη καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ πάθος  
 5 ἂν πάθοι καὶ παύσαιτο γιγνόμενα; Πῶς λέγεις; ἔφη. Οὐδὲν  
 χαλεπὸν, ἢ δ' ὅς, ἐννοῆσαι ὃ λέγω· ἀλλ' οἶον εἰ τὸ καταδαρθάνειν  
 μὲν εἴη, τὸ δ' ἀνεγείρεσθαι μὴ ἀνταποδοιδίη γιγνόμενον ἐκ τοῦ  
 καθεύδοντος, οἷσθ' ὅτι τελευτώντα πάντ' <ἂν> λῆρον τὸν Ἐνδυ-<sup>C</sup>  
 μίωνα ἀποδείξειεν καὶ οὐδαμοῦ ἂν φαίνοιτο, διὰ τὸ καὶ τᾶλλα  
 10 πάντα ταῦτόν ἐκείνῳ πεπουθέναι, [καθεύδειν]. κἂν εἰ συγκρίνοιτο  
 μὲν πάντα, διακρίνοιτο δὲ μή, ταχὺ ἂν τὸ τοῦ Ἀναξαγόρου γεγονὸς  
 εἴη, ὁμοῦ πάντα χρήματα. ὡσαύτως δέ, ὦ φίλε Κέβης, εἰ ἀπο-  
 θνήσκοι μὲν πάντα, ὅσα τοῦ ζῆν μεταλάβοι, ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀποθάνοι,  
 μένοι ἐν τούτῳ τῷ σχήματι τὰ τεθνεῶτα καὶ μὴ πάλιν ἀναβιώ-  
 15 σκοιτο, ἄρ' οὐ πολλὴ ἀνάγκη τελευτώντα πάντα τεθνάναι καὶ  
 μηδὲν ζῆν; εἰ γὰρ ἐκ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων τὰ ζῶντα γίγνοιτο, τὰ δὲ<sup>D</sup>  
 ζῶντα θνήσκοι, τίς μηχανὴ μὴ οὐ πάντα καταναλωθῆναι εἰς τὸ  
 τεθνάναι; Οὐδὲ μία μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ  
 μοι δοκεῖς παντάπασιν ἀληθῆ λέγειν. Ἔστιν γάρ, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης,  
 20 ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, παντὸς μᾶλλον οὔτω, καὶ ἡμεῖς αὐτὰ ταῦτα οὐκ  
 ἐξαπατάμενοι ὁμολογοῦμεν, ἀλλ' ἔστι τῷ ὄντι καὶ τὸ ἀναβιώσκε-

volved in a circle'. COPE. ἀνταποδοιδίη is here intransitive, as in Aristotle *meteor.* xi 347<sup>b</sup> 32 ὡς δ' ἐκεῖ χάλασα, ἐνταῦθα οὐκ ἀνταποδίδωσι τὸ ἅμοιον. Cf. below 72 B.

1. εὐθείᾳ τις] This of course implies that the straight line is finite, i.e. there is not an indefinite quantity of soul in existence, nor can fresh souls be created out of nothing. Plato has taken his metaphor from the δίαυλος δρόμος.

4. τὸ αὐτὸ σχῆμα] compare *Phaedrus* 245 D ἢ πάντα τε οὐράνιον πᾶσάν τε γένεσιν συμπεσοῦσαν στήναι καὶ μήποτε αὐθις ἔχειν ὅθεν κινήθεντα γενήσεται.

8. πάντ' ἂν] I have followed Schanz and others in supplying ἂν. ἀποδείξειεν could hardly stand without it, since the subject of φαίνοιτο is different. Z. omits it.

10. [καθεύδειν] This seems to be a

gloss, and it was condemned by Dobree: the editors however retain it.

12. ὁμοῦ πάντα χρήματα] The ὁμοιομερῆ of Anaxagoras, infinite in number and infinitely divisible, were mixed in formless confusion until *νοῦς* ἐλθὼν αὐτὰ διεκόσμησεν.

16. ἐκ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων] i.e. ἐκ τῶν μὴ τεθνεῶτων, as Heindorf saw. If τὰ ζῶντα were derived from a reserve store of existence which had not passed through life and death, in time this store would be exhausted and all be absorbed in death. The converse is stated in *Republic* 611 A τοῦτο μὲν τοῖνον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὕτως ἐχέτω. εἰ δ' ἔχει, ἐννοεῖς ὅτι [αἱ ψυχαὶ] αἰεὶ ἂν εἶεν αἰ αὐταί. οὔτε γὰρ ἂν ἐλάττους γένοιτο μηδεμίᾳ ἀπολλυμένης οὔτε αὐ πλείους· εἰ γὰρ ὄτιοῦν τῶν ἀθανάτων πλέον γίγνοιτο, οἷσθ' ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ θνητοῦ γίγνοιτο καὶ πάντα ἂν εἴη τελευτώντα ἀθάνατα.

σθαι καὶ ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων τοὺς ζῶντας γίγνεσθαι καὶ τὰς τῶν τεθνεώτων ψυχὰς εἶναι.

E XVIII. Καὶ μὲν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης ὑπολαβὼν, καὶ κατ' ἐκείνον γε τὸν λόγον, ὃ Σώκρατες, εἰ ἀληθὴς ἐστίν, ὃν σὺ εἴωθας θαμὰ λέγειν, ὅτι ἡμῖν ἢ μάθησις οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ ἀνάμνησις τυγχάνει οὐσα, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον ἀνάγκη που ἡμᾶς ἐν προτέρῳ τιλὶ χρόνῳ

I. τὰς τῶν τεθνεώτων ψυχὰς εἶναι.]

After these words the mss. have καὶ ταῖς μὲν γ' (or μὲν) ἀγαθαῖς ἀμεινον εἶναι ταῖς δὲ κακαῖς κάκιον. The inconsequence of this stupid interpolation is so glaring that I have ejected the clause bodily from the text: its author, whose memory is sounder than his logic, was doubtless prompted by 63 C πολὺ ἀμεινον τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ἢ τοῖς κακοῖς. The words are retained by Hermann and the Zürich editors, bracketed by Stallbaum and Schanz.

72 E—76 D, cc. xviii—xxi. Kebes observes that another line of argument tends to show that our souls are immortal, the theory that learning is reminiscence. If questions are properly put, the right answers are elicited, showing that the knowledge sought exists in the mind of the respondent; as we see in the case of geometrical truths. For the satisfaction of Simmias Sokrates adds the following demonstration. Reminiscence we define as recalling to mind something we formerly knew but had forgotten. For instance, a lover on seeing a lyre thinks of his beloved who used the lyre; similarly a picture of a lyre or a horse may remind us of a man, a picture of Simmias may remind us of Kebes, or finally a picture of Simmias may remind us of Simmias himself: so that we see reminiscence may be effected either directly or indirectly. Now if it is effected directly, that is, if the object we perceive is similar to that which it calls to our minds, we cannot fail to notice how far the resemblance is exact. For example: we affirm that there is an idea of equality, which is called to our minds by our perception of sensibles which are equal. That this idea is something distinct from the

equal sensibles is clear; for the sensibles may appear equal to one observer, unequal to another; but about the idea of equality no difference of opinion can exist. Now we are to observe that all sensible equals appear to us as falling short of the standard of absolute equality, which plainly shows that our knowledge of absolute equality is prior to our perception of the sensibles. And whereas (1) this sense of deficiency in the sensibles has been present so long as we have had any perceptions of them, (2) our perceptions of them date from the moment of our birth, it inevitably follows that our knowledge of the idea must have been acquired before our birth (75 C). Now this of course applies to all ideas as well as to that of equality. Since then we have obtained this knowledge, two alternatives are open: either we are born in full possession of it and retain it through life, or we lose it at birth and gradually regain it. The first must be dismissed on this ground: if a man knows a thing he can give an account of it, but we see that men cannot give an account of the ideas: it follows then that the second alternative is true; we lose it, and all learning is but the recovery of it. And since our souls certainly did not acquire this knowledge during their human life they must have gained it before our birth and at birth lost it.

The argument from ἀνάμνησις proves the existence of the soul before birth; thus supplementing ἀνταπόδοσις which is chiefly used to show her existence after death. Moreover ἀνάμνησις shows, what ἀνταπόδοσις did not, that the soul δύναμις καὶ φρόνησις ἔχει apart from the body.

4. ὃν σὺ εἴωθας] This must not be

μεμαθηκέναι ἂ νῦν ἀναμνησκόμεθα· τούτο δὲ ἀδύνατον, εἰ μὴ ἦν που ἡμῖν ἢ ψυχὴ πρὶν ἐν τῷδε τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ εἶδει γενέσθαι. 73 ὥστε καὶ ταύτη ἀθάνατον ἢ ψυχὴ τι ἔοικεν εἶναι. Ἄλλά, ὦ Κέβης, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας ὑπολαβὼν, ποῖαι τούτων αἱ ἀποδείξεις; 5 ὑπόμνησόν με· οὐ γὰρ σφόδρα ἐν τῷ παρόντι μέμνημαι. Ἐνὶ μὲν λόγῳ, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, καλλίστῳ, ὅτι ἐρωτώμενοι οἱ ἄνθρωποι, ἐάν τις καλῶς ἐρωτᾷ, αὐτοὶ λέγουσιν πάντα ἢ ἔχει· καίτοι εἰ μὴ ἐτύγχανεν αὐτοῖς ἐπιστήμη ἐνούσα καὶ ὀρθὸς λόγος, οὐκ ἂν οἰοί τ' ἦσαν τούτο ποιῆσαι· ἐπεὶ τοι ἐάν τις ἐπὶ τὰ διαγράμματα ἄγῃ B ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων, ἐνταῦθα σαφέστατα κατηγορεῖ ὅτι τούτο οὕτως ἔχει. (Εἰ δὲ μὴ ταύτη γε, ἔφη, πείθει, ὦ Σιμμία, ὁ Σωκράτης, σκέψαι δὴ τῆδέ πῃ σοι ἂν σκοπούμενῳ συνδόξῃ.) ἀπιστεῖς γὰρ δὴ, πῶς ἢ καλουμένη μάθησις ἀνάμνησις ἐστίν; Ἄπιστῶ μὲν σοι ἔγωγε, ἢ δ' ὅς ὁ Σιμμίας, οὐ, αὐτὸ δὲ τούτο, ἔφη, δέομαι παθεῖν 15 περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος, ἀναμνησθῆναι. καὶ σχεδὸν γε ἐξ ὧν Κέβης ἐπεχείρησε λέγειν ἤδη μέμνημαι καὶ πείθομαι· οὐδὲν μεντὰν ἦττον ἀκούοιμι νῦν, πῆ σὺ ἐπεχείρησας λέγειν. Τῆδ' ἔγωγε, ἢ δ' ὅς. C ὁμολογοῦμεν γὰρ δῆπου, εἴ τίς τι ἀναμνησθήσεται, δεῖν αὐτὸν τούτο πρότερόν ποτε ἐπίστασθαι. Πάνυ γ' ἔφη. Ἄρ' οὖν καὶ τόδε 20 ὁμολογοῦμεν, ὅταν ἐπιστήμη παραγίνηται τρόπῳ τοιούτῳ, ἀνάμνησιν εἶναι; λέγω δὲ τίνα τρόπον τόνδε· ἐάν τίς τι [πρότερον]

regarded as true of the historic Sokrates.

7. ἐάν τις καλῶς ἐρωτᾷ] Olympiodoros' explanation of καλῶς deserves perpetuation: ὀρθῶς καὶ Πλατωνικῶς καὶ μὴ Περιπατητικῶς καὶ μὴ βωμολόχως. Plato's views will be best understood by comparing *Theaetetus* 149 A—151 D with *Republic* 518 B—D.

9. ποιῆσαι] I have followed Schanz in adopting Hirschig's emendation. I cannot believe in such a construction as οἰοί τε ποιήσῃ, and not a single instance has been adduced in its defence. The fact that κινδυνεύει sometimes is followed by the future infinitive is quite irrelevant. Z. and St. have ποιήσῃ.

ἐπεὶ τοι] So Heindorf for ἔπειτα. This seems absolutely required by the sense: surely the geometrical demonstrations are meant to furnish an instance, of what Kebes has just been saying, not an additional piece of evidence for ἀνάμνησις.

H. Schmidt has much to say against Heindorf and for the vulgate; but the cogency of his argument is not proportionate to its length. ἔπειτα is retained by Z. St. and Schanz.

τὰ διαγράμματα] mathematical diagrams. The interrogation of the slave in *Meno* 82 B foll. is of course a case in point.

10. κατηγορεῖ] Subject the same as of ἄγῃ: it has been suggested that κατηγορεῖ is impersonal, but there is not a shadow of authority for such a use.

14. παθεῖν] mss. μαθεῖν, which is retained by Wohlrab and defended by Schmidt. But παθεῖν is so much more pointed and the alteration is so slight, that I have followed Schanz and most of the later editors in adopting it. 'I desire personal experience of the very thing we are talking about'.

21. ἐάν τίς τι [πρότερον] It is possible to defend πρότερον, since the percep-



ἢ ἰδῶν ἢ ἀκούσας ἢ τινα ἄλλην αἴσθησιν λαβὼν μὴ μόνον ἐκείνου γινῶ, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἕτερον ἐννοήσῃ, οὐ μὴ ἢ αὐτῇ ἐπιστήμῃ ἀλλ' ἄλλῃ, ἄρα οὐχὶ τοῦτο δικαίως ἐλέγομεν ὅτι ἀνεμνήσθη, οὐ τὴν ἐννοίαν D ἔλαβεν; Πῶς λέγεις; Οἶον τὰ τοιαῦδε· ἄλλη που ἐπιστήμῃ ἀνθρώπου καὶ λύρας. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; Οὐκοῦν οἶσθα ὅτι οἱ ἐρασταί, ὅταν 5 ἰδῶσιν λύραν ἢ ἰμάτιον ἢ ἄλλο τι οἷς τὰ παιδικὰ αὐτῶν εἴωθε χρῆσθαι, πάσχουσι τοῦτο· ἐγνωσάν τε τὴν λύραν καὶ ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ ἔλαβον τὸ εἶδος τοῦ παιδός, οὐ ἦν ἢ λύρα; τοῦτο δέ ἐστιν ἀνάμνησις· ὥσπερ καὶ Σιμμίαν τις ἰδὼν πολλάκις Κέβητος ἀνεμνήσθη, καὶ ἄλλα που μυρία τοιαῦτ' ἂν εἴη. Μυρία μέντοι νῆ Δία, 10 ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας. Οὐκοῦν, ἢ δ' ὅς, τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀνάμνησις τίς ἐστι; μάλιστα μέντοι, ὅταν τις τοῦτο πάθῃ περὶ ἐκείνα ἀ ὑπὸ χρόνου καὶ τοῦ μὴ ἐπισκοπεῖν ἤδη ἐπελέληστο; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Τί δέ; ἢ δ' ὅς· ἐστὶν ἵππον γεγραμμένον ἰδόντα καὶ λύραν γεγραμμένην ἀνθρώπου ἀναμνησθῆναι, καὶ Σιμμίαν ἰδόντα γεγραμμένον Κέβητος 15 ἀναμνησθῆναι; Πάνυ γε. Οὐκοῦν καὶ Σιμμίαν ἰδόντα γεγραμ- 74 μένον αὐτοῦ Σιμμίου ἀναμνησθῆναι; Ἔστι μέντοι, ἔφη.

XIX. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ κατὰ πάντα ταῦτα συμβαίνει τὴν ἀνάμνησιν εἶναι μὲν ἀφ' ὁμοίων, εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ ἀνομοίων; Συμβαίνει. Ἄλλ' ὅταν γε ἀπὸ τῶν ὁμοίων ἀναμνησκηται τίς τι, ἄρ' οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον 20

tion must precede the reminiscence. But there is no point in this, and the word seems to have crept in from *πρότερόν ποτε ἐπίστασθαι* above.

2. *ἀλλὰ καὶ ἕτερον ἐννοήσῃ*] This is probably the earliest mention of what has been known since Locke as 'association of ideas'. Compare Aristotle *περὶ μνήμης καὶ ἀναμνήσεως* II 451<sup>b</sup> 16, where he refines upon the simple classification of Plato (*ἀφ' ὁμοίων καὶ ἀνομοίων*) by starting the sequence *ἀφ' ὁμοίου καὶ ἐναντίου καὶ τοῦ σύγγενους*: he deals too with the process as an act of volition.

13. *ἐπελέληστο*] Compare the definition in *Λαῖος* 732 B *ἀνάμνησις δ' ἐστὶν ἐπιρροή φρονήσεως ἀπολειπούσης*.

16. *οὐκοῦν καὶ Σιμμίαν ἰδόντα*] The order in which these illustrations are arranged seems at first sight strange. For instead of working up from the simpler and more direct cases of association to the more complex, we have, as it were, a

descending scale: it is surely more remarkable that the picture of a lyre should remind us of some particular human being than that a picture of Simmias should remind us of the living Simmias. But the explanation is simple, if we remember how Plato intends to apply his analogy. The particulars, by which we are reminded of the ideas, stand in much the same relation to the ideas as the painted Simmias to the real Simmias: hence by this arrangement of his examples Plato emphasises exactly the right form of the analogy. This is one of ten thousand proofs of the astonishing carefulness of Plato's writing. Also it is worth noticing that although the relation between ideas and particulars is in the *Phaedo*, as in the *Republic*, still undefined (see 100 D), this passage distinctly foreshadows the doctrine of *μυμησις*, which is evolved in the *Philebus* and *Timaeus*.

19. *εἶναι μὲν ἀφ' ὁμοίων*] as in the

τόδε προσπάσχειν, ἐννοεῖν εἴτε τι ἑλλείπει τούτο κατὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα εἴτε μὴ ἐκείνου οὐ ἀνεμνήσθη; Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη. Σκόπει δὴ, ἢ δ' ὅς, εἰ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει. φαμέν πού τι εἶναι ἴσον, οἱ ξύλον λέγω ξύλω οὐδὲ λίθον λίθῳ οὐδ' ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν, ἀλλὰ 5 παρὰ ταῦτα πάντα ἕτερόν τι, αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον φῶμέν τι εἶναι ἢ μηδέν; Φῶμεν μέντοι νῆ Δί', ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, θαυμαστώς γε. Ἡ Β καὶ ἐπιστάμεθα αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστιν; Πάνυ γε, ἢ δ' ὅς. Πόθεν λαβόντες αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐπιστήμην; ἄρ' οὐκ ἐξ ὧν νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, ἢ ξύλα ἢ λίθους ἢ ἄλλα ἅττα ἰδόντες ἴσα, ἐκ τούτων ἐκείνο ἐνενοήσαμεν, 10 ἕτερον ὄν τούτων; ἢ οὐχ ἕτερόν σοι φαίνεται; σκόπει δὲ καὶ τῆδε. ἄρ' οὐ λίθοι μὲν ἴσοι καὶ ξύλα ἐνίοτε ταῦτα ὄντα τῷ μὲν ἴσα φαίνεται, τῷ δ' οὐ; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Τί δέ; αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα ἔστιν

last example of the previous chapter. Reminiscence of the ideas by means of the particulars is ἀνάμνησις ἀφ' ὁμοίων.

7. λαβόντες αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐπιστήμην] This does not mean that the knowledge of the idea is derived from the particulars, which is in itself impossible and is contradictory to 75 B: but the knowledge that we possess of the idea is awakened by the perception of the particulars. ἐννοια is the more accurate word used later on. Cf. 74 C τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐνενοήκας τε καὶ εἰληφας. The simile of the aviary in *Theaetetus* 197 D would not be unapt here: knowledge of the idea is our possession, but it is not actually in our grasp until awakened by ἀνάμνησις.

10. σκόπει δὲ καὶ τῆδε] The following sentences furnish proof of the independent existence of the idea; in 74 D begins the proof that our knowledge of it must have been prior to our observation of the particulars.

11. τῷ μὲν] So Schanz with B. The ordinary reading is *τοτέ μὲν...τοτέ δέ*, which Schleiermacher approves on the ground that the defective equality of the particulars appears in their seeming to the same observer now equal now unequal. Prof. Geddes takes the same view: 'Plato is not reasoning from the variety of judgments among men generally: his argumentation proceeds as if

there was but one soul in the universe to hold converse with the outer world'. Surely this is quite unnecessary. The existence of a conflict of opinion is sufficient to establish the difference between the particulars and the idea: in the case of the latter no such conflict does or can exist. *τοτέ* has inferior ms. support and is clumsy after *ἐνίοτε*.

12. αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα] This very strange phrase has a parallel in *Parmenides* 129 B *εἰ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὰ τὰ ὁμοιά τις ἀπέφαιεν ἀνόμοια γιγνόμενα ἢ τὰ ἀνόμοια ὁμοια, τέρας ἂν, οἶμαι, ἦν*. In the present passage various explanations have been given: (1) that of Olympiodoros, that the plural represents the idea as thought by several minds; this is adopted by most commentators: (2) that it represents the idea as exemplified in several sets of equal particulars; to this approximates the view of Schneider, that *αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα* means the separate ideas of equal logs, equal stones &c. But who ever heard of the idea of an equal log? (3) Doederlein supposes that *αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα* means perfectly equal objects, such as can be conceived but do not exist in nature. But this makes Sokrates ask 'do things, which *ex hypothesi* seem to you equal, seem to you unequal?' besides there is no point in the introduction of these imaginary equals. (4) Heindorf seems to me to come much nearer the

C ὅτε ἀνισά σοι ἐφάνη, ἢ ἡ ἰσότης ἀνισότης; Οὐδεπώποτε γε, ὦ Σώκρατες. Οὐ ταῦτὸν ἄρα ἐστίν, ἢ δ' ὅς, ταῦτά τε τὰ ἴσα καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον. Οὐδαμῶς μοι φαίνεται, ὦ Σώκρατες. Ἄλλὰ μὴν ἐκ τούτων γ', ἔφη, τῶν ἴσων, ἐτέρων ὄντων ἐκείνου τοῦ ἴσου, ὅμως αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐννεόηκός τε καὶ εἴληφας; Ἄληθέστατα, ἔφη, 5 λέγεις. [Οὐκοῦν ἢ ὁμοίου ὄντος τούτοις ἢ ἀνομοίου; Πάνυ γε. Διαφέρει δέ γε, ἢ δ' ὅς, οὐδέν' ἕως ἂν ἄλλο ἰδῶν ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς D ὄψεως ἄλλο ἐννοήσης, εἴτε ὅμοιον εἴτε ἀνόμοιον, ἀναγκαῖον, ἔφη, αὐτὸ ἀνάμνησιν γεγενέσθαι. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.] Τί δέ; ἢ δ' ὅς' ἢ πᾶσχομέν τι τοιοῦτον περὶ τὰ ἐν τοῖς ξύλλοις καὶ οἷς νῦν δὴ ἐλέ- 10

truth. After quoting the *Parmenides* he adds 'multitudinis numerus adhiberi in his potuit, quoniam aequalitatis vel similitudinis notio non unum continet, sed ad duo certe refertur'. When Plato asks 'does the idea of equality seem equal or unequal?' the implied comparison compels him perforce to use the plural; not that he thinks there are more ideas of equality than one, but because to ask whether one thing is equal or unequal is sheer nonsense. He immediately explains the unusual phrase in the following words, 'I mean, does equality ever appear to you inequality?' By the time Plato wrote the *Parmenides* he had got rid of these unfortunate ideas of relations: for in the passage quoted Sokrates is stating the earlier form of the ideal theory: and probably he there used the plural not without the intention of pointing to the contradiction which such ideas involve. Schleiermacher takes *αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα* to be the particulars; but his explanation is in itself very unsatisfactory and requires an alteration of the text.

2. *ταῦτά τε τὰ ἴσα*] i.e. the equal particulars.

5. *ἐννεόηκός τε καὶ εἴληφας*] 'you have recalled and gained'; see on 73 C.

6. [*οὐκοῦν ἢ ὁμοίου ὄντος*] From the passage enclosed in brackets I have utterly failed to extract any meaning. Plato has just completed his proof that equal particulars carry back our minds to

an idea of equality which is distinct from the particulars: next he is about to show that our knowledge of the idea must have been prior to our observation of the particulars. But between these two necessary links in his argument we find interposed an irrelevant remark to the effect that the process is called *ἀνάμνησις* whether the object of perception is like or unlike the object of reminiscence. In the present context the repeated definition of *ἀνάμνησις* is surely pointless; and worse than pointless is the re-introduction of the *ὅμοιον καὶ ἀνόμοιον*: for the reminiscence of the idea by means of the particulars is necessarily *ἀφ' ὁμοίου*. I am therefore compelled to treat the words down to *πάνυ μὲν οὖν* as an interpolation: a conclusion at which I find Susemihl and Schmidt have also arrived. Stallbaum has an elaborate defence of the words, which might possibly have been more successful had he understood the difficulty. Prof. Geddes (not however on this passage) suggests that particulars may remind us of other ideas besides that to which they belong. But the whole force of the argument comes from the fact that this kind of reminiscence is *ἀφ' ὁμοίων*, for in this case alone are we conscious of a defect in the resemblance (74 A); and our consciousness of this defect is our sole warrant for inferring that we must have known the ideas before we perceived the particulars (74 E).



γομεν τοῖς ἴσοις· ἄρα φαίνεται ἡμῖν οὕτως ἴσα εἶναι ὡσπερ αὐτὸ  
 ὃ ἔστιν ἢ ἐνδεῖ τι ἐκείνου τοῦ τοιοῦτον εἶναι οἶον τὸ ἴσον, ἢ οὐδέν;  
 Καὶ πολὺ γε, ἔφη, ἐνδεῖ. Οὐκοῦν ὁμολογοῦμεν, ὅταν τίς τι ἰδὼν  
 ἐννοήσῃ, ὅτι βούλεται μὲν τοῦτο, ὃ νῦν ἐγὼ ὀρῶ, εἶναι οἶον ἄλλο  
 5 τι τῶν ὄντων, ἐνδεῖ δὲ καὶ οὐ δύναται τοιοῦτον εἶναι οἶον ἐκεῖνο, E  
 ἀλλ' ἔστιν φαυλότερον, ἀναγκαῖόν που τὸν τοῦτο ἐννοοῦντα τυχεῖν  
 προειδῶτα ἐκεῖνο ᾧ φησιν αὐτὸ προσοικεῖναι μὲν, ἐνδεεστέρως δὲ  
 ἔχειν; Ἀνάγκη. Τί οὖν; τοιοῦτον πεπόνθαμεν καὶ ἡμεῖς, ἢ οὐ,  
 περὶ τε τὰ ἴσα καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον; Παντάπασι γε. Ἀναγκαῖον ἄρα  
 10 ἡμᾶς προειδέναί τὸ ἴσον πρὸ ἐκείνου τοῦ χρόνου, ὅτε τὸ πρῶτον 75  
 ἰδόντες τὰ ἴσα ἐνενοήσαμεν, ὅτι ὀρέγεται μὲν πάντα ταῦτα εἶναι  
 οἶον τὸ ἴσον, ἔχει δὲ ἐνδεεστέρως. Ἔστι ταῦτα. Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ  
 τόδε ὁμολογοῦμεν, μὴ ἄλλοθεν αὐτὸ ἐννενοηκέναι μηδὲ δυνατὸν  
 εἶναι ἐννοῆσαι ἀλλ' ἢ ἐκ τοῦ ἰδεῖν ἢ ἄψασθαι ἢ ἐκ τινος ἄλλης  
 15 τῶν αἰσθήσεων· ταῦτόν δὲ πάντα ταῦτα λέγω. Ταῦτόν γάρ ἔστιν,  
 ᾧ Σώκρατες, πρὸς γε ὃ βούλεται δηλώσαι ὁ λόγος. Ἀλλὰ μὲν δι  
 ἔκ γε τῶν αἰσθήσεων δεῖ ἐννοῆσαι ὅτι πάντα τὰ ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν  
 ἐκείνου τε ὀρέγεται τοῦ ὃ ἔστιν ἴσον, καὶ αὐτοῦ ἐνδεεστερά ἔστιν· B  
 ἢ πῶς λέγομεν; Οὕτως. Πρὸ τοῦ ἄρα ἄρξασθαι ἡμᾶς ὀρᾶν καὶ  
 20 ἀκούειν καὶ τᾶλλα αἰσθάνεσθαι τυχεῖν ἔδει που εἰληφῶτας ἐπιστή-  
 μην αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἴσου ὃ τι ἔστιν, εἰ ἐμέλλομεν τὰ ἐκ τῶν αἰσθήσεων  
 ἴσα ἐκεῖσε ἀνοίσειν [ὅτι προθυμεῖται μὲν πάντα τοιαῦτ' εἶναι οἶον  
 ἐκεῖνο, ἔστιν δὲ αὐτοῦ φαυλότερα]. Ἀνάγκη ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων,

1. ὡσπερ αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστιν] St. adds ἴσον, which Z. has within brackets: but the word is absent in the best mss.

2. ἢ ἐνδεῖ τι ἐκείνου] 'or does it fall short of the idea, that is of being similar to it'. This is the reading of Schanz, which seems quite satisfactory and is very close to the mss. The common reading is τῷ μὴ τοιοῦτον εἶναι, which is excellent sense, but μὴ is almost destitute of authority. Madvig would read ἐκεῖνω τῷ τοιοῦτον εἶναι, 'does there lack anything to that quality of being like': a specimen of Greek composition which one would not rashly impute to Plato.

5. τοιοῦτον εἶναι] The mss. add ἴσον, which is clearly a gloss. Schanz retains it within brackets.

15. ταῦτόν δὲ πάντα ταῦτα λέγω] 'I

count all these sensations as the same thing': as is shown by the following sentence; not, as Wagner says, 'I say the same of all these'.

17. πάντα τὰ ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν] Since all sensuous perceptions do not remind us of equality, Madvig would insert ἴσα after αἰσθήσεων, Schanz brackets ἴσον. Against bracketing ἴσον I would urge that it is premature to apply the present argument to all ideas: that is first done in 75c: while the notion of equals so exclusively engrosses our attention throughout the present chapter that Madvig's insertion seems needless.

22. [ὅτι προθυμεῖται ... φαυλότερα] Schanz following Hirschig brackets these words: Mr Jackson independently takes the same view. The objections to them are

ὦ Σώκρατες. Οὐκοῦν γενόμενοι εὐθὺς ἐρωδόμεν τε καὶ ἠκούομεν  
C καὶ τὰς ἄλλας αἰσθήσεις εἶχομεν; Πάνυ γε. Ἔδει δέ γε, φάμεν,  
πρὸ τούτων τὴν τοῦ ἴσου ἐπιστήμην εἰληφέναι; Ναί. Πρὶν γενέ-  
σθαι ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀνάγκη ἡμῖν αὐτὴν εἰληφέναι. Ἔοικεν. x

XX. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν λαβόντες αὐτὴν πρὸ τοῦ γενέσθαι ἔχοντες 5  
ἐγενόμεθα, ἠπιστάμεθα καὶ πρὶν γενέσθαι καὶ εὐθὺς γενόμενοι οὐ  
μόνον τὸ ἴσον καὶ τὸ μείζον καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον ἀλλὰ καὶ ξύμπαντα  
τὰ τοιαῦτα; οὐ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἴσου νῦν ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν μᾶλλον τι ἢ  
καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ δικαίου καὶ  
D ὀσίου καί, ὕπερ λέγω, περὶ ἀπάντων οἷς ἐπισφραγιζόμεθα τὸ ὁ 10  
ἔστι, καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἐρωτήσεσιν ἐρωτῶντες καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἀποκρίσεσιν  
ἀποκρινόμενοι. ὥστε ἀναγκαῖον ἡμῖν τούτων πάντων τὰς ἐπι-  
στήμας πρὸ τοῦ γενέσθαι εἰληφέναι. Ἔστι ταῦτα. Καὶ εἰ μὲν  
γε λαβόντες ἐκάστοτε μὴ ἐπιλελήσμεθα, εἰδότες αἰεὶ γίγνεσθαι καὶ

(1) that they are irrelevant and inapposite,  
(2) that the use of *προθυμῆται* is most  
strange. I fully acquiesce in the judgment  
of these scholars that the clause is an  
unintelligent gloss upon *ἐκείσε*.

3. πρὸ τούτων] i.e. before our per-  
ceptions of sight, hearing, &c.

5. οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν λαβόντες] 'if then,  
having received this knowledge before  
birth, we were born in possession of it'.  
As yet Plato is merely putting the case,  
without expressing an opinion about it:  
presently we shall find that we were not  
born possessing it, except in a dormant  
state. We now go on to apply the re-  
sults gained for *ἴσον* to all the other  
ideas.

10. ὅπερ λέγω] just above, *ξύμπαντα*  
*τὰ τοιαῦτα*.

οἷς ἐπισφραγιζόμεθα] 'on which we  
stamp the character of essence'. *ὁ ἔστι*  
is Plato's technical term to denote the  
essentiality of the ideas. Plato never  
descends to forms like *αὐτοάνθρωπος*,  
which are common in Aristotle: he would  
say *αὐτὸ ὁ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος*.

11. ἐν ταῖς ἐρωτήσεσιν ... ἀποκρινό-  
μενοι] i.e. in our dialectical discussions.  
The conversational method was as dis-  
tinctive a peculiarity of the form as the

ideal theory was of the substance of  
Plato's philosophy; and so intimately are  
the two connected that *διαλεκτική*, pro-  
perly 'the science of dialogue', means  
nothing less than 'the science of ideas'.  
The Socratic method of examination was  
distinctly aimed at obtaining a definition  
or *λόγος* of the object in question; and  
this definition was peculiarly the out-  
come of the method. Plato, in developing  
the logical concept into a metaphysical  
essence, scrupulously preserved the method  
by which the former was attained.

12. ἀναγκαῖον ἡμῖν] Z. adds *εἶναι*  
with some mss.

14. ἐκάστοτε] i.e. 'and if after re-  
ceiving it we have not, in every instance  
of our doing so, forgotten it, we are  
always born in possession of this know-  
ledge and retain it through life'. I do  
not think it necessary to insert *γιγνώμενοι*  
after *ἐκάστοτε* with Heindorf, although I  
fully agree with his interpretation. Prof.  
Geddes' rendering can hardly stand, and  
he, rather than Heindorf, seems to have  
mistaken the argument. 'If we have',  
he says, 'in all the crises of our history,  
retained this knowledge'. But Plato does  
not say 'if we have retained', but 'if we  
have not forgotten': and though it is

διὰ βίου εἰδέναι· τὸ γὰρ εἰδέναι τοῦτ' ἐστίν, λαβόντα του ἐπι-  
 στήμην ἔχειν καὶ μὴ ἀπολωλέκенаί· ἢ οὐ τοῦτο λήθην λέγομεν, ὧ  
 Σιμμία, ἐπιστήμης ἀποβολήν; Πάντως δήπου, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες. E  
 Εἰ δέ γε οἶμαι λαβόντες πρὶν γενέσθαι γιγνόμενοι ἀπωλέσαμεν,  
 5 ὕστερον δὲ ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι χρώμενοι περὶ ταῦτα ἐκείνας ἀναλαμ-  
 βάνομεν τὰς ἐπιστήμας, ἄς ποτε καὶ πρὶν εἶχομεν, ἀρ' οὐχ ὁ  
 καλοῦμεν μαθάνειν οἰκείαν ἐπιστήμην ἀναλαμβάνειν ἂν εἴη; τοῦτο  
 δέ που ἀναμνησθεσθαι λέγοντες ὀρθῶς ἂν λέγοιμεν; Πάνυ γε.  
 Δυνατὸν γὰρ δὴ τοῦτό γε ἐφάνη, αἰσθόμενόν τι ἢ ἰδόντα ἢ ἀκού- 76  
 10 σαντα ἢ τινα ἄλλην αἰσθησιν λαβόντα ἕτερόν τι ἀπὸ τούτου  
 ἐννοῆσαι ὁ ἐπελέληστο, ὧ τοῦτο ἐπλησίαζεν ἀνόμοιον ὄν ἢ ὧ  
 ὅμοιον ὥστε, ὅπερ λέγω, δυοῖν τὰ ἕτερα, ἦτοι ἐπιστάμενοί γε  
 αὐτὰ γεγόναμεν καὶ ἐπιστάμεθα διὰ βίου πάντες, ἢ ὕστερον, οὓς  
 φάμεν μαθάνειν, οὐδὲν ἄλλ' ἢ ἀναμνησκονται οὗτοι, καὶ ἢ μά-  
 15 θησις ἀνάμνησις ἂν εἴη. Καὶ μάλα δὴ οὕτως ἔχει, ὦ Σώκρατες.

XXI. Πότερον οὖν αἰρεῖ, ὦ Σιμμία; ἐπισταμένους ἡμᾶς  
 γεγονόναί, ἢ ἀναμνησθεσθαι ὕστερον ὧν πρότερον ἐπιστήμην B  
 εἰληφότες ἡμεν; Οὐκ ἔχω, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐν τῷ παρόντι ἐλέσθαι.  
 Τί δὲ τόδε; ἔχεις ἐλέσθαι, καὶ πῆ σοι δοκεῖ περὶ αὐτοῦ· ἀνήρ  
 20 ἐπιστάμενος περὶ ὧν ἐπίσταται ἔχοι ἂν δοῦναι λόγον ἢ οὐ;

sense to say 'if we have retained it in all the crises', it is not sense to say 'if we have not forgotten it in all the crises'; since we have forgotten it once for all, and that, as Heindorf says, at our birth. I think in fact that ἐκάστοτε is to be taken in close connexion with λαβόντες: 'in every instance of our receiving it, we have not forgotten'. (Prof. Geddes is also scarcely accurate in saying that ἐπιστήμη is ἀνάμνησις: Plato says μάθησις is ἀνάμνησις, which is another thing.) The perfect ἐπιλελήσμεθα, as Wohlrab rightly observes, shows that Plato still expresses no opinion.

5. περὶ ταῦτα] This reading seems necessary, although αὐτὰ has stronger ms. authority. ταῦτα means the objects of sense, in antithesis to ἐκείνας. Wohlrab retains αὐτὰ but does not inform us how he proposes to make sense of it.

7. οἰκείαν] 'a knowledge that is already ours'.

9. ἐφάνη] in 73 c.

10. ἕτερόν τι ἀπὸ τούτου] 'to derive from this a conception of something different that he had forgotten, with which this was associated, whether unlike or like'. COPE. ὧ refers to ἕτερόν τι ὁ ἐπελέληστο, τοῦτο τοῦτου. I see no sufficient reason for bracketing the second ὧ with Schanz. Here there is nothing amiss in the introduction of the ὅμοιον and ἀνόμοιον, for Plato is expressly repeating the statement in 73 c.

20. δοῦναι λόγον] 'to give an account'; that is an accurate description of the thing defined, marking its logical differentia. A passage quoted by Wohlrab, *Republic* 534 B, explains the phrase very well: ἢ καὶ διαλεκτικὸν καλεῖς τὸν λόγον ἐκάστου λαμβάνοντα τῆς οὐσίας; καὶ τὸν μὴ ἔχοντα, καθ' ὅσον ἂν μὴ ἔχη λόγον αὐτῷ τε καὶ ἄλλω διδόναι, κατὰ τοσοῦτον νοῦν περὶ τούτου οὐ φήσεις ἔχειν; where we may translate λόγον τῆς οὐσίας 'the



Πολλή ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες. Ἡ καὶ δοκοῦσί σοι πάντες ἔχειν διδόναι λόγον περὶ τούτων ὧν νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν; Βουλοίμην μὲν τᾶν, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας· ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον φοβοῦμαι, μὴ αὐριοι τηρικᾶδε οὐκέτι ἢ ἀνθρώπων οὐδεὶς ἀξίως οἶός τε τοῦτο ποιῆσαι.

C Οὐκ ἄρα δοκοῦσί σοι ἐπίστασθαί γε, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία, πάντες αὐτά; 5 Οὐδαμῶς. Ἀναμιμνήσκονται ἄρα ἅ ποτε ἔμαθον; Ἀνάγκη. Πότε λαβοῦσαι αἱ ψυχαὶ ἡμῶν τὴν ἐπιστήμην αὐτῶν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἀφ' οὗ γε ἄνθρωποι γεγόναμεν. Οὐ δῆτα. Πρότερον ἄρα. Ναί. Ἦσαν ἄρα, ὦ Σιμμία, αἱ ψυχαὶ καὶ πρότερον, πρὶν εἶναι ἐν ἀνθρώπου εἶδει, χωρὶς σωμάτων, καὶ φρόνησιν εἶχον. Εἰ μὴ ἄρα γιγνόμενοι 10 λαμβάνομεν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ταύτας τὰς ἐπιστήμας· οὗτος γὰρ λέπεται ἔτι ὁ χρόνος. Εἶεν, ὦ ἑταῖρε· ἀπόλλυμεν δὲ αὐτὰς ἐν ποίῳ ἄλλῳ χρόνῳ; οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἔχοντές γε αὐτὰς γιγνόμεθα, ὡς ἄρτι ὠμολογήσαμεν ἢ ἐν τούτῳ ἀπόλλυμεν, ἐν ᾧ περ καὶ λαμβάνομεν; ἢ ἔχεις ἄλλον τινὰ εἰπεῖν χρόνον; Οὐδαμῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ 15 ἔλαθον ἑμαντὸν οὐδὲν εἰπών.

XXII. Ἄρ' οὖν οὕτως ἔχει, ἔφη, ἡμῖν, ὦ Σιμμία; εἰ μὲν ἔστιν ἃ θρυλοῦμεν αἰεὶ, καλόν τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ πᾶσα ἢ τοιαύτη οὐσία, καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτην τὰ ἐκ τῶν αἰσθήσεων πάντα ἀναφέρομεν, [ὑπάρ- 1  
E χουσαν πρότερον ἀνευρίσκοντες ἡμετέραν οὖσαν, καὶ ταῦτα ἐκείνη 20

principle of its being'. Compare also 531 E. Below, 99 E, there will be more to say about λόγος.

2. περὶ τούτων] i.e. the ideas.

10. χωρὶς σωμάτων] This does not necessarily follow: Plato however simply means apart from the human bodies in which they now dwell: cf. 114 C, where the purified souls are said to live *ἄνευ σωμάτων τὸ παράπαν*, although the conditions of their existence are obviously conceived as material. The body from which they are freed by death is the γήινον σῶμα of *Phaedrus* 246 C. In the following words καὶ φρόνησιν εἶχον Plato marks the additional result he has gained by the appeal to ἀνάμνησις.

12. ἀπόλλυμεν δέ] Simmias suggests that the knowledge may be acquired just at the moment of birth; Sokrates replies, it is impossible, for that is the very moment at which we lose it: we cannot gain and lose it simultaneously. Com-

pare *Republic* 621 A, where the souls that are on the point of returning to earth must drink of the river Ameles. In comparing this passage, as Prof. Geddes does, with Wordsworth's famous ode, it ought not to be left out of sight that there is a fundamental opposition between them. According to Wordsworth we are born with the antenatal radiance clinging about us and spend our lives in gradually losing it; according to Plato we lose the vision at birth and spend our lives in gradually recovering it.

76 D—77 B, c. xxii. The outcome of the preceding argument is this: the pre-existence of our souls is inseparably bound up with the existence of ideas and the former stands or falls with the latter. Simmias heartily assents to this and affirms his unshaken conviction that the ideas do exist and consequently that our souls existed before our birth.

19. [ὑπάρχουσιν πρότερον] Mr Jack-

ἀπεικάζομεν, ἀναγκαῖον, οὕτως] ὥσπερ καὶ ταῦτα ἔστιν, οὕτως καὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν ψυχὴν εἶναι καὶ πρὶν γεγονέαι ἡμᾶς· εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔστι ταῦτα, ἄλλως ἂν ὁ λόγος οὕτως εἰρημένος εἴη; ἀρ' οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἴση ἀνάγκη ταῦτά τε εἶναι καὶ τὰς ἡμετέρας ψυχὰς πρὶν καὶ ἡμᾶς  
 5 γεγονέαι, καὶ εἰ μὴ ταῦτα, οὐδὲ τάδε; Ὑπερφυῶς, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, δοκεῖ μοι ἡ αὐτὴ ἀνάγκη εἶναι, καὶ εἰς καλὸν γε καταφεύγει ὁ λόγος εἰς τὸ ὁμοίως εἶναι τὴν τε ψυχὴν ἡμῶν πρὶν 77  
 γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ἣν σὺ νῦν λέγεις. οὐ γὰρ ἔχω ἔγωγε οὐδὲν οὕτω μοι ἐναργὲς ὄν ὡς τοῦτο, τὸ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτ'  
 10 εἶναι ὡς οἶόν τε μάλιστα, καλὸν τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα ἂ σὺ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγες· καί, ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, ἱκανῶς ἀποδέδεικται. Τί δὲ δὴ Κέβητι; ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης· δεῖ γὰρ καὶ Κέβητα πείθειν. Ἰκανῶς, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, ὡς ἔγωγε οἶμαι· καίτοι καρτερώτατος ἀνθρώπων ἔστιν πρὸς τὸ ἀπιστεῖν τοῖς λόγοις· ἀλλ' οἶμαι οὐκ ἐνδεῶς τοῦτο  
 15 πεπεῖσθαι αὐτόν, ὅτι πρὶν γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς ἢ ἡμῶν ἢ ψυχῆ. B

son, in the paper before mentioned, maintains that the words from *ὑπάρχουσιν* to *ἀναγκαῖον οὕτως* are spurious. In this opinion I concur for the following reasons: (1) the clause *ὑπάρχουσιν πρότερον ἀνεύρισκοντες ἡμετέραν οὐσαν* would seem just the same kind of clumsy misapplication of Plato's phraseology of which we have already seen too much: Plato says (75 E) that the knowledge of the ideas is our own; but where does he say that the ideas themselves are our own, and what is the sense of saying so? (2) *ταῦτα ἐκεῖνη ἀπεικάζομεν* is a pointless repetition of *ἐπὶ ταύτην ἀναφέρομεν*: (3) *ταῦτα* there means sensibles; presently *ταῦτα* three times refers to the ideas. Wytténbach, on this very ground, proposes to read *αὕτη ἔστιν*: (4) though the repetition of *οὕτως* may be defended, it certainly sounds very awkward here. Accordingly I have bracketed the words. With this omission the sentence will stand: 'if these ideas exist which are for ever on our lips, absolute beauty and goodness and all other absolute essence, and if it is to this essence that we refer all our sense-perceptions, as this surely exists, so surely did our soul exist before our

birth'. *εἶναι* will then depend upon *οὕτως ἔχει*.

2. *εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔστι ταῦτα*] 'if these ideas do not exist'; not as some take it, 'if this is not so'. Cf. below *ἴση ἀνάγκη ταῦτά τε εἶναι*.

5. *εἰ μὴ ταῦτα, οὐδὲ τάδε*] i.e. if the ideas do not exist, neither did our souls exist before birth.

6. *εἰς καλὸν γε*] 'And our argument has found an excellent refuge in the position that the pre-existence of our soul rests on the same assurance as the existence of the ideas'. Wagner should not have supplied *καιρὸν* with *καλόν*, which is explained by the sentence in apposition, *εἰς τὸ ὁμοίως εἶναι*.

8. *ἦν σὺ νῦν λέγεις*] *νῦν* is omitted in some mss. and Schanz brackets it.

11. *καί, ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, ἱκανῶς ἀποδέδεικται*] This reading has the best authority, and Schanz defends the parenthetical use of *ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ* by citing 108 B, *Protagoras* 314 C, *Menexenus* 236 B. Z. and St. give *ἔμοιγε ἱκανῶς ἀποδέδεικται*.

77 B—D, c. xxiii. But, continues Simmias, reminiscence only proves that our soul existed before entering into a human body: it does not prove that the soul

XXIII. *Εἰ μέντοι καὶ ἐπειδὴν ἀποθάνωμεν ἔτι ἔσται, οὐδὲ αὐτῷ μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀποδεδείχθαι, ἀλλ' ἔτι ἐνέστηκεν ὁ νῦν δὴ Κέβης ἔλεγε, τὸ τῶν πολλῶν, ὅπως μὴ ἀποθνήσκουτος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου διασκεδανῦται ἢ ψυχὴ καὶ αὐτῇ τοῦ εἶναι τοῦτο τέλος ἦ. τί γὰρ κωλύει γίνεσθαι μὲν αὐτὴν καὶ ξυνίστασθαι 5 ἀμόθεν ποθὲν καὶ εἶναι, πρὶν καὶ εἰς ἀνθρώπειον σῶμα ἀφικέσθαι, ἐπειδὴν δὲ ἀφίκεται καὶ ἀπαλλάττηται τούτου, τότε καὶ αὐτὴν*  
 C *τελευτᾶν καὶ διαφθεῖρεσθαι; Εὐ λέγεις, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία, ὁ Κέβης. φαίνεται γὰρ ὡσπερ ἡμῖς ἀποδεδείχθαι οὐ δεῖ, ὅτι πρὶν γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς ἢ ἡμῶν ἢ ψυχῇ· δεῖ δὲ προσαποδείξαι ὅτι καὶ ἐπειδὴν 10 ἀποθάνωμεν οὐδὲν ἦττον ἔσται ἢ πρὶν γενέσθαι, εἰ μέλλει τέλος ἢ ἀπόδειξις ἔχειν. Ἀποδέδεικται μὲν, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, ὁ Σωκράτης, καὶ νῦν, εἰ θέλετε συνθεῖναι τούτον τε τὸν λόγον εἰς*  
 D *ταυτόν καὶ ὃν πρὸ τούτου ὠμολογήσαμεν, τὸ γίνεσθαι πάν τὸ ζῶν ἐκ τοῦ τεθνεῶτος. εἰ γὰρ ἔστιν μὲν ἢ ψυχὴ καὶ πρότερον, ἀνάγκη 15 δὲ αὐτῇ εἰς τὸ ζῆν ἰούσῃ τε καὶ γιγνομένη μηδαμόθεν ἄλλοθεν ἢ ἐκ θανάτου καὶ τοῦ τεθνάναι γίνεσθαι, πῶς οὐκ ἀνάγκη αὐτὴν καὶ ἐπειδὴν ἀποθάνῃ εἶναι, ἐπειδὴ γε δεῖ αὐτὴν γίνεσθαι; ἀποδέδεικται μὲν οὖν ὅπερ λέγετε καὶ νῦν.*

on leaving the body may not be dissipated and perish. Kebes agrees that immortality is only half proved. Sokrates replies that the other half is supplied by the argument from alternation of opposites, which proved that the soul must exist after death.

4. *διασκεδανῦται*] The indicative can hardly be right here because we have ἦ in the next clause, and the change of mood would be meaningless. A parallel form is the optative *πηγνυτο* in 118 A. I do not see on what ground the accentuation *διασκεδάννυται* (as subjunctive) and *πήγνυτο* can be defended, since the forms are clearly contractions. Z. and St. have *διασκεδάννυται*.

5. *τί γὰρ κωλύει*] 'What reason is there why she should not come into being and union from somewhere or other and exist before she enters a human frame, but when she has entered one and is in act of leaving it, she should not at that moment herself come to an end and perish?'

6. *ἀμόθεν ποθὲν*] This is Bekker's correction of *ἄλλοθεν*, which is retained by Z. and St.

13. *εἰ θέλετε συνθεῖναι*] I do not understand how, in the face of this express statement of Plato's, some have regarded *ἀνταπόδοσις* and *ἀνάμνησις* as two distinct demonstrations of immortality. As he says, they are two halves of a demonstration; one showing the pre-existence, the other the after-existence of the soul.

77 D—78 B, c. xxiv. Yet, says Sokrates, you and Simmias seem still to have a lurking fear lest the soul on leaving the body be scattered to the winds. Perhaps, replies Kebes, there is a child within us that still needs to be soothed; and soon there will be no man living who can soothe it. Do not despair, says Sokrates; wide is Hellas and wider is the world; you must spare neither pains nor riches to find such a man, not omitting to search among yourselves.



XXIV. "Ομως δέ μοι δοκεῖς σύ τε καὶ Σιμμίας ἠδέως ἂν καὶ τοῦτον διαπραγματεύσασθαι τὸν λόγον ἔτι μᾶλλον, καὶ δεδιέναι τὸ τῶν παίδων, μὴ ὡς ἀληθῶς ὁ ἄνεμος αὐτὴν ἐκβαλνουσαν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος διαφυσᾶ καὶ διασκεδάννυσιν, ἄλλως τε καὶ ὅταν τύχη τις <sup>Ε</sup> μὴ ἐν νηνεμία ἀλλ' ἐν μεγάλῳ τινὶ πνεύματι ἀποθνήσκων. καὶ ὁ Κέβης ἐπιγελάσας 'Ὡς δεδιότων, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, πειρῶ ἀναπείθειν' μᾶλλον δὲ μὴ ὡς ἡμῶν δεδιότων, ἀλλ' ἴσως ἐνι τις καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν παῖς, ὅστις τὰ τοιαῦτα φοβεῖται' τοῦτον οὖν πειρώμεθα πείθειν μὴ δεδιέναι τὸν θάνατον ὥσπερ τὰ μορμολύκεια. Ἄλλὰ <sup>10</sup> χρή, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ἐπάδειν αὐτῷ ἐκάστης ἡμέρας, ἕως ἂν ἐξεπάσσητε. Πόθεν οὖν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῶν τοιούτων ἀγαθὸν <sup>78</sup> ἐπφδὸν ληψόμεθα, ἐπειδὴ σύ, ἔφη, ἡμᾶς ἀπολείπεις; Πολλὴ μὲν ἢ Ἑλλάς, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, ἐν ἣ ἔνεισί που ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες, πολλὰ δὲ καὶ τὰ τῶν βαρβάρων γένη, οὓς πάντας χρὴ διερευνᾶσθαι ζητοῦντας <sup>15</sup> τοιοῦτον ἐπφδὸν, μήτε χρημάτων φειδομένους μήτε πόνων, ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν εἰς ὃ τι <ἂν> ἀναγκαϊότερον ἀναλίσκοιτε χρήματα. Ζητεῖν

2. διαπραγματεύσασθαι τὸν λόγον ἔτι μᾶλλον] I think the misgivings of Simmias and Kebes arise thus. We have indeed seen that the recurrence of soul is a law of nature; but we are not sufficiently acquainted with the laws of nature and the conditions of their interaction to be perfectly sure how they will work in every particular case. So we are still haunted by the doubt that a soul may, under certain circumstances, be dissipated and destroyed: this doubt can only be satisfied by proving that the eternity of soul can be deduced not only from a universal law but from her own inherent nature. Next ἀνάμνησις has placed the eternity of soul on the same footing of assurance as the existence of the ideas: but this is done indirectly; we desire to be convinced that soul not only has had cognition of the ideas, but that she possesses such an affinity with their nature as will justify us in believing that she shares their attribute of eternity; see introduction § 2.

4. διασκεδάννυσιν] Hirschig would read διασκεδαννύη. But here the indicative is clearly right. What we fear is, not lest

the wind should blow the soul away, but lest it is a fact that it does so.

8. ἐν ἡμῖν παῖς] 'there is a child within us'; not of course 'among us'.

11. ἐξεπάσσητε] 'until you have charmed him out of you'. This reading is due to Heindorf; the old editions and the best mss. have ἐξιάσσηται. Heindorf's admirable emendation is confirmed by one ms.

12. ἐπειδὴ σύ, ἔφη] For the repetition of ἔφη Wohlrab compares 89 c, 103 c; 118 A.

14. τὰ τῶν βαρβάρων γένη] Plato's travels had caused him to form a more liberal estimate of barbarian possibilities than was usual in his time. Compare *Republic* 499 c *εἰ τοίνυν ἄκροις εἰς φιλοσοφίαν πόλεως τις ἀνάγκη ἐπιμεληθῆναι ἢ γέγονεν ἐν τῷ ἀπέρω τῷ παρεληλυθότι χρόνῳ ἢ καὶ νῦν ἔστιν ἐν τινὶ βαρβαρικῷ τόπῳ, πόρρω που ἐκτὸς ὄντι τῆς ἡμετέρας ἐπόψεως, ἢ καὶ ἔπειτα γενήσεται, περὶ τούτου ἔτοιμοι τῷ λόγῳ διαμάχασθαι, ὡς γέγονεν ἢ εἰρημένη πολιτεία καὶ ἔστι καὶ γενήσεται γε, ὅταν αὕτη ἢ Μοῦσα πόλεως ἐγκρατὴς γένηται. Cf. *Symposium* 209 E.*

16. ἂν ἀναγκαϊότερον] So Schanz with

δὲ χρῆ καὶ αὐτοὺς μετ' ἀλλήλων ἴσως γὰρ ἂν οὐδὲ ῥαδίως εὗροιτε μᾶλλον ὑμῶν δυναμένους τοῦτο ποιεῖν. Ἄλλα ταῦτα μὲν δὴ, ἔφη, **B** ὑπάρξει, ὁ Κέβης· ὅθεν δὲ ἀπελίπομεν ἐπαπέλωμεν, εἴ σοι ἡδομένη ἐστίν. Ἄλλα μὴν ἡδομένη γε πῶς γὰρ οὐ μέλλει; Καλῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις. 5

**XXV.** Οὐκοῦν τοιόνδε τι, ἢ δ' ὅς ὁ Σωκράτης, δεῖ ἡμᾶς ἐρέσθαι ἑαυτούς, τῷ ποίῳ τινὶ ἄρα προσήκει τοῦτο τὸ πάθος πάσχειν τοῦ διασκεδάνυσθαι, καὶ ὑπὲρ τοῦ ποίου τινὸς δεδιέναι μὴ πάθῃ αὐτό, καὶ τῷ ποίῳ τινὶ <οὔ>· καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο αὐ ἐπισκέψασθαι, πότερον ἢ ψυχὴ ἐστίν, καὶ ἐκ τούτων θαρρεῖν ἢ **10** δεδιέναι ὑπὲρ τῆς ἡμετέρας ψυχῆς; Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις. Ἄρ' **C** οὖν τῷ μὲν συντεθέντι τε καὶ συνθέτῳ ὄντι φύσει προσήκει τοῦτο πάσχειν, διαιρεθῆναι ταύτῃ ἢ περ συντεθῆ· εἰ δέ τι τυγχάνει ὄν ἀξύνθετον, τούτῳ μόνῳ προσήκει μὴ πάσχειν ταῦτα, εἴπερ τῷ

**C**: **BD** omit *ἂν*. **Z.** and **St.** give *ἂν ἐκαιρότερον* with **E**.

78 **B**—80 **E**, *cc.* **xxv**—**xxix**. The question is then, what kind of things are liable to dissolution and what are not? and to which class does soul belong? That which is composite and consists of parts may doubtless be resolved again into parts; but if we can discover something which is incomposite and without parts we may safely affirm that this, if anything, is indissoluble. To the class of incomposites we should assign whatever is constant and changeless; to that of composites all that is ever-changing. Now this is precisely what constitutes the difference between the contents of the ideal and of the phenomenal world respectively: the ideas are changeless, simple, apprehensible by pure intelligence; phenomena are ever-changing, manifold, apprehensible by mere sensation. Let us term the former the invisible, the latter the visible world: to which sphere shall we assign soul and body respectively? (1) the body is visible, the soul is invisible: (2) when the soul apprehends by means of the bodily senses, she deals with the ever-changing and is herself filled with confusion and

uncertainty; when she apprehends by herself, she deals with the changeless, and her own reflections are constant and sure: (3) when soul and body are together, the soul is mistress, the body is servant; and to command is the function of the divine, to obey is that of the mortal. For these three reasons we decide that the affinity of soul is to the divine and changeless and indissoluble, the world of ideas; that of body to the mortal and changeful and dissoluble, the world of phenomena. Hence we should infer that while the body quickly decays the soul is nearly if not quite indissoluble. And as even a body that is embalmed lasts for an indefinite time, how much more enduring then should we expect the soul to be?

9. τῷ ποίῳ τινὶ οὔ] οὔ is not in the mss. but was supplied by Heindorf. It is certainly necessary.

12. καὶ συνθέτῳ] As Prof. Geddes remarks, *συνθέτῳ* denotes the state which is the result of the process expressed by *συντεθέντι*. Wagner wrongly takes *φύσει* with *συνθέτῳ*: it belongs to *προσῆκει*.

14. εἴπερ τῷ ἄλλῳ] It is to be noticed that the present line of argument aims at nothing more than establishing a proba-

ἄλλω; Δοκεῖ μοι, ἔφη, οὕτως ἔχειν, ὁ Κέβης. ↓ Οὐκοῦν ἄπερ αἰεὶ κατὰ ταῦτά καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχει, ταῦτα μάλιστα εἰκὸς εἶναι τὰ ἀξύνθητα, ἃ δὲ ἄλλοτ' ἄλλως καὶ μηδέποτε κατὰ ταῦτά, ταῦτα δὲ σύνθητα; Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ οὕτως. Ἴωμεν δὴ, ἔφη, ἐπὶ ταῦτά ἐφ' ἄπερ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν λόγῳ. αὐτὴ ἡ οὐσία ἧς λόγον δίδομεν τοῦ D εἶναι καὶ ἐρωτῶντες καὶ ἀποκρινόμενοι, πότερον ὡσαύτως αἰεὶ ἔχει κατὰ ταῦτά ἢ ἄλλοτ' ἄλλως; αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον, αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν, αὐτὸ ἕκαστον ὃ ἔστιν, τὸ ὄν, μὴ ποτε μεταβολὴν καὶ ἡντιοῦν ἐνδέχεται; ἢ αἰεὶ αὐτῶν ἕκαστον ὃ ἔστι, μονοειδὲς ὄν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό, ὡσαύτως 10 κατὰ ταῦτά ἔχει καὶ οὐδέποτε οὐδαμῆ οὐδαμῶς ἀλλοίωσιν οὐδεμίαν ἐνδέχεται; Ὡσαύτως, ἔφη, ἀνάγκη, ὁ Κέβης, κατὰ ταῦτά ἔχειν, ὃ Σώκρατες. Τί δὲ τῶν πολλῶν [καλῶν], οἶον ἀνθρώπων ἢ ἵππων ἢ ἱματίων ἢ ἄλλων ὄντινωνοῦν τοιούτων, ἢ ἴσων ἢ καλῶν ἢ πάντων E τῶν ἐκείνοις ὁμωνύμων; Ἄρα κατὰ ταῦτά ἔχει, ἢ πᾶν τούναντίον 15 ἐκείνοις οὔτε αὐτὰ αὐτοῖς οὔτε ἀλλήλοις οὐδέποτε, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, οὐδαμῶς κατὰ ταῦτά; Οὕτως, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης· οὐδέποτε ὡσαύτως

bility that soul is immortal; and as Kebes afterwards points out, it merely shows that soul should be much more durable than body, not that she is inherently eternal. I consider the chief importance of this part of the dialogue to consist in the opening it gives for the objections of Simias and Kebes. The former brings in a theory of soul which would be fatal to Plato's view, were it not refuted; the latter necessitates the final investigation, to which I conceive the present argument is merely preliminary. At the same time we are here first endeavouring to establish a direct connexion between the soul's nature and that of the ideas.

1. οὐκοῦν ἄπερ αἰεὶ κατὰ ταῦτά] Change in any object is the result of transposition, compression, or separation of its parts, or of increase or decrease in their number. Consequently that which has no parts cannot suffer change. All material things have parts, therefore the immaterial objects of reason are alone changeless.

5. ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν λόγῳ] 75 D.

ἧς λόγον δίδομεν τοῦ εἶναι] 'as whose principle we assign being'. λόγον=its

definition, notion. τοῦ εἶναι is descriptive genitive after λόγον. Madvig proposes τὸ εἶναι, which Schanz adopts: but ms. authority is entirely against him, and there is no real difficulty in the genitive. Here again we have a marked association of the ideal theory with the conversational method.

12. τῶν πολλῶν [καλῶν] καλῶν is an obvious interpolation: we are not concerned merely with beautiful particulars; and presently we have ἢ ἴσων ἢ καλῶν ἢ πάντων τῶν ἐκείνοις ὁμωνύμων, 'all the particulars which share the name of the ideas'. The particulars are ὁμόνυμα as being copies of the ideas: see *Sophist* 234 B μμήματα καὶ ὁμόνυμα τῶν ὄντων ἀπεργαζόμενος τῇ γραφικῇ τέχνῃ. Cf. *Timaeus* 41 C.

15. οὔτε αὐτὰ αὐτοῖς] 'they hardly ever preserve any constant relation either to themselves or to each other'. This is one of many passages which show that Plato thoroughly accepted the doctrines of Herakleitos and Protagoras so far as regards the material world.

16. οὕτως, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης] Z. and St. have οὕτως αὐ, ἔφη, ταῦτα, ὁ Κέβης.



79 ἔχει. Οὐκοῦν τούτων μὲν κἂν ἄψαιιο κἂν ἴδοις κἂν ταῖς ἄλλαις αἰσθήσεσιν αἰσθοιο, τῶν δὲ κατὰ ταυτὰ ἐχόντων οὐκ ἔστιν ὅτι ποτ' ἂν ἄλλω ἐπιλάβοιο ἢ τῷ τῆς διανοίας λογισμῷ, ἀλλ' ἔστιν αἰεὶδῆ τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ οὐχ ὁρατά; Παντάπασι, ἔφη, ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

XXVI. Θῶμεν οὖν βούλει, ἔφη, δύο εἶδη τῶν ὄντων, τὸ μὲν 5 ὁρατὸν, τὸ δὲ αἰεδές; Θῶμεν, ἔφη. Καὶ τὸ μὲν αἰεδές αἰεὶ κατὰ ταυτὰ ἔχου, τὸ δὲ ὁρατὸν μηδέποτε κατὰ ταυτὰ; Καὶ τοῦτο, ἔφη, θῶμεν. Φέρε δῆ, ἢ δ' ὅς, ἄλλο τι ἡμῶν αὐτῶν τὸ μὲν σῶμά ἐστι, τὸ δὲ ψυχῆ; Οὐδὲν ἄλλο, ἔφη. Ποτέρω οὖν ὁμοίωτερον τῷ εἶδει φαίμεν ἂν εἶναι καὶ ξυγγενέστερον τὸ σῶμα; Παντί, ἔφη, τοῦτό γε 10 δῆλον, ὅτι τῷ ὁρατῷ. Τί δὲ ἡ ψυχῆ; ὁρατὸν ἢ αἰεδές; Οὐχ ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη. Ἄλλὰ ἡμεῖς γε τὰ ὁρατὰ καὶ τὰ μὴ τῇ τῶν ἀνθρώπων φύσει λέγομεν ἢ ἄλλη τινὶ οἴει; Τῇ τῶν ἀνθρώπων. Τί οὖν περὶ ψυχῆς λέγομεν; ὁρατὸν ἢ ἀόρατον εἶναι; Οὐχ ὁρατὸν. Αἰεδές ἄρα; Ναί. Ὅμοιώτερον ἄρα ψυχῆ σῶματός 15 ἔστιν τῷ αἰεδεῖ, τὸ δὲ τῷ ὁρατῷ. Πᾶσα ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες.

XXVII. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τόδε πάλαι ἐλέγομεν, ὅτι ἡ ψυχῆ, ὅταν μὲν τῷ σῶματι προσχρῆται εἰς τὸ σκοπεῖν τι ἢ διὰ τοῦ ὁρᾶν ἢ διὰ τοῦ ἀκούειν ἢ δι' ἄλλης τινὸς αἰσθήσεως—τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν τὸ διὰ τοῦ σῶματος, τὸ δι' αἰσθήσεων σκοπεῖν τι—, τότε μὲν ἔλκεται ὑπὸ 20

3. τῷ τῆς διανοίας λογισμῷ] Cf. *Phaedrus* 247 C ἀχρώματός τε καὶ ἀσχημάτιστος καὶ ἀναφῆς οὐσία, ὄντως οὐσα, ψυχῆς κυβερνήτη μόνῳ θεατῇ νῶ. See also *Timaeus* 28 A.

5. θῶμεν οὖν βούλει] Z. and St. have εἰ βούλει.

τὸ μὲν ὁρατὸν τὸ δὲ αἰεδές] Compare the division of the universe into ὁρατὸν and νοητὸν in *Republic* 509 D.

8. ἄλλο τι ἡμῶν αὐτῶν] 'of ourselves is not one part body, the other soul?' I agree with Heindorf and Stallbaum in taking ἡμῶν αὐτῶν with τὸ μὲν...τὸ δέ. Ast would join it with ἄλλο τι, on account of the reply, οὐδὲν ἄλλο. But why should special emphasis be laid on the exhaustiveness of the division?

15. οὐχ ὁρατὸν] No distinction is intended between οὐχ ὁρατὸν and αἰεδές. Plato has made his division into ὁρατὸν and αἰεδές, and since soul is not ὁρατὸν, it

is αἰεδές. No doubt the motive which led Plato to choose αἰεδές instead of the direct verbal opposite ἀόρατον was the etymological connexion of the former with Ἄιδης: as if he would say that Ἄιδης, far from being the abode of death and nothingness, is the region of true existence alone. That he did connect the words is clear from 80 D, 81 C, in spite of *Cratylus* 404 B.

17. πάλαι ἐλέγομεν] 65 B foll.

20. τότε μὲν ἔλκεται] 'then she is dragged by the body among things that are never constant, and she herself loses her way and is filled with confusion and dizziness, like one that is drunk; for of such nature are the things that she grasps'. τοιούτων = πλανωμένων &c., cf. 58 D. Plato means that when the soul makes her investigations by the aid of the body, she necessarily is concerned with sensible phenomena; and since these

τοῦ σώματος εἰς τὰ οὐδέποτε κατὰ ταῦτ' ἔχοντα, καὶ αὐτὴ πλα-  
 νᾶται καὶ ταράττεται καὶ ἰλιγγιᾷ ὡς περ μεθύουσα, ἅτε τοιούτων  
 ἐφαπτομένη; Πάνν γε. "Ὅταν δέ γε αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν σκοπῆ, D  
 ἐκείσε οἴχεται εἰς τὸ καθαρὸν τε καὶ αἰὲ ὄν καὶ ἀθάνατον καὶ  
 5 ὡσαύτως ἔχον, καὶ ὡς συγγενῆς οὔσα αὐτοῦ αἰὲ μετ' ἐκείνου τε  
 γίγνεται, ὅταν περ αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν γένηται καὶ ἐξῆ αὐτῆ, καὶ  
 πέπανταί τε τοῦ πλάνου καὶ περὶ ἐκεῖνα αἰὲ κατὰ ταῦτ' ὡσαύτως  
 ἔχει, ἅτε τοιούτων ἐφαπτομένη καὶ τοῦτο αὐτῆς τὸ πάθημα φρό-  
 νησις κέκληται; Παντάπασι, ἔφη, καλῶς καὶ ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ὦ  
 10 Σώκρατες. Ποτέρῳ οὖν αὐ σοι δοκεῖ τῷ εἶδει καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν  
 καὶ ἐκ τῶν νῦν λεγομένων ψυχῇ ὁμοίωτερον εἶναι καὶ ξυγγενέσ- E  
 τερον; Πᾶς ἂν μοι δοκεῖ, ἢ δ' ὅς, συγχωρήσαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐκ  
 ταύτης τῆς μεθόδου, καὶ ὁ δυσμαθέστατος, ὅτι ὄλω καὶ παντὶ  
 ὁμοίωτερόν ἐστι ψυχῇ τῷ αἰὲ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντι μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ μή.  
 15 Τί δὲ τὸ σῶμα; Τῷ ἑτέρῳ.

XXVIII. "Ὅρα δὴ καὶ τῆδε, ὅτι, ἐπειδὴν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὦσι

have nothing stable or sure in them, there is a like want of stability and certainty in her perceptions.

6. καὶ πέπανταί τε τοῦ πλάνου] 'she has rest from her wandering, and in dwelling with them is ever constant, since the things that she grasps are constant'. So in *Republic* 500 C it is said of philosophers, εἰς τεταγμένα ἅττα καὶ κατὰ ταῦτ' αἰὲ ἔχοντα ὄρωντας καὶ θεωμένους οὔτ' ἀδικούντα οὔτ' ἀδικούμενα ὑπ' ἀλλήλων, κόσμῳ δὲ πάντα καὶ κατὰ λόγον ἔχοντα, ταῦτα μιμείσθαι τε καὶ ὅ τι μάλιστα ἀφομοιοῦσθαι. For πλάνου compare *Parmenides* 135 E οὐκ εἶλας ἐν τοῖς ὁραμένοις οὐδὲ περὶ ταῦτα τὴν πλάνην ἐπισκοπεῖν.

8. τοῦτο αὐτῆς τὸ πάθημα] 'this condition of hers is called wisdom'. Olympiodoros is much exercised as to how φρόνησις can be a πάθημα, how an activity of the soul can be denoted by a passive term. But Aristotle, for whom cognition was emphatically an ἐνέργεια, says, *de anima* III iv 429<sup>a</sup> 13, εἰ δὴ ἐστι τὸ νοεῖν ὡς περ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἢ πάσχειν τι ἂν εἴη ὑπὸ τοῦ νοητοῦ ἢ τι τοιοῦτον ἕτερον. I think however that πάθημα here means

nothing more than condition: compare *Republic* 511 D, where the term παθήματα is applied to the four mental states corresponding to the four segments of the line.

12. ἐκ ταύτης τῆς μεθόδου] 'from this way of approaching the question'. μέθοδος is frequently used by Plato for 'scientific method', especially dialectic: cf. *Republic* 510 B, *Politicus* 286 D.

13. ὄλω καὶ παντ[ Prof. Geddes explains 'both in the general and in the particular'; which I think is a needless refinement. It is only a strong expression for 'altogether' and is not uncommon: see *Republic* 469 C, 527 C (with the article), *Laws* 779 B, *Cratylus* 434 A. In *Laws* 734 E we have the reverse order τῷ παντὶ καὶ ὄλω, and in 944 C we find ὄλον καὶ τὸ πᾶν in precisely the same sense. In *Lysis* 215 C is the remarkable phrase ἄρα γε ὄλω τινὶ ἐξαπατώμεθα;

16. ὄρα δὲ καὶ τῆδε] After showing that the soul resembles the ideas (1) in her invisibility (2) in her affinity to the changeless, we now come to the last piece of evidence: that she is mistress over the body and uses it as a slave. Cf. *Timaeus*

80 ψυχή καὶ σῶμα, τῷ μὲν δουλεύειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι ἢ φύσις προσ-  
 τάττει, τῇ δὲ ἄρχειν καὶ δεσπόζειν· καὶ κατὰ ταῦτα αὐ πότερόν σοι  
 δοκεῖ ὅμοιον τῷ θεῷ εἶναι, καὶ πότερον τῷ θνητῷ; ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι  
 τὸ μὲν θεῖον οἶον ἄρχειν τε καὶ ἡγεμονεῦειν πεφυκέναι, τὸ δὲ θνητὸν  
 ἄρχεσθαί τε καὶ δουλεύειν; Ἔμοιγε. Ποτέρῳ οὖν ἢ ψυχῇ ἔοικεν; 5  
 Δῆλα δὴ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι ἢ μὲν ψυχῇ τῷ θεῷ, τὸ δὲ σῶμα τῷ  
 θνητῷ. Σκόπει δὴ, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, εἰ ἐκ πάντων τῶν εἰρημένων  
 B τάδε ἡμῖν ξυμβαίνει, τῷ μὲν θεῷ καὶ ἀθανάτῳ καὶ νοητῷ καὶ  
 μονοειδεῖ καὶ ἀδιαλύτῳ καὶ αἰεὶ ὡσαύτως κατὰ ταῦτα ἔχοντι ἑαυτῷ  
 ὁμοίωτατον εἶναι ψυχῇ, τῷ δὲ ἀνθρωπίνῳ καὶ θνητῷ καὶ πολυειδεῖ 10  
 καὶ ἀνοήτῳ καὶ διαλυτῷ καὶ μηδέποτε κατὰ ταῦτα ἔχοντι ἑαυτῷ  
 ὁμοίωτατον αὐ εἶναι σῶμα. ἔχομέν τι παρὰ ταῦτα ἄλλο λέγειν, ὦ  
 φίλε Κέβης, ἢ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει; Οὐκ ἔχομεν.

XXIX. Τί οὖν; τούτων οὕτως ἐχόντων ἄρ' οὐχὶ σῶματι μὲν  
 ταχὺ διαλύεσθαι προσήκει, ψυχῇ δὲ αὐ τὸ παράπαν ἀδιαλύτῳ 15  
 C εἶναι ἢ ἐγγύς τι τούτου; Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; Ἐννοεῖς οὖν, ἔφη, ἐπειδὴν  
 ἀποθάνῃ ὁ ἄνθρωπος, τὸ μὲν ὄρατόν αὐτοῦ, τὸ σῶμα, καὶ ἐν ὄρατῷ  
 κείμενον, ὃ δὴ νεκρὸν καλοῦμεν, ᾧ προσήκει διαλύεσθαι καὶ δια-  
 πίπτειν, οὐκ εὐθὺς τούτων οὐδὲν πέπονθεν, ἀλλ' ἐπιεικῶς συχρὸν  
 ἐπιμένει χρόνον, εἰ μὲν τις καὶ χαριέντως ἔχων τὸ σῶμα τέλευ- 20

34 C γενέσει δὲ καὶ ἀρετῇ προτέραν καὶ  
 πρεσβυτέραν ψυχὴν σώματος ὡς δεσπότην  
 καὶ ἄρξουσιν ἀρξομένου ξυνεστήσατο.

3. θεῷ...θνητῷ] Below, 80 B, we have  
 the contrast θεῷ—ἀνθρωπίνῳ: but the  
 antithesis θεῖον—θνητὸν occurs *Timaeus*  
 69 C and D.

10. ὁμοίωτατον εἶναι ψυχῇ] I have  
 adopted this reading notwithstanding that  
 there is much stronger ms. authority for  
 ψυχῇ, which Schanz Z. and St. retain.  
 ψυχῇ can only be construed by supplying  
 ξυμβαίνει again, which is intolerably  
 harsh. Such instances as *Philebus* 55 A  
 πολλή τις ἀλογία ξυμβαίνει γίνεσθαι are  
 nothing to the point: such a construction  
 is common enough, but here we have τάδε  
 as the subject of ξυμβαίνει.

11. ἀνοήτῳ] i.e. 'not the object of  
 intelligence': a sense which, I believe,  
 ἀνόητος bears nowhere else; it is however  
 placed beyond doubt by νοητῷ in the  
 opposite catalogue, by which Olympiodo-

ros absurdly understands 'intelligent'.  
 Another rare usage is that of ἀπίθανος in  
*Parmenides* 133 C, = 'incredulous'. Con-  
 sidering the exact correspondence of every  
 word in one list with the antithetical word  
 in the other, Hermann ought not to have  
 wished that the mss. gave ἀσθητῷ.

16. ἢ ἐγγύς τι τούτου] Here is a dis-  
 tinct confession that the foregoing is only  
 an approximate demonstration: we have  
 made out a case of probability, and that  
 is all.

17. ἐν ὄρατῷ κείμενον] 'situate in the  
 region of the visible'.

18. καὶ διαπίπτειν] Z. and St. add  
 καὶ διαπνεῖσθαι which is found in the cita-  
 tions of Stobaeus and Eusebius, but not  
 in the best mss. Hermann justly says  
 'imperite ab anima ad corpus translata  
 esse apparet'.

20. εἰ μὲν τις] It seems to me that  
 needless difficulty has been raised over  
 this sentence. χαριέντως ἔχων simply



τήσῃ καὶ ἐν τοιαύτῃ ὥρᾳ, καὶ πάνυ μάλα. συμπεσὸν γὰρ τὸ σῶμα καὶ ταριχευθέν, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ ταριχευθέντες, ὀλίγου ὕλου μένει ἀμύχανον ὅσον χρόνον. ἔνια δὲ μέρη τοῦ σώματος, καὶ ἂν D σαπῆ, ὅστ᾽ αὖτε καὶ νεῦρα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα, ὅμως ὡς ἔπος  
 5 εἰπεῖν ἀθάνατά ἐστιν ἢ οὐ; Ναί. Ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ ἄρα, τὸ ἀειδές, τὸ εἰς τοιοῦτον τόπον ἕτερον οἰχόμενον γενναῖον καὶ καθαρὸν καὶ ἀειδῆ, εἰς Ἄιδου ὡς ἀληθῶς, παρὰ τὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ φρόνιμον θεόν, οἷ, ἂν θεὸς ἐθέλῃ, αὐτίκα καὶ τῇ ἐμῇ ψυχῇ ἰτέον, αὐτὴ δὲ δὴ ἡμῖν ἢ τοιαύτη καὶ οὕτω πεφυκυῖα ἀπαλλαττομένη τοῦ σώματος εὐθύς δια-  
 10 πεφύσῃται καὶ ἀπόλωλεν, ὡς φασιν οἱ πολλοὶ ἀνθρωποὶ; πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ὦ φίλε Κέβης τε καὶ Σιμμία, ἀλλὰ πολλῶ μᾶλλον ὄδ' E ἔχει· ἐὰν μὲν καθαρὰ ἀπαλλάττηται, μηδὲν τοῦ σώματος ξυνεφέλκουσα, ἅτε οὐδὲν κοινωνοῦσα αὐτῷ ἐν τῷ βίῳ ἐκούσα εἶναι, ἀλλὰ φεύγουσα αὐτὸ καὶ συνηθροισμένη [αὐτὴ εἰς αὐτήν], ἅτε  
 15 μελετώσα ἀεὶ τοῦτο—τοῦτο δὲ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἢ ὀρθῶς φιλοσο-

means 'having his body in a good state', and to this *τοιαύτη* refers. If the body were in a healthy condition at death and at a healthy age, it would hold out longer, says Plato, against decomposition. Mr Cope, I think, is quite correct in translating: 'if a man die with his body in a vigorous state and at a vigorous period of his life, a very considerable time indeed'. The following sentence *συμπεσὸν ...χρόνον* is bracketed by Schanz after Ast. I see no sufficient reason for doing so; the *γὰρ* is certainly not very obvious, but may be explained thus, '(nor is this the strongest case,) for if a body is embalmed, it remains nearly whole for an incredible time'. Hirschig brackets *ὥσπερ...ταριχευθέντες*: very superfluously. Plato says (1) the body of a healthy man who dies in the prime of life lasts a good while, (2) an Egyptian mummy lasts an indefinite time, (3) even without this some parts of the human frame are almost indestructible.

3. καὶ ἂν σαπῆ] i.e. τὸ ἄλλο σῶμα.

7. εἰς Ἄιδου ὡς ἀληθῶς] To Hades rightly named, the abode of the unseen. Cf. *Gorgias* 493 B.

80 E—81 E, cc. xxix, xxx. We cannot

then believe that the soul when she leaves the body is scattered and dispersed; nay, if she departs pure and untainted of the body, because she has never willingly held communion with it during life, she is freed from its follies and passions and reaches the abode of the invisible, where she dwells with the gods for ever. But if she has been the companion of the body, sharing its pleasures and desires and thinking that alone to be real which she can apprehend by it, then she departs tainted and clogged with the material; and in fear of the viewless region, weighed down by her earthy load, she flits about the visible world. Hence it is that ghosts are seen about places of burial; they are such gross spirits as cannot rise from earth, but wander about it, until for their love of the material they once more enter a bodily form.

14. καὶ συνηθροισμένη] Schanz brackets these words, but they are in the best mss., and I see nothing against them. He omits *αὐτὴ εἰς αὐτήν*, which words have much slighter ms. support. I have thought it sufficient to bracket them.

81 φοῦσα καὶ τῷ ὄντι τεθνάσαι μελετῶσα [ράδιως]· ἢ οὐ τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη μελέτη θανάτου; Παντάσασί γε. Οὐκοῦν οὕτω μὲν ἔχουσα εἰς τὸ ὅμοιον αὐτῇ τὸ αἰδέεσθαι ἀπέρχεται, τὸ θεῖόν τε καὶ ἀθάνατον καὶ φρόνιμον, οἳ ἀφικομένη ὑπάρχει αὐτῇ εὐδαίμονι εἶναι, πλάνης καὶ ἀνοίας καὶ φόβων καὶ ἀγρίων ἐρώτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων κακῶν τῶν 5 ἀνθρωπείων ἀπηλλαγμένη, ὥσπερ δὲ λέγεται κατὰ τῶν μεμνημένων, ὡς ἀληθῶς τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον μετὰ τῶν θεῶν διαγοῦσθαι; οὕτω φῶμεν, ὡς Κέβης, ἢ ἄλλως;

B XXX. Οὕτω νῆ Δία, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης. Ἐὰν δέ γε οἶμαι μεμιασμένη καὶ ἀκάθαρτος τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλάττηται, ἅτε τῷ σώματι 10 αἰεὶ ξυνοῦσα καὶ τοῦτο θεραπεύουσα καὶ ἐρώσα καὶ γεγοητευμένη ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ὑπὸ τε τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ ἡδονῶν, ὥστε μηδὲν ἄλλο δοκεῖν εἶναι ἀληθές ἀλλ' ἢ τὸ σωματοειδές, οὐ τις ἂν ἄψαιτο καὶ ἴδοι καὶ πίοι καὶ φάγοι καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἀφροδίσια χρήσαιτο, τὸ δὲ τοῖς ὄμμασι σκοτῶδες καὶ αἰδέεσθαι, νοητὸν δὲ καὶ φιλοσοφία ἀίρετόν, 15 τοῦτο δὲ εἰθισμένη μισεῖν τε καὶ τρέμειν καὶ φεύγειν, οὕτω δὴ ἔχουσαν οἷε ψυχὴν αὐτὴν καθ' αὐτὴν εἰλικρινῆ ἀπαλλάξεσθαι; C Οὐδ' ὅπωςτιοῦν, ἔφη. Ἀλλὰ καὶ διειλημμένην γε οἶμαι ὑπὸ τοῦ σωματοειδοῦς, ὃ αὐτῇ ἢ ὀμίλια τε καὶ συνουσία τοῦ σώματος διὰ τὸ αἰεὶ ξυνεῖναι καὶ διὰ τὴν πολλὴν μελέτην ἐνεποίησε ξύμφυτον; 20

1. *ράδιως* savours of the margin, and I have followed Schanz and Hirschig in bracketing it.

5. *ἀγρίων ἐρώτων*] Cf. *Republic* 572 B *δεῶν τι καὶ ἀγριον καὶ ἀνομον ἐπιθυμιῶν εἶδος ἐκάστω ἐνεστι*.

7. *διαγοῦσθαι*] I have ventured to follow Heindorf and Hirschig in reading thus. The mss. all have *διάγουσα*, which most editors retain, but which I cannot believe that Plato wrote. It is idle to quote Thucydides VII 42 § 2: for in the first place it is rash to argue that a construction found in Thucydides is therefore possible in Plato; secondly, it is not a parallel case. When Thucydides says *Συρακοσίοις κατὰπληξίς ἐγένετο*, and after a subordinate clause resumes with *ὄρωντες*, the shock is not very great; but that after the regular datives *εὐδαίμονι, ἀπηλλαγμένη* Plato should end with this ungrammatical *διάγουσα* is quite a different thing. More to the purpose is Prof.

Geddes' citation of *Phaedrus* 241 D, where however Schanz reads *λέγων* for *λέγων*. Not one of the constructions given in Riddell, *digest of idioms* § 271 foll., at all justifies this, which is not an anacoluthon but a solecism. It has been suggested to connect *διάγουσα* with *ἀπέρχεται*, but I think this is hardly possible.

13. *οὐ τις ἂν ἄψαιτο*] Cf. *Theaetetus* 155 E *οἱ οὐδὲν ἄλλο οἰόμενοι εἶναι ἢ οὐ ἂν δύνωνται ἀπρίξ τοῦν χερῶν λαβέσθαι*, and *Sophist* 246 A.

18. *διειλημμένην*] 'interpenetrated'. The notion of this word is the mixture of two substances so that the particles of one are held apart by those of the other. The soul's substance is as it were adulterated by a material alloy. Z. and St. omit *καί*, which is however in the best mss.

20. *ξύμφυτον*] 'ingrained'. The soul's perpetual communion with the body has so inseparably blended the material and

Πάνυ γε. Ἐμβριθὲς δέ γε, ὦ φίλε, τούτο οἶεσθαι χρὴ εἶναι καὶ βαρὺ καὶ γεῶδες καὶ ὄρατόν· ὃ δὲ καὶ ἔχουσα ἢ τοιαύτη ψυχὴ βαρύνεται τε καὶ ἔλκεται πάλιν εἰς τὸν ὄρατόν τόπον, φόβῳ τοῦ αἰειδοῦς τε καὶ Ἄιδου, ὡςπερ λέγεται, περὶ τὰ μνήματά τε καὶ τοὺς D  
5 τάφους κυλινδουμένη, περὶ ἃ δὲ καὶ ὤφθη ἅττα ψυχῶν σκιοειδῆ φαντάσματα, οἷα παρέχονται αἱ τοιαῦται ψυχαὶ εἶδωλα, αἱ μὴ καθαρῶς ἀπολυθεῖσαι ἀλλὰ τοῦ ὄρατοῦ μετέχουσαι, διὸ καὶ ὄρωνται. Εἰκὸς γε, ὦ Σώκρατες. Εἰκὸς μέντοι, ὦ Κέβης· καὶ οὐ τί γε τὰς τῶν ἀγαθῶν ταύτας εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τὰς τῶν φαύλων, αἱ περὶ τὰ  
10 τοιαῦτα ἀναγκάζονται πλανᾶσθαι δίκην τίνουσαι τῆς προτέρας τροφῆς κακῆς οὔσης· καὶ μέχρι γε τούτου πλανῶνται, ἕως ἂν τῇ τοῦ ξυνεπακολουθοῦντος τοῦ σωματοειδοῦς ἐπιθυμίᾳ πάλιν ἐνδε- E  
θῶσιν εἰς σῶμα.

XXXI. Ἐνδοῦνται δέ, ὡςπερ εἰκὸς, εἰς τοιαῦτα ἦθη ὅποι' 15 ἅτ' ἂν καὶ μεμελετηκυῖαι τύχωσιν ἐν τῷ βίῳ. Τὰ ποῖα δὲ ταῦτα λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες; Οἶον τοὺς μὲν γαστριμαργίας τε καὶ ὑβρείς καὶ φιλοποσίας μεμελετηκότας καὶ μὴ διευλαβημένους εἰς τὰ τῶν ὄνων γένη καὶ τῶν τοιούτων θηρίων εἰκὸς ἐνδύεσθαι· ἢ οὐκ οἶει; 82 Πάνυ μὲν οὖν εἰκὸς λέγεις. Τοὺς δέ γε ἀδικίας τε καὶ τυραννίδας

the spiritual that they become virtually one nature; hence even when separated from the body she is not yet freed from matter.

3. βαρύνεται τε καὶ ἔλκεται] Cf. *Phaedrus* 248 C.

5. περὶ ἃ δὲ καὶ ὤφθη] This is an interesting illustration of the manner in which Plato will take some popular belief, as he often takes some popular expression, and fill it with a deeper meaning of his own. In *Laws* 865 D we find another current opinion about ghosts, here however without any special Platonic turn: that if one man killed another the spirit of the slain wandered about his accustomed haunts, terrifying and tormenting the homicide so long as he remained there.

11. τροφῆς] 'mode of life'.

ἕως ἂν] 'until by craving after that bodily nature which is their companion they are again confined in a body'. The presence of this material alloy is

sufficient to inspire the soul with bodily desires but cannot afford means to gratify them: so that the longing grows more and more intense until the soul is once more confined in her earthy prison.

81 E—82 B, c. xxxi. These souls pass into the bodies of animals whose habits are likeliest to their former way of life; the sensual into asses, the cruel into wolves and hawks; while they that have lacked philosophy but led humane and harmless lives pass into bees and wasps and ants, or even into the human form again.

With this chapter should be compared the remarkable passage *Timaeus* 91 D foll. The other principal statements of Plato on metempsychosis are in *Timaeus* 41 E—42 D, *Republic* 618 A—620 C, *Phaedrus* 249 B. Wytttenbach has a long and learned note on the subject, dealing chiefly with neoplatonist views.

17. μὴ διευλαβημένους] 'who have not taken heed to their ways'.



καὶ ἀρπαγὰς προτετιμηκότας εἰς τὰ τῶν λύκων τε καὶ ἱεράκων καὶ ἰκτινίων γένη· ἢ ποῖ ἂν ἄλλοσέ φαμεν τὰς τοιαύτας ἰέναι; Ἀμέλει, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, εἰς τὰ τοιαῦτα. Οὐκοῦν, ἢ δ' ὅς, δῆλα δὴ καὶ τᾶλλα, οἱ ἂν ἕκαστα ἴοι, κατὰ τὰς αὐτῶν ὁμοιότητος· τῆς μελέτης; Δῆλον δὴ, ἔφη· πῶς δ' οὐ; Οὐκοῦν εὐδαιμονέστατοι, ἔφη, καὶ τούτων εἰσὶ 5 καὶ εἰς βέλτιστον τόπον ἴοντες οἱ τὴν δημοτικὴν καὶ πολιτικὴν ἀρετὴν ἐπιτετηδευκότες, ἣν δὴ καλοῦσι σωφροσύνην τε καὶ δικαιοσύνην, ἔξ ἔθους τε καὶ μελέτης γεγονυῖαν ἄνευ φιλοσοφίας τε καὶ νοῦ; Πῆ δὴ οὗτοι εὐδαιμονέστατοι; Τί; οὐ τούτους εἰκός ἐστιν εἰς τοιοῦτον πάλιν ἀφικνεῖσθαι πολιτικόν τε καὶ ἡμέρον γένος, ἢ που 10 μελιττῶν ἢ σφηκῶν ἢ μυρμηκῶν, ἢ καὶ εἰς ταῦτ' ἡγε πάλιν τὸ ἀνθρώπινον γένος, καὶ γίνεσθαι ἔξ αὐτῶν ἀνδρας μετρίους. Εἰκός.

XXXII. Εἰς δέ γε θεῶν γένος μὴ φιλοσοφήσαντι καὶ παντελῶς 11 καθαρωῶ ἀπίοντι οὐ θέμις ἀφικνεῖσθαι ἄλλ' ἢ τῷ φιλομαθεῖ. ἀλλὰ

2. φαμέν] So Schanz with the best mss., joining ἂν with ἰέναι. Z. and St. φαίμεν.

4. κατὰ τὰς αὐτῶν ὁμοιότητας] 'according to the peculiar affinities of their pursuits'. Cf. *Timaeus* 42 C κατὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα τῆς τοῦ τρόπου γενέσεως.

6. δημοτικὴν καὶ πολιτικὴν ἀρετὴν] As to this popular and social virtue see on 69 B and appendix I. In *Republic* 619 C we find that this class of people are in great danger of making a bad choice at the *αἰρεσις βίων*. One who chose a tyrant's life was τῶν ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ἠκόντων, ἐν τεταγμένῃ πολιτείᾳ ἐν τῷ προτέρῳ βίῳ βεβιωκότα, ἔθει ἄνευ φιλοσοφίας ἀρετῆς μετεिल्φότα. ὡς δὲ καὶ εἰπεῖν οὐκ ἐλάττους εἶναι ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀλίσκομένους τοὺς ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ἦκοντας, ἅτε πόνων ἀγυμνάστους.

9. τί; οὐ τούτους] So Schanz: B has ὅτι οὐ. St. and Z. give ὅτι τούτους.

εἰς τοιοῦτον] 'to another social and gentle race like themselves'. In *Timaeus* 91 D we have another class of harmless but unphilosophic men with a different destination: τὸ δὲ τῶν ὀρνέων φύλον μετερρυθμίζετο, ἀντὶ τριχῶν περὶ φύον, ἐκ τῶν ἀκάκων ἀνδρῶν κούφων δέ, καὶ μετεωρολογικῶν μὲν, ἠγρομένων δὲ δι' ὕψεως τὰς περὶ τούτων ἀποδείξει βεβαιότητας εἶναι

δι' εὐθείαν. Who these are we learn in *Republic* 529 A—530 C: viz. astronomers who fancy that observation of the heavenly bodies is in itself important, apart from its bearing on philosophy.

12. ἀνδρας μετρίους] 'worthy citizens'; men who practise *δημοτικὴ καὶ πολιτικὴ ἀρετὴ* and discharge their social and domestic duties creditably. They belong to a decidedly higher grade than the character described in *Republic* 554.

82 C, D, c. xxxii. But to the company of the gods only the true philosopher can come. For this cause he keeps himself pure from vice, not from the worldly motives that govern the vulgar, but because he will not resist philosophy when she offers freedom and purification to his soul.

13. εἰς δέ γε θεῶν γένος] 'but to the company of the gods none may approach who has not sought wisdom and departed in perfect purity; none but the lover of learning'. The words ἄλλ' ἢ τῷ φιλομαθεῖ are appended as though μὴ φιλοσοφήσαντι καὶ παντελῶς καθαρωῶ ἀπίοντι had not preceded: they are certainly pleonastic, but perfectly natural and intelligible. I see no cause to insert ἄλλω, far less to adopt such a violent transposition as Wytttenbach suggests. *φιλομαθῆς*

τούτων ἕνεκα, ᾧ ἑταίρε Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, οἱ ὀρθῶς φιλοσοφούντες ἀπέχονται τῶν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἐπιθυμιῶν ἀπάσῶν καὶ καρτεροῦσι καὶ οὐ παραδιδόασιν αὐταῖς ἑαυτοῦς, οὐ τι οἰκοφθορίαν τε καὶ πενίαν φοβούμενοι, ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ φιλοχρήματοι 5 οὐδὲ αὖ ἀτιμίαν τε καὶ ἀδοξίαν μοχθηρίας δεδιότες, ὥσπερ οἱ φίλαρχοί τε καὶ φιλότιμοι, ἔπειτα ἀπέχονται αὐτῶν. Οὐ γὰρ ἂν πρέποι, ἔφη, ᾧ Σώκρατες, ὁ Κέβης. Οὐ μέντοι μὰ Δία, ἡ δ' ὄς. τοιγάρτοι τούτοις μὲν ἄπασιν, ᾧ Κέβης, ἐκείνοι, οἷς τι μέλει τῆς D ἑαυτῶν ψυχῆς, ἀλλὰ μὴ σῶμά τι πλάττοντες ζῶσι, χαίρειν εἰπόν- 10 τες οὐ κατὰ ταῦτὰ πορεύονται αὐτοῖς, ὡς οὐκ εἰδόσιν ὅπῃ ἔρχονται, αὐτοὶ δὲ ἡγούμενοι οὐ δεῖν ἐναντία τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ πράττειν καὶ τῇ ἐκείνης λύσει τε καὶ καθαρμῶ ταύτῃ τρέπονται ἐκείνη ἐπόμενοι, ἣ ἐκείνη ὑφηγείται.

and φιλόσοφος are frequently identified by Plato, especially in the passage quoted by Heindorf, *Republic* 376 B τὸ γε φιλομαθὲς καὶ φιλόσοφον ταῦτόν. St. gives ἄλλω ἦ.

9. σῶμά τι πλάττοντες] Literally 'moulding a body', i. e. spending all their care on tending the body. Cf. *Ti-maeus* 88 C τὸν τε αὖ σῶμα ἐπιμελῶς πλάττοντα τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς ἀναποδοτέον κινήσεις. Also *Republic* 377 C καὶ πλάττειν τὰς ψυχὰς τοῖς μύθοις πολλὸ μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ σώματα ταῖς χερσίν. The usage of the word in the present context easily arises from that in the two passages quoted, where it signifies the development of the body by nourishment and training and in each case is opposed to the culture of the soul. The reading of BCD is σώματι, whence Fischer suggested σῶμά τι, which with the Zürich editors I have adopted: the τι seems to add a touch of contempt. E has σώματα, retained by Stallbaum. Ast's σώματι πράττοντες, 'working for the body', is a very strange expression, by no means justified by the use of πράσσειν in Thucydides. Schanz adopts Heindorf's bold alteration λατρεύοντες, which I cannot approve; far less Madvig's coinage πελατεύοντες.

phy, finding the soul a prisoner in her bodily abode, strives by persuasive admonition to set her free; telling her that she is deluded by the body and its sensations: from such she should withdraw herself and trust to herself alone; for she alone can behold the invisible and apprehend the true. And the soul that is discreet listens to the voice of philosophy, for she sees that indulgence of bodily passions has this fatal result. Whatsoever awakes in us the strongest pleasure or pain, fear or desire, this we think to be most surely true. So if she share the body's pleasures and pains, she will also share its beliefs concerning truth; and being the body's close companion through life will leave it at death contaminated by its nature: therefore she will never reach her home in the invisible but must enter again into another body. For this reason the philosopher is virtuous; not from any common motive; but because, when philosophy is delivering his soul, he will not undo her work by indulging the body's appetites. So his soul has peace from its troubling and lives apart from it; and at death she returns to her divine abode, fearing not at all lest as she departs she be scattered by the winds and exist no more.



XXXIII. Πῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες; Ἐγὼ ἐρῶ, ἔφη. γιγνώσκουσι γάρ, ἢ δ' ὅς, οἱ φιλομαθεῖς ὅτι παραλαβοῦσα αὐτῶν τὴν ψυχὴν ἢ φιλοσοφία ἀτεχνῶς διαδεδεμένη ἐν τῷ σώματι καὶ προσκεκολλημένη, ἀναγκαζομένη δὲ ὡς περ διὰ εἶργμου διὰ τούτου σκοπεῖσθαι τὰ ὄντα ἀλλὰ μὴ αὐτὴν δι' αὐτῆς, καὶ ἐν πάσῃ ἀμαθίᾳ κυλι- 5 δουμένην, καὶ τοῦ εἶργμου τὴν δεινότητα κατιδοῦσα ὅτι δι' ἐπιθυμίας ἐστίν, ὡς ἂν μάλιστα αὐτὸς ὁ δεδεμένος ξυλλήπτωρ εἴη τῷ δεδέσθαι, — ὅπερ οὖν λέγω, γιγνώσκουσιν οἱ φιλομαθεῖς ὅτι οὕτω παραλαβοῦσα ἢ φιλοσοφία ἔχουσιν αὐτῶν τὴν ψυχὴν ἠρέμα παραμυθεῖται καὶ λύνει ἐπιχειρεῖ, ἐνδεικνυμένη ὅτι ἀπάτης μὲν 10 μεστὴ ἢ διὰ τῶν ὀμμάτων σκέψις, ἀπάτης δὲ ἢ διὰ τῶν ὠτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων, πειθοῦσα δὲ ἐκ τούτων μὲν ἀναχωρεῖν ὅσον μὴ ἀνάγκη αὐτοῖς χρῆσθαι, αὐτὴν δὲ εἰς αὐτὴν ξυλλέγεσθαι καὶ ἀθροίζεσθαι παρακελευομένη, πιστεύειν δὲ μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ ἄλλ' ἢ αὐτὴν αὐτῇ, ὅ τι ἂν νοήσῃ αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ τῶν 15 ὄντων ὅ τι δ' ἂν δι' ἄλλων σκοπῇ ἐν ἄλλοις ὄν ἄλλο, μηδὲν ἠγείσθαι ἀληθές· εἶναι δὲ τὸ μὲν τοιοῦτον αἰσθητὸν τε καὶ ὀρατὸν,

4. διὰ εἶργμου] 'through the bars of her prison'. She can indeed see τὰ ὄντα, but only in the material symbols by which alone they reveal themselves to the senses.

5. κυλινομένην] 'wallowing in utter ignorance'. Stallbaum compares *Politicus* 309 A, *Theaetetus* 172 C.

6. ὅτι δι' ἐπιθυμίας ἐστίν] I take the literal translation of this sentence to be as follows: 'that it (the prison) exists by means of lust; just the way in which the captive is most apt to aid and abet his own incarceration'; in other words, the prison is the dungeon of lust, wherein the prisoners are accomplices in their own imprisonment—ὡς I understand as a simple relative, 'in which way'. The phrase δι' ἐπιθυμίας ἐστίν is understood by Stallbaum as a periphrasis for ἐπιθυμεί, by Heindorf for ἐπιθυμείται. The former makes the clause ὡς ἂν μάλιστα express the object of the ἐπιθυμία, which comes to this: the prison (i.e. the body) desires to find out how the soul may most aid her own imprisonment. But this is downright nonsense. Heindorf rightly

interprets the ὡς ἂν μάλιστα clause, except that he makes ὡς = ὥστε. But δι' ἐπιθυμίας ἐστίν = ἐπιθυμείται is surely very questionable; moreover it is not the body but bodily pleasures which the embodied soul desires. The interpretation I have suggested precisely agrees with 83 D: the prison of lust is just that very one of which the soul shuts the doors upon herself: for each act of indulgence is the shooting of a fresh bolt. The translator in the Engelmann series alone takes the same view: 'weil er auf der Sinnenlust beruht, auf welche Weise der Gefangene selbst hauptsächlich Helfer seiner Gefangenschaft sein muss'.

7. τῷ δεδέσθαι] So all the mss. Schanz and Z. after Heindorf's conjecture read τοῦ. But since συλλαμβάνειν continually takes a dative there is no reason why the verbal συλλήπτωρ should not be followed by the same case: the alteration seems gratuitous.

8. οὕτω goes with ἔχουσιν.

16. δι' ἄλλων] i.e. τῶν διὰ σώματος αἰσθήσεων. ἐν ἄλλοις ὄν ἄλλο, 'varying with varying conditions'.



ὃ δὲ αὐτῇ ὄρᾳ νοητόν τε καὶ αἰείδες. ταύτῃ οὖν τῇ λύσει οὐκ οἰομένη δεῖν ἐναντιοῦσθαι ἢ τοῦ ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλοσόφου ψυχῇ οὕτως ἀπέχεται τῶν ἡδονῶν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ λυπῶν καὶ φόβων καθ' ὅσον δύναται, λογιζομένη ὅτι, ἐπειδὴν τις σφόδρα ἡσθῆ ἢ φοβηθῆ  
 5 ἢ ἐπιθυμήσῃ, οὐδὲν τοσοῦτον κακὸν ἔπαθεν ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἢ ἂν τις οἰηθείη, οἶον ἢ νοσήσας ἢ τι ἀναλώσας διὰ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας, ἀλλ' ὁ πάντων μέγιστόν τε κακὸν καὶ ἔσχατόν ἐστι, τοῦτο πάσχει καὶ οὐ λογίζεται αὐτό. Τί τοῦτο, ὦ Σώκρατες; ἔφη ὁ Κέβης. "Ὅτι ψυχῇ παντὸς ἀνθρώπου ἀναγκάζεται ἅμα τε ἡσθῆναι ἢ λυπηθῆναι σφό-  
 10 δρα ἐπὶ τῷ καὶ ἡγείσθαι, περὶ ὃ ἂν μάλιστα τοῦτο πάσχη, τοῦτο ἐναργέστατόν τε εἶναι καὶ ἀληθέστατον, οὐχ οὕτως ἔχον ταῦτα δὲ μάλιστα <τὰ> ὀρατά ἢ οὐ; Πάνυ γε. Οὐκοῦν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ πάθει μάλιστα καταδεῖται ψυχῇ ὑπὸ σώματος; Πῶς δὴ; "Ὅτι D ἐκάστη ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη ὥσπερ ἦλον ἔχουσα προσηλοῖ αὐτὴν πρὸς  
 15 τὸ σῶμα καὶ προσπερονᾷ καὶ ποιεῖ σωματοειδῆ, δοξάζουσαν ταῦτα ἀληθῆ εἶναι ἄπερ ἂν καὶ τὸ σῶμα φῆ. ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ ὁμοδοξεῖν τῷ σώματι καὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς χαίρειν ἀναγκάζεται οἶμαι ὁμότροπός τε καὶ ὁμότροφος γίνεσθαι καὶ οἷα μηδέποτε εἰς "Αἶδου καθαρῶς ἀφικέσθαι, ἀλλὰ αἰεὶ τοῦ σώματος ἀναπλέα ἐξίεναι, ὥστε ταχὺ πάλιν  
 20 πίπτειν εἰς ἄλλο σῶμα καὶ ὥσπερ σπειρομένη ἐμφύεσθαι, καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἄμοιρος εἶναι τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ τε καὶ καθαρῶ καὶ μονοειδοῦς E σπουδίας. Ἄληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις, ὁ Κέβης, ὦ Σώκρατες.

4. **λογιζομένη]** The soul reflects that vehement passions of pleasure, pain, fear, or desire so absorb the attention that nothing seems so real as the object inspiring them. Therefore if she is strongly excited by bodily affections of this kind she will be forced to think nothing so real as these material things: so that instead of seeking truth in the changeless verities of the intelligible she will look for it in the everchanging flux of phenomena.

**ἡσθῆ ἢ φοβηθῆ]** Z. and St. add ἢ λυπηθῆ, but these words are not in BCD, and the other mss. are not agreed as to their position.

5. **οὐδὲν τοσοῦτον]** 'not on the scale that one might suppose'. For *τοσοῦτον* virtually = 'so little' compare *Republic* 608 B *μέγας γάρ, ἔφην, ὁ ἀγών, ὦ φίλε*

*Γλαύκων, μέγας, οὐχ ὅσος δοκεῖ.* Schanz, against the mss., writes *ὑπ' αὐτῶν*: but *ἀπὸ* may equally well be said; 'arising from them'.

6. **οἶον ἢ νοσήσας]** the considerations on which the *δημοτικὴ ἀρετὴ* is based.

8. **ὅτι ψυχῇ]** 'that the soul of every man in the act of feeling some vehement pleasure or pain is at the same time constrained to believe that whatsoever most strongly excites such feelings, this is most vivid and true; whereas it is not so'.

12. **τὰ ὀρατά]** Heindorf supplied *τά*, which is missing in the mss.

15. **ταῦτα ἀληθῆ]** So Schanz for *ταῦτα*: rightly, I think.

17. **ὁμότροπός τε καὶ ὁμότροφος]** 'like it in her ways and nurture'.

XXXIV. Τούτων τοίνυν ἔνεκα, ὧ Κέβης, οἱ δικαίως φιλομαθεῖς κόσμοι εἰσι καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι, οὐχ ὧν οἱ πολλοὶ ἔνεκά φασιν ἢ 84 σὺ οἶε; Οὐ δὴτα ἔγωγε. Οὐ γάρ· ἀλλ' οὕτω λογίσαιτ' ἂν ψυχῇ ἀνδρὸς φιλοσόφου, καὶ οὐκ ἂν οἰηθείη τὴν μὲν φιλοσοφίαν χρῆναι ἑαυτὴν λύειν, λουούσης δὲ ἐκείνης αὐτὴν παραδιδόναι ταῖς ἡδοναῖς 5 καὶ λύπαις ἑαυτὴν πάλιν αὐτὴν ἐγκαταδεῖν καὶ ἀνήνυτον ἔργον πράττειν, Πηνελόπης τινὰ ἐναντίως ἰσθὸν μεταχειριζομένην· ἀλλὰ γαλήνην τούτων παρασκευάζουσα, ἐπομένη τῷ λογισμῷ καὶ αἰεὶ ἐν τούτῳ οὔσα, τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ θεῖον καὶ τὸ ἀδόξαστον θεωμένη καὶ 10 ὑπ' ἐκείνου τρεφομένη, ζῆν τε οἶεται οὕτω δεῖν, ἕως ἂν ζῆ, καὶ ἰο ἐπειδὴν τελευτήσῃ, εἰς τὸ ξυγγενὲς καὶ εἰς τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀφικομένη ἀπηλλάχθαι τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων κακῶν. ἐκ δὴ τῆς τοιαύτης τροφῆς οὐδὲν δεινὸν μὴ φοβηθῆ, ταῦτά γ' ἐπιτηδέυσασα, ὧ Συμμία τε καὶ

2. οὐχ ὧν οἱ πολλοὶ ἔνεκά φασιν] 'not for the reasons which the many assign for being so'. Schanz brackets φασίν, and Heindorf proposes φαίνονται, both, as I think, needlessly. Stallbaum rightly supplies κόσμοι εἶναι καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι.

3. οὐ γάρ· ἀλλ' οὕτω] This punctuation is clearly right here as in *Phaedrus* 276 D. οὐ γάρ ἀλλὰ gives just the wrong sense.

5. λουούσης δ' ἐκείνης] 'and while philosophy is losing her to give herself up to pleasures and pains that they may bind her fast'. The appended infinitive ἐγκαταδεῖν is a very common idiom, and why Madvig should wish to expunge παραδιδόναι I cannot see. Schanz however brackets it.

7. μεταχειριζομένην] This is doubtless the right reading, although the mss. are stronger in favour of μεταχειριζομένης; the genitive is however, as Prof. Geddes says, easily accounted for by the proximity of Πηνελόπης. The soul works at a kind of Penelope's web, only in the opposite way. Penelope, to preserve her virtue, undid at night the work she wove by day; the soul weaves again the web of lusts which philosophy has been unravelling to set her free, Prof. Geddes would govern Πηνελόπης by ἐναντίως; but I believe Plato never uses the genitive with

this adverb; for in 112 E, to which Prof. Geddes refers, τούτου is governed by καταντικρῶ. St. has μεταχειριζομένης.

8. τούτων] Sc. ἡδονῶν καὶ λυπῶν.

ἐν τούτῳ] See on 59 A.

10. ὑπ' ἐκείνου τρεφομένη] Compare *Phaedrus* 248 B οὐ δ' ἔνεχ' ἡ πολλὴ σπουδὴ τὸ ἀληθείας ἰδεῖν πεδῖον οὐ ἐστίν, ἢ τε δὴ προσήκουσα ψυχῆς τῷ ἀρίστῳ νομῇ ἐκ τῶ ἐκεῖ λειμῶνος τυγχάνει οὔσα, ἢ τε τοῦ πτεροῦ φύσις, ᾧ ψυχῇ κουφίζεται, τούτῳ τρέφεται. The souls which cannot reach the plain of truth τροφῇ δοξαστῇ χρώνται. Compare the still more striking metaphor in *Timaeus* 90 A ἐκείθεν γάρ, ὅθεν ἡ πρώτη τῆς ψυχῆς γένεσις ἐφυ, τὸ θεῖον τὴν κεφαλὴν καὶ βίξαν ἡμῶν ἀνακρεμαννὸν ὀρθοῖ πᾶν τὸ σῶμα.

11. τοιοῦτον] Sc. ἀληθὲς καὶ θεῖον καὶ ἀδόξαστον.

13. οὐδὲν δεινὸν μὴ φοβηθῆ] For this unusual phrase compare *Republic* 465 B, *Apology* 28 B, *Gorgias* 520 D. Also *Aristophanes Ecclesiazusae* 650 οὐχὶ δέος μὴ σὲ φιλήσῃ.

ταῦτά γ' ἐπιτηδέυσασα] mss. ταῦτα δ'. Many editors, beginning with Forster, have regarded these words as a gloss upon ἐκ τοιαύτης τροφῆς, and Schanz brackets them. This view may be right; but I think there is hardly sufficient evidence for bracketing. If the words are

Κέβης, ὅπως μὴ διασπασθεῖσα ἐν τῇ ἀπαλλαγῇ τοῦ σώματος ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνέμων διαφυσθεῖσα καὶ διαπτομένη οἴχηται καὶ οὐδὲν ἔτι οὐδαμοῦ ᾗ.

XXXV. Σιγὴ οὖν ἐγένετο ταῦτα εἰπόντος τοῦ Σωκράτους ἐπὶ C  
5 πολλὸν χρόνον, καὶ αὐτὸς τε πρὸς τῷ εἰρημένῳ λόγῳ ἦν ὁ Σωκράτης,  
ὡς ἰδεῖν ἐφαίνετο, καὶ ἡμῶν οἱ πλείστοι. Κέβης δὲ καὶ Σιμμίας  
σμικρὸν πρὸς ἀλλήλῳ διελεγέσθην· καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἰδὼν αὐτῶ  
ἤρετο· Τί; ἔφη, ὑμῖν τὰ λεχθέντα μὴ δοκεῖ ἐνδεῶς λέγεσθαι;  
πολλὰς γὰρ δὴ ἔτι ἔχει ὑποψίας καὶ ἀντιλαβίας, εἴ γε δὴ τις αὐτὰ  
10 μέλλει ἰκανῶς διεξιέναι. εἰ μὲν οὖν τι ἄλλο σκοπεῖσθον, οὐδὲν  
λέγω· εἰ δέ τι περὶ τούτων ἀπορείτον, μηδὲν ἀποκνήσητε καὶ αὐτοὶ  
εἰπεῖν καὶ διελθεῖν, εἴ πη ὑμῖν φαίνεται βέλτιον <ἀν> λεχθῆναι, D  
καὶ αὖ καὶ ἐμὲ συμπαραλαβεῖν, εἴ τι μᾶλλον οἴεσθε μετ' ἐμοῦ  
εὐπορήσειν. καὶ ὁ Σιμμίας ἔφη· Καὶ μῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τάληθῆ

genuine, δὲ needs correction. Wytttenbach has ταῦτά τ'.

At first sight the concluding words of the chapter seem to imply that a soul that is pure is less likely to perish than the impure. But since this is not the case, we must understand Plato to mean that the pure soul alone is exempt from fear. The impure soul, having cast in her lot with the body and having no conception of existence apart from it, may well suppose that corporeal life is a condition of her being: but the pure soul, who has lived apart from the body so far as she may and feels her own independent power, has no misgivings lest the company of her slave be necessary to her existence: the body may dread dissolution, but she is secure.

84 C—85 D, c. xxxv. Silence ensues as Sokrates ceases: but presently Simmias and Kebes are heard conversing apart. Are you discussing any doubtful matters in the argument? asks Sokrates, for there must be many remaining. *Simmias*: There are points on which we should like further satisfaction; but we shrink from troubling you at so sad a time. *Sokrates*: If I cannot convince you that I do not consider my present situation sad, I shall find it hard indeed to persuade the

rest of mankind. You think I am more foolish than the swans: for they sing sweetest just before they die; not, as men say, that they are lamenting their approaching death, but because they are Apollo's birds and know the good things that are in Hades; wherefore they sing in gladness of heart. I too am the servant of Apollo, and I depart this life no less cheerfully than they: speak then, if you have anything to ask. *Simmias*: I will speak: the truth of the matters we have been discussing is hard to discover, nevertheless it were fainthearted to abandon the search. So in default of some divine word we must strive by all means to find the surest theory that human reason can furnish, as it were a raft to bear us over the sea of life. Therefore, I tell you, Sokrates, that the foregoing proof does not seem to me complete.

5. πρὸς τῷ εἰρημένῳ λόγῳ] 'was absorbed in the foregoing discourse'.

12. βέλτιον ἀν λεχθῆναι] The insertion of ἀν, which could easily drop out after βέλτιον, seems to me necessary. Prof. Geddes observes that verbs of thinking often take a bare infinitive, to express duty. This is true: but φαίνεται is not a verb of thinking.



σοι ἐρώ. πάλαι γὰρ ἡμῶν ἐκάτερος ἀπορῶν τὸν ἕτερον προωθεῖ  
καὶ κελεύει ἐρέσθαι διὰ τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν μὲν ἀκοῦσαι, ὀκνεῖν δὲ ὄχλον  
παρέχειν, μὴ σοι ἀηδὲς ἢ διὰ τὴν παρούσαν συμφορὰν. καὶ ὃς  
ἀκούσας ἐγέλασέν τε ἡρέμα καὶ φησιν, Βαβαί, ὦ Σιμμία· ἢ που  
E χαλεπῶς ἂν τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους πείσαιμι ὡς οὐ συμφορὰν 5  
ἡγούμαι τὴν παρούσαν τύχην, ὅτε γε μῆδ' ὑμᾶς δύναμαι πείθειν,  
ἀλλὰ φοβεῖσθε, μὴ δυσκολώτερόν τι νῦν διάκειμαι ἢ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν  
βίῳ· καί, ὡς ἔοικε, τῶν κύκνων δοκῶ φαυλότερος ὑμῖν εἶναι τὴν  
μαντικὴν, οὐ ἐπειδὴν αἰσθωνταὶ ὅτι δεῖ αὐτοὺς ἀποθανεῖν, ἄδοντες  
85 καὶ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ, τότε δὴ πλείστα καὶ μάλιστα ἄδουσι, 10  
γεγηθότες ὅτι μέλλουσι παρὰ τὸν θεὸν ἀπιέναι, οὐπερ εἰσὶ θερά-  
ποντες. οἱ δ' ἀνθρωποὶ διὰ τὸ αὐτῶν δέος τοῦ θανάτου καὶ τῶν  
κύκνων καταφύδονται, καὶ φασιν αὐτοὺς θρηνοῦντας τὸν θάνατον  
ὑπὸ λύπης ἐξάδειν, καὶ οὐ λογιζονται ὅτι οὐδὲν ὄρνειον ἄδει, ὅταν  
πεινῇ ἢ ῥιγῇ ἢ τινα ἄλλην λύπην λυπῆται, οὐδὲ αὐτῇ ἢ τε ἀηδῶν 15  
καὶ χελιδῶν καὶ ὁ ἔποψ, ἂ δὴ φασὶ διὰ λύπην θρηνοῦντα ἄδειν  
ἀλλ' οὔτε ταῦτά μοι φαίνεται λυπούμενα ἄδειν οὔτε οἱ κύκνοι, ἀλλ'  
B ἅτε οἶμαι τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος ὄντες μαντικοὶ τέ εἰσι καὶ προειδότες τὰ  
ἐν Ἄιδου ἀγαθὰ ἄδουσι καὶ τέρπονται ἐκείνην τὴν ἡμέραν δια-  
φερόντως ἢ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ. ἐγὼ δὲ καὶ αὐτός που οἶμαι 20  
ὁμόδουλος τε εἶναι τῶν κύκνων καὶ ἱερός τοῦ αὐτοῦ θεοῦ, καὶ οὐ  
χείρον' ἐκείνων τὴν μαντικὴν ἔχειν παρὰ τοῦ δεσπότου, οὐδὲ δυσθυ-  
μότερον αὐτῶν τοῦ βίου ἀπαλλάττεσθαι. ἀλλὰ τούτου γ' ἕνεκα  
λέγειν τε χρῆ καὶ ἐρωτᾶν ὅ τι ἂν βούλησθε ἕως Ἀθηναίων ἐῷσιν  
ἄνδρες ἔνδεκα. Καλῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις, ὁ Σιμμίας· καὶ ἐγὼ τέ σοι ἐρώ 25  
C ὃ ἀπορῶ, καὶ αὐ' ὅδε, ἢ οὐκ ἀποδέχεται τὰ εἰρημένα. ἐμοὶ γὰρ

7. διάκειμαι] Heindorf takes this for a subjunctive, and Hirschig reads *διακέωμαι*: but, even if *διάκειμαι* could be a subjunctive, that mood would be positively wrong here. Sokrates says 'you are afraid (not lest I should be, but) lest I am more peevish than heretofore'. Contrast this with the words of Simmias, *μὴ σοι ἀηδὲς ἢ*, where the subjunctive has its proper reference to the future.

10. καὶ μάλιστα] Schanz reads *κάλιστα*, after Blomfield's conjecture. I have reverted to the reading of the mss.

|| 23. τούτου γε ἕνεκα] 'so far as this is concerned'.

24. ἕως Ἀθηναίων] Cobet proposes *ἕως ἂν οἱ ἔνδεκα ἐῷσιν*. I do not conceive that any person who has ears to hear will prefer Cobet's sentence to Plato's: nor, apart from this, would one willingly sacrifice the grave courtesy of Sokrates' language. I regret that Schanz determines to bracket the clause; still omission is preferable to mutilation. Prof. Geddes justly says *ἄνδρες ἔνδεκα* is to be regarded as one expression, and compares 69 E *τοῖς Ἀθηναίων δικασταῖς*. The common reading is *ἕως ἂν οἱ*, but *ἂν οἱ* are wanting in the best mss.

δοκεῖ, ὃ Σώκρατες, περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἴσως ὥσπερ καὶ σοὶ τὸ μὲν σαφὲς εἶδέναι ἐν τῷ νῦν βίῳ ἢ ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἢ παγχάλεπόν τι, τὸ μέντοι αὐτὰ λεγόμενα περὶ αὐτῶν μὴ οὐχὶ παντὶ τρόπῳ ἐλέγχειν καὶ μὴ προαφίστασθαι, πρὶν ἂν πανταχῇ σκοπῶν ἀπέιπῃ τις, πᾶνυ μαλθακοῦ εἶναι ἀνδρός· δεῖν γὰρ περὶ αὐτὰ ἐν γέ τι τούτων διαπράξασθαι, ἢ μαθεῖν ὅπῃ ἔχει ἢ εὐρεῖν ἢ, εἰ ταῦτα ἀδύνατον, τὸν γοῦν βέλτιστον τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων λόγων λαβόντα καὶ δυσεξελεγκτότατον, ἐπὶ τούτου ὀχούμενον ὥσπερ ἐπὶ σχεδίας κινδυνεύοντα διαπλευσαι τὸν βίον, εἰ μὴ τις δύναιτο ἀσφαλέςτερον καὶ ἀκινδυνότερον ἐπὶ βεβαιότερου ὀχήματος, λόγου θείου τινός, διαπορευθῆναι. καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν ἔγωγε οὐκ ἐπαισχυνθήσομαι ἐρέσθαι, ἐπειδὴ καὶ σὺ ταῦτα λέγεις, οὐδ' ἔμαντὸν αἰτιάσομαι ἐν ὑστέρῳ χρόνῳ ὅτι νῦν οὐκ εἶπον ἃ ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ. ἐμοὶ γάρ, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἐπειδὴ καὶ πρὸς ἔμαντὸν καὶ πρὸς τόνδε σκοπῶ τὰ εἰρημένα, οὐ πᾶνυ φαίνεται ἱκανῶς εἰρήσθαι.

XXXVI. Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, Ἴσως γάρ, ἔφη, ὃ ἑταῖρε, ἀληθῆ ἔ

4. καὶ μὴ προαφίστασθαι] Hirschig wrongly brackets μὴ. The words παντὶ ...προαφίστασθαι are all qualified by μὴ οὐχί: or as Heindorf puts it, we may regard καὶ μὴ προαφίστασθαι as equivalent to μὴ προαφισταμένους. We have here a very strong case of μὴ οὐ after a word which only implies negation: cf. *Symposium* 210 B πολλῆ ἀνοια μὴ οὐχ ἐν τε καὶ ταῦτὸν ἠγείσθαι.

6. ἢ μαθεῖν] i. e. either to learn from another or to discover by our own researches: cf. 99 c. Hesiod says, *Works and Days* 291, οὗτος μὲν πανάριστος, ὃς αὐτὸς πάντα νοῆσθι, | ἐσθλὸς δ' αὐτὸν κάκεινος, ὃς εἰ εἰπόντι πίθηται.

10. λόγου θεοῦ] 'a divine doctrine'; such as the Orphic traditions. The Pythagorean Simmias, whose mystical tendencies are well contrasted with the clear and acute intellect of Kebes, naturally gives a θεῖος λόγος the preference over dialectical demonstration. Cf. 107 A. Olympiodoros explains it, *αὐτοπτικὸς νοῦς ὁ θεῶ. τῶ ὄντι συνῶν*. But the other interpretation is more natural and more dramatically appropriate. The mss. have ἢ λόγου, Schanz brackets ἢ: I have fol-

lowed Heindorf in omitting it. That ἢ is ever explanatory I do not believe: it certainly is not so in the passages cited by Prof. Geddes. Plato would have used καὶ. St. retains ἢ.

85 E—86 D, c. xxxvi. Simmias states his objection. All the terms that have been applied to soul and body may be transferred to harmony and the lyre. The harmony is invisible, immaterial, beautiful, divine; the lyre is material, composite, earthly, perishable. Might we not then on the same principle maintain that the harmony must survive the destruction of the lyre? yet we know it does not. Now suppose the doctrine to be true, that the soul is a harmony of the body, arising from the due proportion and temperament of its parts; will she not, let her be ever so divine, vanish away if these bodily conditions cease? will she not, like other harmonies, cease to be, long before the body itself suffers dissolution?

As I have pointed out in the introduction, the refutation of this theory does not constitute an argument for immortality. To refute a doctrine which would

σοι φαίνεται· ἀλλὰ λέγε, ὅπη δὴ οὐχ ἰκανῶς. Ταύτη ἔμοιγε, ἢ δ' ὅς, ἢ δὴ καὶ περὶ ἁρμονίας ἂν τις καὶ λύρας τε καὶ χορδῶν τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον λόγον εἴποι, ὡς ἢ μὲν ἁρμονία ἀόρατόν τι καὶ ἀσώ-  
 86 ματον καὶ πάγκαλόν τι καὶ θεῖόν ἐστιν ἐν τῇ ἡρμουςμένη λύρα, αὐτὴ δ' ἢ λύρα καὶ αἱ χορδαὶ σώματά τε καὶ σωματοειδῆ καὶ ξύνθετα 5, καὶ γεώδη ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦ θνητοῦ ξυγγενῆ. ἐπειδὴν οὖν ἢ κατὰξῃ τις τὴν λύραν ἢ διατέμῃ καὶ διαρρήξῃ τὰς χορδὰς, εἴ τις δυσχυρίζοιτο τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ ὥσπερ σύ, ὡς ἀνάγκη ἔτι εἶναι τὴν ἁρμονίαν ἐκείνην καὶ μὴ ἀπολωλέναι· οὐδεμία γὰρ μηχανῆ ἂν εἴη τὴν μὲν λύραν ἔτι εἶναι διερωγυῖων τῶν χορδῶν καὶ τὰς χορδὰς θνητοειδεῖς οὔσας, 10 τὴν δὲ ἁρμονίαν ἀπολωλέναι τὴν τοῦ θείου τε καὶ ἀθανάτου ὁμοφυῆ B τε καὶ ξυγγενῆ, προτέραν τοῦ θνητοῦ ἀπολομένην· ἀλλὰ φαίη ἀνάγκη ἔτι πού εἶναι αὐτὴν τὴν ἁρμονίαν, καὶ πρότερον τὰ ξύλα καὶ τὰς χορδὰς κατασαπήσασθαι, πρὶν τι ἐκείνην παθεῖν,—καὶ γὰρ οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἶμαι ἔγωγε καὶ αὐτὸν σε τοῦτο ἐντεθυμῆσθαι, 15 ὅτι τοιοῦτόν τι μάλιστα ὑπολαμβάνομεν τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι, ὥσπερ

be fatal to immortality is not the same as to prove immortality. Plato justly considered that a view so widely entertained and so hostile to his own, must be disposed of; but its overthrow leaves the argument precisely where it was at 81 A.

2. ἢ δῆ] So Forster for ἢ δῆ.

7. διατέμῃ] Schanz brackets this word: needlessly, I think.

εἴ τις δυσχυρίζοιτο] The apodosis never comes. Prof. Geddes finds it in ὄρα οὖν, 86 D. This is not strictly accurate; for the subject of δυσχυρίζοιτο is supposed to maintain that the harmony survives the lyre, while the subject of εἰάν τις ἀξιοῖ maintains that the soul is the first to perish. In fact the protasis εἰάν τις ἀξιοῖ is substituted for the original protasis.

10. διερωγυῖων τῶν χορδῶν] is bracketed by Hirschig, whom Schanz follows: again I see no reason.

16. ὑπολαμβάνομεν] The use of the first person by Simmias would seem to imply that this doctrine was Pythagorean. But there is little or no evidence to that effect, and it is irreconcilable with the Pythagorean dogma of transmigration.

Aristotle *de anima* I iv 407<sup>b</sup>27 mentions the theory as *πίθανή πολλοῖς*, but without assigning it to any particular school or thinker, Macrobius ascribes it to Pythagoras and Philolaos; but the testimony of so late a writer is worthless. Prof. Geddes remarks that it seems more Eleatic than Pythagorean: and there certainly is some resemblance between this *ἁρμονία* and the conception of *ψυχή* as a *κράμα* attributed to Zeno by Diogenes Laertius ix 29. The view of Parmenides is expounded by Theophrastos *de sensu* §§ 3, 4: it is however merely a theory of perception. The opinion that soul is a harmony was certainly held by Aristoxenos the musician, as we learn from Cicero *Tusc.* I 10: and Lucretius in controverting the theory (III 94 foll.) evidently had him chiefly in his mind; cf. III 131 *redde harmoniaī Nomen ad organicos alto delatum Heliconi*. But Aristoxenos was a pupil of Aristotle, not a Pythagorean. On the whole then it seems probable that Simmias is not speaking as a Pythagorean, but making himself the exponent of a widely received opinion. Kebes, who is equally a Py-



ἐντεταμένον τοῦ σώματος ἡμῶν καὶ <sup>ενεχόμενον</sup> συνεχομένου ὑπὸ θερμοῦ καὶ ψυχροῦ καὶ ξηροῦ καὶ ὑγροῦ καὶ τοιούτων τιῶν, κρᾶσιν εἶναι καὶ ἀρμονίαν αὐτῶν τούτων τὴν ψυχὴν ἡμῶν, ἐπειδὴν ταῦτα καλῶς καὶ C μετρίως κραθῆ πρὸς ἄλληλα. εἰ οὖν τυγχάνει ἡ ψυχὴ οὕσα 5 ἀρμονία τις, δῆλον ὅτι, ὅταν χαλασθῆ τὸ σῶμα ἡμῶν ἀμέτρως ἢ ἐπιταθῆ ὑπὸ νόσων καὶ ἄλλων κακῶν, τὴν μὲν ψυχὴν ἀνάγκη εὐθὺς ὑπάρχει ἀπολωλέναι, καίπερ οὕσαν θειοτάτην, ὥσπερ καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι ἀρμονίαι αἱ τ' ἐν τοῖς φθόγγοις καὶ αἱ ἐν τοῖς τῶν δημιουργῶν ἔργοις πᾶσι, τὰ δὲ λείψανα τοῦ σώματος ἐκάστου πολλὸν χρόνον 10 παραμένειν, ἕως ἂν ἡ κατακαυθῆ ἢ κατασαπῆ. ὄρα οὖν πρὸς D τοῦτον τὸν λόγον τί φήσομεν, ἐάν τις ἀξιοῖ κρᾶσιν οὕσαν τὴν ψυχὴν τῶν ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐν τῷ καλουμένῳ θανάτῳ πρώτην ἀπόλυσθαι.

thagorean, professes his disbelief in the doctrine, 87 A : but on the other hand it is a favourite theory with Echekrates, 88 D.

2. κρᾶσιν] 'a temperament'. Compare the lines of Parmenides quoted by Theophrastos *l. l.* (Karsten 145 foll.) :

ὡς γὰρ ἐκάστῳ ἔχει κρᾶσις μελέων πολυ-  
πλάγκτων,  
τῶς νόος ἀνθρώποισι παρέστηκεν· το γὰρ  
αὐτὸ  
ἐστὶν ὅπερ φρονεῖ μελέων φύσις ἀνθρώ-  
ποισι  
καὶ πᾶσιν καὶ παντί· τὸ γὰρ πλέον ἐστὶ  
νόημα.

That is to say, the character of the perception is dominated by the preponderating elements of the percipient. As Theophr. remarks, Parmenides does not distinguish between φρονεῖν and αἰσθάνεσθαι.

The word ἀρμονία is generally used to denote a succession of musical tones, not their simultaneous accord, for which συμφωνία is the ordinary term. The former meaning is however here clearly unsuitable; and in fact ἀρμονία is a general term expressing the relation between musical sounds, in itself signifying neither succession nor accord.

4. μετρίως κραθῆ] Cf. Diog. Laert.

IX 29 ψυχὴν κρᾶμα ὑπάρχειν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων, κατὰ μηδενὸς τούτων ἐπικράτησιν.

10. παραμένειν] 'remain with us'. Cf. 62 E. The word occurs again and again in this sense; yet Hirschig must needs alter it to ἐπιμένειν.

86 D—88 B, c. xxxvii. Sokrates defers his reply to Simmias until he has heard the objection of Kebes, which the latter states as follows. I think our argument is no further on than it was: I admit that the antenatal existence of the soul has been fairly proved, but the evidence of her existence after death seems still insufficient. Not that I agree with the objection of Simmias; but all that has yet been proved is that the soul is more lasting than the body. Suppose a weaver were in the habit of making his own coats; in the course of his life he would wear out many coats; but when his time came to die, the last coat would exist after him; yet we do not deny that the weaver is more durable than the coat. Similarly the soul in the course of a man's life may wear out many bodies: that is, so fast as the body wastes, she may renew it like a garment that needs mending; but when the time of her dissolution comes, she perishes and the body as last renewed by her exists after her.

XXXVII. Διαβλέψας οὖν ὁ Σωκράτης, ὡς περ τὰ πολλὰ εἰώθει, καὶ μειδιάσας, Δίκαια μέντοι, ἔφη, λέγει ὁ Σιμμία. εἰ οὖν τις ὑμῶν εὐπορώτερος ἐμοῦ, τί οὐκ ἀπεκρίνατο; καὶ γὰρ οὐ φαύλως ἔοικεν ἀπομένῳ τοῦ λόγου. δοκεῖ μέντοι μοι χρῆναι πρὸ τῆς 5  
 Ε ἀποκρίσεως ἔτι πρότερον Κέβητος ἀκοῦσαι, τί αὐτῷ ἔδε ἐγκαλεῖ τῷ 5  
 λόγῳ, ἵνα χρόνον ἐγγενομένου βουλευσώμεθα τί ἐροῦμεν, ἔπειτα δὲ ἀκούσαντας ἢ συγχωρεῖν αὐτοῖς, ἐὰν τι δοκῶσι προσάδειν, ἐὰν δὲ μὴ, οὕτως ἤδη ὑπερδικεῖν τοῦ λόγου. ἀλλ' ἄγε, ἢ δ' ὅς, ὦ Κέβης, λέγε, τί ἦν τὸ σὲ αὐτῷ θράπτον [ἀπιστίαν παρέχει]. Λέγω δὴ, ἢ δ' ὅς ὁ Κέβης. ἐμοὶ γὰρ φαίνεται ἔτι ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὁ λόγος εἶναι, καί, 10  
 87 ὅπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐλέγομεν, ταυτὸν ἐγκλημα ἔχει. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ ἦν ἡμῶν ἢ ψυχὴ καὶ πρὶν εἰς τόδε τὸ εἶδος ἐλθεῖν, οὐκ ἀνατίθεται μὴ οὐχὶ πάνυ χαριέντως καί, εἰ μὴ ἐπαχθές ἐστιν εἰπεῖν, πάνυ ἱκανῶς ἀποδοδεῖχθαι ὡς δὲ καὶ ἀποθανόντων ἡμῶν ἔτι που ἔσται, οὐ μοι δοκεῖ τῆδε. ὡς μὲν οὐκ ἰσχυρότερον καὶ πολυχρονιώ- 15

Or to grant you even more: let us suppose that she wears out many bodies, not only in the span of one life, but in many lives; and that at the separation she continues to exist in Hades; yet we have no assurance that this goes on for ever; after repeated incarnations she may gradually be wearied out, and some one of them will be her last. Therefore it is not enough to show that the soul is ever so much stronger and more lasting than the body: you must show that in her own nature she is altogether indissoluble and eternal; else our hope of immortality is but foolishness.

1. διαβλέψας] 'with a piercing glance'. This rare word well describes the penetrating gaze of Sokrates' prominent eyes (*Theaetetus* 143 E) from under the gathered eyebrows: much the same is expressed by ταυρηδὸν ὑποβλέψας in 117 B. The preposition seems to have the same force as in one usage of διαβαίνω—i.e. with eyelids far apart: cf. Aristotle *de insomniis* 462<sup>a</sup>13 ἐνίοις γὰρ τῶν νεωτέρων καὶ πάμπαν διαβλέπουσιν (with eyes wide open), ἐὰν ἢ σκότος, φαίνονται εἰδῶλα πολλὰ κινούμενα, ὥστ' ἐγκαλύπτεσθαι πολλάκις φοβουμένους. Compare Xenophon *Sym-*

*posium* v v 5, where Sokrates says οὕτω μὲν ἤδη τοίνυν οἱ ἐμοὶ ὀφθαλμοὶ καλλίονες ἂν τῶν σῶν εἴησαν. πῶς δὴ; ὅτι οἱ μὲν σοὶ τὸ κατ' εὐθὺ μόνον ὀρώσιν, οἱ δὲ ἐμοὶ καὶ τὸ ἐκ πλαγίου διὰ τὸ ἐπιπόλαιο εἶναι.

4. ἀπομένῳ] 'he is one, it seems, who takes the question in hand after a thorough-going fashion'. I think this rendering is more agreeable to Plato's use of the phrase ἀπτεσθαι λόγου than that of Mr Cope and Prof. Geddes, who take it to mean 'attack'. Cf. *Euthydemus* 283 A, *Republic* 538 C.

9. τὸ σὲ αὐτῷ θράπτον] In order to retain the words ἀπιστίαν παρέχει, some editors have altered τὸ into ὁ. I have judged it better to follow Hermann and Schanz in bracketing them as a gloss. This abbreviated form of ταραττεῖν is more than once used to express a misgiving as to the validity of an argument: cf. *Theaetetus* 187 C, *Parmenides* 130 D.

10. ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ] i.e. just where it was at the end of the discussion of ἀνάμνησις. Kebes is perfectly right: the reasoning contained in chapters 25—29 at best affords a mere presumption in favour of immortality: see note on 78 C.

13. ἐπαχθές] 'arrogant'.

τερον ψυχῇ σώματος, οὐ ξυγχωρῶ τῇ Σιμμίου ἀντιλήψει· δοκεῖ  
 γάρ μοι πᾶσι τούτοις πάνυ πολὺ διαφέρειν. τί οὖν ἂν φαίη ὁ  
 λόγος ἔτι ἀπιστεῖς, ἐπειδὴ ὄρας ἀποθανόντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τό γε  
 ἀσθενέστερον ἔτι ἔν; τὸ δὲ πολυχρονιώτερον οὐ δοκεῖ σοι ἀναγκαῖον B  
 5 εἶναι ἔτι σῶζεσθαι ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ; πρὸς δὲ τοῦτο τόδε ἐπί-  
 σκεψαι, εἴ τι λέγω· εἰκόνας γάρ τινος, ὡς ἔοικεν, κἀγὼ ὥσπερ  
 Σιμμίας δέομαι. ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ ὁμοίως λέγεσθαι ταῦτα, ὥσπερ ἂν  
 τις περὶ ἀνθρώπου ὑφάντου πρεσβύτου ἀποθανόντος λέγοι τοῦτον  
 τὸν λόγον, ὅτι οὐκ ἀπόλωλεν ὁ ἀνθρώπος ἀλλ' ἔστι που σῶς, τεκ-  
 10 μήριον δὲ παρέχοιτο θοιμάτιον ὃ ἠμπεύχετο αὐτὸς ὑφηνάμενος, ὅτι  
 ἐστὶ σῶν καὶ οὐκ ἀπόλωλεν, καὶ εἴ τις ἀπιστοίῃ αὐτῷ, ἀνερωτῶν  
 πότερον πολυχρονιώτερον ἔστι τὸ γένος ἀνθρώπου ἢ ἱματίου ἐν C  
 χρεία τε ὄντος καὶ φορουμένου, ἀποκριναμένου δὲ τινος ὅτι πολὺ τὸ  
 τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, οἷοιτο ἀποδεδειχθαι ὅτι παντὸς ἄρα μᾶλλον ὃ γε  
 15 ἀνθρώπος σῶς ἐστίν, ἐπειδὴ τό γε ὀλιγοχρονιώτερον οὐκ ἀπόλωλεν.  
 τὸ δ' οἶμαι, ὃ Σιμμία, οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει· σκόπει γὰρ καὶ σὺ ἂ λέγω.  
 πᾶς γὰρ ἂν ὑπολάβοι ὅτι εὐηθες λέγει ὁ τοῦτο λέγων· ὁ γὰρ  
 ὑφάντης οὗτος πολλὰ κατατρίψας τοιαῦτα ἱμάτια καὶ ὑφηνάμενος  
 ἐκείνων μὲν ὕστερος ἀπόλωλεν πολλῶν ὄντων, τοῦ δὲ τελευταίου D  
 20 οἶμαι πρότερος, καὶ οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον τούτου ἔνεκα ἀνθρωπὸς ἐστὶν  
 ἱματίου φανλότερον οὐδ' ἀσθενέστερον. τὴν αὐτὴν δὲ οἶμαι εἰκόνα  
 δέξαιτ' ἂν ψυχῇ πρὸς σῶμα, καὶ τις λέγων αὐτὰ ταῦτα περὶ αὐτῶν

1. οὐ ξυγχωρῶ] Again we may observe the superior acuteness of Kebes. The objection of Simmias is ingenious and plausible, but somewhat flimsy: it crumbles away at the first touch of the elenchus: moreover its refutation adds nothing to the argument. That of Kebes goes straight to the root of the matter, and obliges Sokrates to put forth his whole argumentative strength; while its disproof constitutes the crowning argument of the dialogue.

δοκεῖ γάρ] 'for I think soul is far superior in all these respects'.

7. ὁμοίως λέγεσθαι] 'for I think your argument is exactly parallel to the assertion one might make about a weaver who died at an advanced age'. Heindorf would insert εἰ, but this is not necessary.

9. ἔστι που σῶς] I adopt without hesitation Forster's admirable emendation, which by a very slight change materially improves the sense. ἴσως seems to me quite inappropriate, notwithstanding Heindorf's defence of it and its retention by Z. and St.

10. αὐτὸς ὑφηνάμενος] The weaver is chosen as the closest parallel to the soul, who is perpetually renewing the body that is her vesture.

11. ἀπιστοίῃ] mss. ἀπιστῶν which cannot stand, since the question would be pointless in the mouth of an opponent. The ἂν which belongs to λέγοι also does duty for παρέχοιτο, ἀνερωτῶν, and οἷοιτο.

16. τὸ δέ] 'but in fact this is not the case'. Cf. *Theaetetus* 157 B, *Sophist* 244 A, *Laws* 642 A.



μέτρι' ἄν μοι φαίνοιτο λέγειν, ὡς ἡ μὲν ψυχὴ πολυχρόνιον ἔστι, τὸ δὲ σῶμα ἀσθενέστερον καὶ ὀλιγοχροσιώτερον· ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἄν φαίη ἐκάστην τῶν ψυχῶν πολλὰ σώματα κατατρίβειν, ἄλλως τε καὶ εἰ πολλὰ ἔτη βιῶν· εἰ γὰρ ῥέοι τὸ σῶμα καὶ ἀπολλύοιτο ἔτι ζῶντος  
 E τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ἀλλ' ἡ ψυχὴ αἰεὶ τὸ κατατριβόμενον ἀνυφαίνει, 5 ἀναγκαῖον μεντὰν εἶη, ὅποτε ἀπολλύοιτο ἡ ψυχὴ, τὸ τελευταίου ὕφασμα τυχεῖν αὐτὴν ἔχουσαν καὶ τούτου μόνου προτέραν ἀπολλυσθαι, ἀπολομένης δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς τότε ἤδη τὴν φύσιν τῆς ἀσθενείας ἐπιδεικνύοι τὸ σῶμα καὶ ταχὺ σαπὲν διοίχοιτο. ὥστε τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ οὐπω ἄξιον πιστεύσαντα θαρρεῖν, ὡς, ἐπειδὰν ἀποθά- 10  
 88 ωμεν, ἔτι που ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ ἔστιν. εἰ γὰρ τις καὶ πλέον ἔτι τῷ λέγοντι [ἦ] ἂ σὺ λέγεις συγχωρήσειεν, δοὺς αὐτῷ μὴ μόνον ἐν τῷ πρὶν καὶ γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς χρόνῳ εἶναι ἡμῶν τὰς ψυχάς, ἀλλὰ μηδὲν κωλύειν καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνωμεν ἐνίων ἔτι εἶναι καὶ ἔσσεσθαι καὶ 15  
 πολλάκις γενήσεσθαι καὶ ἀποθανεῖσθαι αὖθις· οὕτω γὰρ αὐτὸ φύσει 15 ἰσχυρὸν εἶναι, ὥστε πολλάκις γιγνομένην ψυχὴν ἀντέχειν· δοὺς δὲ ταῦτα ἐκείνο μηκέτι συγχωροῖ, μὴ οὐ πονεῖν αὐτὴν ἐν ταῖς πολλαῖς

*sum out*

3. πολλὰ σώματα κατατρίβειν] i. e. within the limits of a single human life. Kebes puts his case in two forms: the superior durability of the soul is consistent with the supposition (1) that during the ordinary span of human life she wears out many bodies, perpetually restoring them as they suffer waste; (2) that after separation from one body she may survive and enter into another and another. Yet in the first case she may become extinct on separating from the body; in the second she may after several incarnations be worn out by her labours and at some one separation perish utterly. Therefore we cannot argue that because the soul outlasts the body she is necessarily immortal.

9. ἐπιδεικνύοι] Prof. Geddes is not, I think, right in referring this optative to indirect speech, though Soph. *Phil.* 617 would justify it (not the other passage he cites). As Stallbaum points out ἄν is easily carried on from above, ἀναγκαῖον μεντὰν.

11. ἡ ψυχὴ ἔστιν] Schanz adopts ἔστα

from Hirschig, for which I see no sufficient reason, since ἔστω is general. Note that Kebes treats the whole of chapters 25—29 as intended to supplement ἀνάμνησις by showing the after-existence of the soul: he recurs to the objection he made at 77 C, against which Sokrates appeals to ἀνταπόδοσις, but nevertheless proceeds to bring fresh evidence.

τῷ λέγοντι [ἦ] Madvig proposed to strike out ἦ, and Schanz seems right in bracketing it. For (1) τῷ λέγοντι wants an object, (2) Kebes offers to grant not more than what Sokrates says, but more than he has himself just said. He will grant not only that the soul may have existed before birth and may wear out many bodies in this life before perishing, but also that she may survive the severance once or many times before she herself succumbs.

15. οὕτω γὰρ αὐτό] αὐτό, referring to ψυχὴν, seems to be attracted into the gender of ἰσχυρόν. Prof. Geddes compares 109 A πάμμεγά τι εἶναι αὐτό, sc. τὴν γῆν.

γενέσεσιν καὶ τελευτῶσάν γε ἔν τινι τῶν θανάτων παντάπασιν ἀπόλλυσθαι· τοῦτον δὲ τὸν θάνατον καὶ ταύτην τὴν διάλυσιν τοῦ B σώματος, ἢ τῇ ψυχῇ φέρει ὄλεθρον, μηδένα φαίη εἶδέναι· ἀδύνατον γὰρ εἶναι ὄτῳδὸν αἰσθάνεσθαι ἡμῶν· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, οὐδενὶ  
 5 προσήκει θάνατον θαρροῦντι μὴ οὐκ ἀνοήτως θαρρεῖν, ὃς ἂν μὴ ἔχη ἀποδείξει ὅτι ἔστι ψυχὴ παντάπασιν ἀθάνατόν τε καὶ ἀνώλεθρον· εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἀνάγκη ἐἶναι αἰεὶ τὸν μέλλοντα ἀποθανεῖσθαι δεδιέναι ὑπὲρ τῆς αὐτοῦ ψυχῆς, μὴ ἐν τῇ νῦν τοῦ σώματος διαξέυξει παντά-  
 10 πασιν ἀπόληται.

XXXVIII. Πάντες οὖν ἀκούσαντες εἰπόντων αὐτῶν ἀηδῶς C διετέθημεν, ὡς ὕστερον ἐλέγομεν πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ὅτι ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔμπροσθεν λόγου σφύδρα πεπεισμένους ἡμῶς πάλιν ἐδόκουν ἀνα-  
 15 ταραξάει καὶ εἰς ἀπιστίαν καταβαλεῖν οὐ μόνον τοῖς προειρημένους λόγοις, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς τὰ ὕστερον μέλλοντα ῥηθήσεσθαι, μὴ οὐδενὸς ἄξιοι εἶμεν κριταὶ ἢ καὶ τὰ πράγματα ἄπιστα ἦ.

EX. Νῆ τοὺς θεοὺς, ὦ Φαίδων, συγγνώμην γε ἔχω ὑμῖν. καὶ

2. τοῦτον δὲ τὸν θάνατον] Since no one knows how often his soul has already been incarnate, he cannot tell whether or not she may survive the termination of his present life.

4. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει] 'if the hypothesis I suggest be true'. Few who have read through this forcibly stated argument will agree with Wagner that 'it gives the reader the impression that Kebes is represented as an awkward speaker, because he is not a clear thinker'.

88 c—89 c, c. xxxviii. Phaedo pauses to describe the effect of these objections upon the audience: how their confidence is shattered in the argument and in their own judgment. Echekrates sympathises, adding that the conception of soul as a harmony has always had a strong attraction for him. He desires to know how Sokrates behaved. Never, replies Phaedo, did Sokrates appear to greater advantage: he showed neither irritation nor dismay; he cheered and encouraged us, as a general rallies his broken forces. In illustration thereof Phaedo narrates a little by-play which passed between Sokrates and

himself.

By interposing this interlude Plato desires to mark in the most emphatic manner that an acute crisis has arrived in the discussion. The whole position has to be reconsidered, and the argument, as Echekrates says, started again almost from the beginning. The exact situation of the argument at this point is dealt with in the introduction § 2, where I have tried to show as clearly as possible the relation between the earlier and the later part of the demonstration. A short dialogue between Phaedo and Echekrates is similarly introduced at 102 A to mark the completion of an important step.

13. τοῖς προειρημένους λόγοις] governed by ἀπιστίαν.

15. ἄπιστα ἦ] Schanz, following Heindorf, reads εἶη against the mss. But the change of mood is nothing remarkable, as the instances cited by Stallbaum will show. The subjunctive represents a more vivid conception of the contingency: see Prof. Goodwin's excellent article in the *Journal of Philology*, vol. VIII p. 18. For εἶμεν BCD corruptly give ἦμεν.

γὰρ αὐτόν με νῦν ἀκούσαντά σου τοιοῦτόν τι λέγειν πρὸς ἑμαυτὸν  
 D ἐπέρχεται· τίνοι οὖν ἔτι πιστεύσομεν λόγῳ; ὡς γὰρ σφόδρα πιθανὸς  
 ὢν, ὃν ὁ Σωκράτης ἔλεγε λόγον, νῦν εἰς ἀπιστίαν καταπέπτωκεν.  
 θανμαστῶς γὰρ μου ὁ λόγος οὗτος ἀντιλαμβάνεται καὶ νῦν καὶ αἰεὶ,  
 τὸ ἄρμονίαν τινὰ ἡμῶν εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν, καὶ ὡς περ ὑπέμνησέν 5 ||  
με ῥηθεὶς ὅτι καὶ αὐτῷ μοι ταῦτα προεδέδοκτο· καὶ πάννυ δέομαι  
 πάλιν ὡς περ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἄλλου τινὸς λόγου, ὅς με πείσει ὡς τοῦ  
 ἀποθανόντος οὐ συναποθνήσκει ἡ ψυχὴ. λέγε οὖν πρὸς Διός, πῆ  
 E ὁ Σωκράτης μετῆλθε τὸν λόγον; καὶ πότερον κἀκείνος, ὡς περ ὑμᾶς  
 φῆς, ἐνδηλὸς τι ἐγένετο ἀχθόμενος ἢ οὐ, ἀλλὰ πρῶως ἐβοήθει 10  
 τῷ λόγῳ; καὶ ἰκανῶς ἐβοήθησεν ἢ ἐνδεῶς; πάντα ἡμῖν δῖελλθε ὡς  
 δύνασαι ἀκριβέστατα.

ΦΑΙΔ. Καὶ μὴν, ὦ Ἐχέκρατες, πολλακίς θανμάσας Σωκράτη  
 89 οὐ πώποτε μᾶλλον ἠγάσθην ἢ τότε παραγενόμενος. τὸ μὲν οὖν  
 ἔχειν ὃ τι λέγοι ἐκείνος ἴσως οὐδὲν ἄποπον· ἀλλὰ ἔγωγε μάλιστα 15  
 ἐθαύμασα αὐτοῦ πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτο, ὡς ἠδέως καὶ εὐμνεῶς καὶ  
 ἀγαμνεῶς τῶν νεανίσκων τὸν λόγον ἀπεδέξατο, ἔπειτα ἡμῶν ὡς  
 δξέως ἦσθετο ὃ πεπόνθειμεν ὑπὸ τῶν λόγων, ἔπειτα ὡς εὐ ἡμᾶς  
 ἰάσατο καὶ ὡς περ πεφευγότας καὶ ἠττημένους ἀνεκαλέσατο καὶ  
 προὔτρεψεν πρὸς τὸ παρέπεσθαί τε καὶ συσκοπεῖν τὸν λόγον. 20

EX. Πῶς δὴ;

ΦΑΙΔ. Ἐγὼ ἐρῶ. ἔτυχον γὰρ ἐν δεξιᾷ αὐτοῦ καθήμενος  
 B παρὰ τὴν κλίνην ἐπὶ χαμαιζήλου τινός, ὃ δὲ ἐπὶ πολὺ ὑψηλοτέρου  
 ἢ ἐγώ. καταψήσας οὖν μου τὴν κεφαλὴν καὶ συμπίεσας τὰς ἐπὶ  
 τῷ αὐχένι τρίχας—εἰώθει γὰρ, ὅποτε τύχοι, παίξειν μου εἰς τὰς 25  
 τρίχας—Αὔριον δὴ, ἔφη, ἴσως, ὦ Φαίδων, τὰς καλὰς κόμας ἀπο-  
 κερεῖ. Ἔοικεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Σώκρατες. Οὐκ ἂν γε ἐμοὶ πείθῃ.  
 Ἄλλὰ τί; ἦν δ' ἐγώ. Τήμερον, ἔφη, καὶ γὰρ τὰς ἐμὰς καὶ σὺ ταύτας,  
 εἰνπερ γε ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος τελευτήσῃ καὶ μὴ δυνώμεθα αὐτὸν ἀνα-

2. ὡς γὰρ σφόδρα] 'for how strongly persuasive was that theory which Sokrates maintained, and yet it has now fallen into discredit'.

4. ἀντιλαμβάνεται] 'has a wonderfully firm grasp of me'. It never seems to have occurred to Echekrates that his favourite theory was fatal to the soul's immortality and to metempsychosis.

10. ἐνδηλὸς τι] Heindorf rightly says that τι belongs to ἀχθόμενος.

15. ὃ τι λέγοι ἐκείνος] The subject is placed in the relative instead of the main clause.

17. ὡς δξέως ἦσθετο] as is shown by his admonition against 'misology' in the next chapter.

26. τὰς καλὰς κόμας] Z. and St. with some mss. have τὰς καλὰς ταύτας κόμας.

29. ἀναβιώσασθαι] This transitive use of the word occurs again *Crito* 48 C.



βιώσασθαι. καὶ ἐγὼ ἄν, εἰ σὺ εἶην καὶ με διαφεύγοι ὁ λόγος, C  
 ἔνορκον ἂν ποιησαίμην ὥσπερ Ἀργεῖοι, μὴ πρότερον κομήσειν,  
 πρὶν ἂν νικήσω ἀναμαχόμενος τὸν Σιμμίου τε καὶ Κέβητος λόγον.

Ἄλλ', ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πρὸς δύο λέγεται οὐδ' ὁ Ἡρακλῆς οἶός τε εἶναι.  
 5 Ἄλλὰ καὶ ἐμέ, ἔφη, τὸν Ἰόλεω παρακάλει, ἕως ἔτι φῶς ἐστίν.  
 Παρακαλῶ τοίνυν, ἔφη, οὐχ ὡς Ἡρακλῆς, ἀλλ' ὡς Ἰόλεως τὸν  
 Ἡρακλῆ. Οὐδὲν διοίσει, ἔφη.

XXXIX. Ἄλλὰ πρῶτον εὐλαβηθῶμέν τι πάθος μὴ πάθωμεν.  
 Τὸ ποῖον; ἦν δ' ἐγώ. Μὴ γενώμεθα, ἦ δ' ὅς, μισόλογοι, ὥσπερ οἱ D  
 10 μισάνθρωποι γιγνόμενοι ὡς οὐκ ἐστίν, ἔφη, ὅ τι ἂν τις μείζον  
 τούτου κακὸν πάθοι ἢ λόγους μισήσας. γίγνεται δὲ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ  
 τρόπου μισολογία τε καὶ μισανθρωπία. ἢ τε γὰρ μισανθρωπία  
 ἐνδύεται ἐκ τοῦ σφόδρα τιμῆ πιστεῦσαι ἄνευ τέχνης, καὶ ἠγήσασθαι  
 παντάσῃ γε ἀληθῆ εἶναι καὶ ὑγιῆ καὶ πιστὸν τὸν ἄνθρωπον,  
 15 ἔπειτα ὀλίγον ὕστερον εὐρέειν τοῦτον πονηρόν τε καὶ ἄπιστον καὶ  
 αἰθῆς ἕτερον καὶ ὅταν τοῦτο πολλάκις πάθῃ τις, καὶ ὑπὸ τούτων  
 μάλιστα οὐς ἂν ἠγήσαιο οἰκειοτάτους τε καὶ ἑταιροτάτους, τελευ- E  
 τῶν δὴ θαμὰ προσκρούων μισεῖ τε πάντα καὶ ἠγεῖται οὐδενός

2. ὥσπερ Ἀργεῖοι] referring to the story told by Herodotus I 82. The Argives, foiled in their attempt to recover Thyreai from the Spartans, vowed not to let their hair grow till they reconquered it. Prof. Geddes remarks that the Romans on the contrary showed grief by letting their hair grow long.

3. ἀναμαχόμενος] 'renewing the battle'.

4. οὐδ' ὁ Ἡρακλῆς] We find the legend in *Euthydemus* 297 c. Herakles, while fighting the hydra, was assailed by a big crab, against which he called in the aid of Iolaos. Cf. *Laws* 919 b. Presently Schanz after Cobet brackets τὸν Ἡρακλῆ.

5. ἕως ἔτι φῶς ἐστίν] because at sunset he must drink the poison.

89 D—90 D, c. xxxix. Sokrates continues: we must beware lest we become haters of arguments as some become haters of mankind. For when one has been repeatedly deceived in others, whom he believed to be good and true men, he

falls sometimes into distrust and dislike of the whole human race. But this is owing to his ignorance of human nature: he does not reflect that extremes are rare, and that the very good and very bad are equally few in number. It is the same with arguments: if we have come rightly or wrongly to distrust one argument after another, we must not hastily conclude that no valid argument is to be found; it is our own want of skill that we should rather blame. We ought to take warning by those contentious disputants, who assert that there is no stable truth in anything, and fancy themselves prodigiously clever to have found this out. Yet it were sad indeed, supposing there is such a thing as truth, and that we might discover it, if, instead of laying the fault where it is really due, we quarrelled with philosophy and thus deprived ourselves of all chance of attaining truth.

11. ἢ λόγους μισήσας] 'than by conceiving a hatred for arguments'; explanatory of τούτου.

οὐδὲν ὑγιές εἶναι τὸ παράπαν. ἢ οὐκ ἤσθησαι σὺ τοῦτο γιγνόμενον; Πάνυ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. Οὐκοῦν, ἦ δ' ὅς, αἰσχρὸν, καὶ δῆλον ὅτι ἄνευ τέχνης τῆς περὶ τὰνθρώπεια ὁ τοιοῦτος χρῆσθαι ἐπιχειρεῖ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις; εἰ γὰρ που μετὰ τέχνης ἐχρήτο, ὡσπερ ἔχει, οὕτως ἂν ἠγήσατο, τοὺς μὲν χρηστοὺς καὶ πονηροὺς σφόδρα ὀλίγους εἶναι 5 ἐκατέρους, τοὺς δὲ μεταξύ πλείστους. Πῶς λέγεις; ἔφην ἐγώ. "Ὡσπερ, ἦ δ' ὅς, περὶ τῶν σφόδρα μικρῶν καὶ μεγάλων" οἶε τι σπανιώτερον εἶναι ἢ σφόδρα μέγαν ἢ σφόδρα μικρὸν ἐξευρεῖν ἄνθρωπον ἢ κύνα ἢ ἄλλο ὀτιοῦν; ἢ αὖ ταχὺν ἢ βραδύν, ἢ αἰσχρὸν ἢ καλόν, ἢ λευκὸν ἢ μέλανα; ἢ οὐκ ἤσθησαι ὅτι πάντων τῶν τοι- 10 οὔτων τὰ μὲν ἄκρα τῶν ἐσχάτων σπάνια καὶ ὀλίγα, τὰ δὲ μεταξύ ἄφθονα καὶ πολλά; Πάνυ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. Οὐκοῦν οἶε, ἔφη, εἰ B πονηρίας ἀγῶν προτεθείη, πάνυ ἂν ὀλίγους καὶ ἐνταῦθα τοὺς πρώτους φανῆναι; Εἰκὸς γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. Εἰκὸς γάρ, ἔφη, ἀλλὰ ταύτη μὲν οὐχ ὅμοιοι οἱ λόγοι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἀλλὰ σοῦ νῦν δὴ 15 προάγοντος ἐγὼ ἐφespoμένην, ἀλλ' ἐκείνη, ἦ, ἐπειδὴν τις πιστεύσῃ λόγῳ τινὶ ἀληθεῖ εἶναι ἄνευ τῆς περὶ τοὺς λόγους τέχνης, κάπειτα ὀλίγον ὕστερον αὐτῷ δόξῃ ψευδῆς εἶναι, ἐνίοτε μὲν ὦν, ἐνίοτε δ' οὐκ ὦν, καὶ αὐθις ἕτερος καὶ ἕτερος· καὶ μάλιστα δὴ οἱ περὶ τοὺς

οὓς ἂν ἠγήσαιο] 'whom he would naturally think'. ἂν of course belongs to ἠγήσαιο.

1. ἤσθησαι σὺ τοῦτο] Z. has οὕτω τοῦτο. St. οὕτω πως τοῦτο.

2. αἰσχρὸν is bracketed by Schanz. ἄνευ τέχνης] i.e. without a knowledge of mankind.

5. τοὺς μὲν χρηστοὺς καὶ πονηροὺς σφόδρα] Although the order of the words inclines us to take σφόδρα with ὀλίγους, I think the sense requires that it should be joined with χρηστοὺς καὶ πονηροὺς. Heindorf would double σφόδρα; but it is not really wanted with ὀλίγους.

11. τὰ μὲν ἄκρα τῶν ἐσχάτων] 'the extremes in both directions'. The ἐσχάτα are the two opposite qualities, ἄκρα the extremes of these. Thus if we conceive λευκὸν and μέλαν to be represented by a straight line, the central portion is occupied by shades of grey; the ἐσχάτα, or parts remote from the centre, by white and black; and the ἄκρα or ends of the

line by the highest degree of each.

14. ἀλλὰ ταύτη μὲν] Sokrates has been led by the question of Phaedo into a digression upon the nature of the ἀτεχνία shown by misanthropes, which consists in their forgetting that extremes are seldom met with. But this does not constitute the analogy between μισανθρωπία and μισολογία. The real analogy is that when we have been several times disappointed in a λόγος we jump to the conclusion that all λόγοι are worthless, without stopping to consider whether the fault may not lie in our unscientific treatment.

16. ἐπειδὴν τις πιστεύσῃ] The apodosis never comes: Plato finishes the sentence as if he had not written ἦ, which Schanz, at Madvig's suggestion, omits.

19. οἱ περὶ τοὺς ἀντιλογικοὺς λόγους] Plato may refer to the Ephesian school, οἱ ῥέοντες of the *Theaetetus*: perhaps also to sophists of the type of Dionysodoros and Euthydemos, such as he seems to have in view at 101 E; and to the Cynics.

ἀντιλογικούς λόγους διατρίψαντες οἶσθ' ὅτι τελευτῶντες οἴονται C  
σοφώτατοι γεγονέναι τε καὶ κατανευηκέναι μόνοι ὅτι οὔτε τῶν  
πραγμάτων οὐδενὸς οὐδὲν ὑγιᾶς οὐδὲ βέβαιον οὔτε τῶν λόγων,  
ἀλλὰ πάντα τὰ ὄντα ἀτεχνῶς ὥσπερ ἐν Εὐρίπῳ ἄνω καὶ κάτω  
5 στρέφεται καὶ χρόνον οὐδένα ἐν οὐδενὶ μένει. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη  
ἐγώ, ἀληθῆ λέγεις. Οὐκοῦν, ὦ Φαίδων, ἔφη, οἰκτρὸν ἂν εἴη τὸ  
πάθος, εἰ ὄντος δὴ τιнос ἀληθοῦς καὶ βεβαίου λόγου καὶ δυνατοῦ  
κατανοῆσαι, ἔπειτα διὰ τὸ παραγίγνεσθαι τοιούτοις τισὶ λόγοις D  
τοῖς αὐτοῖς τοτὲ μὲν δοκοῦσιν ἀληθέσιν εἶναι, τοτὲ δὲ μή, μὴ ἑαυτὸν  
10 τις αἰτιῶτο μηδὲ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀτεχνίαν, ἀλλὰ τελευτῶν διὰ τὸ ἀλγεῖν  
ἄσμενος ἐπὶ τοὺς λόγους ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ τὴν αἰτίαν ἀπόσαιτο καὶ ἤδη  
τὸν λοιπὸν βίον μισῶν τε καὶ λοιδορῶν διατελοῖ, τῶν δὲ ὄντων  
τῆς ἀληθείας τε καὶ ἐπιστήμης στερηθεῖη. Νῆ τὸν Δία, ἦν δ' ἐγώ,  
οἰκτρὸν δῆτα. ||  
15 XL. Πρῶτον μὲν τοῖνυν, ἔφη, τοῦτο εὐλαβηθῶμεν, καὶ μὴ  
παρίωμεν εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν, ὡς τῶν λόγων κινδυνεύει οὐδὲν ὑγιᾶς E  
εἶναι, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον ὅτι ἡμεῖς οὐπω ὑγιῶς ἔχομεν, ἀλλὰ  
ἀνδριστέον καὶ προθυμητέον ὑγιῶς ἔχειν, σοὶ μὲν οὖν καὶ τοῖς  
ἄλλοις καὶ τοῦ ἔπειτα βίου παντὸς ἕνεκα, ἐμοὶ δὲ αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα τοῦ  
20 θανάτου ὡς κινδυνεύω ἔγωγε ἐν τῷ παρόντι περὶ αὐτοῦ τούτου οὐ 91

2. σοφώτατοι γεγονέναι] Cf. *Sophist* 251 C ἐντυγχάνεις γὰρ, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, πολλάκις τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐσπουδακόσιν, ἐνίοτε πρεσβυτέροις ἀνθρώποις, καὶ ὑπὸ πενίας τῆς περὶ φρόνησιν κτήσεως τὰ τοιαῦτα τεθναμακόσι, καὶ δὴ τι καὶ πάσσοφον οἰομένοις τοῦτ' αὐτὸ ἀνευρηκέναι. Clearly a hit at Antisthenes.

4. ἄνω καὶ κάτω στρέφεται] Compare the invective of Theodoros against the Ephesians, *Theaetetus* 179 E foll. Besides these Herakleiteans (with whom Plato had really little or no quarrel, so far as regards the phenomenal world), the principal ἀντιλογικοὶ were Antisthenes with his school, and some later Sophists, who had caught up the trick of the Sokratic method of question and answer and used it to force on the unwary the acceptance of the most preposterous paradoxes. Their habits are admirably described in the *Euthydemus*. These men, whose only

object was to make a sensation, must be classed apart from disputants of the Cynic and Megarian schools, whose paradoxes rested upon logical and metaphysical errors which were genuine difficulties at the time; which in fact required all Plato's genius to clear away.

90 D—91 C, c. xl. Let us beware then, says Sokrates, lest we rashly charge our argument with being faulty, when the fault is our own. The question is of deep interest to us all, and to me especially: indeed I feel less like a philosopher than like those who argue not for truth's sake but merely that their opinion may prevail; only I am more anxious to persuade myself than you. However, if my belief is true, it is well; if not, it will at least make me better company for you while I am with you. For your part, you must think more of the truth than of Sokrates; and you must not accept my reasoning



φιλοσόφως ἔχει, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ οἱ πάνυ ἀπαίδευτοι φιλονείκως, καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι ὅταν περὶ τοῦ ἀμφισβητώσιν, ὅπῃ μὲν ἔχει περὶ ὧν ἂν ὁ λόγος ἢ οὐ φροντίζουσιν, ὅπως δὲ ἂ αὐτοὶ ἔθετο ταῦτα δόξει τοῖς παροῦσιν, τοῦτο προθυμούνται. καὶ ἐγὼ μοι δοκῶ ἐν τῷ παρόντι τοσοῦτον μόνον ἐκείνων διοίσειν· οὐ γὰρ ὅπως τοῖς 5 παροῦσιν ἂ ἐγὼ λέγω δόξει ἀληθῆ εἶναι προθυμηθήσομαι, εἰ μὴ εἴη πάρεργον, ἀλλ' ὅπως αὐτῷ ἐμοὶ ὅ τι μάλιστα δόξει οὕτως ἔχειν.

B λογιζομαι γάρ, ὦ φίλε ἑταῖρε, θέασαι ὡς πλεονεκτικῶς· εἰ μὲν τυγχάνει ἀληθῆ ὄντα ἂ λέγω, καλῶς δὴ ἔχει τὸ πεισθῆναι· εἰ δὲ μηδὲν ἐστὶ τελευτήσαντι, ἀλλ' οὖν τοῦτόν γε τὸν χρόνον αὐτὸν τὸν 10 πρὸ τοῦ θανάτου ἤττον τοῖς παροῦσιν ἀηδῆς ἔσομαι ὀδυρόμενος. ἢ δὲ δὴ ἀγνοιά μοι αὕτη οὐ ξυνδιατελεῖ, κακὸν γὰρ ἂν ἦν, ἀλλ' ὀλίγον ὕστερον ἀπολείται. παρεσκευασμένος δὴ, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, οὕτως ἐρχομαι ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον· ὑμεῖς μέντοι, ἂν ἐμοὶ 15 C πείθησθε, σμικρὸν φροντίσαντες Σωκράτους, τῆς δὲ ἀληθείας πολὺ μᾶλλον, ἔαν μὲν τι ὑμῖν δοκῶ ἀληθὲς λέγειν, συνομολογήσατε, εἰ δὲ μὴ, παντὶ λόγῳ ἀντιτείνετε, ὅπως μὴ ἐγὼ ὑπὸ προθυμίας ἅμα

until you have fully tested it; lest I depart like a bee leaving my sting behind.

1. οἱ πάνυ ἀπαίδευτοι] The language suggests the Cynics; cf. *Theaetetus* 155 E εἰσι γάρ, ὦ παῖ, μᾶλ' εὐ ἄμουσοι; cf. *Sophist* 246 D, and Arist. *metaph.* H iii 1043<sup>b</sup> 24 οἱ Ἀντισθένειοι καὶ οἱ οὕτως ἀπαίδευτοι. Sophists of the eristic type are no doubt included.

6. εἰ μὴ εἴη πάρεργον] 'unless it were merely by the way'. It is surprising that Prof. Geddes has adopted against all the mss. Hermann's most infelicitous conjecture εἰ μὴ εἰ πάρεργον. Had εἰ been found in the texts, one would have felt strongly inclined to alter it to εἴη.

8. λογιζομαι γάρ] 'for I am reasoning, my dear companion — see how selfishly'. All this is Sokratic *ειρωνεία*: Sokrates and Plato were the last men to persuade themselves that a belief was true, because it was pleasant.

11. ἤττον τοῖς παροῦσι] 'I shall be less likely to annoy the company with lamentation'. ἤττον of course qualifies all the words that follow: it will less be

the case that I shall annoy them by lamenting. The passage would not have required a note but for the strange misconception of Wagner, who seems to think that μὴ is wanted before ὀδυρόμενος.

12. ἢ δὲ δὴ ἀγνοία] Sokrates means that one way or another his doubts will be cleared away; he will not go on existing in doubt whether his existence will continue. For at death he will either find assurance of immortality or he will cease to be, and in neither case is he subject to ἀγνοία. ὀλίγον ὕστερον means shortly after the present moment, not after death. δὴ ἀγνοία is Fischer's suggestion for διαγνοία, which is the reading of the best mss.: the rest have ἀνοία.

15. σμικρὸν φροντίσαντες Σωκράτους] Cf. *Republic* 595 C ἀλλ' οὐ γὰρ πρὸ τῆς ἀληθείας τιμητέος ἀνὴρ; and Arist. *Nic. Eth.* I iv 1096<sup>a</sup> 16 ἀμφοῖν γὰρ ὄντων φίλων ὅσιον προτιμᾶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν.

17. ὅπως μὴ] The editions generally have εἰ ἀλαβούμενοι ὅπως: but the particle is absent in BCD and omitted by Schanz.

ἐμαντόν τε καὶ ὑμᾶς ἐξαπατήσας ὥσπερ μέλιττα τὸ κέντρον ἐγκαταλιπὼν οἰχήσομαι.

XLI. Ἄλλ' ἰτέον, ἔφη. πρῶτόν με ὑπομνήσατε ἂ ἐλέγετε, εἰ μὴ φαίνωμαι μεμνημένος. Σιμμίας μὲν γάρ, ὡς ἐγὼμαι, ἀπιστεῖ  
 5 ἕτε καὶ φοβεῖται, μὴ ἡ ψυχὴ ὅμως καὶ θειότερον καὶ κάλλιον ὂν τοῦ σώματος προαπολλύηται ἐν ἁρμονίας εἶδει οὕσα· Κέβης δέ μὲ μοι ἔδοξε τοῦτο μὲν ἐμοὶ συγχωρεῖν, πολυχρονιώτερόν γε εἶναι ψυχὴν σώματος, ἀλλὰ τότε ἄδηλον παντί, μὴ πολλὰ δὴ σώματα καὶ πολλάκις κατατρίψασα ἡ ψυχὴ τὸ τελευταῖον σῶμα καταλι-  
 10 πούσα νῦν αὐτὴ ἀπολλύηται, καὶ ἡ αὐτὸ τοῦτο θάνατος, ψυχῆς ὄλεθρος, ἐπεὶ σῶμά γε αἰεὶ ἀπολλύμενον οὐδὲν παύεται. ἄρα ἄλλ' ἢ ταῦτ' ἐστίν, ὃ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, ἂ δέῃ ἡμᾶς ἐπισκοπεῖσθαι; Συνομολογεῖτην δὴ ταῦτ' εἶναι ἄμφω. Πότερον οὖν, ἔφη, πάντας  
 15 τοὺς ἔμπροσθε λόγους οὐκ ἀποδέχεσθε, ἢ τοὺς μὲν, τοὺς δ' οὐ; Τοὺς μὲν, ἐφάτην, τοὺς δ' οὐ. Τί οὖν, ἢ δ' ὅς, περὶ ἐκείνου τοῦ λόγου λέγετε, ἐν ᾧ ἔφαμεν τὴν μάθησιν ἀνάμνησιν εἶναι, καὶ τούτου οὕτως ἔχοντος ἀναγκαίως ἔχειν ἄλλοθι πρότερον ἡμῶν εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν, πρὶν ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐνδεθῆναι; Ἐγὼ μὲν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης,  
 20 οὐδενὶ λόγῳ. Καὶ μὴν, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, καὶ αὐτὸς οὕτως ἔχω, καὶ πάνυ ἂν θαυμάζοιμι, εἴ μοι περὶ γε τούτου ἄλλα ποτὲ δόξειεν. καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, Ἄλλὰ ἀνάγκη σοι, ἔφη, ὃ ξένη Ἐθβαίε, ἄλλα

1. ἐμαντόν] This reading has the best authority: Z. and St. give *εαντόν*.

ὥσπερ μέλιττα] The commentators think this is borrowed from the line of Eupolis concerning Perikles, τὸ κέντρον ἐγκατέλειπε τοῖς ἀκρωμένοις. The expression seems likely to have been proverbial.

91 C—92 D, c. xli. Sokrates briefly restates the objections of Simmias and Kebes: he then points out to the former that he must make his choice between the doctrine that soul is a harmony and the doctrine that learning is reminiscence. The theory of reminiscence presupposes that the soul existed before the body; but a harmony comes into existence after that which produces it: either therefore soul is not a harmony or she has had no precognition of the ideas. Simmias admits this and declares without hesitation in favour of reminiscence, which he affirms

to be a rational hypothesis, while the other is merely a plausible analogy.

The first refutation is addressed to believers in *ἀνάμνησις* and pre-existence of the soul; it appeals therefore only to Platonists or Pythagoreans.

6. ἐν ἁρμονίας εἶδει] Cf. *Timaeus* 30 C τῶν μὲν οὖν ἐν μέρους εἶδει μηδενὶ καταξιώσωμεν. Also *Republic* 389 B; *Cratylus* 394 D.

8. πολλὰ δὴ σώματα καὶ πολλάκις] We might take πολλὰ to refer to the exhaustion of many bodies during our human life, and πολλάκις to the repeated incarnations of the soul; the two cases put by Kebes. But the following words καὶ ἡ...παύεται seem to show that Sokrates had the first case only in view; and for the purposes of his argument there is no difference between them.

22. ἄλλα δόξα] So Stallbaum and Schanz; Z. has *δοξάσαι* with the mss.

δόξαι, εἴνπερ μείνη ἦδε ἢ οἴησις, τὸ ἄρμονίαν μὲν εἶναι σύνθετον  
 πρῶγμα, ψυχὴν δὲ ἄρμονίαν τινὰ ἐκ τῶν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἐντεταμένων  
 B συγκείσθαι. οὐ γὰρ που ἀποδέξει γε αὐτοῦ λέγοντος, ὡς πρότερον  
 ἦν ἄρμονία συγκειμένη, πρὶν ἐκεῖνα εἶναι ἐξ ὧν ἔδει αὐτὴν συντε-  
 θῆναι· ἢ ἀποδέξει; Οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκратες. Αἰσθάνει οὖν, 5  
 ἢ δ' ὅς, ὅτι ταῦτά σοι συμβαίνει λέγειν, ὅταν φῆς μὲν εἶναι τὴν  
 ψυχὴν πρὶν καὶ εἰς ἀνθρώπου εἰδός τε καὶ σῶμα ἀφικέσθαι, εἶναι  
 δὲ αὐτὴν συγκειμένην ἐκ τῶν οὐδέπω ὄντων; οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἄρμονία  
 γέ σοι τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν ὃ ἀπεικάζεις, ἀλλὰ πρότερον καὶ ἡ λύρα  
 καὶ αἱ χορδαὶ καὶ οἱ φθόγγοι ἔτι ἀνάρμοστοι ὄντες γίνονται, 10  
 C τελευταῖον δὲ πάντων ξυνίσταται ἡ ἄρμονία καὶ πρῶτον ἀπόλλυ-  
 ται. οὗτος οὖν σοι ὁ λόγος ἐκείνῳ πῶς ξυνάσεται; Οὐδαμῶς,  
 ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας. Καὶ μήν, ἢ δ' ὅς, πρέπει γε εἴπερ τῷ ἄλλῳ λόγῳ  
 ξυνωδῶ εἶναι καὶ τῷ περὶ ἄρμονίας. Πρέπει γάρ, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας.  
 Οὗτος τοίνυν, ἔφη, σοὶ οὐ ξυνωδός, ἀλλ' ὄρα· πρότερον αἰρεῖ τῶν 15  
 λόγων, τὴν μάθησιν ἀνάμησιν εἶναι ἢ ψυχὴν ἄρμονίαν; Πολὺ  
 μᾶλλον, ἔφη, ἐκείνον, ὦ Σώκратες. ὅδε μὲν γὰρ μοι γέγονεν ἄνευ  
 D ἀποδείξεως μετὰ εἰκότος τινός καὶ εὐπρεπείας, ὅθεν καὶ τοῖς πολ-  
 λοῖς δοκεῖ ἀνθρώποις· ἐγὼ δὲ τοῖς διὰ τῶν εἰκότων τὰς ἀποδείξεις  
 ποιουμένοις λόγοις ξυνοῖδα οὖσιν ἀλαζόσιν, καὶ ἂν τις αὐτοὺς μὴ 20  
 φυλάττηται, εὖ μάλα ἐξαπατῶσι, καὶ ἐν γεωμετρίας καὶ ἐν τοῖς  
 ἄλλοις ἅπασιν. ὁ δὲ περὶ τῆς ἀναμνήσεως καὶ μαθήσεως λόγος  
 δι' ὑποθέσεως ἀξίας ἀποδέξασθαι εἴρηται. ἐρρήθη γὰρ που οὕτως

6. ταῦτά σοι συμβαίνει] 'this is what your statement amounts to'. Schmidt proposes οὐ ταῦτά, i. e. you make contradictory statements. This would do well enough, had it ms. authority; but the ms. reading is equally good sense. ταῦτα = πρότερον...συντεθῆναι.

9. ὃ ἀπεικάζεις] 'harmony is not what you represent it', i. e. it is not such a thing as soul. This is the reading of the best mss. and gives a simpler construction than the ordinary φ.

10. οἱ φθόγγοι] i. e. the tones of the several strings before they are combined into harmony.

18. μετὰ εἰκότος τινός] 'through a certain analogy and plausibility'.

τοῖς πολλοῖς] Another indication that this was a widely spread popular opinion,

not distinctively Pythagorean.

23. ἐρρήθη γὰρ που] 'for we said, I think, that the existence of our soul before she entered the body rested on the same assurance as that of the very substance that has the title of absolute essence'. I have followed Schanz in adopting the emendation of Mudge, αὐτῇ for αὐτῆς. Retaining αὐτῆς we make Plato affirm that the pre-existence of the soul is assured inasmuch as her substance is absolute existence. But Plato never said anything of the sort: he merely said, as surely as the ideas exist, so surely did the soul, 76 E. Heindorf in an acute note defends the vulgate, taking αὐτῆς as possessive; 'as surely as absolute existence belongs to her', i. e. was cognised by her; referring to the words in 76 E



ἡμῶν εἶναι ἢ ψυχὴ καὶ πρὶν εἰς σῶμα ἀφικέσθαι, ὥσπερ αὐτὴ ἔστιν ἢ οὐσία ἔχουσα τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν τὴν τοῦ ὃ ἔστιν. ἐγὼ δὲ Ε ταύτην, ὡς ἐμαντὸν πείθω, ἱκανῶς τε καὶ ὀρθῶς ἀποδέδεγμα. ἀνάγκη οὖν μοι, ὡς ἔοικε, διὰ ταῦτα μῆτε ἐμαντοῦ μῆτε ἄλλου 5 ἀποδέχεσθαι λέγοντος, ὡς ψυχὴ ἔστιν ἀρμονία.

XLII. Τί δέ, ἢ δ' ὅς, ὦ Σιμμία, τῆδε; δοκεῖ σοι ἀρμονία ἢ ἄλλη τινὶ συνθέσει προσήκειν ἄλλως πως ἔχειν ἢ ὡς ἂν ἐκεῖνα ἔχη 93 ἔξ ὧν ἂν συγκέηται; Οὐδαμῶς. Οὐδὲ μὴν ποιεῖν τι, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, οὐδέ τι πάσχειν ἄλλο παρ' ἂν ἐκεῖνα ἢ ποιῆ ἢ πάσχη; Συνέφη. 10 Οὐκ ἄρα ἠγείσθαι γε προσήκει ἀρμονίαν τούτων ἔξ ὧν ἂν συντεθῆ, ἀλλ' ἔπεσθαι. Συνεδόκει. Πολλοῦ ἄρα δεῖ ἐναντία γε ἀρμονία

ὑπάρχουσαν πρότερον ἀνευρίσκοντες ἡμετέραν οὔσαν. But (1) this interpretation supposes a very awkward ellipse of ἔστιν in a relative clause, (2) the sense of αὐτῆς is severely strained: could Plato say 'absolute existence is hers', meaning 'absolute existence is cognised by her'? (3) we have already seen reason to doubt the genuineness of the words in 76 E. Hirschig also adopts αὐτή.

3. ἱκανῶς] 'on adequate proof'.

92 E—94 B, c. xlii. Again a harmony must conform to the conditions of the materials which produce it; consequently the completeness of the harmony is in exact proportion to the completeness with which these are brought into tune. It follows then that there are degrees in harmony, corresponding with the conditions of the materials. But in soul there are no degrees; each soul is just as completely soul as every other. Furthermore we say some souls are virtuous, others vicious; and we define virtue to be a harmony, vice a discord of the soul. Now supposing that souls are harmonies, they are harmonies which admit of no difference in degree, since we have admitted that there are no degrees of soul. But a virtuous soul, being a harmony, has in her another harmony, while a vicious soul has a discord; therefore the virtuous soul is more of a harmony, that is, more of a soul, than the vicious. But this being

contrary to our premisses, we are forced to conclude that no soul is more virtuous or vicious than another; or rather that all souls, being complete harmonies, are completely virtuous: a *reductio ad absurdum*.

The second argument will reach those who accept neither ἀνάμνησις nor the ideal theory, but who do accept the view that virtue is a harmonious state of the soul. It is to be observed (1) that the premiss in 93 A πολλοῦ ἄρα δεῖ κ.τ.λ., of which a different use is made in the next chapter, here is simply brought in to show that the perfection of the harmony depends upon the tuning of the strings &c., and consequently that as these may be more or less in tune, the harmony admits corresponding degrees of completeness: (2) the argument might seem to be complete in 93 B, where it is allowed that, while harmony admits degrees, soul does not. But we should regard all the earlier part of the chapter as collecting the materials for the refutation which proceeds consecutively from 93 D: moreover Plato had to guard against the rejoinder that, although harmony, as such, admits of degrees, there may yet be particular kinds of harmony, whereof soul is one, which do not admit of degrees.

11. ἐναντία γε ἀρμονία] ἐναντία is of course accusative plural. Plato means that the harmony is entirely the outcome of its constituents and is conditioned by

κινηθῆναι ἢ φθέγξασθαι ἢ τι ἄλλο ἐναντιωθῆναι τοῖς αὐτῆς μέ-  
 ρεσιν. Πολλοῦ μέντοι, ἔφη. Τί δέ; οὐχ οὕτως ἄρμονία πέφυκεν  
 εἶναι ἐκάστη ἄρμονία, ὡς ἂν ἀρμοσθῆ; Οὐ μανθάνω, ἔφη. Οὐχί,  
 B ἢ δ' ὅς, ἂν μὲν μᾶλλον ἀρμοσθῆ καὶ ἐπὶ πλέον, εἴπερ ἐνδέχεται  
 τοῦτο γίγνεσθαι, μᾶλλον τε ἂν ἄρμονία εἴη καὶ πλείων, εἰ δ' ἦττόν 5  
 τε καὶ ἐπ' ἔλαττον, ἦττόν τε καὶ ἐλάττων; Πάνυ γε. Ἡ οὖν ἔστι  
 τοῦτο περὶ ψυχῆν, ὥστε καὶ κατὰ τὸ σμικρότατον μᾶλλον ἐτέραν  
 ἐτέρας ψυχῆς ἐπὶ πλέον καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ ἐπ' ἔλαττον καὶ ἦττον αὐτὸ  
 τοῦτο εἶναι, ψυχῆν; Οὐδ' ὀπωστιοῦν, ἔφη. Φέρε δὴ, ἔφη, πρὸς  
 C Διός· λέγεται ψυχῆ ἢ μὲν νοῦν τε ἔχει καὶ ἀρετὴν καὶ εἶναι 10  
 ἀγαθῆ, ἢ δὲ ἀνοίαν τε καὶ μοχθηρίαν καὶ εἶναι κακῆ; καὶ ταῦτα  
 ἀληθῶς λέγεται; Ἀληθῶς μέντοι. Τῶν οὖν θεμένων ψυχῆν ἄρ-

them, having no independent existence: as you tighten the string the tone rises. On this ground it would be impossible for a soul to be in a harmonious state, i.e. virtue, independently of the physical conditions of which she herself is the result.

4. μᾶλλον ἀρμοσθῆ καὶ ἐπὶ πλέον] There must be some distinction between μᾶλλον and ἐπὶ πλέον. I think μᾶλλον may apply to the degree of completeness in which the σύνθεσις is accomplished, and ἐπὶ πλέον to the character of the σύνθεσις itself. To take an illustration from music (1) the two notes forming an octave may be more or less in tune; (2) the octave and the fifth are more perfect concords than the fourth and third. This view, I find, is in a manner supported by Olympiodoros: ὑποτίθεται μὴ εἶναι ἄρμονίαν ἀρμονίας πλείω μῆδ' ἐλάττω, ἀλλὰ μῆδὲ μᾶλλον μῆδὲ ἦττον. ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον περὶ τὴν ποσότητα τῶν διαστημάτων καὶ τῶν συστημάτων· ἢ γὰρ διὰ τεσσάρων οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο οὔτε ἐν πλειοσιν οὔτε ἐν ἐλάττωσιν· τὸ δὲ δεύτερον περὶ τὴν ἄνεσιν καὶ τὴν ἐπίτασιν· κατ' αὐτὸ γὰρ τὸ εἶδος οὐδεμία ἄρμονία οὔτε ἀνίεται οὔτε ἐπιτείνεται. That is, a particular harmony, e.g. the fourth, cannot be harmonised ἐπὶ πλέον or μᾶλλον: since (1) it cannot comprehend more than a fixed number of tones, (2) it cannot (if it is to be a true fourth) admit any tampering

with the pitch, κατὰ τὸν ἀρμονικὸν λόγον. The Pythagoreans, he says, συλλαβὰν μὲν καλοῦσιν τὴν διὰ τεσσάρων ἄρμονίαν ὡς ἤκιστα ἄρμονίαν κατακορεσάτην δὲ τὴν διὰ πᾶσων ὡς μάλιστα. As to the μᾶλλον καὶ ἦττον he remarks ἔχει γὰρ ἐκάστη ἄρμονία πλάτος τι κατὰ τὴν αἰσθησιν, οὐ μὴν κατὰ τὸν ἀρμονικὸν λόγον: that is to say, although one precise ratio alone constitutes a true octave, there is a certain margin of variation within which the ear will accept the interval as an octave.

7. μᾶλλον ἐτέραν ἐτέρας] I have retained μᾶλλον with all the mss. It is bracketed by Schanz and expunged by the Zürich editors. μᾶλλον however is not seldom used by Plato to strengthen another comparative: cf. *Timaeus* 87 C δικαιοῦτερον γὰρ τῶν ἀγαθῶν περὶ μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν κακῶν ἴσχειν λόγον. *Politicus* 259 C τῆς δὲ γνωστικῆς μᾶλλον ἢ τῆς χειροτεχνικῆς καὶ ἄλλως πρακτικῆς βούλει τὸν βασιλέα φῶμεν οἰκειότερον εἶναι; *Gorgias* 487 B αἰσχυνοτέρω μᾶλλον τοῦ δέοντος. The present case is, it is true, a stronger one, since the word μᾶλλον is actually repeated; but this is softened by the interposition of ἐπὶ πλέον, and the pleonasm seems to me not unnatural. Some editors would insert ψυχῆν before ψυχῆς: but, as Schmidt observes, this is superfluous on account of the preceding words ἢ οὖν ἔστι τοῦτο περὶ ψυχῆν.

μονίαν εἶναι τί τις φήσει ταῦτα ὄντα εἶναι ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς, τὴν  
 τε ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν κακίαν; πότερον ἀρμονίαν αὖ τινα ἄλλην καὶ  
 ἀναρμωστίαν; καὶ τὴν μὲν ἡρμόσθαι, τὴν ἀγαθὴν, καὶ ἔχειν ἐν  
 αὐτῇ ἀρμονία οὔση ἄλλην ἀρμονίαν, τὴν δὲ ἀναρμωστον αὐτὴν τε  
 5 εἶναι καὶ οὐκ ἔχειν ἐν αὐτῇ ἄλλην; Οὐκ ἔχω ἔγωγ', ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας,  
 εἰπεῖν· δῆλον δ' ὅτι τοιαυτ' ἄττ' ἂν λέγοι ὁ ἐκεῖνο ὑποθέμενος. D  
 Ἀλλὰ προωμολόγηται, ἔφη, μηδὲν μᾶλλον μηδ' ἦττον ἐτέραν ἐτέρας  
 ψυχὴν ψυχῆς εἶναι· τοῦτο δ' ἔστι τὸ ὁμολόγημα, μηδὲν μᾶλλον  
 μηδ' ἐπὶ πλέον μηδ' ἦττον μηδ' ἐπ' ἔλαττον ἐτέραν ἐτέρας ἀρμονίαν  
 10 ἀρμονίας εἶναι ἢ γάρ; Πάνυ γε. Τὴν δέ γε μηδὲν μᾶλλον μηδὲ  
 ἦττον ἀρμονίαν οὔσαν μῆτε μᾶλλον μῆτε ἦττον ἡρμόσθαι· ἔστιν  
 οὕτως; Ἔστιν. Ἡ δὲ μῆτε μᾶλλον μῆτε ἦττον ἡρμωσμένη ἔστιν ὅ  
 τι πλέον ἢ ἔλαττον ἀρμονίας μετέχει, ἢ τὸ ἴσον; Τὸ ἴσον. Οὐκοῦν  
 ψυχῆ, ἐπειδὴ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον οὐδ' ἦττον ἄλλη ἄλλης αὐτὸ τοῦτο E  
 15 ψυχῆ ἔστιν, οὐδὲ δὴ μᾶλλον οὐδὲ ἦττον ἡρμωσται; Οὕτω. Τοῦτο  
 δέ γε πεπονθυῖα οὐδὲν πλέον ἀναρμωστίας οὐδὲ ἀρμονίας μετέχει  
 ἂν; Οὐ γὰρ οὔν. Τοῦτο δ' αὖ πεπονθυῖα ἄρ' ἂν τι πλέον κακίας  
 ἢ ἀρετῆς μετέχει ἐτέρα ἐτέρας, εἴπερ ἢ μὲν κακία ἀναρμωστία, ἢ  
 δὲ ἀρετὴ ἀρμονία εἴη; Οὐδὲν πλέον. Μᾶλλον δὲ γέ που, ὦ Σιμμία,  
 20 κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον κακίας οὐδεμία ψυχῆ μεθέξει, εἴπερ ἀρμονία 94  
 ἐστίν· ἀρμονία γὰρ δῆπου παντελῶς αὐτὸ τοῦτο οὔσα, ἀρμονία,

2. ἀρμονίαν αὖ τινα ἄλλην] The  
 conception of virtue as a harmonious  
 condition of the soul is peculiarly Pla-  
 tonic. Compare the description of δικαιο-  
 σσύνη in *Republic* 443 D μὴ ἕασατα τάλ-  
 λῶτρια πράττειν ἕκαστον ἐν αὐτῷ μηδὲ  
 πολυπραγμανεῖν πρὸς ἄλληλα τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ  
 γένῃ, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι τὰ οἰκεία εὖ θέμενον  
 καὶ ἄρξανα αὐτὸν αὐτοῦ καὶ κοσμήσαντα  
 καὶ φίλον γενόμενον ἑαντῷ καὶ ξυναρμώ-  
 σαντα τρία ὄντα, ὥσπερ ὄρουσ τρεῖς ἀρμο-  
 νίας ἀτεχνῶς, νεάτης τε καὶ ὑπάτης καὶ  
 μέσης. And in *Sophist* 228 B we hear  
 that vice is a στάσις of the soul.

8. τοῦτο δ' ἔστι τὸ ὁμολόγημα] 'the  
 admission amounts to this, that (in saying  
 one soul is not more soul than another)  
 you affirm that one harmony is not more  
 a harmony than another'. Schanz, fol-  
 lowing Madvig and Schmidt, brackets  
 ἀρμονίας, so that we must understand

ψυχὴν ψυχῆς in agreement with ἐτέραν  
 ἐτέρας. But this prematurely anticipates  
 the conclusion in E οὐκοῦν ψυχῆ...ἡρμω-  
 σται. The train of reasoning is thus. We  
 agree that one soul is as much soul as  
 any other. Assuming soul to be a har-  
 mony, this amounts to saying that all  
 these harmonies, which we call souls, are  
 equally harmonies. Now equal har-  
 monies are equally harmonised and have an  
 equal portion of harmony. Therefore  
 souls, being harmonies, are equally har-  
 monised. In other words, if souls are  
 harmonies, they are equal harmonies;  
 but equal harmonies cannot be more or  
 less harmonised one than another; nei-  
 ther therefore can souls. There is no  
 difficulty about ἀρμονίας, if we under-  
 stand 'that particular harmony which is  
 soul'.

21. παντελῶς] Soul is complete and



ἀναρμοστίας οὐποτ' ἂν μετάσχοι. Οὐ μέντοι. <sup>✓</sup> Οὐδέ γε δήπου ψυχῇ, οὐσα παντελῶς ψυχῇ, κακίας. Πῶς γὰρ ἕκ γε τῶν προειρημένων; Ἐκ τούτου ἄρα τοῦ λόγου ἡμῖν πᾶσαι ψυχαὶ πάντων ζῶων ὁμοίως ἀγαθαὶ ἔσονται, εἴπερ ὁμοίως ψυχαὶ πεφύκασιν αὐτὸ τοῦτο, ψυχαί, εἶναι. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκратες. Ἡ καὶ 5  
 B καλῶς δοκεῖ, ἢ δ' ὅς, οὕτω λέγεσθαι, καὶ πάσχειν ἂν ταῦτα ὁ λόγος, εἰ ὀρθῇ ἢ ὑπόθεσις ἦν, τὸ ψυχὴν ἀρμονίαν εἶναι; Οὐδ' ὀπωστιοῦν, ἔφη. ||

XLIII. Τί δέ; ἢ δ' ὅς τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ πάντων ἔσθ' ὁ τι ἄλλο λέγεις ἄρχειν ἢ ψυχὴν, ἄλλως τε καὶ φρόνιμον; Οὐκ ἔγωγε. 10  
 Πότερον συγχωροῦσαν τοῖς κατὰ τὸ σῶμα παθήμασιν ἢ καὶ ἐναντιουμένην; λέγω δὲ τὸ τοιούδε, ὡς καύματος ἐνότος καὶ δίψους ἐπὶ τούναντίον ἔλκειν, τὸ μὴ πίνειν, καὶ πείνης ἐνούσης ἐπὶ τὸ μὴ

perfect soul, as such; therefore complete and perfect harmony: no discord then, and consequently no vice, can exist in her.

4. ψυχὰς πεφύκασιν] Schanz brackets ψυχὰς, following Heindorf. But the clause is of general application: 'seeing that it is the nature of souls to be this precise thing, namely souls, in the same degree'.

5. ἢ καὶ καλῶς] 'do you think this is a worthy conclusion? or that our theory would have been in such a predicament, had our premiss been correct, that soul is a harmony?'

6. πάσχειν ἂν] The mss. omit ἂν, which however occurs in the citation of Stobaeus. It is certainly necessary, since εἰ...ἦν='if our premiss had been correct': which it is not.

94 B—95 A, c. xliii. Lastly we see that the soul rules the body, often thwarting its desires and controlling its affections; whereas we saw that a harmony could not act in opposition to its constituent elements. Soul therefore cannot be a harmony.

The last argument rests neither upon the ideal theory nor upon the doctrine that virtue is harmony: it is simply an appeal to common sense. Aristotle's

views on the subject will be found in *de anima* I iv §§ 2—9. In the lost dialogue *Eudemos* he argued against harmony, (1) that harmony has an opposite, viz. ἀναρμοστία, but soul has no opposite—an obvious *petitio principii*; (2) that the opposite of ἀρμονία σώματος is ἀναρμοστία σώματος: the ἀναρμοστία is disease, weakness, and deformity, therefore the ἀρμονία is health, strength, and beauty; none of which is soul. See Bernays, *Dialogue des Aristoteles* p. 26.

11. πότερον συγχωροῦσαν] The mss. are in confusion here. Schanz gives πότερον [συγχωροῦσαν] τοῖς κατὰ τὸ σῶμα πάθεσιν ἐναντιουμένην [παθήμασι]; which, omitting the brackets, is the reading of BCD. Schanz considers that the confusion arose because the copyist was puzzled by the use of πότερον with a single interrogative. The sentence, as he reads it, seems to me however somewhat bare; and I have reverted to the text of Z. and St. In the next sentence ὡς εἰ is found in B, ὡσεὶ in CD. οἶον is in Stobaeus and many inferior mss. ὡς is in the margin of B, and was approved by Schanz *N. C.* p. 150, though he now prints [ὡσεὶ]. St. and Z. give οἶον.

13. ἐπὶ τούναντίον ἔλκειν] Cf. *Re-public* 439 B foll.

ἐσθλείν, καὶ ἄλλα μυρία που ὀρῶμεν ἐναντιουμένην τὴν ψυχὴν τοῖς C  
κατὰ τὸ σῶμα· ἢ οὐ; Πάνν μὲν οὖν. Οὐκοῦν αὐ ὠμολογήσαμεν  
ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν μήποτ' ἂν αὐτὴν, ἀρμονίαν γε οὖσαν, ἐναντία ἄδειν  
οἷς ἐπιτείνονται καὶ χαλῶτο καὶ πάλλοιτο καὶ ἄλλο ὅτιοῦν πάθος  
5 πᾶσχοι ἐκεῖνα ἐξ ὧν τυγχάνει οὖσα, ἀλλ' ἔπεςθαι ἐκείνοις καὶ  
οὐποτ' ἂν ἡγεμονεύειν; Ὁμολογήσαμεν, ἔφη· πῶς γὰρ οὐ; Τί  
οὖν; νῦν οὐ πᾶν τοῦναντίον ἡμῖν φαίνεται ἐργαζομένη, ἡγεμονεύ-  
ουσά τε ἐκείνων πάντων ἐξ ὧν φησί τις αὐτὴν εἶναι, καὶ ἐναντιου-  
μένη ὀλίγου πάντα διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου καὶ δεσπίζουσα πάντας D  
10 τρόπους, τὰ μὲν χαλεπώτερον κολάζουσα καὶ μετ' ἀλγηδόνων, τὰ  
τε κατὰ τὴν γυμναστικὴν καὶ τὴν ἰατρικὴν, τὰ δὲ πραότερον, καὶ  
τὰ μὲν ἀπειλοῦσα, τὰ δὲ νουθετοῦσα, ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ ὀργαῖς  
καὶ φόβοις ὡς ἄλλη οὖσα ἄλλῃ πράγματι διαλεγομένη; οἷόν που  
καὶ Ὀμηρὸς ἐν Ὀδυσσεΐα πεποίηκεν, οὗ λέγει τὸν Ὀδυσσεΐα

15 στήθος δὲ πλήξας κραδίην ἠνίπαπε μύθῳ·  
τέτλαθι δὴ, κραδίη· καὶ κύντερον ἄλλο ποτ' ἔτλης. E

ἄρ' οἶει αὐτὸν ταῦτα ποιῆσαι διανοούμενον ὡς ἀρμονίας αὐτῆς  
οὔσης καὶ οἷας ἄγεσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν τοῦ σώματος παθῶν, ἀλλ' οὐχ  
οἷας ἄγειν τε ταῦτα καὶ δεσπίζειν, καὶ οὔσης αὐτῆς πολὺ θειοτέρου  
20 τινὸς πράγματος ἢ καθ' ἀρμονίαν; Νῆ Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔμοιγε  
δοκεῖ. Οὐκ ἄρα, ὦ ἄριστε, ἡμῖν οὐδαμῇ καλῶς ἔχει ψυχὴν ἀρμο-  
νίαν τινὰ φάναι εἶναι· οὔτε γὰρ ἂν, ὡς ἔοικεν, Ὀμήρῳ θείῳ ποιητῇ 95  
ὀμολογοῖμεν οὔτε αὐτοὶ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς. Ἐχει οὕτως, ἔφη.

3. ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν] 93 A. St. and Z.  
give ἔμπροσθεν.

4. οἷς ἐπιτείνονται] i.e. ἐκείνοις ᾧ,  
cognate accusative, 'it can never give a  
sound contrary to the tensions and relax-  
ations and vibrations and all the other  
conditions of the materials from which it  
arises'.

12. ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις] The construction  
is usually regarded as following ἀπειλοῦσα  
rather than νουθετοῦσα. Heindorf com-  
pares Isokrates *Areop.* 149 C (§ 48) and  
Lysias *against Andokides* § 33. But it  
is surely evident that ἐπιθυμίαις κ.τ.λ.  
depends on διαλεγομένη, as Schleier-  
macher takes it.

15. στήθος δὲ πλήξας] *Odyssey* xx 17.  
The passage is quoted also in *Republic*

390 D, 441 B.

22. Ὀμήρῳ] In the same half-serious  
manner Plato professes to trace the doc-  
trine πάντα βεῖ back to Homer: *Theaetetus*  
152 E εἰπὼν γὰρ Ὀκεανὸν τε θεῶν γένεσιν  
καὶ μητέρα Τηθύον, πάντα εἰρηκεν ἔκγονα  
βροτῶν τε καὶ κινήσεως. Cf. 153 C.

95 A—E, c. xliv. Having thus disposed  
of the theory of harmony, Sokrates pro-  
ceeds to deal with the objection of Kebes,  
which he first recapitulates. If the philo-  
sopher is to feel any reasonable confi-  
dence that his life in Hades will be the  
happier for his devotion to philosophy on  
earth, we must prove that the soul is  
absolutely indestructible. It is not enough  
that she is strong and godlike, nor that  
for ages before our birth she enjoyed an

XLIV. Εἶπεν δὴ, ἣ δ' ὄς ὁ Σωκράτης, τὰ μὲν Ἀρμονίας ἡμῖν τῆς Θηβαϊκῆς ἱλέα πῶς, ὡς ἔοικε, μετριῶς γέγονε· τί δὲ δὴ τὰ Κάδμου, ἔφη, ὃ Κέβης, πῶς ἰλασόμεθα καὶ τίνι λόγῳ; Σὺ μοι δοκεῖς, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, ἐξευρήσειν· τουτουὶ γοῦν τὸν λόγον τὸν πρὸς τὴν ἁρμονίαν θαυμαστῶς μοι εἶπες ὡς παρὰ δόξαν. Σιμμίου γὰρ 5  
 B λέγοντος ὃ τι ἠπόρει, πάννυ ἐθαύμαζον, εἴ τι ἔξει τις χρῆσασθαι τῷ λόγῳ αὐτοῦ· πάννυ μὲν οὖν μοι ἀτόπως ἔδοξεν εὐθύς τὴν πρώτην ἔφοδον οὐδέξασθαι τοῦ σοῦ λόγου. ταῦτά δὴ οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσαιμι καὶ τὸν τοῦ Κάδμου λόγον εἰ πάθοι. Ὡ γαθῆ, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, μὴ μέγα λέγε, μὴ τις ἡμῖν βασκανία περιτρέψῃ τὸν λόγον τὸν 10

intelligent existence. This does not prove her immortality: the very incarnation in a human body may be the first symptom of her coming dissolution; it matters not whether she undergo one or many such incarnations; if we cannot show that she is actually imperishable, our hope of a future life is vanity.

1. τὰ μὲν Ἀρμονίας] Sokrates playfully personifies the theory of his Theban friend as Harmonia the Theban heroine. She had threatened the argument with destruction, but the persuasive tongue of Sokrates has propitiated her. Harmonia naturally suggests Kadmos, who is made to personify the objection of Kebes. Many and marvellous are the interpretations which various commentators have forced upon this simple piece of pleasantry, which ill deserves such treatment. But even the laboured absurdity of Olympiodoros compares favourably with such trifling as Stallbaum's 'Simmias ratio faciliior, Cebetis difficilior ad refellendum fuit. quamobrem facile illa uxori haec marito tribuitur'. 'Supposing the 'ratio' of Simmias had been ten times more difficult than that of Kebes, to whom but Harmonia could it have been assigned? Heindorf sensibly says 'hinc ad alteram illam Cebetis itidem Thebani transituro sponte se Cadmi offerebat mentio'. Mr Jackson has suggested to me that ἡλεα conveys the notion of 'bidding farewell', ἡλαθι having the same sense addressed to

a deity as χαῖρε addressed to a mortal: in this view he supports by Cicero *de natura deorum* I § 124 deinde si maxime talis est deus, ut nulla gratia, nulla hominum caritate teneatur, valeat; quid enim dicam 'propitius sit'? This seems to me very probable: ἡλαθι certainly is a form of farewell in Theokr. xv 143, where the lady ends her song with ἡλαθι νῦν φίλ' Ἀδῶνι, καὶ ἐς νέωτ' εὐθυμήσαις. Compare Apollonius Rhodius IV 1773 ἡλατ' ἀριστήων μακάρων γένος: the poet is taking leave of his heroes.

6. ὃ τι ἠπόρει] So Schanz after Forster. I have adopted ὃ τι mainly because λέγοντος seems to want an object. If ὅτε be retained we must translate: 'while Simmias was speaking, at the time he was stating his difficulty'. Kebes did not agree with the theory of Simmias, but apparently did not see his way to refute it.

10. βασκανία] 'lest some malign influence should put to confusion our discourse that is to come'. βασκανία expresses the prevalent superstition that over-confidence on the part of man drew down on him the resentment of superhuman powers. Cf. Verg. *Ecl.* VII 27 aut, si ultra placitum laudarit, bacchare frontem Cingite, ne vati noceat mala lingua futuro. The 'mala lingua' of Codrus vents its malice, not in abuse, but in extravagant praise exciting supernatural wrath. This feeling has found its



μέλλοντα ἔσσεσθαι. ἀλλὰ δὴ ταῦτα μὲν τῷ θεῷ μελήσει, ἡμεῖς δὲ Ὀμηρικῶς ἐγγυὲς ἰόντες πειρώμεθα εἰ ἄρα τι λέγεις. ἔστι δὲ δὴ τὸ κεφάλαιον ὧν ζητεῖς· ἀξιόεις ἐπιδειχθῆναι ἡμῶν τὴν ψυχὴν ἀνώλεθρον τε καὶ ἀθάνατον οὖσαν, εἰ φιλόσοφος ἀνὴρ μέλλον C  
 5 ἀποθανεῖσθαι, θαρρῶν τε καὶ ἠγούμενος ἀποθανῶν ἐκεῖ εὖ πράξειν διαφερόντως ἢ εἰ ἐν ἄλλῳ βίῳ βίους ἐτελεύτα, μὴ ἀνόητόν τε καὶ ἠλίθιον θάρσος θαρρήσει. τὸ δὲ ἀποφαίνειν ὅτι ἰσχυρόν τί ἐστιν ἢ ψυχὴ καὶ θεοειδὲς καὶ ἦν ἔτι πρότερον, πρὶν ἡμᾶς ἀνθρώπους γενέσθαι, οὐδὲν κωλύειν φῆς πάντα ταῦτα μηνύειν ἀθανασίαν μὲν  
 10 μὴ, ὅτι δὲ πολυχρόνιον τέ ἐστιν ψυχὴ καὶ ἦν πρὶν πρότερον ἀμήχανον ὅσον χρόνον καὶ ἦδει τε καὶ ἔπραττεν πολλὰ ἄττα· ἀλλὰ D  
 γὰρ οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ἦν ἀθάνατον, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ εἰς ἀνθρώπου σῶμα ἐλθεῖν ἀρχὴ ἦν αὐτῇ ὀλέθρου, ὡσπερ νόσος· καὶ ταλαιπωρομένη τε δὴ τοῦτον τὸν βίον ζῶη καὶ τελευτῶσά γε ἐν τῷ καλουμένῳ  
 15 θανάτῳ ἀπολλύοιτο. διαφέρει δὲ δῆ, φῆς, οὐδὲν εἴτε ἅπαξ εἰς

most perfect expression in *Caliban upon Setebos*, e.g. 'Meanwhile the best way to escape His ire Is, not to seem too happy. 'Sees, himself, Yonder two flies, with purple films and pink, Bask on the pompion-bell above: kills both'. Plato however, when speaking seriously, is careful to repudiate the popular notion of *θεῶν φθόνος*: cf. *Timaeus* 29 E ἀγαθὸς ἦν [sc. ὁ τῶδε τὸ πᾶν ξυριστάς], ἀγαθῷ δὲ οὐδεὶς περὶ οὐδενὸς οὐδέποτε ἐγγίγνεται φθόνος. See too *Phaedrus* 247 A φθόνος γὰρ ἔξω θεῶν χόρου ἴσταται. Aristotle also denies it, *metaph.* I ii 983<sup>a</sup> 2. ἡμῶν is Heindorf's correction for ἡμῶν, which seems too far removed from τὸν λόγον.

1. ἔσσεσθαι seems suspicious, and is bracketed by Schanz. As it has strong ms. support however I have retained it. λέγεσθαι has hardly any authority.

2. Ὀμηρικῶς] Prof. Geddes rightly translates, 'as Homer's heroes do': not, as Wagner, 'in Homeric phrase'.

4. εἰ φιλόσοφος ἀνὴρ] Note that Plato once more carefully marks the proof of immortality as merely subordinate to this main thesis.

6. ἐν ἄλλῳ βίῳ] i.e. ἐν βίῳ μὴ φιλοσόφῳ.

7. τὸ δὲ ἀποφαίνειν] 'but as for proving that the soul is a strong and godlike thing and that she existed even before we were born as men—there is nothing, you say, to prevent all this from showing, not indeed her immortality, but that she is long-lived, &c.' That is to say, Kebes does not object to the reasoning of Sokrates, so far as it merely shows that the soul is very durable; but it is none the nearer to showing that she is immortal.

13. ἀρχὴ ἦν αὐτῇ ὀλέθρου] Kebes did not put it quite in this way; Sokrates amplifies his expression in 88 A πονεῖν αὐτὴν ἐν ταῖς πολλαῖς γενέσεσι.

14. ζῶη] The change of mood is readily understood if we transfer the words from reported to direct speech. The two imperatives would naturally be used by Kebes in making his statement: 'for all your reasoning, she was none the more immortal' (ἦν = ἦν ἄρα); 'the incarnation was the beginning of her dissolution': while the two optatives would in his mouth be present indicative; ζῆ and ἀπόλλυται. As Ast says, the construction follows ὅτι: cf. 96 B, where ὅτι is never actually expressed.

σώμα ἔρχεται εἴτε πολλάκις, πρὸς γε τὸ ἕκαστον ἡμῶν φοβεῖσθαι προσήκει γὰρ φοβεῖσθαι, εἰ μὴ ἀνόητος εἴη, τῷ μὴ εἰδότει μηδὲ ἔχοντι λόγον διδόναι, ὡς ἀθάνατόν ἐστι. τοιαῦτ' ἄττα ἐστὶν οἶμαι, Ε ὦ Κέβης, ἂ λέγεις· καὶ ἐξεπίτηδες πολλάκις ἀναλαμβάνω, ἵνα μή τι διαφύγῃ ἡμᾶς, εἴ τέ τι βούλει, προσθῆς ἢ ἀφέλῃς. καὶ ὁ Κέβης, 5 Ἄλλ' οὐδὲν ἔγωγε ἐν τῷ παρόντι, ἔφη, οὔτε ἀφελεῖν οὔτε προσθεῖναι δέομαι· ἐστὶ δὲ ταῦτα ἂ λέγω.

XLV. Ὁ οὖν Σωκράτης συχνὸν χρόνον ἐπισχὼν καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν τι σκεψάμενος, Οὐ φαῦλον πράγμα, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, ζητεῖς ὅπως γὰρ δεῖ περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς τὴν αἰτίαν διαπραγματεῦ- 10 96 σασθαι. ἐγὼ οὖν σοι δίδειμι περὶ αὐτῶν, ἐὰν βούλῃ, τά γε ἐμὰ

4. **πολλάκις ἀναλαμβάνω]** This extreme care in preparing the indictment serves to remind us of the vital importance of the coming struggle. All that precedes has been, so to speak, mere skirmishing: from this point the main battle begins; the whole strength of the ideal theory must be put forth to secure the victory.

95 E—97 B, c. xlv. This demands an investigation into the causes of generation and decay, on which subject Sokrates proposes to relate his own experiences. In his youth he was strongly fascinated by the old physical philosophy; he inquired whether heat and cold were the universal generative forces; whether the blood were the source of intelligence, or fire, or air, or the brain. But finally he came to the conclusion that he had no aptitude for such speculations, and even lost his faith in the knowledge he before supposed himself to possess. Formerly he rested comfortably in the belief that eating and drinking were the cause of growth; nor did he shrink from saying that one man was taller than another by the head, and that ten are more than eight because of the addition of two. But now he cannot satisfy himself that the mere juxtaposition of separate units is a sufficient cause for their being two; all the less because the same result is produced by the precisely opposite process

of division; nor can he even tell why one is one; but he is forced to reject the physical method as affording no real explanation of anything.

10. **ὅπως γὰρ]** The ἀπορία of Kebes necessarily raises the question propounded in *Timaeus* 27 E τί τὸ ὄν ἀεὶ γένησιν δὲ οὐκ ἔχον, καὶ τί τὸ γιγνόμενον μὲν ὄν δὲ οὐδέποτε; The immortality of the soul can only be proved by means of the theory of ideas; and in order that we may fully understand the bearing of that theory, it is put in sharp contrast with the αἰτίαι of previous philosophies.

11. **τά γε ἐμὰ πάθη]** It has been maintained that we have here a piece of actual history; that the mental development of the real Sokrates is here described. This is however highly improbable. We know from Xenophon (*mem.* i i 11—15) that Sokrates had the utmost distaste for physical speculation; nor does Xenophon say one word which leads us to suppose this was the result of fruitless study. Such inquiries must have been always alien to the strongly practical genius of Sokrates. Plato may be merely describing in its supposed effect on an individual mind the development of philosophy to the theory of ideas; but it is not impossible that he is recounting his own experience. Nothing can be more probable than that a mind so insatiably thirsting for knowledge should have

πάθη ἔπειτα ἂν τί σοι χρήσιμον φαίνηται ὧν ἂν λέγω, πρὸς τὴν πειθῶν περὶ ὧν ἂν λέγῃς χρήσει. Ἄλλὰ μὴν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, βούλομαι γε. Ἄκουε τοίνυν ὡς ἐροῦντος. ἐγὼ γάρ, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, νέος ὦν θαυμαστῶς ὡς ἐπεθύμησα ταύτης τῆς σοφίας, ἦν δὴ  
 5 καλοῦσι περὶ φύσεως ἱστορίαν. ὑπερήφανος γάρ μοι ἐδόκει εἶναι, εἰδέναι τὰς αἰτίας ἐκάστου, διὰ τί γίγνεται ἕκαστον καὶ διὰ τί ἀπόλλυται καὶ διὰ τί ἔστι· καὶ πολλάκις ἔμαντὸν ἄνω κάτω μετέ-  
 βαλλον σκοπῶν τὰ τοιάδε, ἄρ' ἐπειδὴν τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν σηπεδόνα τινὰ λάβη, ὥς τινες ἔλεγον, τότε δὴ τὰ ζῶα συντρέφεται·  
 10 καὶ πότερον τὸ αἷμά ἐστιν ᾧ φρονούμεν, ἢ ὁ ἀήρ ἢ τὸ πῦρ, ἢ τούτων μὲν οὐδέν, ὁ δ' ἐγκέφαλός ἐστιν ὁ τὰς αἰσθήσεις παρέχων τοῦ

already sought it from every existing source, and that when he met Sokrates his disappointment in all should fast be leading him to philosophic scepticism. But in the lack of direct evidence it would be rash to speak positively.

2. ὧν ἂν λέγῃς] i. e. whatever you may have to say after hearing my reply. ὧν λέγεις would refer to the statement already made by Kebes; but this has less ms. authority.

8. τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν] This was held by several philosophers, first perhaps by Anaximandros, of whose ἄπειρον, according to Plutarch and Stobaeus, the first determinations were these. Simplicius assigns to him other ἐναντιότητες among the first determinations, such as ξηρὸν and ὑγρὸν. To Anaxagoras this classification is attributed by Theophrastos *de sensu* 59; and to Archelaos by Diogenes Laertius II 16. Compare Aristotle *de gen. et corr.* II ii 329<sup>b</sup>24 θερμὸν δὲ καὶ ψυχρὸν καὶ ὑγρὸν καὶ ξηρὸν τὰ μὲν τῷ ποιητικὰ εἶναι τὰ δὲ τῷ παθητικὰ λέγεται. Schanz gives τὸ θερμὸν [καὶ ψυχρὸν].

9. σηπεδόνα] 'fermentation'. The σηπεδῶν would take place by the action of θερμῶν, cf. Aristotle *de gen. anim.* V iv 784<sup>b</sup>6 γίνεταί δὲ σῆψις διὰ θερμότητος μὲν πᾶσα, οὐ τῆς συμφύτου δέ. Decomposition of matter in one form must precede its recomposition in another.

10. τὸ αἷμα] See Empedokles 315 (Karsten):

αἵματος ἐν πελάγεσσι τετραμμένη ἀμφοροῦτος,  
 τῇ τε νόημα μάλιστα κυκλίσκεται ἀνθρώποισιν·  
 αἷμα γὰρ ἀνθρώποις περικάρδιόν ἐστι νόημα.

ὁ ἀήρ] This too was the view of more than one philosopher. Air was the ἀρχὴ of Anaximenes. Diogenes of Apollonia said the soul was dry hot air; as in a passage quoted by Simplicius, καὶ πάντων τῶν ζῴων δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐστίν, ἀήρ θερμότερος μὲν τοῦ ἔξω, ἐν ᾧ εἰμέν, τοῦ μέντοι παρὰ τοῦ ἡλίου πολλὸν ψυχρότερος: and again ἀνθρώπος γὰρ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ζῶα ἀναπνέοντα ζῶει τῷ ἀέρι, καὶ τοῦτο αὐτοῖσι καὶ ψυχὴ ἐστὶ καὶ νόησις. Cf. Theophrastos *de sensu* 39—45.

τὸ πῦρ] This was held by Herakleitos, who considered the soul as a ξηρὰ ἀναθυμίασις. Cf. Arist. *de anima* I ii.

11. ὁ δ' ἐγκέφαλος] It is very doubtful to whom this doctrine must be assigned. Possibly it was merely a popular opinion, as Wytténbach thinks. It has been ascribed to the Pythagoreans; but this rests only on a statement of Diogenes Laertius (VIII 30), which has a suspiciously post-platonic appearance. R. Hirzel (*Hermes*, vol. XI p. 240) endeavours to trace it to Alkmaion of Krotona; but his evidence



ἀκούειν καὶ ὄραν καὶ ὀσφραίνεσθαι, ἐκ τούτων δὲ γίγνεται μνήμη καὶ δόξα, ἐκ δὲ μνήμης καὶ δόξης λαβούσης τὸ ἡρεμεῖν κατὰ ταυτὰ γίγνεσθαι ἐπιστήμην· καὶ αὐτῶν τὰς φθορὰς σκοπῶν, καὶ τὰ  
 C περὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ τὴν γῆν πάθη, τελευτῶν οὕτως ἐμαυτῷ ἔδοξα  
 πρὸς ταύτην τὴν σκέψιν ἀφυῆς εἶναι, ὡς οὐδὲν χρήμα. τεκμήριον 5  
 δέ σοι ἐρῶ ἱκανόν· ἐγὼ γὰρ ἂ καὶ πρότερον σαφῶς ἠπιστάμην, ὡς  
 γε ἐμαυτῷ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐδόκουν, τότε ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς σκέψεως  
 οὕτω σφόδρα ἐτυφλώθη, ὥστε ἀπέμαθον καὶ ἂ πρὸ τοῦ ὄμνη  
 εἰδέναί, περὶ ἄλλων τε πολλῶν καὶ διὰ τί ἄνθρωπος αὐξάνεται.  
 τοῦτο γὰρ ὄμνη πρὸ τοῦ παντὶ δῆλον εἶναι, ὅτι διὰ τὸ ἐσθίειν καὶ 10  
 D πίνειν· ἐπειδὴν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν σιτίων ταῖς μὲν σαρκὶ σάρκες προσ-

hardly amounts to proof. Theophrastos *de sensu* 26 does indeed say of him that he affirmed ἀπάσας τὰς αἰσθήσεις συνηρηθῆσαι πῶς πρὸς τὸν ἐγκέφαλον, but this is not very definite. It may be observed that the brain is not ὡ φρονούμεν, but ὁ τὰς αἰσθήσεις παρέχων: and the view of Hippokrates is not far off this. In a passage quoted by Heindorf, *de morbo sacro* 17, he says of the brain, οὗτος γὰρ ἡμῶν ἐστὶ τῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἕρους γενομένων ἐρμηνεύς, ἣν ὑγαίνων τυγχάνη· τὴν δὲ φρόνησιν αὐτῷ ὁ αἶρ παρέχεται. Thus Hippokrates may be said to have held that air is ὡ φρονούμεν and the brain is ὁ τὰς αἰσθήσεις παρέχων. Still as the brain is introduced as an alternative to air, not as supplementary, probably no special reference to Hippokrates is intended. Plato's own view is that the brain and spinal marrow form the medium through which the soul acts on the body: *Timaeus* 73 C, D.

2. λαβοῖσης τὸ ἡρεμεῖν] Cf. *Meno* 97 E καὶ γὰρ αἱ δόξαι αἱ ἀληθεῖς, ὅσον μὲν ἂν χρόνον παραμένωσι, καλὸν τὸ χρήμα, καὶ πάντα τάγαθὰ ἐργάζονται· πολλὸν δὲ χρόνον οὐκ ἐθέλουσι παραμένειν, ἀλλὰ δραπετεύουσιν ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ὥστε οὐ πολλοῦ ἀξιαί εἰσιν, ἕως ἂν τις αὐτὰς δῆσῃ αἰτίας λογισμῶν...ἐπειδὴν δὲ δεῦθεσι, πρῶτον μὲν ἐπιστήμαι γίγνονται, ἔπειτα μόνιμοι. καὶ διὰ ταῦτα δὴ τιμώτερον ἐπιστήμη ὀρθῆς δόξης ἐστὶ, καὶ διαφέρει

δεσμῷ ἐπιστήμη ὀρθῆς δόξης. Also Aristotle *anal. post.* II xix 100<sup>a</sup> 3 ἐκ μὲν οὖν αἰσθήσεως γίνεταί μνήμη, ὡσπερ λέγομεν, ἐκ δὲ μνήμης πολλάκις τοῦ αὐτοῦ γινομένης ἐμπειρία· αἱ γὰρ πολλὰ μνήμαι τῷ ἀριθμῷ ἐμπειρία ἐστίν. ἐκ δ' ἐμπειρίας ἡ ἐκ παντὸς ἡρεμήσαντος τοῦ καθόλου ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, τοῦ ἐνδὸς παρὰ τὰ πολλὰ, ὁ ἂν ἐν ἅπασιν ἐν ἐνῆ ἐκείνοις τὸ αὐτὸ, τέχνης ἀρχὴ καὶ ἐπιστήμης, ἐὰν μὲν περὶ γένεσιν, τέχνης, ἐὰν δὲ περὶ τὸ ὄν, ἐπιστήμης. See also *metaph.* I i 980<sup>b</sup> 28. To Plato the difference between δόξα and ἐπιστήμη was fundamental, the one dealing with γιγνόμενα, the other with ὄντα.

5. ἀφυῆς εἶναι] 'nothing in the world could be more stupid in such studies than myself'. COPE.

6. ἂ καὶ πρότερον] There are three stages to be discriminated in the πάθη of Sokrates: (1) the period when he was content with the ordinary beliefs of the unreflecting many concerning γένεσις καὶ φθορά: (2) when he sought some more scientific theory in the speculations of the physicists: (3) when, disappointed in this and failing in his search for the ultimate αἰτία itself, he fell back upon his system of λόγοι.

11. ταῖς μὲν σαρκὶ σάρκες] This is commonly understood as alluding to the theory of Anaxagoras. But I cannot imagine that any such reference is meant. Sokrates says that his physical studies

γένωνται, τοῖς δὲ ὀστέοις ὀστᾶ, καὶ οὕτω κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τὰ αὐτῶν οἰκεῖα ἐκάστοις προσγένηται, τότε δὴ τὸν ὀλίγον ὄγκον ὄντα ὕστερον πολὺν γεγονέναι, καὶ οὕτω γίγνεσθαι τὸν σμικρὸν ἄνθρωπον μέγαν· οὕτως τότε ὦμην· οὐ δοκῶ σοι  
 5 μετρίως; Ἔμοιγε, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης. Σκέψαι δὴ καὶ τάδε ἔτι. ὦμην γὰρ ἱκανῶς μοι δοκεῖν, ὅποτε τις φαίνοιτο ἄνθρωπος παραστὰς μέγας σμικρῷ, μείζων εἶναι αὐτοῦ τῆ κεφαλῇ, καὶ ἵππος ἵππου· καὶ ἔτι γε τούτων ἐναργέστερα, τὰ δέκα μοι ἐδόκει τῶν ὀκτῶ πλέονα E  
 εἶναι διὰ τὸ δύο αὐτοῖς προσθεῖναι, καὶ τὸ δίτηχυν τοῦ πηχυαίου  
 10 μείζων εἶναι διὰ τὸ ἡμίσει αὐτοῦ ὑπερέχειν. Νῦν δὲ δὴ, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, τί σοι δοκεῖ περὶ αὐτῶν; Πόρρω που, ἔφη, νῆ Δία ἐμὲ εἶναι τοῦ οἴεσθαι περὶ τούτων του τὴν αἰτίαν εἰδέναι, ὅς γε οὐκ ἀποδέχομαι ἐμαντοῦ οὐδὲ ὡς, ἐπειδὴν ἐνὶ τις προσθῆ ἔν, ἢ τὸ ἐν ᾧ προστετέθη δύο γέγονεν, ἢ τὸ προστεθέν καὶ ᾧ προστετέθη διὰ τὴν 97  
 15 πρόσθεσιν τοῦ ἐτέρου τῷ ἐτέρῳ δύο ἐγένετο· θαυμάζω γὰρ εἰ, ὅτε μὲν ἐκάτερον αὐτῶν χωρὶς ἀλλήλων ἦν, ἐν ἅρα ἐκάτερον ἦν καὶ οὐκ ἦσθην τότε δύο, ἐπεὶ δ' ἐπλησίασαν ἀλλήλοις, αὕτη ἅρα αἰτία αὐτοῖς ἐγένετο δύο γενέσθαι, ἢ ξύνοδος τοῦ πλησίον ἀλλήλων τεθῆναι. οὐδέ γε ὡς, εἴαν τις ἐν διασχίσῃ, δύναμαι ἔτι πείθεσθαι  
 20 ὡς αὕτη αὐ αἰτία γέγονεν, ἢ σχίσις, τοῦ δύο γεγονέναι· ἐναντία γὰρ

not only brought him no fresh knowledge but made him sceptical of that which he fancied he already possessed. This belief therefore is one that he held, not only before he made acquaintance with the works of Anaxagoras, but before he entered upon any physical speculations whatsoever. It is probably the view of popular common sense, that the human frame is composed of the food consumed, without any reference to the *ὁμοιομερῆ*.

7. *μείζων εἶναι αὐτοῦ*] The mss. have *αὐτῆ*. I have accepted Wyttenbach's correction (1) because the following words, *καὶ ἵππος ἵππου*, seem to require that the object of comparison should be expressed here also, (2) because *αὐτῆ* seems superfluous with *τῆ κεφαλῆ*. If we retain *αὐτῆ*, we must translate 'just by the head'. Cf. IOI A.

14. *ἢ τὸ προστεθέν*] Wyttenbach writes these words twice over, arguing that the question should be put thus; if

*B* be added to *A*, has *A* become two, or *B*, or are *A + B* two because of their juxtaposition? Schanz follows him. I cannot see that Plato is bound to express this in full, and therefore I have reverted to the ms. reading.

18. *ἢ ξύνοδος*] 'the juxtaposition caused by their approximation'. τοῦ πλησίον ἀλλήλων τεθῆναι is explanatory genitive after *ξύνοδος*: compare *Timaeus* 58 B ἢ δὴ τῆς πιλήσεως ξύνοδος. The right explanation, according to Plato, is not juxtaposition but participation in the idea of duality: it is irrational to speak as if the mere approximation of two objects one to the other had anything to do with the question.

20. *ἐναντία γὰρ γίγνεται*] The fact that two opposite processes produce the same result shows that neither of them can really be the explanation of the result; they are *συναίτια*, not *αἴτια*.

B γίνεταί ἢ τότε αἰτία τοῦ δύο γίνεσθαι· τότε μὲν γὰρ ὅτι συνήγετο πηλσίον ἀλλήλων καὶ προσετίθετο ἕτερον ἐτέρῳ, νῦν δ' ὅτι ἀπάγεται καὶ χωρίζεται ἕτερον ἀφ' ἐτέρου. οὐδέ γε δι' ὅ τι ἐν γίνεταί ὡς ἐπίσταμαι ἔτι πείθω ἐμαυτόν, οὐδ' ἄλλο οὐδὲν ἐνὶ λόγῳ δι' ὅ τι γίνεταί ἢ ἀπόλλυται ἢ ἔστι, κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον τῆς μεθόδου, 5 ἀλλὰ τιν' ἄλλον τρόπον αὐτὸς εἰκῆ φύρῳ, τοῦτον δὲ οὐδαμῆ προσίεμαι. ||

C XLVI. 'Ἄλλ' ἀκούσας μὲν ποτε ἐκ βιβλίου τινός, ὡς ἔφη, Ἀναξαγίρου ἀναγιγνώσκοντος, καὶ λέγοντος ὡς ἄρα νοῦς ἐστὶν ὁ διακοσμῶν τε καὶ πάντων αἴτιος, ταύτη δὴ τῇ αἰτία ἦσθην τε καὶ 10

5. κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον] i. e. the method of physical speculation.

6. αὐτὸς εἰκῆ φύρῳ] 'I mix up everything at random according to another method of my own'. Such is the literal translation of this difficult phrase, but the meaning is not so easily fixed. Wytténbach, saying that the ideal theory cannot possibly be meant, takes φύρῳ as virtually a past tense, and explains 'alium modum ex male intellecto Anaxagora susceptum commentus sum'. Prof. Geddes translates 'it so chanced that I form to myself another method'. He says φύρῳ is 'I work up', like dough, and quotes Aristoph. *Birds* 482 προπεφύραται λόγος εἰς μοι: and so Heindorf takes it. But φύρῳ is not the same as φυράω: Plato always uses the former word in the sense of 'confusing', see below 101 D, *Gorgias* 465 D & c. For 'kneading' he uses the proper word φυράω, cf. *Timaeus* 73 E, *Theaetetus* 147 C. The exact phrase occurs in Aeschylus *Prometheus* 450 ἐφυρον εἰκῆ πάντα. Wytténbach's explanation will not do; we have the present tense running through the whole passage. Nor does Sokrates represent his view as arising from that of Anaxagoras. I believe Sokrates is speaking half ironically, half in earnest. We must remember that the Platonic Sokrates took refuge, not in the theory of ideas, which he failed to reach, but in the method of λόγοι, cf. 99 E. This method is then what he

means by τιν' ἄλλον τρόπον. In 101 C he advises Kebes to leave divisions and additions and such subtleties to those who are cleverer than he. There the irony is obvious; and here with the same irony he says that being unable to follow any of the infallible methods of the physicists he was forced to blunder on after a fashion of his own. And although he does not seriously mean to disparage his own method in comparison with theirs, perhaps he does hint some dissatisfaction that he is still unable to work on the more perfect principle.

97 B—98 B, c. xlvi. Afterwards Sokrates hears a passage of Anaxagoras, wherein that philosopher declares that mind is the universal cause. His hopes are thereby raised to the highest pitch; a system which takes mind for its principle cannot, he thinks, be otherwise than teleological. Anaxagoras will surely point out that mind must order all things for the best, and he will seek no other cause why each thing is as it is, but that it is best so. He will first inform us of the shape and position of the earth and then explain how that shape and position were the best; and similarly with all other natural phenomena, assigning as the cause the best for each and all. So he read the book with eager anticipation.

8. ἀλλ' ἀκούσας] 'but once when I heard a man reading from a book, as he said, of Anaxagoras.'



ἔδοξέ μοι τρόπον τινὰ εἶ ἔχειν τὸ τὸν νοῦν εἶναι πάντων αἴτιον, καὶ ἡγησάμην, εἰ τοῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει, τὸν γε νοῦν κοσμοῦντα πάντα [κοσμεῖν] καὶ ἕκαστον τιθέναι ταύτη ὅπη ἂν βέλτιστα ἔχῃ· εἰ οὖν τις βούλοιο τὴν αἰτίαν εὔρεῖν περὶ ἐκάστου, ὅπη γίγνεται ἢ ἀπόλ-  
 5 λυται ἢ ἔστι, τοῦτο δεῖν περὶ αὐτοῦ εὔρεῖν, ὅπη βέλτιστον αὐτῷ ἔστιν ἢ εἶναι ἢ ἄλλο ὅτιοῦν πάσχειν ἢ ποιεῖν· ἐκ δὲ δὴ τοῦ λόγου D  
 τούτου οὐδὲν ἄλλο σκοπεῖν προσήκειν ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου καὶ περὶ ἄλλων, ἀλλ' ἢ τὸ ἀριστον καὶ τὸ βέλτιστον. ἀναγκαῖον δὲ εἶναι τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον καὶ τὸ χεῖρον εἰδέναι· τὴν  
 10 αὐτὴν γὰρ εἶναι ἐπιστήμην περὶ αὐτῶν. ταῦτα δὴ λογιζόμενος ἄσμενος εὔρηκέμαι ὥμην διδάσκαλον τῆς αἰτίας περὶ τῶν ὄντων κατὰ νοῦν ἐμαυτῷ, τὸν Ἀναξαγόραν, καὶ μοι φράσειν πρῶτον μὲν πότερον ἢ γῆ πλατεῖά ἐστιν ἢ στρογγύλη, ἐπεὶ δὲ φράσειεν, ἐπεκδιγηθήσεσθαι τὴν αἰτίαν καὶ τὴν ἀνάγκην, λέγοντα τὸ ἄμεινον E  
 15 καὶ ὅτι αὐτὴν ἄμεινον ἦν τοιαύτην εἶναι· καὶ εἰ ἐν μέσῳ φαίη εἶναι αὐτὴν, ἐπεκδιγηθήσεσθαι ὡς ἄμεινον ἦν αὐτὴν ἐν μέσῳ εἶναι· καὶ εἰ μοι ταῦτα ἀποφαίνοιο, παρεσκευάσμην ὡς οὐκέτι ποθεσόμενος 98  
 αἰτίας ἄλλο εἶδος. καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ ἡλίου οὕτω παρεσκευάσμην, ὡσαύτως πευσόμενος, καὶ σελήνης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἄστρον, τάχους  
 20 τε πέρι πρὸς ἀλλήλα καὶ τροπῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων παθημάτων, πῆ ποτε ταῦτ' ἄμεινόν ἐστιν ἕκαστον καὶ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν ἢ πάσχει. οὐ γὰρ ἂν ποτε αὐτὸν ὥμην, φάσκοντά γε ὑπὸ νοῦ αὐτὰ

1. **τρόπον τινὰ**] 'in a certain way', but not, as we presently see, in the way of Anaxagoras.

2. **πάντα [κοσμεῖν]**. Hermann is probably right in bracketing *κοσμεῖν*. Translate: 'if mind orders all things, it places each thing severally as is best', i.e. we must not, as Anaxagoras did, assign *ἀέρες* and *αἰθέρες* as causes of various phenomena, if we assign *νοῦς* as the cause of the whole.

7. **περὶ αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου**] So the best mss. Schanz brackets *αὐτοῦ*, Z. and St. give *αὐτοῦ*, omitting *ἐκείνου*. I think the ms. reading will stand: it refers to the *ἐκάστου* above; 'he will seek this cause both for the particular object of his inquiry and for everything else'.

12. **κατὰ νοῦν ἐμαυτῷ**] As Wytténbach points out there is a play on *νοῦν*:

'κατὰ νοῦν, *secundum mentem*, Anaxagorae placitum significat, et vulgo usurpatur, *gratum, ex animi nostri sententia*'.

13. **πλατεῖά ἐστιν ἢ στρογγύλη**] For various views on this subject see Aristotle *de caelo* II xiii 294<sup>a</sup> 29. Thales thought the earth floated like a piece of wood; Anaximenes, Anaxagoras, and Demokritos said it was flat. The Pythagoreans held that it was a sphere.

15. **εἰ ἐν μέσῳ**] Aristotle *de caelo* 293<sup>a</sup> 15. This view was almost universal: the Pythagoreans seem to have been the only exception. They believed the earth to revolve round the central fire.

21. **πῆ ποτε ταῦτ' ἄμεινον**] The final cause of the movements of the heavenly bodies is declared in the *Timaeus*, see especially 39 B foll.

22. **φάσκοντά γε ὑπὸ νοῦ**] If an in-

κεκοσμησθαι, ἄλλην τινὰ αὐτοῖς αἰτίαν ἐπενεγκεῖν ἢ ὅτι βέλτιστον  
 B αὐτὰ οὕτως ἔχειν ἐστὶν ὡσπερ ἔχει· ἐκάστῳ οὖν αὐτὸν ἀποδιδόντα  
 τὴν αἰτίαν καὶ κοινῇ πᾶσι τὸ ἐκάστῳ βέλτιστον ᾧμην καὶ τὸ κοινὸν  
 πᾶσι ἐπεκδιηγήσεσθαι ἀγαθόν· καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἀπεδόμην πολλοῦ τὰς  
 ἐλπίδας, ἀλλὰ πάνυ σπουδῇ λαβὼν τὰς βίβλους ὡς τάχιστα οἶός 5  
 τ' ἢ ἀνεγίνωσκον, ἔν' ὡς τάχιστα εἰδείην τὸ βέλτιστον καὶ τὸ  
 χεῖρον.

XLVII. Ἐπὶ δὲ θαυμαστῆς ἐλπίδος, ὃ ἑταῖρε, ᾧχόμεν φερό-

telligent cause ordered the universe, it is inconceivable that it should not design the best in all things: and this is our proper object of investigation, not the mere physical agencies which immediately produce the phenomena. Plato's own system is perfectly consistent with this principle: by making the αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν the ultimate cause he keeps his ontology strictly teleological; and again his teleology is strictly ontological. The cause of each thing is its indwelling idea; this idea is a form of the ἀγαθόν, therefore the ἀγαθόν is the cause why each thing is as it is. The βέλτιστον is not merely the design of a creative intelligence; it is the very idea which is symbolized in the particular. In the *Timaeus* Plato teaches that the entire universe is the self-evolution of absolute intelligence, which is the same as absolute good. This is differentiated into finite intelligences, subject, through their limitation, to the conditions of space and time. Sensible perceptions are the finite intellect's apprehension, within these conditions, of the idea as existing in absolute intelligence. Thus the perception is the idea, as existing under the form of space. Therefore the idea, which is a form of the good, is the cause of the perception's existence: that is, as was said above, the ἀγαθόν is the ultimate αἰτία of each thing. But only the first-beginnings of this theory are to be found in the *Phaedo*.

98 B—99 D, c. xlvii. Bitter was his disappointment when he found that Anaxagoras did not really use mind as a

cause, but accounted for phenomena by the agency of merely physical forces. Exactly similar would be the conduct of one who, after saying that Sokrates acted by intelligence, should maintain that he sat there in prison because he had muscles and sinews and joints which enabled him to do so; instead of assigning the real cause, that he thought it right to submit to the judgment of the Athenian people. So far as his bones and muscles are concerned, he might have been at Megara by this time; only he thought it his duty to remain. To call such things causes is folly; although they may be termed instruments without which the cause would not produce its effect. But just this confusion of cause and instrument is made by those who suppose a vortex or some other physical force is what keeps the earth in the centre, instead of the true cause, that it is best for it to be there. About this supreme cause, the good, Sokrates would gladly have learnt, could he have found a teacher: as it is he was obliged to content himself with the second best method.

8. ἀπὸ δὲ θαυμαστῆς ἐλπίδος] 'from what a height of hope was I hurled down, when I went on with my reading and saw a man that made no use of mind'. Heindorf takes ἀνδρα = τὸν ἄνδρα: but the above rendering seems preferable. The metaphor in ᾧχόμεν φερόμενος is surely falling from a height; not, as Wagner has it, 'starting from great hope, I was sailing along': a most feeble saying. The same charge is brought against Anaxagoras by Aristotle, *metaph.* I iv 985<sup>a</sup> 18. Ἄναξα-

μενος, ἐπειδὴ προῖὼν καὶ ἀναγιγνώσκων ὀρῶ ἄνδρα τῷ μὲν νῶ  
οὐδὲν χρώμενον [οὐδέ τινας αἰτίας ἐπαιτιώμενον] εἰς τὸ διακοσμεῖν  
τὰ πράγματα, ἀέρας δὲ καὶ αἰθέρας καὶ ὕδατα αἰτιώμενον καὶ ἄλλα C  
πολλὰ καὶ ἄτοπα. καὶ μοι ἔδοξεν ὁμοίωτατον πεπονθέναι ὥσπερ  
5 ἂν εἴ τις λέγων ὅτι Σωκράτης πάντα ὅσα πράττει νῶ πράττει,  
κᾶπειτα ἐπιχειρήσας λέγειν τὰς αἰτίας ἐκάστων ὧν πράττω, λέγοι  
πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι διὰ ταῦτα νῦν ἐνθάδε κάθημαι, ὅτι σύγκειται μου  
τὸ σῶμα ἐξ ὀστέων καὶ νεύρων, καὶ τὰ μὲν ὀστᾶ ἐστὶν στερεὰ καὶ D  
10 ἀνίσθαι, περιαμπέχοντα τὰ ὀστᾶ μετὰ τῶν σαρκῶν καὶ δέρματος  
ὁ συνέχει αὐτά· αἰωρουμένων οὖν τῶν ὀστέων ἐν ταῖς αὐτῶν ξυμ-  
βολαῖς χαλῶντα καὶ συντείνοντα τὰ νεῦρα κάμπτεσθαι που ποιεῖ  
οἷόν τ' εἶναι ἐμὲ νῦν τὰ μέλη, καὶ διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν συγ-  
καμφθεὶς ἐνθάδε κάθημαι· καὶ αὐτὸ περὶ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι ὑμῖν ἐτέρας  
15 τοιαύτας αἰτίας λέγοι, φωνάς τε καὶ ἀέρας καὶ ἀκοάς καὶ ἄλλα  
μυρία τοιαῦτα αἰτιώμενος, ἀμελήσας τὰς ὡς ἀληθῶς αἰτίας λέγειν E  
ὅτι, ἐπειδὴ Ἀθηναίοις ἔδοξε βέλτιον εἶναι ἐμοῦ καταψηφίσασθαι,  
διὰ ταῦτα δὴ καὶ ἐμοὶ βέλτιον αὐτὸ δέδοκται ἐνθάδε καθῆσθαι, καὶ  
δικαιότερον παραμένοντα ὑπέχειν τὴν δίκην ἢ ἂν κελεύσωσιν· ἐπεὶ  
20 νῆ τὸν κύνα, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, πάλαι ἂν ταῦτα τὰ νεῦρά τε καὶ τὰ ὀστᾶ ἢ 99

γώρας τε γὰρ μηχανῇ χρῆται τῷ νῶ πρὸς  
τὴν κοσμοποιίαν, καὶ ὅταν ἀπορήσῃ διὰ τίν'  
αἰτίαν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐστί, τότε παρέλκει αὐτόν,  
ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις πάντα μᾶλλον αἰτιάται τῶν  
γιγνομένων ἢ νοῦν: compare *Laus* 97 B, C.  
Schanz brackets *καὶ* before *ἀναγιγνώσκων*,  
but this causes a harsh collision between  
the two participles.

2. οὐδέ τινας αἰτίας ἐπαιτιώμενον] I  
concur with Mr Jackson in regarding  
these words as an unmeaning interpola-  
tion. The sole complaint Plato has a-  
gainst Anaxagoras is that he made no use  
of νοῦς: what then are these αἰτίαι that he  
ought to have introduced? We cannot  
understand it as explanatory of τῷ μὲν νῶ  
οὐδὲν χρώμενον, 'making no use of mind,  
that is alleging no real (primary) causes',  
(1) because the distinction between pri-  
mary and secondary causes has not yet  
been made, so that a reference to it would  
be unintelligible, (2) the plural is fatal to

such a rendering; there is but one real  
cause, that is νοῦς.

9. διαφυὰς ἔχει χωρὶς ἀπ' ἀλλήλων]  
'joints to separate them one from another',  
and so render the limbs flexible. *διαφυή*  
and *ἄρθρον* regard the joints from opposite  
points of view; the former as breaking  
the continuity of the bones, the latter as  
knitting the frame together.

νεῦρα here, as always in Plato,  
mean sinews or muscles, not nerves. Of  
the nerves he had no knowledge. Cf.  
*Timaeus* 74 D.

19. ἢ ἂν κελεύσωσιν] Hirschig most  
unnecessarily brackets these words. It is  
true there is now no doubt what the sen-  
tence is; but Sokrates expresses in general  
terms that he deems it best to submit to  
whatever may be the judgment of the  
Athenians: compare ἤντι' ἂν τάττη below.

20. πάλαι ἂν ταῦτα] The bones and  
muscles cannot be the cause; for they



περὶ Μέγαρα ἢ Βοιωτοὺς ἦν, ὑπὸ δόξης φερόμενα τοῦ βελτίστου, εἰ μὴ δικαιότερον ᾧμην καὶ κάλλιον εἶναι πρὸ τοῦ φεύγειν τε καὶ ἀποδιδράσκειν ὑπέχειν τῇ πόλει δίκην ἦντιν' ἂν τάττη. ἀλλ' αἷτια μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα καλεῖν λίαν ἄτοπον' εἰ δέ τις λέγοι ὅτι ἄνευ τοῦ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχειν, καὶ ὅσῳ καὶ νεῦρα καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ἔχω, οὐκ ἂν οἶός τ' ἦν ποιεῖν τὰ δόξαντά μοι, ἀληθῆ ἂν λέγοι' ὡς μέντοι διὰ ταῦτα ποιῶ ἢ ποιῶ, καὶ ταῦτα νῶ πράττων, ἀλλ' οὐ τῇ τοῦ βελτίστου αἰρέσει, πολλῇ καὶ μακρὰ ῥαθυμία ἂν εἴη τοῦ λόγου. τὸ γὰρ μὴ διελέσθαι οἷόν τ' εἶναι ὅτι ἄλλο μὲν τί ἐστι τὸ αἷτιον τῶ ὄντι, ἄλλο δὲ ἐκεῖνο ἄνευ οὗ τὸ αἷτιον οὐκ ἂν ποτ' εἴη αἷτιον' ὃ δὴ μοι φαίνονται ψηλαφῶντες οἱ πολλοὶ ὥσπερ ἐν σκοτει, ἀλλοτρίῳ ὀνόματι προσχρώμενοι, ὡς αἷτιον αὐτὸ προσαγορεύειν. διὸ δὴ καὶ ὁ μὲν τις

would have acted in a precisely opposite way had a different *δόξα* τοῦ βελτίστου prompted them.

1. ὑπὸ δόξης φερόμενα] Prof. Geddes justly remarks that it is *δόξα* not *ἐπιστήμη* τοῦ βελτίστου that could urge Sokrates to escape.

3. ἀλλ' αἷτια μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα] Cf. *Timaeus* 46C ταῦτ' οὖν πάντ' ἐστὶ τῶν ξυναϊτίων οἷς θεὸς ὑπηρετοῦσι χρῆται τῆν τοῦ ἀρίστου κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν ἰδέαν ἀποτελῶν' δοξάζεται δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν πλείστων οὗ ξυναΐτια ἀλλ' αἷτια εἶναι τῶν πάντων, ψύχοντα καὶ θερμαινόντα πηγνύντα τε καὶ διαχέοντα καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα ἀπεργαζόμενα. λόγον δὲ οὐδένα οὐδὲ νοῦν εἰς οὐδὲν δυνατὰ ἔχειν ἐστί. Presently he distinguishes these two classes as *πρώται* and *δεύτεραι αἷτια*. In 46E he says τὰ μὲν οὖν ὀμμάτων ξυμμεταΐτια πρὸς τὸ ἔχειν τὴν δύναμιν, ἣν νῦν εἴληχεν, εἰρήσθω' τὸ δὲ μέγιστον αὐτίων εἰς ὠφέλειαν ἔργον, δι' ὃ θεὸς αὐθ' ἡμῖν δωδῶρηται, μετὰ τούτου λεκτέον.

7. καὶ ταῦτα νῶ πράττων] So Schanz after Heindorf. The mss. have *πράττω*, which may be thus rendered: 'to say that it is because of these that I do what I do, and at the same time that I do it by intelligence, is an extremely slovenly mode of speaking': i.e. to assert simultaneously that Sokrates acts thus because of these subsidiary causes and also through intelligence, is a very confused statement. But

though the ms. reading can be defended, I think it probable that Heindorf's neat and simple emendation restores what Plato wrote. Z. and St. have *ταῦτη νῶ πράττω*.

8. τὸ γὰρ μὴ διελέσθαι] The construction is either an *anacoluthon* or an indignant *aposiopesis*. Cf. *Symposium* 177C τὸ οὖν τοιούτων μὲν πέρι πολλὴν σπουδὴν ποιήσασθαι, Ἐρωτα δὲ μηδένα πω ἀνθρώπων τετολημκέναι εἰς ταυτηνὴ τὴν ἡμέραν ἀξίως ὑμνήσαι, ἀλλ' οὕτως ἡμέληται τοσοῦτος θεός; Similarly *Xen. mem.* I iv 12, IV iii 5. Wytttenbach suggests τὸ δ' ἄρ' ἦν μὴ διελέσθαι, which is neat; but no change is needed.

10. ὃ δὴ μοι φαίνονται] 'this is what they seem to me to be handling blindly, as if in the dark'. *ὁ* = τὸ ξυναΐτιον. ἀλλοτρίῳ ὀνόματι, they call it by a name which does not belong to it, i.e. αἷτιον. The reading *ὀμματα* is quite out of place.

12. ὁ μὲν τις δίνην] Empedokles conceived the earth to be kept in its place by the rapid rotation of the universe, as, when a cup of water is whirled swiftly round, the water is retained in the cup; so Aristotle explains, *de caelo* II xiii 295<sup>a</sup> 16, οἱ δ' ὥσπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς, τὴν τοῦ οὐρανοῦ φορὰν κύκλῳ περιθέουσιν καὶ θάττον φερομένην τὴν τῆς γῆς φορὰν κωλύειν, καθάπερ τὸ ἐν τοῖς κυβάθιοις ὕδωρ' καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο κύκλῳ τοῦ κυβάθου φερομένου πολλάκις κάτω τοῦ χαλκοῦ γινόμενον ὕμωσ οὐ φέρεται κάτω

δίην περιτιθεὶς τῇ γῇ ὑπὸ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ μένειν δὴ ποιεῖ τὴν γῆν, ὁ δὲ ὥσπερ καρδόπῳ πλατεία βάθρον τὸν ἀέρα ὑπερείδει· τὴν δὲ τοῦ ὡς οἶόν τε βέλτιστα αὐτὰ τεθῆναι δύναμιν οὕτω νῦν C κείσθαι, ταύτην οὔτε ζητοῦσιν οὔτε τινὰ οἴονται δαιμονίαν ἰσχὺν 5 ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ ἡγούνται τούτου Ἄτλαντα ἂν ποτε ἰσχυρότερον καὶ ἀθανατώτερον καὶ μᾶλλον ἅπαντα συνέχοντα ἔξουρεῖν καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ δέον ξυνδεῖν καὶ συνέχειν οὐδὲν οἴονται. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν τῆς τοιαύτης αἰτίας, ὅπῃ ποτὲ ἔχει, μαθητῆς ὅτου οὖν ἦδιστ' ἂν γενοίμην· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ταύτης ἐστερήθη καὶ οὔτ' αὐτὸς 10 εὔρεῖν οὔτε παρ' ἄλλου μαθεῖν οἶός τε ἐγενόμην, τὸν δεύτερον πλοῦν D

πεφυκὸς φέρεσθαι διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν. Anaxagoras too supposed a περιχώρησις, in order to effect the separation of the ὁμοιομερῆ; but he did not utilize it to steady the earth.

1. ὑπὸ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ should be connected with μένειν.

2. ὁ δὲ ὥσπερ καρδόπῳ] 'another sets the air as a basis of support beneath the earth, which is like a flat kneading-trough'. This view is attributed by Aristotle to Anaximenes, Anaxagoras, and Demokritos; cf. *de caelo* II xiii 294<sup>b</sup> 13. Ἄναξι- μένης δὲ καὶ Ἀναξαγόρας καὶ Δημόκριτος τὸ πλάτος αἰτίον εἶναι φασὶ τοῦ μένειν αὐτῆν. οὐ γὰρ τέμνειν ἀλλ' ἐπιπωματίζειν τὸν ἀέρα τὸν κάτωθεν, ὅπερ φαίνεται τὰ πλάτος ἔχοντα τῶν σωμάτων ποιεῖν. That is to say, the earth does not sink in the ocean of air, but rests upon the surface like a lid.

3. τὴν δὲ τοῦ ὡς οἶόν τε βέλτιστα] As Heindorf says, the words must be construed τὴν δὲ δύναμιν τοῦ οὕτως νῦν αὐτὰ κείσθαι ὡς οἶόν τε βέλτιστα τεθῆναι. The distinction between τεθῆναι and νῦν κείσθαι should be noticed: 'as it was best for them to be placed by mind, so they are now situate'.

5. τούτου] i.e. τοῦ ὡς οἶόν τε βέλτιστα κείσθαι. They think that in their purely physical theories they can find an Atlas, i.e. a system to explain the universe, more potent than the final cause which Sokrates postulates.

7. τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ δέον] 'the good and the binding'. There is a play on the

double sense of δέον: cf. *Cratylus* 418 E ἀγαθοῦ γὰρ ἰδέα οὔσα τὸ δέον φαίνεται δεσμὸς εἶναι καὶ κώλυμα φορᾶς. All this critique of Anaxagoras is a propaedeutic to the ideal theory. The main fault of Anaxagoras is that 'the good' is not the ultimate cause in his system. Plato supplies his defects (in the *Republic* first and still more in the later dialogues) (1) by making τὸ ἀγαθὸν the principle of all existence, so that such thing really exists in proportion as it is perfect; (2) in that νοῦς, instead of being a merely external motive power, is actually the universe: causation is ultimately identity.

9. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ταύτης ἐστερήθη] Sokrates here expressly confesses that he has not succeeded in tracing the genesis of the universe to the idea of the good: and it is most important to bear in mind that what follows is only a description of the δεύτερος πλοῦς. In the *Republic* Plato is bolder and sets forth under a similitude the relation between the ἀγαθὸν and the ideal and material worlds; but not until the *Philebus* and especially his crowning achievement, the *Timaeus*, does he attempt fully to expound the supremacy of the αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν.

10. τὸν δεύτερον πλοῦν] i.e. the next best course. The origin of this proverb is shown by a passage of Menander which Wagner quotes: ὁ δεύτερος πλοῦς ἐστὶ δήπου λεγόμενος, ἂν ἀποτύχη τις πρῶτον ἐν κώπαισι πλεῖν. Heindorf quotes Eus-tathius: δεύτερος πλοῦς λέγεται, ὅτε ἀπο-

ἐπὶ τὴν τῆς αἰτίας ζήτησιν ἢ πεπραγμάτευμαι, βούλει σοι, ἔφη, ἐπίδειξιν ποιήσωμαι, ὃ Κέβης; Ἐπερφυῶς μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ὡς βούλομαι. x

XLVIII. Ἐδοξε τοίνυν μοι, ἡ δ' ὄς, μετὰ ταῦτα, ἐπειδὴ ἀπειρηκα τὰ ὄντα σκοπῶν, δεῖν εὐλαβηθῆναι, μὴ πάθοιμι ὅπερ οἱ τὸν ἥλιον ἐκλείποντα θεωροῦντες καὶ σκοποῦμενοι διαφθειρόνται γάρ που ἔνιοι τὰ ὄμματα, ἐὰν μὴ ἐν ὕδατι ἢ τινι τοιοῦτῳ σκοπῶνται E τὴν εἰκόνα αὐτοῦ. τοιοῦτόν τι καὶ ἐγὼ διανοήθημ, καὶ ἔδεισα, μὴ παντάπασι τὴν ψυχὴν τυφλωθείην βλέπων πρὸς τὰ πράγματα τοῖς ὄμμασι καὶ ἐκάστη τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἐπιχειρῶν ἄπτεσθαι αὐτῶν. 10 ἔδοξε δὴ μοι χρῆναι εἰς τοὺς λόγους καταφυγόντα ἐν ἐκείνοις

τυχῶν τις οὐρίον κώπαις πλὴν κατὰ Πανσανίαν. Plato uses it again, *Politicus* 300 C, *Philebus* 19 C. Compare Aristotle *Nic. Eth.* II ix 4 ἐπεὶ οὖν τοῦ μέσου τυχῶν ἄκρως χαλεπὸν, κατὰ τὸν δεύτερον, φασί, πλοῦν τὰ ἐλάχιστα ληπτέον τῶν κακῶν. Also *politics* III viii 6 (Susemihl) 1284<sup>b</sup>19.

99 D—100 A, c. xlvi. Since then, continues Sokrates, I have been forced to abandon the search for the true cause, and fearing lest, as those who rashly take observations by gazing on the sun himself, instead of his reflection in the water, are bereft of their bodily vision, my soul should be blinded in the endeavour to behold truth herself, I bethought me of contemplating her image, by which I mean definitions or notions. And yet this comparison is scarcely fair: for he that investigates truth in notions certainly does not see her in a similitude more than he who observes sensible objects. Anyhow this was the course I took: assuming the best definition I could form, I regard whatever agrees with that as true, and whatever does not I reject as false. I will presently explain my method more clearly.

From the foregoing analysis it will be seen that my interpretation of this extremely difficult passage differs widely from that of other editors. My objections to their views and defence of my own will be found in appendix II, as requiring

too much space for a note.

5. τὰ ὄντα] 'realities'; i.e. from Plato's point of view the true causes, τὰ γαθὸν καὶ δέον.

8. τὴν εἰκόνα αὐτοῦ] Cf. *Republic* 516 A.

9. τὴν ψυχὴν τυφλωθείην] Compare the metaphor in *Republic* 527 D τὸ δ' ἐστὶν οὐ πᾶν φαῖλον, ἀλλὰ χαλεπὸν πιστεῦσαι, ὅτι ἐν τοῖσι τοῖς μαθήμασι ἐκάστον ὄργανόν τι ψυχῆς ἐκκαθαίρεται τε καὶ ἀναξωπυρεῖται ἀπολλύμενον καὶ τυφλούμενον ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδεύματων, κρείττον ὃν σωθῆναι μυρίων ὀμμάτων' μόνη γὰρ αὐτῷ ἀλήθεια ὄραται.

πρὸς τὰ πράγματα] i.e. the ideas themselves. Cf. 66 D αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ θεατέον αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα. The idea is called πρᾶγμα in virtue of the antithesis between 'thing' and 'shadow'.

10. ἐκάστη τῶν αἰσθήσεων] This is of course metaphorical, like βλέπων, = with all the powers of the soul. But with respect to this clause see appendix II *sub fin.*

11. εἰς τοὺς λόγους] The meaning of this can be fully understood only after a very careful study of *Republic* 506—518. Briefly however it is this. The Sokratic method of definition was, by comparison of a number of particulars which we designate by the same name, to ascertain what attributes were merely accidental in various particulars, and what were es-



σκοπεῖν τῶν ὄντων τὴν ἀλήθειαν. ἴσως μὲν οὖν ᾧ εἰκάζω τρόπον  
 τινὰ οὐκ ἔοικεν· οὐ γὰρ πάνυ συγχωρῶ τὸν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις σκο- 100  
 πούμενον τὰ ὄντα ἐν εἰκόσι μᾶλλον σκοπεῖν ἢ τὸν ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις.  
 ἀλλ' οὖν δὴ ταύτῃ γε ὄρμησα, καὶ ὑποθέμενος ἐκάστοτε λόγον ὄν  
 5 ἂν κρίνω ἐρρωμενέστατον εἶναι, ἂ μὲν ἂν μοι δοκῇ τούτῳ συμ-  
 φωνεῖν, τίθημι ὡς ἀληθῆ ὄντα, καὶ περὶ αἰτίας καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων  
 ἀπάντων τῶν ὄντων, ἂ δ' ἂν μὴ, ὡς οὐκ ἀληθῆ. βούλομαι δέ σοι  
 σαφέστερον εἰπεῖν ἂ λέγω· οἶμαι γάρ σε νῦν οὐ μανθάνειν. Οὐ μὰ  
 τὸν Δία, ἔφη ὁ Κέβηης, οὐ σφόδρα. ||

10 XLIX. Ἄλλ' ἢ δ' ὅς ὧδε λέγω, οὐδὲν καινόν, ἀλλ' ἄπερ αἰὲν B

sential to the class: thus in defining a horse we must distinguish between those qualities which some horses possess and others do not, and those without which the animal would not be a horse. The definition thus formed is the *λόγος*, the concept or general notion. Now in the earlier stage of the ideal theory, wherever there is such a *λόγος*, there is also an idea, corresponding to every group of particulars called by the same name (*Republic* 596 A). The principal difference between the *λόγος* and the *ιδέα* is (1) the *λόγος* is a mental concept, having no existence but in our thought; the *ιδέα* is a self-existing essence, independent of our thought: (2) the *λόγος* includes all that we can discover about the class by observation; the *ιδέα* includes all that there is to be known about it. Therefore from the Platonic point of view the *λόγος* is our conception of the *ιδέα*, the reflection of it in our mind; which reflection only imperfectly represents it, inasmuch as it is derived from an imperfect apprehension of particulars, which themselves are only imperfect likenesses of the idea. In this sense it is that Plato regards the *λόγος* as *εἰκὼν τοῦ ὄντος*. This matter has been admirably cleared up by Mr Jackson, *Journal of Philology* vol. x p. 132 foll. See introduction § 5. There is an interesting use of *λόγος* in *Laws* 895 D, where the Athenian says ἀρ' οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλοις περὶ ἕκαστον τρία νοεῖν;... ἐν μὲν τὴν οὐσίαν, ἐν δὲ τῆς οὐσίας τὸν λόγον, ἐν δὲ τὸ ὄνομα.

The approximation of *οὐσία* to the Aristotelian sense is also notable.

1. ἴσως μὲν οὖν] Sokrates stops to guard himself against conceding too much. The *λόγοι* are indeed only *εἰκόνας*, but so also are the sensible particulars; and the latter are the less trustworthy. He then who seeks truth ἐν τοῖς λόγοις does not deal with images any more than the physicist who investigates natural phenomena. For ᾧ BCDE give ὡς, which perhaps should be retained.

3. τὸν ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις] *ἔργα* here = the particulars. The word is used because of the familiar antithesis with *λόγος*: not, I think, with a view of denoting the particulars as works or products of the ideas whence they derive their existence.

4. ἀλλ' οὖν δὴ] 'however that may be'. Sokrates does not propose here to debate the issue raised in the preceding sentence.

ὑποθέμενος] The method is more fully explained in the next chapter. For example, Sokrates by examining a number of instances of *δίκαιον* forms his *ὑπόθεσις* as to the nature of *δικαιοσύνη*. This *ὑπόθεσις* is his conception of the *αὐτὸ δίκαιον*. Then he compares with this *ὑπόθεσις* particular *δικαῖα*, or whatever professes to be such, and admits or rejects each in so far as it agrees or disagrees with the *ὑπόθεσις*.

100 B—102 A, c. xlix. My method is nothing new, he proceeds: it starts from the ideal theory which is familiar to us;

καὶ ἄλλοτε καὶ ἐν τῷ παρεληλυθότι λόγῳ οὐδὲν πέπαυμαι λέγων. ἔρχομαι γὰρ δὴ ἐπιχειρῶν σοι ἐπιδειξασθαι τῆς αἰτίας τὸ εἶδος ὃ πεπραγματεύομαι, καὶ εἶμι πάλιν ἐπ' ἐκείνα τὰ πολυθρύλητα καὶ ἄρχομαι ἀπ' ἐκείνων, ὑποθέμενος εἶναι τι καλὸν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ μέγα καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα· ἂ εἴ μοι δίδως τε καὶ συγ- 5  
χωρεῖς εἶναι ταῦτα, ἐλπίζω σοι ἐκ τούτων τὴν αἰτίαν ἐπιδείξειν καὶ  
C ἀνευρήσειν, ὡς ἀθάνατον ἢ ψυχὴν. Ἄλλὰ μὴν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, ὡς  
διδόντος σοι οὐκ ἂν φθάνοις περαίνων. Σκόπει δὴ, ἔφη, τὰ ἐξῆς  
ἐκείνοις, ἐάν σοι ξυνοδοῖ ὡσπερ ἐμοί. φαίνεται γὰρ μοι, εἴ τί  
ἐστὶν ἄλλο καλόν, οὐδὲ δι' ἐν ἄλλο καλὸν εἶναι ἢ διότι μετέχει 10  
ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ· καὶ πάντα δὴ οὕτως λέγω. τῇ τοιαύτῃ αἰτία  
συγχωρεῖς; Συγχωρῶ, ἔφη. Οὐ τοίνυν, ἢ δ' ὅς, ἔτι μανθάνω οἷδὲ  
δύναμαι τὰς ἄλλας αἰτίας τὰς σοφὰς ταύτας γιννώσκειν· ἀλλ' ἐάν  
D τίς μοι λέγῃ δι' ὃ τι καλόν ἐστὶν ὅτιοῦν, ἢ χρῶμα εὐαυθὲς ἔχον ἢ  
σχῆμα ἢ ἄλλο ὅτιοῦν τῶν τοιούτων, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα χαίρειν ἐῶ, 15  
ταράττομαι γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσι, τοῦτο δὲ ἀπλῶς καὶ ἀτέχνως  
καὶ ἴσως εὐήθως ἔχω παρ' ἑμαυτῷ, ὅτι οὐκ ἄλλο τι ποιεῖ αὐτὸ

and by means of this theory I hope to prove the soul's immortality. Starting from the assumption that there are ideas of beautiful and just and great &c., I simply affirm that all particulars possessing these qualities possess them through the idea, whether by participation, presence, or communion, or however you may define the connexion. All other causes are beyond my comprehension; I cling simply to my safe reply, that the idea of the beautiful is the cause of beauty. If you accept this, you will never consent to say that one man is greater or less than another by a head, but by greatness or smallness; nor that ten are more than eight by two, but by multitude. Similarly when one is added to one, or divided, the cause why the two are two is not addition or division, but the idea of duality: all other causes you would leave to wiser heads than yours. Again if you were forced to give an account of your hypothesis, you would proceed to a higher generalisation, and again to another; ascending till you reached one that was adequate: and you would beware of falling

into the confusions of thought, of which sham philosophers are guilty. Here Echekrates interrupts to express his admiration of Sokrates' clear exposition.

The upshot of this chapter is that universals alone can be known. For the present however these universals are in the form of *λόγοι* or *ὑποθέσεις*, which are not objects of *νοῦς* proper. When dialectic is made perfect *λόγοι* will be exchanged for *ιδέαι*, *ὑποθέσεις* for *ἀρχαί*.

2. *ἔρχομαι γὰρ δὴ ἐπιχειρῶν*] As Heindorf observes *ἐπιχειρῶν ἐπιδειξασθαι* has virtually a future force, whence it takes the place of *ἐπιδειξόμενος*, which would be the ordinary construction. Cf. *Theaetetus* 180 C *ὅπερ ἦα ἐρῶν*.

8. *οὐκ ἂν φθάνοις*] 'you cannot be too quick in proceeding to the end'. This is not an uncommon formula. Cf. *Symposium* 185 E, Eurip. *Iph. Taur.* 245, Xen. *mem.* II iii 11.

13. *τὰς σοφὰς ταύτας*] i. e. the causes of the physicists.

17. *ὅτι οὐκ ἄλλο τι ποιεῖ*] This is the passage referred to by Aristotle *de gen. et corr.* II ix 335<sup>b</sup>9 *ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν ἰκανῆν*

καλὸν ἢ ἡ ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ εἶτε παρουσία εἶτε κοινωνία εἶτε ὄπη δὴ καὶ ὄπως [προσγενομένη]· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι τοῦτο δισχυρίζομαι, ἀλλ' ὅτι τῷ καλῷ τὰ καλὰ γίγνεται καλά. τοῦτο γάρ μοι δοκεῖ ἀσφαλίστατον εἶναι καὶ ἐμαυτῷ ἀποκρίνασθαι καὶ ἄλλῳ, καὶ τούτου 5 ἐχόμενος ἠγοῦμαι οὐκ ἂν ποτε πεσεῖν, ἀλλ' ἀσφαλές εἶναι καὶ ἐμοὶ E καὶ ὄπωδον ἄλλῳ ἀποκρίνασθαι, ὅτι τῷ καλῷ τὰ καλὰ καλά· ἢ οὐ καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖ; Δοκεῖ. Καὶ μεγέθει ἄρα τὰ μεγάλα μεγάλα καὶ τὰ μείζω μείζω, καὶ σμικρότητι τὰ ἐλάττω ἐλάττω; Ναί. Οὐδὲ σὺ ἄρ' ἂν ἀποδέχοιο, εἴ τίς τινα φαίῃ ἕτερον ἐτέρου τῇ κεφαλῇ

ᾗ ἦθσαν αἰτίαν εἶναι πρὸς τὸ γίνεσθαι τῆν τῶν εἰδῶν φύσιν, ὡσπερ ὁ ἐν τῷ Φαίδωνι Σωκράτης· καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνος, ἐπιτιμήσας τοῖς ἄλλοις ὡς οὐδὲν εἰρηκόσιν, ὑποτίθεται ὡς ἔστι τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν εἶδη τὰ δὲ μεθεκτικὰ τῶν εἰδῶν, καὶ ὅτι εἶναι μὲν ἕκαστον λέγεται κατὰ τὸ εἶδος, γίνεσθαι δὲ κατὰ τῆν μετάληψιν καὶ φθείρεσθαι κατὰ τῆν ἀποβολήν· ὡστ' εἰ ταῦτα ἀληθῆ, τὰ εἶδη οἴεται ἐξ ἀνάγκης αἰτία εἶναι καὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς. Another reference is in *metaph.* I ix 991<sup>b</sup> 3.

1. εἶτε ὄπη δὴ καὶ ὄπως [προσγενομένη] This participle *προσγενομένη* has given much trouble to the editors. Wyttenbach proposes *προσαγορευομένη*, which, though accepted by the Zürich editors, is hardly satisfactory. Schanz and other recent editors bracket *εἶτε*, which is precisely the word I should most wish to keep. For surely Plato is suggesting some alternative to *παρουσία* and *κοινωνία*, not merely some mode of their existence: moreover *προσγενομένη* is not properly applied to those two nouns. Ueberweg's *προσγενομένου* is much better, and I should be content to adopt it, but that Mr Jackson's suggestion to omit *προσγενομένη* seems to offer a better solution of the problem. *προσγίγνεσθαι* is a familiar word as applied to the connexion of ideas and phenomena; cf. *Hippias maior* 289 D, 292 D, *Parmenides* 153 E, and is especially common in later writers; we may therefore easily suppose it to be a marginal note upon *ὄπη καὶ ὄπως*. On the other hand, had Plato written *προσγενομένου*,

there seems no obvious reason for its corruption into -η. A very similar use of *ὄπη καὶ ὄπως* is found in *Laius* 899 B θεοὺς αὐτὰς εἶναι φήσομεν, εἶτε ἐν σώμασιν ἐνοῦσαι, ζῶα ὄντα, κοσμοῦσι πάντα οὐρανόν, εἶτε ὄπη τε καὶ ὄπως. I should add that Olympiodorus in quoting this passage omits *προσγενομένη*.

2. οὐ γὰρ ἔτι τοῦτο] 'for I do not proceed to insist upon that point', i.e. all he insists upon is that the idea is the cause; he does not specify the mode of its operation. This phrase is an indication that Plato at this period did not entertain a view of the relation between ideas and particulars definitely distinct from that expounded in his later writings; but that he had not as yet applied himself to working out the question. In the later dialogues he does not so much alter his view as define it; the definition however necessarily leads to important modifications in the theory of ideas, and to the decisive rejection of the doctrine of *παρουσία*, towards which he had hitherto chiefly inclined: see on 73E: compare *Parmenides* 133 D τὰ παρ' ἡμῶν εἶτε ὁμοιώματα εἶτε ὄπη δὴ τις αὐτὰ τίθεται.

7. μεγέθει ἄρα] The words *μέγεθος* and *σμικρότης* are synonymous with *μείζων* and *ἐλάττων* in 75 C.

9. τῇ κεφαλῇ] Plato here clears up a logical confusion. The fact that the dative is used to express both cause and manner gives the *ἀντιλογικὸς* his opportunity. If A is said to be taller by a head than B, he insists upon understand-



01 μείζω εἶναι, καὶ τὸν ἐλάττω τῷ αὐτῷ τούτῳ ἐλάττω, ἀλλὰ δια-  
μαρτύροιο ἂν ὅτι σὺ μὲν οὐδὲν ἄλλο λέγεις ἢ ὅτι τὸ μείζον πᾶν  
ἕτερον ἑτέρου οὐδενὶ ἄλλῳ μείζον ἔστιν ἢ μεγέθει, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο  
μείζον, διὰ τὸ μέγεθος, τὸ δὲ ἕλαττον οὐδενὶ ἄλλῳ ἕλαττον ἢ  
σμικρότητι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἕλαττον, διὰ τὴν σμικρότητα, φοβού- 5  
μενος οἶμαι, μὴ τίς σοι ἐναντίος λόγος ἀπαντήσῃ, εἰάν τῃ κεφαλῇ  
μείζονά τινα φῆς εἶναι καὶ ἐλάττω, πρῶτον μὲν τῷ αὐτῷ τὸ μείζον  
μείζον εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἕλαττον ἕλαττον, ἔπειτα τῇ κεφαλῇ σμικρᾷ  
B οὔσῃ τὸν μείζω μείζω εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτο δὴ τέρας εἶναι, τὸ σμικρῷ  
τινὶ μέγαν τινὰ εἶναι ἢ οὐκ ἂν φοβοῖο ταῦτα; καὶ ὁ Κέβης 10  
γελάσας, Ἐγώγωγε, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν, ἢ δ' ὅς, τὰ δέκα τῶν ὀκτώ δυοῖν  
πλείω εἶναι, καὶ διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν ὑπερβάλλειν, φοβοῖο ἂν  
λέγειν, ἀλλὰ μὴ πλήθει καὶ διὰ τὸ πλήθος; καὶ τὸ δίπηχυν τοῦ  
πηχυαίου ἡμίσει μείζον εἶναι, ἀλλ' οὐ μεγέθει; ὁ αὐτὸς γάρ που  
φόβος. Πάνυ γ' ἔφη. Τί δέ; ἐνὶ ἐνὸς προστεθέντος τὴν πρόσ- 15  
θεσιν αἰτίαν εἶναι τοῦ δύο γενέσθαι ἢ διασχιθέντος τὴν σχίσιν  
C οὐκ εὐλαβοῖο ἂν λέγειν; καὶ μέγα ἂν βοῆῃς ὅτι οὐκ οἶσθα ἄλλως  
πῶς ἕκαστον γιγνόμενον ἢ μετασχὸν τῆς ἰδίας οὐσίας ἐκάστου οὐ  
ἂν μετάσχη, καὶ ἐν τούτοις οὐκ ἔχεις ἄλλην τινὰ αἰτίαν τοῦ δύο  
γενέσθαι ἀλλ' ἢ τὴν τῆς δυάδος μετάσχεσιν, καὶ δεῖν τούτου 20  
μετασχεῖν τὰ μέλλοντα δύο ἔσεσθαι, καὶ μονάδος ὃ ἂν μέλλῃ ἐν  
ἔσεσθαι, τὰς δὲ σχίσεις ταύτας καὶ προσθέσεις καὶ τὰς ἄλλας τὰς  
τοιαύτας κομψείας ἐφῆς ἂν χαίρειν, παρὲς ἀποκρίνασθαι τοῖς  
D ἑαυτοῦ σοφωτέροις· σὺ δὲ δεδιῶς ἂν, τὸ λεγόμενον, τὴν ἑαυτοῦ  
σκιὰν καὶ τὴν ἀπειρίαν, ἐχόμενος ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀσφαλοῦς τῆς ὑπο- 25

ing 'by the head' as denoting the cause, just as in the phrase 'Sokrates acts by intelligence', νῶ πράττει.

6. ἐναντίος λόγος] Inasmuch as (1), if A is taller by a head than B, B is shorter than A by the same head, namely A's; which is therefore the cause of both tallness and shortness; (2) the head is small compared with the rest of the body, therefore it is absurd to say A is large through a small part of himself.

25. τοῦ ἀσφαλοῦς τῆς ὑποθέσεως] 'clinging to the safeguard of your hypothesis'. The ὑπόθεσις is the notion or definition, λόγος, under which the object to be explained falls. If we are asked,

why is a rose beautiful? we shall not attribute its beauty to the colour, shape, disposition of the petals, and such κομψείαι, for all these are merely ξυναίτια: we shall say it is because the rose partakes of the beautiful. Now it is of course the idea which is the cause of the rose's beauty; the λόγος is not the cause, but it is the conception of the cause which, for fault of direct apprehension of the idea, we have formed by generalisation from particulars. Only when we know the ideas shall we have a true insight into causation; until then λόγοι are the best substitute. The term ὑπόθεσις, as well as the method, may be traced to Sokrates:

θέσεως, οὕτως ἀποκρίναιο ἄν. [εἰ δέ τις αὐτῆς τῆς ὑποθέσεως ἔχοιτο, χαιρειν ἐώς ἂν καὶ οὐκ ἀποκρίναιο, ἕως ἂν τὰ ἀπ' ἐκείνης ὀρμηθέντα σκέψαιο, εἰ σοὶ ἀλλήλοισι συμφωνεῖ ἢ διαφωνεῖ] ἔπειδὴ δὲ ἐκείνης αὐτῆς δέοι σε διδόναι λόγον, ὡσαύτως ἂν διδοίης, ἄλλην  
 5 αὐτὴν ὑπόθεσιν ὑποθέμενος, ἣτις τῶν ἀνωθεν βελτίστη φαίνοιτο,

cf. Xen. mem. IV vi 13 εἰ δέ τις αὐτῷ περὶ τοῦ ἀντιλέγει μηδὲν ἔχων σαφὲς λέγειν, ἀλλ' ἄνευ ἀποδείξεως ἦτοι σοφώτερον φάσκων εἶναι ὢν αὐτὸς λέγει ἢ πολιτικώτερον ἢ ἀνδρείωτερον ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων, ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ἐπανῆγεν ἂν πάντα τὸν λόγον ὡδὲ πως. In illustration we have an inquiry, what is the ἀγαθὸς πολίτης. It is used in a similar sense in *Gorgias* 454 C ἀλλὰ σὺ τὰ σαυτοῦ κατὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ὅπως ἂν βούλη περαίνης.

1. [εἰ δέ τις αὐτῆς τῆς ὑποθέσεως ἔχοιτο] The difficulty of retaining ἔχοιτο in the sense of 'attack' has been perceived by most editors, and Madvig proposes to read ἔφοιτο, which Schanz adopts. But the objections to the passage are by no means thus exhausted. A discussion of them will be found in the article of Mr Jackson's before mentioned, *Journal of Philology* vol. X p. 148. I shall state them as follows: (1) ἔχοιτο in a sense entirely unparalleled following immediately upon the ordinary use. Wagner indeed finds 'a certain acumen' in this; but wherein it consists he fails to inform us. (2) If we acquiesce in ἔχοιτο or accept ἔφοιτο, the words εἰ δέ τις...ἔχοιτο are a clumsy and tautological anticipation of ἔπειδὴ δὲ ἐκείνης αὐτῆς δέοι σε διδόναι λόγον. Ast, seeing this, most ingeniously suggests εἰ δέ τις ἄλλης ὑποθέσεως ἔχοιτο. But, as Mr Jackson observes, there is grave difficulty in applying the term ὑπόθεσις, which is throughout reserved for the Sokratic method, to the principle of an opponent, who would doubtless term it αἰτία. Moreover the introduction of a rival method is here irrelevant. Finally Ast's emendation does not meet the most serious objection of all, which is (3) that the words ἕως ἂν...διαφωνεῖ are inconsis-

tent with the method indicated in ὡσαύτως ἂν διδοίης κ.τ.λ. and are in themselves sheer nonsense. If a hypothesis is proposed to account for a given set of facts, we proceed to observe, not whether the facts are consistent with one another, but whether they are consistent with the hypothesis; and this is precisely what Sokrates professes to do in 100 A ἃ μὲν ἂν δοκῆ ταύτῃ συμφωνεῖν, τίθημι ὡς ἀληθῆ ὄντα, where he is supposing the truth of his hypothesis established. And presently we see that the validity of a doubtful hypothesis is tested, not by examination of particulars, but by the ascent to a more general hypothesis. The word ὀρμηθέντα too strikes me as betraying a writer who had no sense of the difference between aorist and perfect participles: below we have ὠρμημένων. On these grounds I fully agree with Mr Jackson in regarding the passage εἰ δέ τις...διαφωνεῖ as an interpolation; probably, as he suggests, by the same hand that inserted ταῖς μὲν γ' ἀγαθαῖς κ.τ.λ. in 72 D.

4. ὡσαύτως ἂν διδοίης] i.e. as when we are asked to explain a group of particulars we form by generalisation a concept or definition, ὑπόθεσις, which includes them all, so if we have to explain our ὑπόθεσις we form a wider generalisation which includes that and other ὑποθέσεις corresponding to other groups of particulars. We proceed from particulars to species, from species to genus, from genus to a more comprehensive genus, and so ascend step by step until we arrive at one that will satisfy our needs.

5. ἣτις τῶν ἀνωθεν] 'whichever of the higher generalisations seems most adequate'. τῶν ἀνωθεν means the more comprehensive ὑποθέσεις, farther removed

Ε ἕως ἐπὶ τι ἱκανὸν ἔλθοις, ἅμα δὲ οὐκ ἂν φύροις ὡς περ οἱ ἀντιλογικοὶ ἀ hypothesis adequate to the argument  
 περὶ τε τῆς ἀρχῆς διαλεγόμενος καὶ τῶν ἐξ ἐκείνης ὠρμημένων,  
 εἴπερ βούλοιο τι τῶν ὄντων εὐρεῖν. Ἐκείνοις μὲν γὰρ ἴσως οὐδὲ εἰς  
 περὶ τούτου λόγος οὐδὲ φροντίς· ἱκανοὶ γὰρ ὑπὸ σοφίας ὁμοῦ πάντα  
 κυκῶντες ὅμως δύνασθαι αὐτοὶ αὐτοῖς ἀρέσκειν· σὺ δ' εἴπερ εἰ 5  
 02 τῶν φιλοσόφων, οἶμαι ἂν ὡς ἐγὼ λέγω ποιοῖς. Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη,  
 λέγεις, ὃ τε Σιμμίας ἅμα καὶ ὁ Κέβης. X

from the particulars. So Aristotle *anal. post.* I xx 82<sup>a</sup> 23: λέγω δὲ ἄνω μὲν τὴν ἐπὶ τὸ καθόλου, κάτω δὲ τὴν ἐπὶ τὸ κατὰ μέρος. Cf. *metaφh.* B iii 998<sup>b</sup> 17 εἰ μὲν γὰρ ὅτι τὰ καθόλου μᾶλλον ἀρχαί, φανερόν ὅτι τὰ ἀνωτάτω τῶν γενῶν... ταῦτα γὰρ λέγεται κατὰ πάντων.

1. ἕως ἐπὶ τι ἱκανὸν ἔλθοις] I agree with Prof. Geddes, though for very different reasons, in holding that ἱκανὸν does not mean the αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν. In this passage Sokrates is avowedly setting forth his δεύτερος πλοῦς: he has declared his inability (99 D) to attain to the αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν. Now if ἱκανὸν means the αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν, we have here described no δεύτερος πλοῦς, but the perfect dialectic of which Sokrates at present despairs; and we ought to exchange the term ὑπόθεσις for ἀρχή. By the superior method we use our ὑποθέσεις merely as steps to the αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν: having reached this we are enabled to descend step by step, verifying every one of the ὑποθέσεις by which we ascended: so that the knowledge of the αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν is essential to the real knowledge of all our generalisations from the highest to the lowest. But since the inferior method only is attempted here, ἱκανὸν must merely mean a ὑπόθεσις comprehensive enough to satisfy the antagonist or our own doubts. Olympiodoros, though his phraseology is sadly confused, means rightly when he says ἀμεινον δέ, τὸ αἰεὶ ὁμολογούμενον φάναι καὶ τοὺς αὐτοπίστους ὑποθέσεις τε καὶ ἀρχάς.

ἅμα δὲ οὐκ ἂν φύροις] i.e. you would not make a confusion between arguments intended to prove your ὑποθέσεις

and arguments applicable to deductions therefrom: e.g. in the case that follows, you would not confuse a demonstration of the ideal theory with a demonstration of the immortality of the soul, which is a corollary from the former. In other words the processes which are not to be confounded are (1) the establishment of the ὑποθέσεις, (2) the comparison of the ὠρμημένα with the ὑποθέσεις, cf. 100 A. As Grote says, 'during this debate [on the ὠρμημένα] Plato would require his opponent to admit the truth of the fundamental hypothesis provisionally. If the opponent chose to impugn the latter, he must open a distinct debate on that express subject. Plato insists that the discussion of the consequences flowing from the hypothesis shall be kept quite apart from the discussion on the credibility of the hypothesis itself'. In the sarcastic remarks that follow Plato indicates the difference between the aim of the φιλόσοφοι and that of the ἀντιλογικοὶ: the former seek τῶν ὄντων τι εὐρεῖν, the latter αὐτοὶ αὐτοῖς ἀρέσκειν. This spirit of self-satisfaction is exorcised by dialectic; cf. *Theaetetus* 177 B. φύροις is Madvig's correction for φύροιο, which is retained by Z. and St. οὐκ ἂν φύροιο means 'you would not get muddled', but the active gives a preciser sense.

102 A. Plato brings in this brief interlude with his usual skill. The emphatic approval expressed by Echekrates of the principles just laid down serves to impress on us that by them we must stand or fall. We have staked all upon this last effort; we have chosen our own



ΕΧ. Νῆ Δία, ὧ Φαίδων, εἰκότως γε· θανμαστῶς γάρ μοι δοκεῖ ὡς ἐναργῶς τῷ καὶ σμικρὸν νοῦν ἔχοντι εἶπεῖν ἐκεῖνος ταῦτα.

ΦΑΙΔ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὧ Ἐχέκρατες, καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς παροῦσιν ἔδοξεν.

5 ΕΧ. Καὶ γὰρ ἡμῖν τοῖς ἀποῦσι, νῦν δὲ ἀκούουσιν. ἀλλὰ τίνα δὴ ἦν τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα λεχθέντα;

10 Λ. ΦΑΙΔ. Ὡς μὲν ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ἐπεὶ αὐτῷ ταῦτα συνεχωρήθη, καὶ ὁμολογεῖτο εἶναι τι ἕκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ τούτων τᾶλλα Β μεταλαμβάνοντα αὐτῶν τούτων τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν ἴσχειν, τὸ δὴ μετὰ ταῦτα ἠρώτα, Εἰ δὴ, ἢ δ' ὅς, ταῦτα οὕτως λέγεις, ἄρ' οὐχ, ὅταν Σιμμίαν Σωκράτους φῆς μείζω εἶναι, Φαίδωνος δὲ ἐλάττω, λέγεις τὸτ' εἶναι ἐν τῷ Σιμμίᾳ ἀμφοτέρα, καὶ μέγεθος καὶ σμικρότητα; Ἐγωγε. Ἀλλὰ γάρ, ἢ δ' ὅς, ὁμολογεῖς τὸ τὸν Σιμμίαν ὑπερέχειν

battle-ground, on which alone we can hope for victory. Nothing could better mark the gravity of the crisis than this momentary pause in the narrative.

102 A—103 A, c. 1. Assuming then that ideas exist corresponding to the hypotheses, and that by participation in them particulars possess their attributes, Sokrates proceeds thus. When we say Simmias is bigger than Sokrates and less than Phaedo, we are speaking loosely: in reality Simmias partakes of the ideas of great and small; and it is greatness in him which is bigger than smallness in Sokrates, and smallness in him that is less than greatness in Phaedo. For it has nothing to do with the personality of Simmias Sokrates and Phaedo, as such, that one is greater or less than another. We observe then that (1) two opposite ideas can coexist in the same subject, although (2) such opposite ideas cannot combine with each other, either (3) as they exist absolutely in nature, or (4) as they are manifested in concrete particulars. And this incapacity of one opposite idea to take upon it the nature of the other is true of all pairs of opposite ideas as well as great and small.

Setting aside the metaphysical objections to the doctrine of ideas of relation, which we have here in its most pronounced

form, it conveniently serves Plato's purpose to show that in particulars contradictory ideas may coexist. In 103 D we pass on to the next stage. We are here dealing with the participation by particulars in ideas which are not essential to their nature. Greatness and smallness are not essential to a man as heat is essential to fire and cold to snow. With this chapter it is well to contrast *Parmenides* 150 A foll.

7. ἐπεὶ αὐτῷ ταῦτα συνεχωρήθη] Sokrates now assumes the existence of the ideas, though at present he is unable to attain cognition of them: that is, he assumes that his ὑποθέσεις more or less faithfully represent the substantial realities. Taking then the ideas as the true αἰτίαι περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς, it remains to examine whether the immortality of the soul is a legitimate deduction from this theory.

8. τᾶλλα] i.e. concrete existence. τᾶλλα is constantly used thus in the *Parmenides*.

11. λέγεις τὸτ' εἶναι] The ideas are the cause of comparison, as of everything else. It is through partaking of the ideas of great and small that Simmias is comparable in point of size with other men.

13. τὸ τὸν Σιμμίαν ὑπερέχειν] 'as to Simmias being bigger than Sokrates, you

Σωκράτους οὐχ ὡς τοῖς ῥήμασι λέγεται οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἔχειν.  
 C οὐ γὰρ που πεφυκέναι Σιμμίαν ὑπερέχειν τούτῳ τῷ Σιμμίαν εἶναι,  
 ἀλλὰ τῷ μεγέθει ὃ τυγχάνει ἔχων· οὐδ' αὖ Σωκράτους ὑπερέχειν,  
 ὅτι Σωκράτης ὁ Σωκράτης ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ὅτι σμικρότητα ἔχει ὁ  
 Σωκράτης πρὸς τὸ ἐκείνου μέγεθος; Ἀληθῆ. Οὐδέ γε αὖ ὑπὸ 5  
 Φαίδωνος ὑπερέχεσθαι τῷ ὅτι Φαίδων ὁ Φαίδων ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ὅτι  
 μέγεθος ἔχει ὁ Φαίδων πρὸς τὴν Σιμμίου σμικρότητα; Ἔστι ταῦτα.  
 D Ὁὕτως ἄρα ὁ Σιμμίας ἐπωνυμίαν ἔχει σμικρὸς τε καὶ μέγας εἶναι,  
 ἐν μέσῳ ὧν ἀμφοτέρων, τοῦ μὲν τῷ μεγέθει ὑπερέχειν τὴν σμικρό-  
 τητα ὑπέχων, τῷ δὲ τὸ μέγεθος τῆς σμικρότητος παρέχων ὑπερέχον 10  
 καὶ ἅμα μειδιάσας, Ἔοικα, ἔφη, καὶ ξυγγραφικῶς ἐρεῖν, ἀλλ' οὖν  
 ἔχει γέ που ὡς λέγω. Συνέφη. Λέγω δὲ τοῦδ' ἔνεκα, βουλόμενος

admit the truth is not as expressed in the words'. Strictly speaking Simmias is not bigger than Sokrates, for the personality of two men cannot be compared in respect of size. The only things that can be so compared are great and small: therefore it is the greatness in Simmias which we compare with the smallness that is in Sokrates. But to say that Simmias *qua* Simmias is greater or less than Sokrates *qua* Sokrates, would be nonsense.

8. ἐπωνυμίαν ἔχει] because he participates in the two opposite ideas. This predication of opposite attributes exhibits particulars in sharp contrast to the ideas, of which no such contrary predication is, to the Sokrates of the *Phaedo*, possible: cf. *Parmenides* 129 B εἰ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὰ τὰ ὁμοιά τις ἀπέφαιεν ἀνόμοια γιγνώμενα ἢ τὰ ἀνόμοια ὅμοια, τέρας ἄν, οἶμαι, ἦν· εἰ δὲ τὰ τούτων μετέχοντα ἀμφοτέρων ἀμφοτέρα ἀποφαίνει πεπονθότα, οὐδὲν ἔμοιγε, ὦ Ζήνων, ἀτοπον δοκεῖ εἶναι. The whole passage 129 A—130 A should be compared, where Sokrates is stating the earlier Platonic doctrine, which in the latter part of the dialogue Plato criticises with a view to its modification.

9. τὴν σμικρότητα ὑπέχων] This reading is due to Madvig, who thus renders the sentence: 'alterius magnitudini exiguitatem suam superandam submis-

trans, alteri magnitudinem exiguitatem superantem praebens'; i.e. Simmias submits his smallness to be exceeded by the greatness of Phaedo and presents his greatness to exceed the smallness of Sokrates. On the whole this seems the best attempt to disentangle this troublesome sentence that has yet been made. The ordinary reading is *ὑπερέχων*, which is thus translated by Mr Cope: 'exceeding the shortness of the one by excess of height, and lending to the other by comparison a size exceeding his own shortness'. The grave objection to this reading and interpretation is that in the first clause *ὑπερέχων* is followed by the accusative, in the second *ὑπερέχον* by the genitive. The verb may, it is true, take either case; but surely Plato would not use both constructions in the same breath. Wytténbach, Heindorf, and Ast reconstruct the passage each in his own way: Madvig's remedy is however the simplest.

11. ξυγγραφικῶς ἐρεῖν] 'it seems I am going to talk in the style of an indenture'. *ξυγγραφή* is the regular term for a legal document, especially a bond or covenant. Sokrates makes fun of the clumsy sentence he has just uttered, which he compares to the cumbrous pedantry of legal phraseology.

δόξαι σοὶ ὅπερ ἐμοί. ἐμοὶ γὰρ φαίνεται οὐ μόνον αὐτὸ τὸ μέγεθος οὐδέποτε ἑθέλειν ἅμα μέγα καὶ σμικρὸν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν μέγεθος οὐδέποτε προσδέχασθαι τὸ σμικρὸν οὐδ' ἑθέλειν ὑπερέχασθαι, ἀλλὰ δυοῖν τὸ ἕτερον, ἢ φεύγειν καὶ ὑπεκχωρεῖν, ὅταν αὐτῷ  
 5 προσίῃ τὸ ἐναντίον, τὸ σμικρὸν, ἢ προσελθόντος ἐκείνου ἀπολω-  
 λέναι· ὑπομένον δὲ καὶ δεξάμενον τὴν σμικρότητα οὐκ ἑθέλειν εἶναι  
 ἕτερον ἢ ὅπερ ἦν. ὥσπερ ἐγὼ δεξάμενος καὶ ὑπομείνας τὴν σμι-  
 κρότητα, καὶ ἔτι ὦν ὅσπερ εἰμί, οὗτος ὁ αὐτὸς σμικρὸς εἰμί· ἐκεῖνο  
 δὲ οὐ τετόλμηκεν μέγα ὄν σμικρὸν εἶναι· ὡς δ' αὐτως καὶ τὸ  
 10 σμικρὸν τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν οὐκ ἑθέλει ποτὲ μέγα γίγνεσθαι οὐδὲ εἶναι, οὐδ'  
 ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν ἐναντίων ἔτι ὄν ὅπερ ἦν ἅμα τὸναντίον γίγνεσθαι

1. οὐ μόνον αὐτὸ τὸ μέγεθος] According to the earlier Platonism, the idea exists (1) absolutely apart from the sensible world, *χωριστή*, (2) inherent in phenomena, to which it imparts their attributes. Not only are opposite ideas incapable of communion, as existing apart by themselves, but also as informing particulars. The importance of this point becomes manifest when the argument is applied to *ψυχή*.

4. ἢ φεύγειν καὶ ὑπεκχωρεῖν] If any object that was great becomes small, the idea of greatness either withdraws from it and goes elsewhere or is extinguished; and the idea of smallness takes its place. But under no circumstances can the idea of greatness remain in the object and accept the attribute of smallness, thus contradicting its own nature.

6. ὑπομένον] Schanz has adopted Hirschig's *ὑπομείνας*, against all authority. The change of tense is however perfectly proper. Awaiting the approach of the other idea is a prolonged process, accepting it is an act performed once for all. In the next sentence *ὑπομείνας* denotes the actual completion of the process in a specified instance.

οὐκ ἑθέλειν] 'it will not consent to abide and accept smallness and thus become different from what it was, in the way that I accept and abide smallness

and still remaining the man I am, without losing my identity am small; whereas it has never submitted, while remaining great, to be small'. That is to say, if Sokrates *δέχεται σμικρότητα*, we have a small Sokrates, which involves no incongruity nor loss of identity; but if greatness *δέχεται σμικρότητα*, we have small greatness, which is incongruous and impossible. Schmidt (*krit. Comm.* II p. 41) discusses this passage at great length: he would read *οὐκ ἑθέλειν εἶναι ἔτι ὅπερ ἦν*, comparing 103 E *δεξάμενον τὴν ψυχρότητα ἔτι εἶναι ὅπερ ἦν, πῦρ καὶ ψυχρόν*. There is much to be said for this; but I think the vulgate may be defended, as indicating that in the one case a change of identity is involved but not in the other: the incongruity in fact lies in the supposed retention of its identity by the idea under circumstances which render its retention impossible. *σμικρὸν μέγεθος* would remain *μέγεθος* but yet be *ἕτερον*. Moreover Schmidt's reading anticipates the point made in *μέγα ὄν σμικρὸν εἶναι*. On the whole therefore it is better to make no change.

8. οὗτος ὁ αὐτὸς σμικρὸς εἰμί] 'I, this same Sokrates, am small'.

9. τετόλμηκε] as in 103 D *τολμήσειν*. The perfect expresses the fixed constitution of the idea: it has been ordained by nature not to endure smallness.



03 τε καὶ εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἦτοι ἀπέρχεται ἢ ἀπόλλυται ἐν τούτῳ τῷ παθήματι. Παντάπασι, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, οὕτω φαίνεται μοι.

LI. Καὶ τις εἶπε τῶν παρόντων ἀκούσας—ὅστις δ' ἦν, οὐ σαφῶς μέμνημαι—Πρὸς θεῶν, οὐκ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθετον ἡμῖν λόγοις αὐτὸ τὸ ἐναντίον τῶν νυνὶ λεγομένων ὁμολογεῖτο, ἐκ τοῦ ἐλάττονος τὸ 5 μείζον γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἐκ τοῦ μείζονος τὸ ἐλάττον, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς αὕτη εἶναι ἢ γένεσις τοῖς ἐναντίοις, ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων; νῦν δέ μοι δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι ὅτι τοῦτο οὐκ ἂν ποτε γένοιτο. καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης παρα-  
B βαλὼν τὴν κεφαλὴν καὶ ἀκούσας, Ἄνδρικῶς, ἔφη, ἀπεμνημόνευκας, οὐ μέντοι ἐννοεῖς τὸ διαφέρειν τοῦ τε νῦν λεγομένου καὶ τοῦ τότε. 10 τότε μὲν γὰρ ἐλέγετο ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου πράγματος τὸ ἐναντίον πρῶγμα γίγνεσθαι, νῦν δέ ὅτι αὐτὸ τὸ ἐναντίον ἑαυτῷ ἐναντίον οὐκ ἂν ποτε γένοιτο, οὔτε τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν οὔτε τὸ ἐν τῇ φύσει. τότε μὲν γάρ, ὦ φίλε, περὶ τῶν ἐχόντων τὰ ἐναντία ἐλέγομεν, ἐπονομάζοντες αὐτὰ τῇ ἐκείνων ἐπωνυμίᾳ, νῦν δέ περὶ ἐκείνων αὐτῶν ὧν ἐνότων 15

1. ἐν τούτῳ τῷ παθήματι] i. e. ἐν τῷ προσείναι αὐτῷ τὸ ἐναντίον.

103 A—C, ζ. li. One of the company suggests that this doctrine is inconsistent with our former theory of generation from opposites (70 c foll.). Sokrates replies that then we were speaking of particulars possessing the attributes of such opposites, but now we deal with the absolute opposites themselves. The former can pass from one to the other of two opposite conditions; but the opposite itself can never put on the nature of its opposite.

8. παραβαλὼν τὴν κεφαλὴν] 'bending his head to listen'. As Heindorf suggests, the objector probably spoke in a low voice through diffidence.

9. ἀνδρικῶς] Sokrates is never without a word of praise for any mark of interest or intelligence in his listeners. Plato is fond of the word ἀνδρικῶς and its cognates to express staunchness in argument: cf. *Theaetetus* 204 E, *Phaedrus* 265 A, *Republic* 454 B, *Laws* 752 B: in the last two instances ironically.

10. οὐ μέντοι ἐννοεῖς τὸ διαφέρειν] The distinction is clear enough. The concrete particular is not in itself opposed to either of the opposites, therefore it can

admit either of such opposites without contradicting itself; but the opposites themselves are so mutually exclusive that neither can admit the other without self-contradiction. Hot water can become cold, because water is not itself opposite to hot or cold, nor is any attribute essential to it which is opposed to either. But hot cannot become cold without manifest contradiction of its own nature. Similarly, when we generated ζῶν from τεθνηκός, we did not mean that death became life, but simply that things that live have passed over from a state of death into a state of life. In the next chapter however we shall see that a further refinement must be made.

13. οὔτε τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν] Simmias can be small and great by participation in the ideas of small and great; but the idea of greatness in him can never have the quality of smallness, so that Simmias should be small by virtue of its immance. For ἐν τῇ φύσει compare *Parmenides* 132 D τὰ μὲν εἶδη ταῦτα ὡς περ παραδείγματα ἐστάναι ἐν τῇ φύσει.

15. τῇ ἐκείνων ἐπωνυμίᾳ] Here Plato propounds a theory of predication. When we say that Sokrates is small, we do not

ἔχει τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν τὰ ὀνομαζόμενα· αὐτὰ δ' ἐκείνα οὐκ ἂν ποτέ  
 φάμεν ἐθελῆσαι γένεσιν ἀλλήλων δέξασθαι. καὶ ἄμα βλέψας πρὸς  
 τὸν Κέβητα εἶπεν, Ἄρα μὴ πού, ὦ Κέβης, ἔφη, καὶ σέ τι τούτων  
 ἐτάραξεν ὧν ὅδε εἶπεν; ὁ δ' <Οὐκ> αὖ, ἔφη, ὁ Κέβης, οὕτως ἔχω·  
 5 καίτοι οὐ τι λέγω ὡς οὐ πολλά με ταραττεῖ. Συνομολογήκαμεν  
 ἄρα, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἀπλῶς τοῦτο, μηδέποτε ἐναντίον ἑαυτῷ τὸ ἐναντίον  
 ἔσσεσθαι. Παντάπασι, ἔφη. ||

LII. Ἔτι δὴ μοι καὶ τότε σκέψαι, ἔφη, εἰ ἄρα συνομολογήσεις.  
 θερμόν τι καλεῖς καὶ ψυχρόν; Ἐγωγε. Ἄρ' ὅπερ χιόνα καὶ πῦρ;  
 10 Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγε. Ἄλλ' ἕτερόν τι πυρὸς τὸ θερμόν καὶ ἕτερόν τι  
 χιόνος τὸ ψυχρόν; Ναί. Ἀλλὰ τότε γ' οἶμαι δοκεῖ σοι, οὐδέποτε  
 χιόνα οὔσαν δεξαμένην τὸ θερμόν, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ἐλέ-  
 γομεν, ἔτι ἔσσεσθαι ὅπερ ἦν, χιόνα καὶ θερμόν, ἀλλὰ προσιόντος τοῦ

mean that Sokrates and small are the same thing, but we call Sokrates after the name of the idea whose attribute he possesses. To mark this point was necessary because of the confusion into which Antisthenes and others had fallen in the matter of predication. The difference between Plato's treatment of the subject in the *Phaedo* and in the *Sophist* has been dealt with in the introduction § 5.

4. οὐκ αὖ] 'no, not this time'. The mss. are corrupt here: I have adopted the text of Schanz, except that he brackets ὁ Κέβης. Z. and St. have οὐκ αὖ, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης.

103 C—104 C, c. lii. The mutually exclusive opposites, hot and cold, are not identical with fire and snow; yet we see that fire will not admit cold, nor snow heat. Whence we infer that there may be an idea which is not one of a pair of opposites, but which may exclude one of such opposites. For instance, the idea of odd is opposite to that of even, and exclusive of it. Also the idea of three, though not opposite to even, excludes it, because the idea of three necessarily carries with it the idea of odd. Similarly the idea of even and the idea of two exclude the idea of odd. Thus it appears that there are (1) opposite ideas which are mutually

exclusive, (2) other ideas, not identical with any such opposite but necessarily partaking of it, which, equally with that opposite, exclude the other opposite.

After establishing in the fiftieth chapter that opposite ideas cannot enter into communion, Plato's next task is to show that this incommunicability extends to other ideas, which, though not themselves opposite to anything, are inseparably combined with one of such opposites and therefore necessarily exclude the other.

9. ὅπερ χιόνα καὶ πῦρ] Plato at first speaks of hot, cold, fire, snow, without distinctly specifying whether he means ideas or particulars: presently however he gives a precise statement: we have in 104 A (1) περιττόν, the idea of odd, (2) τριάς, the idea of three, (3) τρία, the three particulars informed by the τριάς.

12. χιόνα οὔσαν] Schanz writes χιόνα twice, which is far from euphonious and surely unnecessary, the subject being readily supplied from the preceding sentence.

ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν] 102 E.

13. χιόνα καὶ θερμόν] 'at once snow and hot'. The sense is perfectly right, and I cannot understand why Schanz should bracket καὶ θερμόν, as he does καὶ ψυχρόν in E. For the phrase χιόνα καὶ

θερμῷ ἢ ὑπεκχωρήσειν [αὐτὸ] ἢ ἀπολείσθαι. Πάνυ γε. Καὶ τὸ πῦρ γε αὖ προσιόντος τοῦ ψυχροῦ αὐτῷ ἢ ὑπεξίεναι ἢ ἀπολείσθαι, οὐ μέντοι ποτὲ τολμήσειν δεξάμενον τὴν ψυχρότητα ἔτι εἶναι ὅπερ E ἦν, πῦρ καὶ ψυχρόν. Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις. Ἔστιν ἄρα, ἢ δ' ὅς, περὶ ἔνια τῶν τοιούτων, ὥστε μὴ μόνον αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος ἀξιούσθαι 5 τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὀνόματος εἰς τὸν αἰεὶ χρόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλο τι, ὃ ἔστι μὲν οὐκ ἐκεῖνο, ἔχει δὲ τὴν ἐκείνου μορφήν αἰεὶ ὅτανπερ ἦ. ἔτι δὲ ἐν τοῖσδε ἴσως ἔσται σαφέστερον ὃ λέγω. τὸ γὰρ περιττὸν αἰεὶ που δεῖ τούτου τοῦ ὀνόματος τυγχάνειν, ὅπερ νῦν λέγομεν' ἢ οὐ; Πάνυ γε. Ἄρα μόνον τῶν ὄντων, τούτο γὰρ ἔρωτῶ, ἢ καὶ ἄλλο τι, ὃ 10

γὰρ introduct  
detail affe  
general state

θερμὸν is explanatory of the whole clause δεξαμένην τὸ θερμὸν ἔτι ἔσεσθαι ὅπερ ἦν, the result of which process would be precisely what Plato says, hot snow. Schanz seems to refer it to the ὅπερ ἦν alone. Hirschig goes so far as to bracket all three words; also πῦρ καὶ ψυχρόν below. I cannot see that the shadow of suspicion attaches to them.

1. ἀπολείσθαι.] That which ἀπόλυται is of course not the idea, which is as imperishable existing ἐν τῇ χιόνι as existing ἐν τῇ φύσει: what perishes is the quality of snow which the particular possesses by the immanence of the idea of snow—the sensible form of snow, such as those described in *Timaeus* 50 c as εἰσιόντα καὶ ἐξίοντα: this however is to explain Plato's words by means of an analysis which he had not yet made.

4. ἔστιν ἄρα, ἢ δ' ὅς] 'it is the case then with some ideas of this kind that not only do we recognise the right of this idea itself to the same name in perpetuity, but also that of some other idea, not being identical with it, which, whenever it exists, always possesses the form of the other'. For the construction ἔστιν ὥστε cf. 93 B.

6. τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὀνόματος] So Schanz: rightly, it would seem; cf. below, τὸ γὰρ περιττὸν αἰεὶ που δεῖ τούτου τοῦ ὀνόματος τυγχάνειν. In support of ἐαυτοῦ Prof. Geddes refers to 104 A μετὰ τοῦ ἐαυτοῦ ὀνόματος. But there, as well as in τῷ τε

αὐτῆς ὀνόματι below, a comparison is involved which is absent here. Z. and St. give ἐαυτοῦ.

7. τὴν ἐκείνου μορφήν] On this Wyttbach observes 'notatur alius verborum usus: quo *εἶδος* ut universalis habetur, *μορφή* minus universale et quasi communio τοῦ εἶδους: veluti *numerus imperar* *εἶδος* dicitur, *tria* autem illius *μορφήν* habere'. But this distinction cannot be maintained; for, as Wyttbach himself points out, in 104 D Plato says ἢ ἐναντία *ἰδέα* ἐκείνη τῇ *μορφῇ* ἢ ἂν τοῦτο ἀπεργάζηται, where *μορφή* = τῷ περιττῷ. In fact *μορφή*, *εἶδος*, and *ἰδέα* are in the present passage interchangeable words. 'The species has the *μορφή* of the genus present, with whatever else that *μορφή* may be combined', says Prof. Geddes, rightly.

ἔτι δὲ ἐν τοῖσδε] No fresh point is introduced here: Plato is merely illustrating his proposition more fully. From his second example he again draws the inference stated in 103 E, which he gives in a more complete form in 104 B.

10. τούτο γὰρ ἔρωτῶ] 'for this is the point of my question'. These words direct the attention of the hearer to the proposition on which most stress is laid: viz. that there are ideas which are not logically opposite to anything, but which nevertheless contain the principle of some opposite and therefore refuse to combine with the rival opposite. The vital importance of this we shall presently see.



ἔστι μὲν οὐχ ὅπερ τὸ περιπτόν, ὅμως δὲ δεῖ αὐτὸ μετὰ τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ 104  
 ὀνόματος καὶ τοῦτο καλεῖν αἰεὶ, διὰ τὸ οὕτω πεφυκέναι, ὥστε τοῦ  
 περιπτοῦ μηδέποτε ἀπολείπεσθαι; λέγω δὲ αὐτὸ εἶναι οἶον καὶ ἡ  
 τριάς πέπονθε καὶ ἄλλα πολλά. σκόπει δὲ περὶ τῆς τριάδος· ἄρα  
 5 οὐ δοκεῖ σοι τῶ τε αὐτῆς ὀνόματι αἰεὶ προσαγορευτέα εἶναι καὶ τῶ  
 τοῦ περιπτοῦ, ὄντος οὐχ οὐπερ τῆς τριάδος; ἀλλ' ὅμως οὕτω πως  
 πέφυκε καὶ ἡ τριάς καὶ ἡ πεμπτάς καὶ ὁ ἥμισυς τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ἅπας,  
 ὥστε οὐκ ὦν ὅπερ τὸ περιπτόν αἰεὶ ἕκαστος αὐτῶν ἐστι περιπτός· B  
 καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ δύο καὶ τὰ τέτταρα καὶ ἅπας ὁ ἕτερος αὐτῶν στίχος τοῦ  
 10 ἀριθμοῦ οὐκ ὦν ὅπερ τὸ ἄρτιον ὅμως ἕκαστος αὐτῶν ἄρτιός ἐστιν  
 αἰεὶ συγχωρεῖς ἢ οὐ; Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ; ἔφη. Ὁ τοίνυν, ἔφη, βού-  
 λουμαι δηλώσαι, ἄθρει. ἔστιν δὲ τόδε, ὅτι φαίνεται οὐ μόνον ἐκεῖνα  
 τὰ ἐναντία ἀλλήλα οὐ δεχόμενα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅσα οὐκ ὄντ' ἀλλήλοισ  
 ἐναντία ἔχει αἰεὶ τὰναντία, οὐδὲ ταῦτα ἔοικε δεχομένοις ἐκείνην τὴν  
 15 ἰδέαν ἢ ἂν τῇ ἐν αὐτοῖς οὐσῃ ἐναντία ἢ, ἀλλ' ἐπιούσης αὐτῆς ἤτοι  
 ἀπολλύμενα ἢ ὑπεκχωροῦντα. ἢ οὐ φήσομεν τὰ τρία καὶ ἀπο- C

2. καὶ τοῦτο καλεῖν] sc. περιπτόν.

7. ὁ ἥμισυς τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ἅπας] 'the entire half of the set of numbers' COPE. For the construction cf. Thucydides VIII 8 τὰς ἡμισείας τῶν νεῶν. πολὺς is similarly used, Thuc. I 5 τὸν πλείστον τοῦ βίου; and other like idioms are given in Wagner's note.

12. οὐ μόνον ἐκεῖνα τὰ ἐναντία] 'not only those original opposites refuse to admit each other, but also those, which, though not opposite one to another, always contain the opposites, seem no more likely to admit the idea which is opposite to the idea they contain, but on its approach they either perish or withdraw'. That is to say τριάς is not opposite to δυάς, but it contains an opposite, περιπτόν, to the idea, ἄρτιον, contained in δυάς. Therefore τριάς equally with περιπτόν excludes ἄρτιον and δυάς excludes περιπτόν.

16. ἀπολλύμενα ἢ ὑπεκχωροῦντα] As Ast says, the construction is as though φαίνεται had been written instead of ἔοικε.

104 C—105 B, c. liii. Let us define these ideas more closely. Such an idea

is not itself one of two opposite ideas; nevertheless, into whatsoever particulars it informs it carries along with it one of these opposites; so that the particulars are called not only by the name of their own idea, but by the name of this opposite also; nor can they admit the other opposite without ceasing to be what they are. For instance three particulars are three by participation in the ideal triad; but they are also odd, because the triad always carries with it the idea of oddness. Consequently they can never admit the idea of even without ceasing to be three. Of this a number of other examples are given.

It might be thought that in the last chapter we had already a sufficient account of these ideas. But in the present chapter one important addition is made. Now we not only say of the ἄλλ' ἄττα that they ἔχει τὰ ἐναντία, but also that they ἐπιφέρει τὰ ἐναντία εἰς ὃ τι ἂν κατὰσχη. This is a necessary corollary to the foregoing; but Plato desires to bring it out as prominently as possible, because this is the point at which the whole argument is aimed. Thus the gist of this

λείσθαι πρότερον καὶ ἄλλο ὅτι οὖν πείσσεσθαι, πρὶν ὑπομείναι ἔτι τρία ὄντα ἄρτια γενέσθαι; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης. Οὐδὲ μὴν, ἢ δ' ὅς, ἐναντίον γέ ἐστι δυὰς τριάδι. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. Οὐκ ἄρα μόνον τὰ εἶδη τὰ ἐναντία οὐχ ὑπομένει ἐπιόντα ἄλληλα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλ' ἅττα τὰ ἐναντία οὐχ ὑπομένει ἐπιόντα. Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, 5 λέγεις. x

D LIII. Βούλει οὖν, ἢ δ' ὅς, ἐὰν οἰοί τ' ὤμεν, ὀρισώμεθα ὅποια ταυτὰ ἐστίν; Πάνυ γε. Ἄρ' οὖν, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, τάδε εἴη ἂν, ἃ ὅτι ἂν κατὰσχη μὴ μόνου ἀναγκάζει τὴν αὐτοῦ ιδέαν αὐτὸ ἴσχειν, ἄλλὰ καὶ ἐναντίον, αἰεί τινος; Πῶς λέγεις; "Ὡσπερ ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν. 10 οἴσθα γὰρ δήπου ὅτι ἃ ἂν ἢ τῶν τριῶν ιδέα κατὰσχη, ἀνάγκη αὐτοῖς οὐ μόνον τρισὶν εἶναι ἀλλὰ καὶ περιπτόις. Πάνυ γε. Ἐπὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον δὴ, φαμέν, ἢ ἐναντία ιδέα ἐκείνη τῇ μορφῇ, ἢ ἂν τοῦτο ἀπεργάζηται, οὐδέποτε ἂν ἔλθοι. Οὐ γάρ. Εἰργάζετο δέ γε ἢ περιπτότης; Ναί. Ἐναντία δὲ ταύτῃ ἢ τοῦ ἀρτίου Ναί. Ἐπὶ 15 E τὰ τρία ἄρα ἢ τοῦ ἀρτίου ιδέα οὐδέποτε ἤξει. Οὐ δῆτα. Ἄμοιρα δὴ τοῦ ἀρτίου τὰ τρία. Ἄμοιρα. Ἀνάρτιος ἄρα ἢ τριάς. Ναί.

chapter lies in its application of the principle to concretes.

8. ἃ ὅτι ἂν κατὰσχη] 'which, whatever they occupy, compel that to have not only its own idea, but always that of some opposite as well'. The word κατὰσχη marks the fresh point: what the idea occupies or informs can be nothing else but particulars.

9. τὴν αὐτοῦ ιδέαν] i.e. ἐκείνου ὃ τι ἂν κατὰσχη. Wohlrab strangely remarks 'αὐτοῦ bezüglich auf den Plural ἃ'. To say nothing of the grammar, this makes sheer nonsense, representing the idea as the idea of itself. Plato's meaning is plain enough. The ideal triad, for instance, occupying the concrete three, forces the latter to receive not only the special idea, τριάς, but also the idea of a certain opposite, περιπτόν.

10. ἐναντίου αἰεί τινος] There is so much confusion in the mss. that it would be rash to assert confidently what is the true reading. This however gives precisely the sense required and differs from the best mss. only in the omission of αὐτῷ.

Notwithstanding that αὐτῷ has overwhelming ms. authority I cannot believe it genuine. The only plan for making sense of it is to read δέι with Schmidt for αἰεί. But the phraseology 'but it also has need of some opposite' is so glaringly inappropriate that it is incredible that Plato wrote it. I have therefore with the Zürich editors ejected αὐτῷ, which Schanz retains within brackets. Ast's αἰεί δὴ τινος is not bad, possibly accounting for the corruption δῆνος.

13. ἐκείνη τῇ μορφῇ] see on 103 E.

14. εἰργάζετο δὲ ἢ περιπτότης] The ms. reading ἢ περιπτή is surely indefensible. Plato never uses such a phrase as ἢ περιπτή ιδέα, which would indeed be something very like nonsense. Probably he wrote either ἢ τοῦ περιπτοῦ or ἢ περιπτότης: the latter, which was suggested to me by Mr Jackson, I have ventured to adopt, as the mildest remedy I can find for an evident corruption. Compare 105 C οὐκ ἐρῶ ᾧ ἂν περιπτότης.

15. ἐπὶ τὰ τρία] i.e. three particulars.

17. ἀνάρτιος ἄρα ἢ τριάς] The word

Ὁ τοίνυν ἔλεγον ὀρίσασθαι, ποῖα οὐκ ἐναντία τινὶ ὄντα ὅμως  
 οὐ δέχεται αὐτὸ τὸ ἐναντίον, οἷον νῦν ἢ τριάς τῷ ἀρτίῳ οὐκ οὔσα  
 ἐναντία οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον αὐτὸ δέχεται, τὸ γὰρ ἐναντίον αἰεὶ αὐτῷ  
 ἐπιφέρει, καὶ ἡ δυὰς τῷ περιττῷ καὶ τὸ πῦρ τῷ ψυχρῷ καὶ ἄλλα 105  
 5 πᾶμπολλα—ἀλλ' ἕρα δὴ, εἰ οὕτως ὀρίζει, μὴ μόνον τὸ ἐναντίον τὸ  
 ἐναντίον μὴ δέχεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκείνο ὃ ἂν ἐπιφέρῃ τι ἐναντίον  
 ἐκείνῳ, ἐφ' ὅ τι ἂν αὐτὸ ἦ, αὐτὸ τὸ ἐπιφέρων τὴν τοῦ ἐπιφερομένου  
 ἐναντιότητα μηδέποτε δέξεσθαι. πάλιν δὲ ἀναμιμνήσκον οὐ γὰρ  
 χεῖρον πολλάκις ἀκούειν. τὰ πέντε τὴν τοῦ ἀρτίου οὐ δέξεται,  
 10 οὐδὲ τὰ δέκα τὴν τοῦ περιττοῦ, τὸ διπλάσιον τοῦτο μὲν οὖν καὶ  
 αὐτὸ ἄλλῳ <οὐκ> ἐναντίον, ὅμως δὲ τὴν τοῦ περιττοῦ οὐ δέξεται.  
 οὐδὲ τὸ ἡμιόλιον οὐδὲ τᾶλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα, τὸ ἥμισυ, τὴν τοῦ ὅλου, B

ἀνάρτιος is used instead of περιττῆ to denote the opposition to ἀρτίον involved in the number three: the full significance of this mode of expression will be clear when we come to take the case of ψυχή.

1. ἔλεγον ὀρίσασθαι] Heindorf says 'ἔλεγον in his, ut saepe, idem fere est quod ἐκέλευον'. Cf. Aeschylus *Agamemnon* 955 λέγω κατ' ἄνδρα, μὴ θεόν, σέβειν ἐμέ.

2. οὐ δέχεται αὐτὸ τὸ ἐναντίον] There seems no reason for omitting τὸ ἐναντίον. 'The opposite itself' is distinguished from the idea which is not, but implies, an opposite: and this is all that is meant by the word αὐτό. Cf. 103 B. This seems to be the view of H. Schmidt (*Érit. Comm.* II p. 58), who understands αὐτό 'nicht in dem streng philosophischen Sinne an sich'. Stallbaum's plan of taking τὸ ἐναντίον in apposition to αὐτό is clumsy.

5. ὅρα δὴ εἰ οὕτως ὀρίζει] resumes the sentence begun at ὁ τοίνυν ἔλεγον ὀρίσασθαι, the construction of which is left imperfect.

μὴ μόνον τὸ ἐναντίον] 'that not only does the opposite refuse to admit its opposite, but whatever imports an opposite into that to which itself comes—that very importing idea can never admit the opposite of that which is imported'. Sokrates here speaks highly ξυγγραφικῶς.

Not only will odd refuse to admit even, but the triad, which imports the idea of odd (ἐκείνο ὃ ἂν ἐπιφέρῃ τι ἐναντίον) into whatsoever it enters, will itself (αὐτὸ τὸ ἐπιφέρων) never admit even, the opposite of oddness which is imported by it (τὴν τοῦ ἐπιφερομένου ἐναντιότητα). ἐκείνῳ is to be joined with ἐπιφέρῃ. The present definition differs from that in 104 B in the introduction of the word ἐπιφέρειν, which denotes that the principle is now being applied to concretes which are informed by the ideas.

10. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν καὶ αὐτὸ ἄλλῳ <οὐκ> ἐναντίον] The insertion of οὐκ is absolutely necessary: there is no sense in which the number ten can be said to be contrary to anything else. Cf. 104 C ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅσα οὐκ ὄντα ἀλλήλοις ἐναντία ἔχει αἰεὶ τάναντία: and 104 E. Stallbaum's defence of the vulgate apparently fails to satisfy even himself.

12. οὐδὲ τὸ ἡμιόλιον] 'nor will  $\frac{5}{2}$  and the rest of the fractions whose denominator is 2 accept the idea of whole; nor yet will  $\frac{1}{3}$  and the fractions whose denominator is 3'. These last examples do not seem very felicitous, since we have no such definite contrast of opposites as in the case of odd and even. We must however take it thus:  $\frac{5}{2}$  and  $\frac{1}{3}$  are not opposites to anything; they contain how-



καὶ τριτημόριον αὐτὸ καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα, εἴπερ ἔπει τε καὶ συνδοκεῖ σοι οὕτως. Πάνυ σφόδρα καὶ συνδοκεῖ, ἔφη, καὶ ἔπομαι.

LIV. Πάλιν δὴ μοι, ἔφη, ἐξ ἀρχῆς λέγε. καὶ μή μοι ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐρωτῶ ἀποκρίνου, ἀλλὰ μιμούμενος ἐμέ. λέγω δὲ παρ' ἣν τὸ πρῶτον ἔλεγον ἀποκρισιν, τὴν ἀσφαλῆ ἐκείνην, ἐκ τῶν νῦν λεγομένων ἄλλην ὁρῶν ἀσφάλειαν. εἰ γὰρ ἔροίό με, ὧς ἂν τί [ἐν τῷ] σώματι ἐγγένηται, θερμὸν ἔσται, οὐ τὴν ἀσφαλῆ σοι ἐρῶ ἀποκρισιν ἐκείνην τὴν ἀμαθῆ, ὅτι ὧς ἂν θερμότης, ἀλλὰ κομψοτέραν ἐκ τῶν νῦν, ὅτι ὧς ἂν πῦρ οὐδὲ ἂν ἔρη, ὧς ἂν σώματι τί ἐγγένηται, νοσήσει,

ever the idea of fractionality, which is opposite to that of integrity, therefore they will never admit the latter.

τὸ ἥμισυ. Schanz brackets this as a gloss.

105 B—D, c. liv. We are now enabled to advance beyond our first simple and safe hypothesis. When we are asked what by its immanence makes a thing hot, we shall no longer answer heat, but fire: similarly we shall assign fever as the cause of sickness, not disease; the monad as the cause of numerical imparity, not oddness. Applying this rule, when asked what is the cause of life in the body, Kebes answers soul; for soul contains in her the principle of life which is opposite to death; whence soul can never combine with death.

We now see the significance of Plato's insistence on his point that some ideas which are not opposites yet refuse to combine with certain opposites. Soul is not opposite to anything: but she stands in the same relation to the idea of life as fire does to that of heat and the triad to that of oddness.

It is to be noted that a fourth term is added in this chapter. Hitherto we have had three, e.g. περιττότης, τριάς, τρία: the general idea, the special idea and the particular informed by the latter: now in addition to these three we have σώμα in which the particular resides; the fever that seizes on us is not the idea of fever, but a particular fever, which corresponds to τρία, while the idea of fever corresponds

to τριάς. Similarly the soul that quickens a particular body corresponds to τρία. Now since this fourth term is itself in no wise material to the argument,—it matters nothing to the immortality of soul whether or not she resides in a body—I conceive the point of it is to emphasise the fact that these particulars too, πυρετός and ψυχῆ, carry with them the ideas of νόσος and ζωή, and consequently refuse to admit their opposites. Hitherto it has only been the special idea which ἐπιφέρει the general idea.

3. καὶ μή μοι ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐρωτῶ] 'and do not answer in the terms of the questions I put, but following the examples I shall give you' i.e. to the question, what makes a thing θερμόν? the answer must be, not θερμότης, but πῦρ. The reading in the text has the best ms. authority and gives the best sense.

5. τὴν ἀσφαλῆ ἐκείνην] Cf. 100 E ἀσφαλές εἶναι καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ ὄψοι ἄλλω ἀποκρίνασθαι ὅτι τῷ καλῷ τὰ κατὰ γίγνεται καλά. For the use of ἀσφαλές cf. Τιμαίους 50 A μακρῶς πρὸς ἀλήθειαν ἀσφαλέστερον εἰπεῖν, ὅτι χρυσός.

6. εἰ γὰρ ἔροίό με] 'were you to ask me what must be inherent in a body to make it hot'. Stallbaum seems right in bracketing ἐν τῷ: we thus have the same phrase three times over, with a slight variation in the order of the words. Schanz and others include σώματι in the bracket; but it seems quite as much in place here as in the two passages below.

οὐκ ἐρῶ ὅτι  $\phi$  ἂν νόσος, ἀλλ'  $\phi$  ἂν πυρετός· οὐδ'  $\phi$  ἂν ἀριθμῶ τί ἐγγένηται, περιττός ἔσται, οὐκ ἐρῶ  $\phi$  ἂν περιττότης, ἀλλ'  $\phi$  ἂν μονάς, καὶ τᾶλλα οὕτως. ἀλλ' ὅρα, εἰ ἤδη ἰκανῶς οἶσθ' ὅ τι βούλομαι. Ἄλλὰ πᾶν ἰκανῶς, ἔφη. Ἀποκρίνου δὴ, ἦ δ' ὅς,  $\phi$  ἂν τί ἐγγένηται σώματι, ζῶν ἔσται; Ὡς ἂν ψυχῇ, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν αἰετοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει; Πῶς γὰρ οὐχί; ἦ δ' ὅς. Ἡ ψυχὴ ἄρα ὅ τι ἂν D

1.  $\phi$  ἂν πυρετός] i. e. he will specify the particular kind of sickness instead of using the general term: as Prof. Geddes puts it, the species is substituted for the genus.

2.  $\phi$  ἂν μονάς] Similarly, instead of assigning περιττότης as the cause of oddness in a number, he will assign the idea of that particular odd number, whatever it may be: μονάς, like πυρετός, is merely given as an example.

6. ὅ τι ἂν αὐτῇ κατὰσχη] It is to be noted that the usage of κατὰσχη here is different from that in 104 D. The soul does not occupy the body in the sense in which τριάς occupies τρία: the triad is the cause why the three are three, the soul is not the cause why body is body, but the cause why it is alive. The difference lies in this: the triad is the idea of three; the soul which quickens the body is not the idea of soul, but a particular soul, just as the fever is a particular fever. Thus we have the following terms (1) the idea of life, (2) the idea of soul, which carries the idea of life to particular souls, (3) the particular soul, which vivifies the body, (4) the body in which is displayed this vivifying power. It is true that an idea of soul is a metaphysical monstrosity; but we cannot escape it here, first because otherwise Plato's elaborate parallel breaks down, secondly because in the earlier Platonism an idea of soul is inevitable. Wherever there is a group of particulars called by the same name, we are told in the *Κερυβίλις*, there is an idea corresponding: therefore since there are particular ψυχαί, there must be αὐτὸ δ' ἔστι ψυχῇ. This is one of the errors which Plato rectifies in his later dialogues; for the present we must bear

with it. The whole point of this sentence is that not only the idea of soul but also a particular soul ἐπιφέρει ζωὴν, and accordingly τὸ ἐναντίον  $\phi$  αὐτῇ ἐπιφέρει αἰετοῦτο οὐ μὴ ποτε δέξηται.

105 D—106 D, c. 1v. As then that which will not admit even is uneven, so that which will not admit death, namely soul, is deathless. Now if the negation of even or of heat or of cold necessarily implied indestructibility, then three and snow and fire would not perish at the approach of the opposite to the idea contained in them, but would merely withdraw from it. This however is not the case: these negations do not imply indestructibility; therefore three and snow and fire can cease to exist at the approach of the opposite. But the negation of death does imply indestructibility: soul therefore, on the approach of death, not only refuses to admit it, but also refuses to perish: soul is thus not only deathless but indestructible. Indeed if the eternal principle of life could perish, then there is nothing in existence that should not perish.

We have seen that πῦρ and τρία, on the approach of cold or evenness, had two alternatives open to them, either ὑπεκχωρεῖν or ἀπόλλυσθαι: what is not open to them is δέχεσθαι τὸ ἐναντίον. Therefore if in any case ἀπόλλυσθαι were identified with δέχεσθαι τὸ ἐναντίον, it would necessarily be precluded. In the foregoing instances this is not so: ἀπόλλυσθαι is not identical with δέχεσθαι ψυχρὸν nor with δέχεσθαι ἄριον. Consequently both alternatives are open to πῦρ and τρία. But in the case of ψυχῇ this identification actually occurs: δέχεσθαι τὸ ἐναντίον is for the principle of life

αὐτὴ κατὰσχη, αἰεὶ ἤκει ἐπ' ἐκείνο φέρουσα ζωὴν; Ἦκει μέντοι, ἔφη. Πότερον δ' ἔστι τι ζωῆ ἐναντίον ἢ οὐδέν; Ἔστιν, ἔφη. Τί; Θάνατος. Οὐκοῦν ψυχὴ τὸ ἐναντίον ᾧ αὐτὴ ἐπιφέρει αἰεὶ οὐ μὴ ποτε δέξεται, ὡς ἐκ τῶν πρόσθεν ὠμολόγηται; Καὶ μάλα σφόδρα, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης.

LV. Τί οὖν τὸ μὴ δεχόμενον τὴν τοῦ ἀρτίου ἰδέαν; τί νῦν δὴ ταῦτα ὠνομάζομεν; Ἀνάρτιον, ἔφη. Τὸ δὲ δίκαιον μὴ δεχόμενον E καὶ ὁ ἄν μουσικὸν μὴ δέχεται; Ἄμουσον, ἔφη, τὸ δὲ ἄδικον. Εἶεν. ὁ δ' ἄν θάνατον μὴ δέχεται, τί καλοῦμεν; Ἀθάνατον, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν ἢ ψυχὴ οὐ δέχεται θάνατον; Οὐ. Ἀθάνατον ἄρα ἢ ψυχὴ; Ἀθά- 5  
νατον. Εἶεν, ἔφη· τοῦτο μὲν δὴ ἀποδεδεῖχθαι φῶμεν ἢ πῶς δοκεῖ; Καὶ μάλα γε ἰκανῶς, ᾧ Σώκρατες. Τί οὖν, ἢ δ' ὅς, ᾧ Κέβης; εἰ 10  
106 τῷ ἀναρτίῳ ἀναγκαῖον ἦν ἀνωλέθρῳ εἶναι, ἄλλο τι τὰ τρία ἢ ἀνώ-  
λεθρα ἄν ἦν; Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; Οὐκοῦν εἰ καὶ τὸ ἄθερμον ἀναγκαῖον  
ἦν ἀνώλεθρον εἶναι, ὅποτε τις ἐπὶ χιόνα θερμὸν ἐπαγάγοι, ὑπέξῃ 15  
ἄν ἢ χιῶν οὔσα σῶς καὶ ἄτηκτος; οὐ γὰρ ἄν ἀπώλετό γε, οὐδ'

δέχεσθαι θάνατον: ἀπόλλυσθαι is the same as δέχεσθαι θάνατον: therefore, since δέχεσθαι θάνατον is precluded, so also is ἀπόλλυσθαι; else we should find soul doing what we have agreed is impossible, viz. admitting the opposite idea to the idea contained in it.

6. τί νῦν δὴ ταῦτα] ταῦτα is in BCD, omitted by Z. and St. Schanz cites *Alcid.* I 109 C πρὸς ταῦτ' ἄρα, τὸ δίκαιον, τοὺς λόγους ποιήσει.

10. ἀθάνατον ἄρα ἢ ψυχῆ;] It is necessary to distinguish very carefully the meaning of ἀθάνατον. All it denotes here is ὁ ἄν θάνατον μὴ δέχεται: it is that which contains the opposite idea to θάνατος, as ἀνάρτιον contains the opposite idea to ἀρτίον. It signifies in fact not what soul is but what she is not; and for the present we must dissociate the word from the positive notion of imperishability. We are now merely expressing the particular ἐναντίον which soul will not admit; that the exclusion of this ἐναντίον involves indestructibility is an inference we do not reach until we declare that ἀθάνατον = ἀνώλεθρον. Wytenbach accurately says ἀθάνατον hic dicitur ὁ ἄν θάνατον μὴ

δέχεται: ἀνώλεθρον, quod superveniente contrario οὐκ ἀπόλλυται'. For a somewhat similar subtlety compare Aristotle *topica* VI vi 145<sup>b</sup>21 foll. where ἀθάνατον is regarded as logically distinguishable, though not actually separable, from ἀφθαρτον.

11. τοῦτο μὲν δὴ ἀποδεδεῖχθαι φῶμεν] What has been demonstrated is, not the eternal existence of soul, which is a subsequent inference, but that soul contains the opposite idea to death. Dead soul would be analogous to cold fire or even three. It must be borne in mind that ψυχὴ means the principle of life: a dead vital principle is a contradiction in terms. That this is only a preliminary step to the final induction is marked by the τοῦτο μὲν.

14. εἰ τὸ ἄθερμον] If τὸ ἄθερμον were necessarily indestructible — that is, if ἄθερρος were the opposite idea to ἄθερμον, then snow, as containing ἄθερμον, would not have the alternative of perishing on the approach of its opposite; it must withdraw whole and unmelted. χιῶν ἀπολομένη would then be as impossible as χιῶν θερμὴ is now.



αὐ ὑπομένουσα ἐδέξατο ἂν τὴν θερμότητα. Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις. Ὡσαύτως, οἶμαι, κὰν εἰ τὸ ἄψυχρον ἀνώλεθρον ἦν, ὅποτε ἐπὶ τὸ πῦρ ψυχρὸν τι ἐπῆει, οὐποτ' ἂν ἀπεσβέννυτο οὐδ' ἀπόλλυτο, ἀλλὰ σὼν ἂν ἀπελθὼν ᾤχετο. Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὦδε, ἔφη, ἀνάγκη περὶ τοῦ ἀθάνατου εἰπεῖν; εἰ μὲν τὸ ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀνώ- B  
λεθρὸν ἐστίν, ἀδύνατον ψυχῆ, ὅταν θάνατος ἐπ' αὐτὴν ἴη, ἀπόλλυσθαι· θάνατον μὲν γὰρ δὴ ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων οὐ δέξεται οὐδ' ἔσται τεθνηκυῖα, ὥσπερ τὰ τρία οὐκ ἔσται, ἔφαμεν, ἄρτιον, οὐδέ γ' αὐ τὸ περιττὸν, οὐδὲ δὴ πῦρ ψυχρὸν, οὐδέ γε ἢ ἐν τῷ πυρὶ θερ-  
10 μότης. ἀλλὰ τί κωλύει, φαίη ἂν τις, ἄρτιον μὲν τὸ περιττὸν μὴ γίνεσθαι ἐπίοντος τοῦ ἀρτίου, ὥσπερ ὠμολόγηται, ἀπολομένου δὲ αὐτοῦ ἀντ' ἐκείνου ἄρτιον γεγενῆσθαι; τῷ ταῦτα λέγοντι οὐκ ἂν C  
ἔχοιμεν διαμάχεσθαι ὅτι οὐκ ἀπόλλυται· τὸ γὰρ ἀνάρτιον οὐκ ἀνώ-  
λεθρὸν ἐστίν· ἐπεὶ εἰ τοῦτο ὠμολόγητο ἡμῖν, βραδίως ἂν διεμαχόμεθα  
15 ὅτι ἐπελθόντος τοῦ ἀρτίου τὸ περιττὸν καὶ τὰ τρία οἴχεται ἀπίοντα· καὶ περὶ πυρὸς καὶ θερμοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οὕτως ἂν διεμαχόμεθα. ἢ οὐ; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Οὐκοῦν καὶ νῦν περὶ τοῦ ἀθάνατου, εἰ μὲν ἡμῖν ὁμολογεῖται καὶ ἀνώλεθρον εἶναι, ψυχῆ ἂν εἴη πρὸς τῷ ἀθά-

2. εἰ τὸ ἄψυχρον] The correction, ἄψυχρον, suggested by Wytttenbach, seems to me certain. In order to formulate his antitheses with the utmost precision, Plato has coined the words ἀνάρτιον and ἄθερμον, to express the direct opposites of ἄρτιον and θερμόν: it seems hardly doubtful that he also coined the word ἄψυχρον to express the direct opposite of ψυχρὸν. ἄψυκτον, as Wytttenbach says, is the counterpart of ἀθέρμαντον, not of ἄθερμον: and in a passage where Plato is choosing his terms with such extreme nicety the slightest failure in fitness is not to be tolerated. It is surprising that Wytttenbach's admirable correction has been so completely ignored by subsequent editors. Mr Jackson, independently of Wytttenbach, made the same emendation. ἄψυχρον is confirmed by the corrupt reading ψυχρὸν in Stobaeus *eccl.* I 814.

5. εἰ μὲν τὸ ἀθάνατον] The inference that soul is immortal is not yet definitely drawn, but is based upon the two state-

ments made in this sentence, (1) soul is ἀθάνατον, i. e. she cannot combine with death and so become dead soul; (2) therefore if ἀθάνατον involves ἀνώλεθρον, soul is ἀνώλεθρον, i. e. she cannot perish. When these two propositions are put side by side, it becomes obvious that the refusal of the soul to admit death implies her indestructibility, since we know that ἀθάνατον does involve ἀνώλεθρον.

7. οὐδ' ἔσται τεθνηκυῖα] It is noteworthy that τεθνηκυῖα has a different sense here from that of τεθνηκὸς in the discussion at 71 C: there it implied merely the state of separation of soul and body, but here denotes the actual destruction of the soul.

14. εἰ τοῦτο ὠμολόγητο] sc. τὸ ἀνάρτιον ἀνώλεθρον εἶναι: that in the case of ἀνάρτιον, ἀπόλλυσθαι is equivalent to δέχεσθαι τὸ ἐναντίον, sc. ἄρτιον.

18. πρὸς τῷ ἀθάνατος] At last we have the inference definitely stated. Since soul will not admit the opposite of its imma-

ἄνατος εἶναι καὶ ἀνώλεθρος· εἰ δὲ μή, ἄλλον ἂν δέοι λόγου. Ἄλλ' οὐδὲν δεῖ, ἔφη, τούτου γε ἔνεκα· σχολῇ γὰρ ἂν τι ἄλλο φθορὰν μὴ δέχοιτο, εἴ γε τὸ ἀθάνατον αἰδίου ὄν φθορὰν δέξεται. //

nent idea, and since that opposite is death, soul, being deathless, must be imperishable.

2. **σχολῇ γὰρ ἂν** Here we have the fundamental postulate on which the whole argument rests: viz. that energy cannot be annihilated. All other things being but forms of energy, may make way for their opposites, since their conversion into the opposite state involves not destruction but simply modification of energy. But vital principle is energy itself, therefore its conversion into the opposite state would mean conversion into non-energy, i.e. annihilation of energy. Plato is simply applying to spirit the principle which the older physicists laid down for matter, and which Lucretius formulates in the words 'ex nihilo nihil, in nihilum nil posse reverti'. Similarly we have in 72 D *εἰ γὰρ ἐκ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων τὰ ζῶντα γίγνεται, τὰ δὲ ζῶντα θνήσκου, τίς μηχανῇ μὴ οὐχὶ πάντα καταναλωθῆναι εἰς τὸ τεθνᾶναι*; Compare *Phaedrus* 245 D *τοῦτο δ' οὐτ' ἀπόλλυσθαι οὐτε γίγνεσθαι δυνατόν, ἢ πάντα τε οὐρανὸν πᾶσάν τε γένεσιν συμπεσοῦσαν στῆναι καὶ μήποτε αὐθις ἔχειν ὄνεν κινήθεντα γενήσεται*.

**μὴ δέχοιτο**] It is easier to feel the correctness of *μὴ* than to explain it grammatically. The meaning is 'hardly could there be anything else incapable of admitting destruction, if the immortal, being eternal, will admit it'. *μὴ δέχοιτο φθορὰν* is in fact equivalent to *εἴη τὸ μὴ δεχόμενον φθορὰν*. Wohlrab compares *Cratylus* 429 D *πῶς γὰρ ἂν, ὦ Σώκρατες, λέγων γέ τις τοῦτο, ὃ λέγει, μὴ τὸ ὄν λέγοι*; Add *Gorgias* 510 D *τίνα ἂν τρόπον ἐγὼ μέγα δυναμην καὶ μηδεὶς με ἀδικοίη*.

3. **εἰ...δέξεται**=*εἰ ἐθέλει* or *μέλλει δέξασθαι*. The distinction between *εἰ* with future indicative and *ἐάν* with subjunctive is apt to be overlooked. The former is

constantly used as an equivalent to *εἰ μέλλει*, or even *εἰ χρή*, with infinitive; and the substitution of *ἐάν* would be, as here, impossible. It were easy to multiply instances, but one may suffice: Aristophanes *Frogs* 1460 *εὔρισκε νῆ Δ', εἴπερ ἀναδύσει πάλιν*, 'you must find something, if you mean to go on earth again'. Cf. *Timaeus* 31 A. This usage is recognised by Prof. Goodwin, *moods and tenses* § 49, 1, note 3: he however regards a number of cases as falling into the class of ordinary future conditions equivalent to *ἐάν* with subjunctive (§ 50). I cannot but think that such cases are very rare: nearly if not quite all of the instances he quotes might be taken the other way: especially Isokrates *Archidamos* § 107, where *εἰ δὲ φοβησόμεθα* is, I conceive, precisely parallel to *ἢν ἐθέλωμεν ἀποθνήσκειν*: 'if we mean to be cowards'.

Here it may be convenient to give concisely a synopsis of the reasoning in chapters I—IV. After agreeing that the truth of immortality will be best established if we can show that it is a legitimate deduction from the theory of ideas, we set forth thus: (1) particulars partake successively, or even simultaneously, of contrary ideas, but the idea itself can never admit its opposite, but at the approach thereof either withdraws or perishes: and this applies both to ideas as existing in nature and as immanent in particulars: (2) there is a second set of ideas, not being themselves opposites, but containing opposite ideas; no such idea can admit the opposite of the idea it contains, but either withdraws or perishes; e.g. the triad contains the idea of odd and cannot admit that of even: (3) particulars which one of this second class of ideas informs can never admit the opposite of the contained idea; e.g. three things can never be even: (4) if

LVI. Ὁ δέ γε θεός, οἶμαι, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ τῆς ζωῆς εἶδος καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο ἀθάνατόν ἐστιν, παρὰ πάντων ἂν ὁμολογηθεῖη μηδέποτε ἀπόλλυσθαι. Παρὰ πάντων μέντοι νῆ Δί' ἔφη ἀνθρώπων τέ γε καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, παρὰ θεῶν. Ὅποτε δὲ 5 τὸ ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀδιάφθορόν ἐστιν, ἄλλο τι ψυχῇ ἢ, εἰ ἀθάνατος ἔστιν, ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς οὐσα, καὶ ἀνώλεθρος ἂν εἴη; Πολλῇ ἀνάγκῃ. Ἐπιόντος ἄρα θανάτου ἐπὶ τὸν ἀνθρώπου τὸ μὲν θνητόν, ὡς ἔοικεν, αὐτοῦ ἀποθνήσκει, τὸ δ' ἀθάνατον σὼν καὶ ἀδιάφθορον οὔχεται ἀπὸν, ὑπεκχωρήσαν τῷ θανάτῳ. Φαίνεται. Παντὸς μᾶλλον ἄρα, ἔφη, ὧ 10 Κέβης, ψυχῇ ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀνώλεθρον, καὶ τῷ ὄντι ἔσονται ἡμῶν αἱ ψυχαὶ ἐν Ἄιδου. Οὐκ οὐκ ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, ἔχω παρὰ ταῦτα ἄλλο τι λέγειν οὐδέ πη ἀπιστεῖν τοῖς λόγοις. ἄλλ' εἰ δὴ τι Σιμμίας ἢ τις ἄλλος ἔχει λέγειν, εὖ ἔχει μὴ κατασιγήσαι ὡς οὐκ οἶδα εἰς ὅτινά τις ἄλλον καιρὸν ἀναβάλλοιτο ἢ τὸν νῦν παρόντα,

in any such instance refusal to admit the opposite necessarily involved indestructibility, we could predicate immortality of that which refused to admit it; e.g. if refusal to admit evenness involved indestructibility, three would be imperishable; but since this is not so, three may perish at the approach of evenness: (5) but in the case of soul refusal to admit the opposite of its contained idea does involve indestructibility, since the contained idea is life, whose opposite is death; and that which will not admit death is imperishable: soul therefore on the approach of death has not the option of perishing, but must adopt the other alternative, ὑπεκχωρεῖν. Else, if the principle of life perished, nothing could be found to resist destruction.

106D—107B, c. lvi: Thus from the general principle that all things which refuse to admit death are indestructible we infer that soul can never perish: when death comes upon a man, his mortal part perishes, but his soul withdraws, making way for death, while she herself is saved alive. It must be then that our souls live in Hades. Kebes is now fully convinced: Simmias cannot controvert the reasoning of Sokrates but still feels misgivings;

whereupon Sokrates encourages him to sift the matter until he is thoroughly satisfied.

1. Ὁ δέ γε θεός] We must identify θεός with absolute universal mind, the νοῦς βασιλεὺς of the *Philebus*, the mythical δημιουργός of the *Timaeus*. Eternity cannot be ascribed either to the deities of popular worship or to those of Plato's cosmology: see *Timaeus* 41A, where they are thus addressed by the creator: δι' ἃ καὶ ἐπέπερ γεγέννησθε, ἀθάνατοι μὲν οὐκ ἐστὲ οὐδ' ἄλῃ τοι τὸ πάμπαν, οὐ τι μὲν δὴ λυθήσεσθέ γε οὐδὲ τεύξεσθε θανάτου μοίρας, τῆς ἐμῆς βουλήσεως μείζονος ἔτι δεσμοῦ καὶ κυριωτέρου λαχόντες ἐκείνων, οἷς ὄτ' ἐγίγνωσθε ξυνεδείσθε. In the final development of Plato's system we find that God, the idea of life, and universal soul are identical: ψυχῇ alone of all things is αὐτοκίνητον καὶ ἀθάνατον. This identification however is not to be found in the *Phaedo*: it belongs to the consummated idealism of the *Philebus* and *Timaeus*.

8. ἀποθνήσκει] Here again the word denotes annihilation; not as in 71C.

καὶ ἀδιάφθορον] The distinction made in the last chapter between ἀθάνατον and ἀνώλεθρον must be carefully borne in mind.

14. εἰς ὅτινα...ἀναβάλλοιτο] It is



περὶ τῶν τοιούτων βουλόμενος ἢ τι εἶπειν ἢ ἀκοῦσαι. Ἄλλὰ μὴν, ἢ δ' ὅς ὁ Σιμμίας, οὐδ' αὐτὸς ἔχω ὑπὲρ ἀπιστῶ ἕκ γε τῶν λεγομένων ὑπὸ μέντοι τοῦ μεγέθους περὶ ὧν οἱ λόγοι εἰσὶν, καὶ τὴν ἀνθρω-  
 Β πίνην ἀσθένειαν ἀτιμάζων, ἀναγκάζομαι ἀπιστίαν ἔτι ἔχειν παρ' ἐμαντῶ περὶ τῶν εἰρημένων. Οὐ μόνον γ' ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία, ὁ Σω- 5  
 κράτης, ἀλλὰ ταυτὰ τε εὖ λέγεις, καὶ τὰς ὑποθέσεις τὰς πρώτας, καὶ εἰ πιστὰ ὑμῖν εἰσιν, ὅμως ἐπισκεπτέα σαφέστερον· καὶ ἐὰν

needless, as I think, to insert *ἄν*: this use of the optative both in direct and indirect questions is established by a number of indubitable instances, and probably ought to be retained in some other cases where the editors introduce *ἄν*. It seems rash to assume in the face of much strong ms. evidence that the old use of the optative had entirely died out in Attic Greek. With the present example Wohlrab compares *Euthydemus* 296 E οὐκ ἔχω ὑμῖν πῶς ἀμφισβητοῖην. A case in direct interrogation is *Gorgias* 492 B τί τῆ ἀληθείᾳ ἀσχυοῖ καὶ κάκιον εἶη; In both these passages some would insert *ἄν*; but it is not so easy to dispose of cases like *Aeschylus Choephoroë* 172 and several other passages in tragedy. In *Soph. Oed. Col.* 170 the Laurentian has *ποῖ τις φροντίδος ἔλθοι*; The force is very much the same as that of the 'deliberative' subjunctive; but there is a distinction closely analogous to that drawn by Prof. Goodwin between *ἐὰν γένηται* and *εἰ γένοιτο*: the optative expresses a conception less vivid and more vague. The following words *ἢ τὸν νῦν παρόντα* are very needlessly bracketed by Hirschig.

3. τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην ἀσθένειαν ἀτιμάζων] 'through distrust of human fallibility'. Cf. 85 D. The contrast between the clear-headed logician Kebes and the somewhat vague-minded Simmias is well brought out here. Kebes, sceptical as he is, has found an argument that in his judgment is free from flaw; he therefore freely accepts its consequences: Simmias still hesitates, not because he can find any defect in the reasoning, but rather because

the 'child in him' cannot be soothed by reason. A good piece of dialectic does not come home to him as to his friend. Sokrates, it may be noticed, while commending his caution, points out what it ought to lead to: not to sighing over human weakness, but to a vigorous examination of the *ὑποθέσεις*.

5. οὐ μόνον γε] 'yes, Simmias, and not only so, but, besides what you have just so rightly suggested, you should also, however secure they may seem to you, nevertheless reexamine our first premises'. COPE. There seems no sufficient reason for ejecting *ταῦτά τε εὖ λέγεις* as Hirschig would do: nor can Ast's *ταῦτά γε εἰ λέγεις* be commended.

7. ὅμως ἐπισκεπτέα σαφέστερον] I have followed Schanz in accepting this correction: the vulgate *ἐπισκεπτέαι* involves an anacoluthon so harsh as to amount to bad writing.

καὶ ἐὰν αὐτὰς] 'and if you succeed in analysing them satisfactorily, you will follow up the reasoning, so far as it is possible for man to follow; and only when the result becomes perfectly plain will you cease to prosecute your search'. *κἂν τοῦτ' αὐτὸ σαφές γένηται*, i. e. if the security of the *ὑποθέσεις* and the validity of the deductions from them become plain, then only you will be justified in relaxing your efforts.

107 B—114 C, cc. lvii—lxii. Now follows the myth setting forth the conformation of the earth and the fate of souls in the underworld. Seeing that the soul is immortal, earnest indeed should be the care we bestow upon her training; for

αὐτὰς ἱκανῶς διέλητε, ὡς ἐγὼμαι, ἀκολουθήσετε τῷ λόγῳ, καθ' ἕσον δυνατὸν μάλιστα ἀνθρώπῳ ἐπακολουθήσαι· κὰν τοῦτο αὐτὸ σαφὲς γένηται, οὐδὲν ζητήσετε περαιτέρω. Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις. ✕

LVII. Ἀλλὰ τὸδε γ' ἔφη, ὦ ἄνδρες, δίκαιον διανοηθῆναι ὅτι, C  
5 εἴπερ ἡ ψυχὴ ἀθάνατος, ἐπιμελείας δὴ δεῖται οὐχ ὑπὲρ τοῦ χρόνου τούτου μόνου, ἐν ᾧ καλοῦμεν τὸ ζῆν, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ τοῦ παντός, καὶ ὁ κίνδυνος νῦν δὴ καὶ δόξειεν ἂν δεινὸς εἶναι, εἴ τις αὐτῆς ἀμελήσει. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἦν ὁ θάνατος τοῦ παντός ἀπαλλαγῆ, ἔρμαιον ἂν ἦν τοῖς

upon that will depend her happiness and misery for all time. The ways of Hades are many and intricate; but the soul that has studied death will find herself at home there, and guided by her attendant genius to the place of judgment will pass her appointed sojourn in the companionship of gods: but the impure will be without friend or companion. To realise what regions the soul enters after death, we must understand the true form of the earth. It is a sphere in equilibrium at the centre of the heavens: the part we inhabit is but a small cavity on its surface, filled with the coarser sediment of air which gathers in it. We have no idea that we dwell in such a hollow, but fancy we are on the surface and that our atmosphere is the true air: but could we mount to the surface, we should see how murky and impure is our dwelling compared with that bright region. We should see the earth's surface splendid with zones of the most brilliant colours, of which ours are a faint image, glowing with flowers and trees and precious stones, all bathed in purest aether, untouched by decay: and the dwellers thereon are free from age and sickness, and the gods come to dwell among them. There are many other hollows on the earth besides ours, greater and less, having subterranean communication; but the greatest of all is called Tartaros, which is pierced right through the earth from side to side. From this all rivers issue forth and into it they all return: and a great pulse sways up and down Tartaros, carrying with it all the air and liquid that are

therein, and it replenishes now the rivers that are on one side the earth, now those on the other. All the rivers fall again into Tartaros at a lower point than they flowed out; but not lower than the centre, from which in all directions it is an ascent. Of these rivers the four greatest are Okeanos, Acheron, Pyriphlegethon, and Styx, which flow in many tortuous windings, some beneath the earth and some on its surface. So when the souls of the departed come to judgment, they whose lives have been moderately good proceed to Acheron and dwell there till they are cleansed of any guilt that clings to them; but they whose wickedness is past cure are hurled into Tartaros, whence they come forth no more. All whose guilt is heinous but not yet beyond remedy dwell in Tartaros for a year, and then are cast forth by one of the rivers, on whose banks they meet those they have wronged. Then if they can win the pardon of these, they come forth and are purified; but if not, they return to Tartaros for another period; and this they continue to do until they have gained their pardon. But all that have lived in perfect holiness ascend to the earth's true surface, where they dwell henceforth in bliss and purity.

6. ἐν ᾧ καλοῦμεν τὸ ζῆν] a short expression for ἐν ᾧ ἔστιν ὁ καλοῦμεν τὸ ζῆν. The editors quote several similar phrases: Wyttenbach says he could fill a book with them.

7. εἴ τις αὐτῆς ἀμελήσει] 'if we mean to neglect her'.

κακοῖς ἀποθανοῦσι τοῦ τε σώματος ἄμ' ἀπηλλάχθαι καὶ τῆς αὐτῶν  
 κακίας μετὰ τῆς ψυχῆς· νῦν δ' ἐπειδὴ ἀθάνατος φαίνεται οὐσα,  
 οὐδεμία ἂν εἴη αὐτῇ ἄλλη ἀποφυγὴ κακῶν οὐδὲ σωτηρία πλὴν τοῦ  
 ὡς βελτίστην τε καὶ φρονιμωτάτην γενέσθαι. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο  
 ἔχουσα εἰς Ἄιδου ἢ ψυχὴ ἔρχεται πλὴν τῆς παιδείας τε καὶ τροφῆς, 5  
 ἃ δὴ καὶ μέγιστα λέγεται ὠφελεῖν ἢ βλάπτειν τὸν τελευτήσαντα  
 εὐθύς ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς ἐκείσε πορείας. λέγεται δὲ οὕτως, ὡς ἄρα τελευ-  
 τήσαντα ἕκαστον ὁ ἐκάστου δαίμων, ὅσπερ ζῶντα εἰλήχει, οἷτος  
 ἄγειν ἐπιχειρεῖ εἰς δὴ τινα τόπον, οἱ δὲ τοὺς συλλεγέντας δ α-  
 δικασαμένους εἰς Ἄιδου πορεύεσθαι μετὰ ἡγεμόνος ἐκείνου ᾧ δὴ 10  
 προστέτακται τοὺς ἐνθένδε ἐκείσε πορεύσαι· τυχόντας δὲ ἐκεῖ ὧν  
 δεῖ τυχεῖν καὶ μείναντας ὃν χρὴ χρόνον ἄλλος δεῦρο πάλιν ἡγεμῶν  
 κομίζει ἐν πολλαῖς χρόνου καὶ μακραῖς περιόδους. ἔστι δὲ ἄρα ἢ

1. ἀπηλλάχθαι καὶ τῆς αὐτῶν κα-  
 κίας] A vicious soul would be well rid of  
 her vice even at the cost of her existence.  
 But in *Laws* 958 A death is regarded as a  
 remedy for those whom milder measures  
 will not serve: οἱσι δὲ ὄντως ἐπικεκλωσμέ-  
 ναι [αἱ δόξαι], θάνατον ἴαμα ταῖς οὕτω δια-  
 τεθείσασιν ψυχαῖς διανέμοντες. And in  
 854 C suicide is recommended to the in-  
 curable sinner as his only relief: καὶ ἐὰν  
 μὲν σοι δρῶντι ταῦτα λωφά τι τὸ νόσημα—  
 εἰ δὲ μή, καλλίω θάνατον σκεψάμενος ἀπαλ-  
 λάπτου τοῦ βίου. We may perhaps regard  
 death as offering a chance of turning over  
 a new leaf.

4. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο ἔχουσα.] Cf. *Gor-  
 gias* 523 E καὶ τὸν κριτὴν δεῖ γινῶν εἶναι  
 αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ αὐτὴν τὴν ψυχὴν θεωροῦντα  
 ἐξαίφνης ἀποθανόντος ἐκάστου, ἐρημον πάν-  
 των τῶν συγγενῶν καὶ καταλιπόντα ἐπὶ γῆς  
 πάντα ἐκείνον τὸν κόσμον, ἵνα δικαία ἢ κρι-  
 σις ἦ.

8. ὁ ἐκάστου δαίμων] Olympiodo-  
 ros denies that each soul has a distinct  
 δαίμων for sundry reasons, one of which is  
 ὅτι τοῦ βίου λυθέντος ἀργήσει ὁ λαχὼν ἐκε-  
 νῆς διοικεῖν τὸν βίον. But there can be no  
 doubt that he is wrong: cf. *Republic* 620  
 D ἐκείνην δ' ἐκάστῳ ὃν εἴλετο δαίμονα, τοῦ-  
 τον φύλακα ξυμπέμπειν τοῦ βίου καὶ ἀπο-  
 πληρωτὴν τῶν ἀρεθέντων. We have a dif-  
 ferent sort of daemonic supervision in

*Politicus* 274 B τῆς τοῦ κεκτημένου καὶ  
 νέμοντος ἡμῶς δαίμονος ἀπερημωθέντες ἐπι-  
 μελείας. In *Timaeus* 90 A, the rational  
 part of the soul is said to be a man's δαί-  
 μων. In *Laws* 730 A we find a ξένιος  
 ἐκάστων δαίμων καὶ θεός, who protects  
 strangers.

ὅσπερ ζῶντα εἰλήχει] In *Republic*  
 617 E, on the other hand, we read οὐχ  
 ἡμᾶς δαίμων λήξεται, ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς δαίμονα  
 αἰρήσεσθε. But, as Olympiodoros ex-  
 plains, a δαίμων was assigned to the life  
 chosen by the soul, so that either phrase  
 might be used; though where Plato is so  
 strongly insisting upon the perfect free-  
 dom of choice, he naturally selects δαίμονα  
 αἰρεῖσθαι. No doubt the other was a  
 popular phrase, cf. Theokr. IV 40 αἰαὶ  
 τῷ σκληρῷ μάλα δαίμονος, ὅς με λελόγχει:  
 and Plato there takes the opportunity of  
 protesting against it.

10. μετὰ ἡγεμόνος] The two ἡγεμόνες  
 are evidently distinct from the δαίμων,  
 whose duties seem to cease when he has  
 conveyed the soul to the place of judg-  
 ment. In οἱ δεῖ above, the form of the  
 adverb is determined by τοὺς συλλεγέντας,  
 though in sense it belongs quite as much  
 to διαδικασαμένους.

13. ἐν πολλαῖς χρόνου καὶ μακραῖς  
 περιόδους] Plato does not here specify  
 the number and length of these periods:



πορεία οὐχ ὡς ὁ Αἰσχύλου Τηλέφος λέγει· ἐκείνος μὲν γὰρ ἀπλὴν 108  
οἶμόν φησιν εἰς "Αἰδου φέρειν, ἢ δ' οὔτε ἀπλῆ οὔτε μία φαίνεται  
μοι εἶναι. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν ἡγεμόνων ἔδει· οὐ γὰρ πού τις ἂν διαμάρτοι  
οὐδαμόσε μιᾷ ὁδοῦ οὔσης. νῦν δὲ ἔοικε σχίσεις τε καὶ περιόδους  
5 πολλὰς ἔχειν· ἀπὸ τῶν ὁσίων τε καὶ νομίμων τῶν ἐνθάδε τεκμαι-  
ρόμενος λέγω. ἢ μὲν κοσμίᾳ τε καὶ φρόνιμος ψυχῇ ἔπεται τε καὶ  
οὐκ ἀγνοεῖ τὰ παρόντα· ἢ δ' ἐπιθυμητικῶς τοῦ σώματος ἔχουσα,  
ὑπερ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν εἶπον, περὶ ἐκεῖνο πολὺν χρόνον ἐπτοημένη B  
καὶ περὶ τὸν ὁρατὸν τόπον, πολλὰ ἀντιτείνασα καὶ πολλὰ παθοῦσα,  
10 βία καὶ μόγις ὑπὸ τοῦ προστεταγμένου δαίμονος οἴχεται ἀγομένη.  
ἀφικομένην δὲ ὅτιπερ αἱ ἄλλαι, τὴν μὲν ἀκάθαρτον καὶ τι πεποιθη-  
κυῖαν τοιοῦτον, ἢ φόνων ἀδίκων ἡμένην ἢ ἄλλ' ἅττα τοιαῦτα  
εἰργασμένην, ἃ τούτων ἀδελφὰ τε καὶ ἀδελφῶν ψυχῶν ἔργα τυγ-  
χάνει ὄντα, ταύτην μὲν ἅπας φεύγει τε καὶ ὑπεκτρέπεται καὶ οὔτε  
15 ξυνέμπορος οὔτε ἡγεμὼν ἐθέλει γίγνεσθαι, αὐτὴ δὲ πλανᾶται ἐν  
πάσῃ ἐχομένη ἀπορία, ἕως ἂν δὴ τινες χρόνοι γέωνται, ὧν ἐλθόν- C  
των ὑπ' ἀνάγκης φέρεται εἰς τὴν αὐτῇ πρέπουσαν οἴκησιν· ἢ δὲ

but in *Phaedrus* 248 E foll. we learn that each soul must fulfil ten millennial periods, except that of the philosopher, who is let off with three. Cf. Pindar *Olymp.* II 68 ὅσοι δ' ἐτόλμασαν ἔστρις | ἐκατέρωθι μέν- ναντες ἀπὸ πάμπαν ἀδίκων ἔχειν | ψυχάν, ἔτειλαν Διὸς ὁδὸν παρὰ Κρόνου τύρσιν. In *Republic* 615 A we have also a χιλιέτης πορεία, and the reason for this number is assigned. Every man must be requited tenfold for his good and evil deeds; and calculating human life on the liberal estimate of 100 years, Plato devotes 1000 to his reward and punishment. The Egyptians made the period 3000 years (Herod. II 123); Empedokles goes as far as 30000 for a murderer, εὐτέ τις ἀμπλακίησι φόνῳ φίλα γυῖα μίγην | τρις μιν μυρίας ὥρας ἀπὸ μακάρων ἀλάησθαι | γενόμενον παντοῖα διὰ χρέω εἶδεα θνητῶν.

1. ἀπλὴν οἶμον] This expression seems to have been proverbial. The verse of Aeschylus has not been preserved.

5. ἀπὸ τῶν ὁσίων τε καὶ νομίμων] 'judging by the funeral offerings and ordinances on earth'. ὅσια καὶ νόμιμα

are the offerings made in honour of the departed. As these were made on the shrines of Hekate at the *τρίοδοι*, Plato seems to infer by analogy that the road to Hades is also forked. Cf. *Gorgias* 524 A οὔτοι οὖν, ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσωσι, δικάσουσιν ἐν τῷ λειμῶνι, ἐν τῇ τριόδῳ ἐξ ἧς φέρετον τῷ ὁδῷ, ἢ μὲν εἰς μακάρων νήσους, ἢ δ' εἰς τάρταρον. The old reading *θυσιαῶν* is now universally discarded.

7. οὐκ ἀγνοεῖ τὰ παρόντα] Wyttensbach well observes 'agnoscit eam sibi iam antea meditatione mortis et philosophia cognitam'.

8. ὅπερ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν εἶπον] 81 C ἔλκεται πάλιν εἰς τὸν ὁρατὸν τόπον, φόβῳ τοῦ αἰδοῦς καὶ "Αἰδου, ὡς περ λέγεται, περὶ τὰ μνήματά τε καὶ τοὺς τάφους κυλινομένη. Plutarch *de genio Socratis* § 22 in a curious myth expands the notion of the present passage: his imagery is however chiefly borrowed from the *Phaedrus*.

11. ὅτιπερ αἱ ἄλλαι] so the mss. Schanz adopts Cobet's *οἴπερ*.

15. αὐτὴ δὲ πλανᾶται] 'she strays by herself'.

καθαρῶς τε καὶ μετρίως τὸν βίον διεξεληθοῦσα, καὶ ξυνεμπόρων καὶ ἡγεμόνων θεῶν τυχοῦσα, ᾤκησεν τὸν αὐτῇ ἐκάστη τόπον προσήκοντα. εἰσὶν δὲ πολλοὶ καὶ θαυμαστοὶ τῆς γῆς τόποι, καὶ αὐτῇ οὔτε οἷα οὔτε ὄση δοξάζεται ὑπὸ τῶν περὶ γῆς εἰωθότων λέγειν, ὡς ἐγὼ ὑπό τινος πέπεισμαι.

D LVIII. Καὶ ὁ Σιμμίας, Πῶς ταῦτα, ἔφη, λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες; περὶ γὰρ τοι γῆς καὶ αὐτὸς πολλὰ δὴ ἀκήκοα, οὐ μέντοι ταῦτα ἅ σε πείθει ἠδέως οὐδ' ἂν ἀκούσαιμι. Ἄλλα μέντοι, ὦ Σιμμία, οὐχὶ Γλαύκου τέχνη γέ μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι διηγησασθαι ἅ γ' ἐστίν' ὡς μέντοι ἀληθῆ, χαλεπώτερόν μοι φαίνεται ἢ κατὰ τὴν Γλαύκου 10 τέχνην, καὶ ἅμα μὲν ἐγὼ ἴσως οὐδ' ἂν οἶός τε εἶην, ἅμα δέ, εἰ καὶ ἠπιστάμην, ὁ βίος μοι δοκεῖ ὁ ἐμός, ὦ Σιμμία, τῷ μήκει τοῦ λόγου E οὐκ ἔξαρκεῖ. τὴν μέντοι ἰδέαν τῆς γῆς, οἷαν πέπεισμαι εἶναι, καὶ τοὺς τόπους αὐτῆς οὐδέν με κωλύει λέγειν. Ἄλλ' ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας καὶ ταῦτα ἄρκεῖ. Πέπεισμαι τοίνυν, ἢ δ' ἔς, ἐγὼ, ὡς πρῶτον μὲν, 15 εἰ ἐστὶν ἐν μέσῳ τῷ οὐρανῷ περιφερῆς οὖσα, μηδὲν αὐτῇ δεῖν μήτε 109 ἀέρος πρὸς τὸ μὴ πεσεῖν μήτε ἄλλης ἀνάγκης μηδεμιᾶς τοιαύτης. ἀλλὰ ἱκανὴν εἶναι αὐτὴν ἴσχειν τὴν ὁμοιότητα τοῦ οὐρανοῦ αὐτοῦ

4. οὔτε ὄση δοξάζεται] i.e. not so small as is supposed: cf. 83 B οὐδὲν τοσοῦτον κακὸν ἔπαθεν, and *Sophist* 217 E.

5. ὑπό τινος πέπεισμαι] Some think that Anaximandros is meant, because he first made a map of the world. But there is no evidence that his description of it had anything in common with Plato's: and it seems very doubtful whether a reference to any definite person is intended. Plato is fond of giving an air of antiquity to his fables by referring them to some supposititious author; e.g. the *Αιγύπτιος λόγος* in *Phaedrus* 274 C, and the legendary war between Athens and Atlantis, *Timaeus* 24. Wagner strangely takes τινὸς to be neuter.

8. οὐχὶ Γλαύκου τέχνη] The origin of this proverb is obscure. Wohlrab supposes that the sea-god Glaukos is meant, the patron of sailors. None of the ancient authorities however take this view, but oscillate between various artificers bearing this name; the most distinguished of whom seems to have been

Glaukos of Chios, mentioned by Herodotus (I 25), who invented the art of soldering metal. The diverse theories will be found in Heindorf's note.

12. μοι δοκεῖ] see on 77 A.

18. τὴν ὁμοιότητα τοῦ οὐρανοῦ] Plato's assumption is that the earth has no natural tendency to move in any one direction; and the substance of the universe, being homogeneous, offers it no inducement to move this way or that: were the surrounding mass of various density in different parts, the earth might move in the direction where the least resistance was offered; as it is, it remains poised in the centre of a uniform mass. It must be observed that Plato is putting this forward, not to show that the earth must necessarily abide in the centre, but that there is no reason why it should not. A similar theory is attributed to Anaximandros by Aristotle *de caelo* II xiii 295<sup>b</sup> II εἰσὶ δὲ τινες οἱ διὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητά φασιν αὐτὴν μένειν, ὥσπερ τῶν ἀρχαίων ὁ Ἄναξιμανδρος· μᾶλλον μὲν γὰρ οὐθὲν ἄνω ἢ κάτω

εαυτῶ πάντη καὶ τῆς γῆς αὐτῆς τὴν ἰσορροπίαν· ἰσορροπον γὰρ  
 πρᾶγμα ὁμοίου τινὸς ἐν μέσῳ τεθὲν οὐχ ἔξει μᾶλλον οὐδ' ἦττον  
 οὐδαμῶσε κλιθῆναι, ὁμοίως δ' ἔχον ἀκλινῆς μενεῖ. πρῶτον μὲν, ἢ  
 δ' ὕς, τοῦτο πέπεισμαι. Καὶ ὀρθῶς γε, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας. Ἔτι τοῖνυν,  
 5 ἔφη, πάμμεγά τι εἶναι αὐτό, καὶ ἡμᾶς οἰκεῖν τοὺς μέχρι Ἑρακλείων  
 στηλῶν ἀπὸ Φάσιδος ἐν σμικρῷ τινι μορίῳ, ὥσπερ περὶ τέλμα B  
 μύρμηκας ἢ βατράχους, περὶ τὴν θάλατταν οἰκοῦντας, καὶ ἄλλους  
 ἄλλοθι πολλοὺς ἐν πολλοῖς τοιούτοις τόποις οἰκεῖν. εἶναι γὰρ  
 πανταχῇ περὶ τὴν γῆν πολλὰ κοῖλα καὶ παντοδαπὰ καὶ τὰς ιδέας  
 10 καὶ τὰ μεγέθη, εἰς ἃ ξυνερρηκέναι τό τε ὕδωρ καὶ τὴν ὀμίχλην καὶ  
 τὸν ἀέρα· αὐτὴν δὲ τὴν γῆν καθαρὰν ἐν καθαρῷ κείσθαι τῷ οὐρανῷ,  
 ἐν ᾧπερ ἐστὶ τὰ ἄστρα, ὃν δὴ αἰθέρα ὀνομάζειν τοὺς πολλοὺς τῶν C  
 περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα εἰωθότων λέγειν· οὐ δὴ ὑποστάθμην ταῦτα εἶναι  
 καὶ ξυρρεῖν αἰεὶ εἰς τὰ κοῖλα τῆς γῆς. ἡμᾶς οὖν οἰκοῦντας ἐν τοῖς  
 15 κοίλοις αὐτῆς λεληθέναι καὶ οἶσθαι ἄνω ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς οἰκεῖν, ὥσπερ  
 ἂν εἴ τις ἐν μέσῳ τῷ πυθμένι τοῦ πελάγους οἰκῶν οἰοῖτο τε ἐπὶ τῆς  
 θαλάττης οἰκεῖν καὶ διὰ τοῦ ὕδατος ὄρων τὸν ἥλιον καὶ τὰ ἄλλα  
 ἄστρα τὴν θάλατταν ἡγοῖτο οὐρανὸν εἶναι, διὰ δὲ βραδυτητά τε καὶ  
 ἀσθένειαν μηδεπώποτε ἐπὶ τὰ ἄκρα τῆς θαλάττης ἀφιγμένους μηδὲ D  
 20 ἑωρακῶς εἶη, ἐκδὺς καὶ ἀνακύνσας ἐκ τῆς θαλάττης εἰς τὸν ἐνθάδε  
 τόπον, ὅσῳ καθαρῶτερος καὶ καλλίων τυγχάνει ὢν τοῦ παρὰ σφίσι,  
 μηδὲ ἄλλου ἀκηκῶς εἶη τοῦ ἑωρακότος. ταυτὸν δὴ τοῦτο καὶ ἡμᾶς  
 πεπονθέναι· οἰκοῦντας γὰρ ἔν τινι κοίλῳ τῆς γῆς οἶσθαι ἐπάνω  
 αὐτῆς οἰκεῖν, καὶ τὸν ἀέρα οὐρανὸν καλεῖν, ὡς διὰ τούτου οὐρανὸν

ἢ εἰς τὰ πλάγια φέρεσθαι προσήκει τὸ ἐπὶ  
 τοῦ μέσῳ ἰδρυμένον καὶ ὁμοίως πρὸς τὰ  
 ἔσχατα ἔχων, ἅμα δ' ἀδύνατον εἰς τάναντία  
 ποιῆσθαι τὴν κίνησιν· ὥστ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης  
 μένειν. Compare *Timaeus* 62 E εἰ γάρ  
 τι καὶ στερεὸν εἶη κατὰ μέσον τοῦ παντός  
 ἰσοπαλές, εἰς οὐδὲν ἂν ποτε τῶν ἐσχάτων  
 ἐνεχθείη διὰ τὴν πάντη ὁμοιότητα αὐτῶν:  
 the theory of the *Timaeus* is however  
 different.

6. ἐν σμικρῷ τινι μορίῳ] We are  
 conceived as inhabiting a depression or  
 cavity scooped out of the earth's surface,  
 small and shallow when compared with  
 the extent and mass of the earth; but  
 still wide and deep enough to prevent us  
 from ever scaling its sides. Many other  
 such hollows exist on the earth, but we

are of course cut off from all communica-  
 tion with their inhabitants, as well as  
 with the dwellers on the true surface.  
 Evidently Plato's estimate of the earth's  
 dimensions was immense.

11. αὐτὴν δὲ τὴν γῆν] i.e. the real  
 surface of the earth, as distinguished  
 from the hollows.

13. οὐ δὴ ὑποστάθμην] i.e. our at-  
 mosphere is the sediment of aether, which  
 collects in the depressions on the earth's  
 surface. ταῦτα = ὕδωρ καὶ ὀμίχλην καὶ ἀέρα.

24. τὸν ἀέρα οὐρανὸν καλεῖν] We  
 are in the same plight as the supposed  
 dwellers at the bottom of the sea; who,  
 looking up through the water at the stars,  
 would fancy that the sea above them was  
 the heaven: so we, looking up through



ὄντος τὰ ἄστρον χωροῦντα· τὸ δὲ [εἶναι ταυτόν.] ὑπ' ἀσθενείας καὶ  
 Ε βραδυτήτος οὐχ οἴους τε εἶναι ἡμᾶς διεξελεῖν ἐπ' ἔσχατον τὸν  
 ἀέρα· ἐπεὶ, εἴ τις αὐτοῦ ἐπ' ἄκρα ἔλθοι ἢ πτηνὸς γενόμενος ἀνά-  
 πτοιτο, κατιδεῖν ἀνακίψαντα, ὥσπερ ἐνθάδε οἱ ἐκ τῆς θαλάττης  
 ἰχθύες ἀνακίπτοντες ὀρώσι τὰ ἐνθάδε, οὕτως ἂν τινα καὶ τὰ ἐκεῖ 5  
 κατιδεῖν, καὶ εἰ ἢ φύσις ἰκανὴ εἴη ἀνέχεσθαι θεωροῦσα, γινῶναι ἂν  
 110 ὅτι ἐκεῖνός ἐστιν ὁ ἀληθῶς οὐρανὸς καὶ τὸ ἀληθῶς φῶς καὶ ἡ ὡς  
 ἀληθῶς γῆ. ἥδε μὲν γὰρ ἡ γῆ καὶ οἱ λίθοι καὶ ἅπασ ὁ τόπος ὁ  
 ἐνθάδε διεφθαρμένα ἐστὶν καὶ καταβεβρωμένα, ὥσπερ τὰ ἐν τῇ  
 θαλάττῃ ὑπὸ τῆς ἄλμης, καὶ οὔτε φύεται οὐδὲν ἄξιον λόγου ἐν τῇ 10  
 θαλάττῃ, οὔτε τέλειον, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, οὐδὲν ἐστι, σήραγγες δὲ καὶ  
 ἄμμος καὶ πηλὸς ἀμήχανος καὶ βόρβοροι εἰσιν, ὅπου ἂν καὶ γῆ  
 ᾖ, καὶ πρὸς τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν κάλλη κρίνεσθαι οὐδ' ὅπωςτιοῦν ἄξια·  
 ἐκεῖνα δὲ αὖ τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν πολὺ ἂν ἔτι πλεον φανεῖν διαφέρειν.  
 Β εἰ γὰρ δεῖ καὶ μῦθον λέγειν, ἄξιον ἀκούσαι, ὃ Σιμμία, οἷα τυγχάνει 15  
 τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς ὑπὸ τῷ οὐρανῷ ὄντα. Ἄλλὰ μὴν, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, ὃ  
 Σώκρατες, ἡμεῖς γε τούτου τοῦ μύθου ἠδέως ἂν ἀκούσαιμεν. ||  
 > LIX. Λέγεται τοίνυν, ἔφη, ὃ ἑταῖρε, πρῶτον μὲν εἶναι τοιαύτη  
 ἡ γῆ αὐτῇ ἰδεῖν, εἴ τις ἄνωθεν θεῶτο, ὥσπερ αἱ δωδεκάσκυτοι

the air, fancy it is that wherein the stars move, and that the air is heaven.

1. τὸ δὲ [εἶναι ταυτόν] No satisfactory defence of the words *εἶναι ταυτόν* has been made: nor is Heindorf's τὸ δ' εἶναι τοιοῦτον attractive. Hermann, after Baier, reads τὸ δὲ δεινότατον: but there is no special aptness in this. Hirschig suggests ταῖτιον, but I think Schanz, following Rückert, is right in bracketing *εἶναι ταυτόν* and retaining τὸ δέ, which is exactly the connecting link we want: 'but the truth is that'. τὸ δὲ occurs in this sense *Theaetetus* 157 A, *Sophist* 244 A, *Laus* 642 A, 967 A, *Meno* 97 C, &c. *εἶναι ταυτόν* might be the insertion of a copyist who did not understand the idiom.

3. εἴ τις αὐτοῦ] i.e. if we could either climb the sides of the hollow in which we dwell, or fly up through the air to its surface and peep up, as fishes do out of the sea.

4. κατιδεῖν ἀνακίψαντα] Most editors have ἂν ἀνακίψαντα, but ἂν is want-

ing in the mss. It could, it is true, easily have fallen out in that position; but since *κατιδεῖν* is presently repeated with ἂν, it seems to me hardly necessary to insert the particle here.

12. ὅπου ἂν καὶ γῆ ᾖ] Schanz retains ἡ γῆ with the best mss. But the meaning is, whenever any earth is present in the sea, the result is βόρβοροι.

15. εἰ γὰρ δεῖ καὶ μῦθον λέγειν] After this some mss. and editions have the pointless addition *καλόν*: the word however is absent in the Bodleian and other mss. and is certainly to be omitted.

19. ὥσπερ αἱ δωδεκάσκυτοι σφαῖραι] The number twelve refers to the twelve signs of the zodiac, as is clear from *Timaeus* 55 C ἔτι δὲ οὐσης ξυστάσεως μῆς πέμπτης, ἐπὶ τὸ πᾶν ὁ θεὸς αὐτῇ κατεχρήσατο ἐκεῖνο διασχωρῶν: 'and whereas there remained yet a fifth figure, God used it as a model for the universe in describing its signs'. The πέμπτη ξύστασις was the dodecahedron: cf. *Timaeus*

σφαῖραι, ποικίλη, χρώμασιν διειλημμένη, ὧν καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε εἶναι  
 χρώματα ὡσπερ δείγματα, οἷς δὴ οἱ γραφεῖς καταχρῶνται· ἐκεῖ C  
 δὲ πᾶσαν τὴν γῆν ἐκ τοιούτων εἶναι, καὶ πολὺ ἔτι ἐκ λαμπροτέρων  
 καὶ καθαρωτέρων ἢ τούτων· τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἀλουργῆ εἶναι καὶ θαν-  
 5 μαστὴν τὸ κάλλος, τὴν δὲ χρυσοειδῆ, τὴν δὲ ὕση λευκὴ γύψου  
 ἢ χιόνος λευκοτέραν, καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων χρωμάτων συγκειμένην  
 ὡσαύτως, καὶ ἔτι πλείονων καὶ καλλιόνων ἢ ὅσα ἡμεῖς ἐωράκαμεν.  
 καὶ γὰρ αὐτὰ ταῦτα τὰ κοῖλα αὐτῆς ὕδατός τε καὶ ἀέρος ἐκπλεα  
 ὄντα, χρώματός τι εἶδος παρέχεσθαι στίλβοντα ἐν τῇ τῶν ἄλλων D  
 10 χρωμάτων ποικιλίᾳ, ὥστε ἔν τι αὐτῆς εἶδος συνεχὲς ποικίλον  
 φαντάζεσθαι. ἐν δὲ ταύτῃ οὔσῃ τοιαύτῃ ἀνὰ λόγον τὰ φυόμενα  
 φύεσθαι, δένδρα τε καὶ ἄνθη καὶ τοὺς καρπούς· καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ ὄρη  
 ὡσαύτως καὶ τοὺς λίθους ἔχειν ἀνὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον τὴν τε  
 λειότητα καὶ τὴν διαφάνειαν καὶ τὰ χρώματα καλλίω· ὧν καὶ τὰ  
 15 ἐνθάδε λιθίδια εἶναι ταῦτα τὰ ἀγαπώμενα μόρια, σάρδιά τε καὶ  
 ἰόσπιδας καὶ σμαράγδους καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα· ἐκεῖ δὲ οὐδὲν ὅ E  
 τι οὐ τοιοῦτον εἶναι καὶ ἔτι τούτων καλλίω. τὸ δ' αἴτιον τούτου  
 εἶναι, ὅτι ἐκείνοι οἱ λίθοι εἰσὶ καθαροὶ καὶ οὐ κατεδηδεσμένοι οὐδὲ  
 διεφθαρμένοι ὡσπερ οἱ ἐνθάδε ὑπὸ σηπεδόνος καὶ ἄλμης [ὑπὸ] τῶν

*Locrus* 98 E τὸ δὲ δωδεκάεδρον εἰκόνα τοῦ  
 παντὸς ἐστάσατο, ἔγγιστα σφαίρας ἔόν.  
 The last words, *ἔγγιστα σφαίρας ἔόν*, are  
 a foolish addition by the compiler of the  
*Timaeus Locrus*: for the dodecahedron  
 has nothing to do with the shape of the  
 universe, which is a perfect sphere mo-  
 delled after the image of the αὐτὸ ζῶον:  
 it merely affords the type for the duo-  
 denary division of the zodiac. In the  
 present passage the *δωδεκάσκυτος σφαῖρα*,  
 a ball covered with patches of leather  
 variously coloured, is used to represent  
 not only the twelve signs, but also the  
 variegated surface of the earth. A great  
 store of erudition on the virtues of the  
 number twelve is to be found in Wytt-  
 enbach's note.

8. καὶ γὰρ αὐτὰ ταῦτα] 'even these  
 very hollows, being full of water and of  
 air, display a kind of colour that gleams  
 amid the dazzling diversity of the rest;  
 so that the earth's form appears as one  
 unbroken surface of varied hues'. To an

observer viewing the earth from above  
 even such hollows as that wherein we  
 dwell would appear as patches of colour,  
 iridescent we may suppose; so that the  
 many-coloured surface would not be  
 marred by any blots of obscurity. *συνεχὲς*  
 is regarded by Heindorf and others as  
 adverbial: perhaps however we might  
 treat *εἶδος συνεχὲς* as practically one word,  
 which is qualified by *ποικίλον*.

15. ταῦτα τὰ ἀγαπώμενα] 'the stones  
 that here are so much prized'. For this  
 sense of *ἀγαπᾶν* compare *Politicus* 286 D  
*δεύτερον ἀλλ' οὐ πρῶτον ὁ λόγος ἀγαπᾶν*  
*παραγγέλλει*.

19. ὑπὸ σηπεδόνος καὶ ἄλμης] If  
 the common reading is genuine, we must  
 translate: 'marred by the corruption and  
 brine produced by the sediment that has  
 gathered here'. But the repetition of  
*ὑπὸ* before τῶν *δεῦρο ξυνερρηκῶτων* is  
 rather awkward. Schanz brackets *ὑπὸ*  
*σηπεδόνος καὶ ἄλμης* as a gloss upon *ὑπὸ*  
*τῶν δεῦρο ξυνερρηκῶτων*. Heindorf inserts

δεῦρο ξυνερρηκότων, ἃ καὶ λίθοις καὶ γῆ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις  
 τε καὶ φυτοῖς αἴσχη τε καὶ νόσους παρέχει. τὴν δὲ γῆν αὐτὴν  
 κεκοσμηῆσθαι τούτοις τε ἅπασι καὶ ἔτι χρυσῷ καὶ ἀργύρῳ καὶ  
 111 τοῖς ἄλλοις αὐ τοῖς τοιούτοις. ἐκφανῆ γὰρ αὐτὰ πεφυκέναι, ὄντα  
 πολλὰ πλήθει καὶ μεγάλα καὶ πολλαχού τῆς γῆς, ὥστε αὐτὴν ἰδεῖν 5  
 εἶναι θέαμα εὐδαιμόνων θεατῶν. ζῶα δ' ἐπ' αὐτῇ εἶναι ἄλλα τε  
 πολλὰ καὶ ἀνθρώπους, τοὺς μὲν ἐν μεσογαίᾳ οἰκοῦντας, τοὺς δὲ  
 περὶ τὸν ἀέρα, ὥσπερ ἡμεῖς περὶ τὴν θάλατταν, τοὺς δ' ἐν νήσοις  
 ἄς περιρρεῖν τὸν ἀέρα πρὸς τῇ ἡπείρῳ οὐσας καὶ ἐνὶ λόγῳ, ὃ παρ'  
 ἡμῖν τὸ ὕδωρ τε καὶ ἡ θάλαττά ἐστι πρὸς τὴν ἡμετέραν χρεῖαν, 10  
 B τοῦτο ἐκεῖ τὸν ἀέρα, ὃ δὲ ἡμῖν ἀήρ, ἐκείνοις τὸν αἰθέρα. τὰς δὲ  
 ὥρας αὐτῆς κρᾶσιν ἔχειν τοιαύτην, ὥστε ἐκείνους ἀνόσους εἶναι  
 καὶ χρόνον τε ζῆν πολὺ πλείω τῶν ἐνθάδε, καὶ ὄψει καὶ ἀκοῇ  
 καὶ φρονήσει καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις ἡμῶν ἀφεστάναι τῇ αὐτῇ  
 ἀποστάσει, ἧπερ ἀήρ τε ὕδατος ἀφέστηκεν καὶ αἰθήρ ἀέρος πρὸς 15  
 καθαρότητα. καὶ δὴ καὶ θεῶν ἄλση τε καὶ ἱερά αὐτοῖς εἶναι, ἐν

τε after the second ὑπό, and Stallbaum substitutes ἀπό. I have followed the suggestion of Wytttenbach in bracketing the second ὑπό only.

4. ἐκφανῆ γάρ] they are exposed to view on the surface, not, as with us, hidden in mines.

7. τοὺς δὲ περὶ τὸν ἀέρα] i.e. round the edges of the hollows, which are filled with air. Others again dwell on islands amid the aerial ocean, their bases plunged beneath the air but their surfaces encompassed with aether.

11. ἀήρ] The article is wanting in the mss. and supplied by Bekker. I have, on the suggestion of Schanz, written it as a crasis.

12. κρᾶσιν ἔχειν τοιαύτην] Compare the description of the climate of ancient Attica, *Timaeus* 24 c, where Athene chooses the site of her city τὴν εὐκρασίαν τῶν ὠρῶν ἐν αὐτῷ κατιδοῦσα, ὅτι φρονιμωτάτους ἀνδρας ὀσοι.

13. ὄψει καὶ ἀκοῇ καὶ φρονήσει] This reading has the all but unanimous support of the mss. Heindorf with one ms. reads ὀσφρήσει for φρονήσει, saying 'ingenii praestantiam non sane tam

obiter uno verbo memorasset Plato, nec post φρονήσεως mentionem addidisset haec καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις'. These arguments do not seem very cogent; and it is hardly credible that Plato should have omitted to ascribe superior φρόνησις to his dwellers in aether. Schanz justly compares *Republic* 367 c ὅλον ὄραν ἀκούειν φρονεῖν. In fact ὄψει καὶ ἀκοῇ stand for αἰσθήσει. 'In sight, hearing, and intelligence [i.e. both in bodily and mental power] they excel us in the same proportion as air excels water and aether air in purity'. Z. adopts ὀσφρήσει.

16. ἐν οἷς τῷ ὄντι οἰκητὰς θεοῦ εἶναι] i.e. in these temples is the very presence of the gods themselves; whereas we have but their statues. 'And they had groves and temples of the gods, wherein the gods in very truth were dwellers, and voices and prophecies and visions of them, and of this kind was their communion with them, face to face'. τοιαύτας = personal communion. αὐτοῖς πρὸς αὐτοῖς should be taken in the most emphatic sense, literally 'the people themselves with the gods themselves'.



οἷς τῷ ὄντι οἰκητὰς θεοὺς εἶναι, καὶ φήμας τε καὶ μαντείας καὶ αἰσθήσεις τῶν θεῶν καὶ τοιαύτας συνουσίας γίγνεσθαι αὐτοῖς πρὸς αὐτούς· καὶ τὸν γε ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην καὶ ἄστρα ὀράσθαι ὑπ' αὐτῶν οἷα τυγχάνει ὄντα, καὶ τὴν ἄλλην εὐδαιμονίαν τούτων ἀκό-  
5 λουθον εἶναι. *x*

LX. Καὶ ὅλην μὲν δὴ τὴν γῆν οὕτω πεφυκέαι καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν γῆν τόπους δ' ἐν αὐτῇ εἶναι κατὰ τὰ ἐγκοίλα αὐτῆς κύκλω περὶ ὅλην πολλούς, τοὺς μὲν βαθυτέρους καὶ ἀναπεπταμένους μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν ᾧ ἡμεῖς οἰκοῦμεν, τοὺς δὲ βαθυτέρους ὄντας τὸ χάσμα  
10 αὐτῶν ἔλαττον ἔχειν τοῦ παρ' ἡμῖν τόπου, ἔστι δ' οὗς καὶ βραχυτέρους τῷ βάθει τοῦ ἐνθάδε εἶναι καὶ πλατυτέρους· τούτους δὲ D πάντας ὑπὸ γῆν εἰς ἀλλήλους συντετρηῆσθαι τε πολλαχῆ καὶ κατὰ στενότερα καὶ εὐρύτερα, καὶ διεξόδους ἔχειν, ἧ πολὺ μὲν ὕδωρ ρεῖν ἐξ ἀλλήλων εἰς ἀλλήλους ὥσπερ εἰς κρατήρας, καὶ ἀενάων  
15 ποταμῶν ἀμήχανα μεγέθη ὑπὸ τὴν γῆν καὶ θερμῶν ὑδάτων καὶ ψυχρῶν, πολὺ δὲ πῦρ καὶ πυρὸς μεγάλους ποταμούς, πολλοὺς δὲ ὑγροῦ πηλοῦ καὶ καθαρωτέρου καὶ βορβορωδεστερου, ὥσπερ ἐν Σικελίᾳ οἱ πρὸ τοῦ ρύακος πηλοῦ ῥέοντες ποταμοὶ καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ ῥύαξ. ὦν δὴ καὶ ἐκάστους τοὺς τόπους πληροῦσθαι, ὡς ἂν ἐκά-  
20 στοῖς τύχῃ ἐκάστοτε ἢ περιρροῇ γιγνομένη. ταῦτα δὲ πάντα κινεῖν ἄνω καὶ κάτω ὥσπερ αἰώραν τινὰ ἐνοῦσαν ἐν τῇ γῇ· ἔστι δὲ ἄρα αὕτη ἢ αἰώρα διὰ φύσιν τοιάνδε τινά. ἐν τι τῶν χασμάτων

9. τὸ χάσμα αὐτῶν] There is a slight anacoluthon; the regular construction would be *ἐχοντας*. For αὐτῶν B D E give αὐτούς, which Wyttenbach illustrates by Xen. *Cyrop.* I iii 13 *πειράσομαι ἀγαθῶν ἰππέων κράτιστος ὦν ἰππέες συμμαχεῖν αὐτῷ*. There is no lack of instances of a redundant pronoun, but the effect here is harsh. Schanz reads τὸ αὐτῶν χάσμα, Heindorf τὸ χάσμα αὐτῶν, which latter I have adopted, as being nearly identical with the reading of C, τὸ χάσμα αὐτῶν.

19. ὦν δὴ καὶ ἐκάστους τοὺς τόπους] 'wherewith each of the places is filled in turn as the stream in its course round chances each time to reach it' COPE. The stream, when replenished by the αἰώρα presently to be mentioned, makes a circuit of these hollows through the

subterranean channels. ὡς ἂν is Stallbaum's correction for ὦν ἂν, which Z. retains.

21. ὥσπερ αἰώραν] 'all these are moved backwards and forwards by a kind of oscillation which exists in the earth'. αἰώρα properly signifies a seesaw movement, like that of a pair of scales equally balanced. It is the name given to a kind of gymnastic machine like a swing. By the force of this αἰώρα the volume of air and fluid in Tartaros is perpetually swaying to and fro like a pendulum. When the mass which is ἄνω surges towards the centre, the mass that is κάτω is necessarily driven towards the extremity: then the latter in its turn recoils towards the centre and forces the former towards the opposite extremity.

τῆς γῆς ἄλλως τε μέγιστον τυγχάνει ὄν καὶ διαμπερὲς τετρημένον  
112 δι' ὅλης τῆς γῆς, τοῦτο ὕπερ' Ὀμηρος εἶπε, λέγων αὐτὸ

τῆλε μάλ' ἤχι βάθιστον ὑπὸ χθονός ἐστι βέρεθρον·

ὁ καὶ ἄλλοθι καὶ ἐκεῖνος καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ τῶν ποιητῶν Τάρταρον  
κεκλήκασιν. εἰς γὰρ τοῦτο τὸ χάσμα συρρέουσί τε πάντες οἱ 5  
ποταμοὶ καὶ ἐκ τούτου πάλιν ἐκρέουσιν· γήγνονται δὲ ἕκαστοι  
τοιούτοι δι' οἷας ἂν καὶ τῆς γῆς ῥέωσιν. ἡ δὲ αἰτία ἐστὶν τοῦ  
B ἐκρεῖν τε ἐντεῦθεν καὶ εἰσερεῖν πάντα τὰ ῥεύματα, ὅτι πυθμένα  
οὐκ ἔχει οὐδὲ βάσιν τὸ ὑγρὸν τοῦτο. αἰωρεῖται δὴ καὶ κυμαίνει  
ἄνω καὶ κάτω, καὶ ὁ ἀῆρ καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ περὶ αὐτὸ ταῦτόν ποιεῖ 10  
ξυνέπεται γὰρ αὐτῷ καὶ ὅταν εἰς τὸ ἐπέκεινα τῆς γῆς ὀρμήσῃ καὶ  
ὅταν εἰς τὸ ἐπὶ τάδε, καὶ ὡσπερ τῶν ἀναπνεόντων αἰεὶ ἐκπνεῖ τε  
καὶ ἀναπνεῖ ῥέον τὸ πνεῦμα, οὕτω καὶ ἐκεῖ ξυναιωρούμενον τῷ ὑγρῷ  
τὸ πνεῦμα δεινούς τινας ἀνέμους καὶ ἀμηχάνους παρέχεται καὶ  
C εἰσιὸν καὶ ἐξιόν. ὅταν τε οὖν ὑποχωρήσῃ τὸ ὕδωρ εἰς τὸν τόπον 15

1. διαμπερὲς τετρημένον] Tartaros differs from all the other ἔγκοιλα, not only in its far greater magnitude, but in being pierced right through the earth from end to end; whereas the rest are merely depressions more or less deep. The physical theory of the present passage is simple enough. Let us suppose for the sake of clearness that Tartaros is a chasm pierced from the north to the south pole; and let us concede so much to popular usage as to call one hemisphere, say the northern, ἄνω and the other κάτω. For each of these hemispheres the centre of the earth is the lowest point, towards which all things gravitate. Out of Tartaros ramify a number of channels in all directions through the earth, some reaching to the surface, some subterranean throughout their whole length. Now the αἰώρα pulsing up and down Tartaros carries with it all the fluid that is therein; and when it rushes northwards, it forces the liquid into the channels of the northern hemisphere; then returning southward it fills those in the southern. Thus the stream is violently impelled through the channel by the force of the αἰώρα: but when this

force is spent, it obeys the law of gravitation and makes its way back to Tartaros at a lower level than that whence it started. It can however never pass beyond the centre, since that is the absolutely lowest point from whatever direction it is approached, and an ascent from it would be contrary to the force of gravitation.

2. ὕπερ' Ὀμηρος εἶπε] *Iliad* viii 14: cf. viii 481.

8. ὅτι πυθμένα οὐκ ἔχει] The cause of the αἰώρα is that there is no bottom or foundation on which the liquid mass can rest. Were there a solid platform at the centre of the earth, the fluid on either side would settle there and remain stationary. Of this passage a doubtfully accurate statement and a certainly unfair criticism is made by Aristotle *meteorologica* II ii 355<sup>b</sup> 32 foll., cf. I 349<sup>b</sup> 28. Plato's doctrine of gravitation, which is incomparably more scientific than anything to be found in Aristotle on that subject, is very clearly expounded in *Timaeus* 62 c—63 E.

15: ὅταν τε οὖν ὑποχωρήσῃ] Many editions, including Z. and St., have ὀρμήσαν after οὖν: but since it is absent from the best mss. I have omitted it.

τὸν δὴ κάτω καλούμενον, [τοῖς] κατ' ἐκεῖνα τὰ ρεύματα διὰ τῆς γῆς εἰσρεῖ τε καὶ πληροῖ αὐτὰ ὥσπερ οἱ ἐπαντλοῦντες· ὅταν τε αὐτὸ ἐκείθεν μὲν ἀπολίπη, δεῦρο δὲ ὀρμήσῃ, τὰ ἐνθάδε πληροῖ αὐθις, τὰ δὲ πληρωθέντα ῥεῖ διὰ τῶν ὀχετῶν καὶ διὰ τῆς γῆς, καὶ εἰς  
 5 τοὺς τόπους ἕκαστα ἀφικνούμενα, εἰς οὓς ἐκάστους ὁδοποιεῖται, θαλάττας τε καὶ λίμνας καὶ ποταμούς καὶ κρήνας ποιεῖ· ἐντεῦθεν δὲ πάλιν δυόμενα κατὰ τῆς γῆς, τὰ μὲν μακροτέρους τόπους περι-  
 ελθόντα καὶ πλείους, τὰ δὲ ἐλάττους καὶ βραχυτέρους, πάλιν εἰς  
 10 τὸν Τάρταρον ἐμβάλλει, τὰ μὲν πολὺ κατωτέρω ἢ ἐπηνητλεῖτο, τὰ δὲ ὀλίγον· πάντα δὲ ὑποκάτω εἰσρεῖ τῆς ἐκροῆς. καὶ ἕνια μὲν καταντικρὺ ἢ εἰσρεῖ ἐξέπεσεν, ἕνια δὲ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ μέρος· ἔστι

1. τὸν δὴ κάτω καλούμενον] Plato considers the expression incorrect, as is indicated by δὴ. Cf. *Timaeus* 62 c φύσει γὰρ δὴ τινὰς τόπους δύο εἶναι διελιγφώτας διχῆ τὸ πᾶν ἐναντίους, τὸν μὲν κάτω, πρὸς ὃν φέρεται πᾶνθ' ὅσα τινὰ σώματος ἔγκον ἔχει, τὸν δὲ ἄνω, πρὸς ὃν ἀκουσίως ἔρχεται πᾶν, οὐκ ὀρθὸν οὐδαμῆ νομίζειν. For some very curious reasoning on the other side see Aristotle *de caelo* 11 ii 284<sup>b</sup> 6 foll.

[τοῖς] κατ' ἐκεῖνα τὰ ρεύματα] If the text is sound we must translate 'it (τὸ ὕδωρ) flows into the parts about those streams'; unless with Prof. Geddes we take τοῖς as an instrumental dative, which is hardly probable. But either way the phrase is a singularly awkward one and can scarcely, I think, have been written by Plato; though H. Schmidt defends it, translating 'das zu jenen Strömen Gehörende'. Madvig's *εἰσφρεῖ*, which Schanz adopts, leaves the sentence as clumsy as before. Wyttenbach reads *τότε* for *τοῖς*, which may be right: Ast brackets *τοῖς*. Mr Cope translates 'it flows through the earth to the neighbourhood of those streams and fills them, as it were by a pump'. But surely *διὰ τῆς γῆς* describes the progress of the water after it has entered the channels: it would be a strange expression to apply to its surging up and down Tartaros.

3. τὰ ἐνθάδε] i.e. the rivers in our hemisphere. We are regarded as living

in the 'upper' hemisphere: and so said the Pythagoreans, cf. Aristotle *de caelo* 285<sup>b</sup> 21. Aristotle himself said our hemisphere was the lower: to Plato of course the distinction is meaningless.

9. ἐπηνητλεῖτο] i.e. were pumped into the channels: it is needless to read ἐξηνητλεῖτο with Heindorf.

11. καταντικρὺ ἢ εἰσρεῖ] i.e. καταντικρὺ τῆς χώρας ἢ εἰσρεῖ. This seems to mean that a stream which issued forth from Tartaros, say in an easterly direction, may, by a circuit of the earth, re-enter it on the western side. Aristotle's version of this (*meteorologica* 356<sup>a</sup> 9) is τὰ δὲ καταντικρὺ τῆς θέσει τῆς ἐκροῆς, ὅταν εἰ ῥεῖν ἤρξαντο κάτωθεν, ἄνωθεν ἐκβάλλειν. This is usually regarded as a misstatement on Aristotle's part: but H. Schmidt (*krit. Comm.* 11 107 foll.) ingeniously endeavours to reconcile it with Plato's words. He lays stress on the fact that Aristotle says, not ἄνω and κάτω, but ἄνωθεν and κάτωθεν; and he explains it thus. A river may issue from Tartaros in the southern hemisphere and in the course of its wanderings pass into the northern, finally discharging itself into the very centre of Tartaros. Thus after rising in the northern hemisphere (*κάτωθεν*) it enters Tartaros from the side of the northern (*ἄνωθεν*); but since it discharges itself at the centre, it has not violated the law *μέχρι τοῦ μέσου καθιέναι, πέρα δ' οὐ*. The weak point in the expla-



δὲ ἂ παντάπασιν κύκλω περιελθόντα, ἢ ἄπαξ ἢ καὶ πλεονάκις περιελιχθέντα περὶ τὴν γῆν ὥσπερ οἱ ὄφεις, εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν κάτω καθέντα πάλιν ἐμβάλλει. δυνατὸν δὲ ἐστὶν ἐκατέρωσε μέχρι τοῦ μέσου καθίεναι, πέρα δ' οὐ· ἄναντες γὰρ πρόσω ἀμφοτέροις τοῖς ρεύμασι τὸ ἐκατέρωθεν γίγνεται μέρος.

LXI. Τὰ μὲν οὖν δὴ ἄλλα πολλά τε καὶ μεγάλα καὶ παντοδαπὰ ρεύματά ἐστι τυγχάνει δ' ἄρα ὄντα ἐν τούτοις τοῖς πολλοῖς τέτταρ' ἄττα ρεύματα, ὧν τὸ μὲν μέγιστον καὶ ἐξωτάτω ρέον [περὶ] κύκλω ὁ καλούμενος Ὀκεανός ἐστίν, τούτου δὲ καταντικρῦ καὶ ἐναντίως ρέων Ἀχέρων, ὃς δι' ἐρήμων τε τόπων ρεῖ ἄλλων καὶ 10  
113 δὴ καὶ ὑπὸ γῆν ρέων εἰς τὴν λίμνην ἀφικνεῖται τὴν Ἀχερουσιάδα, οἱ αἱ τῶν τετελευτηκότων ψυχαὶ τῶν πολλῶν ἀφικνοῦνται καὶ τινὰς εἰμαρμένους χρόνους μέναισαι, αἱ μὲν μακροτέρους, αἱ δὲ βραχυτέρους, πάλιν ἐκπέμπονται εἰς τὰς τῶν ζῴων γενέσεις. τρίτος

nation seems to me this. When the stream has once reached the northern hemisphere, it is subject to precisely the same laws of gravitation as the rivers of that hemisphere; and there is no reason why it should be compelled to descend to the very centre any more than a stream which has risen in the northern hemisphere: yet, if it does not, it has passed beyond the centre, relatively to its source. Schmidt's theory in fact breaks down, unless we can understand the words *μέχρι τοῦ μέσου, πέρα δ' οὐ* relatively to the direction of the stream after it has once begun its downward course, irrespective of its point of issue. Perhaps however Plato had not thought of the case of a river passing from one hemisphere to another while on the surface of the earth: or, as exact science is hardly to be expected in a myth, the rivers may be prohibited from crossing the plane which divides the two hemispheres. Aristotle's paraphrase sounds like a reproduction of the Platonic passage based on an imperfect recollection of it. The notion, entertained by some, that *καταντικρῦ ἢ εἰσρεῖ* means that the stream on discharging itself crosses Tartaros and emerges on the opposite side is assuredly untenable. Schanz, against all mss., has *ἐξέπεσεν εἰσρεῖ*.

3. *καθέντα*] This word comes to be practically intransitive similarly to *ἐμβάλλει*: the river is conceived as a power which pours down and discharges its waters. *καθημι* is similarly used of a wind, as we see in Aristophanes *Knights* 430 *ἐξεμι γὰρ σοι λαμπρὸς ἦδη καὶ μέγας καθιέλις*.

4. *ἄναντες γὰρ πρόσω*] so Heindorf for *πρός*. Z. and St. omit *πρόσω*.

8. *τέτταρ' ἄττα ρεύματα*] Homer *Odyssey* x 511,

*νῆα μὲν αὐτοῦ κέλσαι ἐπ' Ὀκεανῷ βαθυδίην, αὐτὸς δ' εἰς Ἄϊδεω ἰέναι δόμον εὐρώεντα· ἔνθα μὲν εἰς Ἀχέροντα Πυριφλεγέθων τε ρέουσιν*  
Κωκυτός θ', ὃς δὴ Στυγὸς ὕδατος ἐστὶν ἀπορροῆς.

[*περὶ*] *κύκλω*] The only passage cited in defence of this phrase is Plutarch *ἔρωτικὸς* x 5, where Didot's edition has *περικύκλω*. The latter is the reading of the best mss. here; but Heindorf justly denounces it as 'monstri simile'. Stallbaum's reference to *Laws* 964 E is totally irrelevant. Heindorf proposes *πέριξ*, Hermann has *περι*, adverbial: but it seems probable that the word has crept in from the margin.

12. *αἱ τῶν τετελευτηκότων*] Cf. 114 A.

δὲ ποταμὸς τούτων κατὰ μέσον ἐκβάλλει, καὶ ἐγγὺς τῆς ἐκβολῆς εἰσπίπτει εἰς τόπον μέγαν πυρὶ πολλῷ καιόμενον, καὶ λίμνην ποιεῖ μείζω τῆς παρ' ἡμῖν θαλάττης, ζέουσαν ὕδατος καὶ πηλοῦ ἐντεῦθεν δὲ χωρεῖ κύκλῳ θολερὸς καὶ πηλώδης, περιελιττόμενος δὲ [τῇ γῆ] **B**  
 5 ἄλλοσέ τε ἀφικνεῖται καὶ παρ' ἔσχατα τῆς Ἀχερουσιάδος λίμνης, οὐ συμμιγνύμενος τῷ ὕδατι περιελιχθεὶς δὲ πολλάκις ὑπὸ γῆς ἐμβάλλει κατωτέρω τοῦ Ταρτάρου· οὗτος δ' ἐστὶν ὃν ἐπονομάζουσιν Πυριφλεγέθοντα, οὐ καὶ οἱ ῥύακες ἀποσπάσματα ἀναφυσῶσιν ὅπῃ ἂν τύχωσι τῆς γῆς. τούτου δὲ αὐ καταντικρὺ ὁ τέταρτος ἐκπίπτει  
 10 εἰς τόπον πρῶτον δεινὸν τε καὶ ἄγριον, ὡς λέγεται, χρῶμα δ' ἔχοντα ὅλον οἶον ὁ κυανός, ὃν δὴ ἐπονομάζουσι Στύγιον, καὶ τὴν λίμνην, **C**  
 ἣν ποιεῖ ὁ ποταμὸς ἐμβάλλων, Στύγα· ὁ δ' ἐμπεσὼν ἐνταῦθα καὶ δεινὰς δυνάμεις λαβὼν ἐν τῷ ὕδατι, δις κατὰ τῆς γῆς, περιελιττόμενος χωρεῖ ἐναντίος τῷ Πυριφλεγέθοντι καὶ ἀπαντᾷ ἐν τῇ

1. ἐκβάλλει] 'issues forth'. In the passage of Aristotle already quoted ἐκβάλλειν has the opposite sense, 'discharges itself'; it is in fact equivalent to ἐμβάλλει in Plato's account. Aristotle follows the ordinary usage, whereas Plato has formed his compounds to fit his present descriptions.

3. ζέουσαν ὕδατος καὶ πηλοῦ] 'boiling with water and mud'. The genitive is joined with the verb as describing the material: cf. *Anthol. Planud.* IV 39

καὶ πεδία ζέοντα πολυσπερέων Ἀγαρηνῶν.

4. περιελιττόμενος δὲ [τῇ γῆ] Of the three writers who quote this passage, Stobaeus Theodoret and Eusebius, τῇ γῆ is found in the first alone: the words are however in all the mss. The objection to them is that they seem to make Pyriphlegethon flow on the surface of the earth, which, Schmidt notwithstanding, cannot be allowed. Stallbaum retains τῇ γῆ, and explains that Pyriphlegethon encircles the earth beneath its surface. But this seems scarcely a natural interpretation; and I have thought it better to bracket the words, which the Zürich editors expunge.

7. κατωτέρω τοῦ Ταρτάρου] 'into a

lower depth of Tartaros'.

12. ἣν ποιεῖ ὁ ποταμὸς] ἣν is absent from most mss. but is rightly added from Theodoret and certain mss. by Heindorf, who compares *Laus* 683 A. The construction is indeed familiar enough.

Στύγα] Plato's conception of Styx as a lake differs from that of the older authorities: cf. Hesiod *Theogonia* 786 foll. where Styx is a river, a branch (κέρας) of Okeanos: and Homer *Il.* makes Kokytos a branch of Styx.

14. ἀπαντᾷ ἐν τῇ Ἀχερουσιάδι λίμνῃ] The convolutions of these four rivers are a little perplexing. They issue from Tartaros on four different sides: Okeanos emerges to the surface and encompasses the whole earth; of its return to Tartaros we are told nothing. Acheron, issuing from the opposite side, flows in the contrary direction, partly on the surface, partly beneath the earth; and before re-entering Tartaros forms the Acherusian lake. Pyriphlegethon, rising half-way between the two former, not far from its source forms the boiling lake, and after many windings skirts one end of the Acherusian lake before plunging into the profoundest deeps of Tartaros. Its course is entirely subterranean. Kokytos, flowing in the opposite

Ἀχερουσιάδι λίμνῃ ἐξ ἐναντίας· καὶ οὐδὲ τὸ τούτου ὕδωρ οὐδενὶ μίγνυται, ἀλλὰ καὶ οὗτος κύκλω περιελθὼν ἐμβάλλει εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον ἐναντίος τῷ Πυριφλεγέθοντι· ὄνομα δὲ τούτῳ ἐστίν, ὡς οἱ ποιηταὶ λέγουσιν, Κωκυτός.

D LXII. Τούτων δὲ οὕτως πεφυκότων, ἐπειδὴν ἀφίκωνται οἱ 5  
τετελευτηκότες εἰς τὸν τόπον οἱ ὁ δαίμων ἕκαστον κομίζει, πρῶτον  
μὲν διεδικάσαντο οἱ τε καλῶς καὶ ὀσίως βιώσαντες καὶ οἱ μὴ. καὶ  
οἱ μὲν ἂν δόξωσι μέσως βεβιωκέναι, πορευθέντες ἐπὶ τὸν Ἀχέροντα,  
ἀναβάντες ἂ δὴ αὐτοῖς ὀχήματά ἐστιν, ἐπὶ τούτων ἀφικνοῦνται εἰς  
τὴν λίμνην, καὶ ἐκεῖ οἰκοῦσί τε καὶ καθαιρόμενοι τῶν τε ἀδικημάτων 10  
διδόντες δίκας ἀπολύονται, εἴ τις τι ἠδίκηκεν, τῶν τε εὐεργεσιῶν  
E τιμὰς φέρονται κατὰ τὴν ἀξίαν ἕκαστος· οἱ δ' ἂν δόξωσιν ἀνιάτως  
ἔχειν διὰ τὰ μεγέθη τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων, ἢ ἱεροσυλίας πολλὰς καὶ  
μεγάλας ἢ φόνους ἀδίκους καὶ παρανόμους πολλοὺς ἐξεργασμένοι,  
ἢ ἄλλα ὅσα τοιαῦτα τυγχάνει ὄντα, τούτους δὲ ἢ προσήκουσα 15  
μοῖρα ρίπτει εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον, ὅθεν οὐποτε ἐκβαίνουσιν. οἱ δ' ἂν  
ἰάσιμα μὲν, μεγάλα δὲ δόξωσιν ἠμαρτηκέναι ἁμαρτήματα, οἷον πρὸς  
πατέρα ἢ μητέρα ὑπ' ὀργῆς βίαιόν τι πράξαντες, καὶ μεταμέλον

direction, ascends to the surface, where it spreads into the Stygian lake; then diving into the earth, it reaches the Acherusian lake from the contrary side to Pyriphlegethon; and making another circuit enters Tartaros opposite to that river. Styx, it will be noticed, is on the earth's surface, whereas the other two lakes are subterranean.

6. ὁ δαίμων] Cf. 107 D.

9. ἀναβάντες] 'going on board vessels which, it is said (δή), are provided for them'.

12. ἀνιάτως ἔχειν] These incurables were cast into Tartaros, not in retribution for their crimes, but as warnings to others; since to Plato punishment is always either remedial or exemplary. So *Gorgias* 525 C οἱ δ' ἂν τὰ ἔσχατα ἀδικήσωσι καὶ διὰ τοιαῦτα ἀδικήματα ἀνίατοι γίνονται, ἐκ τούτων τὰ παραδείγματα γίγνεται, καὶ οὗτοι αὐτοὶ μὲν οὐκέτι ὀνίανται οὐδέν, ἅτε ἀνίατοι ὄντες, ἄλλοι δὲ ὀνίανται οἱ τούτους ὀρώντες διὰ τὰς ἁμαρτίας τὰ μέγιστα καὶ ὀδυνηρότατα καὶ φοβερώτατα πάθη πάσχοντας τὸν αἰὲ χρόνον,

ἀτεχνῶς παραδείγματα ἀνητημένους ἐκεῖ ἐν Αἴδου ἐν τῷ δεσμοτηρίῳ, τοῖς αἰετῶν ἀδίκων ἀφικνουμένοις θεάματα καὶ νουθητήματα. Cf. *Republic* 616 A.

13. ἱεροσυλίας] This was a peculiarly heinous offence: cf. *Laws* 854 A, where the law thus addresses the sacrilegious, ὦ θαυμάσιε, οὐκ ἀνθρώπινόν σε κακὸν οὐδὲ θεῖον κενὶ τὸ νῦν ἐπὶ τὴν ἱεροσυλίαν προτρέπον ἴναί, οἷστρος δὲ σέ τις ἐμφύμενος ἐκ παλαιῶν καὶ ἀκαθάρτων τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἀδικημάτων, περιφερόμενος ἀλιτηριώδης.

16. ὅθεν οὐποτε ἐκβαίνουσιν] In the *νέκυια* of the *Republic* and *Gorgias* also incurable criminals are doomed to eternal punishment: and this is natural where Plato is weaving up popular tradition with his own phantasy. But in *Timaeus* 42 C it is evident that the degenerate soul at any period of her transmigrations has the chance of reformation and final restoration to her original purity: nor is this possibility excluded in *Phaedrus* 248 C foll.

18. καὶ μεταμέλον αὐτοῖς] 'and who



αὐτοῖς τὸν ἄλλον βίον βιώσιν, ἢ ἀνδροφόνοι τοιοῦτω τινὶ ἄλλω 114  
 τρόπῳ γένωνται, τούτους δὲ ἐμπροσθεῖν μὲν εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον ἀνάγκη,  
 ἐμπροσθέντας δὲ αὐτούς καὶ ἐνιαυτὸν ἐκεῖ γενομένους ἐκβάλλει τὸ  
 κύμα, τοὺς μὲν ἀνδροφόρους κατὰ τὸν Κωκυτόν, τοὺς δὲ πατραλοίας  
 5 καὶ μητραλοίας κατὰ τὸν Πυριφλεγέθοντα· ἐπειδὴν δὲ φερόμενοι  
 γένωνται κατὰ τὴν λίμνην τὴν Ἀχερουσιάδα, ἐνταῦθα βοῶσί τε καὶ  
 καλοῦσιν, οἱ μὲν οὓς ἀπέκτειναν, οἱ δὲ οὓς ὕβρισαν, καλέσαντες δ'  
 ἵκετεύουσι καὶ δέονται εἶσαι σφᾶς ἐκβῆναι εἰς τὴν λίμνην καὶ B  
 δέξασθαι, καὶ ἐὰν μὲν πείσωσιν, ἐκβαίνουσί τε καὶ λήγουσι τῶν  
 10 κακῶν, εἰ δὲ μή, φέρονται αὖθις εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον καὶ ἐκεῖθεν πάλιν  
 εἰς τοὺς ποταμούς, καὶ ταῦτα πάσχοντες οὐ πρότερον παύονται,  
 πρὶν ἂν πείσωσιν οὓς ἠδίκησαν· αὕτη γὰρ ἡ δίκη ὑπὸ τῶν δικαστῶν  
 αὐτοῖς ἐτάχθη. οἱ δὲ δὴ ἂν δόξωσι διαφερόντως †πρὸς τὸ ὀσίως

have lived the rest of their days in a state of repentance'. The participle μεταμέλον is used absolutely.

1. τοιοῦτω τινὶ ἄλλω τρόπῳ] i.e. their offence is similar to that of the πατραλοῖαι, in that it was committed in sudden passion and followed by repentance, and different to that of the φόνους ἀδίκους καὶ παρανόμους πολλοὺς ἐξεργασμένους.

3. τὸ κύμα] i.e. ἡ αἰώρα.

4. πατραλοίας καὶ μητραλοίας] These terms apply not only to parricides and matricides, but to any one who strikes a father or mother.

6. κατὰ τὴν λίμνην] It will be remembered that both these rivers enter the Acherusian lake.

12. πρὶν ἂν πείσωσιν οὓς ἠδίκησαν] This was no doubt suggested by the Athenian law which enacted that a person guilty of involuntary homicide must appease the family of the deceased before he could return from exile: cf. Demosth. *Aristokr.* p. 644 τὸν ἄλοντ' ἐπ' ἀκουσίῳ φόνῳ ἐν τισιν εἰρημένοις χρόνοις ἀπελθεῖν τακτὴν ὁδὸν καὶ φεύγειν, ἕως ἂν αἰδέσθηται τινα [? τις] τῶν ἐν γένει τοῦ πεπονηθότος. It would appear that the injured family could not insist upon more than a year's exile, which was called ἀπειναντισμός. Plato adopts this period in *Λaws* 869 E

ὡς ἀκουσίῳ γεγονότος τοῦ φόνου οἱ τε καθαρμοὶ γιγνέσθωσαν τῷ δράσαντι καὶ ἐνιαυτὸς εἰς ἔστω τῆς ἐκδημίας ἐν νόμῳ, cf. 865 E. In *Λaws* 872 E we are told that in another life it shall be done to the wilful homicide as he did to his victim: τοῦ γὰρ κοινοῦ μανθέντος αἵματος οὐκ εἶναι κάθαρσιν ἄλλην οὐδ' ἐκπλυτον ἐθέλειν γίγνεσθαι τὸ μανθέν, πρὶν φόνον φόνῳ ὁμοίῳ ὅμοιον ἢ δράσασα ψυχὴ τίσῃ καὶ πάσης τῆς ξυγγενείας τὸν θυμὸν ἀφιλασαμένη κοίμῃ, cf. 870 E.

13. δόξωσι διαφερόντως πρὸς τὸ ὀσίως βιώσαι] The text is certainly corrupt. Stallbaum's attempt to make βιώσαι do double duty is futile, and his quotations are transparently irrelevant. Schanz, following Heindorf, inserts from Theodoret *προκεκρίσθαι* after βιώσαι. This has some support from Clement of Alexandria, who reads *προκεκλήσθαι*; but it is not satisfactory. For while it is sense to say 'who are deemed to have lived holily', it is not sense to say 'who are deemed to have been judged to have lived holily'. I suspect that Theodoret's *προκεκρίσθαι* is merely a clumsy attempt to supply a deficiency which existed in his copy; and that Plato's real word has been lost: possibly *ἔχειν* after *διαφερόντως*, unless we should read *πρὸς τὸ ὀσίως*.

βιώναι †, οὗτοι εἰσιν οἱ τῶνδε μὲν τῶν τόπων τῶν ἐν τῇ γῇ ἐλευ-  
 C θερούμενοί τε καὶ ἀπαλλαττόμενοι ὥσπερ δεσμωτηρίων, ἄνω δὲ εἰς  
 τὴν καθαρὰν οἴκησιν ἀφικνούμενοι καὶ ἐπὶ γῆς οἰκιζόμενοι. τούτων  
 δὲ αὐτῶν οἱ φιλοσοφία ἱκανῶς καθηράμενοι ἄνευ τε σωμάτων ζῶσι  
 τὸ παράπαν εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον, καὶ εἰς οἰκήσεις ἔτι τούτων 5  
 καλλίους ἀφικνοῦνται, ἅς οὔτε ῥάδιον δηλῶσαι οὔτε ὁ χρόνος ἱκανὸς  
 ἐν τῷ παρόντι. ἀλλὰ τούτων δὴ ἕνεκα χρῆ ὧν διεληλύθαμεν, ὦ  
 Συμμία, πᾶν ποιεῖν, ὥστε ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως ἐν τῷ βίῳ μετα-  
 σχεῖν· καλὸν γὰρ τὸ ἀθλον καὶ ἡ ἐλπίς μεγάλη. //

D LXIII. Τὸ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα δισχυρίσασθαι οὕτως ἔχειν, ὡς 10  
 ἐγὼ διελέλυθα, οὐ πρέπει νοῦν ἔχοντι ἀνδρὶ· ὅτι μέντοι ἢ ταῦτ'  
 ἐστὶν ἢ τοιαῦτ' ἅττα περὶ τὰς ψυχὰς ἡμῶν καὶ τὰς οἰκήσεις,  
 ἐπεὶπερ ἀθάνατόν γε ἡ ψυχὴ φαίνεται οὔσα, τοῦτο καὶ πρέπει μοι  
 δοκεῖ καὶ ἄξιον κινδυνεύσαι οἰομένῳ οὕτως ἔχειν· καλὸς γὰρ ὁ κίν-  
 D δυνος· καὶ χρῆ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὥσπερ ἐπάδειν ἑαυτῷ, διὸ δὴ ἐγῶγε καὶ 15  
 πάλαι μηκύνω τὸν μῦθον. ἀλλὰ τούτων δὴ ἕνεκα θαρρεῖν χρῆ  
 περὶ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ψυχῇ ἄνδρα, ὅστις ἐν τῷ βίῳ τὰς μὲν ἄλλας ἡδονὰς  
 E τὰς περὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ τοὺς κόσμους εἶασε χαίρειν, ὡς ἀλλοτριούς  
 τε ὄντας καὶ πλέον θάτερον ἡγήσάμενος ἀπεργάζεσθαι, τὰς δὲ περὶ

3. ἐπὶ γῆς] so all mss. Eusebius, Theodoret, and Stobaeus have ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς: but the article is not required. 'Upon the earth' means of course on the true surface, distinguished from the hollow wherein we dwell.

4. καθηράμενοι] a genuine reflexive middle: 'who have purified themselves'.

ἄνευ τε σωμάτων] I conceive this to mean 'without earthly bodies': for the most exalted of finite spirits, even the gods, must have body of some sort; that is, they are subject to the conditions of space and time. Cf. *Phaedrus* 246 C. ἄνευ σωμάτων to Plato signifies freedom from bodily appetites.

114 D—115 A, c. lxiii. To insist that all these details are strictly accurate were folly; yet something like this is the fate of the soul and her habitation after death. Wherefore it is well worth while for a man to bestow all care upon his soul during this life, that she may be free from bodily passions and adorned with

true virtue. And now, continues Sokrates, my hour is at hand; and I will go to bathe my body for my burial.

10. τὸ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα δισχυρίσασθαι] Plato lays no stress upon the exact details of his description: indeed he is never at any pains to make his various accounts of 'die letzten Dinge' precisely correspond: all he is really concerned about is that the virtuous soul is better off in the other world than the vicious.

15. ἐπάδειν ἑαυτῷ] cf. 77 E ἀλλὰ χρῆ ἐπάδειν αὐτῷ ἐκάστης ἡμέρας, ἕως ἂν ἐξέπῃσῃτε.

διὸ δὴ ἐγῶγε καὶ πάλαι μηκύνω τὸν μῦθον] This phrase would seem to bear out the view of the myth given in the introduction, p. 8.

19. πλέον θάτερον ἡγήσάμενος ἀπεργάζεσθαι] 'thinking that they do more harm than good'. For this use of *θάτερον* cf. *Euthydemus* 280 E, 297 D. Also Pindar *Pythia* III 34 δαίμων δ' ἕτερος.

τὸ μανθάνειν ἐσπούδασέ τε καὶ κοσμήσας τὴν ψυχὴν οὐκ ἀλλοτρίῳ ἀλλὰ τῷ αὐτῆς κόσμῳ, σωφροσύνη τε καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ ἐλευθερία καὶ ἀληθεία, οὕτω περιμένει τὴν εἰς Ἄιδου πορείαν, 115 ὡς πορευσόμενος ὅταν ἢ εἰμαρμένη καλῇ. ὑμεῖς μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι, εἰσαυθίς ἔν τιμι χρόνῳ ἕκαστοι πορεύσεσθε· ἐμὲ δὲ νῦν ἤδη καλεῖ, φαίη ἂν ἀνὴρ τραγικός, ἢ εἰμαρμένη, καὶ σχεδὸν τί μοι ὦρα τραπέσθαι πρὸς τὸ λουτρόν· δοκεῖ γὰρ δὴ βέλτιον εἶναι λουσάμενον πιεῖν τὸ φάρμακον καὶ μὴ πράγματα ταῖς γυναιξὶ παρέχειν νεκρὸν λούειν.

10 LXIV. Ταῦτα δὴ εἰπόντος αὐτοῦ ὁ Κρίτων, Εἶπεν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώ- B κρατες· τί δὲ τούτοις ἢ ἐμὸ ἐπιστέλλεις ἢ περὶ τῶν παίδων ἢ περὶ ἄλλου του, ὅ τι ἂν σοι ποιοῦντες ἡμεῖς ἐν χάριτι μάλιστα ποιοῖμεν; Ἄπερ αἰεὶ λέγω, ἔφη, ὦ Κρίτων, οὐδὲν καινότερον ὅτι ὑμῶν αὐτῶν

3. ἐλευθερία καὶ ἀληθεία] 'with freedom and truth'. These terms practically correspond to φρόνησις or σοφία. ἐλευθερία is that state of liberation from the body which enables the soul to grasp ἀλήθεια.

5. ἕκαστοι πορεύσεσθε] so nearly all mss. Schanz writes ἕκαστος after Stallbaum.

6. φαίη ἂν ἀνὴρ τραγικός] 'to speak like a hero of tragedy'. The good taste of this parenthesis is admirable. ὅταν ἢ εἰμαρμένη καλεῖ is in perfect keeping with the eloquent passage which is its context: but in applying the phrase to himself Sokrates instinctively feels the risk that it may sound high-flown. And so with these words he passes simply and naturally from his lofty flight of moralizing to the homely, but eminently characteristic, ὦρα τραπέσθαι πρὸς τὸ λουτρόν.

8. καὶ μὴ πράγματα ταῖς γυναιξὶ παρέχειν] 'and not to give the women the trouble of washing my corpse'. This piece of thoughtfulness for others is admirable evidence of the perfect serenity with which Sokrates awaits his doom.

115 A—116 A, c. Ixiv. Kriton now inquires of Sokrates what are his last injunctions. Only that you will take good heed to yourselves, he replies, and

put into practice the principles affirmed in our late discourse. But how are we to bury you? asks Kriton. Sokrates answers with a smile, As you please, provided you can catch me. It would seem that all my words have been thrown away, and I fail to persuade you that this Sokrates who now speaks to you will presently take flight to the company of the gods, and that all you will bury is his forsaken body. So, my friends, be surety for me to Kriton, not this time that I shall stay, but that I shall verily depart. But seriously such incorrect language is mischievous: say then that it is my body which you bury, and bury it as seems to you best.

11. ἐπιστέλλεις] 'proprium de extrema morientium voluntate'. HEINDORF. Cf. 116 B ἐπιστείλας ἅττα ἐβούλετο.

13. ἄπερ αἰεὶ λέγω] 'what I am always saying; nothing fresh: that if you take good care of yourselves you will best please me and mine and yourselves also in whatever you do, even though you make no promise now; but if you are negligent of yourselves and will not guide your lives along the track of our present and our former discourse, though your promises be never so many and earnest at this moment, you will profit nothing'. ἐπι-



ἐπιμελούμενοι ὑμεῖς καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ τοῖς ἐμοῖς καὶ ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς ἐν  
 χάριτι ποιήσετε ἅττ' ἂν ποιήτε, κἂν μὴ νῦν ὁμολογήσητε· ἐὰν δὲ  
 ὑμῶν μὲν αὐτῶν ἀμελήητε, καὶ μὴ θέλητε, ὥσπερ κατ' ἔχνη κατὰ τὰ  
 νῦν τε εἰρημένα καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ ζῆν, οὐδὲ ἐὰν πολλὰ  
 C ὁμολογήσητε ἐν τῷ παρόντι καὶ σφόδρα, οὐδὲν πλέον ποιήσετε. 5  
 Ταῦτα μὲν τοίνυν προθυμηθησόμεθα, ἔφη, οὕτω ποιεῖν· θάπτωμεν  
 δέ σε τίνα τρόπον; "Ὅπως ἂν, ἔφη, βούλησθε, εἴανπερ γε λάβητέ  
 με καὶ μὴ ἐκφύγω ὑμᾶς. γελᾶσας δὲ ἅμα ἡσυχῆ καὶ πρὸς ἡμᾶς  
 ἀποβλέψας εἶπεν, Οὐ πείθω, ὦ ἄνδρες, Κρίτωνα, ὡς ἐγὼ εἰμι οὗτος  
 ὁ Σωκράτης, ὁ νυνὶ διαλεγόμενος, καὶ διατάττων ἕκαστον τῶν λεγο- 10  
 μένων, ἀλλ' οἶεταί με ἐκείνον εἶναι, ὃν ὄψεται ὀλίγον ὕστερον  
 D νεκρὸν, καὶ ἐρωτᾷ δὴ, πῶς με θάπτῃ. "ὅτι δὲ ἐγὼ πάλαι πολλὴν  
 λόγον πεποίημαι, ὡς, ἐπειδὴν πῖω τὸ φάρμακον, οὐκέτι ὑμῖν παρα-  
 μενῶ, ἀλλ' οἰχῆσομαι ἀπιὼν εἰς μακάρων δὴ τινὰς εὐδαιμονίας,  
 ταῦτά [μοι] δοκῶ αὐτῷ ἄλλως λέγειν, παραμυθούμενος ἅμα μὲν 15  
 ὑμᾶς, ἅμα δ' ἐμαυτόν. ἐγγυῆσασθε οὖν με πρὸς Κρίτωνα, ἔφη, τὴν  
 ἐναντίαν ἐγγύην ἢ ἣν οὗτος πρὸς τοὺς δικαστὰς ἡγγυᾶτο. οὗτος  
 μὲν γὰρ ἢ μὴν παραμενεῖν ὑμεῖς δὲ ἢ μὴν μὴ παραμενεῖν ἐγγυῆ-  
 E σασθε, ἐπειδὴν ἀποθάνω, ἀλλὰ οἰχῆσεσθαι ἀπιόντα, ἵνα Κρίτων  
 ῥῆγον φέρῃ, καὶ μὴ ὀρώων μου τὸ σῶμα ἢ καιόμενον ἢ κατορυπτόμενον 20  
 ἀγανακτῆ ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ ὡς δεινὰ πάσχοντος, μηδὲ λέγῃ ἐν τῇ ταφῇ,  
 ὡς ἢ προτίθεται Σωκράτῃ ἢ ἐκφέρει ἢ κατορύττει. εὐ γὰρ ἴσθι, ἢ

μελούμενοι=taking heed to your ways, that you may live virtuously and rationally. Cobet would omit κατὰ before τὰ νῦν, but Schanz cites *Euthyphron* 2 C ἔρχεται κατηγορήσων μου ὡς πρὸς μήτερα πρὸς τὴν πόλιν.

9. ὡς ἐγὼ εἰμι] 'I cannot persuade Kriton, my friends, that the real "I" is that Sokrates who now converses with you and duly arranges every part of his discourse; he imagines I am that which he will presently see as a corpse; and he actually (δῆ) inquires how he is to bury me'. The article is omitted before Σωκράτης in the best mss. and by some editors. In that case we should take Σωκράτης as in apposition to οὗτος. Wyttenbach appositely quotes *Laus* 959 A τὸ δὲ σῶμα ἰνδαλλόμενον ἡμῶν ἐκάστοις ἐπεσθαι, καὶ τελευτησάντων λέγεσθαι καλῶς εἰδῶλα

εἶναι τὰ τῶν νεκρῶν σώματα, τὸν δ' ὄντα ἡμῶν ἕκαστον ὄντως ἀθάνατον εἶναι, ψυχὴν ἐπονομαζόμενον, παρὰ θεοῦ ἄλλους ἀπιέναι.

15. ταῦτά [μοι] δοκῶ αὐτῷ ἄλλως λέγειν] Schanz brackets μοι after Madvig. We can indeed construe μοι with δοκῶ and αὐτῷ with λέγειν: but this gives hardly so good a sense.

17. οὗτος πρὸς τοὺς δικαστὰς ἡγγυᾶτο] Kriton was bail for Sokrates in conjunction with Plato and Kritobulos and Apollodoros. *Apology* 38 B.

22. εὐ γὰρ ἴσθι] 'for you must know that incorrect speech is not only offensive on that score alone, but engenders mischief in our souls'. An inaccurate mode of expression is apt to produce a loose and careless habit of thinking: Sokrates' great object was to find out what things really are and call them by their right

δ' ὅς, ὦ ἄριστε Κρίτων, τὸ μὴ καλῶς λέγειν οὐ μόνον εἰς αὐτὸ τοῦτο πλημμυλές, ἀλλὰ καὶ κακόν τι ἐμποιοῖ ταῖς ψυχαῖς. ἀλλὰ θαρρεῖν τε χρῆ καὶ φάναι τοῦμὸν σῶμα θάπτειν, καὶ θάπτειν οὕτως ὅπως 116  
 ἂν σοι φίλον ἦ καὶ μάλιστα ἡγῆ νόμιμον εἶναι.

- 5 LXXV. Ταῦτ' εἰπὼν ἐκείνος μὲν ἀνίστατο εἰς οἴκημά τι ὡς λουσόμενος, καὶ ὁ Κρίτων εἶπετο αὐτῷ, ἡμᾶς δ' ἐκέλευε περιμένειν. περιεμένομεν οὖν πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς διαλεγόμενοι περὶ τῶν εἰρη-  
 μένων καὶ ἀνασκοποῦντες, τοτὲ δ' αὖ περὶ τῆς ξυμφορᾶς διεξιόντες,  
 ὅση ἡμῖν γεγυυῖα εἴη, ἀτεχνῶς ἡγούμενοι ὥσπερ πατὴρ στερη-  
 10 θέντες διάξειν ὄρφανοὶ τὸν ἔπειτα βίον. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐλούσατο καὶ B  
 ἠνέχθη παρ' αὐτὸν τὰ παιδία—δύο γὰρ αὐτῷ υἱεῖς σμικροὶ ἦσαν, εἰς δὲ μέγας—καὶ αἱ οἰκεῖαι γυναῖκες ἀφίκοντο, [ἐκείναις] ἐναντίου  
 τοῦ Κρίτωνος διαλεχθεῖς τε καὶ ἐπιστείλας ἅττα ἐβούλετο, τὰς μὲν  
 γυναῖκας καὶ τὰ παιδία ἀπιέναι ἐκέλευσεν, αὐτὸς δὲ ἦκε παρ' ἡμᾶς.  
 15 καὶ ἦν ἤδη ἐγγὺς ἡλίου δυσμῶν· χρόνον γὰρ πολὺν διέτριψεν ἐνδον.

names, by obtaining a precise definition of each thing. That which we speak of as Sokrates is his soul, not his body; although, since the body is all we see, popular usage applies the name to the body even when the soul has quitted it. But, says Sokrates, not only is this in itself a slovenly mode of speech, but it may habituate us to thinking that the body is all that exists of a man.

3. **θάπτειν οὕτως**] Most of the recent editors make *θάπτειν* depend upon *φάναι*. There seems to me no valid reason for doing so; and it makes better sense to take it with *χρῆ*.

116 A—117 A, c. lxxv. Sokrates retires to the bath, and on his return takes leave of his children and household. After a little farther conversation with his friends he is warned by the servant of the Eleven that the hour of his death is at hand. The man warmly testifies to the noble character of Sokrates and departs in tears. Sokrates, after a few kind words concerning him, bids the poison be brought. Nay, remonstrates Kriton, the sun is yet on the mountains; many prisoners have put off drinking the hemlock till far on into the evening: there is no haste. They

acted after their kind, answers Sokrates; but I were false to myself, were I so covetous of the little remnant of my life: therefore bring the poison.

11. **δύο γὰρ αὐτῷ**] cf. *Apology* 34 D οἰκεῖοί μοι εἰσι καὶ υἱεῖς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τρεῖς, εἰς μὲν μενράκιον ἤδη, δύο δὲ παιδία. In *Diog. Laert.* 11 26 we are told that the name of the eldest was Lamprokles and those of the two younger Sophroniskos and Menexenos.

12. **αἱ οἰκεῖαι γυναῖκες**] i. e. the women of his family. Probably his wife was not among them, else Plato would have mentioned her. Some suppose that this expression gave rise to the absurd fable that Sokrates had two wives living at the same time; of whom the second, Myrto, daughter or grand-daughter of the famous Aristides, was the mother of his two younger children: see *Diog. Laert.* 1. 1.

[**ἐκείναις**] **ἐναντίου**] The mss. vary between *ἐκείναις* and *ἐκείναι*, and also in the position of the word, which in many follows *ἐναντίου*. Since *ἐκείναι* and the position after *ἐναντίου* are alike impossible, I read as above; bracketing however *ἐκείναις* as highly suspicious.

15. **ἐνδον**] sc. ἐν τῷ οἴκηματι.

ἐλθὼν δ' ἐκαθέζετο λελουμένος, καὶ οὐ πολλὰ μετὰ ταῦτα διελέχθη, καὶ ἦκεν ὁ τῶν ἔνδεκα ὑπὴρέτης καὶ στὰς παρ' αὐτόν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, οὐ καταγνώσομαι σοῦ ὕπερ ἄλλων καταγιγνώσκω, ὅτι μοι χαλεπαίνουσι καὶ καταρῶνται, ἐπειδὴν αὐτοῖς παραγγέλλω πίνειν τὸ φάρμακον ἀναγκαζόντων τῶν ἀρχόντων. σὲ δὲ ἐγὼ καὶ ἄλλως 5 ἔγνωκα ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ γενναιότατον καὶ πραότατον καὶ ἄριστον ἄνδρα ὄντα τῶν πώποτε δεῦρο ἀφικομένων, καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι οὐκ ἔμοι χαλεπαίνεις, γιγνώσκεις γὰρ τοὺς αἰτίους, ἀλλὰ ἐκείνοις. νῦν, οἶσθα γὰρ ἂ ἦλθον ἀγγέλλων, χαίρε τε καὶ πειρῶ ὡς D ῥᾶστα φέρειν τὰ ἀναγκαῖα. καὶ ἅμα δακρύσας μεταστρεφόμενος ἀπῆει. καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἀναβλέψας πρὸς αὐτόν, Καὶ σύ, ἔφη, χαίρε, καὶ ἡμεῖς ταῦτα ποιήσομεν. καὶ ἅμα πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ὦς ἀστεῖος, ἔφη, ὁ ἄνθρωπος· καὶ παρὰ πάντα μοι τὸν χρόνον προσῆει καὶ διελέγετο ἐνίοτε καὶ ἦν ἀνδρῶν λῶστος, καὶ νῦν ὡς γενναίως με ἀποδακρύνει. ἀλλ' ἄγε δὴ, ὦ Κρίτων, πειθώμεθα αὐτῷ, καὶ ἐνεγ- 15 κάτω τις τὸ φάρμακον, εἰ τέτριπται· εἰ δὲ μὴ, τριψάτω ὁ ἄνθρωπος. E καὶ ὁ Κρίτων, Ἄλλ' οἶμαι, ἔφη, ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔτι ἥλιον εἶναι ἐπὶ τοῖς ὄρεσιν καὶ οὐπὼ δεδυκέναι. καὶ ἅμα ἐγὼ οἶδα καὶ ἄλλους πάνν ὄψε πίνοντας, ἐπειδὴν παραγγελλῆ αὐτοῖς, δειπνήσαντάς τε καὶ πίνοντας εὖ μάλα, καὶ ξυγγενομένους γ' ἐνίοις ὧν ἂν τύχῳσιν 20 ἐπιθυμοῦντες. ἀλλὰ μηδὲν ἐπέιγον· ἔτι γὰρ ἐγχωρεῖ. καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, Εἰκότως γε, ἔφη, ὦ Κρίτων, ἐκείνοι τε ταῦτα ποιοῦσιν, οὓς σὺ λέγεις, οἶονται γὰρ κερδανεῖν ταῦτα ποιήσαντες, καὶ ἔγωγε 117 ταῦτα εἰκότως οὐ ποιήσω· οὐδὲν γὰρ οἶμαι κερδανεῖν ὀλίγον ὕστερον

3. οὐ καταγνώσομαι] 'I shall not have the complaint to make of you that I make of others'.

8. οὐκ ἔμοι χαλεπαίνεις] Some read χαλεπανεῖς, but the present is found in the best mss. and gives the best sense. 'I know it is not with me that you are angry, but with them; for you know who are to blame for it'. There is a subtle dramatic propriety in these words which is one of the finer touches of this matchless narrative. This man must have had a large experience of criminals and been accustomed to look on the baser side of humanity. He could however appreciate the nobility of Sokrates, so far as it is directly brought before his eyes; but he never thought of Sokrates as bearing no ill-will even against those who were

really the cause of his death: this is something outside his experience.

9. ἂ ἦλθον ἀγγέλλων] So the best mss. Schanz needlessly reads ἀγγελῶν: but ἀγγέλλων is equivalent to ἀγγελίαν φέρων which we have in *Crito* 43 c.

12. ὡς ἀστεῖος] 'how courteous the good fellow is; throughout all this time he used to come and talk to me now and then, and was the best of men: and now how honestly he mourns for me'. ἀποδακρύνει με as below 117c ἀπέκλειον ἑμαντόν.

21. ἔτι γὰρ ἐγχωρεῖ] 'for there is still time to spare'.

24. ταῦτα εἰκότως οὐ ποιήσω] Hirschig condemns εἰκότως, for no reason that I can see, though Schanz brackets it.

οὐδὲν γὰρ οἶμαι κερδανεῖν] The ms. authority is stronger for κερδάνειν, but



πιῶν ἄλλο γε ἢ γέλωτα ὀφλήσειν παρ' ἑμαυτῷ, γλιχόμενος τοῦ ζῆν καὶ φειδόμενος οὐδενὸς ἔτι ἐνόντος. ἀλλ' ἴθι, ἔφη, πιθοῦ καὶ μὴ ἄλλως ποιεῖ.

LXVI. Καὶ ὁ Κρίτων ἀκούσας ἔνευσε τῷ παιδὶ πλησίον  
 5 ἑστῶτι, καὶ ὁ παῖς ἐξελθὼν καὶ συχνὸν χρόνον διατρίψας ἤκεν  
 ἄγων τὸν μέλλοντα διδόναι τὸ φάρμακον, ἐν κύλικι φέροντα τετριμ-  
 μένον· ἰδὼν δὲ ὁ Σωκράτης τὸν ἄνθρωπον, Εἶεν, ἔφη, ὦ βέλτιστε,  
 σὺ γὰρ τούτων ἐπιστήμων, τί χρὴ ποιεῖν; Οὐδὲν ἄλλο, ἔφη, ἢ  
 πιόντα περιμέναι, ἕως ἂν σου βάρος ἐν τοῖς σκέλεσι γένηται, ἔπειτα Β  
 10 κατακείσθαι· καὶ οὕτως αὐτὸ ποιήσει. καὶ ἅμα ὠρεξε τὴν κύλικα  
 τῷ Σωκράτει· καὶ ὃς λαβὼν καὶ μάλα ἴλεως, ὦ Ἐχέκρατες, οὐδὲν  
 τρέσας οὐδὲ διαφθείρας οὔτε τοῦ χρώματος οὔτε τοῦ προσώπου,  
 ἀλλ' ὥσπερ εἰώθει ταυρηδὸν ὑποβλέψας πρὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον, Τί  
 λέγεις, ἔφη, περὶ τούδε τοῦ πάματος πρὸς τὸ ἀποσπείσαι τι;  
 15 ἔξεστιν, ἦ οὐ; Τοσοῦτον, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, τρίβομεν, ὅσον οἰόμεθα  
 μέτριον εἶναι πιεῖν. Μανθάνω, ἦ δ' ὄς· ἀλλ' εὐχέσθαι γέ που τοῖς  
 θεοῖς ἔξεστί τε καὶ χρὴ, τὴν μετοίκησιν τὴν ἐνθένδε ἐκέισε εὐτυχῆ C  
 γενέσθαι· ἂ δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ εὐχομαί τε καὶ γένοιτο ταύτη. καὶ ἅμ'  
 εἰπὼν ταῦτα ἐπισχόμενος καὶ μάλα εὐχερῶς καὶ εὐκόλως ἐξέπιεν.

here I think Schanz is right in accepting the future. Prof. Geddes defends the present by a reference to Herodotus IX 106; but there Abicht reads *ἐμμενέειν τε καὶ μὴ ἀποστήσασθαι*: besides which the construction is different. Plato could very well say *οὐδὲν οἶμαι κερδαίνειν ἀλλὰ ὀφλήσειν*, but *οὐδὲν ἄλλο κερδαίνειν ἢ ὀφλήσειν* seems very doubtful Greek.

2. *φειδόμενος οὐδενὸς ἔτι ἐνόντος*] 'being chary when the vessel is empty'; a proverbial expression which we find in Hesiod *works and days* 367 *μεσοῦθι φειδεσθαι, δειλὴ δ' ἐνὶ πυθμένι φειδῷ*.

117 A—118 A, cc. lxvi, lxvii. The last moments of Sokrates.

10. *αὐτὸ ποιήσει*] 'the poison will act of itself'. *ποιεῖν* is used in this technical sense by medical writers: Heindorf cites Dioscorides I 95 *ποιεῖ πρὸς φάρμακα*, 'is efficacious against poison'. The lexicons also give Strabo 234 *λοῦτρα κάλλιστα ποιῶντα πρὸς νόσους*.

11. *καὶ ὃς λαβὼν*] 'and he took it right cheerfully, Echekrates, without a

shudder or any change of complexion or countenance; but looking on the man with bent brows, as his manner was, he asked, What say you of this potion as to pouring a libation to some deity? is it permitted or not?' Notice the earnest emphasis thrown on the words *μάλα ἴλεως* by the following ὦ Ἐχέκρατες. *διαφθείρας* = changing for the worse, as Prof. Geddes says: the partitive genitives strengthen the force of the negation. *ταυρηδὸν ὑποβλέψας* describes the fixed piercing gaze habitual to Sokrates, cf. 86 D. For the use of *πρὸς* Stallbaum compares *Symposium* 174 B, 176 B. The man's matter-of-fact reply and his conduct throughout serve to heighten the pathos: he does not mean to be unfeeling, but familiarity with such scenes has produced a certain professional indifference; he seems not to have been personally influenced by Sokrates like the servant of the eleven.

19. *ἐπισχόμενος*] 'putting it to his lips'. The active *ἐπισχεῖν* is used of giving a draught to another.

καὶ ἡμῶν οἱ πολλοὶ τέως μὲν ἐπιεικῶς οἰοί τε ἦσαν κατέχειν τὸ μὴ  
 δακρύνειν, ὡς δὲ εἶδομεν πίνοντά τε καὶ πεπωκότα, οὐκέτι, ἀλλ' ἐμοῦ  
 γε βία καὶ αὐτοῦ ἀστακτὶ ἐχώρει τὰ δάκρυα, ὥστε ἐγκαλυψάμενος  
 ἀπέκλειον ἐμαυτὸν οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἐκεῖνόν γε, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐμαυτοῦ τύχην,  
 D οἷου ἀνδρὸς ἐταίρου ἐστερημένος εἶην. ὁ δὲ Κρίτων ἔτι πρότερος 5  
 ἐμοῦ, ἐπειδὴ οὐχ οἷός τ' ἦν κατέχειν τὰ δάκρυα, ἐξανέστη. Ἀπολ-  
 λόδωρος δὲ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ οὐδὲν ἐπαύετο δακρύνων, καὶ  
 δὴ καὶ τότε ἀναβρυχισάμενος κλαίων καὶ ἀγανακτῶν οὐδένα ὄντινα  
 οὐ κατέκλασε τῶν παρόντων, πλήν γε αὐτοῦ Σωκράτους. ἐκεῖνος  
 δέ, Οἶα, ἔφη, ποιεῖτε, ὦ θαυμάσιοι. ἐγὼ μέντοι οὐχ ἦκιστα τούτου 10  
 ἕνεκα τὰς γυναικας ἀπέπεμψα, ἵνα μὴ τοιαῦτα πλημμελοῖεν καὶ  
 E γὰρ ἀκήκοα, ὅτι ἐν εὐφημίᾳ χρῆ τελευτῶν. ἀλλ' ἡσυχίαν τε ἄγετε  
 καὶ καρτερεῖτε. καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀκούσαντες ἡσυχύνημέν τε καὶ ἐπέσχο-  
 μεν τοῦ δακρύνειν. ὁ δὲ περιελθὼν, ἐπειδὴ οἱ βαρύνεσθαι ἔφη τὰ  
 σκέλη, κατεκλίθη ὑπτίως· οὕτω γὰρ ἐκέλευεν ὁ ἀνθρωπος· καὶ ἅμα 15  
 ἐφαπτόμενος αὐτοῦ οὗτος ὁ δοῦς τὸ φάρμακον διαλιπὼν χρόνον  
 ἐπεσκόπει τοὺς πόδας καὶ τὰ σκέλη, κάπειτα σφόδρα πιέσας αὐτοῦ  
 τὸν πόδα ἤρετο, εἰ αἰσθάνοιτο· ὁ δ' οὐκ ἔφη· καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο αὐθις  
 118 τὰς κνήμας· καὶ ἐπανιῶν οὕτως ἡμῖν ἐπεδείκνυτο, ὅτι ψύχοιτό τε  
 καὶ πηγνύτο. καὶ αὐτὸς ἤπτετο καὶ εἶπεν ὅτι, ἐπειδὴν πρὸς τῇ 20  
 καρδίᾳ γένηται αὐτῷ, τότε οἰχῆσεται. ἤδη οὖν σχεδὸν τι αὐτοῦ ἦν

1. κατέχειν] 'we were able to re-  
 frain from tears'. This usage of κατέ-  
 χειν is rare: cf. Soph. *Oed. Tyr.* 781  
 κάγῳ βαρυνθεὶς τὴν μὲν οὔσαν ἡμέραν μόλις  
 κατέσχον. Below we have the common  
 use, κατέχειν τὰ δάκρυα.

2. ἀλλ' ἐμοῦ γε βία καὶ αὐτοῦ] 'but  
 in spite of myself my tears began to flow  
 in torrents'. COPE.

7. καὶ δὴ καὶ τότε ἀναβρυχισάμε-  
 νος] 'then above all bursting into loud  
 sobs, by his weeping and lamenting he  
 utterly broke down every one of the com-  
 pany, save Sokrates himself'. Hirschig  
 would omit κλαίων καὶ ἀγανακτῶν, Schanz  
 brackets κλαίων καί: but can any one  
 read the sentence without feeling that its  
 rhythm is hopelessly ruined by either of  
 these needless and mischievous omissions?  
 With κατέκλασε Heindorf compares the  
 Homeric κατεκλάσθη φίλον ἦτορ: and  
 Stallbaum quotes two passages of Plutarch,  
*Perikles* 37, *Demosth.* 22, where the word

is used as here. The old editions had  
 κατέκλασε: Stephanus conjectured κατέ-  
 κλασε, which was afterwards discovered  
 in certain mss.

12. ἀκήκοα ὅτι ἐν εὐφημίᾳ χρῆ τελευ-  
 τῶν] According to Olympiodoros it was  
 a Pythagorean precept.

15. οὕτω γὰρ ἐκέλευεν] i.e. ὑπτίως  
 κατακλιθῆναι.

16. οὗτος ὁ δοῦς τὸ φάρμακον] Schanz  
 brackets these words, but I think they  
 are justly defended and retained by  
 Heindorf.

20. πηγνύτο contracted from πηγνύοι-  
 το, cf. 77 B.

καὶ αὐτὸς ἤπτετο] Sokrates himself  
 did the same as the man. This seems  
 to be mentioned simply as evidence of his  
 perfect calmness. Forster proposes αὐθις,  
 supposing that the subject of ἤπτετο is  
 ὁ δοῦς τὸ φάρμακον, and Schanz reads  
 αὐ, presumably on the same hypothesis.  
 Neither alteration is to be commended.

τὰ περὶ τὸ ἦτρον ψυχόμενα, καὶ ἐκκαλυψάμενος, ἐνεκεκάλυπτο γάρ, εἶπεν, ὃ δὴ τελευταῖον ἐφθέγγετο, ὦ Κρίτων, ἔφη, τῷ Ἀσκληπιῷ ὀφείλομεν ἀλεκτρούνα· ἀλλὰ ἀπόδοτε καὶ μὴ ἀμελήσητε. Ἄλλὰ ταῦτα, ἔφη, ἔσται, ὁ Κρίτων· ἀλλ' ὅρα, εἴ τι ἄλλο λέγεις. ταῦτα  
 5 ἐρομένου αὐτοῦ οὐδὲν ἔτι ἀπεκρίνατο, ἀλλ' ὀλίγον χρόνον διαλιπὼν ἐκινήθη τε καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐξεκάλυψεν αὐτόν, καὶ ὃς τὰ ὄμματα ἔστησεν· ἰδὼν δὲ ὁ Κρίτων συνέλαβε τὸ στόμα καὶ τοὺς ὀφθαλμούς.

LXVII. Ἦδε ἡ τελευταίη, ᾧ Ἐχέκρατες, τοῦ ἐταίρου ἡμῶν ἐγένετο, ἀνδρός, ὡς ἡμεῖς φαίμεν ἄν, τῶν τότε ὧν ἐπειράθημεν ἀρίστου  
 10 καὶ ἄλλως φρονιμωτάτου καὶ δικαιοτάτου.

2. τῷ Ἀσκληπιῷ ὀφείλομεν ἀλεκτρούνα] It might have been supposed that the conception of life as a 'fitful fever' was familiar enough to spare us all the unprofitable ingenuity that has been expended on this passage. The last words of Sokrates are in perfect harmony with the whole tenor of his foregoing discourse. His soul is on the point of being liberated from the body and all its attendant infirmities and will presently be restored to her primal purity and health. Corporeal existence is in fact a morbid condition of the soul, for which death is the remedy; wherefore Sokrates vows to Asklepios the sacrifice customary on recovery from sickness. Prof. Geddes aptly quotes *Timon of Athens* v 1 'my long sickness of health and living now begins to mend'. So Olympiodoros: ἵνα τὰ νεοσηκότα τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν τῇ γενέσει ταῦτα ἐξιδόσῃται: he speaks too of an oracle which declares τὰς ψυχὰς ἀναγομένας τὸν παῖνα ἕδει.

6. ἐκινήθη: 'he stirred': probably some slight spasm or shudder at the moment of dissolution. ἐκινήθη is far too mild a word to signify convulsions, as some would have it.

8. ἦδε ἡ τελευταίη] The last three lines of the dialogue have been variously assailed by different critics on divers grounds. First Wytttenbach, offended by τότε, proposes τῶν πρόποτε. Heindorf would have πάντων, τότε ὡς ἐπειράθημεν. Schanz brackets ἄλλως. Hirschig is ac-

tually prepared to cancel all after ἐγένετο. I believe that every word stands exactly as Plato wrote it, and that not one could be altered or omitted without marring the sad music of this solemn close. Wytttenbach supports his τῶν πρόποτε from Plutarch, but the Platonic passages he quotes have γενομένων, ἀφικομένων &c, which makes all the difference. Moreover he introduces a tone of panegyric, which, though not perhaps exaggerated, is quite discordant with the subdued simplicity which is the chief charm of this wonderful scene, and with the studiously modest ὡς ἡμεῖς φαίμεν ἄν: this has been remarked by Prof. Geddes. τῶν τότε, as Stallbaum says, 'solemnis est formula in eiusmodi praeconiis', meaning 'of all his contemporaries'; and for the reference of τότε to a recent period he cites *Politicus* 263 E. But probably, as Grote suggests, Plato used the word rather from his own point of view at the time he wrote than from that of the supposed speaker. ἄλλως has reference not to τῶν τότε, as Heindorf thinks, but to ἀρίστου: 'in other respects' is practically equivalent to 'moreover', or 'besides': it merely serves to mark the transition from the vaguer to the more definite expressions of praise. Preserving the sentence intact I should translate: 'such was the end, O Echekrates, of our companion—a man, as we should say, among all then living whom we knew the noblest, ay and the wisest and most just'.



## APPENDIX I.

### δημοτικὴ καὶ πολιτικὴ ἀρετή.

To the student of Plato's ethics it is obviously important to determine exactly what is to be understood by the popular, as contrasted with the philosophic, ἀρετή, and should there prove to be more than one variety of the former, to distinguish between them. With a view to this, I propose to examine briefly Plato's principal statements on the subject. Besides the passages in the *Phaedo*, 68 D foll. and 82 A, the following extracts seem to me to contain a complete exposition of Plato's views.

i. *Republic* 554 C. ἄρ' οὖν οὐ τούτῳ δῆλον, ὅτι ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ξυμβολαίοις ὁ τοιοῦτος, ἐν οἷς εὐδοκιμεῖ δοκῶν δίκαιος εἶναι, ἐπεικεῖ τινὶ ἑαυτοῦ βίᾳ κατέχει ἄλλας κακὰς ἐπιθυμίας, οὐ πείθων ὅτι οὐκ ἄμεινον, οὐδ' ἡμερῶν λόγῳ, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη καὶ φόβῳ, περὶ τῆς ἄλλης οὐσίας τρέμων; Καὶ πάνν γ', ἔφη. Καὶ νῆ Δία, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ φίλε, τοῖς πολλοῖς γε αὐτῶν εὐρήσεις, ὅταν δέη τἀλλότρια ἀναλίσκειν, τὰς τοῦ κηφῆνος ξυγγενεῖς ἐνούσας ἐπιθυμίας. Καὶ μάλα, ἦ δ' ὅς, σφόδρα. Οὐκ ἄρ' ἂν εἴη ἀστασιαστος ὁ τοιοῦτος ἐν ἑαυτῷ, οὐδὲ εἰς, ἀλλὰ διπλοῦς τις, ἐπιθυμίας δὲ ἐπιθυμιῶν ὡς τὸ πολὺ κρατούσας ἂν ἔχοι βελτίους χειρόνων. Ἔστιν οὕτως. Διὰ ταῦτα δῆ, οἶμαι, εὐσχημονέστερος ἂν πολλῶν ὁ τοιοῦτος εἴη· ὁμοιοθητικῆς δὲ καὶ ἡρμοσμένης τῆς ψυχῆς ἀληθῆς ἀρετῆ πόρρω ποι ἐκφεύγοι ἂν αὐτόν.

ii. *Republic* 506 A. οἶμαι γοῦν, εἶπον, δικάϊά τε καὶ καλὰ ἀγνοούμενα, ὅπη ποτὲ ἀγαθὰ ἔστιν, οὐ πολλοῦ τινὸς ἄξιον φύλακα κεκτῆσθαι ἂν ἑαυτῶν τὸν τοῦτο ἀγνοοῦντα· μαντεύομαι δὲ μηδένα αὐτὰ πρότερον γνώσεσθαι ἱκανῶς.

iii. *Republic* 500 D. ἂν οὖν τις, εἶπον, αὐτῷ [sc. τῷ φιλοσόφῳ] ἀνάγκη γένηται ἂ ἐκεῖ ὄρα μελετῆσαι εἰς ἀνθρώπων ἦθη καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ τιθέναι καὶ μὴ μόνον ἑαυτὸν πλάττειν, ἄρα κακὸν δημιουργὸν αὐτὸν οἶε γενήσεσθαι σωφροσύνης τε καὶ δικαιοσύνης καὶ συμπάσης τῆς δημοτικῆς ἀρετῆς; Ἡκιστὰ γε, ἦ δ' ὅς. 501 A. ἔπειτα, οἶμαι, ἀπεργαζόμενοι πυκνὰ ἂν ἑκατέρωσ' ἀποβλέποιεν πρὸς τε τὸ φύσει δίκαιον καὶ καλὸν καὶ σῶφρον καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ πρὸς ἐκείνο αὖ, ὃ ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐμποιοῖεν, ξυμ-

μυγνύντες τε καὶ κεραυνύντες ἐκ τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων τὸ ἀνδρείκελον, ὃ δὴ καὶ Ὀμηρος ἐκάλεσεν ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐγγιγνόμενον θεοειδές τε καὶ θεοείκελον.

iv. *Latus* 710 A. ΚΑ. Σωφροσύνην μοι δοκεῖ φράζειν, ὦ Μέγилле, δεῖν εἶναι τὴν ξυνεπομένην ὁ ξένος· ἢ γάρ; ΑΘ. Τὴν δημῶδη γε, ὦ Κλεινία, καὶ οὐχ ἦν τις σεμνύνων ἂν λέγοι, ἀλλ' ὅπερ εὐθύς παισὶ καὶ θηρίοις, τοῖς μὲν ἀκρατῶς ἔχειν πρὸς τὰς ἡδονάς, ξύμφυτον ἐπανθεί, τοῖς δὲ ἐγκρατῶς· ὃ καὶ μονούμενον ἔφαμεν τῶν πολλῶν ἀγαθῶν οὐκ ἄξιον εἶναι λόγῳ.

v. *Meno* 99 E. εἰ δὲ νῦν ἡμεῖς ἐν παντὶ τῷ λόγῳ τούτῳ καλῶς ἐζητήσαμέν τε καὶ ἐλέγομεν, ἀρετὴ ἂν εἴη οὔτε φύσει οὔτε διδακτόν, ἀλλὰ θεία μοῖρα παραγιγνομένη ἄνευ νοῦ, οἷς ἂν παραγίγνηται, εἰ μὴ τις εἴη τοιοῦτος τῶν πολιτικῶν ἀνδρῶν, οἷος καὶ ἄλλον ποιῆσαι πολιτικόν. εἰ δὲ εἴη, σχεδὸν ἂν τι οὗτος λέγοιτο τοιοῦτος ἐν τοῖς ζώσιν, οἷον ἔφη Ὀμηρος ἐν τοῖς τεθνεώσι Τειρεσίαν εἶναι, λέγων περὶ αὐτοῦ ὅτι οἷος πέπνυται τῶν ἐν Αἴδου, αἱ δὲ σκιαὶ αἰσσοῦσι. ταῦτόν ἂν καὶ εὐθύς τοιοῦτος, ὥσπερ παρὰ σκιάς ἀληθῆς ἂν πρᾶγμα, εἴη πρὸς ἀρετήν.

vi. *Latus* 642 C. μόνοι γὰρ ἄνευ ἀνάγκης αὐτοφυῶς θεία μοῖρα ἀληθῶς καὶ οὐ τι πλαστῶς εἰσὶν ἀγαθοί.

vii. *Republic* 619 C. εἶναι δὲ αὐτὸν [sc. τὸν τὴν μεγίστην τυραννίδα ἐλόμενον] τῶν ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ἠκόντων, ἐν τεταγμένη πολιτείᾳ ἐν τῷ προτέρῳ βίῳ βεβιωκότα, ἔθει ἄνευ φιλοσοφίας ἀρετῆς μετεληφότα. ὡς δὲ καὶ εἰπεῖν, οὐκ ἐλάττους εἶναι ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀλίσκομένους τοὺς ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ἠκοντας, ἅτε πόνων ἀγυμνάστους.

viii. *Republic* 401 E. τῶν παραλειπομένων καὶ μὴ καλῶς δημιουργηθέντων ἢ μὴ καλῶς φύντων ὀξύτατ' ἂν αἰσθάνοιτο ὁ ἐκεῖ τραφεὶς ὡς ἔδει, καὶ ὀρθῶς δὴ χαίρων καὶ δυσχεραίνων<sup>1</sup> τὰ μὲν καλὰ ἐπαινοῖ καὶ καταδεχόμενος εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν τρέφειτ' ἂν ἀπ' αὐτῶν καὶ γίγνοιτο καλός τε κἀγαθός, τὰ δ' αἰσχροὰ ψέγοι τ' ἂν ὀρθῶς καὶ μισοῖ ἔτι νέος ὢν, πρὶν λόγον δυνατὸς εἶναι λαβεῖν, ἐλθόντος δὲ τοῦ λόγου ἀσπάζοιτ' ἂν αὐτὸν γνωρίζων δι' ὁμοίότητα μάλιστα ὁ οὔτῳ τραφεὶς.

Other passages might be quoted more or less bearing on the subject, e.g. *Republic* 409 A, 430 B, *Phaedrus* 256 E, *Protagoras* 355 C foll., but none, so far as I am aware, which throw any additional light upon it.

In the extract first quoted we have, it is clear, precisely the same conception of the vulgar sort of virtue as in *Phaedo* 68 D. Plato has been describing, in one of the most scathing passages he ever penned, the character of the ὀλιγαρχικὸς ἀνὴρ. Such a man sets lucre above all things, he scrapes and hoards and denies himself, subduing all other ap-

<sup>1</sup> I have followed the text of the Zürich editors.

petites beneath the master-passion of amassing wealth. And since such habits tend in the main to outward orderliness of conduct, he acquires the reputation of being a worthy respectable man. Yet he is filled with a swarm of 'drone lusts', which are commonly held down by the strong hand of avarice, but are suffered to riot unchecked, if this may be done at another's expense. And all this happens because he has paid no heed to his education. Here we have a perfect picture of a man δι' ἀκολασίαν σεσωφρονισμένος: in that he controls his sensual appetites he is so far σώφρων, but he controls them only because he is ἀκόλαστος in the indulgence of unbounded avarice. In ii again Plato insists upon the point which is so strongly emphasised in the *Phaedo*; that no real knowledge of things just and beautiful can exist which is not based on knowledge of the good. [ We see then in these passages that the δημοτικὴ ἀρετὴ is a morality formed by the mass of mankind for themselves on strictly utilitarian principles, by balancing pains and pleasures, and without knowledge of the good. We observe also that for this Plato has nothing but scorn and sarcasm: he would not indeed deny that a temperance which is the effect of intemperance is better than no temperance at all; but it is at best a base and sordid counterfeit of true virtue.]

But in iii we have quite a different picture. Here we see the philosopher himself, as prophet and teacher, creating the δημοτικὴ ἀρετὴ in the souls of his fellow men, by moulding their characters after the image of that justice and beauty whereof he beholds the eternal ideas. As the painter's glance passes to and fro between his model and his canvas, so is the gaze of the philosopher turned now to his ideal archetype, now to the human image of the divine that he is fashioning. Now it is evident that this virtue can no longer be a contemptible thing, since it is worth the philosopher's while to pause in his study of the truth, that he may implant it in the hearts of men: it is indeed the highest that the great mass of mankind can hope to attain, who live and die in the darkness of the cave. Again this is no longer an ethical code which the multitude frame for themselves; it is one which the philosopher frames for them: nor does he construct it on any utilitarian basis, but out of his knowledge of ideal truth. Yet as held by them it is still utilitarian, for they accept it on utilitarian grounds: they receive it, not because they know why it is good, for they are without knowledge of the good, but because the philosopher convinces them that it is for their advantage to do so; that by submitting to its restrictions they avoid great evils. As they hold it therefore, it is utilitarian; as he conceives it, not so; thus they are still, though in a far more refined sense, δι' ἀκολασίαν σεσωφρο-



μισμένοι. Plato acknowledges that the morality of the multitude must be utilitarian, since none other is attainable save by the highly trained metaphysician. Therefore, however superior the morality of those who obey this code may be to that of the oligarchical man, it is sundered from that of the philosopher by a fathomless gulf—it is ἀνευ φρονήσεως.

In the next three quotations Plato is speaking of an innate virtue, not springing from reason or any system, but from natural instinct. The most interesting and important of these passages is that from the *Meno*, which with its context gives a pretty full statement of Plato's view. This instinctive virtue is due to no effort of its possessor but to the dispensation of heaven; θεία μοίρα<sup>1</sup> παραγινομένη—a phrase which is explained in vi by αὐτοφυῶς<sup>2</sup>. Some men are so happily endowed by divine favour that without consciously striving after virtue they lead virtuous lives; they do right without knowing the difference between right and wrong. Now this natural virtue seems at first sight difficult to classify along with either form of δημοτικὴ ἀρετὴ before described. But a closer examination will show that, however much more attractive it may be, it does not in principle differ from the first. For we observe (1) that the virtue which these θεῖοι follow by the impulse of their own hearts is the ordinary utilitarian virtue, (2) they are just, temperate, &c, simply because these virtues are more natural and therefore more easy and pleasant to them than the opposite vices, not because they choose them as being better: their virtue, when analysed, is an amiable form of selfishness. Therefore they must, harsh as it seems, be classed with οἱ δι' ἀκολασίαν σεσωφρονισμένοι, and with the first variety, since their virtue is of themselves, not from the philosopher.

The whole discussion in the *Meno* brings out two points very clearly: (1) the fundamental difference between popular and philosophic ἀρετὴ is the same as that between true opinion and knowledge; (2) true opinion, where it is present, leads in the same path as knowledge: the ιδιώτης who has a true opinion about what is right will act in the same way as the φιλόσοφος who knows what is right<sup>3</sup>. Therefore the

<sup>1</sup> A careful investigation into the meaning of the phrase θεία μοίρα will be found in Zeller's *Philosophie der Griechen* II i p. 497 note (3rd ed.). See also Dr Thompson's note on *Gorgias* 506 E οὐχ οὕτως εἰκὴ κάλλιστα παραγιγνεται.

<sup>2</sup> This seems at first sight to conflict with the opposition of θεία μοίρα with φύσει in the *Meno*. But I think that while in the *Latos* Plato is contrasting the αὐτο-

φύης ἀρετὴ with that which is the result of ἐπιστήμη, in the *Meno* he merely notes that ἀρετὴ is no inbred attribute of human nature, but where it occurs without ἐπιστήμη, it is bestowed by special favour of the gods. Cf. 89 B.

<sup>3</sup> The ιδιώτης and the φιλόσοφος are aiming at precisely the same thing, viz. the good: only the φιλόσοφος seeks it as it really is, the ιδιώτης as it is adumbrated

popular virtue in its highest conceivable form leads to the same conduct as the philosophic virtue. The difference is that we can trust the latter and not the former: we cannot ensure that a man will always have right opinions; they may at any moment slip away from him like the statues of Daidalos. But the knowledge of the philosopher can never fail him: thence it is that he must come forward as the instructor of mankind; they must not be left to their good instincts, which may betray them, or to their utilitarian codes, which must lower them: they must accept a morality founded on the philosopher's sure and abiding knowledge of the good<sup>1</sup>.

In vii we have a slight distinction. Here is one who is virtuous by habit and convention. There is however no specific difference between him and the *θεῖοι* of the *Meno*: his conduct is equally influenced by unreflecting impulse, and we must conceive him as naturally well disposed. Plato notes however that this unthinking obedience to custom and tradition may lead to the most disastrous consequences, when a man is placed in a situation where custom and tradition are of no avail. How little value Plato set on this conventional virtue may be gathered from *Phaedo* 82 B, where those who have lived virtuously *ἐξ ἔθους τε καὶ μελέτης ἄνευ φιλοσοφίας τε καὶ νοῦ* pass at death into the form of some social and peaceable animal, bee, wasp or ant, or at best live again as decent and orderly citizens.

In viii we have the description of a child who is receiving a true education. He is to be surrounded from infancy with an atmosphere of the purest morality, *ὡσπερ αὔρα φέρουσα ἀπὸ χρηστῶν τόπων ὑγιείαν*, till he insensibly glides into harmony with fair reason; music is to sink into his soul, filling it with a love of concord and order: and thus being habituated to all that is noble and beautiful, while still too young to understand the reason why it is so, when in maturer years he at last attains knowledge of the reason, he welcomes it with joy, because all his previous training has fitted him to receive it. Thus we see that the *δημοτικὴ ἀρετὴ* in its highest form serves as a propaedeutic for *ἀρετὴ μετὰ φρονήσεως*. That is to the philosophic child but an early stage which to the unphilosophic many is their journey's end; the highest level their maturity attains is for his youth a starting-point to the knowledge of the good.

The result then of our investigation is this. While all *δημοτικὴ*

in his own mind: the demotic good is, as Plato says, the shadow of the philosophic.

<sup>1</sup> Thus we see the Platonic origin of Aristotle's conception of *ἀρετὴ ὠρισμένη*

*λόγῳ καὶ ὡς ἂν ὁ φρόνιμος ὀρίσειεν. Nic. Eth. II vi 15. Cf. Eud. Eth. III v 1232a 36.*

*ἀρετή* is radically distinguished from philosophical morality by the fact that it is *ἄνευ φρονήσεως*, we may I think discern two well-marked varieties of it, represented by extracts i and iii; regarding that of v vi and vii as not specifically distinct from i. The first is an ethical code formed (1) by the multitude for themselves, (2) on utilitarian principles, (3) without knowledge of the good; the second is (1) formed by the philosopher for the multitude, (2) not on utilitarian principles, (3) with knowledge of the good, but (4) accepted by the multitude on utilitarian principles and without knowledge of the good. The first Plato regards with unmixed contempt; the second he recognises as the best which the great majority of mankind can attain, and by it he hopes to supersede the other: nay, so much importance does he attach to this, that his philosophers must take it in turns to desist from their own meditations and give their minds to instructing their fellow citizens. We must beware of regarding these two varieties as two successive conceptions by Plato of the *δημοτικὴ ἀρετή*: they are two distinct kinds, of which one is utterly condemned, the other positively enforced upon the masses.

Finally it may be noted that the perfection of philosophic virtue is only to be found in the perfect philosopher in whom all knowledge and wisdom are consummated, *ὅς φιλοσοφίας ἐπ' ἄκρον ἀπάσης ἐλήλυθε*. Plato did not pretend that he or any one else had reached such knowledge; therefore he would admit that his moral code was necessarily incomplete and tentative. But this is only to say that no ethical system based on metaphysical research can be perfect until the object of that research has been fully attained; until, that is, absolute knowledge has been won. And though such knowledge may be unattainable, Plato has still consolation: if philosophy's advance in cognition of the truth be endless, endless also must be her progress in virtue.



## APPENDIX II.

THE ordinary interpretation of chapter xlviij represents Sokrates, after failing to unravel the secrets of nature by the methods of the physicists, as betaking himself to the contemplation of nature through the medium of λόγοι. This view has been set forth with such clearness and precision by Prof. Geddes that I cannot do better than give it in his words. 'Having failed in his *first* voyage, under the guidance of the physicists, Sokrates says that he set out by himself on a second voyage of discovery in search of a solid basis of Being, not by gazing on the outward world of matter, but by meditating on the inner world of thought'... 'Sokrates had stated that the study of the external world by the senses simply would not conduct to knowledge of causation, and that the effect of such study would be like looking at an eclipse of the sun with the naked eye; viz. dizziness under the dazzling maze of phenomena (cf. ἰλιγγιᾶ in 79 C, ταραττομαι in 100 D). Therefore, he goes on to say, as one uses a *medium* in looking at an eclipse, such as the reflection in water, or the like, so we must proceed regarding the external world, by studying phenomena through media or images, which images can be nothing else than οἱ λόγοι, *i. e.* principles or reasons intellectually apprehended. This simile however has the disadvantage of representing the intellectual world, as the shadow, and not the reality; and therefore Sokrates at once anticipates and corrects a misimpression that might arise from the use of such a simile. *Perhaps however the process I refer to (viz. τὸ ἐν λόγοις σκοπεῖν) is in a certain respect not parallel with that to which I compare it. For I do not at all admit that the man who looks at things in their principles sees things a whit more by images than one who looks at them in their external effects*<sup>1</sup>. "Although it is true," says Sokrates, "that those who look at the sun's reflection in water see a reflection and nothing more, I do not admit that those who study to obtain a knowledge of Being through

<sup>1</sup> The italics are Prof. Geddes's own.

the medium of the principles in the intellect (*οἱ λόγοι*) perceive mere reflections of things, and not realities. Therefore the simile I have used is simply an illustration indicating that transition in which I turned from the blinding spectacle of *τὰ ἔργα*, as studied by the physicists, to the less remote, but not less real, world of *οἱ λόγοι*, or the intellectual principles of things”.

Now the first remark I have to offer upon the above exposition is that the representation of *δεύτερος πλοῦς* as a ‘second voyage of discovery’ is not consistent with the perfectly correct explanation of that proverb given by Prof. Geddes himself a little earlier; ‘it signifies a “second resource in default of a better”, and is applied, not to what is *absolutely*, but to what is *relatively*, best’. Ast indeed denies this: but that such is the meaning is conclusively determined, not only by the origin of the proverb, but by its use in every one of the passages where it occurs. Sokrates means that having failed in the highest object of his endeavour he betakes himself to this method of *λόγοι* as the closest feasible approximation to it.

But what is this highest object, the *πρῶτος πλοῦς*? Certainly not the investigation of phenomena by means of physical science. On the study of phenomena Plato is perpetually heaping the most contumelious epithets, especially in the period to which the *Phaedo* belongs: even in the *Timæus*, great part of which is occupied with physical speculations, the most Plato will say for such pursuits is that they are a sober and harmless recreation in the intervals of more serious studies (59 c). Neither in matter nor in our opinions about it is there any certainty, stability or truth: matter therefore cannot be meant when Sokrates says *ἀπείρηκα τὰ ὄντα σκοπῶν*. It is true that he guards himself by the provision *οὐ γὰρ πάνυ ξεγχωρῶ κ.τ.λ.*, but this very fact is inconsistent with the theory that phenomena are the *ὄντα* which Sokrates failed to reach: the *λόγοι* must in some sense be *εἰκόνες* of something, else what is the point of the comparison? Apart from this, Sokrates has in the previous chapter given us two perfectly precise statements: (1) that he had actually tested and discredited the methods of the physicists, (2) that his hope was to discover *τὰ γὰθὸν καὶ δέον* as the ultimate *αἰτία*; in other words, to construct a teleological theory of the universe. This then is the ‘great and wondrous hope’, which the physicists could not gratify, and which he himself failed to fulfil; and this it is for which the method of *λόγοι* offers a substitute.

I conceive then that Prof. Geddes has fallen into error as to the nature of the *πρῶτος πλοῦς* by failing to keep a firm hold upon the meaning of *δεύτερος πλοῦς*: for I cannot imagine he would maintain

that Plato even for a moment could speak of the study of *λόγοι* as inferior to the study of phenomena. But I have another very grave objection to his interpretation. He speaks of the 'dazzling maze of phenomena', 'the blinding spectacle of τὰ ἔργα, as studied by the physicists'; and in his exposition the sun symbolises material particulars. But where shall we find such language in Plato? If we turn to a part of the *Republic* with which our present passage is intimately connected, we shall see something very different. In 508 c we read ὀφθαλμοὶ οἴσθ' ὅτι, ὅταν μηκέτ' ἐπ' ἐκείνά τις αὐτοὺς τρέπη ὧν ἂν τὰς χροὰς τὸ ἡμερινὸν φῶς ἐπέχη, ἀλλὰ ὧν νυκτερινὰ φέγγη, ἀμβλυώττουσί τε καὶ ἔγγυς φαίνονται τυφλῶν, ὥσπερ οὐκ ἐνούσης καθαρᾶς ὄψεως. καὶ μάλᾳ, ἔφη. ὅταν δέ γ', οἶμαι, ὧν ὁ ἥλιος καταλάμπη, σαφῶς ὄρωσι, καὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς τούτοις ὄμμασιν ἐνούσα φαίνεται. τί μὴν; οὕτω τοίνυν καὶ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ὧδε νόει' ὅταν μὲν οὖν καταλάμπει ἀλήθειά τε καὶ τὸ ὄν, εἰς τοῦτο ἀπερείσθαι, ἐνόησέ τε καὶ ἔγνω αὐτὸ καὶ νοῦν ἔχειν φαίνεται' ὅταν δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ τῷ σκότῳ κεκραμένον, τὸ γιγνόμενόν τε καὶ ἀπολλύμενον, δοξάζει τε καὶ ἀμβλυώττει ἄνω καὶ κάτω τὰς δόξας μεταβάλλον καὶ ἔοικεν αὐτὸν οὐκ ἔχοντι. Again if we turn to 516 A we find the very same metaphor: the sun moon and stars represent the ideas, and their reflections in water represent these very *λόγοι* with which we are dealing in the present passage. It is to me absolutely incredible that Plato should have inverted his metaphor, should have reversed the relation of thought and matter. Thought is always to him the region of truth and light, matter of dimness and uncertainty: and that he should even for a moment represent thought as a medium to temper the blinding glare of material existence is in my judgment unnatural and inconsistent with the whole tenor of his language on this subject. Prof. Geddes appeals to the use of ἰλιγγία and ταραττομαι, but Plato tells us (*Republic* 518 A) ὅτι διτταὶ καὶ ἀπὸ διττῶν γίγονται ἐπιταράξεις ὄμμασιν, ἕκ τε φωτὸς εἰς σκότος μεθισταμένων καὶ ἐκ σκότους εἰς φῶς. Moreover in the interpretation I am criticising *λόγοι* are used as helps to the contemplation of phenomena, whereas Plato always treats them as helps to the contemplation of the ideas.

The passage, as I read it, has the following significance. I attempted, says Sokrates, to discover τὸ ἀγαθόν as the ultimate cause working in nature. But when, after long endeavour, I failed in the struggle, I began to fear that by fixing my gaze too intently on realities I might be blinded in soul, as men are bereft of their bodily vision by gazing on the sun. So I bethought me of framing in my own mind images or concepts of those realities which I desired to study, and in them safely to examine the nature of their types. But though I admit these concepts



are but images of the realities, mind I don't allow that they are so in any greater degree than material phenomena: both in fact are images; but whereas phenomena are the images presented to us by our senses, concepts are the images deliberately formed by our understanding; concepts therefore are more real than phenomena in proportion as understanding is more sure than sense. Be that as it may, I did form these concepts and used them as a standard to estimate the truth or falsehood of particulars.

Sokrates in fact, since he despairs of actually grasping the eternal ideas, of which all natural phenomena are symbols, endeavours to form from those symbols, mental concepts or universals, which shall represent the ideas to him: they are the ideas as reflected in his intelligence. The verity of these concepts cannot be thoroughly ascertained, as the *Republic* tells us, until the ideas have been actually apprehended and compared with them: meanwhile they afford the best working hypothesis that can be obtained. No prospect of this verification is held out in the *Phaedo*; in the *Republic* however Plato speaks more hopefully.

This interpretation, as it appears to me, establishes the right relation between the *δευτέρος πλοῦς* and the *πρώτος πλοῦς*, gives to Plato's illustration its natural and customary significance, and brings the passage into complete harmony with the *Republic*. The objections which I conceive are most likely to be felt to it would no doubt be based upon the sentence *βλέπων πρὸς τὰ πράγματα κ.τ.λ.* The difficulty of the passage arises, I think, partly from the ambiguity of the term *τὰ ὄντα*, partly from a fusion of the symbol with the thing symbolised, and from a general lack of that precision of language which our familiarity with the sixth book of the *Republic* induces us to expect. But we must remember that Plato is not here professing to give a systematic exposition of his theory, such as we find in the *Republic*; we have only a general outline of the method which is copiously explained in the other dialogue. Accordingly Plato, while setting up an antithesis between realities and images, does not stop at this point to explain what realities are opposed to the images; hence the uncertainty attaching to *τὰ ὄντα*, which the physicists would refer to sensible, Plato to supersensual existences. The meaning he assigns to it is only parenthetically conveyed to us by his saving clause later on. My reference of *τὰ πράγματα* to the ideas I should defend by the use of *ἀντὰ τὰ πράγματα* in 66 E; and we are in no wise bound to assign the same meaning to *πράγματα* and to *ἔργοις*. The words *ἐκάστη τῶν αἰσθήσεων* are, I consider, to be regarded as purely metaphorical. In the passage *ἴσως μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ.*, Plato seems to betray

a consciousness that the absence of precision in his previous statement is likely to lead to misconceptions: he therefore inserts a parenthesis warning us against supposing that the realities of which he speaks are particulars; these, he says, are *εἰκόνες* just as much as the *λόγοι*. But he does not dwell on this point; and his immediate resumption of his narrative with *ἀλλ' οὖν δή*, 'be that as it may', shows that it is not his present purpose to emphasise it.

The views of other editors agree in the main with that of Prof. Geddes, but show some minor points of difference. Fischer, followed by Stallbaum, regards both *λόγοι* and *ἔργα* as *εἰκόνες*, and translates *ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις* 'ex effectis alicuius rei'. Ast and H. Schmidt understanding *ἔργοις* of material objects, deny that *λόγοι* are *εἰκόνες*: and the former expressly, the latter by implication, denies that *δεύτερος πλοῦς* signifies an inferior method. I think the two latter are right about *ἔργοις*, but in respect of the *λόγοι* and the *δεύτερος πλοῦς* Fischer and Stallbaum are unquestionably nearer the truth. But all these views are in my judgment radically vitiated by failure to recognise that a theory of final causes is that which Sokrates had hitherto vainly attempted to reach by apprehension of the ultimate *αἰτία* itself, and to which he now hoped to make an approximation by the aid of his logical method.

The foregoing exposition assumes the genuineness of every word in the passage. Mr Jackson however has suggested to me that one sentence is open to grave suspicion of interpolation. The whole trouble arises from the words *βλέπων πρὸς τὰ πράγματα τοῖς ὄμμασι καὶ ἐκάστη τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἐπιχειρῶν ἄπτεσθαι αὐτῶν*. Had these words been absent, there would not, I think, have been two opinions as to the interpretation of the passage, which would then run thus. 'Exhausted by the effort to grasp realities', says Sokrates, 'I felt I must beware lest I suffered the fate of those who observe an eclipse of the sun directly and are blinded for their pains. I feared my soul might be blinded by direct vision of the truth: and so I thought it prudent to content myself with the consideration of *λόγοι*, which are the reflections of the truth in my thoughts. Yet for all that, these thought-images are just as real as the material images of nature: so I am in at least as good a position as the physicist who occupies himself with the symbols of sense'. Nothing can be more plain and simple than the sense thus obtained. Now if we examine the obnoxious sentence, we shall see that it is in itself confused and inaccurate. After *τὴν ψυχὴν τυφλωθείην*, which gives us the thing symbolised, we have a sudden and perplexing transition to the symbol in *βλέπων πρὸς τὰ πράγματα τοῖς ὄμμασι*: the mind's eye and the body's eye are jumbled most incoherently together; for the depri-

vation of mental vision is given as the result of action on the part of the bodily organ. And in the next breath we have *ἐκάστη τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἐπιχειρῶν ἄπτεσθαι αὐτῶν*, which is not even germane to the metaphor. Surely these are two serious defects. And since we find that the very sentence which hampers the interpretation of the entire passage is in itself, quite apart from the general context, open to damaging criticism, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that the whole clause from *βλέπων* to *αὐτῶν* is from the hand of the same hazy-minded interpolator who has on some other occasions foisted his own ineptitudes upon Plato. The sentence is precisely what we should expect him to introduce, imagining (as he was quite certain to do) that the *πρῶτος πλοῦς* was the observation of particulars<sup>1</sup>.

But although I think there are strong reasons for supposing these words to be spurious, I do not in the least rest my interpretation of the chapter on their rejection. The omission renders the passage a much better piece of exposition; but in any case it seems clear to me that the meaning is the same. On this ground I have refrained from bracketing the words in question, since I do not wish it to appear as if my explanation in any degree depended upon expunging them.

<sup>1</sup> It is possible that the bracket ought to begin with *ἔδεια*. The words *μη̄ παντάπασι τὴν ψυχὴν τυφλωθεῖην* are not indeed open to the objections which apply to the following, but they are not necessary since the same meaning is conveyed in *μη̄ πάθοιμι κ.τ.λ.* Our interpolator may have borrowed from 96 C *ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς σκέψεως οὕτω σφόδρα ἐτυφλώθη*, where, it

may be noted, the blindness is not said to arise from excess of light. The omission of these words gives a satisfactory sentence: *τοιούτων τι καὶ ἐγὼ διανοήθη, καὶ ἔδοξε δὴ μοι χρῆναι*. I do not feel however that the clause *ἔδεια...τυφλωθεῖην* is at all on the same footing as the concluding words of the sentence.



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